

Université de Montréal

**Alliance Politics in Hybrid Regimes:
Political Stability and Instability since World War II**

par Jean-François Gagné

Département de science politique, Faculté des arts et des sciences

Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph.D.
en science politique

août 2012

© Jean-François Gagné, 2012

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales

Cette thèse intitulée :

Alliance Politics in Hybrid Regimes:
Political Stability and Instability since World War II

Présentée par :
Jean-François Gagné

A été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

Magdalena Dembinska
présidente-rapporteuse

Diane Éthier
directrice de recherche

Graciela Ducatenzeiler
membre du jury

Leonardo Morlino
examineur externe

Pierre Bonnechere
représentant du doyen

Remerciements

Je tiens à remercier en premier lieu ma directrice de thèse Diane Éthier qui, pendant les cinq dernières années, a vu grandir ce formidable projet. Ses conseils judicieux et sa confiance à toute épreuve en mes recherches ont été une source d'inspiration et de motivation exceptionnelle. En raison de sa rigueur, sa générosité, sa curiosité et son ouverture intellectuelle, sa contribution à l'avancement de mes travaux a été inestimable. Diane, je vous en serai éternellement reconnaissant.

Je voudrais également remercier la professeure Graciela Ducatenzeiler et les étudiants et étudiantes du séminaire de synthèse en politique comparée, ceux et celles du séminaire sur les théories et les processus de démocratisation donné par la professeure Diane Éthier et enfin le professeur Richard Nadeau de même que les étudiants et étudiantes de son séminaire de thèse. Dans le contexte de ces trois séminaires, j'ai pu échanger sur de nombreuses thématiques liées à ma thèse et présenter l'évolution de ma réflexion.

Je souhaite particulièrement remercier ma mère, Diane Vermette, qui grâce à ses nombreux voyages à l'étranger et ses expériences professionnelles à travers le monde a su jeter un regard réaliste, critique et perspicace sur mes travaux.

Plus largement, ma famille et mes amis ont été une source inépuisable d'encouragement, de soutien affectif et d'appui moral. Je pense à Diane Vermette, Pierre Gagné, Louis-Philippe Gagné, Monique Renaud-Gagné, Réal Lalande, Raphaël Gagné, Justin Laramée, Christine Bérubé, Olivier Sirois, Mélanie Cambrezy, Olivier Schmitt, et à tous les autres. Merci!

Mes remerciements vont aussi à mes collègues du bureau des doctorants du département de science politique. Au cours des années, il y a eu roulement; mais les irréductibles Maxime Boucher, Julien Morency-Laflamme et Nordin Lazreg sont restés.

Je souhaite enfin remercier les organismes suivants pour leur soutien financier : le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSH), la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales de l'Université de Montréal et le Département de science politique de l'Université de Montréal.

Enfin, je remercie les patients relecteurs de ce travail : Diane Vermette et Willy Blomme.

Résumé

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l'instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l'autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s'articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c'est-à-dire, l'alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L'inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l'affrontement et l'instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l'État sur le territoire et dans l'économie. La première variable permet d'identifier quel groupe social au sein de l'État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d'opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d'identifier quel groupe social au sein de l'État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L'apport de la recherche est d'approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l'accent sur l'identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d'appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l'État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l'instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d'illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d'exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L'une sans l'autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forment les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides.

Mots-clés : régime hybride, stabilité politique, instabilité politique, coalition dirigeante, militaires, partis d'opposition, fonctionnaires, chefs locaux, violence organisée extra-légale, pénétration de l'État.

Abstract

The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.

Key words: hybrid regime, political stability, political instability, ruling coalition, military officers, opposition parties, bureaucrats, local leaders, extra-legal organized violence, state penetration.

Table of Contents

Remerciements	iii
Résumé	v
Abstract.....	vi
Table of Contents	vii
List of Tables	xi
List of Figures.....	xii
List of Abbreviations	xiii

Introduction.....	1
--------------------------	----------

Chapter 1 – What We Know and What We Do Not Know about Hybrid

Regime Stability	16
1.1. Political Regimes: Concepts and Typologies	17
1.1.1. Democratic and Autocratic Regimes	18
1.1.2. Types of Hybrid Regimes	21
1.1.3. Typologies of Hybrid Regimes.....	24
1.2. Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability	33
1.2.1. The Economic Approach	35
1.2.2. The Organizational Approach.....	38
1.3. A Critical Assessment.....	43
1.3.1. Electoral and Party Systems.....	45
1.3.2. Economic Development.....	51
1.3.3. Legitimacy	56
1.3.4. A Definition of Hybrid Regime Stability.....	62

Chapter 2 – Explaining Stability and Instability in Dominant-Party Hybrid Regimes.....	70
2.1. A General Framework: Neo-Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.....	72
2.1.1. Neo-Institutionalism in Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability.....	72
2.1.2. Historical Institutionalism and Hybrid Regime Stability.....	75
2.2. A Theory of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes.....	79
2.2.1. The Ruling Coalition.....	79
2.2.2. Dominant Social Groups.....	84
2.2.2.1. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence.....	86
2.2.2.2. The Degree of State Penetration.....	94
2.3. The Methodological Choices.....	107
2.3.1. Types of Data, Sample Size and Empirical Recording.....	107
2.3.2. Case Selection.....	109
Chapter 3 – Malaysia.....	116
3.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1957-2010).....	117
3.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence.....	129
3.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies.....	129
3.2.2. Types of Regimes.....	132
3.3. The Degree of State Penetration.....	140
3.3.1. The Administrative Extension.....	140
3.3.2. The Economic Extension.....	142

Chapter 4 – Indonesia	149
4.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-1998).....	150
4.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence	161
4.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies.....	161
4.2.2. Types of Regimes	168
4.3. The Degree of State Penetration	175
4.3.1. The Administrative Extension	175
4.3.2. The Economic Extension	177
Chapter 5 – Senegal	185
5.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1960-2010).....	186
5.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence	193
5.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies.....	195
5.2.2. Types of Regimes	199
5.3. The Degree of State Penetration	207
5.3.1. The Administrative Extension	207
5.3.2. The Economic Extension	209
Chapter 6 – Paraguay	219
6.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-2008).....	220

6.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence	229
6.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies.....	231
6.2.2. Types of Regimes	234
6.3. The Degree of State Penetration	242
6.3.1. The Administrative Extension	243
6.3.2. The Economic Extension	244
Conclusion	253
Bibliography	272
Appendixes.....	xx
1. List of Hybrid Regimes (1972-2010).....	xx
2. Synthesis of the Literature on Hybrid Regime Stability.....	xxi
3. Definitions of Types of Hybrid Regimes.....	xxii
4. Hybrid Regimes and Underdevelopment.....	xxvii

List of Tables

I	Typologies of Hybrid Regimes	27
II	Electoral Results in Malaysia (Legislative)	137
III	Malaysian State Investment in the Economy	143
IV	Malaysia Socio-Economic Modernization.....	144
V	Electoral Results in Indonesia (Legislative)	171
VI	Indonesia Socio-Economic Modernization.....	179
VII	Indonesian State Investment in the Economy	180
VIII	Electoral Results in Senegal (Legislative and Executive)	202
IX	Senegalese State Investment in the Economy	210
X	Senegal Socio-Economic Modernization.....	212
XI	Electoral Results in Paraguay (Legislative and Executive)	237
XII	Paraguayan State Investment in the Economy	245
XIII	Paraguay Socio-Economic Modernization.....	246
XIV	State Investment in the Economy (% of Gross Investment).....	257
XV	Frequency and Intensity of Political Crises and Duration of the Longest Period of Stability	261

List of Figures

1.	Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes.....	7
2.	Classification of Political Regimes.....	29
3.	Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes.....	85
4.	Natural Resources Rent in Malaysia.....	145
5.	Malaysia Timeline	147
6.	Natural Resources Rent in Indonesia.....	178
7.	Indonesia Timeline.....	183
8.	Natural Resources Rent in Senegal.....	209
9.	Senegal Timeline	217
10.	Natural Resources Rent in Paraguay.....	245
11.	Paraguay Timeline	251
12.	Trends in Extra-Legal Organized Violence and State Penetration	264

List of Abbreviations

ABIM	<u>Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia</u> or Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement
ABRI	<u>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</u> or Indonesian National Armed Forces
ADS	<u>Alliance démocratique sénégalaise</u>
AFP	<u>Alliance des forces du progrès</u> (Senegal)
AJ/PADS	<u>And-Jëf/Parti africain pour la démocratie et le socialisme</u> (Senegal)
AL	Alliance
AMCJA	All Malaya Council of Joint Action
APC	<u>Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio</u> or Patriotic Alliance for Change (Paraguay)
APSA	American Political Science Association
APU	<u>Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah</u> (Malaysia)
ARP	<u>Asociación Rural del Paraguay</u>
BAIS	<u>Badan Intelijen Strategis</u> or Body for Strategic Intelligence (Indonesia)
BAPERKI	<u>Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia</u> or Citizenship Consultative Council
BERJAYA	<u>Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah</u> or Sabah People's United Front
BMS	<u>Bloc des masses sénégalaises</u>
BN	<u>Barisan Nasional</u> or National Front (Malaysia)
BSD	<u>Banque sénégalaise de développement</u>
CENA	Commission électorale nationale autonome (Senegal)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDES	Centre for Information and Development Studies (Indonesia)
CNT	<u>Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores</u> (Paraguay)
CNTS	<u>Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal</u>
COGERAF	Compagnie générale d'études et recherches pour l'Afrique (Senegal)
CONAPA	<u>Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agrícolas</u> or National Coordinating Committee for Small Farmers (Paraguay)

CONCODER	<u>Consejo Nacional de Coordinación para el Desarrollo Rural</u> or Institute for Rural Development in partnership with the Coordination for Rural Development (Paraguay)
COSAPAD	Comité de soutien à l'action du Président Abdou Diouf (Senegal)
PC	<u>Partido Colorado</u> or Colorado Party (Paraguay)
CPT	Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores (Paraguay)
CRAD	Centre régionaux d'assistance au développement (Senegal)
CSIS	Centre of Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)
DAP	Democratic Action Party (Malaysia)
DAU	Development Administrative Unit (Malaysia)
DPR	<u>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</u> or People's Representative Council (Indonesia)
EA	Electoral Authoritarianism
EBR	Eastern Border Region (Paraguay)
EPM	Enlarged Presidential Majority (Senegal)
FEPRINCO	<u>Federación de la Producción, la Industria y el Comercio</u> or Federation of Production, Industry and Commerce (Paraguay)
FNS	Front national sénégalais
FRELIMO	<u>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</u> or Liberation Front of Mozambique
FULNA	<u>Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional</u> or United National Liberation Front (Paraguay)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GERAKAN	<u>Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia</u> or Malaysian People's Movement
GOLKAR	<u>Golongan Karya</u> or Functional Groups (Indonesia)
GPPS	<u>Gerakan Pembela Pancasila</u> or Movement to Defend the Pancasila (Indonesia)
GRESEN	<u>Groupe de rencontres et d'échanges pour un Sénégal nouveau</u>
ICMI	<u>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</u> or Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMP	Independence of Malaya Party
IPF	Indian Progressive Front (Malaysia)

IPKI	<u>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</u> or League for the Upholding of Indonesia Independence
ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung (Indonesia)
KEMAS	<u>Jabatan Kemajuan Masyarakat</u> or Ministry of Rural and Regional Development (Malaysia)
KNIP	<u>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</u> or Central Indonesian National Committee
KPB	Konsortium Perkapalan Bhd (Malaysia)
LD/MPT	Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail (Senegal)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Malaysia)
MASYUMI	<u>Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</u> or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims
MAMPU	Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Manpower Planning Unit
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MCP	<u>Movimento Campesino Paraguayo</u> or Paraguayan Peasant Movement
MFDC	<u>Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance</u>
MIC	Malaysian Indian Congress
MIT	<u>Movimiento Intersindical de Trabajadores</u> or InterUnion Workers Movement (Paraguay)
MNLA	Malayan National Liberation Army
MOPOCO	<u>Movimiento Popular Colorado</u> or Popular Movement Colorado (Paraguay)
MPQ	Movimiento Patria Querida (Paraguay)
MPR	<u>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</u> or People's Consultative Assembly (Indonesia)
MPT	<u>Movimiento Popular Tekojoja</u> or Popular Movement Tekojoja (Paraguay)
NDP	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NU	<u>Nahdlatul Ulama</u> or Renaissance of Islamic Scholars (Indonesia)
OCA	Office de commercialisation agricole (Senegal)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

ONAC	<u>Organización Nacional Campesina</u> or National Peasant Organization (Paraguay)
ONCAD	Office national de cooperation et d'assistance au développement (Senegal)
OPM	Organización Político Militar (Paraguay)
PAI	Parti africain pour l'indépendance (Senegal)
PAP	People's Action Party (Malaysia)
PARKINDO	<u>Partai Kristen Indonesia</u> or Indonesian Christian Party
PARMUSI	<u>Partai Muslimin Indonesia</u> or Indonesian Muslim Party
PAS	<u>Parti Islam SeMalaysia</u> or Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
PB	<u>Partido Blanco</u> or National Christian Union (Paraguay)
PBB	<u>Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu</u> or United Traditional Bumiputera Party (Malaysia)
PBRSS	<u>Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah</u> or United Sabah People's Party (Malaysia)
PBS	<u>Parti Bersatu Sabah</u> or Sabah United Party (Malaysia)
PC	<u>Partido Colorado</u> or Colorado Party (Paraguay)
PCP	<u>Partido Comunista Paraguayo</u> or Paraguayan Communist Party (Paraguay)
PDC	Christian Democratic Party (Paraguay)
PDI	<u>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</u> or Indonesian Democratic Party (Indonesia)
PDS	<u>Parti démocratique sénégalais</u>
PEKEMAS	<u>Parti Keadilan Masyarat Malaysia</u> or Social Justice Party of Malaysia
PEN	<u>Partido Encuentro Nacional</u> or National Encounter Party (Paraguay)
PERTI	<u>Persatuan Terbijah Islamijah</u> or Islamic Education Party (Indonesia)
PESAKA	<u>Parti Pesaka Sarawak</u>
PETA	<u>Pembela Tanah Air</u> or Defenders of the Homeland (Indonesia)
PIR	<u>Persatuan Indonesia Raja</u> or Greater Indonesian Union
PIT	Parti de l'indépendance et du travail (Senegal)
PKI	<u>Partai Komunis Indonesia</u> or Indonesian Communist Party (Indonesia)
PKR	<u>Parti Keadilan Rakyat</u> or People's Justice Party (Malaysia)
PL	<u>Partido Liberal</u> or Liberal Party (Paraguay)
PLR	<u>Partido Liberal Radical</u> or Radical Liberal Party (Paraguay)

PLRA	<u>Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico</u> or Authentic Radical Liberal Party (Paraguay)
PN	<u>Parti Negara</u> (Malaysia)
PNI	<u>Partai Nasional Indonesia</u> or Indonesian National Party
PPB	<u>Parti Pesaka Bumiputra</u> or United Traditional Bumiputera Party (Malaysia)
PPP	<u>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</u> or United Development Party (Indonesia)
PPP	People's Progressive Party (Malaysia)
PPPRI	<u>Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia</u> or Police Employees' Association of Indonesia
PPQ	<u>Patria Querida</u> or Beloved Fatherland Movement (Paraguay)
PPS	<u>Partido País Solidario</u> or Party of a United Country (Paraguay)
PR	<u>Parti Rakyat</u> or People's Party (Malaysia)
PRA	Parti du regroupement africain (Senegal)
PRF	<u>Partido Revolucionario Febrerista</u> or Revolutionary Febrerista Party (Paraguay)
PRI	<u>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</u> or Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)
PRI	<u>Partai Rakyat Indonesia</u> or Indonesia People's Party
PRM	<u>Parti Rakyat Malaysia</u> or Malaysian People's Party
PRN	<u>Partai Rakyat National</u> or National People's Party
PRRI	<u>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</u> or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PRS	<u>Parti Rakyat Sarawak</u> or Sarawak Peoples' Party (Malaysia)
PS	Parti socialiste (Senegal)
PSI	<u>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</u> or Socialist Party of Indonesia
PSII	<u>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia</u> or Islamic Association Party of Indonesia
PSRM	<u>Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia</u> or Malaysian Socialist People's Party
PSS	<u>Parti de la solidarité sénégalaise</u>
PUTERA	<u>Pusat Tenaga Rakyat</u> (Malaysia)
RND	<u>Rassemblement national démocratique</u> (Senegal)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programs

SES	<u>Syndicat des enseignants du Sénégal</u>
SF	Socialist Front (Malaysia)
SNAP	Sarawak National Party (Malaysia)
SONACOS	<u>Société nationale de commercialisation des oléagineux du Sénégal</u>
SONAR	<u>Société nationale d'approvisionnement du monde rural</u> (Senegal)
SPDP	Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (Malaysia)
SPP	Paraguayan Journalist's Association
SPP	Sarawak People's Party (Malaysia)
SUPP	Sarawak United People's Party (Malaysia)
UDES	<u>Union démocratique des étudiants sénégalais</u>
UDP	United Democratic Party (Malaysia)
UDP	United Development Party (Indonesia)
UDS	<u>Union démocratique sénégalaise</u>
UED	Union des étudiants de Dakar (Senegal)
UIP	<u>Unión Industrial Paraguaya</u> or Paraguayan Industrial Union
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation (Malaysia)
UNACE	<u>Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos</u> or National Union of Ethical Citizens (Paraguay)
UNSAS	<u>Union nationale des syndicats autonomes du Sénégal</u>
UNTS	<u>Union nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal</u>
UPKO	<u>United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusum Murut Organisation</u> (Malaysia)
UPRONA	<u>Union pour le progrès national</u> (Burundi)
UPS	<u>Union progressiste sénégalaise</u>
URD	Union pour le renouveau démocratique (Senegal)
USNO	United Sabah National Organization (Malaysia)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	World War II

Introduction

In Roman mythology, Janus is the God of transition with a double-faced head looking in opposite directions: one facing the past, the other facing the future. He is the Almighty sitting at the juncture of two antagonistic worlds: primitive and civilized, war-torn and peaceful. In a way, Janus is emblematic of hybrid regimes. They stand in a paradoxical state between outright dictatorship and full-fledged democracy. They navigate a vast gray zone of institutional ambiguities. This is the subject of our thesis.

Why study hybrid regimes? Why should they attract our attention? Well, the magnitude of the phenomenon should convince us. In 2010, there were 53 hybrid regimes in the world (see appendix 1). Taken together, they regulate the life of roughly 1.4 billion people or 20% of the world population. They are present on every continent: from Latin America to Eurasia, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The states that they govern are by no means marginal. They are global economic hubs such as Singapore; major oil producers such as Venezuela, Kuwait and Nigeria; nuclear super-powers such as Pakistan; regional pivotal states such as Mexico, Turkey and Malaysia; and conflict-ridden countries such as Lebanon and Uganda¹. Turning a blind eye to this reality is simply unacceptable from a scholarly and policy-making point of view.

Why should we be interested in hybrid regime stability *per se*? After all, as Tocqueville (1835: 289) asserted long ago, “the form of government that is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me a mere chimera... When a community actually has a mixed government – that is to say, when it is equally divided between adverse principles – it must either experience a revolution or fall into anarchy”. Indeed, conventional wisdom suggests: “the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington, 1991: 137). According to classic theories of political development, only established autocracies or consolidated democracies are worthy candidates for stability. Logically, this makes sense. Hybrid regimes afflicted by the schizophrenic pull of

¹ Freedom House classified all these countries as partly free (hybrid) in 2010.

institutions heading in opposition directions are bound to be unstable and in principle, their embedded contradictions can generate dysfunctional polities. As a consequence, they have been perceived as purely transitional and ephemeral in nature. To be sure, hybrid regimes are more likely to experience instability than autocratic or democratic regimes (Epstein et al., 2006: 566). Nonetheless, from 1972 to 2010, 66 hybrid regimes have lasted at least 10 years; and 22 endured more than 20 years (see appendix 1). Thus, not all hybrid regimes are unstable. Why is it so? Clearly, there is enough unexplained variation to warrant the effort of reflecting on a genuine theory of hybrid regime stability.

Questions about the standard dichotomous paradigm autocracy/democracy emerged at the end of the Cold War. For one, foreign policy circles were no longer exclusively concerned with traditional security imperatives. Democratic promotion initiatives were making their way on to the agendas of western powers (Carothers, 2007: 112-113). In the process, however, practitioners soon realized the limits of existing frameworks. In most cases, what they were experiencing on the ground could not fit in the democratic or dictatorship box. For two, in retrospective, the hope driving the so-called third wave of democratization that began in the 1970s never materialized. In spite of the initial euphoria, this wave did not bring about electoral democracy in developing countries: that is to say, in short, a regime with frequent, fair, free and competitive elections. Among the 85 regimes that initiated a transition from either autocracy or some form of authoritarianism, only 30 became stable democracies (Geddes, 1999a: 115-116). Instead, it led to a proliferation of hybrid regimes: “authoritarian forms of multiparty electoral competition have increased during the third wave much more rapidly than democratic ones” (Diamond, 2002: 27). As a result, scholars were convinced that new analytical tools were needed. A research program was born.

In historicizing the literature on hybrid regimes, five successive objectives come to light: concept formation, typology construction, causes of emergence, conditions of stability; and finally transition from hybridity. They form a logical sequence of scientific inquiry.

Our thesis focuses on conditions of stability; yet, clarifications about definitions are necessary before addressing the object of our investigation. This is why we will examine definitions of

hybrid regimes in the literature review. In doing so, it will become evident that there are already sufficient authoritative contributions on concept formation and typology construction to provide a solid base for thinking about the next step. As to the causes of emergence and transition from hybridity, examining those at length would lead to an unnecessary digression from our exposé. We will therefore limit ourselves to the following quick overview; it should, we believe, reinforce the relevance of focusing on the conditions of stability.

From our standpoint, and as far as an exercise of generalization can go, existing explanations about the causes of emergence are persuasive enough. Above all, they stress the importance of international and regional context, past regimes and modes of transition. Multiple hypotheses have been formulated along those axes: for instance, hybrid regimes emerge through an interacting process between external democratic and internal autocratic forces, between past autocratic and new democratic institutions, between a democratic civil society and autocratic ruling elites (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 17-20; Merkel, 2004: 54; Morlino, 2009a: 288; Munck & Leff, 1997: 357). In addition to these generic patterns, actor-centered explanations related to incumbent skills in manipulating political institutions as well as contingent factors specific to country dynamics give a more complete picture of the phenomenon.

Recently, the literature has started to examine the transition from hybrid regimes to democratic polities and hypotheses are again numerous. They deal mainly with the importance of opposition coalitions, repetitive experiences with democratic elections and intense links with western institutions (Howard & Roessler, 2006: 380; van de Walle, 2006: 84; Lindberg, 2006: 2; Brownlee, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010: 44). Still, the results have been somewhat inconclusive (Epstein et al., 2006: 564). The reason for such state of affairs is simple. In order to fully grasp the meaning of these defining moments, we believe one should master the conditions for hybrid regime stability; a prerequisite that, as we will see, has not yet been met. We need to understand the dynamics prevailing in hybrid regimes before contemplating the teleological question. Indeed, institutional legacy almost inevitably comes to play in future institutional arrangements (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 56; Gunther et al., 1995: 399).

Henceforth, we will concentrate on the conditions of hybrid regime stability. There has been a burgeoning body of work on this subject since the beginning of the millennium. All in all, explanations converge on the presence of a dominant party as the necessary condition: one approach focuses on the economic instruments of power and the other on organizational capacities. Although they contribute to our understanding of the subject, we will demonstrate that they are nevertheless incomplete. The economic approach basically associates resource scarcity with instability and the ability to fuel patronage networks with stability (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007, 2010). More specifically, these networks are tied to the existence of geographically targeted government transfer programs and labor-intense parastatal companies. In the former, constituencies that support overwhelmingly the incumbent are rewarded with subsidies and the like, and in the latter, jobs and public contracts are dispensed to loyal supporters. Yet, some persistent hybrid regimes are found in very poor countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In these cases, large-scale institutional schemes aimed at buying-off the masses or at co-opting the bulk of elites are simply non-existent. Only a very small fraction can be spoiled. The organizational approach focuses on the existence of a well-oiled party machine and coercive apparatus (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010). This approach has one major drawback. It uses similar variables to those found in the literature on autocratic stability. In doing so, it does not tell us what is special about hybrid regimes, let alone the dynamics prevailing in different hybrid regimes: that is to say in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes that we consider to be the two main types of hybrid regimes. Stated briefly, a hegemonic authoritarian regime is a regime with frequent national elections and universal suffrage, but where opposition parties are illegal; and/or the population does not directly elect the head of state; and/or electoral fraud is recurrent and extensive. A competitive authoritarian regime is characterized by free national elections with competition between parties, but competition is unfair mostly because state resources are used to partisan ends by the dominant party. These concepts will be the object of further explanations in Chapter One. Overall, the organizational approach lacks differentiation between hybrid regimes and this clarification is important because institutional variations among types of hybrid regimes shape the structure of opportunities for elites to find their way in or out of the locus of power.

Thus, our central research question is: under what conditions are hybrid regimes stable or unstable? And how these conditions vary depending on the type of hybrid regime and the level of economic development?

There is also something more profound at stake here. An additional critic pertaining to both approaches points to the foundation for an alternative and convincing explanation. The economic and organization approaches tend to depict the political landscape of hybrid regimes in a dominant party context as relatively monolithic, as in autocratic regimes. All the attention is thus directed at the interests of ruling elites and unilateral coercive measures. At best, other political actors are treated as a passive and uniform group. This singular focus misses the essence of a hybrid regime: the coexistence of competing sources of authority in a non-institutionalized party system (Schedler, 2006: 12). Indeed, conflict about the rules between different political actors is the hallmark of most hybrid regimes. A hybrid regime combines to various degrees democratic *and* autocratic institutions. In other words, the economic and organizational approaches remain evasive about the democratic input: that is, political pluralism and contestation. Who challenges the ruling elites, what are their interests and capacities, and how these considerations influence political interactions?

To address these questions we develop a theory of hybrid regime stability based on political alliances. It starts with the following proposition: in hybrid regimes, elections fragment political allegiances, hence, ruling elites cannot govern alone. In order to preserve their position within the political regime, they need to co-opt representatives of social groups who negotiate their way in what we call the “ruling coalition”. In this sense, hybrid regime stability is intimately related to elite consent. At the same time, cooptation is not undifferentiated: social groups are not all equal. The trick is to know which ones are determinant in legitimizing the ruling elites’ hold on power. In this regard, we argue that four social groups dominate the political landscape in hybrid regimes: the military officers, the opposition parties, the state bureaucrats and the local leaders. Those are the ones that have the power to disrupt the normal functioning of government activities. A specific set of interests can be associated with each group. Most importantly, each has leverage against the ruling elites because it controls a

captive constituency. Thus, the crucial analytical element is whether the ruling coalition excludes or includes these four dominant social groups.

Adding a level of complexity, the influence that these four dominant social groups have on the conduct of political affairs is a function of two variables: the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. These variables structure the patterns of authority in any modern society and as such should affect the configuration of the ruling coalition composition. The degree of extra-legal organized violence is determinant in identifying which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites; and the degree of state penetration is determinant in identifying which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center.

It is our contention that the degree of extra-legal organized violence is linked to political regimes and, in this case, types of hybrid regimes. Indeed, when the degree is high, it generally means that the political arena is located outside official institutions: a situation common to hegemonic authoritarian regimes that fosters the intervention of military officers in politics. When the degree is low, it indicates that most political actors agree to channel social demands through the party system: a situation common to competitive authoritarian regimes that confer to political parties the role of aggregating and articulating collective interests. As for the degree of state penetration, we link it to the level of economic development. A high degree implies the edification of an efficient civil administration and a state apparatus heavily involved in the process of industrialization. Upper-echelon state bureaucrats become the main architects of the country future and influential players in allocating resources as well as in coordinating and implementing policies across the territory. A low degree reflects predatory practices and underdevelopment, at least in the South. It echoes a weak state in which elites retreat to the capital and leave regions in a political vacuum. Local leaders fill the void and act as privileged intermediaries between the national institutions and the rural base. Consequently, the following two-by-two matrix schematically represents our framework of political alliances in hybrid regimes:

Figure 1 – Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes

Extra-Legal Organized Violence	
Low	High
Opposition Parties (Competitive Authoritarian Regime) & State Bureaucrats (Developing Country)	Military Officers (Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime) & State Bureaucrats (Developing Country)
Opposition Parties (Competitive Authoritarian Regime) & Local Leaders (Underdeveloped Country)	Military Officers (Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime) & Local Leaders (Underdeveloped Country)

Each box in this figure represents an ideal-type. In the upper-left quadrant, a low degree of extra-legal organized violence and high degree of state penetration empower opposition parties and state bureaucrats. This alliance is likely to be associated with a competitive authoritarian regime and a developing economy (case study: Malaysia). In the upper-right quadrant, a high degree of extra-legal organized violence and a high degree of state penetration empower military officers and state bureaucrats. This alliance is likely to be associated with a hegemonic authoritarian regime and a developing economy (case study: Indonesia). In the lower-left quadrant, a low degree of extra-legal organized violence and a low degree of state penetration empower opposition parties and local leaders. This alliance is likely to be associated with a competitive authoritarian regime and an underdeveloped economy (case study: Senegal). Finally, in the lower-right quadrant, a high degree of extra-legal organized violence and low degree of state penetration empower military officers and local leaders. This alliance is likely to be associated with a hegemonic authoritarian regime and an underdeveloped economy (case study: Paraguay).

These four quadrants lay out our hypotheses. They indicate the conditions under which a hybrid regime is more likely to be stable. They pinpoint which dominant social groups should be included in the ruling coalition according to a specific political and economic context. When the composition of a ruling coalition diverges from these ideal-types – i.e. incongruities between the composition of the ruling coalition and contextual elements – the disenfranchised dominant social groups will publicly contest the authority of the ruling elites and instability should be expected.

To our knowledge, no research has systematically compared the composition of political alliances across various regions in a hybrid context. This is surprising given that it is a key research axis in the field of political development. The works of Barrington Moore (1968) as well as O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986) are classic examples. Far from being outdated, they have led to subsequent testing (see Mahoney, 2003: 140-141; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Snyder, 1992; Eisenstadt, 2000; McFaul 2002). Overall, the literature has explored the relevance of various social groups: i.e. entrepreneurs, civil servants, military and police officers, religious communities, journalists, monarchical families, peasants, workers, technical specialists, intellectuals, opposition parties and so on (see Almond & Coleman, 1960: 562-567; Huntington, 1970: 7; Linz, 1978: 27-38). Therefore, we do not pretend to (re) invent the wheel so to speak. Obviously, the aforementioned four dominant social groups are not a construction of our own. The innovative character of the theory we have developed over the last three years resides in the links we establish between four dominant social groups and two variables that, taken as a whole, could serve as a reliable analytical tool for a diagnostic of political stability or instability. Ultimately the main scientific contribution of our thesis is to offer an integrated framework based on the recognition of political pluralism, that distinguishes between the respective hybrid patterns prevailing in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes as well as in developing and underdeveloped economies.

Our theory provides a roadmap for cross-national comparison, not a blueprint of actual dynamics. We identify the necessary social groups to include in the ruling coalition according to pre-established variables. Without these dominant social groups, instability is almost inevitable. That being said, the patterns of political alliances we identify may not be sufficient

in all cases. Depending on the idiographic dynamic of a country, additional social groups may also have a stabilizing effect. It is not either an all-or-nothing situation. Political alliances in hybrid regimes thrive on selective co-optation and contained inclusion. For instance, in a context where the opposition parties are a dominant social group, some opposition parties are obviously more important than others. It is the same with state bureaucrats, military officers and local leaders. The bottom line is that a social group is not a unified bloc. As a secondary analytical layer, we need to acknowledge political pluralism within each of them. In this regard, we will formulate general rules about which ones are strategic – hence should be included in the coalition in order to induce stability – but beyond these considerations, it becomes a country specific issue. Furthermore, we recognize that it is not always easy to determine the degree of extra-legal organized violence or state penetration as evidence sometimes suggests a median value at a given time. The design of our contextual variables serves to provide clarity: that is, creating an analytical contrast in order to construct ideal-types. Afterward, it is a matter of detecting tendencies and candidly admitting that our framework yields mixed results in periods when the degree of extra-legal organized violence and/or state penetration falls in-between our dichotomous categories while being cogent when a clear assessment can be made.

In regard to the scholastic boundaries of our reflection, we opt for historical institutionalism as a meta-theory. First, the keystone of our argument centers on the institutional locus of power in hybrid regimes: the ruling coalition. But the structure of opportunities and the distribution of resources within the ruling coalition are embedded in a broader institutional context that includes the types of hybrid regimes and the level of economic development. Second, we take history seriously and in most cases look back to Independence Day. We refrain from assessing events as they unravel or overestimating the importance of proximate causes. Regime stability is a macro-political phenomenon structured by slow-moving forces. Notwithstanding, far from being homeostatic, we consider history as a non-linear process, a diachronic process. Temporal sequencing is at the heart of our analysis: there are periods of remission and chocking points in each country-regime. And third, our framework offers a middle-range theory. We do not wish to present a new type of hybrid regime, a new classification, novel causes of hybrid regime emergence and conditions of stability all at once. Neither do we aim

at explaining political stability in autocratic, hybrid and democratic regimes simultaneously in a single framework. We are only concerned with a more concise research object: conditions for hybrid regime stability.

Along those lines, our theory has fixed parameters in terms of temporal and spatial contingencies. First, the time period extends from 1945 to 2010. In regard to the starting date, we were guided by the fact that hybrid regimes refer to institutional arrangements that at the very least include frequent direct elections with universal suffrage. Before 1945, such prerequisites were an anomaly in most developing countries (Cowen & Laakso, 2002: 4; Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 132-135). Ultimately, the existence of this anomaly denotes a major change over time in what is meant by differences between political regimes; and the end of the Second World War with the seminal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) represents a turning point for that matter (Huntington, 1991: 6). We stop at 2010 in order to have sufficient documentation for the examination of our hypotheses while avoiding the risk of having to work on on-going events. Second, we exclude small states (population of less than a million) or city-states; whether because of their size or remoteness, they obey a different logic than the one of political regimes in larger states (Briguglio et al., 2008; Anckar, 2006; Sutton, 2007). In these cases, our theory yields little analytical output. Also perhaps to state the obvious, hybrid regimes are found in non-western countries. Taking into account these two parameters, we have a total of about 60 cases of hybrid regimes (see appendix 1).

Methodologically speaking, we employ a “middle-way” between large-N and single or binary case studies. In regard to large-N, problems of data accessibility and reliability as well as the exigencies of validation related to the nature of our theory – i.e. process-tracing of ruling coalition dynamics – prevent us from performing any statistical analysis. As for binary cases, considering our theory specification (four ideal-types), we need more than one or two cases to examine the inner working of our arguments.

In terms of case selection, the method of most different systems design first dictates the choice of our countries. We choose this method because if our analytical framework explains diverse cases in terms of geographical location, political system, colonial history and cultural

background, it will increase its potential of inference to a larger population sample. Consequently, we made the choice of covering Latin America (Paraguay), sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal) and Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia). Senegal, Paraguay and Indonesia are presidential systems, while Malaysia is a parliamentary system². Our cases should also witness different colonial history and access to independence at different times: Paraguay in 1811, Senegal in 1960, Malaysia in 1957 and Indonesia in 1945. Paraguay was a Spanish colony, Senegal a French one; Malaysia was a British colony and Indonesia a Dutch one. The population of Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal is mostly Muslim, whereas in Paraguay inhabitants are essentially Christian. Their degree of fractionalization also varies: from a relative homogenous society in Paraguay to the more heterogeneous ones in Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal.

Second, we were looking for crucial cases: that is, dominant party hybrid regimes that have experienced periods of instability. Indeed, comparisons that do not take into account rival explanations are of limited use in comparative politics. Although they all have their weaknesses, it is difficult to deny the ascendancy of the Colorado Party in Paraguay, the *Parti Socialiste* in Senegal, the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia and the Golkar Party in Indonesia. Moreover, all of these countries have experienced at some point in their contemporary history significant periods of instability. For example, in Paraguay, the 1989 coup ended the reign of Stroessner. In Senegal, the 1988 post-electoral riots threaten Diouf's hold on power and forced the declaration of a state of emergency. In Malaysia, the Chinese-Malay race riot of 1969 almost pushed the country into chaos. In Indonesia, the supposedly aborted coup in 1965 and the subsequent purges of communists by General Suharto traumatized the country for some times. These are only few examples. Many more political crises will be described in the empirical chapters.

Third and finally, at the development stage, a plausibility probe strategy makes sense. It was important that our theory be able to illuminate classic cases of hybrid regimes. The Malaysian hybrid regime is one of the most studied nomothetic cases on the subject. For the others,

² Over the period covered in the present study, the Senegalese, Paraguayan and Indonesian political systems changed on many occasions.

Paraguay was one of the most durable hybrid regimes in the world until 2008; Senegal was among the first competitive authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa; and the New Order in Indonesia under Suharto was an institutional novelty at that time and perhaps a prototypical example of a façade democracy (i.e. in this case a hegemonic authoritarian regime) with opposition parties created by the ruling elites and an all-powerful president elected by the legislative assembly.

In our research we have asked big questions and worked hard to provide a parsimonious answer. We found it useful to support our theory with illustrative cases so that the nuances of our line of reasoning can be captured. We do not pretend that these cases are a representative sample of all hybrid regimes over the period covered; and we do not claim that our framework automatically applies to all hybrid regimes. The selection is not purely random; cases are chosen to reflect our hypotheses (one case study for each ideal-type). Yet, to prevent axiomatic theorizing, we devoted much attention to the research design. In this regard, we are confident that, with the three case selection strategies, the political history of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay will provide an empirical basis to gauge the relevance of our theory. The idea is not to ask if another case could have been selected, but if collectively the four cases satisfy our criteria.

As for the type of information, the demonstration relies mostly on qualitative data. That being said, statistics on election results, socio-economic trends, etc, are added in support of our argument. Data collection is based on secondary sources: that is, transnational, international and national organizations as well as media and scholarly publications. Primary sources like participant observation, surveys or semi-structured interviews are sidelined for two reasons. For one, we firmly believe that enough information already exists in the specialized literature to provide a solid empirical basis to expose the inner working of our hypotheses. For two, given our sample size and case selection, fieldwork would involve significant resources and an overly time consuming effort.

The presentation of country narrative follows the structured and focused method used in case studies (George & Bennett, 2004: 67). The method is structured insofar as the empirical

material in each case is gathered to answer the same generic questions. The method is focused in the sense that specific aspects of the political history in each country are examined based on the identification of a small number of variables and precise indicators. The intent is to standardize the way to report facts in order to compare findings not only within our sample, but also later on to the entire population under study.

Last but not least, we want to clearly state our research objectives. First, we aim at knowledge accumulation. We do not wish to (re) open debates about types of hybrid regimes or causes of emergence for instance. Furthermore, we do not deny the overall utility of existing approaches to hybrid regimes stability. We only point to their inability to interpret important variations in terms of types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development. In other words, the present body of work on the subject traces the general contour of our understanding of hybrid regime stability, but we need to dig deeper in order to explain unresolved issues. Second, we choose the ambitious and rocky road of theory building; leaving the testing and validating phases for future research. We also depart from the attempt to iterate hypothesis testing or hypothesis (re) specification. For one, the testing of existing theories of hybrid regime stability is already well advanced (see appendix 2) and for two the modification of one variable would fall short of solving the problems we raise. Third, we want to produce meaningful generalizations. We were less interested in offering an exhaustive portrait of political dynamics in a country X than what different countries have in common. Still, the different layers of our theory provide enough analytical flexibility to integrate contrasting realities.

The thesis is divided as follows. To set the record straight, the first chapter entitled “What We Know and What We Do not Know about Hybrid Regime Stability” opens with an overview of concepts and typologies of political regimes. It includes a brief definition of what a democratic and autocratic regime is, a synthesis of types of hybrid regimes diversity, shortcomings of existing typologies of hybrid regimes and the value-added of the dichotomous one we selected, which is based on two concepts: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. These are mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive and empirically sound while being the object of a relative academic consensus. This is followed by a presentation of the economic and organizational approaches on hybrid regime stability. For the sake of

intelligibility, it is articulated around four pillars: that is to say, Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007, 2010) for the economic approach; and Brownlee (2007) as well as Levitsky & Way (2010) for the organizational approach. These authors helpfully cover a large portion of the literature on hybrid regime stability, using similar definitions of hybrid regimes and articulating well-developed arguments. A critical assessment follows. It will demonstrate why explanations of autocratic and democratic stability are not a surrogate for a theory of hybrid regime stability and how existing theories of hybrid regime stability are incomplete. The analysis is connected to three sets of factors: electoral and party systems, economic development, and legitimacy. Obviously, conditions of stability are manifold³ but no explanations of political stability could be valid without references to these three core notions. They have the unique property of cutting across all types of regimes. The chapter closes with a discussion on the definition of hybrid regime stability. It calls for moving beyond a definition based on regime or government duration in order to add indicators that will help us to focus not only on the outcome but also on the process.

The second chapter entitled “Explaining Stability and Instability in Dominant-Party Hybrid Regimes” represents the core of our thesis. It comprises three sections. The first will introduce the meta-theory of neo-institutionalism in approaches to hybrid regime stability. It will clearly spell-out our academic contribution, since all theories of hybrid regime stability can be associated to neo-institutionalism. We will also present the three main strands of neo-institutionalism – historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism – and examine why historical institutionalism is the best fit to think about hybrid regime stability. In the second section, we will articulate the specific meaning of the ruling coalition in hybrid regimes and its implication in terms of distribution of resources. We will develop the rationale for choosing our two variables - the degree of extra-legal organized violence and state penetration – and the indicators to measure them. We will discuss the logic of our hypotheses, specify the interests of the four social dominant groups as well as the nature of leverage they have over the ruling elites. The last section will be dedicated to

³ For an extensive overview of explanatory factors of regime stability, see Teorell (2010), Bunce (2000), Beetham (1994), Hadenius (1992), Brooker (2000); and Linz (1975).

methodological issues; namely the rationale behind our choices in terms of types of data, size of sample, selection of cases and how we will report facts.

Following the above, we will turn to the empirical demonstration of our theoretical framework. The first two empirical chapters will address the political development of Malaysia and Indonesia. They will highlight from the start the difference between hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, while being both developing countries. The next two chapters will deepen our understanding of political dynamics in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes from the perspective of underdeveloped countries. They will look at Senegal and Paraguay. Each chapter is organized the same way. First, an event-analysis of political crises is presented with special attention to its ramification on the composition of the ruling coalition as a condition of stability. Second, the degree of extra-legal organized violence and state penetration as it relates to the types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development are discussed to clarify specific issues evoked in the event-analysis. And third, a conclusion is reached as to the relevance of our framework for explaining the conditions of stability or instability in the country.

What We Know and What We Do Not Know about Hybrid Regime Stability

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review on hybrid regime stability. It is a relatively new corpus still in the making. Debates are numerous and conventions very few. Much remains to be done. In this sense, the study of hybrid regime stability is full of potential. It is only the beginning of an exciting and stimulating line of inquiry.

Undertaking such an intellectual venture requires first a discussion on definitions of political regimes. The objective is to prevent any loss of meaning by the excessive use of a concept without determining its referent. The section starts with precisions about what a political regime is. Once this baseline is established, a distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes will be made using Dahl's (1998: 85; 1971: 3) seminal contribution. Then, a nomenclature of types of hybrid regimes will be presented emphasizing two effervescent periods of concept formation. To make sense of this plethora of types, classification schemes will be addressed afterward. A special attention will be given to the one developed by Diamond (2002) and colleagues (Schedler, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010), and articulated around two concepts: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism.

Next, theories of hybrid regimes stability will be introduced. This section aims at providing the reader with a state of the art on the subject. Theories of hybrid regime stability essentially hinge on the dominant party framework adopting either the economic or organizational approach. The main proponents of the economic approach are Magoloni (2006) and Greene (2007, 2010). The organizational approach rests on two bodies of work: Brownlee (2007) and Levitsky & Way (2010). Levitsky & Way (2010) add another component to their theory – namely, international factors – making their framework eclectic. These are the four pillars of the study on hybrid regime stability and it will be stated why it is so. For each author, the

research question, definition of stability, methodology and hypotheses will constitute the structure for dissecting their arguments and findings.

A critical assessment closes the chapter. The idea is to pinpoint what the literature on hybrid regime stability says about the wider literature on regime stability and what research avenues the literature on hybrid regime stability has neglected. By doing so, it will allow the problematic of our thesis to stand out and impose itself. The assessment is constructed around three themes or sets of explanatory factors: electoral and party systems, economic development and legitimacy. The choice of focusing on these themes will be justified. Before pitching in with the crux of the assessment, we will tackle the question of international factors. It is a bit off subject, at least in terms of how it fits in our presentation; but we have no choice but to speak up given its preponderance in Levitsky & Way's (2010) framework. The three aforementioned themes will allow us to praise the progress the subfield of hybrid regime stability has made so far and herald what lies ahead in terms of unresolved issues. Finally we will conclude the critical assessment by evoking drawbacks in the definition of stability itself.

1.1. Political Regimes: Concepts and Typologies

Discussions on definitions can easily fall into a quagmire, especially when they relate to regime types. It can lead to endless debates. To be sure, there is an intrinsic value to these discussions. From time-to-time, there is a necessity to reflect on whether the meaning of a given concept corresponds to the evolving reality. But this is in itself a research object that is not part of our own thesis. We do not wish to open Pandora's box but to clear the air so to speak. Given the institutional ambiguity characterizing hybrid regimes, this is easier said than done. One can always find a fact to argue that a regime is an autocracy or democracy, and not a hybrid regime. The key to overcome this obstacle is not to lose sight of the overall picture. A political regime being multidimensional by nature, we must be careful that all facts have been taken into account before making a judgment.

For Easton (1965: 192), a regime "represents relatively stable expectations, depending on the system and its state of change, with regard to the range of matters that can be handled

politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters are processed, and the position of those through whom binding action may be taken on these matters”. According to O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 73en), a political regime concerns “the ensemble of patterns, explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal governmental positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted and excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access”. Although they intertwine, it is important not to conflate the regime, the state and the government.

“A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it” (Fishman, 1990: 428).

Hence, the state usually refers to a given territory and population organized under a single system of government internationally recognized and sovereign (Ethier, 2010a: 77). The public administration, both its civil and military components, constitutes its operational arm. As for the concept of government, it represents the apex of decision-making, which can take different forms depending on the type of regime (Hermet et al., 2005: 133). In short, the government exercises authority over the state and the regime constrains government activities. Obviously, the concept of political regime in the aforementioned definitions remains wide-ranging. Let see how it should be interpreted.

1.1.1. Democratic and Autocratic Regimes

After the end of World War II and until the 1990s, the literature on political development in comparative politics was fixed on a dichotomy between democratic and autocratic regimes. According to Dahl (1998: 85), a democratic regime rests on the following institutions: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; access to alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. They are an integral part of

his classic contestation/participation framework (Dahl, 1971: 3). The crux of contestation is the presence of a legal political opposition that has the right to compete against the ruling party and elites for elected positions. For political competition to be fair, freedom of expression and associational autonomy should be respected; as well, independent sources of information should be available to the general public. Participation, on the other hand, refers to popular sovereignty and the enlargement of citizenry through the elimination of exclusion criteria based on property, literacy, gender, race or ethnicity.

This definition is a procedural definition not a substantive one. It is however more demanding than the minimal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) that directs attention solely to the existence of electoral procedures as an expression of the will of the people and a mean to realize the “common good”, and omits to include explicitly notions of civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion.

A substantive definition of democracy deals mostly with the content of public policies and examines whether these policies are in line with democratic ideals such as economic equality. This definition is problematic. First, political regime and economic policy are two separate concepts (Burton et al., 1992: 2). Economic equality is not the exclusive domain of democracy. Other types of regimes may promote it. Communist regimes are one example. In fact, authoritarian populists, democratic reformists and radical elites may all advocate redistributive policies (Asher, 1984: 14). Second, “in a democracy substantive compromises cannot be binding” (Przeworski, 1988: 64). Only procedures that obey to the universalistic principles of a modern democracy can be binding and, in order to be universalistic, these procedures have to leave the content of policies undetermined and open to debate. Economic equality is a matter of public policy. And public policies may change from one government to another, from one mandate to another, or from one country to another. It is not embedded in the democratic regime *per se*. Regime is about procedures, and policies about substance. Ultimately, the substantive definition is usually used for comparison between western consolidated democracies (liberal democracy), which is not the object of our research. Thus, in the present study, a democratic regime refers to an electoral democracy, to a definition based

on institutions and procedures. That being said, all consolidated democracies are electoral democracies, whereas all electoral democracies are not necessarily consolidated.

For the purpose of comparison, an autocratic regime is defined in opposition to a democratic regime. It is one that satisfies none of the above criteria: there are no frequent elections; opposition parties are illegal; civic liberties and political rights are inexistent, bluntly and systematically violated; and state violence is manifest in the day-to-day life of citizens. Obviously, all autocratic regimes do not look alike. Most of all, they vary in terms of the degree of repression. In the case of totalitarian regimes incarnated by fascist Germany under Hitler, communist USSR under Stalin as well as China under Mao, a powerful ideology aims at radically transforming the society through indoctrination, propaganda and the physical elimination of non-adherents. They were involved in the large-scale annihilation of any form of dissent, real or perceived, with modern techniques. In a way, these cases represent the beginning and foundation of the study on autocratic regimes (see Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956). Other post-WW II versions of autocratic regimes use more targeted, punctual, less public means of repression. Our definition of an autocratic regime somewhat departs from Linz's classic definition of authoritarianism. He defines an authoritarian regime as a "political system with limited, non-responsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without either extensive or intense political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or, occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable limits" (Linz, 1970: 255). In an autocratic regime, limited political pluralism is absent and the government and the party if it exists are under the absolute control of one person. To somewhat cancel out the notion of "limited pluralism" in Linz's definition of authoritarianism, the adjective "closed" is often adjunct to the concept in the literature on political development to symbolize its autocratic feature. The bottom line is that Linz's definition will later serve as the cornerstone of the reflection on authoritarianism with "adjectives" (Mahoney, 2003: 158). It opens the door to concepts such as hegemonic and competitive authoritarianism, given the reconnaissance of some form of political contestation

and participation embedded in the definition⁴. Thus, in our thesis, the concept of an autocratic regime encompasses totalitarian as well as closed authoritarian regimes.

These definitions are relatively straightforward. They represent the classic vision that the field of political development had for over half of a century. However, as decades passed, scholars realized that many autocratic leaders were introducing frequent elections with universal suffrage as well as authorizing opposition parties to compete for top positions. Still, they were not electoral democracies. Regrouping all non-democratic regimes under the label of autocratic regimes was more and more akin to concept stretching. Institutional forms of autocratic regimes multiplied and diversified to a point that it endangered the coherence of the category. Differences within the autocratic regime category were sometimes as important as differences between autocratic and democratic regimes (Kohli, 2003: 96; Geddes, 1999a: 121). New categories were therefore needed to describe such empirical novelty.

1.1.2. Types of Hybrid Regimes

A simple definition of hybrid regime can be summed up as a regime that combines, to different degrees, certain aspects of a democratic regime such as national elections with certain aspects of an autocratic regime such as state control of media outlets. Here, the concept of “hybrid regime” represents a class of phenomena that regroups all types of intermediary regimes. The conceptual frontier between an autocracy and a hybrid regime is as follows: the latter has frequent direct national elections with universal suffrage, while the former does not. In the autocratic category, we find the Middle East monarchies (e.g. Saudi Arabia), communist regimes (e.g. China) and military dictatorships (e.g. Myanmar, at least until 2010). Yet, many autocratic regimes hold some forms of direct elections, especially communist states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. In these regimes, the systematic repression and indoctrination of the population, the presence of only a single candidate on the electoral list,

⁴ Linz’s justification behind the introduction of the concept of authoritarianism was the necessity to create a third category beside the existing totalitarian and democratic ones since too many regimes did not fit into either ones. According to Linz’s own words, his definition of authoritarianism corresponds to some form of hybrid regime (1970: 280); a hybrid regime that looks very much like a hegemonic authoritarian one as described in the next section. Today, authoritarianism is often used as a synonymous of non-democratic regimes that include autocratic and hybrid regimes.

the seldom occurrence of elections or the limited enfranchisement provides the basis for excluding them from the hybrid category. The distinction between a hybrid regime and democracy is even subtler: hybrid regimes hold frequent, free and competitive elections but with a constantly uneven playing field between the incumbent and the opposition. Foremost, it concerns the abuse of state resources for partisan ends by the ruling party and therefore the unfairness of party competition. This “unfair” character is subject to important variations between countries and the line between the two is foremost qualitative in nature and less a question of degree. It can easily fall into an idiosyncratic narrative. Nevertheless, the point is to demonstrate the systematic imbalance between the incumbent and possible contenders, whatever means are used to achieve that end; at least as far as an exercise of classification is concerned.

In between autocratic and democratic regimes, there exists a wide diversity of institutional hybrid arrangements. In this regard, Collier & Levitsky (1997: 431) counted more than one hundred “diminished subtypes” and since then, many others have appeared in the literature. Historically, types of hybrid regimes can be regrouped in two categories. The first one is mostly associated with experts on Latin America and emerged in the 1990s with the so-called “democracy with adjectives” label. These types were created to reflect the fact that many Latin American regimes underwent a democratic transition following the demise of military regimes in the 1970s-80s, a transition that remained in some cases incomplete. Amongst others, we find *dictablanda/democradura* (Rouquié, 1975: 1077-1078; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 9), exclusionary democracy (Remmer, 1985: 69-70), tutelary democracy (Przeworski, 1988: 60-61), protected democracy (Loveman, 1994: 111), delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994: 59-60), oligarchy democracy (Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 99), limited democracy (Archer, 1995: 166) and semi-democracy (Diamond et al., 1995: 8). By the end of the 1990s, a second generation of hybrid regime concepts emerged. They were less regionally based, echoing a more global approach. They were expressing the prevalence of hybrid regimes in all regions of the world and came into being after scholars had realized the persistence of authoritarian traits in many former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan African regimes that entered into a democratic transition in the 1990s. They are the following: illiberal democracy/liberal autocracy (Zakaria, 1997: 22-23), feckless pluralism/dominant-power politics (Carothers,

2002: 10-14), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 53), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002: 36-37, 41-46), and semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003: 16-20)⁵. From this list, it is obvious that there is a wide diversity of hybrid regime concepts. Taken together, they offer a comprehensive portrayal of hybrid regimes and there is therefore no rational behind the continuous search and creation of new types.

Yet, there is a considerable overlap between them. As a result, a country-regime can be often associated with more than one hybrid regime type. For instance, the Malaysian hybrid regime has been qualified as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002: 49), a semi-democracy (Case, 1996: 437, Gasiorowski, 1996: 481; Brooker, 2000: 260; Crouch, 1993: 153), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003: 4), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 318; Diamond, 2002: 31), or simply and more generally as a hybrid regime (Mauzy, 2006: 47) to mention a few. It goes without saying that from this vantage point, the edifice of knowledge accumulation on hybrid regimes looks like a vain intellectual enterprise. The multiplication of similar types, albeit different in some respects, produces confusion and seriously complicates any efforts to construct a coherent typology and to compare findings about conditions of hybrid regime stability. At the moment, concept formation related to hybrid regimes is best characterized as a tower of Babel to use Armony & Schamis' (2005) analogy.

It is true, hybrid regimes take various forms and the exact combination of democratic and autocratic institutional arrangements is often *sui generis* to each country. In this regard, the multiplication of hybrid regimes is a testimony of such diversity. Nonetheless, as Schedler (2002: 38) wrote, "where empirical reality is fuzzy, no amount of conceptual sophistication will allow us to draw clear and consensual lines between regime types. On the contrary, regime boundaries tend to be blurry and controversial to the extent that their constitutive norms are idealizations that admit varying degrees of realization in actual political practice".

Thus, the challenge is to find a typology that differentiates between various forms of hybrid regimes while remaining manageable. Indeed, the diversity of hybrid regimes is too great to

⁵ The above types are briefly defined in appendix 3.

regroup all of them in one category. It certainly hides distinct features that should matter in terms of our understanding of political dynamics in a given country. At the same time, these distinct features are only useful insofar as they simplify reality instead of increasing its opacity. At some point, multiplying types of hybrid regimes creates confusion and becomes unintelligible. A balance should be struck between these two considerations.

1.1.3. Typologies of Hybrid Regimes

Typology is a key analytical tool in comparative politics. It is an exercise of classification where different categories should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Mill, 1858; Sartori, 1994: 22-23). It should identify clear-cut indicators and specify coding procedures. As the example of Malaysia illustrates, this exercise has proved itself to be quite a challenge for many working on hybrid regimes and in some cases have led to imbroglios.

Although typologies of non-democratic regimes date back to the end of the 1960s, those that explicitly relate to hybrid regimes are relatively new. Hybrid regimes are non-democratic regimes, but non-democratic regimes also include autocratic regimes. Typologies of non-democratic regimes abound⁶. They usually focus on one dimension. Finer (1962: 273), Schmitter (1976: 115), Perlmutter (1977: 9-17) and Nordlinger (1977: 11-19) propose different categories of military regimes; Tucker (1961: 281-282) and Huntington (1970: 10-17) decorticate one-party regimes whereas Chehabi & Linz (1998: 10-23) put a premium on sultanistic (or personalistic) regime characteristics. Aside from these academic contributions, Finer (1970: chapter 12) elaborates a typology that includes totalitarian and dynastic regimes, façade-democracy, quasi-democracy and military regimes; and O'Donnell (1979: 110) proposes a typology based on the degree of political modernization (i.e. traditional, populist and bureaucratic authoritarianism). Although very rich and insightful, these typologies introduce analytical elements, such as economic development, that should be interpreted independently of the nature of any political regime. In other words, they leave the domain of

⁶ For an extensive overview of non-democratic regime typologies, see Brooker (2000) chapter one.

typology construction and enter the realm of theory building⁷, a point that will be raised below when discussing the typology of Hadenius & Teorell. Furthermore, Finer's final classification ends-up with over a dozen of categories and O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarian concept "came to describe almost any Latin American nondemocratic regime in the 1970s, whether populist and inclusionary as postrevolutionary Mexico, or elitist and exclusionary as Chile under Pinochet or Argentina under the military junta from 1976 to 1983" (Brachet-Marquez, 2005: 468). Finally, Linz & Stepan (1996: 44-45) divide non-democratic regimes in four categories – i.e. totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian, and sultanistic regimes – whereas Geddes (1999b: 10-19) offers a synthesis of earlier works that regroup military, single-party and personalistic regimes. Yet, it is not all that clear where a hybrid regime fits in these typologies. Some types of non-democratic regimes can be associated with either an autocratic or a hybrid regime. For instance, in Geddes' case, the single-party regime category includes the Communist Party in China (autocratic) as well as the Tanganyika African National Union (1961-1985) in Tanzania (hybrid). Personalistic regime was a defining feature of the autocratic regime under the late Kim Il-Sung in North Korea as well as of the more competitive regime of Malaysia under Mahathir. Military regime is a central characteristic of the closed authoritarian regime of the Myanmar junta as well as of the Paraguayan regime under Stroessner, which allowed some form of political opposition (after 1962).

These contributions on different forms of non-democratic regimes cannot be tossed away as if they would belong to the ash of history; a tendency that we see too often in the subfield of hybrid regimes where research is presented as new without references to the classic literature on political development; especially the literature on authoritarianism of the 1970s. We believe this practice is detrimental to any attempt to defend the usefulness of research on hybrid regimes. Indeed we briefly go through some important studies on the subject that in a way represent the foundation of the reflection on types of non-democratic regimes, but in doing so we also highlight their limits based on specific criteria.

⁷ In Chapter Two, we will acknowledge the analytical utility of their work and integrate it into our theory.

Moreover, besides Schedler (2002) as well as Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010)⁸, some of the authors mentioned in the discussion on hybrid regime concepts formulate types based on a dichotomy, which methodologically speaking could serve as a basis for a typology on the subject. O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 9) propose the *dictablanda/democratura* distinction. Carothers (2002: 10-12) does the same with his “feckless pluralism” versus “dominant power politics” regimes. However, in each case, these concepts translate general observations and lack specific criteria that could allow us to make an informed judgment on regime classification. In this regard, the only exception from our hybrid regime enumeration is Zakaria (1997: 23) who creates two concepts “liberal autocracy” and “illiberal democracy” from the Freedom House Index that include two categories: civil liberties and political rights. Among the country-regimes designated as partly free, “illiberal democracy” is associated with a relatively lower civil liberty value compared to the political right category; while “liberal autocracy” is linked with a higher civil liberty value compared to the political rights category⁹. Yet, political rights and civil liberties often go hand in hand. The 1997 Freedom House Index identifies a total of 53 hybrid regimes¹⁰: 11 are illiberal democracies; 23 are liberal autocracies; and 19 have an equal value on political rights and civil liberties. Thus, 35% of hybrid regimes could not be labeled as liberal autocracy or illiberal democracy. It leaves a very large group of hybrid regimes unclassified.

⁸ Those authors in collaboration with Larry Diamond (ref. *Thinking about Hybrid Regimes*) contributed to a special issue of the *Journal of Democracy* (vol. 13, no. 2, 2002), in which they developed a typology of hybrid regimes. Their conceptual contribution to the literature on hybrid regime types is discussed in details below.

⁹ According to Freedom House, political rights include: the electoral process; political pluralism and participation; and functioning of government. Civil liberties include: freedom of expression and belief; associational and organization rights; rule of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights. The lower the value, the more democratic the regime is; the higher the value, the more autocratic the regime is.

¹⁰ OECD countries and small states with a population of less than one million are excluded.

Table I – Typologies of Hybrid Regimes

Morlino (2009)	Wigell (2008)	Hadenius & Teorell (2007)	Merkel (2004)	Diamond (2002)
Limited Democracy	Autocracy	Monarchy Regime	Exclusive Democracy	Politically Closed Authoritarian Regime
Democracy Without State	Electoral Autocracy	One-Party Regime	Domain Democracy	Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian Regime
Quasi-Democracy	Constitutional Oligarchy	No-Party Regime	Illiberal Democracy	Competitive Authoritarian Regime
	Democracy	Military Regime	Delegative Democracy	Ambiguous Regime
		Dominant Limited Multiparty Regime		Electoral Democracy
		Nondominant Limited Multiparty Regime		Liberal Democracy
		Democratic Multiparty Regime		

Gray zone represents types of hybrid regimes

Typologies that explicitly examine hybrid regimes are from the following scholars: Diamond (2002: 29-33), Merkel (2004: 49-50), Hadenius & Teorell (2007: 146-149), Wigell (2008: 243) and Morlino (2009a: 291-293). We adopt Diamond’s (2002) typology because others either (i) include types that are not mutually exclusive, which is often the manifestation of a typology based on more than one principle; (ii) refer to electoral democracies that are not yet consolidated, which is not our research object; or (iii) have not been the object of a relative academic consensus.


The first point can be illustrated by examining Hadenius & Teorell’s typology. The military and monarchy regime types are at odds with the rest of their concepts, which rest on the number of parties within the party system: i.e. “one-party”, “no-party”, “dominant limited multiparty”, “non-dominant limited multiparty” and “democratic multiparty” regimes. Indeed, a military regime can be a dominant limited multiparty regime like in Indonesia or a one-party regime like in Cuba. This problem is evident in Hadenius & Teorell’s (2006: 11) earlier work

where they propose amongst others four categories of military regimes: “military no-party”, “military one-party”, “military multiparty” and “military traditional” categories. We find this same problem with the “monarchy” category. The idea here is when types are not mutually exclusive, it leads to their multiplication under mixed label categories; to a point that they end up being notably difficult to manage and operationalize. Furthermore, these mixed-labels are often symptomatic of a typology that enters the realm of theory building yet without an overarching framework. Indeed, different types obey to different logics or principles. For instance, “because most officers value the unity and capacity of the military institution more than they value holding office, they cling less tightly to power than do office holders in other forms of authoritarianism [i.e. one-party and personalistic regimes]” (Geddes, 1999b: 48). From this vantage point, the mixed label “military one-party” regime would be incoherent.

The second point is manifest in Merkel’s typology based on defective democracies that encompass concepts associated with the “democracy with adjectives” label: i.e. “exclusive democracy”, “domain democracy”, “illiberal democracy” and “delegative democracy”. The title of the special issue of the journal “Democratization” – i.e. *Consolidated & Defective Democracy* – in which the author develops his typology suggests that these diminishing subtypes of democracies deal mostly with the problem of new democracies: that is to say, electoral democracies that remain fragile. For example, Merkel (2004: 51) had classified Brazil as an exclusionary democracy and Mexico as an illiberal democracy in 2002. In other words, it exposes the problem related to the quality of democracy and more generally to the substantive dimensions of democracies. Concepts of defective democracies seem to compare developing countries that made a democratic transition with western consolidated democracies standards. Wigell’s conceptualization manifests similar tendencies. His hybrid regime categories include some dimensions usually associated with a well-established democracy, such as the prevalence of democratic norms at every institutional level (local, regional, national) (Wigell, 2008: 241). This object of inquiry is different from the one we pursue; it is outside of our research agenda. Hybrid regimes are not electoral democracies; they are something less. This is why the present study opts for a typology based on “authoritarianism with adjectives”.

Morlino’s well-designed typology could have served as a basis to evaluate various types of hybrid regimes. He uses Ragin’s (2008) fuzzy set analysis method and a factor analysis to construct a typology of hybrid regimes based on three groups of indicators. The first set of indicators concerns the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and beliefs, as well as freedom of association and organization. The second refers to rule of law, personal autonomy and individual freedom. The last set is limited to whether the state is functioning adequately. According to the author, indicators in each group are clustered together and are strongly connected, making each group analytically independent from each other. From these sets of indicators, Morlino (2009a: 291-293) associates three types of hybrid regimes: “limited democracies”, “democracy without state”, and “quasi-democracies”. Each type shows an absence/weakness of at least one of the related group of indicators. The first set of indicators is linked to the concept of “limited democracies”. “Democracy without state” merges with the second and third group of indicators, while “quasi-democracies” represents a regime that has defects in all three groups of indicators. Although Morlino’s typology proves to be informative, it has not been yet the object of iterated validation and application.

Figure 2 – Classification of Political Regimes



The typology developed by Diamond (2002: 29-33), in collaboration with Schedler (2002: 41-46) as well as Levitsky & Way (2002: 53-54), is increasingly becoming the standard-bearer in the subfield of hybrid regimes. It is essentially based on two types: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. It is one that is similar to Dahl’s (1971: 7) framework of contestation and participation of which concepts of “inclusive hegemonies” and “competitive oligarchies” are an integral part. The same can be said about the visionary work

of Hermet in *Elections Without Choice* (1978: chapter 1) who has proposed two categories – i.e. “one-party elections” and “semi-competitive elections” – to describe political development in the Third World. It also recaptures Banks & Textor’s (1963: 87) classification: (i) where opposition parties are organized freely and have an innate capacity to compete (i.e. democracy); (ii) where opposition parties are organized freely but some have limited capacity to compete (i.e. competitive authoritarianism); (iii) where political parties are legalized but are in effect located outside the party system (i.e. hegemonic authoritarianism); and (iv) where opposition parties are banned (autocracy). Thus, although the typology developed by Diamond and colleagues is relatively new, it hinges on a solid conceptual basis.

