

Université de Montréal

The Institutional Choices of Politicians
How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers

par

Silvina L. Danesi

Département de science politique

Faculté des arts et des sciences

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Cette thèse intitulée:

The Institutional Choices of Politicians
How and Why Legislators Shape Lower Chambers

présentée par :

Silvina L. Danesi

a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

Richard Nadeau

président-rapporteur

André Blais

directeur de recherche

Mark P. Jones

codirecteur

Philippe Faucher

membre du jury

Eduardo Alemán

examineur externe

Thomas Le Grand

représentant du doyen

Résumé

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu'en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des *coalitions procédurales*.

L'analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l'agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité.

Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d'assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l'existence d'un pouvoir de veto sur l'agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu'en Argentine. L'étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l'opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir.

Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. À l'inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu'alors, entre l'Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l'agenda législatif.

Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l'hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l'hypothèse générale. Les chapitres III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l'Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l'organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitres V et VI, respectivement pour l'Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l'évolution de l'autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l'hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche.

Mot-clés : Dessin institutionnel ; développement institutionnel ; partis politiques ; chambres basses ; législateurs ; théorie du Cartel ; contrôle de l'agenda ; Argentine ; Chili.

Abstract

This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as *procedural coalitions*.

The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor.

In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (*Hacienda*) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine's counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition.

The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the

amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country's politics and a description of the Chambers' organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research.

Keywords : Institutional design; institutional development; political parties; lower chambers; legislators; Cartel Theory; agenda control; Argentina; Chile.

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List of Acronyms

- C.A.L. Comisión de Asesoramiento Legislativo (Legislative Advisory Committee)
- CLP Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria (Committee on Parliamentary Business - Argentina)
- GOU Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (Group of United officers)
- LDM Leaders Delegation' Meeting
- RP Ruling party
- R&HA Committee on Rules and House Administration (Chile)

For my parents and Francisco, Faustina and Felipe

CHAPTER I

The Institutional Choices of Legislators

Why Do They Matter?

Why do legislatures change? How should we understand shifts in their rules? Whose goals do these changes serve?

These questions have received a variety of answers regarding the U.S. Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives of the post-New Deal era.¹ The constant growth of the subfield of Congressional Studies, and the consequent improved understanding of the Modern House, contrasts sharply with scanty knowledge about the institutional evolution of legislatures of other presidential countries. Furthermore, the contribution of Congressional Studies to the development of a general legislative theory has been limited (Mezey 1993; Brady and McCubbins 2002; Gamm and Huber 2002).

This thesis is about the institutional choices made by legislators of *other* presidential countries. Using the Cartel Theory that has been applied to the study of the U.S. House, the objective is to provide a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the national lower chambers of two Latin American countries (Argentina and Chile).² This task is guided by two purposes. First, I intend to establish the patterns or central features of the Chambers' institutional development. Second, I plan to ascertain whether parties determined or not the key features of this development. In other words, I plan to assess the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the institutional choices made by deputies through time.

¹ I will refer to the U.S. House of Representatives as the "U.S. House."

² These two lower chambers are the Honorable Cámara de Diputados del Congreso Nacional (Argentina) and the Cámara de Diputados del Congreso Nacional (Chile) or the *Corporación*. I will refer to them as "the Chambers."

The main claim of the Cartel Theory is that “parties in the House are a species of “legislative cartel.” These cartels usurp the power resident in the House to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). Based on this claim the general hypothesis to be tested is *when a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor*. It will take a large part of chapter II to fully explain the Cartel Theory and the genesis of this hypothesis. At this point I would stress that this study is focused on the structure, on the internal organization of legislatures, on the largely unknown territory of the arrangements legislators make in the pre-floor stages of the legislative process.

Unlike most studies in the past, recent works about legislative politics in Latin America have begun to consider the Chambers’ organization and its relation to parties. Yet, these contributions focus on the 1980s and 1990s and mention only indirectly some aspects of the aforementioned internal arrangements. Instead, there is a vast literature on “both sides” of the pre-floor stages, that is to say, executive-legislative relations and party discipline on the floor. I believe that it is necessary to achieve a balanced understanding of the three phases -executive-legislative relations, parties as *procedural coalitions*, parties as *floor coalitions*- to connect the dots and foster more diversified research regarding the strategies of parties in legislatures. This dissertation is designed to provide a comparative analysis of two unexplored aspects in Argentine and Chilean lower Chambers: the evolution of their institutional design and the role played by parties in it. In this introduction I look at why the institutional choices of legislators matter (section 1),

at what we know until now about these choices (section 2), at the purposes and main questions of the dissertation (section 3), and at its contents (section 4).

Section 1. Why do the Institutional Choices of Legislators Matter?

The institutional choices of legislators define the rules of the legislative game and constitute, as such, an essential part of the policymaking process. This straightaway reason means, among other things, that this dissertation is not targeted to *legislative* sceptics. My work will not capture the attention of those who consider Latin American legislatures as superfluous or trivial institutions.

The rigorous assessment of the institutional choices of legislators is essential to measure legislatures' *capacities*. The analysis provided in this study is helpful to those who deal with the intricate task of measuring policymaking activities and are concerned about veto players and agenda control. They will find in the following chapters how offices endowed with agenda-setting power emerged and the way in which they exercise their power. In addition, the study of the institutional design and of the role played by parties in its shaping is the necessary complement of those works that focus on the analysis of party behavior on the floor.

Institutional design matters not only for academics, but also for politicians. As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 125) explain, reelection and good policymaking are not the only interests legislators pursue. They also strive for *internal advancement* and for *party majority status*. As we will see, legislators understand pretty well that the rules of the legislative game determine their position, power, and legislative perquisites.

If institutional design did not matter, there would be no reforms to the *Reglamentos*, no harsh debates about the functions of those who are in charge of the Chambers, no disputes about who speaks first, second (or not at all) on the floor, no arguments about the way Chairs are assigned, no demands of the opposition to occupy more positions in the committee system. If institutional design did not matter, there would be no *Reglamentos* (Rules of the House). If the institutional choices of legislators did not matter, the Chambers would function, as Cox (2006, 141) explains, in the “legislative state of nature (...) an assembly in which all business is conducted in the plenary session (no committees) and members’ ability to talk and make motions is largely unrestricted and unregulated.” Despite the appearances, our legislators do not function in a legislative state of nature. They consciously design every aspect of their organizations and consistently defend their advantages.

If a quick inventory of the present rules and norms of the Chambers could satiate the interest of academics and legislators, why should we care about the institutional *development* of the Chambers?

We should, and we *must* care because the understanding of the Argentine and Chilean politics remains partial without a comprehensive analysis of what took place *inside* the Chambers during the last sixty years. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 277) concluded that there has been “a version of “party government,” in the House at least, throughout the postwar period.” Did Chilean and Argentine parties determine the key features of their Chambers through time? When were the rules and norms that regulate the activity of legislators enacted or adopted? Did they change? If they changed, who changed them?

Only a study of the Chambers' institutional development can help us answer these questions. The analyses of party systems, though extremely rich -specially in the case of Chile-, have not covered the organization of the Chambers.

The need to understand in a comprehensive way both countries' politics brings to other two main reasons for considering the Chambers' institutional development.

The first is related to the influence of dictatorships over the legislative organization. The analysis of the evolution of legislative rules and norms will help understand how authoritarian laws impacted on the legislative organization and also how parties *responded* to authoritarian legacies *inside* the Chambers. We will see that parties managed to adapt and even make use of these rules.

The second reason concerns the assessment of the consolidation of democracy. How the obscure and distant legislative arrangements are related to one of the main subjects in comparative politics? The response is that the study of the institutional choices of legislators during the last decades can help understand their performance. Did parties control the Chamber's tools needed to implement their campaign promises? Could opposition parties veto any step of the legislative process? How did the opposition participate? Were committees independent from party influence? Once in charge of the Chamber, what did parties do with its rules? Why did they change them? What is the impact of their decisions?

The answers to these questions are particularly relevant to Argentina and Chile because they *are democracies* with an *authoritarian past*. The return to democracy left behind the insulated "Legislative Advisory Committee" (C.A.L. "Comisión de Asesoramiento

Legislativo”) established in the Argentine National Congress by the military coup in 1976 and the three (1974-1980) and four (1981-1989) “legislative committees” of Pinochet, all of them composed of captains, colonels, and generals in charge of *proposing legislation* to the Executive Power. Congresses in Chile and Argentina bear with the responsibility of being one of the main institutions that contribute to the stability of the democratic system.

Finally, this dissertation will be interesting to those concerned with comparing democratic legislatures. The analysis of the institutional development of two Latin American Chambers with the lenses of a theory conceived for the U.S. House, that is, the demonstration that diverse regime histories, constitutional and internal rules were not obstacles to apply the Cartel Theory may contribute to build a general theory of legislatures in presidential regimes.

Section 2. What We Know About the Institutional Development of the Chambers

We do not know much about the institutional development of the Chambers because the attention from the scholarly community in the subfield of Latin American legislative politics emerged after the last wave of democratization in the region. In part because they have been overshadowed by presidents and frequently closed by militaries, Morgenstern (2002, 5) argues, Latin American legislatures have received limited study. Note, for instance, that the “first stab” about the analysis of committee systems in Latin American legislatures was made in the early 2000s (Morgenstern 2002, 11).

As in any legislative subfield, the first approach to the literature of Latin American congresses is through constitutional and normative studies that describe the functioning of legislatures and compare legislative rules (Andrade Geywitz 1945; Ahumada Muñoz 1967; Bugatti 1974; Sabato and Cavarozzi 1984; Macris 1986; Pellet Lastra 1993; Gentile 1997; Crescenzi 1998). Thanks to the increased interest about legislative politics in Latin America after the 1990s, the content and the methodology of the studies substantially changed. Recent analyses in the new-institutionalism vein examine the role these legislatures play in the policymaking process and the executive-legislative relations - particularly the agenda-setting power of the Executive- (Jones 2001; Casar 2002; Eaton 2002; Siavelis 2002; Weldon 2002; Amorim Neto *et al.* 2003; Nacif 2003; Tsebelis and Alemán 2005; Alemán and Schwartz 2006; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Toro Maureira 2007; Alemán 2009; Alemán and Navia 2009).

Within this wave of recent studies, a few works have indirectly examined some legislative rules or norms either as "a cause of" or as "a consequence of" the party, electoral system or party discipline in the Chamber. The first type of studies states that legislative rules or norms help explain: a) the high level of party discipline (Jones 2002; Morgenstern 2002; Weldon 2002); b) the functioning of majority parties as cartels (Jones and Hwang 2003a; Jones and Hwang 2003b; Jones and Hwang 2005); c) the sources of presidential support and political stability (Mustapic 2002; Nolte 2003), and d) the legislative agenda and, consequently, the policymaking process (Alemán 2006). In the second type of studies rules or norms appear as the result of: a) a centralized party government model (Nacif 2002); b) the stability and cohesion of legislative coalitions (Carey 2002; Alemán and

Saiegh 2007), and c) the electoral reform (Carey 2002; Morgenstern 2002; Nacif 2002; Dworak 2003; Rivera Sanchez 2004).

Some of the previous citations belong to Morgenstern and Nacif's book *Legislative Politics in Latin America* (2002). These authors, as well as the contributors in the volume, adapted questions and hypotheses applied to the study of Western consolidated democracies, namely U.S. theories, to the analysis of legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. One of their themes is "*parliamentary parties and legislative structure.*" In this rubric they analyzed the relation between *procedural coalitions*, *committee systems*, and *floor voting coalitions* and partisan, electoral, and constitutional arrangements.

In what follows the works that have associated legislative rules or norms to the role of parties in the Argentine and Chilean Chambers, namely those from *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, are summarized. At the end of this summary, I point out their contributions and limits regarding this dissertation.

2.1 The Studies

Beginning with the Argentine Chamber, I mention the works of Jones (2002), Mustapic (2002), Jones and Hwang (2003b; 2005), and Alemán (2006).

Jones (2002) studied the primary determinants of the Chamber's high level of party discipline in the post-1989 period through the analysis of roll-call votes. The substantive cohesion on the floor, he argues, "stems primarily from a combination of institutional rules governing the elections and intralegislative organization" (Jones 2002, 184).

Concerning the electoral rules, Jones explains that there is a strong relation between the party and the political careers of legislators.³ About the *intralegislative organization* Jones (and also Mustapic 2002) stresses the functions of the President of the Chamber and of the party leader and their influence on the behavior of legislators. While the former decides, in consultation with other party leaders, which committee leadership positions correspond to which party, the latter determines how committee assignment will be allocated. Party leaders also possess important resources such as delegation assignments, budgetary resources, and control over the flow of legislation, and over the participation in floor debates. In sum, the rules governing the election of deputies, combined with the power the President and party leaders exercise, “helps in large part to explain the rarity of legislators voting against their party’s position on the Chamber floor” (Jones 2002, 184).

In subsequent articles Jones and Hwang (2003b; 2005) applied the Cartel Theory to analyze party politics in the Argentine Chamber. The authors argue that the success of the majority party -the Peronist/Justicialist Party -PJ- (Partido Justicialista)- in the 1989-2003 period stems from its functioning as an effective cartel (Jones and Hwang 2003b). The origins of this cartel, however, are distinct from those in the U.S. House. While in the latter legislators are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leader (Cox and McCubbins 1993), in Argentina provincial-level party bosses are the key players who

³ Following the same line of research Jones and Hwang (2003a; 2005) explain that parties in Argentina have a great deal of control over legislators’ access to the ballot. Argentine deputies are elected from closed party lists in multi-member districts (with a median district magnitude of 3 and a mean of 5). These lists are created at the provincial-level through elite arrangement or party primary (Jones and Hwang 2003a). Between 1989 and 2003 only a median of 19% of deputies (20% and 12% for the Peronist Party and the Radical Civic Union Party, respectively) achieved immediate reelection, with an overwhelming majority returning to political posts in their province, or going to national level posts, often in representation of their province. In most instances the reelection decision for Argentine deputies, they argue, lies primarily with the provincial-level party boss, and not with the individual legislator (Jones and Hwang 2005).

engage in this delegation, but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar. Majority control of the legislature in the U.S. House is based on an ideological, reputational, and, to a lesser extent, distributive logic (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). In Argentina “this majority control is based on a similar mix, but with distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation” (Jones and Hwang 2003b, 16).

As would be expected in a legislature where the majority party functions as an effective cartel, the authors argue, the Chamber rules provide the majority party leadership with substantial power and nearly complete control over legislative agenda. Accordingly, although the Rules Committee operates in part based on consensus, when a disagreement occurs the majority party’s position always prevails (Jones and Hwang 2003b, 20).⁴ As to the committee system they explain that “during the 1989-2003 period the majority party occupied a median of 77% of the [committee] chairs, but only 47% of the seats” (Jones and Hwang 2005, 277). In reference to these “committee incentives” Mustapic (2002) explains that they generate cohesion both within and among parties. Committee positions (and the increase in the number of committees) are clientelistic rewards or payments for service. To Mustapic, whose main subject is executive-legislative relations (1983-1995 period), legislative positions are one of the factors on which the Executive Power relies to foster party discipline and to generate legislative support.

⁴ In Argentina this is the Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria). The President and the Vice-Presidents of the Chamber and the party delegation’s leaders constitute this committee.

Alemán's article *Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures* (2006) explores the control of the legislative agenda in the region, analyzing in particular the Argentine, Chilean, and Mexican cases. The author focuses on the rules of the Chambers and on the agenda-setting power of majority leaders -who lack codified gatekeeping rights in Argentina and Chile-. As to rules, he mentions the existence of a joint meeting of a partisan committee and Chamber authorities to set the order of business and of simple procedures for majorities to force the vote to schedule a bill for plenary debate in both Chambers (Alemán 2006; 132,134). Majority leaders display their de facto power in those joint meetings. In addition, he mentions three factors as relevant for the analysis of the agenda control: the (positive) agenda power of certain Executive Powers, the lack of committee autonomy from the leadership of legislative parties, and the fragmentation and discipline of parties (Alemán 2006, 128). Discussing the lack of autonomy of standing committees in Latin American countries Alemán mentions some particular aspects of their legislative organizations: the power of referral (i.e., the common use of multiple referrals) and the fact that the finance (*Hacienda*) and constitutional committees "have a more stable and more professional membership than most others" (Alemán 2006, 130). After describing the rules and norms related to agenda-setting power in Argentina and Chile, Alemán examines roll-call data from Argentina (1983-1997) and Chile (1997-2000). His results "reveal not only leadership control over the policy agenda but also the strength of Argentine and Chilean parties in government" (Alemán 2006, 151).

In addition to Alemán's article, but focused exclusively on the Chilean lower Chamber, we find the works of Carey (2002), Nolte (2003), Alemán and Saiegh (2007),

and Toro Maureira (2007). The first author examines the post-transition Chilean legislative party system. He argues that this system differs from the highly fluid mid-century system because, throughout the 1990s, it has been characterized by the stability and cohesiveness of the two main legislative coalitions, a product of the M=2 reform of the electoral system (Carey 2002, 224).⁵ The Chamber, he explains, is organized on the grounds of coalition control. In reference to *floor coalitions*, his roll-call votes analyses (1990-2001) demonstrate that “legislators from the two main coalitions tend to vote with each other and that the coalitions also tend to vote against each other” (Carey 2002, 250). Among the mechanisms that generate cohesiveness within coalitions he identifies ideological spread, the executive’s authority to control the legislative agenda, and the coordination at the level of coalition leadership. In reference to the latter, the author highlights the importance of the weekly *Concertación* meetings, the consistent coalition majorities in committee composition, and the majority-controlled *Mesas Directivas* (the directing boards of the Chamber). Coalitions, he argues, “are clearly central actors in structuring congressional decisions” (Carey 2002, 251).

Similarly, Alemán and Saiegh (2007) argue that competition between the two stable multiparty coalitions (the *Concertación* of the Center-left, and the coalition of the Right, *Unión por Chile*) has dominated electoral and legislative politics in post-Pinochet Chile. Therefore, the Chilean electoral coalitions are not merely electoral pacts. Rather, they constitute two distinct policy-based coalitions.

⁵ Chilean legislators are elected from open ballot lists in a two-member district (60 districts) electoral system. This system was imposed by the outgoing military regime.

Toro Maureira (2007) also investigates Chilean deputies' behavior considering bills sent by the Executive Power during the legislative term 2002-2006. The evidence (analysis of roll-call votes) indicates that one of the most relevant reasons of President Lagos' legislative success was the high unity of the governmental party and the heterogeneous action of the opposing bloc.

In addition to their cohesive behavior on the floor, Carey argues that Chilean coalitions also control the agenda and structure the committee system. In Carey's opinion the fundamental institutions of the Chamber are the *Mesas Directivas* (Directing Boards), which have some control over the legislative agenda and committee assignments-, and the "17 permanent committees" (Carey 2002; 237, 238). The *Concertación*, the author explains, maintained a majority, of either 7;6 or 8;5, on all committees at all times (1994-2001) (Carey 2002, 239). As to committee Chairs, while 5 of 17 committees were chaired by members of the opposition in 1997, the majority coalition has asserted a near monopoly over Chairs in the 1998-2001 period (holding 16 of 17 Chairs) (Carey 2002, 239). The domination of the *Concertación*, Carey and Nolte (2003) argue, did not prevent the development of a strong committee system. Chilean legislators, who endeavor to build careers through reelection to Congress, are concerned with committee work, local politics, and have a hierarchical committee system that has accumulated experience and expertise (Carey 2001, 243).⁶ The importance of certain committees, namely the *Hacienda* Committee, is evidenced by an analysis of reassignment rates. Carey concludes that this Chamber is highly professionalized, and that its committee system is accumulating substantial expertise.

⁶ In Chile 76% of the deputies renominated and, of these, 78% won in 1993.

To recapitulate, studies of the Argentine Chamber focus on the behavior of parties as *floor coalitions*. Their main evidence comes from the analysis of roll-call votes and from statistics about its composition from 1989 to 2003. The rules and norms of the Chamber that give majority leaders agenda-setting control, coupled with the power of parties - specially provincial-level party bosses- to decide the diversified political careers of legislators and to reward them with legislative positions, help explain the cartel behavior at the floor level. In addition, *parties* are the main actors in the Argentine Chamber. As part of the "intralegislative organization" these studies discuss the functions of the President of the Chamber and of party leaders, the structuring of the committee system, and the activities of the Committee on Parliamentary Business. Their authors emphasize the power of the President of the Chamber and of party leaders to set the agenda and to control the allocation of committee seats, namely of committee Chairs. Jones and Alemán, in particular, explain how the Committee on Parliamentary Business is controlled by the majority party. Alemán discusses also the power of referral (of the President of the Chamber), the prerogative of majorities to expedite committee reports, and points out that some committees are more important than others.

In the case of the Chilean Chamber studies focus on the behavior of parties on the floor but discuss a little bit more their role as *procedural coalitions*. The analysis of roll-call votes is used to trace the discipline of the two Chilean multiparty coalitions of the 1990s and 2000s. The cohesiveness of these coalitions, the authors argue, differs from the transient alliances of the pre-transition era. In contrast to Argentina, *coalitions* are the principal actors in the *Corporación*. Their leaders, majorities, and Chamber authorities, however, structure Chambers' decisions, control the legislative agenda (heavily

influenced by the Executive Power), and committee assignments as well as their Argentine counterparts do. The examination of committee assignments (1994-2001) shows, like in Argentina, a near monopoly over Chairs. The fact that permanent committees are not all alike, especially the *Hacienda* committee, is confirmed by Carey, Nolte, and Alemán. According to Carey and Nolte, despite coalitional control, Chilean deputies have built a strong committee system.

2.2 Contributions and Limits

The studies reviewed provide useful information about the actual organization of the Chambers. I refer in particular to the central role of parties (Argentina) and coalitions (Chile) in their functioning; to the power these parties and coalitions concentrate regarding the legislative agenda and the allocation of committee seats; to the prerogatives of the Presidents of the Chambers and party leaders; to the stratification of the committee system; and to the difference we can infer about the organization of the committee systems in Argentina and Chile. Through the chapters we will see not only the integral analysis of the aspects discussed by the authors, but also the confirmation of most of their findings for previous periods.

These studies, however, provide partial information about the Chambers. They are neither focused on the analysis of pre-floor stages of the legislative process nor to its development through time. The examination of parties as *procedural coalitions* is: a) considered among other factors that affect/is affected by the behavior of parties as *floor coalitions*; b) obscured sometimes by the prerogative of the Executive Power over the legislative agenda (Chile); and c) limited to a few aspects of the agenda-setting control or

the structuring of the committee system. In addition, they cover short periods of time, always after the 1980s.

This time-bound and partial focus, I hasten to add, makes sense, in particular regarding the availability of data.⁷ For one part, roll-call votes -the data privileged by most authors- is not difficult to find. For the other part, committees' memberships and the *Reglamentos* (Rules of the House), can be found in the websites of the Chambers. In sum, since almost nothing is known about the institutional evolution of the Chambers, it is sensible to start with the recent past and with the data available.

Section 3. The Purposes and Main Questions of the Dissertation

The objective of this study is to provide a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the Argentine and Chilean lower Chambers. The general hypothesis to be tested, which derives from the Cartel Theory, is that *when a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

Two purposes guide the study. First, I intend to reconstruct the patterns or central features of the Chambers' institutional development. This primary step, which I call the ***reconstruction task***, is the most important difference between my dissertation and the studies reviewed. While I develop the definition of institutional development at length in chapter II here I can briefly note that, for one part, I identify *institutional development*

⁷ I can attest that doing fieldwork in the Chambers, particularly collecting data from the 1940s to the 1970s, is not an exciting endeavor because it implies, as Jenkins (2001) notes, "[f]lipping through old, dusty journals, [and] digging around in poorly-organized archives."

with the *evolution of the rules and norms associated with the structuring of the committee and the directing board systems and the pre-floor and floor procedures*. I call these dispositions the "*organizational rules and norms*." For the other part, I identify *institutional development* with both the *preservation* and the *change* of these rules and norms over time. Therefore, the question associated with the first purpose is: ***what are the patterns that characterize the institutional development of the Chambers (i.e., the preservation and change of their organizational rules and norms) over time?*** I plan to establish these patterns specifying when, by whom, how, and why the organizational rules and norms were adopted or modified.

The second purpose is to assess the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the institutional choices made by deputies through time. To put it differently, the goal is to ascertain whether ruling parties acted as *procedural coalitions*. The questions related to this second step are: ***what was the role of majority (ruling) parties in the institutional development of the Chambers?***⁸ ***Did the institutional development of the Chambers advantage ruling parties?***

This second purpose also distinguishes my study because I will make a comprehensive assessment regarding the evolution of rules and norms over time and I will focus on the role of parties as *procedural coalitions*. Despite this distinction, this second step will establish a link with the works mentioned above. In this sense, we will be able to detect the origins of several features and confirm partial trends highlighted by the authors.

⁸ Contrasting with the U.S. House, the Argentine and Chilean Chambers were seldom in charge of a majority party. That is why the adjective "ruling" in parenthesis is beside the adjective "majority." See chapters III and V for a complete explanation about the parties and coalitions/pluralities and majorities that ruled the Chambers.

Section 4. Content of the Dissertation

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the theory and methodology. It provides, in particular, the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions I will use to support or disconfirm the general hypothesis. Following Morgenstern's advice (2002, 5), who argued that in order to understand the unknown Latin American legislatures it is "necessary to first generate a view of what we are explaining," chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country's politics and a description of the Chambers' organization during the period over analysis. This description comprises their partisan composition by legislative periods. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) deal with the reconstruction task. After analyzing the reforms to the *Reglamento*, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems, both chapters conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the limits and merits of the Cartel Theory to explain the institutional development of the Chambers. Chapter VII concludes. I sum up the findings, I give my final assessment about the theory, and I suggest further avenues of research.

CHAPTER II

Analyzing Institutional Development

Once the literature review and the study of the party systems in Argentina and Chile had been completed I had no doubt about the theory to test for my research. The problem was how to proceed. There was no dataset about deputies, no precise information about the parties or coalitions that had been in charge of the Chambers. Were they majorities or pluralities? Another problem was how to examine institutional development through time. What aspects of the Chambers should I study to detect this evolution? The analysis of committee assignments from 1945 to 2002 was a main concern. I could not find information about this issue before the 1990s. And after 1990, I had only partial analyses. In view of these limits I decided to conduct fieldwork in both Chambers, to create my own datasets, and to integrate quantitative and qualitative analyses.

Part I of the chapter presents the Cartel Theory, explains why I chose it, and shows how I derived my general hypothesis. In Part II I provide the definition of institutional development. I then present, in Part III, the criteria and predictions derived from the theory and two norms from the committee-government model that I will use to support or disconfirm the general hypothesis. Part IV focuses on a second theory that I test and introduces a typology of majorities and pluralities. Finally, in the last section I detail how I created the datasets and explain how I combine quantitative and qualitative methods.

Part I. The Cartel Theory

Section 1. Situating the Theory

Different eras of congressional organization have been identified according to their degree of centralization of power.⁹ In the post-New Deal period studies are traditionally divided between the so-called textbook Congress era studies, which appeared after WW II as a result of scholarly work done in the 1950s and 1960s, and the postreform era studies, which emerged in the middle of the 1980s after the main reform of the Rules of the U.S. House in the 1970s. The former describe the U.S. Congress as a modern and professionalized institution characterized by "*committee government*", that is to say, a decentralized structure with weak parties and party leaders and an autonomous committee system controlled by powerful committee barons who strictly adhere to seniority and apprenticeship norms.¹⁰ The postreform era studies, by contrast, characterize the U.S. Congress as an organization made up of *subservient committees* and a *relevant chamber floor* or a *majority party* as the locus of decision-making.¹¹ The

⁹ Cox and McCubbins identify twelve eras or partisan arrangements in Congress between 1789 and 1995 (Cox and McCubbins 2002).

¹⁰ The early studies, thickly *descriptive*, were made by political scientists working in the traditions of anthropology and sociology (Matthews 1960; Peabody and Polsby 1963; Polsby 1968; Huitt and Peabody 1969; Dexter 1969; Fenno 1978). This era also included the *first-generation of formal models* (Shepsle and Weingast 1995) to which the existence of autonomous committees and strict adherence to the seniority system reflect gains from cooperation. The *second-generation of formal models* - distributive models - enriched the institutional content of rational choice theories of legislatures, providing ways in which exogenous institutional arrangements channelled expressions of legislative self-interest (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1995). The theories of this era claimed that *reelection* was the prime goal of congressmen (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1989 [1977]; Loomis 1988; Arnold 1990).

¹¹ In the relevant-chamber-floor approach non-partisan goals are salient and political parties are denied a consequential role. Among these studies we find those that focus on floor majorities, the problems of legislative decision making under uncertainty, and the role of information (Austen-Smith 1990; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1991); competing groups (Dodd 1986; Diermeier 1995), and floor unanimity/cross-coalitions vis à vis the Executive Power or inter-chamber rivalry (Davidson and Oleszek 1976; Dodd 1977; Sundquist 1981; Maass 1983; Cooper 1988; Born 1990; Diermeier and Myerson 1999).

main claim of party-centered analyses is that parties are crucial in the U.S. House. Particularly, this institution is well organized to serve the collective interests of the majority (Cooper and Brady 1981; Sinclair 1983, 1995; Stewart 1989; Strom 1990; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rodhe 1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rodhe 2000, 2001; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002, 2005; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2007).

Section 2. The Cartel or Party Government Theory

The theory that guides my dissertation comes from the party-centered approach. It is the Cartel or Party Government Theory presented by Cox and McCubbins in *Legislative Leviathan* (1993). In this book the authors deal with several problems that the committee government model faces when it comes to understanding the systemic structure of the U.S. House and its institutional development in the postwar period (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 276). Their work reevaluates the role of parties and committees in the U.S. House. In this sense, *Legislative Leviathan* presents the most direct challenge to the standard wisdom about the existence of a committee government in the U.S. House. In the authors' view "congressional parties are a species of legislative cartel. These cartels usurp the rule-making power of the House in order to endow their members with differential power (e.g., the power of committee chairs) and to facilitate and stabilize legislative trades that benefit their members" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 278). In articulating their view of parties, they discuss the *incentives of party leaders* and the behavior of parties as *procedural coalitions*.

Beginning with the *incentives of party leaders*, Cox and McCubbins explain that legislative parties arise in order to ensure that the usual problems of providing and maintaining public goods are overcome. Majority party members are united by their stake in the value of their common party label. They suffer electorally if voters believe the party failed to adopt needed legislation, just as they benefit if voters credit the party with legislative accomplishments. Therefore, individual members' desire for *reelection* generates a collective interest in their party's reputation. In this context, faced with members who want to pursue individual goals (majority party dilemma), the party creates *leadership posts* that are both attractive and elective, and that induce its leaders to internalize the "collective electoral fate of the party" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 133). Their occupants have both the wherewithal (monitoring responsibility-arbiter), and the incentives (rewards) to solve collective dilemmas. In relation to these rewards, Cox and McCubbins state that reelection is not the only interest legislators pursue. They also strive for *internal advancement* and for *party majority status* because, the authors say, not all reelections are created equal: "the payoff to being reelected is higher if one's party wins a majority, as evinced by the obvious payoffs in terms of the Speakership and committee chairmanships" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 125).

As regards parties as *procedural coalitions* Cox and McCubbins underline the influence of the majority party on the pre-floor stages of legislation.¹² They explain that they "see the translation of procedural into substantive advantages as occurring on both "active"

¹² Procedural coalitions are formed by those legislators who join to distribute/benefit from the institutional advantages (select the institutional leaders of the chamber, structure its committee system, and get a disproportionate share of staff and other legislative resources). Morgenstern gives, in my view, a clear and brief definition when he argues that procedural coalitions, which may be quite different from floor coalitions, are formed by "those legislators who join to elect legislative leaders, approve voting rules, select staff, and dole out committee assignments, or generally organize the legislative business" (Morgenstern 2002, 10).

and “latent” tracks” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 8). They relate the active track with the scheduling power of the Speaker and committee Chairs and the latent track or “automatic pilot” with the substantive advantage the majority party can attain by structuring the committee system, which also affects the legislative agenda. The most important function of the majority party, they argue, “is precisely to usurp the House’s power to structure the committee system” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 253).

They test this view of the majority party as a procedural coalition through an examination of the *committee assignment process* and of the power of the majority party to *set the legislative agenda*.

With respect to the former they provide statistical evidence about the limits of the main claims of the committee-government model (e.g., the “pure self-selection model” and the seniority norm), and the relative influence of party leaders on committee assignments, in particular in the case of freshmen.

In relation to the scheduling power, they present two models that show a partisan bias in the selection of bills, and analyze the tools with which majority parties influence the committee system.¹³ These tools, which they call “the instruments of control,” are the creation and destruction of committees, the (re)definition of their jurisdictions, the substantive agenda-setting power of Chairs, the referral power of the Speaker, the regulation of committees’ memberships and appointments, and finally the creation of control committees (i.e., committees that can review and revise other committees’

¹³ The first model is related to the preferences of a rational Speaker to set the agenda. The second refers to the influence the expectations of the Speaker have on the bills committees report.

decisions). Their main conclusion is that there has been “a version of “party government,” in the House at least, throughout the postwar period” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 277).

In an article published in 1997 Cox and McCubbins argued that party government is not conditional on the level of agreement within the party. The question, they explained, is whether party government disappears during the period in which the majority party is divided or if majority party members still retain substantial institutional advantages. If one considers that even during the heyday of committee government in the U.S. House “no minority party member served as chair of any committee (...) [or] as Speaker, the majority got the lion’s share of staff allocations on all committees, and majority party members got a more than proportional share of seats on the key committees, it seems clear that the deck was stacked” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1379). To put the point another way, they explained, “if one accepts the following premises: (1) election of the Speaker and of committee members is by straight party-line votes controlled by the majority party; (2) allocation of committee staff is controlled by the majority party; (3) the Speaker and the committee chairs have substantial agenda power; (4) the committee system as a whole (...) is consistent with the majority party’s interests, then one has bought the key assumptions of our argument” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1379).

In *Setting the Agenda* (2005), Cox and McCubbins stressed the “majority party’ ability to set the agenda as the key to its success,” in contrast to traditional partisan theories that pointed out to its ability to marshal its troops on the floor as the source of its power (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 7). In particular, they explain that the agenda is cartelized

when special agenda-setting powers are formally delegated in various offices (the chairmanships, the Speakership, and the Committee on Rules), and when the majority party secures most of these offices for its senior partners (and ensures their minimally fiduciary behaviour). (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 18, 21). In addition, they performed a qualitative study of the changes in the U.S. House Rules. They showed that the structure of agenda power that enables the majority party to legislate, erected in the late 1880s, has not substantially changed. They mention, specifically, that minority party's prerogatives have not been restored, that the Committee on Rules has maintained its central position, and that "the powers of the Speaker have waxed and waned, but when they have changed, they have simply been redistributed within the majority party, not allocated to any minority party members" (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 45). Their central conclusion is that "changes in the House rules during the 1880s, culminating in Reed's rules, greatly advantaged the majority party; and that subsequent changes in House rules and organization have not significantly altered that advantage" (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 24).

Although the idea may seem familiar, it is appropriate to clarify what the authors mean when they argue that parties act as "cartels." They use the term cartel because "procedural cartels, like economic cartels seek to establish a collective monopoly on a particular resource (in this case, agenda-setting power), seek to restrict supply of products made with this resource (in this case, bills that are placed on the floor agenda), and face problems of free-riding (in this case, members reluctant to vote for a party measure when such a vote will not sell well back home, or members eager to use their delegated agenda powers for personal gain)" (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 42,43).

Section 3. Why Cartel Theory?

The straightforward answer is that I chose it because it considers parties as the most important actors, the central features in the legislative arena. Considering the predominant role parties and coalitions have played in the Argentine and Chilean lower Chambers (see chapter I), I believe that the Cartel Theory is appropriate to understand their institutional development. Previous works in the subfield about this issue also encouraged my choice. Jones *et al* (2002) have demonstrated the inapplicability to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies of theories for which parties are irrelevant actors (such as distributional and informational theories). Mezey (1993) argues that party-centered models seem adequate in the case of political systems with strong parties that select candidates, finance their campaigns, and where PR implies that several legislators (elected from closed lists) represent the same constituency.

In addition to these reasons, I chose this theory because it differs from the rest regarding its assumptions about legislators' interests. This approach includes as legislators' goals not just reelection but also advancement in the internal hierarchy of posts within the House, good public policy, and majority status for their parties. A theory that assumes that reelection is the only goal of legislators would be particularly dubious in the case of Argentina since electoral rules in this country limit legislators' ability to develop a professional legislative career (Jones *et al.* 2002, 656).

Leaving aside the advantages of the theory *vis à vis* other approaches, I want to make a remark about the evolution of the theory itself and how it relates to my research. As we saw in section II, the Party Government Theory (1993), now the Procedural Cartel

Theory (2005), has had its *own development*. The accent now is on the use of agenda control and on the role of senior partners (in 1993 the focus was on the Speaker and the top few leaders). Even though I pay attention to the evolution of the theory, namely in *Setting the Agenda* (2005), my research is guided by the Cartel or Party Government Theory as it was defined in *Legislative Leviathan* (1993). Despite its close relation with the agenda-setting power, in the latter the structuring of the committee system is emphasized, and that is exactly what I wish to investigate in my research. Why? Because we do not have piles of articles about this issue (as it is the case for the U.S. House). Therefore, nothing can be taken *for granted*. The patterns of the structuring of the committee systems of the Chambers are waiting to be discovered.

Section 4. Adapting the Theory

Cox and McCubbins present their theory in different ways in *Legislative Leviathan*. The most specific definition is perhaps the following: "Our view is that parties in the House -especially the majority party- are a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). The two main consequences of the possession of this rule-making power, they argue, is that "the legislative process in general -and the committee system in particular- is stacked in favor of majority party interests" and that the "key players in most legislative deals are members of the majority party" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2).

To adapt the theory to the Chambers:

- a) I do not speak of majority but of **ruling party** (in order to consider majorities and pluralities);
- b) I do not speak only of ruling parties but also of **ruling coalitions** (in order to consider the coalitions that ruled both Chambers, specially the *Corporación*);
- c) I formulate the general hypothesis combining the view of the Cartel Theory with 1) and 2).

The general hypothesis to be examined is then:

*When a legislative **party or coalition** becomes the **ruling party or coalition** in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

From this general hypothesis I derive the predictions that will guide the analysis of the evolution of the rules and norms.

Part II. The Institutional Development of the Chambers: the Evolution of

Organizational Rules and Norms

As mentioned in chapter I, the first purpose of this study is to reconstruct the patterns of institutional development of the Chambers, what I call the *reconstruction task*. I identify the institutional development of the Chambers with the *evolution* of their organizational *rules* and *norms*. The definition of these terms is essential to understand the meaning and sense of the reconstruction task. This is the objective of this part.

According to Schickler (2001, 3), "whatever else a national legislature may be, it is a complex of rules, procedures, and specialized internal institutions (...) Particular configurations of these rules (...) may serve the interests of individual members, parties, pressure groups, sectors of society, or the legislature as a whole. As a result, as any legislature evolves through time, little is more fundamental to its politics than recurrent, often intense, efforts to *change* its institutions."

Beyond the constitutional settings in which the Chambers operate, their members are empowered to enact their own *organizational rules* and *norms*. When I refer to **rules**, I am speaking of the precepts contained in the *Reglamentos* of the Chambers (the Rules of the House in the U.S. House of Representatives), which regulate pre-floor and floor procedures.

When I refer to **norms**, I am considering the non-codified rights or procedures, the precedents or established practices, and the interpretations deputies make of certain rules.

When I use the adjective **organizational**, I am speaking of the aspects that structure the activity of deputies.

The aspects of the organization I chose to examine in this study are the **Reglamentos** and the **directing board** and **committee systems**. In relation to *Reglamentos*, I analyze their reforms considering the political context, which party tabled the reform, its content, and the rules finally amended. As regards the directing boards, I examine their partisan composition, their functions and the procedure and practice to elect them. The analysis of the committee system considers its structure, and the process of committee assignment.

I do not examine the rules and norms related to these aspects as they are regulated today, but their *evolution through time*. In this way I will be able to establish the patterns of institutional development.

The analysis of the evolution of the norms and rules related to the structuring of the directing board and committee systems cover mainly the pre-floor stages of the legislative process. Nevertheless, some of the reforms to the *Reglamentos* and certain precedents or legislative practices will let us know measures adopted by ruling parties or coalitions in order to control floor proceedings.

Summarizing, I identify *institutional development* with the *evolution of the rules and norms associated with the structuring of the committee and the directing board systems and the pre-floor and floor procedures*. I call these dispositions the "organizational rules and norms." In addition, I identify *institutional development* with both the *preservation* and the *change* of these rules and norms over time.

Part III. How to Support of Disconfirm the General Hypothesis

The second purpose of this study is to ascertain whether parties acted as procedural coalitions. This part presents the tools that will help me find out the role played by ruling parties or coalitions in the institutional development of the Chambers. Section 5 deals with the criteria and predictions to support or disconfirm the general hypothesis. Section 6 defines the two norms of the committee-government model: the apprenticeship and the seniority norms.

Section 5. Criteria and Predictions to Support of Disconfirm the General Hypothesis

I assess the cartel behavior of the ruling party or coalition through two main criteria and several predictions that derive from the Cartel Theory. To make the predictions I used two guides: the main conclusions regarding the cartel behavior of the majority party contained in *Legislative Leviathan* and also the analysis of the primacy of Reed's Rules in the U.S. House developed by Cox and McCubbins in *Setting the Agenda*. The predictions refer to the proposal and approval of reforms to the *Reglamentos* and to each norm or rule related to the directing board and committee systems.

General Hypothesis

When a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.

The general criterion supporting the hypothesis is:

"Any change in the organizational rules or norms that accrues the advantages of ruling parties supports the general hypothesis"

The general criterion that would disconfirm the hypothesis is:

"Any change in the organizational rules and norms that benefits the opposition/minority parties disconfirms the general hypothesis"

Below I present the predictions in three simple tables. Though simple, their content is important because it will be applied in chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile), which are devoted to the reconstruction task. As noted the predictions refer to the proposal and approval of reforms to the *Reglamentos* (Table 1), and to each norm or rule related to the directing board system (Table 2) and the committee system (Table 3).

Table 1 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY – REFORMS TO THE *REGLAMENTOS*

1 - Reforms to the *Reglamento* proposed by ruling parties or coalitions are adopted on straight party-line vote.

2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling parties or coalitions and/or accrue their advantages.

Table 2 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY BY NORMS/RULES OF THE DIRECTING BOARD SYSTEM

Organizational rule/norm	Predictions
Election procedure	The election of the members of the directing board or <i>Mesa</i> is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling parties or coalitions.
Censure motions	Censure motions moved against the <i>Mesa</i> are rejected.
Partisan composition	No member of the opposition serves as President or Vice-President of the directing board or <i>Mesa</i> .
Power (functions)	The power of the members of the directing board or <i>Mesa</i> increases or is redistributed within the ruling party or coalition.

The prediction related to the partisan composition of the directing board (Table 2) is new in the sense that it could have never been considered by Cox and McCubbins. In the U.S. House there exists only the Speaker, who belongs always to the majority party. In addition, the prediction regarding the censure motion is examined only in Chile because this institution is not legislated in Argentina.

The committee system has its own main prediction:

"Committees are agents of the ruling party or coalition"

I then derive more specific predictions presented in Table 3.

Table 3 - PREDICTIONS DERIVED FROM THE CARTEL THEORY BY NORMS/RULES OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE SYSTEM

Organizational rule/norm	Prediction
Creation of standing committees	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 - The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system. 2 - Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees.
<i>Membership</i>	
Enlargement of committees' memberships	Although the enlargement of committees' memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, ruling parties or coalitions control this process and preserve their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats.
Creation of leadership positions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1- The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of committees. 2 - Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and keep the lions' share of the new committee leadership positions.
Committee assignments	The allocation of committee seats is controlled by ruling parties or coalitions.
Partisan composition	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1- Party ratios in committees are consistently set in ruling parties' or coalitions' favor. 2- Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of seats in important committees.
<i>Chairmanships</i>	
Assignment process	The assignment of committee Chairs is controlled by ruling parties or coalitions.

The predictions about the creation of standing committees, the enlargement of committees' memberships, and the creation of leadership positions are adaptations of the instruments of control the majority party uses to structure the committee system (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 254).

Section 6. The Apprenticeship and Seniority Norms

As Cox and McCubbins did for the U.S. House, the analysis of the allocation of committee seats in the Chambers will consider the impact of the apprenticeship and seniority norms since they suppose a limit to the influence of parties over assignments. The latter refers to committee-specific seniority and implies that the committee member of the majority (ruling) party with the longest continuous service on the committee becomes Chair (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 46). The former suggests that committee appointments *"operate under an "apprenticeship" norm that guarantees mediocre assignments to incoming members"* (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 42).¹⁴ As will be discussed in chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile), I consider committee-specific seniority, but also the impact of "seniority in Chamber" (i.e. total service in the Chamber) more generally.

¹⁴ Cox and McCubbins explain that this norm was suggested by Bullock (1976) and additionally that "In somewhat the same vein, Dodd and Oppenheimer (1977, 41) suggest that a "congressional seniority" norm has reserved the choicest assignments to those who have accumulated many years of House experience" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 42).

Part IV. The Margin Hypothesis

The examination of the committee assignment process considers another prediction that also stems from the party-centered literature: the margin hypothesis of Young and Heitshusen (2003).

These authors argue that majority party incentives to influence committee composition vary by victory margins. Differing from the U.S. House, the Chambers were ruled not only by single-party majorities, but also by single-party pluralities, majority coalitions and plurality coalitions. These pluralities and majorities, in turn, were not equal in terms of the seats they secured in Chamber. This fact makes Young and Heitshusen's line of investigation particularly interesting.

To test this theory I needed a typology. Therefore, I created a codification of pluralities and majorities (Table 4).

Table 4 - CODIFICATION OF PLURALITIES AND MAJORITIES

Type of Plurality – Majority	Criterion
Regular Plurality	$s \leq 0.46$
Exceptional Plurality	$0.46 < s < 0.50$
Regular Majority	$0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$
Exceptional Majority	$0.55 < s < 0.67$
Qualified Majority	$s \geq 0.67$

Note: s is the share of seats of the ruling party in the Chamber.

The "Type of Plurality – Majority" labels of Table 1 are in accordance and complement the labels commonly used in the literature on voting systems (Bergman 1993; Teasdale

1996; Colomer and McLean 1998; Nurmi 2003; **Barbera** and **Jackson** 2004; Freixas 2004; Baharad and Nitzan 2007). I refer particularly to the following labels: "plurality" or "relative majority" (the party that secures more [votes] seats than the rest in Chamber); "absolute majority" (50% + 1 of the [votes] seats), and "qualified or super majority" (2/3 - 67%- or more of the [votes] seats).

With this typology I am ready to test the prediction of Young and Heitshusen. According to the authors, "A majority party with a small margin faces more difficulties in overcoming the minority party's obstructive tendencies [Dion 1997] and thus has greater incentives to influence committee composition in ways favourable to the majority party [McCarty *et al.* 2001]" (Young and Heitshusen 2003, 663).

The prediction, adapted to the Chambers' scenario, can be stated as follows: *since pluralities and regular majorities face "more difficulties in overcoming the opposition delegation's obstructive tendencies" (Young and Heitshusen 2003, 663), they will exercise (in proportion) greater control of the standing committees' composition than qualified or exceptional majorities.*

The general criterion supporting the hypothesis is:

"Pluralities and regular majorities secure (in proportion) a greater share of committee seats than qualified or exceptional majorities do"

The general criterion that would disconfirm the hypothesis is:

"All types of ruling parties exhibit an equal share of committee seats"

Part V. Time Frame - Datasets - Analyses

The study will cover the institutional development of the Chambers from 1945/6 to 2001/2. The exact year for each country is determined by their legislative periods.³⁵

In Argentina the exact period is 1946-2001. It begins with the congressional and presidential elections of 1946 (first term of President Juan D. Perón), and ends before the renewal of the Chamber after the 2001 mid-term congressional elections (President Fernando de la Rúa's term). The study in Chile covers fifty-seven years. It begins with the renewal of the Chamber after the 1945 mid-term congressional elections (President Juan Antonio Ríos Morales' term), and ends in 2001 during the Presidency of Ricardo Lagos Escobar.

There are two reasons for adopting such a time frame. On the one hand, the study demands a long extension of time to examine intra-country temporal variation. On the other hand, this extension of time allows a *reconstruction* of all the information needed. The further one goes back in time, the more difficult the task gets regarding legislative archival sources.

Except otherwise indicated, the information shown in tables, figures, and the empirical analyses of chapters IV and VI rely on two new extensive datasets of Argentine and Chilean deputies.

³⁵ The legislative period in Chile and Argentina is the time the Chambers function between two elections. In Chile the legislative period lasts four years. It opens with the election of the *Mesa* and the committee assignments and coincides with the four-year terms of its deputies. In Argentina the legislative period lasts two years. It opens with the election of the directing board and the committee assignments but does not coincide with the four-year terms of its deputies. Note that in Argentina one-half of the Chamber is renewed every two years and that the directing board is elected every year.

The datasets cover practically the same period (Argentina: 1946-2001; Chile: 1945-2002). The unit of observation (3.945 in Argentina; 1538 in Chile) is member (name)-legislative period. For each unit of observation the following variables were considered: party affiliation; region of provenance; number of terms in Chamber (in order to distinguish freshmen from seniors); committee assignments; positions in the Chamber (President or Vice-President), within delegations (party leader) and in committees (Chair-Vice-Chair-Secretary-Regular member); and type of ruling party the deputy belong to (single-party or coalition / plurality or majority). To my knowledge, this is the first research based on such a collection of data.

All the information comes from official archives, and was gathered during extended fieldwork in Argentine and Chile.

In Argentina I conducted research in the "Oficina de Informacion Parlamentaria" of the Chamber of Deputies (Capital City - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires). In Chile I worked first in the "Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional" (Capital City - Santiago), and then in the "Oficina de Informaciones" of the *Corporación*, situated in the city of Valparaiso. The bulk of the work consisted primarily in a systematic search through the indexes of the Journals of Sessions of the Argentine and Chilean Chambers from 1945 to 1973. I looked for the debates about the reforms to the *Reglamento*, committee assignments, censure motions (only in Chile), and the sessions devoted to the election of the directing boards. I also examined special publications about the composition of the Argentine Chamber, and few works about the evolution of the Chilean committee system until the 1950s. For the post-dictatorship period in Chile, I used the information available on the

Corporación's website and data I had gathered for my MA thesis in my previous visit to the Chilean Chamber in 2001. When I was about to finish my work in Chile, the officials of the "Oficina de Informaciones" informed me that since the 1990s the Journals of Sessions did not have indexes. Hence, from 1990 to 2002 the search was done session by session. In the case of Argentina I continued to rely on the paper version of the Journal of Sessions for the 1980s and early 1990s because the Chamber's website has no information of these periods. Indexes also disappeared from the Argentine Journal of Sessions since 1989. The information related to the functions of the members of the directing boards or *Mesas* and Chairs were obtained from different versions of the *Reglamentos* of each Chamber.¹⁶

The analyses of the reforms to the *Reglamentos*; the composition of the directing boards, their functions, elections, the evolution of the standing committee system and the procedure and practices about the committee assignment process are all based on the debates found in the Journal of Sessions and in the successive versions of the *Reglamentos*.

I test my hypotheses about ruling parties or coalition shares in Chamber and committees, the impact of the margin hypothesis and the influence of the seniority and apprenticeship norms using contingency tables, OLS regression models, and logit regression models. The details regarding the empirical analyses are provided in individual country chapters.

¹⁶ The list of official publications, websites and the definitions of terms that are often used in the study can be consulted in APPENDIX A.

Throughout the analyses attention is paid to the electoral system in force, and the ruling-party type in the Chambers at the time of the reform or maintenance of organizational rules and norms, to check for the influence of these factors.

This study is about the institutional design of two Latin American Chambers of Deputies. It intends to provide a comparative and as far as possible complete view of their institutional development over time. To that end, it examines specific rules and norms of these organizations. The analytical framework is the Cartel Theory. Therefore, it focuses on the roles parties played in this development. The goal is to ascertain whether these parties acted as procedural coalitions.

CHAPTER III

Getting to Know the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

1946-2001

My main goals are to reconstruct the patterns that underlay and shaped the institutional development of the national lower chambers of Argentina and Chile and determine if the Cartel Theory can explain them. As mentioned in chapter I, the first step to reach my goals is to generate a view of these organizations through time, a subject neglected in the literature before the 1980s and partially studied since then. Therefore, starting with the Argentine case, I present a summary account of the country's politics during these fifty-five years (Part I) and then provide a detailed description of the Chamber's organization (Part II).

Part I. Overview of Argentine Politics

Basic information about the interplay among constitutional, military governments, and parties is offered in this part. This information is needed to grasp the surrounding circumstances in which the institutional development of the Chamber took place. Section 1 briefly describes constitutional changes and identifies democratic and authoritarian periods. Section 2 gives an overview of the two main Argentine political parties.

Section 1. Constitutions, Democratic and Authoritarian Periods

Argentina is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and an autonomous Federal Capital (24 electoral districts). It has a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature.

The National Constitution, originally adopted in 1853, has had several reforms. Among the most important are the 1949 and the 1994 amendments. The former took place during the first term of President Juan D. Perón (1946-1952) and was annulled by the *de facto* government of 1955. The 1994 reform -the actual text of the Constitution- was a result of a pact between the two main political parties: the **Peronist/Justicialist Party -PJ- (Partido Peronista/Justicialista)** and the **Radical Civic Union -UCR- (Unión Cívica Radical)**. This reform reduced the presidential term from six to four years, and abolished the indirect system of electoral college established for the election of the President (and the Vice-President) in 1853. Since 1995, the Executive Power is elected via a modified majority runoff.¹⁷

The 1949 and the 1994 reforms have one element in common: both introduced the presidential reelection, an institution explicitly forbidden in the original text of 1853. The actual Constitution set a limit of two consecutive four-year terms.¹⁸

In the period over analysis, ten presidential elections were held. Six presidents belonged to the PJ, and four to the UCR. As Table 5 shows only three presidents completed their terms in office.

¹⁷ No electoral college brought a majority different from the one decided by popular vote from 1853 to 1989, and no presidential runoff has been held since 1995.

¹⁸ The 1994 reform also raised the composition of the upper Chamber from 48 to 72 senators, changed its renewal period (from every three to every two years), and reduced senators' tenure from nine to six-year terms. Since 1994 each province elects three senators: two seats go to the party obtaining the first plurality, and the third seat goes to the runner up. Before the reform, each province -and the Federal Capital- was represented by two senators elected indirectly by provincial legislatures -an electoral college in the Federal Capital-.

Table 5 - PARTY, TENURE, AND CAUSE OF TERM CONCLUSION OF DEMOCRATIC ARGENTINE PRESIDENTS 1946-2001

President	Party-Coalition in Government ^a	Period	Term Conclusion
Juan D. Perón	National Front ^b	June 46 - June 52	Completion of legal term
Juan D. Perón	PJ	June 52 - Sep. 55	Overthrown by a <i>coup d'état</i>
	<i>Military Coup</i>		
Arturo Frondizi ^c	UCRI ^d	May 58 - March 62	Overthrown by a <i>coup d'état</i>
	<i>Military Coup</i>		
Arturo U. Illia ^e	UCRP ^f	Oct. 63 - June 66	Overthrown by a <i>coup d'état</i>
	<i>Military Coup</i>		
Héctor J. Cámpora ^g	PJ	May 73 - July 73	Resigned
Raúl A. Lastiri ^h	PJ	July 73 - Oct. 73	Interim
Juan D. Perón	PJ	Oct. 73 - July 74	Died in office
María E. M. de Perón	PJ	July 74 - March 76	Overthrown by a <i>coup d'état</i>
	<i>Military Coup</i>		
Raúl R. Alfonsín ⁱ	UCR	Dec. 83 - July 89	Resigned
Carlos S. Menem ^j	PJ	July 89 - July 95	Completion of legal term
Carlos S. Menem	PJ	July 95 - Dec. 99	Completion of legal term
Fernando de la Rúa ^k	ALIANZA ^l	Dec. 99 - Dec. 01	Resigned

a. For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX B.

b. The National Front consisted of the Labor Party (Partido Laborista), the Labor and Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente), and the Radical Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (UCR-Junta Renovadora).

c. Arturo Frondizi was twice deputy for the UCR (1946-1948; 1948-1952).

d. Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCR Intransigente).

e. Arturo U. Illia was deputy for the UCR (1948-1952).

f. People's Radical Civic Union (UCR del Pueblo).

g. Héctor J. Cámpora was twice deputy for the PJ (1946-1950; 1952-1958).

h. Raúl A. Lastiri was deputy for the PJ (1973-1977).

i. Raúl R. Alfonsín was deputy for the UCRP (1963-1967) and senator for the UCR (Dec. 2001-July 2002).

j. Carlos S. Menem is senator for the PJ since 2005.

k. Fernando de la Rúa was deputy (1991-1992) and three times senator for the UCR (1973-1977; 1983-1989; 1992-1996).

l. The Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación) was a coalition composed of the UCR and the Front of a Country in Solidarity -FREPASO- (Frente País Solidario).

Source: Own elaboration upon data from Potash (1959), Hodges (1988), Manzetti (1993), and Jones (2002).

From 1955 to 1983 Argentina had four military coups. The armed forces stood in power for intermittent periods that covered more than eighteen years. All coups ordered the dissolution of the Congress (Table 6).¹⁹

Table 6 - TENURE ARGENTINE *DE FACTO* PRESIDENTS, DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS DEPOSED AND CHAMBER'S DISSOLUTION AND RE-OPENING SESSIONS 1955-1983

<i>De Facto</i> President and Term in Office	Date of Military Coup	Democratic President Deposed	Date of Chamber's Last Session before the Coup	Date of Chamber's Re-opening Session	Period Known as the
Eduardo A. Lonardi (Sept. '55 - Nov. '55) Pedro E. Aramburu (Nov. '55 - May '58)	16.09.55	Juan D. Perón	15.09.55	31.03.58	"Liberating Revolution"
José M. Guido (March '62 - Oct. '63) Juan C. Onganía (June '66 - June '70)	27.03.62	Arturo Frondizi	23.04.62	12.08.63	-
Roberto M. Levingston (June '70 - March '71) Alejandro A. Lanusse (March '71 - May '73)	28.06.66	Arturo U. Illia	24.06.66	03.05.73	"Argentine Revolution"
Jorge R. Videla (March '76 - March '80) Roberto E. Viola (March '80 - Dec. '81) Leopoldo F. Galtieri (Dec. '81 - July '82) Reynaldo B. A. Bignone (July '82 - Dec. '83)	24.03.76	María E. M. de Perón	17,18.03.76	29.11.83	"Process of National Reorganization"

Source: Own elaboration upon data from Potash (1959), Snow (1971), Hodges (1988), Manzetti (1993), and Journals of Sessions of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1955-1983).

The coup that deposed President Perón (the "Liberating Revolution") was led by General Eduardo A. Leonardi. He was immediately replaced by General Pedro E. Aramburu when the hard-line group in the armed forces, whose main goal was to erase any Peronist legacy, knew about Leonardi's reconciliation plans with Peronists. General Aramburu dissolved and banned the PJ, confiscated its assets, made illegal the naming of "Perón," and annulled the 1949 Constitution.

¹⁹ Before 1955 Argentina had two interventions of the armed forces: the 1930 coup (06.09.30) that overthrew President Hipólito Yrigoyen (UCR), and the 1943 coup (04.06.43) that put an end to President Ramón Castillo's term (Conservative Party - CONSR- Partido Conservador).

President Arturo Frondizi (**Intransigent Radical Civic Union -UCRI- UCR Intransigente**) was overthrown in March 1962. The Supreme Court appointed José M. Guido, pro-tempore President of the Senate, as interim president until the elections scheduled for July 1963. During Guido's period a new electoral law that introduced the PR system was adopted by members of the **People's Radical Civic Union -UCRP- (UCR del Pueblo)** and the **Conservative Party -CONSR- (Partido Conservador)** in charge of the Ministries of *Interior* (Home Affairs) and Defence. Besides, Aramburu's measures banning the PJ were re-enacted.

Almost three years later the armed forces deposed President Arturo U. Illia (UCRP). Generals Juan C. Onganía, Roberto M. Levingston and Alejandro Lanusse consecutively led this military government labelled the "Argentine Revolution."²⁰

The bloodiest, most violent, and economically devastating *de facto* regime Argentina has ever suffered was the one that deposed María Estela Martínez de Perón (PJ) in 1976. The "Process of National Reorganization" was in charge of four "juntas" made up of three generals each.²¹ After the defeat in the Malvinas War (June 1982), the military regime, completely delegitimized, began a rapid withdrawal that led to the democratic elections held on October 30, 1983.²²

²⁰ General Onganía's dictatorship collapsed in June 1970. His comrades forced him to resign after the assassination of General Aramburu by "Montoneros" (a guerrilla organization). Onganía was replaced by General Levingston who was also forced to resign after confronting mass demonstrations against the government. General Lanusse replaced Levingston in March 1971. He stood in power until the inauguration of President Héctor J. Campora's (PJ) constitutional government in March 1973.

²¹ These juntas are still being prosecuted for human rights violations.

²² The Malvinas Islands are situated in the South Atlantic Ocean, near the East Argentine coast. Argentina and the United Kingdom have disputed over their sovereignty since the 19th century. The Malvinas war was caused by the Argentine invasion of the islands on April 2, 1982 (decided by the then *de facto* government). The war ended with the Argentine surrender on June 14, 1982.

