

Université de Montréal

**Dangerous Identities: The Impact of Fundamental Ethnic Identities on Conflict
Intensity**

par
Mike Medeiros

Département de science politique
Faculté des arts et des sciences

Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de
Maître ès science (M. Sc.) en science politique

juillet, 2009

© Mike Medeiros, 2009

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures

Ce mémoire intitulé :

Dangerous Identities: The Impact of Fundamental Ethnic Identities on Conflict Intensity

présenté par :
Mike Medeiros

a été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

Robert Dalpé
président-rapporteur

Patrick Fournier
directeur de recherche

Richard Nadeau
membre du jury

Résumé

Bien que plusieurs chercheurs aient analysé l'influence de divers facteurs sur l'intensité des conflits ethniques, il a été constaté que l'identité ethnique elle-même n'a jamais été correctement examinée. Ce phénomène est essentiellement dû à ce que nous croyons être une classification inexacte des groupes ethniques. Nous proposons une nouvelle méthode de catégorisation pour les identités ethniques présentant que la religion, la langue et la race forment les distinctions les plus précises et nous les classifions alors comme les identités ethniques fondamentales. Subséquemment, une étude comparative de ces identités ethniques a été entreprise avec l'utilisation de deux bases de données différentes: l'ensemble de données Battle Deaths qui est associé avec la base de données sur les conflits armés de l'UCDP/PRIO et la base de données Minorities at Risk. Les résultats, dans leur ensemble, ont indiqué que les identités ethniques avec des attachements émotifs plus intenses mènent à une plus grande intensité de conflit. Les conflits ethniques fondamentaux ont démontré une tendance à mener à des conflits plus intenses que les conflits ethniques non-fondamentaux. De plus, la similitude parmi les groupes ethniques tend à affaiblir l'intensité des conflits. En outre, l'étude a également conclu que plus le nombre d'identités ethnique fondamentales impliquées dans un conflit est grand, plus le conflit sera intense. Cependant, les résultats ne pouvaient pas déterminer une différence conséquente parmi l'influence relative des trois identités ethniques fondamentales.

Mots clés: ethnicité, conflit, intensité, identité, religion, langage, race.

Abstract

Though many have analyzed numerous factors' influence on ethnic conflict intensity, it was found that ethnic identity itself has not been properly examined. This phenomenon is basically due to what we believe is improper ethnic group classification. We propose a new categorization method for ethnic identities putting forth religion, language and race as the clearest distinction of ethnic identity and labelling them as fundamental ethnic identities. Subsequently, a comparative examination of these ethnic identities was undertaken with the use of two different sources of data: the Battle Deaths dataset associated with the UCDP/PRIO data on armed conflicts and the Minorities at Risk dataset. The results, overall, indicated that ethnic identities with more intense emotional attachments lead to greater conflict intensity. Fundamental ethnic conflicts were shown to lead to greater intensity than non-fundamental ethnic conflicts. Also, similarity amongst ethnic groups was demonstrated to weaken conflict intensity. Furthermore, the study also concluded that the greater the number of fundamental ethnic identity differences involved in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. However, the findings were unable to find any meaningful difference among the relative influence of the three fundamental ethnic identities.

Key words: Ethnicity, Conflict, Intensity, Identity, Religion, Language, Race.

Table of Content

List of Tables.....	iii
List of Figures.....	iv
List of Annexes.....	v
List of Abbreviations.....	vi
Acknowledgements.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1- Ethnic Conflict Literature Review.....	7
<i>Defining Ethnic Conflicts</i>	7
<i>Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups</i>	9
<i>Causes of Ethnic Conflicts</i>	11
<i>Influences on Ethnic Conflicts</i>	15
<i>Summary of the Literature on Ethnic Conflicts and its Important Gaps</i>	18
Chapter 2- Fundamental Ethnic Identities.....	22
<i>Comparisons between Ethnic Identities</i>	23
<i>Fundamental Ethnic Identities</i>	24
<i>Hypotheses</i>	28
Chapter 3- Research Design.....	33
<i>Methodology</i>	33
<i>Datasets</i>	40
<i>Statistical Analysis</i>	48
Chapter 4- Results Description.....	51
<i>Presentation of the Results</i>	51
<i>Discussion</i>	69

Conclusion..... 75

References..... 80

Annexes..... 88

Annex 1..... 88

Annex 2..... 91

List of Tables

Table 1: Ethnic Conflict Classification.....	52
Table 2: Mean Differences for the BD Dataset.....	53
Table 3: Mean Differences for the MAR Dataset.....	55
Table 4: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for the BD Dataset.....	58
Table 5: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Static Data).....	60
Table 6: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Time-Series Data).....	62
Table 7: Mean Differences for each Category of Multiple Identity Conflicts.....	65
Table 8: Mean Differences for Sectarianism.....	66
Table 9: Mean Differences for Linguistic Similarity.....	68

List of Figures

Figure 1: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the BD dataset.....	54
Figure 2: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the MAR dataset.....	56

List of Annexes

Annex 1- BD Dataset Group Classification..... 88

Annex 2-MAR Dataset Group Classification..... 91

List of Abbreviations

BD	Battle Deaths dataset
MAR	Minorities at Risk dataset
UCDP/PRIO	Uppsala Conflict Data Program / International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Acknowledgments

I would like to first and foremost thank Patrick Fournier for all the help, support, information and patience which he was kind enough to give to me. Without him, this project would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Bethany Lacina and the staff at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and at the Minorities at Risk project for their helpful insight to my inquiries into their data. Finally, I would like to thank, in a general manner, all those who manifested their interest in my attempt to further understand ethnic conflicts in my long process.

Dangerous Identities: The Impact of Fundamental Ethnic Identities on Conflict Intensity

All good people agree,
And all good people say,
All nice people, like Us, are We
And everyone else is They:
But if you cross over the sea,
Instead of over the way,
You may end by (think of it!) looking on We
As only a sort of They!

-Rudyard Kipling, *We and They* (1926)

Introduction

The poem above highlights just how futile the distinction between people can be. It illustrates that the difference between we and they may not be anything at all. However, it is evident that no matter how futile the distinction between groups might appear. That difference, whether it is perceived or real, always possesses a tremendous potential for conflict. The world is filled with places where differences between individuals have led to havoc and misery. The places which have had the misfortune to host these terrible events have marked our news and our lives. They have consequently become engrained in our vocabulary. Kosovo, Darfur, East Timor, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland have a global connotation that is synonymous with hatred and destruction. Nevertheless, these places are but a few of the well known examples that we utilise to describe horrific and terrifying events, analogies of human tragedies. They are also only a few of the ethnic war zones that have received the gift of international media attention. A gift which is meant

to bring help, but so often it is empty. Examples of ethnic conflicts, where seemingly normal human beings do horrific things to each other, leave many perplexed and saddened.

However, the reality is that ethnic conflicts are a universal social phenomenon that can occur in any society in any region of the world without much warning. The fact that ethnic conflicts are universal phenomena must increase our preoccupation with these incidents (Horowitz 1985). Ethnic conflicts, therefore, represent a source of great concern for countries that are composed of heterogeneous populations because ethnic differences make domestic peace difficult (Connor 1972; Rabushka & Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; Ignatieff 1993; Moynihan 1993; Huntington 1996; Sambanis 2001). Ethnic conflicts have even been argued as being endemic to multi-ethnic societies (Brass 1985). These concerns are heightened by the fact that most countries are heterogeneous; a factor which increases the risk of violence (Ellingsen 2000). The anxiety attached to ethnic conflicts is created by the fact that they can cause tremendous destabilisation and destruction to a country or, even, an entire region. However, the apex of the concerns related to ethnic conflicts lies in their potential for death. Huth & Valentino (2008) have argued that ethnic conflicts enhance the likelihood of mass killings. Kegley & Wittkopf (1995) have, for their part, presented ethnic conflicts as one of the world's greatest killers.

The truth of the matter is that all conflicts possess an intrinsic destructive nature. However, conflicts of an ethnic nature can be considered the most destructive due to underlying hatreds that provoke an elevated potential of violence and loss of life. Unfortunately, the true essence of the destructiveness of ethnic conflicts is often underappreciated. Several academics had predicted the end of conflicts based on ethnic allegiances. The cold war had supposedly rendered conflict beyond the realm of ethnicity (Rubenstein 1990; Fukuyama 1992). However, history has clearly demonstrated that this

scenario did not materialize. Interethnic conflicts were actually in the last century at their most intense and endemic than they had ever been (Smith 1981). Furthermore, data explicitly shows that the recent trends in conflicts demonstrate a propensity towards internal clashes. Wallensteen & Sollenberg (1997) show that conflicts seem to have taken a turn towards a predominance of internal clashes after the end of the Cold War; whereas others demonstrate that the trend started earlier (Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Hewitt et al. 2008). It is important to highlight that this trend towards an internalization of conflicts has had an important ethnic element to it because the disputes have been of a communal nature (Gurr 1994). Thus, the numerous conflicts of an ethnic nature in the last few decades have demonstrated that ethnonationalism is a constant force in the creation of conflicts that cannot simply be eliminated.