Diamond (2002: 25) identifies three types of hybrid regimes: “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” regimes (or hegemonic authoritarianism), “competitive electoral authoritarian” regimes (or competitive authoritarianism) and a residual category called “ambiguous” regimes. To identify hybrid regimes, Diamond (2002: 32) first uses the Freedom House Index where a regime with a score from 4.0 to 6.0 on the combined seven-point scale is considered hybrid. However, as Ottaway (2003: 8) notes, “attempts to classify hybrid regimes on a continuum, ranging from those that are closer to authoritarianism to those that are closer to democracy, have greater rigor and are more satisfactory in theory, but they tend to break down in the application”. We do not wish to enter the debate about using a given dataset on political institutions over another¹¹, or about the validity of ordinal versus nominal measurement. The point here is to acknowledge that these may be useful in differentiating between autocratic, hybrid and democratic regimes – although in some instance like in any large-N cross-national classification, measurement error is always possible – while having limited utility in terms of determining whether the hybrid regime type is hegemonic authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism. To distinguish between hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, Diamond (2002: 29) uses three additional indicators: “(i) the percentage of legislative seats held by the ruling party, (ii) the percentage of the votes won by the ruling party presidential candidate, and (iii) the years the incumbent ruler has continuously been in

¹¹ Beside Freedom House, there exist many datasets on political institutions: see Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (Kaufmann et al., 2007); Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001); Regime Change (Gasiorowski, 1996), Democracy and Development (Przeworski et al., 2000); Polyarchy Index (Vanhanen, 2000); and Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2010).

power”. With respect to the longevity criterion, Diamond associates long tenure with a hegemonic authoritarian regime. However, the time length in office is not specific to any hybrid regime type (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007: 145; Chehabi & Linz, 1998: 9). Indeed, some heads of state in competitive authoritarian regimes, such as Khama in Botswana, Senghor in Senegal or Biya in Cameroon, have remained in power for a while. Otherwise, for the author, when the ruling party or incumbent wins more than 75% of the popular vote for the executive position, it is considered a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Although leaders in hegemonic authoritarian regimes like in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan win elections with percentage close to 100%, it happens also in competitive authoritarian regimes such as Côte d’Ivoire where Henri Konan Bédié won with more than 90% of the vote in the 1995 presidential election, while loosing the next election to Laurent Gbagbo. The point is only that more than one election should be factored in when making a judgment on the significance of electoral results for presidential candidates. Finally, the meaning of percentage in seats is equivocal. Indeed, in almost all hybrid regimes, whether it is a hegemonic authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regime, the ruling party usually has at least the two-third majority necessary to amend the Constitution; a strategic and indispensable advantage.

While taken separately, these indicators are limited in terms of distinguishing between hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism, together they nevertheless point to a crucial difference between the two: the relative balance of power between the incumbent and the opposition. According to Schedler (2002: 47), in “competitive EA [i.e. electoral authoritarian] regimes authoritarian rulers are insecure; in hegemonic EA regimes they are invincible. In the former, the electoral arena is a genuine battleground in the struggle for power; in the latter, it is little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation and self-reproduction of power”. Thus in the scale of abstraction, electoral authoritarianism is a higher concept that regroups hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism; to us, it is synonymous of hybrid regime. Overall, Schedler uses the same criteria as those of Diamond (2002: 29). Yet, given the aforementioned, the operationalization is still problematic. We need to look for additional indicators. It will, amongst others, help to eliminate Diamond’s residual

category (ambiguous regimes) by classifying the country-regime within this category in the other two as well as increase our confidence in the overall classification.

Levitsky & Way (2002: 54) advance that competitive authoritarianism is different from “regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power (such as Egypt, Singapore, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s)”: that is, hegemonic authoritarianism regime. They provide precise measurements to distinguish between the two. For Levitsky & Way (2010: 7), hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism hold frequent national elections; the former impedes the legalization of opposition parties while the latter authorizes it. Evidently, most of today’s hybrid regimes have national elections with some form of political competition, leaving the hegemonic authoritarianism category almost empty. Thus they add three additional criteria to exclude cases from the competitive authoritarian category.

First, “a hybrid regime that holds elections and has some form of competitive party system but whereas non-elected officials retain considerable power, such as (a) those in which the most important executive office is not elected (e.g. Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco); (b) regimes in which top executive positions are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is seriously constrained by the military or other non-elected bodies (e.g. Guatemala, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey in the early 1990s); and (c) competitive regimes under foreign occupation (e.g. Lebanon in the early 1990s)” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 32).

Second, a hybrid regime in which “parties or candidates are routinely excluded, either formally or effectively, from competing in elections for the national executive” falls into the hegemonic authoritarian category (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 33); this is the case when opposition parties are systematically denied the right to run political campaigns (open electoral offices, recruit candidates or organize party meetings). Third, a hybrid regime in which electoral fraud is so systematic that results do not reflect voter preferences cannot be considered a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 33)¹².

¹² Given the general absence of independent surveys on voter preferences in hybrid regimes, observing opposition electoral victories at lower levels (e.g. city, regional, etc.) could indicate that ruling elites are willing to respect election results and thus will not engage in massive electoral manipulation.

In some cases, the fine line between autocratic regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes is far from being obvious; and the same can be said about the line between competitive authoritarian and democratic regimes. Nevertheless, the line exists: differences between these types reflect differences in the form of political competition. China and Indonesia (before 1998) as well as Malaysia and Japan are examples pertaining respectively to each category. Lumping together China and Indonesia (before 1998) or Malaysia and Japan in the same category prevents us from knowing what is at stake: that is to say how power is distributed and organized in a political community. The difference between autocratic and hegemonic authoritarian regimes concerns first the presence of elections but many autocratic regimes have elections. So we felt the need to look for explicit additional information before making a judgment call about classification. The difference between hegemonic and competitive authoritarian regimes deals foremost with the presence of opposition parties. Again, although it is a characteristic of competitive authoritarian regimes, these political actors can sometimes emerge in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Here, the concept declination brought forth by Diamond (2002) and Schedler (2002), as well as the contribution of Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010), was accurate enough to guide our classification of hybrid regimes. It was also appropriate to establish the differences between competitive authoritarian and democratic regimes.

No typology is perfect. However, the typology we choose has the advantage of being grounded in solid research at the origin of most contemporary work on political regimes and more and more contemporary scholars working on hybrid regimes are adopting it. For instance, we have evoked the affinities of Diamond's typology with Dahl's (1971) one and, as we will see in the next section, Diamond's typology allows the comparison of results between theories of hybrid regime stability.

1.2. Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability

The literature on hybrid regime stability has been flourishing since the 2000s (see appendix 2). We will refrain from presenting every scholarly work on the subject and rather focus on few

authors clustered around two general approaches: the economic (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006) and the organizational approach (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Four reasons justify this choice. First, the authors selected expose a large variety of arguments and as such they offer a comprehensive panorama of lines of research on hybrid regime stability. Second, they integrate into their framework arguments found in most researches on the subject. Presenting the entire corpus would be therefore redundant. Third, with some variants, they use similar definitions of types of hybrid regimes; hence facilitating the comparison of their findings and the accumulation of knowledge. Fourth, they have developed sophisticated and methodologically well-grounded theories. In a way, they represent the four pillars and foundation of our current understanding of hybrid regime stability¹³. They are a reference on the subject and any study that excludes them should be deemed scanty.

Before we examine the economic and the organizational approaches, we wish to make a general observation. Causes of regime emergence and conditions of regime stability are analytically different notions (Gunther et al., 1995: 3): if both are conflated, it creates confusion on what is explained. This problem is exemplified by modernization theories, which remain evasive about the nature of the predicted outcome (i.e. democratic emergence or democratic stability). They simply contend that a correlation exists between economic development and democracy. Yet, recent researches on the subject demonstrate that economic development is weakly correlated to the emergence of democracy, but above a certain threshold is highly significant in regard to democratic stability (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 165). That being said, it is important not to exaggerate the distinction. Decisions and events during transition may have an impact in the consolidation phase (Karl & Schmitter, 1991: 280-281, Munck & Leff, 1997: 345). The bottom line is that lumping together both notions is inimical to the coherence of the theory and leave unspecified the parameters under which it applies. Moreover, while the notion of “cause” is used to discuss hybrid regime emergence, the notion of “condition” is more appropriate when dealing with hybrid regime stability. The difference is more than a semantic one. Regime emergence is usually apprehended in a relatively short time period. As such, the action/reaction chain of events can be more easily

¹³ For instance, Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006) have won the best book award in the Comparative Democratization section of the American Political Science Association in 2008 and 2007 respectively.

observed. As time elapses between two phenomena, causality is harder to prove. On one hand, intervening factors come to play and make the relation spurious. On the other, iterated interactions between the independent (X) and dependent (Y) variables become almost inevitable. X influences Y, and Y influences X, *ad continuum*. Ergo, the direction of causality is blurred by time. The notion of condition recognizes such interaction. Its nature is more functional than “genetic” as it is for the causes of emergence (Rustow, 1970: 341).

1.2.1. The Economic Approach

The economic approach focuses on why and how a ruling party wins repeatedly elections for an extended period of time in a context of limited multiparty competition. Electoral clientelism, patronage and rent-seeking behavior form the basis of the argument. Magaloni (2006) in *Voting for Autocracy* is mostly concerned with the mass voters’ behavior, while Greene (2007) in *Why Dominant Parties Lose* provides a general framework of elite motivations. Both allegorize the inner logic of their theory using formal modeling and test its significance based on the analytic narrative of the Mexican case during the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) era (1928-2000), which includes regressions using sub-national statistics. Since Mexico under the PRI was holding frequent elections with universal suffrage and opposition parties were legal, it is fair to say that their inquiry is about the study of dynamics in competitive authoritarianism¹⁴.

Magaloni (2006: 20) defends the idea that the hegemony of the ruling party depends on the massive support it gets which in turn is related to “(a) long-term economic growth; (b) vote buying and the distribution of government transfers through... a punishment regime or the autocrat’s threat to exclude opposition voters and politicians from the party’s spoils system; and (c) electoral fraud and force”. According to the author, economic crises may destabilize the regime only when successive inflationist crises or prolonged economic stagnation occurs. It is the historical economic performance of the government that influences voting behavior, not the immediate situation. In other words, voters may forgive a government for a

¹⁴ Greene (2007) briefly extends his argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan at the end of his book; all dominant party regimes, but belonging to different types of regimes.

momentarily economic downturn as long as it does not last too long or repeat itself over time. As for the punishment measures the ruling party could use to prevent instability, “vote buying works better when people’s votes can be observed”: that is, in rural electoral districts where citizens vote in mass for the same party whereas in urban areas voting patterns are more fragmented (Magaloni, 2006: 67, chapter 4). It enables elites to target rewards, which makes it more cost effective. Moreover, the level of material rewards needed to gather support increases when the ideological distance between citizens and the ruling party looms large and when citizens moved beyond the survival mode (Magaloni, 2006: 69-70, 81). Hence, the ruling party abstains from buying out anti-regime supporters and wealthy individuals. Economic incentives are simply not enough to constrain them. Magaloni further specifies her theory and adds what she calls the entry-deterrence strategy:

“First, the party will react in an unforgiving fashion toward defectors by withdrawing funds from those municipalities that elect opposition representatives. Second, the ruling party will disproportionately invest in its supporters who can more credibly threaten to exit, rather than its most loyal followers, who are likely to support the party regardless” (2006: 124).

She also found by examining budget cycles that governmental spoils were especially evident before general election rather than after. Electoral fraud and the use of force are also an integral part of the punishment regime; without them, the ruling party’s threat to retaliate may not be credible enough to deter voters from joining the opposition. More important, electoral fraud and use of force act as the last resort to control electoral outcome if there is a possibility for the opposition to win. And in Magaloni’s (2006: 229) theory, if electoral results are not contested by most of the major opposition parties, the armed forces will always join and support the regime. The author asserts that mass mobilization denouncing electoral irregularities is unlikely “when electoral fraud is not common knowledge, because the ruling party will deceive moderate voters into believing the elections were clean, even if there was fraud” (Magaloni, 2006: 237). When the Electoral Commission is independent and transparent, and electoral irregularities publicly denounced, the opposition usually unites in a common cause aiming at toppling the party in power.

A key analytical element in Magaloni's theory is that mass support for the dominant party is conditional to an "image of invincibility" (2006: 52). High voter turnout and wins by huge margins as well as pompous electoral campaigns send the signal of a moribund opposition. As such, it raises substantially the cost of voting and defecting to the opposition. The fact that the opposition has never governed means uncertainty about how it will govern: "voters might be more tolerant of economic crises in situations where opponents possess no record in government" (Magaloni, 2006: 61). Furthermore, while politically united against the government, the opposition parties are usually divided in terms of economic policies. These divisions hinder their chance of winning elections against the ruling party. In one phrase, the author suggests that ruling elites will remain in power as long as it fosters long-term economic growth, which provides the resources to co-opt large segment of voters (Magaloni, 2006: 73).

Greene's theory concentrates on the incumbent's superiority in terms of resources and its concomitant ability to raise the cost of participation in the party system for the opposition (Greene, 2007: 5). The incumbent's edge concerns its capacity to deviate state resources for partisan ends. Foremost, it depends on the state ability to control economic activities, mainly through public ownership of large companies (Greene, 2007: 33). Money in itself is meaningless. What matters is how the ruling party can divert, regulate and target capital flows in order to tilt the electoral balance in its favor. Most of all, it concerns employment opportunities in state-owned enterprises. An economy dominated by the state provides ample means for the ruling elites to buy-off the loyalty of political and economic elites. It enables them to dispense jobs to the medium and higher strata of society. Furthermore, the omnipresence of the state also implies a certain form of individual economic dependence. There are very few options available to the labor force in the private sector. The state is the main avenue for social mobility. Hence, it increases the bargaining power of the power-holders. Securing personal income in the public administration becomes a matter of survival for many citizens. A hybrid regime sustains itself by making individual economic security conditional to the support of the ruling party. In this context, blunt repression is less effective than economic instruments of coercion. The mere threat of losing a job or a business license is enough to provoke self-censorship among citizens tempted to denounce state abuse of power. And without economic autonomy, democracy is an empty shell; citizens will be highly

reluctant to defend their rights fearing state retaliation. As for the opposition, challengers face an opportunity cost by brushing aside the material benefits associated with accepting dominant party bribes and cooptation tactics. However, by refusing such benefits, they impose on themselves another cost: systematic harassment that can go from legal actions, imprisonment, torture and even death. In the end, only parties that defend specific issues are allowed, given that they do not directly threaten the dominant party. Opposition parties remain small and unable to compete with the dominant party at the polls. The winner is known before Election Day due to the uneven playing field between the incumbent and the opposition. In this context, there is no need for extensive electoral fraud.

According to Greene, state retreat from the economy means hybrid regime instability. Greene (2010) later examines the statistical significance of his theory with seven competitive authoritarian regimes (Malaysia, Mexico, Senegal, Singapore, Taiwan, Gambia and Botswana) between 1961 and 2008, and the results corroborate his initial findings. In a hybrid regime, the dominant party survives as long as “politicize public resources” are the main game in town (2010: 808, 820-822). This line of reasoning rests on the premise that the government can use state resources for partisan ends with impunity, to the detriment of the public goods. In order to do so, state-owned companies' operations are secretive and opaque. Separation of powers is minimal or non-existent. For instance, the packing of oversight and steering committees with government sympathizers render the entire process a pure formality. In sum, accountability and transparency are highly problematic. With little constraints, the incumbent has the latitude to plunge into public funds and manage it in a discretionary fashion. In short, “the political economy of single-party dominance consists of a large state and a politically quiescent public bureaucracy” (Greene, 2010: 828).

1.2.2. The Organizational Approach

The other major line of inquiry on hybrid regime stability stresses the importance of a well-functioning ruling party and an effective coercive apparatus. The question remains the same as for the economic approach: how the dominant party wins elections over and over again? Hence, stability is defined in terms of government continuity and instability means the ruling

party electoral defeat. The approach focuses mostly on elite unity. Brownlee (2007) in *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* is especially concerned with the inner-working of the ruling party, while Levitsky & Way (2010) in *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* devote much attention to the ruling party capacities as well as those of the security and police forces. The latter also add international factors. The methodology differs from the one used by the proponents of the economic approach. Brownlee (2007) conducted fieldwork and interviews. He used the cases of Egypt, Malaysia, Philippines and Iran to illustrate his argument. He classifies these regimes as “autocracy with elections” and makes no clear distinction between hybrid regime types. The historic period starts as early as 1950s in some cases. Levitsky & Way’s (2010) demonstration is substantial. It is a large-N qualitative study. It covers 35 competitive authoritarian regimes from of all regions of the globe after the end of the Cold War.

Brownlee (2007) contends that a well-structured and institutionalized party participates in asserting domination over competing political forces and mitigates centrifugal force from within. Case in point:

“The National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt and UMNO in Malaysia brought elite cohesion within the regime and electoral control in the public arena... On the alternative path trod by Iran and the Philippines, elite rivalries were not contained within a party and instead escalated into open factionalism” (Brownlee, 2007: 13, 14).

Brownlee analyzes the impact of elite confrontation, party competition and more generally political institutions from a historical perspective of three processes. First, regime formation is a defining moment when rules are created in the context of a relative institutional vacuum. The general contour of how elites will interact is at the heart of the contention. In many ways, new institutions affect the distribution of power within society and as such, it generates conflicts between various political groups. The key is “whether elites decisively resolve their core conflicts during the period of regime formation” (Brownlee, 2007: 37). At the onset, conflict resolution follows largely a pattern of attrition: that is, the capacity of a political organization to eliminate other potential rivals and assert its authority over various social forces.

Unresolved conflicts tend to perpetuate themselves. Henceforth, political instability will be a recurrent feature. In the course of intense struggle for power, the capacity of political organizations is related to their strategic posture – i.e. coercive means - but also to their ability to forge alliances in order to gather momentum for their quest of institutional control. Political parties manage these alliances: they channel resources, coordinate actions and mobilize support. Ultimately, regime formation is a period marked by a confrontation between political organizations in the making.

Second, during the phase of regime consolidation, “the act of governing raises new challenges and prompts leaders to broaden their initial clique” (Brownlee, 2007: 37). As the coalition grows larger and disparate, the locus of conflict is less between parties and more among elites within the party, especially the ruling party. At that stage, the main challenge for the ruling elites is to contain the ambitions of the ranks and files. Once nomination procedures are instated, professional advancement is no longer a function of arbitrary decisions and, as such, individuals do not fear to lose their position overnight. The time horizon of elites expands and their expectations change: they have now strong incentives in conforming to the rules and stay loyal to the ruling party. Their future is less uncertain and much more predictable. “By offering a sustainable system for members to settle disputes and exert influence, ruling parties generate and maintain a cohesive leadership cadre” (Brownlee, 2007: 39). These procedures are there to make sure that “no faction will indefinitely trump the others, and thus the organization’s decisions will, over time, reflect its composition” (Brownlee, 2007: 39). Therefore, in a regime where no party is endowed with such institutional strength, elite factionalism will be endemic.

Third, regime breakdown concerns party disintegration. History is far from being linear and no party is exempt from falling into decay. The question becomes why ruling elites would voluntarily dissolve their organization? The author gives the following answer.

“Rulers may subsequently deactivate existing party institutions for fear that rivals will take hold of them... They then narrow their coalitions along strict ideological or personal lines, marginalizing other figures in the ruling cadre.... Such actions have the unintended consequence of hastening the outcome they

are meant to prevent: rulers who seek to consolidate their authority instead disperse it” (Brownlee, 2007: 37).

The incumbent’s growing insecurity in regard to the potential challenge of his rule by elite rivals through extra-legal means is the driving force behind the institutional dismantling of a party. And the greater the challenge gets, the more the head of state relapses into whimsical behavior. As a consequence, elites defect in greater numbers since they have no interest in keeping the status quo. Overall, a *quid pro quo* often sets itself: when the incumbent fears to be toppled, political elites worry that their time as influent actor of the decision-making process might be over (Brownlee, 2007: 41).

In sum, Brownlee explores the “life cycle” of the dominant party in hybrid regimes. He highlights the difficulty of monopolizing top positions within the political regime for a long period when no clear victory emerges from initial conflicts. Later, animosity between political elites is inevitable. Yet, elites’ rife is less probative than how political antagonism is overcome: within the rules or with violence. According to the author, while force is often central in claiming authority at the beginning when rules are generally absent, untamed violence needs to be replaced by institutions capable of mediating elite conflicts as time goes by. Otherwise, it is a recipe for instability.

Levitsky & Way (2010) confront the problem from another angle. They do not wish to unravel various institutional processes or mechanisms, but aim at variable specifications in explaining outcomes. Furthermore, as we will see, they provide a comprehensive framework insofar as it includes variables of a different nature. Overall, the authors profess that their theory predicts the political trajectory in 80% of cases (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 341-342).

Rich details are provided, more than in any other authors presented so far, of what constitutes the object of their inquiry: that is, competitive authoritarian regime. They present a thorough examination of how to distinguish between various forms of hybrid regimes¹⁵. They explicitly specify the meaning of stability and instability: governments that stay in power for at least

¹⁵ See the previous section on hybrid regime typologies.

three consecutive terms or inversely where at least one turnover occurs, but the regime does not democratize (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 368-369). The term government refers to the incumbent and/or ruling party. Levitsky & Way (2010: 20-23) envision three possible outcomes: (1) stable authoritarianism, (2) unstable authoritarianism and (3) democracy. Democracy is defined as a government turnover followed by three consecutive terms where elections were free, fair and competitive. The 1990-1995 period serves to evaluate the type of hybrid regimes and the 1996-2008 period to measure whether the regime is stable or not; and in the case of instability whether it engages in the process of democratization or not.

They develop a two-step argument. International factors carry out the first cut and internal factors complement the analysis. Levitsky & Way (2010) allege that a competitive authoritarian regime with low linkages with the West has a higher probability of remaining stable, especially if a black knight supports it: that is, a powerful authoritarian counter-hegemonic force such as China. Linkages are defined as economic (trade), social (international traveling of people), communication (international telephone calls and Internet) and intergovernmental (membership of regional organizations) ties between a hybrid and a democratic regime. Basically, low linkages mean an absence of external socialization to democratic rules. The stability of a hybrid regime also depends on international leverage. For the authors, this variable reduces itself to the size of a hybrid regime economy in terms of GDP, the presence of significant oil and gas reserves, nuclear weapon grade capacity, or competing security issues as well as the support of a black knight. These features are said to allow hybrid regimes to be independent and to isolate themselves from western external pressures. Of all the cases the authors examine, only Mexico, Taiwan and Russia are tagged “low leverage”: that is, relatively independent from external pressures. Hence, Levitsky & Way (2010: 52) come to the conclusion that it has no independent effect on the outcome: without high linkage, high leverage is more or less inconsequential.

As for internal factors, Levitsky & Way focus on organizational capacities of the ruling party and the coercive apparatus. The organizational strength of the ruling party is defined by the geographical extension and societal penetration of the party as well as by the unity between its members and discipline of lower-level elites generated by shared-beliefs (historic, ethnic,

ideological) (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 60-61, 377-378). These non-material factors allow the ruling party to face adversity during hard times, especially during economic turmoil. The state coercive capacity corresponds to the presence of a “large, well-trained, and well-equipped internal security apparatus with an effective presence across the national territory” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 376). The authors also take into account the cohesion of the security apparatus; a by-product of “large-scale external war; or intense and enduring military competition or threat; or successful revolutionary or anticolonial struggle” (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 376). The assumption here is that the coercive capacity is under the exclusive control of the ruling party. The security apparatus is not an instrument of the state. It is in effect the repressive branch of the dominant party. Levitsky & Way (2010: 26) recognize the importance of opposition unity and its impact on hybrid regime stability but, for them, opposition cohesion is meaningless when ruling elites are united. In the end, a ruling party that is able to reduce the political, economical, technological and social exchange with the West while increasing the complexity, specialization and effectiveness of its organization is more likely to preserve its dominant position within the national party system for a long time.

As we have seen, Greene, Magaloni, Brownlee as well as Levitsky & Way are from our perspective the key theoreticians of hybrid regime stability. Although in the case of the eclectic framework of Levitsky & Way, the classification is somewhat problematic, they themselves state: “our approach to incumbent power is organizational” (2010: 56). It is important here to emphasize that both approaches put a premium on one single institution as the guarantor of stability: the ruling party. In doing so, they want to explain what makes a ruling party dominant.

1.3. A Critical Assessment

Any critical assessment of the literature on hybrid regime should start with how it relates to the preexisting literature on democratic and autocratic stability. Only then, we can obviate the temptation of presenting something as new when it is not and, most importantly, posit that hybrid regimes are analytically different from other types of regimes. It is an exercise of differentiation, which is fundamental to any claim of knowledge accumulation. In this regard,

we will concentrate on three themes: (1) the electoral and party systems, (2) economic development and (3) legitimacy. As mentioned in the introduction, conditions of regime stability are numerous. We choose to focus on these three themes because they are central to any explanation of stability. They examine the political, economic and cultural dimensions, providing an exhaustive overview of the issue from different angles. Also, these themes cut across all regime types; allowing meaningful comparisons with the economic and organizational approaches to hybrid regime stability.

Before moving on with our critical assessment, we need to clarify one point from the start: how international factors connect to the literature on regime stability. Levitsky & Way (2010) frame international institutions in a post-Cold War environment and focus on their democratization effect. In this regard, we believe that dynamics come down to geographic proximity of hybrid regimes to Western countries. Mexico and the Caribbean countries are neighbors of the United States, whereas Eastern and Southern European countries fall under the umbrella of the European Union. Of course, there are exceptions. Nicaragua (1990 transition), Guyana (1992 transition) and Taiwan (1996 transition) may be three of them¹⁶. Still, in the first two cases, the regime was crisis-ridden. Therefore, we assume that with the exception of those regimes geographically close to the West, international links with western institutions have a limited impact on the democratization of hybrid regimes.

That being said, we are interested in hybrid regime stability and instability *per se*. Asking why a hybrid regime is unstable is not the same as asking why it moves to a democratic regime. In the case of instability, we leave the direction of change unspecified. Ultimately, we think meshing together the question of democratic transition of hybrid regimes and hybrid regime stability/instability within a single framework increases significantly the complexity of the analysis. Most of all, it runs the risk of opening doors without closing them. For instance, how the national context influences the democratic transition of hybrid regimes remains ambiguous in Levitsky & Way's theory. To be sure, their theory is eclectic, not syncretic. The problem is not so much about underlying contradictions than about asking too much of a single theory.

¹⁶ See Levitsky & Way's (2010: 375) list of high linkage countries.

There is always a trade-off. A general theory of hybrid regimes will surely lack precision in regard to certain dynamics, precisions that nevertheless may be crucial in evaluating the validity and utility of the theory. A choice has to be made. Our research focuses on the hybrid regime dynamics themselves rather than on trying to understand why a hybrid regime makes a transition to democracy.

Whether the object is stability/instability or democratization, international factors cannot be denied. In the ubiquitous world we live in, very few states are isolated from outside forces. Yet, we argue that for the majority of hybrid regimes, the explanation should be found within national boundaries. As Schmitter (2001: 47) stressed, “the impact of the international context is normally mediated through national or sub-national actors and processes”. Domestic dynamics should be the core of any model of political stability, the starting point of the analysis. It should be the prism through which we see the influence of external factors.

From now on, in our critic of the organizational approach that includes amongst others Levitsky & Way’s theory, we will disregard international institutions and concentrate on domestic factors of regime stability.

1.3.1. Electoral and Party Systems

The stability of democracy is often associated with various institutional designs. For instance, many studies have examined whether a presidential or a parliamentary system, a proportional representation or first-past-the-post voting system is more conducive to stability (Duverger, 1972: 23-32; Linz, 1990). Before addressing these issues, others point to the necessity of considering if the party system is an institution in the first place (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995: 3; Huntington, 1968: 13-23, 1965: 397-461); the absence of such a condition would of course entertains instability in a democratic regime.

In the case of hybrid regimes, theories on stability have acknowledged the frequency with which the ruling elites alter the electoral and party systems. According to Levitsky & Way (2010: 79):

“Institutionalist analyses hinge on the assumption that formal institutions are (1) regularly enforced, and (2) minimally stable. In other words, they take for granted that parchment rules actually constrain actors in practice. Although these assumptions hold up relatively well in the advanced industrialized democracies, they travel less well to other parts of the world. Indeed, a striking characteristic of many competitive authoritarian regimes is the extent of sheer institutional weakness. In most competitive authoritarian regimes, formal institutions are highly unstable”.

Institutional instability is a deliberate and survival strategy of ruling elites in hybrid regimes (Schedler, 2002: 42-45). For instance, the UMNO changed the Malaysian Constitution 46 times in 40 years (Funston, 2001: 171). As counter-intuitive as it sounds, hybrid regime stability resides in institutional volatility or, put differently, on the degree to which ruling elites can manipulate institutions and impose new ones in order to win elections. And studying the various legal arrangements of electoral and party systems brings little insight into the problem at hand. Of course, some electoral or party systems may favor the ruling party (e.g. the gerrymandering of the electoral map), but what matters most is the fact that any given electoral or party system can be modified in order to suit the interests of the ruling elites depending on the context. Therefore with few exceptions, the literature on hybrid regime stability stays away from explanations based on different electoral and party institutional arrangements¹⁷. That being said, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of institutional volatility. It is not a constant. It is a periodic feature. Part of the effort in unraveling the dynamics of hybrid regimes is to identify in which conditions institutional instability occurs.

Sheltering against the potential volatility of the electoral and party systems, the elites find refuge in the ruling coalition apprehended as an amalgam of factions under the auspices of the ruling party¹⁸. This is another important contribution of the literature on hybrid regime stability, especially in Brownlee’s (2007) theory. Briefly, outside the dominant party, the incumbent acts unilaterally. Opposition figures feel the Damocles’ sword over their head. Inside, there is a sense of predictability. It is a community into which consensus is formed by

¹⁷ To our knowledge, the only analysis that deals explicitly with this issue in a hybrid context is Croissant (2003).

¹⁸ The ruling coalition is usually synonymous of dominant party in the literature on hybrid regime stability.

iterated interactions, diverse experience and common perception about how conflict should be mediated through non-violent and legal expression; there is a commitment to collective objectives. Elites mutually agree to behave in accordance with prescribed norms of conduct. There is a shared understanding and recognition of the reputation and interests of each actor. In a nutshell, the ruling coalition is the only political institution that does not fall prey to arbitrariness of power-holders. Thus, when dealing with hybrid regimes, it is important to locate the domain that is subject to institutional volatility and not extend what we find to the entire political institutional architecture.

That being said, the organizational approach has one significant hurdle: the rationale used to explain hybrid regime stability is very close to the one evoked in the larger literature on political development to explain the stability of single-party autocratic regimes. Indeed, theoretically, scholars have long ago asserted the importance of a strong party in relation to autocratic stability. In this regard, Huntington's book (1968) entitled *Political Order in Changing Societies* serves as a reference on the subject¹⁹. Overall, it stresses the importance of the institutionalization of the ruling party as a determinant of autocratic regime stability. More recently, Linz (2000: 40; 52-64) has underlined the centrality of the political party and coercive apparatus in maintaining totalitarian regimes. Thus, in using similar factors, the organizational approach does not clearly specify the differences between single-party autocratic regime stability and dominant-party hybrid regime stability. The point here is that the literature on hybrid regime stability has to position itself in relation to the literature on autocratic regimes if it wishes to contribute to the development of the subfield on hybrid regimes and accumulate knowledge (Snyder, 2006: 227). Empirically, most of modern autocratic communist regimes have been highly durable for reasons raised by the organizational approach. China under the Chinese Communist Party, Cuba under the Cuban Communist Party, North Korea under the Korea Workers' Party and Laos under the Lao People's Revolutionary Party are prime examples.

¹⁹ See also Huntington & Moore (1970). Their edited book includes all cases of one-party in non-democratic regimes. Yet, the strongest one-party regimes are autocratic ones (ref: Hitler's Germany, China and the Soviet Union).

It is our contention that all non-democratic regimes do not have the exact same configuration of conditions of stability. In fact, these various configurations are intimately tied to an institutional context: that is, the nature of non-democratic regimes. For instance, Hadenius & Teorell (2007: 150) estimate that the average life span of one-party autocratic regimes is 17.8 years, whereas in the case of a dominant limited multiparty system – i.e. competitive authoritarian regimes – it is almost 10 years. Magaloni's (2008: 21) findings largely validate these results. Hence, the relevance of a dominant party appears to be more significant in an autocratic than in a hybrid regime and in the latter case additional factors should intervene. Not all non-democratic regimes look alike and institutional differences should have an impact on the dynamics at play.

Furthermore, differences between types of hybrid regimes matter, especially in regard to the introduction of frequent national elections with universal suffrage and the legalization of opposition parties. Indeed, various authors highlight the importance of elections or legislatures in hybrid regimes while evoking arguments similar to the economic and organizational approaches, such as patronage and rule-based mechanisms²⁰. Therefore, it is not so much the particular form of electoral and party systems that should be factored in, but the mere fact that elections and/or party competition do exist and contribute to shape the structure of opportunities in which elites find their way in or out of the locus of power.

At the same time, the aforementioned authors analyze the presence of elections or the legalization of opposition parties from a highly aggregated perspective: that is, they are measuring their impact on hybrid regime duration²¹. Hence, they want to know if one type of hybrid regime is more stable than another. This is not entirely satisfying. Explaining the political dynamics prevailing in each type of hybrid regime involves understanding why a given type of hybrid regime will experience period of stability and instability or why a given type of hybrid regime in one country is more stable than the same type in another country. And these temporal and spatial variations still elude us.

²⁰ See Boix & Svolik (2010), Magaloni (2008), Gandhi (2008), Blaydes (2008), Gandhi & Przeworski (2006), and Lust-Okar (2006).

²¹ See also Brownlee (2009) and Hadenius & Teorell (2007).

To our knowledge, no research has systematically compared hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes across various historical contexts and integrated them into a unified and coherent framework. Greene (2007), Magaloni (2006) as well as Levitsky & Way (2010) zoom in only on competitive authoritarian regimes, whereas Brownlee (2007) makes no distinction between types of hybrid regimes. While it is true that the competitive authoritarian regimes represent the bulk of non-democratic regimes since the end of the Cold War (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007: 149-150), hegemonic authoritarianism cannot be framed as a marginal phenomenon. Diamond (2002: 11-12; 28-29) shows that the proportions of hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes were roughly equal, and among hegemonic authoritarian regimes some are strategic countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Angola. From a geopolitical standpoint, these are pivotal countries and regional powers, and their political stability is intimately associated with their type of regime. Moreover, in recent years, we have witnessed a potential resurgence of hegemonic authoritarian regimes especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. All of this suggests the worthy scholarly effort to explore how the dynamics of hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism differ from each other²².

In parallel, an additional remark is worth stressing. In a regime where at least one well-functioning party is absent, instability is endemic and it becomes impossible to qualify the regime itself²³. As Morlino (2009a: 277) stresses: “in order to have something that may be labelled as a regime we need at least minimal stabilization... Otherwise, we ‘pick up fireflies for lanterns’ by confusing a temporary changing situation with a more stabilized one whatever the reasons might be”. In this regard, how can we determine the basic structure of authority in

²² It is worth noting that Levitsky & Way (2010: 343) provide some insights about possible explanations of the conditions of stability in hegemonic authoritarian regimes at the end of their book by briefly stating that “our theory appears to perform well even if we expand the sample to include less competitive regimes” (i.e. hegemonic authoritarianism). However, if Levitsky & Way recognize the possibility that hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism stability could operate under similar conditions, the logical conclusion is that we still do not know the specific dynamics at play into each type of hybrid regime.

²³ Of course, there are exceptions; the case of Bangladesh is one. Yet, as a general rule, the presence of a dominant party is a *sine qua non* condition to pass the minimum threshold in terms of duration to evaluate the type of hybrid regime. The only systematic outlier to this pattern appears to be the hybrid regimes in the Middle East where the monarchical regent acts as a surrogate to the dominant party, such as in Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco.

Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville and Afghanistan to name a few? As evidence, a hybrid regime with no dominant party lasts a little more than five years (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007: 150). The absence of a dominant party in non-democratic regimes is either conducive to a transitional regime, which is already adequately explained by classic theories of political development, or a failed state in which power is located outside political institutions such as in rogue military factions, rebel groups or powerful families. But it is an entire different subject than ours. It is therefore obvious that we have to concentrate on the behavior of the dominant party as a class of phenomenon. Dominant parties do exist in established democracies: in Italy (Christian Democratic Party: 1945-1981), Japan (Liberal Democratic Party: 1955-1989), Israel (Mapai-Israel Labor Party: 1948-1977) and Sweden (Social Democratic Party: 1932-1976) (Pempel, 1990: 4). Yet, *contra* to Friedman & Wong (2008) who study adaptive strategies of the dominant party in a variety of regime types, we only focus on hybrid regimes because the institutional context poses quite a different and specific set of challenges to the ruling elites. From our perspective, comparing Japan, Malaysia and China for instance, yields few insights in understanding hybrid regime stability and instability.

Finally, in the organizational approach, the dominant party variable alone is excessively static. It has a bias toward stability. It is too macro to take into account political change. As Levitsky & Way (2010: 73) recognize, “powerful coercive and party structures rarely emerge or disappear overnight, and they are almost never the product of short-term crafting or institutional design”. From this vantage point, the focus is on elements of continuity. It fails to anticipate historical events such as the transformation of one-party systems in sub-Saharan Africa to multiparty competition in the 1990s. Indeed, “until they were challenged and began to fall, one-party states in Africa were viewed by many scholars as fairly resilient; there were few predictions that Africa would experience much of the political revolution that rocked Latin America” (Herbst, 1994: 186). In other words, the organizational approach provides very few systematic explanations as why instability may occur in a dominant party hybrid regime. Our exegesis is to give equal weight to both elements of continuity and discontinuity, stability and instability. After all, they are two sides of the same coin.

In sum, the institutionalization of a dominant party is a condition of stability in both autocratic and hybrid regimes. The institutionalization of electoral and party systems is a condition of stability in a democratic regime. The organizational approach and to a lesser degree the economic approach highlight this distinction. Yet, we argue that the analytical difference between one-party autocratic and dominant-party hybrid regime dynamics as well as between hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes are not clearly spelled out in the existing literature on hybrid regime stability. Furthermore, instability in dominant party hybrid regimes is still an obscure phenomenon in the organizational approach. Therefore, in order to expand our appreciation of hybrid regime dynamics we should ask: what are the patterns of stability and instability in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes where *at least one* party is organizationally strong?

1.3.2. Economic Development

From political institutions, we now move to economic factors: an everlasting object of contention among scholars concerned with political development. Indeed, since the inception of modernization theories, democratic stability has been linked to economic development and its corollary: industrialization, urbanization, education, communication media and economic growth (Lipset, 1959: 75-85; Lerner, 1958: 54-64). Most of all, economic development transforms the class structure. It contributes to the emergence of a middle-class where individuals with crosscutting interests and upward social mobility opportunities are gradually exposed to diverse interests and cultivate moderate political opinion (Lipset, 1959: 83-84). It supports the rise of the bourgeoisie and reduces the influence of powerful landlords as well as the prevalence of the peasantry as a dominant social group who tends to favor tradition over modernity (Moore, 1968: 418-427). It empowers the working-class by increasing its membership and organizational capabilities through labor unions, which defend the rights of the mass and therefore downplay the influence of elites within the political regime, making democracy more inclusive instead of exclusive (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 8, 59). More generally, economic development fosters the dissemination of economic and organizational resources within society and by ricochet favors a more equal distribution of power within the political regime (Vanhanen, 1997: 42-54). In addition, the economic performance of the

government is related to the stability of a democratic regime. Prolonged economic contraction, inflation crisis, increased unemployment, disruption in food distribution and basic government services are detrimental to the general social peace, can ignite violent upheavals and provoke a democratic breakdown (Almond & Mundt, 1973: 628; Lipset, 1959: 89; Linz, 1978: 21, 54).

As history demonstrates, the stability of other types of regimes can also be explained by sustained economic development. In this regard, the economic approach (Greene, 2007) formulates an interesting argument. In hybrid regimes, economic development contributes to stability only if it rests on a large public sector. In a nutshell, state intervention in the economy is a mean to control society. The economy is dominated by parastatal enterprises and interference with market forces are designed to serve foremost the interests of the ruling party. Commerce chambers, trade unions, professional associations and a like are in one way or another cushioned by the ruling elites. In comparison, economic development is conducive to democratic stability mainly insofar as it promotes the active participation of autonomous economic actors in the private sector. As for economic performance, hybrid regimes are also vulnerable. Foremost, economic decline means resource scarcity and the inability to spoil the mass of followers with social and economic benefits. However according to Magaloni (2006), the population of hybrid regimes appears to be more tolerant than the one in democratic regimes because of the absence of a proven track record from the opposition who never ruled before.

Similar patterns can easily be traced in autocratic regimes, especially in communist states. Thus, as it is the case for the organizational approach, the defenders of the economic approach are not able to distinguish between the dynamics found in autocratic versus hybrid regimes as well as in different types of hybrid regimes. Furthermore, the economic approach leaves open two unresolved issues. First, why a dominant party in a hybrid regime would remain in power while undergoing a privatization process? Second, why a dominant party in a hybrid regime would remain in power in a context of underdevelopment? These questions are crucial because it concerns large numbers of hybrid regimes. Indeed, many hybrid regimes are underdeveloped countries. If we compound various indicators, about 40% of hybrid regimes in 2010 can be considered underdeveloped (see appendix 4). By underdeveloped, we mean a country in which

the industrial base is embryonic or atrophied, and the economy is mostly dependent on the agricultural sector where exports are based on a single or few commodities. Following the structural adjustment programs (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the adoption of neoliberal policies worldwide by national leaders, most southern countries underwent massive sell out of public assets and a state retreat of the economy. In both cases, many dominant parties in hybrid regimes remained in power despite structural obstacles.

Let us first address the case of hybrid regime stability in underdeveloped countries. The economic approach contends that stability depends on an oversized coalition: that is, the ability of the ruling party to gather wide support among the elite and the population. When resources dry out in the course of a prolonged economic recession, instability will emerge. The argument rests essentially on the case of Mexico. The country is an emerging economy in its own rights. It is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since 1994. It was surely one of the most developed economies among hybrid regimes before the PRI defeat in 2000. Is this case representative of other hybrid regimes? Can we compare Mexico with let say Senegal? Do the ruling elites in these countries have the same economic resources at their disposal? It is hard to answer by the affirmative. The ability of state-owned companies to provide secure jobs to the middle and upper classes as well as the capacity of the government to distribute widely economic advantages to loyal supporters is fairly limited in underdeveloped countries. Massive co-optation is simply not possible. At the same time, many dominant party regimes in underdeveloped countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, stayed in power for decades while domestic resources for co-optation were scarce and social policies almost inexistent (Cowen, 2002: 18-20). The People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (1972-1991), the FRELIMO in Mozambique (1975-today) or the UPRONA in Burundi (1966-1993) are few examples. The bottom line is that before considering the impact of economic decline, we should look at the level of economic development.

Even Levitsky & Way's (2010) rationale for stability in underdeveloped countries is not entirely convincing. They stress succinctly that non-material factors, such as nationalism and ethnicity, provide the basis for unity in case of economic scarcity (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 65). However, as the authors acknowledge, nationalist ideology, especially when it revolves around

anti-colonial and anti-imperial stances, may have a limited time span: “violent struggles most effectively generate cohesion while the revolutionary generation is alive. Subsequent generations are likely to lack sufficient legitimacy to impose unity in crisis, and they often have less experience with high-intensity coercion” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 363). Ideology usually involves a critique of past institutions and since younger generations have no real recollection of this past, it tends to lose meaning and its symbolic power as generations succeed each other (Huntington: 1970: 13-14). Moreover, given that ethnic homogeneity is a rare phenomenon in non-western countries, exclusive politics may galvanize the solidarity of members within an organization but in the process it antagonizes individuals from other organizations. It tends to lead to civil war, not political stability (Byman & Van Evera, 1998: 39-41). Ultimately, material and non-material factors in economic and organizational approaches do not illuminate how hybrid regime dynamics in developing and underdeveloped countries differ.

In line with modernization theories, democracy can emerge in low-income economies but could easily relapse in face of unforeseen disruptive events (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 165, 177). To be sure, there are cases of stable democratic polity in poor countries. Benin after 1991 is an example. But they are the exception. In hybrid regimes, cases of stable polity in underdeveloped countries are not an anomaly; they are a common feature. The point here is that stability of hybrid regimes in underdeveloped countries goes against the very logic of modernization theories; and theories of hybrid regime stability are ill equipped to explain such phenomenon. Why do we find stable hybrid regimes in underdeveloped countries and how to integrate such considerations into an overall analytical framework of hybrid regime stability that also includes developing economies? These questions remain unanswered.

As for the privatization process, Greene (2007: 33) posits that the main threat to a dominant-party regime is the retreat of the state from the economy. Selling state companies to private interests is akin to surrender power to the uncertainty of free, fair and competitive elections. Because privatization in Greene’s theory involves the emergence of independent economic actors and most of all curtails the ability of the ruling elites to distribute rewards, the cost/benefit ratio of supporting the opposition decreases. Thus, the latter has suddenly a

legitimate chance of winning elections. This framework assumes that privatization is a transparent process, and the attribution of state assets goes to the highest private bidder regardless of its connection with the regime. According to liberal economic theories, this is how privatization should be conducted.

In fact, many non-western countries have deviated from this ideal. Case in point is the Russian shock therapy orchestrated by Yegor Gaidar, where individuals close to Yelstin's inner circle became oligarchs almost overnight by acquiring state assets at under market value (Hoffman, 2002; Handelman, 1995). Van de Walle (2001: 178-182) has also observed the same problem in sub-Saharan Africa where economic liberalization was often partial and unregulated, promoting corruption and clientelism. According to Zinecker (2009: 303-304), deregulation promoted by the IMF and World Bank in developing countries fostered rent-seeking behavior. In this context, privatization in itself can be a major source of patronage. Property may change hands and in nature but abides within the same circle of elites; an exchange with little transparency to show for. There are various ways to implement the privatization process. Some may be conducive to stability, others to instability.

Equally important, we argue, is which public asset is sold. It is probably not a coincidence if Diamond (2002) opens his seminal article called *Thinking about Hybrid Regimes* with the example of Russia, Indonesia, Ukraine, Nigeria, Turkey and Venezuela as typical hybrid regimes. Among these cases, only Ukraine and Turkey are not major world oil or gas exporters/producers. The case of petro-states illustrates the fact that the ruling elites can sell public enterprises operating in low valued-added product markets to the highest bidder. However, rules change when it concerns state companies generating a large share of national income or political capital. What matters is not the control of the economy *per se* by the state, but the state control of strategic sectors generating substantial rents that have extensive ramifications in all sectors of the economy. Without these rents, the ruling party is no longer able to co-opt opponents and instability ensues (Ross, 2001: 333-334; Wantchekon, 2002: 10; Robinson et al, 2006: 450). Privatization of strategic sectors is conceivable, but it should be partial. For instance, the state can surrender the management function to private investors and integrate them to the property structure while keeping an ownership majority. Thus, the ruling

elites will be more reluctant to sell on the open market all its shares in state media companies, steel or car factories, oil companies and so on.

To link the problem related to the privatization process with the one related to underdevelopment, we wonder what the state has to sell in poor countries. Hence, what is the impact of privatization when the state has very few assets? In underdeveloped countries, large-scale state-owned enterprises are – when they do exist – rare. Most public jobs are within ministries and are not well paid. In other words, the destabilizing effect of privatization should be more visible in developing countries.

To recapitulate, the economic approach does not infirm modernization theories but specifies the conditions under which economic development and economic growth foster stability in a hybrid regime context. Still, we know little about differences between non-democratic regimes and between types of hybrid regimes, and more central to our reflection here, the analytical toolbox of both the organizational and economic approach ends up empty when it deals with hybrid regime stability in underdeveloped countries; a rather frequent phenomenon. The economic constraint in these countries is much more acute compare to a richer country such as Mexico, forcing the ruling elites to be highly selective in the choice of who they bribe or spoil. Also, the economic approach tends to overestimate the significance of the privatization argument. For one, privatization can be a source of patronage. For two, strategic sectors continue to be protected by the state. It all comes down to a crucial question: how conditions of stability in hybrid regimes vary according to different levels of economic development?

1.3.3. Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a core notion within the literature on democratic regime stability. Yet, “legitimacy is a mushy concept that political analyst do well to avoid” (Huntington, 1991: 46). In this regard, Lipset’s (1959: 86) distinction between effectiveness and legitimacy is a starting point:

“By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society”.

In parallel, Easton (1975: 437) advances the notion of diffuse versus specific support:

“Some types of evaluations are closely related to what the political authorities do and how they do it. Others are more fundamental in character because they are directed to basic aspects of the system. They represent more enduring bonds and thereby make it possible for members to oppose the incumbents of offices and yet retain respect for the offices themselves, for the way in which they are ordered, and for the community of which they are a part. The distinction of roughly this sort I have called specific against diffuse support”.

Linz (1978: 18) proposes the following definition: “democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular historical juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals”. The author differentiates legitimacy from efficacy and effectiveness: efficacy referring “to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens” while “effectiveness is the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results” (Linz, 1978: 18, 22). For Przeworski (1986: 56), “what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives”. Similarly, “a regime is legitimate when its people believe it is the most appropriate form of government for their country – better than any alternative they can imagine – and therefore that it has the moral right to make laws, collect taxes, direct resources, and command obedience” (Diamond, 2008: 88).

From these definitions, legitimacy is still a rather vague notion; especially if we want to look at how it applies to autocratic and hybrid regimes. In this regard, approaches to hybrid regime stability are of no help. They do not explicitly integrate the notion of legitimacy in their

framework. If it is true that the notion is sometimes mentioned, it is without any clear references to what legitimacy actually means in a hybrid context and what are the empirical declinations. To delineate the differences between regime types, we compare them along four axes: (i) legitimacy and effectiveness, (ii) regime and government, (iii) attitudes and behaviors, as well as (iv) mass and elites. As it will soon be evident, these objects of comparison intertwined with each other. And it is only in relation to each other that we can better grasp the meaning of legitimacy in hybrid regimes.

First, legitimacy is fundamental to any reflection on hybrid regime because it is frequently contested. If legitimacy is associated with the absence of political alternative, than legitimacy in hybrid regimes is problematic. Indeed, “disloyal” parties and anti-regime social movements almost invariably exist. They promote and defend political alternatives aiming at transforming radically the regime whether in line with democratic ideals or authoritarian imperatives. From indigenous leaders, to religious zealots and liberal reformists many contest the legitimacy of the regime in place and do it on a regular basis. A significant proportion of citizens casts their votes in support or joins the ranks of disenfranchised political organizations. Of course, not all opposition parties and social movements embody a political alternative, yet many actually do.

For democratic and autocratic regimes, legitimacy is still important, but it is somewhat latent or forcedly dormant depending on the context²⁴. Instead, all eyes are on state effectiveness. In a stable democracy, as the authoritarian past fades away, regime legitimacy is taken for granted; it is no longer a critical issue and popular discontent is directed toward state ineffectiveness (Morlino, 1998: 32-33)²⁵. In a stable autocratic regime, political alternative is generally absent by default. State repression is so systematic that opposition leaders calling for a regime change are in effect muted and dissolved. In very few instances, protest may be

²⁴ All types of regimes need legitimacy and public support of the regime confers legitimacy. Public support can be voluntary as in democracies or coerced as in autocracies (Diamond, 2008: 89; Beetham, 1991: 90-94). Yet, the distinction between coerced and voluntary support of the regime is an assumption. Empirically, it is far from being crystal clear since it deals with individual intentions and not all are equally subject to indoctrination.

²⁵ By this, we do not imply that a crisis of legitimacy is not conceivable in a consolidated democracy. As Morlino (2009b: 211) asserts, political apathy found in old democracies are symptomatic of a delegitimation process. We only want to stress that legitimacy crises are more frequent and acute in hybrid regimes compared to other types of regimes.

tolerated insofar as it concerns economic conditions in its broader sense but not political rights. Thus, contention in autocratic regimes appears to be less about regime legitimacy than state effectiveness (or “performance” legitimacy).

The point here is that while the literature on hybrid regimes generally neglects the question of legitimacy, its relevance for hybrid regimes is undeniable; it makes the omission even more questionable. More than for any other types of regimes, legitimacy should be at the core of academic research on hybrid regime stability. Of course, some anti-regime opposition parties in new democracies may contest the legitimacy of the regime, and evaluating the regime legitimacy is particularly important to know whether a democratic regime is consolidated or not. Yet, *contra* to democratic regimes, in hybrid regimes, many opposition groups continue to contest the legitimacy of the regime long ago after it emerged. Its persistence is at the crux of why it is so central to our understanding of political dynamics in hybrid regimes. Still, we do not pretend that hybrid regimes are in a protracted and everlasting crisis of legitimacy. There are quiet and turbulent periods. This variation should be central to the study of hybrid regime dynamics. Moreover, the focus on legitimacy does not imply that state effectiveness is irrelevant in hybrid regimes. As it was discussed in addressing the theme of economic development, bad performance may very well precipitate the fall of the regime, but it usually takes a prolonged recession or successive crises for public policies to become a potential ticking bomb²⁶.

Second, in a hybrid regime, the regime and the government are two concepts that often overlap. At the beginning of Chapter One, we said that the regime refers to the rules and procedures that determine the access to power and constrain the government. However, in the section on electoral and party systems, we also agree with the economic and organizational approaches that in hybrid regimes the government alters some of the rules of the game according to its own interests; shaping in a way the regime so that at the end the government and the regime are difficult to distinguish. In a stable democracy, when citizens do not agree with a government policy, they nevertheless respect the way it is chosen. These are two

²⁶ As Magaloni (2006: 61) eloquently demonstrates with the case of Mexico, voters are surprisingly indulgent in a context of poor economic performance. For a similar argument, see Manzetti & Wilson (2007).

separate issues. Governments succeed one another, but the regime lasts. In a hybrid regime, such safety valves do not function: alternation of power from one party to another is a rare phenomenon. Thus, disapproval of the government could also mean doubts about the regime legitimacy (Alagappa, 1995: 27). Obviously, it is important not to exaggerate the argument since there is still a difference between the regime and the government. The government in hybrid regimes may shape the electoral and party systems, but the basic institutional architecture may remain intact: that is, the presence of frequent elections with universal suffrage or, depending on the type, the presence of a legal opposition. What we want to highlight is that contestation of the government in hybrid regimes has great implications; it is as important as a legitimacy crisis of the regime in a democracy.

Third, in hybrid and autocratic regimes, the evaluation of citizen attitudes is highly problematic. Mass surveys are notoriously difficult to conduct and interpret (Magaloni, 2006: 13; Goode, 2010). Authorities may intervene in the sampling selection process; exert pressures on the subjects themselves to respond according to a predetermined discourse, and/or pre-approve the questionnaire to be distributed while censoring some questions. In fact, this is one of the main reasons why academics are reluctant to address the question of legitimacy in non-democratic regimes. Indeed, mass survey on citizen political attitudes in hybrid regimes is embryonic. For instance, the Asian Barometer has just finished the first survey on Malaysia. Thus, historic comparison is not possible. The World Values Survey goes back to the end of the Cold War depending on the country, which is still a relatively short period of time to study the stability of hybrid regimes. Yet, attitudes (or beliefs) are only one facet of legitimacy; the other is behavior (or consent). While the former is about intention, the latter is about action, which is more readily observable even in autocratic and hybrid regimes.

Fourth, it is worth asking if citizen attitudes are essential to our understanding. Could elite attitudes or behaviors serve instead as a sound empirical basis for the study of legitimacy in the context of hybrid regimes? In a democratic regime, elites and the mass interact and ultimately citizen attitudes determine the level of legitimacy a democratic regime has. Politics in hybrid regimes is not a one-way street like in autocratic regimes, but it remains mostly a top-down affair. The assumption here is that:

“As the elite groups have greater control over power resources and are more engaged in the political process, shared norms and consent among elite are more important than among the general public. And groups that have an effective capacity for articulating and mobilization are even more crucial because of their multiplier effect” (Alagappa, 1995: 28).

Mass mobilization does occur in hybrid regimes, but it tends to be orchestrated by political elites at different levels (national, regional, local). In the end, elites are the pivotal actor of a legitimacy crisis and in that context the study of mass attitudes is not as consequential as it is in democratic regimes. The mass as an actor is relevant, but only at the periphery, as a factor of second importance. Without elite support, mass mobilization is less likely to have an impact on government activities whereas elite discontent without mass support can have nonetheless serious consequences. We will expand our reflection on this matter in the next chapter. Furthermore, elites are by nature geared toward action. They have to choose side all the time: for or against a given law, for or against a given political organization. In turn, these choices reveal their intent. Better, elite’s attitudes measured in terms of public declarations can be misleading: “between simple declarations and the actions there is a world of difference... If not for other reasons, this alone would be sufficient to justify an analysis of the behaviour” (Morlino, 1998: 318). Rhetoric is frequent in politics. From this vantage point, what matters is what political elites do and less what they say or think.

In brief, legitimacy is empirically an intractable notion in non-democratic regimes because the object of legitimacy is ubiquitous and citizen attitudes are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, albeit risky in terms of research design validity, it should not prevent us from probing its significance with regard to hybrid regime dynamics. We argue that it is an essential feature of hybrid regimes more than of any other type of regime given the sustained presence of a political alternative whether within the party system or in civil society. In a hybrid regime, legitimacy is contested, whereas in an autocratic regime it is repressed and in a democratic regime it is mostly resolved. As for measurement problems, they are somehow by-passed given that the focus in hybrid regimes should be most of all on elite behavior and less on citizen attitudes as it is the case in democratic regimes. Our decision to focus on elite behavior

as an indicator of regime legitimacy is not a pure arbitrary choice; it rests on logical arguments. Legitimacy is about the right to rule; and in hybrid regimes, this right finds its source mostly in elite consent of the government authority.

No doubt, legitimacy is a thorny notion in a comparative perspective. Most of all, there is the inherent danger of falling into tautological explanations where stability is both defined and explained by legitimacy. Part of the difficulty of untangling the notion of legitimacy is a function of its all-encompassing referent. Indeed, the confusion emanates from the multi-dimensional and interactive characters of legitimacy. Along those lines, the consent of the governed (behavior) defines legitimacy and the extension of shared norms and values among the population (attitudes) explains legitimacy (Levi et al., 2009; Beetham, 1991: 13-16). In other words, the respect of rules (behavior) depends on whether an individual believes in those rules (attitudes). We previously argued that consent of the governed in hybrid regimes is about elite behavior. As we will see shortly, indicators of stability are intimately related to the consent by the elites. Although stability and elite consent may be positing as analytically different notions, this distinction tends to breakdown in the variable specification phase as the same indicators are used to measure both. After all, what is a *coup d'État* by military officers or a boycott of election results by the opposition if it is not a sign of elite discontent? Furthermore, we have already established that elite attitudes (i.e. shared norms and values) are misleading giving the rhetorical nature of political discourse. Thus, there is a missing link: what are the conditions for political elites to express consent and support the regime, the government or the dominant party leaders? The answer to this question will find its way through the development of our theoretical framework in the next chapter. Ultimately, the study of stability is the study of legitimacy.

1.3.4. A Definition of Hybrid Regime Stability

In continuity with the preceding comments, the chapter closes with a discussion on the definition of hybrid regime stability and its empirical manifestation. In this regard, political stability is a trite concept and it should be problematized, especially when dealing with hybrid regimes. The intrinsic institutional volatility of hybrid regimes raised in the opening of our

critical assessment has implications not only in terms of explanatory factors (i.e. the impact of electoral and party systems) but also for the conceptualization of stability. Indeed, how to understand hybrid regime stability in a context of institutional volatility? To obviate this conundrum, the economic and organization approaches define hybrid regime stability as government durability: that is, whether the dominant-party wins elections after elections or loose. We find this definition unsatisfactory and call for the necessity to broaden its meaning.

Political stability sometimes refers to the absence of armed conflicts that extend from mass unrest and street riots to civil wars (see Kaufmann et al., 2008). A definition of stability based on such indicators shifts the research question to the causes of social violence. In this case, the object of stability or instability is exogenous to the political regime. We are interested in what is stable or unstable within the system, not outside of it. Although we do not deny possible connections between social violence and instability of the political regime, in our mind they are two analytical separate objects. The principle of covariance is not automatic. Case in point, India is regularly victim of rural insurrections, terrorist attacks and so on while its polity is rather stable.

Stability also refers to the basic structure of authority (regime): that is, the constitutive nature of access to power. For instance, when frequent elections are introduced or cancelled, or opposition parties are legalized or outlawed, a change of regime is assumed and associated with instability. The benchmark is the core principles surrounding the incumbent selection. The high volatility of institutional arrangements in hybrid regimes is in effect at a lower level. For instance, in the Bangladesh hybrid regime, the system of government alternated between a presidential, a parliamentary and an interim system eight times since 1984 while maintaining multiparty elections all along. It is the distinction between holding frequent elections versus modifying regularly electoral laws, between formally recognizing opposition parties versus altering the requisites to be formally recognized. Hence, it is important not to extrapolate the manipulation by the ruling elites of the electoral and party systems to the overall structure of authority.

Obviously, regime change is an indicator of instability. Yet, it is incomplete. First, regime change often implies a teleological process whereas a regime may experience instability while remaining hybrid. The basic structure of authority may be suspended or briefly interrupted. And since we are not trying to explain the transition from hybridity, we have no reason to limit ourselves to such definition. On the contrary, in doing so, many and perhaps significant events are ignored. This brings us to the second problem. A definition of stability based on regime change involves a threshold so high for instability to be detected that it becomes almost a non-event. Indeed, since for reasons already mentioned, we exclude cases of failed states or transitional regimes that have experienced repeated regime changes in a short lapse of time, regime change is otherwise more often than not reduced to a single moment. And understanding instability in a country based on one event is a rather tenuous empirical validation. Circumstances can be exponential and produce idiographic statements. Alternatively, causal relations can always be spurious. In other words, counterfactual cases are missing. The problem of stability and instability should be framed as an iterated diachronic process. Third, the meaning of a regime change or its implication for the distribution of power within the country is not always explicit or constant in hybrid regimes. Very often it is the same government who stays in power after the legalization of opposition parties, like in Kenya under the presidency of Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) and his party KANU who survived a democratic transition in 1991-1992. Moi was not the only one. In many sub-Saharan African countries, the same pattern has been observed (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 197).

It follows that hybrid regime stability would be defined in terms of government time tenure in office. When a party wins election after election, it equates to stability; and when it falls victim of a turnover, it means instability. Still with no further details, such definition evades crucial analytical problems. First, it concentrates on the outcome and neglects the processes, as with a definition based on regime change. Elections are held every five years or so and in the interval, the radar screen is on “off” as if stability or instability would be a spontaneous, all of a sudden phenomenon. It leaves a large number of events between elections out of the equation and, in doing so, it does not offer in a systematic way any response to which events are meaningful; and those events can possibly explain *ex ante* the outcome of elections. Observers interpret *ex post* the meaning of events case by case without any guiding principles.

Even more troublesome, instability is reduced to a single snapshot: the ruling party's electoral defeat. Second, what if the same leader or party remains in power, but cabinets succeed each other in a short time period? Is it a sign of instability? What if the dominant party loses its two-third majority necessary in order to amend the Constitution, but is still the winner of the election? Is it a forerunner of instability? Third, sometimes government turnover does not alter the fundamental political dynamics like in Sri Lanka where the United National Party lost the incumbency in 1994 while the regime maintained its hybridity (partly free) until 2010 according to Freedom House. In other words, such definition lacks precision and leaves too much discretion to the subjective judgment of scholars.

Therefore, none of the definitions presented so far injects sufficient variations in the phenomenon to be explained to start thinking about the conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes. For instance, what the 2000 electoral defeat of the *Parti Socialiste* in Senegal over the long time opposition figure Abdoulaye Wade tells us about instability and the political history of the country if the former stayed in power for over 40 years? Variation is central from a methodological point of view. Without it, the validity of concomitant relations is difficult to assess. Furthermore, intuitively there is something odd about the proposition that a relatively extended period of time is the sign of monolithic tendencies. It raises the possibility that the research object is ill defined: that is to say, it is homeostatic and does not enable us to dissect real-world events.

In our research, stability is associated with an absence of conflict about the rules of the game (Boudon & Bourricaud, 2004: 92; Sartori, 1987: 224-226; Ake, 1975: 273). In comparison, conflicts within the rules are ones that emerge within a specific set of institutions where all actors had previously agreed upon the rules and procedures that govern their interaction and were committed to full respect of their implementation. Conflicts about the rules are a zero-sum game; conflicts within the rules are closer to a positive-sum game (Boudon & Bourricaud, 2004: 92). Conflicts between political parties over policies are conflicts within the rules; conflicts between political parties over electoral reforms are conflict about the rules. The first are the expression of a stable political regime that can live and even improve out of both

consensus and dissenting opinions, within an agreed framework. The second is a clear signal that instability is at the door, calling for a change.

Stability is also extrapolated to a given period until a political crisis erupts. Here, “[stability] and crisis are conceived of as processes. In this way they can be analyzed diachronically” (Morlino, 1998: 17). Ergo, we refrain from using a definition of stability based on the capacity of the system to solve crises. A regime experiences periods of stability and instability. It is temporally contingent. Qualifying a hybrid regime as stable or unstable without specifying the period could be misleading.

Political crises have various manifestations. Chief among them is the momentarily paralysis of the main government organs. This is the highest level of instability. Indicators of such level of instability are a *coup d’État*, a state of emergency, the imposition of martial law, a massive public boycott of election results by disenfranchise elites or a combination of these. It can also be an alteration in the powers entrusted to the executive, the legislative and the judicial pertaining to a regime change or a change of leadership. With medium level of instability, institutions can still function but are significantly obstructed by either elite divisions within the dominant party, frequent cabinet changes, the assassination or kidnapping of ruling elites, the lost of the two-third majority by the ruling party, a long-term general strike of major sectors of the public administration called by opposition leaders, or disagreement among political elites over the nomination of an individual to a key position within the ruling party or in the cabinet. At a lower level, instability deals with local and isolated disruptions of the political institutions, low voter turnout and electoral volatility. Taken together, these indicators can tell if there is instability in a hybrid regime. Evidently, one crisis can feed another. A general strike or an electoral boycott can lead to a state of emergency. In this sense, the actors of instability in hybrid regimes are usually political elites that disobey the rules dictated by the leaders of the ruling party. Instability is not merely public protest.

Standard definitions of hybrid regime stability either focus on the regime duration or the ruling party longevity. In this regard, in many hybrid regimes, the basic structure of authority and the ascendance of the ruling party tend not to change much; they almost look like a static object.

This is somewhat ironic given that formal institutions in hybrid regimes are often considered to be inherently volatile. It points to the necessity of recognizing that not all hybrid regimes are unstable and in doing so of asking which formal institutions are unstable or stable. We defend the idea that the definition of hybrid regime stability should be broadened to take into account conflicts about the rules of the game in order to better capture challenges to the authority of ruling elites. In fact, not including these challenges in the analysis would dismiss the very nature of hybrid regimes.

Conclusion

The concept of hybrid regime pushes the boundaries of intelligibility. Its embedded contradictions and its institutional volatility make conceptual frontiers far from being impermeable and traditional ways of framing problems are suddenly inadequate. Nothing is black or white; everything is in shades of gray.

Nevertheless, obstacles can be overcome and rigor is possible even in the foggy zone of hybrid regimes. Various hybrid regime types have been presented together with a working typology; one that is based on mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. It includes two key concepts: hegemonic authoritarian regime and competitive authoritarian regime. These have the unique advantage of dealing explicitly with hybrid regimes and have been the object of a relative consensus among the academic community; allowing more easily to compare research results in the subfield.

We have outlined the economic and organizational approaches. No doubt, they can serve as a sound foundation for our understanding of hybrid regime stability. Amongst others, they underline the centrality of the dominant party in explaining hybrid regime stability. Belonging to the economic approach, Magaloni (2006) centers on the necessity of buying off large segment of society: that is, allocating grants and similar forms of public spending in exchange of votes. When the country is in deep recession, instability is on the horizon. Also, Greene (2007, 2010) stresses the importance of co-opting elites by attributing jobs in state-owned

companies to devoted followers. When the state retreats, notably in the case of privatization programs, instability is expected. In the former, stability is linked to resource endowment and redistributive capacities of the state; in the latter, stability is linked to the state control of economic flows. As for the organizational approach, Brownlee (2007) advocates the determinant role of rules governing the interactions between political elites, especially those related to promotion and succession, in assuring the survival of the ruling party. Instability is provoked by the non-respect of rules and arbitrarily decisions of power-holders. Levitsky & Way (2010) zoom-in on capacities: that is, when the ruling party and the internal security apparatus penetrate the entire territory and benefit from shared beliefs (ideological, ethnic, historic), stability is more likely. In the absence of a dominant party and coercive apparatus, instability should be expected. They also include international factors: that is linkages with the West and leverages understood as structural weaknesses in the international system.