Section 2. Main Political Parties

Argentina's political history is characterized by the hegemony of three parties in the period 1880-1976 (the Conservatives -1880-1916-, the Radicals -1916-1945-, and the Peronists -1946-1976-), and an emerging two-party system since 1983, although Peronists "have scored more victories, obtained more seats, and registered a more stable performance [during the last two decades]" (Malamud and De Luca 2005, 5). In particular, between 1946 and 2001 the most important parties were the middle-class UCR and the urban working-class and petite bourgeoisie PJ.

2.1 *The Radicals*

The UCR was founded in 1890. Immigrant middle class formed the base for Argentina's first non-aristocratic political party. Radicals were opposed to Conservative regimes that ruled the country through restricted suffrage and/or fraudulent elections. Their goal was the "recognition of the right of the middle class to participate fully in the economic, social, and political life of the country" (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 15). The first Radical president was Hipólito Yrigoyen. He won the presidency twice: in 1916, the first election after the passage of the "Saenz Peña Law," and in 1928.²³ Marcelo T. de Alvear was the second Radical president (1922-1928). In his second term, President Yrigoyen retained power for less than 2 years (he was deposed by Argentina's first military government in September 1930). Radicals would not regain the presidency until the late 1950s. During almost thirty years the country was ruled by

²³ The Sáenz Peña Law, named after the president who introduced it (President Roque Sáenz Peña), established the "incomplete list" system, made male voting compulsory, guaranteed the secret ballot, and tied voting to military service. Only natives and naturalized men could vote (this excluding most of the then working class).

military (1930-1932 – 1943-1945 – 1955-1958), Conservative (1932-1943), and Peronist (1946-1955) governments.²⁴

A few months before the elections of February 1958 (by the end of General Aramburu's regime), Radicals split into two separate organizations: the **UCRI** (the **Intransigent Radicals**) headed by Arturo Frondizi, and the **UCRP** (the **People's Radicals**), led by Ricardo Balbín. While the UCRI's main goals were integration (the reincorporation of Peronism into national political life) and development (industrialization and foreign investments), the UCRP rejected electoral alliances with the PJ and adopted a nationalistic posture.

The 1958 elections were won by the UCRI. Arturo Frondizi attained the presidency primarily due to a bargain with Perón who, from the exile, traded about two million votes for a promise of legality for his banned movement (Snow and Manzetti 1993). Keeping his word, President Frondizi (UCRI) allowed the PJ to nominate candidates in the legislative and provincial elections of 1962. The Peronist victories led to the March 1962 military intervention that voided the results of provincial elections, annulled legislative elections, and dissolved Congress.²⁵

During the 1963 political campaign the UCRI formed a front with the PJ. The UCRP, whose presidential candidate was Arturo U. Illia, refused to take part in this agreement. When the provisional government in charge announced that all votes cast

²⁴ In this period Radicals were subject to factionalism. As the major opposition party, it denounced the use of electoral fraud by Conservatives, competed electorally against President Perón and came in conflict with his authoritarian rule. On the contrary, the UCR Antipersonalista movement, which broke with the party in 1931, entered the conservative coalition, and the Radical Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (Unión Cívica Radical-Junta Renovadora) supported Perón in the 1946 elections (Potash 1959).

²⁵ In 1962 the PJ obtained 45 of the 95 seats at stake in the lower Chamber and 9 governorships including the crucial province of Buenos Aires.

for candidates of the UCRI-PJ front would be voided, Frondizi (UCRI) and Perón asked their followers to cast blank ballots in protest. Arturo U. Illia (UCRP) attained the presidency with 26% of the popular vote (blank votes attained 19%). After three years that were notable for the lack of government action, President Illia (UCRP) was deposed by General Onganía (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 22).

By the time of the 1973 elections Ricardo Balbín led the only party that included the name "Radical" in its label. Frondizi's followers had reorganized in 1964 as the **Movement of Integration and Development -MID- (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo)**, while the UCRI radicals reorganized as the **Intransigent Party -PI- (Partido Intransigente)** under the leadership of Oscar Alende (1973). In the two successive presidential elections of 1973 Radicals were defeated by Peronists. Until the 1976 coup they were again the main opposition party.

Almost eighteen years after the military intervention that overthrew President Illia (1966), another Radical candidate, Raúl R. Alfonsín, was elected president (1983). This was the first national defeat of the PJ in legitimate elections and Alfonsín's (UCR) administration was the first democratic government after the 1976-1983 dictatorship. Until the legislative and provincial elections of 1987 Alfonsín (UCR) remained a popular president. Nevertheless, that year marked the first of five consecutive electoral defeats for the UCR. Due mainly to the outbreak of hyperinflation Alfonsín resigned in July 1989, five months before the end of his term.

During President Menem's (PJ) administrations (1989-1995; 1995-1999), the UCR was immersed in a deep crisis of both ideas and leadership (Snow and Manzetti 1993). All in

all, Radicals fell from 52% of the presidential vote in 1983 to 17% in 1995 (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). Furthermore, in 1995 the UCR presidential candidate finished third behind the candidate of the newly created **Front of a Country in Solidarity - FREPASO- (Frente País Solidario)**.

The political landscape changed when the UCR and the FREPASO formed the **Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education -ALIANZA- (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación)**, a coalition that defeated the PJ in the legislative elections of 1997.

The 1999 presidential elections were also won by the ALIANZA whose candidate, the Radical Fernando de la Rúa, obtained 45.5% of the votes. "The Alianza promised to combat corruption and address the social costs of neoliberalism (...) However, de la Rúa failed to deliver on both of these fronts" (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 37). After the resignation of Vice-President Carlos Alvarez (FREPASO-ALIANZA), following the burst of a corruption scandal in the Senate and turbulent economic months, the ALIANZA was defeated by the PJ in the October 2001 legislative elections. Only two years after his inauguration, President de la Rúa (UCR-ALIANZA) resigned in the midst of the unprecedented political, economic, and social crisis that provoked the middle-class uprising against his administration in December 2001. The slogan of this wave of rioting and protest was "throw everyone out" (*que se vayan todos*). The FREPASO was virtually wiped out in the 2001 crisis.

2.2 *The Peronists*

The *de facto* regime that deposed President Yrigoyen (UCR) in 1930 was followed by the “infamous decade” that ended in 1943.²⁶ That year the armed forces led by the GOU lodge (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) deposed President Ramón A. Castillo (CONSR).²⁷ Although General Edelmiro Farrell was the *de facto* president, Colonel Juan D. Perón, one of the GOU’s leaders, became the real power behind the government.²⁸ In October 1945, after being detained and imprisoned by a group of army officers, “hundreds of thousands of workers converged in the huge plaza in front of the government house to demand Perón’s return. He was released and for the next decade was the master of Argentina” (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 19).

In the 1946 elections, Perón was the presidential candidate for the **National Front** formed by the **Labor Party (Partido Laborista)**, the **Labor and Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente)**, and a faction of the UCR, the **Radical Reorganizing Group -UCR/JR- (UCR Junta Renovadora)**. The Labor Party and the UCR/JR officially merged in June 1946 to constitute the **Unified Party of the National Revolution -PURN- (Partido Unificado de la Revolución Nacional)**, and later reorganized in January 1947 as the Peronist Party (in 1963 Perón, who was exiled in Venezuela, founded the Justicialist Party as a continuity of the Peronist Party).

²⁶ This decade was governed by Conservative politicians who reached power through fraudulent elections and run the country almost exclusively for the benefit of the landed aristocracy, commercial and industrial elites of Buenos Aires, and foreign interests (Snow and Manzetti 1993).

²⁷ The GOU was composed of middle-grade officers that were as much pro-Axis as Anti-Communist.

²⁸ Perón implemented pro-labor policies that benefited the neglected new urban working class. By 1945 he headed the Vice-presidency, the Secretary of Labor, the Minister of War, and the Postwar Council.

In the presidential elections of November 1951, the Perón-Teissaire formula defeated the Radical ticket Balbín-Frondizi. Peron's second constitutional mandate lasted until the military coup of 1955.

Even though Peron's administrations resolutely benefited neglected sectors of society, he was first criticized and then fought for his authoritarian measures against the press, the judiciary, and opposition leaders. By 1955 he had lost the support of the main political actors that had backed his candidacy in 1945: the Catholic Church, organized labor, and the armed forces (Snow and Manzetti 1993). As Snow and Manzetti argue (1993, 21), although it was "relatively simple for the military to get rid of Perón, it was much more difficult to rid the country of Peronism." In this sense, note that the PJ, despite successive bans, remained the largest political party during the 1950s and 1960s and that neo-Peronist parties obtained significant victories during the 1960s.²⁹

General Lanusse, the last *de facto* president of the "Argentine Revolution," mandated that all Peronist candidates *but Perón* were allowed to compete for the presidency in the 1973 elections. The elections held in March were won by Héctor J. Campora, the candidate of the **Justicialist Front of Liberation -FREJULI- (Frente Justicialista de Liberación)**. Nevertheless, his tenure did not last long. After eight weeks in office he resigned and called for new elections to allow Perón to take charge. In September 1973 Perón again defeated his main opponent, the Radical Ricardo Balbín, by a landslide (62% of the vote) (Manzetti 1993). Perón stood in power less than ten months because

²⁹ The outlawing of the Peronist Party (Nov. 1955) created a political void into which several neo-Peronist parties (known as "Peronism without Perón") sought to move. "Organized in most instances by men who had served President Perón at one time only to break with him subsequently, these parties tended to resemble the banned organization in their emphasis on labor, in their party programs, and, in several instances, in their deliberate choice of a name beginning with the letter "P" (Potash 1959, 520).

he died on July 1st, 1974. He was replaced by Vice-President María Estela Martínez de Perón, who *ruled* the country until the military coup of 1976.³⁰

The failed PJ presidential candidate in 1983, Italo Luder, was an upper-middle-class intellectual who tried to lead a campaign damaged by outdated, violent, and demagogic speeches made by other Peronists.

After the 1983 electoral defeat, a group of moderate Peronists emerged. **The Renewers (Los Renovadores)**, as they called themselves, performed impressively in the mid-term elections of 1985 and gained control of the majority of the provinces in 1987. When the Peronists selected their presidential candidate for 1989, however, the powerful governor of Buenos Aires, the *Renewer* Antonio Cafiero (PJ), was defeated by Carlos S. Menem (PJ), a *caudillo* of the poor province of La Rioja, who was allied with the old union bosses.

On May 14, 1989, Carlos S. Menem obtained 47% of the popular vote against 37% for the Radical competitor. Leaving aside his populist platform, he responded to the 1989 hyperinflationary crisis with a dramatic policy shift to neoliberalism (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, 27). After this shift, the PJ won four national elections in a row (including the presidential elections of 1995) and even reformed the Constitution in 1994. The absence of transparency and the high-profile scandals of Menem's administrations eroded the electoral support of the PJ (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). After two

³⁰ In the aftermath of Perón's death Peronism split in three factions: the Peronist youth (or the guerrilla group Montoneros) that went underground, the ultra-right wing headed by Social Welfare Minister José López Rega, and the union bosses led by Lorenzo Miguel. As Snow and Manzetti (1993) argue, the military period only hid the profound crisis that affected Peronism after its leader's death.

consecutive electoral defeats (1997 and 1999), the PJ won the mid-term elections of 2001.

The Argentine political setting of the period covered by this thesis (1946-2001) may be well defined in this way: in fifty-five years only three presidents completed their terms in office. This being the case, the idea of exploring the functioning of the lower Chamber may appear somewhat dubious. The following sections and the next chapter deal with this challenge. I will demonstrate that beyond political circumstances and external influences, the Chamber has had its own institutional dynamic.

Part II. The Description of the Chamber's Political Organization³¹

My first objective is to specify when, by whom, how, and why the organizational rules of the lower Chambers were adopted or modified. Part I gave the general context in which that development took place in Argentina. Now I turn to a detailed description of the organization of its lower Chamber through time. This information is essential to fully understand the emergence of those patterns.

The lack of systematic information about the Argentine lower Chamber is almost complete, particularly before 1983. The following sections address basic subjects such as quorums, legislative periods, and majorities and pluralities that ruled the Chamber. Section 5, in particular, offers a description of its partisan composition from 1946 to 2001.

Section 3. Membership, Quorums, and Legislative Periods

The 257 Argentine deputies are elected for four-year terms from 24 multimember districts. One-half of the Chamber is renewed every two years, and deputies can be reelected indefinitely. The legislative year lasts from March 1st to February 28th/29th of the following year. Ordinary sessions cover a period of eight months -from March 1st to November 30th-. Extraordinary sessions go from December 1st to February 28th/29th. Every two years, preparatory sessions are held in December (to elect the directing board and make the committee assignments), and annually in

³¹ Except otherwise indicated, all data employed in the rest of this chapter were obtained from official publications of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (see APPENDIX A).

February (to establish hours and days of ordinary sessions).³² The quorum is the “absolute majority of the members meaning this that present members outnumber absent ones” (rule 15 of the *Reglamento*). In other words, the actual quorum is 129/257. The main institutional features of the Chamber (i.e., deputies’ terms, the biannual renewal, legislative periods, and legislative calendar) come from the 1853 and 1994 constitutions. Its actual membership, by contrast, has several sources. In addition, it has changed quite a few times as a result of decennial census updates, amendments to the electoral system, the achievement of provincial status of national territories, laws, and *de facto* decrees.

In the 1853 Constitution, the legislative year went from May 1st to April 30th of the following year (ordinary sessions covered a period of four months -from May 1st to September 30th- extraordinary sessions went from November 1st to April 30th, and the preparatory sessions were held in April or November). A law approved on December 2, 1854, apportioned one deputy per 20,000 people or fraction over 10,000.

The 1898 constitutional reform fixed the proportion of one deputy per 33,000 people or fraction over 16,500 and established that this proportion should be updated by the Congress according to decennial censuses.

Leaving behind years of electoral fraud, in 1912 the Congress approved the Sáenz Peña Law, also known as “incomplete list.” This law gave two thirds of the seats to the party

³² The directing board of the Chamber is composed of a President and three Vice-Presidents (I will refer to the latter as VP1, VP2, and VP3).

that got the most votes in a district, and the remaining third to the second largest party. Nine years later, and based on the 1912 census, Law 10.834 apportioned one deputy per 49,000 people or fraction over 16,500. From 1920 on the Chamber would be made up of 158 deputies.

Thirty years later, Perón's administrations brought substantive though fleeting changes. The 1949 Constitution modified not only the proportion established in 1919 (from then on it would be one deputy per 100,000 people or fraction over 50,000), but also established that no district would receive fewer than two deputies, that they would be elected for six-year terms (instead of four-year terms), and that one-half of the Chamber would be renewed every three years (instead of the biannual renewal). Before ending the first term of Perón, the Congress introduced the uninominal system that established a congressional redistricting at the national level.³³ These reforms, the incorporation of "delegates" from national territories, and the achievement of provincial status of national territories increased the Chamber's membership from 158 in 1946 to 166 in 1955.³⁴

³³ Law no. 14.032.

³⁴ The national territories of Chaco and La Pampa attained provincial status in 1951 (Law no. 14.037) - until the overthrowing of President Perón these provinces were known as Presidente Perón and Eva Perón, respectively. The first deputies representing Chaco and La Pampa entered in the Chamber in 1953 (two deputies from Chaco and four deputies from La Pampa). Misiones changed to province in 1953 (Law no. 14.294) and sent two deputies to the Chamber in 1955. The rest of the territories became provinces in 1955 (Formosa, Neuquén, Río Negro, Chubut, and Patagonia by Law no. 14.408). Before changing to provinces those territories were represented in the Chamber through "delegates" that only could vote in committees (they did not have the right to vote on the floor). In 1952 eleven delegates entered in the Chamber representing the territories of Comodoro Rivadavia (1), Chubut (1), Formosa (2), Misiones (2), Neuquén (1), Río Negro (2), Santa Cruz (1), and Tierra del Fuego (1). In 1957 the military regime split the Patagonia province to form the province of Santa Cruz, and the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur which was the last territory to attain provincial status in 1991. The first deputies representing the territories which changed to provinces in 1955 entered in the Chamber in 1958. From 1955 to 1966 Tierra del Fuego had no national legislative representatives.

The military government of 1955 annulled the legislation enacted by Perón's governments, established a new proportion for the 1958 elections (one deputy per 85,000 people), but maintained the minimum of two deputies per province. After President Frondizi's oust in 1962, the Sáenz Peña Law was abrogated and replaced by the PR electoral system, which was first applied in 1963.

The incorporation of deputies representing the territories that changed to provinces in 1955, coupled with the aforementioned changes, increased the number of deputies first to 187 (1958-1962), and then to 192 (1963-1966).

The dictatorial regime of 1972 adopted three main changes in view of the 1973 elections. First, the biannual renewal of the Chamber was annulled. Second, no district would receive fewer than three deputies. Third, the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur would elect two deputies. Therefore, the Chamber reopened in 1973 with 243 members whose terms would end in 1977 (the Congress was dissolved by the 1976 military coup). These changes were applied only for the 1973 elections.

On July 12, 1983, General Reynaldo B. A. Bignone (the then *de facto* President) signed a decree calling for elections on October 30. This decree established that: a) the proportion from then on would be of one deputy per 161,000 people or fraction over 80,500; b) no district would receive fewer than five deputies; and that c) no district would receive fewer deputies than it possessed during the 1973-1976 democratic period. Consequently, using the 1980 census the number of deputies to be elected was established in 254.

In 1990 the national territory of Tierra del Fuego achieved provincial status, receiving five instead of two deputies. Accordingly, the number of deputies increased from 254 to 257 in 1991. As Jones argued (2002, 148), “while a new allocation of seats should have been conducted following the 1991 census, this has not occurred, and it is unlikely to occur any time in the near future.” The author was right because the last distribution of seats (2009) was carried out using the 1980 census.

The last two changes of the period were also adopted in the 1990s. The first, introduced by the constitutional reform of 1994, fixed the actual periods of ordinary and extraordinary sessions. The second, adopted by a reform to the *Reglamento* 1996, established the actual quorum. This amendment modified the traditional criterion to fix the quorum that until 1996 was the “50% + 1 of the total number of deputies” (rule 10 of the *Reglamento*) which meant that 130 deputies were needed to open a session. The new rule lowered the quorum from 130 to 129 deputies.

The biannual renewals and re-openings after military coups, coupled with the institutional changes described, led to eighteen different legislative periods in the period 1946-2001. They differ not only for their memberships but also for the length of their terms (Table 7).

In this sense, while 13 of the 18 legislative periods followed the constitutional rule of “biannual renewal of the Chamber”, there were two terms that lasted less than a year, two terms of three years, and even one case of four years. These distinct legislative periods were governed by various ruling parties and coalitions. This is the subject of the next section.

Table 7 - LEGISLATIVE PERIODS AND NUMBER OF DEPUTIES

ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislative Period	1946 1948	1948 1952 ^a	1952 1955 ^b	1955 ^c	1958 1960	1960 1962	1963 1965	1965 1966 ^d	1973 1976 ^e	1983 1985	1985 1987	1987 1989	1989 1991	1991 1993	1993 1995	1995 1997	1997 1999	1999 2001
Number of Deputies	158	158	160	166	187	192	192	192	243	254	254	254	254	257	257	257	257	257

- a. The 1949 constitutional reform extended the terms of those who were deputies in 1948 until 1952.
- b. According to the 1949 constitutional reform deputies were elected for six-year terms and one-half of the Chamber was renewed every three years.
- c. The Congress was dissolved by the Liberating Revolution.
- d. The Congress was dissolved by the Argentine Revolution.
- e. According to the 1972 de facto rules deputies were elected for four-year terms without biannual renovation. Nevertheless, the Congress was dissolved by the Process of National Reorganization.

The eighteen legislative periods shown in Table 7 were ruled by eight single-party majorities, seven single-party pluralities, two majority coalitions and one plurality coalition. Peronists as well as Radicals were four times the single-party majority in Chamber. Two Peronist majority coalitions controlled the Chamber (1946-1948; 1973-1976). The only plurality coalition was the ALIANZA UCR-FREPASO (1999-2001). Peronists and Radicals were the single-party plurality four and three times respectively (Table 8).

Table 8 - MAJORITIES-PLURALITIES / SINGLE PARTY-COALITION, RULING PARTY-COALITION BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislative Period	Majority-Plurality/ Single Party-Coalition	Ruling Party/Coalition
1946-1948	Majority Coalition	National Front
1948-1952 1952-1955 1955	Single-Party Majority	PJ
1958-1960 1960-1962	Single-Party Majority	UCRI
1963-1965 1965-1966	Single-Party Plurality	UCRP
1973-1976	Majority Coalition	FREJULI
1983-1985 1985-1987	Single-Party Majority	UCR
1987-1989	Single-Party Plurality	UCR
1989-1991 1991-1993 1993-1995	Single-Party Plurality	PJ
1995-1997	Single-Party Majority	PJ
1997-1999	Single-Party Plurality	PJ
1999-2001	Plurality Coalition	ALIANZA

The ruling party (the party or coalition in control of the Chamber) was always the same as that of the Executive Power. In other words, although presidents in Argentina did not have almost half of the time the majority in the lower Chamber, they did not have to deal with a different ruling party there.

4.1. *Ruling Pluralities*

Ruling pluralities and majorities differed by the number of seats they secured in Chamber. Beginning with pluralities, I classified them using the typology presented in chapter II (*Regular Plurality: $S \leq 0.46$; Exceptional Plurality: $0.46 < s < 0.50$*).

Table 9 - NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, PARTY AND TYPE OF RULING PLURALITIES BY LEGISLATIVE PERIODS
ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

RULING PLURALITIES					
Legislative Period	Ruling Party/Coalition	Seats (No.)	Seats (%)	Total Seats (No.)	Plurality Type
1963-1965	UCRP	71	36,98	192	RP ^a
1965-1966	UCRP	69	35,94	192	RP
1987-1989	UCR	113	44,49	254	RP
1989-1991	PJ	120	47,24	254	EP ^b
1991-1993	PJ	117	45,53	257	RP
1993-1995	PJ	128	49,81	257	EP
1997-1999	PJ	119	46,3	257	EP
1999-2001	ALIANZA	118	45,92	257	RP

a. Regular plurality ($S \leq 0.46$)

b. Exceptional plurality ($0.46 < s < 0.50$)

Table 9 shows that the Chamber was ruled by three exceptional pluralities (all of them Peronist), and five regular pluralities (three Radical, one Peronist, and one from the ALIANZA). Radicals register the lowest plurality (1965-1966) and Peronist the highest


(1993-1995). Additionally, half of the 1960s and almost all of the 1990s were ruled by pluralities.

While being the ruling plurality Radicals obtained, on average, 39.1% of the seats, with the highest number of seats in 1987-1989. As noted, Peronists were the ruling plurality in four occasions. Instead of Radicals, the PJ had an exceptional plurality three times (1989-1991, 1993-1995, and 1997-1999). It is interesting to note that: a) being the quorum 130/257 in 1993-1995, the PJ with 128 members was only two seats short of majority in this legislative period; and that b) the worst percentage of seats the PJ secured as a ruling plurality -45.5% in 1991-1993- was higher than the highest UCR ruling plurality -44.5% in 1987-1989-.

The only plurality coalition that ruled the Chamber was the ALIANZA in 1999-2001, which had 118 seats (81 UCR, 37 FREPASO). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the UCR and the FREPASO never formed a delegation in the Chamber. Their official label was the "ALIANZA Inter-group" (Interbloque de la ALIANZA). In other words, there has never been an "ALIANZA delegation" in the Chamber, but an UCR and a FREPASO separate delegations, each one with its own authorities and correlative legislative benefits.³⁵

Differences among parties and through decades in terms of the type of pluralities can be appreciated in figure 1.

³⁵ Following Jones and Hwang (2003) I call delegation (also known as bloc, party fraction or caucus) to the principal organizing unit of parties in the Chambers.



4.2. Ruling Majorities

As shown in Table 10, the Chamber was ruled by five qualified majorities that exceeded 2/3 of the seats (one Radical and four Peronist), two exceptional majorities (one Peronist and one Radical), and three regular majorities (one Peronist and two Radical). This classification was made following the typology established in chapter II: *Regular Majority: $0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$; Exceptional Majority: $0.55 < s < 0.67$; Qualified Majority: $S \geq 0.67$*).

Table 10 - NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, PARTY AND TYPE OF RULING MAJORITIES BY LEGISLATIVE PERIODS ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

RULING MAJORITIES					
Legislative Period	Ruling Party/Coalition	Seats (No.)	Seats (%)	Total Seats (No.)	Majority Type
1946-1948	National Front	108	68,35	158	QM ^a
1948-1952	PJ	112	70,89	158	QM
1952-1955	PJ	146	91,25	160	QM
1955	PJ	154	92,77	166	QM
1958-1960	UCRI	133	71,12	187	QM
1960-1962	UCRI	112	58,33	192	EM ^b
1973-1976	FREJULI	146	60,08	243	EM
1983-1985	UCR	129	50,79	254	RM ^c
1985-1987	UCR	129	50,79	254	RM
1995-1997	PJ	131	50,97	257	RM

a. Qualified majority ($S \geq 0.67$)


b. Exceptional majority ($0.55 < s < 0.67$)

c. Regular majority ($0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$)

While the largest majorities concentrate in the periods 1946-1960 and 1973-1976, regular majorities can only be found in the 1980s and 1990s (see also figure 2).

When Radicals were the majority party in Chamber they obtained, on average, 57,7% of the seats, with peaks of 71,12% in 1958-1960 and drops of 50.8% in 1983-1987. Radicals (UCRI Radicals) obtained a qualified majority in 1958-1960, during Frondizi's administration. All Peronist qualified and exceptional majorities in Chamber coincide with the presidencies of Juan D. Perón.

This *collection* of majorities and pluralities were in charge of different compositions of the Chamber. The following section provides detailed information about the parties that shared the Chamber with those ruling majorities and pluralities.



Section 5. Partisan Composition of the Chamber by Legislative Periods³⁶

I describe the compositions of the eighteen legislatures paying attention to the main delegations, were they *parties* or *coalitions*. This distinction is important because it is the criterion adopted in 1963 to define the term “delegation.” In this sense, a delegation can either be a group of members of a *party* (i.e., delegation=party) or a *coalition of parties* formed in Chamber *after* the election (i.e., delegation=coalition). In what follows delegations are presented as they appear in the official booklets of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies called “The Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ Memberships.”

5.1 *Legislative Periods 1946-1948 _ 1948-1952 _ 1952-1955 _ 1955*

The increasing pre-eminence of the PJ ruling party in the Chamber from 1946 to 1955 left little room for the opposition. As shown in Tables 11, 13, 15, and 17, parties of the opposition progressively disappeared, the UCR being the only delegation that shared the Chamber with the PJ in 1955.

During President Peron’s first term (1946-1952), the majority of the opposition in Chamber was known as the “44 delegation” (el Bloque de los 44) in reference to the 44 seats the UCR (then UCR-*Comité Nacional*) had won in the 1946 elections (Table 11).

³⁶ For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX B.

Table 11
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1946-1948

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PLab ^a	50	31.65
UCR-CN ^b	44	27.84
UCR-JR ^c	28	17.72
Lel ^d	27	17.08
UCR-Iri ^e	3	1.9
CONSR	1	0.63
DemN ^f	1	0.63
DemP ^g	1	0.63
UCR-BI ^h	1	0.63
UCR-Anti ⁱ	1	0.63
NOP ^j	1	0.63
Total	158	100

- a. Labor Party (Partido Laborista)
b. Radical Civic Union - National Committee (UCR-Comité Nacional)
c. Radical Reorganizing Group (UCR-Junta Renovadora)
d. Labor & Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente)
e. Irigoyenista Radical Civic Union (UCR-Irigoyenista)
f. National Democratic Party (Demócrata Nacional)
g. Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista)
h. Bloquista Radical Civic Union (UCR Bloquista)
i. Antipersonalista UCR (UCR-Antipersonalista)
j. Chamber's records do not identify the party of the deputy

Table 12
Directing Board and Ruling Coalition - 1946

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCR-JR	
VP1	PLab	
VP2	Lel	
Ruling Coalition		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PLab	50	31.65
UCR-JR	28	17.72
Lel	27	17.08
UCR-Iri	3	1.9
Total	108	68,35

The rest of the opposition was composed of the CONSR and the DemN (conservative parties whose traditional strength sunk during Perón's regime -Potash 1959-), the Antipersonalista and the Bloquista UCR (splinters of the UCR that had backed the conservative presidential candidates), and the DemP (a moderate, left-of-center and anti-clerical party of the province of Santa Fé that was founded by Lisandro de la Torre in 1914).

In addition to the UCR-JR, the PLab and the Lel, we find the Irigoyenista UCR in the ruling coalition (Table 12). This was a faction of the UCR that had supported the ticket Perón-Quijano.

In 1948-1952 the PJ, already unified, is the ruling party in Chamber and occupies all the positions on the directing board (Table 14).

Table 13
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1948-1952

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	112	70.89
UCR	44	27.85
UCR-Anti	1	0.63
DemN	1	0.63
Total	158	100

Table 14
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1948

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	PJ	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	112	70.89
Total	112	70.89

The UCR membership of the first two legislative periods contrast sharply with the 14 and 12 seats the party secured in 1952 and 1955, respectively (Tables 15 and 17).

Table 15
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1952-1955

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	146	91.25
UCR	14	8.75
Total	160	100

Table 16
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1952

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	PJ	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	146	91.25
Total	146	91.25

Radicals blamed the uninominal system in force from 1952 to 1955 for these results.³⁷

They argued that it had been designed to gerrymander the lines in favor of the PJ and to the minority's detriment. Peronists, for their part, claimed that the uninominal system benefited minorities (they recalled that it had allowed the prestigious Argentine Socialist politician, Alfredo Palacios, to be elected to the Chamber in 1904), and argued that their representation came from the electoral results (in 1951 the PJ had obtained 62,49% of the votes against 31,81% of the UCR). The historical evidence supports both claims. For one part, the margins of victory of the PJ steadily increased

³⁷ Deputy Donato Latella Frías (UCR) called this system "the cunning law of districts" (la mañosa ley de las circunscripciones), claiming that the UCR should have gotten 50 or 60 deputies according to the number of votes they obtained in the legislative election. Journal 06.05.55, p. 99.

from 1946 to 1955, and the initial advantages of the redistricting of 1951 hold over the 1955 elections. For the other part, the PJ won more deputies than they had before redistricting while the UCR dropped 30 seats.

The uninominal system, however, was not the only problem of Radicals. Internal conflicts would further reduce their strength in Chamber. By 1955 the small UCR group (12 members) split into “unionistas” and “intransigentes.”

Table 17
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1955

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	154	92.77
UCR	12	7.23
Total	166	100

Table 18
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1955

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP ₁	PJ	
VP ₂	PJ	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	154	92.77
Total	154	92.77

In 1952 women entered the Chamber. The passage of the women's enfranchisement law in 1947 (Law no. 13.010) allow them to be candidates for the 1951 elections. As a result, twenty-three female deputies (and six female senators) joined Congress that year. In 1953 a woman was elected for the first time to the directing board of the Chamber.³⁸

³⁸ Deputy Delia Degliuomini de Parodi (PJ) was elected VP₁ for 3 consecutive years (1953-1955). Women should wait 44 years to be part again of the directing board of the Chamber.

5.2 Legislative Periods 1958-1960 _ 1960-1962

In the first elections after the military government of the “Liberating Revolution,” the UCRI, supported by Peronist votes, won 71% of the seats in Chamber and got all the positions on the directing board (Table 20). The other faction of the UCR, the UCRP, was the second party in Chamber. After the UCRP came the Liberals from the province of Corrientes (Table 19).

Table 19
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1958-1960

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRI	133	71.12
UCRP	51	27.27
LIB ^a	2	1.07
NOP	1	0.53
Total	187	100.00

a. Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Corrientes).

Table 20
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1958

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCRI	
VP1	UCRI	
VP2	UCRI	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRI	133	71.12
Total	133	71.12

In the period 1960-1962 the UCRI lost its qualified majority decreasing from 71% to 58% of the seats (Tables 20 and 22). The UCRP, by contrast, improved its position getting 74 seats. For the first time in the period over analysis two parties, the Liberals and the National Democrats, presented themselves in Chamber as a delegation: **the Parties of the Center -PdeC- (Partidos de Centro)**, and demanded their place in committees like the other delegations (Table 21).³⁹

³⁹ Journal 11.05.60, p. 46.

Table 21
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1960-1962

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRI	112	58.33
UCRP	74	38.54
PdeC ^a	4	2.08
DPBB ^b	1	0.52
UCR	1	0.52
Total	192	100.00

a. Parties of the Center (Partidos de Centro)

b. Provincial Defense White Flag Party
(Partido Defensa Provincial Bandera
Blanca de Tucumán)

Table 22
Directing Board and Ruling Party – 1960

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCRI	
VP1	UCRI	
VP2	UCRI	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRI	112	58.33
Total	112	58.33

In 1961, nine deputies left the UCRI delegation and formed the **Radical National and Popular** group (7 members), and the **Dissident UCRI** group (2 members).

5.3 Legislative Periods 1963-1965 _ 1965-1966

The “first Congress of the proportionality rule” (i.e., after the introduction of the PR electoral system), brought to the Chamber twenty-five parties.⁴⁰ Despite the fact that the UCRP of President Illia obtained only 71 of the 192 seats, it refused to consider the formation of a legislative coalition (Snow 1971). The second plurality, with 20% of the seats, was the UCRI. In contrast to precedent periods, this time a third party obtained a significant presence in Chamber. It was the **Union of the Argentine People -UdelPA- (Unión del Pueblo Argentino)** created to back retired General Aramburu’s candidacy for the presidency.⁴¹ The UCRP, the UCRI and the UdelPA formed the directing board (Table 24).

⁴⁰ This is the label Arturo Mor Roig -UCRP- (President of the Chamber), gave to this legislative period in his first speech to the Chamber. Journal 12.08.63, p. 12.

⁴¹ The party disintegrated after Aramburu’s assassination in 1969.

Table 23
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1963-1965

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRP	71	36.98
UCRI	39	20.31
MPProv ^a	17	8.85
UdelPA ^b	14	7.29
FedPCe ^c	12	6.25
DemP	11	5.73
DemC ^d	7	3.65
PSA ^e	6	3.13
FPProv ^f	5	2.60
PSD ^g	5	2.60
NOD ^h	3	1.56
PAL ⁱ	2	1.04
Total	192	100.00

- a. Popular Provincial Movements (Movimientos Populares Provinciales)
b. Union of the Argentine People (Unión del Pueblo Argentino)
c. National Federation of Center Parties (Federación Nacional de Partidos de Centro)
d. Democratic Christian Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)
e. Argentine Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Argentino)
f. Federation of Provincial Parties (Federación de Partidos Provinciales)
g. Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático)
h. Deputy belonging to no delegation
i. Partido Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes

Table 24
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1963

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCRP	
VP1	UCRI	
VP2	UdelPA	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRP	71	36.98
Total	71	36.98

Some parties that entered in the Chamber for the first time decided to gather in delegations. As Table 23 shows, this was the case of the **Popular Provincial Movements -MPProv- (Movimientos Populares Provinciales)**, a group of six parties that represented the Peronist movement; the **National Federation of Center Parties - FedPCe- (Federación Nacional de Partidos de Centro)**; and the **Federation of Provincial Parties -FPProv- (Federación de Partidos Provinciales)**.⁴²

In 1964, dissident UCRI members led by former President Frondizi formed a new party, and consequently a new delegation in Chamber: the **Movement of Integration and Development -MID- (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo)**. This delegation appears in the booklets of the Chamber in 1965.

⁴² Peronists were not allowed to use the label PJ and could present candidates only to the lower Chamber. Therefore, they were obliged to create a handful of provincial parties to participate in the electoral process of 1963. See Appendix B for the list of parties that formed these delegations.

Table 25
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1965-1966

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRP	69	35.94
PJ	54	28.13
MID ^a	14	7.29
FedPCe	10	5.21
UCRI	10	5.21
DemP	9	4.69
UdeIPA	7	3.65
PSA	5	2.60
DemC	4	2.08
FPProv	4	2.08
PSD	2	1.04
PAL	2	1.04
NOD	2	1.04
Total	192	100.00

a. Movement of Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo)

Table 26
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1965

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCRP	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	MID	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCRP	69	35.94
Total	69	35.94

In the legislative elections of March 1965, the UCRP declined to 69 seats (the lowest plurality from 1946 to 2001). The most important loss, however, was suffered by the Intransigent Radicals who became the fourth delegation in Chamber together with the Federation of Center Parties as we can see in Table 25. The PJ delegation had 54 deputies, and was composed of a group of neo-peronist parties. The most important of those parties was the **Popular Union Party -PunPo- (Partido Unión Popular)** with 36 seats. The remaining 18 seats belonged to the parties that formed the MPProv (eleven parties in 1965). Frondizi's MID won 14 seats, reaching in this way the third place in Chamber (Table 25). The directing board was elected in proportion to the seats secured by each party (Table 26).

5.4 Legislative Period 1973-1976

The Congress re-opened in 1973 after seven years of dictatorship.

Table 27
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1973-1976

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
FREJULI	146	60.08
UCR	51	20.99
APFe ^a	13	5.35
APR ^b	7	2.88
BSJ ^c	3	1.23
CONSR	3	1.23
PCRev ^d	3	1.23
MPPSL ^e	3	1.23
PAL	3	1.23
UdelPA	3	1.23
MPN ^f	2	0.82
CRSJ ^g	1	0.41
MPCat ^h	1	0.41
MPSal ⁱ	1	0.41
PACH ^j	1	0.41
POLe ^k	1	0.41
PPRN ^l	1	0.41
Total	243	100.00

- a. Federalist Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista)
- b. Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria)
- c. Bloc from San Juan (Bloquista de San Juan)
- d. Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Cristiano Revolucionario)
- e. Provincial Popular Movement from San Luis (Movimiento Popular Provincial de San Luis)
- f. Popular Movement from Neuquén (Movimiento Popular Neuquino)
- g. Cruzada Renovadora from San Juan (Cruzada Renovadora de San Juan)
- h. Popular Movement from Catamarca (Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño)
- i. Popular Movement from Salta (Movimiento Popular Salteño)
- j. Action for Chubut Party (Partido Acción Chubutense)
- k. Legal Orientation Party (Partido Orientación Legalista)
- l. Provincial Party from Rio Negro (Partido Provincial de Rio Negro)

Table 28
Directing Board and Ruling Coalition - 1973

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	FREJULI (PJ)	
VP1	FREJULI (PPC)	
VP2	FREJULI (MID)	
Ruling Coalition		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
FREJULI	146	60.08
Total	146	60.08

According to *de facto* rules, this Chamber was made up of 243 deputies, and was expected to last until 1977 (the biannual renewal was annulled).

Peronists, who led a coalition of twenty-five organizations labelled **FREJULI**, secured in this period an exceptional majority. In addition to the PJ, the most important parties in the FREJULI were the **Popular Christian Party -PPC-** (**Partido Popular Cristiano**),

and the Frondizi's MID. Members of these three parties occupied the directing board (Table 28).

After the UCR were the **Federalist Popular Alliance -APFe- (Alianza Popular Federalista)**, composed of five provincial parties, and the **Revolutionary Popular Alliance -APR- (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria)**, a delegation of three parties of the left (Table 27). Note that provincial parties that in precedent periods gathered to form a delegation decided to stand alone in Chamber. This process would grow on in the next periods.

5.5 *Legislative Periods 1983-1985 _ 1985-1987*

In December 1983, the Congress re-opened for the sixth time after a military government. In the polarized presidential and legislative elections of 1983, the winning UCR and the PJ got almost all the seats (94.49%). The third party was the **Intransigent Party -PI- (Partido Intransigente)** of Oscar Alende with three deputies (Table 29). As Table 30 shows, this was the first period in which the majority (UCR) shared the directing board with the first plurality (PJ).

Among the new groups, we find the **Union of the Democratic Center -UCeDe- (Unión de Centro Democrático)**. This party was founded in 1982 by a retired military officer, Alvaro Alsogaray, who publicly supported the 1966 and 1976 military coups. His creed was deregulation, privatization, and free-market economics.

Table 29
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1983-1985

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	129	50.79
PJ	111	43.70
PI ^a	3	1.18
BSJ	2	0.79
MPN	2	0.79
UCeDe ^b	2	0.79
DemC	1	0.39
MFPam ^c	1	0.39
MPJ ^d	1	0.39
PAL	1	0.39
PAutC ^e	1	0.39
Total	254	100.00

- a. Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente)
b. Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático)
c. Federal Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Federalista Pampeano)
d. Popular Movement from Jujuy (Movimiento Popular Jujeño)
e. Autonomist Party from Corrientes (Partido Autonomista de Corrientes)

Table 30
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1983

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCR	
VP1	UCR	
VP2	PJ	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	129	50.79
Total	129	50.79

Table 31
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1985-1987

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	129	50.79
PJ/FR ^a	61	24.02
BUJ ^b	29	11.42
NOD	7	2.76
PI	5	1.97
PJ/17Oct ^c	4	1.57
UCeDe	3	1.18
DemC	2	0.79
MPJu	2	0.79
MPN	2	0.79
PAutC	2	0.79
BSJ	1	0.39
DemP	1	0.39
DemMza ^d	1	0.39
FREJCat ^e	1	0.39
LIB	1	0.39
MID	1	0.39
MPCat	1	0.39
PRSlta ^f	1	0.39
Total	254	100.00

- a. PJ Renovation Front (PJ Frente Renovador)
b. Bloc of the Justicialist Unity (Bloque de la Unidad Justicialista)
c. Peronist Bloc October 17 (Bloque Peronista 17 de Octubre)
d. Democratic Party from Mendoza (Partido Demócrata de Mendoza)
e. FREJULI from Catamarca (FREJULI de Catamarca)
f. Renovation Party from Salta (Partido Renovador de Salta)

Table 32
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1985

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCR	
VP1	UCR	
VP2	PJ (FR)	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	129	50.79
Total	129	50.79

In the legislative period 1985-1987 Radicals neither lost nor increased their seats. The situation of the PJ was different as we can see in Table 31. Peronists not only lost seats but also divided in three factions: the **Justicialist Party Renewal Front -PJ/FR- (PJ Frente Renovador)**, the **Bloc of the Justicialist Unity -BUJ- (Bloque de la Unidad Justicialista)**; and the **Peronist Bloc October 17 -PJ/17 Oct- (Bloque Peronista 17 de Octubre)**.

Nonetheless, a delegation of the PJ (the FR) with less than half of the seats of the majority managed to be part of the directing board of the Chamber (Table 32). We can also see in Table 31 the continuous growth of provincial parties initiated in the legislative period 1973-1976.

5.6 *Legislative Periods 1987-1989 _ 1989-1991 _ 1991-1993*

The electoral support of the UCR decreased substantially in 1987. The party lost sixteen seats in the Chamber and the governorships of many provinces. The losses of the UCR in the legislative arena and at the national level were the gains of the then *almost* reunited PJ.

Being now the first plurality, the UCR shared the directing board with the PJ and the UCeDe (Table 34).

Table 33
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1987-1989

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	113	44.49
PJ	99	38.98
UCeDe	7	2.76
PI	5	1.97
DemC	3	1.18
DemP	2	0.79
LIB	2	0.79
MPJ	2	0.79
MPN	2	0.79
NOD	2	0.79
PAutC	2	0.79
PRSit	2	0.79
PSUC ^a	2	0.79
BSJ	1	0.39
DemMza	1	0.39
DPBB	1	0.39
FREJCat	1	0.39
MID	1	0.39
MPCat	1	0.39
PFed ^b	1	0.39
PJ/17Oct	1	0.39
PJ/FR	1	0.39
PPRN	1	0.39
US ^c	1	0.39
Total	254	100.00

a. Unified-Christian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Unificado-Cristiano)

b. Federal Party (Partido Federal)

c. Socialist Unity (Unidad Socialista)

Table 34
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1987

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCR	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	UCeDe	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	113	44.49
Total	113	44.49

The decline of the UCR continued in the presidential and congressional elections of 1989. As mentioned, these elections were won by the Carlos S. Menem (PJ) in the midst of a chaotic economic situation. In the Chamber, the PJ increased its representation from 99 to 120 deputies becoming the first plurality (Tables 33 and 35).

Table 35
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1989-1991

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	120	47.24
UCR	90	35.43
UCeDe	11	4.33
DemC	3	1.18
DemP	3	1.18
FRep ^a	2	0.79
HyL ^b	2	0.79
LIB	2	0.79
MPJ	2	0.79
MPN	2	0.79
PFed	2	0.79
PI	2	0.79
PRSlta	2	0.79
DPBB	1	0.39
BSJ	1	0.39
CRSJ	1	0.39
DemMza	1	0.39
MAS – IZU ^c	1	0.39
MID	1	0.39
PAutC	1	0.39
PBJub ^d	1	0.39
PPRN	1	0.39
PSUC	1	0.39
US	1	0.39
Total	254	100.00

a. Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana)

b. Humanism and Liberation (Humanismo y Liberación)

c. Movement to Socialism - Unified Left (Movimiento al Socialismo - Izquierda Unida)

d. White Party of Retired People (Partido Blanco de los Jubilados)

Table 36
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1989

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	UCR	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	120	47.24
Total	120	47.24

The third place in Chamber was occupied by the antithesis to the PJ: the UCeDe. The months to come, however, would show that the PJ would benefit from this fact. Although a recalcitrant anti-peronist, Alsogaray (the head of the UCeDe) supported President Menem's shift to neoliberalism and several members of his party occupied positions in his government.

In Table 36 we can see that Peronists did not follow the tradition of pluralities regarding the directing board (Tables 24, 26, and 34). In this legislative period they kept for themselves the presidency and the VP1, leaving only the VP2 for the UCR.

Table 37
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1991-1993

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	117	45.53
UCR	84	32.68
UCeDe	10	3.89
MOPE ^a	5	1.95
FRep	4	1.56
APer ^b	3	1.17
DemP	3	1.17
MODIN ^c	3	1.17
PRSlta	3	1.17
US	3	1.17
CRSJ	2	0.78
LIB	2	0.78
MID	2	0.78
MOPOF ^d	2	0.78
MPJ	2	0.78
MPN	2	0.78
PI	2	0.78
Ach ^e	1	0.39
BSJ	1	0.39
DemC	1	0.39
DemMza	1	0.39
MAS ^f	1	0.39
PAutC	1	0.39
PBJub	1	0.39
PFed	1	0.39
Total	257	100.00

a. Peronist Movement (Movimiento Peronista)

b. Afirmación Peronista

c. Dignity and Independence Movement (Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia)

d. Popular Movement from Tierra del Fuego (Movimiento Popular Fueguino)

e. Action for El Chaco (Acción Chaqueña)

f. Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo)

Table 38
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1991

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	UCR	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	117	45.53
Total	117	45.53

The same distribution of the positions on the directing board was kept in the 1991-1993 legislative period, even though the PJ had lost three seats in the 1991 mid-term elections (Table 38). This period marks the emergence of a dissident movement inside the PJ. Its first expression is the **Peronist Movement -MOPE- (Movimiento Peronista)** (Table 37). This delegation, composed of Peronists who were against the policies implemented by President Menem, would be the first step towards the creation of the FREPASO.

5.7 *Legislative Periods 1993-1995 – 1995-1997*

In the 1993 mid-term elections, the PJ increased its representation from 117 to 128 seats. As mentioned, the party was two seats short of majority (Table 39).

Table 39
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1993-1995

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	128	49.81
UCR	83	32.30
MODIN	6	2.33
US	5	1.95
UCeDe	4	1.56
FG ^a	3	1.17
FRep	3	1.17
MOPOF	3	1.17
PRSIta	3	1.17
Ach	2	0.78
DemP	2	0.78
LIB	2	0.78
MPJ	2	0.78
MPN	2	0.78
PAutC	2	0.78
BSJ	1	0.39
CONSR	1	0.39
CRSJ	1	0.39
DemMza	1	0.39
MID	1	0.39
PCB ^b	1	0.39
PI	1	0.39
Total	257	100.00

a. Frente Grande

b. Popular Christian Bloc (Bloque Popular Cristiano)

Table 40
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1993

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	UCR	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	128	49.81
Total	128	49.81

While the UCR continued its decline, the UCeDe lost its third place in Chamber. As Table 39 shows, Alsogaray's party was replaced by an ephemeral and Buenos Aires-based organization named the **Dignity and Independence Movement -MODIN- (Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia)**. This movement was headed by former Colonel Aldo Rico who had been the leader of the 1987 and 1988 military

rebellions against President Alfonsín.⁴³ With half of the members of the MODIN, we find the second step towards the creation of the FREAPSO: the **Frente Grande -FG-** delegation (Table 39). It is interesting to note that this was the first legislative period of the implementation of the Women's Quota Law ("Ley de Cupos"), that is, the law that established that a minimum of 30% of all candidates on the party lists in all of the nation's 24 electoral districts should be women.

Table 41
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1995-1997

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	131	50.97
UCR	68	26.46
FREPASO	22	8.56
MODIN	3	1.17
PAIS	3	1.17
PRSlta	3	1.17
DemMza	2	0.78
DemP	2	0.78
LIB	2	0.78
MOPOF	2	0.78
MPN	2	0.78
PAutC	2	0.78
UCeDe	2	0.78
Ach	1	0.39
BSJ	1	0.39
CG ^a	1	0.39
FRep	1	0.39
LAB ^b	1	0.39
MAzB ^c	1	0.39
MoReCi ^d	1	0.39
MPJ	1	0.39
MPPSL	1	0.39
P&J	1	0.39
PC	1	0.39
PI	1	0.39
ReDe ^e	1	0.39
Total	257	100.00

a. Corriente Grande

b. Línea Abierta

c. Blue and White Movement (Movimiento Azul y Blanco)

d. Civic Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renovación Cívica)

e. Republican & Democratic (Republicano Democrático)

Table 42
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1995

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP1	PJ	
VP2	UCR	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	131	50.97
Total	131	50.97

⁴³ These rebellions were organized by Rico to demand a halt to the trial of military officers accused of human rights violations under the preceding military regime (Cabrera and Murillo 1994, 153).

The year 1995 was by far one of the best for the PJ. In addition to the economic success of his government, President Menem was reelected -thanks to the 1994 constitutional that was approved in record time-, and the PJ secured the majority of seats in the Chamber. The UCR lost sixteen seats but maintained the VP2 on the directing board (Table 42). The opposition to the PJ, however, kept growing with the emergence of the FREPASO delegation (Table 41). This party was an alliance among different factions of Peronist dissidents, socialists and other social-democrats and leftists groups (Cabrera 1996). The coalition campaigned on issues of political change, clean government, and institutional integrity in order to "end with *Menemism*."

5.8 *Legislative Periods 1997-1999_1999-2001*

The composition of the Chamber in the legislative period 1997-1999 was not only affected by the mid-term elections of 1997, but also by internal reforms. Regarding elections, the PJ dropped from 131 to 119 seats losing its majority in Chamber. The UCR suffered the worst election results since the return to democracy obtaining only 66 seats. The party that best performed was the FREPASO. This front became the third most important party in the Chamber ever with 14.79% of the seats (Table 39 and figure 3).⁴⁴

As to internal reforms, deputies approved the creation of the VP3 in 1996. This new position on the directing board was occupied by the FREPASO (Table 44). As we will

⁴⁴ The Chamber had two other "important third parties" in the past: the UCRI (11.98% of seats in 1965), and the BUJ (11.42% of seats in 1985). The remaining third parties from 1946 to 2001 always had less than 10% of the seats (see figure 3).

see shortly, the creation of the VP₃ would allow the PJ and the UCR to keep the first three positions of the directing board of the Chamber.

Table 43
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1997-1999

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	119	46.30
UCR	66	25.68
FREPASO	38	14.79
AR ^a	3	1.17
DemMza	3	1.17
PRSlta	3	1.17
MPN	2	0.78
DemP	2	0.78
FC-S ^b	2	0.78
FPNu ^c	2	0.78
FRep	2	0.78
LIB	2	0.78
MOPOF	2	0.78
PAIS	2	0.78
BSJ	1	0.39
CRSJ	1	0.39
D&J ^d	1	0.39
LAB	1	0.39
MPJ	1	0.39
MPPSL	1	0.39
PAutC	1	0.39
ReDe	1	0.39
UCeDe	1	0.39
Total	257	100.00

a. Action for the Republic (Acción por la República)

b. Civic-Social Front (Frente Cívico-Social)

c. New Party Front (Frente Partido Nuevo)

d. Justice and Development (Desarrollo y Justicia)

Table 44
Directing Board and Ruling Party - 1997

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	PJ	
VP ₁	PJ	
VP ₂	UCR	
VP ₃	FREPASO	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	119	46.30
Total	119	46.30

The presidential and congressional elections of 1999 brought the ALIANZA UCR-FREPASO to power. In the Chamber the ALIANZA was the ruling plurality (the only ruling plurality coalition of the period).

After the ALIANZA came the PJ, which lost twenty seats in these elections, the **Federal Inter-bloc -FEDInt- (Interbloque Federal)**, and the **Action for the Republic -AR- (Acción por la República)**. The FEDInt was composed of nine traditional provincial

parties that decided to gather and form a delegation. The AR, the third political force in the 1999 elections, was a center-right party led by Domingo F. Cavallo, former Minister of Economy of President Menem and of President de la Rúa.⁴⁵

Table 45
Chamber's Partisan Composition
Legislative Period 1999-2001

Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PJ	99	38.52
UCR	81	31.52
FREPASO	37	14.4
FEDInt ^a	14	5.46
AR	11	4.28
FC-S	4	1.56
FPNu	3	1.17
FRep	3	1.17
MPN	2	0.78
MS&ER ^b	1	0.39
UB ^c	1	0.39
UCeDe	1	0.39
Total	257	100.00


- a. Federal Inter-bloc (Interbloque Federal)
b. Movimiento Social y Entrerriano
c. Unity from Bs. As. (Unidad Bonaerense)

Table 46
Directing Board and ALIANZA - 1999

Directing Board		
Position	Party	
P	UCR	
VP1	FREPASO	
VP2	PJ	
VP3	FEDInt	
ALIANZA (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
UCR	81	31.52
FREPASO	37	14.4
Total	118	45.92

Although Cavallo's AR was the fourth political party in the Chamber (it had supposedly the right to get the VP3), the last position on the directing board was occupied by the FEDInt (Table 46).

⁴⁵ Cavallo was "the father" of the *convertibilidad* (a law by which the government equalized the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar in 1991) and also of the *corralito* (a decree that imposed severe limits on banks withdrawals and led to the devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2001).



From 1946 to 2001 Argentines have intermittently elected six Peronist and four Radical presidents, and suffered more than eighteen years of *de facto* governments. Democracy returned to the country in 1983. Considering the past experience, eighteen years of democratically **elected governments** (1983-2001) is a strong sign of democratic consolidation.⁴⁶

The party system has offered four main options. First, a predominant party (PJ) that governed the country sometimes with authoritarian (1950s) or unexpected neoliberal measures (1990s), and exerted its power even while being banned or in the opposition. Second, a traditional party (UCR) that split into two factions during almost a decade (1958-1966), improved its electoral performance after the last dictatorship, suffered a gradual decline during the 1990s, and had a transient success as part of a coalition that dissipated its electoral support in less than two years of government (1999-2001). Third, some short-lived third parties that were incapable to become a sustained challenge to the PJ or the UCR (UdelPA, PI, UCeDe, MODIN, APFe, MID, FREPASO, and AR). Fourth, a myriad of traditional provincial parties that at the end of the period began to gather in order to capitalize their representation. Within these party system and political circumstances takes place the analysis of the six-time closed Argentine lower Chamber.

This is a Chamber whose institutional framework was shaped by constitutional rules. Its membership, by contrast, is the result of a combination of *de facto* decree-laws and democratic rules. Taking a look inside the Chamber we see that this is an institution

⁴⁶ Despite economic, social, and political crises that sign of democratic consolidation continues until today (2010).

that has been governed by *parties*. Except for three periods, coalitions are unusual at the high level of the Argentine legislative arena. Besides, during these past fifty-five years the Chamber has been ruled half by majorities, half by pluralities. While the former pertain mostly to the 1940s and 1950s, when the majoritarian electoral system was in force, the latter appeared after 1963 with the introduction of the PR system. Peronists ruled the Chamber during ten legislative periods (22 years), and Radicals were in charge of it in nine opportunities (15 years). Successive constitutional reforms, *de facto* rules, and military interventions explain this difference. Considering the number of seats, Radicals were always the second delegation when Peronists controlled the Chamber. The sometimes banned PJ was the second delegation after the ruling UCRP in 1965-1966, and during the 1980s and 1990s. While the majoritarian electoral system was in force, third delegations either did not exist or were represented by few deputies. As expected, this bipartisan composition changed in 1963 with the then new "Chamber of proportionality." Nonetheless, except for a handful of cases, namely the FREPASO, third parties continued to have a low representation.

CHAPTER IV

Reconstructing Patterns of Institutional Development

Argentine Chamber of Deputies

1946-2001

Now that a general view of the organization of the Argentine lower Chamber has been presented, I proceed with what I call the reconstruction task, an in-depth description and analysis of the patterns of the Chamber's institutional development. As mentioned in chapter II, I identify that development with the evolution (preservation or change) of its organizational rules and norms, that is, those rules and norms associated with the structuring of the committee and the directing board systems and the pre-floor and floor procedures. Therefore, the main question of this chapter is: *what are the patterns that characterize the evolution of the organizational rules and norms in the Argentine Chamber?*

I plan to establish these patterns specifying when, by whom, how, and why rules and norms concerning the reforms to the *Reglamento* (Part I), the directing board system (Part II), and the standing committee system (Part III) were preserved or changed. Part IV concludes summarizing the patterns found, and providing a preliminary assessment of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory regarding the Argentine case.

The analysis is guided by expectations that stem from the general hypothesis mentioned in chapter II: *when a legislative party becomes the ruling party in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

Throughout the analysis special attention is paid to the electoral system in force, and the ruling-party type in the Chamber at the time of the reform of organizational rules and norms. The U.S. literature is of little use, however, for such endeavors. Therefore, I do not have specific expectations as to what impact the 1963 electoral reform and the

type of majority or plurality governing the Chamber have on these aspects. I approach these issues with empiricist lenses, hoping to bring forth new insights in the process.

Part I. Reforms to the *Reglamento*

The *Reglamento* of the Chamber had several minor and general reforms from 1946 to 2001. In this section I study the main general reforms of 1955, 1963, and 1996, and one precise amendment that took place in 1989. Changes to the directing board system and the standing committee system are studied in the following sections. The expectations to be tested through the analysis of these main reforms are: *1- Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling parties are adopted on straight party-line vote; 2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling parties and/or accrue their advantages.*

To help understand the following description keep in mind that reforms to the *Reglamento* require a report of the standing *Committee on Rules* before being considered on the floor. The analysis of each reform begins with a brief description of the political situation in the Chamber as well as the authors and their objectives, continues with an account of the main changes, and ends with an assessment about how well the Cartel Theory fares in this case.

Section 1. The 1955 Reform: “The Innocent Tentative to Improve the *Reglamento*”⁴⁷

In 1955 the Chamber was ruled by the largest qualified majority of the period. It was a Peronist majority that had 93% of the seats. On May 04, the Chamber approved a resolution tabled by Peronist deputies to create a special committee to reform the *Reglamento*. This committee was immediately constituted by six PJ and one UCR members under the chairmanship of a PJ deputy.⁴⁸ The committee report was considered two days later on the floor and approved by the majority delegation (PJ) in one sitting.

This fast-track treatment was in spite of the criticisms of the opposition (UCR) that claimed the reform was a violation to the right of free expression, and a curtailment to the power of minorities. Joaquín Díaz de Vivar (PJ), by contrast, explained that this revision was an “innocent tentative to improve the *Reglamento* of the Chamber.”⁴⁹ It aimed at adapting the *Reglamento* to the “Constitution of Perón” (i.e., the 1949 Constitution), and a new ministerial Law.⁵⁰

The most contested amendment was the replacement of traditional oath of office formulas (referring to “God” and “the Country”) for a secular formula that only mentioned “the allegiance to the National Constitution.”⁵¹

⁴⁷ See debate of the reform in Journal 06.05.55, pp. 87/112.

⁴⁸ Journal 04.05.55, pp. 48/9.

⁴⁹ Journal 06.05.55, p. 106.

⁵⁰ These were the goals of the reform according to Jorge S. Pellerano (PJ), Chair of the special committee in charge of the revision (Journal 06.05.55, pp. 91/2).

⁵¹ The suppression of the clerical formula, in particular, was one of the legislative measures adopted by the Peronist government due to its conflictive relationship with the Catholic Church in 1955.

Three other changes were a new majority to discuss questions of privilege, the reduction of terms to speak, and the suppression of bills' "justifications."⁵² The first change fixed a qualified majority (2/3 of the members) to discuss questions of privilege on the floor.⁵³ Otherwise, these motions would be sent to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (to be piled with the rest of the pending questions of privilege this committee usually accumulates). It is important to note that these motions most of the time are not moved to defend a privilege but to criticize the government or to bring up a scandal or political problem. That is why they are seldom approved to be discussed on the floor. With reference to the terms to speak, the reform reduced the period known as "The Hour," which was considered the opposition's time or the "backup/B plan" when questions of privilege were sent to committee.⁵⁴

Finally, the revision established that certain Chamber's officials would be elected by the plenary (instead of the Presidency), and increased the number of standing committees and their membership (to match new ministries created by law).

⁵² Traditionally the Journal of Sessions published deputies' bills with their correlative "justifications," that is, a text where they stated the reasons for their initiatives. UCR deputies claimed that this suppression implied a violation to the republican principle of publicity of government acts.

⁵³ Legislative privileges are the privileges, immunities and powers held, enjoyed and exercised by the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and their respective members. Legislative privileges enable them to perform their constitutional functions free from external interference. They are one of the safeguards of the constitutional separation of powers. Any claim that a privilege has been infringed is raised in the Chamber by means of a "question of privilege."

