Papyrus : Digital Institutional Repository


Dessin du pavillon Roger Gaudry/Sketch of Roger Gaudry Building

Papyrus : Université de Montréal Digital Institutional Repository - Browsing by Author "EHLERS, Lars"

Digital Institutional Repository

Papyrus : Université de Montréal Digital Institutional Repository - Browsing by Author "EHLERS, Lars"

Sort by: Order: Results:

  • EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2009-12)
    In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each ...
  • Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars (2013-11)
    We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; STORCKEN, Ton (2002)
    In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a ...
  • ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar (2010-10-20)
    A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; WEYMARK, John A. (2001)
    A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate ...
  • EHLERS, Lars (2005)
    Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina (2005)
    In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina (2003)
    We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not ...
  • DUTTA, Bhaskar; EHLERS, Lars; KAR, Anirban (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2008-04)
    We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; BARBERÀ, Salvador (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2007-03)
  • EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina (2013-07)
    We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, ...
  • EHLERS, Lars (2003)
    We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced ...
  • EHLERS, Lars (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2009-03)
    This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; MASSÓ, Jordi (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, 2007-02-01)
    We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent ...
  • ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar (2012-04)
    We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under ...
  • EHLERS, Lars (2001)
    We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes ...
  • Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina (2014-12)
    We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are ...
  • EHLERS, Lars; STORCKEN, Ton (Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques, 2007)
    In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives ...
  • EHLERS, Lars (2001)
    Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.
  • EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina (2001)
    We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of ...

Language

My Account

Browse

Search Papyrus


Les bibliothèques/UdeM