We began the critical assessment by mentioning why we exclude international factors from the analysis. We advanced that these factors in Levitsky & Way's framework deals with democratic transition of hybrid regimes, are limited to geographic proximity with the West, and in the end are mediated by domestic ones. Once this issue was addressed, we argued that additional research was needed to formulate a genuine theory of hybrid regime stability that takes into account the specificity of hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, and the dynamics prevailing in both developing and underdeveloped economies. We contended that the factors presented in the organizational and by the same token the economic approach are an integral part of the literature on autocratic stability or empirically can be found in autocratic regimes. Henceforth, we still do not know exactly what is special about hybrid regimes and what dynamics are prevailing in different types of hybrid regimes. Furthermore, we find it difficult to agree that differences between developing and underdeveloped economies are trivial since structural resource constraints should affect the ruling elites strategy of co-optation. We have emphasized the neglect of legitimacy in the literature on hybrid regimes and specified its meaning in the context of our research object: that is, the elite consent of the government authority as a constitutive element of stability. Hence, explaining stability in hybrid regimes involves elucidating why political elites will support or not the government. In parallel, we have stressed the necessity of including

indicators in the definition of hybrid regime stability that would allow for the systematic observation of processes and not only of outcomes. In the next chapter, we will present our theory on hybrid regime stability as a framework to resolve the problems we identified. The challenge will be to answer the numerous questions raised in our critical assessment and integrate our hypotheses into a coherent framework.

Explaining Stability and Instability in Dominant-Party Hybrid Regimes

The previous chapter sets the record straight on an emerging but burgeoning literature. It offers a synthesis of what we know so far on hybrid regime stability; as well as what we do not know and need to know. Although the existence of a dominant party is a prerequisite for stability in hybrid regimes, it does not cover the ground when trying to capture the conditions of stability. A convincing explanation is still missing. Our understanding of hybrid regime stability is incomplete because no systematic research has gone beyond the dominant party to apprehend a richer and more representative spectrum of political interactions. No systematic research has explored how different types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development affect conditions of stability. Furthermore, our grasp of the phenomenon is limited because too much attention is attributed to electoral outcomes, and not enough on process and political conflict broadly defined. One has to remember that stability refers here to the normal conduct of political affairs and instability to the paralysis or dysfunction of the government. It finds its expression in elite support of the government or its disaffection. Consequently, the central question is: under which conditions the political elites will consent to devolve authority to the government in a dominant party hybrid regime and how these conditions change over time depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic development?

The present chapter articulates our answer. It starts at the highest level of abstraction and gradually moves down to concrete considerations. It is divided in three sections.

The first section addresses the general contour of our reflection. It anchors our framework in neo-institutionalism. It explains why we use this meta-theory, how it is linked to the economic and organizational approaches that also construct their explanation based on neo-institutionalism and how our own approach of political dynamics in hybrid regimes differs.

Various strands of neo-institutionalism will be presented with a special attention to historical institutionalism. In elaborating what historical institutionalism brings to the table, the focus will be on how it is especially suited to capture the diachronic process associated with periods of stability and instability.

The second section details our theory of political alliances. It aims at solving the problems we find in the literature while providing a coherent and unified framework to explain patterns of stability and instability in hybrid regimes. It outlines the master notion of ruling coalition and the specificity of the hybrid regime institutional context compared to democratic and autocratic regimes and follows with the development at length of the main theoretical components including their connections to each other. To help apprehending the logic of our argumentation, a schematic representation of conditions of stability opens the section. It takes the form of a matrix that pinpoints which alliance in hybrid regimes is conducive to stability according a specific political and economic environment. With this roadmap in mind, we will elaborate on the two independent variables – i.e. degree of extra-legal organized violence and degree of state penetration – and on how they help us identify the dominant social groups that will prevail depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic development. In the process, we will specify the interests of four dominant social groups – i.e. military officers, opposition parties, state bureaucrats and local leaders – and elaborate on the leverage they have over the ruling elites. This will allow us to discuss strategies that the ruling elites should pursue to have legitimacy and foster stability.

Last but not least, the chapter ends with comments about methodological issues. The objective is to detail our vision of the junction between theory and reality in order to make the research design explicit. It discusses the types of data used, the sample size requested to validate our claims and the way we will report the empirical findings. Afterward, the three case selection strategies will be displayed: that is, the method of most different systems design, crucial cases and plausibility probes. In the process, the temporal and spatial parameters will be raised.

2.1. A General Framework: Neo-Institutionalism in Comparative Politics

Our approach is molded in the fold of neo-institutionalism²⁷. In comparative politics, it is the authoritative canvas used to apprehend various research objects. It defends the simple idea that institutions matter: that is, it has explanatory powers. It serves as the basis to understand any political phenomenon because institutions mediate exogenous forces. It is the prism through which dynamics of conflicts found their true meaning. Without it, it is akin to reduce the human world to physic laws.

2.1.1. Neo-Institutionalism in Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability

Approaches of hybrid regime stability suggest that the dominant party structures the political opportunities for elites or political groups inside and outside this single institution. It defines the interests, preferences and strategies of all actors. Our theory also centers on an institution, but a polymorph one: the ruling coalition. In this sense, we are all inspired by the new institutionalism.

That being said, we were intrigued by the monolithic account of political conflicts offered by existing explanations, as if all actors would look alike. Intuitively, we were worried that some important analytical elements could be missing and convinced that interests of political actors are not uniform. We thought the problem of hybrid regime stability needed to be addressed from another angle: that is, political pluralism. Thus, instead of obscuring the identity of actors, it is our contention to acknowledge their diversity²⁸. Obviously, the ambition is not to cover the entire spectrum, a world of infinite possibilities. Rather, we are concerned with dominant social groups.

²⁷ It is worth specifying that neo-institutionalism – and its variants – is a meta-theory. It does not produce testable hypotheses, nor does it entail a single explanation of a given dynamic. Rather, “meta-theories suggest orientating concepts, target certain kinds of variables as important, and point to styles of research and explanation” (Mahoney, 2003: 136). It belongs to a higher degree of abstraction, one closer to epistemology and less to ontology *per se*. At the same time, we do not wish to enter the debate about the philosophy of science, as it would unduly divert attention from the object of our research. The purpose of this section is only to situate the reader as where we stand in terms of how we intend to tackle the problem at hand.

²⁸ Approaches of hybrid regime stability sometimes speak of such diversity in their respective narrative while treating it as an idiosyncratic feature external to their overall theory.

Furthermore, we were uncomfortable with the idea that power-holders in hybrid regimes could impose their view on all social groups. The economic and organizational approaches give the impression that all actors are passive, at the mercy of the ruling elites. Our reading of political dynamics in hybrid regimes is different. We assert that the ruling elites in hybrid regimes could not govern alone. There is no monopoly of power; leaders of the ruling party need allies to preserve their privileged position within the party system. And repression cannot be sufficient to co-opt potential allies; responsiveness to some of their political demands are equally important.

To our knowledge, very few researches if any have explored and compared systematically political alliances in a cross-national setting in various hybrid contexts. They leave the identity of political allies undetermined and evidently the impact of such considerations on strategies of co-optation and hybrid regime stability unexplored. We examine such avenue; it is one of our main contributions.

Indeed, the dominant party framework hides various forms of political pluralism (Wiseman, 1993: 339-440). As such, it misses the essence of hybrid regimes: institutional reforms are an object of conflict between competing political groups (Schedler, 2006: 12). And its one-sided interpretation of a hybrid regime is even iffier. A hybrid regime is a regime that manifests various combinations of autocratic *and* democratic institutional arrangements. A balance between political control (repression) and political participation (responsiveness) characterizes its inner-working. The organizational approach appears to be skewed toward autocratic traits and does not highlight how the democratic aspect relates to their theory; why certain political groups challenge the ruling elites, why they contest its authority. All are depicted as submissive to the ruling elites will. Even if the proponents of the economic approach introduce more explicitly democratic traits into their framework, especially Magaloni (2006), voters are said to have no incentives to vote for other contenders than the ruler. It is at odds with the fact that citizens would side with opposition parties or support political organizations that may decide to join or not the ruling elites. The point is that dimensions related to the dominant

party as an institution are central to our understanding of hybrid regime stability, but an explanation limited to the dominant party the way it is framed is incomplete.

The absence in the study of hybrid regime stability of a framework positioning political alliances as a key determinant with an emphasis on the identity of dominant social groups puzzled us given that it is one of the central analytical problems the field of political development tries to deal with. It has led to fruitful research programs in democratization studies. For instance, one of the greatest contributions of Barrington Moore (1968) was to highlight the determinant impact of class coalition on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Following his footsteps, eminent scholars such as Skocpol (1979), Huber & Stephens (1995) and Valenzuela (2001) have examined various patterns of class alliances²⁹. On another front, O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986) argue that the alliance of soft-liner (reformists) elites with some factions of the military have contributed to the emergence of a transition from authoritarianism. It resulted in a series of iterated testing: Snyder (1992), Bratton & van de Walle (1997), Eisenstadt (2000) and McFaul (2002) are few examples. Although these examples address different research questions, they paragon an essential similarity: politics is rarely if ever a one-man show. Anyone who wants to remain in power or induce political change needs to forge alliances and the end result depends on the composition of these alliances. Ultimately, instability occurs when certain social groups are excluded from the system of representation or are denied any entry; hence, logically stability depends on the inclusive character of that system (Lipset, 1959: 87-88; Huntington, 1965: 414). In a hybrid regime, not all have the same impact. The challenge is to identify which ones are strategic and why.

Thereupon, we do not pretend to (re) invent the wheel. The social groups we identify are not a construction of our own. For instance, Almond & Coleman (1960: 562-567) recognize the relevance of the executive, the bureaucracy, the army, religious organizations, the dominant-party and the press in relation to the political dynamics in developing countries. Similarly, Huntington (1970: 7) dresses a list of pertinent actors in authoritarian regimes that includes the

²⁹ Mahoney (2003: 140-141) establishes a list of all relevant academic works in regard to the testing of Moore's hypotheses.

political leaders, church, the monarchy, state administration, police, military, national assemblies, local government bodies, associations, peasants, workers, managers, technical specialist and intellectuals. Linz's (1978: 27-38) work revolves around the notion of loyal, semi-loyal and disloyal oppositions. Furthermore, the classic literature on the bureaucratic authoritarian state (Collier, 1979) that focuses on the alliance between high-ranking military officers and capitalist technocrats offers valuable insights and is no stranger, as we will see, to one pattern of alliances found in hybrid regimes – that is, hegemonic authoritarian regimes in a developing economy – but it is not the only one.

The originality of our theory is based on the selection of the dominant social groups that are critical to stability, as well as on the choice of variables and various links we make in regard to the hybrid context within a unified analytical framework. As we know of, no theory is exclusively constructed around our four dominant social groups apprehended as a whole and articulated with the intent to explain variation between hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes as well as developing and underdeveloped economies.

That being said, our focus on conflict dynamics between various social groups in different institutional context is coherent with one kind of neo-institutionalism: historical institutionalism. Indeed, “by taking the goals, strategies, and preferences as something to be explained, historical institutionalists show that, unless something is known about the context, broad assumptions about "self-interested behavior" are empty” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 9). Yet, historical institutionalism is more than a willingness to recognize contrasting realities in hybrid regimes.

2.1.2. Historical Institutionalism and Hybrid Regime Stability

Hall & Taylor (1996) propose three types of neo-institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The first one qualifies institutions as an object of conflict where the balance of power between different actors is asymmetrical and it is concerned with institutional trajectories (e.g. Skocpol, 1979). The second centers on a cost/benefits analysis and concentrates particularly on problems of

collective actions and how actors with conflicting interests can cooperate in order to achieve their goals in a context of incomplete information (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). The third looks at institutions as a normative enterprise that creates meanings and symbols to guide actor's behavior in defending its interests (e.g. McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001).

However, it is not always possible to identify which type of neo-institutionalism one belong to given the eclecticism prevailing in the field of comparative politics (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 955-956). For instance, Karl (1997: 10) proposes a structured contingency approach:

“It unites structural and choice-based approaches by claiming that prior interactions of structure and agency create the institutional legacy that constraints choice down the road... it problematizes the nature of choice, the identities of actors making such choices, and the way their preferences are formed within specific structures of incentives”.

Bates et al. (1998: 10) contend: “our approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation”. Yet, the focal point of such convergence is historical institutionalism, which is recognized as a vehicle for integrating various ideas from all strands of neo-institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938, 957). The bottom line is that no approach is perfectly hermetic. The core of our approach is historical institutionalism but may borrow from time to time, at the periphery, notions from other types of neo-institutionalism.

Ultimately, we side with the proponents of historical institutionalism because of the nature of the problems we are concerned with. Indeed, hybrid regime stability is about long-term processes, critical junctures and middle-range theories. Let see more in details the logic behind the intimate relation between the twos.

Historical institutionalism privileges the study of long-term temporal framing. Power configurations are embedded in social, economic, political and cultural structures. Stability is a by-product of such structures. They are slow moving, self-reinforcing and ubiquitous in nature. The implications are straightforward: historical patterns can only be assessed with the

passage of time. A short period is analogue to tunnel vision. It hides certain dynamics and reveals others that only give a partial picture of the situation (Pierson, 2003: 178-180). To illustrate our point, the case of the end of the Cold War as a watershed event is instructive. For instance, how can a study examining the hybrid regime in Malaysia begin in 1990 when the regime emerged in 1957 and has persisted since then? The analytical object of regime stability deals with macro-processes that span over a long period. Ultimately, a short time period can be used to study causes of regime emergence. For conditions of stability, a longer time period is prescribed. Otherwise, it creates an artificial and arbitrary disruption in historical continuity.

Far from being homeostatic, historical institutionalism recognizes the importance of critical junctures or defining political moments. On one hand, structural factors inject a certain dose of immobility in the analysis. The intent is not to freeze time so to speak but to determine institutional constraints at certain times. As such, patterns are detectable. Past institutions endure because very few political groups are powerful enough to create alone entirely new institutions (Kohli, 2004: 411). New institutions are expansive and disruptive. They create confusion, frustration and uncertainty. On the other, the human world is not predetermined. Political trajectories are not linear. At some point in history, institutions, especially in non-western countries, are contested when past compromises no longer reflect the reality in terms of balance of power between competing political groups. They become an object of conflict, of a political crisis. These critical junctures are the moment of institutional reforms. New rules are established, some of them may have unintended consequences in the long term. For instance, the exclusion and marginalization of a particular political group may have the immediate effect of consolidating the power of the rulers, but of eventually leading to its demise. Furthermore, a critical juncture may take place in what seems to be at first glance an insignificant event. But the addition of small events can end up having a significant impact (Pierson, 2003: 181-182). From this perspective, the electoral defeat of a dominant party may be the by-product of a succession of prior political crises. In short, *longue durée*, to paraphrase Braudel's expression, relates to stability, and critical junctures to instability. Both notions are essential for apprehending the chronology of events as they unfold. Historical institutionalism is about temporal sequencing.

Third, since the inception of structural functionalism by Talcott Parsons, political science has gradually abandon the ideal of natural science: the formulation of one general theory. The social world is too heterogeneous to be reduced to simple universal laws, like the law of gravity. At the same time, if one does not want to be contented with particularistic findings, the only alternative is to isolate an object, such as political regime, economic structure, or war. Then, a partial explanation is given in the sense that a theory will never cover all facets of, for instance, a political regime. In regard to our research object, we had to choose and define such partial explanation from concept formation, typology construction and identification of causes of emergence or conditions of stability. Finally, a type of regime had to be selected. For instance, the conditions of stability in hybrid regimes do not explain stability in autocratic or democratic regimes. A theory that tries to handle altogether these issues will most likely be syncretic. A middle-range theory recognizes that each case is not unique, but all cases are not all alike. It is not about universalistic validity but about a framework of cross-national comparison. Not all events can be explained with the same rational: patterns of stability and instability will be in some cases evident while in others, inexistent or ambiguous. As Thelen & Steinmo assert (1992: 3), “institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of outcomes”. Although theory should have a predictive capacity, it should in no way imply that history is pre-determined, events are ineluctable, and social life has a natural order and an inherent progressive dimension. We stand by such intellectual endeavor.

Rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism turn out to be ill equipped to ground our hypotheses. Rational choice institutionalism tends to treat the interests of individuals as universal and a-temporal, leaving out the identity of each actor and the effect of time. It provides little insight on how to parcel out history in a way that acknowledges non-linear processes. As for sociological institutionalism, it tends to concentrate on a single or few events in a short period. It hinges too much on the specificity of each case and has limited generalization capabilities, at least in terms of identifying patterns of political alliances.

That being said, we recognize that we somewhat depart from traditional approaches of historical institutionalism given that our intent is not to demonstrate in detail the process of institution-building and how this process has consequences for future institutional

development. Still, our concerns about context and the challenge of capturing systematically the evolution of the ruling coalition and political pluralism are coherent with historical institutionalism. It implies first looking into the past. Indeed, we start the analysis in most cases at Independence Day. Second, it entails to carve time, to divide into two periods: persistence and change of the ruling coalition. Third, unexpected dynamics are always possible and sometimes the exact empirical manifestation of our variables may be ambiguous. By analogy, our theory is a roadmap for comparison, not a blueprint of actual events. In this sense, the nature of our problem and the way we frame our answer are embedded in historical institutionalism. One final word, most researches that are interested in studying political alliances and regime stability can be associated to historical institutionalism. Moore (1968), O'Donnell (1979), Skocpol (1979) Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Tilly (2007) are few examples. Hence, we walk in the footsteps of a long tradition in the field of political development.

2.2. A Theory of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes

It is our strong conviction that the authenticity of hybrid regimes compared to other types of regimes resides in the coexistence of competing sources of authority in a non-institutionalized party system. Hence, hybrid regime stability is intimately related to the ability of the ruling elites to maintain a political alliance, labeled a ruling coalition. Foremost, the ruling elites should ally with “dominant groups that have the power to sanction legitimate order” (Alagappa, 1995: 15). It constitutes the core of our theory of political alliances to explain the stability or instability of hybrid regimes.

2.2.1. The Ruling Coalition

The hybrid overall institutional context shapes the structure of opportunities in a unique way. It calls for a genuine theory of hybrid regimes, one that differs from autocratic and democratic regimes. In hybrid regimes, the political landscape is fragmented yet contained. No one has a monopoly over collective representation while allegiance is somewhat adamant. As a result,

the maintenance of a ruling coalition composed of political groups backed by captive constituencies is the optimal strategy.

To dissipate any ambiguity, the ruling coalition is a collection of political organizations united in the pursuit of a common objective and committed to the rules and norms governing intra elite interactions, including nomination procedures as well as the distribution and access of resources. The leaders of the dominant party head the ruling coalition. These leaders are the incumbent and its inner circle of advisers. They epitomize the ruling elites. They are “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Burton et al. 1992: 8). These elites constitute the core and the others within the ruling coalition the peripheral actors. Peripheral actors are the dominant social groups in the ruling coalition.

In an autocratic regime, there is usually a single source of authority. In a one-party autocratic regime, the adherence to the official party ideology is mandatory for everyone. Any derogation is amenable and punished severely. Dissent voices are muted and defiant organizations quickly dismantled. Notwithstanding, popular mobilization is considerable but it is strictly orchestrated to galvanize the public in favor of the incumbency. The mass is undifferentiated. Otherwise, systematic state repression is effectively closing off political space. Furthermore in the absence of direct and frequent elections, the official party is a hermetic institution. It is basically a loose constellation of more or so free-floating opportunistic politicians. They have no ties to a given constituency. They defend their own interests and those of the party. In principle, they are only accountable to the ruling elites. Therefore, in a one-party autocratic regime, the political support is confined to party members dependent on a small circle of high-ranking party officials. The political regime is monolithic and static.

In a hybrid regime, political liberalization injects dynamism. Suddenly, new political groups emerge with conflicting demands. It segments the population based on occupation, ethnicity, religion, ideology, etc. Political alternatives are created and challenge to a certain degree the ruling elites hold on power. Authority is contested. Even in hegemonic authoritarian regimes, dominant parties “have been created by fusing a variety of groups with different ideological

traditions and varying social bases, not by completely suborning some elements to one dominant force” (Linz, 1970: 265). On one hand, the ruling elites surely cannot legitimately pretend to embody and appeal to the entire spectrum of all social cleavages. Henceforth, forging a multi-cleavages coalition becomes paramount. It incites the ruling elites to enlarge the circle of “trustees” if they want to preserve their commanding position. On the other, unlike democratic regimes, the political regime is restricted: its access is often a privilege, not a right. Most political organizations stay at the margin. And political intervention to favor or deny admission of certain groups is frequent. Even once these groups are duly accredited, the ruling elites usually keep veto power for themselves. Legislative and judiciary bodies are often just a little more than rubber-stamp institutions. In other words, political competition in hybrid regimes is about selective co-optation and contained inclusion. The ruling elites cannot govern alone; they would not have the legitimacy to do so. But they do not want to rule and compete with everyone.

The institutionalization of a ruling coalition becomes an attractive option. It substitutes itself to an overall weak party system. It expands access to state resources without broadening it to empower all potential competitors. It manages the diversity of political affiliation. Yet, like any institutions, it needs a minimum of constancy in its membership. The alliance should not be ephemeral: an ad hoc pact of convenience. It should form a political bloc. That being said, regardless of the rules not all have the same status within it. A nucleus composed of staunch allies represents the locus of institutional power and negotiation, compromise as well as sometimes coercion characterize their interaction. Others are subject to unilateral decisions by the ruling elites and may enter or exit the ruling coalition without any dire consequences for power-holders. In a way, a stable hybrid regime is characterized by the institutionalization of a ruling coalition in an inchoate party system. It is the legitimate center of power. It is an institution, the most important one in a hybrid regime. In other words, although the party system may be weak, some political organizations within it may have considerable authority.

In parallel, the inception of elections in hybrid regimes breaks elite solidarity by tying each of them to a given constituency apprehended not only as an electoral district but also more broadly as electoral groups or loyal supporters. It gives to a certain degree a voice to ordinary

citizens. This holds true even if elections are not competitive. For instance, in a one-party hybrid regime, direct elections can participate in ousting representatives favored by the ruling elites: as it was the case in Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (Hayward, 1987: 16). In other words, elections introduce flexibility in allegiance even if there is technically no choice between political parties. Nevertheless, the articulation and aggregation of interests is not a carbon copy of western democracies. Lincoln's maxim – the government of the people, by the people, for the people – is for the most part a mirage in a hybrid context. The ruling elites control the choice available to voters and manipulate incentives in a way to induce heavily the outcome in favor of their preferred one. As Jayasuriya & Rodan (2007: 781) said,

“Non-democratic notions of representation are not driven by any acceptance of the need for authorization by those being represented, nor are the represented intended to be self-constituting and able to hold decision-makers to account. Instead, representation is intended to effect a process of structuring political participation that bypasses or controls intermediary organizations, with the intention of exerting a high degree of control over what conflicts are permissible or not in politics”.

Political participation derives from the structure of elite representation within the system. Most of all, although political elites have to defend the interest of their constituency, the latter are largely captive: that is, some political groups have the quasi-monopoly of representation over a given constituency. In such a case, there is little competition between political groups, at least within the coalition, for the same constituency. This rigidity in affiliation is mostly a function of history in many non-western countries whereas identity evolves but very slowly in a highly stratified society. We will further develop this point when addressing the particularities of our four dominant social groups in the next section.

In turn, the capacity of the peripheral actors to obtain concessions from the ruling elites is intimately related to the size and resources of their constituency. It is the main source of leverage against the ruling elites. It prevents or limits state repression directed at both elites and constituencies (Crone, 1988: 257; Remmer, 1985: 74). A social group is dominant foremost because it has followers. They can mobilize and deliver the vote. They can reach out to some electoral segments in ways that the ruling elites cannot. The hold on power of the

latter is conditional amongst others to winning elections, which necessitates moving beyond their immediate partisan base and expanding their electoral support. In this sense, the ruling coalition includes political groups with captive constituencies. And only political groups gravitating within the ruling coalition are able to uphold some demands from their respective constituency.

Therefore, the relation between the ruling elites and the peripheral actors within the ruling coalition is one of interdependence marked by asymmetry. Peripheral actors heading large constituencies induce the ruling elites to make compromises, devolve power and (re) distribute resources instead of acting unilaterally like in an autocratic regime. The ruling elites do not act in isolation, but in interaction with other political groups. Still, the ruling elites are the gatekeepers of the political regime and who ever threaten their position shall be victim of political exclusion.

One central issue to political development is what resources each actor possesses (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1997: 266). Although the ruling elites in hybrid regimes have an overwhelming advantage in terms of economic and organizational resources, other actors should not be neglected when they have captive constituencies. The larger it is, the more leverage they have against the ruling elites. Obviously, nothing is fixed in stone. Political affiliation in hybrid regimes is not almost inert like in an autocratic regime. The changing patterns depend largely on the complex superimposition of cleavages – whether in terms of class, ethnicity, religion or territory – and societal changes. Societal change is an inherent feature in all countries, except maybe in those isolated micro-island states of the Pacific. The political regime is confronted with new demands and new political forces to reckon with. The stability of the regime thus depends mainly on its capacity to timely absorb these groups whenever their presence becomes relevant for the survival of the regime. In other words, in order to stay in power, the ruling elites have to incorporate a variety of political groups as the society transforms itself overtime. In principle, the ruling elites can adapt to a changing context by altering the composition of the ruling coalition.

Now that we have briefly established the distinctiveness of the hybrid regime institutional context compared to autocratic and democratic regimes - i.e. unlike an autocratic regime, it has competing sources of authority and unlike a democratic regime, it has an overly weak party system and captive constituencies - we will focus solely on hybrid regime dynamics. Our theory is not one about regime stability; it is about hybrid regime stability. We do not wish to explain and compare the stability in autocracies and democracies, but in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes at different levels of economic development.

2.2.2. Dominant Social Groups

According to our theory, the precise composition of the ruling coalition operates under two conditions that constitute the two independent structural variables of our analytical framework: the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. They have the advert effect of empowering certain social groups at the expense of others and as such, they are the cornerstone of authority like in any modern society: that is, the capacity to exert influence and the right to exercise power. The degree of extra-legal organized violence is determinant in identifying whom amongst the peripheral actors within the state or the regime is the competing figure of authority to the ruling elites. The degree of state penetration is determinant in identifying who is responsible within the state or society for connecting various levels of authority, especially between the center and regions. Hence, they should affect the configuration of the ruling coalition composition. A high degree of extra-legal organized violence permeates the politicization of military officers and a low degree favors the preponderance of opposition parties as a counter-weight to the ruling elites. A high level of state penetration is concomitant with the ascendancy of state bureaucrats and a low one with local leaders as the main relay between levels of authority. Thereafter, a simple two-dimensional matrix provides the roadmap to analyze patterns of political alliances and by ricochet stability and instability in hybrid regimes.

Figure 3 – Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes

Extra-Legal Organized Violence	
Low	High
Opposition Parties (Competitive Authoritarian Regime) & State Bureaucrats (Developing Country)	Military Officers (Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime) & State Bureaucrats (Developing Country)
Opposition Parties (Competitive Authoritarian Regime) & Local Leaders (Underdeveloped Country)	Military Officers (Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime) & Local Leaders (Underdeveloped Country)

The left side is typical of competitive authoritarian regimes; the upper-left box being linked to developing countries and the lower-left box to underdeveloped countries. The right side is usually the arrangement found in hegemonic authoritarian regimes; the upper-right box representing an alliance common in developing countries and the lower-right box an alliance typical of underdeveloped countries.

These political groups are essential. Other political groups may join the ruling coalition, but it then becomes contingent to the specificity of each country. Moreover, rarely if ever the ruling elites will exclude all military officers, opposition parties, state bureaucrats or local leaders at once from the ruling coalition. Instability is generated by the exclusion of some factions or parties belonging to these groups, according to a precise political and economic context. The identification of dominant social groups serves a higher function: i.e. where should we look first to understand stability and instability in hybrid regimes. This is important to remember. Along those lines, one needs to acknowledge that this analytical device is an ideal-type representation. In reality, conceptual frontiers may be weakened when confronted with in-between cases. Finally, when the military is the dominant social group, the ruling coalition is merely reduced to an amalgam of factions within the ruling party; and when the opposition parties are the dominant social group, the ruling coalition takes the form of a multiparty

alliance. Bureaucrats are political insiders within the ruling coalition, whereas local leaders are political outsiders. Hence, the ruling coalition is a polymorph institution. In our theory, the forms of the ruling coalition have no analytical power *per se*. They are descriptive in nature. Their purpose is to clarify and not necessarily explain the patterns of elites' interactions.

In order to ground our reflection in solid foundation, numerous references to academic specialists on any of our four dominant social groups will be made. We do not pretend to be expert on each of them, let alone even on one of them. There is already sufficient knowledge accumulated on the behavior and interests of each group. Again, our contribution rests on the various links we make to hybrid regime stability and how we integrate disparate findings in a single and coherent theory.

2.2.2.1. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence

The first key factor in observing patterns of coalition composition and predicting hybrid regime stability or instability is the degree of extra-legal organized violence. A high degree signifies that political conflict is deregulated and subversive. There is no abdication of any rules; only brute force counts. As if the government would be almost in a perpetual state of siege. It provides incentives for the military officers to intervene in politics and, given their corporate interests, tends to correlate with hegemonic authoritarianism in which the form of ruling coalition is usually confined to the ruling party. A low degree implies that social demands are channeled through the party system; it bestows a central role to political parties, a context that equates to a competitive authoritarian regime and fosters the formation of a multiparty coalition. There is some form of shared understanding about the conduct of political affairs. Let us decorticate this chain of reasoning.

First things first, the degree of extra-legal organized violence refers to the strategic threats the ruling elites face. We exclude considerations related to non-political forms of violence such as criminal activities. The degree is estimated according to its duration and intensity; sporadic guerrilla attacks do not have the same meaning as sustained armed conflicts. Also, geographic extension and location are factored in. There is a difference between social violence in one city

versus in many across the country, as well as between raging turbulence in a big city versus in a small rural municipality. Last but not least, both internal and external violence should be considered; external source deals with the presence of an insecure regional hegemony and transnational terrorism. Therefore, a high degree of extra-legal organized violence corresponds to a sustained civil war geographically spread out or an international war involving the entire society. A low degree involves punctual and isolated civil unrest or latent inter-state military confrontation.

Military Officers

Extra-legal organized violence deals directly with the corporate interests of military officers³⁰. So, it is not surprising if we see this factor influencing their presence within the ruling coalition as peripheral actors. Indeed, as long as they perceive that the regime is threatened, they feel as their duties to interfere with the decision-making process. It is the “manifest destiny” of soldiers to intervene and save the nation when the government is weak and fails to provide order (Finer, 1988: 32-35). Hence, when the national interest is at stake, military officers will be active players in politics to make sure adequate steps are taken and will tend to present a united front (Chalmers, 1977: 33). Consequently, military officers do not fallback into the barracks but it is not because they like party politics. They do not. “Military officers view political parties as undesirable agents of disunity” (Nordlinger, 1977: 56, 58). As such, they refrain from engaging in negotiations, deliberations and compromises with political parties with the purpose of building an alliance. This is why they are mostly associated with hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

A high degree of extra-legal organized violence translates the atomization of the party system. Opposition parties are illegal or mere puppets of the ruling elites. Choices are so limited that large segments of the population have no voice even if elections liberalize the regime and signal to the embryonic opposition movement the possibility, real or perceived, of expressing their grievances. Without formal institutions to channel such grievances, opposition

³⁰ Military officers as a social group refer to all military personnel with no *a priori* about the rank.

movements are systematically pushed into street politics (Przeworski, 1988: 73), a situation typical of hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The political arena is located outside the party system, which fosters social agitation and incites military officers to intervene and ensure order. Since opposition parties are inexistent or anemic, authority is highly centralized within the ruling party. Consequently, in a hegemonic authoritarian regime, pluralism is about political factions within the ruling party; one of these factions would be the military officer. In this context, the ruling coalition is mainly inner-looking.

It is important to notice that a stable hegemonic authoritarian regime is not a military regime even if it is often created by and made of military officers. The National Council (1972-1978) during the Marcos' era in the Philippines and other forms of military institutions are on the contrary a source of instability. Indeed, military officers are concerned with their corporate interests, not in governing a country. They do not seek ultimate political power: they "see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power" (Finer, 1988: 22). In many ways, the military recognizes that "in order to remain in power (i.e., to preserve its capacity to intervene in matters of importance to itself), it will have to get out of power (i.e., remove itself from direct responsibility for governing)" (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 35). They perceive themselves as "moderator" and "guardian" of existing institutions (Nordlinger, 1977: 25). Ultimately, a threat to the regime does not constitute a basis for holding power; it is functionally limited to protecting the regime and the citizens (Rouquié, 1986: 111). In stable hegemonic authoritarian regimes, military institutions are not a long-term solution; eventually power should be transferred to civilian institutions like an executive office or the national assembly. In this way, it is important not to associate hegemonic authoritarian regimes with military regimes. As Brooker (2000: 100) sums up, "these distinctly less-than-military regimes are often better viewed in relation to democracy or semidemocracy than to military dictatorship".

In a democratic regime or a competitive authoritarian regime, the military force follows the "liberal model" which implies that officer corps are depoliticized and subordinated to civilian controls, whereas in autocratic regimes, it falls under the "penetration model" where political conformity is maintained by a pervasive ideology and soldiers act as propagandists

(Nordlinger, 1977: 11-19). In hegemonic authoritarianism, the military force although functional in nature is politicized and organized under a national banner so that its corporate interests can be represented within the ruling coalition. Officers want to preserve this strategic position within the political regime because they want to contain civilian abuse of power in regard to what they consider their exclusive domains: namely how to intervene in armed conflicts; how as well as who should be nominated for promotions; and in some cases, when lower-class interests are threatened or economic assets of the military are ceased or reduced (Nordlinger, 1977: chapter 2). A politicized military corps signals that its support is not unconditional. Its members want to remain politically independent on certain issues.

They are able to do so foremost because they have the monopoly on arms, or at least a decisive strategic advantage compared to other coercive apparatus like security forces or policemen (Finer, 1962: 10). Their potential and actual force is unmatched. It can quickly be deployed anywhere on the territory and rapidly control or at least contain an explosive situation. Its mere loud and visible presence on the ground inspires fear. Without the army on their side, no political group would survive for long. Indeed, “a united officer corps is virtually always capable of maintaining a civilian government in office” (Nordlinger 1977: 5). When the level of extra-legal organized violence is high, the ruling elites therefore have to include the military in the ruling coalition. And if military officers are divided, the ruling elites should seek to ally with the strongest element – i.e. those who command the most effective coercive unit and respect among the population – within the military establishment. Otherwise it runs the risk of being victim of a *coup d’État*. This is the most drastic option. Military officers can also shift their support to legislative branches, notably the opposition, or to the judiciary. They might also foster divisions within the executive by siding with other peripheral actors unsatisfied with the status quo. They can give implicit approval to civil unrest or general strike by adopting a posture of non-intervention. They can even dispute the government authority in secluded areas. Furthermore, the monopoly of arms means that ultimately the army is the only figure of authority able to impose order; a function that confers to military officers almost instant deference among the population victim of abuse or who fears for its own security.

In addition, the military has “a highly emotionalized symbolic status” associated to the virtues attributed to the group – i.e. “bravery, discipline, obedience, self-abnegation, poverty, patriotism” – which “at most time and in most countries are esteemed and cherished” (Finer: 1962: 10). Officers are often adulated for their historic exploits such as heroic victories in international wars or war of Independence. However, it is important not to exaggerate their influence in society (see Nordlinger, 1977: chapter 2). First, most of the time, the ranks and files are composed of one communal group, which helps maintaining cohesion but contributes to antagonize others. Second, military officers come mostly from the middle-class and as such they often defend their interests; their greatest influence is therefore within this group. Third, historic exploits resonate foremost within the generation who actually lived during these tumultuous events. Fourth, military officers lose their moral halo when they intervene with brutal force against the general population, especially if it is frequent and relatively recent in time, or when they seize power and intend to establish themselves as rulers. In this sense, military officers have captive constituencies; they have a reservoir of support in society.

As already said but worth repeating, it is hard to delineate cause from effect when studying conditions of stability. At what point does a high degree of extra-legal organized violence beget the presence of the military in politics and structure the polity as a hegemonic authoritarian regime? Or at what point does the presence of the military in a hegemonic authoritarian regime cause a high degree of extra-legal organized violence because it blocks entry into the party system? If it is difficult to assess with certainty, there is no doubt that mutual interaction and self-reinforcing effects can be observed. What is important to note is that there is an intimate connection between all these dimensions that forms a coherent, we argue, line of reasoning.

Opposition Parties

A low degree of extra-legal organized violence in hybrid regimes usually implies the presence of party competition, which is only possible when the military officers fall back into the barracks and behave like in a liberal model. “The channeling of opposition into the electoral arena served the authoritarian incumbent by getting strikers, students, and other potentially

disruptive trouble makers off the regime's back, and out of the unpredictable realm of street demonstrations and picket lines and into the highly regulated realm of campaigns and elections" (Eisenstadt, 2000: 15). The party system becomes the point of convergence of social demands and most political actors express adherence to the precedence of rule over violence. Yet, loyalty to the political regime is not blindly taken for granted since not all parties have influence, even benign, over the decision-making process. Traditionally, a loyal opposition is understood in reference to the overall party system (Linz, 1978: 16). Here, a loyal opposition is one not necessarily loyal to the party system, but loyal to the ruling coalition, somewhat a kind of semi-loyal opposition.

When the degree of extra-legal organized violence is low, opposition parties usually do exist and compete, albeit unfairly, with the ruling party for votes; a situation defined as a competitive authoritarian regime. The political arena moves into legislative institutions. Actors refrain from using force to achieve their goal and recognize that elections are the only legitimate mean to access power. Opposition parties act as a safety valve to prevent social bottlenecks. In general, politicians agree that collective demands need to be channeled through formal institutions, although the exact nature of these institutions remains an object of intense conflict.

The introduction of real party competition produces a certain fragmentation of the votes along party lines. Coalition building becomes a strategy of electoral containment to reduce the uncertainty associated with the prospect of a competitive election and control the results that come out of the process. Therefore, the ruling coalition takes an outward-shape. Instead of intra-party, it is inter-party dynamics that become predominant. Indeed, intra-party dynamics are still important since the ruling party heads the coalition; it is the conductor so to speak. But increased attention is being given to inter-party interactions since the ruling coalition is the only arena where dissent voices can be heard... behind closed doors. Excluding all opposition parties from it is akin to reduce dissent to silence. It cannot last long.

At the same time, not all opposition parties are welcomed in the ruling coalition. This brings us to a central issue: opposition parties are not one unified bloc. They are differentiated based

on their interests, programmatic stances and affiliations. Interests vary according to whether opposition parties are transition-seeking, patronage-seeking or adopting anti-regime stance.

“Transition-seeking parties [are] willing to legitimize the system by participating in institutions agreed upon by the authoritarians, but only to the end of reforming them from within. Patronage-seeking opposition parties [are] willing to play by authoritarian rules, with the eventual but distant objective of liberalizing the electoral system, but obtaining offices, public financing, and other resources in the meantime, in exchange for loyally fronting opposition candidates to make the regime look competitive. Anti-regime [are] hard-line opposition which refuses to even participate in authoritarian institutions and seeks instead to undermine them, usually via protest mobilization” (Eisenstadt, 2000: 8).

Usually patronage-seeking parties will bandwagon with the ruling coalition and adopt a work-from-within strategy. Some transition-seeking parties may decide to momentarily side with the ruling coalition and later breakout from the coalition in order to accumulate power today and fight tomorrow. Yet, in doing so, it could run the risk of alienating its own constituency. It is the same with anti-regime parties. Also, it is not because an opposition party could rebel against the ruling party that the latter will try to co-opt it. The ruling elites will cooperate with patronage-seeking and moderate transition-seeking parties, but repress and more likely ban anti-regime parties because they pose a direct threat to their hold on power. The party system in a competitive authoritarian regime is composed of a nucleus, the ruling party, an inner ring, the patronage-seeking parties within the coalition, and an outer ring composed of transition-seeking and anti-regime parties. In this system, patronage-seeking parties are still pivotal actors. For instance, they may decide to join an opposition coalition if they judge that their interest is best served. They can represent a credible threat by defecting from the ruling coalition and joining the opposition to challenge the control by the ruling coalition of legislative institutions. They can organize an electoral boycott or call for a general strike. In an autocratic regime, opposition parties are inexistent, and in hegemonic authoritarian regimes they are all by force patronage-seeking parties when they are legalized. In a democratic regime, such categories are largely irrelevant and political parties are classified based on the ideological spectrum.

This brings us to a second important analytical element. Patronage-seeking parties are usually ideologically located at the margin, but not at the extreme-right or left. Because it needs to attract the maximum of voters as well as some competing opposition parties and act as a centripetal force in the party system in order to form a ruling coalition, the ruling party is a centrist party; a catchall party. This position gives it programmatic flexibility. Depending on the context, it can promote nationalist or internationalist policies, social security or free-market mechanisms, etc. Hence, its political platform is pragmatic and less ideological in nature. If the ruling party would be located in the extreme-right of the ideological spectrum for instance, such strategy would be difficult to implement and the formation of a ruling coalition unlikely or ephemeral. Thus the ruling party will tend to perceive as an enemy, any political parties that try to occupy the same position within the ideological spectrum and will therefore not include a competing centrist party within the ruling coalition. Opposition parties that are “niche party” while defending programmatic policies that are not too extreme are prime candidates as a worthy ruling coalition partner.

Finally, party differentiation in a non-western party system is not confined to the traditional right-left polarization. As Ottaway (2003: 167) points out: “in most countries, the language of economic polarization (urban/rural; rich and poor in urban area) has fallen out of fashion, while the languages of ethnic and religious polarization and of nationalism are on the ascendancy”. Indeed, cleavages are often extended to or dominated by a division based on affiliation such as ethnicity, religion, regionalism, clan, family, etc. These cleavages are vertically integrated. For instance, a cleavage between Catholic and Muslim people will most likely lead to one moderate party representing each group not two. Moreover, rarely a Catholic will side with a Muslim party or vice-versa. As such, they have captive constituencies that give them leverage against the ruling elites. Communal affiliations often involve strong emotional attachment that provides almost unconditional and instant political support.

So far, we have established the link between the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the importance of military officers or opposition parties, and how it corresponds to hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes dynamics. It contributes to clarify differences between types of hybrid regimes; an exercise generally neglected by the

organizational and economic approaches. Respectively, military officers and opposition parties are not passive, ready to be co-opted at any price by the ruling elites. They negotiate their way in as a faction of the ruling party or a party within the ruling coalition. The military are able to do so given their monopoly of arms and emblematic position in society, especially within middle-class and the dominant communal group. Opposition parties are attractive for the ruling elites if they are patronage-seeking, ideologically located on the margin, and could count on a significant captive constituency based on ethnic, religious or regional affiliation. The military can always threaten to foment a *coup d'État* and patronage parties to defect to the opposition. If we only look at economic and organizational resources, especially in competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties would appear weak. But if we add the notion of captive constituencies, they are suddenly significant adversaries for the ruling elites.

2.2.2.2. The Degree of State Penetration

The second critical factor when analyzing patterns of political alliances in hybrid regimes is the degree of state penetration. A high degree confers to state bureaucrats a significant role in socio-economical interactions and is usually associated with developing economy in non-western countries, whereas a low degree basically decentralizes by default state functions to local authorities and are evidently a characteristic of an underdeveloped economy. The rationale behind such line of reasoning is that the state presence in the economy fosters economic development in most southern countries, which is usually supported by a well-functioning administrative apparatus³¹. And “the particular structure of the political economy... influences the nature and expression of social conflict and this, in turn, shapes the operation of political institutions” (Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007: 776). Neither is tied to any specific types of hybrid regimes. In both cases, the dominant peripheral actors – state bureaucrats and local leaders – are usually factions of the ruling party. Yet, state bureaucrats are considered as political insiders, whereas local leaders are political outsiders.

³¹ There exists a vast literature linking state presence in the economy and economic development. See Johnson (1982), Evans (1989), Woo-Coming (1999), Chang (2002) and Kohli (2004).

The degree of state penetration is defined along two axes: (i) the administrative extension of state presence across the territory and (ii) the centralization of economic functions (i.e. economic extension). Administrative extension designates the geographical dispersion of state representatives and adequate infrastructures in most parts of the country in the field of order and security, tax collection, health, education, transport, telecommunication, etc. The centralization of the economic functions deals with the intervention of the state in the economy. Key indicators are the existence of economic plans designed to industrialize the country and state investment in the economy. As asserted in our critical assessment, state ownership is mostly relevant in sectors generating substantial rents and in labor-intensive industries. State ownership of an oil company or of a car manufacturer are good examples. State-directed strategies are evident when there is a relative continuity in state economic policies, a clear and detailed model of development and a commitment to a single objective: increase the nation industrial capacity. Therefore, what matters is more how the state intervenes in the economy, and less whether or not it does. High state penetration is akin to the monopoly of state companies in various industrial sectors and significant interactions between the central government and its subunits. Low state penetration is a situation prevailing when peripheral regions have little contact with the capital and state involvement in the economy is limited to functions of resource allocation (or consumption) to the detriment of productive ones.

State Bureaucrats

When state penetration is high, the presence of state bureaucrats can be felt all across the national territory. They benefit from a hierarchical, professional, specialized and autonomous civil administration. By autonomous, we mean not dependent on one or few non-political actors. They invest all spheres of society; foremost the economic sphere. They are the architects of prosperity and basically determine who gets what. It can therefore be expected that the ruling elites who alienate the bureaucracy play a dangerous game. State bureaucrats are an indispensable relay for the central government, one that maintains cohesion and effectiveness within the entire administration. This characterization is the prototype of a strong state that fosters economic development.

More specifically, state bureaucrats are usually not confined to the government buildings in the capital. Their reach penetrates reclusive villages and is apparent in terms of offices, personnel and the provision of services to local communities. Still, one should not confuse this dispersion with uncoordinated actions. Indeed, decision-making is nevertheless centralized. The highest echelon of the administration orchestrates all tasks related to the elaboration of strategies and planning. Local representatives implement decisions taken at the top and sometimes provide feedback. And the central government will refrain from devolving power to local government. For instance, they will not allow local officials to perceive their own taxes. State bureaucrats are competent individuals. The civil administration often recruits the best minds and the most experienced candidates. They are not selected solely based on their personal connection with high-place individuals, but mostly on their skills. They are educated. They accomplish a wide variety of functions according to well-specified divisions of labor (Kohli, 2004: 395, 489). Finally, they are relatively autonomous from political and economic actors. Interference is not totally absent, but overall they have the flexibility to formulate strategies and elaborate plans independently from outside influence once the designated officials have provided the short, medium and long-term state objectives. Evidently, this is the weberian ideal-type of a rational-legal bureaucracy.

However, state bureaucrats in hybrid regimes are far more proactive than this depiction presages. Indeed, they are economic actors in their own right. In this regard, we should distinguish between the economic dynamics prevailing in countries such as Japan and South Korea from the ones of developing economies in most other non-western countries. In Japan and South Korea, there exists an intimate relation between public and private actors in their joint effort to pursue economic growth and industrialization expansion (Johnson, 1982; Evans 1989). It is the state that defines economic priorities and directs which economic sector should be developed (Kohli, 2004). Yet, the model is based on private oligopolies and domestic investments. Large private conglomerates like the Chaebols in South Korea or the Keiretsu in Japan are prime examples.

Developing economies in non-western countries are characterized by the heavy presence of state-owned companies and international credit. The important point here for our argumentation is that these features have the effect of marginalizing the national bourgeoisie and labor in society (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009; O'Donnell, 1977: 65, 68). Labor unions are reduced to corporatist representation within the confine of limited actions dictated by the ruling elites. The latter determine which union is allowed, who can be considered a member of a given union, in which sectors the union can operate, etc. Also, the government usually represents the sole source of revenue for these associations, interferes in leadership nomination, and basically calls the shots within the organization (Collier & Collier, 1977: 493). As for the bourgeoisie, some individuals may have an influence on the ruling elites, but it is particularistic and informal in nature. It is the privilege of very few wealthy entrepreneurs. Otherwise, as collective actors organize under a single banner or within representative associations, they are generally speaking powerless. The vast majority are small businesses totally dependent on the state. Thus, the bourgeoisie and unions are not major actors in society. As such, their inclusion in the ruling coalition is not essential: that is, they are dependent to a point that they have little leverage over the ruling elites. Hence, public economic actors fill the power vacuum left by the weakening of leading entrepreneurs and labor representatives. We assist to the formation of a "state bourgeoisie: functionary-businessmen who remove diverse productive activities from private capital, absorb an important portion of accumulation, and together contribute so that the state grows more than would have been necessary in strictly economic terms" (O'Donnell, 1977: 62). The upper-management of state-owned companies as well as the one of related ministries become major players in society. Overall, they lead the diversification of the economic structure. It is not analogous to developed economies, but it can in no way be associated to an atrophied industrial base and the mono-exportation of a single agricultural commodity produced with low technological inputs as in underdeveloped countries.

Given their individualistic nature and usually as members of the ruling elites, upper echelon state bureaucrats occupy a special place in the ruling coalition compared to the first two political groups previously discussed. In this sense, they are political insiders. Foremost, they pose a threat to the incumbent. Indeed, they occasionally challenge the incumbent in intra-

party elections and create serious elite's division within the ruling coalition. Often supported by an opposition coalition, they may run against the incumbent in national elections for the position of head of state and contribute to the lost by the ruling coalition of the two-third majority. They might even call for a national boycott of elections in the case of suspected electoral fraud. Hence, the ruling party needs to manage conflicts between the incumbent and the upper-echelon state bureaucrats in order to avoid a political crisis.

The credibility of state bureaucrats' defiance of the incumbent's decisions is attributed mostly to the ascendancy the former has on the domestic market. Upper echelon state bureaucrats oversight most strategic sectors. Through the attribution of licenses, permits, subsidiaries, social security benefits and the imposition of personal and corporate incomes, sale and trade taxes, as well as price-fixer of basic commodities, they organize who gets what in society, especially in the context of an omnipresence of parastatal giant companies in labor intensive industries. In this way, a vast network of economic actors is at their mercy. It allows them to grant economic benefits to some clientele in exchange of political support. If it is true that ultimately, the ruling elites are responsible for designing the overall national economic plan, nevertheless "state bureaucracy have a profound influence on policy making, not only at administrative levels but also through providing expert, well-informed policy advice to the political decision-makers" (Brooker, 2000: 181). They retain some form of discretionary power. In fact, "each bureaucratic unit possesses a certain volume of power resources, which may be composed of coercion, information, legitimacy, and economic goods" (Oszlak, 2005: 497). These powers are concentrated in ministries or departments such Finance, Commerce and Industry³². Their position within the public administration allows them to build mass support on a personal basis independently, to a certain degree, of the incumbent or the party they represent. For heads of state-owned companies, it is the size of the rent and the opacity of accounting procedures in these units that provide flexibility to dispense favors, even sometimes acting as a commercial bank of some sort by lending huge sums of money at preferential rates. Furthermore, whether through vertical or horizontal integration, sub-contracting or externalities, they can extend their tentacles and exert their domination over

³² As ministers, state bureaucrats are elected officials in a parliamentary system. In a presidential system, the head of state nominates them in cabinet positions.

many sectors of the economy. In sum, these administrative units are key because they are the gatekeepers of most economic flows and owners of most economic outputs; and elites who head these units are expected to assert their supremacy over significant segments of society.

Of course, fearing that one may accumulate too much power if staying too long in a neuralgic administrative unit, the incumbent may decide to adopt a musical chair tactic or simply fire a given individual that becomes exceedingly greedy. However, turnovers are easier to do at lower levels in the state bureaucracy; and at that level it is usually the responsibility of the upper echelon bureaucrats to nominate subalterns. At the top, if the bureaucracy is to be effective, it needs to hire competent individuals. These individuals are not easily replaceable, especially if ceaseless replacement becomes a habit. In fact, such behavior is more symptomatic of underdeveloped countries.

Local Leaders

When the degree of state penetration is low, state bureaucrats are invisible in the periphery. They are the anti-thesis of Weber's conception of an effective state. They function in an inchoate organizational structure; they are hired based on loyalty and their job attribution is often ill-defined; they are mere pawns of a higher power structure. In other words, the state is weak. Overall, state bureaucrats behave as kleptocrats in a predatory fashion. The economy is abandoned to the unforgiving market forces and informal practices, which tend to have disastrous consequences including maintaining low economic productivity and a general state of decrepitude in the country. Economic plans may exist, but the strategy changes frequently with no real commitment to long-term industrialization objectives. In this context, local leaders fill the power vacuum in isolated regions. They are the unavoidable intermediary between the central government and the periphery. Without their collective support, the ruling elites will lack political support in rural areas; potentially pooling only in urban constituencies where the small middle-class is usually highly critical of government actions. Defection of local leaders therefore brings the ruling elites one step closer to the lost of their legitimacy and their demise.

State bureaucrats in underdeveloped countries are mostly concentrated in the capital. They have little contact with rural communities. Their physical presence is at best punctual and temporary. They provide no public service whether it is in terms of public health, tax collection, security, infrastructure, etc. In fact, regions are virtually cut-off from the center and as such rural inhabitants do not feel any bonds with the national party system. To make it worst, the bureaucratic decision-making process is chaotic and various ministries and subunits work in isolation with one another. There is no overarching hierarchy and any clear integrated policy direction. They perform little productive functions and what is expected from them in terms of objectives and results is hazy. Many end up performing similar and rudimentary tasks. Duplication of positions is common. Finally, state bureaucrats are the coquetry of well-connected individuals. They are often hired not for their competence but for their almost total abdication to a “patron”. They receive a salary, sometimes a significant one, in exchange of loyalty. Overall, state bureaucrats obey to entrenched interests whether they are the ones of a politician, a military general, a foreign investor, a national banker, etc. Outside influence is pervasive and constant.

Still, even more probative is the predatory behavior of civil servants. Public funds are used for private gain and an extreme accumulation of wealth by public office holders is a common feature (Mbaku & Ihonvbere, 2006: 12). This highlights the blurry line between formal and informal practices. If public funds are not embezzled for private use, they are rarely invested in value-added social overhead capital. Instead, state money is dilapidated in an ostensive fashion in, for instance, a grandiose memorial, luxury public buildings or a sudden and excessive raise of civil servant salaries (Kohli, 2004: 399). In this sense, as in developing countries, the size of public sector in terms of the number of employees is often substantial. More than the sheer number, it is their action that is revealing. As with developing countries, state-owned enterprises may be omnipresent in the economy, but operations are limited to commercial tax of primary commodity exportation and various custom duties. Under production sharing agreements covering the most lucrative sectors of production, state bureaucrats bestow licenses and permits, negotiate extractive rights but have little control over the management and investment strategies. Often, these state-owned companies are empty

shell with few assets or productive activities. This gloomy picture has been described in details in Bayart's (2009) seminal book *The State in Africa: the Politic of the Belly*.

If state bureaucrats are not the key players, it is the same with economic domestic private actors. The division of labor and the structure of the economy are often dominated by the primary sector and controlled by international firms who provide the capital, technology and specialized labor. There are little positive spillovers in the domestic economy. Capital flight is endemic and as a consequence, reinvestment is highly problematic. The absorptive capacity of technological imports by labor is very limited. In brief, the domestic economy is too small and feeble for the domestic bourgeoisie to be an active participant in politics. Labor work is so precarious and rudimentary that it prevents extensive unionization on a national scale. Although the size of the labor force could invest them with some power, the level of poverty is so high that economic survival tends to prime over economic emancipation. In other words, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and workers have very little influence.

Facing such vacuity, the presumption found in the literature is the absence of authority. This is where local leaders fill the void, especially in rural areas that are outside the reach of the state. These leaders occupy multiple functions. They are often simultaneously mayor, judge, banker, landowner, trading broker and spiritual guide in a small community. As such, they act as an unavoidable relay between the centre and their community. For example, the agricultural production of local farmers is sold in a nearby village to a single broker with a monopoly on local transactions, the local leader. They provide orders. More importantly, local communities are constructed around tradition, rites and symbols. Each community works as a normative microcosm with its own code. Social networks are limited to personal contacts, informal and live exchanges on one-on-one basis. There exist among individuals a sentiment of obligation, of mutual solidarity toward the community and its respective leader. For all these reasons, villagers and peasants are captive constituencies.

Yet, a local leader by itself has little leverage over the ruling elites. Indeed, the small size of local leaders' constituencies gives the ruling elites few incentives to co-opt them. Two conditions could change significantly their status and power in relation with the ruling elites: if

they regroup under a single banner or if by any chance there are lucrative natural resources on their territory. In the latter case, control of these resources alters the balance of power. The region becomes strategic given the wealth it could generate. Furthermore, with high returns, one or a coalition of local leaders can expand their influence to other territories; each time increasing their capacity to mobilize more and more political support. Local leaders controlling a region that is crossed by a major commercial route can also expect substantial returns. In this context, local leaders have significant leverage over the ruling elites. Moving on with a project without the approval of the local leaders is perilous. Sabotage, mutiny, route blocking, kidnapping are all possible actions and common events around exploitation sites in non-western countries, especially in underdeveloped countries. In either case, the defection of local leaders may have grave consequences for the ruling coalition. Their action can range from electoral boycott followed by a state of emergency to the toppling of the ruling elites and lower voter turnout accompanied by the lost of two-third majority.

Coalitions including local leaders are an effective strategy for pursuing goals of targeting specific as well as merging different constituencies into a centralized hierarchy in the absence of state presence in the periphery (Bayart, 2009: 164; Brynen, 1995: 25; O'Donnell, 1977: 66; Eisenstadt, 1973: 24, 29; Khan, 2005; Baldwin, 2011). At the same time, local leaders are often not part of the ruling party *per se*. They may administer the local committee of the dominant party, act as an elected delegate under the banner of the dominant party and be the main representative of the civil service. They may be members of the ruling party, but in an instrumental function. They are less adherent, and more sorts of sympathizers: that is, they offer their support to the ruling party but in an opportunistic way. They will more likely play parties against each other in order to receive the best payoff. They are political brokers. Given that a local leader is the exclusive interlocutor of a given community: "in the same way that the patron chooses his voters, he also chooses the candidates or party to which he will deliver the bloc vote at his disposal. Usually, following some hard bargaining, the patron delivers his fiefdom's votes to the party that offers the most" (Rouquié, 1978: 30). Some may have great ambitions, but most of them remain in their stronghold. They are not directly and actively involved in national politics, for instance as a presidential candidate, unless their interests are threatened by the central government. There are political outsiders.

Political interactions between the ruling elites and local leaders are best described as clientelistic: that is, “the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state and in the society. In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994: 458). “The client buys protection, first, against the exigencies of markets or nature; second, against the arbitrariness or weakness of the centre, or against the demands of other strong people or groups” (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 214).

Nuances are essential. First, clientelistic exchanges are manifest in all non-western countries, but significantly different depending on the state penetration in society. In a weak state, clientelistic networks are a generalized pattern of exchanges between patrons and clients and not a simple addition to or a parallel dimension of the overall institutional framework as in the case in stronger bureaucratic states (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: chapter 5). It is a way of life, the only way. There is no option, no readily alternative. It functions along the idea of patron-brokerage, not organization-brokerage: the former is independent while the latter is related to the center of power and its entities such as the public administration, political parties, trade unions, etc. In countries where the state is present in every corner of society, a local official may bribe citizens as part of his party strategy to win political support. For instance, it may take the form of subsidies to build an irrigation system for farmers. Clientelistic relations are therefore in a sense more or so formal, explicit, universalistic and dispersed in nature. In weak states, clientelistic relations are informal, implicit, particularistic and geographically concentrated. It is about a favor given to a specific individual often in a context of a verbal agreement. It is a sold vote. “The vote is a commodity of exchange with no political meaning for the person who has it in his possession. It is precisely a question of an economic valuable given for a political right” (Rouquié, 1978: 24). In stronger states, it is a gregarious vote. “The gregarious vote is collective and passive. Groups of voters are organized to ballot. They are transported, lodged, fed, entertained and may even receive small presents” (Rouquié, 1978: 25).

Second, state penetration may be problematic in both underdeveloped and developing economies. It has to do with geography and demography. Some regions are physically cut-off from the rest of the country. Dense tropical forests and river networks, archipelagic morphology, vast deserts or high peak mountains insulate these regions. Combined with low population density, it increases significantly the cost of linking them with the center (Herbst, 2000: 11-12). The economy of scale is simply not there to allow for state projection over the entire territory. Overall, citizens of these regions have less contact with outsiders and local leaders would influence sub-national political dynamics regardless of the level of economic development. Still in developing country, their role in national politics should be marginal compared to other dominant social groups or to the situation prevailing in underdeveloped countries.

Third, since the advent of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s, the state control of economic functions has been greatly reduced. Yet, especially in Asia, the state continues to exercise significant influence in the economy through various regulatory powers and public investment schemes; and the stalwart administrative infrastructure still functions properly (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009). In Latin America, the retreat of the state gave additional powers to sub-national units: over centralization followed by a chaotic and massive decentralization process left many regions with no administrative services (Cornelius, 2000; Yashar, 1999; O'Donnell, 1993). In this context, local civil society took the relay. If anything, local leaders should exert in this context increasing influence over politics in hybrid regimes. Furthermore, lately, there has been somewhat of a resurgence of state intervention in the economy in non-western countries, with China serving as a model to emulate. Henceforth, the dichotomy between the power dynamics of state bureaucrats and local leaders remains relevant.

The introduction of local leaders within the general framework of the ruling coalition connects sub-national politics with national politics. In the process, it fills a gap left by the economic and organizational approaches. In the organizational approach, low state penetration is detrimental to stability. It is akin to unstructured patterns of political participation; to random and chaotic interactions as if only the formal institutions of the state can maintain stability. We contend that in the absence of such presence, local leaders act as surrogates and are the focal

point of informal institutional networks that can be guarantors of stability if local leaders are included in a given ruling coalition. In other words, a weak state does not necessarily imply instability within the ruling coalition. In the economic approach, underdeveloped countries are associated with instability because they have little to co-opt elites with. It does not make a difference between various form of patronage: the sold vote (individual) and the gregarious vote (organizational). In this sense, local leaders often exchange political support for economic autonomy over the territory they control and not necessarily material incentives. They want to be masters of their own domain. In any cases, they have leverage because they reign over captive constituencies. The bottom line is “a territorially disaggregated, geographically nuanced perspective on political regimes, one that captures variations in the reach of the central state as well as in the forms of rule at the subnational level, would strengthen our understanding of contemporary nondemocratic politics” (Snyder, 2006: 229). Indeed, it did.

The four dominant social groups are ideal-types or analytical tools to simplify the complexity of social interactions in hybrid regimes. We generally frame the dominant social groups as relatively cohesive. Yet, the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion of dominant social groups frequently start with divisions within each group. Discords between military officers are often related to the decision to intervene or not in politics, and if necessary how to intervene. Members of an opposition party may engage in intense debates about the necessity to reform the regime from within or from outside the ruling coalition. Bureaucratic infighting between ministries over a given policy or major tensions between local leaders for control of a given territory is also common. As we already said but cannot insist enough, the point here is that instability is not the by-product of a total exclusion of one or another of our four dominant social groups. Within each dominant social group there are factions or parties with greater resources compared to their respective counterpart: not all have the same status. When these powerful actors within each dominant social group are excluded from the ruling coalition instability is more likely. Further, in reality, there is sometimes an overlap between the four dominant social groups. For instance, a military officer can be a state bureaucrat or a local leader, or vice-versa. In this case, their position within the ruling coalition is reinforced. Also, our four social dominant groups may have economic interests in the private sector. In this context, the bourgeoisie is important only insofar as it is mainly composed of one of our

dominant social groups. Alternatively, there is sometimes a close interaction between dominant social groups. Upper echelon state bureaucrats of a state-owned company operating, in a natural resources sector, work in connivance with local leaders overseeing the territory where the extraction site is located. Nevertheless, depending on the degree of state penetration, these interactions are characterized by a dimension of authority that favor one or another.

To recapitulate, in hybrid regimes, elections open the political regime and have the advert effect of fragmenting people allegiances whereas many constituencies are captive of dominant social groups. Hence, ruling elites cannot govern alone. They have to forge alliances to maintain the stability of the regime. Captive constituency means something different for each of our four political groups: for the military, it is mostly about coercion; for opposition parties it is about identity; for the bureaucrats it is about economic dependence and for local leaders it is often a mix of all the above. The stability of hybrid regimes depends on the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition. The composition of the ruling coalition is determined by the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration. These two variables allow us to understand why military officers and opposition parties are linked to a specific type of hybrid regime and why state bureaucrats and local leaders are linked to a specific level of economic development.

The degree of extra-legal organized violence and state penetration are posited as independent from each other. There is enough variation to have confidence in such an assumption. That being said, our two main variables are not necessarily constant in time. Some countries experience periodic outbreaks of civil conflict whereas others are basically always in a state of siege or absolved of any disruptive violent events and direct threat. In some countries, state penetration change significantly whereas in others, it remains problematic or unproblematic. Therefore, a country can move from one ideal-type to another and not necessarily in an orderly sequence.

2.3. The Methodological Choices

We have asked big questions and worked hard to provide a parsimonious answer. To prevent axiomatic theorizing, we devote much attention to the research design. As Geddes (2003: 4) eloquently summarizes:

“To be successful, social science must steer a careful course between the Scylla of lovely but untested theory and Charybdis, the maelstrom of information unstructured by theory... Much of the field of comparative politics has failed to keep to this difficult course, veering instead from one catastrophic extreme to the other. The result is a modest accumulation of theoretical knowledge in many parts of the field”.

Our choices of methods in terms of data collection, sample size, case selection and the angle through which each case has been investigated are shaped by the research objectives – i.e. knowledge accumulation, theory building and generalizations – presented in the thesis introduction, as well as the problematic and hypotheses.

2.3.1. Types of Data, Sample Size and Empirical Recording

There are two types of data: quantitative and qualitative³³. We use a mix of both in our demonstration. Quantitative information on regime types and state penetration is collected from transnational, international or national organizations. Still, either because they offer an incomplete picture or because they are not available, these sources are complemented by qualitative data from national or local newspapers and scholarly publications. The chronicle of political crises is solely qualitative in nature because coalition dynamics do not lend themselves easily to any quantification and because, to our knowledge, no open-source dataset

³³ From our standpoint, formal model and mathematic equation are not related to external validation. It is a method of internal validation that is most relevant when the research object has no empirical manifestation. A classic example is a nuclear war. Formal models are in this case a valuable methodological alternative. Many studies on hybrid regimes use formal modeling, - e.g. Gandhi & Przeworski (2006), Magaloni (2008) or Boix & Svobik (2010). However, it tends to treat actors as having uniformed interests, with perfect information and equal resources in a two-players game. From our standpoint, these limitations are method-driven. Since hybrid regime dynamics involve a plurality of actors defending different types of interests, a formal model would reify a logic that alters reality instead of reflecting it in a best possible way.

exists on the subject. Primary qualitative sources like participant observation, surveys or semi-structured interviews are not used. First, given the intrusive nature of hybrid regimes in society and our conspicuous political research object, participant observation and surveys are problematic. Authorization to observe elite interaction within the ruling coalition is unlikely to be granted and authorities would likely interfere with survey questions and distribution. Semi-structured interviews would be conceivable but given our resource constraints, the selection would be limited to one or two cases; it would prevent us from exposing the full extension of our four ideal-types. Also, since we go far back in time, interviews are most likely to yield information about recent events leaving a large period uncovered. Furthermore, we firmly believe there is already sufficient knowledge on each country not warrant a fact-finding mission. We want foremost to integrate and connect vast and disparate country specific findings into a coherent framework.

We settle for a “middle-way” between large-N and single or binary case studies. On one hand, large-N analyses are frequent in comparative politics and in the field of political development. Researches on hybrid regimes are no exception³⁴. Problems of data accessibility and reliability as well as the methodological exigencies related to the nature of our theory – i.e. process tracing of ruling coalition dynamics – prevent us from basing our demonstration on a large-N statistical analysis and performing any regressions. On the other hand, single case study is also very common in the literature on hybrid regimes³⁵. Yet, again, given our research objectives and theory specifications, we need more than one or two cases to examine the inner working of our arguments. Furthermore, we were not motivated by the fact that existing theories did not explain a specific case, but by general problems find in the literature on hybrid regime stability and the search of recurring patterns in diverse parts of the world. Therefore, our sample size looks for the equilibrium between two traditional extremes³⁶.

³⁴ See Hadenius & Teorell (2006, 2007), Brownlee (2009), Howard & Roessler (2006), Greene (2010), Davenport (2000), Lindberg (2006), Engberg & Ersson (1999), Alexander (2004), Gates et al. (2006).