⁵⁴ Deputies in the opposition or minor delegations use this period, as well as the questions of privilege, to express their views about current events, justify their position in certain issues, and **exercise the congressional oversight** of the **executive** branch. The reform reduced from one hour to 30' the term to consider bills and written or oral questions to the Executive Power (requests of information), and included in this 30' the consideration of petitions to committees, motions of preference, and the Table of resolutions previously asked by deputies.

This reform produced *political* and decentralizing amendments. Within the first group are those *political-technical* reforms that accrued ruling party's advantages and, at the same time, limited the participation of the opposition (e.g., a tighter control of floor proceedings through a qualified majority to discuss questions of privilege and the reduction of "The Hour"), and those *purely political* that did not imply new advantages for the ruling party, but a showing of its power to adapt Chamber's rules to the authoritarian turn of the last year of Perón's regime (e.g., the approval of the secular oath of office formula and the suppression of bills' justifications).

The transfer from the President to the plenary of the prerogative to elect certain Chamber's officials is a decentralizing (democratizing) measure that does not harm the power of the majority.

In brief, this first reform supports the Cartel Theory. It was proposed and approved *in totum* by the ruling party. While the *purely political* reforms demonstrate its cohesion, the *political-technical* ones indeed accrued its advantages.

Section 2. The 1963 Reform: "Adapting the *Reglamento* to the PR System"⁵⁵

Ruled by a plurality that controlled 37% of the seats, the first Chamber elected by the PR electoral system approved in December 1963 a mega reform to the *Reglamento*. Given that PR's direct consequence was the proliferation of delegations, changes focused on decentralizing the control of the agenda and basic aspects of debates, reducing the time-allotting on the floor, and promoting the participation of

⁵⁵ See debate of the reform in Journals: 18.12.63, pp. 898/925; 19.12.63, pp. 951/74; 20.12.63, pp. 1015/79; 26.12.63, pp. 1108/28.

pluralities. A unanimous report of the Committee on Rules was considered on the floor. Among the most important changes of this reform are: a) the creation of the Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria); b) the introduction of rules about delegations; c) the institution of "in" minority reports in committees; d) the reintroduction of "The Hour";⁵⁶ and e) the reduction of certain terms to speak and the suppression of the "free debate" during the analysis "rule by rule" of bills.⁵⁷ In addition, this reform reintroduced the traditional oath of office formulas making reference to "God" (including the reference to the "Holy Bible"), and "the Country."

The creation of the CLP was the "key element of the reform."⁵⁸ Its structure, functions and decisional system were largely debated. The CLP would be chaired by the President of the Chamber and composed of the Vice-presidents (VPs) and the leaders of delegations. It would prepare the long-term legislative agenda and the order of business for each sitting (both functions previously performed by the President of the Chamber), receive reports about committees' activities, and implement measures to expedite debates on the floor.

Except for the UCRI, which was against the creation the CLP, the rest of the opposition proposed some corrections -that would not be accepted by the Committee on Rules-.

Héctor Gómez Machado (UCRI) complained that they were giving the CLP functions

⁵⁶ The reform not only reintroduced the "The Hour" but also established the possibility to prorogue it for one more hour (2/3 of the votes was needed), and 30' to the consideration of petitions to committees, motions of preference and the Table of resolutions and bills previously asked by deputies.

⁵⁷ In the Argentine Congress a bill must be approved in each Chamber "in general" (debate about the subject matter of the bill) and "in particular" (debate rule by rule) to become a law.

⁵⁸ Pablo González Bergez (FedPCe), member of the Committee on Rules (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1029).

that *should belong to the President of the Chamber*. The UCRI, he explained, was in favor of setting up an *advisory committee* to the President, but not a substitute of the President. The MPProv (the undercover PJ) demanded basic rules of functioning (e.g., the fixing of quorums), and the suppression of the VPs as members of the CLP. León Patlis (DemP) suggested the adoption of a **weighted voting system (every delegation leader would possess a number of votes equal to the size of her delegation)**.

In response, Pablo González Bergez (FedPCe) argued that the CLP was established to *advise the Chamber, not its President*, and that the goal was to create a committee to coordinate and organize the legislative business according to the interests of delegations. Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda (DemP) remarked that this would be a *bona fide* committee and expressed: “[Before] the majority prepared the order of business and it did it according to its will (...) now nobody owns the quorum, and we need to agree.”⁵⁹

The fact of being a *bona fide* committee implied that: a) it would not represent proportionally the Chamber, so there would not be a weighted voting system;⁶⁰ b) it would prepare an order of business *subject to the approval of the Chamber* (the President’s order of business was definite); c) it would not be empowered to report to the Chamber (there would be no majority or minority reports); d) it would have neither a fixed membership nor a quorum; and that it e) it would include the VPs only to keep

⁵⁹ Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda was the member of the Committee on Rules in charge of presenting the report on the floor (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1035).

⁶⁰ Martínez Raymonda explained that the introduction of a weighted vote would imply the creation of a “parallel body” or a “little parliament” inside the Chamber (Journal 20.12.63, p. 1035).

them informed of the business of the Chamber. Additionally, they pointed out that if the CLP did not meet, the *President would prepare the order of the business in its place.*

Besides the CLP, this reform introduced rules about delegations. From then on three or more deputies could form a delegation according to their political allegiances (affinities), and one or two deputies could also do so if their *parties existed before the electoral process.* From the discussion it came clear that in the *Reglamento political party and legislative delegation* are different things because a *delegation does not represent necessarily a political party.* In other words, a delegation can assemble *members of a political party* (it usually does), but also can be formed by a *coalition of parties.*

Finally, two changes were introduced *inside* committees. First, committees were allowed to produce “in” minority reports if two reunions failed because of lack of quorum.⁶¹ Second, a bill should be included in the committee schedule if at least three members of the committee demanded so.

A Chamber ruled by a plurality, approved changes that benefited pluralities. This reform supports the Cartel Theory. It was proposed and approved with the consensus of a handful of pluralities (the ruling plurality among them). It adopted rules that created and reintroduced pluralities’ advantages.⁶²

⁶¹ Not to be confused with “minority reports.” “In” minority reports are those adopted by a minority of deputies when there is no quorum in the committee.

⁶² The reintroduction and extension of the “The Hour” was the main advantage (and one of the main revenges) regained by pluralities regarding the floor. The other revenge? The reintroduction of the oath of office formulas annulled by the 1955 reform.

The substantive new benefits touched the control of the agenda and basic aspects of debates (the creation of the CLP), the functioning of committees (the introduction of “in minority reports”), and the formation of delegations (fixing very flexible and low minima to form them). The reduction of the time-allotting and suppression of the free-debate seem to be related to the need of handling the discussion of 192 deputies (the Chamber had 166 deputies when the last reform was adopted). In short, the reform was tailor-made to the pluralities of the “first Congress of the proportionality rule.”

Section 3. The 1996 Reform: “Adapting the *Reglamento* to the 1994 Constitution”⁶³

As mentioned in chapter III, in the 1995 elections the PJ secured the majority of seats in Chamber. Before that year, however, the PJ was the virtual majority because it easily reached the quorum with the help of some allies (e.g., the UCeDe).

After five years of discussions in the Committee on Rules, in July 1996 began the analysis of a general reform to the *Reglamento* proposed by the ruling PJ. The controversial document was composed of a majority report signed by members of the PJ and two minority reports and six dissenting opinions signed by parties of the opposition.⁶⁴ Although the member presenting the majority report (Horacio Macedo - PJ-) explained that the document was meant to adequate the *Reglamento* to the 1994 Constitution and to speed up debates, all opposition and minor delegations emphatically rejected it.

⁶³ See debate of the reform in Journals: 10.07.96, pp. 2008/63; 07,08.08.96, p. 2476; 04.12.96, pp. 5896/5959.

⁶⁴ The majority and minority reports are published in the Orden del Día No. 331/96.

The majority report had three main proposals: a) new decisional powers and a “weighted voting system” for the CLP; b) the vote of the President in ordinary legislative proceedings and double vote in case of tie (I will refer to this as the “President’s right to vote issue”), and c) the shortening and the suppression of terms to speak on the floor.⁶⁵

With reference to the CLP, the PJ proposed that it could *change* days and hours of sessions, *approve* the long-term agenda and the order of business for each sitting, *decide* over questions of privilege and the opportunity to express commemorations, *fix* the time to vote, and *determine* the type of voting system to be applied.⁶⁶ In case of lack of consensus, the CLP could apply a weighted voting system.⁶⁷ The CLP decision required absolute majority of votes, and the President should decide in case of tie.

Four other proposed reforms are worth mentioning. The majority report sought to change the system to fix the quorum (to reduce it in a nutshell), increase from five to ten the number of deputies needed to demand a special session, and establish that if a committee produced two reports on the same bill with the same number of signatures, the majority report would be the one signed by its Chair. The fourth reform is special because, in contrast to the rest, it implies a benefit to minority delegations: the

⁶⁵ The PJ proposed to shorten the following terms: a) Discussion and approval of CLP’s decisions (from 5’ to 3’); b) Justification of questions of privilege (from 10’ to 5’); c) Discussion in the general debate of a bill (committee reporters, authors of the resolution and delegation leaders would have 30’ instead of 60’, and the rest of the deputies would have 10’ instead of 30’); d) Discussion in the particular debate of a bill (committee reporters, authors of the resolution and delegation leaders would have 10’ instead of 20’, and the rest of the deputies would have 2 opportunities of 5’ each instead 2 opportunities of 10’ and 5’ each). Besides, “The Hour” and the debate that usually followed certain motions were suppressed, and failed motions could not be tabled again in the same sitting.

⁶⁶ Instead of the plenary of deputies, from now on the CLP would decide if questions of privilege would be analyzed on the floor or sent to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.

⁶⁷ Recall that by this system (called “voto ponderado”) every delegation leader possesses a number of votes equal to the size of her delegation in the Chamber.

number of deputies needed to demand a roll-call (nominal) vote was reduced from 1/5 to 1/10. In the session held to analyze this reform, most of the minority delegations and all the opposition abandoned the floor to prevent the approval of the report. Opposition leaders criticized it arguing that it violated the principle of popular representation because it gave super powers to the ruling-party leader and to the President of the Chamber.⁶⁸ One month later, the report was sent back to the Committee on Rules, and in December 1996 a new report reached the floor.⁶⁹ In this document the weighted voting system and the most controversial decisional powers of the CLP were eliminated. Furthermore, during the debate the PJ renounced to give the CLP the power to decide over questions of privilege. The majority delegation (PJ), however, insisted on the President's right to vote issue, the lowering of the quorum, and the shortening and suppression of terms to speak on the floor.

The PJ managed to get quite a few of its proposals, but lost the roll-call vote on the President's right to vote issue. How? The majority party *simply* did not have enough deputies on the floor at the time of the roll-call vote.⁷⁰ Furthermore, in a weird debate the PJ first refused and then accepted a FREPASO proposal to create a *Third Vice-*

⁶⁸ While Laura Musa (UCR) expressed that "all issues will be resolved beforehand in the CLP" and Alberto A. Natale (DemP) said that this report was "an abuse the majority wants to impose on minority rights", Rodolfo Rodil (FREPASO) argued the goal was to "discipline the delegation of the majority party and to gag minority delegations." See Journal 10.07.96, pp. 2047, 2058 and 2954, respectively.

⁶⁹ The new report can be read in the Orden del Día 1208/96.

⁷⁰ Due to the importance of this long and debated amendment about the President's right to vote issue, opposition delegations demanded a roll-call vote. This type of vote must be approved by the Chamber in order to proceed. But President Marcelo E. López Arias (PJ) ordered the nominal vote omitting that approval. To the surprise of all deputies when the votes were counted the result was 71 in favor, 80 against, 5 abstentions and 4 non-registered votes. The President immediately ordered a second vote arguing that the abstentions and the non-registered votes could change the result. In this moment some of the PJ deputies who were in the galleries near the floor tried to enter to the plenary to reach the necessary number, but opposition leaders claimed that the second vote should be carried out with the same deputies present in the first vote. After a failed second roll-call vote, one break and much discussion, the PJ finally lost the vote in the third roll-call vote (Journal 04.12.96, pp. 5937/49).

Presidency in the Chamber.⁷¹ It is worth to mention that this substantial change to the structure of the Chamber was never proposed in any previous resolution or report, and also never discussed in any of the debates about this reform.

Finally, a *maternity leave* and the already mentioned change benefiting minority delegations were also approved.

In this reform the ruling majority gained important prerogatives, renounced to proposals that would have accrued its advantages, accepted an unexpected and substantial amendment, approved rules that benefited minority parties, and lost one of the main votes. All in all, this implies a partial confirmation of the Cartel Theory. Let me explain this.

What did the PJ get? In this reform the PJ got new decisional powers to the CLP,⁷² all the proposed shortening of terms to speak on the floor including the suppression of “The Hour”, the reduced quorum,⁷³ more power to the chairs of committees, and the increase of the number of deputies needed to demand a special session.

⁷¹ The unexpected creation of the Third Vice-Presidency was tersely proposed during the general debate by Rodolfo Rodil (FREPASO). He argued that to be representative the directing board of the Chamber should include the political force that had gathered more than five million votes in the last election. Once the particular debate began, Rodil asked for the inclusion of this amendment and the UCR delegation supported the proposition. Horacio A. Macedo (PJ), Vice-Chair of the Committee on Rules, rejected the amendment. Immediately the FREPASO leader asked for a roll-call vote and a UCR deputy called (for the third time) the attention of the Presidency explaining that “if the vote proceeded, they would be rejecting the FREPASO amendment.” Minutes later the majority leader announced “the PJ delegation has decided to accept the proposal regarding the creation of a Third Vice-Presidency” (Journal 04.12.06, pp. 5926/7 and 5931/3).

⁷² From then on the CLP would fix the time to vote and the type of voting system to be applied on the floor, implement measures to expedite work on committees, and decide over the opportunity to express commemorations.

⁷³ The Chamber passed from the “50% + 1 of the total number of deputies” quorum formula (until 1996 the quorum was 130/257), to the “absolute majority” formula which means: “when present members outnumber absent ones” (since 1997 the quorum is 129/257).

Why did the PJ renounce to its first proposals? It is important to underline that the PJ left aside *extreme* amendments that were not only rejected by the opposition but also by some of its own members. Therefore, the hypothesis of an approval on these subject matters is implausible. In other words, this is not the subject that disconfirms the theory.

Why did the PJ accept the creation of the Third Vice-Presidency? The PJ and the UCR occupied all the positions of the directing board from 1989 to 1997 (see Tables 32 to 38 in chapter III) against the objections and protests of minority and opposition parties that demanded “a seat in the government of the Chamber,” namely the VP2 (see Part II in this chapter). The creation of the VP3 benefited the ruling majority (PJ) and the first plurality (UCR) because in this way they kept for themselves the VP1 (PJ) and the VP2 (UCR) of the Chamber. By the way, it is obvious that the PJ Vice-Chair of the Committee on Rules (who was in charge of commanding the debate on the floor) was not aware of this amendment. This was a last minute “agreement” among party leaders.

Though formally the approval of benefits to minority parties disconfirms the theory, the lonely amendment (the reduction of the number of deputies needed to demand a roll-call vote) is worthless if compared with the changes adopted in favor of the ruling party. These last reforms assured the latter the tightest control of the work in committees and of floor proceedings a party has ever had in the Chamber (see Table 64 at the end of this chapter). The vote lost by the PJ on the President’s right to vote issue disconfirms the theory. In particular, the first prediction (*“Reforms to the*

Reglamento proposed by ruling parties are adopted on straight party-line vote”) is not supported. This disconfirmation shows that the cohesion of a majority or plurality *must not be taken for granted*.⁷⁴

Section 4. The 1989 Reform: “New Positions that Reflect the Current State of the Country, not the Nation we Idealized from our Past that no Longer Exists”⁷⁵

From 1946 to 1989 the Chamber had two Chief Officers and two Chief Officials.⁷⁶ The election of these four functionaries (the highest functionaries of the Chamber) was always controlled by the ruling party. Nevertheless, there is a difference among the periods 1946-1966, 1973-1989 and 1989-2001. In the period 1946-1966 each party proposed its candidate, most of the time an experienced functionary with a long legislative career, and the four elected ones (always ruling-party candidates) lasted in their positions until death, retirement or resignation. From 1973 on, by contrast, there were only ruling-party candidates, most of the time former members of the ruling-party delegation, who changed every time the ruling party changed. The great difference between those periods and the 1989-2001 term is that the Chamber not

⁷⁴ This is also the reason that explains why I will affirm in the next chapter that the theory is supported when majorities or minorities reject amendments that can suppress their advantages. In these cases majorities or pluralities are ratifying their power and cohesion, both things that cannot be assumed.

⁷⁵ In this way the first plurality leader César Jaroslavsky (UCR) justified the creation of new permanent positions (one Chief Officer and One Chief Official) in the Chamber (Journal 31.08, 01.09.89, pp. 3056). This reason differed markedly from the justifications expressed in the bill tabled to create these positions. This document mentioned the “constant increase of the activities of the Chamber” and the “multiple functions modern times impose to the Argentine Parliament.” See debate in Journal 31.08, 01.09.89, pp. 3054/58.

⁷⁶ The Chief Officers were the Administrative and Parliamentary Officers (“Secretarios Administrativo y Parlamentario”) and the Chief Officials were the Administrative and Parliamentary Officials (“Pro-secretarios Administrativo y Parlamentario”).

only created two new positions, but also institutionalized their *political character* in the *Reglamento*.

The circumstances of this reform need a detailed explanation. In July 1989, President Menem (PJ) assumed power following the resignation of President Alfonsín (UCR), six months prior to the end of his term. Even though the renewal of the Chamber *would take place in November 1989*, both parties agreed to give the *Presidency of the Chamber to the PJ in July*. Therefore, while the Executive Power and the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies were in charge of the PJ, the *first plurality* in the Chamber was *Radical until the November renewal*. In short, the PJ chaired a Chamber where Radicals were the first plurality. In addition, immediately after the election of the new PJ President of the Chamber, the four (UCR) highest functionaries of the Chamber were replaced by four (PJ) new officials.

In this context, before the day break of September 1st, 1989, in the midst of a critical sitting devoted to approve the "Emergency Economic Law" and through a dubious legislative procedure, the UCR and the PJ agreed on creating two new permanent positions in the Chamber: one Chief Officer and one Chief Official.⁷⁷ Against the criticisms of minority groups, they also approved that the now six highest functionaries of the Chamber would be *politically elected*, four of them by the delegation "with more deputies," and the rest by the delegation that "follows in number of seats."

The reform did not benefit the PJ since the party had already elected *its* four functionaries in July (and would continue to do so until they keep the Presidency of the Chamber). In contrast, it did benefit the UCR: Radicals would be the delegation that

⁷⁷The new positions created in 1989 were the Coordination Officer (Secretario de Coordinación Operativa) and the Coordination Official (Pro-secretario de Coordinación Operativa).

would “follow in number of seats” to the PJ after the November renewal, so they gained the prerogative to nominate the two new functionaries at the end of 1989. Furthermore, the UCR did not wait until the end of the year. On September 14, 1989, the two new (UCR) functionaries were elected by the Chamber.

This reform to the *Reglamento* deserves special attention. At first sight it disconfirms the Cartel Theory: the PJ, in exchange of *nothing*, benefited the UCR (the main delegation of the opposition) with two new positions (which have no function in the *Reglamento*), and even voted to elect them before the renewal of the Chamber. Actually, the PJ indeed exchanged something, but it had done so three months ago, in May 1989. The political agreement, which can be found only in newspapers, was that the PJ would support the creation of new positions in exchange of *getting the Presidency of the Chamber before the November renewal*, and a *larger share of chairmanships in all committees* at the time of the renewal. While the latter can be confirmed by the data shown in Table 58 (section 9.4), the fact that the PJ held the Presidency of the Chamber *before* the biannual renewal, that is, being the UCR the first plurality in the Chamber, is an event, a surprising event, overlooked in the literature, and only known by legislative journalists for whom this is one of the many anecdotes about *political agreements* in the Chamber.

As to the Cartel Theory, this is a fascinating case that supports its predictions. A ruling party (PJ) in control of a Chamber composed of a first plurality of the opposition (UCR), adopts on straight party-line vote the creation of benefits favoring that first plurality (two new permanent positions), in order to secure actual and future advantages (the

Presidency before the renewal and a larger share of chairmanships in all committees). To put it another way, as the (adapted) general hypothesis of the Cartel Theory explains: *when a legislative party becomes the ruling party in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

Ruling parties (majorities as well as pluralities) shaped the reforms to the *Reglamento* and their implementation. They did so sometimes against the opposition (1955), but most of the time with their explicit (1963, 1989) or implicit (1996) accord. In particular, the rules of the Chamber were modified by the PJ twice when this party was the ruling majority (1955-1996), once by a Chamber of minorities (1963), and once by the PJ, when it was in charge of a Chamber in which Radicals were the first plurality (1989).

The reforms of 1955 and 1963 support the Cartel Theory predictions. Both of them were adopted on straight party-line vote and approved rules that accrued ruling parties' advantages (a majority ruling party in 1955, a plurality in 1963).

While the reform of 1989 also gives credit to the theory, the one that took place in 1996 partially supports its predictions. Let me briefly explain the reasons of this statement.

The 1989 reform was the result of a deal between the UCR and the PJ by which the latter secured substantive advantages in exchange of two powerless but permanent positions to the former. One of the main changes of the 1996 reform, the creation of the also powerless but attractive Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber, was also the result of a deal: a place in the directing board for the FREPASO, in exchange of

maintaining the most coveted positions for the PJ (the Presidency and the First Vice-Presidency of the Chamber).⁷⁸ In both cases, the ruling party altered the structure of the Chamber (creating powerless but permanent positions), in exchange of keeping or improving its preeminent status. As noted, *it used of the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

But the 1996 reform changed other rules that also support the predictions of the theory. Among the most important, it suppressed dispositions of the 1963 reform (“The Hour” was annulled), lowered the quorum, increased the powers of the CLP, and reduced the time-allotting on the floor.

One may ask how a reinforced CLP (an institution created in 1963) can benefit a ruling majority, and why a reduced time-allotting on the floor would benefit a ruling majority or ruling parties in general. Beginning with the CLP, the fact is that the *bona fide* CLP, so loosely defined, did not end with the President’s and the ruling party’s control over the legislative agenda. Since 1973 the CLP has become a new “instrument of control” of ruling parties because they command its functioning and decisions.⁷⁹ This is the reason why the PJ in 1996 sought to add (not to reduce) the CLP decisional powers. This is also the explanation to the strong minority delegations’ opposition to this amendment. If the CLP had been the *bona fide* committee imagined by the 1963 deputies, minority parties would have never been opposed to giving it more power.

⁷⁸ The Vice-Presidents of the Chamber substitute the President in case of her absence or sickness. Besides this function, they have legislative perquisites (e.g., an office in the Chamber’s building, permanent employees of the Chamber’s staff at her service, and the right to designate advisors).

⁷⁹ As Jones and Hwang (2005, 278) explain, “[w]hile the CLP operates in part based on consensus, when a disagreement occurs the majority party’s position prevails. When the CLP meets is left to the majority party’s discretion. The CLP decides which bills will be discussed during the session, who will speak during floor debate, the session hours, etc. The majority leadership often unilaterally modifies the agenda without consultation or warning when it considers the modification to be in its best interest.”

As to the substantive reduction of terms to speak, this is a measure that benefits ruling parties, especially in a Chamber where party discipline is the rule (i.e., there is no need to listen to long speeches of the opposition), particularly at the end of the legislative year, when legislation must be approved. As Döring (2003, 148) explains, “timetable restrictions grant to the agenda setter scheduling power for speeding up the business of the House against delaying attempts up to outright obstruction from opposition parties.”

At the same time, Peronists failed to increase the power of the President of the Chamber. This *faux pas* shows that the cohesion or consensus of a majority/plurality must not be assumed. Every time their members vote together they are ratifying the existence and functioning of their *cartels*. Though in this case I am almost sure that the failure was due to the disorder that reigned in that session, the fact is that the ruling party *failed to adopt a reform that would have benefited it*.

Considered together, the four reforms support the Cartel Theory. The 1996 amendment, in particular, partially supports the theory: the ruling party gained important prerogatives, but renounced to accrue its advantages and failed to increase the power of the President. Nonetheless, note that in the late 1980s and 1990s - specially in 1996- the PJ accorded with the UCR and the FREPASO substantial changes in the structure of the Chamber. These changes allowed the PJ to preserve its preeminent position. As mentioned, it used the rule-making power of the Chamber in its favor. This is a cartel behavior.

Part II. The Directing Board System

In this part I analyse the functions, rules and practices regarding the election procedure and partisan composition of the directing board of the Chamber. In the U.S. House, the institution studied by Cox and McCubbins, there is no directing board, but only the position of the Speaker who always belong to the majority party. Therefore, the predictions I will test are specially elaborated for my cases, though always based on the principles of the Cartel Theory.

Section 5. The Composition of the Directing Boards

Were the directing boards composed only of members of the ruling party? Did directing boards have a bipartisan membership? Where do their members come from? Were they freshman or senior deputies? As noted in the last chapter, the partisan composition of the directing boards has changed through time. This section provides a first approach of these boards that will be helpful for the rest of the chapter.

During the period 1946-2001 the Chamber elected 39 directing boards. For the statistical analyses I consider the 18 directing boards elected at the beginning of each legislative period (at the time of the biannual renewal of the Chamber).⁸⁰ As noted, I will refer to the three Vice-Presidents of the Chamber as VP1, VP2, and VP3.

⁸⁰ Although the directing boards of the second (or third) year of each legislative period were not considered in the dataset, it is interest to note that these boards have always had the same partisan composition as the first year.

While Presidents always belonged to the ruling party, 33 of the 39 directing boards have had VP1s that belonged to the ruling party. Except for the period 1973-1975, since the PR system is in force (1963) almost all VP2s were picked from the second delegation in Chamber. VP3s (only two cases in the period over analysis) belonged to the third delegation.

Considering the directing boards of the eighteen legislative periods Table 47 shows the distribution of the 56 positions between ruling and opposition parties. The last column shows that 71% of the members of the directing boards were elected from the ruling party. See also that while Presidents and VP1s came from the party in control of the Chamber (100% and 83%, respectively), the largest number of VP2 were chosen among members of opposition parties (61%).

Table 47 - RULING AND OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Ruling/Opposition Parties	Directing Board Positions				Total
	President	VP1	VP2	VP3	
Ruling Party	18	15	7	0	40
%	100.0	83.3	38.9	0.0	71.4
Opposition Parties	0	3	11	2	16
%	0.00	16.7	61.1	100.0	28.6
Total	18	18	18	2	56
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Since being a member of the ruling party was always a necessary condition to be President, and to be VP1 most of the time, it is an obvious result the leading presence of the PJ in the most important positions of the directing boards during the whole period (54%) (Table 48).

Table 48 - MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY PARTY - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1946-2001

Parties	Directing Board Positions				Total
	President	VP1	VP2	VP3	
PJ	10	12	8 ^a	0	30
%	55.6	66.7	44.4	0.0	53.6
UCR	4	2	5	0	11
%	22.2	11.1	27.8	0.0	19.6
UCRI	2	3	2	0	7
%	11.1	16.7	11.1	0.0	12.5
UCRP	2	0	0	0	2
%	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6
FREPASO	0	1	0	1	2
%	0.0	5.6	0.0	5.6	3.6
OTHER PARTIES	0	0	3 ^b	1 ^c	4
%	0.0	0.0	16.7	5.6	7.1
Total	18	18	18	2	56
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

a. The VP2 belonged to the Lel in 1946 and to the PJ/FR in 1985.

b. The VP2 belonged to the UdeI PA in 1963, to the MID in 1965, and to the UCeDe in 1987.

c. The VP3 was occupied by the Federal Inter-bloc in 1999.

In particular, the PJ registers the highest percentages for President and VP1 (55.6% and 66.7%, respectively). Moreover, as to the VP2 the PJ can be situated in second place only if we consider the rest of the parties altogether. If we take into account the percentages of the UCR and its two factions in the directing boards (35.7% in total), this party registers almost 20 percentage points less than the PJ.

Almost 80% of the Presidents came from Buenos Aires province. For VP1 and VP2 the highest percentages concentrate in the Centro and Capital regions (27.8% in both cases). As Table 49 shows, the Centro, Litoral, Norte, and Cuyo regions never reached the Presidency and had a modest representation in the VP1 and VP2 positions.

Table 49 - MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY REGION - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1946-2001

Regions	Directing Board Positions				Total
	President	VP1	VP2	VP3	
Buenos Aires	14	4	4	1	23
%	77.8	22.2	22.2	50.0	41.1
Capital	4	3	5	0	12
%	22.2	16.7	27.8	0.0	21.4
Centro	0	5	4	0	9
%	0.0	27.8	22.2	0.0	16.1
Litoral	0	2	1	0	3
%	0.0	11.1	5.6	0.0	5.4
Norte	0	2	3	0	5
%	0.0	11.1	16.7	0.00	8.9
Cuyo	0	2	1	1	4
%	0.0	11.1	5.6	50.0	7.1
Total	18	18	18	2	56
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 50 - TERMS IN CHAMBER MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS BY REGION - ARGENTINE
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Terms in Chamber	Directing Board Positions				Total
	President	VP1	VP2	VP3	
1	6	9	13	0	28
%	33.3	50.0	72.2	0.0	50.0
2	7	5	2	2	16
%	38.9	27.8	11.1	100.0	28.6
3	4	4	3	0	11
%	22.2	22.2	16.7	0.0	19.6
4	1	0	0	0	1
%	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Total	18	18	18	2	56
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Half of the members of the directing boards were freshmen. Seniority in Chamber (measured by the number of terms in Chamber) seems to be a variable to consider in order to explain the election of Presidents and VP1s, particularly for those deputies with 2 and 3 terms (Table 50).

The preliminary portrait seems supported by the results shown in Table 51. There we see the effect of the variables *region* (R_1 =*Buenos Aires*), *seniority*, and *ruling party* over the probability of being elected President, VP1, and VP2.⁸¹

Table 51 - EFFECT OF REGION, SENIORITY, AND RULING PARTY OVER THE PROBABILITY OF BEING ELECTED PRESIDENT, VP1, AND VP2 - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

	President		VP1		VP2	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
R1 (Bs. As.)	2.26***	.57	-.30***	.57	-.26	.57
Seniority	1.00***	.22	.85*	.25	.348	.30
Ruling Party	-	-	1.58	.64	-.61	.49
Constant	-8.14***	.67	-7.67***	.77	-5.50***	.56
R2	0.16		0.06		0.02	
N	3945		3945		3945	

* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

The logit regressions show positive and significant coefficients for the *Buenos Aires region* and *seniority* in the case of Presidents (ruling party is not considered because it is a constant in this case), and also positive and significant coefficients for *seniority* and *ruling party* for VP1. Nevertheless, as we will see later in this chapter, when seniority is considered in the Argentine case it is essential not to lose sight of the fact that very few legislators are seniors.

This first approach shows that from 1946 to 2001 the positions of President and VP1 have been occupied by members of the ruling party. Deputies of the opposition have had a tiny representation in the VP1s, occupied 61% of the VP2s, and monopolized the VP3s (though in the latter case we are considering only two cases). Fifty percent of all members were freshmen and the majority belonged to the PJ. More

⁸¹ See description of variables in section 9.3.

than two-thirds of the Presidents came from the all-important province of Buenos Aires.

Section 6. Functions

In this section I analyze if the members of the directing board have lost, acquired, or transferred their powers to the sphere of the ruling party (e.g., a President's prerogative is transformed into a decision of the plenary that can be adopted by the majority/plurality of those voting). The prediction to test is in this case: *The power of the members of the directing board increases or is redistributed within the ruling party.*

The directing board is composed of a President and three Vice-presidents. In the Chamber it is not usual to talk about the "directing board" or the "Presidency," but about "the President." This is not strange because the directing board is not even mentioned in the rules. Vice-presidents have no function but substituting the President in case of illness or disability, they are members of the CLP, and they may be assigned to committees. The central authority in the Chamber is the President to whom the *Reglamento* has always provided substantial power.

In 1946, besides the general administrative tasks and legislative duties related to the sittings, the President had six main functions: to refer bills to committees; to prepare the order of business for each sitting; to appoint standing, special, and bicameral committees; to hire and dismiss employees; to determine the functions of all the highest functionaries and designate some of them; and to submit the internal budget to floor approval. In addition, the President was not allowed to vote, except in case of tie, or if he had participated in the debate of a particular bill.

During these fifty-five years the President never performed one of these functions, lost two of them, and gained a new position in the Chamber.

The duty Presidents never performed was the submission of the internal budget to floor approval.⁸² As mentioned, in 1955 the election of some functionaries was assigned to the plenary, and in 1963 the preparation of the order of business was transferred to the CLP. Finally, since 1964 the President chairs the CLP meetings and prepares the order of business if the CPL does not meet (this is her new position).

Although the transfer of the agenda-setting function (to the CLP), and the election of the functionaries (to the plenary) may indicate some sort of democratization of Chamber's decisions, this is not the case. For one part, the President and the ruling delegation leader exercise ample authority over the CLP. For the other part, the election of the functionaries was always controlled by the ruling party. The transfer of these functions in this case implies a redistribution within the ruling party.

Summarizing, the central authority of the Chamber is in 2001 as strong as it was in 1946. The President kept the most important functions a legislative authority can have: the referral, agenda-setting (now as Chair of the ruling-party controlled CLP), and committee-assignment powers. We should not lose sight of the fact that the

⁸² In the Chamber the compilation of departments' requests as well as the preparation, implementation, and financial management of the Budget has always been done at presidential level. Deputies neither receive information about the Chamber's annual budget, nor approve or control it. Furthermore, basic oversight rules were eliminated in the 1963 reform to the *Reglamento*. Until this year Chamber's rules assigned to the Committee on Rules the report on the implementation of the Chamber's annual budget. During the debate about the reform Salvador F. Busacca (DemC) proposed to assign this function to the Committee on the Budget. Rafael J. Martínez Raymonda (DemP) explained that this rule had not been reformed, and that there was no reason to insist on this text because the Committee on Rules had never reported on this issue. Therefore, he argued, there was no need to add this phrase to the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget and also no problem to suppress this task from the list of the Committee on Rules' functions. This suppression was approved by the Chamber (Journal 26.12.63, p. 1109).

President also kept decisive administrative functions: the elaboration and implementation of the budget and the human resources management.

It would be inaccurate to say that the Cartel Theory is disconfirmed because the functions of the extremely powerful Argentine President of the Chamber have not increased (what other function could this central authority have?) I will bring up this subject in the conclusion to this section. By now I just want to mention that it is difficult to find such extreme concentration of power in the head of a lower Chamber in the 21st century.

Section 7. The Election of Directing Boards: Procedure and Practice

This section deals with the procedure followed to elect the directing boards and the criteria applied to determine their partisan composition. The expectations to support or disconfirm the influence of the ruling party are: 1- *The election of the members of the directing board is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling parties;* 2- *No member of the opposition serves as President or VP of the directing board.*

The data analyzed in this section can be found in APPENDIX C.

The rules to elect the Chamber's authorities were never modified. They are elected for one-year term in preparatory sessions. To be elected President, VP1, VP2, or VP3 a plurality of those voting is needed, the vote is public, and a nominal (i.e., roll-call) voting system is mandatory.

Legislative practice, however, has changed the voting system and the traditional way to nominate candidates. The nominal vote was mandatory from 1946 to 1975 and, *in*

practice, is optional since 1983. That year deputies agreed on implementing a weighted voting system: the nomination made by each delegation leader represents the vote of the members of her group. Nevertheless, if a motion for a nominal vote is supported by at least 1/5 of the deputies in attendance, a roll-call is mandatory.⁸³

Regarding the nomination, while the Sáenz Peña Law was in force (1946-1962) each delegation proposed and voted for its own candidate. On the contrary, since 1963 delegations have gathered to nominate and elect candidates (APPENDIX C). Furthermore, the first and second delegations almost always voted together for electing President and VP1,⁸⁴ and most of the time for VP2.⁸⁵ As to the VP3, in 1997 the UCR and the PJ voted together to elect a FREPASO deputy, but in 1999 they supported different candidates.⁸⁶

As APPENDIX C shows, no candidate to any position of the directing board different from the one proposed or supported by the ruling party was ever elected. This is the main conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the 39 preparatory sessions in which the authorities of the Chamber were elected from 1946 to 2001.

Besides this main pattern, four other particular criteria were applied to determine the partisan composition of the directing boards. I will refer to them as: "The winner takes all the positions" (1946-1962/1973-1975), "Mixed directing boards" (1963-1966/1987-

⁸³ After 1983 the nominal voting system to elect the directing board was used in two disputed cases: the election of VP2 in 1987 and the election of VP3 in 1999.

⁸⁴ In 1997 the UCR abstained in the election of Alberto Pierri (PJ) and Marcelo López Arias (PJ) as President and VP1, respectively. In 1973 the UCR supported a UCR candidate for VP1 while the PJ did so for a PJ (PPC) candidate.

⁸⁵ In 1963 the UCRP supported a UdeIIPA candidate for VP2. By contrast, the UCRI voted for a MPProv candidate. In 1973 the PJ voted for a member of the PJ (MID) delegation for VP2 while the UCR voted for an APFe deputy. In 1987 the UCR and the PJ also voted differently for VP2: while the former picked a UCeDe deputy, the latter picked a MPN member.

⁸⁶ In 1999 the UCR voted for a **Federal Inter-bloc** deputy, while the PJ supported an AR candidate.

1988), “The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority” (1983-1986), and “The President and VP1 positions belong to the ruling party” (1989-2001).

Table 52 is useful to follow the description of these criteria and the periods in which they were applied.

Table 52 - DIRECTING BOARD POSITIONS BY TYPE OF MAJORITY-PLURALITY/SINGLE PARTY-COALITION, RULING, SECOND, AND THIRD PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislative Period	Majority-Plurality/Single Party-Coalition	Directing Board Positions			
		President	VP1	VP2	VP3 ^a
1946-1948	Majority Coalition	RP ^b	RP	RP	-
1948-1952	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	RP	-
1952-1955	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	RP	-
1955	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	RP	-
1958-1960	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	RP	-
1960-1962	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	RP	-
1963-1965	Single-Party Plurality	RP	S ^c	t ^d	-
1965-1966	Single-Party Plurality	RP	S	t	-
1973-1976	Majority Coalition	RP	RP	RP	-
1983-1985	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	S	-
1985-1987	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	S	-
1987-1989	Single-Party Plurality	RP	S	t	-
1989-1991	Single-Party Plurality	RP	RP	S	-
1991-1993	Single-Party Plurality	RP	RP	S	-
1993-1995	Single-Party Plurality	RP	RP	S	-
1995-1997	Single-Party Majority	RP	RP	S	-
1997-1999	Single-Party Plurality	RP	RP	S	t
1999-2001	Plurality Coalition	RP	RP	S	t

a. The Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber was created in 1996.

b. Ruling Party.

c. Second Party.

d. Third Party.

The first criterion is simple: *all positions go to the majority party*. It was applied during the Saénz Peña Law period and from 1973 to 1975, that is, when ruling parties had *qualified and exceptional majorities*.

The second criterion, "Mixed directing boards," is also simple: *positions are assigned in proportion to the membership of each "party."* It was applied for the first time in 1963-1966 and then in 1987-1988, that is, when *pluralities* were in charge of the Chamber.

In 1983, the UCR and the PJ agreed on a new criterion. Neither winner takes all, nor PR. *The majority keeps the President and VP1 positions and the VP2 goes to the first plurality.* Actually, this criterion would last only for the "radical years" 1983-1986.

The fourth and last criterion was imposed by the PJ and the UCR in 1989: no matter the type of majority or plurality the ruling party holds in Chamber, the President and the VP1 positions will be filled by ruling-party members, and the VP2 by a deputy of the second delegation.

The successive criteria regarding the partisan composition of directing boards were not always welcomed by all parties. Let me briefly mention the most interesting debates about this subject.

- In 1973-1975, the PJ (then the FREJULI) applied the criterion "The winner takes all the positions" even though the Chamber had been electing the directing board according to the second criterion ("Mixed directing boards") since 1963, and disregarding the fact that the PJ had supported this second criterion from

1963 to 1966.⁸⁷ Ferdinando Pedrini (FREJULI) responded to the complains of the opposition explaining that his group could not follow the proportionality criterion because the FREJULI was a coalition formed by quite a few parties that *deserved representation in the directing board*.⁸⁸

- When the second criterion, “Mixed directing boards”, was first applied (1963) the UCRP ruling party fixed a norm: directing board positions would be assigned to *parties*, not to *coalitions or alliances formed in the Chamber after the election*.⁸⁹ The opposite norm was sustained by the UCRI and the DemC: they would elect delegations, be they a party or a coalition.⁹⁰ The ruling-party criterion (UCRP) prevailed. The “Mixed directing boards” criterion was again applied in 1987 when Radicals lost its majority in Chamber. Being the first plurality, Radicals *agreed* to give the VP1 to the PJ and the VP2 to the UCeDe.
- The fourth and last criterion, as mentioned, was imposed by the PJ and the UCR in 1989. In that year Peronists, though being the first plurality (regular plurality), kept for themselves the VP1 (until now ruling pluralities gave the VP1 to the second delegation). The reasons stated by the leaders of both delegations (PJ and UCR) to make this decision were “the order of Presidential

⁸⁷ In the election of authorities of 1965 Paulino Niembro, in representation of the PJ delegation, announced they would vote for the UCRP (ruling party) candidate for President because they were following the criterion of proportionality. Journal 26.04.65, pp. 6/8.

⁸⁸ Journal 03.05.73, pp. 6/12. From 1973 to 1976 the Presidency belonged to the PJ (FREJULI), the VP1 to the PPC (FREJULI), and the VP2 to the MID (FREJULI).

⁸⁹ Following this norm the UCRP, UdelPA, SocD and DemP voted for candidates from *parties* electing a UCRP deputy for President, an UCRI deputy for VP1, and an UdelPA deputy for VP2.

⁹⁰ Following this norm the UCRI and DemC voted for a UCRP (President), UCRI (VP1), and MPProv (VP2) directing board. The MPProv delegation was a group of provincial parties that represented the peronist movement. Their members explained that they deserved the VP2 because they were the third group in Chamber (they had 17 members, while the UdelPA had 14). See speeches of deputies Juan A. Luco (PJ) -Journal 12.08.63, p. 11- , and Alberto Serú García (PJ) -Journal 20.12.63, p. 1023-.

Succession”⁹¹ and the “need to have an efficient management of the Chamber.”⁹² This criterion was many times criticized, especially in 1995 by a FREPASO leader who demanded (unsuccessfully) the VP2 for his party.⁹³ Despite minority parties’ protests, the PJ kept the Presidency and the VP1 and the UCR the VP2 even in 1991, when the PJ delegation was split in three factions and Peronists held the lowest percentage of seats as a plurality.⁹⁴

- The same distribution of positions -PJ (P); PJ (VP1); UCR (VP2) - remained in 1997, when the PJ suffered a major electoral defeat and lost the majority in Chamber. The difference then was that the newly created VP3 *went to the FREPASO*. That year, some weeks before the election of the directing board, the UCR and the FREPASO (the ALIANZA) publicly announced they would vote against the election of a Peronist as President of the Chamber. They were “*the coalition that had come to end with the Menemismo in the Chamber.*” Nonetheless, in the session they *abstained*. The rest of the delegations denounced collusion between the PJ and the ALIANZA: “they exchanged the VP1 for important positions on committees and the VP3 for the FREPASO.”⁹⁵ Finally, and even though the ALIANZA was the first plurality in 1999 and 2000,

⁹¹ In Argentina the President of the Chamber of Deputies is third in the line of succession after the President pro-tempore of the Senate (second), and the Vice-President (first).

⁹² This decision was repudiated by some minority delegations. Francisco de Durañona y Vedia (UCeDe) argued that his delegation would abstain because two traditional practices had been violated: the PR criterion to elect authorities when no delegation had the majority, and the previous consultation with delegations (this election was negotiated only between the PJ and the UCR). Journal 29.11.89, pp. 5648/56.

⁹³ Journal 29.11.95, pp. 5555/60.

⁹⁴ Fernando de la Rúa (UCR) said that although his delegation considered that the VP1 should be occupied by the second minority, they would vote for the PJ candidate in order to avoid unnecessary arguments. Journal 28.11.91, p. 4901.

⁹⁵ Speeches of Amalia Isequilla (MPPSL) and Rafael A. Bulacio (ReDe). Journal 03.12.97, in the official records of the debates available online at www.diputados.gov.ar - <http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html>

it also kept the Presidency and the VP1, leaving the VP2 to the PJ and the VP3 to the **Federal Inter-bloc**.⁹⁶

Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that *reelection is the rule* regarding Presidents in the Argentine Chamber. Since 1946, Presidents have been almost always reelected the second year of the legislative period or the second or third legislative period (if the party remained in power or the Chamber was not closed by a military coup).⁹⁷ That being said, I wanted to highlight that the Radical Juan C. Pugliese was six times President of the Chamber (1983-1988), and that the controversial and criticized Peronist Alberto R. Pierri broke all the records because he was elected eleven consecutive times to occupy that position (1989-1998).⁹⁸

To conclude, the election of the directing board is based on an old rule that benefits ruling parties (only the plurality of those voting is needed). The practice has replaced the mandatory roll-call voting system to elect the authorities by a weighted voting system. In other words, it adapted the procedure to the strict party discipline that reigns in the Chamber. The weighted voting had indeed benefited ruling parties. The analysis of the preparatory sessions shows that dissident voices inside delegations can be easily overlooked using this system.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ The election of VP3 in 1999 presented a similar scenario as that of 1963 for VP2, but the result was the opposite. Differing from the criterion adopted in 1963 by the UCRP (only parties can get positions on the directing board), the ruling party in 1999 (ALIANZA) supported the Inter-Federal Bloc for VP3 which was composed of a 9 parties. The PJ, by contrast, supported the AR delegation for VP3 (the AR was Cavallo's party). Journal 09.12.99, official records of the debates available online at www.diputados.gov.ar - <http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html>

⁹⁷ See the authorities of the Chamber of Deputies in <http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/aut.ses%20prep1109.pdf>

⁹⁸ Alberto Pierri was elected twice in 1989 (in July and November).

⁹⁹ The best example is the preparatory session of 1997. Five PJ deputies were against the election of Pierri, among them the actual President of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner. She literally shouted to Pierri announcing that

As to the powers of the head of the Chamber, note that the *idea* that the President is (and should remain) the administrative, legislative, and political authority is a norm (and a rule) that has survived electoral changes, reforms to the *Reglamento*, and that has been supported by all ruling parties. The remarkable situation in this aspect it is not the fact that the PJ had always tried to increase the President's powers, but the fact that the rest of the parties have not tried to redistribute all this power in an "Internal Affairs Committee", as it is the case in other legislatures. The *bona fide* CLP -until now the most serious intent to decentralize at least the agenda-setting power- was controlled by the following ruling parties after 1965.

Evidently, this extreme concentration of power is an advantage that no party with chances to get the Presidency is willing to lose. It is in this sense that I affirm that the unreformed powers of the President support the Cartel Theory.

Regarding the partisan composition of the directing boards one fact tells it all: no candidate to any position of the directing board different from the one proposed or supported by the ruling party was ever elected in the Chamber during these fifty-five years.

The four criteria related to the partisan composition of the directing boards also support the predictions of the theory. The electoral reform of 1963 produced a substantial change: for the first time mixed (proportional) directing boards were elected. This fact credits the theory: in a Chamber of pluralities, pluralities chose the most beneficial distribution of those positions according to their interests. Outside the "Chamber of the proportionality rule" (1963-1966) that criterion was replaced by

she would vote against him and demanding the right to speak to the Chamber but Pierrri did not allow her to speak to the plenary during that session. Journal, 03.12.97.

patterns oriented to favor the ruling party. Furthermore, since 1989 the ruling party advantages the rest of the delegations in the directing board, *no matter which type of plurality rules the Chamber*. The opposition, however, is in those directing boards and this fact appears to disconfirm the theory. But consider that those bipartisan directing boards are the result of negotiations that gave ruling parties the lion's share of the authority positions (the Presidency and the First Vice-Presidency). Furthermore, the PJ, with the agreement of the UCR, clearly preferred to create a Vice-Presidency for the FREPASO (the VP₃) before losing its pre-eminence (concretely, before ceding the VP₁ to the Radicals). This is the same pattern that was found in the 1989 reform to the *Reglamento*: modify rules, alter the structure of the Chamber to keep advantages. This, again, is a cartel behavior.

In chapter II I mentioned that one of the predictions to test in this section was "*All motions entertained to remove the President or the directing board from office are rejected.*" The Argentine *Reglamento* has never regulated the removal procedure of the directing board and the journals of sessions register no debate about this subject matter from 1946 to 2001.¹⁰⁰ That is why this prediction is not tested in the Argentine case.

¹⁰⁰ The only record I found was a "confidence question" (an institution not regulated in the *Reglamento*) tabled by President Rodolfo J. Tercera del Franco (PJ) himself because one deputy had objected his decision regarding a question of privilege. Although deputies recognized that this procedure was not regulated in the *Reglamento*, they voted and dismissed the confidence question (Journal 21.07.65, pp. 1311/12).

Part III. Structuring the Committee System

When Cox and McCubbins presented the Cartel Theory, they had *against* them evidence showing that from the 1920s to the 1970s there had been a committee government in the U.S. House. Therefore, they made their case through the analyses of the incentives of party leaders, and parties as procedural and floor coalitions. My point of departure is different. Actually, I have to find out first of all whether there was a party or a committee government before the 1970s in the Argentine Chamber, and to evaluate if my results confirm what other authors have argued regarding the 1983-2001 term.

In this section I investigate the type of standing committee system prevalent in the Chamber from 1946 to 2001. Was it an autonomous committee system? Or, by contrast, were committees agents of the ruling party? Based on expectations from the Cartel Theory I look for ties between the ruling party and the organization of the standing committee system. To this end section 8 explains the expansion of the Chamber's standing committee system through the analysis of descriptive data. Then, section 9 deals with a systematic analysis of the committee assignment process.

Section 8. The Expansion of the Standing Committee System

Reviewing the studies on committee size manipulation in the U.S. Congress, Eulau (1984, 592) stated that “[p]olitical units are more likely to increase than decrease in size, and efforts to reduce their size are invariably offset by tendencies toward growth, as if growth were a law of nature.” If we were to find confirming evidence of

such a “law” of committee growth, a good place to start would be the standing committees of the Argentine Chamber. In this section I describe the relentless expansion of the standing committee system, and analyze if this process can be explained as an instrument of partisan control. Three “instruments of control” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 254) are examined: the creation of standing committees, the enlargement of committees’ memberships and leadership positions.

8.1 *The Creation of Standing Committees*

I consider the following expectations that suppose an influence of the ruling party over the committee system: 1- *The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties to occupy a place in the committee system;* 2- *Ruling parties control this process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees.* The description of the creation of standing committees can be followed in APPENDIX D.

From 1946 to 2001 the number of standing committees increased from 19 to 45, while the number of deputies went from 158 to 257. This expansion was *moderate* from 1946 to 1976, when 9 committees were created (and 2 committees were dissolved). During the period 1983-2001, by contrast, the committee system increased by 19 units; the 1990-1998 term experiencing the greatest expansion (14 committees).

- During the *moderate period* (1946-1976) the creation of (the 9) committees followed three patterns.

First, members of ruling parties authored all but one resolution tabled to create them.¹⁰¹ This means that ruling parties *controlled* the creation of committees.

That is why I will call this pattern the “controlled-creation pattern.” Note that 6 of the 9 resolutions were also signed by opposition parties.

Second, except for 3 committees (those created in the 1955 reform), the remaining 6 were the result of consensual decisions among parties which aimed at dealing with social problems (e.g., committees on Aboriginal Affairs and on Housing) or at matching the ministries of the Executive Power (e.g., Committee on Energy and Fuels).

Third, ruling parties chaired all these 9 new committees.

- From 1983 to 2001 the creation of (the 19) committees followed five patterns.

First, the “controlled-creation pattern” (opposition parties signed 10 of the 19 resolutions).

Second, committees were created in a record time (summary proceedings going from 12 days to a few hours, that is, the same day resolutions were tabled). Except for the controversial sittings of December 1987 and 1991, the approval of these resolutions on the floor was quick and smooth.¹⁰² The approval of the future new committees would be even easier. Since 1996 the resolutions were signed by members of the three main parties: the PJ, UCR, and FREPASO. I will call these summary and consensual proceedings the “fast-track pattern.”

¹⁰¹ The exception was the creation of the Committee on Tourism and Sports in 1973. The resolution was signed by UCR deputies (the opposition in this period).

¹⁰² In those sittings minor delegations vehemently criticized the procedure applied to Table the resolutions creating the committees and their jurisdictions -that superposed those of pre-existent committees. See Journals 21.12.87 and 19.12.91.

Third, 15 of the 19 new committees were approved “in groups” (two, three or four committees per sitting) during sessions which took place immediately after the Chamber’s biannual renewal.¹⁰³ I will call this the “renewal-negotiation period pattern.”

Fourth, regarding the justifications to the resolutions, a simple reading shows that they are poorly written and that they use similar phrases such as “the need to fill jurisdictional holes,” or the fact that “the Senate has already created this committee.” In other cases the *realpolitik* reasons (for instance, to carry out political deals about the distribution of Chamber positions) are explicitly stated by delegation leaders.¹⁰⁴

Fifth, despite electoral defeats and an “increasing number of delegations” (a phrase repeated to justify the expansion of the committee system) ruling parties, in particular the Peronists, kept for themselves most of the chairs of the new committees.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ See in APPENDIX D the creation of committees in the following sessions: May 1984, December 1987/1991/1993, and March 1998.

¹⁰⁴ I refer specially to the creation of the standing committees in 1987 and 1998. See resolution 2353-D-87 of delegation leader César Jaroslavsky (UCR), and the speech of Eduardo Camaño (PJ) in the session of March 11, 1998.

¹⁰⁵ During the period 1983/2001, 68% (13/19) of the chairs of new committees went to the ruling party. See APPENDIX D.

8.2 *The Enlargement of Committees' Memberships*

The representation of all delegations, as much as possible, is one concern of the committee assignment process. Ruling parties can decide to implement strictly the proportionality rule -obtaining committees that mirror their Chambers- or enlarge committees' memberships -to keep their (over)representation and, at the same time, give place to other parties in committees-. My prediction in this section is based on the latter strategy. Therefore, the expectation in this case is: *Although the enlargement of committees' memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, ruling parties control this process and maintain their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats.* The description of the enlargement of committees' memberships can be followed in APPENDIX D.

In the Chamber committees' membership is established in the *Reglamento*. During the period 1946-1976 committees were assigned a fixed number of deputies. Since 1983, minima and maxima have been established.

While the number of deputies increased by 63 percentage points (from 158 to 257), the majority of committees has almost tripled its membership, going from a mean of 9 members in 1946 to 26 in 2001. The committees whose membership has increased the most are Budget, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Affairs (i.e, the most important committees of the Chamber).¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ See the stratification of committees based on their size and the number of authority positions in APPENDIX D.

In this fifty-five-year period, the Chamber adopted 13 resolutions to increase committees' membership. From 1946 to 1961 almost all the resolutions received a consensual approval.¹⁰⁷ As to those tabled from 1963 to 2001 (8 in total), their passage was smoother and even more expedient than those that created committees. Moreover, these 8 resolutions were signed by leaders of the two largest delegations, and most of them also by leaders of the third and fourth delegations in Chamber. The justifications to these resolutions are all pretty the same (e.g., "to ensure the representation of all delegations"). From 1983 the approval of resolutions followed the "controlled-creation", "fast-track," and "renewal-negotiation period" patterns.

It is possible to relate the *increase in the number of deputies*, with the *share of committee seats* of the ruling party by legislative period, and the *date of the enlargement*. Data about the share of committee assignments accruing to the ruling party as compared to its share of seats between 1946 and 2001 is presented in Table 57 (section 9.4). The increase in the number of deputies and the date of the enlargement of committees' memberships can be found in APPENDIX D. Paying attention to these tables we can see that the increase in the number of deputies in 1955, 1963, and 1983 was followed by the enlargement of committees' memberships. In these years, the gap between the share of seats of the ruling party in Chamber and its share of committee assignments was not significant. I conclude that the enlargements were justified by the increase in the number of deputies, and that proportional committee assignments

¹⁰⁷ The exception is again the enlargement of committees' membership in 1955.

were made (by the way, no enlargement was approved in 1958 and 1973, when the Chamber increased the number of deputies to 187 and 243, respectively).

By contrast, the *three* consecutive enlargements of 1994, 1998, and 2000 followed *no* increase in the number of deputies and the above mentioned gap for the 1997-1999 and 1999-2001 periods *is* significant. Furthermore, the number of delegations decreased during these periods (see Tables 43 and 45 in chapter III). Therefore, ruling parties (PJ and ALIANZA) enlarged committees' memberships to secure their over-representation.

Two cases about committee enlargements are worth mentioning because they reveal the intention of the ruling party to maintain its prevalence in the committee system. The first was the 1960 enlargement. That year the UCRI ruling party decided that committees should have 2/3 of UCRI members. After a long and harsh discussion about the ratio to assign committee seats, the UCRI imposed its criterion and approved the (2/3) assignment. Nevertheless, a couple of days later the Chamber approved an enlargement (it was the only way for the UCRI to maintain its 2/3 in each committee and at the same time give to the second (UCRP) and minor parties a more *appropriate* representation in the committee system).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ As will be analyzed in more detail in Section 8.2, the *Reglamento* establishes that committee assignments will be made "to the fullest extent feasible" in proportion to the seats held by parties in the Chamber. I call this the "proportionality rule." In 1960 the UCRP (then the opposition) demanded a partisan ratio of 5 (ruling party):4 (opposition) -committees having 9 members then. The UCRI (the ruling party) claimed that the proportionality rule was inspired in the Sáenz Peña Law, that is, partisan ratio in committees should be 6:3. The UCRP argued that the Sáenz Peña Law had nothing to do with the appointments to committees and that rules were inspired in the PR system. A UCRI deputy said the problem was that while the membership of the Chamber had increased since 1955, the number of committees and their membership had remained the same. Hence, the solution was to increase the number of committees and their membership. Finally, both delegations authorized the Presidency to make the appointments, but only the UCRI delegation voted in favor of the Sáenz

The second case was the enlargement of the membership of the Committees on Labor and on Pensions in 1961. These two committees could not work because of the split of the ruling party (UCRI) in two factions. This increase was approved to maintain the 2/3 criterion altered by that division.

An obvious corollary to this expansion is that there are multiple assignments, which are not restricted by the *Reglamento*. Table 53 shows the sharp increase in multiple assignments Chamber since 1946. The mean number of assignments by deputy is 2.4 for the whole sample, going from 1.05 in 1948-1952 to 4.72 in 1999-2001.

Table 53 - THE GROWTH OF MULTIPLE ASSIGNMENTS THROUGH TIME - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislature	No. of Committees	No. of Assignments	Average No. of Assignments
1946-1948	19	149	0.97
1948-1952	20	164	1.05
1952-1955	20	162	1.05
1955	22	216	1.30
1958-1960	21	203	1.09
1960-1962	20	239	1.24
1963-1965	23	320	1.67
1965-1966	23	352	1.83
1973-1976	24	555	2.28
1983-1985	26	617	2.43
1985-1987	28	673	2.65
1987-1989	31	738	2.91
1989-1991	31	758	2.98
1991-1993	33	815	3.17
1993-1995	38	964	3.75
1995-1997	39	929	3.60
1997-1999	44	1,216	4.73
1999-2001	45	1,212	4.72
Total		7856,42	
Average	28.16	436	2.4

Peña criterion (Journal 11.05.60, pp. 45/138). One week later both delegations approved the enlargement of the membership of all standing committees (Journal 19.05.60, pp. 318/20).

8.3 *The Creation of Leadership Positions*

Besides multiple assignments and the increase in the number and size of committees, the 1946-2001 time-period has also witnessed the proliferation of committee leadership positions. The expectations to be tested in this case are: 1- *The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of committees;* 2- *Ruling parties control this process and keep the lions' share of the new committee leadership positions.*

Data about the creation of leadership positions in committees can be found in APPENDIX D.

While in 1946 committees had one Chair and one Secretary, in 2001 they had one Chair, two Vice-Chairs (I will refer to them as VC1 and VC2), and three Secretaries (important committees having four Secretaries). The proliferation of committee leadership positions began in 1963 with the creation of a Vice-Chair (VC1) for all committees, and had a peak in 1987 when a second Vice-Chair (VC2) and a second Secretary for all committees were approved.

The creation of leadership positions was included in the resolutions tabled to increase the number of committees or their membership. Therefore, the creation of these positions follows the already mentioned patterns ("controlled-creation", "fast track," and "renewal-negotiation period" patterns). According to these documents, the increase was needed to "improve the direction of committees" or "make more efficient the work in committees." These justifications are curious, most of all if we consider

that the *Reglamento* establishes no functions for Vice-Chairs and secretaries and that, in practice, they have no decisional power in committees.

Which parties benefited from the creation of these new positions? Tables 54, 55, and 56 show the assignment of CV1, CV2, and Secretaries by parties from 1963 to 2001. Two patterns can be established from the data presented there: ruling parties secure over-representation in VC2, leaving most of the VC1 to the second delegation in Chamber (1987-2001), and ruling parties get the lion's share of Secretaries (1963-2001).

