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dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-16T16:49:44Z
dc.date.available2014-07-16T16:49:44Z
dc.date.issued2014-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/10925
dc.publisherUniversité de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.fr
dc.subjectGeneral allocation problems
dc.subjectExternalities
dc.subjectStrategy-proofness
dc.subjectGamma-core
dc.titleStrategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisitedfr
dc.typeArticlefr
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques
dcterms.abstractWe consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.fr
dcterms.isPartOfurn:ISSN:0709-9231
dcterms.languageengfr
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion publiée / Version of Record
oaire.citationTitleCahier de recherche
oaire.citationIssue2014-02


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