A shift towards internal conflicts, centered on ethnic distinctions, reinforces apprehensions over ethnic conflicts. They, obviously, imply serious repercussions for populations at the heart of such conflicts. These conflicts can generate economic, social and political deterioration to any country that is in the grasp of this phenomenon. Ethnic conflicts can lead to states with no rule of law where governments can no longer assume their responsibilities and where the security of citizens can no longer be guaranteed; thus, representing a tremendous risk and danger for affected populations. Unfortunately, there are a lot of people that lie in the harmful grasp of ethnic conflicts. Gurr (1993b) found that one sixth of the global population was involved in ethnic conflicts; emphasizing the unquestionable importance which ethnic conflicts represent for the world's population.

Ethnic conflicts are, thus, a great danger to the security of all. It is, therefore, clear that ethnic conflicts demand a particular attention from the academic community in order to develop a better understanding and, subsequently, arrive at rectifying solutions to these

phenomena. This apparent concern which is posed by ethnic conflicts has, actually, resulted in a wide array of scientific literature that has attempted to improve our comprehension of conflicts of an ethnic nature. I believe that the studies which examine ethnic conflicts can safely be classified into three major categories: causes, the factors which lead to the onset of ethnic conflicts, influences, the variables which impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts, and resolutions, strategies which would resolve, or at the very least attenuate, the ongoing ethnic tensions. A look at the literature on the factors which cause ethnic conflicts and the variables which influence their intensity and one quickly realizes that there is never just one cause to a conflict or one influence that affects it. Rather, the literature presents ethnic conflicts as complex phenomena caused by a myriad of factors, none exclusive to ethnicity, and influenced by multiple variables. Thus, ethnic conflicts are not a single factor phenomenon. The complexity of ethnic conflicts, therefore, renders finding appropriate and successful resolutions quite complicated.

Yet, although there has been much headway into important elements of ethnic conflicts, the research has clearly not been exhaustive. It is my belief that the large body of academic work which has ethnic conflicts as its focal point has made important progress. However, there is, undoubtedly, not a full understanding of the phenomenon.

One such element which is not fully understood relates to the influence of ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The theory that I put forward in this study is that ethnicity is an umbrella notion which encompasses all group identities that have ethnic elements as their focus. Furthermore, in line with Sambanis (2001), I bring forth that three specific identities form the basis of ethnicity. Religion, language and race possess undeniable and clear ethnic distinctions; I put forward that this aspect should lead them to be known as “fundamental ethnic identities”. Examining how ethnic identities affect ethnic

conflicts should be considered indisputably necessary; such an exploration would bring valuable insight into an element which could influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to ascertain the influence of fundamental, as well as non-fundamental, ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Moreover, I propose that particular elements of ethnic group similarity and levels of differences between ethnic groups should also be explored for their potential impact on ethnic conflict intensity. This study, thus, will be examining the effects that identities, in this case of the ethnic kind, might have on the intensity of ethnic conflicts. It is important to note that although the literature on the potential influence of ethnic identities on conflicts is not bear, it is, at the same time, far from being systematic and often flawed. This thesis seeks to shine a new light on the phenomenon and attempt to correct unsound theoretical conceptions of ethnicity.

This study will be structured into four main chapters. The first will examine the academic literature which has concentrated on ethnic conflicts. It will present the manner that the notion of ethnic conflicts has been conceptualized. It will also display the factors which the literature has deemed to be causes of ethnic conflicts, as well as the variables which have been reckoned to impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts. The following chapter will bring forth the theory on ethnic identity, which I developed, that will form the basis for this study. It will also examine the attempts which have been made to isolate the impact of ethnic identity on conflict. The second chapter will also elaborate a series of questions and hypotheses which will be the framework for the following research. The third chapter, for its part, will lay forth the research design and methodological framework of the empirical work that will be undertaken. Finally, our last chapter will present and examine the results

of our statistical analyses. The fourth chapter will also explore the significance of the results and their contribution to the understanding of ethnic conflicts.

In the following series of chapters, I will explore the important notions related to ethnic conflicts and examine the influence of one specific element, ethnic identity, on such conflicts; this will all be done in an attempt to bring a greater understanding to a complex and important phenomenon which threatens millions throughout the world.

Chapter 1

Ethnic Conflict Literature Review

Ethnic conflicts have garnered much interest from researchers and academics. This phenomenon has notably been the result of an increase in the number of conflicts of an ethnic nature which have been signalled in recent times. These studies hold a twofold purpose. They, firstly, seek to inquire and explain the causes and functioning of ethnic conflicts; and they also, ultimately, attempt to find resolutions in order to end or control these disastrous manifestations of ethnic tensions.

This chapter seeks to review the literature on ethnic conflicts. It examines how ethnic conflicts have been perceived and explained through the academic literature. It is organized into five main sections: the definition of ethnic conflicts, ethnic identity and ethnic groups, the causes of ethnic conflicts, the variables that influence ethnic conflicts, and a conclusion.

Furthermore, this chapter also seeks to highlight the merits and failings of the existing literature on ethnic identities and conflicts. Its goal is to identify elements that are lacking or unclear in the literature and which would be important in the understanding of ethnic conflicts.

Defining Ethnic Conflicts

Before embarking on an in-depth analysis of ethnic conflicts, it is, initially, extremely important to understand what is meant by the term “ethnic conflict”. The notion of ethnic conflict is often employed to describe a great variety of conflicts; and can, thus, lead to an unclear and ambiguous understanding of the notion itself. Hence, it is important to define what is meant when referring to an ethnic conflict.

At the outset, to properly understand ethnic conflicts, it is essential to comprehend the factors that compose it. Thus, it is, firstly, crucial to understand what a conflict represents. It is imperative to realize that conflicts arise from a difference between individuals or

groups in regards to goals. As Coser (1956) defines it, a conflict is a struggle in the hope of winning objectives by neutralizing, injuring or eliminating rivals. Hence, conflicts can be explained as a pursuit of incompatible goals by two or more parties leading to a confrontation of a varying degree that can range from simple tensions to all out violent clashes.

Conflicts, thus, arise from a dysfunctional, or at the very least problematic, situation. However, the conflict itself can have a therapeutic quality by playing a remediating functionality in society (Bourdieu 1962; Oberschall 1973). The outcome of the conflict will remediate the dysfunction that initially led to the conflict in the first place. Boulding (1945, p. 240) further adds to this notion by asserting that a “conflict conducted in a decent and responsible manner is essential to any form of progress”. Although, conflicts represent an unquestionable source of negative consequences, the ultimate outcome can be seen as being positive.

In relation to ethnic conflicts, conflicts can, thus, simply be construed as conflicts involving parties distinguished by ethnicity. Nevertheless, I would like to venture that, to be categorized as an ethnic conflict, it is not necessary for the contradicting goals to themselves be centered on ethnicity; the vital element should be that the groups themselves are divided along clear ethnic lines.

However, there should be one exception to this rule. Struggles for decolonization, although most often involving clear ethnic distinctions (notably race), should not be considered ethnic conflicts because of the lack of an important element related to them: territoriality. I would advance that the concept of territory also plays a quintessential role in ethnic identities (Goffman 1963; Stea 1965; Sommer 1966; Lyman & Scott 1967; Becker 1973). In a decolonization conflict, there is a lack of territorial attachment from one of the

parties; and, hence, this type of conflict should be excluded from being classified in the ethnic conflict category.

Ethnic conflicts have, thus, been defined as a confrontation of parties with incompatible goals that are distinguished along ethnic lines and where both parties have a territorial attachment to the zone in conflict. This definition does not, unfortunately, permit a full understanding of the phenomenon. It is incomplete because only half of the phenomenon is fully described. In consequence, although conflicts have correctly been defined, to ascertain a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, it is also important to properly examine the notion of ethnicity.

Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups

Having previously exposed the essential nature of conflicts, this section sets out to explain the notion of ethnicity. It seeks to detail the purpose and function of ethnic identity and how it is rendered salient in individuals and groups.

Ethnicity can simply be explained as a group identity. The concept of group identity is simply the identity that is shared by a group of individuals. It is the set of values shared by all members of a specific group. De Levita (1965) describes it as the constant features of a group in spite of the fact that the members of the group vary and change. It is “like any other identity... a collective sense of social belonging and ultimate loyalty related to parentage and a belief in common origins” (De Vos & Romanucci-Ross 1995, p. 350).

A fundamental notion in the concept of group identity is its necessity of comparison in order to exist. Strauss (1959) brings forth that the constitution of any human group is other groups. In order to exist, a group, and therefore its identity, needs to be different from another group, yet it also needs to compare itself to another group.