Table 54 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE FIRST VICE-CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD AND OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2001

Legislative Period	First Vice-chairs								Total	T (%)
	Ruling Party	RP (%)	Second Party	SP (%)	Third Party	TP %	Other Parties	OP (%)		
1963-1965	4	23,5	3	17,6	3	17,6	7	41,2	17	100,0
1965-1966	9	39,1	9	39,1	2	8,7	3	13,0	23	100,0
1973-1976	10	45,5	10	45,5	1	4,5	1	4,5	22	100,0
1983-1985	13	50,0	11	42,3	2	7,7	0	0,0	26	100,0
1985-1987	14	50,0	10	35,7	1	3,6	3	10,7	28	100,0
1987-1989	13	41,9	15	48,4	1	3,2	2	6,5	31	100,0
1989-1991	7	23,3	23	76,7	0	0,0	0	0,0	30	100,0
1991-1993	7	21,2	26	78,8	0	0,0	0	0,0	33	100,0
1993-1995	9	23,7	29	76,3	0	0,0	0	0,0	38	100,0
1995-1997	10	27,0	26	70,3	1	2,7	0	0,0	37	100,0
1997-1999	17	38,6	15	34,1	7	15,9	5	11,4	44	100,0
1999-2001	12	28,6	27	64,3	2	4,8	1	2,4	42	100,0

N=371

Note: The number of vice-chairs in the column "Total" may not coincide with the legal number of vice-chairs according to the *Reglamento*. The reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the *Composition of the Chamber and Committees' Memberships* ("Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones").

From 1963 to 1987 the distribution of VC1 between ruling and second parties was mostly equivalent (Table 54). The situation changed markedly with the introduction of the VC2 in 1987. That year second parties began to increase their presence in the VC1

(securing more than 60% until 2001).¹⁰⁹ We can see also that there was a distribution of VC1 between the parties of the ALIANZA (UCR and FREPASO) in 1997 (see “second party” and “third party” columns) and that despite losing its majority Peronists secured 39% of the VC1.

It may be clear by now that ruling parties in the Argentine lower Chamber rarely give positions to the opposition *freely*. Take a look at Tables 56 and 57. VC2 *belong* to ruling parties (they have secured more than 2/3 of these positions since 1989). They had over-representation (1973 to 1985), and the plurality (1963-1966/1987-2001) in the case of Secretaries (Table 34).

Table 55 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE SECOND VICE-CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD AND OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1987-2001

Legislative Period	Second Vice-chairs							Total	T (%)	
	Ruling Party	RP %	Second Party	SP %	Third Party	TP %	Other Parties			
1987-1989	17	54,8	8	25,8	2	6,5	4	12,9	31	100,0
1989-1991	22	71,0	4	12,9	2	6,5	3	9,7	31	100,0
1991-1993	23	71,9	4	12,5	3	9,4	2	6,3	32	100,0
1993-1995	30	81,1	3	8,1	0	0,0	4	10,8	37	100,0
1995-1997	35	97,2	1	2,8	0	0,0	0	0,0	36	100,0
1997-1999	34	79,1	3	7,0	4	9,3	2	4,7	43	100,0
1999-2001	31	79,5	4	10,3	3	7,7	1	2,6	39	100,0

N=249

Note: The number of vice-chairs in the column “Total” may not coincide with the legal number of vice-chairs according to the *Reglamento*. The reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the *Composition of the Chamber and Committees’ Memberships* (“Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones”).

¹⁰⁹ There were two exceptions. The first was in 1987 when the PJ held 48.4% of the VC1, and in 1997 when the ALIANZA secured 50% of the same position.

Table 56 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIES BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD PARTIES AND OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2001

Legislative Period	Secretaries								Total	T (%)
	Ruling Party	RP (%)	Second Party	SP (%)	Third Party	TP %	Other Parties	OP (%)		
1963-1965	10	43,5	4	17,4	2	8,7	7	30,4	23	100,0
1965-1966	7	31,8	5	22,7	2	9,1	8	36,4	22	100,0
1973-1976	23	100,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	0	0,0	23	100,0
1983-1985	17	65,4	9	34,6	0	0,0	0	0,0	26	100,0
1985-1987	16	61,5	5	19,2	2	7,7	3	11,5	26	100,0
1987-1989	28	47,5	22	37,3	2	3,4	7	11,9	59	100,0
1989-1991	27	49,1	18	32,7	4	7,3	6	10,9	55	100,0
1991-1993	26	41,3	20	31,7	4	6,3	13	20,6	63	100,0
1993-1995	30	40,5	23	31,1	4	5,4	17	23,0	74	100,0
1995-1997	30	45,5	18	27,3	1	1,5	17	25,8	66	100,0
1997-1999	33	35,9	24	26,1	15	16,3	20	21,7	92	100,0
1999-2001	51	45,5	34	30,4	9	8,0	18	16,1	112	100,0

N=641

Note: The number of secretaries in the column "Total" may not coincide with the legal number of secretaries according to the *Reglamento*. The reason is that some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the *Composition of the Chamber and Committees' Memberships* ("Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones").

To recapitulate, the descriptive data portrayed in sections 8.1 to 8.3 partially support the theory. The influence of ruling parties in the creation of committees began in the 1980s, it is limited to four cases in relation to the enlargement of memberships and to different periods and positions in the case of leadership positions. Pluralities made the most important changes regarding the enlargement of leadership positions, a process that started after the introduction of the PR (1963). The type or majority or plurality and the change of electoral system do not seem to influence the enlargement of committees' memberships.

Regarding the creation of committees a distinction must be made. In the *moderate* period (1946-1976), only the second prediction is supported (*Ruling parties control this process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees*). Ruling parties controlled the process and monopolized its Chairs, but the creation of committees was due to the need for matching the ministries or dealing with social problems. Therefore, the first

prediction is disconfirmed (*The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties to occupy a place in the committee system*).

The situation in the 1983-2001 period is different because both predictions are confirmed. Ruling parties authored all resolutions and secured 68 % of the new Chairs. But more can be said. The creation of committees was summary and consensual (the agreement between ruling parties and the main opposition parties is omnipresent). The “need for matching the structure of ministries” as a justification was abandoned (it is difficult to justify on these grounds the creation of 19 committees, furthermore when the Chamber already had 26 committees and the Executive Power never had more than 15 ministries). Pitiful justifications led way to the explicit mention of *realpolitik* reasons. In addition, 80% of the committees were created “in groups” after the renewal of the Chamber. In other words, during the period *all the benefits of the Chamber are distributed*.

In the case of the enlargement of committees’ memberships, the theory is partially confirmed. Even though ruling parties controlled the process during the whole period, I only proved that ruling parties *maintained their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats* after the enlargement twice during the 1960s and twice at the end of the 1990s. The rest of the cases does not support the prediction.

Finally, ruling parties, based again on paltry justifications and with the ample support of opposition parties, commanded the proliferation of inutile committee leadership positions but did not get the lion's share of *all* the new positions.

Two years are important in this process: 1963 (creation of the VC1), and 1987 (creation of VC2 and a second Secretary). In both cases, pluralities needed to respond to the demands of the parties of the opposition (the 1963 was the "Chamber of the proportionality rule"; the 1987 was the Chamber of the mid-term elections in which Radicals were defeated and Peronists managed to get the VP1).

The over-representation of ruling parties is clear since 1973 in the case of secretaries (after 1985 there was a decline) and since 1989 for VC2. The distribution of VC1 was mostly equivalent until 1987. After that year it benefited the second party in Chamber. In simpler terms, in 1987 the UCR and the PJ decided not only that three new committees would be created, but also that the second delegation would be permanently represented in the committee system through the VC1. Once this position was granted to the second delegation, the ruling party secured over-representation in VC2 and the position of first plurality in the case of secretaries.

Section 9. Committee Assignments

The study of committee assignments is central to test the influence of ruling parties in legislatures. In this section I provide a detailed description of rules and practices on assignments in the Chamber. Then I introduce the predictions and outline the methodological approach I apply to the analysis of the allocation of committee seats. Finally, I present the results and conclusions regarding each aspect considered.

9.1 *The Committee Assignment Process: Rules and Practices*

In order to understand the committee assignment process, it is necessary to distinguish between rules and practices. According to the *Reglamento*, every two years, following the Chamber's partial renewal, the Chamber decides if the allocation of committee seats will be made "by the Chamber itself", or by "its President" (rule 29). Committee assignments will be made "to the fullest extent feasible" in proportion to the seats held by parties in the Chamber (rule 105). As mentioned, this is the "proportionality rule." Rule 106 states that once committee assignments are made, each committee will elect its authorities (plurality of votes is required).

In spite of several reforms to the *Reglamento* these three rules were never modified.¹¹⁰

In addition, these are the *only* rules related to the assignment process. Differing from other congresses, in the Chamber there are no initial freshman committee assignment requests or non-freshman transfer requests. There is neither a committee on committees devoted to prepare the assignment slate for each party, nor delegations or floor approval of those committee nominations.¹¹¹

The eighteen preparatory sessions and the debates about committee assignments that took place between 1946 and 2001 show three features of this process: a) presidents have *always* been entitled by the Chamber to allocate committee seats (I call this the "first phase of the process"); b) once the Chamber delegates the allocation of committee seats to the President, the process is in her hands (I call this the second

¹¹⁰ Rule 106 was modified in terms of the number of leadership positions, but not regarding the procedure to elect them. The proportionality rule was introduced in the general reform to the *Reglamento* of 1941.

¹¹¹ Sometimes deputies declare themselves interested in particular committees in delegation meetings, through memos addressed to the delegation leader or to the President. As any document addressed to the Presidency of the Chamber, the latter rare requests are published in the "Boletín de Asuntos Entrados." There is no official record of the former.

phase of the process); c) the authorization the Chamber gives to the President to make the assignments *implies* consultation with delegation leaders.

Regarding this second, non-regulated phase of the committee assignment process Jones *et al.* (2002, 660) explain that the President “decides, in consultation with the party delegation leaders, which committee leadership positions (President, Vice-President, Secretary) correspond to which parties. Once this allocation is decided, each party’s leadership distributes its committee assignments.” The analysis of the aforementioned debates allows me to make five observations to the process.

First, consultation is discretionary. It depends on who sits in the President’s chair. In 1952 a UCR deputy addressed the President and claimed: “it is understood that this authorization [of the President to assign committee positions] implies a consultation with the delegations.” The President (Héctor J. Cámpora - PJ) answered that this consultation was “a simple parliamentary practice [...], if it were an imposed condition, this would mean a limitation to the authorization the Chamber gives to the Presidency.”¹¹²

Second, there is no agreement on the subject matter of consultation. For instance, while in 1960 the Chamber debated the ratio implied in the proportionality rule (see section 8.1), in 1961 a deputy explained that consultations were meant to name the specific deputies proposed in each committee,¹¹³ and in 1987 the President openly

¹¹² Journal 05.05.52, p. 57.

¹¹³ Journal 15.06.61, p. 961.

denied having the responsibility to allocate committee leadership positions explaining that this was not part of the consultations.¹¹⁴

Third, although all delegation leaders are supposed to be consulted, the practice shows that most of them are *completely unaware* of the negotiations.

Fourth, negotiations about the leadership positions on committees are entangled with negotiations regarding the Vice-Presidencies of the Chamber. Usually delegation leaders from minor parties denounce and lament these agreements during the preparatory sessions.¹¹⁵

Fifth, negotiations sometimes take more time than expected. Although committees are supposed to be appointed before the opening of ordinary sessions, it is not unusual for committees to be appointed two or three months after that date.

In short, the committee assignment process in the Chamber has the following features: a) the *Reglamento* establishes who can make the assignments and the criterion to follow to allocate seats; b) the practice shows that Presidents are always delegated the task by the Chamber, and that they decide the allocation through informal consultations with party leaders; c) what is consulted and what exactly Presidents decide is not uniform from one legislative period to another; c) it does not

¹¹⁴ In 1987 the problem was the number of authorities the PJ would get in committees. The PJ delegation leader José L. Manzano asked for a special session to make the appointments. President Juan C. Pugliese (UCR) explained that the Presidency had nothing to do with the appointment of committee authorities, that that was an issue that each committee should arrange. Manzano said that "the PJ could not delegate committee appointments." Federico T. Storani (UCR) motioned to respect the traditional procedure. Manzano tried to respond but he was denied the right to speak and the President closed the debate (Journal 27.11.87, pp. 4354/56).

¹¹⁵ See the preparatory sessions in Journals 27.11.87, pp. 4345/54 and 29.11.89, pp. 5648/56, and in the official records of debates available online at <http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html>: 03.12.97 and 01.12.99.

ensure the participation of all delegation leaders; and d) it is part of a broader negotiation that includes other positions in the Chamber.

Let's now turn to theories to examine the patterns of committee assignments that emerge empirically.

9.2 Predictions

Considering the characteristics of the Chamber as well as evidence from previous research, I expect party-centered theories to be particularly relevant for the examination of the Chamber committee assignments.¹¹⁶ I follow in this section the steps taken by Cox and McCubbins in *Legislative Leviathan* (1993) to evaluate the use of assignments as an instrument of partisan control.

Therefore, I consider two factors that may limit the influence of party leaders: seniority and apprenticeship norms. As mentioned in chapter II, the former refers to committee-specific seniority and implies that the committee member of the majority (ruling) party with the longest continuous service on the committee becomes Chair (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The latter suggests that committee appointments "*operate under an apprenticeship norm that guarantees mediocre assignments to incoming members*" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 42). As will be discussed below, I consider in this study committee-specific seniority, but also the impact of chamber seniority (i.e., total service in Chamber) more generally.

¹¹⁶ Jones et al. (2002) have demonstrated the inapplicability of the distributional and informational theories to the Argentine system (1983-1997 period), and Jones and Hwang (2005) demonstrated the general applicability of the Cartel Theory to the Chamber by examining deputy behavior through roll-call vote analysis (1989-2003 period).

Of course, I also investigate “whether partisan criteria enter the assignment process” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 163) testing four predictions. The first three are related to the Cartel Theory, and the fourth to the margin hypothesis of Young and Heitshusen (2003).¹¹⁷

Following this order I test: 1) whether *party ratios in standing committees are consistently set in ruling parties’ favor*; 2) the extent to which *ruling parties have super-proportional share of seats in important committees*; 3) the extent to which *ruling parties have super-proportional share of authority positions (chairmanships) in committees*; and 4) if *pluralities and regular majorities exercise (in proportion) greater control of the standing committees’ composition than qualified or exceptional majorities do*.

In brief, while considering the extent to which seniority and apprenticeship norms matter in committee assignments, I test predictions stemming from the party-centered literature. First, the cartel hypothesis that predicts super-proportions of ruling-party members in the standing committees’ composition, in important committees, and in authority positions. Second, the margin hypothesis that states that cartel-behavior tendencies are enhanced when the ruling party has won by slight margins.

¹¹⁷ As explained in chapter II Young and Heitshusen (2003) argue that majority-party incentives to influence committee composition vary by party margins. In this sense, pluralities and regular majorities will exercise (in proportion) greater control of the standing committees’ composition than qualified or exceptional majorities do because they face more difficulties in overcoming the opposition delegation’s obstructive tendencies.

9.3 *Methodology*

In the empirical section that follows (9.4 Results), I start with descriptive data at the aggregate (legislature) level. Then I move to the analysis of committee assignments at the deputy level. I also examine sub-samples to compare the determinants of committee assignments under different electoral rules. Finally, I switch the level of analysis to individual assignments, in order to test for the influence of committee-specific seniority on chairmanship.

The *dependent variable* is the weighted sum of committee assignments of each deputy. Using a weighted sum allows me to examine the power held by a deputy in terms of assignments to more or less important committees and in terms of the leadership positions held within those committees, not just the count of her assignments.

To construct the weighted sum of assignments I first classify the standing committees according to their importance. As explained above, I could not compute a transfers-based stratification of committees because there are no committee-transfer requests in the Chamber.

Instead, based on knowledge of the Argentine Chamber's functioning, I scale committees according to objective measures: a) the timing of the increase in size of each committee, b) the timing of the increase in the count of Vice-Chairs and secretaries within each committee, and c) the longevity of each committee. These three criteria come from the reforms to the *Reglamento* approved by deputies.

Committees that were first increased in size by the successive reforms to the *Reglamento* were given a score from 1 (latest increase in size) to 6 (earliest increase in size).¹¹⁸ A similar codification is used for the timing of increases in the official number of Vice-Chairs and Secretaries, again from 1 to 6 (1 representing a less important committee). Finally, I computed the longevity of committees as the count of legislatures during which a committee existed, and rescaled this measure from 1 to 6, 1 meaning youngest committees (older committees are assumed more relevant than newer ones). The average score on those three measures gives the committee importance score. APPENDIX E shows the results of this classification.

The position held within a committee (regular member, Secretary, Vice-Chair, Chair) is then used to create an ordinal ranking (from 1 to 4, respectively). Finally, multiplying the committee importance score and the position held within that committee before summing multiple assignments gives the total amount of power a deputy holds in committees.

To test my main hypotheses, I predict deputies' weighted sum of assignments using the following set of variables:

Ruling Party: The ruling status of the party to which a deputy belongs (coded 1 for deputies from ruling parties and 0 for all other parties);

Seniority: Either a freshman dummy that equals one if the deputy *i* is appointed to committees for the first time (to test for apprenticeship norm) or the count of four-

¹¹⁸ There were 6 common patterns of timing for increase of committee size, explaining that values range from 1 to 6.

year terms of the deputy i (both measures cannot be included at the same time due to collinearity);

Cumulation: The total number of assignments of a deputy, thus netting out the “importance” component of her assignments predicted by the other variables;

Chamber Position: A control variable that measures whether the deputy holds an authority position in the Chamber (i.e., President or Vice-president of the Chamber);

Group Position: A control variable that measures whether the deputy holds an authority position in her delegation;

Legislature Dummies: control variables correcting for the temporal increase in the number of committees;

Regions: Dummy variables (the region of Argentina to which the deputy belongs), to be tested against the base of the Capital region.

A significant and positive coefficient estimate for the *Ruling Party* variable would give support to the cartel hypothesis, since it implies that ruling-party members have more than a proportional share of assignments in committees, all else being equal.

Seniority variables allow testing for apprenticeship and seniority norms.

I also replace the *Ruling Party* indicator with five subtypes of ruling-party variables: regular pluralities, exceptional pluralities, regular majorities, exceptional majorities, and qualified majorities. Such sub-types variables are used to test the margin hypothesis. If this hypothesis is correct, then deputies from smaller ruling parties (e.g.,

regular and exceptional pluralities) would garner more power in committees than deputies from majority ruling parties. In the last part of the empirical section, I replace the seniority-in-Chamber measures with committee-specific seniority for a more robust test of the seniority norms hypotheses. Instead of considering legislators as units of analysis, I then focus on assignments, so that committee-specific seniority can be matched to the corresponding assignments.

Unfortunately, I lack information on the background of deputies (such as prior occupation). If professional background is expected to predict the share of power in committees, I may face an omitted variable bias. This is true especially if the omitted variable is not orthogonal to my main independent variables (Kennedy 2008, 93) – seniority and party attachment. Yet, I found no reason to expect a strong correlation between the missing variable (professional background) and seniority in Chamber. Likewise, I do not expect the omitted variable to be correlated with the party in power. As such, I believe the resulting specification bias should not be severe.

9.4 Results

- Ruling-Party Shares in Chamber and Committees-

The descriptive statistics for my main covariates are presented in APPENDIX E. A quick look at these results shows that the average deputy scores about 11 points in the weighted sum of committee assignments, my dependent variable. The most powerful deputy garnered above 40 points on that scale, while a few deputies did not secure a single assignment to committees. A clear majority of deputies (about 79%) in the sample are in their first legislative term. This fact confirms for the term 1946-2001

the idea of “amateur legislators” stressed by Jones *et al.* (2002) for the period 1983-1997.

A preliminary test of the cartel hypothesis consists of comparing the shares of seats of ruling parties with their shares of committee assignments across time. Table 57 presents the share of committee assignments accruing to the ruling party as compared to its share of seats between 1946 and 2001. The last column shows the difference between the two shares in percentage points. I also performed tests to examine whether the percentage-point difference between the two shares is statistically significant.

Table 57 - SHARE OF SEATS AND SHARE OF ASSIGNMENTS RULING PARTY AND TYPE OF MAJORITY-PLURALITY/SINGLE PARTY-COALITION - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislative Period	Share of Seats	Majority-Plurality/ Single Party-Coalition	Share of Committee Assignments	Gap
1946-1948	69.62	Majority Coalition	67.79	-1.83
1948-1952	70.89	Single-Party Majority	68.90	-1.99
1952-1955	91.25	Single-Party Majority	87.04	-4.21
1955	92.77	Single-Party Majority	89.35	-3.42
1958-1960	71.12	Single-Party Majority	68.47	-2.65
1960-1962	58.33	Single-Party Majority	64.44	6.11
1963-1965	37.50	Single-Party Plurality	38.13	0.63
1965-1966	35.94	Single-Party Plurality	36.08	0.14
1973-1976	60.08	Majority Coalition	54.95	-5.13
1983-1985	50.79	Single-Party Majority	53.97	3.18
1985-1987	50.79	Single-Party Majority	52.75	1.96
1987-1989	44.49	Single-Party Plurality	47.02	2.53
1989-1991	47.64	Single-Party Plurality	49.87	2.23
1991-1993	45.53	Single-Party Plurality	50.67	5.14
1993-1995	49.81	Single-Party Plurality	52.28	2.47
1995-1997	50.97	Single-Party Majority	55.30	4.33
1997-1999	46.30	Single-Party Plurality	52.06	5.76*
1999-2001	45.91	Plurality Coalition	52.31	6.40*

Note: The shares are those of the ruling party in the Chamber.
Significance testing: Two-sample proportion tests (one-tailed); * = $p < 0.05$

At first glance, representation seems fair. For the first five legislatures opposition parties even managed to secure modest over-representation in committee assignments, though this disproportionality is non-significant. Only in later periods do ruling parties tend to have over-proportional shares of assignments, but only slightly so (only for the last two legislatures was the gap statistically significant).

It is interesting to highlight that the most important over-representations belong to ruling pluralities, not to qualified majorities (although the latter register shares of committee assignments superior to 65%). As to the period 1960-1962, note the gap coincides with what was explained in a previous section about the interpretation of the proportionality rule made by the UCRI delegation in 1960 (that year the UCRI ruling party decided that committees should have $\frac{2}{3}$ of UCRI members - see section 8.2).

The portrait is transformed, however, as soon as I consider the importance of assignments. Table 58 shows the assignment of committee chairs from 1946 to 2001.

While during the Sáenz Peña Law (1946-1962) ruling parties monopolized committee Chairs, from 1963 they secured over-representation in every legislative period. During the whole period they secured 387 (77%) of a total of 502 Chairs.

Even in the "Chamber of the proportionality rule" (1963-1966), the percentage of Chairs secured by the feeble UCRP ruling plurality is higher than its share of seats in Chamber. Paying attention to the gaps of pluralities of the 1980s and 1990s we can see that the PJ (1989-1991/1991-1993) and the ALIANZA (1999-2001) behaved as cartels. In

particular, I want to highlight the fact that the gap of the *PJ plurality of 1989-1991* is *higher* than the gap of the *PJ majority of the 1995-1997* period.

Table 58 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRS BY RULING, SECOND, THIRD, AND OTHER PARTIES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Legislative Period	Share of Seats Ruling Party/Coalition (1)	CHAIRS							Total	Gap (%) (2 - 1)
		Ruling Party	RP (%) (2)	Second Party	SP (%)	Third Party	Other Parties	OP (%)		
1946-1948	69.6	18	100.0	0	0,0	0	0	0,0	18	30.4
1948-1952	70.9	20	100.0	0	0,0	0	0	0,0	20	29.1
1952-1955	91.3	19	100.0	0	0,0	-	-	-	19	8.7
1955	92.8	22	100.0	0	0,0	-	-	-	22	7.2
1958-1960	71.1	21	100.0	0	0,0	0	-	-	21	28.9
1960-1962	58.3	20	100.0	0	0,0	0	-	-	20	41.7
1963-1965	37.5	11	47.8	4	17.4	2	6	26,1	23	10.3
1965-1966	35.9	10	43.5	8	34.8	2	3	13,0	23	7.6
1973-1976	60.1	21	87.5	3	12.5	0	0	0,0	24	27.4
1983-1985	50.8	19	73.1	7	26.9	0	0	0,0	26	22.3
1985-1987	50.8	20	76.9	3	11.5	2	1	3,8	26	26.1
1987-1989	44.5	17	54.8	12	38.7	1	1	3,2	31	10.3
1989-1991	47.6	24	80	5	16.7	1	0	0,0	30	32.4
1991-1993	45.5	26	78.8	6	18.2	1	0	0,0	33	33.3
1993-1995	49.8	29	76.3	8	21.1	1	0	0,0	38	26.5
1995-1997	51.0	31	79.5	7	17.9	1	0	0,0	39	28.5
1997-1999	46.3	26	59.1	9	20.5	5	4	9,1	44	12.8
1999-2001	45.9	33	73.3	10	22.2	1	1	2,2	45	27.4
Total		387	77,1	82	21.5	13,3	16	3,1	502	

N=502

Note: The number of committees chairs in the column "Total" may not coincide with the legal number of committee chairs. The reason is that in general some positions are vacant at the time of the publication of the booklets the *Composition of the Chamber and Committees' Memberships* ("Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones").

This fact confirms the terms of the bargain between the PJ and the UCR in 1989: the Presidency for the PJ before the November renewal and *a larger share of chairmanships in all committees* in exchange of two new positions for the UCR (see section 4). In addition, note that the highest gap (33.3%) belongs to the legislative period 1991-1993 in which the PJ registered its lowest share of seats.

Table 59 shows the shares of chairmanships secured by ruling parties during the whole period in four of the most important committees. More than 94% of those positions were held by ruling parties. In fact, all the chairs from the Budget and the Foreign Affairs committees were controlled by ruling parties.

Table 59 - DISTRIBUTION OF CHAIRS IN SOME IMPORTANT COMMITTEES - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

Committee	Ruling Party	Opposition
Constitutional Affairs	16	2
Budget	18	0
Foreign Affairs	18	0
Education	15	2
Total	94.4%	5.6%

Note: The Chair of the Committee on Education was vacant during one legislature.

Thus, when weighting for the importance of assignments, these figures offer initial support for the cartel hypothesis. Ruling parties managed to assign their members to committee Chairs and also in authority positions inside those committees most important to Argentine legislators. To further explore this assertion, I turn to a more systematic examination of this relationship.

-Determinants of Committee Assignments at the Deputy Level-

Table 60 shows the results of models predicting the weighted sum of assignments in committees at the deputy level. Let me first consider whether deputies from ruling parties secure more power in committees as compared to other deputies, and whether this advantage lies within the bounds of statistical significance.

Table 6o - PREDICTING WEIGHTED COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1946-2001 (OLS)

Variables	Freshman Model	Seniority Model
Ruling Party	1.943 *** (0.187)	1.991 *** (0.188)
Freshman	-1.629 *** (0.199)	
Chamber Seniority		0.632 *** (0.153)
Group Position	-2.54 *** (0.342)	-2.459 *** (0.346)
Chamber Position	-6.245 *** (0.733)	-6.174 *** (0.740)
Cumulation	0.477 *** (0.077)	0.482 *** (0.077)
Buenos Aires (Province)	-0.923 ** (0.294)	-0.911 ** (0.296)
Centro	-0.714 * (0.314)	-0.719 * (0.317)
Litoral	-1.032 ** (0.373)	-1.044 ** (0.376)
Norte	-1.626 *** (0.324)	-1.618 *** (0.327)
Cuyo	-0.524 (0.377)	-0.514 (0.380)
Sur	-1.462 *** (0.410)	-1.491 *** (0.414)
Constant	5.915 *** (0.532)	3.679 *** (0.537)
R2	0.38	0.37
N	3945	3945

Note: The dependent variable is the weighted sum of committee assignments. Legislature dummies are included in the regression (to control for the increase in the total number of committees over time), although the estimates are not shown.
*** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$

As the positive coefficient associated with the ruling-party variable indicates, all else being equal, members of the ruling party have surplus power in committees. In other words, ruling parties in the Argentine Chamber tend to have the upper hand in the strategic composition of committees, assigning super-proportions of their own deputies to important positions. The mean across the sample for total committee

power is 10.9 units. If the deputy belongs to the ruling party, she may expect to have about 2 more units than the average opposition deputy (Column 2, Table 60).

Second, we may also test whether apprenticeship and seniority norms exist in the Chamber and compare the relative importance of such norms with the evidence of party dominance. We can see that the freshman variable's estimate is negatively and significantly related to the power one deputy holds in committees (Column 1, Table 60). In other words, freshmen typically are assigned to less relevant positions than seniors. In other words, the apprenticeship norm matters about as much as party dominance.

I also performed a mean comparison test of the power in committees of freshmen and seniors of the ruling party and the opposition (actual data) that turn out significant. While the mean power of freshmen of the ruling party is 9.6, that of the freshmen of the opposition is 9.4. In the case of seniors, the mean of those from the ruling-party is 13 and that of the seniors of the opposition is 11.6.

As the "*apprenticeship*" norm states, mediocre assignments are guaranteed to incoming members. However, there is a tiny difference in favor of freshmen of the ruling party. There is also a slight difference in favor of *seniors* of the ruling party.

In addition, following my model of Table 60 I predicted the value of the dependent variables after changing the values of the Freshman and Ruling Party variables. I kept all the other variables at the observed values. Results are shown in Table 61.

Table 61 - PREDICTED VALUES - POWER IN COMMITTEES SENIORS & FRESHMEN OF THE RULING PARTY/OPPOSITION – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2001

Ruling Party-Opposition/Seniors-Freshmen	Predicted Values
Opposition Seniors	10,677
Opposition Freshmen	9,048
Ruling Party Seniors	12,620
Ruling Party Freshmen	10,991

On average, freshmen of the ruling party have more power than those of the opposition. Besides, the former have a little more power than *seniors* of the *opposition*. Using the seniority-in-Chamber variable (Column 2, Table 60) we find a similar pattern for the seniority-in-Chamber norm. Legislators are more likely to get higher status in committees if they have more experience in the Chamber. Yet, the magnitude of the seniority effect (for one additional term in the chamber) is slightly lower than that of the ruling party.

The mean comparison test and the predicted values of Table 61 also show that seniority is a criterion to consider assignments, but the best combination still is be a *senior* in the *ruling party*. Most importantly, recall that very few deputies in Argentina are seniors. Indeed, the mode of the count of legislative terms over the whole time-period is 1: 79% of deputies are at their first four-year term. Only 5% of all the deputies between 1946 and 2001 were in office for more than two four-year terms. Even though seniors benefited from their status, they represent a small minority in the Chamber.

It can also be seen from the results that deputies from most regions are typically disadvantaged as compared to those from the reference region: the Capital. As the name indicates, this region comprises deputies from the capital of Argentina, the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (not to be confused with the province of Buenos Aires). Note that were the weighted committee assignments perfectly proportional to

the regional composition of the Chamber, regional dummies' coefficient estimates should all remain zeros.

The "Group Position" and "Chamber Position" variables are mere controls. Their negative coefficients simply mean that when deputies already occupy a leadership position within their delegation or within the Chamber, then they typically have less power in committees, all else equal. As for the cumulation variable, as explained above, it is the count of assignments, thus netting out the impact of the other explanatory variables on the importance of each deputy's assignments.

Summarizing, committee assignments have been proportional during the period. This fact does not support the theory. By contrast, ruling party members were assigned to important committees, and occupied 77% of the Chairs from 1946 to 2001. Seniority and apprenticeship norms influence assignments, but they are not the criteria that define them. At this point, it is tempting to conclude that ruling-party dominance is at least partially supported by the data. However, observing the whole period 1946-2001 may disguise important differences across time. For example, under PR (that is, from 1963 on), ruling parties tended to have slighter margins of victory. The cartel-like behavior may not be identical depending on margins of victory, as is predicted by the margin hypothesis. This is why I turn now to the analysis of the margin hypothesis.

-The Impact of the Electoral System and the Margin Hypothesis-

The margin hypothesis states that smaller shares of victories induce governments to exhibit even higher super-proportions in committees as compared to larger governments. Small shares of victories became frequent in Argentina after the introduction of PR in 1963, yielding suitable data to test this hypothesis. Using dummies for five main ruling-party types and opposition, I can test whether small governments (pluralities) typically exhibit a different behavior than large governments (majorities).

In the first column of Table 62, I compare the coefficient estimates of the five ruling-party subtypes against the reference of all opposition deputies. Observing the estimates for those five ruling type variables, I find a pattern consistent with the margin hypothesis. The advantage of deputies from small ruling parties (regular and exceptional pluralities) is slightly higher than that of deputies from majorities, although the relationship is not clearly linear (the qualified majorities' coefficient is larger than that of other majority types).

However, a stricter test consists of measuring the significance of the differences between the estimates of ruling-party type variables. I first performed 10 tests, one for each possible pairing of ruling-party type estimates, to see whether those estimates are equal. In all cases, the results indicate that I cannot reject the null hypothesis (results not shown). To illustrate this, I rerun the regression in the second column of Table 62, this time using qualified majorities as the reference category.

Table 62 - TEST OF THE MARGIN HYPOTHESIS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001 (OLS)

Variables	Opposition as Reference	Qualified Majorities as Reference
Regular Plurality	2.027 *** (0.330)	0.082 (0.588)
Exceptional Plurality	2.288 *** (0.402)	0.344 (0.629)
Regular Majority	1.924 *** (0.399)	-0.020 (0.628)
Exceptional Majority	1.565 ** (0.535)	-0.380 (0.720)
Qualified Majority	1.945 *** (0.485)	
Opposition		-1.945 *** (0.485)
Chamber Seniority	0.630 *** (0.154)	0.630 *** (0.154)
Group Position	-2.445 *** (0.347)	-2.445 *** (0.347)
Chamber Position	-6.153 *** (0.741)	-6.153 *** (0.741)
Cumulation	0.475 *** (0.078)	0.475 *** (0.078)
Buenos Aires (Province)	-0.916 ** (0.296)	-0.916 ** (0.296)
Centro	-0.721 * (0.317)	-0.721 * (0.317)
Litoral	-1.048 ** (0.376)	-1.048 ** (0.376)
Norte	-1.616 *** (0.327)	-1.616 *** (0.327)
Cuyo	-0.518 (0.380)	-0.518 (0.380)
Sur	-1.490 *** (0.414)	-1.490 *** (0.414)
Constant	3.722 *** (0.627)	5.667 *** (0.543)
R ²	0.37	0.37
N	3945	3945

Note: The dependent variable is the weighted sum of committee assignments. Legislature dummies are included in the regression (to control for the increase in the total number of committees over time), although the estimates are not shown.

*** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$

It can be seen that other ruling-party types are not significantly different from qualified majorities. Therefore, the margin hypothesis is not supported by the data: there is no significant difference in the effects of margins of victory, all types of ruling parties exhibiting an equally over-proportional control of committee assignments.

From these results, it appears that the electoral system reform in Argentina has not affected committee assignment patterns. Certainly, PR has spawned different types of ruling parties compared to majority systems, but ruling parties had a similar tendency to produce super-proportions in important committee positions over the whole time-period.

-Committee-Specific Seniority-

I found some evidence of a seniority-in-Chamber norm, even though it remains a marginal status in Argentina. Yet, I still have to consider committee-specific seniority and not just seniority in Chamber. More specifically, if the former exists, it should explain chairmanships' assignments to committees within the ruling party. I test this hypothesis by replacing the previous measures of seniority in Chamber with committee-specific seniority (i.e., the number of terms a deputy has previously been appointed to a committee). Since I need to match committee-specific experience to the relevant committee, I change the level of analysis and consider the pool of assignments that took place during the time-period (I exclude the first legislature, 1946-1948, since committee-specific data are not available prior to 1946). The dependent variable is now binomial. I code 1 the assignments as Chairs and 0 all other assignments. In other words, I am asking, over the pool of all assignments, *which factors are more likely to lead to a Chair assignment compared to other positions?*

Besides the use of committee-specific seniority, the set of explanatory variables is similar as before but for two exceptions. First, authority positions in the Chamber (i.e., Presidents or Vice-Presidents of the Chamber) lead to perfect failure predictions: no

deputy holding a position of President or VP in the Chamber ever became Chair of a committee. These 69 cases were dropped. Second, I have rescaled all independent variables between 0 and 1, so that coefficient estimates may be compared in size even if I use a logit regression.

Table 63 presents the results. Note that because of rescaling, estimates are comparable in size. Without including an interactive term between the ruling party and committee seniority variables (Model 1, left column), the estimates suggest a huge and statistically significant effect for deputies having prior experience in a committee. The impact of the ruling party is also significant, but committee seniority appears to increase one's likelihood of being assigned Chair (as compared to other committee positions) to a greater extent than belonging to the ruling party, all else equal. Yet, including the interactive term "Ruling Party x Seniority" shows that having committee experience matters mostly among deputies from the ruling party (Model 2, right column). Indeed, the constitutive term for the seniority variable, which represents the impact of committee experience among opposition deputies, has a marginal effect of about 0.06 points on the probability of being appointed Chair. For ruling party deputies, the marginal effect of additional seniority increases to 0.17 points. Therefore, claiming that seniority matters more than being in power to explain chairmanship is misleading.

Committee-specific seniority, I argue, weighs little as compared to party dominance. To test this claim, I plot in-sample predicted probabilities against experience for both opposition deputies and ruling-party members, using estimates of column 2, Table 63.

Figure 4 shows the plots. The dashed lines show the confidence intervals around the smoothed predicted probability curves.

Table 63 - CHAIRMANSHIPS IN COMMITTEES, 1948-2001 (LOGIT)

Variables	Coefficient		Marginal Effects	Coefficient		Marginal Effects
Ruling Party	1.057 *** (0.115)		0.037	0.761 *** (0.132)		0.026
Committee-Specific Seniority	4.369 *** (0.376)		0.151	1.829 * (0.824)		0.064
Ruling Party * Seniority				3.127 ***† (0.806)		0.109
Group Post	-0.221 (0.247)		-0.007	-0.147 (0.247)		-0.005
Cumulation	-0.196 (0.442)		-0.007	-0.271 (0.446)		-0.009
Buenos Aires (Province)	-0.188 (0.148)		-0.006	-0.181 (0.149)		-0.006
Centro	-0.208 (0.161)		-0.007	-0.179 (0.162)		-0.006
Litoral	-0.368 (0.202)		-0.011	-0.344 (0.203)		-0.011
Norte	-0.929 *** (0.197)		-0.025	-0.903 *** (0.198)		-0.025
Cuyo	-0.465 * (0.204)		-0.014	-0.455 * (0.205)		-0.014
Sur	-0.581 * (0.225)		-0.016	-0.564 * (0.226)		-0.016
Constant	-2.671 *** (0.285)			-2.419 *** (0.290)		
Pseudo-R ²	0.09			0.09		
Log-likelihood	-1780.826			-1771.725		
% Correctly Predicted	95.12			95.09		
N	10,064			10,064		

Notes: Binomial logit regression. All coefficients are rescaled from 0 to 1, so that coefficients above can be compared in size. Marginal effects are for a discrete change in the value of the independent variables (from 0 to 1). The first legislature (1946-1948) is dropped since committee-specific seniority is unknown for that legislature. Legislature dummies are included in the regression (results not shown).


*** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$

† = Interaction jointly significant with each of the constitutive term ($p < 0.05$).

Although experience matters, this is mostly true for members of ruling party. The impact of experience among ruling-party members increases the probability of being assigned Chair from less than 0.1 to 0.8. In comparison the change in predicted probabilities remains trivial for opposition deputies. Thus, only having committee-

specific experience is not sufficient *per se* for a deputy aspiring to become Chair; the ruling status of her party definitely matters for this aspiration to be fulfilled.

FIGURE 4 - IN-SAMPLE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF BEING ASSIGNED CHAIR, BY EXPERIENCE AND RULING PARTY - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES



Note: Based on the estimates of the logit regression (Table 7, Column 1). The dashed lines are the confidence intervals; the solid lines are the smoothed curves of predicted probabilities.

Since the 1940s, rules about assignments have not been modified, and Presidents have *always* been entitled by the Chamber to determine the allocation of committee seats. Even though the non-regulated phase of the committee assignment process was influenced by the *style* of each President, committee assignments have been proportional. By contrast, when weighting the meaningfulness of assignments, that is, when considering the importance of committees and their chairmanships, I can affirm that committees acted as agents of the ruling party. The over-representation of

Chairs secured by certain pluralities is remarkable. The change of the electoral system, and the type of majority or plurality did not alter the behavior of parties. Before and after PR, ruling majorities and pluralities had a similar tendency to get super-proportional control of important committees, the small differences falling outside the bounds of statistical significance. In addition, we saw that apprenticeship and seniority-in-Chamber norms matter to the allocation of seats, but that they are not the criteria that define the process. Committee-specific experience is mainly used by ruling parties to discriminate among their deputies when deciding committee Chair positions. Recall, however, that very few legislators in Argentina are seniors. Therefore, even though those who manage to gain this experience are more likely to become Chairs, especially if their party is in power, the majority of assignments concern deputies having no prior committee experience.

Before concluding this section, I would like to underline two aspects of the committee assignment process that were affected by the change of the electoral system. First, while during the Sáenz Peña Law (1946-1962) ruling parties *monopolized* committee Chairs, from 1963 on they secured a notable *over-representation*. The introduction of the PR system, however, did not affect the monopoly of ruling parties over the Chairs of the *most important committees*. Second, after PR the allocation of committee seats is tied to the party composition of the directing board. The consultation of delegation leaders was almost inexistent in the journal of sessions before 1963 and became evident after that year. This consultation is limited to a handful of parties: those that compose the directing board. Decisive allies may be invited, most of all when a plurality rules the Chamber.

Part IV. Conclusion

Did ruling parties determine the key features of the Chamber's organization over time? Did the reform or maintenance of the Chamber's organizational rules and norms advantage them? In other words, can the Cartel Theory explain the patterns of institutional development that were reconstructed in this chapter? I devote this part to summarize the patterns that were found, and to preliminary assess the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the role of ruling parties in the institutional development of the Chamber.

I describe the institutional development of key units and the evolution of the prerogatives of ruling parties in Table 64. The reconstruction of the institutional development of the Chamber can be synthesized in the following patterns:

Ruling parties have increased their power. The actual *Reglamento* advantages ruling parties in two crucial aspects: the control of floor proceedings (a lowered quorum; the reduction of all terms to speak on the floor; the right to nominate four highest functionaries, two of them in charge of the legislative affairs; the qualified majority to discuss questions of privilege; an increased number of deputies needed to demand a special session), and of the agenda (the *de facto* control of a reinforced CLP; the prerogative of Chairs to determine the majority report in case of tie; the prerogative to expedite the work in committees).

The rules and practices that form the core of the power of ruling parties remained untouched. The agenda-setting, committee-assignment, and referral powers, together with the absolute control of the human resources management, and the preparation and implementation of the internal budget, remained in the hands of the President of the Chamber. The procedure to elect the directing board, and the rules and *practices* to make the allocation of committee seats were never modified. These rules and practices secure a tight control of the organization and functioning of the Chamber. No Radical or Peronist majority/plurality/single-party/coalition changed them.

Ruling parties have accommodated the rules of the Chamber at their convenience. Ruling pluralities and majorities have modified the *Reglamento* in their favor. Pluralities reintroduced lost prerogatives (1963), approved changes that accrued their advantages (1963; 1989), and even transformed the traditional structure of the Chamber in exchange of maintaining their pre-eminence (1989; 1996). Majorities also amended the *Reglamento* (1996), or reinterpreted it (from 1973 on) to increase their prerogatives and get rid of rules that limited their power (1955; 1996).

Ruling parties have strategically used the committee system in their advantage. The biannual renewals, the closings and re-openings due to military coups, and the influence of parties over the careers of legislators shaped an “amateur committee system” (paraphrasing Jones *et al.* 2002). Ruling parties kept control of the committee system securing their presence in the most important committees and getting 77% of the Chairs from 1946 to 2001.

Ruling parties have implemented PR in a particular way. In 1963, ruling parties lost their monopoly over the directing board and committee Chairs, and their power to reform the rules unilaterally. From that year on the Chamber would have *mixed/bipartisan directing boards*, parties would *distribute committee Chairs* and amendments would *require the support* of at least some allies. In a nutshell, ruling parties were obliged to *learn to distribute*.

The Chamber, however, is far from the participative and proportional arena dreamt by the pluralities of 1963, and by the architects of the *de facto* government that introduced the PR system in 1962. The PJ and the UCR -with the help of the FREPASO in the late 1990s- successfully managed to attenuate the effects of PR in the Chamber. They did so implementing some *criteria* and *practices* that assured the pre-eminence of the ruling party:

- The “mixed (proportional) directing boards” criterion of 1963 was rapidly abandoned to be replaced by criteria oriented to favor the ruling party. When the demands of the opposition put at risk its advantages, the ruling party responded creating the Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber.
- Ruling parties secured the control of the election of the directing board by replacing a mandatory roll-call voting system by a weighted voting system.
- Facing the fact that they *have to* share committee Chairs, ruling parties created new positions (Vice-Chairs to all committees in 1963). When the opposition demanded more places in the committee system the response was the creation of standing committees (19 standing committees from 1983 to 1998), the creation of

new positions (second Vice-Chairs and Secretaries for all committees in 1987), and the enlargement of committees' memberships (late 1990s).

- They transformed the *bona fide* CLP in a new "instrument of control" of ruling parties.
- The "consultation table" was limited to a small group of parties.

Ruling parties have controlled the main legislative procedures. They kept during the whole period control of the election and composition of the directing boards, committee-assignments, creation of committees and enlargement of committees' membership and leadership positions, and the election of the committee Chairs (Table 64).

Though ruling parties controlled these procedures, they did not behave as procedural coalitions regarding the creation of committees before the 1980s. This behavior is limited to a handful of cases in relation to the enlargement of memberships, and also limited to certain periods and positions in the case of the Vice-Chairs and Secretaries of committees. In addition, the proportional allocation of committee seats from 1946 to 2001, the lowering of the number of deputies required to demand a roll-call vote (1996), and the failure to increase the power on the President of the Chamber (1996) do not support the predictions of the Cartel Theory. Except for the proportional allocation of committee seats and the creation of committees before the 1980s, the rest of the cases cannot be considered as "patterns." Nevertheless, I will bring up all these issues in the final assessment (chapter VII).

On the whole, ruling parties did determine the key features of the Chamber's organization over time. Their cartel behavior is present during the entire period. The introduction of the PR system obliged them to implement different strategies to preserve their pre-eminence. These strategies were successful to reach that goal. Nevertheless, they altered the traditional organization of the Argentine lower Chamber and they produced an enduring negative impact on its committee system.

Table 64 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF RULING PARTIES AND SECOND/THIRD PARTIES ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

	1946	2001
	"The Hour"	-
Advantages of Pluralities (second, third and minor parties)	-	In minority reports
	-	Three committee members may demand the inclusion of a bill in the committee agenda
	-	Rules about delegations
	-	Second Vice-Presidency of the Chamber (second party)
	-	Nomination of two of the six highest functionaries of the Chamber (second party)
	-	Second parties have over-representation in First Vice-Chairs -VC1- (64% on average from 1987 to 2001)
	-	Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber (third delegation or party)
	1/5 of deputies can demand a roll-call (nominal) vote	1/10 of deputies can demand a roll-call (nominal) vote
Advantages of Ruling Parties	-	Qualified majority to discuss questions of privileges on the floor
	-	Reduction of all terms to speak on the floor
	-	Lowered quorum
	-	<i>De facto</i> control of the CLP
	<i>De facto</i> prerogative to nominate four highest officials	The <i>right</i> to nominate four highest officials of the Chamber
	-	More power to committee Chairs
	-	They can fix the time to vote and the type of voting system to be applied on the floor
	-	They decide over the opportunity to express commemorations
	-	They can expedite the work in committees
	-	Over-representation on the directing board (Presidency and First Vice-Presidency)
Monopoly of the positions on the directing board	Over-representation of committee Chairs (72% on average from 1983 to 2001)	
Monopoly of 19 committee Chairs	Over-representation in Second Vice-Chairs -VC2- (76% on average from 1987 to 2001)	
-	The 1st plurality in committee Secretaries (44% on average from 1987 to 2001)	
-	A <i>de facto</i> weighted voting system to elect the directing board	
Roll-call voting system to elect the directing board	A minimum of 10 deputies is required to demand a special session	
A minimum of 5 deputies is required to demand a special session	45 Chairs to distribute	
19 Chairs to distribute		

Table 64 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF RULING PARTIES
 ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001
 (cont.)

	1946	2001
President	Referral of bills	IDEM
	Agenda-setting	Agenda-setting (controlling the CLP-preparing the agenda if CLP does not meet)
	Committee assignments	IDEM
	Preparation and implementation of the internal budget	IDEM
	Human resources management	IDEM
	Determines the functions of the highest functionaries	IDEM
	-	Chair of the CLP
	Election of certain Chamber's Officials	-
Committee Chairs	Complete and <i>exclusive</i> control of the committee procedure and agenda	Complete control of the committee procedure and agenda
	Control the permanent staff assigned to the committee	IDEM
	Act as substitutes in case of absence or disability of members of the directing board	IDEM
	-	Determine the majority report in case of tie
	-	Receive extra resources (mostly for staff salary)
Legislative Procedures controlled by Ruling Parties	Election and composition of the directing boards	
	Creation of committees and election of their Chairs	
	Committee assignments	
	Enlargement of committees' memberships and leadership positions	

CHAPTER V

Getting to Know the Chilean Chamber of Deputies

1945-2002

This chapter provides information about the organization of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies from 1945 to 2002. I present, first, a summary of the country's politics which includes its multiparty system composed of manifold and changing coalitions (Part I), and then I turn to the Chamber's organization (Part II). There I describe its main institutional changes, along with a detailed account of its membership, ruling parties, and coalitions.

Part I. Overview of Chilean Politics

The purpose of this part is to situate the institutional development of the Chamber in its political context. To this end, section 1 briefly reviews constitutional changes and presidential periods, and section 2 offers a general description of Chilean political parties and coalitions.

Section 1. Constitutions and Presidents

Chile is a unitary republic consisting of 15 regions and 53 provinces. It has a presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature. The original and clerical Constitution of 1833, in force until 1925, established that the president was elected for a five-year term by an electoral college, having the prerogative of immediate reelection.¹¹⁹ The Constitution of 1925 marked the beginning of a fully presidential

¹¹⁹ Immediate reelection was abolished by the constitutional reform of 1871 (government of President Federico Errázuriz Zañartu). In the 1833 Constitution the upper Chamber had 20 senators elected for nine-year terms by "departmental electors." The indirect election of senators was abolished by the 1871 reform, which also reduced their term to six years. To learn about previous constitutional essays see Valencia Avaria (1986) or go to "Breve Historia Constitucional de Chile" http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/resena_const and "Constitución Política" <http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/index.html>, both links of the official site of the Library of the National Congress of Chile.

regime and the separation of Church and state.¹²⁰ It also abolished the electoral college establishing that presidents would be elected directly for six-year terms. If no candidate received an absolute majority, the election would be in the hands of legislators who should select between the two leading candidates by secret ballot in a joint session of Congress (Gil 1966; J. S. Valenzuela 1995). The next constitutional text was adopted in 1980. This document, which suffered many substantial reforms, is the actual Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile.¹²¹ In its original version presidents would be elected for eight-year terms. This term was reduced to four years for the period 1990-1994 (constitutional reform of 1989), extended to six years in 1994, and finally reduced to four years in the 2005 reform.¹²² The 1980 constitution eliminated the intervention of Congress to select the president in the absence of an absolute majority of the vote by substituting a runoff election between the two front runners (A. Valenzuela 1994, 148).

From 1945 to 2002, eight presidential elections were held (Table 65). This period opens and closes with left-of-center governments (two Radical -1945-1952- and three *Concertación* -1990-2002- administrations).¹²³

¹²⁰The 1925 Constitution was written by a committee and approved by a plebiscite in July of this year. In this text the upper Chamber was composed of 45 members directly elected from 9 groups of provinces ("agrupaciones provinciales") for eight-year terms.

¹²¹This constitution was approved by a plebiscite held on September 11, 1980 during the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. It established three types of senators: elected, designated, and for-life senators (former presidents). The 26 directly elected senators (2 senators per region - 13 regions) and the 9 designated senators would have eight-year terms.

¹²²The 1989 constitutional reform was the result of a negotiation between the outgoing military government and political parties. This negotiation took place some months before the elections of December 1989, the first elections after almost 17 years of military government. The reform was approved by a plebiscite in July of this year. Among its many amendments it increased the number of elected senators from 26 to 38 by increasing the number of districts in certain regions. The 2005 constitutional reform eliminated all non-elected senators, both designated and former presidents.

¹²³The first year of my research period (1945) coincides with the last year of the mandate of President Juan A. Ríos Morales. He was the second of three successive Radical governments elected by Center-left coalitions.

Table 65 - PARTY, TENURE, AND CAUSE OF TERM CONCLUSION OF CHILEAN PRESIDENTS 1945-2006

President	Party-Coalition in Government ^a	Period	Term Conclusion
Juan A. Ríos Morales (PR) ^b	Democratic Alliance	Apr. 42 - Jan. 46	Resigned
Alfredo Duhalde Vázquez (PR)	PR - PS	Jan. 46 - Nov. 46	Interim
Gabriel González Videla (PR) ^c	PR - PC - PL	Nov. 46 - Nov. 52	Completion of legal term
Carlos Ibañez del Campo (IND) ^d	ANAP - FENAFUI - MONAP ^e	Nov. 52 - Nov. 58	Completion of legal term
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (Right)	CONS ^f - LIB	Nov. 58 - Nov. 64	Completion of legal term
Eduardo Frei Montalva (DC) ^g	DC	Nov. 64 - Nov. 70	Completion of legal term
Salvador Allende Gossens (PS) ^h	Popular Unity	Nov. 70 - Sept. 73	Overthrown by a <i>coup d'état</i>
<i>Military Coup</i>			
Patricio Aylwin Azócar (DC) ⁱ	<i>Concertación</i>	March 90 - Feb. 94	Completion of legal term
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (DC) ^j	<i>Concertación</i>	March 94 - Feb. 00	Completion of legal term
Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS)	<i>Concertación</i>	March 00 - Feb. 06	Completion of legal term

a. For a list of political parties and coalitions see APPENDIX F.

b. Juan A. Ríos Morales was twice deputy (1924-1927 -Congress was dissolved in 1924;- 1926-1930) and once senator for the PR (1930-1938 -Congress was dissolved in 1934-) and once independent deputy (1933-1937). He resigned in January 1946 for health reasons. The Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática) that supported his government consisted of the Radical Party -PR- (Partido Radical), the Socialist Party -PS- (Partido Socialista), the Communists PC- (Partido Comunista), and the *alessandrista* Liberals.

c. Gabriel González Videla was three times deputy for the PR (1930-1934; 1933-1937; 1937-1941), Chilean Ambassador to Portugal and Brazil, and senator for the PR (1945-1953).

d. From 1927 to 1931 Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo ruled the country as virtual dictator. He was elected senator in 1949 for the Agrarian Labor Party (PAL).

e. ANAP: People's National Alliance (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo); FENAFUI: National Federation of *Ibañistas* (Federación Nacional de Fuerzas Ibañistas), and MONAP: People's National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo).

f. Conservative Party (Partido Conservador).

g. Eduardo Frei Montalva was Minister of Public Works of President Ríos Morales (PR) (1945-1946) and senator for the National Falange (1949-1957; 1957-1965) and for the Christian Democrat Party -DC- (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) (1973-1981). The military coup dissolved the Congress by Decree-law no. 27 (September 21, 1973).

h. Salvador Allende Gossens was Health Minister of President Aguirre Cerda (PR) and four times senator (1945-1953; 1953-1961; 1961-1969, and 1969-1973). The Popular Unity (Union Popular), the coalition created to support his candidacy in 1970, consisted of the PS, the PC, the PR, the Social Democrat Party -PSD- (Partido Social Demócrata), the Movement for United Popular Action -MAPU- (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria), and the Independent Popular Action -API- (Acción Popular Independiente).

i. Patricio Aylwin Azócar was twice senator for the DC (1965-1973; 1973-1981). The Coalition of Parties for Democracy -*Concertación*- (*Concertación* de Partidos por la Democracia) was composed of the DC, the PS, the Party for Democracy -PPD- (Partido por la Democracia), and 13 minor political groups.

j. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the son of former president Frei Montalva, was a DC Senator when he was elected president.

Source: Own elaboration upon data from Gil (1966), Petras (1969), Burnett (1970), Collier and Sater (1996), Etchepare Jensen (2001), Jobet (2003), Bizzarro (2005), and Oppenheim (2007).

Between them we find an “apolitical” administration (Carlos Ibañez del Campo), followed by rightist (Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez Alessandri), reformist (Eduardo Frei Montalva), and leftist (Salvador Allende) governments. Four presidents were selected by the Congress (1946, 1952, 1958, and 1970), and only one reached the Presidency by

a majority of the popular vote (Frei Montalva in 1964). Since 1989, two presidents have obtained the majority of votes (Aylwin Azócar -1989- and Frei Ruíz-Tagle -1993-), and one has been elected after a presidential runoff (Lagos Escobar -1999-).

As it is well known, on September 11, 1973, the Socialist president Salvador Allende was deposed by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. The *de facto* government blamed politicians, political parties, and the politicization and mobilization of the Chilean society for the crisis that *had prompted its intervention*. Its goals were the re-establishment of the rule of law, social pacification, and sustained capital accumulation (Taylor 2006).

These goals were implemented in practice by a fierce bloody repression, neoliberal policies, the adoption of a new constitution, and the substantial change of the electoral system. General Pinochet left power in 1989 after being defeated in a plebiscite.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, it would take more that fifteen years and three governments of the Center-left *Concertación* coalition to get rid of the authoritarian enclaves inherited by his dictatorship.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ This plebiscite, held on October 5, 1988, was established in the 1980 Constitution. It was a yes-no consultation to enable Pinochet to continue in power until 1996. The campaign for the "NO" was organized by the "Coalition of Parties for the NO" that would later become the Coalition of Parties for Democracy or the Center-left *Concertación*. The "NO" received the 54.7% of the votes.

¹²⁵ According to Manuel Garretón some transitions to democracy from military rule "typically occur within the institutional framework of the authoritarian regime, with one of the opposition's main problems being how to work from within this framework in order to change it and achieve democratic institutions." The outcome, Garretón explains, is often incomplete democracy, a regime basically democratic but riddled with inherited authoritarian enclaves. The author distinguishes three authoritarian enclaves that remained during the transition to democracy: 1) the restrictions on popular sovereignty (e.g., Pinochet-controlled senatorial appointments, antimajoritarian features in the electoral system, and the autonomy of the armed forces from civilian control; 2) the ethical-symbolic enclave represented by all the unresolved cases of human rights violations, and 3) the continuing presence of Pinochet himself, who remained as commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces until 1998 (Garretón 1995, 147; 149).

As will be shown along this chapter, the interplay among parties of the three main blocs of the political system -the Right, the Center, and the Left- and the special role of Center parties in the formation of coalitions are the dominant and underlying patterns of Chilean politics. In addition, the formation and duration of presidential and legislative coalitions will be affected by a stressful dynamic of non-concurrent elections (see APPENDIX G). As J. S. Valenzuela (1995) explains, presidents who took office immediately before congressional elections were fortunate because this timing tended to strengthen their legislative support (e.g., 1952-1953; 1964-1965). The opposite situation, presidents that lost coalition partners or even saw their coalitions disintegrate, happened when presidential elections immediately followed legislative elections (e.g., 1957-1958; 1969-1970). In this situation coalitions and party leaders in Congress had little incentive to collaborate with the outgoing president (A. Valenzuela 1994). Next section provides basic information about that interplay among parties at the national level to then turn to a detailed analysis of the effects of the aforementioned patterns on the lower Chamber.

Section 2. Political Parties and Coalitions¹²⁶

The presentation of an overview of the competitive and polarized multiparty Chilean system (A. Valenzuela 1994) is a defying enterprise. The goal of this section is to place my research into the historical context for the purpose of analysis. Having in mind this modest end, I identify five periods of the Chilean party system: 1) the hegemony of the traditional parties (19th century); 2) the Age of Parliament (1890s-

¹²⁶ This section draws mainly from the studies of **Burnett (1970)** and J.S. Valenzuela (1995).

1910s); 3) the reconstruction of the party system (1920s-1950s); 4) the gradual shift to the Left (1960s-1973), and 5) the stable multiparty system (1990s-2000s).

During most of the nineteenth century Chilean politics was characterized by differences over Church-State issues. This was the time of the pre-eminence of the President over Congress and the *hegemony of the Conservatives (CONS)*, the progressive -though oligarchic- *Liberals (PL)*, and *the Nationals -PN1857- (Partido Nacional)* who “represented the upper bureaucracy and the banking, commercial, and industrialist groups” (Petras 1969, 97).

Then follows what the authors call the *Age of Parliament* (Burnett 1970, 166) or “semi-presidential” period (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 15), a phase of 30 years that came after the eight-month Chilean civil war of 1891.¹²⁷ This historical span is characterized by a polarized multiparty system “built upon profound ideological diversity [where] coalitions were necessitated by the failure of any single partisan structure to secure a congressional majority” (Burnett 1970, 166).¹²⁸ Representative parties of this period were the middle-class **Radicals -PR- (Radicales)**; the PN1857; the **Liberal Democratic Party -PLD- (Partido Liberal Democrático)**, whose members longed for a powerful presidential system; the **Democratic Party -PD- (Partido Democrático)** that gathered former Radicals who split away from the party because it failed to capture the allegiance of the working class, and various socialist political associations.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Dissensions on the approval of the 1891 national budget, and more broadly over the powers of the executive, led to an armed conflict between the Congress (supported by the Chilean Navy) and President José M. Balmaceda (Chilean Army sided with him). As J. S. Valenzuela (1995, 15) argues “the victory of the forces under congressional leadership produced significant changes in the nation’s political institutions.”

¹²⁸ During this period a new interpretation of the 1833 Constitution was implemented. This interpretation was that cabinets were required to have congressional majorities (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 15).