³⁵ See amongst others Abente-Brun (2009); Langston (2006), Ekman (2009), Way (2006), Karl (1987), Zinecker (2009) and McMann (2006).

³⁶ The use of middle-way is also frequent in the literature on hybrid regimes. See Ottaway (2003), van de Walle (2006), Case (1996a) and Alexander (2008).

It is closely associated with the structured and focused method. It essentially articulates how to report facts. It is developed by George & Bennett (2004: 67):

“The method is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined”.

Indeed, each empirical chapter is constructed to answer the same generic questions. The identification of a small number of variables and precise indicators give focus to the research. It does not expand further the historical account of each country selected³⁷. We are not looking for rich details like in a descriptive single case study but still, our hypotheses are more refined than those found in quantitative researches. The structured and focused method allows the tracing-process of our specific research object: that is, the event-history analysis of the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of the ruling coalition. In this way, we can examine the conjecture of pre-established conditions of stability and its significance. Furthermore, it produces comparable findings since it is based on standardized comparisons, predefined and specific observable implications.

2.3.2. Case Selection

Case selection is a determinant step in any research design. Here, the question is not why a case is more relevant than another. Our research objective is to produce generalizations. Hence, to select cases by a process of elimination is incoherent. In principle, our analytical framework should be relevant to the entire population of hybrid regimes for the time period covered. This is true except for two types of countries that have been excluded from our investigation. First, city-states such as Singapore as well as microstates such as the small islands of the Pacific Ocean are beyond the scope of our framework. Whether it is because of

³⁷ The comparison is not based on a myriad of factors associated with the specificity of a given country as in configurative-ideographic case studies; or on the testing of all relevant factors identified by the literature as in cross-national statistical analysis.

their remoteness (Anckar, 2006), problem of economy of scale (Briguglio et al., 2008) or intimate proximity between rulers and citizens (Suton, 1987), these regimes tend to behave somewhat differently than political regimes in larger states (Rokkan, 1968; Samy et al. 2008). Second, as already mentioned in Chapter One, our analytical framework should be relevant only to hybrid regimes not geographically closed to Western Europe or North America. The proximity of hybrid regimes to these regions could hypothetically transform the nature of the analytical framework from an endogenous to an exogenous explanation. Taking into account these two constraints, our analytical framework can be applied to about 60 hybrid regimes that have existed since 1945 (see appendix 1)³⁸. With these general clarifications in mind, we selected Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay based on four criteria.

First, to answer our research question we needed case with variations in terms of levels of economic development and types of hybrid regimes. Senegal and Paraguay are considered underdeveloped countries, while Malaysia and Indonesia are developing economies. Obviously, economic development is not necessarily stagnant. For instance, Indonesia started as an agrarian economy and gradually diversified over the years. Since it requires a detailed examination of the economic system, the argument behind such classification will be presented in the empirical chapters. Also, we opted for two hegemonic authoritarian regimes (Paraguay and Indonesia) and two competitive authoritarian regimes (Senegal and Malaysia). This classification rests on the longer period of hybridity in each country. Ditto, the definitive attribution of hybrid regime types will be exposed in chapters dedicated to each country. We recognize that few regimes stay the same over many decades. For example, Senegal was a *de facto* one-party regime between 1967 and 1976. We will acknowledge this non-linear process of political and economic development into our country narrative. And such changes will allow us to better understand the process of recomposition of the ruling coalition by examining variations within a single country.

³⁸ It should be noted that the time period in appendix 1 starts in 1972 because it is when Freedom House began evaluating political regimes. In our own analysis, we start in 1945 for reasons evoke in the methodological section.

That being said, we are especially interested in hybrid periods. This period has to be at least 10 years long. Ultimately, the 10 years benchmark is a convention. It is the threshold used by eminent scholars such as Morlino (2009a: 283). A country that experiences ceaseless regime change is referred to as unstable regime *per se* or failed state, not unstable hybrid regime. These cases are not part of our population and our analytical framework yields little insight in regard to their behavior. The Paraguayan hybrid regime dates back to the Stroessner's coup (1954) and lived until 2008. The Senegalese hybrid regime began in 1960 and survived until today (2010). The Malaysian hybrid regime took form in the 1970s and remains so. Finally, the Indonesian hybrid regime emerged after the 1965 abortive coup and has hold up until the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

This point brings us to the time period of our inquiry. It starts with the year 1945 or the date of Independence and ends with the last hybrid period or 2010. In regard to the starting date, hybrid regimes refer to institutional arrangements that at the very least include frequent direct elections with universal suffrage. Before 1945, such prerequisites were an anomaly in most developing countries (Cowen & Laakso, 2002: 4; Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 132-135). Ultimately, the existence of this anomaly denotes the changing meaning of political regimes over time and the end of WW II with the seminal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) represents a turning point for that matter (Huntington, 1991: 6). We stop at 2010 in order to have sufficient documentation for the examination of our hypotheses and prevent working on on-going events.

Second, cases have to manifest a different contextual environment in terms of (a) geographical location, (b) system of government, (c) colonial history and (d) cultural background. This diversity will provide an interesting empirical basis to illustrate the declinaison of our theory in various settings. It will also highlight the prospect that it might turn out to be useful in explaining the dynamics of many other hybrid regimes. It was important to verify if patterns could be found in different regions host of many hybrid regimes. As such, Latin America (Paraguay), sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal) and Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia) are

represented³⁹. The selected cases should represent different systems of government. Senegal, Paraguay and Indonesia are presidential systems, while Malaysia is a parliamentary system. Our cases should also witness different colonial history and access to independence at different times: Paraguay in 1811, Senegal in 1960, Malaysia in 1957 and Indonesia in 1945. Paraguay was a Spanish colony, Senegal a French one; Malaysia was a British colony and Indonesia a Dutch one. The population of Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal is mostly Muslim, whereas in Paraguay inhabitants are essentially Christian. Their degree of fractionalization also varies: from the highly homogenous society in Paraguay to the more heterogeneous ones in Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal.

Third, we were looking for crucial cases that challenge theoretical approaches of hybrid regime stability. Comparisons that do not take into account rival explanations are of limited use in comparative politics. In other words, we were first looking for cases where a dominant party ruled for an extended period, but had experienced political crises. Although they all have their weaknesses, it is difficult to deny the ascendance of the Colorado Party in Paraguay, the *Union progressiste sénégalaise* (UPS) later transformed into the *Parti socialiste* (PS), the UMNO in Malaysia and the Golkar Party in Indonesia. Moreover, all of these countries have experienced at some point in their history more than one period of instability in a hybrid context. For example, in Paraguay, the 1989 coup put an end to the Stroessner's era. In Senegal, the 1988 post-electoral riots threaten the Diouf's regime. In Malaysia, the Chinese-Malay race riot of 1969 galvanized the country. In Indonesia, the supposedly aborted coup in 1965 and the subsequent purges of communists by General Suharto left the country under trauma for a while. These are only few examples; many others will be presented in each country narrative. Crucial cases rest also on the idea that any analysis that excludes certain dynamics found in one country is incomplete insofar as these dynamics cannot be labeled as deviant. As it will become evident in the chapters to come, the formulation of statements of cross-national regularities that disregard the role of opposition parties in Malaysia, military officers in Indonesia and Paraguay or local leaders in Senegal will fall short of a reliable

³⁹ In the Middle East and North Africa, very few hybrid regimes can satisfy to the third criteria given that monarchical family not dominant-party are the most frequent regent. Further, in the post-Soviet space, hybrid regimes have not last long enough to be able to observe structural patterns.

theory. Indeed, rigorous idiographic studies on these countries devote much attention to these social groups. The intent is to bridge the rich literature on single case study that often follows an inductive chain of inquiry in which facts speak for themselves with the deductive nature of a pre-established framework that often evades the inescapable reality of a given country.

Fourth, logically we lean toward the plausibility probes selection strategy (Eckstein, 1975: 108-120; Lijphart, 1971: 691-692). If our theory could explain classic cases of hybrid regimes at the development stage, it is most likely that it will be able to provide insights on other more ambiguous cases of hybrid regimes. It would justify the worthy academic effort to move to the theory-testing phase⁴⁰. The Malaysian hybrid regime is a reference and probably the most studied nomothetic case on the subject. The other authoritative case is Mexico. Despite its relevance, the Mexican regime is outside of our population sample since it is geographically in the backyard of the United States; its patterns of stability and instability may be related to exogenous factors. Otherwise, Paraguay was one the most durable hybrid regimes in the world; one that last about fifty years. Senegal was among the first competitive authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa; and Indonesia under Suharto was the prototypical example of a façade democracy (hegemonic authoritarian regime) with opposition parties created by the ruling elites and an almighty president elected by the legislative assembly. Ultimately, plausible probes and crucial cases strategies are particularly suited for the study of complex macropolitical phenomena such as problems of regime stability (Eckstein, 1975: 111, 121).

Conclusion

We believe this chapter has offered an answer to our initial question about the conditions under which the political elites will consent to devolve authority to the government in a dominant party hybrid regime and therefore maintain stability and how these conditions will change depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic development.

⁴⁰ Although they ask the same questions, use the same theory and select among the same population of cases, theory building and theory testing are two distinct phases in the logic of inquiry. And at this stage, choosing hard, deviant or ambiguous cases that could possibly contradict our theory all the way down would be counterproductive.

In doing so, we made explicit the general canvas into which our reflection is embedded: that is to say, neo-intuitionism. Although it is now clear that the economic and organizational approaches also subscribe to this meta-theory, our comprehension of dynamics in hybrid regimes is diametrically different. The economic and organizational approaches depict a relatively monolithic environment. They offer no way of apprehending political pluralism, which is an obvious fact of political life in hybrid regimes, and knowing the identity of who challenge the ruling elites. They frame political conflicts mostly as unidirectional. According to these approaches, the ruling elites impose their view and all other actors are passive. The very nature of a hybrid regime combines as we have seen autocratic and democratic institutions. Since the economic and organizational approaches focus on autocratic traits, we had to undertake the analysis of conditions of stability in hybrid regimes from the democratic angle. We think it better reflects the political reality, which is characterized by competing sources of authority in a non-institutionalized party system. This intellectual enterprise is coherent with the other choice we made of framing our theory within historical institutionalism, one of the three strands of neo-institutionalism: the other two being rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Furthermore, historical institutionalism insists on macro-processes, critical junctures and middle-range theories, all of which is especially appropriate to examine the question of political stability.

The core of this chapter was the presentation of our genuine theory of political alliances as a condition of stability in a hybrid context. It stressed the diversity and rigidity of political allegiances but also the importance of forging alliances with dominant social groups in order to govern legitimately and maintain stability of the regime. For that purpose, we have introduced the concept of a “ruling coalition”. The crucial analytical element here is the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders in an out of the ruling coalition. In other words, stability in hybrid regimes depends on the existence and composition of a ruling coalition. In this regard, we have identified four dominant social groups that we believe to be key ones in hybrid regimes. They are the military officers, the opposition parties, the state bureaucrats and the local leaders. As we have shown, the significance of each group and the configuration of political alliances is a function of two structural factors that we use as our key

independent variables: (1) the degree of extra-legal organized violence (i.e. low or high); and (2) the degree of state penetration (i.e. low or high). They connect the dots between specific social groups and the political and economic context. The first variable provides a rationale as to why military officers are the dominant social group actor in hegemonic authoritarian regimes where its value is high and why opposition parties are linked to competitive authoritarian regimes where its value is low; whereas the second establishes the reason why state bureaucrats are dominant in developing economies where the value is high and local leaders prevail in underdeveloped economies where the value is low. In a nutshell, this is our theory and we hope it will contribute to a better understanding of conditions of stability in hybrid regimes.

Finally, the methodological choices were addressed. We developed an argumentation in regards to sample size and type of data, as well as to the way we intend to present our empirical findings and case selection strategies. It is based on our research objectives mentioned in the introduction (i.e. knowledge accumulation, theory development and meaningful generalizations), as well as on the specification of our theory (i.e. four ideal-types). We opted for the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. Together, they offer substantial materials to expose the richness of our theory.

Malaysia

Malaysia is a Southeast Asian country composed of two bodies of land - Peninsular Malaysia (West) and Malaysian Borneo (East) – separated by the South China Sea. A former British colony, the country gained Independence in 1957. It is ethnically diverse. In 2004, the total population of Malaysia was 29 millions. Malays were representing 50.4%, Chinese 23.7%, Indigenous people 11% and Indians 7.1%. The majority are Muslims (60.2%), but Buddhist (19.2%), Christian (9.1%), and Hindu (6.3%) are also significant religious groups⁴¹. The parliamentary system follows the Westminster model and includes the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The Malaysian ruling elites have remained in power for almost half a century under a democratic regime (1957-1969) and a competitive authoritarian regime (1969-2010). The cornerstone of their success has resided in their capacity to build alliances with appropriate political forces in the country. Indeed, the dominant party UMNO has orchestrated and maintained a ruling coalition – *Barisan Nasional* (BN)⁴² – encompassing over the years and until now a wide range of political interests. As such, it could legitimately claim to represent the dominant segments of the Malaysian society. Yet, by no means was the Malaysian hybrid regime stable all along. It has witnessed political crises of different levels of intensity and most of them were related to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition.

When looking at the first variable, i.e. the degree of organized violence, it has been overall quite low but especially noticeable after the end of the *Konfrontasi*⁴³ period with Indonesia in 1966. According to our framework, we should therefore observe a pattern where opposition

⁴¹ The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.

⁴² From 1957 to 1973, it was named the Alliance.

⁴³ The *Konfrontasi* refers to the military conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia (1962-1966).

parties are invested with powers to challenge the authority of the ruling elites and, as a dominant group, prime candidates for inclusion within the ruling coalition. The stabilizing effect of party co-optation dynamics in Malaysia should be especially evident under the competitive authoritarian regime. As to the second variable, state penetration has varied across the territory over the years but generally speaking, the state and by ricochet the ruling elites have exercised substantive control over local politics and economics. Malaysia moved from an agricultural production based economy to a manufacturing hub and in the process, the government created a myriad of state-owned companies operating in a quasi-monopolistic market. Therefore, the growing influence of state bureaucrats as a dominant group in national politics should be evident.

3.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1957-2010)

The chronological narrative of political crises that follows will illustrate two points. First, the centrality of opposition parties in hybrid regime stability does not reduce itself to the decision of the ruling elites to include them or not; it also implies a decision on which one to include. It is therefore fair to say that the reason why the UMNO stayed in power for so long is in large part due to the formation and maintenance of an inter-party coalition. Instances of instability have been a function of the difficulty of choosing the right combination of parties at a given time in the Malaysian context, given the heterogeneity of the political landscape and socio-economic change. Indeed, the mere impossibility of satisfying simultaneously the interests of the Chinese community, an eclectic group of believers, and the Islamist movement extolling the formation of a theocratic state, has proved to be a significant source of instability in Malaysia. Ethnic and Islam politics in the present case were not easy to reconcile in one coherent institution: that is, the ruling coalition. Second, minor events can cumulate and have a profound effect on the political dynamics in a more or so distant future. Here, the state of emergency in the Malaysian Federal State of Kelantan in 1977-78 was no stranger to the BN electoral rout in 2008. It brought Islam politics at the front stage of national politics and forced the ruling elites to position themselves in the debate on the separation between religion and the state.

Few words first on the so-called founding Merdeka Constitution are essential because it defines the distribution of power between competing ethnic groups that has persisted until today. When the British returned to their former colony after Japan surrender in 1945, they pushed for the Malayan Union. Amongst others, it would have had granted citizenship to all inhabitants living in the country irrespective of their ethnic origin. Outraged, the Malay community organized itself and formed the UMNO to defend Malay's control over the party system. At the same time, Chinese, Indians and a limited number of Malays formed the All Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) and the *Pusat Tenaga Rakyat* (PUTERA) to promote a non-communal alternative formulated in the People's Constitutional Proposals. To make sure their voice would be heard, they staged on October 20th (1947) a general strike. The British automatically perceived this coalition as radical and made the choice to deal with the more moderate UMNO elites (Weiss, 2006: 72). Yet, the British were against the institutionalization of a dominant party based on the supremacy of one ethnic group (Crouch, 1996: 17). In response to such concern, an influent UMNO leader, Onn bin Jaafar, defected from the party and decided to create the multiethnic Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in 1951 to contest the Kuala Lumpur municipal election of 1952, which was in effect a ground test for an eventual general election. To counter Onn's defiance, the UMNO formed an electoral pact with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and won 9 of the 12 seats. The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) joined the rank in 1954. The "Merdeka" Constitution (1957) was born out of this alliance: a form of elite pact, foremost between Malays and Chinese, in which various economic and political concessions were formally agreed upon⁴⁴.

Quickly, the significance of this alliance was going to be tested. In July 1958, the MCA president Lim Chong Eu contested the inclusive character of the bargain. He was complaining about the unbalanced partnership in effect overly in favor of the UMNO. He demanded equal power, protection of cultural institutions and the right to compete in all electoral districts with a Chinese majority (Lee Seng Hock, 2011). Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman responded

⁴⁴ According to Case (1995: 79), "this document parceled out most state positions and power to UMNO leaders while preventing them from intruding in Chinese business dealings. As a formula for legitimatization, the "bargain" was oligarchic and communalist".

swiftly. He threatened to exclude the MCA from the coalition in preparation of the upcoming election if Lim Chong Eu did not retract himself. In July 1959, with the support of the MCA pro-UMNO faction headed by Tan Siew Sin, party members voted against Lim's political agenda. Lim resigned and later formed the opposition party Gerakan; Tan Siew Sin was nominated to the position of Finance Minister (1959-1974).

The intensity of this crisis was medium. The fact that elite division did not concern the dominant party but a peripheral one was reducing the scope. Nevertheless, it was a clear signal to all political actors that there was a hierarchy within the ruling coalition: the UMNO reigns at the top and who ever publicly contest this prerogative shall face dire consequences. Yet, the fact that the majority of MCA members decided to preserve the status quo shows the importance they were giving to their inclusion in the Alliance regardless, to a certain degree, of the power devolve to them. Although ultimately, loyalty was rewarded – as the attribution of the prestigious position of Finance Minister to a MCA leader displays – the original reaction of the ruling elites was clearly directed toward the overly open challenge made by a MCA faction. It is only once the dust had settled down that the nomination of Tan Siew Sin as Minister of Finance was interpreted as the recognition by the ruling elites of the importance of MCA consent for the legitimacy of the Alliance and UMNO supremacy. Finally, although Lim was temporally sidelined for his audacity, his party (Gerakan) will be later included in a new ruling coalition. It is a testimony that the ruling elites were acknowledging Lim's ascendancy over a specific constituency that UMNO had little influence or control over.

Again, the tense relationship between Malays and Chinese within the coalition was in full display in the events surrounding Singapore's expulsion from the Malaysian Federation it had joined in 1963. Prior to that political move, the People's Action Party (PAP), which was founded by former Kuomintang party members, was governing without opposition in the city-state. Yet following the merger, the UMNO decided to enlist candidates in the 1963 Singapore elections while the PAP invested the electoral scene in the Malaya mainland for the 1964 general elections. They were challenging the authority of each other in their respective electoral stronghold. In May 1965, the PAP formed an opposition coalition called the Malaysian Solidarity Convention. "Although the Malaysian Solidarity Convention claimed to

be non communal, right-wing UMNO leaders saw it as a Chinese plot to take over control of Malaysia” (US Library of Congress, Singapore, 2012). Worth noting, punctual racial confrontation between Malays and Chinese also occurred in Singapore at that time. Eventually, Prime Minister Tunku decided to ban the PAP and expelled Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965 (Milne & Mauzy, 1980: 139).

By definition, fragmentation of the national territory is a high intensity crisis. Yet, it appeared not to be the case here. Originally, the PAP leader, Lee Kuan Yew, “convinced Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, of the urgency of proceeding with a political merger” (Leifer, 1995: 98). It was one to welcome Singapore in the Malaysian party system not in the ruling coalition. As such, it is revealing how the crisis was peacefully resolved. Rarely secession goes so smoothly. It reinforces the point that exclusion from the party system is not as significant as exclusion from the ruling coalition in terms of hybrid regime instability. Furthermore, ultimately the PAP tentative to form an all-Chinese coalition across the Malaysian Federation would have had reduced the influence of the MCA in society and altogether threatened the Alliance legitimacy as a representative of major ethnic groups in the country; not to say potentially the supremacy of UMNO. Therefore, the exclusion of the PAP had the advert effect of reinforcing the necessity of including the MCA as the main representative of the Chinese community. It contributed to consolidate the ruling coalition.

In September 1966, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the founder of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and Chief Minister of Sarawak, a state of the island of Borneo that joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963, received a vote of no confidence from the state legislators. A staunch defender of greater regional autonomy, he refused to resign (Boon, 2002: 60). The Governor of Sarawak dismissed him and Tawi Sli was appointed. Stephen sued the Governor and the court judged the Governor’s decision illegal. As a result of the constitutional crisis, Prime Minister Tunku declared a state of emergency in Sarawak and eventually Tawi Sli was reinstated.

Given its sub-national dimension, the intensity of this crisis was low. It was the first of a series of events (Kelantan in 1977-78 and Sabah in 1986) that shows the resonance of local politics

in national affairs. The central government actively interfered at lower levels to enforce the nomination of pro-Alliance sympathizers. Yet, even if the Chief Minister Stephen lost his position because of his challenge to the authority of the Alliance, his party SNAP was nevertheless later included in the new BN ruling coalition. This decision from the ruling elites was a tentative to broaden the coalition's political spectrum and to reach out for segments of the indigenous communities that were dominating the isolated Borneo federal states (Zakaria, 1989: 366).

The next crisis shook the country to its foundation. In the 1969 national election, the Alliance gained just the sufficient seats to control the House of Representatives and registered less than 50% of the vote. On May 11-12, the pro-Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Gerakan organized various public manifestations in the capital to celebrate their historic performance at the polls and were met with equivalent pro-Malay rallies; it led to the infamous race riot of May 13th (1969) when about 200 people died and 400 were injured as a result of the clash. The state of emergency was immediately declared and maintained for 21 months; the Parliament was suspended and replaced by the National Operations Council. The exit strategy included the introduction of the national ideology *Rukunegara*⁴⁵, a model of economic development “the New Economic Policy” and an enlarged ruling coalition. Gerakan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) joined in 1972, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was integrated in 1973, and four other minor parties (Sarawak United People's Party or SUPP, *Parti Pesaka Bumiputera* or PPB, and USNO from Sabah) were also included. The offer was extended to the DAP who refused to join the rank of the newly formed coalition called *Barisan Nasional* (BN), which was officially registered as a political organization in 1974 (www.bn.org.my).

With the *Reformasi* movement starting in 1998, the race riot of 1969 was the most serious crisis of legitimacy the regime faced. Its intensity was evidently high. It was a sort of wake-up call for the ruling elites. It was first a protest from the Alliance constituencies against the relative disconnectedness of its political leaders from their reality; but above all, it was a

⁴⁵ The state ideology consisted of five principles: (i) belief in one God; (ii) loyalty to the king and country; (iii) supremacy of the Constitution; (iv) rule of law; and (v) courtesy and morality.

protest against the Malays' deteriorating economic situation. It was a signal that political elites should never be free-floating, overly non-responsive to the grievances of their constituency. Second, it was a manifestation of the exclusive character of political forces represented in the Alliance. The three original parties were simply not able to appeal to large segments of the population, which tends to confirm the existence of captive constituencies typical of hybrid regimes. Consequently, according to Means (1991: 28), "a major effort was made to incorporate the more accommodating of the opposition parties into a broader coalition. In this way, criticism could be channeled and contained within the structure of intra-coalition discussions and bargaining, without involvement of public mobilization and acrimonious public debate". In sum, the origin of the traumatizing events of May 1969 was a sentiment of exclusion and the remedy a movement toward inclusion. The extension of the new coalition could have threatened its cohesion. Yet, its unity was preserved under the prerogative of ethnic harmony between Malays, Chinese, Indians and Indigenes.

During the 1975 UMNO general assembly, three factions clashed and engaged in a bitter fight that was transgressing the traditional procedures for succession of the deputy prime minister. For one, Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein (1970-76) named its preferred choice and implicitly forced the hand of the delegates; and for two, Prime Minister Hussein Onn, who succeeded Razak after he had suddenly died of leukemia, chose a younger candidate, Mahathir, over senior ones (Case, 1995: 98). Some UMNO elites were arrested under the Internal Security Act (Crouch, 1996: 98). This medium intensity crisis is the only event in Malaysian contemporary political history that falls definitely outside of our framework. It deals mostly with nomination procedures and not with the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion of dominant social groups. Overall, it was a minor incident although the circumstances contributed to the rise of Mahathir to the incumbency, the Malaysian head of state with the longest tenure.

In 1977-78, PAS members of the Kelantan's assembly introduced a motion of no confidence directed at the Chief Minister, Mohamed Nasir. UMNO and MCA members rejected the motion and protested by leaving the assembly. Nasir called for the dissolution of the assembly and his supporters gathered in the streets where violence and looting erupted. Prime Minister

Hussein Onn imposed a curfew and declared the state of emergency. It is worth noting that the agreement leading to the inclusion of PAS within the ruling coalition was that the Kelantan state would remain a PAS stronghold and some PAS leaders would be nominated to various cabinet and federal positions: for instance Asri Muda was appointed Land Development Minister (Means, 1991: 29-30). In declaring a state of emergency and intervening into state politics to decide what should happen next, the national ruling elites broke in effect the pact. "PAS members who held office in the BN government, resigned their positions but also explained that PAS would remain in the BN. The wish of PAS leaders to remain in the BN was quickly foreclosed when the BN Council met to expel all members who had voted against the Kelantan emergency Bill" (Means, 1991: 63). In the end, PAS lost control of the state in the 1978 elections to the benefit of the ruling coalition.

The intensity of the 1977 crisis in Kelantan was low to medium. Although the state of emergency is a highly disruptive event, it was in this case limited to one federal state. Regardless of how isolated the event was it triggered a significant fracture between Muslims in Malaysian politics that has lasted till today. It pinpoints to hurdles associated with the reconciliation of the BN secular mandatory stance, purposely chosen to accommodate the diverse ethnic groups, with the fact that most Malays are devout Muslims. Ultimately, PAS insubordination and confrontational actions led to its disenfranchisement. It simply did not fit with the moderate politics of BN. Yet, the exclusion of PAS from the ruling coalition opened a breach in the BN legitimate claim of being representative of all Malaysians.

The Memali incident in November 1985 raised the animosity between the BN and the PAS to an entirely new level. Located in the northern state of Kedah, the small village was the home of former PAS leader, Ibrahim Mahmud, who was accused by the central authorities of fostering civil unrest (Means, 1991: 128). Ibrahim Mahmud resisted to his arrest and refused to surrender. Thereafter, the Prime Minister ordered the police to storm the village and some twenty people died (Case, 1995: 75). "PAS Vice-President Ustaz Abdul Hadi Awang... issued a fatwa (Islamic edict) stating that to oppose the government is to conduct jihad (holy war) and to die for the cause is *mati syahid* (martyr's death)" (Means, 1991: 129). For any Muslim, such edict is a serious declaration, at least heavily charge symbolically.

The Memali crisis was low in intensity again because restricted to one remote small area. Still, it was also a manifestation of an emerging malaise in regard to the rise of Islam politics among the ruling elites. Facing an utter defiance, it was unusual for the ruling elites not to ban automatically the anti-regime PAS. Probably, the ruling elites did not want to be portrayed as anti-Muslim by declaring illegal the only Islamic party in the country. Thus, they opted for tolerance. More importantly, with the exclusion of PAS, BN would have lacked any Muslim figure of authority. It was at that time that Anwar Ibrahim entered into national politics and was propelled by Prime Minister Mahathir to the higher spheres of UMNO party leadership relatively quickly. Indeed Anwar, a close associate of Ibrahim Mahmud, gathered significant support among Muslim civil society organizations; especially from *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (ABIM), a youth Muslim organization he created in 1972 when he was a student (Kingsbury, 2001: 278). Noteworthy, as in the cases of Lim in 1958 and Stephen in 1966, Anwar was first considered a nuisance. Indeed, he was accused in 1974 of instigating disorders as a student activist fighting against rural poverty in Baling (Kedang) and jailed without trial in the Kanunting Detention Center. Nonetheless, Mahathir's action was expressing an evident political calculation: without Anwar, the BN would have had a shallow legitimacy among religious Muslims. The Memali crisis also marked the radicalization of the PAS, which was favoring the BN. As long as the BN could depict the PAS as an extremist organization, the ruling elites were in good position to play on the fear of other ethnic groups that it would seize power and to discredit it as a credible political alternative.

From March to May 1986, the federal state of Sabah experienced various riots mostly concentrated in the capital Kota Kinabalu dominated by the Kadazan ethnic group. The riots were mainly a reaction to the 1985 state election. The *Parti Bersatu Sabah* (PBS), a pro Catholic party, defeated the *Berjaya*, a BN partner. It degenerated into street protests of the minority Muslim Malays, bomb explosions and life threat to the PBS leader (Crossette, 1987). PBS was included in the BN a year later and a snap election was held in 4-5 May 1986 confirming PBS victory. PBS eventually left the ruling coalition in 1990 and as a consequence, the government decided to cut off its support provoking sufficient defection to force its demise (Case, 1995: 77). In 1994, PBS was no longer active.

The Sabah crisis was of low intensity but reflected again the uneasy position of BN toward Islam politics. Rather than responding with force to Muslims protests, it instead lent its support to the Kadazan and its party (PBS) given the predominance of the ethnic group in the federal state. According to Case (1995: 77),

“Kadazan grievances arose over UMNO’s refusal to allow Sabah a state university or local television station, to increase Sabah's share of local oil revenues or the proportion of Sabahans working in local branches of federal agencies, or to stem the flow of Muslim migrants from the Philippines. This resentment was more generally expressed as indignation over UMNO’s dismissal of the Twenty Points, a series of assurances offered to Sabah when it joined Malaysia in 1963”.

As an expression of good faith and of its willingness to accommodate regional demands, the BN included the PBS in 1987. And its departure from the ruling coalition three years later, as well as eventually its demise, shows the strategic relevance for any political organization to be incorporated within the ruling coalition.

In October 1987, the MCA, the DAP and Gerakan exceptionally joined forces and mobilized in street protests against the appointment, by the Government, to the Country Chinese schools, of over a hundred Chinese educated in non-Mandarin schools. Crouch reports (1996: 109):

“A deranged Malay soldier went on a shooting spree in the Chow Kit area of Kuala Lumpur, not far from where the 13 May rioting had begun in 1969.... Several people were hit by bullets, and one – a Malay- was killed before the soldier surrendered... Although the incident was unrelated to political developments, it had an electrifying impact; and people in Kuala Lumpur began to stock food”.

The UMNO youth wing was going to respond and intended to organize a massive manifestation in Kuala Lumpur. On the order of Mahathir, Operation Lalang (1987) was put in motion to prevent further escalation. Hundred were arrested under the Internal Security Act, many of whom were politicians from all sides (Funston, 2001: 164).

The intensity of this crisis was medium as it involved elite division; namely the MCA and

Gerakan tactical refusal of the BN decision. It demonstrates the ambiguous link between elites and the mass in hybrid regimes. This crisis was a clear sign of an attack on Chinese entrenched interests. Political parties from all sides united to protest against what was perceived as a violation of their cultural freedom. It epitomizes the connection between elected officials and constituencies. In this sense, for the MCA and Gerakan, being in the ruling coalition meant striking a balance between the ruling elite's interests and those of their constituencies. They did not kneel unconditionally to the ruling elites; sometimes, they were contesting their unilateral actions. It is a probative example that the MCA and Gerakan were not entirely dependent on the UMNO and that the nature of their relationship was one of asymmetrical interdependence. This event shows that "MCA and Gerakan elites thus not only exist, but are able to extract significant material benefits for themselves and enough symbolic policy outputs for their constituents that they can claim with some credibility that Barisan is concerned with the well-being of all ethnic communities" (Case, 1996b: 149-150).

A year later, a serious constitutional crisis was going to prevent the ruling elites from governing. It came as a fight between the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PETRONAS (the national oil company), former Finance Minister as well as Trade and Industry Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, and the Prime Minister Mahathir for the top position in the UMNO. It moved to a standoff and led literally to a fracture of UMNO between Team A (Mahathir) and Team B (Razaleigh). Team A defeated Team B in UMNO general elections. Razaleigh contested the results on a charge of electoral fraud. He brought the case to court and Mahathir eventually removed Salleh Abas, the Lord President of the Supreme Court, from his position (Kingsbury, 2001: 280). Razaleigh left the UMNO and created a new opposition party *Semangat 46* which rapidly forged two alliances: one called *Gagasan Rakyat* that was including the DAP and the *Parti Rakyat Malaysia* (PRM); and the other named *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* that included the PAS. These coalitions however quickly dissolved.

The intensity of the 1988 constitutional crisis was high. For a brief period, the ruling party was paralyzed and thereafter the powers entrusted in the judicial altered. It symbolized the entrance of state bureaucrats in politics and its independent power base. To be sure, the state

bureaucracy had always been an integral part of the UMNO partisan base and most UMNO leaders began their career as bureaucrats. Yet, it was the first time that a high-ranking official was openly challenging the Prime Minister. What was before decided by consensus, was now subject to an intense electoral competition. The state bureaucracy was no longer a monolithic bloc, a passive actor. Some factions began to question the authority of the Mahathir's administration and to denounce its growing interference in their internal affairs. Furthermore, the demise of *Semangat 46* was, as in other instances, another evidence of where the locus of power is located in a hybrid regime. Most of all, Razaleigh's failure found its source in his inability to forge a single alliance with the DAP and the PAS, a similar problem against which BN elites were also confronted. Finally, loosing Razaleigh was a blow of the BN against the PAS. Indeed, Razaleigh – a native from Kelantan – was initially the BN solution to capture the state constituencies and diminish PAS influence (Tan & Vasil, 1984: 45). When Razaleigh left the BN, the door was open for the PAS to return. Indeed, the PAS thereafter recaptured the state position. The move also allowed the PAS to regain some form of political capital that it had lost after the Memali crisis.

In 1998, the popular Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was dismissed, expelled from the dominant party and arrested on charges of corruption and sodomy. Although the circumstances surrounding his expulsion remain unclear, it was becoming more and more evident that Anwar was mounting a challenge to Mahathir for the UMNO presidency. In the subsequent months, thousands of people had gathered in the streets to signal their discontent (Freedman, 2006: 110-111). It eventually led to the creation of the *Reformasi* movement. It formed an electoral pact under the unofficial banner of the Alternative Front in the 2004 general elections and later under the People's Front in 2008. The latter included the three main opposition parties: the PKR (People Justice Party), DAP and PAS. It succeeded in the 2008 general elections to prevent, for the first time since Independence, the ruling coalition from winning the two-third majority necessary to amend the constitution. As a result, the then Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who was elected as UMNO president partly for his Islamic background, stepped down and was replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister Najib (Mauzy & Barter, 2008: 223).

We are dealing here with two consecutive crises: the first one was of medium intensity given the elite division within the dominant party that came with it; but it led to another crisis of medium intensity, albeit a more serious one, with the lost of the two-third majority by the BN in 2008. Without the control of the legislative body, the ruling elites were no longer able to alter the political regime in order to manage the electoral outcome. As in the case of Razaleigh, Anwar had great influence over the bureaucracy: “Through the bureaucracy and key public corporations, Anwar built long networks of trusted ABIM associates” (Case, 1994: 923; Case, 2001: 50). His exclusion meant the lost of some segments of the bureaucracy. Being a powerful and charismatic figure, Anwar’s exclusion triggered the second most significant crisis of legitimacy for the BN, one that was reflected in the lost of many votes, and also the lost of the Selangor federal state, the most prosperous state of Malaysia surrounding the special district of the capital Kuala Lumpur, in the 2008 elections. In a way, it is not at all clear what and who the BN represents anymore. It has entered a sort of crisis of identity that does not bode well for the prospect of stability in Malaysia. As of today, confrontational ethnic and religious rhetoric as well as massive public demonstrations have increased significantly and are now a common feature (Chin & Huat, 2009: 78-81). Even if Prime Minister Najib has made great efforts to recapture the Malay vote and to extend a friendly hand to non-Malay representatives, the once prevailing national harmony is falling apart and tensions within and between parties have led to a fragmented and highly unpredictable political landscape (Chin, 2010).

The BN was kind of a party system within a party system. Being excluded from or included in, largely determined the faith of a given political organization. But each time such event was occurring, it generated political crises of various intensities. Overall, resisting to the temptation of riding alone has prevented the UMNO from falling out of fashion all along. It can still legitimately claim to represent dominant social groups. Yet, the BN quest for the consent of elites has been a constant preoccupation during the social transformations of the last decades. It is indeed the context into which BN found itself after the 2008 elections.

3.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence

Compared to other countries in the region and despite what we described in the previous section, Malaysia was an oasis of tranquility. Hence, we were expecting political parties to be at the forefront of politics and channeling social demands through the party system. Our study of the events – especially before Razaleigh’s departure – confirms it. But further analysis about constituencies and voting patterns was needed in order for us to validate the claim that the ruling elites of the UMNO had to forge alliances and develop coalition-building strategies in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime.

Except for the pre-independence guerrilla war against the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), commonly called the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) when approximately 10,000 people were killed, Malaysia has experienced low level of extra-legal organized violence with zero battle-related deaths since the 1970s (Harff & Gurr, 2004: 67; World Development Indicators, 2011). And this conflict was for the most part confined to the rural areas of the northern region of the Malayan peninsula. Following the liberal model of a professional officer corps (Jeshurun, 1975: 1-2), the national army did in no time invest the political scene or threaten to do so. The only exception was during the state of emergency in 1969-71 where the UMNO suspended the Parliament and created the National Operations Council into which the armed forces were given some form of political power. Overall, civilians have always remained in control of political institutions meaning therefore that the political parties were, through the period studied, the locus of authority. One clear supporting evidence is the way Singapore seceded without bloodshed or military intervention.

3.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies

In Chapter Two, we formulate a secondary hypothesis to the effect that the dominant party should be located at the center of the ideological spectrum in order to act as a centripetal force. According to Mauzy (2006: 63, 60), “the UMNO-led regime has skillfully positioned itself in the political center of the ethnic and religious divide to such an extent that it is perceived as

indispensable for political stability". The coalition BN led by the UMNO has included mostly moderate parties since 1974 (Crouch, 1996: 34)⁴⁶. Before that date, the ruling coalition was only composed of the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC. As for the PAS and the DAP, they have been basically the heart and soul of the Malaysian opposition since Independence. The PAS has traditionally promoted the installment of an Islamic State while the DAP has been in favor of a regime change, a democratic one, and social equality (Gomez, 1998: 248-249). The latter has been one with the most critical voices in Malaysia. The PKR, the latest party formed in the context of the 2008 elections, was like the DAP, an anti-regime party. It was not only aiming at defeating the BN at the polls but also at changing significantly the way the political game is played. Furthermore, its leaders wanted to occupy the ideological centre and were therefore directly challenging the UMNO. Taking into consideration the strong anti-regime orientation of the PAS, DAP and PKR, they were excluded from the ruling coalition. The MCP was the only anti-systemic party with advocating revolutionary means of political expression. It was responsible for the communist insurgency and was banned in 1966. Thus, the unique position occupied by the BN has had the strategic advantage of being able to absorb new political parties therefore extending its legitimacy to constituencies beyond the UMNO direct appeal to certain segments of the Malaysian community.

Almost all parties have been associated with a given ethnic group, a religious community or socio-economic groups; and in some instances cleavages overlap. As a background check, the Malays have been the dominant ethnic group, while the rest of the population is of Chinese, Indigenous or Indians descent. Traditionally, Malays have been located in rural areas, while Chinese have been concentrated mainly in urban areas. Indians have been dispersed all over the territories and Indigenes are gathered in Borneo. In terms of religion, Malays have been mostly Sunni Muslim, Indians affiliated to Hinduism and the Chinese a multi-confessional ethnic group. The most densely populated areas were the industrial Selangor federal state and the special district of Kuala Lumpur. In this context, the UMNO originally mustered much of its popular support among rural teachers while expanding its reach to a newly formed urban and Muslim middle-class not necessarily attracted by a particular Islamic project. The MCA

⁴⁶ i.e. the MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PPP, PBB, SUPP, SNAP, PBS, LDP, PBRs, UPKO, SPDP and PRS.

has been representing mostly the Chinese bourgeoisie, while Gerakan has embodied overtimes members of the Chinese working class with strong affiliation with trade unions (Gomez, 1998: 247). The MIC has integrated ethnic Indians from all horizons. The PPP is essentially active in the federal state of Perak and appeals to urban Chinese (Gomez, 1998: 235-236). The PBB has been mostly influential in Sarawak federal state and heads the “Barisan Tiga (tripartite front) compromising other Sarawak-based Barisan Nasional components members, i.e., the Chinese-based Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) and the Iban-based Sarawak National Party (SNAP)” (Gomez, 1998: 236). In Sabah, the other Borneo federal state, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been working on mobilizing the Chinese community in the region while the United Sabah People’s Party (PBRS) and the *United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut* (UPKO) have been defending the interests of the Kadazan ethnic group. Although this mosaic of parties could look impressive, the opposition has been in reality composed mainly of the DAP, PAS and PKR. The DAP partisan base was built along crosscutting socio-economic affiliations of pro-democratic individuals, mostly Chinese. The PAS was “a breakaway UMNO faction... primarily rural teachers, some of whom were also associated with UMNO” (Gomez, 1998: 239). Its stronghold has been in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah. The PKR was Anwar’s wife political party and had been operating as a hub for the civil society. There was also the All-Malaysian Indian Progressive Front (IPF), which was a by-product of elite division within the MIC and as such had covered the same constituencies. It was not associated to the opposition given that it tried to join the BN and worked closely with it in elections (Gomez, 1998: 239).

From this brief description, it is evident that there is little competition between parties for the same constituencies besides between the UMNO and the PAS. Vertical affiliations combined with competitive elections forced the ruling elites to work actively toward coalition building in order to remain in power. In Malaysia, constituencies have been relatively captive (Crouch, 1996: 33). It is interesting to note that the Malaysian Electoral Commission did not disaggregate the electoral results of each party member of the BN until 1995. Nevertheless, two patterns emerge. First, the vote percentage of the BN after its expansion jumped from 44.8% in 1969 to 60.8% in 1974. Second, in 1995 when the BN obtained the highest vote percentage since 1959, the UMNO won 89 seats over 192; less than the majority. Hence,

without its coalition partners it would have meant having to form a minority government therefore greatly reducing its prestige, power and ability to shape political institutions according to its interests. Although the UMNO had the economic and organizational resources to govern alone, the electoral game was preventing it to do so: “the exigencies of electoral politics provided the immediate incentive for UMNO to come to an arrangement with a non-Malay party” (Crouch, 1996: 17). Furthermore, given the aforementioned, the UMNO could not pretend to represent all dominant forces within society. Its appeal to non-Malays was limited: that is, to the Chinese, the Indians, but also the Indigenes of Borneo. Therefore, whoever was able to mobilize and organize the vote of these constituencies had leverage over the dominant party. And this leverage came with benefits. Indeed, “the parties with greatest access to funds are those from the Barisan Nasional; most of these parties, including the MIC and the Gerakan, have had access to funds on a regular basis from corporate figures and business entities” (Gomez, 1998: 259).

3.2.2. Types of Regimes

At this stage, we wish to make the following comments about the exact nature of the electoral game as it relates to the type of hybrid regime: that is, on the competitive authoritarian character of the Malaysian regime. The political regime has gone through two phases: a democratic (1957-1969) and a hybrid one (1969-2010). Yet, we are reticent to classify Malaysia as an authentic democratic regime during the first period. At best, it was an ambiguous regime given its consociational traits and the presence of autocratic instruments of power. It denotes the difficulty to differentiate between a democratic and a competitive authoritarian regime. Indeed, the “unfair” competition found in a competitive authoritarian regime is subject to interpretation on a case-by-case basis. It enters the foggy zone of hybrid regimes. Over the years, the numerous amendments to the Constitution and the behavior of the ruling elites have clearly pushed the regime in the direction of a competitive authoritarian regime.

In the first decade, national elections with universal suffrage were held within every five years as prescribed by the Constitution. Electoral fraud was generally absent and electoral results

were respected by elites and accepted by citizens. Opposition parties were legal and barriers to entry into the party system were minimum. Freedom of association and assembly were genuine and the freedom of the press was guaranteed by a wide diversity of private media outlets relatively independent from the state. It represents the democratic apogee of the Malaysian contemporary history (Teik, 1997: 47; Zakaria, 1989: 353).

Although it surely is the most democratic period, we are skeptic about its genuine democratic credentials. First, the famous adage – one person, one vote – had no bearing in Malaysia. Indeed, the Constitution was reflecting an elite accommodation between various ethnic groups that was conferring to the Malays supremacy over the party system. The gerrymandering of the electoral map was heavily skewed in favor of the rural areas predominantly populated by the Malays. According to Crouch (1996: 58):

“The 1957 Constitution had accepted the principle that there should be some weight in favour of the rural areas because of size and difficulties of communication compared to urban constituencies. But it had limited the disparity to no more than 15 percent from the size of the average constituency. A constitutional amendment in 1962, however, allowed rural constituencies to have as little as half the voters in urban constituencies; and in 1973 the restriction on the extent of disparity between constituencies was abolished altogether”.

As a result in 1959 and 1964, the Alliance won 51.8% and 58.5% of the vote while obtaining 71.2% and 85.6% of the seats respectively; a difference of approximately 20% (see table 3.1. below).

How can a political regime be called democratic when electoral outcomes are so distorted? Ultimately, it comes down to whether a consociational democracy is a democratic regime at all. Without solving this complex issue, we argue that consociational democracy should be understood within the specific institutional context of non-western countries. “Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1969: 216). It empowers ethnic groups through the institutional guarantee of the protection of their basic rights in matters of education, religion, and culture, etc. Such guarantees usually involve a written agreement and

some form of power sharing. The problem is that consociational democracy reinforces ethnic cleavages by institutionalizing them, especially in non-western countries, instead of favoring crosscutting interests that is traditionally associated with democracy (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005: 320, 323). It favors polarization over moderation and tolerance. Originally, Lijphart (1968) formulated his theory based on the case of Netherlands and later, tested it with others European countries in *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977) to then extend it to developing ones such as Lebanon and Indonesia. It bears the question if comparison between western European countries and countries in the South can yield any significant results. For instance, the historical context of Netherlands and Indonesia are so different that focusing on repeating patterns can be hazardous. This is when the introduction of Lustick's (1979: 330-332) control version of consociationalism becomes relevant. It is more closely adapted to the reality of many developing countries. It stresses the domination of a group-specific ideology, the absence of bargaining between political groups and the general disconnect between elites and the people they represent. In other words, consociationalism becomes a coercive instrument for a powerful ethnic group and as such it can no longer be associated with a democracy. Without necessarily contending that Malaysia falls under this "dark" version of consociationalism – there is room for gradation⁴⁷ – it nevertheless attracts the attention to which institutional context embeds consociationalism. It is not because a regime institutes a form of consociationalism that it is necessarily democratic. Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria had democratic institutions into which consociationalism features were integrated.

This brings us to the second reason why Malaysia could hardly be considered a democratic regime. During this period (1957-69), the government had the power and the right to intervene in an authoritarian fashion. Chief among them were (i) the Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1948)⁴⁸ that basically denied the *habeas corpus*, albeit not for an indefinite time, to any citizen who poses a threat to the national security and (ii) the Sedition Act (1948) that prohibited any widespread contestation of the government or the civil administration as well as comments prompting communal strifes (Funston, 2001: 178).

⁴⁷ Case (1996b: 148-150) develops a convincing argument about the discrepancies between the Lustick's control model and the Malaysian consociationalism regime.

⁴⁸ It was later renamed the Internal Security Act (1960).

These laws obviously hampered seriously the civil liberties and political rights of Malaysian citizens and elites. One could argue that the fact they were not widely used was a testimony of the regime democratic tendencies. However, it can also be argued that the general restraint of the ruling elites in terms of repression was simply the manifestation of self-censorship by the population. The bottom line is that in any electoral democracy those laws would not be present. It devolves considerable discretionary powers to the government.

Third and evenly problematic was the concentration of power in the Office of the Prime Minister. Amongst others, we find the Human Right Commission, the Anti-Corruption Agency, the Attorney General and the Election Commission. Consequently, the effective separation of powers, mostly between the judicial and executive, is in doubt. Moreover, the Prime Minister was also the *de facto* Minister of Home Affairs who overheads amongst others all police and security forces as well as the registrar of societies. It questions foremost the limited accountability and transparency of the government at that time. Under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister, the independence of the Electoral Commission is seriously in doubt. We do not find such concentration of power in a democratic regime. Therefore, given the consociationalism nature of the Malaysian electoral system combined with the existence of authoritarian instruments of repression and the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, we are encouraged to frame this period as a “dormant” period of competitive authoritarianism. The democratic benevolent attitude of the Malaysian ruling elites could have easily changed if stability and security would have been at stake (Lipset, 1998: 123).

As one key example, the 1969 race riot had convinced them that a more firm hand was needed. Since the enlargement of the ruling coalition was formalized in 1974, Freedom House then classified the Malaysian regime as hybrid (partly free)⁴⁹. Indeed, authoritarian traits were in full display. Under the Internal Security Act, over ten thousand people had been arrested, and

⁴⁹ Freedom House’s rating began in 1972. It catalogued the Malaysian regime as free for only two years: 1972 and 1973. This assessment was obviously preliminary since those were the first years following the end of the state of emergency and the exact architecture of the regime to come was still in motion.

a number of laws and amendments were passed to further curtail political activities (Funston, 2001:177-178). National media outlets were controlled for the most part by the ruling elites (Kingsbury, 2001: 281). When PETRONAS was created under the auspices of the Prime Minister, it provided almost unlimited funds to use for partisan ends. The time period of electoral campaigns was shortened. In the 2004 elections, the electoral campaign officially lasted only eight days (Mauzy & Barter, 2008: 214).

Yet, it was certainly not a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Over time, national electoral results have clearly confirmed the competitive nature of the political regime. The BN has never won more than 65% of the votes, while the opposition has won from time to time elections at provincial level: it was for instance the case in Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Sabah and lately in the prosperous Selangor province. It shows that electoral fraud was not a common practice and that the percentage of votes was reflecting citizens' preferences.

Table II – Electoral Results in Malaysia (Legislative)

Year	Political Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
1955	Alliance (AL)	818,013	81.7	51	98.1
	Parti Negara (PN)	78,909	7.9	0	0
	Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)	40,667	4.1	1	1.9
	Others	63,938	6.4	0	0
	Total	1,001,527	100.1	52	100
	Participation Rate (82.8%)				
1959	AL	800,944	51.8	74	71.2
	PAS	329,070	21.3	13	12.5
	Socialist Front (SF)	199,688	12.9	8	7.7
	People's Progressive Party (PPP)	97,391	6.3	4	3.8
	PN	32,578	2.1	1	1
	Others	87,598	5.7	4	3.9
	Total	1,547,269	100.1	104	100.1
	Participation Rate (73.3%)				
1964	AL	1,204,340	58.5	89	85.6
	SF	330,898	16.1	2	1.9
	PAS	301,187	14.6	9	8.7
	United Democratic Party (UDP)	88,223	4.3	1	1
	PPP	69,898	3.4	2	1.9
	People's Action Party (PAP)	42,130	2	1	1
	Others	20,828	1.1	0	0
	Total	2,057,504	100	104	100.1
	Participation Rate (78.9%)				
1969	AL	1,063,238	44.8	77	53.5
	PAS	495,641	20.9	12	8.3
	Democratic Action Party (DAP)	286,606	12.1	13	9
	Gerakan	178,971	7.5	8	5.6
	PPP	80,756	3.4	4	2.8
	Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP)	71,293	3	5	3.5
	Sarawak National Party (SNAP)	64,593	2.7	9	6.3
	United Sabah National Organization (USNO)	31,947	1.3	13	9
	Parti Pesaka Sarawak (PESAKA)	30,765	1.3	2	1.4
	Parti Rakyat (PR)	25,785	1.1	0	0
	Others	43,518	1.9	1	0.7
	Total	2,373,113	100	144	100.1
	Participation Rate (73.6%)				
1974	Barisan Nasional (BN)	1,287,400	60.8	135	87.7
	DAP	387,845	18.3	9	5.8
	SNAP	117,566	5.6	9	5.8
	Parti Keadilan Masyarakat Malaysia (PEKEMAS)	105,718	5	1	0.6
	Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM)	84,206	4	0	0
	Others	134,181	6.4	0	0
	Total	2,116,916	100.1	154	99.9
	Participation Rate (55.6%)				
1978	BN	1,987,907	57.2	131	84.4
	DAP	664,433	19.1	16	10.4
	PAS	537,720	15.5	5	3.2
	Others	283,370	8.1	2	1.9
	Total	3,473,430	99.9	154	99.9
Participation Rate (75.3%)					

1982	BN	2,522,079	60.5	132	85.7
	DAP	815,473	19.6	9	5.8
	PAS	602,530	14.5	5	3.2
	Others	225,615	5.4	8	5.2
	Total	4,165,697	100	154	99.9
	Participation Rate (74.4%)				
1986	BN	2,649,263	57.3	148	83.6
	DAP	968,009	21.0	24	13.6
	PAS	718,891	15.6	1	0.6
	Others	283,598	6.2	4	2.3
	Total	4,619,761	100.1	177	100.1
	Participation Rate (68.1%)				
1990	BN	2,985,392	53.4	127	70.6
	DAP	985,228	17.6	20	11.1
	Parti Semangat '46 (S46)	826,398	14.8	8	4.4
	PAS	391,813	7	7	3.9
	Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS)	128,260	2.3	14	7.8
	Others	276,136	4.9	4	2.2
	Total	5,593,227	100	180	100
	Participation Rate (72.6%)				
1995	BN	3,881,214	65.2	162	84.4
	DAP	712,175	12	9	4.7
	S46	616,589	10.4	6	3.1
	PAS	430,098	7.2	7	3.6
	PBS	198,594	3.3	8	4.2
	Others	118,025	2	0	0
	Total	5,956,695	100.1	192	100
	Participation Rate (68.3%)				
1999	BN	3,762,556	56.6	148	75.6
	PAS	996,437	15	27	13.5
	DAP	848,040	12.7	10	5.7
	Keadilan	767,969	11.5	5	2.6
	PBS	143,338	2.2	3	1.6
	Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM)	68,990	1	0	0
	Others	64,507	1	0	0
	Total	6,651,837	100	193	99
Participation Rate (71.1%)					
2004	BN	4,420,452	63.9	198	90.4
	Alternative Front	1,668,998	24.1	8	3.7
	DAP	687,340	9.9	12	5.5
	Others	139,438	2.1	1	0.5
	Total	6,916,228	100	219	100.1
Participation Rate (73.9%)					
2008	BN	4,082,411	50.3	140	63.1
	People's Front	3,796,464	46.8	82	36.9
	Others	65,399	0.8	0	0
	Total	7,944,274	97.9	222	100
Participation Rate (75.9%)					

Data Source: Tan (2001); Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category.

Based on our definition, Malaysia was a competitive authoritarian regime from 1969 to 2010, and a democratic yet ambiguous regime between 1957 and 1969. It was a competitive authoritarian in a making that was close to an electoral democracy between 1957-69; while manifesting an overall institutional design that we usually do not find in electoral democracies. Consequently, the relevance of our framework for that period should be ambiguous as well. On one side, the electoral gains of the opposition parties Gerakan and DAP in 1969 reflect the volatility of the constituencies and defection of voters from the Alliance during that period. It tends to show the absence of institutional constraints on voter's preference typical of hybrid regimes. Constituencies were not as clearly defined as later on. Given its embryonic dimension, the possibility of crosscutting allegiances cannot be denied and as such the competitive nature of the electoral game may correspond more closely to an electoral democracy. On the other side, the behavior of the ruling elites in the 1958 MCA, 1965 Singapore and 1966 Sarawak crises are signs of their ambition to control the political outcome unilaterally, which is what is found in hybrid regimes. The UMNO ultimatum against the Lim's MCA leadership, the relative nimble ease with which the ruling elites expelled Singapore and the non recognition of the judiciary decision in the case of the Stephen's dismiss are eloquent evidences of institutional constraints that were not being formed to dictate the future rules of the game. After 1969, the picture becomes limp, notably with the frequent use of the Internal Security Act in line with a more repressive regime. Elections in a context of captive constituencies provide incentives for the ruling elites to forge alliances. Hence as the narrative demonstrates, an essential ingredient of instability came from the exclusion of some opposition parties and stability in the inclusion of others in the ruling coalition. Other than economic and organizational, the capacity of the ruling elites to include various political groups was essentially related to its central position in the ideological spectrum. And providing this capacity to form and manage an effective coalition would exist, the contextual environment being one where the degree of violence was very low, the institutional framework gradually established itself as the one of a competitive authoritarian regime.

3.3. The Degree of State Penetration

The Malaysian regime has been resting on a strong state, with a civil administration among the most effective in the region and extended over the entire territory. The state has been directing the economic orientation and the model of development. It has been in control of key assets generating substantial rents. Therefore, state bureaucrats should have been active players in politics over the period covered by our analysis. The events surrounding the defection of Razaleigh and the expulsion of Anwar from the UMNO tend to confirm such expectation. Yet, the narrative of the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion of dominant social groups presented at the beginning of the chapter depicts an interesting trajectory. State bureaucrats have gradually overshadowed patronage-seeking opposition parties as a determining actor of political dynamics. The history of state building in Malaysia provides an answer as why it is so. The ruling elites tried to weaken the bureaucracy precisely when it was reaching its peak. In the process, they encountered influent state bureaucrats – i.e. Razaleigh and Anwar – that over the years had built up an independent power base.

3.3.1. The Administrative Extension

During the colonial era, civil administration in Malaysia was for the most part responsible for law and order as well as tax collection. In the 1950s, government revenue mostly came from tax on international transactions; where as income tax on individuals and corporate entities equated to 20% (Markandan, 1960: 50). However, with accession to Independence, the situation gradually changed and by the 1990s, income tax represented roughly 50% of total taxes (World Development Indicators, 2012). To reach these levels, the bureaucracy had to deploy many agents and establish operational offices across the territory. Along those lines, “public sector employment (excluding military and police personnel) increased from 139,476 persons in 1970 to 521,818 persons in 1983” (Teik, 1997: 55). Although the compilation of quantitative data on transport and telecommunication networks started only in the 1980s and 1990s, to give a general idea, at that time it was comparable to the level found in South Korea which was already considered an emerging economy (World Development Indicators, 2012).

After the Esman-Montgomery report (1966), the bureaucracy underwent significant changes. The Development Administrative Unit (DAU) was set up, followed in 1977 by the Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Manpower Planning Unit (MAMPU). These programs were designed to increase the capacity of the civil administration to act upon social demands and the effectiveness of its inner-working. It laid-out its ambition to recruit highly qualified individuals and elaborate modern organizational charts. In order to increase the accountability and efficacy of the public administration, many mechanisms were introduced over the years, such the Operations Room technique and the Client Charter (Ahmad, 1997: 64, 72). Thus, it eventually led to the conclusion that “the Malaysian bureaucracy is one of the most effective in Southeast Asia” and has been often cited as a model for developing countries (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 109; Gomez & Sundaram, 1999: 98).

That being said, the morphology of the Malaysian territory has created a natural barrier to administrative extension. Indeed, the country is divided in two by the South China Sea: The Malay Peninsula (West) and the Borneo Island (East). There is somewhat a fracture within Malaysia. On the West side, the central government has been omnipresent; on the East side it has been less cogent. The capital and most economic centers have been located in the Malay Peninsula. The Borneo Island has been rural, home of many illegal workers and covered by rainforest. By comparison, the population density in Borneo average 32 inhabitants per square km whereas it is 385 in the Malay Peninsula (Government of Malaysia, 2012). Furthermore, the Kelantan federal state on the Malay Peninsula is basically surrounded by the Titiwangsa Mountains. Thus, it is not a coincidence if local politics in these regions have found their way at the national level over the years. Indeed, the events in Sarawak (1966), Kelantan (1977) and Sabah (1986) illustrate it. The influence of the PAS in Kelantan was no stranger to the presence of *Ulama* – local clerics teaching Muslim edicts that have represented the main strength of the party organizational capacity – in many regions, notably in those where the state was less present (Shiozaki, 2000: 102; Gomez, 1998: 249). It has also provided a rationale for why the ruling coalition had included relatively small and marginal regional parties confined to the Sarawak and Sabah states. Again the narrative of those three events clearly delineates the degree of autonomy of local leaders. In no way the central government had lost control over those regions; it was always able to impose its prerogatives. If anything, the state

presence in local communities was assured via KEMAS (Rural and Regional Development Ministry) with about 14,000 representatives dispersed all over the country (Funston, 2001: 175).

3.3.2. The Economic Extension

On the economic front, Malaysia experienced significant transformation in half a century. We can trace three phases of state intervention into the Malaysian economy. The first phase (1957-1969) was one of a *laissez-faire* policy. The role of the state was limited to a regulatory function. The economy was primarily based on agriculture and natural resources such as oil, tin and timber. Thus, the role of state bureaucrats in politics was relatively marginal at that time.

The second phase (1970-1980) came into being with the New Economic Policy, which later became the National Development Policy. The objectives were to foster economic development and equality, mostly for Malays. It aimed at positioning the country as a manufacturing hub, especially in small electronic equipment (Funston, 2001: 170). As part of its grand strategy, the government took over many foreign or Chinese private companies through trust agencies such as *Khazanah Nasional Bhd*, *Permodalan Nasional Bhd* and *Perbadanan Nasional Bhd*. It created a myriad of state-owned companies: “the number of public agencies rose from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 1970 to 656 in 1980” (Teik, 1997: 55). As a result, the government became an active player in almost all sectors of the economy: energy (e.g. PETRONAS), transport (e.g. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad), financial services (e.g. Malayan Banking) and media (e.g. Bernama). In each of these sectors, state-owned companies were occupying a dominant position in the market. The government even invested at the beginning of the 1980s in heavy industries, notably in the creation of the national car company Proton. It gave rise to a middle-class, a state middle-class. And one of the main architects of Malaysian economic statism was Razaleigh himself.

Table III – Malaysian State Investment in the Economy

	General gov't consumption (% total consumption)	Gov't enterprises and investment (% of gross investment)
1970	21.4	32.3
1975	23.9	37.6
1980	24.6	37.3
1985	22.7	46.8
1990	21.0	33.8
1995	20.9	28.4
2000	20.1	47.0
2005	22.9	49.9
2009	22.1	52.4

Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012

The last phase was marked by the 1980s worldwide economic recession. In order to create a more investor friendly environment, the Malaysia Incorporated Policy (1983) was launched. It was designed to foster public and private partnerships and stimulate entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the government undertook a privatization program that reduced the size of the public administration and its presence in the economy; a situation reflected in the decreasing share of state investments in the 1990s. It had two advert effects. First, it created a hostile bureaucracy protesting against the violation of its entrenched interests. Its bitterness was mostly directed toward Prime Minister Mahathir given its personal style of ruling. According to Case, (2001: 50), “anecdotal accounts suggest that the country’s Malay civil servants—dependent on government largesse and thus normally a potent UMNO constituency—came to view Mahathir as repugnant”. Prime Minister Mahathir recognized it and took many steps to reassert its control:

“During the 1980s it became increasingly common for civil servants to contest positions in UMNO and other government parties, but by the late 1980s the government felt compelled to take action against flagrant breaches of regulations... The change in policy took place in the context of the UMNO split when many civil servants in UMNO may have sympathized with the prime minister’s opponents” (Crouch, 1996: 272).

Hence, when Razaleigh challenged Mahathir in 1988, the former could find support among an important UMNO faction consisting of disillusioned state bureaucrats. Furthermore, as former Minister of Trade and Industry he had “wide discretionary powers over licensing, ownership structure, ethnic employment pattern, product distribution quotas, local content and even product pricing” (Teik, 1997: 56; Crouch, 1996: 117). Second, it later gave an opportunity to the then Minister of Finance (1991-93) and Deputy Prime Minister (1993-1998) Anwar Ibrahim to spread its tentacles not only in the bureaucracy but also in the private sector. Whereas the disenfranchised bureaucrats were loosely organized in the 1980s, it was not the same in 1990s. Through its ABIM affiliates, Anwar infiltrated the bureaucracy (Case, 1994: 923). As such, ABIM was in the position to coordinate political action and mobilize the constituency. Moreover, Anwar was popular among small and medium companies for its willingness to promote transparency (Gomez & Sundaram, 1999: 124-125). At last but not least, the Minister of Finance had various opportunities for patronage activities, especially during the privatization phase of the 1980s-90s (Case, 1994: 924; Gomez, 1998: 128).

Overall, Malaysia is a developing economy. As expressed in the document “Vision 2020”, its leaders even aimed at making it a developed country by then with such project as the creation of a technological pole labeled the “Multimedia Super Corridor”. Whereas the majority of the population was living in rural areas in the 1960s, five decades later, almost 75% have now been living in urban areas. The mortality rate declined significantly over the same period to reach numbers comparable to developed nations. The structure of the economy shifted from the agricultural sector to more capital and technological intensive activities such as the manufacturing and industrial sectors.


Table IV – Malaysia Socio-Economic Modernization

Indicator Name	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Urban population (% of total)	26.60	33.50	42.00	49.80	62.00	72.20
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	97.00	55.10	31.10	17.90	10.60	6.30
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	n.d.	88.71	92.65	92.44	97.03	n.d.
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	34.32	29.44	22.61	15.22	8.60	9.52*
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	8.05	12.44	21.55	24.22	30.86	25.48*
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	19.40	27.39	41.04	42.20	48.32	44.27*

* 2009 value

Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

Figure 4 – Natural Resources Rent in Malaysia



Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

Yet, labor union and the bourgeoisie have been all along dependent on the state. Originally, unions were somewhat influential. They were capable of mobilizing the working-class as the 1969 electoral gains of Gerakan demonstrated (Gomez, 1998: 247). After the race riot, the ruling elites used the Trade Union Ordinance (1959) to bring all labor activities firmly under the control of the government and included Gerakan in the coalition. As for the bourgeoisie, it was first mostly composed of ethnic Chinese during the Alliance period. And this was the moment when it could pretend to have some form of autonomy: “UMNO leaders, granting in the manner of the sultan in council the state licenses and contracts that sustained Chinese businesses, received campaign contributions, secret funds, and memberships on the boards of Chinese-owned companies. Top Chinese businessmen, in turn, were given a political voice through the MCA in the governing Alliance” (Case, 1995: 79, 89). The New Economic Policy reduced the economic power of Chinese businessmen and created a state bourgeoisie with the multiplication of parastatal companies. Even after the privatization process, among the top ten publicly listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia in 2000, the government had majority ownership in six of them (Gomez, 2005). If anything, the share of state investment has increased significantly in the past decade. Overall, “Malay businesspeople were not entrepreneurs who set up new enterprises but clients of politicians who were given business

opportunities as rewards for political support” (Crouch, 1993: 146). Furthermore, natural resources rent, especially oil rent from PETRONAS, continued to fuel the state treasury and provided a source of patronage with billions of off-budget dollars. Which brings us to the question of clientelistic network in developing countries.

Money politics was an inescapable fact in the country. It reached scandalous proportions with the bail out of *Konsortium Perkapalan Bhd* (KPB) by PETRONAS. Indeed, KPB was owned by the son of Prime Minister Mahathir, who had been controlling effectively PETRONAS. Slater (2003: 92) reports: “When the bailout went through, one UMNO official lamented: I thought such things could only happen in Indonesia or some African countries”. However, this event did not reflect the nature of patronage networks in Malaysia. They were diffused and generally speaking oriented toward the provision of public goods and less toward private ostentatious consumption. The government “has taken care to supplement its appeals with steady flows of patronage, usually in the form of state contracts, licenses, and development grants” in exchange for political support (Case, 1994: 917). They were part of a larger development scheme – i.e. New Economic Policy – orchestrated by elites located in the capital; and for the most part, evidences have shown their effectiveness (see table IV).


In sum, a closer look at state penetration in Malaysia provides a more fine-grained analysis of the dynamic of exclusion and inclusion presented earlier in the chapter. It contributes to understand why some local politics played a role in some instances and why state bureaucrats only became active later on. The fact that the two high profile ruling elites – i.e. Razaleigh and Anwar – wielded significant power independently of the incumbent and the party they were associated with, and that this power was partly the by-product of their ascent on the public administration, allowed them to become leaders of a dominant social group to be wooed and to play a major role in the political outcome. Indeed, they were source of instability as the events in 1988, 1998 and 2008 demonstrate.