Another key aspect of ethnicity is that it is essentially subjective (De Vos & Romanucci-Ross 1995). There is no “real” attachment to identity. This is an important element of ethnic identity which is characterized by Anderson (1991) as being essentially nothing more than “imagined communities”. Although the affiliation of the individual towards the ethnic group is real, the link itself does not exist. The latter point is further developed by Romanucci-Ross & De Vos’ description of ethnicity (1995, p. 13) as a “subjective sense of loyalty based on imagined origins and parentage rather than something to be measured by objectively present criteria or historical facts”. An example of such a phenomenon would be an individual who relates to an ethnic group by claiming some sort of distant lineage, although there might not be any substantive evidence of such ancestry.

A further main feature of ethnic identity is that it can be like a matryoshka doll. Ethnic identities can be assumed from a spectrum that ranges from a micro to a macro level; and this process can be done without generating an internal conflict. Roosens (1995) identifies this phenomenon as “layering” of the ethnic structure. Individuals possess a multitude of identities, including multiple ethnic identities. The individual assumes an ethnic identity in regards to the best perceived possibility of maximizing results for himself (Barth 1969). The individual can, thus, have the ability to pick an ethnic identity that best suits his goals. Hence, it is through this process, which is influenced by particular situations, that ethnic identity becomes salient.

An additional, and final, principal aspect of ethnicity revolves around the intrinsic emotional connections which are attached to ethnicity. This is a feature of ethnicity that, according to Connor (1994), is often badly underestimated. It is the emotional depth of ethnonational identity that renders it volatile and, thus, dangerous. The emotional attachments of ethnicity are seen as the reason why “ethnicity can be very negative and

destructive in its intent” (De Vos 1995, p.43). Furthermore, as has been demonstrated, seeing that conflicts are caused by differences amongst groups, these differences can result in discrimination and prejudice between the groups (Van Dijk 1987; Essed 1991). The discrimination and prejudice which result from the differences amongst ethnic groups, subsequently, lead to enhancing ethnic emotional attachments. Hence, it is these emotional attachments that render ethnic conflicts more threatening than other group identities (Romanucci-Ross & De Vos 1995).

Ethnicity can, therefore, be summed up as a dynamic and malleable group identity that is based on perceived values and connections which become salient in an individual and group in a given situation and that has an intrinsic emotion to it which renders it more dangerous than other group identities.

Causes of Ethnic Conflicts

The previous sections explored the concept of ethnic conflicts. It is, thus, now valuable to turn to and examine the factors which cause ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts, and their destructive potential, do not simply come about. This section, therefore, seeks to enumerate factors which lead ethnic groups to enter into a state of conflict.

In attempting to identify the particular cause of a conflict, the literature demonstrates it is often impossible. This impracticality seems to come from the fact that conflicts cannot normally be associated to one single causal variable (Sorokin 1962). Consequently, in analyzing the causes of ethnic conflicts, it is important to keep in mind, as it will be demonstrated, the complexity of situations involving ethnic conflicts.

Much research has been devoted to identifying and understanding elements which provoke conflicts. One of these factors might very well be humans’ own natural predisposition. Conflicts have been presented as being innate to all social animals (Ardrey

1966; Lorenz 1969). Sociological functions and psychological drives, manifested through natural selection and related to survival, lead individuals and groups to engage in conflicts and wars (Wright 1964; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). However, some researchers refute this assertion of normality of conflict and contend, rather, that conflict is an abnormal situation and that, instead, cooperation between individuals and groups represents the normality in their relationships (Parsons 1951; Smelser 1962; Johnson 1966).

The literature also presents more concrete factors which lead to the development of conflicts. The literature actually reveals that the most important cause of ethnic conflicts seems to be competition. The struggle for economic and political resources is generally utilized to explain the start and perseverance of conflicts (Horowitz 1985; Rogers & Dando 1992). It is the competition amongst different groups to attain incompatible goals which lead such groups to enter into conflict. Many negative consequences arise from the competitive struggles between groups: social categorization (Tajfel & Turner 1979), outgroup rejection (Coser 1956; Brewer 1979), out-group discrimination (Dustin & Davis 1970; Bettencourt et al. 1992), the preference of autocratic leadership (Blake & Mouton 1964; Sherif et al. 1961), and politicization (Rothchild 1986). These negative consequences all arise in an attempt to achieve or maintain an advantage over adversarial groups. However, competition also has another important effect on ethnic conflicts; it helps to increase group cohesion and reinforces group identity (Rothchild 1986; Posen 1993). It is the strengthened group cohesion and group identity which further reinforces the psychological divides between the conflicting parties. The emphasis on competition to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts, and all other conflicts, stresses groups' willingness to fight each other in order to attain divergent goals. Therefore, it has been suggested that

ethnic groups struggle against one another for something that they have and want to keep or to attain something that they are blocked from obtaining.

Although the literature tends to emphasize the role of competition on the onset of ethnic conflicts, it is important to underline that this competition is the result of problematic situations associated with economic and political factors. The economy has been singled out as a significant determinant of ethnic conflicts. The theory behind this notion is that periods of economic difficulty lead to conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Miguel et al. 2004). However, others reject the straightforward link between the economic situation of groups and conflict (Boulding 1945; Sorokin 1962). Political factors have also been presented as causing the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. The literature demonstrates that political situations can be manipulated by individuals in the hopes of obtaining a gain. Elites in society can utilize, or even create, tensions to serve their own political interests (Brass 1985; Rothchild 1986; Saideman 1997; Soeters 2005). The political manipulation of contextual situations in an opportunistic manner is seen as being able to generate or reinforce conflicts. One way in which these manipulative political manoeuvres can lead to ethnic conflicts is through the explicit discrimination against out-groups (Fox 2003)

Differences in military capabilities are also seen as a cause of conflict. The balance of power can play a crucial role in keeping groups from entering into conflicts. It does so by controlling the fear that can develop in opposing groups. Fear tends to arise in a situation which is perceived to be unbalanced or unequal (Richardson 1960). The balance of power can, thus, strongly influence the degeneration of conflicts into violence (Wright 1935; Wehr 1979). When a situation is no longer balanced along an acceptable power distribution, a sense of fear can develop in one of the camps, pushing that party towards an

attempt to re-balance the situation. This attempt at re-balancing relations of power between groups can lead to an escalation of hostilities which, in turn, may itself very easily lead to direct open conflict between the groups (Jervis 1978; Posen 1993).

The structure in which a given situation is managed also plays a noteworthy role in the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. Wehr (1979) points out that leftist ideologues such as Marx, Lenin and Mao concentrated on the class structure of a society to explain conflicts. However, structural impacts go far beyond social class. Some aspects of structural impact extend to the political structure of the country. The level of freedom, through a democracy-autocracy continuum, has been demonstrated to influence the outset of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Lindström & Moore 1995; Davis & Moore 1997; Esty et al.1999). The legal system has also been presented as leading to the generation of tensions. Wright (1935) refers to an improper legal system as a main cause of war. A legal system which is unable to confront and deal with tensions in a perceivably just manner will see those tensions escalate. The international system as a structure has also been brought forth as being a determinant on the onset of conflict. The argument is derived from the international system's inability to properly and successfully deal with international and intranational tensions (Wright 1935; Boulding 1945; Lund 1996; Ramsbotham et al. 2005). However, within the structuralist and internationalist calls for change, it is important to note that those changes have to be properly installed because rapid and improper change and transformation of a given situation may actually risk enflaming existing conflicts or, even, creating new ones (Sorokin 1962; Wright 1964). Thus, the effects of change can be seen as a further cause which can lead to conflicts.

The international context can also provoke the development of ethnic conflicts through contagion. Ethnic conflicts have been demonstrated to jump across borders and

spread to neighbouring countries (Lindström & Moore 1995; Fox 2000a; Saideman & Ayres 2000; Cetinyan 2002). Therefore, ongoing conflicts in one area can cause the onset of conflict in neighbouring areas; rendering the phenomenon of conflict contagion a possible cause of conflict.

It is worth highlighting that none of the factors which have been presented as potential causes of ethnic conflicts are specific to conflicts of an ethnic nature. Rather, they are causal characteristics that can be applied to all types of conflicts. Therefore, it is fair to assert that ethnic conflicts do not seem to possess causes which are particular to them.

As a summary of the causes of conflicts, one must underscore the difficulty to isolate just one factor as the sole source of conflicts. Thus, a full understanding of the causes of a conflict needs to have a multifaceted dimension. Gilliland (1995) reminds that it is important not to oversimplify the important roles that complex social, cultural and psychological phenomena play in conflict situation. Wright (1935, p.1) explains this complexity in an almost cynical realization: “the absence of conditions of peace is the cause of war”. Hence, in attempting to isolate the cause of an ethnic conflict it is important to keep in mind the complexity of the situation and realize that there might be an interaction of multiple causes at hand.