¹²⁹ The PN1857 and PLD would disappear in the 1920s (J. S. Valenzuela 1995).

Following Burnett, I call the third period the *reconstitution of the party system* (1920s-1950s), or the time of the emergence of mass-based political parties and the primacy of socio-economic issues (J. S. Valenzuela 1995). Typical of this period are the successive and changing coalitions among the dominant Radical Party *and* the **Communists (PC)**, the **Socialists (PS)** *and* the Liberals and Conservatives.

The slow decline of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals and the *gradual shift to the Left among the electorate* (Petras 1972, 107) characterize the fourth period (1964-1973). This new scenario, driven by electoral reforms and a changing social structure, showed the emergence of Left/Center-left fronts, the electorally successful **Christians Democrats (DC)**, and finally the **Popular Unity** government of Salvador Allende (PS).

Beginning after the return to democracy (1989), but rooted in political developments that took place during the last years of the dictatorship, the fifth period brought a more *stable multiparty system divided into two polarized and consistent coalitions*. This system is composed of reconstituted and reshaped pre-authoritarian parties and a handful of new political groups. Three successive coalition governments (of the Center-left *Concertación*) supported by a congressional majority are one of the main political features of this period.

Considering these periods, my research starts almost at the end of the *reconstruction of the party system* (1945), covers the entire process of the Right decline and the progressive shift to the Left and ends after twelve years of political stability (2002). The subsequent section provides an account of the main events (coalition formation-splits-reunifications) that marked the development of Chilean political

parties from 1945 to 2002. Radicals, Socialists and Communists, and Christian Democrats are used as axes within which the rest of the parties are included.

2.1 *The Radicals*

The **Radical Party -PR- (Partido Radical)** was created in 1863. Its origins can be traced in the progressive wing of the Liberal Party. “The Radical party is the third major political structure [after the Conservatives and the Liberals] to evolve out of the political struggle of the last century” (Burnett 1970, 181). Though they originally called themselves “The Reds” (Los Rojos), Radicals evolved progressively to a centrist position. As Collier and Sater (1996, 240) put it, “[T]he single most important (and in a real sense the most popular) party between the 1930s and early 1960s, the Radical party combined delicately balanced and often competing interests.” Radicals held the presidency for 14 years (1938-1952) leading the Center-left (1938-1947) and Center-right (1948-1952) coalitions that supported their governments. They were the largest party in the lower Chamber in 1945, 1949, 1957, and 1961.¹³⁰

During the administration of the third Radical President, Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952), the repressive Law for the Defense of Democracy or “Accursed Law” (Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia o “Ley maldita”) was enacted (1948). This law made illegal the Communist Party, “ordered the removal of all Communists voters from the electoral registry [26,384 voters], and gave the government power to confine Communist leaders to remote areas of the country” (Gil 1966, 73). It is important to

¹³⁰ While Communists and Socialists rallied behind the candidacy of the first two Radical presidents - Pedro Aguirre Cerda (**Popular Front coalition - 1938**) and Juan A. Ríos Morales (**Democratic Alliance coalition - 1942**) - only the PC backed President Gabriel González Videla (the third Radical president), who won the elections with a plurality of votes (1946). The PL joined the PR-PC coalition after the elections and supported González Videla in the congressional election.

mention the passage of this law because it will impact the legislative arena in two ways: first, it will cause divisions in the main parties and second, it will mark the end of the Center-left coalition that ruled the Chamber from 1946 to 1948. At the Executive level the law banning the PC produced a rightist cabinet reshuffle. Although this coalition was successful in the congressional elections of 1949, as Petras (1969, 135) explains, “[T]he failure of middle-class-dominated coalitions to bring about promised changes led to the rise of the rightist, authoritarian Ibáñez, whose ideology claimed to be anti-political [...] above politics.”

The independent Ibáñez del Campo reached the presidency (1952-1958) building a heterogeneous coalition. During his administration Radicals, as well as the rest of the traditional parties, were in the opposition. The electoral performance of the PR improved with the decline of Ibáñez del Campo and during its participation in Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez’s rightist government. President Alessandri Rodríguez had promised an “orthodox, free market model of development” for Chile (Oppenheim 2007, 32). The failure of his administration, particularly regarding the situation of the middle-class, favored the surge of the Christian Democrats (1964) and, at the same time, the decline of Radicals who progressively lost their popular appeal. In words of Petras (1969, 154) “[A]s the malaise of the middle strata grew, the Christian Democrats filled the political vacuum on the center-left.” From then on the Radicals would never repeat their prior electoral performance, and successive splits would further reduce their electoral support.

In 1969, the PR decided to join several leftist parties to form the **Popular Unity -UP- (Unión Popular)** coalition that made possible the victory of Senator Allende (PS) in the presidential elections of 1970. This decision divided the party. Those opposed to Allende formed the **Radical Democracy Party -PDR69- (Partido Democracia Radical)**, and supported the rightist candidacy of former President Alessandri Rodríguez. The other faction remained in the UP until the end of Allende's government (September 11, 1973).

Parties resumed their role in the political process during a wave of protests and strikes against Pinochet (1983). The post-dictatorship political landscape became structured around support or rejection of military rule and its legacy (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 56). The place of the Radicals was first in the Center-left *Coalition of Parties for the NO - Concertación de Partidos por el NO-* and then in the Center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación*).¹³¹ In 1994, the **Social Democratic Party -PSD- (Partido Social Demócrata)** joined the PR and formed the **Radical Social Democrat Party - PRSD94- (Partido Radical Social Demócrata)** that backed the presidential candidate of the *Concertación*, Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS) in 1999 (Bizarro 2005, 559).

¹³¹ The *Coalition of Parties for the NO* was created to campaign against Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite in which he was defeated.

2.2 *Socialists and Communists*

The **Socialist Party -PS- (Partido Socialista)** was created in 1933 when various leftist groups decided to merge.¹³² Jobet (2003) distinguished four phases in the development of the PS. From 1933 to 1938 it was a growing and revolutionary time for the party. Then a phase of government coalitions and internal divisions followed (1939-1946). The third was the reorganization phase that would end in 1957 with the reunification of the Socialists. The fourth period was characterized by new strategies that resulted in the creation of successful leftist and Center-left coalitions. To these periods I add what I would call a restructuration phase after the banning of the party by the dictatorship and its later participation in the *Concertación* coalition.

It will be immediately clear that my research covers the most challenging periods of the PS until its last merger in the late 1990s. Regarding their relationship with the PC, it is important to highlight that Socialists always disputed with Communists over the influence on the leftist electorate, the representation of working class interests, and rejected any alliance with non-labor parties, being in general less prone than Communists to participate in coalitions (J. S. Valenzuela 1995).

The **Socialist Labor Party -POS- (Partido Obrero Socialista)**, created in 1912, was transformed into the **Communist Party -PC- (Partido Comunista)** in 1922 (the Chilean section of the Third International). Contrary to Socialists, members of the PC displayed a sympathetic tendency toward electoral coalitions with traditional parties and

¹³² These groups were the New Public Action -NAP- (Nueva Acción Pública), the Revolutionary Social Action -ARS- (Acción Revolucionaria Socialista) that had merged with the Unified Socialist Party -PSU- (Partido Socialista Unificado) before 1933, the Marxist Socialist Party -PSM- (Partido Socialista Marxista), and the Socialist Order -SO- (Orden Socialista).

parliamentary cooperation until 1973. Communists sought for Chileans a democratic revolution through elections and a multiclass (working-middle class) coalition (Petras 1969).

The PS and the PC participated in the **Popular Front -FP- (1938)** and in the **Democratic Alliance (1942)**, the coalitions that backed the first two Radical presidents.¹³³ In contrast to the PC, the PS did not participate in the coalition that supported the candidacy of President González Videla (PR), but voted for him in Congress (since he had not been elected with a majority of votes). During González Videla's government, the PS adopted an independent stand that turned to open opposition as repressive measures began to be adopted. In 1947, the PS formed an opposition front called the **FRAS (Radical-Agrarian-Socialist Falange – (F)alange (R)adical (A)graria (S)ocialista)** in order to coordinate the opposition to Radicals (Garay Vera 1990, 139).¹³⁴

The PC took the opposite path. In 1946, it got three cabinet positions and in the 1947 municipal elections it became the third most popular party in the country. Nonetheless, when Liberals *and Radicals* abandoned the cabinet because they feared the influence and the electoral gains of the Communists - and also "bowing to the pressure of the United States" (J. S. Valenzuela 1995, 37) -, President González Videla decided to expel

¹³³ In 1940 a faction of the PS led by César Godoy - who always opposed the participation of his party in the FP- withdrew to form the **Socialist Workers Party -PST- (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores)**. Some members of the PST would join the PC in 1944. In 1943 the majority of the PS decided to adopt an independent position but a faction led by Marmaduke Grove announced that it would support the Democratic Alliance government. Some months later the PS decided to stay in the Democratic Alliance, collaborate with it in Congress, but to abandon any position in the executive power. In July 1944 Grove and his followers step out the party and organized the **Authentic Socialist Party -PSA- (Partido Socialista Auténtico)**. The PS majority faction that was opposed to participate in the government was headed by the then former Minister of Health Salvador Allende. This group decided to break with the Democratic Alliance in July 1945 (Jobet 2003, 54). During the interim period of Duhalde Vázquez (PR- Jan. 46-Nov. 46) the PS formed the **People's Front (Frente del Pueblo)**, a group opposed to the Democratic Alliance. Nevertheless, some of their members (Juan B. Rosetti and Bernardo Ibañez among others) decided to participate in Duhalde's government.

¹³⁴ For the constitution of the FRAS see section 5.2 in this chapter.

the Communists of his government. He first broke off diplomatic relations with the Communist nations, and then introduced in Congress the Accursed Law.

The banning of Communists caused the split of the PS into two factions. The one led by Rosetti and Ibañez, which kept the "Socialist Party" label, voted for the law, participated in González Videla's cabinet, and joined the government for the 1949 congressional elections. The other faction adopted the name of **Popular Socialist Party -PSP- (Partido Socialista Popular)**. It represented the majority of the party and was led by Raúl Ampuero and the then Senator Salvador Allende. The Communists, despite their banning, did not radicalize or retreat into clandestinity. They continued to accept the rules of the Chilean political game exerting whatever marginal influence they could on the elections using different labels or joining Marxist and middle- to upper-class coalitions- (Drake 1978, 290).

When the 1952 presidential elections were approaching, Senator Allende quit the PSP, went back to the PS and became the presidential candidate of the **People's National Front -FRENAP- (Frente Nacional del Pueblo)**, a coalition of Socialists, Communists, and small factions of the PR and the PD. The PSP, in turn, decided to support the candidacy of future President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (IND), joining a coalition of various *Ibañistas* groups.

The alliance between the PSP and Ibáñez lasted until October 1953. The PSP decided to go to the opposition because Ibáñez del Campo hadn't sent to the Congress bills on agrarian reform, copper industry nationalization, and particularly the one to repeal the Accursed Law (Jobet 2003, 65).

In March 1956, the PSP, together with the FRENAP and the **Peoples' Democratic Party -PDPu49- (Partido Democrático del Pueblo)**, created the **Popular Action Front -FRAP- (Frente de Acción Popular)**. One of the goals of this front, particularly of the Popular Socialists, was to create an alliance composed only of labor parties leaving aside centrist groups they considered *bourgeois* parties.

The FRAP constituted a cohesive opposition in Congress. Its representation almost doubled between 1957 and 1961 due to three events. First, in July 1957 the factions of the PS decided to reunify (ratifying in this occasion their opposition to *bourgeois* political groups and to "multiparty opportunism"). Second, the Law for Defense of Democracy was repealed in 1958. Therefore, the reinstated PC officially presented its own candidates for the 1961 elections. Third, the **National Democratic Party -PADENA- (Partido Democrático Nacional)** joined the FRAP in 1960.

Senator Allende was the presidential candidate of the FRAP for the elections of 1958 and 1964. The difference between Allende and the front-runner in 1958 (Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez -Right-) was tiny (2.7 points). In 1964, Allende also got the second place in the presidential race, though this time the difference with the DC Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva was 17 points. The PADENA left the FRAP and supported President Frei Montalva (DC) after his victory. Besides, young members of the PS left the party and formed in 1965 the **Left Revolutionary Movement -MIR- (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria)**.

On December 17, 1969, the PS adopted a decision that countered its principles. It joined the *bourgeois* PR (and a handful of left parties) to form the **Popular Unity -UP-**, the successful coalition that backed Senator Allende for the 1970 presidential elections.¹³⁵

As Oppenheim (2007, 47) put it, “the six-year term of President Salvador Allende began with enthusiasm and excitement and ended, three years later, in death and tragedy.” After a favorable first year, political confrontation arose in 1972.¹³⁶ The main dispute between government and opposition (and within the UP itself), was the creation of a Social Property Area -APS- (Area de Propiedad Social), or the socialization of industries that would be controlled by workers. This issue provoked the end of the cooperation of the DC with Allende, a split in the UP, and the establishment of a recalcitrant congressional opposition. The year 1972 was characterized by a deterioration of the economic situation, the burst of strikes and, finally, by a period of military participation in the cabinet (Nov. 72 to March 73). By 1973, the political center had disappeared, and the society was polarized. Two irreconcilable coalitions participated in the congressional elections of May 1973.¹³⁷ The electoral results gave none of them the necessary votes to carry out their antithetical plans. This political stalemate was solved by the military coup of September 1973, openly supported by the opposition and the US government.

¹³⁵ Allende’s rivals were former President Alessandri Rodríguez, supported by a coalition of the Right, and former legislator Radomiro Tomic Romero (DC). The electoral results (Allende 36.2%, Alessandri Rodríguez 34.9%, and Tomic Romero 27.8%) brought the decision to the legislators. Congressional vote favored Allende. He received the support of the DC after signing a pact in which he promised to follow constitutional procedures and respect the democratic system. For the constitution of the Popular Unity see section 5.8 in this chapter.

¹³⁶ During 1971 the copper industry’s nationalisation passed unanimously through Congress, agrarian reform was fully implemented, and the expansion of social programs was supported by the DC.

¹³⁷ The coalitions were the leftist Federation of the Popular Unity and the Center-Right Democratic Confederation -CODE- (Confederación Democrática). See section 5.8 in this chapter.

Even though parties were banned in September 1973, the 1980 Constitution explicitly introduced an article to *permanently* ban parties of the Left. This prohibition included, of course, the PS and the PC. This provision was *rewritten* by the 1989 reform. Nevertheless, the legal status of leftist parties was definitely established in 1990, during President Aylwin's administration.¹³⁸

After the return to democracy, the PS divided into two factions: the Almeyda Socialists and the Núñez Socialists, named after their respective general secretaries. The latter faction, together with smaller groups, formed the instrumental **Party for Democracy - PPD- (Partido por la Democracia)**, and joined the *Concertación*. The former, together with Communists, the Christian left, and other groups created the **Broad Party of the Socialist Left -PAIS- (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista)** (Scully 1992, 196).

Twenty-six years after the military intervention that overthrew President Allende (PS), another Socialist candidate, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, was elected president in the 2000 presidential runoff. He was the third victorious candidate of the *Concertación*.

¹³⁸ It is worth mentioning that the PS and the PC, and their leaders and members, "suffered the brunt of the repressive policies of the military regime, including torture, imprisonment, exile, and in some cases, physical extermination" (Scully 1992, 196). That may explain why Communists, breaking with their traditional behavior, adopted a strategy of struggle, including popular rebellion and acute forms of violence during the 1980s (Scully 1992, 197).

2.3 *The Christian Democrats*

The **Christian Democratic Party -DC- (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)** was created in 1957, when the **National Falange -FN- (Falange Nacional)** absorbed the **Social Christian Conservative Party -ConsSC- (Partido Conservador Social Cristiano)**. The FN and the ConsSC were both offshoots from the Conservative Party. Later the **Agrarian Labor Party -PAL- (Partido Agrario Laborista)** and the **New Democratic Left (Nueva Izquierda Democrática)**, a split-away from the National Democratic Party, would also merge with the DC.

Tenets of DC were Christianity (though DC welcomed Protestants, Catholics, Jews as well as non believers), democracy, humanism, revolution (in freedom), nationalism (of constructive cooperation with the US), and communitarianism. Its doctrine, coupled with the appeal of one of its most conspicuous leaders, Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva, made the DC the “new centrist alternative to both extremes” (Valenzuela 1994, 131). After Frei Montalva’s defeat in the presidential elections of 1958, the newly created DC increased its legislative representation, and shared the opposition to the government of President Alessandri Rodríguez (Right) with the FRAP. Nevertheless, in the 1964 presidential elections Liberals and Conservatives, who feared the increasing influence of the Left, backed up the candidacy of Frei Montalva. His slogan was “Revolution in Freedom” (“Revolución en Libertad”). He promised an active role of the state (based on substantial US direct aid), programmes oriented to incorporate new social actors, and agrarian reform. According to Burnett (1970, 186), “[T]he tactical efficacy of promising

revolutionary solutions to Chile's problems, though within the context of political democracy, proved overwhelming in the 1964 and 1965 elections."

In spite of strong foreign and domestic support, the government was not capable of fulfilling its promises (at least at the extent of middle- and lower-class expectations). At the same time, the socio-economic reforms of the DC were too revolutionary for the Right (Liberals and Conservatives now unified in the **National Party -PN66/Partido Nacional-**). Therefore, the two blocs of parties of the Left and the Right became the DC's opposition.

The DC had a prime role in Allende's (PS) administration. For one part, controlled by its left wing, it had the last word in Allende's congressional election (November 1969). For the other part, this time led by right-wing members of their party, Christian Democrats forged with the Right the **Democratic Confederation -CODE- (Confederación Democrática)** coalition (1972). The constitution of the CODE contributed to the political deadlock and its members supported the military coup of September 1973.

The first democratic president after sixteen years and a half of dictatorship was the DC Patricio Aylwin Azócar, the candidate of the Center-left *Concertación*. Aylwin Azócar and the following two presidents of the *Concertación*, Eduardo Frei Ruíz-Tagle (DC) and Ricardo Lagos Escobar (PS), had to "deal with the political challenges of democratic consolidation in Chile" (Oppenheim 2007, 211). One of the most difficult challenges they faced was the elimination of undemocratic features that remained in Chile's political institutions. Main events in this long and laborious road to democratic consolidation were the arrest of then Senator Pinochet in London (October 1998), that

"broke forever the image of military impunity in Chile" (Oppenheim 2007, 210), and the 2005 constitutional reform, that marked the end of the transition to democracy in Chile.

As noted, parties and their coalitions structured around support or rejection of the military dictatorship. On the right wing **side of the political spectrum two new parties emerged. They are the National Renewal Party -RN- (Partido Renovación Nacional), and the *ultra-right* Independent Democratic Union -UDI- (Unión Demócrata Independiente).** Although they supported Pinochet's intent to remain in power (the RN and the UDI campaigned for the "SI" in the plebiscite of 1988 in which Pinochet was defeated), they can be distinguished. The RN, the continuation of the dissolved PN66, participated in the discussions about the reform of the 1980 Constitution whose approval facilitated the return to democracy. The UDI, by contrast, is composed of the hard-line generation of leaders that emerged from the dictatorship's administration. Therefore, this party generally rejected any discussion of the institutional framework left by the military government. Understanding the mechanism of the new electoral system, RN and UDI have formed an alliance for each election: **Democracy and Progress (Pacto Democracia y Progreso)** in 1989, **Union for the Progress of Chile (Union por el Progreso de Chile)** in 1993, and **Union for Chile (Union por Chile)** in 1997.

Part II. The Description of the Chamber's Political Organization¹³⁹

As I mentioned in chapter I, the analysis of patterns of institutional development demands knowledge of the organization of the Chamber through time. There is abundant (and varied) information about congressional elections' results in Chile, but not much about the effects of electoral processes on the lower Chamber. Luis Valencia Avaria's book (1986) about members of the executive and legislative powers is an impressive exception. Unfortunately, his study does not include information about the party of legislators. Beyond this, there is scarce information about the organization of the lower Chamber, and almost nothing about the parties or coalitions in charge of the direction of the Chamber. In the following sections I provide essential data about the Chamber's organization (sections 3 and 4), and its partisan composition (section 5).

Section 3. Membership, Quorums, and Legislative Periods

The Chilean lower Chamber is made up of 120 deputies elected for four-year terms from sixty electoral districts. The entire Chamber is renewed every four years, and deputies can be reelected indefinitely. The quorum is 1/3 of the total number of deputies. Ordinary sessions last from May 21st to September 18th and extraordinary sessions from September 19th to May 20th. The Chamber meets to the swearing-in ceremony of its members and the election of its directing board or *Mesa* on March 11th every four years. This membership, the electoral system in force, as well as the building of the National Congress situated in the City of Valparaiso, are novelties introduced by the dictatorship.

¹³⁹ Except otherwise indicated, all data employed in the rest of this chapter were obtained from official publications of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and the Library of the National Congress of Chile (see APPENDIX A).

The Constitution of 1833 fixed the proportion of one deputy for every "20,000 souls," or fraction over 10,000 (rule 19). Deputies served for three-year terms and the Chamber was renewed every three years. Ordinary sessions went from June 1st to September 1st. The quorum was the "absolute majority" of the total number of deputies. The 1874 constitutional reform apportioned one deputy per "20,000 souls," or fraction over 12,000 (rule 19).

The 1925 Constitution introduced substantial changes. First, deputies' term was increased to four years and the entire Chamber came up for election every four years. Second, it lowered the quorum to 1/5 of the total number of deputies. Third, it enlarged the period of ordinary sessions (from May 21st to September 18th). Fourth, it allocated one deputy for every 30,000 people or fraction over 15,000. Fifth, it introduced the proportional representation system (rule 25), in J. S. Valenzuela's opinion (1995, 31), a "modified D'Hondt method of proportional representation, with revamped multi-member electoral districts." This reform left behind the cumulative vote in force since 1874, which in turn had replaced the winner-take-all system of the 1828-1873 period. The electoral law of 1938 established 28 electoral districts for the 25 provinces (these 25 provinces were aggregated in 9 "group of provinces" or "agrupaciones provinciales"). The provinces of Santiago and Ñuble had 4 and 2 electoral districts respectively, and Llanquihue and Aysén formed one district (Gil 1966, 208). The 1930 census was used to determine representation in the lower Chamber. Following this census, seats increased from 132 to 147. It's interesting to note that next censuses were ignored, and that the 1930 census was used to apportion seats until the 1960s (Gil 1966, 208).

In 1958 and 1960 the electoral system underwent two substantive reforms. First, candidates were prohibited from running in more than one list for the same election (Law no. 12889). Second, pacts in lower Chamber and municipal elections were proscribed (Law no. 14089). Consider that before the reform “some candidates ran at the same time under the banner of two parties that were irreconcilably opposed, perhaps from the two ends of the national political spectrum. At times clericals, anti-clericals, rightist, and leftist all got together on the same list, specially in the provinces” (Gil 1966, 216). These reforms also established a single ballot issued by the state (it would contain all party slates for any single type of election in a district), the strengthening of penalties for failure to register, and permanent voter lists (Gil 1966).

¹⁴⁰

In 1967, a constitutional reform created the 10th « agrupación provincial » (provinces of Chiloé, Aysén, and Magallanes).¹⁴¹ Consequently, the Chamber increased its membership from 147 to 150 deputies. It is worth mentioning that three years later, during President Frei Montalva’s government (DC), the literacy requirement to vote was suppressed and the age to vote was lowered to 18 years old.¹⁴²

As mentioned, the military government adopted a new constitutional text in 1980. Besides lowering the number of deputies, and increasing the quorum to 1/3, it established a requirement to be elected deputy: candidates should have completed the secondary school. It also gave the Executive Power the prerogative to dissolve the

¹⁴⁰ Before the reform the order in which candidates’ names appeared on the ballot was decided by the party and each party printed and distributed its own ballots (Gil 1966, 217; A. Valenzuela 1994, 127).

¹⁴¹ Law no. 16.672.

¹⁴² Law no. 17.284.

Chamber of Deputies. Following the 1980 constitution, the electoral law established sixty districts that would elect 2 deputies each.¹⁴³ This law is famous, not for the number of districts, but for the binominal electoral system it introduced. Blais and Massicotte (1997) note in their study of electoral systems of 166 countries that Chile has a peculiar rule that could not be fit into any category examined (i.e., plurality rule, PR, majority rule, and mixed systems). The authors explain that “Chile has two-member districts. If the leading party gets twice as many votes as the second party, it wins the two seats; otherwise, the top two parties each win one seat” (Blais and Massicotte 1997, 126). This system gives undue political weight to the minority (A. Valenzuela 1994, Oppenheim 2007, Constitución Política-online). As Oppenheim argues (2007, 213) “with one third of the vote, the minority could claim one half of the elective seats.” More specifically, A. Valenzuela (1994, 111) says that this electoral law “was designed to promote a two-party system while favouring the parties of the Right by creating an unusual two-past-the-post system, in which the runner up has significant electoral advantages.”

The most important change regarding the Chamber since 1980 was introduced by the constitutional reform in 1989, which suppressed the presidential prerogative to dissolve it.

The institutional changes described resulted in eleven legislative periods from 1945 to 2002. As we can see in Table 66, except for the 1973 legislative period, which lasted almost four months - May to September - and of course not considering the years of

¹⁴³ Organic Constitutional Law no. 18.700.

military government, the Chamber always functioned effectively according to constitutional rules.

Table 66 - LEGISLATIVE TERMS AND NUMBER OF DEPUTIES - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

1945-2002

Legislative Period	1945 1949	1949 1953	1953 1957	1957 1961	1961 1965	1965 1969	1969 1973	1973 a	1990 1994	1994 1998	1998 2002
Number of Deputies	147	147	147	147	147	147	150	150	120	120	120

a. The military coup dissolved the Congress by Decree-law no. 27 (September 21, 1973).

Section 4. Majorities and Pluralities in Control of the Chamber

These eleven legislative periods were ruled by one single-party majority, one single-party plurality, and nine majority coalitions (Table 67). Center-left coalitions secured the majority of seats in three opportunities, and only the Centrist DC had once the plurality and once the majority in Chamber. Five majority coalitions were shared by parties of the Center and the Right, and one majority coalition by parties of the Right, the Center, and the Left.

**Table 67 - MAJORITIES-PLURALITIES / SINGLE PARTY-COALITION, RULING PARTY-COALITION, RIGHT-CENTER-LEFT SPECTRUM BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002**

Legislative Period	Majority-Plurality/ Single Party-Coalition	Party-Coalition	Right-Center-Left Spectrum
1945-1949	Majority Coalition (O) ^a	APL45-CONS-PA-PL-PLP	C-R
1949-1953	Majority Coalition	LIDERS	R-C-L
1953-1957	Majority Coalition	CONS-FENAFUI-MONAP53- PL-PR	C-R
1957-1961	Majority Coalition (O)	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56 ^b	C-R
1961-1965	Majority Coalition	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	C-R
1965-1969	<i>Single-Party Majority</i>	DC	C
1969-1973	<i>Single-Party Plurality</i>	DC	C
1973	Majority Coalition (O)	CODE	C-R
1990-1994	Majority Coalition	CONCERTACION	C-L
1994-1998	Majority Coalition	CONCERTACION	C-L
1998-2002	Majority Coalition	CONCERTACION	C-L

a. Coalition of parties of the opposition.

b. Journal of Sessions, June 4, 1957, p. 107.

Three alliances are identified as (O) or “coalitions of parties of the opposition” in the second column of Table 67. This distinction refers to the Executive-Legislative relations. It means that the coalition in control of the Chamber was not the coalition supporting

the Executive Power. In other words, in these three periods the national government did not have (*was not able to form*) a majority coalition in the lower Chamber. Note that the Chilean is a *presidential system*. Therefore, the only decisive coalitions are the pre-electoral alliances (they are needed either to get the majority of votes in general elections or, until 1973, in the congress in the absence of a majority election).

**Table 68 - PARTY/COALITION, NUMBER, PERCENTAGE OF SEATS, AND TYPE OF RULING MAJORITIES/PLURALITIES BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1945-2002**

Legislative Period	Ruling Party-Coalition	Seats (No.)	Seats (%)	Total Seats (No.)	Majority/Plurality Type
1945-1949	APL45-CONS-PA-PL-PLP	74	50,34	147	RM ^a
1949-1953	LIDERS	80	54,42	147	RM
1953-1957	CONS-FENAFUI-MONAP 53 -PL-PR	75	51,01	147	RM
1957-1961	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56	74	50,34	147	RM
1961-1965	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	84	57,14	147	EM ^b
1965-1969	DC	82	55,78	147	EM
1969-1973	DC	56	37,33	150	RP^c
1973	CODE	87	58	150	EM
1990-1994	CONCERTACION	69	57,5	120	EM
1994-1998	CONCERTACION	70	58,32	120	EM
1998-2002	CONCERTACION	69	57,5	120	EM

a. Regular majority (0.50 ≤ s ≤ 0.55)


b. Exceptional majority (0.55 < s < 0.67)

c. Regular Plurality (S ≤ 0.46)

Majorities in control of the Chamber differ not only by their party or by their structure (single-party or coalitions), but also by number of seats they secured in Chamber. Using the typology presented in Chapter II (*Regular Plurality: $S \leq 0.46$; Exceptional Plurality: $0.46 < s < 0.50$; Regular Majority: $0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$; Exceptional Majority: $0.55 < s < 0.67$; Qualified Majority: $S \geq 0.67$), Table 68 shows that the Chilean lower Chamber was ruled*

by six exceptional majorities, four regular majorities, adding to this list the lonely single-party regular plurality (1969-1973).

In Table 68 we can also identify two blocs of majorities: from 1945 to 1961 *regular majorities*; since then, *exceptional majorities*. This difference can be appreciated in figure 5 too. Put it differently, we can see the effects of the 1958/1960 electoral reforms that reduced the number of parties in Chamber. According to Gil (1966, 216) “[T]he elimination of all electoral pacts (...) dealt a mortal blow to the *callampa* or fly-by-night party that flourished under the old system.” This effect will be also visible in the following description of the partisan composition of the Chamber by legislative periods.



Section 5. Partisan Composition of the Chamber by Legislative Periods

The reconstruction of the partnership of ruling coalitions, and of the detailed composition of the Chamber through time, is not an easy task due to the restless change of the Chilean multiparty system, particularly until the 1990s. To simplify as much as possible the presentation of this reconstruction, tables showing the complete composition of each period are included, paying attention to the Right-Center-Left distribution of parties and the membership of the eleven directing boards or Chilean *Mesas*.¹⁴⁴

5.1 *Legislative Period 1945-1949*

In 1945, a Center-right majority coalition shared the Chamber with a minority coalition that supported the Executive Power called the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (Table 70).

The ruling coalition was composed of Conservatives, Liberals, the old Agrarian Party - PA- (Partido Agrario), the *Ibañista* **People's Liberation Alliance -APL45- (Alianza Popular Libertadora)**, and the **Liberal Progressive Party -PLP- (Partido Liberal Progresista)**.

¹⁴⁴ To designate the directing board of the Chamber -composed of the President and two Vice-Presidents- I use the Chilean term "*Mesa*."

Table 69
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum,
Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1945-1949

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	CONS ^a	36	24,49
	PL ^b	31	21,09
	PLP ^c	3	2,04
	PD45 ^d	1	0,68
Subtotal RIGHT		71	48,3
C	PR ^e	40	27,21
	PD ^f	6	4,08
	FN ^g	3	2,04
	PA ^h	3	2,04
	APL45 ⁱ	1	0,68
Subtotal CENTER		53	36,05
L	PPN45 ^j	15	10,2
	PS ^k	6	4,08
	PSA ^l	2	1,36
Subtotal LEFT		23	15,64
TOTAL		147	100

- a. Conservative Party (Partido Conservador)
b. Liberal Party (Partido Liberal)
c. Liberal Progressive Party (Partido Liberal Progresista)
d. Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata)
e. Radical Party (Partido Radical)
f. Democratic Party (Partido Democrático)
g. National Falange (Falange Nacional)
h. Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario)
i. People's Liberation Alliance (Alianza Popular Libertadora)
j. Progressive National Party (Partido Progresista Nacional)
k. Socialist Party (Partido socialista)
l. Authentic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Auténtico)

Table 70
Mesa, Ruling Coalition, and
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE - 1945

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	CONS	
VP1	PA	
VP2	PL	
Ruling Coalition		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
APL45	1	0,68
CONS	36	24,49
PA	3	2,04
PL	31	21,09
PLP	3	2,04
Total	74	50,34
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PR	40	27,21
PPN45	15	10,2
PD	6	4,08
PS	6	4,08
PSA	2	1,36
Total	69	46,93

This coalition formed in May 1945 during the last year of the Radical President Ríos Morales. Several cabinet reshuffles that included Liberal ministers, the withdrawal of Socialists from the government, and divisions within the PR characterized Ríos Morales's administration. As Collier and Stater (1996, 245) point out, "given the level of political in-fighting it is no surprise that the opposition did well in the 1945 congressional elections."

The minority coalition grouped the following parties: PR, PPN₄₅, PD, PS, and PSA. The “**Progressive National Party**” -PPN₄₅- was actually *a label* used by the PC for these congressional elections. The **Authentic Socialist Party** -PSA- was a faction of the PS that had left the party in 1944 to support Ríos Morales’ administration.

The **Falangists** -FN-, who were outside the pact but supported the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, were a group of dissident Conservatives that had separated from the party in 1938, and would become the successful Christian Democrats in the late 1950s.¹⁴⁵ Finally, the lonely PD₄₅ was a rightist splinter of the Democratic Party.

In this Chamber rightist parties occupied 48% of the seats (Table 69). Though their pre-eminence would last one more period, they will progressively decrease until reaching their lowest percentage in 1965 (Table 79). The main parties, PR-CONS-PL, belong to the Centre-right. As Table 70 shows, the most important party, the Radicals with 40 seats, were part of the minority coalition.

5.2 *Legislative Period 1949-1953*

The ruling coalition in 1949 was the LIDERS. It was made up of (Li)berals, (De)mocrats, (R)adicals, and (S)ocialists (Table 72). This alliance was created to participate in the mid-term elections of 1949 that followed the approval of the Accursed Law promoted by the Radical President González Videla. Consequently, the LIDERS was formed by three parties (PR, PD, and PL), and one faction that had voted in favor of banning the Communists (the faction was the PS led by Juan B. Rosetti and

¹⁴⁵ In the early 1930s young Conservatives, in contrast to the mainstream of the party, espoused the views of the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and decided to implement them in the political realm. At the end of the decade they will become the Falangists.

Bernardo Ibañez who, helped by the government, kept for their group the label “Socialist Party”). As Drake argued (1978, 293), “González Videla new governing coalition with the Right retained control of Congress.”

Table 71
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1949-1953

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PL	33	22,45
	Const ^a	20	13,61
	CONS	9	6,12
	ConsSC ^b	4	2,72
	PLP	2	1,36
Subtotal RIGHT		68	46,26
C	PR	34	23,13
	PAL ^c	14	9,52
	PRDem ⁴⁹ _d	8	5,44
	PD	6	4,08
	FN	3	2,04
	ARCh ⁴⁹ _e	1	0,68
Subtotal CENTER		66	44,89
L	PSP ^f	6	4,08
	PS	5	3,4
	PDPu ⁴⁹ _g	1	0,68
	PSA	1	0,68
Subtotal LEFT		13	8,84
TOTAL		147	100

a. Traditionalist Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Tradicionalista)

b. Social Christian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Socialcristiano)

c. Agrarian Laborist Party (Partido Agrario Laborista)

d. Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Democrático)

e. Chilean Renewal Action (Acción Renovadora de Chile)

f. Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular)

g. People's Democratic Party (Partido Democrático del Pueblo)

Table 72
Mesa, LIDERS (Ruling Coalition) and FRAS - 1949

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	PR	
VP1	PS	
VP2	PD	
LIDERS (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PR	34	23,13
PL	33	22,45
PD	6	4,08
PS	5	3,4
PLP	2	1,36
Total	80	54,42
FRAS		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PAL	14	9,52
PRDem ⁴⁹	8	5,44
PSP	6	4,08
FN	3	2,04
Total	31	21,08

The non-communist opposition grouped in the FRAS (Radical-Agrarian-Socialist Falange) formed by (F)alangists, Democratic (R)adicals, (A)grarians, and Popular (S)ocialists. The **Democratic Radical Party -PRDem⁴⁹- (Partido Radical Democrático)** inside the FRAS was a faction of the Radicals who had opposed the

candidacy of President González Videla (PR) in 1946. The PSP was the majority of the PS led by Raúl Ampuero and Salvador Allende.

The clandestine Communists, for their part, had forged a coalition with the PSA, the PDPu49, and the PRDoc49 for these elections.¹⁴⁶ As we can see in Table 7, only the PSA and the PDPu49 secured 1 deputy each.

Outside the coalitions are the **Chilean Renewal Action -ARCh49- (Acción Renovadora de Chile)**, a group created for the 1949 elections that gathered independents who were disappointed of traditional parties; the factions of the Conservatives -the ConsSC and the ConsT-, and the PSA.¹⁴⁷ The **Agrarian Labor Party (PAL)** deserves special mention. It was created in December 1945 by the merger of the old Agrarian Party, the Ibañistas groups assembled in the **People's Liberation Alliance -APL45- (Alianza Popular Libertadora)**, and the **Nationalist Movement of Chile (Movimiento Nacionalista de Chile)** (Garay Vera 1990). These groups advocated the formation of a corporate state and were disenchanted by traditional parties. In 1953 Agrarians will be the main party within the *Ibañistas* groups.

In this Chamber rightist parties occupied 46% of the seats (Table 71). As it was in 1945, the main parties belong to the Centre-right (PR-CONS-PL), and the most important party was the PR, though this time it was part of the ruling coalition (Table 72).

¹⁴⁶ The **Doctrinaire Radical Party -PRDoc49- (Partido Radical Doctrinario)** was composed of left wing members of the PR.

¹⁴⁷ The ConsT were in favour of the law banning the PC and the ConsSC against it. The Conservatives' split formally took place *after* a complementary election held to replace Senator Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal who died in May 1949. The Journal of Sessions and the records of the Chamber, however, distinguish between ConsT and ConsSC since May 1949.

5.3 *Legislative Period 1953-1957*

“Eighteen parties obtained congressional representation” in the 1953 elections, says Etchepare Jensen in his study (2001, 19); “twenty parties,” according to Gil (1966, 79); nineteen for Nolhen (2005, 280); “many parties,” for other authors, and finally nineteen parties in the Journal of Sessions (my principal source). The new parties in the Chamber were those that had backed Senator Ibáñez del Campo’s successful candidacy to the Presidency (Nov. 1952). Despite Ibañez’s efforts, they split in three groups for the 1953 congressional elections (Table 74):¹⁴⁸

- The ephemeral **People’s National Alliance -ANAP- (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo)** composed of the PAL, PSP, PDPu49, PRDoc49, and the **Progressive Feminist Party -PPF- (Partido Progresista Femenino)**.¹⁴⁹ These were the *best organized* and more traditional groups of the *Ibañismo*;
- The **National Federation of Ibañistas -FENAFUI- (Federación Nacional de Fuerzas Ibañistas)** which consisted of the **National Christian Party -PNCr53- (Partido Nacional Cristiano)**, the ARCh49, the **National Ibañista Movement -MNI- Movimiento Nacional Ibañista**, the **National Union of Independents -UNI- (Unión Nacional de Independientes)**, and the **Feminist Party of Chile -PFCh- (Partido Femenino de Chile)**. The FENAFUI was led by future Senator María de la Cruz Toledo. Their members were against traditional parties and also rejected the ANAP because they considered that this alliance belonged to the *lazy and greedy* group of existing parties, and

¹⁴⁸ This description draws from Etchepare Jensen (2001).

¹⁴⁹ The PSP withdrew from the government in October 1953 and went to the opposition (Jobet 2003).

Table 73
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1953-1957

Right-Centre-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PL	22	14,97
	ConstT	16	10,88
	PNCr53 ^a	4	2,72
	ConsU ^b	2	1,36
	PLP	1	0,68
Subtotal RIGHT		45	30,61
C	PAL	26	17,69
	PR	17	11,56
	MNI53 ^c	6	4,08
	UNI53 ^d	4	2,72
	FN	3	2,04
	PRDoc49 ^e	3	2,04
	PA	2	1,36
	ARCh49	1	0,68
	MONAP53 ^f	1	0,68
	PLab53 ^g	1	0,68
	PD	1	0,68
Subtotal CENTER		65	44,21
L	PSP	20	13,61
	PS	12	8,16
	PDPu49	5	3,4
Subtotal LEFT		37	25,17
TOTAL		147	100

a. National Christian Party (Partido Nacional Cristiano)

b. United Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Unido)

c. National Ibañista Movement (Movimiento Nacional Ibañista)

d. National Union of Independents (Unión Nacional de Independientes)

e. Doctrinaire Radical Party (Partido Radical Doctrinario)

f. People's National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo)

g. Labor Party (Partido de los Trabajadores)

Table 74
Mesa, Ruling Coalition, FENAFUI
and ANAP - 1953

Mesa		
Position	Party	
P	UNI53	
VP1	ConstT	
VP2	PR	
Ruling Coalition		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PL	22	14,97
PR	17	11,56
ConstT	16	10,88
MNI53	6	4,08
UNI53	4	2,72
PNCr53	4	2,72
ConsU	2	1,36
ARCh49	1	0,68
MONAP53	1	0,68
PLab53	1	0,68
PLP	1	0,68
Total	75	51,01
FENAFUI		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
MNI53	6	4,08
PNCr53	4	2,72
UNI53	4	2,72
PLab53	1	0,68
ARCh49	1	0,68
Total	16	10,88
ANAP		
Delegation	Seats	Seats (%)
PAL	26	17,69
PSP	20	13,61
PDPu49	5	3,4
PRDoc49	3	2,04
Total	54	36,74

- The People's National Movement -MONAP53- (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo) led by former Colonel Ramón Álvarez Golsak.

The Chamber was ruled by a majority coalition of one *Ibañista* group (FENAFUI), and three traditional parties (the Conservatives, the Radicals, and the Liberals) (Table 74).¹⁵⁰ This *mixed* alliance was created six months after the victory of Ibáñez del Campo or, as Gil (1966, 79) argued, “when the Chilean electorate’s feelings against the traditional major parties were at the peak.” Even though *Ibañistas’* seats were enough to get the majority, their high level of fragmentation and their ideological differences resulted in this unexpected coalition. This was not the predicted alliance for two reasons: first, the participation of Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals countered the core message of President Ibáñez del Campo’s campaign (the rejection of traditional parties); second, the largest party and main supporter of Ibáñez, the PAL, was not part of it. According to Garay Vergara (1990), this absence should not be a surprise, due to the intricate relation between the PAL and Ibáñez del Campo.

The PS and the clandestine PC joined for these elections. They had supported Senator Allende for the presidential elections of 1952, and now were part of the opposition in Chamber.

In contrast to precedent periods, Center parties were prevalent (44%); the Left secured one-third of the seats; the three main parties belonged to the Center (PAL), the Right (PL), and the Left (PSP); and the PAL was the party that secured most seats in Chamber (Table 73).

Finally, it is interesting to mention that in May 1949 women were enfranchised (until 1949 they could vote in municipal elections). Women voted for the first time at national

¹⁵⁰ According to the database of the Library of the National Congress of Chile the campaign of the deputy of the PLP was supported by Ibáñez del Campo.

level in the presidential elections of 1952 and entered the Chamber in 1953 with a modest representation: one deputy, one senator.¹⁵¹

5.4 Legislative Period 1957-1961

President Ibáñez del Campo failed to fulfill his campaign promises. Furthermore, during his administration Chile suffered the worst inflationary episode of its history (Collier and Sater 1996).

Table 75
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats Legislative Period 1957-1961

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PL	30	20,41
	ConsU	22	14,97
	PN56 ^a	5	3,4
	CONS	2	1,36
Subtotal RIGHT		59	40,14
C	PR	36	24,49
	FN	14	9,52
	PAL	13	8,84
	PD	5	3,4
	IND ^b	3	2,04
	MR57 ^c	1	0,68
Subtotal CENTER		72	48,97
L	PS	7	4,76
	PSP	5	3,4
	PT57 ^d	4	2,72
Subtotal LEFT		16	10,88
TOTAL		147	100

- a. National Party 1956 (Partido Nacional)
b. Independents (Independientes)
c. Republican Movement (Movimiento Republicano)
d. Labor Party57 (Partido del Trabajo - Partido de los Trabajadores)

Table 76
Mesa, Ruling Coalition and FRAP - 1957

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	ConsU	
VP1	PL	
VP2	PAL	
Ruling Coalition		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PL	30	20,41
ConsU	22	14,97
PAL	13	8,84
PN56	5	3,4
IND	2	1,36
CONS	2	1,36
Total	74	50,34
FRAP		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PS	7	4,76
PSP	5	3,4
PD	5	3,4
PT57	4	2,72
Total	21	14,28

¹⁵¹ Actually, the first woman in Chamber was the Radical Inés Enríquez who was elected in a complementary election in 1950. The first woman elected to the *Mesa* (VP1) was the PPD Eliana Carball Martínez (22.06.1993).

The chaotic situation at the end of Ibañez del Campo's government benefited traditional parties. As Gil (1966, 80) put it, "the losers of 1953 were this time the winners (...) after the Ibañista fiasco, (...) voters were willing to put their faith again in the long-established political organizations."

Electoral results favored the PR -it became again the largest party in Chamber-, the PL, ConsU, and the FN. Therefore, the main parties again concentrated in the Center-right spectrum (Table 75).

The majority coalition consisted this time of five parties: Conservatives (ConsU and CONS), PL, PAL, PN56, and Independents (Table 76).¹⁵² As Table 75 shows, the *Ibañistas* groups either disappeared or decreased considerably. The only party supporting the national government in this coalition was the PAL, which represented 9% of the lower Chamber's seats.

The **Popular Action Front -FRAP- (Frente de Acción Popular)**, created one year earlier, entered the Chamber with 21 deputies, a representation that was less than what they expected (Table 76). Actually the Left lost more than half of the seats it had secured in 1953.

The three new parties are the **National Party -PN56-**, the **Labor Party -PT57-**, and the **Republican Movement -MR57-**. The first, which must not be confused with the future National Party of 1966, was formed by various splinters of the Agrarians, and was dissolved in 1958 after supporting the presidential candidacy of Alessandri Rodriguez (Right) (Bizzarro 2005, 553). The **Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo o Partido de los**

¹⁵² See Journal of Sessions June 4, 1957, p. 107.

Trabajadores) grouped former *Ibañistas* and clandestine Communists (e.g., Juan Acevedo Pávez, Juan Ahumada Trigo, and José Cademartori Ivernizzi). Finally, the MR57 was formed by conservative members that had backed President Ibáñez del Campo, and that would support the presidential candidacy of Alessandri Rodríguez (Right) (Bizzarro 2005, 488).

5.5 *Legislative Period 1961-1965*

This was the first legislative period after the electoral reforms of 1958 and 1960 that had prohibited candidates from running in more than one list for the same election, and proscribed electoral pacts (see section 3 in this chapter). These were also the first congressional elections for the flourishing Christian Democrats, for the reinstated Communists (the law banning the PC was repealed in 1958), and for the *enlarged FRAP* (Tables 77 and 78). As mentioned, this front was joined in 1960 by the **PADENA or National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional)**, “a residue of Carlos Ibañez’s followers who fused together in 1960” (Burnett 1970, 215).

A majority Center-right coalition of PL, ConsU, and PR called the (National) Democratic Front ruled the Chamber (Table 78).¹⁵³ As Petras (1969, 180) put it “because of the combined opposition of the FRAP and the Christian Democrats, the right-wing parties needed the support of the Radicals to obtain congressional majority.” Collier and Sater (1996, 258) argue that the Radicals were invited into Alessandri Rodríguez’s government in August 1961, and that the front was formally

¹⁵³ While some authors call this this front the “National Democratic Front” (Gil 1966), others call it the “Democratic Front” (Scully 1992, Collier and Sater 1996).

created in October of this year. Nonetheless, the coalition was already crystal clear in March 1961 when the Chamber elected a Radical president for the *Mesa* (Table 78).

Table 77
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1961-1965

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PL	28	19,05
	ConsU	17	11,56
Subtotal RIGHT		45	30,61
C	PR	39	26,53
	DC ^a	23	15,65
	PADENA ^b	12	8,16
Subtotal CENTER		74	50,34
L	PC ^c	16	10,88
	PS	12	8,16
Subtotal LEFT		28	19,04
TOTAL		147	100

a. Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)

b. National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional)

c. PC Communist Party (Partido Comunista)

Table 78
Mesa, DEMOCRATIC FRONT (Ruling Coalition) and FRAP - 1961

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	PR	
VP1	ConsU	
VP2	PL	
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PR	39	26,53
PL	28	19,05
ConsU	17	11,56
Total	84	57,14
FRAP		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PC	16	10,88
PADENA	12	8,16
PS	12	8,16
Total	40	27,2

The PR added 39 deputies to the PL-ConsU group composed of 45 legislators. This support brought to the Chamber the first exceptional majority coalition of the period.

The subtotals in Table 77 show the beginning of a shift of the electorate toward the Center, moderate, and extreme Left. Except for the 1953-1957 period, two of the three main parties were always rightist groups. This time the centrist DC and the PADENA occupied this place and the Left almost doubled its representation. In particular, the reinstated PC secured 16 of the 28 seats of the Left.

5.6 Legislative Period 1965-1969

For the first (and last) time, Christian Democrats secured a single-party exceptional majority (Table 80). According to J. S. Valenzuela (1995, 47), the 1965 congressional elections took place “under the full glow of the newly inaugurated presidency of Eduardo Frei.” From then on the DC would be the largest single political party in Chile until 2001. Consequently, these elections marked the end of the long-lasting supremacy of Radicals, who dropped from 39 to 20 seats.

The tendency in favor of the Center-Left is now clear. The Right, which has always been the first (1945-1949), or second (1953-1961) bloc in the Chamber, occupies now the third place (6%) well behind the Left (22%) (Table 79).

Table 79
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats Legislative Period 1965-1969

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PL	6	4,08
	ConsU	3	2,04
Subtotal RIGHT		9	6,12
C	DC	82	55,78
	PR	20	13,61
	PADENA	3	2,04
Subtotal CENTER		105	71,43
L	PC	18	12,24
	PS	15	10,2
Subtotal LEFT		33	22,44
TOTAL		147	100

Table 80
Mesa, Ruling Party and FRAP - 1965

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	DC	
VP1	DC	
VP2	DC	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	82	55,78
Total	82	55,78
FRAP		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PC	18	12,24
PS	15	10,2
Total	33	22,44

These elections, however, marked a decrease for FRAP. Note that the Front lost one of its partners, the PADENA, which decided to support President Frei Montalva after his victory in the 1964 elections.

5.7 *Legislative Period 1969-1973*

The reforms implemented by President Frei Montalva's administration (e.g., agrarian reform, new social programs, fiscal innovations, diversification of markets, a larger role of the state in Chilean industry) were too revolutionary for the Right, and not transformative enough for the Left -including the left-wing of the DC-. Furthermore, the "perennial Chilean problem of inflation continued to haunt the PDC government" (Collier and Sater 1996, 318).

The polarized Chamber of 1969 reflected this situation. While the blocs of the Right and the Left increased their representation, the Center, particularly the DC, suffered important losses, but the PR modestly gained a handful of seats. Therefore, a coalition between the PR *and* the Right *or* the Left was at hand to get the control of the Chamber. Nevertheless, the traditional politics of compromise or coalition building in which the PR had a central role were over. The lack of agreement among the parties of the opposition allowed the DC to become again the ruling party, though this time a plurality one (Table 82).

Table 81
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left
Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1969-1973

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PN66 ^a	33	22
Subtotal RIGHT		33	22
C	DC	56	37,33
	PR	24	16
Subtotal CENTER		80	53,33
L	PC	22	14,67
	PS	15	10
Subtotal LEFT		37	24,67
TOTAL		150	100

a. National Party
(Partido Nacional)

Table 82
Mesa, Ruling Party and FRAP - 1969

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	DC	
VP1	DC	
VP2	DC	
Ruling Party		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	56	37,33
Total	56	37,33
FRAP		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PC	22	14,67
PS	15	10
Total	37	24,67

The new party in Chamber was the rightist **National Party -PN66- (Partido Nacional)** (Table 81). It was the result of the merger of the Liberal, Conservative (Unido), and **National Action -AN- (Acción Nacional)** parties in 1966. Note also that the 15 Socialists deputies, though unified in Chamber, were divided into two factions: 9 belonged to the PS, and 6 to the **Popular Socialist Union -USP- Unión Socialista Popular**, a Raúl Ampuero's faction created in 1967.

5.8 Legislative Period 1973

The 1973 congressional elections offered Chileans two opposite coalitions: the **Democratic Confederation -CODE- (Confederación Democrática)**, and the **Federation of the Popular Unity** -the label of the UP for these elections-. The result was that "each side drew up a joint slate, making polarization of Chilean politics complete" (A. Valenzuela 1994, 106).

The **CODE** was the exceptional ruling coalition (Table 84). It consisted of the following parties: PN66, DC, PADENA, **Radical Democracy Party -PDR69- (Partido Democracia Radical)**, and the **Left Radical Party -PIR- (Partido de la Izquierda Radical)**. The PDR69 was a Radical splinter. Their members left the party and joined right-wing groups when Radicals decided to support Salvador Allende in 1969.¹⁵⁴ The PIR was originally an Allende supporter that broke with the Popular Unity and joined the DC in 1972 due to opposed views over the Social Property Area issue.

The Federation of the Popular Unity gathered Socialists, Communists, Radicals, the **Social Democrat Party -PSD- (Partido Social Demócrata)**, the **Movement for United Popular Action -MAPU- (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria)**, the **Independent Popular Action -API- (Acción Popular Independiente)**, and the **Christian Left Party -IC- (Izquierda Cristiana)**. The MAPU was formed by members of the left-wing of the DC that left the party to join the UP in May 1969. The API was a creation of a former *Ibañista* supporter (Senator Rafael Tarud). Finally, the IC was also a scission of the DC that rejected the relation of its party with the rightist PN66. Its members joined the UP in June 1971.

These elections took place in the midst of a monumental economic and political national crisis. For both coalitions, the CODE and the UP, they “marked an apogee of conflict and testing” (Drake 1978, 329).

¹⁵⁴ The PDR69 was led by Julio Durán, Inés Enriquez, and Angel Faiwovich.

Table 83
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1973

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	PN66	34	22,67
	PDR69 ^a	2	1,33
Subtotal RIGHT		36	24
C	DC	50	33,33
	PR	5	3,33
	API ^b	2	1,33
	PIR ^c	1	0,67
Subtotal CENTER		58	38,66
L	PS	28	18,67
	PC	24	16
	IC ^d	2	1,33
	MAPU ^e	2	1,33
Subtotal LEFT		56	37,33
TOTAL		150	100

a. Radical Democracy Party (Partido Democracia Radical)

b. Independent Popular Action (Acción Popular Independiente)

c. Left Radical Party (Partido de la Izquierda Radical)

d. Christian Left Party (Izquierda Cristiana)

e. Movement for United Popular Action (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria)

Table 84
Mesa, CODE (Ruling Coalition) and
FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY -
1973

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	DC	
VP1	PN66	
VP2	PIR	
CODE (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	50	33,33
PN66	34	22,67
PDR69	2	1,33
PIR	1	0,67
Total	87	58
FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
PS	28	18,67
PC	24	16
PR	5	3,33
API	2	1,33
IC	2	1,33
MAPU	2	1,33
Total	63	41,99

The slogan of the opposition was “Not just a new Congress, but a new government” (Oppenheim 2007, 67). It wanted to impeach Allende to end his “transition to Socialism.” The government, in turn, accused the CODE of plotting a military coup. The results of the “electoral test” brought no solution. The CODE took control of the Chamber, but did not secure enough seats for impeachment. The UP surprised the opposition with its electoral performance. As Oppenheim (2007, 69) put it, “it was unusual for the party in power to gain seats in the midterm election.” *For all intents and purposes*, however, the UP remained a minority government.

5.9 *Legislative Period 1990-1994*

General Pinochet followed all the necessary steps he believed appropriate in order to put an end to the multiparty system (e.g., the adoption of a binominal electoral system in favor of the Right, and a new constitution that banned parties of the Left, to mention only *legal* means). Moreover, he built a new Congress in Valparaíso “as a means of deflating the egos of politicians by removing their main forum from Santiago” (Collier and Sater 2004, 382).¹⁵⁵ A. Valenzuela (1994, 112) argues, however, that “[T]he resurgence of a strong multiparty system in the aftermath of the military rule is vivid testimony to the failure of those measures.”

The first-time concurrent presidential-legislative elections of 1989 brought to the Chamber an exceptional majority of the Center-left *Concertación*. In addition to the traditional DC and PR, it was composed of the **Party for Democracy -PPD- (Partido por la Democracia)** that assembled the centrist-leaning Núñez Socialists and other groups (Scully 1992, 196), and the **Humanist-Green Alliance -AHVerde- (Alianza Humanista Verde)** that was a progressive, environmental alliance (Table 86). The greens, led by Laura Rodríguez, came into being in the late 1980s with an ecological agenda (Bizzarro 2005, 549).

¹⁵⁵ Collier and Sater argue that this new building was one of Pinochet’s final schemes, an “old deal with Admiral Merino,” and characterize it as a “half neo-Babylonian, half post-modernist atrocity across the street from the bus terminal” (Collier and Sater 2004, 382).

Table 85
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1990-1994

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	RN ^a	29	24,17
	UDI ^b	11	9,17
	ILB ^c	8	6,67
Subtotal RIGHT		48	40,01
C	DC	38	31,67
	ILA ^d	9	7,5
	PR	5	4,17
	IND	1	0,83
	AHVerde ^e	1	0,83
Subtotal CENTER		54	45
L	PPD ^f	16	13,33
	PAIS89 ^g	2	1,66
Subtotal LEFT		18	14,99
TOTAL		120	100

a. National Renewal Party (Partido Renovación Nacional)

b. Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente)

c. Independents List "B"

d. Independents List "A"

e. AHVerde Humanist-Green Alliance (Alianza Humanista Verde)

f. Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia). It can be better classified as a Center-left party.

g. Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista)

Table 86
Mesa, CONCERTACION
(Ruling Coalition) and DEMOCRACY
AND PROGRESS - 1990

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	PPD	
VP1	DC	
VP2	UDI	
<i>CONCERTACION (Ruling Coalition)</i>		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	38	31,67
PPD	16	13,33
ILA	9	7,5
PR	5	4,17
AHVerde	1	0,83
Total	69	57,5
<i>DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS</i>		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
RN	29	24,17
UDI	11	9,17
ILB	8	6,67
Total	48	40,01

The ruling *Concertación* shared the Chamber with the **Democracy and Progress** coalition (**Pacto Democracia y Progreso**). This new coalition of the Right gathered the **National Renovation -RN- (Renovación Nacional)** and the **Independent Democratic Union -UDI- (Unión Demócrata Independiente)**. RN was, and would be for the next two elections, the largest party inside the Right coalition (Table 86).

"ILA" and "ILB" were the independents that run together with the *Concertación* and with Democracy and Progress, respectively (Table 85).

The **Broad Party of the Socialist Left -PAIS89-** (**Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista**) was the party created by the harder-line Almeyda Socialists together with the PC, and the Christian left (Scully 1992, 196). The PC did not obtain congressional representation from 1989 to 2002.

5.10 Legislative Periods 1994-1998_1998-2002

After four years of reinforcement of democratic consensus enhanced by economic success, the second-time concurrent presidential-legislative elections again gave the victory to the *Concertación*.

Table 87
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1994-1998

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	RN	29	24,17
	UDI	15	12,5
	ILB	4	3,33
	UCCP ^a	2	1,67
Subtotal RIGHT		50	41,67
C	DC	37	30,82
	PR	2	1,67
	ILD ^b	1	0,83
Subtotal CENTER		40	33,32
L	PPD	15	12,5
	PS	15	12,5
Subtotal LEFT		30	25
TOTAL		120	100

a. Center-Center Union (Unión de Centro Centro Progresista)

b. Independents List "D"

Table 88
Mesa, *CONCERTACION* (Ruling Coalition) and UNION OF THE PROGRESS FOR CHILE - 1994

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	PPD	
VP1	DC	
VP2	RN	
CONCERTACION (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	37	30,82
PS	15	12,5
PPD	15	12,5
PR	2	1,67
ILD	1	0,83
Total	70	58,32
UNION FOR THE PROGRESS OF CHILE		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
RN	29	24,17
UDI	15	12,5
ILB	4	3,33
UCCP	2	1,67
Total	50	41,67

The Center-left coalition secured one more time the majority in Chamber. The PS, as an autonomous party, was part of it in 1994 (Table 88).¹⁵⁶

The rightist coalition **Union for the Progress of Chile (Unión por el Progreso de Chile)** had a third associate, the **Center-Center Union Party -UCCP- (Unión de Centro Centro Progresista)**, a small right-wing party led by Francisco Javier Errázuriz (Table 88).

Both coalitions held firm for the 1997 congressional elections. The new partner of the *Concertación* was then the **Social Democrat Party -PRSD94- (Partido Radical Social Demócrata)** (the merger of the PR with the Social Democrats in August 1994) (Tables 89 and 90).

The label chosen by the RN and the UDI for their coalition this time was **Union for Chile (Unión por Chile)**. The union included the **Party of the South -PSur- (Partido del Sur)**, a rightist party limited to the 8th, 9th, and 10th regions (Table 90).

During these last three legislative periods the seats secured by each party remained relatively stable, the exception being the parties of the Right. While the UDI progressively increased its representation from 11 to 17 deputies from 1990 to 1998, the RN lost 6 seats in the 1998 elections (Tables 85, 87, and 89), though it remained the main party of the Right.