Conclusion

During the period covered by our study, the cornerstone of hybrid regime stability in Malaysia resided in the formation of a ruling coalition – i.e. BN – headed by the UMNO that was encompassing key opposition parties and state bureaucrats. Most political crises during the country contemporary history can be traced in the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion of these two dominant social groups in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime and a developing economy. As such, our expectations and actual outcomes converge; it confirms the utility and validity of our framework. Indeed, it is conformed to a situation characterized by a low level of extra-legal organized violence and high state penetration.

Furthermore, our two variables not only mark out which actors should attract our attention but also deepen our understanding of the sequence of political crises and the behavior of the ruling elites. More precisely, in looking at the degree of extra-legal organized violence and detailing the importance of opposition parties and their respective captive constituency, it became apparent that antagonistic cleavages were threatening the stability of the Malaysian hybrid regime. The difficulty of integrating pro-Chinese and pro-Islamic parties – notably the MCA and PAS – in the ruling coalition proved to be a significant conundrum for the ruling elites and a recurrent source of instability. As for the state penetration variable, it explains why Razaleigh and Anwar were able to mount a challenge against the ruling elites and why state bureaucrats became prominent actors in the 1980s and later on.

Figure 5 – Malaysia Timeline



Note: RT = Regime Type; ED = Economic Development

Finally, the case of Malaysia reveals two interesting features. First, the ruling elites used different techniques to co-opt different clienteles. When they were reaching-out to ethnic groups by co-opting opposition parties, their appeals to the Muslim communities were more personalized: that is, they were looking to co-opt individuals who had good credentials among the Muslim community. As mentioned previously, this is partly why Mahathir lured Anwar within its inner-circle. Hence, the ruling elites appear to have traditionally managed antagonistic cleavages by developing mechanisms of co-optation based on various institutional levels. Second, many political crises occurred outside Kuala Lumpur. National parties interfered in local politics on many occasions and seem to have used this arena as a proxy of their rivalry. In a way, it may have prevented a more direct confrontation and possibly the replication of a highly destabilizing situation similar to the infamous race riot of 1969 that inflamed the capital.

Indonesia

Indonesia is an archipelago of over 6,000 inhabited islands (13,000 total) that are home of more than 300 ethnic groups speaking over 500 native languages, with a population of approximately 250 millions, where most are either Javanese (40.6%) or Sundanese (15%) and of Muslim faith (86.1%)⁵⁰. It came into being in a dreadful conflict with its former colonial master, the Dutch. A *de facto* independent country in 1945, Indonesia could not live in peace. Netherlands fought to reverse what it considered to be an ignominy. Armed confrontation in which Muslim parties as well as local military commanders played a large role, coupled with a succession of diplomatic negotiations, eventually led to the recognition of sovereign Indonesia in 1949 and the formation of a unitary state under a parliamentary system in 1950⁵¹. The system of government has changed over time but it is essentially today presidential with a lower house called the House of Representatives or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) and an upper house called the People's Consultative Assembly or the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR).

Following the still mysterious 1965 abortive coup⁵², General Suharto became president of Indonesia. Suharto's fiat was based on a strong ruling party (Golkar). He reigned over the country in the context of a hegemonic authoritarian regime (1965-1998) and developing economy⁵³. However, political crises erupted on many occasions. Chief among them was the creation of the so-called Petition of Fifty (1980) uniting elites of various professions to contest

⁵⁰ The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.

⁵¹ The Dutch had a preference for a federal state based on a parliamentary system while the Indonesian nationalists led by Sukarno were on the side of a unitary state based on a presidential system. The end result was thus a compromise. For a detailed chronicle of the events leading to the Indonesian Independence, see US Library of Congress, Indonesia (2012).

⁵² Various interpretations exist over the actual events that led to the coup and the extent of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Communist Party of Indonesia or PKI) involvement in it. See Roosa (2006); Crouch (1978: chapters 4-6), and US Library of Congress, Indonesia (2012).

⁵³ From 1945 to 1957, Indonesia was a democratic regime; and from 1958 to 1965 it was an autocratic regime (see section 4.2.2.).

Suharto's authority. Contemporary Indonesia was a hotbed of extra-legal organized violence marked by numerous rural insurrections. Very few regions were spared of any bloodshed and the state did not experience civil peace for very long. In that context, we would expect the military to be a dominant social group and stability intimately related to its inclusion in the ruling coalition. Furthermore, we should be in a position to observe that stability of a ruling coalition that includes the military is embedded in a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Given the topography of the country, state penetration has always been a challenge. Yet, under the New Order, very few regions could escape the central authority in Jakarta and the government was the spearhead of economic modernization. Therefore, expectations are that the influence of state bureaucrats over national politics will become more and more apparent.

4.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-1998)

The event-history analysis of political crises in Indonesia reveals foremost the centrality of military and Islamic organizations. Initially sidelined during the 1950s, the increased presence of military officers (ABRI) in legislative bodies and the bureaucracy as well as in the economy from 1960s to 1970s, and their gradual exclusion later is an inescapable fact of Indonesian politics. It was the military's decision to cooperate or not with the ruling elites that would determine the faith of the ruling coalition stability. Yet, the military was not a monolithic bloc. Competing interests within its ranks – mostly between the Red/White faction (secular nationalists such as Moerdani) and the Green faction (Islamic moderates such as Sudharmono) – affected the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition. Thus, it was not only a question of if the military was included or not in the ruling coalition, but also which military factions were. Islamic parties – especially the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and Masyumi – were originally major actors both in the party system and the state bureaucracy, mostly in the Ministry of Religion⁵⁴. For reasons that will be evoked, Sukarno later banned Masyumi. During Suharto's New Order, the NU was forced to merge with other parties to form a somewhat decorative Muslim coalition called the United Development Party (UDP). By the mid-1980s, supported by the long time NU president Abdurrahman Wahid, the Indonesian

⁵⁴ See section 4.3.1.

Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) headed by Habibie took the relay and invested the state bureaucracy as well as the armed forces (ref: Green faction)⁵⁵. This introductory overview of political dynamics in Indonesia provides a glimpse of the wide-diversity of social forces as well as of the overlap of their functional representation and changing nature over time. As a remainder, the objective of all country narrative is not to offer a complete explanation of their political history but to examine the empirical manifestation of our hypotheses. Thereupon, here is the chronicle of political crises in Indonesia.

In 1947, the Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir was already forming a third cabinet when Tan Malaka, a leader of the Indonesian revolution extolling communism, helped by high profile politicians and military officers, kidnapped Sjahrir and three ministers and declared the installment of the Supreme Political Council (Kahin, 1952: 189; Jhaveri, 1975: 105). A staunch nationalist, Malaka, was displeased with the conciliatory tone of the ruling elites and the resulting Linggadjati Agreement (1946) with the Dutch, and acted upon it. Basically, this agreement was attributing the primacy of the Dutch Queen over Indonesian politics. Sukarno ordered the arrest of rebels and Sjahrir was reinstated in his function. It is now known as the “July Third Affair”. Following this event, it became apparent that the agreement did not have the support of many Indonesian elites. The Dutch cancelled the agreement and initiated the military intervention “Operation Product” to impose their solution.

This was a medium to high intensity crisis given the direct attack on the authority of the government. It involved military officers in a plot to kidnap the Prime Minister. Although how high in the military ranks the conspiracy winded up remains unclear, it appears that many generals, notably Sudirman and Sudarsono, decided to choose sides instead of remaining neutral (Anderson, 2006: 394-397). It was the start of military involvement in national politics. That being said, the crisis took place at a time when Indonesia was not officially an independent state therefore falling outside of our analytical framework. If we nevertheless

⁵⁵ Islamic organizations were also not a monolithic bloc. For instance, the leader of the Muhammadiyah (1995-2000), Amien Rais – former member of Masyumi – left the ICMI in 1997 and joined the *Reformasi* movement that toppled Suharto.

include it in the narrative, it is because we consider it as indicative of the embryonic disposition of the military to intervene in domestic politics.

In September 1948, Communist splinter parties violently took control of the local government in Madiun and self-proclaimed the town in East Java a Soviet Republic. The event was a resent against the Sukarno-Hatta government who, on the advise of military officers, was suspected of masterminding putative actions aiming at disarming local communist groups (Kingsbury, 2001: 364). For the military, the Communist takeover in Madiun was akin to treachery during a time of war when all Indonesians should have been united to fight a common foreign enemy (Kingsbury, 2001: 364). Although the revolt was not formally sanctioned by the PKI, ideological affinities forced it to support the initiative (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). The republican army rapidly intervened and squashed the rebellion.

The crisis was low in intensity since it dealt with local politics. Yet, the connection with national politics should not be underestimated since it was implicitly championed by the PKI who successfully started to undermine Sukarno's authority and the prominence of the Indonesian National Party (PNI). It epitomizes a nascent qualm between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (ABRI) and the PKI that will culminate in the 1965 Communist purge. The crux of the contention was a power struggle between the military headquarters working to assert their authority over the territory and the PKI growing influence in the countryside, especially among peasants. The feud was about the exclusion of local leaders from politics and the centralization of authority in Jakarta. Furthermore, the fact that Madiun was located near the capital was a direct affront to the military status as protector of the state. As with the July Third Affair, the Madiun Affair occurred while Indonesia was fighting for its independence. It adds to the event-history analysis as a contextual function: namely, the origin of the animosity between ABRI and the PKI.

On 17 October 1952, a small number of officers led by Army Chief of Staff General Nasution pushed in Parliament for the dissolution of the assembly and the shake up of military hierarchy (Vatikiotis, 1993: 67). Nasution wanted to modernize the Indonesian army. Amongst others, he was advocating the demobilization of over 200,000 men recruited to fight the Independence

War, mostly from PETA⁵⁶ (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Supported by local military commanders dispersed across the territory, many political parties with strong roots in rural areas worked actively to block the military headquarter initiative. They called for the resignation of Nasution. Sukarno landed his support to the civil institutions and refused to dissolve the legislative while proceeding to a significant turnover of high-ranking military officials; General Nasution was forced to resign from his position as Army Chief of Staff.

The crisis was medium in intensity. It centered on elite division, mostly between political parties and the military establishment. A reminiscence of the Madiun Affair, it was the alliance between local leaders and the government, as well as more generally with political parties against their corporate interests – i.e. the monopoly of legitimate violence – that irritated the military leadership. Sukarno's unwillingness to approve military modernization and his subsequent shake up of the military command, were bold moves. Slowly but surely high-ranking officers were developing resentment against political elites, and especially against Sukarno. The military's dismay was amplified by the inability of the ruling elites to form a functional coalition. In fact, from 1950 to 1957, coalition cabinet rose and fell at a fast pace⁵⁷. Before 1957, Sukarno was envisioning the composition of the cabinet as representative of all major political forces in the country and, on many occasions, he forced the Prime Minister to select candidates from the entire ideological spectrum (Jhaveri, 1975: 118). This was Sukarno's conception of a ruling coalition during the parliamentary era. There was no dominant party and a plethora of Muslim, socialist and nationalist parties were aggressively defending their entrenched interests. For instance, in the 1955 first general elections since Independence, eighteen parties obtained at least one seat in Parliament. The military officers perceived themselves as the only alternative to disorder. Yet, Sukarno continued to keep them at distance. He was all too aware of the danger to attribute greater power to the military.

⁵⁶ *Pembela Tanah Air* or Defenders of the Homeland (PETA) was an army of volunteers set up by the Japanese during the occupation.

⁵⁷ Here are the successive cabinets from 1950 to 1957: Hatta's cabinet (January 1948 – January 1950), Halim's cabinet (January 1950 – September 1950), Natsin's cabinet (September 1950 – April 1951), Wirjosandjojo's cabinet (April 1951 – April 1952) Wilopo's cabinet (April 1952 – July 1953), Sastroamidjojo's cabinet (July 1953 – August 1955), Harahap's cabinet (August 1955 – March 1956) and again the Sastroamidjojo's cabinet (March 1956 – April 1957).

After few years in exile, Nasution, given its popularity among high-ranking officials, was reappointed for the second time as Army Chief of Staff. Facing increased mutiny within local military commanders, he issued an order in 1955 calling for the systematic relocation of regional military leaders (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Headed by General Lubis, diverse regional military units gathered in Jakarta in November 1956. Lubis was ambitious: he wanted to overthrow political and military elites starting at the top, with the intention of dismissing Nasution from his position of Army Chief of Staff and dissolving the cabinet (Feith, 2007: 505). In the end, Lubis' challenge failed. Yet, in the following months, military commanders in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Maluku regions toppled local governments and established the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) - Universal Struggle Charter (Permesta). Their grievances were wide ranging: disregard by the central government of local demands, ineffective bureaucracy crippled by corruption, as well as a benevolent attitude of the national elites toward the PKI (Kingsbury, 2001: 367). The movement was defeated, albeit sporadic clashes lasted for few more years (Crouch, 1978: 33).

The failed coup in the capital and the bloodless coup in the regions were together a high intensity crisis. The country was on the verge of falling apart. In the end, the central government reasserted its authority; Masyumi and PSI were banned. Sukarno and the military headquarters drew closer – probably by necessity more than by choice – and local military leaders who obtained momentarily Sukarno's support in 1952 were once again overly defiant. Ultimately, crises from 1950 to 1957 illustrate the fluidity of alliance politics in Indonesia during that period. Former enemies became allies and former allies became enemies depending on the issue at stake. In this context, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition are difficult to interpret since the existence of a ruling coalition *per se* is problematic. In fact, it would be fair to say that during that period of high instability, there were a series of *ad hoc* coalitions but no such thing as a ruling coalition.

In March 1957, Sukarno declared martial law after the resignation of the Sastroamidjojo's cabinet. Martial law put an end to the parliamentary system and signaled the return to the 1945 Constitution attributing strong executive power to President Sukarno. In 1960, a new legislature called the "National Front" was formed with the aim of mobilizing all political

actors: political parties, civil society and the armed forces. “One hundred fifty-four of its 238 seats were given to representatives of "functional groups", including the military, which became known as Golkar.... As many as 25 percent of the seats were allocated for the PKI” (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). The martial law officially ended in 1963, albeit it continued under a modified form with the conclusion of the West Irian campaign against Malaysia (Crouch, 1978: 34, 54).

The crisis was paramount as it transformed the regime itself. The former strategy of alliance politics based on a coalition of political parties loosely integrated was history. The formula proved to be ineffective, leading to a succession of ephemeral coalitions. The National Front became an all-inclusive coalition in which the military and, after 1963, the PKI were at the forefront. Sukarno’s rationale was simple: military political power was necessarily growing with the declaration of martial law and the PKI emerged as the strongest contender of institutions dominated by the military. Yet, the inclusion of the military and the PKI – two rival groups that despised each other – in the same coalition was a risky strategy that could not last long.

In 1965, in a bizarre and still mysterious twist of events, a series of generals were killed or kidnapped by a group of conspirators called the 30th September Movement. The authorities suspected an attempted *coup d’État* against Sukarno and accused the Communists to be behind the plot. According to the Indonesian fact-finding Commission, from 250,000 to 500,000 people were killed in the PKI purge (Crouch, 1978: 155). The annihilation of PKI supporters left President Sukarno alone with no political alternative to the army leadership. His capacity to reduce the army’s influence was close to nil. Eventually, Sukarno had no choice but to surrender. In 1966, he resigned and handed over his power to the new leader, General Suharto, who was duly appointed by the MPR as the second president of the republic in March 1968 (Crouch, 1978: 220)⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ The other legislative body is the DPR. All its members are elected. In principle, the DPR main functions are to vote and ratify laws as well as to oversight government activities. The MPR includes DPR members, and nominated representatives of functional groups and regional administrations. The MPR is responsible for electing the President, drafting main policy guidelines and amending the constitution.

The crisis was a critical juncture and therefore of high intensity. It transformed Indonesian politics at its core. The New Order authority was going to center on the military and the bureaucracy, the basis of Suharto's elite support. These groups will definitely displace political parties and local leaders as dominant social groups henceforth witnessing a major change in the distribution of power. The military officers will control and leave their imprint on every administrative and political institution at all levels: national, provincial, district and local. And they will become a major economic actor penetrating the economic sphere both private and public. Non-military state bureaucrats will have a decisive role later on in the 1980s-90s as a counter-force to military hegemony. For the first time since Independence, a well-structured ruling coalition was formed: the political party Golkar. It will become the institutional locus that binds various politic groups. And thanks also to sustained economic development and political order, Golkar will win all legislative elections until 1998. That being said, by the mid-1980s, Suharto's decision to exclude the Red/White military faction from the ruling coalition was containing germs of instability for the next decade to come.

Just after the 1973 first national election of the DPR since 1955, pressure from below culminated in the 1974 Malari Affair. It was triggered by the visit in Jakarta of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Public grievances were mainly about foreign capital domination over the national economy. It subsequently expanded to the resent against growing economic inequalities. Led by the student movement at the *Institut Teknologi Bandung* (ITB), mass mobilization inflamed the streets. Protesters demanded the ousting of Suharto and a radical transformation of the political and economic systems⁵⁹. It degenerated into rioting and looting. The demonstrators were hardly repressed, few were killed, the government closed numerous media and universities fell under the direct supervision of the military (Aspinall, 2005: 24). These events came in fact as an escalation following another crisis: few months before, outraged Muslim parties went awry furious against a marriage bill initiated by the government that would have superseded Islamic laws (Liddle, 1978: 185). Eventually a compromise was reached.

⁵⁹ The so-called "White book of the 1978 Students' Struggle".

These crises were medium insofar as the decision to repress or not students and to accept or not Islamic demands were indeed divisive issues within the ruling coalition. Most of all, they created a malaise within the military who was a dominant force in the ruling coalition. It shows that the military cohesion was nevertheless precarious (Crouch, 1978: 316). It illustrates that the ruling coalition did not evolve in isolation from outside pressures. Yet, Suharto's ruling coalition stood firm. The fact that these were the only events that threatened the functioning of the government over the 1970s confirms the general consent and acquiescence of key peripheral actors, at least until the 1980s. With the communist threat long gone, the issue of Islam politics will then recapture the center stage as the decisive cleavage in society and challenge the unity of the ruling coalition.

In March 1980, Suharto spoke in front of ABRI commanders and questioned indirectly their allegiance to the state ideology, Pancasila (Vatikiotis, 1993: 141)⁶⁰. Thereafter, fifty public figures including senior retired generals, notably "the father of the army" General Nasution, former governors, mayors, prime ministers, ministers and religious leaders signed a petition denouncing Suharto's reification of all criticisms directed at him as if it would equate with the abnegation of Pancasila (Aspinall, 2005: 61). Their public protest came with a steep price. Suharto constrained their activity on all fronts. They lost their job, access to bank credit, business licenses, right to travel abroad and permission to express themselves in media outlets (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 85; Vatikiotis, 1993: 141). Nevertheless, the group continued to meet informally over the years.

The intensity of the crisis was medium. The Petition of the Fifty was the first unified opposition front against Suharto from within the ruling coalition. The fulcrum of the crisis was the growing exclusion of a dominant social group, especially retired generals, from the ruling coalition. It was a direct challenge to Suharto's command. Indeed, the Petition of the Fifty "retained considerable moral authority and were widely respected in the broader public" (Aspinall, 2005: 67). Consequently, "Suharto's popularity among the elite was in slow but perceptible decline, senior military figures, both active and retired, had begun working quietly

⁶⁰ Pancasila is the Indonesian official state ideology. It rests on five pillars: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian-style democracy and social justice.

to seek his removal” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 69). The fact that the group was not officially banned but systematically harassed is a testimony of its importance. Suharto knew the danger of transforming these elites into political martyrs. Nevertheless, he was losing elites’ support. In search of an alternative, he will turn to the moderate Muslim community that had a well-developed organization capable of mobilizing mass support (Aspinall, 2005: 38)⁶¹.

The first clear sign of such a tendency was the election of General Sudharmono, a Muslim, as Suharto’s vice-president in 1987. ABRI leadership did not approve Suharto’s choice, especially the Moerdani’s faction⁶². As chairman of Golkar (1983-1988), Sudharmono had worked to make the party less dependent on ABRI (Aspinall, 2005: 33). In 1988, Moerdani succeeded in discharging Sudharmono and nominating Wahono as Golkar chairman (Vatikiotis, 1993: 87, 160). It backfired in November 1991 after the Dili massacre in East Timor where ABRI troops shot into the crowd. For the first time, high-ranking military officers were blamed and held accountable for their action: “two dismissed senior officers were both Christians and regarded as being aligned with Moerdani” (Honna, 2003:14).

The crises were medium in intensity. It reflected again the division within the ruling coalition; most of all the rivalry between the nationalist secular high-ranking officials and the increasingly Islamic penetration of the Indonesian bureaucracy and army through the network of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Suharto actively orchestrated the marginalization of the secular and nationalist Red/White faction, while attributing to key Islamic leaders from ICMI not only positions in the cabinet and civil administration but also in ABRI (Kingsbury, 2001: 374; Bertrand, 2004: 84-88): it became the so-called Green faction. As further evidence, the Catholic dominated Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a research center associated to Moerdani and close to the government, fell out of favor to the benefit of the Muslim dominated Centre for Information and Development Studies

⁶¹ Muslim groups and parties originally helped Suharto in establishing the New Order by playing a key role in eliminating the Communist sympathizers. However, this was an *ad hoc* alliance. Suharto rapidly changed his position and started to repress Muslim organizations to make sure they would remain inactive as a political group (Bertrand, 2004: 40). Regardless, Muslim organizations continued to act as the backbone of civil society in Indonesia.

⁶² General L.B. Moerdani was a Christian, ABRI Commander-in-Chief (1983-1988) and the second most powerful man in Indonesia behind Suharto at that time.

(CIDES) (Bertrand, 2004: 89). Moreover, in 1994, ABRI intelligence agency (BAIS) created by Moerdani was dissolved (Honna, 2003: 20). “The new policy exacerbated tension in the ruling elite. It especially alienated Moerdani’s supporters in ABRI, who considered that vigilance against political Islam was central to security policy” (Aspinall, 2005: 41). Yet again in 1993, ABRI succeeded in electing General Sutrisno as vice-president instead of Suharto’s choice, Habibie (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002: 37)⁶³. Suharto reigned at the top of Indonesian politics, but he was not free to behave independently of alliance politics reality. The fact that he accepted Sutrisno’s election, reached out to moderate Muslims in order to extend his political support and adjusted to the defection or expulsion of military factions from the ruling coalition corroborates such premises. But at the end, the exclusion of the strong Red/White faction from the ruling coalition to the benefit of the ICMI network generated instability.

At the beginning of the 1990s, student protests became a regular feature, partly because of the willingness of ABRI not to use violence against them (Vatikiotis, 1993: 143; Aspinall, 2005: 35). Similarly, labor strikes were more and more frequent, especially in the industrial city of Medan; and peasants were mobilizing in West Java and Madura (Pabottingi, 1995: 251-252). The country was in ebullition. In December 1993, Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno, won the PDI election. “This was despite Suharto’s best attempts to have her election thwarted, but she was successful because of the support she received from senior members of ABRI’s Red and White group” (Kingsbury, 2001; 378). In July 1996, the ruling elites tried to oust the opposition leader with no success. The country was ripped for a revolution. The Asian economic crisis and the subsequent downfall of the rupiah triggered an inflationary spiral that added fuel to the fire. And following the recommendation the IMF, “the removal of energy and food subsidies in May 1998 sparked widespread chaos in Indonesia” (Smith, 2001:86). The student movement hit the street in mass across the country and was rapidly joined by all segments of society notably the influential Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and the PDI. Initially, the government responded with brutal violence. Instead of diffusing the situation, the crackdown galvanized it. On May 18th, “Golkar chairperson and DPR Speaker Harmoko called on the President to step down ... Habibie himself approached Suharto and

⁶³ However, “in 1993 Suharto named his longtime information minister, Harmoko, to succeed Wahono and become Golkar’s first-ever civilian general chairman” (Malley, 1999: 89).

advised him to step aside... [few days later] fourteen cabinet ministers informed the President that they would not be willing to serve in his reshuffled cabinet” (Aspinall, 2005: 234-235). Suharto finally resigned on May 21st 1998.

This series of crises were obviously high in intensity and represented the fatal blow to the New Order. When the Red/White faction represented by General Wiranto refused to act against the demonstrators, the ICMI soon left the sinking ship: Suharto was isolated (Funston, 2001: 79). “It was at this juncture, when Suharto finally lost the backing of his closest allies, and military leaders signaled that they could not ensure order, that he realized he had to step down” (Freedman, 2006: 96). In other words, the mobilization came from below, but it succeeded only insofar as the military decided not to intervene. It was Suharto’s ultimate sentence for the exclusion of the Red/White faction from the ruling coalition.

The above event-history analysis demonstrates foremost the central role of the military through ABRI and indeed the rise of high-level state bureaucrats associated to ICMI. The power in Indonesia was concentrated in the presidency, but ABRI, and to a lesser degree, the ICMI were far from spectators. It reflects asymmetrical interdependence between actors. “In Indonesia, even an incumbent president’s power must be backed by at least a minimal consensus among the military and bureaucratic elite” (Jackson, 1978: 6). And these elites were not muted and subjugated: they were pressuring the ruling elites. None could be framed as monolithic as both institutions reflected the division within society: most of all the secular/religious cleavage. Furthermore, the narrative reveals that the rivalry was not only on one side, between the military and political parties and on the other, between state bureaucrats and local leaders, but also between social groups on each side. The ICMI and ABRI were penetrating both the military and the state bureaucracy; each was representing in a way two dominant social groups. In this context, it points to the difficulty associated with incorporating simultaneously the ICMI and ABRI in the ruling coalition. Ultimately, the gradual exclusion of ABRI (i.e. its main faction, the Red/White) as a political and bureaucratic force from the ruling coalition hampered seriously in the long term the normal functioning of the government.

4.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence

In Indonesia, the use of extra-legal means of political expression has been the norm over time. In such context, we would expect that the military would be the cornerstone of authority since it is the only social group capable of coping systematically with such challenge. The above narrative tends to corroborate such statement. Yet, the centrality of the military should be further explored not only in terms of its corporate interests and constituencies but also to validate if its inclusion in the coalition coincides with a hegemonic authoritarian regime.

The country has a long history of violence and its people have seen their share of blood. Indeed, from the War of Independence to secession conflicts and the Communist purge, the death toll has reached macabre proportion. On Java and Sumatra Islands, the Indonesian People's Army was up against the Dutch and British until 1949. The confrontation took mostly the form of guerrilla warfare and claimed thousand of lives. In the 1950s, the Islamic movement, Darul Islam, calling for the installment of a theocracy, took the arms in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. From 1963 to 1966, low intensity conflicts erupted in North Borneo between Malaysia and Indonesia. The 1965 repression of communists had no cause to be envious of Stalin brutality. Later, civil wars raged in West Papua (1965-84), East Timor (1975-98) and Aceh (1990-2005) involving various autonomous and secessionist movements. Moreover, street protests in urban areas were frequent and often degenerated into riots, and in rural areas peasants and landholders often were solving their conflicts with violence (Aspinall, 2005: 250; Crouch, 1978: 21; Jackson, 1978: 40). In brief, the country was the theatre of high degree of extra-legal organized violence and civil unrest.

4.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies

From 1950 to 1965, the military's role in politics evolved as its organizational capacity increased. The War of Independence had an inherent political dimension for the military. They were the spearhead of an emancipation project that would shape the future institutions. But it was foremost about fighting a foreign enemy, not siding with a given domestic political group. Furthermore, until the mid-1950s, the Indonesian armed forces were a collection of relatively

autonomous units spread over the archipelagic territory. Their operations lacked a clear chain of command and tactics were based on guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the events surrounding the PRRI (1956) show that even if the military was gradually included in the President's close political circle, the fact that they did not have control over their subunits prevented them from playing a stabilizing force. They were not in a position to influence political outcomes on the national scene precisely because their organization was centrifugal.

Yet, the military forces were already benefiting from an aura of legitimacy among the general population as the liberator from the foreign troops of occupation. Interesting enough, given its grassroots organizational structure during that period, "the army's ethnic representation fairly reflected the ethnic composition of the country, and its ideological orientation was strongly Islamic" (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). In a way, regional military commanders were part of the local fabric and as such were able to attract sympathy among the public. But with the radicalization of Islam politics, notably the Darul Islam revolt, its composition was skewed toward Javanese (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). This shift highlights the cleavage between devoted abangan Muslims in Java and santry Muslims in outer islands. Santry is based on "pure" interpretation of Islam while abangan integrates various traditions found in Hinduism, Buddhism and Animist religions. Furthermore, in Java itself, the santry/abangan fracture, as well as the modernist/traditionalist cleavage among santry was also visible (Liddle, 1978: 1989-190). They were structuring political affiliations to the point "there was virtually no partisan competition" (Liddle, 1978: 190). The abangan Javanese was demographically the dominant group; and the armed forces reflected such distribution of power. Ultimately, the dissociation of the military from Islam politics coincided with the military shake up of 1952, which in principle was supposed to allow Sukarno to place abangan Javanese loyalists in key military positions (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012).

As already mentioned, General Nasution was determined to transform the Indonesian armed forces into a professional corps. In doing so, he was threatening not only the well-entrenched interests of local military commanders, but also the ones of political parties who started to worry about the emergence of an effective and independent instrument of coercion. The decision of political parties to deny General Nasution the authorization to proceed with the

modernization of the armed forces gave rise to a reflection among high-ranking officers about their role in politics as an institution, and incited them to articulate a common policy (Crouch, 1978: 31). Military unity and political action became a necessity. The civil government weakened by factionalism and cabinet instability proved to be unable to lead the country. Disorder was breeding on every corner. The military had an additional incentive to intervene. The decisive military victories in crushing insurrections across the territory in the 1950s were giving them some momentum and prestige. It was the only actor capable of providing security to the common people. Nevertheless, they were lacking influence over politicians and, overall, dependent on civil institutions.

With the declaration of martial law in 1957, the military became an indispensable ally for Sukarno to assert his authority over a nation ready to explode. It was the opportunity for ABRI to push its way into politics. Under the instigation of General Nasution, the moral and legal basis for such intrusion was introduced in 1958 under the concept of the “Middle Way”, “according to which the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain politically inactive. Instead the military claimed the right to continuous representation in the government, legislature, and administration” (Crouch 1978: 24). Later, the “Middle Way” was expanded under the label *dwifungsi* (or dual function): the military was becoming both a protector of the state and a socio-economic agent of change. It was ratified by the legislative and given force of a law⁶⁴; “constitutionally legitimizing what had been military ideology” (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Thereafter, the armed forces were consolidating their authority. For instance, “in Sukarno’s cabinet, representation of the armed forces jumped from two ministers to eleven” (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). The military also enhanced its prestige with the victory in West Irian and the containment of local rebellions in the 1960s. Regardless of the military ascendance in politics, it is important to keep in mind that “the army leaders recognized that Sukarno’s authority as president gave the regime an aura of legitimacy it would not have without him. They knew that he had the support of most of the political parties” (Crouch, 1978: 46). In other words, the military was content with being a peripheral actor within the ruling coalition rather than directly seizing power.

⁶⁴ Law No20/1982.

At the same time, Sukarno wanted to contain the growing power of the military. He opted for the most potent political organization: the PKI, which was building an extensive network capable of mobilizing thousands of supporters all over the country. Indeed, the PKI ironically benefited from martial law. Instead of allocating resources to win elections or pass bills, it channeled all its efforts in building an organizational capacity especially with the development of local branches (Rocamora, 1973: 145). In other words, by canceling elections, Sukarno participated in strengthening the organizational structure of political parties. The PKI benefited the most because it was already present in the countryside where it was winning the heart and mind of the population to the detriment of local military commanders; the army and secular nationalists were concentrated in urban areas (Crouch, 1978: 248). Furthermore, in the process, PKI leaders “mobilize popular support in the takeovers of both foreign property and surplus land” (Crouch, 1978: 78). In fact, the PKI acted as a surrogate of the civil administration in rural areas, notably by enforcing the implementation of Sukarno’s land reforms (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). In terms of capacity, and with a membership of over two millions individuals, only the PKI could contain military ambitions (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). In the absolute, a coalition merging the two had the potential for fostering elite’s consent of Sukarno’s authority.

Yet, Sukarno’s strategy to ally with the PKI had the advert effect of reinforcing the military temptation to intervene in politics, especially when the PKI tried to outstrip the military prerogative in regard to the monopoly of legitimate violence. Already betrayed by the Madiun Affair in January 1965, the military was outraged by the PKI leaders' proposition to arm and train workers and peasants. Their intent was to form a fifth force composed of peasants, armed by China, that would evade the control of the military establishment and act directly in support of the army, navy, air force and police (Crouch, 1978: 82-90; Neher & Marlay, 1995: 78). The proposition also included the implementation of an advisory board within each of the four branches of the armed forces, composed of civil representatives. The ABRI-PKI coalition built by Sukarno was precarious since each was suspicious of the intention of the other and tended to see conflicts as a zero-sum game. In other words, ABRI was not willing to cooperate with a

political party so hostile to its corporate interests. It is in this context that the 1965 coup occurred, leading to the departure of Sukarno and take over of General Suharto in 1966.

During fifteen years, political parties – mostly Muslims and socialists/communists – stood in the way of military corporate interests on several occasions. The cumulating effect reached its apex in 1965. As these challenges occurred, the military gradually transformed itself into a more or less cohesive force to reckon with. From the coup and until 1998, they will overshadow political parties as the central figure of authority in national institutions. Political parties survived the New Order, but the government kept their activities on a tight grip through various means, mostly financial and nomination controls (Santoso, 1997: 30). The entire opposition was in effect co-opted and “associated with ideological obfuscation rather than ideological differentiation from the regime” (Aspinall, 2005: 257). Furthermore, the new 1971 electoral system consisting of a proportional and a list system “caused the alienation of MPs from their constituencies” (Santoso, 1997: 28). Many MPs were parachuted into an alien constituency. For opposition leaders, “selection by the president is more important in creating power than a mass following” (Jackson, 1978; 32). Thus, as the military grew stronger, political parties grew weaker.

Military officers started to occupy key functions in the government and civil administration. “By the late 1970s, half the cabinet and over two-thirds of the regional governorships were military appointees. At the district level, 56 per cent of district officers were military men. In the bureaucracy, 78 per cent of director-generals and 84 per cent of ministerial secretaries were Abri appointees” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 70-71). For many observers, popular support of the regime was largely attributed to the role of military officers (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). According to Santoso (1997: 36-37), “it is also a fact that in daily life, ABRI members are respected and trusted by the public formally and informally. Many from the lower rungs have been chosen voluntarily by the public as village headmen or chairmen of social and sports organizations”. In fact, according to General Wahono, the basis of ABRI involvement in politics lays on its public support (Honna, 2003: 37).

Through its ABRI *Masuk Desa* program (ABRI go to villages), it connected directly with the people. “The Indonesian army was, in a sense, a people’s army” (Crouch, 1978: 36). Although by law, military officers were not allowed to vote in general elections, they nevertheless had captive constituencies. As additional evidence, the 1987 general election was a testimony of their ability to attract voters. “ABRI for the first time decided to lend tacit support to one of the two minority parties, the Christian-backed Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). ABRI-organized PDI rallies in Jakarta resulted in spectacular electoral gains for the party in the capital” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 77-78).

In the 1980s, military status within the ruling coalition began to wane. For instance, “only four ministers in the 1988 and two in the 1993 cabinet were active duty officers, and the number declined further in the 1993 cabinet” compared to eleven in the 1980s (Vatikiotis 1993: 25; 61; 140). This decline coincided with ABRI factionalism. In many ways, the division was a reflection of social cleavage (Liddle, 1978: 182). It was a political microcosm of social change that was including different constituencies. The armed forces had been traditionally dominated by abangan Javanese and Christians: that is the secular and nationalist Red/White faction. Yet, the society was evolving and its Islamization more and more apparent though less radical compared to the Darul Islam era. In the 1970-80s, ICMI moderate leaders started to exert influence in their community (Bertrand, 2004: 85). In parallel, the armed forces underwent a major personnel turnover. The old guard who orchestrated the National Revolution retired and a younger generation took over, many of them being proud Muslims. The rise of Generals Feisal Tanjung, Hartono and Syarwan Hamid at the top of ABRI chain of command is a clear example of such tendency (Honna, 2003: 30-31). The Green faction emerged and grew closer to Suharto to the detriment of the Red/White faction. The rift between Suharto and Moerdani, largely a by-product of the criticism of the latter on Suharto’s family business operations, and the ruthless repression in Tanjung Priok⁶⁵ convinced Islamic leaders that only Suharto could check the vile ambition of non-Muslims (Vatikiotis, 1993: 163). This is why they landed their

⁶⁵ Moerdani was responsible amongst others for the September 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre, where soldiers shot at the mob killing hundred Muslims who demanded the release of four Mosque caretakers arrested few days before (Bertrand, 2004: 77).

support to the President even if he was the main culprit of Islamic repression back in the old days. At the same time, Bertrand argues (2004: 87),

“A continued marginalization of Islamic groups, and relative favoritism of Christians and abangan, would have required increasing amounts of societal repression, as the pressures for more political involvement among Muslims had been on the rise... When Muslim organizations began to adopt more accommodationist strategies and became less threatening to the New Order’s rule, there were few arguments left to resist a greater inclusion of Muslims”.

Regardless of this division within ABRI and of the rise of Islamic influence through ICMI, ABRI’s support was essential to the Suharto regime because it was, according to Habibie himself, “a bidding force... [that] hold together the various elements and factions within Golkar” (Honna, 2003: 30). Habibie’s tentative rapprochement in 1993 with the Petition of the Fifty is indicative of such statement⁶⁶. Golkar was not an ordinary political party. Its initial function was to provide organizational capacities in the fight against communism (Juoro, 1998: 197). Once the domestic enemy was eliminated, Suharto reshaped the organization into an electoral machine. And at all times, ABRI was an integral part of its inner-working; to a point that there was a considerable overlap between Golkar and ABRI membership. Golkar was more a joint secretariat of functional groups supervised by ABRI than a real decision-making body, but military officers were not more accountable than other political groups in the New Order. Popular participation in public affairs was reduced to policy implementation at the local level (Jackson, 1978: 5). Also, ABRI, including the Red/White faction, was not a pro-democratic force. “In many respects, the officers most alienated from Suharto retained highly authoritarian views” (Aspinall, 2005: 54). Overall, the Golkar structure followed the top-down model, but it was nevertheless “relatively responsive of the people’s aspirations, especially those related to major economic activities and selected welfare programmes” (Juoro, 1998: 206). The main forum for participation in Golkar was the Department of Research and Development that was regularly offering individuals of various horizons the possibility to express their opinion on specific issues. The bottom line is that “ABRI stands above all other groups because of its tight organization, its capacity for violence, its

⁶⁶ Habibie invited the group to speak openly during one Parliament session.

domination of Golkar and parliament, and its financial understanding with the business sector” (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 83). Moreover, it could count on wide popular support.

During the New Order, ABRI was the greatest challenge to Suharto personal power. Some of its high-ranking officers were able to accumulate significant power. The Moerdani network is a prime example. On many occasions, as the event-history analysis has catalogued, ABRI opposed itself to Suharto, whether directly as with the Petition of the Fifty or the ousted of Sudharmono as Golkar chairman or indirectly by tolerating public manifestation; sometimes with success and in other cases with dire consequences. In fact, “within the DPR, it is the most vocal in criticizing the government policies” (Santoso, 1997: 36). Suharto was never in position to behave in an autocratic fashion in its relation with ABRI.

The above comments were intended to delineate the complex role of the military in Indonesian politics as it relates to our analytical framework. As Sukarno opted to play the PKI against the ABRI, Suharto similarly decided to play ABRI against the ICMI. Instead of forming a coalition where all social groups would be united against the opposition, they adopted a strategy of “divide and rule”. In other words, the ruling elites were picturing themselves as a moderator of conflicts between peripheral actors; conflicts that they nevertheless orchestrated themselves and that will have the unintended consequence of initiating their demise. Still, from 1965 to 1980, the regime proved to be highly stable and this hallmark was the result of an alliance between military officers and the state bureaucrats factions within the ruling party Golkar. And the role of the military within the ruling coalition could not be separated from the larger political context associated with the regime type: that is, the 1965-1980 period was one characterized by a hegemonic authoritarian regime.

4.2.2. Types of Regimes

The Indonesian regime went through various phases until the advent of electoral democracy in 1998. Freedom House considers that the Indonesian regime was partly free (hybrid) from 1972 to 1992, not free from 1993 to 1997, and again partly free from 1998 to 2005. Given the fact that the independence of Indonesia happened two decades before Freedom House started its

classification, it has limited analytical utility. Alternatively, we identify three periods. The first was a form of electoral democracy (1950-1957). The second was a mere dictatorship (1958-1965). And the last was epitomic of a hegemonic authoritarian regime (1966-1998).

1950-1957: Electoral Democracy

Most specialists agree that the Indonesian regime was an electoral democracy during the 1950-1957's period (Juoro, 1998: 203; Neher & Marlay, 1995: 75; Kingsbury, 2001: 30; Pabottingi, 1995: 240). The first election in 1955 was based on universal suffrage; it was free, fair and competitive since the main national political parties found their way into the party system (Lipset, 1998: 87). Legislative powers of the assembly were genuine, the press was vibrant, courts were free of political interference, and the civil society was flourishing (Vatikiotis, 1993: 196). As the diversity of political parties found in Indonesia at that time illustrates, freedom of association and expression was generally respected.

This rosy picture should not however be overstated. First, party leaders were disconnected from the reality of their constituencies; secluded in the capital (Liddle, 1978: 173). They were driven by the quest of personal power unconstrained by party discipline or social demands (Rocamora, 1973: 145). Hence, the competition was not between ideologies but between individuals. Second, political elites were approaching elections with skepticism; suddenly, the political game was out of their hands (Rocamora, 1973: 145; Liddle, 1978: 174). Furthermore, it is difficult to judge a regime based only on one election. Third, the separation of powers between the executive and legislative was ambiguous. Most of all, the role played by the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), a non-elected advisory body to the president, was one played in parallel with the functions legally attributed to the cabinet and the legislative (Jhaveri, 1975: 92, 116). Also, although the 1950 Provisional Constitution was limiting the power of the president, Sukarno retained in practice considerable power and was not directly elected.

We therefore conclude that Indonesia was an electoral democracy but with some obvious hurdles. Also, as it was the case for Malaysia and in fact as it is for most countries, it is always

difficult to assess with certitude the type of regime during the first decade after Independence. The regime is in gestation and his definite attributes still in the making.

From the vantage point of our analytical framework, the period is a mismatch. There were incongruities between the degree of extra-legal organized violence, the regime type and the pattern of alliance politics. The combination of civil wars, an embryonic democracy and a multiparty coalition was a recipe for chaos; and indeed instability was chronic. In such a context, and as stated before, the dynamics of alliance politics during this period fall outside of our analytical framework.

1958-1965: Autocratic Regime - Guided Democracy

In the course of the first two years following the declaration of martial law in 1957, elections were abolished and the Parliament dissolved. All along, the press was muted, political meetings illegal and political repression on the rise. The National Defense Council with the military occupying key positions was created, and the 1945 quibbling Constitution reinstated. But indeed, it was lacking precisions and leaving room for interpretation by political elites in regard to state and society relations, as well as to the specific rights and duties of the government and citizens (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Its reinstatement meant a change in the system of government, from a parliamentary to presidential system. In effect, all powers were concentrated in the hands of the President. When Sukarno named himself president for life in 1963, there was little doubt about the true face of the regime. It looked very much like a dictatorship.

Looking back, the Guided Democracy was mostly a transitional period. It witnessed a change of system of government and a change of constitution. Although after 1963, Sukarno reinstated political parties, their exact legal status was in limbo. Therefore, the application of our analytical framework is far from being straightforward. From 1957 to 1962, it was almost a dictatorship dominated by the military. Sukarno's choice of allies after 1963, and its inherent instability as the 1965 abortive coup illustrates, demonstrate the dichotomous relation between the military and political parties. An alliance that includes both in such a context is not meant

to last. The ruling elites have to side with either one and it is obvious that Sukarno could not remain in power without the military. Sukarno behaved after 1963 as if he was stuck between a hegemonic authoritarian and a competitive authoritarian regime...a recipe for instability.

1966-1998: Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime - The New Order

During that period, Indonesia held regular legislative elections with universal suffrage (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) and opposition parties were allowed to compete. However, Suharto was not directly elected, many members of the MPR were nominated, electoral fraud was common, opposition leaders were handpicked by the ruling elites. And freedom of press and association were severely restrained (Smith, 2001: 108). President Suharto was unopposed and nominated each time (1972, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993) through a unanimous decision by the MPR (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 85). Although the proportion was changing in each election, he appointed overall over half of the MPR members; providing a *de facto* majority to the ruling elites in the legislature. Violence and intimidation were frequent against the opposition, notably through the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) (Kingsbury, 2001: 371).

Table V – Electoral Results in Indonesia (Legislative)

Year	Political Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
1955	Partai Nasional Indoensia (PNI)	8,434,653	22.3	57	22.2
	Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi)	7,903,886	20.9	57	22.2
	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6,955,141	18.4	45	17.5
	Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6,176,914	16.3	39	15.2
	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1,091,160	2.9	8	3.1
	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)	1,003,325	2.7	8	3.1
	Partai Katolik	770,740	2	6	2.3
	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	753,191	2	5	1.9
	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)	541,306	1.4	4	1.6
	Persatuan Terbijah Islamijah (Perti)	483,014	1.3	4	1.6
	Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	242,125	0.6	2	0.8
	Partai Buruh	224,167	0.6	2	0.8
	Gerakan Pembela Pancasila (GPPS)	219,985	0.6	2	0.8
	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)	206,261	0.5	2	0.8
	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia (PPPRI)	200,419	0.5	2	0.8
	Partai Murba	199,588	0.5	2	0.8
	Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki)	178,887	0.5	1	0.4
	Persatuan Indonesia Raja (PIR)	178,481	0.5	1	0.4
	Others	2,022,056	5.4	10	3.9
	Total	37,785,299	99.9	257	100.2
Participation Rate (87.7%)					

1971	Golongan Karya (GOLKAR)	34,348,673	62.8	236	65.5
	NU	10,213,650	18.7	58	16.1
	PNI	3,793,266	6.9	20	5.5
	Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi)	2,930,746	5.4	24	6.7
	PSII	1,308,237	2.4	10	2.8
	Parkindo	733,359	1.3	7	1.9
	Partai Katolik	603,740	1.1	3	0.8
	Perti	381,309	0.7	2	0.5
	IPKI	338,403	0.6	0	0
	Partai Murba	48,126	0.1	0	0
	Others	0	0	0	0
	Total	54,699,509	100	360	99.8
	Participation Rate (94%)				
1977	GOLKAR	39,750,096	62.1	232	64.4
	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	18,743,491	29.3	99	27.5
	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)	5,504,757	8.6	29	8.1
	Total	63,998,344	100	360	100
	Participation Rate (90.6%)				
1982	GOLKAR	48,334,724	64.3	242	67.2
	PPP	20,871,880	27.8	94	26.1
	PDI	5,919,702	7.9	24	6.7
	Total	75,126,306	100	360	100
	Participation Rate (92%)				
1987	GOLKAR	62,783,680	73.2	299	74.8
	PPP	13,701,428	16	61	15.3
	PDI	9,324,708	10.9	40	10
	Total	85,809,816	100.1	400	100.1
	Participation Rate (91.3%)				
1992	GOLKAR	66,599,326	68.1	282	70.5
	PPP	16,624,547	17.0	62	15.5
	PDI	14,585,546	14.9	56	14
	Total	97,809,419	100.0	400	100
	Participation Rate (90.9%)				
1997	GOLKAR	84,187,907	74.5	325	76.5
	PPP	25,340,028	22.4	89	20.9
	PDI	3,463,225	3.1	11	2.6
	Total	112,991,160	100	425	100
	Participation Rate (89.8%)				

Data Source: Rýland (2001)

Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category.

The doctrine of “floating mass” forbade political activities except during elections. And the only two legal opposition parties were a creation of Suharto himself, designed to foster internal infighting. Indeed in 1973, he forced the merge of existing political parties into two entities: the United Development Party (PPP)⁶⁷ and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI)⁶⁸.

⁶⁷ The PPP includes the NU, Muslim Party of Indonesia (*Parmusi*) and Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII) and the Islamic Educational Movement (*Perti*)

The former was regrouping Islamic parties of various strands and the latter was an amalgam of nationalist and Christian parties. Golkar was the only party allowed to operate below the provincial level, giving it a direct and exclusive contact with the population (Juoro, 1998: 198). Media outlets had to obtain a license from the government to publish whatever content, and editorial boards were selected by the ruling elites (Santoso, 1997: 27). In this regard, one reason why Freedom House might have downgraded the Indonesian regime from partly free to not free in 1993 could have been the closing of the influential media *DēTik*, *Editor*, and *Tempo*. “After the banning, the return to coercion accelerated. The security forces arrested and tried several prominent dissidents” (Aspinall, 2005: 47). Overall, the real political opposition operated largely beyond the confine of political institutions (van der Kroef, 1978: 621). Therefore, the period of the New Order clearly corresponds to characteristics found in a hegemonic authoritarian regime; the conduct of elections could not be called competitive at all and in many ways, results were loaded well in advance.

However, although the influence of military is hard to deny, the contention about whether Indonesia was under Suharto a military regime or based on civil institutions is less evident. First, of course Suharto himself was a general. Second, the New Order created a powerful coercive apparatus using extra-constitutional means such as the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Kopkamtib*), the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (*Bakin*) and the Special Operations (*Opus*). Given their covert and repressive nature as well as the target of their activities, that is the society in general, these agencies were typical of a police state organization and draw closer the regime to a totalitarian form. Third, the strong ABRI presence in the government and civil administration was too evident, giving it an instant military flavor.

Yet, public policies during the New Order diverted from what we usually see in a military dictatorship. “Policies, if anything, are less favorable to the military establishment’s institutional interests than were the policies of Guided Democracy.... drastically reducing the

⁶⁸ The PDI includes the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), the Murba Party (*Partai Murba*), the Indonesian Christian Party (*Parkindo*), Catholic Party (*Partai Katolik*).

size of the Indonesian military establishment” (Jackson, 1978: 13)⁶⁹. According to Vatikiotis (1993: 61), “the demilitarization of Suharto’s New Order has gone so far it is barely recognized as a military-led government. In many ways it is not”. Second, some Indonesian military officers transformed themselves into savvy politicians: they departed from the typical hard-nose behavior associated with their professional training (Crouch, 1978: 35). Third, “the Indonesian military’s dual function doctrine, formulated in 1965, did not claim actual leadership for the military but was used to claim a permanent and open role for the armed forces in Indonesian politics and society” (Brooker, 2000: 140). In the end, civilian institutions prevailed over military ones: Indonesia had a parliament and was not governed by some form of military council or junta.

As for the post-1998 period, we are reticent to classify it as partly free given it was a genuine democratic transition. Freedom of the press was restored. The 1999 legislative election (DPR) was competitive and fair as the PDI victory testifies. And under the Sukarnoputri’s presidency, all legislative bodies, regional and local representatives as well as the president of the republic were now directly elected.

In retrospective, the most stable period in the political history of Indonesia is the one that mirrors our ideal-type. The 1970s saw fewer crises than in other decades. The military were included in the ruling coalition as a key peripheral actor under a hegemonic authoritarian regime. The case of Indonesia illustrates that the prevalence of a given dominant social group is not necessarily and unconditionally tied to a regime type but when it converges in conformity with our analytical framework it has a reinforcing effect. That being said, the fact that military officers were part to different degrees of the ruling coalition and behave as if they were in a hegemonic authoritarian regime – as the gestation of the “Middle Way” that found its legal expression in 1982 demonstrates – during the democratic (1950-1957) and autocratic period (1958-1965), and not like the liberal or penetration model respectively (see Chapter Two, p. 88-89), generated instability and tends to confirm the nil hypothesis. Our framework explains foremost hybrid regime stability, not necessarily stability in other types of regimes.

⁶⁹ From 600,000 to 350,000 officers between 1967 and 1979.

We however gave equal attention to the period before the New Order even if it was not a hybrid one. We did so because it participates in exploring the extension of our claims and put into perspective the historic ascension of Indonesian military officers in politics.

4.3. The Degree of State Penetration

The Indonesian regime evolved gradually into a strong state. During the Sukarno's era, administrative extension was problematic. Afterwards, it improved. The New Order centralization process was underway and soon as few regions could escape Jakarta's control. Economic extension followed a similar trajectory. An underdeveloped nation until the 1970s, it succeeded in bringing about economic modernization through massive state intervention. Therefore, we would expect that state bureaucrats gradually replaced local leaders as a determinant social group in Indonesian politics. The events surrounding the PRRI in the 1950s, ABRI's penetration of the bureaucracy and later the importance of Habibie and the ICMI affiliates in the 1980s-90s is in line with such claim.

4.3.1. Administrative Extension

Under the Dutch's control, local leaders were accomplishing the basic functions of the civil administration (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 123). After Independence, a power vacuum occurred and the political integrity of the state especially in the outer islands was in disarray. There was a marked disconnection between the center and the regions whereas the latter had almost no contact with the former. Regions were physically and administratively cut-off with few transportation networks linking them with the center and had little access to any public services. Furthermore, in the capital, the state bureaucracy was divided along party lines: each party having more or so the control of a ministry. For instance, NU sympathizers were visible in the Ministry of Religion and PNI sympathizers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and Information (Emmerson, 1978: 88). The situation led to bitter infighting, each party using the state resources for its own interests (Rocamora, 1973: 184). Nomination procedures in the civil administration were foremost political in nature, with few considerations related to competences (Jackson & Moeliono, 1973: 104). In this context, the state bureaucracy could

obviously not be considered a dominant social group. Local affinities based on the traditional vision of *bapak* (father/patron) and *anak* (child/client) were primordial (Jackson, 1978: 36). “In the cultures of Java, Sumatra, and the surrounding islands... a rigidly stratified society is held together by vertical alignments between patrons and clients” (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 77). Yet, instead of cultivating the cooperation with local leaders, the center antagonized them with the resulting instability the ruling coalition experienced in the 1950s.

The New Order changed all of that. It implemented a unified and centralized civil administration structure. Law 5/1974 created civil administrative units at all levels (provinces, districts, villages) that paralleled the military one, assuring control and respect of decisions taken in the capital⁷⁰. Additionally, military officers were heavily recruited in the bureaucracy to further the grip of the ruling elites and curb the pervasive influence of political parties (Crone, 1991: 103). Leaving the political arena, the bureaucracy was being transformed into an effective instrument of economic development. According to the presidential decree 6/1970, political activities were forbidden within the civil administration, and all state employees were obliged to demonstrate loyalty to Golkar (Emmerson, 1978: 107). The cabinet included academics instead of politicians (Crouch, 1978: 242). And the civil administration attracted most students with higher education (Santoso, 1997: 38). Suharto rationalized the civil administration. He reduced the number of ministries by 25% compared to what prevailed under the Guided Democracy (Emmerson, 1978: 82). The Inpres government program was largely directed to investment in education, health and infrastructure. (Bertrand, 2004: 195). The impact was quickly visible as the situation in all those areas significantly improved: literacy and life expectancy rates progressed as well as transportation networks connecting isolated areas (Emmerson, 1978: 133; Santoso, 1997: 23; US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Finally, tax collection was reinforced and fiscal revenue increased substantially, while regional administration revenues were controlled by Jakarta (Malley, 1999: 79).

Noteworthy, all along one ministry was expanding in terms of employees, whereas in others reduction of personnel was the mantra. At a point, it became the biggest of all ministries. It

⁷⁰ Under the law, one person nominated by the national elites oversaw both the regional administration and regional government (Malley, 1999: 79).

was the Ministry of Religion. Nearly, “one-third of all Indonesian half-million civilian departmental employees worked for it” (Emmerson, 1978: 87). In 1971, “the appointment of a religious technocrat as minister, Professor H.A. Mukti Ali, a man unaffiliated with any political party” signaled the willingness of the ruling elites to co-opt moderate Islamic leaders (Emmerson, 1978: 96). It will serve as the basis for the ICMI emergence and penetration of the civil administration. Before 2000, ICMI was reporting over forty thousand members, mostly civil servants, whereas the defunct Masyumi and the NU were formed of entrepreneurs and teachers respectively (Aspinall, 2005: 40). Later, ICMI tentacles under the Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) will widen and infiltrate most ministries. It evolved into a centre of bureaucratic power within the civil administration. However, this ascension never materialized into a direct access to the ruling elites: “ICMI reformers succeeded only in establishing themselves on the regime’s periphery” (Aspinall, 2005: 59). It would therefore be fair to state that the 1987-88 crises and Suharto’s nomination of Sudharmono as vice-president are part of a trend that started two decades earlier.

The archipelagic territory of Indonesia leads to a simple conclusion: “Indonesia has perhaps the most awesome physical impediments to national integration of any state in the Third World today” (Jackson, 1978: 23). It comes therefore as no surprise that regional dissents and refusal of the central authority persisted. Yet, during much of the New Order period, provision of public goods was improving and, in some cases, was adequate compared to developing countries standards.


4.3.2. Economic Extension

Initially, Sukarno spent vast sums in non-productive activities such as the organization of sumptuous celebrations and the edification of superlative public properties (Crouch, 1978: 44). The President was not specifically concerned with the state of the economy, but as it appeared more with political gains. Until 1956, there was no development plan for the long-term economic growth of the country. After that date, a first five-year plan proposed public investment strategies but was eclipsed by the chaotic takeover of Dutch companies by the state. And it was the PKI members and military officers that actually undertook the

nationalization process, not civil servants. ABRI and PKI were therefore competing not only on the political front but also on the economic one. Over 300 plantations and the same amount of firms operating in natural resources and services sectors were subject to a takeover by the state (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012).

A national oil, natural gas and mining company, Pertamina, was created in 1968, headed by Ibnu Sutowo, Nasution’s close associate. Pertamina quickly diversified its activities both vertically in transformation process and horizontally in agricultural and manufacture sectors, and the revenue generated served political purposes especially to increase social capital overhead and military procurement (Crouch, 1978: 276; US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). With the oil shock in 1973, oil revenues increased exponentially, contributing to the expansion of government programs and its presence in the economy. Another source of public funding was Bulog, a trading company specialized in agricultural products, especially rice, but with many other assets in the clothing, banking and forest sectors in which military officers were also heavily involved (Crouch, 1978: 278).

Figure 6 – Natural Resources Rent in Indonesia



Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

By the late 1960s, the National Development Planning Council (*Bappenas*) was set up and led by market-friendly economists from the University of Indonesia who obtained their PhD from

Berkeley (California). They designed the first five-year plans of the New Order: “Repelita I (FY 1969-73) stressed increased production of staple foods and infrastructure development; Repelita II (FY 1974-78) focused on agriculture, employment, and regionally equitable development; Repelita III (FY 1979-83) emphasized development of agriculture-related and other industry; Repelita IV (FY 1984-88) concentrated on basic industries; and Repelita V (FY 1989-93) targeted transport and communications” (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). The impact of these plans was visible in the increased share of the value added of the industrial sector (see table VI).

It propelled the country towards an emerging economy. Yet, a vivid and autonomous middle-class never extended beyond few industrial centers. In these urban areas, the rapid growth contributed to a certain degree to the formation of an embryonic political opposition. In this regard, Golkar electoral support base was in rural regions (Malley, 1999: 103-104). Notwithstanding these developments, small entrepreneurs were undersized and reliant on state contract to keep doing business (Santoso, 1997: 38-39). And besides those affiliated to Golkar such as Soksi, labor unions were prohibited after the PKI purge in 1965. Foreign corporations and Chinese-Indonesian businessmen⁷¹ with close connections with military and government officials dominated the economy (Crone, 1991: 103; Jackson, 1978: 28; Crouch, 1978: 284). Indigenous entrepreneurs were suffocating in a protected market monopolized by conglomerates.

Table VI – Indonesia Socio-Economic Modernization

Indicator Name	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Urban population (% of total)	14.60	17.10	22.10	30.60	42.00
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	217.80	164.90	121.20	85.00	54.00
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	n.a	83.97	n.a	118.75	112.74
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	51.46	44.94	23.97	19.41	15.60
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	9.22	10.29	12.99	20.66	27.75
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	15.05	18.69	41.72	39.12	45.93

Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

⁷¹ Notably the world-class tycoon Liem Sioe Liong.

Indeed, state intervention in the economy was widespread during the Suharto era. It took mostly indirect forms such as “fixing prices, controlling supplies of fertilizer and kerosene, setting licensing arrangements for imported goods, and imposing arbitrary ceilings on bank credits” (Pabottingi, 1995: 250). These extensive regulation controls provided the instrument for the government to decide which sectors and companies were to be privileged. In the process, the government chose to protect monopolistic positions in strategic sectors (Freedman, 2006: 86). All private economic actors were hostage of government preferences.

Table VII – Indonesian State Investment in the Economy

	General Gov't Consumption (% of Total Consumption)	Gov't Enterprises and Investment (% of Gross Investment)
1970	9.28	40.4
1975	12.19	39.4
1980	16.75	49.5
1985	16.36	43.0
1990	13.04	32.5
1995	11.28	20.7
2000	9.47	20.7
2005	11.2	20.7
2009	14.5	

Data Source: Economic Freedom of the World, 2012

With oil collapse and world economic recession in the mid-1980s, the country performance was showing signs of decline. The so-called western-trained “Berkeley Mafia” and other pro-market academics pushed for a new set of reforms and a deregulation of the financial sector. They advocated the end of government controls on bank lending, the use of preferential interest rates and subsidized credit programs. The ruling elites did proceed with trade liberalization and the dismantling of some monopolies. Competitive bides replaced the practice of import licenses attribution on plastic and steel to one conglomerate; and non-tariff barriers in the manufacturing sectors were reduced from 50% to 35% (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). The measures contributed to revitalize the economy.

Yet, the liberalization process was limited. The natural resources sector remained under the

firm control of the government. Furthermore, Habibie created the Council for the Development of Strategic Industries to identify which state-owned companies should not be privatized. The Council selected ten state enterprises working in high-tech sectors, armament and steel production (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Hence, Habibie oversaw vast segments of the economy and was responsible for the wellbeing of citizens belonging to various backgrounds. In addition, as head of Sekneg (state secretariat), Sudharmono oversaw the attribution of development projects to economic actors and reduced substantially government windfall of ABRI business affiliates (Honna, 2003:11). He also orchestrated a reorientation of Golkar's treasury by "recruiting new cadres from ranks of business who might provide financial support for Golkar, which would in turn reduce ABRI's influence in Golkar administration" (Honna, 2003: 11). In the end, deregulation only reinforced the position of the conglomerates that with their initial market position could benefit the most from new business opportunities. The privatization process was far from being transparent. The chief beneficiary was Suharto's family (Vatikiotis, 1993: 152).

Above all, the privatization process profited to Suharto's immediate entourage and upper echelon state bureaucrats to the detriment of military officers (Aspinall, 2005: 32). And ABRI was skeptical of Professor B.J. Habibie's intentions, head of ICMI and Minister of Research and Technology, who could "consolidate his independent power base outside of military control" (Honna, 2003:13). Indeed, during the first decades of the New Order, military officers built a private fortune. Most of all, they received side-payments from foreign or Chinese businessmen in exchange of license delivery. This is the shift more than the economic liberalization process *per se* that created instability and dissatisfaction among ABRI representatives.

Furthermore, although clientelistic practice was an integral part of Indonesian politics, its form changed over time. Originally, it was particularistic whereas local military officers were coercing rural communities and controlling regional economic activities for private gains. During the New Order, the ruling elites allowed the development of military patronage network via the control of state-owned companies (e.g. Pertamina) or the private sector insofar as it served mostly as a source of structural financing for the armed forces (Crouch, 1978: 38-


39, 275). At the same time, government grants, notably through the Inpres and Banpres programs, were targeting the poor regions in exchange of loyalty to Suharto and Golkar (Malley, 1999: 80; Juoro, 1998: 195; Bertrand, 2004: 41, 196). It was thus part of a larger scheme. Until the 1990s, corruption level never fostered popular upheaval (Vatikiotis, 1993: 165). By the time the liberalization process was in full motion, clientelistic practices had diverted the gains from organizational aims to particularistic interests, namely the Suharto family who ripped the larger share of the windfall. Yet it was only when, on the advise of the IMF, Suharto decided to deregulate the price of basic commodities and started to exclude dominant social groups that the opulence of the Suharto family became outrageously provocative; anger started to mount within the Indonesian population and led to the fall of life-long president.

The analysis of the degree of state penetration reveals the great socio-economic transformation Indonesia has gone through over the period covered in the present study. It had an impact on the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition by shifting the role of relay between the center and the regions from local military commanders to state bureaucrats. It also contributed to anchor the importance of Habibie as a dominant figure of the bureaucracy.

Conclusion

The support of military officers and state bureaucrats were determining factors explaining political stability in Indonesia. The fact that this alliance cemented during the first two decades or so of the hegemonic authoritarian regime (1965-1980) and that this period was the most stable one of the country contemporary history fits our hypotheses. Especially if one considers that at the same time the expansion of the state over the territory and in the economy had for consequence to empower state bureaucrats. In the 1980s-1990s, instability was created by the gradual exclusion of the strongest faction within ABRI (i.e. Red/White faction) from the ruling coalition. Overall, we believe our framework contributes to simplify complex elite's interactions without neglecting central aspects of the country political life.

Figure 7 – Indonesia Timeline



Note: RT = Regime type; ED = Economic development

The two variables participate in clarifying the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion within the ruling coalition. The examination of the degree of extra-legal organized violence enriches our comprehension pertaining to the almost intrinsic animosity that existed between military officers and opposition parties; corroborating our claim that these two dominant social groups are mutually exclusive. Their relation is a zero-sum game. Indeed, as the military influence over politics grew, the relevance of opposition parties as agent of political expression diminished accordingly. It also delineates the position of military officers within the political regime. They were one of the only critical voices of the ruling elites. As such, it implies that they had some form of autonomy over the ruling elites while being members of the ruling coalition. They never intended to rule the country and continued to anchor their actions in relation to the ruling elites in civilian institutions. Finally, given that the degree of extra-legal organized violence was high throughout the period, military officers had therefore incentives to intervene all along and without their consent, the ruling elites were vulnerable. Yet, their positive impact on stability was mostly visible during the hegemonic authoritarian period, which tends to indicate that our framework – especially the degree of extra-legal organized violence since it relates to the type of regime – is one dedicated to patterns of stability in hybrid regimes and not, in its present format, to the study of stability in other types of regimes. The degree of state penetration highlights the crucial role of local leaders during the 1950s in fostering instability as little attempt was made by the ruling elites to incorporate them in the ruling coalition. Over the years, the state invested the economic sphere and state bureaucrats

became an integral part of the ruling alliance; contributing to establish functional links between the center and regions and providing the ruling elites with key support.

The case of Indonesia provides additional insights. First, the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion within the ruling coalition were complex, at least compared to Malaysia. Often, there was superimposition of institutional structures and social group identities intertwined. Indeed, ABRI started as a military organization but many of its members were appointed to the civil administration. ICMI began as a religious organization mostly active within the bureaucracy, but later expanded its tentacles in the military. These overlaps partly explain why there was a growing rivalry between the two, which Suharto envisioned as a way to assert its domination but led instead to an unstable ruling coalition and eventually to its ousted of power. Second, if it was established that small states were outside our population sample because the dynamics prevailing in these countries obey to a different logic, a similar argument appears not to be valid for big states. Indeed, Indonesia has one the largest population among non-western countries and our framework holds regardless.

Senegal

A former French colony, Senegal became fully independent on April 4th 1960. Located on the West coast of the sub-Saharan continent, it has a population of nearly 13 millions of which 43.3% are Wolof, 23.8% are Pular, 14.7% are Serer and 94% are Muslim⁷². Although the system of government has been subject to important modifications overtimes, for the most part of its contemporary history it was a presidential system with a bicameral parliament including a senate and a national assembly.

Over the years, the *Union progressiste sénégalaise* (UPS) – renamed the *Parti socialiste* (PS) in 1976 – dominated the country political landscape until 2000, going through various types of hybrid regimes: a competitive authoritarian regime from 1960 to 1966, a hegemonic authoritarian one from 1967 to 1976 and finally again a competitive authoritarian regime from 1977 to 2010. Léopold Sédar Senghor (1960-1981) and Abdou Diouf (1981-2000) were the chief architects of the ruling party longevity. Nevertheless, the government experienced many political crises and the majority of them were high in intensity. The new millennium marked the election of the long time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade and his *Parti démocratique sénégalais* (PDS) who were, up to 2010, in command of the country's destiny.