Influences on Ethnic Conflicts

After examining elements which lead to a state of conflict between groups, it is important to explore variables which influence the intensity of conflicts. These are factors which can influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts and lead them to become more violent and last longer. Therefore, the aspects which will be presented in this section do not lead to the onset of conflicts, they only affect the severity of situations which are already in an existing state of conflict.

Initially it is worth stating that the factors which influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts might not be from the present. Events which happened in the past can have an effect on ethnic conflicts. This is an important element of the primordialist perspective which states that past attachments and events can resurface and lead to the mobilization of groups against each other (Geertz 1963; Isaacs 1975; Smith 1981). However, a more concrete, and somewhat less primordialist perspective, of the past is related to autonomy. The fact that a group had experienced a greater amount of autonomy in the past will positively affect the dynamics of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Fox 1997, 2000b; Ayres & Saideman 2000). This historical factor will contribute to an increased intensity of ethnic conflict.

Differences in economic and political resources also greatly impact ethnic conflicts. Probably the most important influences on conflicts relate to economic factors. Economic variables are not only important in causing the onset of conflicts, but they also influence the dynamics while groups are in a state of conflict. Several economic variables have been enumerated in the literature as having an impact on ongoing ethnic conflicts. Economic differences between ethnic groups in conflicts, for example, will play a role on the dynamics of conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Also, economic discrimination of a group from a different ethnicity will positively influence the intensity of such conflicts (Gurr 1993b; Cetinyan 2002). Furthermore, the level of economic development has also been shown to impact ongoing conflicts (Miller 1995; Davis and Moore 1997; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Political factors have also been mentioned as elements which affect ethnic conflicts. Differences in political resources, as in the case of economic differences, positively influence the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. (Gurr 1993a, 1993b; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Moreover, political

discrimination has also been demonstrated to positively affect ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993b). Another important political factor which influences the intensity of ethnic conflicts relates to the political system in place in countries affected by conflict. The level of freedom of the political context, measured through a democracy-autocracy continuum¹, has been demonstrated to induce higher intensity in ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Lindström & Moore 1995; Davis & Moore 1997; Esty et al.1999).

Furthermore, exterior factors have also been shown to impact the gravity of ethnic conflicts. Foreign actors can influence group dilemmas by giving political and military support to ethnic groups in conflict (Davis & Moore 1997; Fox 2000a, 2001). International support reinforces these groups, which leads to changes in the power structures of the conflict. Also, international support might be specifically provided through kin, groups of the same ethnic stock. This type of support provided by kinfolk who support related groups in other countries positively influences, as well, the degree of harshness of such conflicts (Saideman & Ayres 2000).

Demographic factors have also been presented as important elements for the level of intensity of conflicts. The level of diversity of the country, whether it is more ethnically homogenous or heterogeneous, can positively impact the intensity of ethnic conflicts (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Furthermore, demographic factors specifically related to the ethnic groups can also influence conflicts. The relative size of the group has been shown to be a determining factor in the intensity of the conflict (Ayres & Saideman 2000). Another such aspect related to the ethnic groups is the level of cohesion of the group. Ethnic group cohesion, the number of organizations and individuals who represent the ethnic group and the level of support which they have from amongst the ethnic group members, has been

¹ Gurr & Moore (1997) indicate that such measures actually evaluate political repression.

demonstrated to positively influence ethnic conflicts (Fox 1999, 2000b). Furthermore, cultural differences between groups have also been presented as determinants which will positively affect the intensity of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Fox 2000a). Once again, it is important to keep in mind, as with the causes of ethnic conflicts, that such conflicts do not possess a single factor of influence which determines their intensity; these are factors which are, once more, non-exclusive to ethnic conflicts. Influence, thus, must also be examined in a multifaceted perspective because ethnic conflicts are complex social, cultural and psychological phenomena.

Summary of the Literature on Ethnic Conflicts and its Important Gaps

After examining the academic literature which focuses on ethnic conflicts, this section seeks to present a summary of the processes which lead to the development of conflicts, ethnicity and, thus, ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, the major causes that lead to the onset of ethnic conflicts along with important variables which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts are also briefly summarized. This section will also bring forth a major gap which exists in the ethnic conflict literature relating to the influence of ethnic identities on conflicts. This relationship has not been properly ascertained and, moreover, we propose that the void in the literature is mostly due to the fact that the parameters of ethnicity have not been properly defined.

The literature clearly delineates a conflict as being parties with incompatible goals which enter into confrontation in order to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals and, thus, achieve their desired goal. Ethnicity is described as a group identity established around a set of common values shared by all of its members. Thus, an ethnic identity is simply a subset of group identity that focuses on ethnic elements and is compared to other ethnic groups. It is the ethnic elements of the group which distinguishes it from other ethnic

groups. Hence, it can be supposed that if ethnicity is based on identity then ethnic conflicts can be defined as conflicts between different identities and that these identities focus on ethnic elements. Therefore, an ethnic conflict is determined as involving groups, who are attached to a common territory, with incompatible goals distinguished by different sets of common group values which form the focal point of their different ethnic identities. The examination of the literature on ethnic conflicts also brings forth the importance of the emotional attachments which are involved in ethnic conflicts. However, although the emotional impact of ethnicity has been examined, the literature seems to lack an in-depth analysis of the influence of the emotional attachments of ethnic identities.

Upon examination of the causes of ethnic conflicts, the main origin of such conflicts appears to be competition. The struggle for political and economic resources is what is generally utilized to explain the causes of ethnic conflicts. However, an array of other variables is also employed as causes of ethnic conflicts. The literature clearly points out that it is almost impossible to isolate just one variable which is the cause of an ethnic conflict. Thus, ethnic conflicts should be seen as a multifaceted phenomenon with competition as the main cause of ethnic conflicts and with other variables as contributing causes to such conflicts. The literature places much emphasis on examining factors which can account for direct or contributing causes of ethnic conflicts. This can easily be understood because it is through the isolation of causal variables which lead to the onset of ethnic conflicts that, subsequently, remediation for these triggering factors of conflict can be found and, thus, a resolution can be ultimately brought to the conflict.

However, many other variables which cannot be considered as causes of ethnic conflicts play an important role on ethnic conflicts. These variables influence the level of intensity of ethnic conflicts. Such phenomena do not seem to receive the same attention as

causes of ethnic conflicts. If the literature demonstrates that there are variables which are perceived to lead groups into a state of ethnic conflicts, it is also critical to examine the variables which affect the intensity of ethnic conflicts.

The literature presents a myriad of variables which can impact the strength of an ethnic conflict. However, I would like to draw attention to a neglected variable; I would like to emphasize ethnic identity. The literature demonstrates that research into the effect of cultural differences, which include ethnic identities, on ethnic conflicts has been conducted. Nevertheless, such research does not permit to give a complete picture of the influence of such differences on ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, these studies do not specifically concentrate on ethnic identity differences. A more thorough examination of specific identities which make up ethnic groups that are involved in confrontations could lead to a greater understanding of the ethnic conflict phenomenon. Can it be that different types of ethnic identities influence ethnic conflicts differently? What are the effects of different types of ethnic identities on the levels of intensity of ethnic conflicts? What are the results of comparing different ethnic identities in order to isolate their impact on ethnic conflict volatility? This is a line of research which can greatly contribute to the further comprehension of ethnic conflicts. It is the direction which will, subsequently, be the framework for this study.

As has been exposed, there is a great gap in the study of ethnic conflicts in relation to the influence on conflicts of identities which form the focal point of ethnicities. This situation is mostly due, I believe, to improper definitions of variables which form ethnicity. Ethnic categories and ethnicity are often interchangeable and compared to each other; rendering a true definition of ethnicity problematic. To resolve this problem, I offer the argument that ethnicity should be regarded as an umbrella notion which refers to all group

identities that revolve around ethnic elements. In other words, ethnicity should not be seen as a group identity, but rather as a category of group identities; unless it is compared to non-ethnic group identities.

Furthermore, to get a better grasp of the influence of ethnic identities on ethnic conflicts, there must be a proper categorization of ethnic identities. I share Sambanis' reasoning (2001) about the importance of highlighting three specific ethnic identities: religion, language and race. I would also like to advance that these three identities should be referred to as fundamental ethnic identities. Individuals and groups can be divided into an infinity of partitions. However, I suggest that it is only religion, language and race which are the fundamental divisions of ethnicity and which can, thus, truly be considered as undeniable.

The literature demonstrates, as Sambanis (2001) points out, and to the best of my knowledge, a lack of proper comparisons between these three identities. Hence, there is a need to accurately evaluate the potential influence of ethnic identities on the volatility of ethnic conflicts. It is my belief that there is a necessity to better understand how these three ethnic identities influence ethnic conflicts. Isolating the influence of fundamental ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts will be the basis of this study. The aim of this research is, therefore, to attempt to contribute to a void in the literature.