¹⁵⁶ As noted, during President Aylwin's administration the PS was reinstated. Therefore, many Socialists that had used the PPD as an "instrumental party" in the 1989 elections opted to go back to the PS.

Table 89
Chamber's Partisan Composition by Right-Center-Left Spectrum, Party, Number and Percentage of Seats
Legislative Period 1998-2002

Right-Center-Left Spectrum	Party	Seats	Seats (%)
R	RN	23	19,17
	UDI	17	14,17
	ILB	6	5
	UCCP	2	1,67
	PSur ^a	1	0,83
Subtotal RIGHT		49	40,84
C	DC	38	31,67
	PRSD ⁹⁴ _b	4	3,33
	IND	2	1,67
Subtotal CENTER		44	36,67
L	PPD	16	13,33
	PS	11	9,16
Subtotal LEFT		27	22,49
TOTAL		120	100

a. Party of the South (Partido del Sur)

b. Radical Social Democrat Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata)

Table 90
Mesa, *CONCERTACION*
(Ruling Coalition) and UNION FOR CHILE - 1998

<i>Mesa</i>		
Position	Party	
P	DC	
VP1	PPD	
VP2	PS	
<i>CONCERTACION</i> (Ruling Coalition)		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
DC	38	31,67
PPD	16	13,33
PS	11	9,16
PRSD ⁹⁴	4	3,33
Total	69	57,49
UNION FOR CHILE		
Party	Seats	Seats (%)
RN	23	19,17
UDI	17	14,17
ILB	6	5
PSur	1	0,83
Total	47	39,17

It is interesting to note that despite its clear majority, and in contrast to all precedent periods, the *Concertación* ruling coalition had from 1990 to 1998 a VP2 from the opposition in the *Mesas* (Tables 86 and 88). This decision, abruptly abandoned in 1998, was adopted during a period of "participative changes," as we will see in the following chapter.

Politics of accommodation, creation and break up of alliances, splits, mergers and reunifications, the progressive decline of traditional parties and the late emergence of stable and cohesive political blocs, successive governments that cover all the ideological spectrum and even a dictatorship that failed to change the essence of the multiparty Chilean political system. The analysis of the institutional development of the Chilean lower Chamber is immersed in this context. This is a Chamber whose main institutional features are the result of the combination of a progressive democratic constitution of the 1920s and three fundamental legal instruments of the dictatorship: the constitution of 1980, the binominal electoral system, and the law of the National Congress. This is a Latin American lower Chamber that except for the years of military government *has always functioned effectively according to constitutional rules*. This is also a Chamber of majority coalitions in which Center parties have an essential role, and where dominant parties are as atypical as pluralities. The two unique cases, one of a single-party majority, the other of a single-party plurality, relate, of course, with a Center party, or, I may say, with *the* Center party of the Christian Democrats. Beyond this uncommon feature, nothing extreme can be said about Chilean ruling coalitions since their membership was always in the range of 50% and 58% of the seats. Regarding this range, 1961 marks the emergence of exceptional majorities, a tendency that continued until the 2000s. Contrasting with the restless change of coalitions and of the distribution of parties in the Right-Center-Left spectrum until the 1970s, after the return to democracy the Chamber was ruled by three successive exceptional majorities that belonged to the same coalition. The stability, consistency, and duration of these

ruling coalitions (and of those of the opposition) are a *rara avis* in the Chilean political history, and were all but the expected results after seventeen years of dictatorship.

CHAPTER VI

Reconstructing Patterns of Institutional Development

Chilean Chamber of Deputies

1945-2002

The general context portrayed in the last chapter gives the necessary descriptive tools that enable the analysis of the patterns of the Chamber's institutional development. Now is the time to reconstruct these patterns, and find out if they support or contradict the predictions of the Cartel Theory. To reconstruct these patterns I specify when, by whom, how, and why rules and norms concerning the reforms to the *Reglamento* (Part I), the directing board system or Chilean *Mesa* (Part II), and the standing committee system (Part III) were modified or maintained. Throughout the study special attention is paid to the role played by ruling coalitions, the electoral system in force, and the ruling-coalition type in the Chamber at the time of the reform or maintenance of these organizational rules and norms. As it was for the Argentine case, the analysis is oriented by the expectations that come from the general hypothesis: *when a legislative coalition becomes the ruling coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural cartel, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor*. Part IV presents the conclusion. I summarize the patterns found, and offer an initial evaluation of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory regarding the Chilean case.

The Chilean lower Chamber has been ruled by nine coalitions and only in two occasions by a single party (1965-1969; 1969-1973), as we saw in chapter V. For this reason, I will use throughout this chapter the terms "ruling coalitions" when referring to the parties (coalitions or single parties) that were in charge of the Chamber. The distinction between "ruling coalitions" and "ruling party" will be made in the tables. The terms "ruling party" will be used in the particular sections devoted to analyze patterns of development related to the legislative periods 1965-1969 and 1969-1973.

Part I. Reforms to the *Reglamento*

In this part I study the four main general reforms to the *Reglamento* of the Chilean Chamber of 1967, 1969, 1990, and 1994, and one precise amendment that took place in 1953. Changes to the directing board system or Chilean *Mesa*, and to the standing committee system are dealt with later in this chapter. The predictions to be tested are: 1- *Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling coalitions are adopted on straight party-line vote*; 2- *The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling coalitions and/or accrue their advantages.*

To help understand the analysis it is important to keep in mind that: a) reforms to the *Reglamento* require a report of the standing *Committee on Rules and House Administration* before being considered on the floor; b) to refer to this committee I use the acronym "R&HA"; c) to designate the directing board of the Chamber -composed of the President and two Vice-Presidents- I use the Chilean term "*Mesa*"; d) *Mesa* members are part of the Committee on R&HA in their own right, and the President of the Chamber is its Chair; e) according to a Chilean legislative tradition, "technical committees" refer to all standing committees except the *Hacienda* Committee; f) reproducing the structure of chapter IV, the analysis of each reform begins with a brief description of the political situation in the Chamber as well as the proponents and their goals, follows with an account of the main amendments, and ends with a verdict about how well the Cartel Theory fares in this case.

Changes in the standing committee system mentioned in this and next sections can be seen in APPENDIX H.

Section 1. The 1953 Reform: **“No More Dumb Deputies in this Honourable Chamber”**¹⁵⁷

This amendment, whose goal was to facilitate the creation of delegations to minor parties, was tabled two times (in June 1949 by Falangists and Agrarians, and in June 1951 by **Falangists, Socialists, and Agrarians**), and finally approved in June 1953. In 1949 or 1951 this revision had no chance to pass. The minor groups that had tabled it were part of a fragmented opposition. The situation changed in 1953 when the Chamber was full of fragmented *Ibañistas* parties that had backed the candidacy of President Ibáñez del Campo (IND).

In the Chilean Chamber every deputy should belong to a delegation. Until 1953, parties with less than 12 deputies had to either gather and form an *Independent* delegation or enter in one of the delegations of the main parties. In the chambers of 1949 and 1953 *Independent* delegations were not only overcrowded but also composed of ideologically different parties.¹⁵⁸ These mega caucuses were difficult to represent (their leaders belonged to one of the multiple parties that composed them) and, despite their number and diversity, they only had a unique time allotted to make speeches on the floor. The reform authorized parties with less than 12 deputies to merge with other(s) minor parties until reaching the number of 12.

This reform *was not introduced* by members of the ruling coalition in 1953 (CONFENAFUI-MONAP₅₃-PL-PR). Furthermore, Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals did not benefit because each party had enough deputies to form its own delegations.

¹⁵⁷ Deputy Galvarino Rivera (PLab53), Journal 02.06.53, p. 85.

¹⁵⁸ In 1949 there were 15 parties in Chamber, 11 of them with less than 12 deputies. In 1953 there were 19 parties in Chamber, 13 of them with less than 12 deputies (see Tables 71 and 73 in chapter V).

Nonetheless, it received their approval. The reason is that it benefited the 10 fragmented *Ibañistas* parties, 5 of which were part of the group of parties that had nominated the President of the Chamber (FENAFUI). This means that the ruling coalition was “functioning” and that this time, in contrast to what happened in 1949, the reform was approved because it suppressed dispositions detrimental to one of its partners.

Section 2. The 1967 Reform: “Proportionality for All Parties and Equality for All Committees (Except for *Hacienda*)”

As explained in the last chapter, the Chamber was ruled by a single-party **majority only once (1965-1969 / Christian Democrat Party -DC-)**. The general amendment that took place in this period was tabled by the DC President of the Chamber, but the final report of the Committee on R&HA included many other changes proposed by other deputies. **Its main goals aimed at limiting discretionary committee assignments, expediting work in committees, reorganizing the time-allotting on the floor, and improving the congressional oversight of the Executive Power.**

The most significant changes introduced in the committee system were **the creation and renaming of standing committees, a new procedure to assign committee seats, the prohibition of multiple assignments, and the limits set to the *Hacienda* Committee’s powers.**¹⁵⁹

Regarding *committee seats*, the reform introduced a coefficient to make committee assignments, and established that a deputy may not serve simultaneously as a

¹⁵⁹ One standing committee was created and six committees were renamed to match the ministries of the Executive Power.

member of more than two standing committees, unless explicit authorization of the Chamber.¹⁶⁰

The *delimitation of the jurisdiction* of the *Hacienda* Committee tried to solve an old problem. This committee has always been the most influential and powerful institution of the committee system. In addition to its jurisdictional subject-matters (bills concerning public expenditures), the *Hacienda* Committee is referred bills reported by the rest of the committees (the “technical committees”) if they affect the federal budget, and the financial situation of the state and its corporations. This referral, known as the “financing analysis,” has troubled technical committees because *Hacienda* tends to exceed its jurisdiction reporting on (or vetoing) the whole bill or rules whose study belongs to the former. Chilean deputies called this extended (and controversial) analysis the “*revision or control power*” of *Hacienda*.

To end this dispute the 1967 reform introduced: a) a detailed description of *Hacienda*’s jurisdiction; b) an explicit prohibition by which it could not analyze other parts of the bills not related to the “financing analysis”, and c) a mandate to technical committees directing that they should make an itemized list of the rules *Hacienda* must analyze before sending bills to the “financing analysis.” The reform, however, allowed referrals to *Hacienda* when “for whatever reason” technical committees did not report on their bills. During the debate deputies claimed to end with the “tutorial or control” role assumed by *Hacienda*, and demanded respect for the jurisdictions of the rest of the

¹⁶⁰ For a detailed explanation of committee assignments and of this coefficient go to section 11.1 in this chapter.

committees.¹⁶¹ Liberals, some Christian Democrats, and the Chair of *Hacienda* expressed their rejection to the reform but accepted it because their representatives in the Committee on R&HA had “given their word” to this change.

Besides these significant changes, the opinion of the minority was introduced in committee reports (just the opinion, not “minority reports”), and the Chamber **was allowed to fix deadlines to committees in order to report. As to the floor procedure, the new coefficient to allocate committee seats was also applied** to allot time for debates. In addition, a minimum of 15 minutes was established for all delegations for the *Incidentes*.¹⁶²

Overall, this reform fixed objective rules to avoid discretionary decisions. In this sense, it was a response to years of discussions and demands of fair play regarding committee assignments, the allotting of time on the floor, and the powers of the *Hacienda* Committee. To assess these changes in terms of the Cartel Theory it is necessary to distinguish between immediate and long-term effects. The direct and great gain of the ruling party was the reorganization of the time-allotting on the floor: the DC, with 72 deputies in 1967, passed from 30 to 88 minutes in the *Incidentes*. To secure this gain, it guaranteed a minimum of 15 minutes to delegations with less than 12 deputies. The losers were the medium-size delegations of the opposition (Radicals with 19 deputies, Communists with 18 deputies, and Socialists with 17 deputies). These

¹⁶¹ Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 12.07.67, p. 1039. José O. Millas Correa (PC), Journal 20.07.67, p. 1493.

¹⁶² The period of “Incidentes” in the Chilean lower Chamber is similar to the “The Hour” in Argentina. Opposition deputies use this term to express their views about current events, justify their position in certain issues, and exercise the congressional oversight of the executive branch.

delegations, which had until 1967 a minimum of 30 minutes, lost an average of 9 minutes per session. The power to fix deadlines to committees **in order to report** is another substantial gain of the ruling party because with a simple majority -a quick vote- it can expedite the analysis of bills of its interest. The suppression of multiple assignments is, by contrast, a loss for the majority party because it limits its negotiation power.

As to *Hacienda*, beyond the introduction of bureaucratic measures, the immediate and chief effects were its new *subsidiary* role (from then on it would be referred bills that "for whatever reason" were not reported by technical committees), and the suppression of its *control* role (the financial analysis could not be extended to the whole bill). The new *subsidiary* role implied a gain to the ruling party because *Hacienda* was then over its control. As we will see in section 10, *Hacienda* will be always jealously defended by its members (no matter the party they belong to), and by ruling coalitions because of its jurisdiction. Hence, the *Hacienda* "problem" could be defined as a "*Hacienda & ruling coalitions vs. technical committees' affair.*" For the same reasons, the suppression of its *control* role was an important loss for the majority party.

Finally, the adoption of a coefficient to allocate committee seats had no direct impact because assignments had been already done at the beginning of the period. Therefore, its effects can only be appreciated in the following legislative periods. Nevertheless, by this reform the majority party renounced to "interpret" the proportionality rule, a discretionary procedure that had enabled previous majority coalitions to have over-

representation in the committee system.¹⁶³ In a nutshell, by fixing “objective rules” the majority party gained more control of floor proceedings but lost important advantages. For these reasons the Cartel Theory is disconfirmed.

Section 3. The 1969 Reform: “The Technical Amendment”

This revision, proposed by three Christian Democrat deputies and reported by the unanimous consent of the Committee on R&HA, was presented and approved in less than one month. Its analysis took place right after the congressional elections of 1969 in which the DC lost its majority, and before the renewal of the Chamber that would be controlled by a DC single-party *plurality*.

The goal of this amendment was to address the errors and lacunas that had been detected since the approval of the 1967 reform, particularly regarding the legislative procedure inside committees. This was a “technical”, “apolitical” proposal “prepared with affection by experienced functionaries of the Chamber” that contained only “minima and essential” changes.¹⁶⁴

Despite its “technical” character and overwhelming consensus, the Communists expressed their disagreement with this reform arguing that it was the wrong time to do it since “the next composition of the Chamber will be completely different from the actual membership.”¹⁶⁵

This general amendment introduced, among other changes, a title of 98 rules that adapted the procedure in force for the floor to the functioning of standing committees.

¹⁶³ See section 11.1.

¹⁶⁴ Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3155/65.

¹⁶⁵ Juan Acevedo Pávez (PC), Journal 22.04.69, p. 3167.

In particular, it suppressed the 1967 prohibition of multiple assignments, it ordered that Chairs of technical committees should be in charge of drafting the itemized list of rules *Hacienda* should study in the “financing analysis”, and enlarged the jurisdiction of the newly created (1968) Committee on Latin American Integration.¹⁶⁶

The “technical” tone of the debate changed completely when deputies discussed the reform to the functions of the *Hacienda* Committee. While the report of the Committee on R&HA proposed that *Hacienda* could analyze other aspects of a bill not related to the “financing analysis” if the *committee agreed to proceed this way* -this meaning the majority of the deputies present in the committee-, the President of the Chamber (Héctor Valenzuela Valderrama -DC-) and Patricio Phillips Peñafiel (Liberal) proposed that the committee could do so if only *one of its members* asked it. After a bitter exchange of opinions the Chamber approved the Committee on R&HA’s report.¹⁶⁷

This “technical” reform had two important political gains for the ruling party. For one part, the President recovered the prerogative to make multiple assignments, an important legislative tool of negotiation. For the other part, the ruling party in *Hacienda* got back its “control” function. Note that when deputies approved the *unanimous* Committee of R&HA’s report they authorized *Hacienda* to analyze bills entirely *if the majority of its* (present) *members* decided so, skipping in this way the explicit prohibition established in 1967. In other words, *Hacienda* regained its revisory function. And when the powers of *Hacienda* increase, the power of the ruling party that controls it increases as well. And when that happens, the Cartel Theory is supported.

¹⁶⁶ This revision also introduced changes to the rules related to censure motions against the *Mesa* (see section 9).

¹⁶⁷ See section 10.3.

Section 4. The 1990 Reform: “The Participative *Reglamento*”

After the 1989 congressional elections that marked the end of the dictatorship, a multiparty group began the analysis of a new *Reglamento* for the Chamber.¹⁶⁸ The result of five months of study was a real code (the new *Reglamento* has a preliminary title, four books, and 12 titles) that produced more than one hundred changes. The goals were oriented to update legislative rules to the political and social Chilean landscape of the 1990s, and to adapt them to the Constitution of 1980 and to the “Constitutional Law of the National Congress” adopted by the dictatorship.¹⁶⁹ The document of the multiparty group was reported in June by the Committee on H&RA which was made up of 8 deputies of the *Concertación* (the then ruling majority coalition), and 5 deputies of the Right. The new *Reglamento* was approved in July 1990. As an experienced DC deputy argued, until 1973 «only the President ruled and administrated the Chamber.”¹⁷⁰ This long-lasting monopoly ended with the regulation of the functions of the *Mesa* and of the Committee on R&HA. With respect to the *Mesa*, the reform put in charge of its important decisions, namely the daily agenda-setting and committee-assignment functions, previously in the hands of its President. Likely, the administration, budgeting, and the human resources management, all presidential responsibilities shared with the Committee on R&HA, were definitely transferred to the latter. Nevertheless, new prerogatives were accorded to the President of the Chamber

¹⁶⁸ The multiparty group was composed of 15 elected deputies: 8 from the Right (6 RN and 2 UDI), 6 from the Center-left (4 DC and 2 PR), and 1 independent.

¹⁶⁹ The Law no. 18.918, called the “Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Congreso Nacional,” was adopted by Pinochet’s administration on February 5, 1990, one month before the inauguration of President Patricio Aylwin Azócar (DC). It was reformed in 1991, 1994, 1999, and 2001 due its evident legal lacunas, and also to the limits and prohibitions it established to the Legislative Power.

¹⁷⁰ Baldemar Carrasco Muñoz (DC), Journal 06.06.90, p. 468. The 1990-1994 was his third term in the Chamber.

by the Constitutional Law of the National Congress: the rejection of bills and amendments. In the first case, the bill dies before referral. In the second case, the amendment is suppressed and not considered on the floor or in committee (this prerogative was also accorded to committee Chairs).

This revision reduced the minimum size of delegations from 12 to 9 deputies (note that the Chamber had 120 deputies instead of 150), adding that each party could form *one delegation per 9 deputies they had in the Chamber*. In other words, from 1990 on there are parties with more than one delegation. Besides, the reform introduced the **position of "Delegation Leader"** and its functions. This leader represents the delegation in the also new "Leaders Delegation's Meeting" chaired by the President of the Chamber, whose decisions are adopted by a weighted voting system.¹⁷¹ A decision adopted by the unanimous consent of these leaders is mandatory for the Chamber.

The new *Reglamento* fixed a strict proportionality for the *Incidentes* and suppressed the minimum of 15 minutes established in 1967 (a motion raised by a PPD deputy to fix a minimum of 8 minutes for minor delegations was rejected). The use of these terms was organized on the basis of a rotation system (following a proposition of PPD and Socialist deputies).¹⁷² Also related to the procedure, the reform introduced a third type of voting: the abstention. This change, deputy Juan A. Coloma Correa (UDI) argued, would allow the expression of a "perfectly legitimate position."¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ As mentioned in chapter IV by this system every delegation leader possesses a number of votes equal to the size of her delegation in the Chamber.

¹⁷² By this system all delegations would be assigned the first term during the legislative period, according the first term of the rotation to the majority or first plurality party.

¹⁷³ Journal 06.06.90, p. 17.

Regarding the staff of the Chamber, this reform broke with a long tradition related to the election of the highest officials of the Chamber. Until 1973 only the Secretary General was elected (and could be removed) by the Chamber. From then on the Chamber would also elect (and remove) the Pro-Secretary and the Secretary-Chief of Committees.

Concerning the committee system, this amendment ratified a decision adopted by the Chamber in March 1990 by which two new standing committees were created and six were renamed.

During the debate the National Renewal Party (RN-Right) supported the reform but insisted on a proposal that had been rejected by the multiparty group, by the Committee on R&HA's report, and that would be rejected on the floor. The proposition was to apply the proportionality rule to the election of *committee Chairs*. Members of the majority coalition replied that these positions would be elected as they had always been elected: *according to political agreements*.¹⁷⁴ Besides, RN deputies (and some DC members) criticized the lack of definition of committee jurisdictions, giving as an example the problems caused by the creation of the Committee on Human Rights, whose functions had began to interfere with those of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The willingness to encourage participation, collective decisions, to democratize, and decentralize the political and administrative control of the Chamber is evident in this reform. Clear signs were given since its inception, with the creation of the

¹⁷⁴ Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 26.06.90, pp. 922/37.

multiparty group in charge of its drafting, and continued with the transfer of functions from the President to the *Mesa* and the Committee on R&HA, the creation of a "Leaders Delegation's Meeting", the introduction of "abstentions", and the rotation system for the *Incidentes*.

Nevertheless, these amendments, expected to have groundbreaking effects, did not lessen the power of the ruling coalition.

First, the President of the Chamber chairs the *Mesa* and the Committee on R&HA, two institutions whose membership is monopolized (*Mesa*) or over-represented (Committee on R&HA) by the ruling coalition.¹⁷⁵ In other words, *functions were transferred from the exclusive sphere of the President to collective spheres controlled by the ruling coalition*.

Second, the new "Leaders Delegation's Meeting" is also chaired by the *President of the Chamber* and, equally important, its decisions are adopted by a weighted voting system. Hence, this is another institution controlled by the ruling coalition.¹⁷⁶

Third, the Congressional *de facto* law accorded to the President of the Chamber a legislative prerogative by far more influential than the daily agenda-setting handed over to the *Mesa*: the rejection of bills and amendments.

Fourth, the election of the highest officials of the Chamber by the majority of deputies reinforces the control of the legislative procedure by the majority coalition.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ See Parts II and III.

¹⁷⁶ Among other legislative priorities the Leaders Delegation's Meeting decides together with the *Mesa* which bills are subject to "immediate treatment" since 1994.

Beyond these changes, the reduction of the minimum size of delegations seems to obey more to the new membership of the Chamber (120 deputies), than to favor minor parties. In fact, the new *Reglamento* suppressed the minimum terms for the *Incidentes* even though minor parties that were part of the *Concertación* ruling coalition insisted on their regulation. Finally, note that the willingness to democratize and decentralize the political control of the Chamber was not strong enough to alter the political character of the assignments of committee Chairs.

To recapitulate, the transfer of functions from the President to the *Mesa* and the Committee on R&HA *maintained* the ruling coalition's advantages in its sphere of influence. The new prerogatives of the President, the weighted voting system adopted by the new "Leaders Delegation's Meeting", and the election of the highest officials by the Chamber *are effective and significant gains* of the ruling coalition.

The rejection of the persistent attempt of the opposition to change the election of committee Chairs is an interesting new situation to evaluate. It implies neither new prerogatives for ruling coalitions nor the maintenance of the status quo. The first conclusion (no new prerogatives) is obvious, but the second may be not so evident. Though rules haven't been changed (the method to elect committee Chairs remains the same), the majority coalition has shown its strength by rejecting the *intent* of the opposition to *change* the rules. How did the majority reject the bill? By voting against it. This is a simple but not a self-evident explanation. The consensus to vote for or against a bill must not be taken for granted, specially in the case of coalitions. On the

¹⁷⁷ It is necessary to mention that in the Chilean lower Chamber these positions are filled with experienced functionaries with long legislative careers.

floor there is not a weighted voting system by which delegation leaders possess a number of votes equal to the size of her delegation in the Chamber. On the floor *each vote counts*. As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2) explain, “[j]ust like members of other cartels, members of majority parties face continual incentives to “cheat” on the deals that have been struck. These incentives to cheat threaten both the existence of the cartel and the efficient operation of the relevant “market” (...) the structure that the majority party imposes on the House can be viewed as resolving or ameliorating members’ incentives to cheat, thereby facilitating mutual beneficial trade.” In other words, each time ruling coalitions are challenged, the “structure they impose on the Chamber” is tested. A cohesive vote of a ruling coalition implies that this “structure” is working. When ruling coalitions show their strength by voting against bills that aim at suppressing their advantages their power is *ratified* and, consequently, the Cartel Theory is supported.

Section 5. The 1994 Reform: The Old *Reglamento* Was Not so Bad, Was It?

The analysis of this general revision began in 1991, almost a year after the 1990 reform. The Committee on R&HA received more than 300 amendments, 220 of which were accepted. The final report, adopted by unanimous consent, was presented to the Chamber in May 1993. The amendment was approved in May 1994 (after the Chamber’s 1994 renewal). A majority coalition of the *Concertación* was for the second time in charge of the Chamber.

The main goals of this last mega reform were to speed up debates and simplify the legislative procedure, regulate a transparent and accountable management of

legislative funds, encourage the public diffusion of legislative activities, and improve the congressional oversight of the executive branch.

Concerning the legislative procedure, the most significant change was the new method to fix the quorum to "Chamber Agreements."¹⁷⁸ The introduction of abstentions in 1990, Juan A. Coloma Correa (UDI) explained, produced an unexpected outcome: in many occasions even though affirmative votes (e.g., 25 affirmative votes) were more than negative votes (e.g., 15 negative votes), the addition of the latter to the abstentions (e.g., 22 abstentions) exceeded the affirmative votes (37 votes), producing lack of agreement. This way of considering abstentions, however, was not always applied. In other occasions the Chamber had decided to count abstentions as affirmative votes, considering in this way the motion "approved." The fact is, deputy Coloma Correa stated, that "in innumerable occasions there have been a clear majority to approve an issue, but we have stumbled on [this] obstacle."¹⁷⁹ The measure adopted to solve the "unexpected outcome" was twofold. First, the Chamber would vote again and deputies who had abstained would be asked to vote in the affirmative or in the negative. Second, if the same result persisted, abstentions would be counted as *affirmative votes*.

Other than the "abstention" issue, the revision reduced the terms allotted to speak in committees, on the floor, and during the period of *Incidentes*; limited "interruptions" to two minutes, and gave deputies the possibility of introducing in the Journal of Sessions

¹⁷⁸ Among other decisions, a "Chamber Agreement" should be met to create special committees, make public secret documents, approve committee assignments proposed by the *Mesa*, fix deadlines to committees' reports, and authorize deputies to travel outside the country.

¹⁷⁹ Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 10.05.94, p. 1582.

written speeches and commemorations.¹⁸⁰ As a measure of transparency, results of the electronic voting began to be entered on the Journal (i.e., the names of deputies recorded as voting in the affirmative, in the negative, and the abstentions).

With respect to the committee system, the reform empowered standing committees to create subcommittees (to which they could delegate all or any of their functions except the power to report directly to the Chamber), created two standing committees, and renamed two committees.

The *Mesa* gained and lost functions. For one part, it was assigned the preparation and implementation of the budget, and the adoption of all measures necessary to publicize the activity of the Chamber. For the other part, the agenda-setting functions that had been transferred from the President to the *Mesa* in 1990 were reassigned to the former because “the experience of these three years showed that it is the President of the Chamber who actually performs them.”¹⁸¹ To put it another way, the practice *showed* what the *Reglamento* had established for more than one hundred years before the 1990 reform.

The amendment also modified the membership and functions of the Committee on R&HA. From then on, in addition to the *Mesa* members, it would be composed of 13 *delegation leaders*. Pursuing transparency, the revision established that the committee would: a) appoint the staff of the Chamber *following a Secretary General proposition*, b)

¹⁸⁰ The report proposed to shorten the following terms: a) Discussion in the general debate of a bill (from 30' to 15'), b) Discussion in the particular debate of a bill (from 10' to 5' each deputy), and c) *Incidentes* (from 3 to 1 hour per week). Regarding the second amendment, note that during debates deputies can ask the President of the Chamber an “interruption” in order to make comments or observations about the subject matter on discussion.

¹⁸¹ Report of the Committee on R&HA, Journal 10.05.94, p. 1507.

approve the Chamber's budget prepared by the *Mesa* and the travels of deputies outside the country, and c) propose the Chamber the amount of official funds to be assigned to deputies and the membership of a committee in charge of auditing the implementation of the Chamber's budget.

Even though the DC, PPD, UDI, and PS supported the amendment two issues caused controversy among deputies. The first was the "motion to recommit issue" (i.e., the number of votes required to suspend a debate and bring back a bill to a committee, a powerful legislative tool for delaying a bill or introducing neglected amendments). The Committee on R&HA's report suggested to increase this number from a simple majority to two-thirds of the deputies present on the floor, but the *Concertación* deputy José Viera-Gallo (PS) announced that they would reject this proposition. Coloma Correa (UDI) argued that this suggestion should be approved on behalf of transparency and asked Viera-Gallo to "be flexible." Viera-Gallo replied "someone can be flexible, but not silly. Actually he [deputy Coloma Correa] wants the majority not to be the majority."¹⁸² Finally, the *Concertación* proposition to reject the reform prevailed on the floor.

... And the second controversial issue had to do with the *Hacienda* Committee. This time, the report of the Committee on R&HA sought to limit the power of *Hacienda* establishing that it could analyze other aspects of a bill not related to the "financing analysis" only *by the unanimous consent of its members* (the *Reglamento* in force required *the agreement* of its members). The proposal was rejected on the floor.

¹⁸² Journal 10.05.94, p. 1516.

As mentioned, this reform empowered standing committees to create subcommittees. In relation to *Hacienda*, the Committee on R&HA proposed the *Mesa* could order this committee to create subcommittees. This reform, refused by the whole committee, was also rejected on the floor because it “upsets *Hacienda* deputies,” and because “there are other legal means to speed its reports.”¹⁸³

Though transparency amendments should not be underestimated, it is clear that some of the changes produced by this reform were oriented to correct the effects of the “1990 participative *Reglamento*.” The “abstention outcome,” an evident annoying surprise for the *Concertación*, was solved by way of interpretation; the terms allotted to speak were reduced; the President of the Chamber regained its agenda-setting control, and the centralization of the administration was reinforced by the mandatory presence of delegation leaders in the Committee on R&HA, and by transferring functions of this committee to the *Mesa*.

The reconsideration of certain amendments, however, was not only one aspect. The majority also stopped attempts to weaken two crucial powers. First, it retained the control of the motions to recommit. In this sense the majority coalition could continue either to delay or to revise bills according to its political convenience. Second, it preserved the influence of its majority in *Hacienda* in two senses. For one part, it rejected the unanimity to proceed with the “financing analysis” of bills. For the other part, it preserved the decision to create subcommittees inside *Hacienda*, avoiding in this way unexpected results of a mandatory fragmentation.

¹⁸³ Andrés Palma Irazazaval (DC), Journal 10.05.94, p. 1760.

While the centralization of functions imply a reassignment within the majority coalition (i.e., the coalition *maintained* its power), the interpretation of abstentions and the reduction of the terms to speak mean *effective gains*. The rejection of measures that would have suppressed important prerogatives is once more a *ratification* of the strength and cohesion of the coalition. Therefore, the Cartel Theory is supported by this reform.

The main reforms to the *Reglamento* took place during the ruling of *exceptional majorities* ($0.55 < s < 0.67$), two of them in the late 1960s, and the other two in the early 1990s. Through these reforms ruling coalitions gained and lost advantages, maintained and recovered lost functions, and retained their power. As to new advantages, the uniform and long terms to participate on the floor were progressively replaced by a proportional and more expedite system; *Hacienda* is allowed a subsidiary role; the Chamber can fix deadlines to committees to report, and has the right to elect the highest officials; abstentions are considered affirmative votes; the President and the committee Chairs got new powerful prerogatives from a *de facto* law, and the decisions of the new *collective* and *participative* "Leaders Delegation's Meeting" are adopted by a weighted voting system. By contrast, when the majority ruling party introduced the coefficient to make committee assignments (1967), it suppressed an advantage that had benefited some coalitions during the 1940s and 1950s (see section 11.1).

Through an internal transfer and reassignment of prerogatives, ruling coalitions maintained the agenda-setting and committee-assignment functions, and the administration of the Chamber in its sphere of influence.

Regarding the recovering of lost functions, *Hacienda* got back its power to revise bills, and the President (later the *Mesa*) regained the prerogative to make multiple assignments.

Finally, ruling coalitions showed their strength to retain their advantages when the opposition tried to modify the political procedure to assign committee Chairs, the majority required for motions to recommit, and the powers of the *Hacienda* committee.

The reform approved in 1953, for its part, shows how cohesive a ruling coalition can be in order to suppress rules detrimental to a handful of its members. This example is particularly important if we consider the strange membership of this coalition made up of Conservatives, Radicals, Liberals, and *Ibañistas* groups.

Except for one amendment (the introduction of the coefficient to make committee assignments in 1967), the general patterns mentioned above support the predictions related to the behavior of procedural coalitions. If we pay attention to the chronology of the amendments, we will see that they do not belong to a special period. In this sense, the change of electoral system does not seem to affect them.

Part II. The Chilean *Mesa*

The functions of the directing board of the Chamber or Chilean *Mesa*, and the rules and practices regarding its election procedure and partisan composition are analyzed in this part. In addition, section 9 deals with the censure motions that have been moved against them from 1945 to 2002, an institution that does not exist in Argentina.¹⁸⁴ Except for this change, I follow the same structure as in chapter IV.

Section 6. The Composition of the *Mesas*

I present a description of the composition of the *Mesas*. I distinguish between members of the ruling coalitions and opposition, I identify the parties they belong to, the regions they come from, and finally I consider their experience measured by the number of terms they served in Chamber.

Lower Chamber's *Mesas* in Chile is *an affair of ruling coalitions* as the 94% of the last column in Table 91 shows. Members of the *Mesas* belonged to the coalitions in control of the Chamber from 1945 to 1973 and during the 1998-2002 period. Only the *Mesas* of the first two periods after the return of democracy included a VP2 from the opposition.

¹⁸⁴ The approval of a censure motion involves the removal of the *Mesa*.

TABLE 91 - RULING AND OPPOSITION COALITION/PARTY MEMBERS OF THE *MESAS* – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Ruling-Opposition Coalition/Party	Mesa Positions			Total
	President	VP1	VP2	
Ruling C/P	11	11	9	31
%	100.0	100.0	81.8	93.9
Opposition C/P	0	0	2	16
%	0.00	0.00	18.2	6.06
Total	11	11	11	33
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The DC is the party that occupied most positions in the *Mesas* during the whole period (30%) (Table 92). It is also the only party that occupied *all* its positions. In second place, not far from the PPD and the Radicals, comes the Conservative Party with less than half of DC's percentage (12%).

TABLE 92 - MEMBERS OF THE *MESAS* BY PARTY - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Parties	Mesa Positions			Total
	President	VP1	VP2	
DC	4	4	2	10
%	36.36	36.36	18.18	30.30
CONS	2	2	0	4
%	18.18	18.18	0.0	12.12
PPD	2	1	0	3
%	18.18	9.09	0.00	9.09
PR	2	0	1	3
%	18.18	0.00	9.09	9.09
OTHER	1	4	8	13
%	9.09	36.36	72.72	39.39
Total	11	11	11	33
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

From 1945 to 2002 Center parties occupied the majority of the *Mesa* positions. Parties of the Right and the Left each secured the Presidency twice (Table 93).

The majority of the Presidents comes from the *Metropolitana* region (Santiago Capital City) which also concentrates 39% of the *Mesa* positions (Table 94). Distant from the

percentage of Santiago Capital City come the Bio Bio and the Araucanía regions. The latter, together with De los Ríos, Maule and Coquimbo, never reached the Presidency and had a modest representation in the VP1 and VP2 positions. As mentioned in chapter V, Chile has 15 regions, six of which are not included in Table 94 because they have never occupied a position in the *Mesa* during the period.

TABLE 93 - MEMBERS OF THE *MESAS* BY RIGHT-CENTER-LEFT PARTIES - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Parties	<i>Mesa</i> Positions			Total	
	President	VP1	VP2		
RIGHT	CONS	2	2	0	11 33,33
	%	18.18	18.18	0.0	
	PL	0	1	2	
	%	0.00	9.09	18.18	
	PN66	0	1	0	
	%	0.00	9.09	0.00	
	RN	0	0	1	
	%	0.00	0.00	9.09	
	UDI	0	0	1	
	%	0.00	0.00	9.09	
CENTER	DC	4	4	2	17 51,51
	%	36.36	36.36	18.18	
	PR	2	0	1	
	%	18.18	0.00	9.09	
	UNI53	1	0	0	
	%	9.09	0.00	0.00	
	PA	0	1	0	
	%	0.00	9.09	0.00	
	PAL	0	0	1	
	%	0.00	0.00	9.09	
LEFT	PPD	2	1	0	5 15,15
	%	18.18	9.09	0.00	
	PSP	0	1	0	
	%	0.00	9.09	0.00	
	PS	0	0	1	
%	0.00	0.00	9.09		
Total	11	11	11	33	
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

TABLE 94 - MEMBERS OF THE MESAS BY REGION – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Regions	Directing Board Positions			Total
	President	VP1	VP2	
Coquimbo	0	1	0	1
%	0.00	9.09	0.00	3.03
Valparaiso	1	1	0	2
%	9.09	9.09	0.00	6.06
O'Higgins	1	2	0	3
%	9.09	18.18	0.00	9.09
Maule	0	1	1	2
%	0.00	9.09	9.09	6.06
Metropolitana	6	3	4	13
%	54,55	27,27	36,36	39.39
Bio Bio	2	0	2	4
%	18.18	0.00	18.18	12.12
Araucanía	0	1	3	4
%	0.00	9.09	27,27	12.12
De los Ríos	0	0	1	1
%	0.00	0.00	9.09	3.03
De los Lagos	1	2	0	3
%	9.09	18.18	0.00	9.09
Total	11	11	11	33
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 95 - TERMS IN CHAMBER OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MESAS - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Terms in Chamber	Mesa Positions			Total
	President	VP1	VP2	
1	1	0	1	2
%	9.09	0.00	9.09	6.06
2	3	5	5	13
%	27.27	45.45	45.45	39.39
3	2	3	3	8
%	18.18	27,27	27,27	24.24
4	3	1	2	6
%	27,27	9.09	18.18	18.18
5	2	1	0	3
%	18.18	9.09	0.00	9.09
7	0	1	0	1
%	0.00	9.09	0.00	3.03
Total	11	11	11	33
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As Table 95 shows, 94% of the members of the *Mesa* were seniors. Though 39% were deputies with 2 terms, seniors with 3 and more terms double the number of Presidencies held by two-term seniors, and occupied the same number of VP. Therefore, seniority in Chamber (measured by the number of terms in Chamber) is a variable to consider when explaining the election of the *Mesa*, particularly for the positions of President and most of all for VP1 (no VP1 was a freshman) (Table 95).

Results shown in Table 96 corroborate the previous descriptive information. There we see the effect of the variables *Metropolitana region*, *seniority*, and *ruling coalition* on the probability of being elected President, VP1 and VP2.

TABLE 96 - EFFECT OF REGION, SENIORITY, AND RULING COALITION OVER THE PROBABILITY OF BEING ELECTED PRESIDENT, VP1, AND VP2 - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

	President		VP1		VP2	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Metropolitana Region	1.30*	.61	.11	.68	.59	.63
Seniority	.61***	.17	.61***	.16	.33	.19
Ruling Coalition	-	-	-	-	1.31	.78
Constant	-6.93***	.72	-6.44***	.63	6.73***	.86
R2	0.11		0.07		0.05	
N	1538		1538		1538	

* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

The logit regressions display positive and significant coefficients for the *Metropolitana region* and *seniority* in the case of Presidents, a positive and significant coefficient for *seniority* for VP1, but not significant for the *Metropolitana region* variable as expected (8/11 VP1 come from other regions). Ruling coalition is not considered for President and VP1 because it is a constant in these cases.

The good performance of *seniority in Chamber* is consistent with the fact that 53% of the deputies were seniors from 1945 to 2002 (28% with 2 terms and 15% with 3 terms).

We have now a general picture of the *Mesas*. In the Chilean lower Chamber directing boards were almost monopolized by ruling coalitions and senior deputies. The majority of their members belonged to Center parties, and came from Santiago City and the Southern regions of Bio Bio and Araucanía. Let's turn to the analysis of their functions, rules, and practices regarding their elections, and the censure motions that were moved against them.

Section 7. Functions

The prediction to test in this section is: *The power of the members of the Mesa increases or is redistributed within the ruling coalition.* In other words, ruling coalitions are expected to increase their advantages as *Mesas* acquire new functions, and/or are expected not to lose prerogatives when the functions of the *Mesas* are transferred to other institutions of the Chamber.

The directing board of the Chamber, called the *Mesa* since 1925, is composed of a President and two Vice-Presidents (I refer to the latter as VPs, or VP1 and VP2). VPs substitute the President in case of illness or disability. The President and VPs are members of the Committee on R&HA in their own right since the 19th century. Despite the apparent image of a collective enterprise, the President is the central *legislative*

authority of the Chamber. The functions of the *Mesa* were for the first time regulated in the 1990 reform.

In 1945, other than routine duties related to the sittings, the President had three main functions: agenda-setting (for public and secret sessions), the allocation of committee seats subject to Chamber's approval (he also filled committee vacancies), and the referral of bills. In addition, the President chaired the Committee on R&HA. In 1967, the replacement of committee members was regulated as an administrative procedure, and in 1990 the agenda-setting (for public and secret sessions) and the committee-assignment prerogatives were transferred from the President to the *Mesa* (the agenda-setting for public sessions was reassigned to the President in 1994). From 1969 to 1994 the President was designated Chair of the newly created "Leaders Delegation's Meeting," empowered to convene delegations' meetings, and to reject bills and amendments.¹⁸⁵ Regarding duties, the President must prepare the estimates of the Chamber and forward them to the Finance Minister (1990), and inform the citizenry about the activity of the Chamber every year (1997). Concerning the non-legislative functions, the internal budget and the administration and human resources management of the Chamber have always been in charge of the Committee on R&HA and the highest officials. In 1994, the preparation and supervision of the implementation of the internal budget was transferred to the *Mesa*, but its approval remained in charge of the Committee on R&HA.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ The President can convene these meetings whenever he considers them convenient and also suspend sittings during these meetings.

¹⁸⁶ From 1945 to 1973 a subcommittee of the Committee on R&HA audited the report of the implementation of the internal budget prepared by the Treasurer of the Chamber. Once approved in the Committee on R&HA, the

During these fifty-seven years the *Mesa* has *gained* functions. The head of the Chamber, for its part, has *maintained* and *(re)gained* functions. In addition, the *Mesa* and (its) the President were involved in a reciprocal transfer of functions, namely the agenda-setting, and the committee-assignments functions. This transfer implies a *reassignment* within the ruling coalition. These patterns support the prediction according to which *the power of the members of the Mesa increases or is redistributed within the ruling coalition*. Even though the main changes (for both the *Mesa* and the President) took place in 1990, they do not seem to be related to the type of ruling coalition or electoral system in force. These changes respond to an external factor (the *de facto* Congressional Law), and to the “participative” goals of the 1990 reform (e.g., the transfer of the agenda-setting function from the President to the *Mesa*). In the same sense, the centralization operated in the 1994 reform (the *Mesa* was transferred budgeting functions from the Committee on R&HA, and the President regained the agenda-setting function for public sessions) seems to be due to an assessment made by the *Concertación* of the effects of the “participative 1990 reform.”

Section 8. The Election of the Mesas: Procedure and Practice

The analysis of the elections of the *Mesas* begins with a description of the procedure, and is followed by a study of the criteria applied to determine their partisan composition. The expectations in this case are: 1- *The election of the members of the Mesa is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling coalitions; and 2- No member of*

report was submitted to Chamber's approval. In 1990 the subcommittee was transformed into an Auditing Committee appointed by the Committee on R&HA until 1994, and by the Chamber since then.

the opposition serves as President or VP of the Mesa. All the information about the election of the *Mesas* can be seen in APPENDIX I.

The *Mesa* is elected for four-year terms at the beginning of the legislative period. An absolute majority of the deputies *present* in the Chamber is needed to elect its members and the vote is *secret*.¹⁸⁷

From 1945 to 2002 exactly the same procedure was applied at the beginning of each legislative period: the motion to elect the *Mesa* was moved by the provisional President of the Chamber, deputies voted by secret ballots, the Secretary General announced the number of votes each candidate had received, and the provisional President announced the final results. All eleven elections were made in one round.

The extensive analysis of the 11 sessions devoted to elect the authorities of the Chamber from 1946 to 2002 shows that no candidate to any position of the *Mesa* different from the one proposed or supported by ruling coalitions was ever elected. This is the main pattern regarding the election of the authorities of the Chamber. In addition, two criteria were applied to determine the partisan composition of the *Mesas*: "*The coalition/party in control of the Chamber takes all the positions*" (1945-1973/1998-2002) and "*The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority coalition*" (1990-1998).

The first criterion implies that *all positions go to the coalition or party in control of the Chamber, be it a majority or a plurality.* It was applied from 1945 to 1973 and reintroduced in the legislative period 1998-2002. Except for 1957, Chamber records

¹⁸⁷ The *Mesa* has always been elected by secret vote. Nevertheless, this mandatory type of vote was introduced in the 1990 reform.

show that the President of the *Mesa* was always picked from the first plurality in Chamber.¹⁸⁸ An interesting election is the one of the 1969-1973 legislative period in which we can see (APPENDIX I) how the fragmentation inside the Chamber benefited the DC, the only single-party plurality in control of the Chamber from 1945 to 2002.¹⁸⁹

The second criterion (*The President and VP1 positions belong to the majority coalition*) was applied from 1990 to 1998. This criterion was the base of the “Political Pact for the Good Administration of the Chamber” between the *Concertación* and the ultra-right UDI. According to this pact, the *Concertación* would nominate the candidates for the Presidency and the VP1, and the UDI would do the same regarding the VP2 during the legislative period 1990-1994.¹⁹⁰ The RN (the other rightist party), outside the pact, presented its own candidates. In APPENDIX I we can see how this pact worked through the sum of the votes in the 1990 election: the UDI (11 seats + some votes from rightist independent deputies) supported the *Concertación* (69 seats) candidates to the Presidency and VP1, and the latter did the same for the UDI nominee (Juan A. Coloma Correa) to VP2.

The 1994-1998 period brought some changes. For one part, the administration pact included the RN. Therefore, the Right (RN and UDI) would nominate alternatively candidates for the VP2. The transfer of votes from the *Concertación* to the Right can be

¹⁸⁸ In 1957 Conservatives had 24 seats and Liberals 30 seats. Nevertheless, the Conservative Héctor Correa Letelier was elected President.

¹⁸⁹ Besides, note that the 47 blank votes (Socialist, Radical, and Communist votes) must have been either counted as affirmative votes or excluded from the counting. Otherwise the DC could have never secured the positions of the *Mesa* since the majority of the deputies present is needed to elect them.

¹⁹⁰ This *impressive* agreement between the Centre-left *Concertación* and the ultra-right UDI, which included the Senate *Mesa*, was mentioned each time a member of the *Mesa* was elected from 1990 to 1994. See Journals 26.09.91, p. 98; 15.09.92, p. 3051; 20.07.93, p. 1746; 21.07.93, p. 1943, and 18.08.93, p. 3070.

seen in the 1994 election for VP2.¹⁹¹ For the other part, a pact within the *Concertación* was implemented. According to this internal agreement the Presidency rotated PPD-PS-DC, and the VP1 rotated DC-PS-PPD over the legislative period.¹⁹²

The pact between the *Concertación* and the Right broke up in January 1997 when the former disapproved the nomination of a UDI deputy to the VP2.¹⁹³ Even though the last VP2 of the period was nominated by the Right, since 1998 the old criterion (*the coalition/party in control of the Chamber takes all the positions*) was re-established.¹⁹⁴

The first prediction -*The election of the Mesa is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling coalitions*- is credited by the precedent analysis for the whole period and, consequently, for all type of majorities and pluralities, and disregarding the electoral system in force.

The second prediction -*No member of the opposition serves as President or VP of the Mesa*- is valid for nine of the eleven periods. The two exceptions (1990-1994 and 1994-1998) are neither related to a change in the electoral system, nor to the type of ruling coalition in Chamber. As the records of the Chamber show, a pact is at the base of those bipartisan *Mesas* in which the *Concertación* kept the lion's share of the positions. In other words, only the votes of the *Concertación* enabled the opposition to get the

¹⁹¹ Though it was clear that the votes of the *Concertación* were enough to elect its candidates, the elected President expressed his surprise once he realized that the Right hadn't voted for his candidacy after the counting of votes. See the speech of Jorge Schaulson Brodsky in Journal 11.03.94, p.11.

¹⁹² The 1994-1998 administration pact was mentioned in Journals 11.03.94, p.11; 14.03.95, p. 10; 12.07.95, p. 8; 19.03.96, p. 8; 19.11.96, p. 8, and 14.01.97, p. 10.

¹⁹³ The nomination of the UDI deputy Carlos Bombal was vetoed by the *Concertación* because of his participation in the abduction of Professor Alejandro Avalos Davidson of the Catholic University of Chile during the dictatorship. The Right argued that the administration pact did not include a "veto power" of the *Concertación*, that each party had the right to nominate its candidate, and that this candidate should be elected by the Chamber.

¹⁹⁴ The restoration of this criterion was made explicit in Journals 08.10.98, p. 9 and 11.03.99, p. 11.

VP2. This behavior, which is manifestly related with the *participative* and *democratizing* ambiance that reigned in the Chamber in the early 1990s, contradicts the predictions of the theory. Nevertheless, it is clear that the ruling coalition controlled the election of the *Mesa* since it vetoed the nomination of the Right in 1997 (the VP2 was finally occupied by a *Concertación* deputy).

As it happened with other short-lived participative measures adopted in 1990, the bipartisan *Mesas* last only a handful of years. Once the majority coalition decided that the pact was over, the traditional criterion (cartel behaviour) to elect the *Mesa* was applied again.

Section 9. Censure Motions

Even though they were elected for four-year terms, only the Conservative-Agrarian-Liberal *Mesa* of 1945 lasted its entire mandate, the rest of the legislative periods having on average three *Mesas*. From 1949 to 1973 this recurring rotation can be explained by resignations and *censure motions*.¹⁹⁵ Resignations, in particular, were related to coalitions' break ups, loss of support from the delegation/s or the Chamber, or to "orders from the party."¹⁹⁶ As analyzed above, since the 1990s successive changes respond to political agreements, especially since 1994. In this section I deal with the censures moved against the *Mesas*. The expectation in this case is *Censure motions moved against the Mesa are rejected*.

¹⁹⁵ The most unstable legislative period was the 1969-1973 term with five different *Mesas* (the Chamber was ruled by a DC single-party plurality).

¹⁹⁶ Journal 15.10.58, p. 72 and 12.12.62, p. 2859.

Censure or no confidence motions, which must be moved by a delegation, have been frequently used until 1973, and seldom since then.¹⁹⁷ From 1945 to 2002, twenty-five motions were moved (Table 97).¹⁹⁸ Twenty-two of them belong to the 1945-1973 term. Of these twenty-two motions, five were accepted and the rest was rejected. The three motions of the 1990-2002 period were rejected.

All the *rejected* censure motions belong to periods in which ruling coalitions and the DC ruling party had the majority in Chamber. The best example of the strength of majorities to reject censure motions is the 1955 case: the President of the Chamber could not be removed even though it had been proven that he had delayed the analysis of a bill.¹⁹⁹

Successful censures, conversely, had their chance during the DC single-party plurality of 1969-1973, and after the LIDERS coalition broke up in 1950 (Table 97). In the last case, Liberals and Conservatives moved a censure against the Radical President because he allegedly delayed the analysis of a bill to introduce courses of religion in schools but, most of all, because the coalition that had elected him *had disappeared*.²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, note the censure motion was approved by a vote of 62 to 60 (Table 97).

¹⁹⁷ During the period over analysis three changes were introduced to the censure motions' procedure. Until 1969 two deputies (one in favor and one against the motion) could speak during the debate. Besides, if the motion was accepted, it was not clear when the vacancy and the following election of the new *Mesa* took place. The 1969 reform allowed the participation of more deputies in the debate, declared the immediate vacancy of the positions and established the exact time for the election of the new *Mesa*. The 1990 reform established that delegation leaders are in charge of moving these motions.

¹⁹⁸ Withdrawn censure motions were not considered.

¹⁹⁹ The censure motion was rejected by a vote of 54 to 49 (Table 7). The debate of this censure can be found in Journal 11.05.55, p. 6132. The political scandal was so important that the President finally resigned seven days later.

²⁰⁰ Journal October 1950.

TABLE 97 - APPROVED AND REJECTED CENSURE MOTIONS - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1945-2002

Date	Proponents of the Censure Motions (Parties)	Mesa/Member of the Mesa censured (Party)	Affirmative Votes	Negative Votes	Abstentions	Result
October 1950	Liberal-Conservative	Radical President	62	60	-	A ^a
26.12.50 ^b	Falangist-Radical	Socialist-Liberal-Democrat	-	53	-	R ^c
11.05.55	Renewal Action	President UNI ⁵³ (<i>Ibañista</i>)	49	54	-	R
14.08.57	Socialist	Conservative-Liberal- <i>Ibañista</i>	37	56	-	R
29.04.58	Liberal-Conservative	Radical-Agrarian-C. Democrat	26	60	-	R
03.03.59	Socialist	Radical-Democratic-Socialist	10	57	-	R
26.07.60	FRAP	Radical-Democratic-Socialist	12	75	-	R
02.08.60	C. Democrat-FRAP	Radical-Democratic-Socialist	30	74	-	R
26.10.65	Socialist	Christian Democrat	43	54	-	R
02.08.66	Radical	Christian Democrat	36	57	-	R
11.10.66	Communist	Christian Democrat	29	58	-	R
17.10.67	Communist	Christian Democrat	31	55	-	R
27.12.67	Communist	Christian Democrat	25	52	-	R
12.03.68	Radical	Christian Democrat	22	51	-	R
05.11.68	Socialist	Christian Democrat	15	61	-	R
03.09.69	Communist-Radical-Socialist	Christian Democrat	54	51	23	A
10.09.69	Christian Democrat	MAPU-PC-PC (Left)	50	49	30	A
05.05.70	Radical- Christian Democrat	Democratic Radicals (Right)	73	27	1	A
15.06.71	Christian Democrat	Popular Unity	78	44	-	A
17.10.72	Communist	Christian Democrat	37	67	-	R
25.04.73	Socialist	Christian Democrat	24	61	-	R
01.08.73	Popular Unity	DC-PN66-PIR (CODE)	36	70	-	R
04.12.90	National Renewal	Christian Democrat VP1	32	77	1	R
09.09.98	RN-UDI (Right)	Concertation	38	54	-	R
01.08.2001	RN-UDI (Right)	Christian Democrat VP2	33	47	-	R

a. *Approved.*

b. Before the vote the motion had been withdrawn.

c. Rejected.

Except for this case, all approved censure motions concentrate in the 1969-1973 period.

In September 1969 Communists, Radicals, and Socialists removed a Christian Democrat *Mesa* on the grounds that it had obstructed the passage of a bill to nationalize the copper industry. The censure was approved by a vote of 54 to 51 with the helpful abstention of Liberals and Conservatives.²⁰¹ This directing board was replaced by a leftist (MAPU-PC-PC) *Mesa* supported by Radical deputies.

The day after the new *Mesa* was elected (10.09.69) Christian Democrats moved a censure motion owing to the "biased" (to the socialist project) speech given by the new President after his election. They won by 1 vote. Conservatives, Liberals, and a handful of Radicals abstained.²⁰² After the censure the Chamber elected a rightist *Mesa* made up of Democratic Radicals that opposed the candidacy of Allende and his *socialist project*.

In May 1970 the Radical delegation, supported by Christian Democrats and parties of the Left, moved a censure against the rightist *Mesa* because it hadn't convened a special session to consider a political affair that had a profound impact in the Chilean society.²⁰³ The rightist Nationals (Conservatives and Liberals) defended the *Mesa*, denounced that the censure was motivated by political interests, and criticized the "odious system of election and censure, censure and election by which *Mesas* last only minutes in the Chamber."²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Journal 03.09.69, pp. 4075/81.

²⁰² Journal 10.09.69, pp. 4571/7.

²⁰³ In May 1970 a DC engineer in charge of the implementation of the agrarian reform of President Frei Montalva was assassinated while presiding over a transfer of a fund to local peasants.

²⁰⁴ Fernando Maturana (PN66), Journal 05.05.70, p. 5696.

In June 1971 Christian Democrats censured the leftist *Mesa* that had replaced the rightist *Mesa* removed in May 1970. DC deputies alleged two reasons: first, the Communist VP1 hadn't respected the rules during a debate and second, the government of the Popular Unity was abusing its powers at all levels. The censure was adopted by 78 votes for and 44 against (Table 97).²⁰⁵

Some days later the Chamber elected a *Mesa* of Christian Democrats. This *Mesa* would be safe from any censure because the alliance between them and the rightist Nationals against the Popular Unity was then operative.

In short, the analysis shows that majority coalitions, despite their type or ideological composition, defend their *Mesas* fiercely. If they have to make a change, they arrange it internally by way of resignations, as a good cartel does. Pluralities, obviously, do not have this chance. If censure motions reach the floor it means that all previous negotiations have failed. Nonetheless, the Chilean case demonstrates that censuring a plurality is not an *easy task*, and that pluralities also defend their *Mesas* fiercely. The Radical *Mesa* of 1950 was removed by two votes, not at all a bad score for a recently broken coalition inside a fragmented Chamber. Christian Democrats, for their part, tried to regain the *Mesa* the day after they lost it, authoring all the censure motions until reaching their goal. After less than two years and three changes the Chamber came full circle electing again a DC *Mesa*.

²⁰⁵ Journal 15.06.71, pp. 151/4 (there was no roll-call vote).

In conclusion, the *Mesa* and (its) the *President* concentrate the most important legislative functions. The election and composition of the *Mesas* is in hands of the party or coalition that controls the Chamber. Only their votes can give the opposition the possibility to be part of the directing board. Otherwise, in order to reach the *Mesa* the opposition must wait for majority coalitions to break up, or congressional elections to bring a ruling plurality and then, try to censure it. But even if the opposition removes the ruling plurality, it must not expect to occupy the most coveted positions for a long time.

The concentration of power in the Presidency and the *Mesa*, the uniform control of the election of the latter and of the censure motions, and the composition of almost all the *Mesas* of the period support the predictions of the Cartel Theory. By contrast, the *participative* bipartisan *Mesas* of the 1990-1998 disconfirm it. In the following section I analyze if this pre-eminence of the party or coalition that controls the Chamber applies to the structuring of the committee system.

Part III. Structuring the Committee System

In this part I look for ties between ruling coalitions and the organization of the standing committee system. I try to find out if the Chilean committee system follows a routine and nondiscretionary procedure to allocate committee seats, or, by contrast, if committees are agents of the ruling party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). I begin with the evolution of the Chamber's standing committee system (section 10), then I proceed with a systematic analysis of the process of committee assignments (section 11), and finally I offer my conclusion.

Section 10. The Evolution of the Standing Committee System

In this section I describe the development of the standing committee system, and analyze if this process can be explained as an instrument of partisan control. Two "instruments of control" (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 254) are examined: the creation of standing committees, and changes in committees' memberships and leadership positions.

10.1 *The Creation of Standing Committees*

I consider the following expectations based on the assumption that ruling coalitions control the committee system: *1- The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system; 2- Ruling coalitions control this*

process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees. The description of the changes in the committee system can be followed in APPENDIX H.

In the Chilean Chamber the development of the committee system followed one objective: to adapt the system to the political, economic, and social main issues of each period. This goal was reached in three ways: creating standing committees, transforming special into standing committees, and renaming pre-existent committees either to include new responsibilities or to match the ministries of the Executive.

From 1945 to 2002 twenty-three committees were renamed and the number of standing committees increased from 13 to 19, while the number of deputies increased from 147 (1945) to 150 (1969) and then decreased to 120 (1990). During the whole period ruling coalitions kept for themselves the Chairs of the new committees.

Before 1973 nine committees assumed new names and two standing committees were created. The extension of the jurisdictions of pre-existent committees to subjects such as mining, transportation, social security, or sports reflects the new socio-economic priorities of the period. The 1967 reform renamed six committees to match the ministries of the Executive Power and transformed the *Special Committee on Housing* into the standing *Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs* to consider pressing matters related to urban development and the shortage of adequate housing. The *Committee on Latin American Integration* was created in 1968. It was proposed by four Christian

Democrats (the President of the Chamber among them), one Socialist, and one Liberal.²⁰⁶

In the period 1990-2002 the committee system increased by five units, one committee was dissolved (the unfamiliar *Committee on Latin American Integration*), and fourteen changed their names. In March 20, 1990, the second session after the return to democracy, deputies approved the creation of the standing committees on *Natural Resources* and on *Human Rights*, and also decided to rename six committees. This motion was proposed by the PPD President of the Chamber and immediately approved on the floor. Later, during the 1990 reform to the *Reglamento's* debate, members of the Committee on R&HA explained that these changes aimed at modernizing the institutions of the Chamber to new worldwide socio-economic issues (Environment - Telecommunications - Social Development), and to pressing concerns of the Chilean society after the dictatorship (Human Rights). The 1994 reform renamed two committees, and created two standing committees: *on Family* and *on Science and Technology*. While the creation of the latter received great support, the *Committee on Family* was not welcomed by all deputies.²⁰⁷ Nonetheless, there was no opposition to its approval. Finally, on May 17, 2001, the Chamber approved by unanimous consent the

²⁰⁶ The original jurisdiction of this committee included the Latin American Free-Trade Zone created by the Montevideo Treaty (1960). The 1969 reform enlarged its jurisdiction to all matters concerning the Latin American Parliament. During the debate some deputies, especially the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, deputy Enrique Zorrilla (DC), expressed their doubts about the convenience of *creating* this committee or *subcommittee* (it was obvious that quite a few deputies, including Mr. Zorrilla, did not have the slightest idea that this committee had been created one year ago and that it was actually functioning). *Journal* 27.11.68, p. 1280.

