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Papyrus : Université de Montréal Digital Institutional Repository - Browsing by Author "SPRUMONT, Yves"

Digital Institutional Repository

Papyrus : Université de Montréal Digital Institutional Repository - Browsing by Author "SPRUMONT, Yves"

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  • SPRUMONT, Yves (1997)
    Assuming at least three individuals and some regularity conditions, we construct a set S* of Pareto surfaces which is an ordinal basis of the set S of all surfaces: every surface in S is ordinally equivalent to some surface ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (2004)
    We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2009-12)
    We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (1999)
    We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves; SUZUMURA, Kotaro (2002)
    Consistency of a binary relation requires any preference cycle to involve indifference only. As shown by Suzumura (1976b), consistency is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering extension of a relation. ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (2011-12)
    A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (1997)
    In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves (2000)
    We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves (2002)
    We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives ...
  • MANIQUET, François; SPRUMONT, Yves (1998)
    In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves (2013-01)
    A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves; MOULIN, Hervé (2005)
    We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost ...
  • MANIQUET, François; SPRUMONT, Yves (2002)
    We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; ASHEIM, Geir B.; SPRUMONT, Yves; SUZUMURA, Kotaro (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2006)
    We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves; SUZUMURA, Kotaro (2002)
    We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary do-mains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (2004)
    A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze ...
  • BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves (2001)
    We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (1999)
    We characterize Paretian quasi-orders in the two-agent continuous case.
  • SPRUMONT, Yves; SUZUMURA, Kotaro (2001)
    The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or ...
  • SPRUMONT, Yves (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2009-02)
    We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ...

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