The following chapter will focus on the categorization of ethnicity and, also, present the hypotheses which will form the basis of this study.

Chapter 2

The Impact of Ethnic Identities on Conflict

The previous chapter explored the concepts which form ethnic conflict. It also presented factors which are perceived to lead to conflicts. These are causes which create a state of conflict. The previous chapter, in addition, explored variables which are perceived to accentuate or diminish the intensity of ethnic conflicts. It is important to note that the latter factors do not lead to a state of conflict, it is the former factors which do so; the latter factors influence situations which are already in a state of conflict.

Ethnic groups who have become entangled in a state of conflict can be affected by multiple factors. These variables influence the dynamics of the conflict between the groups. Researchers have attempted to isolate the impact of specific elements of the interaction between different ethnic groups in conflict. One such factor that I have highlighted for its potential effect on ethnic conflicts relates to the ethnic identities of the groups. There have been attempts to examine the impact of ethnicity on conflicts; however, I believe, that these ethnic categories have suffered from improper categorization parameters which have negatively affected comparisons.

The following chapter examines studies which have undertaken a comparative examination along ethnic lines and lays forth how ethnic categories have so far been compared in the ethnic conflict literature. It will also propose a new categorization method for ethnic identities and will also present an in-depth analysis of these categories of ethnicity. Lastly, this chapter will present hypotheses which will be the framework of the ensuing study. These hypotheses will examine the influence of the proposed categories of ethnic identities on conflict intensity.

Comparisons between Ethnic Identities

The literature is ripe with studies that have attempted to identify which specific group identities have a more significant effect on group conflict. Some of these comparisons have not been based on ethnicity (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Fox 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003). However, others have discussed the dilemma in a more ethnicity prone perspective. The effect of ethnic identities has been studied on electoral outcomes, but with ethnic categories compared to social class (De Jong 1956; Lipset 1960; Lijphart 1979). It is also noteworthy to mention that the aforementioned studies utilized the religious and linguistics identities of ethnicity.

Still, there have been attempts to define clear categories of ethnicity. However, the categorization of ethnicity has sometimes been confusing and unclear. Some studies divide conflicts into comparison between ethnicity and ethnic variables (Smith 1981; Henderson 1997). Such a categorization goes against our definition of ethnicity as an umbrella to all ethnic groups and seemingly leads to confusion. Gurr (1993a, 1993b) attempts to categorize ethnic conflicts into specific categories which will allow for an in-depth comparison of different conflicts. However, his types of ethnic groups are somewhat confusing and do not seem to have a clear cut ethnic distinction between them but seem, rather, more determined by the specific goals of the groups. Soeters (2005) is more successful in defining true ethnic breakdowns of ethnic groups by ascertaining that they can be categorized into four groupings: race, religion, region and record. These categories showcase more of the ethnic divide of the groups, what their connection is based on. However, I believe, the region and record categories are problematic because they are still not distinct enough to avoid a group being entered into two different categories. I believe that such a standard of division for ethnic groups and conflicts is attained by Sambanis (2001). He underlines the importance

clean ethnic distinctions and proposes studying the subject by comparing the ethnic identities of religion, language and race.

As I have already stated, I agree with Sambanis' argument and add that these three identities should be known as the fundamental identities of ethnicity because of what I believe is the undeniable nature of these identities. To underline, I bring forth that these three identities form the fundamental bases of ethnicity. They are the three true ways of accurately distinguishing ethnic groups: religious beliefs, languages spoken and racial features. There can be no mistaking in a distinction along these three ethnic identities; unlike others. One can confuse a Canadian from an American, or an Albertan from an Ontarian. But it is much harder to confuse a Muslim from a Christian, a Francophone from an Anglophone or an East Asian from a Black person. Furthermore, I propose that ethnic identities which cannot be classified in either of these three categories, tribe and region for example, should be defined as non-fundamental ethnic identities.

Fundamental Ethnic Identities

The role of these three identities on conflicts has been examined, mostly separately, in the literature. Hence, the following section will expose how each of the three fundamental ethnic identities has been presented in other studies. This section will detail the manner which these three fundamental ethnic identities have been shown to influence individuals and groups who are identified to them.

Religion

Religion is one of the most uniting and divisive elements of our lives. It can have undertones in all aspects of society. The literature demonstrates that religion has an important role in conflicts. Fox (1999) states that religion serves four basic functions in

relation to conflict: it provides a value-laden belief system; it supplies standards and criteria of behaviour based on that belief system; it organizes adherents through its institutions; and it legitimizes actors, actions and institutions. Isaacs (1975) even goes so far as to ascertain that religion appears in every conflict. Religion is even seen as being impossible to totally separate from nationalism (Fox 2003). There even seems to be an increasing attention directed to religious elements of conflicts. Fox (2004) underlines this importance by demonstrating that the influence of religion on conflicts has been growing; which has also led to an increase in religious conflicts over the past decades. Fox (1997; 2000a, 2003) also emphasizes that religious conflicts differ from other types of conflicts involving other ethnic groups.

This difference is mostly due to the fact that religious conflicts possess an important emotional factor which is connected to religious beliefs. The relevance of religion in a conflict is through emotion, more specifically passion, and this emotional surfacing is directly caused by the fact that the beliefs, along with the relationship to God, of an individual and a group are attacked (Isaacs 1975; Fox 2000b). This is why, as McTernan (2003) puts it, religion justifies violence. There is a strong sentiment attached to belief and religion, any attack or menace, real or perceived, to those beliefs unleashes an emotional, passionate reaction. In a religious conflict it is those strong bonds and beliefs that confront each other for the supremacy of belief and community.

Language

Language represents an important attachment for groups. Language often serves as one of the most important symbols of identification and distinction (Das Gupta 1970). It is a means of communication which easily distinguishes individuals into appropriate groups.

Language is, thus, as Harrel (1995) describes it, an easy and strong ethnic marker when compared to others elements of division. This factor notably creates “strong emotional-cultural attachments to mother tongues, readily generated into political cleavages and leading to murderous violence” (Isaacs 1975, p.103). Liebkind (1982) further points out that linguistic groups utilize divergence as a strategy to explicitly communicate pride in one’s own linguistic group. This linguistic pride also serves to counter pressures of assimilation (Laitin 2000a). The fears related to assimilation conger up a strong emotional reaction because if the group is assimilated there is a loss of group identity and, hence, of the group itself. Thus, preserving linguistic identity becomes a fight for survival.

However, language does suffer from an emotional weakness. The main issue with linguistic identification is that language in itself it is not necessary for linguistic identity (Isaacs 1975; Laitin 2000b). This weakness in the emotional connection leaves it vulnerable to what Edwards (1992) calls a “language shift”. Individuals can change linguistic identification and, hence, change linguistic identity. For this reason, I can ascertain that language is the easiest of the three identities examined to change. One would have to try very hard to change racial groups, and changing religion demands a deep spiritual introspection and emotional sacrifice; but it is much easier to learn another language, or even to make another language one’s dominant linguistic identifier. Although linguistic identity can be considered the easiest of the fundamental ethnic identities to change, it is important to note that individuals do have a deep attachment to their language and such a decision does come will complex implications which are influenced by multiple factors (Laitin 1992).

Race

Racial difference represents the easiest form of distinction to identify between humans. It can be seen as the most fateful group demarcation in history (Merelman 1994). Race plays an important part in the lives of individuals, especially if they live in multi-racial societies. Racial membership has an undeniable importance because individuals will take into consideration racial interests in their decision-making process (Philpot 2004). It is, thus, easily understandable to realize how physical racial demarcations make up an important element in social relations. However, in terms of race and conflict, the literature seems to lack much work on the issue. One of the reasons that this type of literature is so poor is emphasized by Reynal-Querol. She believes that “the literature that studies the ethnic causes of social conflict has limited ethnicity to linguistic fragmentation and, in some cases, to religious fragmentation” (2002, p.42). Therefore, a greater understanding of how racial distinction may affect ethnic conflicts, as the subsequent study will attempt to do, will be a welcomed contribution to the literature on ethnic conflicts.

As has been presented, the fundamental ethnic identities represent a great potential for hostilities. However, there is an important gap in the study of ethnic conflicts in relation to the impact of the fundamental ethnic identities on conflicts. Most importantly, the three fundamental identities of ethnic conflicts have not been studied through a comparative manner with each other in order to identify their respective influence on the propensity of accentuating the intensity of ethnic conflicts.

Hypotheses

Do ethnic conflicts have a determining difference due to the type of ethnic groups, hence the ethnic identities, involved in the conflict?

This section will explore this query. It will express the questions and hypotheses which will be examined by this study. It is my belief that the best manner to compare different ethnic group conflicts is to categorize them in what I have described as fundamental ethnic identities. I have selected to measure the influence of the fundamental ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts – a measurement which is often utilized to measure (Gurr 1993a; Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997; Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002). This endeavour will be done through four questions.