²⁰⁷ Many scientific groups demanded the creation of the committee on *Science and Technology* including the Chilean Science Academy.

creation of the *Committee on Fisheries*, one of the most important socio-economic activities in Chile. The motion was signed by deputies of the PS, PPD, and the UDI.²⁰⁸

10.2 *Committees' Memberships and Leadership Positions*

In the Chilean lower Chamber each committee is made up of 13 deputies since 1935. The only exception to this rule is the Committee on R&HA whose membership increased from 13 to 16 in 1990 (13 deputies + the *Mesa* until 1994, and 13 delegation leaders + the *Mesa* since then).

One of the most common concerns of Chilean deputies when debating about the creation of committees is the need to avoid multiple assignments. Furthermore, they limited assignments to two committees in 1967, suppressed this limitation in 1969, and lately tried to find ways to lower the number of deputies in each committee. Table 98 reveals that assignments were on average stable until 1973, and that they began to increase in the 1990s as a consequence of the creation of new committees and the decrease in the number of deputies. Even though the average increase is modest (from 1.5 in 1945 to 1.98 in 1998), deputies' complains about the problems caused by their appointments to two or three committee never ceased.

²⁰⁸ The creation of this committee had been demanded since 1990 by deputies from all political parties.

TABLE 98 - COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS THROUGH TIME – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Legislative Period	Number of Committees	Number of Assignments	Average Number of Assignments per Deputy
1945-1949	13	169	1,15
1949-1953	13	169	1,15
1953-1957	13	169	1,15
1957-1961	13	169	1,15
1961-1965	13	169	1,15
1965-1969	13	169	1,15
1969-1973	15	195	1,3
1973	15	194	1,29
1990-1994	16	211	1,76
1994-1998	18	237	1,98
1998-2002	18	237	1,98
Total		2088	
Average	15	190	1,4

Concerning leadership positions, Chairs are the only authorities of committees since the 19th century. As mentioned, ruling coalitions monopolized the Chairs of all new committees. Though the magnitude of this control will be better estimated in the next section, here I analyze the value of being a Chair. In other words, what parties get when one of its members is the head of a committee.

Chairs last in their position the whole legislative period (four years). They have *complete* and *exclusive* control of the committee procedure and agenda. Their prerogatives include the decision to hold secret sessions and to assign meetings the specific purpose of discussing current events (a kind of “incident(s)” meeting), the rejection of amendments, and the preparation of the itemized list of rules *Hacienda* should study in the “financing analysis.” The *participative* reform of 1990 had transformed the exclusive decision of Chairs to hold secret sessions into a majority decision. As it happened with other measures, this amendment was suppressed in 1994.

The impressive power of Chairs, coupled with the jurisdiction of the *Hacienda* Committee, gives an idea of the influential position of the Chair of this committee.

- *An Automatic Procedure or a Political Negotiation?*²⁰⁹

In view of their significance it is no surprising to find debates over committee Chairs' assignments. One of the most revealing debates thereof took place in 2000, during the third period of the Center-Left *Concertación* ruling coalition.

On April 23, 1998, one month after the renewal of the Chamber, ten RN (Right) deputies tabled a bill to reform the *Reglamento*. Its goal was to apply the proportionality rule to the election of the *Mesa* and *committee Chairs*.²¹⁰ The Committee on R&HA reported this bill in November 1999 recommending its rejection (voting results: 5 in the affirmative, 8 in the negative). Seven months later the report was rejected on the floor (voting results: 37 in the affirmative -all from rightist parties-, 48 in the negative -all from the *Concertación*-). Beyond voting results, this debate is particularly interesting because of the exchanges between the blocs of the Right and Centre-left, the *alternative solutions* proposed by the *Concertación* to solve the "Mesa and Chairs' problem," and the way the rightist opposition reacted to them. In this sense, the opposition, with 50 deputies -in a Chamber of 120 members-, complained about the election of the *Mesa* and committee Chairs that had taken place in 1998 because *all* the positions had been assigned to the *Concertación*. They claimed that minorities should be part of the administration and government of the Chamber for the sake of

²⁰⁹ Committee on R&HA's report, Journal 07.06.00, p. 19.

²¹⁰ Journal 23.04.98, p. 57. This was actually their second attempt. A similar amendment had been tabled in the 1990 reform to the *Reglamento* (see section 4 in this chapter).

democracy, transparency, and a responsible exercise of the congressional oversight of the Executive. The *Concertación* deputies replied that the election of these positions were traditionally a *political affair*, and that the adoption of an *automatic procedure* (e.g., the proportionality rule) should be part of a broader “democratization plan” that must include the abrogation of the authoritarian enclaves inherited by the dictatorship, the binominal electoral system that benefited the Right, and the suppression of designated and for-life senators.

Nonetheless, to solve the “*Mesa and Chairs’ problem*” (better defined as the *requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the direction of the Chamber*) the *Concertación* suggested the creation of a *Third Vice-Presidency of the Chamber* and of *Vice-Chairs* in committees (*déjà vu?*). The RN deputies firmly refused this proposition. They argued that far from improving the administration of the Chamber, the creation of *bureaucratic* new positions would be inefficient, would cost a lot of money, and would be *impossible to explain to the public opinion*. What they wanted, and they failed to get, was an “equitable distribution of positions according to the representation of each party in Chamber.”²¹¹

In short, the evolution of the standing committee system does not fully credit the Cartel Theory. The goals pursued by the consensual (and modest) increase of the number of standing committees are the antithesis of the first prediction (*the increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise but an answer to requests from members of the ruling and*

²¹¹ Gustavo Alessandri Valdes (RN) and Baldo Prokurica (RN), Journal 07.06.00, pp. 19/24.

opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system). The second prediction (*ruling coalitions control this process and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees*), by contrast, is supported since ruling coalitions controlled the creation of new committees and monopolized their Chairs. This tie between ruling coalitions and Chairs (all of them, new and old ones) has a simple explanation: Chilean Chairs concentrate powerful prerogatives. This is also the rationale behind the *Concertación's* solution (the *Argentine* solution) to the "Mesa and Chairs' problem": the creation of new positions, but *no* proportional distribution of *control* and *power* (Chairs).

Finally, the stable memberships and leadership positions of the Chilean committee system contradict the predictions of the theory.²¹²

10.3 The Most Important Committees

Despite the equality of standing committees in terms of membership and authorities, it may be clear by now that *Hacienda* is by far the most important committee in the Chilean lower Chamber. In this section I confirm this pre-eminence, and show that there are a handful of committees that are also considered *important* by Chilean deputies, though to a lesser extent if compared to *Hacienda*. To address this issue I consider the place accorded to committees by constitutional laws, *Reglamentos*, and deputies in the principal debates of the period 1945-2002. I begin, of course, with

²¹² The prediction for the enlargement of committees' memberships was: *Although the enlargement of committees' memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, ruling parties control this process and maintain their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats*. The predictions in the case of the of leadership positions were: 1- *The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of committees*; 2- *Ruling parties control this process and keep the lions' share of the new committee leadership positions*.

Hacienda, then turn to the Committee on R&HA, and finally deal with a proposal that tried to stratify committees. This analysis is helpful in two ways: to grasp the advantages of controlling *Hacienda*, and to better understand the patterns of committee assignments that are analyzed in the next section.

Hacienda is one of the most traditional committees in the Chamber together with Defence, Agriculture, Commerce, Mining, Education, and the Committee on R&HA. It is also the only standing committee whose jurisdiction was always defined in the *Reglamento* -technical committees are only listed-, and in the *de facto* Constitutional Law of the National Congress of 1989.²¹³ As mentioned, in addition to its jurisdiction, *Hacienda* is referred bills reported by technical committees to carry out the “financing analysis” or if, for whatever reason, they did not report it (*subsidiary* role). *Hacienda* can analyse not only rules related to the “financing analysis,” but also the rest of the bill if its members believe it may relate to financing matters (the controversial role known as the “*revision* or *control* power”). Bills that fall into *Hacienda*'s jurisdiction cannot be analyzed on the floor without its report even with the unanimous consent of the Chamber. This pre-eminence was confirmed in 1989 when the Constitutional Law of the National Congress defined its jurisdiction, and mandated that its members would be part, in their own right, of the special bicameral committee in charge of analyzing the National Budget every year.

Discussions about *Hacienda* powers, particularly its *revision* or *control* power over bills, have been recurrent. In my view, the most important exchange of opinions thereof took

²¹³ The jurisdiction of the dissolved and almost unknown Committee on Latin American Integration was defined in the *Reglamento* from 1969 to 1973.

place in 1969, when the DC President of the Chamber, together with Patricio Phillips Peñafiel (Liberal), tried to lower the requirements to exercise the “control power.” Phillips Peñafiel argued that *Hacienda* should have the power of revision because it was composed of the “most competent and experienced people,” and because its work had prevented the approval of “legal aberrations that came from technical committees.”²¹⁴ These comments were repudiated by Christian Democrats, Radicals, and Socialists who argued that the approval of this reform would imply that “only *Hacienda* should exist in the Chamber,” or accept that “the thirteen members of *Hacienda* are the more talented, the wisest and smarter deputies in the Chamber,” and that this would be “humiliating for the rest of the deputies.”²¹⁵ It is also interesting to note that Eduardo J. Clavel Amion (PR) claimed that *truth must be told* about the way deputies were assigned to *Hacienda*: “simply exerting political pressure.”²¹⁶

As to the *Committee on R&HA*, its existence is implied in the Constitutional Law of the National Congress, and its jurisdiction is defined in the *Reglamento* only since 1990.²¹⁷ Nevertheless, it has always been attractive because of its membership and assumed functions: the *Mesa* is part of it, the amendments to the *Reglamento* require its report, and it is in charge of the preparation, approval, and auditing of the internal budget, and of the administration and human resources management of the Chamber.²¹⁸ As noted, it is the only committee that has 16 members since 1990. The most visible sign of its

²¹⁴ Patricio Phillips Peñafiel (PL), Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3179/80.

²¹⁵ See debate in Journal 22.04.69, pp. 3176/88.

²¹⁶ Eduardo J. Clavel Amion (PR), Journal 22.04.69, p. 3180.

²¹⁷ The constitutional law establishes that the Chamber will have “a committee in charge of its administration.” Before the 1990s the *Reglamento* mentioned this committee just to mandate that it should not accord permanent economic benefits to deputies even with the unanimous consent of the Chamber.

²¹⁸ In 1994 the preparation and supervision of the implementation of the internal budget were transferred to the *Mesa*.

valuable functions was given by the Chamber in 1994, when the reform to the *Reglamento* mandated that 13 delegations leaders should be part of it (in addition to the *Mesa*).

The gap in terms of relevance and workload between the committees on *Hacienda*, *Constitutional Affairs*, *Interior*,²¹⁹ *Foreign Affairs*, *R&HA*, and the rest of the committees was highlighted during debates, and through bills tabled to the consideration of the Chamber.²²⁰ Of all the records analyzed, the most authoritative example is the initiative tabled by Gutenberg Martínez (DC) while being President of the Chamber.²²¹ The goal of his bill was to define the committees on *Constitutional Affairs*, *Hacienda*, *Interior*, and *Foreign Affairs* as “exclusive committees” (i.e., their members may not serve on any other committee), and to *reduce* the number of deputies of the rest of the committees. It is a fact supported by statistical evidence, the bill reads, that these four committees are referred a great volume of bills, and that they hold many more meetings than the rest of the committees.²²² The report of the Committee on *R&HA* rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would break the proportionality rule, and harm minor parties’ representation in the committee system. The bill was criticized on the floor. Despite the objections, during the debate deputies recognized the *de facto* stratification of committees. Furthermore, some of them complained about the evidence that the committees on *Constitutional Affairs*, *Hacienda*, *Interior*, and *Foreign Affairs* were

²¹⁹ Among other domestic political issues, this committee reports legislation concerning the structure, status, and power of regions, provinces, and municipalities; boundary disputes, and matters relating to public lands.

²²⁰ In addition to the debates already cited see the following Journals 26.05.65, pp. 121/32 and 12.05.94, pp. 1757; 1762.

²²¹ Deputy Gutenberg Martínez (DC) was President of the Chamber from November 1996 to March 1999.

²²² Journal 10.03.98, pp. 172/175.

actually *control committees*, blaming the “untouchable and exclusive” referral power of the President of the Chamber for this situation.²²³

Even though the Chilean lower Chamber never had exclusive or semi-exclusive committees, the precedent analysis demonstrates that there has always been stratification, legally regulated in the case of *Hacienda* and R&HA, and explicitly declared by deputies in the case of Constitutional/Foreign Affairs and *Interior*. The next subsection, among other issues, analyzes this stratification in terms of committee assignments.

Section 11. Committee Assignments

Did ruling coalitions influence committee assignments in the Chilean lower Chamber? Or, by contrast, considering that 53% of its deputies are seniors, was the allocation of seats a pre-determined procedure? This section deals with these questions presenting first, a detailed description of rules and practices on assignments. Then, I summarize the predictions and the methodological approach I apply to the analysis of the allocation of committee seats highlighting some changes I made for the Chilean case. Finally, I present the results and conclusion.

11.1 *The Committee Assignment Process: Rules and Practices*

In the Chilean lower Chamber committee assignments are made every four years immediately after the Chamber renewal. Seats are allocated applying a

²²³ Journal 10.03.98, pp. 12/8.

coefficient that is obtained dividing the total of committee seats by the total of deputies.²²⁴ This coefficient is then multiplied by the number of deputies of each party and the result indicates their number of seats in the committee system. In case of fractions, a special law regulating this issue is applied.²²⁵ Since 1990 the *Mesa* is in charge of preparing the assignment slate for each party. Its proposal is then submitted to Chamber's approval.²²⁶ Once assignments are made, each committee elects its Chair (majority of votes is required).

Beyond the *Reglamento's* rules, the study of the sessions that approved assignments reveals that consultations with delegation leaders are part of the process, especially since 1965, and unavoidably since the 1990s. For instance, in 1994 committee assignments were postponed four months because delegations were not able to reach an agreement.²²⁷ This method to allocate committee seats was not always applied (until 1967 the *Reglamento* mentioned only the "proportionality rule"), and when applied, was not always accepted by all parties. In what follows we will see that: a) before the coefficient was introduced there was a controversy about the interpretation of the "proportionality rule:" while majority coalitions claimed that the PR rule implied the use of two coefficients (one for the parties of the majority, and one for the parties of the minority), minor parties claimed that the PR rule should be applied to "parties" using a unique coefficient; b) in 1965 minor parties disagreed on the allocation of

²²⁴ As mentioned, this coefficient was introduced in the 1967 reform. Before 1967 the only criterion regulated in the *Reglamento* to allocate committee seats was the "proportionality rule." As we will see immediately, problems related with the interpretation of the "proportionality rule" before the 1960s caused the adoption of the coefficient.

²²⁵ Law of July 9, 1878. This law is always published as an appendix in the *Reglamento*.

²²⁶ Before the 1990s the committee-assignment function was in charge of the President of the Chamber who should also submit the proposal to Chamber's approval.

²²⁷ Journal 12.07.94, p. 2332.

committees made by the Presidency, and c) in 1971 one party tried to impose a new criterion.

- *The Interpretation of the Proportionality Rule*

Before 1967, the allocation of committee seats was approved by the Chamber following a proposal of its President who also filled vacancies when deputies ceased to be members of committees. Presidents, based on the proportionality rule, fixed the proportions of each party, consulted delegation leaders, and made the proposition to the Chamber. Finally, party leaders assigned the positions internally (Andrade Geywitz 1945). This peaceful depiction cannot be extended to the 1957-1961 and 1965-1969 periods, even though the same procedure was in force.

The main debate about the interpretation of the proportionality rule took place in 1957. Then the Chamber had 13 committees composed of 13 members each. This amounted to a total of 166 committee seats to assign.²²⁸ That year the criterion applied by the Conservative President of the Chamber, Héctor Correa Letelier, was that the *majority coalition that had elected the Mesa (74 deputies), had the right to occupy the majority of seats in every committee (7 seats in every committee + 4 seats in Committee on R&HA=88 seats), and that the minority (73 deputies) had the right to be assigned the rest of the seats (78 seats)*. To proceed this way Correa Letelier had established *two different coefficients* to determine the number of seats each party would have in the committee system: *one for the parties of the majority, and one for the parties of the minority.*²²⁹

²²⁸ The President and VPs (*Mesa*) are members of the Committee on R&HA in their own right. Therefore they are excluded from the counting.

²²⁹ The coefficient for the majority was obtained dividing 88 committee seats by 74 deputies (1.18). For instance, Liberals with 31 deputies had 37 seats to occupy in committees. The coefficient for the minority was

Correa Letelier and Hugo Zepada Barrios (PL) argued that committee assignments had been established according to the rules in force, and following the same procedure applied in 1941, 1945, and in 1949. This proposal was refused by Radicals and Falangists. They claimed that the *Mesa* did not respect the proportionality rule, that the precedents they invoked did not exist because committee assignments were not related to *majorities* or *minorities* but to *parties*, that there should be *one coefficient for all parties*, and that it should be the result of dividing the total of committee seats (166) by the total of deputies (147). Despite their claims, the proposal of the majority was approved.²³⁰

- *Minor Parties and the Allocation of Committees*

The coefficient that Radicals and Falangists had demanded in 1957 ($166/147=1.12$) was applied in 1965 by the Christian Democrat President of the Chamber, Hugo E. Ballesteros. Almost all parties agreed with his proposal, except for Liberals and Conservatives who then formed the *Independent* delegation with 9 members. Their main criticism was that the assignment had been unfair because *they hadn't got a seat in Hacienda*. The majority party and the largest pluralities, they argued, chose the "most important committees leaving minorities in the less important ones."²³¹ Considering the committees Liberals and Conservatives were assigned to, it is clear that they referred to Education, Defence, Health, Mining, Agriculture, and Public Works. José Millas Correa (PC) argued that the problem of Liberals and Conservatives came from the election results (March 7, 1965), and had nothing to do with the

1.06 (78 seats divided by 73 deputies). In this way Radicals, with 36 deputies, had right to 39 seats in committees.

²³⁰ Journal 04.06.57, pp. 107-121.

²³¹ Journal 26.05.65, p. 127.

proportionality rule, adding that this explained why “they did not get a seat in the most important committee of the Chamber.”²³²

- *The Opportunity to Allocate Committee Seats*

In 1971 some members of the DC left the party and formed the Christian Left Party.²³³ In view of their new status in Chamber -they did not belong to the DC delegation any more-, they wanted to be assigned seats in committees in representation of their new party. Therefore, they demanded a reallocation of seats arguing that *assignments should change every time the membership of the Chamber changed for whatever reason during the legislative period*. This interpretation was disapproved on the floor. The prevalent criterion was that the allocation made at the beginning of each legislative period holds for the whole four-year term.²³⁴

Recapitulating, the committee assignment process in the Chilean lower Chamber has the following features: a) it is made every four years and holds for the entire legislative period; b) Chamber’s approval has always been a requisite; c) until 1967 the PR system was used as the criterion to allocate seats; d) the PR criterion was sometimes applied to *majorities and minorities using two coefficients* (at least in 1945 and 1957), and sometimes to *parties using one coefficient* (at least in 1965); e) after 1967 a unique coefficient is used to allocate seats; f) the President of the Chamber made the assignment proposal until 1973; g) since the 1990s this proposal is in charge of the *Mesa*, and h) the traditional consultation with delegation leaders has become unavoidable

²³² Journal 26.05.65, p. 131.

²³³ See chapter V, section 5.8.

²³⁴ Journal 01.12.71, pp. 1737/47.

since the 1990s. Consequently, Chilean deputies have passed from a relatively discretionary process to a regulated system. To put it differently, they have limited their power over the committee assignment process by an amendment to the *Reglamento* in 1967. This change, adopted with the vote of the powerful and unique DC single-party majority, is a decision that counters a cartel behavior. Furthermore, in the 1990s the *Concertación* deepened this “limitation-of-the-power” process when, after accepting a VP2 of the opposition, it decided to transfer the committee-assignment function from the President to the *Mesa*.

What was the difference for ruling coalitions between the allocation of seats based on *majorities and minorities using two coefficients* and on *parties using one coefficient*? To what extent did the coefficient introduced in 1967 change the allocation of committee seats? How did this “limitation-of-the-power” process affect the influence of ruling coalitions over committee assignments? Did *seniority in Chamber* or *seniority in Committees* play a role in assignments? I address these questions in the next section.

11.2 Predictions

To find out whether committee assignments respond to norms of committee-government models, or to party-centered theories, I test identical expectations and apply the same methodology as those used for the Argentine case. Detailed information about predictions and methodology has been introduced and explained in chapter IV. Therefore, before presenting the results I summarize the predictions and highlight methodological changes I made for the Chilean case.

In reference to predictions that may limit the influence of parties I consider the seniority and apprenticeship norms. The seniority norm is evaluated in two senses: as chamber seniority (i.e., total service in Chamber) and as committee-specific seniority. The apprenticeship norm, as mentioned, suggests that the committee allocation process guarantees mediocre assignments to freshmen.

To investigate if the ruling status (be it related to majorities/pluralities - coalitions/parties) is the key to understand the assignment process, I test whether party ratios in standing committees are consistently set in ruling coalitions' favor, and examine the extent to which they have super-proportional share of seats in important committees and of Chairs in committees (see predictions in Table 3 in chapter II).

Finally, adapting the margin hypothesis of Young and Heitshusen (2003) to the Chilean case, I examine if ruling coalitions' incentives to influence committee composition vary by party margins (i.e., regular plurality $-s \leq 0.46-$, regular $-0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55-$ or exceptional majorities $-0.55 < s < 0.67-$).²³⁵

11.3 *Methodology*

In the empirical section that follows (11.4 *Results*), I start with descriptive data at the aggregate or legislature level. Then I move to the analysis of committee assignments at the deputy level. Finally, I switch the level of analysis to individual assignments, in order to test for the influence of committee-specific seniority on chairmanships.

²³⁵ The margin hypothesis was introduced in chapter II.

The *dependent variable* is again the weighted sum of committee assignments of each deputy. To construct it I first classify the standing committees considering their importance. This stratification is based on the following indicators: a) the place accorded to committees by constitutional laws and *Reglamentos*; b) the importance accorded to committees by deputies in debates and bills, and c) the longevity of each committee. These three criteria come from the extensive analysis of legislation, debates, and bills related to the committee system from 1945 to 2002, and to the evolution of the committee system through time.

Since I want to have a comparable scaling to the one used for Argentina, I transformed those indicators in an index which is in the same scale (i.e., 1-6). Therefore, I rescaled the three indicators into 1-6 variables. Then, I took their average value as a measure of committee importance, the final measure being a 1-6 scale. As to legislation, committees were given a score from 6 (those whose jurisdictions were detailed in constitutional laws and *Reglamentos*) to 1 (committees only listed in the *Reglamento*). About debates and bills, committees were given a score from 6 (those whose jurisdictions were debated, whose relative importance was signalled by deputies, which were identified as “control” committees, and that were classified as exclusive committees) to 1 (committees qualified as inferior, less important or secondary and those that were referred to as “the rest of the committees”). Finally, I computed the longevity of committees as the count of legislatures during which a committee existed, and rescaled this measure from 1 to 6, 1 meaning youngest committees (older committees are assumed more relevant than newer ones). The average score on those

three measures gives the committee score. APPENDIX J shows the results of the stratification.

The position held within a committee is then used to create an ordinal ranking. To make the measure comparable to Argentina, I gave Chairs 4 points and regular members 1 point. Therefore, Chairs and regular members in Chile have the same scores as in Argentina.

Overall the variable 'committee power' is constructed with measures of committee and position importance that are comparable in scale. Thus, even though it is not possible to use the same indicators to build the power index (since the valuation of committees in Argentina is based on different grounds), this approach helps making the dependent variable comparable across the two countries.

To test my main hypotheses, I predict deputies' weighted sum of assignments using identical independent variables (*Ruling Party (Coalition)*, *Freshman*, *Seniority*, *Cumulation*, *Chamber (Mesa) Position* and *Group Position*) with the only exception that, because there are too many regions in Chile, I included a dummy variable for the *Metropolitana* (Santiago) region only.

As mentioned in the Argentine case, a significant and positive coefficient estimate for the *Ruling Coalition* variable would give support to the cartel hypothesis, since it implies that ruling coalition members have more than a proportional share of assignments in committees, all else being equal. *Seniority* variables allow us to test for apprenticeship and seniority norms. I also replace the *Ruling Coalition* indicator with three subtypes of ruling coalition variables: regular pluralities, regular majorities, and exceptional

majorities. Such sub-type variables are used to test the margin hypothesis. If this hypothesis is correct, then deputies from regular pluralities (actually in the only single-party regular plurality of 1969) would garner more power in committees than deputies from regular/exceptional majorities.

Finally, as I did for Argentina, in the last part of the empirical section I replaced the seniority-in-Chamber measures with committee-specific seniority for a more robust test of the seniority norms hypotheses. Instead of considering legislators as units of analysis, I then focus on assignments, so that committee-specific seniority can be matched to the corresponding assignments.

11.4 Results

- Ruling Coalition Shares in Chamber and Committees-

The descriptive statistics for my main covariates are presented in APPENDIX J. The average deputy scores about 5 points in the weighted sum of committee assignments, my dependent variable. The most powerful deputy garnered above 27 points on that scale, while a few deputies did not secure a single assignment to committees. A majority of deputies (about 53%) in the sample are seniors.

A preliminary test of the cartel hypothesis consists of comparing the shares of seats of ruling coalitions to their shares of committee assignments across time.

Table 99 presents the share of committee assignments accruing to ruling coalitions as compared to their share of seats between 1945 and 2002. The last column shows the

difference between the two shares in percentage points. I also performed proportion tests to examine whether the percentage-point difference between the two shares is statistically significant.

Except for 1945-1949 and 1957-1961, representation is fair, even favorable to the opposition since the 1970s. In other words, a very small over-representation was found only for the *regular majorities* ($0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$) of 1945 and 1957 - before the introduction of the coefficient in 1967 - though this disproportionality is non-significant.

TABLE 99 - SHARE OF SEATS AND SHARE OF ASSIGNMENTS RULING COALITIONS – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Legislative Period	Majority-Plurality/ Single Party-Coalition	Share of Seats	Share of Committee Assignments	Gap
1945-1949	Majority Coalition	50,34	54,44	4,10
1949-1953	Majority Coalition	54,42	55,62	1,20
1953-1957	Majority Coalition	51,02	50,89	-0,13
1957-1961	Majority Coalition	50,34	53,85	3,51
1961-1965	Majority Coalition	57,14	57,99	0,85
1965-1969	<i>Single-Party Majority</i>	55,78	56,21	0,43
1969-1973	<i>Single-Party Plurality</i>	37,33	38,46	1,13
1973	Majority Coalition	58,00	57,73	-0,27
1990-1994	Majority Coalition	57,50	56,40	-1,10
1994-1998	Majority Coalition	58,33	58,23	-0,11
1998-2002	Majority Coalition	57,50	57,81	0,31

Note: The shares are those of the ruling coalitions in the Chamber.
Significance testing: Two-sample proportion tests (one-tailed); * = $p < 0.05$

While the gap those years is in the range of 4.1 and -0.13, after 1967 it is more stable (1.13 and -0.27). The change of the electoral system (before an after the 1990s) does not

seem to have an impact on ruling coalitions' shares. In short, the cartel prediction fails since ruling coalitions had no significant over-representation when share of committee assignments are compared to share of seats.

Results of Table 99 confirm, however, the information obtained through debates' analyses. In this sense: a) in the 1945-1949 and 1957-1961 periods ruling coalitions tried to secure as much as committee seats as possible applying the "two coefficients procedure"; b) the most proportional period before the introduction of the coefficient (1967) was 1965-1969, that is, when the DC single-party majority decided to strictly apply the proportionality rule considering one coefficient for all parties; c) the power of the DC single-plurality in 1969 is once again present in its tiny over-representation in committees; d) excluding 1969-1973, since the introduction of the coefficient (1967) committee assignments are more proportional than before, particularly since the 1990s when consultation with delegation leaders became unavoidable, and e) while the first period after the return of democracy -the *participative* 1990-1994 period- was the best for the opposition in terms of committee assignments (-1.10), the 1998-2002 period shows the efforts of the majority coalition to regain lost ground.

TABLE 100 - ASSIGNMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRS BY RULING COALITION AND OPPOSITION – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Legislative Period	Share of Seats Ruling Coalition (1)	Number of Chairs Ruling Coalition	Ruling Coalition (%) (2)	Number of Chairs Opposition	Opposition (%)	Total	Gap (%) (2-1)
1945-1949	50,34	12	92,3	1	7,7	13	42.0
1949-1953	54,42	9	69,2	4	30,8	13	14.8
1953-1957	51,02	10	76,9	3	23,1	13	25.9
1957-1961	50,34	12	100,0	0	0,0	12 ^a	49.7
1961-1965	57,14	13	100,0	0	0,0	13	42.9
1965-1969	55,78	13	100,0	0	0,0	13	44.2
1969-1973	37,33	8	53,3	7	46,7	15	16.0
1973	58,00	15	100,0	0	0,0	15	42.0
1990-1994	57,50	12	75,0	4	25,0	16	17.5
1994-1998	58,33	15	83,3	3	16,7	18	25.0
1998-2002	57,50	17	94,4	1	5,6	18 ^b	36.9
Total	-	136	85,5	23	14,5	159	-

N=159

a. The Chair of the Committee on Agriculture was vacant in 1957.

b. The Chair of the Committee on Fisheries is not counted because it was created in 2001.

The assignment of committee Chairs from 1945 to 2002 (Table 100) reveals a plain over-representation of ruling coalitions during the whole period: they secured 136 (86%) of a total of 159 Chairs. No matter the type of ruling coalition or electoral system, the over-representation goes from 69% to 100% of the Chairs.

The exception is again the period of the DC single-party plurality (1969-1973). But even in this case, note the DC got 53% of the Chairs while having 37% of the seats in Chamber, and 38% of committee seats.

Through the gaps we can see that the tendencies previously mentioned for 1945-1949 and 1957-1961 (ruling coalitions that sought to control the committee system as much

as possible), 1990-1994 (the *participative* beneficial period for the opposition), and 1998-2002 (the majority in search of its lost ground) remain for Chairs' assignments. In addition, if we consider that the four Chairs of the opposition of the 1990-1994 period went to the UDI, we can appreciate the effects of the "administration pact" between the Center-left *Concertación* and the ultra-Right UDI at the Chairs' assignments level. Therefore, the assignment of committee Chairs supports the prediction for the entire period.

Table 101 shows the shares of chairmanships secured by ruling coalitions from 1945 to 2002 in the five most important committees.

TABLE 101 - DISTRIBUTION OF CHAIRS IN MOST IMPORTANT COMMITTEES – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

Committee	Ruling Coalition	Opposition
Constitutional Affairs	11	0
<i>Hacienda</i>	10	1
Foreign Affairs	10	1
R&HA	11	0
<i>Interior</i>	9	2
Total	92.7%	7.3%

N=55

We see that 93% of those positions were held by ruling coalitions. The monopoly in the Committee on R&HA is not unexpected since its Chair is the President of the Chamber, *who always belonged to the ruling coalition*. The fact that an opposition party chaired *Hacienda* has a simple explanation that confirms previous analyses: the Chair belonged to the ultra-right UDI during the *participative* period (1990-1994 or the best period for the opposition). Foreign Affairs was chaired by a Conservative in 1949, that is, when the

Chamber was reorganized after the effects of the banning of the PC. Finally, *Interior* was once chaired by a Conservative (1949), and by a deputy of the rightist RN (1994).

Thus, when weighting for the importance of assignments, these figures offer initial support for the cartel hypothesis. Regardless the type of majority, plurality or electoral system, ruling coalitions over-represented and even monopolized committee Chairs in general, and also Chairs inside those committees most important to Chilean legislators. To further explore this assertion, I turn to a more systematic examination of this relationship.

-Determinants of Committee Assignments at the Deputy Level-

Table 102 shows the results of models predicting the weighted sum of assignments in committees at the deputy level. I first consider whether deputies from ruling coalitions secure more power in committees as compared to other deputies, and whether this advantage lies within the bounds of statistical significance.

The mean across the sample for total committee power is 4.9 units (APPENDIX J). According to the results, being member of the ruling coalition increases the 'power-in-committees' score of a deputy by 0.97 points, as compared to opposition members, all else being equal. Hence, while Table 99 indicates that there is no significant difference between the share of assignments and the share of seats, a deeper look at assignments reveals that ruling coalitions tend to have surplus power in committees.

TABLE 102 - PREDICTING WEIGHTED POWER IN COMMITTEE SYSTEM – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 (OLS)

Variables	Freshman Model	Seniority Model
Ruling Coalition	0.970*** (0.157)	0.948*** (0.157)
Freshman	-1.432*** (0.164)	
Chamber Seniority		0.650*** (0.073)
Group Position	0.347 (0.230)	0.394 (0.229)
Mesa Position	3.530*** (0.546)	3.435*** (0.547)
Cumulation	2.836*** (0.154)	2.851*** (0.154)
Santiago	0.460* (0.184)	0.421* (0.184)
Constant	1.067*** (0.326)	-0.822* (0.345)
R ²	0.33	0.33
N	1538	1538

* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

I also test whether apprenticeship and seniority norms exist in the Chamber, and compare the relative importance of such norms with party dominance. Considering the freshman and seniority variables' estimates (Column 1 and Column 2, Table 102, respectively), I cannot claim that the fact of being a newcomer or to have more than one term in the Chamber is trivial. Freshmen are assigned mediocre positions and seniority matters regarding the allocation of seats.

As I did for Argentina I performed a mean comparison test of the power in committees of freshmen and seniors of the ruling party and the opposition with actual data that turn out significant. While the mean power of freshmen of the ruling coalition is 4.1, that of the freshmen of the opposition is 3.7. For seniors, the mean of those from the ruling coalition is 6.5 and that of the seniors of the opposition is 4.5. Again, mediocre

assignments for newcomers and the significance of seniority are confirmed. But this time, we can see the difference between members of the ruling party and of the opposition for both, norms and particularly in the case of seniors.

Following the model of Table 102 (as I did for Argentina), I predicted the value of the dependent variables after changing the values of the Freshman and Ruling Coalition variables. I kept all the other variables at the observed values. Results are shown in Table 103.

TABLE 103 - PREDICTED VALUES - POWER IN COMMITTEES SENIORS & FRESHMEN OF THE RULING PARTY/OPPOSITION – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2002

Ruling Party-Opposition/Seniors- Freshmen	Predicted Values
Opposition Seniors	5,019
Opposition Freshmen	3,588
Ruling Party Seniors	5,989
Ruling Party Freshmen	4,558

Ruling-coalition seniors have on average much more power than those of the opposition but the latter perform better than freshmen of the ruling coalition. The difference between ruling coalition and opposition freshmen remains.

In sum, seniority-in-Chamber and apprenticeship norms are criteria considered for appointments in the Chilean Chamber. The fact of belonging to the ruling coalition is an advantage, namely for seniors.

As to regions, the results show that deputies from Santiago are slightly advantaged in committees as compared to deputies from other regions.

Note also that deputies holding positions in the Chamber (in the *Mesa* or as delegation leaders) are more likely to have power in committees too. Thus, Chilean deputies tend

to cumulate Chamber positions and important committee positions. This finding coincides with the fact that the *Mesa* members (during the whole period) and delegations leaders (since 1994) are part of the Committee on R&HA in their own right.

Obviously, those who have multiple assignments necessarily have more power overall. In this sense, note the cumulation variable controls for multiple-assignments. By controlling for cumulation, I net out the effect of multiple assignments and observe power by assignment. Results do not change much if I omit cumulation.

As explained in the Argentine case, the fact of observing the whole period (1945-2002), may disguise important differences across time. Therefore, the next step considers the relevance of the margin hypothesis and the effects of the change of the electoral system.

-The Impact of the Electoral System and the Margin Hypothesis-

The margin hypothesis states that smaller shares of victories lead parties in control of the Chamber to exhibit even higher super-proportions in committees as compared to larger ones. In this sense, note that the Chilean lower Chamber was ruled by *regular majorities* ($0.50 \leq s \leq 0.55$) until 1961, and by *exceptional majorities* ($0.55 < s < 0.67$) since then -excluding of course the DC single-party plurality of 1969-1973-. This means first, that I have two clear blocs that relate to different margins of victory and second, that the change of the electoral system (from PR to binominal in 1990) did not cause this difference.

In order to test the margin hypothesis I use dummies for three ruling coalitions' types and opposition.

In the first column of Table 104, I compare the coefficient estimates of these three subtypes against the reference of all opposition deputies. Observing the estimates for those three variables, I do not find a pattern consistent with the margin hypothesis. The cartel effect is significant for regular and exceptional majorities, not for pluralities. In addition, note that there is no significant difference between types.

Therefore, the margin hypothesis is not supported by the data because the ruling coalitions' types that exhibit (an almost equal) over-proportional control of committee assignments are regular and exceptional *majorities*.

TABLE 104 - TEST OF THE MARGIN HYPOTHESIS – CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002 (OLS)

Variables	Opposition as Reference	Exceptional Majorities as Reference
Regular Plurality	0.645 (0.511)	-0.454 (0.554)
Regular Majority	0.815 ** (0.253)	-0.284 (0.332)
Exceptional Majority	1.099 *** (0.216)	
Opposition		-1.099 *** (0.216)
Chamber Seniority	0.653 *** (0.073)	0.653 *** (0.073)
Group Position	0.390 (0.229)	0.390 (0.229)
Mesa Position	3.445 *** (0.547)	3.445 *** (0.547)
Cumulation	2.857 *** (0.154)	2.857 *** (0.154)
Santiago	0.415 * (0.184)	0.415 * (0.184)
Constant	-0.766 * (0.355)	0.333 (0.416)
R ²	0.33	0.33
N	1538	1538

*** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$

From these results, it appears that the electoral system reform in Chile has not affected committee assignment patterns. I also examine sub-samples to compare the determinants of committee assignments under different electoral rules (PR until 1973 - binominal system since the 1990s), and no important differences were found (results not shown). The passage from the PR to the binominal system in 1989 did not affect the tendency of ruling coalitions to produce super-proportions in important committee positions over the whole time-period.

-Committee-specific Seniority-

In this section I consider committee-specific seniority norm. As mentioned, if the norm exists, it should explain chairmanships' assignments to committees within the ruling coalition. As done before in the Argentine case, I test this hypothesis by replacing previous measures of seniority in Chamber with committee-specific seniority (i.e., the number of times a deputy has previously been appointed to a committee). Since I need to match committee-specific experience to the relevant committee, I change the level of analysis and consider the pool of assignments that took place during the time-period (I exclude the first legislature, 1945-1949, since committee-specific data are not available prior to 1945). The dependent variable is now binomial, I code 1 the assignments as Chairs and 0 all other assignments. The question to be answered is again: over the pool of all assignments, *which factors are more likely to lead to a chair assignment compared to other positions?*

TABLE 105 - CHAIRMANSHIPS IN COMMITTEES, 1949-2002 (LOGIT)

Variables	Coefficient	Marginal Effects	Coefficient	Marginal Effects
Ruling Coalition	1.518 *** (0.238)	0.076	2.102 *** (0.549)	0.106
Committee Seniority	2.279 *** (0.400)	0.152	3.272 *** (0.891)	0.212
Ruling Coal.* Seniority			-1.596 (1.306)	-0.078
Group Post	-0.302 (0.279)	-0.014	-0.303 (0.278)	-0.014
Mesa Position	0.878 * (0.377)	0.064	0.887 * (0.376)	0.064
Cumulation	-2.419 ** (0.737)	-0.121	-2.453 ** (0.738)	-0.119
Santiago	0.247 (0.201)	0.013	0.241 (0.201)	0.012
Constant	-3.000 *** (0.420)		-3.153 *** (0.445)	
Pseudo-R ²	0.11		0.11	
Log-likelihood	-457.997		-457.285	
% Correctly Predicted	92.39		92.39	
N	1,919		1,919	

Notes: Binomial logit regression. All variables are rescaled from 0 to 1, so that coefficient estimates above can be compared in size. Marginal effects are for a discrete change in the value of the independent variables (from 0 to 1).

The first legislature (1945) is dropped since committee-specific seniority is unknown for that legislature. Legislature dummies are included in the regression (results not shown).


*** = $p < 0.001$; ** = $p < 0.01$; * = $p < 0.05$

Besides the use of committee-specific seniority, the set of explanatory variables is similar as before but for one exception. I have rescaled all independent variables between 0 and 1, so that coefficient estimates may be compared in size even if I use a logit regression.

Table 105 shows the results. The left column shows the baseline model while the right column shows a model in which I added an interactive term between the party and seniority variables. The first model shows that the ruling coalition and committee seniority variables have a large influence on the probability of being assigned Chair, as the statistically significant estimates reveal. Those results support the idea that

seniority-in-committee norm matters to become Chair. Having committee experience increases the likelihood of being assigned Chair *as compared to a regular member position*.

FIGURE 6 - IN-SAMPLE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF BEING ASSIGNED CHAIR, BY EXPERIENCE AND RULING COALITION - CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES



Note: Based on the estimates of the logit regression (Table 105, Column 2). The dashed lines are the confidence intervals; the solid lines are the smoothed curves of predicted probabilities.

As I did for Argentina, I test an interactive term (model 2) to confirm whether committee experience matters only for ruling party members. The non-significant estimate for the interaction term, however, indicates that the effect of committee seniority is about the same among ruling coalition and opposition deputies.

In other words, committee-specific seniority matters in Chile, but it matters for opposition and ruling coalition members equally. As before, to test this claim, I plot in-

sample predicted probabilities against experience for both opposition deputies and ruling-coalition members, using estimates of column 2, Table 105. Figure 6 shows the plots. The dashed lines show the confidence intervals around the smoothed predicted probability curves. The figure illustrates that committee experience matters in both cases: the confidence intervals in the two panels clearly overlap.

Recall, however, that when focusing on the aggregate level of assignments rather than on the assignment level (Tables 100 and 101), results showed a definite over-representation of ruling coalitions during the whole period.

The descriptive data at the aggregate level shows that committee assignments have been relatively fair during the whole period, and more proportional and stable since the introduction of the coefficient. By contrast, Chairs belong to ruling coalitions almost exclusively in all committees and, in the case of the most important, only a pact or the fact of being ideologically close to the ruling coalition can exceptionally make a Chair available to the opposition. The determinants of committee assignments at the deputy level demonstrate that ruling coalitions tend to have the upper hand in the strategic composition of committees. The condition of belonging to the ruling coalition is important, but not the only factor considered when the time of assignments comes: apprenticeship and seniority-in-Chamber norms are part of the decision. In the Chilean lower Chamber pluralities do not exhibit higher super-proportions in committees as compared to majorities. Committee-specific experience matters for all those who

envision the possibility of becoming Chairs. The combination “committee-specific experience + ruling coalition” guarantees the fulfillment of that project.

Chilean deputies have built a conservative committee system. Its structure, which is quite stable, has been shaped by the political, economic, and social main concerns of each period, and changes have been adopted by consensus. Chilean deputies have also restrained their power over the committee assignment process. The allocation of committee seats, somewhat imbalanced until the 1960s, has become progressively more proportional and considers committee seniority and apprenticeship norms. But this is a partial portrait of this traditional arrangement. Two other features of this system are: its stratification and its over-proportion of senior ruling-coalition members in committee Chairs. This concentration of power, almost undisputed in the most important committees, remained during the whole period despite the type of majority, plurality, or electoral system. Only majority coalitions can “give” a Chair to the opposition. If this opportunity appears, only seniors can take advantage of it. Since the 1990s, it is clear that Chilean ruling coalitions are ready to alter the traditional structure of the system creating new bureaucratic positions, but not to renounce to the power that comes from chairmanships. To sum up, the existence of a fairly objective and stable committee system is as true as the uniform cartel behavior displayed by ruling coalitions regarding its most important positions.

Part IV. Conclusion

Now is the time to summarize the patterns found, and to begin the assessment of the merits and limits of the Cartel Theory to explain the role of ruling coalitions in the institutional development of the Chamber. As it was for Argentina, the evaluation will be guided by the following questions: *Did ruling parties determine the key features of the Chamber's organization over time? Did the reform or maintenance of the Chamber's organizational rules and norms advantage them?*

Table 106 at the end of this conclusion synthesizes the changes to be mentioned in the following paragraphs.

The comprehensive analysis of the aspects considered in Parts I to III shows that the development of the Chamber is characterized by five patterns that defy any type of ruling majority, plurality, or electoral system.

First, *ruling coalitions have increased their power*. The *Reglamento* of 2002 gives ruling coalitions advantages that did not exist in 1945. During this fifty-seven years they have achieved a tighter control of floor proceedings (through a proportional and expedite time-allotting on the floor), and of the legislative agenda (e.g., the President can reject bills and amendments; Chairs can reject amendments; *Hacienda* has subsidiary and control functions; the President chairs a leaders' committee whose decisions are adopted by a weighted voting system, and ruling coalitions have the prerogative to fix

deadlines to committees to report). In addition, they have six new committee Chairs to distribute internally, or to use as a tool of negotiation.

Second, *errors (loss of advantages) were immediately fixed (reassigned)*. Considered as two blocs of reforms, the 1967-1969 and the 1990-1994 general amendments have something in common. Unfavourable rules to ruling coalitions that had been approved in 1967 and 1990, were respectively suppressed by the 1969 and 1994 reforms. In the case of the first bloc, two explicit prohibitions established in 1967 (multiple assignments and the control prerogative of *Hacienda*) were suppressed in 1969. As to the second bloc, the 1994 reform reinterpreted (the "abstention surprise"), or directly eliminated some of the "participative reforms" of 1990 (the transfer of the agenda-setting function from the President to the *Mesa*, and the transformation of the exclusive decision of Chairs to hold secret sessions into a majority decision). In addition to reforms to the *Reglamento*, consider also that the "administration pact" (1990-1998) that gave the opposition a handful of Chairs and the VP2 of the *Mesa* was abandoned in 1998.

Third, *ruling coalitions considered certain rules and practices non-negotiable*. When I look at the institutional development of a Chamber, I consider not only changes but also *untouched* rules and practices. During the period over analysis the referral power, which ensures control over the flow of legislation and perpetuates committees' stratification, remained in hands of the President despite deputies' complains. Three other rules and practices that form the core of the majority coalition power not only *remained* but resisted direct attempts to be reformed. They are the jurisdiction and functioning of

Hacienda, the political processes to elect the *Mesa* and committee Chairs, and the control of motions to recommit (Table 106).

Fourth, *ruling coalitions have forged a committee system that combines stability, proportional membership, seniority and apprenticeship norms with a tight and persistent political control of its main positions*. As mentioned, two strong tendencies are evident in this case. For one part, the intention to maintain an organized, proportional, and manageable committee system. For the other, the decision to exercise a firm and irrevocable control of key committees' positions.

Fifth, *ruling coalitions have controlled the main legislative procedures*. Though majority coalitions renounced to interpret the proportionality rule in their advantage when they established the committee-assignment coefficient in 1967, they kept during the whole period control of the election and composition of the *Mesas*, the censure motions, the creation of committees, and the election of the powerful committee Chairs.

The predictions of the theory did not fare well to explain the behavior of ruling coalitions in all the cases. In particular I want to mention the decision to renounce to the interpretation of the proportionality rule to make committee assignments, and the suppression of the *control* role of *Hacienda*-even though it was regained later- (1967); the *participative* measures adopted in 1990, namely the "administration pact" that gave important positions to the opposition and even weaken the power of Chairs -again, even though these measures were abandoned in the short term-; and the proportional

assignments in committees, and the conservative development of the committee system during the whole period.

Inside a conservative structure, and despite different arrangements and political complexities, many and varying ruling coalitions have defended their prerogatives and managed to keep and increase their power. The five patterns aforementioned demonstrate that Chilean coalitions did determine the key features of their lower Chamber's organization over time using its rule-making power to their favor. Beyond its many remarkable peculiarities, the defying Chilean case confirms the predictions of the Cartel Theory.

TABLE 106 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF MAJORITY COALITIONS
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

	1945	2002
	Referral of bills	IDEM
	Agenda-setting (public and secret sessions)	Agenda-setting (public sessions)
	Committee assignments subject to Chamber's approval	-
President	Chair of the <i>Mesa</i> and the Committee on R&HA	IDEM
	-	Chair of the LDM ^a
	-	Organization of delegations' meetings any time and suspension of sittings during these meetings
	-	Rejection of bills, motions, and amendments
	-	Committee assignments subject to Chamber's approval
Mesa	-	Agenda-setting (exclusive for secret sessions and the weekly order of business of simple bills; shared with the LDM for bills subject to "immediate treatment")
	-	Preparation and supervision of the implementation of the internal budget
	Preparation, supervision of the implementation, and auditing of the internal budget and human resources management shared with highest officials	Human resources management shared with highest officials
Committee on R&HA	-	Nomination of the Auditing Committee (internal budget) subject to Chamber's approval
	-	Approval of the budget
	Complete and <i>exclusive</i> control of the committee procedure and agenda	IDEM
Chairs	-	Preparation of the itemized list of rules <i>Hacienda</i> should study in the "financing analysis"
	-	Change of meetings' purpose (e.g., to discuss current events)
	-	Rejection of amendments
Advantages Ratified by Majority Coalitions		Political election of the <i>Mesa</i> Political election of committee Chairs Motions to recommit <i>Hacienda's</i> control function <i>Hacienda's</i> functioning (decision to create subcommittees)
		Election and composition of the <i>Mesas</i>
Legislative Procedures controlled by Majority Coalitions		Committee Assignments Censure motions Creation of committees and election of their Chairs

a. Leaders Delegation's Meeting

TABLE 106 - INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF KEY UNITS AND PREROGATIVES OF MAJORITY COALITIONS
CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002
(cont.)

	1945	2002
	<i>Hacienda de facto</i> control function	Hacienda control and subsidiary functions established in the <i>Reglamento</i>
	Interpretation of the PR rule to allocate committee seats	-
	-	Deadlines to committees in order to report
	General time allotting on the floor and <i>Incidentes</i>	Proportional time allotting on the floor and <i>Incidentes</i>
	-	Reduction of all terms to speak on the floor, during <i>Incidentes</i> and in committees
Advantages Majority Coalitions	-	Decisions of the LDM are adopted by a weighted voting system
	-	Decisions adopted by the unanimous consent in the LDM are mandatory for the Chamber
	Election of the Secretary General of the Chamber	Election of all highest officials of the Chamber
	-	Abstentions are counted as affirmative votes
	13 committee Chairs to distribute	19 committee Chairs to distribute

CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

I have a direct knowledge of the Argentine Congress because I worked there during the 1990s and early 2000s. Even though I did not work in the *Corporación*, I visited it many times. In particular, I went to Valparaíso to conduct fieldwork first for my Masters' thesis and then for this dissertation. My first research focused on a comparison of the management of both Chambers. I was surprised by the differences I found between *them* and *us*. The way they hired functionaries, their *small* committee system (only one authority per committee?), their tri-partisan *Mesas* composed of members of a *coalition*, their detailed *Reglamento*, and their Code of Official Conduct... The list is long. I always admired the structure and organization of the *Corporación*, so dissimilar from *ours*.

I chose the Chilean and the Argentine Chambers to test the Cartel Theory because of their contrasts and because both of them are, in turn, different from the U.S. House. How would the theory fare in these *Latin American* legislatures, immersed in so divergent political contexts, with distinct party and electoral systems? The patterns of institutional development of the Chilean and Argentine lower Chambers found in this work are captivating for two reasons. First, despite *our* differences, *our* ruling parties have behaved as procedural coalitions. Second, the Chilean Chamber surprised me twice. The Cartel Theory not only fares well in the *Corporación*. It fares better than in Argentina and the U.S. House.

In this conclusion I present a summary of my research in two steps. Part I displays the main results based on the predictions laid out in chapter II. Part II presents them according to the distinction made by Cox and McCubbins between active and latent procedural power, and explains what happens with the results that do not support the

theory. Then, I discuss the negative agenda power in Chile, and the origins of the powerful legislative parties in Argentina (Part III). The last part concludes by suggesting three avenues of research.

Part I. What Have We Learned About the Institutional Development of the

Chambers?

Chapter I explained why the institutional choices of legislators matter, and introduced the studies that associated the organization of the Chambers to parties. I pointed out that despite their time-bound and partial focus, they provided valuable information about the functioning of the Chambers. The purposes and main questions of the dissertation followed this review. I explained that the reconstruction of the patterns of the institutional development of the Chambers, and the examination of the role played by parties in this evolution were my main tasks.

Chapter II presented the theory and the methodology. It introduced the general hypothesis, a series of predictions based on the Cartel Theory, and the notion of institutional development. In particular, I indicated that the *Reglamentos* and the directing board and committee systems were the aspects of the organization chosen to my research. The last part of the chapter described the time frame of the research, the datasets used for the analyses, and the fieldwork conducted in Argentina and Chile.

Chapter III and V presented a view of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and of the *Corporación*. Their comparison shows how different the political context and the composition of the Chambers have been during the period. We learnt that institutional stability was the norm before and after the military coup in Chile. General elections and presidential and legislative terms always followed constitutional rules. The violent military coup of 1973 was a disgraceful exception to Chile, “the Latin American country that stood out for its long tradition of representative democracy” (A. Valenzuela 1994, 91). At the legislative arena level, we saw how the six diverse and transient majority coalitions that ruled the Chamber until the 1960s, and the more stable *Concertación* ruling coalitions of the 1990s, reflected the competitiveness of the Chilean party system in which there are “no giants (...), no party or tendency with a clear majority” (A. Valenzuela 1994, 103). Only twice the Chamber was ruled by a single party, one of them a single-party plurality (1969-1973). No majority secured more than 58% of the seats. From 1945 to 2001 the number of deputies decreased from 147 to 120, and the Chamber witnessed the decline of traditional parties and the emergence of new groups and coalitions.

The Argentine chapter showed that institutional instability -due mainly to successive military coups- was the norm in the country between the 1950s and early 1980s. The recurrent social and economic crises seem more difficult to be eradicated from its political landscape. Different presidential and legislative terms were found from 1945 to 2001. The Argentine lower Chamber was ruled by *all* types of pluralities and majorities. Unlike Chile, most of them (15 out of 18) were ruling *parties*, either the PJ or the UCR. Radicals or Peronists were also the principal partners of the three coalitions of the period. Differing

from the *Corporación*, we saw that this Chamber increased its membership from 158 to 257 deputies between 1945 and 2001. Peronists and Radicals have witnessed the emergence and dissolution of third parties and a myriad of provincial parties.

In particular, we learnt that both countries changed their electoral system during the period. In both cases, a *de facto* government produced the reform. The timing of the change and the new electoral system chosen, however, differed. The *de facto* government of 1962 in Argentina, pursuing to end Peronist landslides, annulled the Sáenz Peña Law and established the PR system (Snow 1965). Conversely, in 1987 Pinochet's administration adopted a binominal system that left behind the PR system of the 1925 Constitution. The reform aimed at forming two moderate blocs to destruct the *old* and *unstable* Chilean multiparty system (A. Valenzuela 1994). The composition of the Argentine Chamber after the 1960s, and that of the *Corporación* after the 1990s, show that both *de facto* governments failed in their attempts.

Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) were devoted to the reconstruction task. There I presented the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Here I summarize them mentioning first the prediction (as it was stated in chapter II), and second if it was supported or not by the results. I offer a brief comment in each case. The findings are the following:

REFORMS TO THE *REGLAMENTOS*

1 – Reforms to the Reglamento proposed by ruling parties or coalitions are adopted on straight party-line vote

Supported.

Nine reforms to the *Reglamento* (four in Argentina and five in Chile) were adopted on straight party-line vote.

One case (the failed voting on the President's right to vote issue in Argentina) does not support the prediction.

2- The changes that are approved are those that suppress dispositions detrimental to ruling parties or coalitions and/or accrue their advantages

Partially supported.

Argentina. The general reforms of 1955, 1963, and 1989 support the prediction. In the 1989 and 1996 general reforms, the ruling party altered the structure of the Chamber to maintain its preeminent status in the Chamber.

One *amendment* (not to be confused with a general reform) does not support the prediction (the number of deputies needed to demand a roll-call vote was reduced in 1996).

Chile. In the successive general reforms ruling coalitions lost (1967; 1990) and regained (1969; 1994) functions. There was also an internal transfer and reassignment of prerogatives within ruling coalitions. In the 1990s ruling coalitions resisted direct attempts of the opposition to suppress their prerogatives.

One *amendment* does not support the prediction: the introduction of the coefficient to make committee assignments in 1967.

I considered prediction no. 1 “supported” because only one vote was lost by a ruling party in 1996. In Chile, by contrast, no vote was lost by ruling coalitions. Prediction no. 2 is “partially supported” because *two amendments* in *nine general reforms* benefited opposition parties. This means that I consider (in this and in the rest of the cases) the predictions strictly and for both countries at the same time. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the description that follows each prediction. Despite the partial confirmation, the results show a clear tendency to support the cartel behavior.

DIRECTING BOARD SYSTEM

1 - Election procedure. The election of the members of the directing board or Mesa is by straight party-line votes controlled by ruling parties or coalitions

Supported.

In both Chambers no candidate to any position of the directing board or *Mesa* different from the one proposed or supported by the ruling party or coalition was ever elected.

2 - Censure motions moved against the Mesa are rejected (only in the Corporación)

Supported.

Majority coalitions rejected all censure motions.

Censure motions were approved in case of coalition break up or when the Chamber was ruled by a plurality (only 1969-1973).

3 - Partisan composition. No member of the opposition serves as President or Vice-President of the directing board or Mesa

Supported.

Argentina. The prediction is supported until 1963. After that year there were mixed or bipartisan directing boards in which ruling parties got the lion's share of the authority positions.

Chile. The prediction is supported until 1990 and after 1998. During the periods 1990-1994 and 1994-1998 a pact between ruling parties and the opposition gave the latter the VP2.

4 - Power (functions). The power of the members of the directing board or Mesa increases or is redistributed within the ruling party or coalition

Supported.

Argentina. The head of the Chamber kept its powers during the whole period.

Chile. The *Mesa* has gained functions. The head of the Chamber, for its part, has maintained and (re)gained functions. The *Mesa* and (its) the President were involved in a reciprocal transfer of functions.

In this second aspect two predictions (election procedure and functions) are supported for both countries during the whole period. Censure motions (2), supported, only apply to Chile. Regarding the partisan composition of the directing boards, in Chile only two periods had a VP2 from the opposition, and in Argentina ruling parties always kept the lion's share of the positions. The tendency, again, is in favor of the cartel behavior.

STANDING COMMITTEE SYSTEM

1 - Committees are agents of the ruling party or coalition

Partially supported.

Not all the following predictions, which derive from that main one, are supported.

Creation of standing committees

2 - The increase in the number of committees is not due to the need for matching the structure of ministries or for generating greater expertise, but an answer to requests from members of ruling and opposition parties or coalitions to occupy a place in the committee system.

Not supported.

Argentina. In the period 1946-1976 the prediction is not supported. The creation of committees was due to the need for matching the ministries, or dealing with social problems. Since 1983 the prediction is supported.

Chile. The prediction is not supported. Idem Argentina period 1946-1976.

3 - Ruling parties or coalitions control this process (creation of committees) and get the majority of Chairs of the new committees

Supported.

Argentina. Ruling parties controlled the process. They monopolized the new Chairs until 1976, and secured the majority of them (68%) since 1983.

Chile. Ruling coalitions controlled the creation of new committees and monopolized their Chairs.

Membership

1 - Enlargement of committees' memberships. Although the enlargement of committees' memberships is meant to enhance the representation of delegations in the committee system, ruling parties or coalitions control this process and maintain their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats

Not supported.

Argentina. Ruling parties controlled the process during the whole period. They maintained their prevalence in the distribution of committee seats after the enlargement twice during the 1960s, and twice at the end of the 1990s. The rest of the cases do not support the prediction.

Chile. There was no enlargement of committees' memberships.

2 - Creation of leadership positions. The increase in committee leadership positions is due to requests from opposition parties to occupy a place in the directing boards of committees. Ruling parties or coalitions control this process and keep the lion's share of the new committee leadership positions

Partially supported.

Argentina. Ruling parties controlled this process but did not get the lion's share of all the new positions. The over-representation of ruling parties is clear since 1973 in the case of Secretaries (after 1985 there was a decline), and since 1989 for VC2. The

distribution of VC1 was mostly equivalent until 1987. After that year it benefited the second party in Chamber.

Chile. No new leadership position was created.

Committee assignments

1 - The allocation of committee seats is controlled by ruling parties or coalitions

Supported.

Argentina. Since the 1940s rules about assignments have not been modified, and Presidents have always been entitled by the Chamber to determine the allocation of committee seats.

Chile. Ruling coalitions have limited their power over the committee assignment process (1967), but have controlled the process during the whole period. Chamber's approval has always been a requisite. The President of the Chamber made the assignment proposal until 1973. Since the 1990s this proposal is made by the *Mesa*.

2 - Partisan composition. Party ratios in committees are consistently set in ruling parties' or coalitions' favor

Not supported.

In both Chambers committee assignments have been proportional.

3 - Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of seats in important committees

Supported.

Members of ruling parties or coalitions had the upper hand in the strategic composition of committees.

Seniority and apprenticeship norms matter about as much as party dominance (they are not the main criteria).

Seniority remains a marginal status in Argentina (79% of deputies are at their first four-year term). More than half of the deputies in the *Corporación* are seniors (53%).

Chairmanships

1 - Assignment process. The assignment of committee Chairs is controlled by ruling parties or coalitions.