Overall, the degree of extra-legal organized violence was low. Although West Africa has witnessed many atrocities over the years, Senegal stands apart. Only in the 1980s with the conflict in the Casamance region did it reach worrying levels. Henceforth, according to our framework, opposition parties and not military officers should be playing a decisive role in political dynamics and the type of hybrid regime should closely correspond to a competitive authoritarian regime. As for the degree of state penetration, it was also low. The state grew in size, but it did not manifest an effective presence in most rural areas; and the multiplicity of

⁷² The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.

parastatal enterprises provided generous salaries for connected notables but contributed little to productive outputs. Conversely, we expect local leaders to have a significant impact on patterns of stability and instability.

5.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1960-2010)

The narrative of political crises that follows shows two general trends⁷³. First, consent of local leaders is the key factor explaining the PS survival over four decades. It is only when they stopped landing in bloc their support that ruling elites were defeated in elections. Political parties were generally confined to urban areas and each battled hard to consolidate their respective constituency. Second, the 1980s was the least stable period; and it was only during that one that a ruling coalition did not include any member of the opposition parties. The first president, Léopold Senghor, had the vision of a unified party (1966-1978) that would absorb all political forces; the second, Abdou Diouf, was in favor of an enlarged presidential majority (EPM) (1991-2000) that would include leaders of opposition parties in the government; and the third, Abdoulaye Wade, invited opposition parties to formally join his Sopi coalition (2000-2010). These were all various forms of political alliances that fall under the ruling coalition appellation.

On September 5th 1960, Senghor was elected and became the first president of the Republic of Senegal. Soon, a conflict broke out between him and Prime Minister Dia over the political and economic orientation of the country. In April 1962, Dia used state emergency powers to muzzle media outlets and assert his control over the country (Hesseling, 1985: 232). Months later, in December 1962, Dia sent a brigade to dissolve the Parliament. Four deputies were arrested then freed by paratroopers on Senghor's order (Hesseling, 1985: 233). In the end, the three main armed forces – the republican guards, gendarmerie and paratroopers – chose to support Senghor in conformity with article 24 of the Constitution (Sy, 2009: 35). Dia and his

⁷³ As a remainder, our definition of a political crisis implies the disruption of government normal activities. The political history of Senegal includes many urban riots and labor strikes that are not covered here. Yet, all these riots and strikes did not necessarily affect the functioning of the government apparatus mostly because of their limited duration. For instance, the general strike of 1999 lasted only two days. It reflects a general consensus among elites about the appropriate way to end a conflict. In other words, it did not involve any manifestation of political elite contestation. Elite's consent of power-holder's decisions remained intact.

loyal ministers were jailed on charge of attempting a *coup d'État*; and more than thirty deputies were expelled from the UPS (Schumacher, 1975: 39).

This was a major constitutional crisis of high intensity. It severely affected the functioning of the government. At the heart of the conflict was first Dia maneuvering to establish a one-party state whereas Senghor was promoting a somewhat softer version: that is, the integration of political parties into the UPS (Hesseling, 1985: 236). Indeed, later on, Senghor's option will prevail. By the end of 1966, the UPS had absorbed the *Parti du regroupement africain* (PRA) and a faction of the *Bloc des masses sénégalaises* (BMS), while other opposition parties or factions who refused to join the ruling party were banned. It was the case for the *Parti africain pour l'indépendance* (PAI), the *Front national sénégalais* (FNS) and the remaining BMS affiliates. Effectively, all political parties except the UPS ceased to exist. Second, Dia pushed for something close to a command Soviet-style economy that would have threaten French as well as local leaders economic interests (O'Brien, 1971: 275; Coulon, 1988: 147). The latter consisted mostly of marabouts⁷⁴, and these were largely under the influence of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, the Mourides, controlling a significant portion of the peanut agricultural output and trading operations. Therefore, in opposing Dia, Senghor sided with the local leaders and chose to co-opt opposition parties willing to join him instead of repressing them all together.

During the period 1967-69, the country found itself in a major turmoil. On February 3rd 1967, Demba Diop, a deputy and mayor of Mbour – a center of the peanut processing industry 80 km south of Dakar, the capital – was assassinated. On March 22, the same year, attending a Muslim annual celebration at the main Dakar mosque, an individual claiming to be a Dia's sympathizer succeeded in putting the President Senghor at gunpoint, but was stopped before he could shoot (Hesseling, 1985: 258). Shortly after, a student boycott at the University of Dakar escalated into a countrywide general strike and troops were sent to repress protesters. Amongst others, bank employees, petroleum and postal workers as well as officials from the rural development agency, the *Office national de coopération et d'assistance au*

⁷⁴ In Senegal, a marabout is a Muslim religious leader.

développement (ONCAD), joined the ranks and marched in the streets of the capital and of several cities (Schumacher, 1975: 23). In rural areas, hard-pressed peasants collectively stopped paying their debt and switched to subsistence farming instead of using their lot for the commercial production of peanuts; it is known in the literature as the infamous “*malaise paysan*” (O’Brien, 1979: 20-31; Casswell, 1984: 47-48). The state of emergency was declared. Public buildings including universities and schools were closed; and public gathering of more than five persons was made illegal (Hesseling, 1985: 262). Politicians were arrested and the French army was called to rescue the national army being detached near the borders (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 36, 38). Protests continued and lasted until 1969. Ultimately, it was the concerted intervention of religious leaders and the implementation of a series of economic reforms that diffused the situation, notably an increase in the price of peanuts and a restructuring of peasants debts (Coulon, 1988: 153, 184; Casswell, 1984: 48).

Obviously, together, this series of crises was high in intensity; it threatened the regime at its core. The state literally stopped functioning, creating chaos all over the country and seriously disrupting government activities. Grievances were numerous⁷⁵ but these events were at the end an accumulation of all of those and a combination of many factors that can be foremost interpret as a crisis of representation. The survival of only one party, the UPS, had left the opposition with only two options: “clandestine political activity or trade union organizations” (Coulon, 1988: 148). They chose the latter and entered into a confrontation with the ruling elites. Indeed, unions were the main vehicles of public discontent, especially the *Union nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal* (UNTS). Facing such defiance, the ruling elites quickly dissolved the UNTS and replaced it by one loyal to the UPS: the *Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal* (CNTS). Furthermore, the unified party ruling coalition formula had left the marabouts anxious about their status within it. As O’Brien (1971: 278) evokes: “the

⁷⁵ Students disliked the French authority over the university administration (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 253). Peasants were displeased with a reduced price paid for peanuts, the main source of individual income; a consequence of the French decision to end their policy of subsidizing the price of peanuts in their former colony and new government regulations (Casswell, 1984: 46). Their discontent was especially acute since the decreasing price of peanuts coincided with an increase in the price of staple foods, especially rice; and others were furious about new tax schemes (Schumacher, 1975: 23). Union workers wanted better labor rights and salaries (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 253). State employees complained about the absence of wage increase since the Independence (O’Brien, 1979: 219).

power of the marabouts, in this new situation, is less clearly defined; politicians no longer have the same urgent need of electoral support”. They were losing their leverage. Once reassured, notably by being given a key role in ONCAD through which they can exert influence, they backed the Government and order was restored in the countryside. The impact of the peasant contestation on the conduct of political affairs in Senegal was a clear signal of the strategic influence of rural constituencies.

In March 1983, eleven opposition parties published a declaration to condemn what they perceived to be fraudulent results of the legislative and executive elections the same year. Four parties contested the electoral results in the Supreme Court (Hesseling, 1985: 297). Deputies of the newly formed PDS and *Rassemblement national démocratique* (RND) even refused to sit in Parliament (Sy, 2009: 159). Few months later, everything was back to normal but opposition parties came back again in protest during the electoral campaign for the 1984 municipal and rural elections and decided to go for a boycott of the elections (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 132).

This crisis was medium in intensity since it involved a boycott of elections and brief suspension of the usual functioning of the Parliament. It happened in a context where the country had enjoyed almost fifteen years of relative political stability. In that interval, two important events should however attract our attention. First, in 1978, Senghor proceeded with a form of contained political liberalization by allowing two opposition parties (PDS and RND) to compete against the PS. In doing so, he installed a three parties system that will last until April 1981. The indirect effect was to dismantle the pre-existing ruling coalition that was regrouping elites of the PRA and BMS under the auspice of a unified party. Second, Senghor voluntarily resigned in 1981 and was replaced by his close associate, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. With him in power, a new generation of bureaucrats entered politics (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 131; Diop & Diouf, 1990: 93; Schumacher, 1975: 83). This shift led to a major difficulty for the Diouf’s Government to obtain support from local leaders. The strong ties the marabouts had with the old political elites were suddenly cut off and the new elites had little connection with the local base (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 91, 316.). Thus, previous patterns of

political alliances were dismantled and instability emerged looming ahead for the next years to come.

In February 1988, after the official results of the legislative elections were announced, social unrest cropped up, mostly in Dakar. The PDS challenged the ruling elites and threaten to publish what it claimed to be “the true results of the elections” (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 136). Diouf declared the state of emergency. Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the PDS, as well as other leaders of the opposition were arrested (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 341). Order was quickly restored but not for very long; an opposition coalition was formed, the *Alliance démocratique sénégalaise* (ADS), and eleven parties signed a document entitled *la plate-forme des onze* to protest against government actions. They called for mass mobilization against the state of emergency. Subsequently, urban riots were reported and manifestations were heavily repressed. The crisis ended in May with the liberation of Wade. Nevertheless, the rumbling discontent remained high during the following years as the boycott of the municipal elections in 1990 testifies.

This crisis was high in intensity as the state of emergency suspended government functions. Opposition grievances were wide-ranging, but *la plate-forme des onze* mostly called for the resignation of Diouf as well as for the cancellation and rescheduling of the last legislative election. In a *volte-face*, Wade agreed to meet with Diouf after his release from prison and in doing so, automatically distanced himself from the opposition coalition. Diouf named Wade as Parliament Opposition Leader and made illegal the formation of a political coalition (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 359). This decision should be understood in a context where Diouf “succeeded in wooing nine of Wade’s PDS parliamentarians to the PS by mid-1986” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 263). It will culminate in 1991 with the formation of a government of national unity, the EPM. It aimed at including leaders of the main opposition parties within a ruling coalition. Overall, the crisis did not spread over in the countryside. The backing of a powerful ally, the general Khalif of the Mourides Abdoul Ahad Mbacké, was no stranger to this situation: just before the 1988 election, the Khalif declared that not voting for Diouf would equate to a betrayal of the founder of the Mourides Brotherhood, the Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (Sy, 2009: 161, 321).

In 1993, the Vice-President of the Constitutional Council, the judge Babacar Sèye, was assassinated 24 hours after the legislative electoral results were revealed. As history repeats itself, social agitation occurred with pictures of burned cars, looting and vandalized properties in Dakar; and once again Wade was arrested (Coulibaly, 2006: 31). At that time, Wade was repeatedly warning magistrates not to associate themselves with the PS or be complaisant about electoral fraud (Coulibaly, 2006: 75-77). He was suspected of conspiracy but it was never proven and he was eventually released from custody. Strangely enough, when Wade was elected president in 2000, he blessed the murderers of Sèye and introduced three years later a law granting amnesty to somehow erase the events from historical records (Sy, 2009: 166). After Sèye was gunned down in 1993, the same year, another crisis emerged when opposition parties rallied in the street to protest against a 15% salary cut and the imprisonment of a religious leader, Moustapha Sy; a popular figure among the urban youth (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2012; Villalon, 1995: 140). The government responded with repression and “three M.P.’s and some 87 others were found guilty on November 12 of participating in an illegal demonstration” (US Department of State, 1994).

These crises were of medium intensity since it involved the assassination or the collective sacking of political elites. It epitomizes a battle between Diouf and Wade in which the power of the latter grew; as a member of the EPM and Minister of State, Wade was getting greater exposure although he did not have any portfolio. Yet, over and above this power struggle, the crisis was mostly reflecting the volatility of the composition of the EPM; Wade himself entered and exited the coalition on few occasions. It resembled more like an *ad hoc* alliance between two individuals than a long-term strategic partnership between political parties. It was also symbolizing the emergence of dissent voices among the Muslim community. Indeed, “Moustapha Sy had become highly critical of the government, launching a scathing personal attack on Diouf just days before the February elections” (Villalon, 1995: 140).

In 2000, Diouf lost the presidential election to Wade by a 17% margin. A year later, the Sopi coalition led by Wade obtained a two-third majority in the legislative elections. It gave citizens hope for a better future and marked the beginning of a significant elite turnover. More than

forty years of PS domination vanished in thin air, with only a remaining 10 seats in Parliament. In fact a wind of change had already started to blow in 1998 when the participation rate reached 38.8% in the legislative elections: signaling a general dissatisfaction with politics. In the 2000 executive and 2001 legislative elections, participation rates came back in a blue sky reaching respectively 60.8% and 67.4%.

The crisis was high in intensity since it involved a major overhaul of the distribution of power within the Senegalese party system. The event was a by-product of three phenomena. First, the fact that Diouf was getting old and did not want to step-out was reducing opportunities for professional advancement and inciting some PS barons to leave the ruling party. In this regard, Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse are prime examples. The former, as government Minister in both the Senghor and Diouf administration, ended up creating his own party in 2000: the *Union pour le renouveau démocratique* (URD). The latter, as Foreign Minister, formed the same year the *Alliance des forces de progrès* (AFP). In 2000, they ran for president against Diouf and Wade. In the second round of the election, “Wade masterfully maneuvered Ka and Niasse into his camp. With their support, Wade won the election and changed Senegal forever” (Galvan, 2001: 55). Second, Wade built a coalition under the leadership of the PDS that included a myriad of minor parties (approximately 40) and together contributed to the PS rout. In doing so, he captured a significant share of the urban vote. Third, after 1988, “the marabouts stopped issuing religious edicts in support of Diouf’s ruling party... the marabouts adopted a stance of political neutrality, neither supporting the ruling party nor mobilizing support for opposition candidates” (Galvan, 2001: 59). In other words, the PS gradually lost his traditional ally. At the same time, Wade claimed his allegiance to the mourides and made public appearance during religious ceremonies in Touba, the epicenter of the Brotherhood; all of this to be pictured as a man of good faith among the rural communities (Sy, 2009: 322).

On March 22nd 2007, twelve opposition parties signed a declaration to protest against what they considered to be a rigged executive electoral process and decided to boycott the legislative elections few months later. The victory of Wade was for them an imposture (Sy, 2009: 215). Chief among them were Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS), Moustapha Niasse (AFP)

and Abdoulaye Bathily (LD/MPT)⁷⁶. Their complaints were many but most off all it was about the lack of transparency of the *Commission électorale nationale autonome* (CENA). As a result, the participation to the 2007 legislative election was a record low at 34.5%.

The crisis was medium in intensity with the boycott of the major opposition parties but did not prevent the ruling elites from governing. In fact, it increased their power since the remaining political parties could not compete with the Sopi coalition. However, this hegemonic position should not be exaggerated: with a low participation rate and without the inclusion of at least one major opposition party in the Sopi coalition and allies in rural areas, the reign of Wade and his PDS appeared to rest on a shaky ground. Indeed, the Sopi coalition looked much more like a relatively loose constellation of notables than a true multiparty coalition.

Senegal has a tradition of compromise, negotiation and coalition building. Repression alone was never the unique mantra of power-holders. As the event-history illustrated, political elites had shown ingenuity in constructing political alliances. All had their weaknesses, which is partly the reason why Senegal has experienced so many high intensity crises. Nevertheless, in the decade when no ruling coalition existed, the country was ripe for major social upheavals. Only the support of the marabouts saved the day.

5.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence

In spite of the prevalence of several conflicts in West Africa, Senegal has been relatively spared of organized forms of social violence. According to our framework, opposition parties and not military officers should therefore act as a counter-weight force to the ruling elites. The event-history analysis confirms it. Still, further precisions about the role of military officers, the appeal each political party has to a given constituency, as well as the type of hybrid regime in which dynamics evolve are essential to understand the specific patterns of political alliances in Senegal.

⁷⁶ LD/MPT stands for *Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail*.

Beside the conflict in Casamance in the early 1980s, the military intervention in July of 1981 after the *coup d'État* in Gambia and the 1989-1991 border conflict with Mauritania, it appears that Senegal was exempted from the curse that so many sub-Saharan countries were victims of: endless civil wars. Despite this blessing as one could say, the three aforementioned events should have incited military officers to intervene in politics after 1980. Indeed, Gambia being surrounded by Senegal, instability could have easily spread over in Senegal. This was the logic behind the Senegalese Government decision to send troops to overturn the coup plotter (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 94). Also, the Jola separatism movement in the Casamance region - the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) - was challenging the integrity of the state and as such, it dealt with the corporate interests of military officers. In this regard, the Senegalese Government intervened in Guinea-Bissau to overthrow the leader of the July 1998 *coup d'État*, General Ansumane Mane, “believed to be a supporter of Casamance rebels” (Institute for Security Studies, 2012). More than 5,000 people were killed over a period of 20 years in the Casamance conflict (Center of Systemic Peace, 2012). As for the border war with Mauritania, it originated as a dispute over grazing rights but escalated and spread over to Senegalese towns where many Mauritanian local merchants were systematically victims of harassment, looting and so on. They eventually fled the country causing a significant refugees crisis. In addition, high level of post-electoral violence was a constant feature in Senegal. Almost all elections were followed by urban riots after results were announced and the police capacity was so limited that it could not restore by itself order (Diop, 1992: 17). Thus, there is a puzzle here: despite these incentives to intervene in politics, why did the military stay in the barracks?

Many elements need to be considered here. First, post-electoral violence was largely uncoordinated, spontaneous, short-lived and concentrated in the capital. Second, Casamance is a relatively isolated region; at least from the center of power, Dakar. The two are separated by Gambia. Third, Senegal gained independence without taking up the arms. In other words, the armed forces had no opportunities to enter politics from the beginning and civil institutions were well established by the 1980s. Fourth, the armed forces were mainly deployed in the periphery close to international borders (O'Brien, 1979: 209; Hesselings, 1985: 378). Fifth, the military was not a potent force; at least compared to the French armed forces who were

protecting the government and the capital. And finally, sixth, the Senegalese army was trained and educated by French military personnel; as such it had some form of ascendancy over the coercive apparatus of his former colony (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 99-100). For all these reasons, it is not surprising that Senegalese military officers did not become a major actor in the country political dynamics in spite of the events of the 1980s. As Coulon (1988: 167) concludes: “the government has sometimes turned to the army for help (in Gambia and in Casamance), but in the last analysis, it does not owe its survival to military intervention. There is in Senegal today a tradition of nonintervention by the army in political life”. Now that we have cleared out this analytical ambiguity, we will expand our reflection on coalition building by examining the very large panoramic landscape of political parties in Senegal.

5.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies

Thanks to previous experiences with competitive elections that dated back to colonial time, political pluralism was alive and well in place in Senegal during the first years of Independence. But step by step, Senghor was going to incorporate all major forces within the UPS: “Eight out of twenty-one political organizations formed between 1948 and 1966 (or 38 percent) joined with Senghor’s party” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 247). Those that refused to join or were advocating anti-systemic discourse were banned. In this regard, the PAI was the first victim of such policy. It was outlawed in 1960 based on allegations of violent political actions. The party was perceived as too radical in advocating a labor revolution.

The first main target of cooptation was the BMS. Senghor offered government positions and seats in Parliament. Some BMS members accepted, while others declined. In October 1963, the party was outlawed. Created by the Cheick Anta Diop, a staunch defender of freedom of expression and an imminent scholar, the BMS positioned itself like the UPS “under the banner of African nationalism and was favored by some marabouts of the powerful Muslim brotherhood, the mourides” (Coulon, 1988: 148). It was therefore representing a direct threat to the UPS. The Cheick Anta Diop formed another party shortly after, the FNS, but such deviance from the main political path was never tolerated by the ruling elites and it was dissolved a year later.

However, the key merger was the inclusion of the PRA, the main legal opposition party at that time. In fact, the row between Dia and Senghor was partly due to the unwillingness of the former to make concession to PRA members in order to join the Government. For Senghor, a master of political alliance, the risk was worthy. The PRA was rooted in Casamance, a region that from Independence Day felt somewhat alien to the center of power and the islamo-Wolof tradition of the country⁷⁷. Because Casamance was the home of the distinct Jola ethnic group, of which many members were not Muslims, Senghor knew he had to incorporate them in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict. And history proved Senghor was right: “with the end of the unified party the conflict in Casamance broke out” (Coulon, 1988: 165). Ultimately, in June 1966, PRA officials conceded in exchange of positions in ministries and UPS (Hesseling, 1985: 256). It was the last official opposition party to exist and it marked the fulfillment of Senghor’s vision of a ruling coalition: that is to say a unified party.

In both cases (BMS and PRA), opposition parties had a constituency. According to Hayward & Grovogui (1987: 247), “it was important to demonstrate a following, and the official results notwithstanding, it was clear that Senghor and other leaders of the UPS felt that the PRA-Sénégal had done so. Abdoulaye Ly [PRA] went on to discuss the post-election merger with the UPS saying [...] ... It was only when we were very strong that we joined with the UPS”. Although for opposition parties, life outside the UPS was increasingly difficult, repression alone could never achieve the same results than coalition building. There was a compromise or an exchange: “access to state power and resources was available for elites who demonstrated mass support and a willingness to cooperate” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 248). Of course, UPS being a party of notables, the inclusion of BMS and PRA was personalistic in nature; Senghor was co-opting the individuals more than opposition parties themselves. Yet, the UPS later transformed itself and absorbed more organized political forces such as labor unions that were representing the traditional partisan base of the ruling party (Sy, 2009: 227). Also, in order to foster cohesion, the President took the decision of creating several organizations such

⁷⁷ The Wolof is the dominant ethnic group in Senegal. They are concentrated in cities working as civil servants or traders, and in rural areas where the peanut production is located. They are also leaders of the Muslim organizations. Other major ethnic groups are the Fula, Serer, and Jola. However, ethnic exclusion was never a fact of life in Senegal. Non-Wolof ethnic groups could access state institutions (Coulon, 1988: 163).

as the *Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes*, *Club nation et développement* and *L'École des cadres du parti* (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 41-42).

In 1978, with the introduction of the law of the three parties, the alliance under Senghor's unified party somewhat vanished. In the 1980s, a process of reconstruction of the ruling coalition was undertaken coinciding with the most turbulent decade in Senegalese political history. Indeed, such reconstruction will not materialize until 1991, when Diouf put into motion a government of national unity – that is to say an EPM – as a reaction to the social upheaval that had cumulated in the 1988 state of emergency. Briefly, the three parties law was dividing the ideological spectrum in three niches: (1) liberal and democratic (center-right); (2) socialist and democratic (center); (3) Marxist or communist (center-left) (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 255). And only one party could occupy each one. Obviously, the PS could choose first where it wanted to stand and it comes as no surprise that the ruling elites positioned themselves in the center, “giving one access to the largest number of voters with similar ideological affinities” (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 255). The newly formed PDS led by former lawyer Wade filled the liberal and democratic space whereas the (re) born PAI captured the Marxist slot. The partisan base of both opposition parties was in urban areas (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 260), but the PAI was largely overshadowed by the PDS in terms of number of sympathizers (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 124). It was a party system of contained pluralism. In this regard, “the exclusion of Cheikh Anta's popular RND” is significant (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 264). The end of the unified party and the inception of the three parties system was the result of a deteriorating economic situation that was diminishing resources available for cooptation; especially considering “the growing number, size, and diversity of opposition groups that started with the creation of the PDS in 1974” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 241). Hence, this conjecture reveals that a long-lasting coalition is about selective cooptation. Otherwise, risk of implosion increases, especially when resources dry out.

Interesting enough, Diouf's EPM coalition strategy was precisely a response to a lack of resources, especially with the introduction of the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) starting at the end of the 1970s. Opposition parties gave their consent to the ruling elites in exchange of greater representation in governing bodies. In other words, coalition building

became a strategy in a context of acute economic constraints: “their inclusion has given leaders of the opposition greater voice in the PS government” (Beck, 1999: 198). For instance, the leader of the main opposition party, Wade, decided to join Diouf’s EPM. According to Beck (1999: 201-203), the rationale was prospective in nature: he wanted to present himself as a credible and capable future incumbent. Similarly, leaders of the LD-MPT “accepted the posts of minister of the environment and deputy minister of literacy, with the hope that the party could demonstrate its capacity for political management and reform in these policy areas” (Beck, 1999: 203-204). For opposition parties with a vocal pro-democratic rhetoric, such alliance was risky; it could alienate their traditional base. Case in point, “in July 1993, the state radio acknowledged that newly elected deputies from several small opposition parties had revealed a secret pact formed between the PS and the PDS in 1991 to double the salaries of the deputies.... This pact thus indicated that negotiating their entry into the EPM had diverted opposition parties from the task of keeping the government honest” (Beck, 1999: 209-210). It demonstrates the opportunistic behavior of so-called democrats calling for a regime change. Furthermore, on the socio-economic front, their respective programmatic platform was not so different (Coulon, 1988: 168). Hence, the inclusion of the PDS did not bring additional votes in reaching out to a captive constituency inaccessible to the PS. Especially if one considers that the EPM was largely a post-electoral coalition. It was not the emergence of an institution but only the symbol of momentarily elite accommodation: a tentative to gather support to diffuse an immediate crisis. That being said, Diouf attempted to consolidate various factions notably in creating the *Groupe de rencontre et d'échanges pour un Sénégal nouveau* (GRESEN) and the *Comité de soutien à l'action du président Abdou Diouf* (COSAPAD) (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 146).

In forming his Sopi coalition, Wade appeared to repeat the same mistake his predecessors had made. Indeed, the Sopi coalition rounded up over 40 parties, mostly those who had decided not to join Diouf’s EPM. Each party was in fact the personal political vehicle of a given representative with no real organization beyond a very limited geographical area (Beck, 1999: 204). Hence, the coalition was less one of an alliance between political parties and more one between the PDS and various notables. If it is true that the ability of Wade to convince the two other main opposition figures, Djibo Leyti Kä (URD) and Ousmane Tanor Dieng (AFP), to

support him in the second round of the 2000 presidential election was determinant in the outcome, the support of Kā and Dieng was nevertheless an *ad hoc* tactical decision. It was not part of a larger strategic partnership.

Overall, coalition-building strategies were eventually an integral part of all heads of state way of governing in Senegal. It contributed to explain why some periods were more stable than others. However, given the nature of the coalition, it was subject to volatility and therefore increased the probability of high intensity crisis to reoccur. The institutional integration of one of the main opposition parties within the ruling coalition never really occurred in its ideal form in Senegal. Cooptation mechanisms operated on a personalistic basis rather than on an organizational one. Ultimately, we argue, the significance of these observations should be understood within the larger context of types of hybrid regimes. This is precisely what comes next.

5.2.2. Types of Regimes

The Senegalese political regime went through many different phases. It is our contention that patterns of political alliances should be put into relation with these regime transformations. According to our criteria, we classify Senegal as a competitive authoritarian regime from 1960 to 1966, a hegemonic authoritarian regime from 1967 to 1976, and again a competitive authoritarian regime from 1977 to 2010. Freedom House identifies the Senegalese regime has not free (autocratic) from 1972 to 1974, partly free (hybrid) from 1975 to 2001, free (democratic) from 2002 to 2008, than partly free (hybrid) again during 2009 and 2010. Freedom House evaluates the Senegalese regime has not free (1972-1976) mostly because of the absence of opposition parties; and free (2002-2008) because of the peaceful alternation of power. Below, we will develop our interpretation of the nature of the political regime in Senegal based on the criteria that were articulated in Chapter One and formulated by Diamond and colleagues.

Competitive Authoritarian Regime (1960-1966)

The first key-moment following the declaration by Senegal of its Independence was the adoption of the 1960 Constitution that was including guarantees for a number of rights and liberties to individuals and organizations: above all, the conduct of direct and competitive elections with universal suffrage for both executive and legislative bodies. The president was to be elected every seven years and the members of the national assembly every five years. Many opposition parties could exist and were free to campaign and organize meeting. As Hayward & Grovogui (1987: 246) wrote: “what is striking... about the 1963 national elections is the seriousness with which the opposition approached them. Their extensive involvement in these elections is a clear indication of the general belief in the efficacy of the electoral process”. In brief, the Senegalese regime had the trademark of an electoral democracy from the start.

This trademark was not however free of some significant flaws. Indeed, starting in 1963, Senghor will proceed with constitutional revisions that will alter the labeling of the regime. First, after the Dia’s affair, the President brought under his authority legislative powers (Hesseling, 1985: 243). Second, in 1964, a new law was introduced making it mandatory for all parties to register to the Ministry of Interior (Coulon, 1988: 148). And it was PS officials who were heading this ministry. Third, the country became a single district and only parties who were presenting a candidate for each seat could compete in elections. *De facto*, it basically created a one-party system, since with the list winning the most votes, all members on that list would be automatically attributed a seat in the National Assembly (Coulon, 1988: 148). Finally, in May 1965, the Assembly approved a new law that was restricting the freedom of associations. It conferred to the government the right to outlaw by decree organizations suspected of sedition (Hesseling, 1985: 255). In sum, the poor performance of the *Union démocratique sénégalaise* (UDS) in the 1963 election reflects the pervasive effect of the UPS use of state resources for partisan ends: the former could simply not match the latter, even if freedom of expression was respected. Especially if one considers how electoral results were falsified with impunity (O’Brien, 1967: 562). As for other opposition parties, they were lacking any real organizational capacity, being for the most part ephemeral entities and empty

shells. In other words, competition was unfair; reality check had transformed the trademark into a competitive authoritarian regime.

Senghor's strategy to co-opt opposition parties (PRA and some factions of the BMS) was of course coherent with that type of hybrid regime in place at that time. That being said, he pushed the logic to the extreme by eventually either incorporating or banning all existing parties. The bottom line is that by making the PS the sole party, Senghor transformed this type of regime into a hegemonic authoritarian one only six years after independence.

Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime (1967-1976)

When the PRA decided to integrate the PS in 1966, no legal opposition was active. Although the PS was allowing some form of political pluralism within his ranks – that is the capacity to express and defend divergent opinions – competitive elections was a thing of the past. Furthermore, in 1967, Senghor introduced additional constitutional reforms that were attributing even greater powers to the president. Notably, he could dissolve the Assembly and decide on the timing of elections (Hesseling, 1985: 259).

That being said, we could not call the regime autocratic for the following reasons. First, “freedom of speech in Senegal was never throttled. Social and political life in the country was constantly enlivened by debates on issues, by the voicing of opposition, and by the confrontation of clans and of ideas” (Coulon, 1988: 146). The presence of ten members of the PRA and two members of the BMS on the official list for the 1973 legislative election supports this claim (Hesseling, 1985: 261-262). Second, elections were nevertheless regularly held without violence as the 1968 and 1973 executive and legislative elections suggest (Hesseling, 1985: 261). Third, in 1970, Senghor reduced the number of terms a president could serve to one and submitted the change to a popular referendum; as well, he reinstated the position of prime minister. Finally, “as Senghor liked to note, opposition parties were not outlawed” altogether (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 249). The creation of the PDS in 1974 tends to confirm such assertion, albeit it was the only one to whom such privilege was granted.

In such a context, we would expect first that the degree of extra-legal organized violence would be high and second that military should have played a bigger role in politics. In the first case, we must admit, it looks very much like an anomaly: a hegemonic authoritarian regime prevailed when the degree of extra-legal organized violence was low. There was probably a diffusion effect at play here. Indeed, many regimes in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s-1970s were one-party states. Almost everywhere, the ruling elites used the same rhetoric: now that the former colonial master is gone, to prevent disintegration political centralization was in order. In the second case, as it was detailed previously, military officers in Senegal were in practice a proxy of the French establishment who supported the Senghor regime. And French military officers could not invest Senegalese politics without causing massive discontent among the population and fueling anti-imperialism sentiments. Therefore, our framework provides mixed interpretations during this period.

Table VIII – Electoral Results in Senegal (Legislative and Executive)

Year	Political Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
1959	Union progressiste sngalaise (UPS)	682,365	83	n.a.	n.a.
	Parti de la solidarit sngalaise (PSS)	99,332	12.1	n.a.	n.a.
	Parti du regroupement africain (PRA-Sngal)	40,270	4.9	n.a.	n.a.
	Total	821,967	100	n.a.	n.a.
	Participation Rate (74.5%)				
1963	UPS	1,132,518	94.2	80	100
	Union dmocratique sngalaise (UDS)	69,776	5.8	0	0
	Total	1,202,294	100	80	100
	Participation Rate (89.9%)				
1968	UPS	1,209,984	100	80	100
	Participation Rate (93%)				
1973	UPS	1,355,306	100	100	100
	Participation Rate (96.9%)				
1978	Parti Socialsite (PS)	790,799	81.7	83	83
	Parti dmocratique sngalais (PDS)	172,948	17.9	17	17
	Parti africain de l'indpendance (PAI)	3,734	0.4	0	0
	Total	967,481	100	100	100
	Participation Rate (62%)				
1983	PS	862,713	79.9	111	92.5
	PDS	150,785	14.0	8	6.7
	Rassemblement national dmocratique (RND)	29,271	2.7	1	0.8
	Others	36,401	3.3	0	0
	Total	1,079,170	99.9	120	100
Participation Rate (56.2%)					

1988	PS	794,559	71	103	85.8
	PDS	275,552	24.6	17	14.2
	Others	43,633	3.9	0	0
	Total	1,113,744	99.5	120	100
	Participation Rate (57.9%)				
1993	PS	602,171	56.6	84	56.2
	PDS	321,585	30.2	27	30.5
	RND	52,189	4.9	3	5.0
	Ligue dmocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD/MPT)	43,950	4.1	3	4.2
	Parti de l'indpendance et du travail (PIT)	32,348	3.0	2	3.1
	Union dmocratique sngalaise/Rnovation (UDS-R)	12,339	1.2	1	1.2
	Total	1,064,582	100	120	100
	Participation Rate (41%)				
1998	PS	612,559	50.2	93	66.4
	PDS	233,287	19.1	23	16.4
	Union pour le renouveau dmocratique (URD)	161,320	13.2	11	7.9
	And-J'f/Parti africain pour la dmocratie et le socialisme (AJ/PADS)	60,673	5	4	2.9
	LD/MPT	48,097	3.9	3	2.1
	Others	104,493	8.6	6	4.2
	Total	1,220,429	100	140	99.9
	Participation Rate (38.8%)				
2001	Coalition Sopi	931,617	52.3	89	74.2
	PS	326,126	18.3	10	8.3
	Alliance des forces du progrs (AFP)	303,150	17	11	9.2
	AJ/PADS	76,102	4.3	2	1.7
	URD	69,109	3.9	3	2.5
	Others	73,552	4.2	5	4.1
	Total	1,779,656	100	120	100
	Participation Rate (67.4%)				
2007	Coalition Sopi	1,190,609	69.2	131	87.3
	Coalition Takku Defarat Sngal	86,621	5.04	3	2
	Coalition And Defar Sngal	84,988	4.94	3	2
	Coalition Waar-Wi	74,919	4.35	3	2
	Rassemblement pour le peuple	73,083	4.25	2	1.3
	Front pour le socialisme et la dmocratie/Benno Jub'l	37,428	2.18	1	0.7
	Alliance pour le progrs et la justice/J'f J'l	33,297	1.94	1	0.7
	Convergence pour le renouveau et la citoyennet	30,658	1.78	1	0.7
	Parti socialiste authentique (PSA)	26,320	1.53	1	0.7
	Others	82,394	4.8	4	2.7
	Total	1,720,317	100	150	100
	Participation Rate (34.7%)				

Data Source: African Elections Database; Bendel (1999)

Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category.

Year	Candidate	Votes	%
1963	Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) Participation Rate (56.7%)	1,149,935	100
1968	Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) Participation Rate (94.7%)	1,229,927	100
1973	Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) Participation Rate (97%)	1,357,056	100
1978	Lopold Sdar Senghor (PS)	807,515	82.02
1st round	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	174,817	17.38
	Total	982,332	99.4
	Participation Rate (63.5%)		
1983	Abdou Diouf (PS)	908,879	83.45
1st round	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	161,067	14.79
	Total	1,069,946	98.24
	Participation Rate (56.2%)		
1988	Abdou Diouf (PS)	828,301	73.2
1st round	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	291,869	25.8
	Others	11,298	1.1
	Total	1,131,468	100.1
	Participation Rate (58.8%)		
1993	Abdou Diouf (PS)	757,311	58.4
1st round	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	415,295	32.0
	Landing Savan (AJ/PADS)	37,787	2.9
	Abdoulaye Bathily (LD/MPT)	31,279	2.4
	Others	54,983	4.2
	Total	1,296,655	100.0
	Participation Rate (51.5%)		
2000	Abdou Diouf (PS)	687,969	41.5
2nd round	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	969,332	58.5
	Total	1,657,301	100.0
	Participation Rate (60.8%)		
2007	Abdoulaye Wade (Sopi)	1,914,403	55.9
1st round	Idrissa Seck	510,922	14.9
	Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS)	464,287	13.6
	Total	2,889,612	84.4
	Participation Rate (70.6%)		

Data Source: African Elections Database; Bendel (1999)

Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others"

Competitive Authoritarian Regime (1976 to the present)

With the 1976 constitutional revision and the instauration of the three parties system, opposition parties were back in the game. And with the introduction of the proportional system, they had a legitimate chance of winning a seat in the National Assembly. Of course, the limited number of parties allowed to compete in elections and the predetermined

programmatic platform imposed by the ruling elites on opposition parties were leaning toward an hegemonic authoritarian regime; especially if we had the level of electoral fraud that was suspected to be endemic, at least according to the opposition parties. Still, other parties were allowed to exist even if they could not compete. In this regard, the RND was far from being a marginal player. For instance, its call to boycott the 1978 legislative elections was heard as numerous voters stayed home (Hesseling, 1985: 279). But all existing opposition parties competed in the 1978 legislative elections.

Later on, Senegal experienced a democratic revival with the inception of roughly 10 parties in 1981 – 15 in 1983 – and the creation of the Electoral Commission to supervise elections. In the 1990s, opposition parties could channel their grievances through political institutions instead of using street politics (Foucher, 2007: 123; Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 134; Beck, 1999: 200). Regardless of these openings, the reality remained unchanged. The competition was unfair. The PS benefited from a decisive advantage. For instance, polling station presidents were mostly PS affiliates, who often helped analphabet voters – they were many in some regions and they knew personally PS members – to read the list (Hesseling, 1985: 281-282). Also, “the Supreme Court ruled... that identity cards were not required of those voting, opening the door to multiple voting. The secret ballot was optional and was rarely used in fact” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 258). Hence, the conduct of elections was subject to a number of irregularities. The Electoral Commission was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior therefore not an autonomous organization. Also, diversity of media outlets in Senegal was basically non-existent. Only a few newspapers, radio stations and television channels were operating and all were controlled by the state (Hesseling, 1985: 329, 341). Consequently, the opposition party positive visibility in media was marginal (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 313).

With the peaceful alternation of power in 2000, after 40 years of PS domination, some observers interpreted the event as an indelible sign of a genuine democratic transition⁷⁸. We are skeptic of such enthusiasm. First, Wade’s behavior prior to the 2000 elections showed that

⁷⁸ For instance, Freedom House classified Senegal in 2002 as a democratic regime until 2008.

he was more of an opportunist than a genuine democrat. According to Mbow (2008: 159, 164), “Wade is becoming a veritable caricature of Senghorism”, using state resources to tilt the electoral balance in its favor. Furthermore, once in power he actually increased the centralization of power in the hand of the president. For instance, “Wade and his *Parti démocratique sénégalais* (PDS) have maintained a constitutional article that provides for the arrest of individuals who criticize the president, and they have used it against opponents” including journalists (Jourde, 2008: 79). On top of that, Wade introduced a ban on opposition march. Hence, freedom of expression was significantly constrained. Thomas & Sissokho (2005: 114) report: “nothing has changed. If anything, it has got worse”. In the end, the 2007 elections revealed the true nature of the Wade’s Government. As Mbow asserts (2008: 156), “despite the promise of democracy in 2000, Senegal today has declined to the point of mere electoral authoritarianism”.

At first glance, the fact that the conflict in Casamance during the 1980s did not coincide with a hegemonic authoritarian regime deviates from our framework. Yet, the characteristics of the conflict prevent us from attributing a high degree of extra-legal organized violence over the period. Indeed, the conflict was geographically concentrated in a remote area. Thus, it should not be interpreted as incoherent to our framework. The fact that the least stable period of the country young political history happen when no formal ruling coalition including opposition parties existed is in line with our explanation of political dynamics. Later on, coalition-building strategies and type of hybrid regime match, as the EMP (Diouf) and the Sopi coalition (Wade) are coherent with a competitive authoritarian context.

To close this section and making a link with the next, all along, the domination of the PS could have been attributed to its ruling elites’ skillful manipulation of political alliances and most importantly the inability of the opposition parties to find support in rural areas where most Senegalese were living. “It was a victim of its urbanity and its petit bourgeois and intellectual associations” (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 119). As such, the PS was in a position to proceed with political reforms precisely because the rural population was cut-off from party politics; hence could assert its domination through local leader intermediaries (Diop, 1992: 19). It is only

when the PS lost the support of local leaders that the balance of power shifted in favor of the opposition. We will develop below a rationale as to why it is so.

5.3. The Degree of State Penetration

From the perspective of state penetration, Senegal is an underdeveloped country: there is no case of mistaken identity. The state has little presence in the countryside and economic activities are highly concentrated in the agricultural sector, with cultivation of peanuts leading the stock. Not only is the country more or so dependant on a single crop, but also regardless of numerous attempts to assert his ascendancy, the state has relinquished its authority in that matter to the powerful local leaders, the marabouts. The prosperity of the country therefore rests very much in their hands and rural inhabitants owe them their survival and even their salute given that many belong to the Mouride Brotherhood. In other words, they have captive constituencies, which is reinforced by ethnic identity since most are of Wolof descent. And considering Senghor was a Catholic belonging to the Serer ethnic group, he understood too well the necessity of forging a political alliance. That being said, the state expansion during the first two decades after independence have been marked by the increase presence of state bureaucrats in the government apparatus in the 1980s. This shift has proved to be somewhat confrontational. A close look at the degree of state penetration will provide an answer as to why they found their way as ruling elites and why local leaders nevertheless remained the dominant social group.

5.3.1. The Administrative Extension

Throughout the period, the presence of the Senegalese administration has been reduced to the capital and few urban centers. Agglomerations have been concentrated in coastal regions, while in the rest of the country the population was dispersed over an inhospitable territory. Located in the Sahel region, the northeastern part of the country has been suffering from an increase desertification and a deterioration of arable land for decades. Population density has been relatively low and communication networks were sub-standards. For instance, only 27% of all roads were paved in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 2012). Hence, many regions

located at the periphery are cut-off from the center, which obviously has been a serious strain on the establishment of a modern civil administration (Hesseling, 1985: 57). In fact, it was religious leaders who acted as channels of communication between the center and the periphery in the countryside (Coulon, 1988: 168). Furthermore, in rural areas the only tangible state activity has been tax collection, but in many cases it was the local leader who had the responsibility to accomplish such task (Balans et al., 1975: 165). Data on this issue are fairly recent, but as an indication, the government tax revenues represented only 14% of GDP in 1998 (World Development Indicators, 2012). Given that the tax administration is often a key indicator of state penetration over the territory⁷⁹, it tends to show its general absence from rural areas. The bottom line is that there was a political power vacuum outside the capital and major cities and in these areas the only legitimacy that the ruling elites could have had was through the local leaders.

Even in urban areas, the situation was qualitatively not much better. The bureaucracy was overstaffed, filled with individuals with low professional qualifications, badly organized and corrupt (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 60). For example, the state bureaucracy increased sixfold in the first decade since Independence (O'Brien, 1979: 213). During that period, the ONCAD was overstaffed by at least a quarter; and these employees were in many cases deemed incompetent (Casswell, 1984: 65). As a result of the state expansion, the public administration was one of the main employers and an avenue of social mobility. Yet, as a COGERAF⁸⁰ report concluded: “the allocation of administrative responsibilities and lines of authority within most departments remained vague; work procedures and methods were surrounded by uncertainty; the supervision of administrative personnel at all levels was highly ineffective” (Schumacher, 1975: 101). According to Bayart (2009: 78), “in Senegal between 1966 and 1980, embezzlement and fraud within the *Office national de coopération et d'assistance au développement* (ONCAD) were thought to amount to as much as 5-10 per cent of the total revenue of producers, representing tens of billions of CFA francs”. In such disarray, no doubt, the bureaucracy was ineffective. And it is only through these lenses that the impact of economic extension can be interpreted.


⁷⁹ See Herbst (2000: 131); Tilly (1985).

⁸⁰ *Compagnie générale d'Études et recherches pour l'Afrique* (COGERAF).

5.3.2. The Economic Extension

During the colonial era, groundnuts represented the main economic activity in Senegal. With 80% of exports and 87% of labor force, the country was a mono-crop producer (CIA World Factbook, 2012). In the first decades after independence, the ruling elites in an effort to move out from a state of underdevelopment created a multitude of state companies and introduced a range of regulatory schemes to control economic flows. For instance, “between 1970 and 1975 approximately seventy-five state companies were created” (Coulon, 1988: 166). Some sectors such as the phosphate and petrochemical industries were showing promises, but not enough to outweigh the atrophied agricultural sector that remained the backbone of Senegalese economy (Coulon, 1988: 169).

Figure 8 – Natural Resources Rent in Senegal



Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

Above all, agricultural surplus were dilapidated in unproductive state programs instead of being injected to modernize the economy (Coulon, 1988: 169). Furthermore, the income generated by the peanut industry served to buy social peace in urban areas by subsidizing price of staple foods such as rice as well as salaries of civil servants (Bayart, 2009: 63). Otherwise, profit from the peanut industry was not only invested in state industrial projects that proved to be mere sand castles to use an analogy, but large sums were also diverted to non-productive

assets or transfer in foreign portfolio (Casswell, 1984: 73). In the end, there was little reinvestment in the peanut industry, which over the years experienced declining productivity (Casswell, 1984: 45).

Table IX – Senegalese State Investment in the Economy

	General Gov't Consumption (% of Total Consumption)	Gov't Enterprises and Investment (% of Gross Investment)
1970	14.95	32.1
1975	15.46	19.8
1980	19.34	32.2
1985	16.31	18.2
1990	16.13	22.6
1995	13.90	21.5
2000	11.70	20.1
2005	11.2	33.6
2009	9.5	36.2

Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012

From the very beginning of the country independence, the ruling elites designed many economic plans that were focusing mostly on the agricultural sector. Yet, it was lacking a long-term development strategy. Indeed, the process of industrialization was never fully integrated to produce tangible benefits and positive externalities. In many cases, there were discrepancies between public declarations, actual programs and their implementation (Balans et al., 1975: 169). Such a state of affairs was visible in the volatility of state investment, especially between 1970 and 1990. Ultimately, the ruling elites appear to have devolved the economic future of their country to the hazard of rainfalls and world price (Mbodj, 1992: 110).

The first plan (1961-1965) marked the beginning of the active participation of the state in the economy, especially with the creation of cooperatives in rural areas. The process of nationalization was led by the *Office de Commercialisation Agricole* (OCA), the *Banque Sénégalaise de Développement* (BSD) and the *Centres régionaux d'assistance au développement* (CRAD) (Mbodj, 1992: 99; Casswell, 1984: 42). The second plan (1965-1969)

and third plan (1969-1973) focused almost exclusively on the peanut industry with centralization of all related activities in the ONCAD and, in the third plan, a new policy to attract foreign investments was introduced and reinforced in the fourth (1973-1977) and fifth (1977-1981) plans. For instance, in 1976, a free-trade zone was implemented in Dakar (Hesseling, 1985: 69). That being said, in 1975-76, state intervention increased with the creation of two new parastatal enterprises: the *Société nationale de commercialisation des oléagineux du Sénégal* (SONACOS) and *Société nationale d'approvisionnement du monde rural* (SONAR). The plans were also aiming at the reduction of food imports such as rice, millet, corn and sugar (Hesseling, 1985: 66). In addition, ruling elites pushed for the development of a chemical industry oriented toward the transformation of phosphate, which is used as a fertilizer in the agricultural production (Hesseling, 1985: 69). This strategy was abruptly cancelled out by the severe drought in 1977 and 1978 that killed the annual peanut harvest and the decline of the price of phosphate on world market (Boye, 1992: 56). In 1980, the ONCAD was closed down. The move was “designed to appease the peasants, who had become discouraged by unwieldy and ineffective production and marketing structures that were more useful in serving personal and political aims than those of development” (Coulon, 1988: 155). As part of the new agricultural policy, the end of ONCAD and other decentralization policies aimed at empowering rural inhabitants, mostly big rural producers, and reducing the influence of urban groups (Mbodj, 1992: 121). The IMF SAP has left its imprint on the sixth plan (1981-1985) and subsequent ones until today. Significant budget cuts, a reduction of the public administration, liberalization of prices have been the hallmark (Hesseling, 1985: 62; Coulon, 1988: 166). Yet, the implementation was only partial. For example, in order to neutralize Wade’s populist and nationalist rhetoric, Diouf proposed to reduce the price of staple foods against the IMF recommendation (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 355). Furthermore, individuals in urban areas remained “economically reliant upon representatives of the state as their political patrons, who provide access to food aid, development projects, and employment in the dominant public sector” (Beck, 1999: 213).

All along, the state maintained a tight leash on labor unions, especially after the events of May 1968. Indeed, during the first decade, and reacting to the process of unification under the umbrella of the UPS, they were the spearhead of civil society and the main driver of social

mobilization (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 122). As a consequence, the *Union nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal* (UNTS) was disbanded in August 1969, the *Union des étudiants de Dakar* (UED) and the *Union démocratique des étudiants sénégalais* (UDES) in February 1971 and the *Syndicat des enseignants du Sénégal* (SES) in March 1973 (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 207). They will be replaced by the *Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal* (CNTS), who supported the PS (Coulon, 1988: 148). In exchange of their allegiance, few members of the CNTS were nominated to PS and government positions (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 234). From now on, the PS will look more and more like a corporatist organization, at least as far as labor unions are concerned⁸¹.

Table X – Senegal Socio-Economic Modernization

Indicator Name	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Urban population (% of total)	23.00	30.00	35.80	39.00	40.60	42.90
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	311.10	274.70	200.20	138.60	118.80	75.20
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	n.a.	n.a.	42.65	54.84	68.17	83.73 ^a
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	n.a.	n.a.	20.08	19.93	19.14	16.71
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	n.a.	n.a.	13.50	15.26	14.65	12.77
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	n.a.	n.a.	20.07	22.18	23.23	22.15

a: year 2009

Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

In regard to the private bourgeoisie, it was for quite a while almost inexistent in Senegal at least in the formal sector. “The class of Senegalese merchants and manufacturers is still relatively small compared to the powerful foreign interests in the country... [and] very dependent on the state” (Coulon, 1988: 162). Foreigners were monopolizing most of the lucrative sectors of the economy (Hesseling, 1985: 59). As for the upper class, it was composed of high-ranking civil servants (Hesseling, 1985: 82-83). It explains the ascendancy of powerful individuals such as Diouf and his right arm Jean Collin who were career bureaucrats. Yet, both had a weak authority over economic actors. Jean Collin was mostly involved in the security apparatus (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 107-108), while Diouf who was the

⁸¹ By the mid-1990, the CNTS gradually took its distance from the PS and allied with unions affiliated to opposition parties. It formed a coalition called the *Intersyndicale*. However, the coalition proved to be dysfunctional. CNTS was working toward a consensual formula whereas other members, notably the Members of *Union nationale des syndicats autonomes du Sénégal* (UNSAS) were more militants and disapproved the conciliatory tone of the CNTS (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2012).

main architect of nationalization of the peanut commercial networks lost his edge when he dissolved the ONCAD; a bargaining tool in the relationship between local leaders and the ruling elites (Coulon, 1988: 167). It was the price to pay for local leaders' support; especially in a context where the President proceeded in the 1980s to a significant centralization of power by excluding long-time political PS barons who had ties amongst others with local leaders, and by replacing them by docile state bureaucrats. These bureaucrats were disconnected from all constituencies (Coulon, 1988: 159). Thus, according to Coulon (1988: 162), "the most successful businessmen are merchants belonging to the mouride brotherhood" "They are in effect the only really large-scale landowners in Senegal" (O'Brien, 1971: 202). They were in control of the peanut industry. They were the local leaders.

Even during the heyday of the ONCAD, marabouts retained substantial powers (Casswell, 1984: 70). In fact, "ONCAD was in reality a creature of certain rural interests groups - traders, transporters, money-lenders, large producers and great marabouts - upon whom rested the political patronage of the Parti Socialiste" (Bayart, 2009: 97). They were the main intermediaries. Furthermore, ONCAD never constrained the operations of the marabouts; they were allowed to sell their production without using the cooperative mechanism (Casswell, 1984: 58). When the privatization and decentralization processes came with the IMF PAS, it only participated in reinforcing the marabouts' position in the economic structure. They were the only real actors of the private sector. Bayart (2009: 226) writes: "the policies of structural adjustment are thus not so very different from the policies of nationalization during the two previous decades". That being said, "in closing down ONCAD, the unofficial cashbox of the barons of the Parti Socialiste" (Bayart, 2009: 226), Diouf dismantled patronage networks that were holding together urban clients close or at least loyal to the public administration. As already mentioned, social upheavals in the 1980s were one of the by-products of this decision.

It is important to stress that the authority of the marabouts expanded beyond the mere question of economic resources. This was especially true for marabouts who were belonging to one of the Muslim Brotherhoods: the Layènnés, the Niassènes Hamallistes, the Qadiriya, the

Tidjaniya and the most influential one the Mourides⁸². As religious leaders, they were wielding substantive authority over their constituencies based on an indelible affective attachment. Schumacher (1975: 5) contends: “they are believed to possess, in addition to magical powers, the spiritual authority to ensure or deny religious salvation”. Along the line of a very strong spiritual vertical affiliation, marabouts are therefore the intermediary between God and the individual, between God and the community. They act as caretaker. They oversee wedding arrangements, succession, land tenure, order and personal security, tax collection and so on (Hesseling, 1985: 97). The link between peasants and marabouts are in a way sanctioned by tradition and religion.

Furthermore in Senegal, Islam is an institution characterized by a hierarchical and vertical structure with a Khalif at the top. This sense of hierarchy can be illustrated by the following example: the marabout Seigne Khadim was initially against the 1988 voting directive dictated by the Khalif but later retracted himself on television and apologized for contradicting a Mouride’s order (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 322). This hierarchical structure also comes with a near monopoly on political representation in regions they control (Diop, 1992: 16). In other words, since rural inhabitants have been granted the right to vote in 1956 even before independence, the marabouts have been in command of a vast number of constituencies for a very long time building within a very strong legitimacy and therefore increasing their leverage against the ruling elites (Hesseling 1985: 86, 92). As such, their support has always been cherished among politicians in the capital.

At the same time, without publicly advertising it, each marabout could “sell” his constituency to the highest bidder (O’Brien, 1971: 273; Hesseling, 1985: 97; Balans et al., 1975: 171). They were somewhat voter brokers. For instance, “a prominent marabout in the area also supported Wade’s PDS candidacy in 1993 because Diouf had ignored his requests for a well and a road for one of his villages... However, he switched back to the PS during the legislative elections when he found that the PDS leader was ungrateful for the marabout’s political support” (Beck, 1999: 2010-211). In the end, they tended to support the party in power as long as their

⁸² The ruling elites succeeded in co-opting all Brotherhoods in rural areas, not only the Mourides (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 74).

entrenched interests were not compromised. Opposition parties were serving as a bargain chip for local leaders who felt the PS did not respond to their demands.

In exchange of electoral support, the state would grant amongst others things greater autonomy over their fiefdom: rural communities had their own resources and administration (Balans et al., 1975: 172). And regardless of their powers, local leaders did not get involved directly in politics by becoming politicians themselves (Casswell, 1984: 67). They stayed on the periphery. Furthermore, by no means would they defend only their personal interests. They had a positive influence in government circles on behalf of their constituencies and succeeded in obtaining various financial supports from the government for the peasants (Casswell, 1984: 67-68). They were responsive to the demands and needs of their followers.

That being said, more and more, “the marabouts are no longer simple clients of the ruling elites and of the state. Riding on the wave of popular opinion that sees Islam as a universal remedy to poverty and decadence, the marabouts have become more demanding partners of the state, setting themselves up as lesson-givers, or even as a counterelite” (Coulon, 1988: 173). It is probably linked to the growing discomfort marabouts felt in supporting a regime that despise their own constituencies. The influence of the Brotherhood also changed as the nature of its actions demonstrates. Some were adopting a position of neutrality, while others would actively participate in party politics (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 141). In both cases, their clout as influent agents of the state in matters of electoral dominance greatly diminished over time. For instance, the reputation of Cheikh Tidiane Sy who founded a committee for the reelection of Diouf was severely put in jeopardy when accusation of electoral fraud surfaced (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 324). The 1993 events were a clear illustration of its leverage against the ruling elites being reduced in the face of a dissent voice threatening the unity of the Muslim community. Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, the activities of marabouts were no longer confined to rural areas; they started to penetrate cities (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 77-78). They were now entering the traditional *chasse-gardée* of political parties, which could partly explain their disassociation from the ruling elites. All this suggests new patterns of clientelist networks in a highly volatile electoral game.


In sum, the degree of state penetration provides additional information as why local leaders are so strategic for the ruling elites and why the state bureaucrats yield little power outside the capital. The state had scarce resources and could not afford to expand its tentacles in the countryside. Even in cities, the bureaucracy was generally speaking ineffective and although the state expansion as in the 1960s-1970s had led to the rise of state bureaucrats in politics in the 1980s, their influence in the economic sphere remained marginal. By ricochet, very few could pretend leading organized networks capable of making a difference when it counts, beyond the limited confine of Dakar. In return, local leaders would fill the void left by the state outside the capital and urban cities. They had their hands on large captive constituencies that were neuralgic for the power-holders. The ruling elites had a very strong interest in nurturing the sympathy of local leaders and integrating them into a ruling coalition. The timing of local leaders exclusion from the ruling coalition coincided with the inception in the 1980s and the late 1990s of state bureaucrats in key positions within the government and significant social changes notably the displacement of local leaders interests in economic activities in urban areas. This conjecture generated instability as defining moments such the 1988 state emergency and Diouf's defeat in the 2000 presidential election testify.

Conclusion

As a known country-specialist writes: “the success of Senghor and his party can be explained to a great extent by the relationship of trust he was able to cultivate among this class of religious leaders” (Coulon, 1988: 145). Our examination of political alliances and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition have confirmed this assertion. The logic behind their preponderance had to do with the low degree of state penetration and the underdevelopment of the economic structure primarily based on peanut production. Overall, the brief review of Senegalese economic plans demonstrates the absence of a long-term vision and a commitment to engage the country in an industrialization process. However, in itself, it is not sufficient. Local leaders alone cannot guarantee political stability. Senegal was victim of many political crises even when local leaders supported the ruling elites. Another dominant social group had to be factored in: opposition parties. Indeed, their absence from the ruling

coalition led to the least stable period (1980s) after the country independence. They had the power to disrupt the functioning of the government. Their active presence in politics and the necessity to acknowledge some of their demands and co-opt them into a ruling coalition were fostered by an overall low degree of extra-legal organized violence and an institutional context characterized by a competitive authoritarian regime. Therefore, patterns of stability and instability tend to fit our analytical framework.

Figure 9 – Senegal Timeline



A closer look at the degree of extra-legal organized violence gave us the rational as to why the military officers never entered the realm of politics despite the civil conflict in Casamance in the 1980s and other external threats. It had to do with the location of the civil conflict in question and the presence of the French army as protector of the government. The variable also contributed to provide an answer in regard to why certain parties were co-opted (e.g. PRA) while others were banned (e.g. FNS). Finally, this variable shed light on why the impact of opposition parties on stability was shallow. Although some were included in the ruling coalition, very few had captive constituencies and at times many parties were trying to attract a relatively small electorate. Most of all, besides the PDS, they were not political organizations *per se*, but the banner of influent individuals in a specific geographic area. Hence, co-opting opposition parties equated to including individuals and the diverse form of ruling coalitions in Senegal never attracted formally rival organizations because they were basically non-existent. In a way, it was a strategy by default. Still, it worked relatively well in a context where resources were scarce. Co-opting individuals is much less expansive than co-opting

organizations. As for the state penetration variable, it formulates a rational as why career state bureaucrats such as Diouf became prominent political actors, but simultaneously why they were not a determinant factor in conflict dynamics. The state expanded significantly over the first decades, but the expansion did not translate into concrete economic achievements. It shows a disconnection between state and society.

In retrospect, the political history of Senegal is instructive. At first glance, our framework provides mixed results for the 1967-1976 period. It was a highly stable hegemonic authoritarian regime when the military officers were absent from the ruling coalition for reasons that were previously developed. What is interesting here is that stability is not only a function of regime type and degree of extra-legal organized violence but also of level of economic development and state penetration. In other words, without this link, our framework is invalidated for a period of nine years, which remains a relatively small time frame compared to fifty years. But with the state penetration variable, it indicates that in a certain context, our two variables do not have equal weight. Ultimately, it reinforces the pertinence of developing a theory that could integrate the political and economic dimensions of a society.

Paraguay

Paraguay is a landlocked underdeveloped country surrounded by Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia. A Spanish colony until 1811, it has a population of approximately 6.9 millions; 95% are *mestizos* of Guaraní descent and 90% are Catholic by faith⁸³. The system of government has gone through several transformations but remained a presidential one with, albeit with some interruptions, a bicameral congress: chamber of deputies and senate.

For over sixty years, the Colorado Party (*Partido Colorado* or PC) headed by the *Junta de Gobierno* (the executive committee) dominated the political life of the country first under an autocratic regime (1945-1954) and then under a hybrid regime, hegemonic authoritarian between 1955 and 1989, and competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 2008. The country experienced severe crises, notably the fall in 1989 of Alfredo Stroessner, the long-time country president. Since the degree of extra-legal organized violence was high until the end of the 1970s, we should be in a position to observe political patterns that provide incentives for the military to intervene in politics and facilitate their inclusion in the ruling coalition; and it should coincide with a stable hegemonic authoritarian regime. Afterward, as the country pacifies and elites accept to channel their political demands through the party system, the legitimacy of military officers should diminish and the importance of opposition parties increase. Their inclusion in the ruling coalition should correspond to a stable competitive authoritarian regime. The degree of state penetration was low throughout the period covered in the present study. Administrative and economic extensions were reduced to the capital. Outside of it, the state was generally absent. Thus, our expectations are that stability should be the by-product of an alliance with local leaders.

⁸³ The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.

6.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-2008)

The political history of Paraguay reveals the importance of the PC in explaining the course of events. In fact, instability within the country was largely a function of factional politics within the PC itself⁸⁴. From 1948 to 1954, six Colorado presidents successively governed the country for a very brief moment. Then Stroessner came to power and reigned until 1989 bringing an era of stability within the party and the country. But after his departure, bitter infighting within the PC became again the *modus operandi*: from 1989 to 2008, there will be five presidents. The military officers were often at the center of these developments, siding with different party factions overtime and occasionally divided on which one should rule. In short, politicians backed by military officers have contested on many occasions the authority of the ruling elites, especially before and after Stroessner. Depending on the period, they were gatekeepers of stability or triggers of instability. Local leaders are less visible in the narrative of political crises that follows. Their support to the ruling elites was somewhat relatively constant until the 1980s. Later on, their role will increase. They will have a decisive impact on the PC defeat in the 2008 presidential election.

To provide a general background, Paraguay was wrecked by instability from 1870 to 1940, a period that saw the succession of thirty-five presidents and countless coups and counter-coups. As Lott (1974: 74) states, “presidents were jailed, murdered, or exiled, and very few indeed were fortunate enough to be able to complete their constitutional terms of office”. The PC was in power from 1880 to 1904, and the Liberal Party (PL), the other main country political party, from 1904 to 1940 with brief interludes in 1912 (PC) and 1936-1937 (Revolutionary Febrerista Party - PRF). Not affiliated to any party, dictator General Morínigo was president from 1940 to 1948.

⁸⁴In the 1950s-60s, the PC had three factions: epifanistas, democráticos and guionistas. In the 1970s, most PC members were stronistas. In the 1980s, two new factions emerged: militants and traditionalists. In the 1990s, two others took form: the ovidistas and arganistas. As we will see, some factions sometimes allied with the opposition (Liberal Parties). As such, the PC is foremost a symbol of tradition than an organization structured by a political or ideological platform with a defined sociological base. We want to highlight this issue from the start as it complicates substantially the analysis of political dynamics and can make the exercise of differentiation between each faction and their respective positioning in the party system difficult to follow at times.

The first crisis to emerge after the end of WW II, which constitutes the departure point in our research design, was in June 1946. With the defeat of the Axis powers, the pro-fascist President Morínigo realized that he was suddenly out of fashion (Miranda, 1990: 45). Hitherto, he adopted an entirely new strategy and focused on coalition building; targeting the Febreristas and Colorados as well as military officers (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 52; Miranda, 1990: 61). The Febreristas were asking for more: they wanted to be the dominant voice in the cabinet and assurance that Morínigo would not be candidate in the 1948 presidential election (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 52). A month later, the Febreristas, joined by disfranchised military officers as well as Liberals and Communists, organized a public rally in the capital Asunción. Febreristas leaders were arrested and political meetings were banned. In January 1947, members of the PC with backing from some of the military establishment staged an *autogolpe*⁸⁵ to reassert Morínigo's position as head of state in the face of massive popular discontent. The move triggered an intense reaction among the military officers who defected in mass: about 80% reneged the uniform (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341-342). Soon, a bloody civil war erupted. The epicenter was the small city of Concepción in the Northern region. A state of emergency was declared, one that will last officially until 1987 with brief interruptions.

Obviously, this crisis was high in intensity, as the government did not function for about a year. Although outnumbered, Morínigo and his ally (PC) could count on the support of peasant militias, and the artillery regiment in Asunción led by the young and rising Stroessner (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 52-53). In the end, they won and consolidated their power by eliminating all non-Colorado partisans in the bureaucracy and military (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 92). In the process, about one-fifth of the Paraguayan population left the country (Bouvier, 1988: 5). The army commanders eventually removed Morínigo from office and the unchallenged Colorado candidate Juan Natalicio González was elected by party members in 1948 replacing the interim acting president, the Supreme Court Chief of Justice Juan Manuel Frutos. The crisis highlights the critical importance of military support – above all, military officers in Asunción, the capital – and the nascent peasant strategic role in monitoring the political activities in the countryside.

⁸⁵ An *autogolpe* is a self-coup, i.e. a form of *coup d'État* when the leader of a country dissolves or renders powerless the national legislature and assumes extraordinary powers not granted under normal circumstances.

Competing factions within the PC quickly ousted President González. In 1949, Raimundo Rolón and Felipe Molas López became presidents for only few months each. Then emerged the leader of the democráticos faction, Federico Chávez, who served as president of Paraguay from 1949 to 1954. In the meantime, Stroessner was already commander-in-chief of the army. Fearing the increased power of the military, Chávez advocated the creation of a more potent national police force to protect the interests of the PC (Bouvier, 1988: 6; Lewis, 1980: 58-59). This proposal for what could have been perceived as a major institutional change led to a military coup that will bring Stroessner to power with the help of fellow Colorado Epifanio Méndez Fleitas (Lewis, 1980: 58). On August 15th 1954, Stroessner became president of Paraguay.

These crises were again high in intensity. They reflect the growing influence of military officers in politics. They were involved in the coups that brought successively Rolón and López in power (Miranda, 1990: 46)⁸⁶. In both instances, Stroessner was on the winning side. Once in power, López tried to reduce the control of the democráticos faction in the cabinet and planned for an *autogolpe* (Miranda, 1990: 47). López went to Stroessner for help, but the latter decided to go public this time and revealed López's intention. It backfired and Chávez replaced López as president of Paraguay⁸⁷. Finally, in 1954, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Stroessner, toppled Chávez. The new strongman was benefiting from few allies within the PC and could only count on the epifanistas faction⁸⁸ – embodied by Fleitas who later will be suspected of planning a coup against him; democráticos were controlling the PC (Lewis, 1980: 72-73). Hence, Stroessner proceeded to reshuffle the cabinet, excluding Méndez Fleitas. Most Fleitas' sympathizers were either expelled from the PC or worst, jailed (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 55). In the process, Stroessner attributed important positions to the guionistas faction, notably to Edgar Ynsfrán, but not to the democráticos. The stage was set for the next political crisis.