Which type of ethnic identity leads to a higher intensity in ethnic group conflicts?

In order to answer this question a comparison of the fundamental ethnic identities, religious, linguistic, and racial, along with non-fundamental ethnic identities will be conducted. The results should demonstrate which type of ethnic identity leads to more pronounced ethnic conflicts.

Studies which have compared such identities have demonstrated that religion has a greater propensity to lead to more intense ethnic conflicts. In Fox's comparison (2004) of religious conflicts to non-religious conflicts, he found that, although religious conflicts occurred less often than non-religious conflicts, religious conflicts were more intense. Seul (1999) also found that religion served identity impulses more powerfully than other constructs of identity. When compared to language, studies have tended to demonstrate that religion leads to more intense conflicts (Lijphart 1979; Henderson 1997; Reynal-Querol

2002). However, the results are not unanimous. Ellingsen (2000), for her part, showed that language has a greater impact on conflicts than religion.

Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that the works which have attempted to compare different fundamental ethnic identities with each other have led to the indication that religion has a greater impact on ethnic conflicts. Studies have demonstrated that religion has a stronger emotional attachment which leads more often to a higher intensity in conflicts than the other fundamental ethnic identities. Hence, I believe that the results will show that ethnic conflicts based on religious identities will have a higher intensity than other types of ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, I believe that the literature has also shown a strong emotional attachment created by language. Thus, I predict that the results will place language based ethnic conflicts in second place. Finally, I deem that, although the literature on race and conflict is quite limited, racially based ethnic conflicts will come in third place ahead of non-fundamental identities. This assumption is based on the belief that race generates stronger emotional reactions compared to conflicts not based on a fundamental ethnic identity. I therefore propose the following hypothesis regarding the relative importance of these three factors.

H1: The intensity of ethnic conflicts will be positively associated with, in declining order of importance, religion, language, race, and non-fundamental identities.

Are conflicts between groups with multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences more prone to higher levels of intensity than conflicts with only one fundamental ethnic identity distinction?

I will also seek to compare ethnic conflicts which are based on one fundamental ethnic identity with those which are based on multiple fundamental ethnic identities in

order to determine if the latter accentuates the level of intensity of ethnic conflicts. From what I could gather, there seems to be a void in the literature in reference to this subject. However, I believe that common sense leads one to presume that having to deal with multiple ethnic identities, hence multiple emotional connections, renders conflict more severe than ethnic conflicts based on a single fundamental ethnic identity. Therefore, I believe that the results will show support the following assertion:

H2: Ethnic conflicts based on multiple fundamental ethnic identities have a higher intensity than ethnic conflicts based only on one fundamental ethnic identity.

To further understand the effect of ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts, it is, I believe, important to extend this examination to the impact of particular sub-categories of ethnic identities. Two specific questions will follow this direction.

Are sectarian religious conflicts prone to weaker levels of intensity than conflicts between religious identities from different major religions?

Sectarian religious conflicts are religious conflicts which oppose groups from the same major religion: i.e., Catholics versus Protestants, Sunnis versus Shiites, etc. Non-sectarian religious conflicts oppose groups from different major religions: i.e., Christians versus Jews, Muslims versus Hindus, etc. Drooger's findings (2002) demonstrate that if conflicting groups are of the same religion there are better chances of finding common ground. I believe that this factor is due to the fact that there is, ultimately, a bond between groups of the same religion which limits emotional intensity, compared with non-sectarian religious conflicts, and that, therefore, this religious bond also possesses a greater ability to push groups to find a resolution. Thus, I believe that the results will indicate that:

H3: Sectarian religious conflicts are prone to lesser levels of intensity than non-sectarian religious conflicts.

Are linguistic ethnic conflicts between groups who share similar languages less intense than conflicts between groups with non-similar linguistic distinctions?

Similar languages are defined as languages that have linguistic similarities: i.e., Russian versus Ukrainian, Croatian versus Serbian, etc. Hence, non-similar languages are those which do not share any significant linguistic similarities: i.e., Turkish versus Greek, Azerbaijani versus Armenian, etc. One study has examined this exact same research question. Laitin (2000a) demonstrated that linguistic conflicts with more pronounced language differentiations exhibit less intensity. However, as it will be indicated in greater detail in the following chapter, I believe that there is a major concern with the methodology of that study which might have flawed the results in the reverse direction. I have, hence, decided not to base my projections on Laitin's results.

I, consequently, believe that language based ethnic conflicts share the same dimension as do religious ethnic conflicts in respect to similarity. Similar languages help to lead to better chances of finding common ground. This emotional impact should, hence, not be as strong in the similar category. Similar language groups can be seen as distant kin, which implies some sort of connection between the conflicting groups. Therefore, I estimate that the results will demonstrate that:

H4: Linguistic conflicts implicating similar linguistic groups have a lower intensity than linguistic conflicts which do not share significant linguistic similarities.

The questions which have been presented in this section will not only be the framework of the subsequent study but will also permit to elaborate on the understanding of

the relationship between ethnic identities and conflicts and, thus, contribute to the literature on the matter.

After having established the framework of the study in this chapter, the following chapter will present the methodological design of the empirical study.

Chapter 3

Research Design

This chapter will present the methodological design of the empirical study. It is composed of three main sections: the methodology which will include the variables at the heart of the study; the datasets from which the data were garnered; and the statistical analyses which were performed on the data.

Methodology

In order to evaluate the relative influence of identities on conflict intensity, a comparative method was used. Hence, the study was a comparison of the three fundamental ethnic identities: religious, linguistic and racial. Conflicts with these identities were also compared to non-fundamental ethnic identities, and to groups in conflicts which possess multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences. Furthermore, the comparison was done through a large-N study. Having the largest possible sample for the study will enable the results to have a better chance of being applicable on a larger scale.

The data were collected from two different datasets. The beneficial contribution of utilizing two different datasets, instead of just one, is to reinforce the implications of the results. Although the datasets are composed of different ethnic conflicts and labelled in different manners, if the aggregated results lead in the same directions in both cases, it can only emphasize the meaning and significance of the results. Furthermore, while there are added methodological complexities which might leave this study vulnerable to criticisms, similar results for both datasets would attenuate the validity of such criticisms and reinforce the importance of the study.

The core of the study was its variables. They were composed of three different sets of variables. Firstly, ethnic identities formed the independent variables of the study. Secondly, measures of the conflict intensity constituted the dependent variables. Lastly, a series of control variables served to isolate the influence of ethnic identities on conflicts.

Ethnic Identities

The objective of this study is to analyze the effects that different ethnic identities may have on the intensity of ethnic group conflicts. In order to evaluate this relationship, a series of ethnic conflicts was examined. The independent variables of this study consisted of five categories of ethnic identities, three fundamental ethnic identities (religion, language, and race), the non-fundamental ethnic identity category, and a category composed of ethnic conflicts involving multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences. These categories were defined as follows:

- Religion: involves conflicts in which the protagonists are distinguished as belonging to different religious groups, whether from different major religions or not.
- Language: contains conflicts which involve opposing parties that do not speak the same language.
- Race: comprised of ethnic conflicts in which the groups are differentiated by a difference in the general physical traits of the group members.
- Non-Fundamental: contains conflicts with groups that are differentiated by ethnic identities other than the three prior fundamental identities. Such examples are tribes and regions.
- Multiple Identities: this category features conflicting groups which are differentiated by more than one fundamental ethnic identity.

Furthermore, three of the categories were divided into sub-categories for a more in-depth analysis. The sub-divided categories were classified as follows:

- The multiple identities category was divided into two sub-categories, respectively one composed of two fundamental ethnic differences and the other of three such identity distinctions. This will allow for a further examination into the possible impact of the amount of fundamental ethnic identity differences on conflicts.
- The conflicts in the religion category were also split into two sub-categories in order to examine the possible effect that common religious values might have on ethnic conflicts. These two sub-categories were characterized as being sectarian, involving conflicts which have religious groups that can be considered as being divisions from the same major religion, or non-sectarian, composed of conflicts in which the protagonists are religious groups belonging to different major religions.
- The language category was, as well, separated into two sub-categories. This was undertaken to study the effect that linguistic similarity of ethnic groups might have on ethnic tensions. These two sub-categories were defined as similar, composed of conflict involving groups that speak different languages but which have important linguistic similarities, or non-similar, formed of conflicting groups that speak different languages and which do not have important linguistic similarities.

Conflict Intensity

This study will seek to examine the influence of ethnic identities on levels of intensity in ethnic conflicts. The dependent variable was, hence, the intensity of the ethnic conflicts. The measures for the intensity of the conflicts were based on four different indicators from two different datasets.