Supported.

2 - Partisan composition. Ruling parties or coalitions have super-proportional share of chairmanships

Supported.

Predictions 1 and 2 are supported in the Chambers for the whole period. In addition, parties and coalitions almost monopolized the Chairs of the most important committees.

Seniority-in-Committee matters in both Chambers as much as ruling party to become Chair but the influence of the norm seems to be stronger in the *Corporación*.

Regarding both types of seniority norms (in Chamber and in Committee) consider that the harmonious and constant four-year renewals in the *Corporación* helped to build an organization composed of a majority of seniors whose experience is well valued. In the Argentine Chamber, by contrast, a conflictive combination of biannual renewals and

successive military coups, coupled with the diversified careers of the Argentine politicians (Jones *et al.* 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005), shaped a lower Chamber of newcomers who skipped the *cursus honorum* to reach important positions.

Margin Hypothesis

Not supported.

There is no significant difference in the control of the standing committees' compositions among types of majorities/pluralities.

In this third aspect, though the predictions related to the "creation of the standing committees" and the "membership" are partially supported, the tendency regarding the cartel behavior in the *Corporación* is negative. In the case of committee assignments we have for the first time a "not supported" prediction for both Chambers for the whole period (prediction no. 2). This proportionality may be related also with the negative result of the margin hypothesis. No matter the type of majority or plurality, committee assignments have been proportional. The other two predictions (1 and 3 of "committee assignments"), by contrast, are supported. The predictions about committee Chairs are both supported. The tendency is in favor of the support of the Cartel Theory, though the structuring of the committee system has been stronger in the Argentine lower Chamber.

Let us turn now to the analysis of the results considering this time the general hypothesis.

Part II. The Results *vis à vis* the General Hypothesis - Parties as Procedural

Coalitions

Despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled the Chilean and Argentine Chambers have determined the key features of their organizations from the 1940s to the 2000s. This process was not neutral. The aforementioned results show that making use of the rule-making power of their Chambers, parties and coalitions maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interest. In the words of Cox and McCubbins, they behaved as *procedural coalitions*.

The general hypothesis is *when a legislative party or coalition becomes the ruling party or coalition in the Chamber, it will function as a procedural coalition, that is, it will usurp the rule-making power of the Chamber to its favor.*

In order to analyze the results *vis à vis* this hypothesis it is useful to refer to the distinction made by Cox and McCubbins between “active” and “latent” procedural power. *Active procedural power* is related to the scheduling power either to expedite (positive agenda power), or delay (negative agenda power) the progress of a bill.²³⁶ The *latent procedural power* refers to the substantive advantages the majority party can

²³⁶ According to Cox and McCubbins examples of positive agenda power include the prerogative a committee can have to craft special rules, the U.S. Speaker’s ability to allow motions to “suspend the rules and pass” a particular bill, and the President’s right under the urgency procedure to send bills to the top of the assembly’s agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 353). The first two cases do not apply to the Chilean and the Argentine Chambers. The Chilean President (Executive Power), however, can declare the urgency procedure. As mentioned in chapter I, this parallel procedure is one of the most important subjects in the subfield (executive-legislative relations), and perhaps one of the reasons that explain the lack of comprehensive studies about the agenda control in the Chambers. Therefore, my analysis focuses on the negative agenda-setting power.

attain simply by structuring the committee system (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 8, 253, 259).

To that distinction I add what I call a “second type” of latent procedural power. It relates to the *control of floor proceedings*, either to lessen the ruling parties’ task of disciplining the troops on the floor or to limit the participation of the opposition during the session.

I consider these procedural powers in sections 1 to 3. In the last section I explain how rules and norms that do not support the general hypothesis affect my analysis. I use the acronym RP to refer to ruling majorities/pluralities, single-parties/coalitions.

Section 1. Setting the Agenda

The Chilean and Argentine RP controlled the election and monopolized/secured a super-proportional share of what Carroll, Cox, and Pachon (2006, 154) call “mega-seats”, that is, members of the directing boards and Chairs of standing committees that are in charge of the day-to-day legislative agenda.

Argentine RP created powerless Vice-Chairs and Secretaries in committees and a Vice-Presidency and positions in the Chamber to avoid sharing those mega-seats with the opposition or, in terms of Cox and McCubbins, to avoid sharing *the agenda-setting power*.

Chilean RP controlled the election of the *Mesa* and the chairmanships without creating new positions (because the *opposition* rejected this option), and consistently retained this political prerogative when the opposition demanded *its share* of mega-seats.

All in all, both RP maintained the control of those mega-seats and, consequently, of the agenda-setting power. The difference is that the Argentine Chamber was affected in its structure, and in its budget by the creation of these powerless new positions.

Both RP also cartelized the agenda via offices that are endowed negative agenda-setting power. These offices are the Presidency, the *Mesa* (Chile), the Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Argentina), the chairmanships, the *Hacienda* Committee (Chile), and the Committee on R&HA (Chile).

The Argentine and Chilean Presidents never lost the referral power and chair all the offices that have a say in the agenda of the Chamber (CLP -Argentina-; the Leaders Delegation's Meeting and the *Mesa* -Chile-). The agenda-setting power was either maintained in the sphere of the Presidency, or redistributed inside the RP (i.e., the Chilean *Mesa* and the Argentine CLP).

Chilean Presidents, in particular, are legally authorized to exercise an extreme version of the "speaker's veto over scheduling" (Cox and McCubbins 1994, 227): they can reject bills and amendments (as mentioned in chapter VI this implies that "*bills die before referral*"). Chilean Chairs, in addition to their exclusive and complete control of the committee agenda, have also that extreme version of negative agenda-setting power: they can reject amendments. I highlight the fact that bills or amendments in these cases are not *delayed* but *eliminated*. That is why I talk about an extreme version of the "speaker's veto over scheduling." Note also that the rules that established these vetoes over scheduling were adopted by the Congressional Law of Pinochet. Chilean RP never amended these prerogatives even though that law was criticized and several times modified to suppress "authoritarian enclaves."

In Argentina Presidents and Chairs have substantial though *traditional* negative agenda-setting power. Argentine Presidents (who concentrate administrative, budgetary and legislative functions) can exercise negative agenda-setting power over bills when they *decide* the referral (e.g., the bill is referred to as many committees as possible, including the Committee on Budget), or later, in the CLP, when they can veto the placement of the bill in the order of business. In both cases, the difference with Chile is that the bill “*is alive,*” despite its fate inside the legislative labyrinth. Argentine Chairs, who can also veto the placement of the bill in the committee agenda, have a kind of positive agenda power: they can determine the majority report in case of tie (expediting in this way the passage of a bill to the consideration of the CLP).

The extreme version of the “speaker’s veto over scheduling” in the hands of the Chilean Presidents and Chairs (who also have the *traditional* negative agenda-setting power) is a powerful tool to cartelize the agenda, a tool their *Argentine* counterparts do not have. To put it differently, RP in both Chambers are strong, though Chilean RP are more powerful (cartelized) than Argentine’s.

The Chilean and Argentine RP have behaved as cartels regarding the defence of their directing boards in two different ways.

In Chile RP controlled the censure motions to the *Mesas*. In this sense, they secured the bedrock of the RP power (the very foundation from which derives all the prerogatives).

In Argentina RP cartelized the defence of their directing boards differently: RP never regulated censure motions. This is an issue that “does not reach the floor.”

Chilean RP have two other mighty tools to cartelize the agenda that Argentine's do not have: the *control* and the *subsidiary* prerogatives of *Hacienda*. By the former, *Hacienda* can extend the "financing analysis" to parts of the bills not referred to its report. By the latter, *Hacienda* can report bills that technical committees do not report. In reference to this negative agenda power of *Hacienda*, it is important to mention that its equivalent in Argentina (the Committee on Budget) also exercises a control function (since bills authorizing the expenditure of money need its approval). The point is that the Argentine Committee on Budget, though criticized for its powers by the rest of the committees, never had *Haciendas'* prerogatives, namely the "extension of the financing analysis" and the subsidiary role.

Finally, Chilean RP, in contrast to their Argentine's counterparts, hold a larger share of seats in the Committee on R&HA because the *Mesa* belongs to this committee in their own right. R&HA, as mentioned, is in charge of reporting all reforms to the *Reglamento*.

Section 2. Structuring the Committee System

Some of the aforementioned measures to cartelize the agenda (i.e., the monopoly/super-proportional share of mega-seats which includes the Chairs of standing committees, the negative agenda power of Chairs, the jurisdictions of *Hacienda* (Chile) and Budget (Argentina), and the special membership of the Chilean R&HA) can also be considered as measures adopted by RP to structure the committee system.

In the next paragraphs I mention other aspects of the committee system cartelized by both RP: the chairmanships, the committee assignment process, the creation of standing

committees, the (re)defining of their jurisdictions, and the enlargement of their memberships and leadership positions.

Both RP assigned committee Chairs in a “systematically partisan fashion” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 13) during the whole period, namely to the most important committees. Furthermore, Chilean RP ratified this norm against the will of opposition parties.

Argentine RP went one step further in the cartelization of the committee system: committee assignments never received floor approval. The *second, non-regulated phase of the committee assignment* process begins and ends in hands of the President of the Chamber. This is another “issue that does not reach the floor.”

In addition, Argentine RP used the rule-making power of the Chamber to avoid sharing the power resident in the committee system with the opposition (enlarging committees’ memberships -early 1960s; late 1990s- and creating standing committees -since the 1980s- and leadership positions -1963; 1987- in a *systematically partisan fashion*).

Chileans RP, for their part, progressively redefined the jurisdiction of *Hacienda* and rejected every bill oriented to weaken its power, particularly in the 1990s.

Section 3. Controlling Floor Proceedings

In addition to controlling the agenda and structuring the committee system, the Argentine and Chilean RP adopted rules and norms to get a *tighter control of floor proceedings* (what I called the second type of “latent power”). These rules and norms tend either to facilitate the task of disciplining the troops on the floor (a role generally performed by the RP’s delegation leader), or to limit the participation of the opposition /

complicate its decisions imposing qualified majorities, or thresholds to move or table motions.

Among the first type (rules and norms that facilitate the discipline on the floor), we find the voting system to elect directing boards (Argentina), the lowered quorum (Argentina), and the consideration of abstentions as affirmative votes (Chile).

As to the election of the directing boards in Argentina, RP have replaced the roll-call voting system by a weighted voting system. It is true that this system is more expedite. But it is also very effective to avoid surprises on the floor (e.g., speeches of a faction of the party that disagrees with the distribution of Chairs and encourages "indiscipline"), and makes definitely more difficult the use of the right to speak to rebel deputies inside the RP.

A lowered quorum (Argentina), no matter how minor the amendment may be, is always beneficial for RP. The records of the Chamber show that sometimes the presence of only one deputy makes the difference to open or continue a session.

The consideration of abstentions as affirmative votes (Chile) is a great relief for RP: rebel deputies inside a RP in general do not vote on the negative but abstain. If this happens, there is no need to worry about the final result of the vote.

Examples of the second type of measures (those that tend to limit the participation of the opposition or to complicate its decisions) are the qualified majorities required to discuss questions of privilege (Argentina); the reduction of all terms to speak on the floor (Argentina); the proportional time allotting on the floor and in the period of *Incidentes* (Chile); the reduction of the period of *Incidentes* (Chile); the suppression of *The Hour*

(Argentina); the control of motions of recommit (Chile), and the increased number of deputies to demand a special session (Argentina).

Section 4. Rules and Norms that Do Not Support the General Hypothesis

Ruling parties in the Argentine and the Chilean Chambers are alike in another sense. As shown in Part I, they have approved rules that weakened their power, and I also found some patterns that contradict the Cartel Theory. In particular I should mention the proportional committee assignments during the whole period in both Chambers, the decision to fix a coefficient to allocate committee seats (Chile), the “participative decisions” adopted in the *Corporación* in the early 1990s, the approval of rules that benefited minorities (Argentina), and the failed attempt to accrue the power of RP (Argentina).

How do these decisions affect the precedent analysis? In response to an article that had underlined the existence of similar rules in the U.S. House, Cox and McCubbins (1997) argued that majority parties can lose several battles on the margin but still benefit substantially from the rules as a whole. What matters is the “overall partisan impact of the rules (...) if the changes consistently decrease, or consistently increase, the power of majority party leaders” (Cox and McCubbins 1997, 1385). In my cases, there is no doubt that ruling parties and coalitions continued to benefit from the “rules as a whole” despite the adoption of some decisions that suppressed their benefits or disadvantaged them. Besides, those rules and patterns did not affect the prerogatives that form the

core of the RP power. Furthermore, the patterns of cartel behavior found in the Chilean and Argentine Chambers consistently increased the power of their RP through time.

Part III. Specificities. Negative Agenda-Setting Power in Chile and Powerful

Legislative Parties in Argentina

The authors reviewed in chapter I saw no difference between the agenda control exercised in the Argentine and Chilean Chambers (Carey 2002, Alemán 2006). Discussing the (positive) agenda control of Chilean Presidents, Carey argues that “the formal agenda control of officers of the Chilean Congress within the legislature is akin to that found elsewhere” (Carey 2002, 238).

The results of this research show that this is not the case. Chilean RP have endowed several offices with negative agenda-setting power. Some of them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts.

These results are not just important to establish a difference between Chambers. In my view they should be considered to nuance the claims about the overriding influence of the Executive Power over the Chamber in Chile. The urgency procedure, for instance, is a positive agenda (and strong) agenda power of the Executive to expedite (skipping legislative steps, reducing times) the analysis of a bill. The weekly meetings between legislators of the coalition and the ministries of the Executive are another (positive) way to set the agenda. *Besides* these tools, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the Chamber, itself, has strong *negative* agenda-setting powers to delay or even eliminate the passage of a bill. This fact should be acknowledged and considered

together with the influence of the Executive when assessing the success of ruling coalitions in the *Corporación*.

How can this difference between Argentina and Chile be explained? Commenting on the agenda-setting power of majorities in the U.S. House, Cox and McCubbins give an explanation that I consider useful to answer this question. The authors argue that “legislative parties— especially in systems where floor voting discipline is costly to secure, such as the U.S. — specialize in controlling the agenda, rather than in controlling votes. That is, they seek to determine what is voted on to begin with, rather than to dictate their members’ votes issue by issue (although they do regularly seek votes on the margin)” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 15).

This may explain why there is more negative agenda-setting power in the *Corporación*. I am not saying that Chilean coalitions are not disciplined on the floor.²³⁷ Rather, I simply wish to point out four facts. First, coalitional intra-organizational dynamics are different from single-parties’ (namely regarding the process of decision-making and the distribution of legislative benefits and mega-seats), and demand a coordination between each party’s and the alliance’s goals. Second, except for the *Concertación*, Chilean coalitions were temporary alliances whose partners changed from one legislative period to another. Third, while the Chilean Chamber was ruled by nine majority coalitions, its Argentine equivalent was only three times in the hands of alliances. Fourth, the Argentine lower Chamber is considered an organization with high levels of party discipline (Jones 2002).

²³⁷ Regarding the unity of Chilean coalitions on the floor see Ames 2002; Maureira 2007; Alemán and Saiegh 2007.

Therefore, the great variety of Chilean ruling coalitions, given the challenges that their intra-organizational dynamics impose, may have influenced the creation of a system with several offices endowed with substantial negative agenda-setting power, rather than one specialized in controlling the troops on the floor.

In the case of Argentina, the literature argues that the substantive cohesion on the floor “stems primarily from a combination of institutional rules governing the elections and intralegislative organization” (Jones 2002, 184). Mustapic (2002) stresses the functions of the President of the Chamber, party leaders, and their influence on the behavior of legislators, mainly through the allocation of committee positions. The success of the majority party -the PJ- in the 1989-2003 period, Jones and Hwang (2003b) explain, stems from its functioning as an effective cartel. In Argentina “this majority control is based on a similar mix, but with distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation” (Jones and Hwang 2003b, 16).

My analysis suggests that the success of the “strong” Argentine ruling parties to control the Chamber is also due to a less evident process of creation and distribution of powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. In this way, ruling parties satisfied the demands of the opposition and kept the control of the Chamber. As I mentioned, this process impacted the structure and the budget of the Chamber. In my opinion, the committee system is the first collateral damage of this process.

Part IV. Avenues of Research

Researchers have only begun to discover Latin American legislatures. This dissertation could be considered as part of this effort. To make further progress in this fascinating subfield I think we should explore certain institutional tools, and extend this type of analysis to other Chambers. In this sense, I envisage three avenues of research.

First, the impact of the extreme version of the “speaker’s veto over scheduling” Chilean Presidents and Chairs have needs to be ascertained. In particular, we need to look at which bills or amendments are left out of the agenda. It would be important to know the origin of the bills (deputies of the opposition/ruling party), but also the content of the bills rejected. This negative agenda-setting power is in force since the 1990s. The comparison between legislative periods would tell us if ruling coalitions agreed or disagreed on the legislation that should not pass through the years. Likewise, a systematic comparison between this extreme veto power and the power of referral of the Argentine President would be extremely useful. No doubt, Chilean Presidents are stronger in this sense, but we should not underestimate the negative agenda-setting power of a President that has forty-five committees at her disposal to decide the referral. In Argentina bills may be “alive” but hopelessly lost in the legislative labyrinth.

Second, we need to compare the negative agenda-setting power of the Committee on Parliamentary Business -CLP- (Argentina) and the Leaders Delegation’s Meetings -LDM-. These institutions are clearly different: one is loosely defined (Argentina), the other is regulated and bases its decisions in a weighted voted system.

Their composition, however, is similar. They are composed of party leaders and chaired by the Presidents of the Chambers. Until now we know something about the CLP, but almost nothing about the LDM. Which one is more effective from the point of view of the ruling parties' or coalitions' interests? What is the role of Presidents? Are all decisions in the LDM adopted by the weighted voting system? What is the place of the opposition in this case?

These first two avenues are oriented to assess which strategy, the loosely regulated Argentine style or the hyper-regulated Chilean style, serves better the goals of the agenda-setting power.

Finally, the comparative and diachronic study of the institutional evolution of other legislatures needs to be conducted. In this sense, I would choose Colombia and Mexico. Again, my choice follows the line of "different countries, different political contexts, different Chambers." Once the differences established, the task is to analyze the behavior of their parties. The conventional wisdom that tells us about the dominant (and of course real) role of powerful Executives must not halt our efforts to explore the role of deputies in the design of their institutions. I tried to show in this dissertation that this is a fruitful line of research.

Works on Latin American legislatures focus on parties as floor voting coalitions and on the relation between Congress and the Executive Power. Some of them have begun to explore what happens inside the Chambers. This dissertation, following Cox and McCubbins, provides a view of the influence of parties as *procedural coalitions*. As the

authors did for the U.S. House, I showed that cohesion on the floor, though important, is not the only measure of party strength. What happens before a bill is considered in the Chamber matters as much.

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APPENDIX A

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Argentine Chamber of Deputies

- *Rules of the Chamber* ("Reglamento de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación"). Editions from 1955 to 2001.
- *Composition of the Chamber and Committees' Memberships* ("Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones"); Editions from 1964 to 2000.
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- *Journals of Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies* ("Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación"). Editions from 1946 to 1997. Online debates from 1998 to 2001 ("Versiones Taquigráficas Online"). <http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dtaquigrafos/frames.html>
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- Database - Argentine deputies ("La Memoria Legislativa Argentina") - Chamber of Deputies <http://www.archivodiputados.gov.ar/>
- Laws about party and electoral systems (1946-2001).
- National Constitutions of 1853; 1949; 1994.

Chilean Chamber of Deputies

- *Rules of the Chamber* ("Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación"). Editions from 1861 to 1973. Online editions since 1990 http://www.camara.cl/camara/camara_LOC.aspx
- *Journals of Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies* ("Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación"). Editions from 1945 to 1973. Online debates from 1990 to 2002 ("Versiones Taquigráficas Online").
-
- Organic Constitutional Law no. 18.700 ("Ley Orgánica Constitucional del Congreso Nacional")
Printed version of 1990
Online version http://www.camara.cl/camara/camara_LOC.aspx
- Database - Chilean deputies ("Reseñas Parlamentarias") Library of the National Congress of Chile. <http://biografias.bcn.cl/pags/biografias/index.php>
- Laws about party and electoral systems (1945-2002).
- National Constitutions of 1833; 1925; 1980; 2005.

DEFINITIONS

Bill. Other than bills, the Chambers analyze and pass resolutions, declarations (Argentina) and motions (Chile). I will use the term “bill” to refer to all of them. .

Corporación. The Chilean lower Chamber.

Delegation. The principal organizing unit of parties in the Chambers also known as bloc, party fraction, or caucus (Jones and Hwang 2003a).

Floor or plenary. The body of deputies in a sitting of the Chambers.

Freshmen. Deputies in their first term.

Journal. The Journal of Sessions of the Argentine or Chilean Chamber of Deputies.

Legislative period. The legislative period in Chile and Argentina is the time the Chambers function between two elections. In Chile the legislative period last four years. It opens with the election of the *Mesa* and the committee assignments and coincides with the four-year terms of its deputies. In Argentina the legislative period lasts two years. It opens with the election of the directing board and the committee assignments but does not coincide with the four-year terms of its deputies. Note that in Argentina one-half of the Chamber is renewed every two years and that the directing board is elected every year.

Mega-seats. Carroll, Cox, and Pachon (2006, 154) explain that “depending on the assembly in question, mega-seats are positions such as those held by the chief executive, cabinet ministers, the presiding officer, members of the directing board, and chairs of permanent committees”. Assemblies elect (or influence the appointment of) these officials who are in charge of the day-to-day legislative agenda.

Procedural coalitions. Alliances formed by those legislators who join to distribute/benefit from the institutional advantages (select the institutional leaders of the chamber, structure its committee

system, and get a disproportionate share of staff and other legislative resources). Morgenstern gives, in my view, a clear and brief definition when he argues that procedural coalitions, which may be quite different from floor coalitions, are formed by “those legislators who join to elect legislative leaders, approve voting rules, select staff, and dole out committee assignments, or generally organize the legislative business” (Morgenstern 2002, 10).

Ruling party or coalition. The party or coalition in control of the Chamber.

Second (Third) party or coalition. The party or coalition that comes in second (third) place in terms of number of seats.

APPENDIX B

PARTIES AND COALITIONS

IN THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES - 1946-2001

ACh	1991	Action for El Chaco (Acción Chaqueña)	
ALIANZA	1999	Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education (Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación)	FREPASO – UCR
APer	1991	Afirmación Peronista	
APFe	1973	Federalist Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista)	DemP - MPJ - MPPam – PRBsAs – PUnPo
APR	1973	Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria)	PC - PCRev – PI
APSL	1965	Popular Action for San Luis (Acción Popular Sanluiseña)	
APTuc	1965	Provincial Action from Tucuman (Acción Provinciana de Tucumán)	
AR	1997	Action for the Republic (Acción por la República)	
BSJ	1973	Bloc from San Juan (Bloquista de San Juan)	
BUJ	1985	Bloc of the Justicialist Unity (Bloque de la Unidad Justicialista)	
CG	1995	Corriente Grande	
CONSR	1946	Conservative Party (Partido Conservador)	
CRSJ	1973	Cruzada Renovadora from San Juan (Cruzada Renovadora de San Juan)	
DemC	1963	Democratic Christian Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)	
DemMza	1985	Democratic Party from Mendoza (Partido Demócrata de Mendoza)	
DemN	1946	National Democratic Party (Demócrata Nacional)	
DemP	1946	Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista)	
DPBB	1960	Provincial Defense White Flag Party (Partido Defensa Provincial Bandera Blanca de Tucumán)	
D&J	1997	Justice and Development (Desarrollo y Justicia)	
FC-S	1997	Civic-Social Front (Frente Cívico-Social)	
FEDInt	1999	Federal Inter-bloc (Interbloque Federal)	DemMza - DemP - PRSIta – PAutC – BSJ – CRSJ - D&J – LIB - MOPOFU
FedPCe	1963	National Federation of Center Parties (Federación Nacional de Partidos de Centro)	CONSR- Dem – DemU - LIB – PN – PDCCF - DemN - PAM -
FG	1993	Frente Grande	
FPCtes	1965	Provincial Movement from Corrientes (Movimiento Provincial Correntino)	
FPNu	1997	New Party Front (Frente Partido Nuevo)	
FPProv	1963	Federation of Provincial Parties (Federación de Partidos Provinciales)	CRSJ - BSJ - DPBB – MFDSIta - PStgo
FREJCat	1985	FREJULI from Catamarca (FREJULI de Catamarca)	
FREJULI	1973	Justicialist Front of Liberation (Frente Justicialista de Liberación)	
FRep	1989	Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana)	

FREPASO	1995	Front of a Country in Solidarity (Frente País Solidario).	
H&L	1989	Humanism and Liberation (Humanismo y Liberación)	
LAB	1995	Línea Abierta	
LeI	1946	Labor & Independent Party (Partido Laborista e Independiente)	
LIB	1958	Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Corrientes)	
MAS	1991	Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo)	
MAS - IZU	1989	Movement to Socialism - Unified Left (Movimiento al Socialismo - Izquierda Unida)	
MAzB	1995	Blue and White Movement (Movimiento Azul y Blanco)	
MFDSLta	1963	Federal Democratic Movement from Salta (Movimiento Federal Democrático de Salta)	
MFPam	1983	Federal Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Federalista Pampeano)	
MID	1965	Movement of Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo)	
MODIN	1991	Dignity and Independence Movement (Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia)	
MOPE	1991	Peronist Movement (Movimiento Peronista)	
MOPOF	1991	Popular Movement from Tierra del Fuego (Movimiento Popular Fueguino)	
MoReCi	1995	Civic Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renvación Cívica)	
MPCat	1973	Popular Movement from Catamarca (Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño)	
MPJ	1973	Popular Movement from Jujuy (Movimiento Popular Jujeño)	
MPMza	1965	Popular Movement from Mendoza (Movimiento Popular de Mendoza)	
MPN	1963	Popular Movement from Neuquén (Movimiento Popular Neuquino)	
MPPam	1973	Popular Movement from La Pampa (Movimiento Popular Pampeano)	
MPProv	1963	Popular Provincial Movements (Movimientos Populares Provinciales)	APSL - APTuc - FPCtes - MPMza - MPN - PBla - PBTr - PLN - PUnPo - PUNSCruz - PyJu - 3B
MPPSL	1973	Provincial Popular Movement from San Luis (Movimiento Popular Provincial de San Luis)	
MPSal	1973	Popular Movement from Salta (Movimiento Popular Salteño)	
MS&Er	1999	Movimiento Social y Entrerriano	
National Front	1646	Frente Nacional	PL - UCR-JR - LeI - UCR-Iri
NOGroup		Deputy belongs to no group	
PACH	1973	Action for Chubut Party (Partido Acción Chubutense)	
PAIS	1995	PAIS	
PAL	1963	Partido Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes	
PAM	1965	Alliance for Misiones (Partido Alianza Misionera)	
PAutC	1983	Autonomist Party from Corrientes (Partido Autonomista de Corrientes)	

PBJub	1989	White Party of Retired People (Partido Blanco de los Jubilados)	
PBl	1963	White Party (Partido Blanco)	
PBTr	1963	White Labor Party (Partido Blanco de los Trabajadores)	
PC	1995	Communist Party (Partido Comunista)	
PCB	1993	Popular Christian Bloc (Bloque Popular Cristiano)	
PCRev	1973	Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Cristiano Revolucionario)	
PDCCF	1963	Democratic Conservative Party from the Federal Capital (Partido Democrático Conservador de la Capital Federal)	
PdeC	1960	Parties of the Center (Partidos de Centro)	LIB - DemN
PFed	1987	Federal Party (Partido Federal)	
PI	1983	Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente)	
PJ	1946	Peronist/Justicialist Party (Partido Peronista/Justicialista)	
PJ/17 Oct	1985	Peronist Bloc October 17 (Bloque Peronista 17 de Octubre)	
PJ/FR	1985	PJ Renewal Front (PJ Frente Renovador)	
PLab	1946	Labor Party (Partido Laborista)	
PLN	1963	National Labor Party (Partido Laborista Nacional)	
PN	1963	National Party (Partido Nacional)	
POLe	1973	Legal Orientation Party (Partido Orientación Legalista)	
PPC	1973	Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano)	
PPRN	1973	Provincial Party from Rio Negro (Partido Provincial de Rio Negro)	
PProvMSL	1973	Provincial parties from Mendoza and San Luis (Partidos Provinciales "Mendoza y San Luis")	
PRBsAs	1973	Renovation Party from Buenos Aires Province (Partido Renovador de la Provincia de Bs. As.)	
PRSlta	1985	Renovation Party from Salta (Partido Renovador de Salta)	
PSA	1963	Argentine Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Argentino)	
PSD	1963	Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrático)	
PStgo	1963	Provincial Party from Santiago del Estero (Provincial de Santiago del Estero)	
PSUC	1987	Unified-Christian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Unificado-Cristiano)	
PUnPo	1965	Popular Union Party (Partido Unión Popular)	
PUNSCruz	1965	National Unity Party from Santa Cruz (Partido Unión Nacional de Santa Cruz)	
PURN	1946	Unified Party of the National Revolution (Partido Unificado de la Revolución Nacional)	
P&J	1995	Justice and Participation (Participación y Justicia)	
ReDe	1995	Republican & Democratic (Republicano Democrático)	
UB	1999	Unity from Bs. As. (Unidad Bonaerense)	

UCeDe	1983	Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático)
UCR	1948	Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical)
UCR/Anti	1946	Antipersonalista UCR (UCR-Antipersonalista)
UCR-BI	1946	Bloquista Radical Civic Union (UCR Bloquista)
UCR-CN	1946	Radical Civic Union - National Committee (UCR-Comité Nacional)
UCR-Iri	1946	Irigoyenista Radical Civic Union (UCR-Irigoyenista)
UCR-JR	1946	Radical Reorganizing Group (UCR-Junta Renovadora)
UCRI	1958	Intransigent Radical Civic Union - the Intransigent Radicals- (UCR Intransigente)
UCRP	1958	People's Radical Civic Union -the People's Radicals- (UCR del Pueblo)
UdeIPA	1963	Union of the Argentine People (Unión del Pueblo Argentino)
US	1987	Socialist Unity (Unidad Socialista)
3B	1963	Three Flags (Tres Banderas)

Note: The year in the second column refers to the first register of the party or coalition in the booklets of the Composition of the Chamber and Committees' Memberships ("Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – Composición y Comisiones")

APPENDIX C

ELECTION OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001

YEAR	PARTY DIRECTING BOARD (P-VP1-VP2-VP3)	PRESIDENT	VP1	VP2	VP3
1946	UCR/JR-PLab-Lel	Each delegation voted for its candidate	Each delegation voted for its candidate	Each delegation voted for its candidate	-
1948-1952-1955	PJ-PJ-PJ	"	"	"	- -
1958-1960 / 1960-1962	UCRI-UCRI-UCRI	"	"	"	- -
1963	UCRP-UCRI-UdeIPA	UCRP, UCRI, UdeIPA, DemC, DemP, and PSD voted for the UCRP candidate	UCRP, UCRI, UdeIPA, DemC, DemP, and PSD voted for the UCRI candidate	UCRP, UdeIPA, PSD and DemP voted for the UdeIPA candidate	-
				UCRI, MPProv, and DemC voted for the MPProv candidate	
PSA, FPProv, and FedPCe voted for their candidates					
1965	UCRP-PJ-MID	UCRP, PJ, MID, and UCRI voted for the UCRP candidate	UCRP, PJ, MID, and UCRI voted for the PJ candidate	UCRP, PJ, MID and UCRI voted for the MID candidate	-
		PSA, FPProv, and FedPCe voted for their candidates			
1973	PJ-PJ (PPC)-PJ (MID)	All delegations voted for the PJ candidate	PJ voted for PJ (PPC)	PJ voted for PJ (MID)	-
			UCR, APFe, and PAL voted for UCR	UCR, APFe and PAL voted for APFe	
			PProvMSL, APR and PCRev voted for their candidates		
1983	UCR-UCR-PJ	All delegations voted for the UCR candidate	UCR, PJ, DemC, BSJ, MPJ, LIB, MFPam, MPN, and UCeDe voted for the UCR candidate	UCR, PJ, DemC, UCeDe, and MPN voted for the PJ candidate	-
			PI voted for the PJ candidate	PI voted for the PI candidate	
				BSJ, MPJ, LIB, and MFPam voted for the BSJ candidate	
1985	UCR-UCR-PJ (FR)	All delegations voted for UCR	All delegations voted for the UCR candidate	UCR, PJ, DemC, DemP, BSJ, PRSIta, MPN, MPJ, and MPCat voted for the PJ (FR) candidate	-
				PAutC, LIB, DemP, and UCeDe voted for the PAutC candidate	
				PI voted for the PI candidate	
1987	UCR-PJ-UCeDe	Majority of delegations voted for the UCR candidate	All delegations for the PJ candidate	UCR, UCeDe, AutC, DemMza, DemP, PAL, PPRN, PRSIta, PRBsAs, APTuc, and PFed voted for the UCeDe candidate	-
		DPBB abstained		The President of the Chamber and Deputy Alsogaray voted for the UCeDe candidate	
				PJ-FR, DemC, PI, MPN, MPCat, MID, Soc, Unidad Justicialista, MoPoJu, and DPBB voted for the MPN candidate	

ELECTION OF THE DIRECTING BOARDS – ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1946-2001
(cont.)

YEAR	PARTY DIRECTING BOARD (P-VP1-VP2-VP3)	PRESIDENT	VP1	VP2	VP3
1989	PJ-PJ-UCR	Majority of delegations voted for PJ	PJ, UCR, DemC, HyL, FR, MPN, PRSIta, MPJu, PI, MPRioN, PBlanco, Unidad Soc, and ACR San Juan voted for the PJ candidate	PJ, UCR, DemC, HyL, MPN, PRSIta, MPJu, PI, MPRioN, PBlanco, and Unidad Soc voted for UCR	-
		UCeDe and IU abstained	IU, UCeDe, DemP, Lib y AutCtes, and PDMza abstained	ACR San Juan voted for the MPN candidate IU, UCeDe, DemP, LIB y AutCtes, PDMza, and FR abstained	
1991	PJ-PJ-UCR	Majority of delegations voted for PJ	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for the UCR candidate	-
		MAS abstained			
1993	PJ-PJ-UCR	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for PJ	Majority of delegations voted for UCR	-
		FG abstained	FG abstained	FG abstained	
1995	PJ-PJ-UCR	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for the UCR candidate	-
		FREPASO abstained	FREPASO abstained	FREPASO and CG abstained	
1997	PJ-PJ-UCR-FREPASO	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for the PJ candidate	Majority of delegations voted for the UCR candidate	FREPASO, PJ, UCR, PAIS, MPPSL, ReDe, and Lab voted for the FREPASO candidate
		LIB, BSJuan, RSIta, DemP and DMza voted for the DemP candidate	LIB, BSJuan, RSIta, DMza, and DemP voted for the Dmza candidate	LIB, BSJuan, RSIta, DMza, and DemP voted for the LIB candidate	DMza, LIB, BSJuan, RSIta, DemP, PAutC, MPJu, and D&J voted for the BSJuan candidate
		UCR, FREPASO, AR, and CRSan Juan abstained	MPJu and D&J voted for the UCR candidate	FRTucuman voted for the BSJuan candidate	MPN, MOPOF, FRTuc, and FPNU for the provincial parties candidate
			UCR and FREPASO abstained	MPN voted for the UCR-FREPASO candidate	
				MPJu and D&J voted for the FREPASO candidate	
1999	UCR-FREPASO-PJ-FEDInt	All delegations voted for the UCR candidate	All delegations voted for the FREPASO candidate	All delegations voted for the PJ candidate	ALIANZA, BFed, and UB voted for the FEDInt candidate
					AR and PJ voted for the AR candidate
					PNCtes, MPN, and FR voted for the MPN candidate

**ENLARGEMENT OF COMMITTEES' MEMBERSHIP - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
1946-2001^a**

STANDING COMMITTEES	NUMBER OF MEMBERS BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD								
	1946 1948	1955	1960 1962	1963 1965	1983 1985	1991 1993	1993 1995	1997 1999	1999 2001
Constitutional Affairs	7	9	11	15	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	15-33
General Legislation	9		11	15	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	
Foreign Affairs	7	9	11	15	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-33	15-37
Budget	19	23	31			15-34	15-35	15-39	15-41
Education	7	9	11	15	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	15-33
Science & Technology	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	
Culture	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-27	15-31
Judiciary	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Pensions	7	9	14	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Health	9		11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Family, Women & Childhood	-	-	-	-	15-25			15-27	15-31
Elderly	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-27	15-31
Criminal Legislation	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Labor	7	9	14	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Defense	9		11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Public Works	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Agriculture	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Finance		9	11	15	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	
Industry (and Commerce)	7	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Industry	-	9	11	15	15-25		15-29	15-31	
Commerce	-	9	11	15	15-25		15-29	15-31	
Energy & Fuels	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	
Communications (and Transportation)	9				15-25	-	-	-	-
Comunications	-	9	11	15		15-28	15-29	15-31	
Transportation	-	9	11	15		15-28	15-29	15-31	
Regional Development	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-28	15-29	15-31	
Urban Affairs	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Fisheries & Maritime Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-27	15-31
Housing	-	-	-	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Rules	7	9	11	15	15-25			15-27	15-31
Impeachment Procedure	7	9	11	9	15-25			15-27	15-31
Natural Resources	-	-	-	-	15-25			15-27	15-31
Turism & Sports	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-28			
Economy	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Drug Addiction	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Taxation	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-27	15-31
Population and Human Resources	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Sports	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Turism	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	15-25		15-27	15-31
Cooperative Affairs & NGO Mercosur	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-25	15-27	15-31
Small Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-27	15-31
Consumers Protection	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-27	15-31
Homeland Security	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-27	15-31
Freedom of Expression	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-27	15-31
People with Disabilities	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15-31
National Territories	9	9	11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aboriginal Affairs	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No. Deputies	158	166	192	192	254	257	257	257	257

a. The resolutions that enlarged a limited group of committees are not included.

CREATION OF LEADERSHIP POSITIONS - ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1963-2000

STANDING COMMITTEES	COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BY LEGISLATIVE PERIOD					
	1963	1987	1994	1998	1999	2000
Constitutional Affairs	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			P+VP1+VP2+4S
General Legislation	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		P+VP1+VP2+4S
Foreign Affairs	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S	P+VP1+VP2+4S		P+VP1+VP2+4S
Budget	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			P+VP1+VP2+4S
Education	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		P+VP1+VP2+4S
Science & Technology		P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Culture			P+VP1+VP2+3S			P+VP1+VP2+4S
Judiciary	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Pensions	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Health	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			
Family, Women & Childhood		P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			
Elderly				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Criminal Legislation	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Labor	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Defense	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Public Works	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			P+VP1+VP2+4S
Agriculture	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		P+VP1+VP2+4S
Finance	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Industry	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Commerce	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Energy & Fuels		P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Communications	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Transportation	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Regional Development		P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Urban Affairs	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Fisheries & Maritime Affairs					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Housing	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Rules	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Impeachment Procedure	P+VP+S	P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Natural Resources		P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			
Turism		P+VP1+VP2+2S		P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Economy		P+VP1+VP2+2S	P+VP1+VP2+3S			
Mining		P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Drug Addiction		P+VP1+VP2+2S			P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Taxation					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Population and Human Resources					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Sports					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Human Rights					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Cooperative Affairs & NGO				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Mercosur					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
Small Business				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Consumers Protection				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Homeland Security				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
Freedom of Expression				P+VP1+VP2+3S		
People with Disabilities					P+VP1+VP2+3S	
No. Deputies	192	254	257	257	257	257

P: Chair

VP: Vice-president - VP1: 1st Vice-president - VP2: 2nd Vice-presidentS: Secretary - 1S: 1st Secretary - 2S: 2nd Secretary - 3S: 3rd Secretary - 4S: 4th Secretary

APPENDIX E
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - ARGENTINE LOWER CHAMBER

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Committee Power	10.885	6.867	0	40.2
Ruling Party	0.547	0.498	0	1
Regular Plurality	0.124	0.330	0	1
Exceptional Plurality	0.093	0.291	0	1
Regular Majority	0.099	0.298	0	1
Exceptional Majority	0.065	0.247	0	1
Qualified Majority	0.165	0.372	0	1
Freshman	0.525	0.499	0	1
Seniority (in legislative terms)	1.270	0.588	1	5
Experience (committee-specific)	0.408	0.756	0	8
Cumulation	2.607	1.654	0	11
Group Position	0.076	0.265	0	1
Chamber Position	0.014	0.118	0	1

WEIGHTING OF COMMITTEES BY IMPORTANCE - ARGENTINE LOWER CHAMBER

Committee	Score	Committee	Score
Budget	5.67	Natural Resources	2.45
Foreign Affairs	5.67	Family, Women & Childhood	2.35
Constitutional Affairs	5.00	Energy & Fuels	2.31
General Legislation	4.33	Urban Affairs & National Territories	2.31
Education	4.33	Economy	2.25
Public Works	4.00	Science & Technology	2.12
Agriculture	3.67	Housing	2.08
Health	3.67	Regional Development	2.02
Pensions	3.33	Tourism & Sports	1.88
Transportation	3.33	Sports	1.88
Finance	3.04	Elderly	1.63
Labor	3.00	Mines	1.59
Communications & Transportation	3.00	Drug Addiction	1.59
Rules	3.00	Cooperative Affairs & NGOs	1.53
Defense	3.00	Small Businesses	1.43
Urban Affairs	3.00	Consumers Protection	1.43
Criminal Legislation	3.00	Homeland Security	1.43
Industry	3.00	Freedom of Expression	1.43
Commerce	3.00	Population and Human Resources	1.39
Communications	3.00	Port Activity, Fishing & Maritime Affairs	1.29
Judiciary	2.67	Taxation	1.29
Impeachment Procedure	2.67	Human Rights	1.29
Industry & Commerce	2.67	Aboriginal Affairs	1.10
Culture	2.63	Mercosur	1.10
National Territories	2.57	People with Disabilities	1.00
Tourism	2.55		

Note: See text for details on coding.

APPENDIX F
POLITICAL PARTIES AND COALITIONS IN CHILE - 1945-2002

PARTIES

AN	1964	National Action (Acción Nacional)
API	1969/1973	Independent Popular Action (Acción Popular Independiente)
APL45	1945	People's Liberation Alliance (Alianza Popular Libertadora)
ARCh49	1949	Chilean Renewal Action (Acción Renovadora de Chile)
CONS	19th Century	Conservative party (Partido Conservador)
ConsSC	1949	Social Christian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Socialcristiano)
ConsT	1949	Traditionalist Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Tradicionalista)
ConsU	1953	United Conservative party (Partido Conservador Unido)
DC	1957/1961	Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)
FN	1938/1945	National Falange (Falange Nacional)
IC	1971/1973	Christian Left Party (Izquierda Cristiana)
LDP	19th Century	Liberal Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Liberal)
MAPU	1969/1973	Movement for United Popular Action (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria)
MNI53	1953	National Ibañista Movement (Movimiento Nacional Ibañista)
MONAP53	1953	People's National Movement (Movimiento Nacional del Pueblo)
MR57	1957	Republican Movement (Movimiento Republicano)
PA	1931/1945	Agrarian Party (Partido Agrario)
PADENA	1960/1961	National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional)
PAL	1945/1949	Agrarian Labor Party (Partido Agrario Laborista)
PC	1922/1945	Communist Party (Partido Comunista)
PD	19th Century	Democratic Party (Partido Democrático)
PD45	1945	Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata)
PDPu49	1949	People's Democratic Party (Partido Democrático del Pueblo)
PDR69	1969	Radical Democracy Party (Partido Democracia Radical)
PFCh	1953	Feminist Party of Chile (Partido Femenino de Chile)

PIR	1971/1973	Left Radical Party (Partido de la Izquierda Radical)
PL	19th Century	Liberal party (Partido Liberal)
PLab53	1953	Labor Party (Partido de los Trabajadores)
PLD	19th Century	Liberal Democratic Party (Partido Liberal Democrático)
PLP	1945	Liberal Progressive Party (Partido Liberal Progresista)
PN1857	19th Century	National Party (Partido Nacional)
PN56	1956/1957	National Party (Partido Nacional)
PN66	1966	National Party 1966 (Partido Nacional 1966)
PNCr53	1953	National Christian Party (Partido Nacional Cristiano)
PNP	1958	Popular National Party (Partido Nacional Popular)
PPD	1989	Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia)
PPF	1953	Progressive Feminist Party (Partido Progresista Femenino)
PPN45	1945	Progressive National Party (Partido Progresista Nacional)
PR	19th Century	Radical Party (Partido Radical)
PRDem49	1946/1949	Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Democrático)
PRDoc49	1949	Doctrinaire Radical Party (Partido Radical Doctrinario)
PRSD94	1994	Radical Social Democrat Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata)
PS	1933/1945	Socialist Party (Partido Socialista)
PSA	1945	Authentic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Auténtico)
PSD	1965	Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata)
PSP	1948/1949	Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular)
PST	1940	Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores)
PSur	1997	Party of the South (Partido del Sur)
PT57	1957	Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo - Partido de los Trabajadores)
RN	1989	National Renewal Party (Partido Renovación Nacional)
UCCP	1997	Center-Center Union (Unión de Centro Centro Progresista)
UDI	1989	Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente)
UNI53	1953	National Union of Independents (Unión Nacional de Independientes)

USP 1967 Popular Socialist Union (Unión Socialista Popular)

COALITIONS

AHVerde	1990	Humanist-Green Alliance (Alianza Humanista Verde)	Humanist Party - Green Party
ANAP	1953	People's National Alliance (Alianza Nacional del Pueblo)	PAL - PSP - PDPu49 - PRDoc49 - PPF
CODE	1973	Democratic Confederation (Confederación Democrática)	PN66 - DC - PADENA - PDR69 - PIR
CONCERTACIÓN	1989/1993/ 1997	Coalition of Parties for Democracy (<i>Concertación</i> de Partidos por la Democracia)	DC - PS - PPD (see tables 86-88-90)
Democracy and Progress	1989	(Pacto Democracia y Progreso)	RN - UDI
Democratic Alliance	1945	Alianza Democrática	PR - PS - PC
Federation of the Popular Unity	1973	(Federación de la Unidad Popular)	PS - PC - PR - PSD - MAPU - API - IC
FENAFUI	1953	National Federation of <i>Ibañistas</i> (Federación Nacional de Fuerzas Ibañistas)	PNCr53 - ARCh49 - MNI - UNI - PFCh
FP	1938	Popular Front (Frente Popular)	PR - PS - PC
FRAP	1956	Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular)	PSP - PS - PC - PDPu49
FRAS	1947	Radical Agrarian Socialist Falange (Falange Radical Agraria Socialista)	FN - PRDem49 - PAL - PSP
(N)DF	1961	(National) Democratic Front (Frente Democrático -Nacional-)	CONS-LIB-PR
PAIS	1989	Broad Party of the Socialist Left (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista)	Almeyda Socialists - PC - Christian Left
UP	1969	Popular Unity (Unidad Popular)	PS - PC - PR - PSD - MAPU - API - PIR
Union for Chile	1997	(Unión por Chile)	RN - UDI - Psur
Union for the Progress of Chile	1993	(Unión por el Progreso de Chile)	RN - UDI - UCCP

Note: The year in the second column refers to the legislative period in which the party entered in Chamber. When the second column has two years the first one refers to the year of creation of the party or faction.

APPENDIX G
DATE OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS CHILE
1945-2002

Year	Presidential Election	Congressional Election
1945 ^a		04/03
1946	04/09	
1947		
1948		
1949		06/03
1950		
1951		
1952	04/09	
1953		01/03
1954		
1955		
1956		
1957		03/03
1958	04/09	
1959		
1960		
1961		05/03
1962		
1963		
1964	04/09	
1965		07/03
1966		
1967		
1968		
1969		02/03
1970	04/09	
1971		
1972		
1973		04/03
<i>Military government 1973-1989</i>		
1989 ^b	14/12	14/12
1990		
1991		
1992		
1993	11/12	11/12
1994		
1995		
1996		
1997		11/12
1998		
1999	12/12	
2000	16/01	
2001		16/12

- a. The 1925 Constitution established a five-year term for presidents. According to the electoral law, presidential elections took place sixty days before the end of that term, and congressional elections were held "every four years, the first Sunday of March of the last year." Electoral laws no. 6834 of 1941, 9334 of 1949, 12891 of 1958, 14852 of 1962, and 17902 of 1973.
- b. Since 1989 congressional elections are held every four years "ninety days before the renewal of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, if this day coincides with a Sunday. If not, elections will be held next immediate Sunday." (Electoral law no. 18,700). Following this chronogram and given that the renewal of the Chambers takes place in March every four years, all elections beginning in 1989 were held in December (that is, ninety days before this renewal). The presidential term has changed three times since the adoption of the 1980 Constitution. The constitutional reform of 2005 reduced from six to four years the presidential term, and established that presidential and legislative elections must be held *on the same day*.

APPENDIX H

CREATION AND RENAMING OF STANDING COMMITTEES

CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

1945-1949	1953-1957	1965-1969		
	1956	1967	1968	1969
1- Interior				
2- Foreign Affairs				
3- Constitution, Legislation & Justice				
4- Education				
5- <i>Hacienda</i>				
6- Defence		6- National Defence & Sports ^a		
7- Roads & Public Works				7- Public Works & Transportation
8- Agriculture & Colonization				
9- <i>Asistencia Medico-Social e Higiene</i> (Health)		9- Public Health		
10- Labor & Social Legislation		10- Labor & Social Security		
11- Industry	11- Mining & Industry	11- Mining		
12- Economy & Commerce		12- Economy & Transportation		12- Economy, "Fomento" & Reconstruction
13- Interior Surveillance & Rules (R&HA)			15- Interior Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA)	
		13- Housing & Urban Affairs (DC) ^b		
			14- Latin American Integration (Wilna Saavedra Cortes - DC) ^c	

- a. The Special Committee on Sports was created in 1954. Its first Chair was Sergio Ojeda Doren (UNI53). The 1967 reform merged it with the Committee on Defense creating the Committee on Defense & Sports. Its first Chair was José R. Monares Gómez (DC).
- b. Committees **in bold and italics types** are new committees. In parenthesis () the party and name of their first Chair.
- c. In 1990 this committee merged with the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CREATION AND RENAMING OF STANDING COMMITTEES

CHILEAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1945-2002

(cont.)

1990-1994		1994-1998	1998-2001
March 1990	June 1990	1994	2001
	1- Interior, Regionalization, Planification & Social Development		
	2- Foreign Affairs, Interparliamentary Affairs & Latin American Integration		
	4- Education, Culture, Science & Technology, Sports & Recreation	4- Education, Culture, Sports & Recreation	
	6- National Defence		
	7- Public Works, Transportation & Telecommunications		
8- Agriculture, Rural Development & Maritime Affairs		8- Agriculture, Silviculture & Fisheries	8- Agriculture, Silviculture & Rural Development
10- Health			
12- Mining & Energy			
13- Economy, "Fomento" & Development			
16- Internal Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA)		18- Internal Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA)	19- Internal Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA)
14- Housing & Urban Development			
9- Natural Resources & Environment (Gutenberg Martinez Ocamica -DC-)			
15- Human Rights & Citizenship (Maria A. Maluenda Campos -PPD-)			
		16- Family (María A.Saa Díaz -PPD-)	
		17- Science & Technology (Joaquín Palma Irarrazaval -DC-)	
			18- Fisheries, Aquaculture & Maritime Affairs (Rafael Arratia Valdebenito -DC-)

APPENDIX I

ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002

Date	Position	Candidates	Candidates' Party	Candidates' Coalition	Number of Seats of the Party/Coalition	Votes obtained by each candidate	Total of Votes Cast/Total Seats in Chamber
22/05/45	P	Coloma Mellado, Juan	Cons	CONS-PA-PL	74	73	141 for P/147; 136 for VP/147
		Faivovich Hitzcovich, Angel	PR	DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	69	68	
	VP1	del Pedregal Artigas, Alberto	PA	CONS-PA-PL	74	72	
		Cifuentes Sobarzo, Carlos	PD	DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	69	63	
	VP2	Echevarria Moorehouse, José	CONS	CONS-PA-PL	74	1	
		Atienza Pedraza, Carlos	PL	CONS-PA-PL	74	72	
VP2	Godoy Urrutia, César	PPN45	DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE	69	63		
	Zepeda Barrios, Hugo	PL	CONS-PA-PL	74	1		
24/05/49	P	Brañes Farmer, Raul	PR	LIDERS	78	79	138/147
		Coloma Mellado, Juan	ConsT	-	20	52	
		Concha Molina, Lucio	ConsT	-	20	1	
		-	-	-	-	6 B ^a	
	VP1	Tapia Moore, Astolfo	PS	LIDERS	78	78	
		Zepeda Barrios, Hugo	PL	LIDERS	78	52	
		Ojeda, Juan Efrain	PSP	FRAS	31	1	
	VP2	-	-	-	-	7 B	
		Cifuentes Sobarzo, Carlos	PD	LIDERS	78	78	
-	-	-	-	60 B			
26/05/53	P	Castro Palma, Baltasar	UNI53	FENAFUI-ConsT-PR	75	77	138/147
		Lea-Plaza Saenz, Alfredo	PAL	ANAP	54	61	
	VP1	Correa Letelier, Héctor	ConsT	FENAFUI-ConsT-PR	75	77	
		Chelén Rojas, Alejandro	PSP	ANAP	54	61	
	VP2	Montane Castro, Carlos	PR	FENAFUI-ConsT-PR	75	77	
		Minchel Balladares, Luis	PDPu49	ANAP	54	59	
Bustamante del Campo, Sergio	PAL	ANAP	54	2			
22/05/57	P	Correa Letelier, Héctor	ConsU	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56/58	74	73	141/147
		Sandoval Vargas, Nestor	PR	-	36	33	
		Musalem Saffie, Jose	FN	-	14	33	
		-	-	-	-	2 B	
	VP1	Sepulveda Garcés, Sergio	PL	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56/58 (O)	74	73	
		Morales Adriasola, Raul	PR	-	36	33	
		Pablo Elorza, Tomas	CONS	-	2	34	
		Del Rio Gundian, Humberto	PL	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56/58	74	1	
	VP2	de la Presa Casanueva, Rafael	PAL	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56/58	74	73	
		Brucher Encina, Raul	PR	-	36	33	
		Gormaz Molina, Raul	IND	-	-	33	
		David Lebon, Alfonso	PAL	ConsU-PL-PAL-IND-PN56/58	74	1	
Palma Vicuna, Jose	FN	-	14	1			

a. Blank votes

ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002
(cont.)

Date	Position	Candidates	Candidates' Party	Candidates' Coalition	Number of Seats of the Party/Coalition	Votes obtained by each candidate	Total of Votes Cast/Total Seats in Chamber
24/05/61	P	Schaulsohn Numhäuser, Jacobo	PR	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	84	80	139/147
		Fonseca Aedo, José	PADENA	FRAP	40	57	
		Morales, Raul	PR	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	84	1	
		Sivori Alzerreca, Carlos	DC	-	23	1	
	VP1	Loyola Vazquez, Gustavo	ConsU	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	84	82	
		Sivori Alzerreca, Carlos	DC	-	23	55	
		Fonseca Aedo, José Roman	PADENA	FRAP	40	1	
	VP2	Huerta Muñoz, José	PL	DEMOCRATIC FRONT	84	81	
		Godoy Urrutia, César	PC	FRAP	40	57	
-		-	-	-	1 B		
25/05/65	P	Ballesteros Reyes, Eugenio	DC	DC	82	79	133/147
		Marín Millie, Gladys	PC	FRAP	33	25	
		Morales Abarzúa, Carlos	PR	-	20	19	
		Momberg Roa, Hardy	PL	-	6	7	
		Lorca Valencia, Alfredo	PL	-	6	1	
		-	-	-	-	2 B	
	VP1	Isla Hevia, José Manuel	DC	DC	82	80	
		Allende Gossens, Laura	PS	FRAP	33	25	
		Enríquez Frodden, Inés	PR	-	20	19	
	VP2	Monckeberg Barros, Gustavo	ConsU	-	3	7	
		-	-	-	-	2 B	
		Papic Ramos, Luis	DC	DC	82	80	
Lazo Carrera, Carmen		PS	FRAP	33	25		
Amión, Eduardo Clavel		PR	-	20	19		
De la Fuente Cortés, Gabriel		PL	-	6	7		
-	-	-	-	2 B			
4/6/69	P	Valenzuela Valderrama, Héctor	DC	DC	56	51	139/150
		Phillips Penafiel, Patricio	PN66	-	33	32	
		Silva Solar, Julio	DC	-	56	1	
		Pareto Gonzalez, Luis	DC	-	56	1	
		-	-	-	-	47 B	
		-	-	-	-	6 N ^b	
	VP1	Videla Riquelme, Pedro	DC	DC	56	52	
		Tagle Valdes, Jose	PN66	-	33	31	
		Giannini Iniguez, Osvaldo	DC	-	56	1	
	VP2	-	-	-	-	47 B	
		-	-	-	-	6 N	
		Stark Troncoso, Pedro	DC	DC	56	52	
Amunategui Johnson, Miguel		PN66	-	33	31		
Cardemil Alfaro, Gustavo		DC	-	56	1		
-		-	-	-	47 B		
-	-	-	-	6 N			

b. Null votes.

ELECTION OF THE CHILEAN MESAS 1945-2002
(cont.)

Date	Position	Candidates	Candidates' Party	Candidates' Coalition	Number of Seats of the Party/Coalition	Votes obtained by each candidate	Total of Votes Cast/Total Seats in Chamber
23/05/73	P	Pareto Gonzalez, Luis	DC	CODE	87	76	136/150
		Palestro Rojas, Mario	PS	FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY	63	57	
		Leighton Guzman, Bernardo	PN66	CODE (O)	87	1	
	VP1	Lorca Rojas, Gustavo	PN66	CODE (O)	87	78	
		Tejeda Oliva, Luis	PC	FPU	63	57	
		Arnello Romo, Mario	PN66	CODE (O)	87	1	
VP2	Muñoz Barra, Roberto	PIR	CODE (O)	87	75		
	Salvo Inostroza, Camilo	PR	FEDERATION OF THE POPULAR UNITY	63	57		
11/03/90	P	Viera-Gallo Quesney, José	PPD	CONCERTACION	69	84	120/120
		Matthei Fornet, Evelyn	RN	-	29	35	
		-	-	-	-	1 V ^c	
	VP1	Dupré Silva, Carlos	DC	CONCERTACION	69	85	
		Horvath Kiss, Antonio	ILB	-	29	34	
		-	-	-	-	1 V	
VP2	Coloma Correa, Juan	UDI	-	11	84		
	Prokurica Prokurica, Baldo	RN	-	29	34		
11/03/94	P	Schaulsohn Brodsky, Jorge	PPD	CONCERTACION	70	65	120/120
		Chadwick Piñera, Andrés	UDI	UNION FOR THE PROGRESS OF CHILE	50	51	
		Valenzuela Herrera, Felipe	PS	CONCERTACION	70	1	
	VP1	Latorre Carmona, Juan Carlos	DC	CONCERTACION	70	68	
		Prochelle Aguilar, Marina	RN	UNION FOR THE PROGRESS OF CHILE	50	51	
		Rocha Manrique, Jaime	PR	CONCERTACION	70	1	
VP2	Espina Otero, Alberto	RN	UNION FOR THE PROGRESS OF CHILE	50	95		
	Martinez Ocamica, Gutemberg	DC	CONCERTACION	70	1		
11/03/98	P	Martinez Ocamica, Gutemberg	DC	CONCERTACION	69	71	120/120
		Cristi Marfil, Maria	RN	UNION FOR CHILE	47	45	
		-	-	-	-	4 V	
	VP1	Muñoz D'Albora, Adriana	PPD	CONCERTACION	69	67	
		Ulloa Aguillón, Jorge	UDI	UNION FOR CHILE	47	45	
	VP2	Naranjo Ortiz, Jaime	PS	CONCERTACION	69	68	
Garcia-Huidobro, Alejandro		UCCP	-	2	42		
Avila Contreras, Nelson		PPD	CONCERTACION	69	1		
-	-	-	-	4 B			
-	-	-	-	5 V			

c. Void votes.

APPENDIX J

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - CHILEAN LOWER CHAMBER

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Committee Power	4.856	3.673	0	27,0
Ruling Party	0.531	0.499	0	1
Regular Plurality	0.097	0.296	0	1
Regular Majority	0.381	0.485	0	1
Exceptional Majority	0.521	0.499	0	1
Freshman	0.474	0.499	0	1
Seniority (in legislative terms)	1.894	1.106	1	9
Experience (committee-specific) ^a	1.237	0.516	1	4
Cumulation	1.353	0.606	0	4
Group Position	0.144	0.351	0	1
Chamber Position	0.021	0.144	0	1

N=1542

a. The unit of analysis is assignments (N=2088).

WEIGHTING OF COMMITTEES BY IMPORTANCE
CHILEAN LOWER CHAMBER

Committee	Score
<i>Hacienda</i>	5,33
Internal Regime, Administration & Rules (R&HA)	3,67
Constitution, Legislation & Justice	3,00
Foreign Affairs, Interparliamentary Affairs & Latin American Integration	3,00
Mining	3,00
Interior, Regionalization, Planification & Social Development	3,00
Agriculture, Silviculture & Rural Development	2,67
Labor & Social Security	2,67
Education, Culture, Sports & Recreation	2,67
Public Works, Transportation & Telecommunications	2,67
National Defence	2,67
Health	2,67
Economy, "Fomento" & Development	2,67
Housing & Urban Development	1,67
Science & Technology	1,33
Natural Resources & Environment	1,33
Human Rights & Citizenship	1,33
Family	1,00
Latin American Integration	1,00
Fisheries, Aquaculture & Maritime Affairs	1,00

Note. See text for details on coding.