⁸⁶ Rolón and López were guionistas.

⁸⁷ Chávez was a democrático.

⁸⁸ The epifanistas faction is the result of a split within the democráticos faction. Those who decided to follow Fleitas became epifanistas and the others remained democráticos.

In August 1958, the *Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores* (CPT) organized a general strike demanding a 30% wage increase, but the police quickly stormed its headquarter and arrested its militants (Lewis, 1980: 90). The democráticos who were still holding the majority in Congress complained and asked for the release of CPT leaders as well as for the resignation of the Minister of Labor, González Alsina. Stroessner agreed to some demands and ended the state of emergency. A month later, the police violently repressed a student manifestation that turned into a street riot. This time, the democráticos called for the resignation of the Minister of Interior, Ynsfrán. Stroessner issued two presidential decrees: one ordering the (re) imposition of the state of emergency and the other the dissolution of Congress. “More than one hundred democráticos were taken into custody” including congressmen and *Junta de Gobierno* officials (Lewis, 1980: 93). Many fled to Argentina and joined Méndez Fleitas to form the Popular Colorado Movement (MOPOCO). The purge was massive: the PC lost 80% of its leadership (Lambert, 1997a: 20 en6).

The crisis was high in intensity. Stroessner used his alliance with the guionistas to eliminate the democráticos. The latter did not automatically give up. Indeed, the MOPOCO instigated numerous low-intensity attacks in the countryside. “But Ynsfrán ... obtained considerable peasant support himself in the process of receiving information with which to control guerrilla warfare” (Miranda, 1990: 64). He implemented a wide network of collaborators and penetrated grass-root organizations in order to consolidate his power and the hegemonic position of the PC (Lewis, 1980: 84, 86; Roett & Sacks, 1991: 55). Soon, Stroessner perceived Ynsfrán’s independent popular base as a threat (Lewis, 1980: 98). Coincidentally, “a crisis occurred among the police in Asunción involving the police chief and several other Ynsfrán protégés”: that is, a corruption scandal that allowed Stroessner to revamp the police force by excluding Ynsfrán’s supporters (Miranda, 1990: 64). Ynsfrán resigned in November 1966. Given that he was pushing for the creation of an urban guard that could challenge military officers, the latter were obviously pleased with the events (Lewis, 1980: 91). In sum, “without the democráticos... and the guionistas around, the only plausible scenario was for everyone to become stronistas” (Miranda, 1990: 65). Yet, instead of dismantling Ynsfrán’s network, Stroessner somewhat reorganized and institutionalized it under the auspices of the PC by creating *seccionales* or local party branches in every town and village of the country (Lambert,

1997a: 6). Also, with the fall of each faction came an equivalent clean up within the military ranks and the nomination of officers loyal to Stroessner (Lewis, 1980: 226). Thereafter for two decades, a military-Colorado alliance will cement the ruling coalition and maintain stability in the country. There was no need for other actors to be included.

In 1987, the election for the position of president of the PC crystallized an emerging feud between two factions: the militants and the traditionalists. The militants were backing the Minister of the Interior, Sabino A. Montanaro; and the traditionalists were favoring Juan Ramón Chaves, the president of the *Junta de Gobierno* (Nickson, 1988: 255). The militants were pro-Stroessner and staunch advocates of using repression in dealing with the opposition. For instance, they were behind the creation of “an extreme right-wing paramilitary organisation, the Anti-Communist Action Group” (Nickson, 1988: 255). The loyalty of the traditionalists was to the party rather than to Stroessner (Miranda, 1990: 130). The conflict burst into the streets, each faction organizing rallies. In August, with the apparent approval of Stroessner, the militants positioned policemen around the Convention Hall to block the traditionalists from attending the convention (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 343). Montanaro won the party election unchallenged, militants took control of the government and “seventeen of the thirty-five members of the junta were kicked out” (Abente, 1995: 311).

This crisis was medium in intensity but a sign of major upheavals to come. While the militants were controlling the state, namely the police force, the traditionalists had, until 1987, their hands on the party (Nickson, 1988: 251). Yet, in the early 1980s, both were already competing for influence in the *seccionales* across the territory (Abente, 1995: 310; Lambert, 1997a: 18). It highlights the rising politicization of the countryside and its concomitant growing instability. Indeed, major developments were occurring; notably the creation of Agrarians Leagues and the discontent of Catholic priests with regard to human rights violation in regions were propelling the peasant issue at the center stage of politics. If anything, the events were a forerunner of Stroessner’s exit from power. As Miranda (1990: 132) resumes: “with most of the military supporting the traditionalist position... Stroessner had sealed the fate of his regime”.

In 1989, after forty-five years as president of Paraguay, Stroessner era was over. The aging incumbent fell victim of a putsch. Foremost, it was the result of a succession crisis. The militants pushed for the candidature of Stroessner or his son, Gustavo, an Air Force Colonel, as president of Paraguay (Powers, 1992: 6). The military officers generally vouched instead for Luis María Argaña, the president of the Supreme Court (Miranda, 1990: 131). They were displeased at the militants' attempt to interfere with military nomination and force the retirement of some officers still at the peak of their career, especially General Andrés Rodríguez (Abente, 1995: 312). On February 1st, the militants served an ultimatum to Rodríguez: "either accept the post of minister of defense (and give up direct command of troops) or resign... But Rodríguez declined to be kicked upstairs... Instead, on the next evening, he ordered his troops to arrest President Stroessner... The fight lasted a few hours (at the presidential Escort Regiment), but Stroessner surrendered toward dawn on February 3rd" (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 131). As history repeats itself, Rodríguez purged the PC of the militant faction therefore establishing the full authority of traditionalists.

The crisis was high in intensity. It highlights the destabilizing effect of excluding from the ruling coalition General Rodríguez, the commander of the First Brigade. Indeed, "the political loyalty of the First Brigade is crucial to the Paraguayan state because the unit's barracks are right outside of Asunción" and it is "Paraguay's largest, best equipped, and best trained army unit" (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 131). Also, in its opposition to Stroessner's re-election, Rodríguez had the support of what was left of the traditionalists and the opposition coalition, the National Accord (Nickson, 1988: 258). The National Accord was an unofficial opposition coalition formed in 1979. It included the PRF, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and MOPOCO as well as labor unions and church organizations. With the militants defeated, the alliance between the traditionalists and the National Accord evaporated. Later on, the militants as well as other dissident factions found their way back to the PC (Lambert, 2000: 383). Nevertheless, the decision of the Colorado elites to extend a friendly hand to the opposition parties, albeit opportunistically, was a novelty and surprising move in stark contrast with the Stroessner period.

Although the new 1992 Constitution denied to military officers the right to participate in

political activities, it did not prevent some high-ranking officers from changing side and publicly supporting Juan Carlos Wasmosy against the candidate of the traditionalists, Luis María Argaña, during the December Colorado primaries (Lambert, 2000: 385). Initially, Argaña won, but the new electoral tribunal, filled with Rodríguez's sympathizers, overturned the result (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 58). Wasmosy was named the new Colorado president but was in a weak position. The arganistas defected to the opposition, *de facto* creating a minority government. Having no choice but to strengthen his position, Wasmosy engineered in 1994 a "governability pact" with the PLRA, the PRF and the PDC to recapture the majority. Most importantly, the key architect of Wasmosy's electoral victory was General Oviedo who strongly claimed and demonstrated on which side he was. As a reward, Wasmosy named him commander of the army. Yet, Oviedo's thirst for power was obvious. Wasmosy decided in 1996 to relieve the General of his new functions. "Oviedo refused to comply and threatened to bomb the presidential palace if Wasmosy did not resign, effectively declaring a *coup d'état*" (Lambert, 2000: 390). In the end, Argaña replaced Wasmosy as Colorado president in April 1996. Oviedo was arrested in June but was quickly released in the face of strong popular support (Nickson, 1997b: 199). In a complex twist of events, Oviedo was eventually nominated as the PC presidential candidate for the 1998 elections, but re-arrested weeks prior to the elections (Lambert, 2000: 390). "Oviedo's running mate, civilian engineer Raúl Cubas, then became the Colorado Party presidential candidate, and Cuba's archenemy, Luis María Argaña, an old stronista, became the vice-presidential nominee" (Sondrol, 2007: 335).

The crisis was high in intensity. The ruling coalition was in disarray: shifting alliances and switching sides were the norm. Ultimately, the military was the binding force that held the PC together. When the military was divided, the party was divided. Furthermore, as the Colorado was divided, so were the rural constituencies. As Lambert (2000: 390-391) asserts, "while much of the vote for the Colorado Party was undoubtedly based on traditional family loyalties and clientelistic networks.... he [Oviedo] exploited his own ties to the peasantry". Hence, Oviedo's ability to navigate his way in the corridors of power exposes the significance of the rural support. Finally, Wasmosy's efforts to build a coalition also denote the importance of opposition parties even if the "governability pact" proved to be an *ad hoc* solution more than a

strategic partnership. As for the Cuba/Argaña ticket, it will encounter a tragic faith.

In August 1998, “Cubas reorganized the military tribunal which had originally sentenced Oviedo, suggesting the beginning of a campaign to restore oviedistas control over the armed forces” (Lambert, 2000: 391). In the process, he absolved Oviedo of any crime and ended his jail term. The Supreme Court overruled the presidential decree, the attorney general authorized Cubas’ impeachment, and the crisis escalated in March when the arganistas unilaterally ended the ongoing PC elections where the oviedistas victory was almost certain (Lambert, 2000: 391). In response, oviedistas decided to siege the party headquarters. “On March 23, 1999, Vice President Luis María Argaña was machine-gunned in downtown Asunción” (Sondrol, 2007: 335). Politicians of all allegiances quickly blamed Cubas and Oviedo, albeit without proof. It triggered a series of mass protests and violent repression. Finally, Cubas flew to Brazil and Oviedo to Argentina.

The intensity of the crisis was high as the assassination of Argaña was coupled with Cubas’ resignation. For a while, violent confrontations raged between the police/army and Argaña’s supporters just outside the Congress building. Suddenly, the country was without a head of state. “The presidency fell to the arganista speaker of the senate, Luis González Macchi, who immediately created a government of national unity. The agreed division of power left the cabinet with seven Colorados... and two members each from the opposition parties, the PLRA and PEN”⁸⁹ (Lambert, 2000: 392). Again, this alliance was a tactical coalition to momentarily defuse a crisis. No real credible commitment was institutionalized. For instance, the PLRA was offered the vice-presidency, but once the PLRA had accepted to join the government of national unity, Macchi refused to comply with his terms of the bargain. In February, the PLRA returned to the opposition and “the ruling Colorados remained split between arganistas and oviedistas” (Sondrol, 2007: 336). The military factor was still omnipresent. Case in point, Macchi “purged the armed forces of over 100 oviedista officers, as well as 45 senior commanders” and worked to “bring the armed forces into line with the dominant arganista faction” (Lambert, 2000: 393). After these massive moves against the military, in August

⁸⁹ The PEN is an opposition coalition called the National Encounter Party composed of the PRF and the PDC.

2003, Macchi stepped down and was replaced by the newly elected Colorado candidate Nicanor Duarte Frutos.

In 2008, the Colorado primaries were once more the host of serious elite division. It was opposing Blanca Ovelar de Duarte, the Minister of Education, to Luis Alberto Castiglioni, the vice-president. President Frutos was favoring Duarte. According to Abente (2009: 147-148), Frutos' plan was to get a "puppet" president elected to eventually recapture the top position as the new 1992 Constitution was authorizing only a single mandate of five years. Many Colorados did not approve the move and landed their support to Castiglioni. Nevertheless, Duarte became the Colorado candidate for the 2008 presidential elections and the party was divided as ever. He entered the electoral campaign in a weak position. Hoping to prevent Oviedo – unable to compete in elections since in exile and accused of crimes – from giving by default his support to the opposition and possibly defeating Duarte, Frutos freed Oviedo of all legal charges. He was authorized to run as candidate in the presidential election. The intent was to fragment the opposition votes. The plan admirably failed. The PC lost the presidency after sixty years in power to a former catholic bishop, Fernando Lugo. It was an electro-shock, an historic moment. It was the first time in Paraguayan history that such a turnover was occurring as a result of a competitive election. In a way, it was the sign of a genuine democratic transition.

The crisis was high in intensity. It was a dramatic change in the distribution of power. Although the Colorado internal divisions were certainly a critical factor in Lugo's victory, his ability to form a working coalition and attract the main opposition party, the PLRA, tilt the balance in his favor (Abente, 2009: 145). Also, albeit Lugo resigned as bishop of his diocese in 2005 and the Vatican suspended him from episcopal functions in 2007, he was still for the peasants the "Bishop of the poor". His successful appeal to rural constituencies cannot be denied (O'Shaughnessy & Díaz, 2009: xiv). Lugo formed a cabinet in which most positions went to the PLRA, but the PC (the Minister of Economy Dionisio Borda) and the armed forces (the Defense Minister Gen. Luis Bareiro) were also represented.

Patterns of alliance politics in Paraguay are not easy to detect, especially before and after Stroessner's presidency. It is an epic story of volatile alliances and most of all a confrontation between high-profile politicians and generals. In this context, elite interactions are highly personalized and the position of each faction varies according to specific circumstances. Ultimately, the ambition of would-be ruler substitutes itself to organizational interests. Friends become enemies and enemies become friends almost overnight. Regardless of a series of backstabbing events and frequent crossover, the involvement of the military in politics has been an inescapable reality. Focusing on this dominant social group goes a long way in explaining periods of stability and instability in Paraguay. As for local leaders, their true significance has transpired only when things started to get hairy towards the end of the Stroessner era. Before, their support was almost taken for granted.

The next two sections will shed additional light on the importance of military officers and local leaders compared to other social groups depending on the type of hybrid regime Paraguay has experienced and the level of economic development.

6.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence

As we have seen, Paraguay has a long history of political violence. We should expect the military officers to be a central figure of authority and indeed, the previous narrative of political crises confirms it. As it will be further develop, their corporate interests dictate their behavior and their capacity to exert influence on the ruling elites is tied amongst others to their constituencies. However, additional precisions are needed to explain the decision of the ruling elites to co-opt opposition parties during the post-Stroessner era: that is, Rodríguez and the National Accord (1989), Wasmosy and the governability pact (1994) and Macchi and the government of national unity (1999). Our interpretation rests on the change of type of hybrid regime from hegemonic authoritarianism (1954-1989) to competitive authoritarianism (1990-2008).

Way back, the Triple Alliance War (1865-70) against its powerful neighboring countries Argentina and Brazil had left the country in despair: "Paraguay lost more than half of its

500,000 inhabitants” (Klaiber, 1998: 92). The Chaco War (1932-35) between Paraguay and Bolivia also imposed a heavy toll on the future of the country; it was “an event that plunged the military into politics” (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341). In fact, the Chaco War revealed the general discontent of military officers about the lack of interest of politicians, namely the Liberals, for the necessity of well-equipped and well-trained armed forces (Miranda, 1990: 44). “The Paraguayan Liberals, afraid of making their generals too powerful, preferred to keep the military budget low and to depend on peace negotiations” (Lewis, 1980: 7). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Liberals were ousted by militarist elements of the armed forces. Overall, both the Triple Alliance War and the Chaco War lead to a general observation: belligerent countries with great ambitions were surrounding Paraguay. As Lewis (1980: 7) argues, “the constant need to defend Paraguay borders from threatening neighbors has tended to enhance the position of the army, perhaps to an exaggerated degree”. Even if our analysis starts at 1945, the subsequent military actions that took place over the years can hardly be understood without references to these traumatic episodes in the history of one of the first Latin American country to access independence.

The 1947 civil war was no less devastating: the country population dropped by one-third (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 4). With such tradition of violence, disfranchised political movements in Paraguay were naturally inclined to take arms to defend their rights and express their opinions. Indeed, during the earlier years of the repressive Stroessner regime, “guerrilla activism flourished along the border. The group of 14th of May was created, combining former Liberal activists and the Vanguardia Febrerista” (Miranda, 1990: 92). Also, “MOPOCO launched various unsuccessful guerrilla movements from exile and maintained a strong if shadowy presence within the Colorado party” (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 345). In the 1960s, the United National Liberation Front (FULNA), “with strong backing from the Communist Party of Paraguay”, was also involved in subversive actions (Miranda, 1990: 92). Finally, in the mid-1970s, some student and peasant leaders formed the small *Organización Político Militar* (OPM). The guerilla group orchestrated few attacks, but Stroessner’s security apparatus quickly destroyed it. Since the 1990s, most extra-legal organized violence activities have seized and Congress has been acting as the vector of political expression. Therefore, the following comments will focus on the interests of military officers and its leverage over the

ruling elites since for the most part the degree of extra-legal organized violence was high. Nevertheless, we will briefly address related issues pertaining to political parties to provide some inputs about the subsequent period when the degree was low.

6.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies

From the very beginning, we can trace a systematic attempt by the ruling elites to covet the support of the military. Already in the 1940s, the fascist Morínigo was allocating significant resources “spending about half the national budget on the armed forces” to co-opt this strategic actor (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341). Gradually, they accumulated enough power to gain leverage against the ruling elites and defend their own corporate interests (Abente, 1995: 305-306). The armed forces became an indispensable ally. “In the eighteen years between the February Revolution and Stroessner’s rise to power, it put nine presidents into the palace and removed seven of them” (Lewis, 1980: 124).

Stroessner pursued a similar policy as Morínigo. During his terms, “the military has broad influence and disproportionate priority in the state, with a budget greater than those for education, health, agriculture, or commerce” (Powers, 1992: 28). However, Stroessner pushed the logic much further enlarging the legitimacy of the military. He first formulated a new doctrine in which domestic issues and war against insurgents had precedence over traditional foreign threats (Sondrol, 1992: 108). Along those lines, Stroessner appointed military officers to key positions in the police force and cabinet (Bouvier, 1988: 11). Furthermore, he used the military to impose cohesion within the PC by somewhat merging the two entities. As Nickson (1988: 240) reports: “since July 1955 officials serving in the armed forces have been obliged to join the Colorado Party and admission to the officer corps has become effectively restricted to children of Colorado families”. Military officers were from now on a partisan force. Yet, they “have to a large extent managed to preserve their autonomy and continue to represent the strongest political force outside the control of civilian government” (Lambert, 1997b: 205). Military officers acted as a counterweight to the PC. But because Stroessner wanted to protect himself against possible independent actions from the officer corps, he also “built up his own,

personal, heavily armed Presidential Escort Battalion, an elite unit of 1,500 men” (Lewis, 1980: 139).

The armed forces were representing about 20,000 officers and Stroessner knew most of them personally, being the one directly responsible for almost all military promotions (Lott, 1971: 124; Lewis, 1980: 107). They were mostly visible in the capital and where the state of emergency that last from 1947 to 1987 was *de facto* in effect (Miranda, 1990: 78). Obviously, in sheer numbers, it was a rather small constituency, geographically limited to Asunción. Thus, the question is whether they could reached-out and mobilize a larger segment of the population.

In Paraguay, military officers were more proponents of the tradition than agents of modernization. On Stroessner’s order, they were involved in civil engineering activities linked to construction projects in the transport, telecommunication, health and education sectors (Sondrol, 1992: 109; Lewis, 1980: 129). As such, it might have raised their profile in some communities and attracted additional secondary supports that could have been mobilized in due time. However, overall they were concerned about the preservation of the status quo and the reproduction of a social stratification with them at the top (Sondrol, 1992: 108).

Still, their overall influence in society should not be underestimated given their command of a black market and role as private entrepreneurs. Their commercial interests in various companies – notably in transportation – hid insidious schemes involving drug and human trafficking as well as illegal smuggling of various products (Sondrol, 1992: 109; Nickson, 1997a: 28; Lewis, 1980: 131-132). Also, military officers were offered well-paid jobs in parastatal companies and privileged opportunities in the real estate market (Lambert, 1996: 98; Miranda, 1990: 119)⁹⁰. According to Stroessner himself, this was the cost to obtain military

⁹⁰ No one profited more from these preferential treatments than General Rodríguez. “The owner of one of Asunción largest and most luxurious mansions, Rodríguez has sizeable interests in banking and currency exchange, brewing, flour milling, construction, manufacturing, ranching, real estate, and the import-export trade, and he controls key cigarette, luxury car, and aircraft import concessions” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 133; Nickson, 1997a: 31).

support (Bouvier, 1988: 25). In the process, they accumulated wealth to a point that many Paraguayans depended on them for their economic security.

At the same time, they were largely exempted from the tactical functions and responsibilities related to political repression and the stigma associated with brutal and excessive violence. “Most of the daily operations concerning political intelligence were the responsibility of the Asunción police”... and “by allocating such a visible and critical role to the police, Stroessner managed to protect the military from controversy” (Miranda, 1990: 59). Yet, as the most potent coercive apparatus in the country, their status was given them an aura of invincibility: who ever dare to challenge them should pay a steep price. For all these reasons, the military could mobilize significant numbers of supporters during election periods: but probably and most effectively in districts in and around the capital, the economic and political center of the country. Except for the 2008 elections, rarely if ever the electoral outcome went against their will.

In our framework, military officers and opposition parties are two antagonistic social groups that cannot live together. Stroessner always despised opposition parties, and the military unconditionally supported him in that matter. It is only when he put his own house in order that some forms of liberalization took place. He legalized only the opposition parties ready to play by his rules and never attempted to form a coalition with them, while after 1989, the ruling elites will consider this possibility on few occasions.

This behavior should be understood in relation to the degree of extra-legal organized violence. As it decreases, the importance of opposition parties increases as well as the necessity to include one of them in the ruling coalition. For instance, it is in this context that the emergence as well as the demise of the National Accord find its true meaning. Indeed, just before the 1989 May election, “in exchange for positions within the *Junta de Gobierno* and in the public administration, MOPOCO, the exiled dissident faction of the Colorado Party, was persuaded to abandon its alliance with the opposition and to rejoin the party, where it was rapidly co-opted and absorbed. Following this, the *Acuerdo Nacional*, and thus opposition unity, dissolved” (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 53).

Most importantly, why did the ruling elites want to lure the PLRA? The rationale was simple. The Liberals, and above all the PLRA, represented the most formidable challenge to Stroessner and the PC. As Roett & Sacks (1991: 116, 118) describe, both parties can count on about the same number of adherents and political affiliation is a family tradition transmitted to one generation to another with no crossover voter. Also, most communities are equally divided between Liberals and Colorados: “there are very few one-party communities” (Hicks, 1967: 281). Thus, the Liberals had captive constituencies and could influence a large portion of the votes.

Why it did not work out? First, the programmatic stance of the Colorados and Liberals was almost identical (Miranda, 1990: 81). In principle, it meant that the two parties were competing for the same constituencies. They were not complementary but archenemies, yet mostly for historic reasons. Additionally, the military officers were still an integral part of the ruling coalition at that time. They stubbornly refused to return to the barracks. Therefore, including opposition parties was posing a serious problem as their mutual distrust was creating unbearable frictions within the ruling coalition and preventing its institutionalization. Military officers and opposition parties were mutually exclusive social groups. This friction coincided with a change of hybrid regime type.

6.2.2. Types of Regimes

The Paraguayan political regime is difficult to assess, especially during Stroessner years. According to Roett & Sacks (1991: 127), “the regime was such an oddity as to defy classification”. Many point to its uniqueness, at least compared to its Latin American counterparts (Lambert, 1996: 104). Freedom House classifies the regime as partly free (hybrid) from 1972 to 2010. We are inclined to divide the Paraguayan regime into three phases: (1) autocratic (1945-1954); (2) hegemonic authoritarianism (1955-1989); and (3) competitive authoritarianism (1990-2008). This sequence tends to corroborate the evolving patterns of political alliances found in Paraguay.

1945-1954: Autocratic Regime

The 1945-1954's period was largely autocratic since no frequent elections were held and repression was the primary mean of political communication⁹¹. Morínigo's absolute domination over the political regime was inscribed in the 1940 Constitution: "it gave virtually dictatorial powers to the executive; the president could dissolve Congress, dictate laws, and command the armed forces" (Miranda, 1990: 56). The Constitution also included provisions for the creation of the Council of State responsible for centralizing all interest groups (including business, farmers, bankers, the military, and the Roman Catholic Church) in a single corporatist institution controlled by the Executive. Overall, from 1940 to 1946, the military oversaw all aspects of state-society relations (Abente, 1995: 300). Starting in 1947, a state of emergency was in full force. Civil liberties and political rights were scorned and violated with impunity. The rule of law was completely absent, and freedom of speech and freedom of association were inexistent (Lewis, 1980: 52).

1955-1989: Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime

Once Stroessner took over power, the political regime mutated in something qualitatively different. There was first a transition period between 1955 and 1962 from an autocratic to an embryonic hybrid regime of a hegemonic authoritarian type. During this period, the 1940 Constitution prevailed, although direct single-candidate executive elections were introduced. Universal suffrage including women and illiterate rights to vote became effective only in 1961 (León-Roesch & Ortiz, 2005: 418). The PC was the sole legal party in Congress. Furthermore, the state of emergency was still in effect except on election days (Miranda, 1990: 78).

Most of all, it is a period marked by a violent campaign against political opponents comparable to defunct totalitarian regimes (Lewis, 1980: 227)⁹². The brutality of the secret

⁹¹ General elections occurred in 1948 (González) and 1949 (López). They were not scheduled. They were organized to procure some form of legitimacy to the new ruler. In both cases, the candidate was unchallenged.

⁹² Nevertheless, the analogy should not be exaggerated. The Stroessner regime was "not sufficiently mobilizational, ideological, or socializing to warrant the totalitarian label" (Power, 1992: 6). Lewis also adds, "of

police headed by *the Departamento de Investigación* and the *Division Tecnica para la Represión del Comunismo* was such that a general climate of fear and suspicion among the population was widespread (Lambert, 1997a: 9). In addition, the PC members managed to “provide a network of unpaid spies and informers to keep all potential enemies under surveillance” (Lewis, 1980: 150). Law 294 (1955) entitled “In Defense of Democracy” was promulgated to fight communism and any kind of anti-systemic ideology; its shallowness was used on purpose to legally but arbitrarily arrest without warrant political opponents and control the flow of information; it basically canceled constitutional guarantees (Miranda, 1990: 79). The first target was of course the PL (Lewis, 1980: 280).

In the 1960s, the regime became more tolerant towards political opposition. Indeed, Stroessner authorized small openings. In 1963, for the first time in Paraguayan history, the presidential election was competitive, albeit not free and fair⁹³. The 1967 Constitution attributed to the majority party automatically the two-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, whereas minority parties received one-third (Abente, 1995: 314)⁹⁴. The same year, the PL, the PLR and the PRF were all officially registered as legal parties⁹⁵. In principle, it meant that their members were allowed to engage in debate with other fellow politicians, mobilize their electorate, diffuse their programmatic agenda in the media and convene to coordinate their actions (Lewis, 1980: 177-178).

The PL and PLR were a “loyal opposition” insofar as they refrained from publicly criticizing the president as well as the armed forces, and from organizing public rallies. The legislative branch was a little more than a rubber-stamp institution (Nickson, 1988: 242). Also, Stroessner heavily interfered with opposition party leadership (Bouvier, 1988: 15, 21). In 1970, Law 209

the twenty-eight men who served under him, none of them were imprisoned, executed, or publicly humiliated” (Lewis, 1980: 121).

⁹³ It should be noted that voting was mandatory for adults in Paraguay (Bouvier, 1988: 16). Also, during the Stroessner era, all public employees are PC members by choice or by force (Lambert, 1997a: 7; Roett & Sacks, 1991: 118).

⁹⁴ The one-third of the seats was distributed according to the percentage of the votes an opposition party received compared to the total of votes opposition parties obtained.

⁹⁵ The PL and the PLR were legalized. The PLRA and the PDC operated in a gray zone; not legal, but not systematically repressed. And finally, the PCP and the MOPOCO were banned parties (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 122).

entitled “Defense of the Public Peace and the Freedom of Individuals” authorized the government to sanction anyone who was contemplating to transgress the law, especially in relation to political activities (Miranda, 1990: 79). It was a legal instrument to contain the opposition. Hence, it had no choice but to obey to Stroessner’s rules since the latter was basically controlling the entry to the party system. There was also a provision for banning political rallies.

The Electoral Commission was packed with Colorado sympathizers (Nickson, 1988: 241). During the electoral period, opposition parties did not have access to media outlets and in the end of 1980s with the closing of ABC Color (1984) and *El Pueblo* (1987) no independent media existed in Paraguay besides the Church Press (Hicks, 1971: 100; US Library of Congress, Paraguay, 2012). Bouvier (1988, 19-20) claims: “journalists are periodically detained and the independent Paraguayan Journalist’s Association (SPP), formed in 1979, has yet to be granted legal recognition... Major newspapers are owned by friends and relatives of General Stroessner. Opposition weeklies, such as *El Enanon*, *El Radical*, *Dialogo* and *La Republica* have all been shut down”. Moreover, the entire electoral process was manifesting numerous irregularities that were challenging the integrity of results and reducing the event to a mere façade (Bouvier, 1988: 15-16; Nickson, 1988: 241). Finally, the 1977 Constitution had removed any limit to presidential terms. Thus, according to Abente (1995: 301), “the post-1960 party system can best be characterized as a pragmatic hegemonic system”.

Table XI – Electoral Results in Paraguay (Legislative and Executive)

Year	Political Party	Votes	%	Seats	%
1963	Colorado Party (PC)	569,551	92.3	40	66.6
	Liberal Party (PL)	47,750	7.7	20	33.7
	Total	617,301	100	60	100
	Participation Rate (85.1%)				
1968	PC	465,535	71.6	40	66.6
	PLR	139,622	21.5	16	26.6
	PL	27,965	4.3	3	5
	PRF	16,871	2.6	1	1.8
	Total	649,993	100	60	100
	Participation Rate (73.1%)				

1973	PC	681,306	84.7	40	66.6
	PLR	98,096	12.2	16	26.6
	PL	24,611	3.1	4	6.7
	Total	804,013	100	60	99.9
	Participation Rate (77.4%)				
1978	PC	905,461	90.7	40	66.6
	PLR	54,984	5.5	16	26.6
	PL	37,059	3.7	4	6.7
	Total	997,504	99.9	60	99.9
	Participation Rate (86%)				
1983	PC	944,637	91	40	66.6
	PLR	59,094	5.7	16	26.7
	PL	34,010	3.3	4	6.7
	Total	1,037,741	100	60	100
	Participation Rate (92.6%)				
1988	PC	1,187,738	89.6	40	66.6
	PLR	95,450	7.2	13	21.7
	PL	42,430	3.2	7	11.7
	Total	1,325,618	100	60	100
	Participation Rate (92.2%)				
1989	PC	845,820	74.5	48	66.6
	Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA)	229,329	20.2	21	29.2
	Others	56,570	5	3	4.1
	Total	1,131,719	99.7	72	99.9
	Participation Rate (52%)				
1993	PC	488,342	43.4	38	47.5
	PLRA	414,208	36.8	33	41.3
	National Encounter Alliance (PEN)	199,053	17.7	9	11.3
	Others	23,275	2.1	0	0
	Total	1,124,878	100	80	100
	Participation Rate (67.6%)				
1998	PC	875,473	53.8	45	56.3
	Democratic Alliance	681,917	42.8	35	43.8
	Others	55,024	3.4	0	0
	Total	1,612,414	100	80	100
	Participation Rate (80.5%)				
2003	PC	520,761	34.8	37	46.3
	PLRA	379,066	25.3	21	26.3
	Patria Querida Movement (MPQ)	255,811	17.1	10	12.5
	National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE)	216,803	14.7	10	12.5
	Party of a United Country (PPS)	49,280	3.3	2	2.5
	PEN	39,372	2.7	0	0
	Others	33,973	2.3	0	0
	Total	1,495,066	100	80	100
	Participation Rate (64.1%)				
	2008	PC	564,458	32.5	30
PLRA		498,529	28.7	27	33.8
UNACE		332,880	19.1	15	18.8
Popular Movement Tekojoja (MPT)		111,250	6.4	1	1.3
Beloved Fatherland Movement (PPQ)		102,055	5.9	3	3.8
Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC)/Alianza Democratica Tricolor		28,435	1.6	2	2.5
Others		101,237	5.8	2	2.5
Total		1,738,844	100	80	100
Participation Rate (65.4%)					

Data Source: Le—n-Roesch & Ortiz (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union; Paraguay Electoral Commission, 2012.

Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category.

Year	Candidate	Votes	%
1954	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	239,978	100
	Participation Rate (n.a.)		
1958	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	295,414	100
	Participation Rate (n.a.)		
1963	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	569,551	92.3
	Ernesto Gavilan (PL)	47,750	7.7
	Total	617,301	100
	Participation Rate (85.1%)		
1968	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	465,535	71.6
	Gustavo Gonzalez (PLR)	139,622	21.5
	Ruy Ruffinelli (PL)	27,965	4.3
	PRF	16,871	2.6
	Total	649,993	100
	Participation rate (73.1%)		
1973	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	681,306	84.7
	Gustavo Riart (PLR)	98,096	12.2
	Carlos Levi Ruffinelli (PL)	24,611	3.1
	Total	804,013	100
	Participation rate (77.4%)		
1978	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	905,461	90.8
	German Acosta Caballero (PLR)	54,984	5.5
	Fulvio Hugo Celauro (PL)	37,059	3.7
	Total	997,504	100
	Participation rate (86%)		
1983	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	944,637	91
	Enzo Doldan (PLR)	59,094	5.7
	Fulvio Hufo Celauro (PL)	34,010	3.3
	Total	1,037,741	100
	Participation rate (92.6%)		
1988	Alfredo Stroessner (PC)	1,187,738	89.6
	Luis Maria Vega (PLR)	95,450	7.2
	Carlos Ferreira Ybarra (PL)	42,430	3.2
	Total	1,325,618	100
	Participation rate (92.2%)		
1989	Andrs Rodriguez (PC)	894,374	75.9
	Domingo Laino (PLRA)	240,600	20.4
	Others	43,630	3.7
	Total	1,178,604	100
	Participation Rate (54%)		
1993	Juan Carlos Wasmosy (PC)	468,213	41.6
	Domingo Laino (PLRA)	376,868	33.5
	Guillermo Caballero Vargas (PEN)	271,421	24.1
	Others	8,161	0.7
	Total	1,124,663	99.9
	Participation Rate (69%)		

1998	Raul Cubas Grau (PC)	887,196	54.8
	Domingo Laino Figueredo (PLRA)	703,379	43.4
	Luis Campos (PRF)	8,139	0.5
	Gustavo Bader Ibanez (PB)	4,192	0.3
	Total	1,602,906	99.0
	Participation Rate (80.5%)		
2003	Nicanor Duarte Frutos (PC)	574,232	38.3
	Julio Cesar Franco (PLRA)	370,348	24.7
	Pedro Fadul (MPQ)	328,916	21.9
	Guillermo Sanchez (UNACE)	208,391	13.9
	Other	17,313	1.2
	Total	1,499,200	100
Participation Rate (64.3%)			
2008	Fernando Lugo (APC)	766,502	42.7
	Blanca Ovelar (PC)	573,562	32
	Lino Oviedo (UNACE)	410,637	22.9
	Pedro Nicolas Maara Fadul Niella (PPQ)	44,060	2.4
	Total	1,794,761	100
Participation Rate (65.6%)			

Data Source: Le—n-Roesch & Ortiz (2005); Election Guide.org; Abente-Brun (2009) Paraguay Electoral Commission, 2012.

Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others"

One may wonder if the regime under Stroessner was a military regime. After all, he himself was a general, the military budget represented a large part of government expenditures, military officers were omnipresent in the state administration and the state of emergency prevailed until 1987. Yet, country analysts are almost unanimous: “After 1940, parties had to share some of the power with the military, but they never lost their central role”, especially the PC (Abente, 1995: 300; Powers, 1992: 5). The military as an institution never ruled Paraguay (Sondrol, 1992: 107; Lambert, 1997a: 7). For instance, “civilians occupied 70 percent of the ministerial posts, and military officers were appointed to only a few high civil service positions” and among them most were no longer serving in the armed forces (Abente, 1995: 305). In fact, the PC fulfilled an important function during the Stroessner era: it provided a check on the military’s ambitions (Lewis, 1980: 150). Overall, civilian institutions were the basis of the Paraguayan political regime.

1990-2008: Competitive Authoritarian Regime

In 1989, Stroessner's rule finally ended. The formation of an official opposition coalition became legal and the "the explicit prohibition of affiliation to political parties by members of the armed forces and the police was a further crucial reform" (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 55). "Newspapers that Stroessner had banned were again on the street" (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 1). Local elections were organized for the first time in the history of the country and the rule guaranteeing the two-third of the seats to the majority party was eliminated (Nickson, 1997b: 156). In May 1993, the opposition obtained the majority in Congress, albeit not as a united front signaling that elections was generally free, fair and competitive. Indeed, old practices of ballot stuffing and vote-rigging appeared to belong to the past. Groups of the civil society were expanding and gradually learning to play an important role in politics. For instance, "by the beginning of 1990, there were already 402 union organizations" (Céspedes, 1997: 108).

That being said, the transition was above all, "an attempt to restore the civil-military pact" (Martini & Lezcano, 1997: 65). Political competition was unfair insofar as the military officers were intervening to influence the vote and the same elites remained in power; those who were supporting Stroessner's way of doing politics were still very much around (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 1, 352; Léon-Roesch & Ortiz, 2005: 418). Indeed, the event-history analysis (e.g. 1998 political crisis) demonstrates the general disrespect of the ruling elites in regard to the judicial and legislative authorities. Corruption, both in the public and private spheres, is still a major problem (Nickson, 1997a: 40). Reports of irregularities during elections continue to surface (Lambert, 2000: 380). As Riquelme & Riquelme (1997: 62) state, "conditions for truly democratic electoral contests in Paraguay are a long way from realization". Thus, as Sondrol (2007: 325) affirms, "Paraguayan politics is a hybrid political system lying somewhere between less-than-democratic and less-than-truly authoritarian regime", a competitive authoritarian regime to be more precise. With the victory of Lugo in the 2008 presidential election, the peaceful transfer of power and the military retreat to the barracks, Paraguay is now engaged in a democratic transition.

In sum, the military provided the basis for stability during the hegemonic authoritarian period (1954-1989): “the military sought to enforce internal unity and play an active logistical role in the Colorado campaign” (Lambert, 2000: 383). After 1989, the military continued to interfere in the political process to “guarantee continuity of the ruling civilian and military elite under a different political system and to initiate a liberalization process as a means of protecting its corporate interests” (Riquelme, & Riquelme, 1997: 52). However, this corporate interest was little more than an anachronism. Their *raison d’être* was no longer there as extra-legal organized violence was almost inexistent. And if anything, their corporate interests were equating to personnel interests; that is the personal fortune of high-ranking military officers was in jeopardy (Riquelme & Riquelme: 1997: 56). Indeed, this was largely the basis of Rodríguez’s putsch. Later on, opposition parties began to uproot military hegemony over politics signaling a change of type of hybrid regime: that is to say, the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. It created an environment conducive to the emancipation of opposition parties. Based on these observations, we can therefore conclude that instability during the post-Stroessner era is due to the declining influence of the military officers and the growing influence of the opposition parties. The former refuses to relinquish its power and despise the latter, making a ruling coalition that includes both necessarily ephemeral. Ultimately, elite division within the Colorado can be interpreted as a debate about the place of the military and parties in politics.

6.3. The Degree of State Penetration

State penetration in Paraguay has remained low throughout the history of the country. According to our framework, the implications are that local leaders should be responsible in linking the center with regions. Most studies on Paraguay attribute to local politicians (*seccionales*) a determinant impact in mobilizing the peasantry, which constitute the larger segment of society: about “90 percent of the population lived in the countryside” (Abente, 1999: 8; Miranda, 1990: 88; Lambert, 1997a: 5-6). These *seccionales* were the basis of the PC and their influence was resting on patron-client relations in a context of under-development. However, the event-history raises an unresolved issue: why do we assist at the growing

politicization of the countryside and why was the Church at the heart of this process? The analysis of the Paraguayan economic transformation provides the answer.

6.3.1. The Administrative Extension

During the period covered by our study, the central administration in Paraguay was confined to the capital. In regions, the state presence was minimal and sometimes invisible. There was basically no tax system (Nickson, 1997a: 36). Like the other case studies, data before 1990 are fragmentary. To give a general impression of the state of administrative extension, tax revenues represented only 9% of GDP in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 2012). The transportation network outside Asunción was deficient. Although progress was made over times, foreign agro-businesses benefited the most from the construction of paved roads linking farms to markets, notably cross-border connections with Brazil (Lewis, 1980: 160). Besides these achievements, social overhead capital had remained rudimentary. As Lambert (2000: 387) reports, there is “a lack of significant state-sponsored investment in small-scale rural development, welfare, public health or education”. In fact, foreign aid was almost the sole financial contributor to public services (Lambert, 1997a: 10; 1996: 100). In the absence of the state, *seccionales* and church parishes – through its Catholic Relief Service - were delivering basic social and health services in rural regions (Abente, 1995: 308-309).

Initially, this structural weakness was somewhat tempered by the high demographic concentration found in Paraguay where most inhabitants resided in a 12 miles radius of the capital (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 5). However, by the end of 1970s, rural-rural colonization programs contributed to disperse the population in uncharted territories, especially in the eastern regions. The western region called the Chaco is a vast and inhospitable land, representing roughly two-third of the territory but where less than 5% of the Paraguayans lived, mostly indigenous tribes (Sondrol, 2007: 326).

Although highly centralized in the capital, the size of state bureaucracy expanded significantly. In 1972, the state was employing an estimate of 20,000 civil servants; in 1982 it had increased to 52,000 and reached 153,000 by the end of 1980s (Lambert, 2000: 386; Borda, 1997: 137).

Nevertheless, as Nickson (1997a: 35) sums up, “under the Stroessner regime, the public administration was highly disorganized and employment was based on personal and familial relationships... Many of the new recruits were non-attending *planilleros*”⁹⁶, job description and performance evaluation were inoperative, and about 75% of the civil servants were earning less than the minimum wage. In 2000, Law 1626/00 was introduced with the objective of modernizing the public service through various reforms and the *Secretaria de la Función Pública* was created for that purpose, but the law was never fully implemented (Molinas et al., 2006: 25-27).

6.3.2. The Economic Extension


Agriculture has been the main economic activity in Paraguay. Although, the primary sector underwent significant transformation over the years, namely its commercialization for export markets, the economic structure made little progress in terms of diversification and industrialization (Lewis, 1980: 114). Worst, besides few wealthy landlords and foreigners operating in the agro-export sector, the average peasant was equipped with “an axe, a hoe, and a machete” and in most cases, a large share of his production was oriented towards subsistence (Lewis, 1980: 9; Miranda, 1990: 104-106). The main agricultural crops were cotton, soybeans, tobacco, and yerba. Handicraft workshops dominated the manufacturing sector with few small factories operating in the transformation of agricultural product (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 80; Miranda, 1990: 106). The most dynamic sectors were finance, construction (mostly in the 1970s) and contraband; none could serve as a basis for industrialization (Powers, 1992: 10; Lambert, 1996: 100). In a nutshell, Paraguay was a poor country; the state had little revenue.

The Technical Planning Secretariat was created in 1962 and issued a series of national economic plans over the years. However, they were poorly designed and badly executed to a point that their impact on economic development was marginal to say the least (US Library of Congress, Paraguay, 2012). Even after the Stroessner era, there was an “absence of an overall development plan, with stated aims and objectives, and strategies designed in accordance with

⁹⁶ In the Paraguayan context, *Planilleros* refers to an individual who receives a salary without working and gives a share to senior officials.

the availability of resources... the approach to decision-making was characterized by trial and error and fire-fighting” (Borda, 1997: 137-138). This lack of direction mirrored the erratic investments of the state before the year 2000.

Figure 10 – Natural Resources Rent in Paraguay



Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

Table XII – Paraguayan State Investment in the Economy

	General Gov't Consumption (% of Total Consumption)	Gov't Enterprises and Investment (% of Gross Investment)
1970	10.42	27.0
1975	7.70	21.1
1980	7.36	17.8
1985	7.87	31.4
1990	7.45	13.3
1995	11.23	23.2
2000	16.07	35.7
2005	12.0	35.7
2009	13.2	n.a.

Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012

Table XIII – Paraguay Socio-Economic Modernization

Indicator Name	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Urban population growth (annual %)	35.6	37.1	41.7	48.7	55.3	61.5
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	89.30	74.10	64.50	50.10	35.30	24.60
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	n.a.	98.46	101.78	103.95	119.53	99.43*
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	36.40	32.07	28.62	27.78	17.02	18.70
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	16.72	16.68	16.01	16.78	15.46	11.66
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	19.90	20.68	27.44	25.23	22.48	19.23

*: year 2009

Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012

In the 1950s, Stroessner called the IMF to the rescue and imposed an adjustment program that contributed to stabilize the economy, especially inflation and the currency exchange rate (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 64). The general approach was one of export promotion, mostly geared toward the attraction of investments in the agricultural sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was decided that the state would be an active economic player. Many state corporations were created and investments were made in almost all sectors: banking, telecommunication and transportation services; cement and steel industries; cattle ranching, sawmills, meatpacking, alcoholic beverage marketing, and so on (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 70; Borda, 1997: 132). It coincided with the economic bonanza generated by the construction of one of the biggest hydroelectric dam in the world, the \$20 billions Itaipú Dam (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 347). In parallel, the Institute for Rural Welfare in partnership with the Coordination for Rural Development (CONCODER) initiated a colonization program to relocate landless peasants to the Eastern Border Region (EBR): “more than 93,000 lots were awarded between 1956 and 1982, giving birth to 487 rural colonies and directly affecting the lives of an estimated 450,000 people, or some 25 percent of the rural population” (Abente, 1999: 24; Fogel, 1997: 102)⁹⁷.

All in all, even during the economic boom associated with the Itaipú Dam, capital was never used for productive ends, but for consumption, grandiose or unsound projects (Powers, 1992:

⁹⁷ The colonization program was partly the result of Stroessner’s extensive use of land as a mean to co-opt individuals. “By the mid-1980s, Stroessner had parceled out virtually all of Paraguay’s state lands, some of them several times over”; depriving “the state of a useful safety valve during times of economic decline” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 129, 79).

8; Lambert, 1997a: 10-11). For instance, the state decided to build “a \$US100 millions luxury airport” and upgrade “the capacity of the state-owned cement plant after the Itaipú Dam was completed” (Bouvier, 1988: 30). In fact, the state economic penetration was mostly a mirage. Foreigners dominated the small Paraguayan economy. Positions in parastatal companies controlling monopolistic markets were granted to military officers and powerful Colorado elites (Bouvier, 1988: 24). Yet, there were in many instances empty shells providing a front for money-laundry and contraband activities (Sondrol, 1992: 109). And the wealth generated by the informal sector was subject to capital flight (Nickson, 1997a: 30). In this context, the privatization law of 1991 had little significance. The government was still controlling “the five largest entities, covering power, telecommunications, sanitation, cement and oil refining” but their impact on the economy is weak (Lambert, 2000: 387).

In terms of the stratification and composition of social groups, the aforementioned has clear implications. The Paraguayan bourgeoisie is “relatively new, poorly organized, and politically weak” (Powers, 1992: 19)⁹⁸. The business class consists of two groups: transnational companies that dominate the agro-export sector and the domestic firms that are mostly owned by military officers and political elites and concentrated on the local market (Lewis, 1980: 155). Big landowners had some influence in Paraguay: “historically, Paraguayan peasants have responded to clientelistic ties of loyalty to local landowners who belong to either the Liberal or the Colorado Party” (Bouvier, 1988: 42). A clear example is Wasmosy’s rise to power. Before becoming president, he was the “president of the *Asociación Rural del Paraguay* (ARP), the organisation representing the interests of the landowners” (Kidd, 1997: 121). However, the agrarian policy of Stroessner broke many of those ties by displacing peasants in virgin territories or by prioritizing local political elites as patronage brokers, over economic actors (Nickson, 1988: 242). Labor unions were also a marginal player. None could be created without the approval of the ruling elites. Hence, they “enjoyed total control of urban

⁹⁸ Three main business associations at that time – “the Paraguayan Industrial Union (UIP) representing manufacturers and agricultural processing plants; the Paraguayan Rural Association (ARP) for cattle raisers; and the Federation of Production, Industry, and Commerce (FEPRINCO)” – were quickly co-opted by Stroessner (Powers, 1992: 19).

and rural workers from the early 1960s onward” (Miranda, 1990: 91, 107)⁹⁹. Even if by the end of the 1980s two independent unions emerged – the *Movimiento Intersindical de Trabajadores* (MIT) and *Confederación de Trabajadores* (CNT) – their reach was limited compared to the nationwide network of the PC, the military or the Church (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 343; Céspedes, 1997: 109).

As reported by Lott (1971: 262), the state bureaucracy “has been a relatively weak pressure group.... Entirely dependent as they are upon him [Stroessner]”. The power certain upper-echelon bureaucrats enjoyed, such as Méndez Fleitas or Edgar Ynsfrán, was linked to the coercive apparatus and personalistic traits, and less to economic functions of the state (Miranda, 1990: 62-63). While the civil administration was an important source of patronage, the very low salaries mitigated its impact beyond a small and privileged strata composed of military officers and high-ranking Colorados. With little revenues, the state bureaucracy was created on borrowed money and largely at the mercy of foreign aid (Lambert, 1997a: 10). Regardless of political events, the state bureaucracy remained a passive actor.

This brings us to the local leaders: namely the presidents of *seccionales* and the Catholic priests. The PC had about two hundred local branches (*seccionales*) responsible of mobilizing the base and distributing favors (Abente, 1995: 307; Bouvier, 1988: 12). It was “often the most important person in the community” (Lott, 1971: 238). Local leaders were obviously Colorados even in overly Liberal villages. Yet, the community was often consulted to decide which Colorado representative would be nominated as president of a given *seccionale* (Hicks, 1971: 104). Therefore, it was not strictly a top-down affair. Delegates were not bluntly imposed on the community by the center. The function of the local leaders was to act as the intermediary between the peasantry and politicians in the capital (Hicks, 1971: 90). Furthermore, peasants “owe their loyalty to particular leaders, not to a party or an ideology in general” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 116; Miranda, 1990: 16). In other words, “the two traditional parties are patronage parties, designed to serve the individual interests of their clients” (Hicks,

⁹⁹ “Public sector workers have been excluded from the union movements” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 105). Also, “the Colorado Party embraces a large number of ancillary institutions such as professional associations, veteran’s groups, student clubs, women’s organizations, peasants groups, cultural societies, and the party press” (Lewis, 1980: 114).

1967: 276). Speaking of the PC, Lambert (1997a: 5-6) states, “while it is true that its political independence was severely reduced under Stroessner, its local influence greatly increased”. In this sense, local leaders had captive constituencies. Even if peasant organizations grew, “political tradition retained an extremely strong influence over the majority of the peasantry at election time. A local patron, linked to one of the traditional parties, who offered protection and material reward, had far more weight than a revolutionary speech which might seem distant from the daily reality of the peasant farmer” (Fogel, 1997: 102)¹⁰⁰.

That being said, Catholic priests were also influential local leaders in rural areas, benefiting from broad support among the population (Bouvier, 1988: 38; Hicks, 1967: 273). Initially, they maintained a position of neutrality that was allowing them to act as mediator *par excellence*; they were tacitly supporting the Stroessner regime under a system of *quid pro quo* in which the state was paying for the Church expenses in exchange of a veto right on every clerical nomination in the country (Lewis, 1980: 114; Hicks, 1967: 278). With the creation of the Christian Agrarian Leagues in the 1960s, the Church entered the realm of political mobilization (Miranda, 1990: 90). Even if by the mid-1970s it had lost its control of the leagues, “the institutional presence of the Church in Paraguayan society increased markedly. New dioceses were established, many more priests were sent to rural areas” (Nickson, 1988: 245; Lewis, 1980: 189). In the 1980s, the Church had become one of the most outspoken critics of the Stroessner government and of repressive tactics, which gave them further legitimacy amongst peasants. But ultimately, it had always been on fertile grounds in rural areas; “for many reasons, Paraguayans constantly look to the church for guidance and strength, and therefore the relationship that Stroessner maintained with it for so very many years, bumpy as it may have been, was always understood as crucial for the continuity of the regime” (Miranda, 1990: 89). The fact that Rodríguez sought the Church support when it seized power tends to confirm such claim (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 125; Martini & Lezcano, 1997: 67). Yet, the Church decided to go its own way until Lugo came to power (Sondrol, 2007: 338). And Lugo’s rise to power should be understood in the following context: “he was the bishop of the

¹⁰⁰ In the 1980s, the following peasants organizations were created: the Paraguayan Peasant Movement (MCP), the National Coordinating Committee for Small Farmers (CONAPA), the National Peasant Union and the National Peasant Organization (ONAC) (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 105).

province of San Pedro, which is to the northeast of Asunción, the capital of Paraguay. And that's where the heart of a lot of the soybean production, a lot of the worst of the dispossessions... happened" (Goodman, 2008).


To recapitulate, this section demonstrates the low degree of state penetration and the general state of underdevelopment that was prevailing in Paraguay. Foreign companies were overshadowing state bureaucrats and, given the low level of economic development, no independent bourgeoisie or labor unions capable of challenging the ruling elites existed. In many regions, the state was absent. Power resided with the president of the PC branches and, to a second degree, with Church parishes. In other words, it provides a rationale as to why these local actors were key to understanding political dynamics in Paraguay. Far from being static, the countryside has experienced over the years significant transformations. Most of all, many peasants migrated into new territories therefore creating new problems including the disruption of pre-existing patterns of authority. This process opened a window of opportunity for the Church to forsake its traditional political neutrality and defend the rights and liberties of peasants in rural areas. It also coincided with "the gradual erosion of the rural base of support of the Colorado Party" (Abente, 1999: 48-49). Ultimately, the presence of competing forces in the countryside contributed to political instability in the 1990s and so forth.

Conclusion

For very long, the backbone of the regime's stability was the support of military officers in the capital and the Colorado Party *seccionales* (local branches) in the countryside. The former was maintaining unity within the Colorado Party, dissuading opposition parties from rebelling and overthrowing the ruling elites. The latter was linking peasants in rural areas to politicians in Congress not on the basis of ideological or organizational ties but through personal affiliation. This alliance has fostered stability especially during the hegemonic authoritarian period (1954-1989); a period of various economic cycles but still characterized by underdevelopment in terms of industrialization achievements. The end of the Stroessner era brought the emergence of a competitive authoritarian regime (1990-2008). Opposition parties became more assertive,

while military officers refused to relinquish their privileged position in the system. Military officers disdain for party politics made their cooperation in a multiparty coalition highly problematic. Simultaneously, socio-economic transformations in rural areas were favoring the emergence of new political actors in the countryside, namely the Catholic priests.

Figure 11 – Paraguay Timeline



Thus, the two decades after the fall of Stroessner are symptomatic of a competition between old and new social groups and the (re) composition of a winning ruling coalition still in the making. Instability was generated by the inability of the ruling elites to form a ruling coalition in accordance with the prevailing context: that is to attract the support of the Church and opposition parties, a strategy that the current President Lugo used with the success we know. Overall, the dynamics of political alliances in relation to patterns of stability and instability have been coherent with our theory.

The case of Paraguay is also instructive for six reasons. First, instability during the autocratic period (1945-53) was caused by the absence of a dominant party and fell outside our framework; in the other periods a dominant party was present. Second, the regime change from hegemonic authoritarianism to competitive authoritarianism raises an interesting issue: military exclusion from the ruling coalition generated instability in a competitive authoritarian regime. We think this deviation from our ideal-type is mostly due to a transitional period in the 1990s. By the 2000s, military officers were less and less a factor in political dynamics. Third, our framework yields mitigated outputs in regard to the period from 1998 to 2008 when no

political crisis occurred, but political alliances were in disarray. Maybe the assassination of Argaña had somewhat traumatized the country and frozen so to speak political conflicts. It is difficult to say. However, this should be put into perspective: explaining 50 out of 60 years of political history is a good record in social sciences. Fourth, compared to the Senegalese case, the profile of local leaders takes a different form and most importantly, the countryside is host of competing political forces. In this sense, local leaders are a polymorph social group. It should not be envisioned and portrayed as one of a kind set of actors. Yet, as with Senegal, religion is an essential piece of the puzzle. Fifth, the relevance of the state penetration variable is contingent to a relative dispersion of the population across the territory. To be honest, before 1970s, the initial impact of local leaders on the prospect of stability is unclear because of the demographic concentration around the center. Finally, the case also reveals the difficulty of detecting patterns of political alliances in a system based on personalism. Individuals not organizations become the main unit of analysis, and even in a small country like Paraguay, they are many influential elites. Dynamics become highly idiosyncratic and predictions are hazardous. In this sense, the role of Stroessner as a stabilizing force can simply not be ignored. In other words, the application of our theory should be more probative when organized social groups exist.

Conclusion

Our thesis presents a theory that we hope will enable academics and policy makers to better analyze the phenomenon of political alliances in hybrid regimes and what it does to the stability or instability of these regimes. It focuses on the development of a framework that integrates what we consider to be the ideal-type conditions of stability and formulates a rationale to explain why hybrid regimes experience periods of stability and instability in a diverse institutional context. This diversity is expressed through two fundamental macro-processes: types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development. In examining variations along those lines, four social groups stand out: military officers, opposition parties, state bureaucrats and local leaders. They are key stakeholders. They are the ones capable of disrupting the functioning of government activities and even of signing the death sentence of a dominant-party hybrid regime. Hence, for the ruling elites, obtaining their support is paramount. To connect the dots and give meaning to our framework, we introduce two variables: the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration. The former tells us why military officers or opposition parties are connected to a specific type of hybrid regime (hegemonic authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism) and the latter why state bureaucrats or local leaders are connected to a specific level of economic development (developing or underdeveloped economy).

We illustrate our theory using four empirical cases: Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. Below, we will compare results between these four case studies to assess the coherence of our analytical framework. We will also outline trends in regard to stability and instability in hybrid regimes, and draw attention on policy implications. We will examine explanations of hybrid regime stability pertaining to the economic and organizational approaches and how they hold up in regard to our case studies while highlighting our own scientific contribution. And finally, we will evoke the limits of our theory and how our thesis opens-up new research avenues.

Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes: Empirical Findings

Our case studies share one major characteristic: in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, the ruling elites never governed alone during hybrid periods and getting the right mix of support was for all of them the key to hold the regime. They attracted dominant social groups that negotiated their way in the ruling coalition: that is to say, they could choose to support the ruling elites or challenge them. In each case however, political alliances differ in terms of their composition. The matrix we developed enables us to understand why and how.

Being one of the most studied hybrid regimes, the Malaysian case served as the point of departure; it is the first building block of our theory. In reading the specialized literature on the country political and economic history, all eyes were pointing to the determinant role of the dominant party: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). More than its mere presence, country experts were stressing its ability to co-opt opposition parties as well as civil servants into a ruling coalition, the *Barisan Nasional* (BN), that had been the basis of political stability in Malaysia. The event-history narrative corroborates it. Instability was largely related to the difficulty for the ruling elites to select the “right” opposition parties in a society marked by antagonistic cleavages and the challenge of powerful bureaucrats. Indeed, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) were two major opposition parties who held irreconcilable views. Ideally, the two should have been included. In reality, a choice had to be made since no coalition would have survived with both in. Razaleigh and Anwar were two career bureaucrats and high-profile politicians who headed important ministry portfolios and had extensive networks in the public administration. Following their exclusion from the ruling coalition, they were at the center of recent turmoil, and in the case of Anwar he still is.

The depiction of Malaysian political dynamics was so convincing that we could not help but to wonder whether these could be found in other countries. We immediately turned to its neighbor, Indonesia, and quickly realized that the Malaysian recipe for success could not be applied in Indonesia. So, of course, the next question was why? What were the differences between the two countries? The first observation was that evidently the political regime, the

degree of violence and the involvement of the military establishment in politics were not at all the same.

Elections in Malaysia were competitive, relatively free but unfair given that the government was using with impunity state resources for partisan ends. In Indonesia during the Suharto era, elections were barely competitive, certainly not free and fair. The legislative branch and opposition parties were a creation of the President. They were competing in the People's Consultative Assembly but were all obeying to Suharto; a model later emulated by leaders like Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Thus, we were facing different types of hybrid regimes: Malaysia (1969-today) was a competitive authoritarian regime and Indonesia (1965-1998) was a hegemonic authoritarian one. Also, besides the communist guerrilla in the 1950s, Malaysia was shielded from the bloodshed and atrocities of civil conflicts so recurrent in Southeast Asia and notably in Indonesia. Indeed, civil wars raged almost continuously in the biggest archipelagic country in the world: in West Papua (1965-84), East Timor (1975-98) and Aceh (1990-2005). Finally, there is almost no mention what so ever of the military in the literature on the political history of Malaysia whereas in the Indonesian case, every publication cites the Indonesian National Armed Forces (ABRI).

That being said, both countries share one major characteristic: they are developing countries, not underdeveloped ones. Differences between non-western countries are as important as those between non-western countries and advanced industrialized nations. No one would dispute the fact that Germany and Malaysia could hardly be put in the same basket, but the same can be said of China and Senegal. Of course, the Malaysian economic structure is more diverse and more industrialized than the one of Indonesia. Nonetheless, Indonesia has made giant leaps forward over the years and can be considered an emerging economy in its own right. The valued added of the industrial sector in Malaysia and Indonesia has reached roughly 40% of GDP in the early 1980s (World Development Indicators, 2012). Furthermore, in both cases, the state has been an active agent of modernization. Public investments in the economy were representing close to 40% of total investments in both Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1970s-80s (Economic Freedom in the World, 2012).

These observations, differences and similitudes, provided the groundwork to build our theory. The focus on type of regime and level of economic development as well as on social dominant groups came from our critical assessment. Yet, we needed a rationale to link specific social groups to the type of regime and level of economic development in order to produce a coherent framework. The comparison of Malaysia and Indonesia forced us to ask: why should opposition parties be associated to competitive authoritarian regimes besides the obvious tautological explanation that it is because they are allowed to enter the party system? And by the same token, why should the military officers be associated to a hegemonic authoritarian regime? The degree of extra-legal organized violence provides that link. A low level creates an environment that is conducive to the active participation of political parties and the maintenance of a competitive authoritarian regime. Inversely, a high level creates an environment that is conducive to the intervention of military officers in politics and the preservation of a hegemonic authoritarian regime.

The event-history of political crises in Indonesia demonstrates how central the military officers were to the ruling party Golkar during the hegemonic authoritarian period (1965-1998). When they supported the ruling elites, stability was ensured; and when they challenged them, like after the Petition of Fifty in 1980, instability followed. Their influence penetrated the government, the state and the economy. In a sense, state bureaucrats were also key allies of the ruling elites because they were military officers, at least until the 1980s. This overlap between social groups reinforced the influence of military officers on the outcome, i.e. stability of the regime. However, later on, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) under the wing of Habibie increased its presence in the civil administration. They acted as a counterweight to ABRI and even infiltrated it, as influential Muslim leaders such as General Sudharmono were nominated to high-ranking positions. This competition, both within the military and the state bureaucracy and between the Red/White (military nationalist) and Green (Islamic bureaucrats) factions, was supposed to weaken them and allow Suharto to preserve his authority: applying the old adage “divide and rule”. Yet, in the process, Suharto favored the Green faction to the detriment of the Red/White one. Ultimately, the Red/White faction rebelled, defected to the opposition and supported the democratic movement that included the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and student associations in ousting Suharto.

The binary cases of Malaysia and Indonesia elucidate a problem raised in the literature review: that is, what is the difference between political dynamics found in competitive authoritarian regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Still, in its actual form, our framework had limited capacity for generalization since both countries were developing ones while many hybrid regimes are poor with an economy based on a mono-crop export model. Thus, to refine our theory, there was a need to include two other cases: underdeveloped countries. Sub-Saharan Africa being an obvious region to look at, we made the choice of Senegal (in accordance with our case selection criteria). The last case we thought could be in Latin America where there are few underdeveloped countries and we selected Paraguay. As we said before, it was important to include as much diversification as we can.

During the period between 1960 and 2010, the value added of the industrial sector in Senegal and Paraguay was approximately 20% of GDP¹⁰¹, 20% less than in Malaysia and Indonesia. The economy of Senegal was oriented toward the peanut production and the one of Paraguay toward the soybeans and cotton production. Malaysia and Indonesia could benefit from a substantive rent from the oil-state companies, Petronas and Pertamina respectively. Still, there exportation also included electronic appliances and other manufacturing products. The state presence in the economy was highly volatile in Senegal and Paraguay, reflecting an absence of direction and poor economic development plans if any.

Table XIV – State Investment in the Economy (% of Gross Investment)

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Malaysia	32.3	37.6	37.3	46.8	33.8	28.4	47.0	49.9	52.4
Indonesia	40.4	39.4	49.5	43.0	32.5	20.7	20.7	20.7	n.a.
Senegal	32.1	19.8	32.2	18.2	22.6	21.5	20.1	33.6	36.2
Paraguay	27.0	21.1	17.8	31.4	13.3	23.2	35.7	35.7	n.a.

Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012

¹⁰¹ In Paraguay, the construction of the huge Itaipú Dam in the 1970s altered macro-economic indicators. Hence, the value added of the industrial sector in the 1980s was close to 30% for only this decade. For Senegal, there is no data available on this indicator during the 1960s-70s.

For instances, in Paraguay the share of state investment in the economy represented 31.4% in 1985 and 13.3 % in 1990. In Senegal, the same aggregates equated 32.2% in 1980 and 18.2% in 1985. On average, the Senegalese and Paraguayan states were responsible of 26% of total investment whereas in Malaysia it was 41%, and in Indonesia 37% during the hybrid period. Thus, it is fair to say that Senegal and Paraguay were not at all at the same level of development than Malaysia and Indonesia and that the state in the two groups did not play the same role.

Far from being an exact replica of each other, Senegal and Paraguay however had different types of hybrid regimes and degrees of extra-legal organized violence. The Senegalese hybrid regime was a competitive authoritarian one, except from 1967 to 1976, when the *Parti Socialiste* was the sole party in the party system. Otherwise, elections were competitive and relatively free, but the government benefited from a decisive advantage: the Electoral Commission was packed by its sympathizers allowing ballot tampering, such as ballot stuffing and multiple voting, to go unpunished. Also, the independent media, especially radio and television outlets, were almost non-existent. In Paraguay, the hybrid regime went through two distinct phases. The first, during the Stroessner's years was a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Like in Indonesia, the legislative branch (after 1962) was a democratic façade. Direct elections with universal suffrage were held on a regular basis but Stroessner was deciding arbitrarily which parties could enter the party system. Civil liberties such as freedom of association and political rights such as organization of party meetings were heavily restricted. The second phase saw significant openings. Opposition parties were free to register and recruit, media outlets were expressing a diversity of opinions, and associational autonomy was guaranteed. Nevertheless, it was not an electoral democracy given the systematic intervention of military officers in the political process, notably through voter intimidation. As for degree of extra-legal organized violence, Senegal was exempted from the general upheaval prevailing in neighboring countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia. The low-intensity conflict in Casamance remains a drop in the ocean; especially considering the fact that the conflict was located in a reclusive and nearly separated region split by Gambia. Inversely, in Paraguay, a bloody civil

war erupted in 1947 and lasted about a year. And for much of the 1960s-70s, guerrilla outbursts regularly occurred in the countryside.

The stability in Senegal was therefore related to the capacity of the ruling elites to co-opt opposition parties and local leaders. The 1980s were the most unstable and coincided with the decade when the ruling coalition did not include any member of the opposition parties. The ruling coalition took different forms depending on who was the incumbent: a unified party absorbing all opposition parties under Senghor (1966-1978); an enlarged presidential majority attributing cabinet positions to the opposition under Diouf (1991-2000) and the multiparty Sopi coalition under Wade (2000-2010). In itself, the relation between the ruling elites and opposition parties is incomplete to explain political dynamics in Senegal. The support of local leaders was determinant. Indeed, without the marabouts controlling a significant portion of the peanut agricultural outputs and trading operations, the demise of the ruling elites was inevitable. Precisely, when these local leaders decided to stop endorsing in mass the ruling elites in 2000, the latter lost power.