Firstly, two variables provided by the Battle Deaths dataset (BD) were used. These variables are the number of battle deaths associated to each conflict and the number of years registered for each conflict. The first variable depicts the raw number of estimated registered deaths related to battle, with a minimum of 25, per year for each conflict examined. It is based on the battle dead best estimation variable of the BD dataset. The battle deaths were summed for each conflict and averaged on the total number of years registered to each conflict.² Real numbers of deaths provide an interesting measure of the gravity, and deadliness, potential of the different identities. The second variable which will serve as a measure of intensity from the BD dataset is the number of registered years of the conflict, i.e. the number of years for which at least 25 deaths were estimated to have occurred. This measure, although not a regular conception of length, allows for an understanding into the potential persistence of each ethnic identity.

Secondly, two variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR) will also be utilized to measure intensity: protest and rebellion. It is important to note that these variables were captured in two temporal dimensions; over a quinquennial period and annually. The intensity of the conflicts was, firstly, measured through group protest activities. Two different indicators actually form this variable. The Quinquennial Protest Scores variable, which covers the period from 1945 to 1999 labelled as PROTI in the dataset, was utilized for periodic analyses, whereas the Annual Protest Scores variable, which covers the period from 1985 to 2000 labelled as PROT, is an annual measure of

² It is important to note that the number of years registered for each conflict does not refer to the actual length of the conflict. Due to the minimal requirements of battle deaths and the availability of data, the cases do not necessarily have contiguous data for battle deaths; gaps in battle deaths estimations of conflicts are common features of the BD dataset. Therefore, a regular conception of registered length would not be plausible in this situation.

protest.³ Examining the protest activity of conflicts allows for the comprehension of non-violent dynamics of ethnic conflicts. Protests are less intense, obviously, than violent conflicts; but they, however, still measure intensity in conflicts and are a good indicator of conflict gravity. Our second measure of intensity from MAR was the anti-regime rebellion activity of the conflicts. The Quinquennial Rebellion Scores variable, which covers the period from 1945 to 1999 and is labelled as REBEL, quantified the periodic rebellion intensity of the conflicts; while the Annual Rebellion Scores variable, which covers the period from 1985 to 2000 and is labelled as REB, measured the rebellion intensity in an annualised manner.

All of these measures will serve as the dependent variables in the study of the influence of the different ethnic identities on the intensity of ethnic conflicts.

Control Variables

In an attempt to control for the influence of other variables on the relationship between our ethnic identities and the variables used to measure the intensity of the ethnic conflicts, five control variables were added to the linear regressions. This measure was only performed with the MAR dataset due to the availability of the variables. These elements were all established by prior studies to affect ethnic conflict dynamics. Thus, these control variables were able to identify the true influence of the ethnic identities on conflict intensity.

³ It is worth nothing that the MAR codebook for the version of the dataset used in this study contains an erratum. The PROTI and PROT variable labels are reversed.

Regime

The type of government which oversees the ethnic tension can play an important role on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Lindström & Moore 1995; Davis & Moore 1997; Esty et al. 1999). Therefore, a variable was used to examine the influence of regime types on ethnic conflicts. The data utilized to create this variable came from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2009).⁴ The specific data used was provided from the Revised Combined Polity Score variable, labelled as POLITY2. It is a modified version of the Combined Polity Score, labelled as POLITY. It facilitates the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. The original variable, POLITY, is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score of the dataset; this process results in a unified polity scale. Seeing that the dataset has a temporal range of 1800 to 2007, the data beyond the temporal range needed, either 1945 to 1999 or 1985 to 2000, were, obviously, excluded.

Lost Autonomy

The historical situation of a group has also been found to influence ethnic conflicts. Groups who have had greater autonomy in the past have demonstrated to have more severe levels of conflict (Gurr 1993a; Ayres & Saideman 2000). In order to account for the possible impact of such historical situations, a variable reflecting past autonomy was employed. The Index of Political Autonomy Grievances Values was used to measure the influence of autonomy grievances. The variable is an index which is constructed by adding the weights from three other variables. The value is labelled as AUTLOST.

⁴ When using the MAR dataset, the data utilized to measure the influence of regime type is normally from the Polity datasets.

Group Concentration

Certain group factors have been demonstrated to heighten conflict. One such variable is group concentration. This demographic factor represents the spatial distribution of the group. Studies have shown that the more geographically concentrated a group is, the greater the intensity of a conflict (Ayres & Saideman 2000; Cetinyan 2002). Thus, to assay the effect of this factor, a variable reflecting the geographical concentration of the ethnic groups was used. This variable is labelled GROUPCON.

Economic Differentials

The difference in available economic resources has been indicated as accentuating the intensity of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Therefore, to control for the influence of economic differences between the groups in conflict, the Economic Differentials Index was utilized. This variable, which is labelled as ECDIFXX, is a composite scale, composed of six different economic factors of the MAR dataset, which measures economic inequalities amongst the conflicting groups.

Political Differentials

Inequalities in the access to political resources can be a determinant of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993a; Cetinyan 2002; Caprioli & Trumbore 2003). Such political differences between the conflicting groups were measured with the Political Differentials Index, which is labelled as POLDIFXX. This variable is a composite variable scale formed by six different variables from the MAR dataset.

Other factors have also been shown to accentuate conflicts but were not included as control variables in this study. Firstly, international military and political support (Davis &

Moore 1997; Fox 2000a; Saideman & Ayres 2000; Fox 2001) were excluded because correspondence with MAR personnel indicated that the support variables were originally coded on paper and were not integrated into the MAR database. However, they are currently working on integrating those variables with the latest MAR dataset. Secondly, contagion has also been shown to affect conflict intensity (Lindström & Moore 1995; Fox 2000a; Saideman & Ayres 2000). The contagion variables, labelled separately as ICONREB for the rebellion variable and INCONPRO for the protest variable, were collected only from 1970 to 1995 and approximately only once per decade. They were thus excluded because the decennial periodic measure of these variables was not in line with the quinquennial period of the study and, also, the time frame of these variables was deemed to be too short for our study. Lastly, group cohesion has been found, as well, to increase intensity in ethnic group conflicts (Fox 1999, 2000b; Fox & Sandler 2003). The cohesion variable, labelled as COHESX, covers the period from 1980 to 1995. This variable had to also be excluded because it did not match the time frame of our study.

It is important to highlight that all the variables used for the MAR dataset, both the measures and the controls, were converted into a 0 to 1 scale to allow for an appropriate comparison between the variables.

Datasets

The subsequent study used two different datasets as the sources of the data to be analyzed. These datasets, however, possess different forms of values: hard numbers for the death toll and the registered years associated with the BD dataset, and coded variables determined by the MAR researchers. It is, thus, important to divide the study into two

different analyses; one concentrated on the variables of the BD dataset, and the other on those of the MAR dataset.

Battle Deaths Dataset

The BD dataset sets forth to identify the number of death caused by conflicts. The project maintains a dataset on battle deaths, both for soldiers and civilians killed in combat, in state-based armed conflicts, both internal and external, for the period from 1946 to 2005. The actual dataset used for the analysis is the Battle Deaths Dataset version 2.0. This dataset gathers Lacina & Gleditsch's data on battle deaths (2005) with the UCDP/PRIO dataset on armed conflicts.

This dataset describes an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Lacina 2006, p.4). It is important to note that the dataset only includes data on battle deaths if the estimate for the given year is at least 25 deaths. It also defines “battle deaths” as “deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat. Contested combat is use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict against any person or target during which the perpetrator faces the immediate threat of lethal force being used by another party to the conflict against him/her and/or allied fighters. Contested combat excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or civilians outside of the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of prisoners of war)” (Lacina 2006, p.5). It is, hence, important to note that this dataset only presents a specific category of conflict death, the actual estimated total of conflict deaths might be considerably higher (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005).

The BD dataset includes data on a wide variety of internal and external conflicts. For our purposes, the BD dataset included two hundred sixty-nine conflicts.⁵ However, to properly utilize this dataset, the ethnic conflicts from the dataset had to be isolated from the non-ethnic conflicts. To do so, the two hundred sixty-nine conflicts were sorted by me into five categories:

- Ethnic: conflicts which implicate groups that are clearly defined along ethnic lines.
- Ideological: conflicts in which the main goal of the insurgent group is to change the political system in place.
- Decolonization: the main goal of these conflicts is to achieve independence from a colonial power. Although these types of conflicts might be drawn along ethnic lines, often by race, I do not believe that these conflicts possess the same characteristics as regular ethnic conflicts, notably because there is no geographical interaction or proximity between the conflicting groups.
- Elite/Military: the main purpose of these conflicts is to gain political power for individuals or factions.
- Interstate Non-Ethnic: external conflicts between countries without an ethnic difference among the conflicting groups.