As for Paraguay, stability was manifest when the ruling elites allied with the military officers and local leaders in a coalition dubbed a “granitic unity”. After Stroessner, the military became divided about who should rule next and what kind of political interaction should be promoted. The most powerful military faction repeatedly challenged the authority of the ruling elites and brought instability. Furthermore although local leaders were members in good standing of the ruling party Colorado (*seccionales* or local branch), they were above all patrons of a community, not representatives of a party responsible for transmitting an ideological or programmatic platform. Again, the post-Stroessner era offers a contrasting picture. What was once domination in the countryside became the battlefield of intense rivalry – mostly between *seccionales* presidents and Church priests, but also Liberal local party bosses – for the heart and mind of peasants. Without the support of most military officers and declining support in rural areas, instability was looming large. The Colorado Party was defeated in 2008 after sixty-two years in power to a former Catholic Bishop, Fernando Lugo, and his multiparty coalition.

The above reviews the political dynamics found in our four case studies. Overall, each country helps us examine the multiple ramifications of our theory in concrete terms. It offers an accurate yet parsimonious narrative of the political history of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. The cases support our argument that although conflicts about the rules of the game in hybrid regimes – which defines its very nature – are frequent, they are not constant; and these conflicts converge in the ruling coalition. They are periods of instability and periods of appeasement. As long as the ruling coalition reflects dominant social groups, the regime remains stable and ruling elites have the authority to govern. As the empirical material exposes, dominant social groups sometimes contest and defy the ruling elites. Hence, *contra* to autocratic regimes, the ruling elites in hybrid regimes do not have full control of the system of representation. Thus, alliance politics become central to their survival.

Political Stability and Instability in Hybrid Regimes

A synthesis of periods of stability and instability reveals interesting variations between Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. As we will see, the differences in number of political crises, their intensity and the duration of periods of stability reflect the importance of institutions and social groups, which reinforce the relevance of our theory and the necessity of focusing on political alliances.

At first glance, Malaysia looks like the most troubled country with thirteen political crises followed by Indonesia, Paraguay and Senegal with eleven, nine and seven political crises respectively. Hence, the least-developed countries appear to be punctuated with fewer destabilizing events than the more developed ones. It confirms that stability in hybrid regimes is not the prerogative of well-to-do nations. Obviously, the contention here is not to say that poor countries are more stable than rich ones. We only stress that economic development *per se* is not a factor of stability/instability. It needs to be supported by the following considerations: which social groups does a given economic situation empower and what kind of interactions do these social groups have with the ruling elites?

Table XV – Frequency and Intensity of Political Crises and Duration of the Longest Period of Stability

	Number of Crises	Number of High Intensity Crises	Longest Period of Stability (in years)
Malaysia	13	3	22
Indonesia	11	5	33
Senegal	7	4	19
Paraguay	9	8	31

Senegal and Paraguay are also the two countries with the smallest population. Implicitly, it should mean that the number of political crises is also a function of its population size. The larger the population, the more likely the number of political crises will increase. Intuitively, it seems right: the more political interactions there are, the more likely friction can occur. For instance, Senegal has a population of 12 millions and Nigeria of 160 millions; and Nigeria is a lot more unstable than Senegal. Yet, Indonesia is by far the most populous country among our four cases and had less political crises than Malaysia. The answer to this puzzle is that again social groups matter. It is not so much the size of the population that should be factored in, but what are the main societal cleavages and how these cleavages intersect in relation to political alliances. There are more inimical cleavages in Malaysia than in Indonesia. In the former, there are ethnic, religious, regional and class divisions; in the latter, the fracture is mostly concentrated and visible along religious and regional lines¹⁰².

Similarly, the geography of crises also reveals that many of those that occurred in Malaysia and Indonesia were located in the periphery; in Senegal and Paraguay, much of the instability was located in the capital. While the political geography is intimately related to the extent the central state has resources, we also demonstrate that weak states can also be politically stable. It goes down to our contention: what should matter is to know whom a weak or strong state

¹⁰² Although both countries have a Chinese community, in Malaysia, the political activity of this ethnic group is much more organized than in Indonesia and in relative terms it represents a larger segment of the population than in Indonesia.

empowers and what kind of interactions the dominant social groups have with the ruling elites. Otherwise, the relation is spurious.

Of course, the difference between the numbers of crises is not that great; we need to be careful about inferences. The point here is simply to highlight the significance of social groups in understanding patterns of stability and instability. Hypotheses based on linear covariance miss the point. The meaning of any level of economic development or state strength on the dynamics of stability and instability is not found in its sheer value, but in its impact on the balance of power between social groups.

That being said, the number of political crises should be compared to the number of high intensity crises. In this regard, Paraguay has the greatest number of high intensity crises among our four cases with eight, followed by Indonesia, Senegal and Malaysia with five, four and three. Hence, Malaysia who has the larger number of political crises has the fewer high intensity crises and in Paraguay the relation is almost inverted (Senegal having the smallest number of political crises). Malaysia and Paraguay are the day and night in terms of state repression. Malaysia has used punctuated and targeted means of repression mostly directed at political elites. In the 1960s-70s, state repression in Paraguay was systematic. No one was exempted from it and the level of violence was close to the one of a totalitarian state. Overall if we would have to classify our four countries on a continuum of political regimes, Paraguay (1954-1989) would be much closer to an autocratic regime on the extreme left and Malaysia (1970-2010) to a democratic regime on the extreme right; whereas Indonesia (1965-1998) could fit into the center left space and Senegal (1976-2010) into the center right one. Thus, within the boundaries of hybrid regimes, the more autocratic a regime is the more likely it will experience high intensity crises, and the more democratic a regime is the more likely it will experience low intensity crises. Since we work with a relatively small sample, generalizations should however be interpreted with caution.

Nonetheless, more than the autocratic propensities, high intensity crises in our samples are often the by-product of military intervention in politics as an autonomous power. In hybrid regimes, because military officers have significant coercive instruments at their disposal

compared to other social groups and because they are the main actors of *coup d'État* – which is one of the highest intensity events in our definition of stability – the distribution of high intensity crises among our four cases is coherent. Furthermore, the difference in high intensity crises between Paraguay and Indonesia can be explained by the absence of a military institution in Paraguay. There is no such thing as ABRI in Paraguay, an overarching organization that functions as a kind of a pressure group. Power-hungry generals in Paraguay were not contained by any rules, besides their own ambition.


Also, high intensity crises in Malaysia (1965, 1969 and 1988) were provoked by political elites followed by the civil society while in Senegal, high intensity crises (especially in 1969 and 1988) appeared to be triggered by the civil society with the support of political elite afterward. The direction of the relation between political parties and civil society can be explained by the extension of political party activities. In Malaysia, political parties are everywhere, from the tiniest villages to urban centers. They penetrate every association. By analogy, they act as a conductor of social affairs. In Senegal, political parties were largely confined to the capital and to a very small circle of privileged elites. In this case, the impulse of social demands came from the bottom.

In a nutshell, the number of political crises tends to be related to the level of economic development and the degree of state penetration; and the intensity of political crises to the type of hybrid regime and the degree of extra-legal organized violence.

This conclusion should be balanced by the fact that the evolution of the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration display different trajectories in our four case studies. The above diagrams illustrate the trend of our two variables in each country. In Malaysia and Senegal, the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration have been fairly constant over time. In Indonesia, the degree of state penetration increased significantly whereas in Paraguay a sharp drop after the 1970s outlines the tendency in extra-legal organized violence. These changes in Indonesia and Paraguay imply a transfer of authority between social groups. In Indonesia, the need to gain the support of military officers was clear but the choice between local leaders and state bureaucrats was elusive until the mid-

1970s. In Paraguay, the necessity to co-opt local leaders was always evident, but in the 1990s-2000s the ambivalence between including military officers or opposition parties in the ruling coalition was tangible. It mirrors a change in the distribution of resources and structure of opportunities, augmenting the likelihood of conflicts. High intensity crises in Paraguay and Indonesia could therefore be apprehended amongst others by the transition from one ideal-type to another.

Figure 12 – Trends in Extra-Legal Organized Violence and State Penetration



Note: OV = Extra-Legal Organized Violence; SP = State Penetration

Finally, the examination of the duration of periods of stability highlights marked differences. By period of stability, we mean the longest interval between two high intensity crises. In

Indonesia, it lasted 33 years (1965-1998); in Paraguay 31 years (1958-1989); in Malaysia 22 years (1988-today); and in Senegal 19 years (1969-1988). All the above periods took place after 1960; reducing the potential significance of a temporal effect¹⁰³. Hence, hegemonic authoritarian regimes have longer period of stability than competitive authoritarian regimes. The country narrative provides an indication as why it is the case. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes, the military tends to “freeze” the alliance by increasing the cost of defection. It has the means to make a defector paid a steep price for his challenge of the ruling elites. In competitive authoritarian regimes, alliances are more fluid. Opposition parties come and go. The cost of being excluded from the ruling coalition is high but not as high as in hegemonic authoritarian regimes.

The policy implications of our analysis are twofold. First, instability is more likely to crop up in a developing country governed by a competitive authoritarian regime, but the intensity of political crises will tend to be moderate. Political dynamics fluctuate within an acceptable and predictable range. Stability will be more likely observed in an underdeveloped country governed by a hegemonic authoritarian regime, but the intensity of political crises will tend to be acute. Political dynamics are constant over a long period but suddenly witness an abrupt and overhaul transformation, indicating higher volatility. Thus, political risks multiply. Any investment by foreign donors, private companies or multilateral agencies should include these various windows of opportunity and plan accordingly.

Second, ultimately what matters in hybrid regimes is less the rules of the game than who are the stakeholders. Hybrid regimes are characterized by institutional volatility. Yet, instability in the rules of the game is offset by the stability in patterns of political alliances. In other words, the ruling elites in hybrid regimes frequently alter laws pertaining to the electoral and party systems as long as they have the support of dominant social groups. Close contact and exchanges with these groups is thus fundamental in influencing the trajectory of a polity and social dynamics.

¹⁰³ The period covered for Indonesia and Paraguay is about 15 years longer than Malaysia and Senegal; it increases the probability to find a longer period of stability in the two former cases.

Competing Explanations: Economic and Organizational Approaches

In no way do we pretend that our theory eclipses all others and invalidates all what we know so far about conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes. As we have said before but worth repeating, we aim at knowledge accumulation. However, it is relevant to examine how the competing explanations perform in regard to our cases. The idea is to assess briefly if the problems we raised in Chapter One find their empirical manifestation in our four case studies in order to seal the deal in terms of justifying the four countries we selected and the theory we formulated.

Magaloni mostly focuses on how public spending affects electoral outcome. It is undeniable; in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, the state has tied the attribution of grants, subsidies and a like to loyal constituencies. However, there is a variation. Not all of these countries could afford to implement in a systematic way such strategy of co-optation. More precisely, Magaloni's explanation rests on resource endowment. The state has to spoil a large number of constituencies given that the ruling elites usually muster an overwhelming share of the votes and voters in a given constituency are all voting for the same candidate. Hence, when resources are scarce, instability is on the horizon. Our analysis of Senegal and Paraguay demonstrates that stability is possible even when the state has limited resources. In underdeveloped countries, the ruling elites spoil an individual who has followers instead of the entire community. In other words, there are different types of patronage: one that is based on elites and one that is based on the mass. In developing economies, the ruling elites may use both; but in underdeveloped economies, they tend to use mostly elite forms of patronage, which is of course much cheaper. Also, the case of Paraguay illustrates that focusing on elites is more efficient in a context where constituencies are equally divided between different candidates. The president of *seccionales* was distributing favors only among his followers, instead of the ruling elites buying off the entire community, as it is the case with mass forms of patronage. Our framework integrates these analytical inputs: it is the difference between patterns of political alliances based on state bureaucrats (mass) or local leaders (elites).

Greene's theory highlights the importance of the state control of the economy in order to dispense jobs to loyal supporters and the destabilizing effect of privatization. In all our cases, the state is often the main employer. While it is true that job cuts in the civil administration create grievances and in some cases precipitate rallies in the capital, it is not all that clear how it is connected to political instability. After all, in our four cases, the government was – except in rare occasions – still functioning and the ruling elites remained in power; both in a context of state control and state retreat of the economy. Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay underwent a privatization process but none of them conducted the reforms according to the rule of law in a transparent and accountable fashion. As the process of privatization varies from one country to another, so is its impact on stability. The bottom line is that in our four case studies, the privatization process served as an instrument of patronage fostering stability instead of provoking instability. Furthermore, more than anything what should count is if strategic state-owned companies were privatized. In this regard, state-oil companies in Malaysia and Indonesia remained in the firm hands of the ruling elites. Thus, although some political crises may be explained by the retreat of the state from the economy, our critical assessment of Greene's theory clearly surfaces. The correlation proposed by the latter could be complemented by considerations about how stability is maintained in a weak state, which is one dimension of our theory: that is, by obtaining the support of local leaders in exchange of relative autonomy over the economic life of a given region.

Brownlee stresses the crucial initial phase during which the ruling elites eliminate rival contenders. Later on, he pinpoints the positive impact of institutionalizing rules governing elite's interaction, especially in regard to promotion and succession, on stability. At the beginning of each country narrative, we indeed report intense conflicts visible in terms of number and/or intensity of political crises. Yet, the only case where clear rules regarding professional advancement existed was in Malaysia and the one that had basically no rules at all was Paraguay. Yet, both countries experienced serious internal elite divisions. Paraguay had overcome these divisions until the defeat of the Colorado Party in 2008 and Malaysia the same until the UMNO lost the two-third majority in 2008. In Senegal, rules related to internal management of the *Parti Socialiste* were changing constantly without dire consequences except in 2000 with Diouf's defeat. Indonesia somewhat confirms Brownlee's expectation.

The absence of rules and the succession crisis – related to Suharto’s future as head of state – precipitated the exit of Golkar from power. Thus, rule-based explanations appear to have little bearing on the outcome in hybrid regimes. It recaptures our argument that these conditions may be more probative in one-party autocratic regimes whereas in hybrid regimes institutional volatility is the hallmark. Here, our theory fills the void. It is not rules that should matter but patterns of political alliances. This is the source of stability in hybrid regimes.

Levitsky & Way’s thesis centers on the existence of a cohesive and extensive party machine and coercive apparatus. Malaysia and Indonesia are probably the cases that score the highest in all these categories and indeed they remained stable for a very long period while being a competitive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian regime respectively. In Paraguay, the Colorado Party had an extensive reach all across the territory but was not cohesive (except during the 1970s) despite the fact that its elites were sharing a common historic and ethnic background¹⁰⁴. Nevertheless, it survived for sixty years. Thus, the respective weight of cohesion versus extension of the ruling party is ambiguous. Furthermore, in the light of the Paraguay case, one might wonder if what really matters is the presence of a cohesive and extensive coercive force regardless of the ruling party features. Finally, stability also occurred in Senegal, which is a country where these indicators were not present. In sum, the inner working of Levitsky & Way’s theory could benefit from further specifications. And these could be explored through our theory. Indeed, the variation between the dominant party and coercive apparatus capacities and their respective significance should be understood in terms of differences between types of hybrid regimes: that is, between competitive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. In a context where opposition parties are a dominant social group, the ruling party capacities should be neuralgic; and where military officers are a dominant social group, coercive capacities come first.

¹⁰⁴ The same can be said about its main rival the Liberal Party.

Limits of our Theory

Our theory has obvious limits. We wish to highlight three of them. The first is the parameters we define in Chapter One and Two. The dynamics found in city-states or small states with a population of less than a million obey to a different logic than others states. Similarly, the context prevailing before 1945 was so different compared to the post-World War II environment that we could not expect to detect the same recurring patterns in both. Lastly, countries geographically close to western powers are excluded because in these cases international factors should play a decisive role whereas the crux of our theory is on domestic factors. Nevertheless, it leaves us with plenty of cases to work it (see appendix 1). Second, we propose a middle-range theory of hybrid regime stability, not a general theory of hybrid regime or a total theory of regime stability, not even of hybrid regime stability. On one hand, we do not pretend to explain why a hybrid regime will fall back into an autocratic regime or embark into a democratic transition, or what are the conditions of stability in autocratic or democratic regimes. We are only concerned with hybrid regime stability and instability *per se*. On the other hand, our theory is not either an absolute theory of hybrid regime stability: that is, it is sufficient to explain all outcomes. For instance, the American support to Suharto and Stroessner or French support to Senegal had an impact on regime stability. Similarly, it is undeniable that personal traits played a role in the event-history of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. Mahathir, Suharto, Senghor and Stroessner are charismatic and skilled leaders who have proved to be masters in navigating their way out of many political crises. The bottom line is that macro (international) and micro (individual) factors are part of the equation but the meso level (national) is the key to apprehend both. It is the filter that allows us to see clearly the complexity of what is going on in a given country. Third, one should recall that our definition of stability is based on elite consent of the government; which is one dimension of legitimacy. When they withdraw their support, paralysis of government activities ensues. In an ideal world, we should have examined the impact of citizens' attitudes on the conduct of government affairs. Yet, as we argued in Chapter One, this is problematic given the absence of longitudinal data on the subject in non-western countries. Nevertheless, we also articulate a rationale as why it should not prevent us from studying stability as we define it. It

has to do with the fact that elite consent depends on the inclusion of dominant social groups in a ruling coalition.

Future Research

The present thesis, we hope, is only the beginning of an exciting research program. It should lead to iterated testing and hypothesis specification, and stimulate innovative thinking on other dimensions related to the fascinating subfield of hybrid regimes.

To move forward, we should test our theory and see how it performs in the sixty cases of hybrid regimes we identified (see appendix 1). Although we believe our theory helps us understand the political dynamics found in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, these cases are by no means representative of all hybrid regimes. In this sense, the validity of our theory remains to be tested. *A priori*, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Morocco, Kuwait and Nicaragua are prime candidates given that the hybrid regime in these countries has survived, according to Freedom House, for almost 40 years and maybe more. Morocco and Kuwait represent hard cases because of the role of the monarchy, which is not explicitly addressed by our framework. Nevertheless, it could yield valuable insights and contribute to the refinement of our hypotheses. Other hard cases are those that challenge our expectations. One example is Egypt. It could be especially revealing since while it cannot be considered an underdeveloped country, local leaders appear to have had throughout history a decisive say in political outcomes. Far from refuting our framework, contradictions may be resolved in working on the specification of hypotheses. Although we prefer studying the political history of hybrid regimes, our theory can also be used to understand single events. For instance, the comparison of political crises in Honduras (2009), Pakistan (2009), Georgia (2009) and Nigeria (2010) could be valuable insofar as they all happened the same year or so¹⁰⁵. Detecting differences and similitudes in these cases based on our matrix should contribute to deepen our understanding of patterns of political alliances in hybrid regimes.

¹⁰⁵ According to Freedom House, all these countries were hybrid regimes during the year of the crisis.

Furthermore, the use of an alternative methodology could participate in strengthening the empirical proof. First, in our case studies, the link between extra-legal organized violence and types of hybrid regimes as well as the link between state penetration and economic development is corroborated. Nevertheless, they could be tested with a larger sample and be the object of a statistical analysis. Second, and more importantly, although we integrate informal institutions such as those under the control of local leaders and, more broadly, clientelism in our theory and in our country narrative, we recognize that its treatment in the latter could benefit from additional research especially ethnographic studies in the form of interviews. It could enrich and complement our theory by unraveling unwritten or unrecorded processes of political alliances and cooptation arrangements. It could contribute to a more fine-grained analysis of the interaction between informal and formal institutions as well as of the historical development of institution building. In doing so, we could better study the reciprocal influence of the dominant social groups in their relation to the ruling elites.

Finally, the thesis identifies conditions of hybrid regime stability and instability. It leaves open the political trajectory, especially a transition to a democratic regime. The literature on this subject pinpoints the importance of the opposition coalition in bringing about a change of regime. A core question should be a coalition between who – who's in, who's out – the same question that was at the origin of this research but in the context of the ruling coalition. Moving further in the search for a better understanding of political dynamics at stake in developing countries, this research question needs to be on tomorrow's agenda.

Bibliography

Abente, Diego. 1999. Stronism, Post-Stronismo, and the Prospects for Democratization. *The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies*, Working Paper #119.

Abente, Diego. 1995. A Party System in Transition. In *Building Democratic Institutions - Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Abente-Brun, Diego. 2009. Paraguay: The Unraveling of One-Party Rule. *Journal of Democracy* 20 (1): 143-156.

Acemoglu, Daron & James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adelman, Irma & Cynthia Taft Morris. 1973. *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

African Elections Database. 2012. *Elections in Senegal*. Available at: <http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html> Accessed May 9th, 2012.

Ahmad, Abdullah Sanusi B. 1997. Public Administration Reforms in Malaysia: A Developing Country Perspective. In *Governance: Promoting Sound Development Management*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Ake, Claude. 1975. A Definition of Political Stability. *Comparative Politics* 7 (2): 271-283.

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 1995. *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Alexander, Marcus. 2008. Democratization and Hybrid Regimes: Comparative Evidence from Southeast Europe. *East European Politics and Societies* 22 (4): 928-954.

Alexander, Marcus. 2004. Dynamics of Oppression: Survival of Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes. In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*. Chicago.

Almond, Gabriel A. & James S. Coleman, eds. 1960. *Politics and Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel & Robert J. Mundt. 1973. Crisis, Choice, and Change: Tentative Conclusions. In *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development*, edited by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Anckar, Dag. 2006. Islandness or Smallness? A Comparative Look at Political Institutions in

Small Island States. *Island Studies Journal* 1 (1): 43-54.

Anderson, Benedict R. 2006. *Java in A time of Revolution - Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*. Jakarta: PT Equinox Publishing.

Archer, Ronald P. 1995. Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy. In *Building Democratic Institutions - Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Armony, Ariel C. & Hector E. Schamis. 2005. Babel in Democratization Studies. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (4): 113-128.

Asher, William. 1984. *Scheming for the Poor - The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aspinall, Edward. 2005. *Opposing Suharto - Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Balans, Jean-Louis, Christian Coulon & Jean-Marc Gastellu. 1975. *Autonomie locale et intégration nationale au Sénégal*. Paris: Pedone.

Baldwin, Kate. 2011. When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs and Coalition-Building in Africa. In *Working Papers 130: Afrobarometer*.

Banks, Arthur S. & Robert B. Textor. 1963. *A Cross-Polity Survey*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Barisan Nasional, Official Website. Available at: <http://www.bn.org.my> . Accessed November 4th, 2011.

Bates, Robert H, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal & Barry R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bayart, Jean-François. 2009. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, Linda J. 1999. Senegal's Enlarged Presidential Majority: Deepening Democracy or Detour? In *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, edited by Richard Joseph. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer & Patrick Walsh. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (1): 165-176.

Beetham, David. 1994. Conditions for Democratic Consolidation. *Review of African Political Economy* 21 (60): 157-172.

- Beetham, David. 1991. *Legitimation of Power*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Bendel, Petra. 1999. Senegal. In *Elections in Africa - A Data Handbook*, edited by Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich and Bernhard Thibaut. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2008. Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt. In *Conference on Dictatorships*. Princeton University.
- Bogaards, Matthijs. 2009. How to Classify Hybrid Regime? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism. *Democratization* 16 (2): 399-423.
- Boix, Charles & Milan Svolik. 2010. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorship. *Working Paper Series*, Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352065>.. Accessed September 8th, 2011.
- Boon, Kheng Cheach. 2002. *Malaysia: The Making of a Nation*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Borda, Dionisio. 1997. Economic Policy. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Boudon, Raymond & François Bourricaud. 2004. *Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Bouvier, Virginia Marie. 1988. *Decline of the Dictator: Paraguay at a Crossroads*. Washington D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America.
- Boye, François. 1992. Les mécanismes économiques en perspective. In *Sénégal: Trajectoires d'un État*, edited by Moman Coumba Diop. Dakar/Paris: Codesria/Kathala.
- Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa - Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, Michael & Nicolas van de Walle. 1994. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa. *World Politics* 46 (4): 453-489.
- Briguglio, Lino, Gordon Cordina, Nadia Farrugia & Constance Vigilance, eds.. 2008. *Small States and The Pillars of Economic Resilience*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
- Brooker, Paul. 2000. *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Brownlee, Jason. 2009. Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions. *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (3): 515-532.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brynen, Rex. 1995. The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25 (1): 23-36.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie J. 2000. Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations. *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7): 703-734.
- Bunce, Valerie J. & Sharon L. Wolchik. 2010. Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. *World Politics* 62 (1): 43-86.
- Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther & John Higley. 1992. Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes. In *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, edited by John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Byman, Daniel & Stephen Van Evera. 1998. Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict. *Security Studies* 7 (3): 1-50.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2007. A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 18 (4): 112-115.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2004. *Critical Mission. Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (1): 5-21.
- Case, William. 2001. Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy. *Journal of Democracy* 12 (1): 43-57.
- Case, William. 1996a. Can the Halfway House Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Countries. *Comparative Politics* 28 (4): 437-464.
- Case, William. 1996b. *Elites and Regimes in Malaysia - Revisiting a Consociational Democracy*. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute.
- Case, William. 1995. Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy. In *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Case, William. 1994. The UMNO Party Election in Malaysia: One for the Money. *Asian Survey* 34 (10): 916-930.

Casswell, Nim. 1984. Autopsie de l'ONCAD: La politique arachidière au Sénégal, 1966-1980. *Politique Africaine* 14: 39-73.

Center of Systemic Peace. 2012. Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2012. Available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm> . Accessed April 14th, 2012.

Céspedes, Roberto. 1997. The Labour Movement. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Chalmers, Douglas A. 1977. The Politicized State in Latin America. In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James M. Malloy. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem Press.

Chehabi, Houchang E. & Juan J. Linz, eds. 1998. *Sultanistic Regimes*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chin, James. 2010. The Rise of Najib and 1Malaysia. *Southeast Asian Studies*: 165-179.

Chin, James. 2009. Malaysia' Electoral Upheaval, *Journal of Democracy* 20 (3): 71-85.

Chin, James & Wong Chin Huat. 2009. Malaysia's Electoral Upheaval. *Journal of Democracy* 20 (3): 71-85.

CIA World Factbook. 2012. *Indonesia*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. Accessed February 7th, 2012.

CIA World Factbook. 2012. *Malaysia*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. Accessed February 7th, 2012.

CIA World Factbook. 2012. *Paraguay*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. Accessed February 7th, 2012.

CIA World Factbook. 2012. *Senegal*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>. Accessed February 7th, 2012.

Collier, David. 1993. The Comparative Method. In *The State of the Discipline II*, edited by Ada W. Finifter. Washington: American Political Science Association.

Collier, David, ed. 1979. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collier, David & Ruth Collier. 1977. Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism. In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James M. Malloy. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

Collier, David & Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. *World Politics* 49 (3): 430-451.

Collier, David & James E. Mahon. 1993. Conceptual Stretching Revisited. *American Political Science Review* 87 (4): 845-855.

Cornelius, Wayne A. 2000. Blind Spots in Democratization: Sub-national Politics as a Constraint on Mexico's Transition. *Democratization* 7 (3): 117-132.

Coulibaly, Abdou Latif. 2003. *Sénégal, affaire Me Sèye: un meurtre sur commande*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Coulon, Christian 1988. Senegal: The Development and Fragility of Semidemocracy. In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Routledge.

Coulon, Christian. 1978. Elections, factions et idéologies au Sénégal. In *Aux urnes l'Afrique*, edited by Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire et Centre d'études et de recherches internationales. Paris: Pedone.

Cowen, Michael & Liisa Laakso, eds. 2002. *Multi-Party Elections in Africa*. New York: Palgrave.

Crescenzi, Mark. J. C. 1999. Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (2): 192-212.

Croissant, Aurel. 2003. Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of Delegative Democracy: A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea. *Democratization* 10 (3): 68-98.

Crone, Donald K. 1991. Military Regimes and Social Justice in Indonesia and Thailand. In *Civil Military Interaction in Asia and Africa*, edited by Charles H. Kennedy and David J. Louscher. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Crone, Donald K. 1988. State, Social Elites and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia. *World Politics* 40 (2): 252-268.

Crossette, Barbara. 1987. Kota Kinabalu; With Houses on Stilts and Hopes in Another Land. *New York Times*, October 1st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/01/world/>

kota-kinabalu-journal-with-houses-on-stilts-and-hopes-in-another-land.html?src=pm.
Accessed November 15th, 2011.

Crouch, Harold. 1996. *Government and Society in Malaysia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Crouch, Harold. 1993. Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic. In *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism*, edited by Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Crouch, Harold. 1978. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1998. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davenport, Christian. 2000. Understanding Illiberal Democracies, Liberal Autocracies, and Everything in Between: A Cross-National Examination from 1972-1996. In *paper presented at the World Democratization 2000 - Rethinking Democracy in the New Millennium*. University of Houston.

Diamond, Larry. 2008. *The Spirit of Democracy*. New York: Times Books.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 21-35.

Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. 1995. *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diaw, Aminata & Mamadou Diouf. 1998. The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. In *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa*, edited by Adebayo O. Olukoshi. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Diop, Momar Coumba, ed. 1992. *Sénégal: Trajectoires d'un État*. Dakar/Paris: Codesria/Kathala.

Diop, Moman Coumba & Mamadou Diouf. 1990. *Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf - État et Société*. Paris: Karthala.

Duverger, Maurice. 1972. *Party Politics and Pressure Groups*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Easton, David. 1975. A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (4): 435-457.

Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Studies and Theory in Political Science. In *Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. New York: Addison-Wesley.

Economic Freedom in the World. 2012. Available at: <http://www.freetheworld.com/> Accessed June 7th, 2012.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1973. *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*. London: Sage Publications.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah & Luis Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients and Friends - Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eisenstadt, Todd. 2000. Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization. *Democratization* 7 (3): 3-24.

Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, & Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. Democratic Transitions. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 551-569.

Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening. 2012. *Election Guide – Paraguay*. Available at: <http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=856> Accessed June 1st, 2012.

Ekman, Joakim. 2009. Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes. *International Political Science Review* 30 (1): 7-32.

Emmerson, Donald. 1978. The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength. In *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Encyclopedia Britannica. 2012. *Madiun Affair*. Available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/355889/Madiun-Affair>. Accessed January 13th, 2012.

Encyclopedia of Nations. 2012. *Senegal – Rise to Power*. Available at: <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/World-Leaders-2003/Senegal-RISE-TO-POWER.html> . Accessed March 15th, 2012.

Engberg, Jan & Svante Ersson. 1999. Illiberal Democracy in the Third World - An Empirical Enquiry. In *paper presented at Democracy in the Third World: What Should Be Done? - ECPR Joint Session of Workshops*. Mannheim, Germany.

Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, & Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. Democratic Transitions. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 551-569.

Ethier, Diane 2010a. *Introduction aux relations internationales*. Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Éthier, Diane. 2010b. L'imposition de la démocratie a-t-elle été l'exception ou la règle depuis 1945? *Études internationales* 41 (3): 313-339.

Éthier, Diane. 2003. Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives. *Democratization* 10 (1): 99-120.

Evans, Peter B. 1989. Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State. *Sociological Forum* 4 (4): 561-587.

Feith, Herbert. 2007. *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Finer, Samuel E. 1988 (1962). The Morphology of Military Regimes. In *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats. Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Fishman, Robert M.. 1990. Review: Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy. *World Politics* 42 (3): 422-440.

Fogel, Ramon. 1997. The Peasantry. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Foucher, Vincent. 2007. Blue Marches - Public Performance and Political Turnover in Senegal. In *Staging Politics - Power and Performance in Asia and Africa*, edited by Julia C. Strauss and Donald B. Cruise O'Brien. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

Freedman, Amy L. 2006. *Political Change and Consolidation – Democracy's Rocky Road in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Freedom House. 2012. *Freedom in the World 2012*. Washington D.C.: Freedom House.

Freyburg, Tina, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka & Anne Wetzel. 2009. EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighborhood. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (6): 916-934.

Friedman, Edward & Joseph Wong. 2008. *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning To Lose*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Friedrich, Carl Joachim & Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. New York: Praeger.

- Funston, John, ed. 2001. *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Galvan, Dennis Charles. 2001. Political Turnover and Social Change in Senegal. *Journal of Democracy* 12 (3): 51-62.
- Gandhi, Jennifer & Adam Przeworski. 2006. Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorship. *Economics and Politics* 18 (1): 1-26.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1996. An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset. *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (4): 469-483.
- Gates, Scott; Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, & Håvard Strand. 2006. Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: The Duration of Polities. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 893-908.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2006. Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? In *Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*. Washington D.C.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sand Castles - Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999a. What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115-144.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999b. Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument. In *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*. Atlanta.
- George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Gomez, Edmund Terence. 2005. *Who Owns Corporate Malaysia?* Malaysiakini. Available at: <http://www.malaysiakini.com/opinions/39516> Accessed November 9th, 2011.
- Gomez, Edmund Terence. 1998. Malaysia. In *Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia*, edited by Wolfgang Sachsenröder and Ulrike E. Frings. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Gomez, Edmund Terence & Jomo Kwame Sundaram. 1999. *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodman, Amy. 2008. *The Bishop of the Poor: Paraguay's New President Fernando Lugo Ends 62 Years of Conservative Rule*. Available at: http://www.democracynow.org/2008/8/19/inauguration_of_paraguays_new_president_fernando Accessed May 8th, 2012.

Goode, J. Paul. 2010. Redefining Russia: Hybrid Regimes, Fieldwork, and Russian Politics. *Perspective in Politics* 8 (4): 1055-1076.

Government of Malaysia. 2012. Department of Statistics. Available at: <http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/index.php?lang=en>. Accessed March 6th, 2012.

Greene, Kenneth F. 2010. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance. *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (7): 807-834.

Greene, Kenneth F. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose - Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gunther, Richard, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros & Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds. 1995. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation - Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hadenius, Axel. 1992. *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hadenius, Axel & Jan Teorell. 2007. Pathways from Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 18 (1): 143-156.

Hadenius, Axel & Jan Teorell. 2006. *Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways to Democracy, 1972-2003*. Lund University.

Haggard, Stephan & Robert R. Kaufmann. 1997. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. *Comparative Politics* 29 (3): 263-283.

Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism. *Political Studies* 44: 936-957.

Handelman, Stephen. 1995. *Comrade Criminal*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Harff, Barbara & Ted Robert Gurr. 2004. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hartlyn, Jonathan & Arturo Valenzuela. 1994. Democracy in Latin America since 1930. In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hayward, Fred M. 1987. *Elections in Independent Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hayward, Fred M. & Siba N. Grovogui. 1987. Persistence and Change in Senegalese Electoral Processes. In *Elections in Independent Africa*, edited by Fred M. Hayward. Boulder: Westview.

- Hesseling, Gerti. 1985. *Histoire politique du Sénégal*. Paris: Karthala.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa - Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 1994. The Dilemmas of Explaining Political Upheaval: Ghana in Comparative Perspective. In *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, edited by Jennifer A. Widner. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Hermet, Guy, Bertrand Badie, Pierre Birnbaum & Philippe Braud. 2005. *Dictionnaire de la science politique et des institutions politiques*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Hermet, Guy. 1978. State-Controlled Elections: A Framework. In *Elections Without Choice*, edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié. London: The Macmillan Press LTD.
- Hicks, Frederic. 1971. Interpersonal Relationships and Caudillismo in Paraguay. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 13 (1): 89-111.
- Hicks, Frederic. 1967. Politics, Power, and the Role of the Village Priest in Paraguay. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 9 (2): 273-282.
- Hoffman, David E. 2002. *The Oligarchs: Wealth And Power In The New Russia*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Honna, Jun. 2003. *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Howard, Marc Morjé & Philip G. Roessler. 2006. Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 365-381.
- Huber, Evelyne & John D. Stephens. 1995. Conclusion: Agrarian Structure and Political Power: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Latin America. In *Agrarian Structure and Political Power: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of Latin America*, edited by Evelyne Huber and Frank Safford. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave - Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1970. Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems. In *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement Henry Moore. New York: Basic Books.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1965. Political Development and Political Decay. *World Politics* 17 (3): 386-430.

Huntington, Samuel P. & Clement H. Moore, eds. 1970. *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society - The Dynamics of Established One-Party System*. New York: Basic Books.

Inglehart, Ronald & Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2012. *Voter Turnout – Malaysia*. Available at: <http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm> Accessed April 8th, 2012.

Institute for Security Studies. 2012. *Senegal – Security Information*. Available at: <http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/Senegal/SecInfo.html> Accessed March 22nd, 2012.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2012. *Election Archives Paraguay – Chamber of Deputies*. Available at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2249_arc.htm Accessed June 6th, 2012.

Jackson, David. 1978. Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia. In *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jackson, Karl D. & Johannes Moeliono. 1973. Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java. In *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, edited by William Liddle. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.

Jayasuriya, Kanishka & Garry Rodan. 2007. Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in Southeast Asia. *Democratization* 14 (5): 773-794.

Jeshurun, Chandran. 1975. *The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-1973*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Jhaveri, Satyavati S. 1975. *The Presidency in Indonesia - Dilemmas of Democracy*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Joseph, Richard. 1997. Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives. *Comparative Politics* 29 (3): 363-382.

Jourde, Cédric. 2008. The Master is Gone, But Does the House Still Stand? The Fate of Single-Party Systems After the Defeat of Single Parties in West Africa. In *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning To Lose*, edited by Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong. London: Taylor & Francis.

- Juoro, Umar. 1998. Indonesia. In *Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia*, edited by Wolfgang Sachsenröder and Ulrike E. Frings. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kahin, George Mc Turman. 1952. *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
- Karagiannis, Nikolaos. 2001. Key Economic and Politico-Institutional Elements of Modern Interventionism. *Social and Economic Studies* 50 (3/4): 17-47.
- Karl, Terry L. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1987. Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela. *Latin American Research Review* 22 (1): 63-94.
- Karl, Terry Lynn & Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe. *International Social Science Journal* 128 (2): 269-284.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi. 2008. *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2005. Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for Democracy in Developing Countries. *Democratization* 12 (5): 704-724.
- Kidd, Stephen. 1997. Indigenous Peoples. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kingsbury, Damien. 2001. *South-East Asia - A Political Profile*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klaiber, Jeffrey L. 1998. *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State-Directed Development - Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kohli, Atul. 2003. State, Society and Political Development. In *The State of the Discipline*, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Komisi Pemilihan Umum. 2012. *General Elections Commission in Indonesia*. Available at: <http://www.kpu.go.id/> Accessed February 7th, 2012.
- Lambert, Peter A. 2000. A Decade of Electoral Democracy: Continuity, Change and Crisis in Paraguay. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19 (379-396).

- Lambert, Peter. 1997a. The Regime of Alfredo Stroessner. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lambert, Peter. 1997b. Assessing the Transition. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lambert, Peter. 1996. Mechanisms of Control: the Stroessner Regime in Paraguay. In *Authoritarianism in Latin America since Independence*, edited by Will Fowler. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Langston, Joy. 2006. Elite Ruptures: When Do Ruling Parties Split? 57-75. In *Electoral Authoritarianism - The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by A. Schedler. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Lee Seng Hock, Thomas. 2011. An Impossible Dream for the MCA? . *The Malaysian Insider*, March 3th. Available at: <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/breakingviews/article/a-n-impossible-dream-for-the-mca-thomas-lee-seng-hock>. Accessed December 12th, 2011.
- Leifer, Michael. 1995. *Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Léon-Roesch, Marta, Richard Ortiz Ortiz. 2005. Paraguay. In *Elections in the Americas: South America - A Data Handbook*, edited by Dieter Nohlen. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: Macmillan.
- Levi, Margaret, Audrey Sacks & Tom Tyler. 2009. Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimizing Beliefs. *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (3): 354-375.
- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way. 2002. Elections without Democracy: the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51-65.
- Lewis, Paul 1980. *Paraguay Under Stroessner*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Liddle, William R. 1978. Participation and the Political Parties. In *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1988. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682-693.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1969. Consociational Democracy. *World Politics* 21: 207-225.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lin, Justin Yifu & Célestin Monga. 2010. Growth Identification and Facilitation - The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change. *Policy Research Working Paper 5313*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Lindberg, Staffan I. 2006. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. 2000. *Régimes Totalitaires et Autoritaires*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Linz, Juan J. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1): 51-69.
- Linz, Juan J. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. 1975. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. In *Handbook of Political Regimes*, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading: Addison Wesley.
- Linz, Juan J. 1970. An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain. In *Mass Politics - Studies in Political Sociology*, edited by Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen. New York: The Free Press.
- Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation - Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Martin Seymour, ed. 1998. *Democracy in Asia and Africa*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.
- Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1994. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address. *American Sociological Review* 59 (1): 1-22.
- Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.
- Lott, Leo B. 1971. *Venezuela and Paraguay; Political Modernity and Tradition in Conflict*. New York: Rinehart and Winston.

- Loveman, Brian. 1994. Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transition in Latin America. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 36: 105-189.
- Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. Elections under Authoritarianism. Preliminary Lessons from Jordan. *Democratization* 13 (3): 456-471.
- Lustick, Ian. 1979. Stability in Divided Societies: Consociationalism v. Control. *World Politics* 31: 325-344.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (10): 1-27.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahoney, James. 2003. Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research: the Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism. In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott & Tim Scully, eds. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Malley, Michael. 1999. Regions: Centralization and Resistance. In *Indonesia Beyond Suharto*, edited by Donald K. Emmerson. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Manzetti, Luigi & Crole J. Wilson. 2007. Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support? *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (8): 949-970.
- Markandan, Paul. 1960. *Report on Finance, Commerce and Industry Federation of Malaya 1960*. Singapore: Far Eastern Features Service.
- Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jagers & Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. *Polity IV Project*. Center for Systematic Peace.
- Martini, Carlos & Carlos María Lezcano. 1997. The Armed Forces. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Mauzy, Diane. 2006. The Challenge to Democracy – Singapore's and Malaysia's Resilient Hybrid Regimes. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2 (2): 47-68.
- Mauzy, Diane & Shane J. Barter. 2008. Learning to Lose? Not If UMNO Can Help It. In *Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning To Lose*, edited by Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong. London: Taylor & Francis.

Mbaku, John Mukum & Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere, eds. 2006. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change - Constraints to Democratization in Africa*. Trenton: Africa World Press.

Mbodj, Mohamed P. 1992. La crise trentenaire de l'économie arachidière. In *Sénégal: Trajectoires d'un État*, edited by Momar Coumba Diop. Dakar/Paris: Codesria/Kathala.

Mbow, Penda. 2008. Senegal: The Return of Personalism. *Journal of Democracy* 19 (1): 156-169.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McFaul, Michael. 2002. The Fourth Wave of Democratization and Dictatorship - Non Cooperative Transitions in the Post Communist World. *World Politics* 54 (2): 212-244.

McMann, Kelly. 2006. *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Means, Gordon P. 1991. *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Means, Gordon P. 1976. *Malaysian Politics*. New York: New York University Press.

Menocal, Alina Rocha, Verena Fritz & Lise Rakner. 2008. Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 15 (1): 29-40.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. Embedded and Defective Democracies. *Democratization* 11 (5): 33-58.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States - State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mills, John Stuart. 1858. *A System of Logic , Tatiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Milne, Robert Stephen & Diane Mauzy. 1980. *Politics and Government in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International.

Miranda, Carlos R. 1990. *The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Molinas, José, Anibal Pérez-Linan, Sebastian Saiegh & Marcela Montero. 2006. *Political Institutions, Policymaking Progresses and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003*. : Instituto Desarrollo/ University of Pittsburg.

- Moore, Barrington Jr. 1968. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 2009a. Are there Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion? *European Political Science Review* 1 (2): 273-296.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 2009b. Legitimacy and the Quality of Democracy. *International Social Science Journal* 60 (196): 211-222.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 1998. *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis - Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Munck, Gerardo L. & Carol Skalnik Leff. 1997. Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics* 29 (3): 343-362.
- Neher, Clark D. & Ross Marlay. 1995. *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Nickson, Andrew. 1997a. Corruption and the Transition. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert & Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nickson, Andrew. 1997b. The Wasmosy Government. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert & Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nickson, Andrew. 1988. Tyranny and Longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay. *Third World Quarterly* 10 (1): 237- 259.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise. 1971. *The Mourides of Senegal - The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise. 1967. Political Opposition in Senegal: 1960-67. *Government and Opposition* 2 (4): 557-566.
- O'Brien, Rita Cruise. 1979. *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal*. London: Sage.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1): 55-69.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1993. The State and Democratization. *World Development* 21 (8): 1355-1369.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1979. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley: University of California, International & Area Studies.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1977. Corporatism and the Question of the State. In *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James M. Malloy. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo & Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

O'Shaughnessy, Hugo & Edgar Venerando Ruiz Díaz. 2009. *The Priest of Paraguay: Fernando Lugo and the Making of a Nation*. New York: Zed Books.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.

Oszlak, Oscar. 2005. State Bureaucracy - Politics and Policies. In *The Handbook of Political Sociology - State, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks and Mildred A. Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ottaway, Marina. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pabottingi, Mochtar. 1995. Indonesia - Historicizing the New Order's legitimacy Dilemma. In *Political Legitimacy in Southeast*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pempel, T. J., ed. 1990. *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Perlmutter, Amos. 1977. *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pierson, Paul. 2003. Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics. In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Powers, Nancy R. 1992. *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay: Problems and Perspectives: A Rapporteur's Report*. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre-Dame.

Przeworski, Adam. 1995. *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1988. Democracy As a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts. In

Constitutionalism and Democracy, edited by Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1986. Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy. In *Transition from Authoritarianism Rules: Comparative Perspectives*, edited by O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam & Fernando Limongi. 1997. Modernization: Theories and Facts. *World Politics* 49 (2): 155-183.

Przeworski, Adam & Fernando Limongi. 1993. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): 51-69.

Rabasa, Angel & John Haseaman. 2002. *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia - Challenges, Politics, and Power*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Ragin, Charles C. 2008. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Remmer, Karen L. 1985. Exclusionary Democracy. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 20 (4): 64-85.

Riquelme, Marcial A. & Jorge G. Riquelme. 1997. Political Parties. In *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*, edited by Peter Lambert and Andrew Nickson. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik & Thierry Verdier. 2006. Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79:447-468.

Rocamora, J. Eliseo. 1973. Political Participation and the Party System: the PNI Example. In *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, edited by William Liddle. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.

Rodan, Garry & Kanishka Jayasuriya. 2009. Capitalist Development, Regime transitions and New Forms of Authoritarianism in Asia. *Pacific Review* 22 (1): 23-47.

Roeder, Philip G. & Donald Rothchild. Conclusion: Nation-State Stewardship and the Alternatives to Power Sharing. In *Sustainable Peace - Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Roett, Riordan & Richard S. Sacks. 1990. Authoritarian Paraguay: The Personalist Tradition. In *Latin American Politics & Development*, edited by Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Roett, Riordan & Richard Scott Sacks. 1991. *Paraguay: the Personalist Legacy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Roosa, John. 2006. *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Ross, Michael L. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics* 53 (3): 325-361.
- Rouquié, Alain. 1986. Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in Latin America. In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philip Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rouquié, Alain. 1978. Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts. In *Elections Without Choice*, edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié. London: The Macmillan Press.
- Rouquié, Alain. 1975. L'hypothèse "Bonapartiste" et l'émergence des systèmes politiques semi-compétitifs. *Revue française de science politique* 25 (6): 1077-1111.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne H. Stephens & John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Rüland, Jürgen. 2001. Indonesia. In *Elections in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rustow, Dankart A. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics* 2 (3): 337-363.
- Samy, Yiagadeesen, David Carment, Stewart Prest & Jean-François Gagné. 2008. Small States, Resilience and Governance. In *Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience*, edited by Lino Briguglio, Gordon Cordina, Nadia Farrugia and Constance Vigilance. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
- Santoso, Amir. 1997. Democratization - The Case of Indonesia's New Order. In *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, edited by Anek Laothamatas. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Bien comparer, mal comparer. *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 1 (1): 19-36.

Sartori, Giovanni, 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers.

Schedler, Andreas, ed. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism - The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schedler, Andreas. 2002. The Menu of Manipulation. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 36-50.

Schmitter, Philippe C. 2001. The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmitter, Philippe. C. 1976. Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967. In *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. New York: Holmes and Meier.

Schumacher, Edward J. 1975. *Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development In Senegal*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Shiozaki, Yuki. 2000. The State and Ulama in Contemporary Malaysia. In *State, Society and International Relations In Asia*, edited by Parvizi Amineh. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slater, Dan. 2003. Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia. *Comparative Politics* 36 (1): 81-101.

Smith, Anthony L. 2001. Indonesia - Transforming the Leviathan. In *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*, edited by John Funston. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Snyder, Richard. 2006. Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: the Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes. In *Electoral Authoritarianism - The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by A. Schedler. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Snyder, Richard. 1992. Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships. *Comparative Politics* 24 (4): 379-399.

Sondrol, Paul C. 2007. Paraguay - Democracy Challenged. In *Latin American Politics and Development*, edited by Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. Boulder: Westview Press.

Sondrol, Paul C. 1992. The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations. *Armed Forces and Society* 19 (1): 105-122.

Suton, Paul. 2007. Building Good Governance and Resilience in Small States. In paper presented for the *International Conference on Small States and Economic Resilience*. University of Malta.

Sy, Hamadou Tidiane. 2007. *Senegal's Praised Democracy on Trial*. BBC. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6390869.stm>. Accessed April 5th, 2012.

Sy, Seydou Madani. 2009. *Les régimes politiques sénégalais de l'indépendance à l'alternance politique 1960-2008*. Paris: Karthala.

Tan, Chee Khoo & R K Vasil. 1984. *Without Fear or Favour*. Petaling Jaya (Malaysia): Eastern Universities Press.

Tan, Kevin Y.L. 2001. Malaysia. In *Elections in Asia and the Pacific - A Data Handbook*., edited by Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann. New York: Oxford University Press.

Teik, Khoo Boo 1997. Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia since 1957 - Class, Ethnicity and Changing Capitalism. In *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia*, edited by Anek Laothamatas. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Teorell, Jan. 2010. *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thelen, Kathleen & Sven Steinmo. 1992. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics In *Structuring Politics Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen and Frank Longstret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, Melissa A. & Oumar Sissokho. 2005. Liaison Legislature: The Role of the National Assembly in Senegal. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43 (1): 97-117.

Tilly, Charles. 2007. *Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1984. *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1835 (2004). *Democracy in America*. Vol. I. New York: The Library of America.

Tucker, Robert C. 1961. Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 281-289.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *International Trade Indicators – Diversification Index*. Available at: <http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx> Accessed June 18th, 2012.

US Department of State. 1994. *Senegal Human Rights Practices*. Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Senegal.html. Accessed March 21st, 2012.

US Library of Congress. 2012. *Country Studies: Paraguay*. Available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pytoc.html> Accessed May, 6th, 2012.

US Library of Congress. 2012. *Country Studies: Singapore*. Available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sgtoc.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2012.

US Library of Congress. 2012. *Country Studies: Indonesia*. Available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/idotoc.html>. Accessed November 9th, 2011.

Vachudova, Anna Milada. 2006. *Democratization in Post Communist Europe. Liberal Regimes and the Leverage of International Actors*. Working Paper No 139. Harvard University: Center for European Studies.

Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 2001. Class Relations and Democratization: A Reassessment of Barrington Moore's Model. In *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America*, edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Van Schendelen, M. P. C. M. 1985. Consociational Democracy: The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms. *The Political Science Reviewer* 15 (1): 143-183.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce? In *Electoral Authoritarianism - The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by Andreas Schedler. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 77-92.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van der Kroef, Justus. 1978-1979. Patterns of Political Opposition in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Affairs* 51 (4): 620-638.

Vanhanen, Tatu. 2000. A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998. *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2): 251-265.

Vanhanen, Tatu. 1997. *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries*. London:

Routledge.

Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. 1993. *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto*. London: Routledge.

Villalon, Leonardo A. 1995. *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2002. *Why Do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?*. Yale University.

Way, Lucan A. 2006. Authoritarian Failure: How Does State Weakness Strengthen Electoral Competition? In *Electoral Authoritarianism - The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, edited by Andreas Schedler. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Weiss, Meredith L. 2006. *Protest and Possibilities - Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

White, Stephen 1986. Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy. *World Politics* 38 (2): 462-482.

Whitehead, Lawrence. 2001. Three International Dimensions of Democratization. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Widner, Jennifer A., ed. 1994. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Wigell, Mikael. 2008. Mapping Hybrid Regimes: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics. *Democratization* 15 (2): 230-250.

Wiseman, John A. 1993. Democracy and the New Political Pluralism in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Significance. *Third World Quarterly* 14 (3): 439-449.

Woo-Coming, Meredith. 1999. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

World Bank. 2012. *World Development Indicators*.

Yashar, Deborah. 1999. Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America. *World Politics* 52 (1): 76-104.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs* 76 (6): 22-43.

Zakaria Haji Ahmad. 1999. *The 1999 General Elections: A Preliminary Overview*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies

Zakaria, Haji Ahmad 1989. Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in Divided Society. In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Zinecker, Heidun. 2009. Regime-Hybridity in Developing Countries: Achievements and Limitations of New Research on Transitions. *International Studies Review* 11 (2): 302-331.

Zolberg, Aristide. 1966. *Creating Political Order: The Party-State of West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Appendix 1 – Hybrid Regimes (1972-2010)

Country	Hybrid Period	Duration	Western Influence after 1990	Hybrid in 2010	Population	Asia	Latin America	Middle East & North Africa	Sub-Sahara Africa	Eurasia
Albania	1991-2010	19	X	Albania	3,204,000					X
Armenia	1991-2010	19	X	Armenia	3,092,000					X
Bangladesh	1972-2010	38		Bangladesh	148,692,000	X				
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996-2010	14	X	Bolivia	9,930,000		X			
Brazil	1972-1984	12		Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,760,000					X
Burkina Faso	1972-1983; 1992-2010	14.5		Burkina Faso	16,469,000				X	
Central African Republic	1991-2010	19		Burundi	8,383,000				X	
Chile	1979-1989	19		Central African Republic	4,401,000				X	
Colombia	1989-2010	21		Colombia	46,295,000		X			
Côte d'Ivoire	1979-1992	13		Ecuador	14,465,000		X			
Djibouti	1999-2010	11		Gambia	1,728,000				X	
East Timor	1999-2010	11		Georgia	4,452,000					X
Ecuador	2000-2010	10		Guatemala	14,389,000		X			
Egypt	1974-1992	18		Guinea	9,982,000				X	
El Salvador	1976-1996	20		Guinea-Bissau	1,515,000				X	
Ethiopia	1995-2009	14		Haiti	9,993,000		X			
Gabon	1990-2008	18		Honduras	7,600,000		X			
Georgia	1992-2010	18		Kenya	40,512,682				X	
Guatemala	1984-2010	26		Kosovo	1,776,000					X
Guinea-Bissau	1991-2010	19		Kuwait	2,737,000			X		
Honduras	1972-1983; 1993-2010	14		Kyrgyzstan	5,448,000					X
Indonesia	1972-1992	20		Lebanon	4,228,000			X		
Jordan	1984-2008	24		Lesotho	2,171,000				X	
Kenya	1972-1986	14		Liberia	3,994,000				X	
Kuwait	1972-2010	38		Macedonia	2,060,000					X
Lebanon	1975-1987	12		Madagascar	20,714,000				X	
Lesotho	1973-1987; 1991-2001	12		Malawi	14,901,000				X	
Liberia	1974-1988; 1997-2010	13.5		Malaysia	28,401,000	X				
Macedonia	1992-2010	18	X	Mexico	113,423,000		X			
Madagascar	1983-2010	27		Moldova	3,562,000					X
Malawi	1989-2010	21		Morocco	31,951,000			X		
Malaysia	1974-2010	36		Mozambique	23,391,000				X	
Mexico	1972-1993	21	X	Nepal	29,959,000	X				
Moldova	1991-2010	19	X	Nicaragua	5,788,000		X			
Morocco	1972-2010	38		Niger	15,512,000				X	
Mozambique	1994-2010	16		Nigeria	158,423,000				X	
Nepal	1977-2010	33		Pakistan	173,593,000	X				
Nicaragua	1972-2010	38		Papua New Guinea	6,858,000	X				
Niger	1999-2010	11		Paraguay	6,455,000		X			
Nigeria	1998-2010	12		Philippines	93,261,000	X				
Pakistan	1985-1998	13		Senegal	12,434,000				X	
Panama	1978-1993	15		Sierra Leone	5,868,000				X	
Paraguay	1972-2010	38		Singapore	5,077,000	X				
Peru	1989-2000	11		Sri Lanka	20,653,000	X				
Philippines	1972-1986	14		Tanzania	44,841,000				X	
Poland	1978-1989	11		Thailand	69,122,000	X				
Qatar	1976-1988	12		Timor Leste	1,143,000	X				
Russia	1991-2003	12		Togo	6,028,000				X	
Senegal	1975-2001	26		Turkey	72,752,000			X		
Sierra Leone	1972-1991; 1998-2010	15.5		Uganda	33,424,000				X	
Singapore	1972-2010	38		Ukraine	45,871,000					X
South Africa	1973-1993	20		Venezuela	28,834,000		X			
South Korea	1973-1987	14		Zambia	12,926,000				X	
Sri Lanka	1981-2010	29								
Sudan	1978-1988	10								
Swaziland	1972-1992	20								
Tanzania	1995-2010	15								
Thailand	1978-1997	19								
Tunisia	1978-1992	14								
Uganda	1980-1990	10								
Ukraine	1991-2004	13	X							
United Arabs Emirates	1976-1988	12								
Venezuela	1999-2010	11								
Yugoslavia	1981-1992	11	X							
Zambia	1972-2010	38								
Zimbabwe	1978-2000	22								
66			8	53	1,456,441,682	10	10	4	20	9

Note: We use the Freedom House Index (1972-2010) to identify hybrid regimes on a world-wide basis because it is the only time-series cross-national database that includes explicitly the hybrid regime category in its classification and covers a period that goes back decades before the end of the URSS and remains active as of today. Nevertheless, Freedom House started evaluating country political regimes in 1972. Thus, it should be noted that the temporal gap between the Freedom House classification starting date and our own (1945) might include unaccounted instances of hybridity. To be considered hybrid, a regime has to last at least 10 years. Some discrepancies may exist between Freedom House and our classification in empirical chapters. For instance, Freedom House considers Indonesia as partly free (hybrid) from 1972 to 1992; whereas we catalogue it as hybrid (partly free) from 1966 to 1998 (see chapter 4). Data on population is from World Development Indicators (2012).

Appendix 2

Synthesis of the Literature on Hybrid Regime Stability

Authors	Types of Hybrid Regime	Cases/Regions/Countries/Polities	Period
Economic Instruments			
Greene (2010)	Competitive Authoritarianism	7 non-western countries	1961-2008
Zinecker (2009)	Delegative Democracy	Colombia	1953-2006
Greene (2007)	Competitive Authoritarianism	Mexico	1930s-1990s
Magaloni (2006)	Hegemonic Party Autocracy	Mexico	1930s-2000s
McMann (2006)	Hybrid Regime	Russia, Kyrgystan	1990s-2000s
Karl (1997)	Hybrid Regime	Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Algeria	1920s - 1995
Organizational Capacities			
Levitsky & Way (2010)	Competitive Authoritarianism	35 non-western countries	1990-2008
Bunce & Wolchik (2010)	Competitive Authoritarianism	9 post-communist countries	1998-2008
Boix & Svolik (2010)	Dictatorship	540 Leaders	1950-1990
Ekman (2009)	Hybrid Regime	Tanzania, Russia, Venezuela	1990 - 2008
Magaloni (2008)	Hegemonic Party Autocracy	Mexico & 100 non-democratic regimes	1950-2000
Gandhi (2008)	Dictatorship	138 countries	1946-2002
Blaydes (2008)	Hegemonic Party	Egypt	1987-2005
Lust-Okar (2008)	Electoral Authoritarianism	Jordan	1989-2003
Alexander (2008)	Hybrid Regime	East Europe	1990- 2000s
Menocal et al. (2008)	Hybrid Regime	Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa (56 countries)	1972-2004
Brownlee (2007)	Autocracy with Elections	Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, the Philippines	1945-2005
Geddes (2006)	Single-Party Regime	170 non-democratic regimes	1946-2000
Langston (2006)	Electoral Authoritarianism	Taiwan, Mexico	1940s - 1990s
Gandhi & Przeworski (2006)	Dictatorship	199 countries	1946-1996
Gates et al. (2006)	Internal Inconsistent Polities	World (716 polities)	1800-2000
Way (2006)	Electoral Authoritarianism	Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine	1990s - 2000s
Davenport (2000)	Liberal Autocracy, Illiberal Democracy	164 countries	1972-1996

Appendix 3

Definitions of Types of Hybrid Regimes

Exclusionary democracy. Remmer (1985: 71-74) puts forth the concept of exclusionary democracy and defines it as a political regime with real competition between parties, but a low level of popular participation in democratic institutions such as elections. Citizens are excluded from the electoral process based on discriminatory criteria such as gender, property, literacy and race. Although she specifies other types of regimes such as inclusive authoritarianism, her work focuses mainly on exclusionary democracy.

Dictablanda/democradura. O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 9) propose two hybrid regimes types based on their prospect of liberalization and democratization. Where “authoritarian rulers...tolerate or even promote liberalization... without altering the structure of authority, that is, without becoming accountable to the citizenry for their actions or subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive elections” the HR has been labeled “*dictablanda*” or “liberalized authoritarianism”. “Inversely, once democratization has begun and its prudent advocates fear the excessive expansion of such a process or wish to keep contentious issues off the agenda of collective deliberation, they may well continue old, or even create new, restrictions on the freedoms of particular individuals or groups who are deemed insufficiently prepared or sufficiently dangerous to enjoy full citizenship status”. In this case, hybrid regimes are designated as “limited political democracy” or *democradura*”.

Tutelary democracy. Tutelary democracy is a regime “in which the military extricates itself from the direct performance of government and withdraws into barracks, but withdraws intact and contingently...Thus, while elections take place in such systems and the elected representatives govern, the armed forces remain in the shadow, ready to fall upon anyone who transgresses too far in undermining their values or their interests” (Przeworski, 1988: 60-61).

Protected democracy. Loveman (1994: 111) advances the concept of “protected democracy”. “It is premised on the notion that people must be protected from themselves and from organizations that might subvert the existing political order. Such efforts toward change, even when legal, must be thwarted at all costs and are subject to repression”. Loveman stresses that these interventions in circumventing the scope of political reforms were mainly attributed to the military, in Latin America.

Delegative democracy. O’Donnell (1994: 59-60) comes up with another HR subtype: “delegative democracy”. “Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office. The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests”. “Typically, winning presidential candidates in delegative democracies present themselves as above both political parties and organized interests”. In other words, it is a low-intensity citizenship regime.

Oligarchic democracy. Hartlyn & Valenzuela (1994: 99) suggest the concept of “oligarchic democracy”, “that is to say, regimes, in which presidents and national assemblies derived from open, if not fully fair, political competition for the support of limited electorates, according to prescribed constitutional rules and which were largely comparable to the *restricted* representative regimes in Europe of the same period”. It refers to political regimes where political competition between parties is limited due to institutional barriers to entry.

Limited democracy. Archer (1995: 166-167) as well as Burton et al. (1992: 5) call “limited democracy” a regime in which citizens are excluded from the right to vote based on property, literacy, gender or race. Archer also introduces another concept: that is, “besieged democracy”. He defines it rather succinctly as a regime under an imminent threat of a military intervention whether its origin is domestic or external. These are

democratic regimes victims of civil war or engaged in an international conflict where democratic institutions are momentarily suspended.

Semi-democracy. Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1995: 8) define “semi-democracy” as “those countries in which the effective power of elected officials is so limited or political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not produce true popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and political liberties are so uncertain that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves peacefully, without fear”. They also include two other categories called hegemonic party-system and pseudo-democracy. The first HR subtype corresponds to a regime “in which opposition parties are legal but are denied, through pervasive electoral malpractices and frequent state coercion, any real chance to compete for power”. The other refers to the “existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, [that] masks (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination”.

Illiberal democracy. For Zakaria (1997: 27-30), “illiberal democracies” are democracies where elections are regularly held with universal suffrage, but where civil liberties are blatantly violated and the application of the rule of law is highly problematic. In opposition, “liberal autocracy” is a regime where political rights are limited, but the separation of powers is evident. Zakaria gives the example of Haïti and Hong-Kong to illustrate respectively “illiberal democracy” and “liberal autocracy”.

Feckless pluralism / dominant-power politics. Carothers (2002: 10-12) proposes two HR subtypes: “feckless pluralism” and “dominant-power politics”. Feckless pluralism is characterized by “regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these positive features, ... political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective.” Feckless pluralism can mostly be found in Latin America. Dominant

power politics on the other side “have limited but still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping—whether it is a movement, a party, an extended family, or a single leader—dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future”. Dominant-power politics is a distinctive feature in sub-Saharan, Post-Communist and Asian states.

Competitive authoritarianism. Levitsky & Way (2002: 53-59) come with the concept of “competitive authoritarianism”. Competitive authoritarian regimes held regular elections and opposition parties are legalized. Massive fraud is generally absent and opposition parties compete for top positions in the political system. Yet, the playing field is uneven. Ruling elites use state resources for political purpose and manipulate institutions such as electoral laws to their own advantage in order to create institutional barriers to entry. They also use multiple informal means such as bribery and harassment through prosecution under libel laws.

Electoral authoritarianism. For Schedler (2002: 36-37), “electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections, they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty”. Their strategy is electoral containment.

Semi-authoritarianism. According to Ottaway (2003: 3; 20), “semi-authoritarian” regimes “are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits.” These regimes are “determined to maintain the appearance of

democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails”. “They allow little real competition for power, thus reducing government accountability.” They put limits on the transfer of power; they have weak institutions; they produce incoherent reforms and limit the constitution of an independent and vivid civil society. “All semi-authoritarian regimes take steps to preserve their core, namely the power of the central government”.

Appendix 4 – Hybrid Regimes and Underdevelopment

Hybrid Regimes ¹	GDP per capita (SUS) ²	Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) ²	Diversification Index ³
Albania	3,678	20	0.71
Armenia	3,031	20	0.74
Bangladesh	675	19	0.86
Bolivia	1,979	13	0.83
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4,409	8	0.58
Burkina Faso	536	n.a.	0.82
Burundi	192	n.a.	0.75
Central African Republic	457	56*	0.76
Colombia	6,225	7	0.64
Ecuador	4,008	7	0.72
Gambia	467	27	0.75
Georgia	2,620	8	0.71
Guatemala	2,862	13	0.67
Guinea	452	13	0.81
Guinea-Bissau	580	n.a.	0.75
Haiti	671	n.a.	0.75
Honduras	2,026	13	0.77
Kenya	775	25	0.67
Kosovo	3,059	12	n.a.
Kuwait	41,365	n.a.	0.80
Kyrgyzstan	860	21	0.68
Lebanon	9,227	6	0.62
Lesotho	982	9	0.83
Liberia	247	n.a.	0.70
Macedonia	4,460	11	n.a.
Madagascar	421	29	0.70
Malawi	343	31*	0.80
Malaysia	8,373	11	0.47
Mexico	9,123	4	0.41
Moldova	1,631	14	n.a.
Morocco	2,796	15	0.65
Mozambique	410	32	0.83
Nepal	438	36	0.64
Nicaragua	1,132	21	0.83
Niger	358	n.a.	0.80
Nigeria	1,222	n.a.	0.80
Pakistan	11,019	21	0.72
Papua New Guinea	1,382	36	0.82
Paraguay	2,840	22	0.75
Philippines	2,140	12	0.60
Senegal	1,042	17	0.75
Sierra Leone	325	49	0.68
Singapore	41,122	n.a.	0.48
Sri Lanka	2,375	13	0.75
Tanzania	527	28	n.a.
Thailand	4,608	12	0.39
Timor Leste	623	n.a.	0.75
Togo	523	n.a.	0.70
Turkey	10,094	10	0.46
Uganda	509	24	0.73
Ukraine	3,007	8	0.57
Venezuela	13,590	n.a.	0.78
Zambia	1,253	9	0.87
Total (53 countries)		17	24

Data Source:

1. Freedom in the World 2012

2. World Development Indicators, 2012

3. UNCTAD, 2010. Lower the value is, the more diversified the exports and imports compared to the rest of the world

Note: All values are for the year 2010 (* indicates the value is for the year 2009). An underdeveloped country is associated with a country in which the value added of the agricultural sector represents at least 20% of GDP and/or the value of the diversif