The classification of each conflict was done by me through an in depth research of each conflict to define which category best represents them.⁶ Furthermore, conflicts which

⁵ The dataset is said to actually have two hundred thirty-six conflicts (Harbom et al. 2008); however, many of the conflicts concentrate on the countries of conflict and aggregate protagonists together. For the purpose of this study, I preformed a triage of the conflicts to isolate similar group types and classify them together. This process resulted in an increase of the number of conflicts.

⁶ I used internet searches to find encyclopaedic information from different trustworthy sources which allowed me to properly classify the conflicts. I did not keep a detailed inventory of each source utilized for each conflict; however, the most common examples were the World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>), and the Encarta Encyclopaedia (<http://encarta.msn.com>). Academic books and articles were also used to ascertain the nature of the conflicts examined.

are included in the dataset but do not have any available data in the battle dead best estimation category were removed. Only the conflicts in the ethnic conflict category were used in the study. This process resulted in eighty-five conflicts being retained. However, the conflict involving Bangladesh was removed from the analysis of ethnic conflicts because the number of deaths for that specific conflict which is registered in a one-year period, 50 000, was more than double any other averaged death toll and was an outlier skewing the results of the analyses. After this removal, there were eighty-four conflicts left in the ethnic conflict category.

The conflicts which were categorized as ethnic conflicts were further classified into specific ethnic identity categories and sub-categories. I performed all of the classifications, except the linguistic distinctions, of the ethnic conflicts into the appropriate categories. The ethnic conflicts were classified into the five ethnic identity categories.⁷ Classification for the ethnic conflicts of the BD dataset was made as follows:

- Religion: the protagonists in the conflicts were deemed to belong to different religious groups, whether from outside or inside the same religion.
- Language: the conflicting parties were divided by linguistic differences. The distinction was made with the use of *Ethnologue* (Gordon 2005), an encyclopaedic type reference on the languages of the world. If the languages spoken by the conflicting groups were registered in *Ethnologue* as being different, they were classified as different.
- Race: the conflict is between groups with different visible physical traits. Race was defined in a strict manner based on genetics and using differences in physical traits

⁷ The classification process of the ethnic conflicts was the same as the classification of the BD conflicts into their appropriate types. The same types of sources were utilized for this procedure for all the categories and sub-categories, except for the linguistic category.

as the distinction, and not on a more liberal interpretation of race that defines it along shared values. Furthermore, clear racial distinction along visible traits was necessary to be included in this category. If the literature deemed the groups to be racially different, along clear and distinct racial lines, then the conflicts were entered in this category.

- Non-Fundamental: if the ethnic conflict cannot be categorized as belonging to any of the three fundamental ethnic identities, then it was classified as being of a non-fundamental ethnic nature and entered in this category.
- Multiple Identities: ethnic conflicts which were classified in more than one of the fundamental ethnic identity categories were also classified in this category. The multiple identities category was also separated into two sub-categories, one with two fundamental ethnic differences and the other with three.

Moreover, the religion and language categories were also divided into sub-categories for an additional classification to allow for further analysis:

- The Religion category was divided into two sub-categories based on sectarianism. Ethnic conflicts in which the protagonists are divided along sectarian groups from the same major religion were classified as sectarian and those which involve ethnic groups from different religions were categorized as non-sectarian.
- The Language category was also separated into two sub-categories. Ethnic conflicts in which the groups speak different languages that belong to the same main branch of the same linguistic family according to the *Ethnologue* (Gordon 2005) reference on languages (ex: both languages belong to the Germanic branch of the Indo-European linguistic family) were classified in the similar sub-category; whereas, ethnic conflicts involving groups that speak different languages which do not belong

to the same main branch of the same linguistic family were classified in the non-similar sub-category.

Minorities at Risk Dataset

The MAR dataset, for its part, seeks to examine the situation of minorities groups throughout the world. This dataset was created and is managed by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), based at the University of Maryland. The MAR dataset is composed of three hundred twenty-one ethnic groups throughout the world which, at one point of the period which is covered by the dataset, were deemed to be politically active.⁸ The MAR project identifies where the ethnic groups are, what they do, and what happens to them. The project concentrates specifically on ethnopolitical groups and non-state communal groups which have "political significance" because of their status and political actions. The MAR project is, hence, composed of internal conflicts.

The MAR project determines political significance based on two criteria:

- The ethnic group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment in comparison to other groups in a society.
- The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests.

This study will use the phase IV of the MAR dataset which was released in February 2005 and accounts for data from 1945 up to, and including, 2003.

⁸ The number of conflicts advertised on the MAR official website is less than this amount because the number of conflicts on the MAR website refers to groups which can still be considered politically active, whereas the MAR data includes groups which no longer fulfill that criterion.

The MAR dataset includes immigrant groups which are in conflict with other ethnic groups. These groups do not possess the same characteristics that this study has identified to groups in traditional ethnic conflicts.⁹ In order to filter conflicts which involve immigrants groups, the Ethno-Political Group Type variable was used. If conflicts possess a value of 3 (ethno-class, corresponding to foreign implanted groups without a specific territorial characteristic), they were excluded from the study. This process was not necessary with the BD dataset because such conflicts were not initially incorporated in the dataset. The results of this action led to two hundred eighty-nine conflicts being used as the population for the MAR study.

Seeing that all the conflicts in the MAR dataset are ethnic in origin, a triage to fit ethnic conflict specificities was not necessary. The MAR dataset also has classified ethnic conflicts along ethnic categories. However, the classification of the MAR dataset is different from mine. I, thus, decided to create five ethnic identity categories in line with the framework of this study. To reclassify the different conflicts in the MAR dataset, the mean category of the variables was utilized. Here is how I relabelled the conflicts in the MAR dataset to fit my classification:

- Religion: the Different Group Religion variable was used to classify conflicts in the religion category. The Different Group Religion variable, labelled as BELIEF, differentiates the religious beliefs of the conflicting parties along religious lines. The Different Group Religion variable ranges from 0 to 3. Conflicts with values of 1 (different sect within same religion) and 3 (different religion) were categorized in this category. The other conflicts, coded 0 and 2, were deemed to be non-religious.

⁹ The characteristics of immigrant groups are not the same as those of traditional ethnic groups which this study seeks to explore, notably because of the lack of territorial attachment. For specific characteristics on immigrant ethnic groups see Fuchs 1993; Sanders 2002.

- Language: the Different Language variable, labelled as CULDIFX2, delimited the ethnic conflicts in the language category. The Different Language variable differentiates linguistic similarity of the conflicting groups and ranges from 0 to 2. Conflicts with values of 1 (some indeterminate differential) and 2 (significant differential) were entered in this category. Those coded with a value of 0 were classified as non-linguistic in nature.
- Race: The Different Physical Appearance variable of the dataset was used to sort conflicts in the race category. The Different Physical Appearance variable, labelled as RACE, was used to differentiate the physical traits of the conflicting groups. This variable ranges in value from 0 to 3. If the conflict possessed a value of 3 (different racial stock, little or no intermixture), the only value that I consider to be racial, they were judged to have a racial difference and were entered in the race category; thus, the others were considered non-racial. Furthermore, conflicts with a value of 0 (unknown) were entered as system missing. This procedure was undertaken in order to keep only properly coded conflicts. The coded value of unknown does not permit to identify any particularities about the racial characteristics of the groups and should, thus, be excluded.¹⁰
- Non-Fundamental: the constituted categories were utilized to create the non-fundamental category. Conflicts with a dichotomised value of 0 in the religion, language and race categories were entered as non-fundamental identities.
- Multiple Identities: if the conflicts were entered in two or three of the fundamental ethnic identity categories, they were also entered in the multiple identities

¹⁰ It is important to note that this procedure led to a considerably reduced amount of cases for the statistical analyses. However, all the analyses were performed with an alternate version of the race variable which included the unknown value coded as 0 instead as system missing and the results did not indicate an important difference which would have warranted the inclusion of these cases.

categories. Also, the multiple identities category was divided into two sub-categories, one formed of two fundamental ethnic identities and the other of three fundamental ethnic identities, to further explore the impact of the number of ethnic identity differences on conflict intensity.

Additionally, the religion and language categories were also divided into sub-categories for a more thorough investigation:

- The sub-classification of religious conflicts was determined by categorizing conflicts with a value of 1 in the sectarian category and those with a value of 3 were classified in the non-sectarian category.
- Conflicts entered in the language category that possessed a value of 1 were entered in the similar sub-category, and those with a value of 2 were placed in the non-similar sub-category.¹¹

It is important to note that for all the MAR data related to ethnic identity variables, only whole numbers were used. Coded values with decimals were rounded downwards. The theory behind this action is that either the conflict reached the threshold of the coded value or it did not.

Statistical Analysis

In order to bring forth answers to the questions that form the basis of this study, and thus accept or reject our hypotheses, statistical analyses were necessary to arrive at results. The data was analyzed to allow for thorough results for all four research questions.

¹¹ It is important to underline that this study was different from Laitin (2000a) because the groups with a value of 3 in the Ethno-Political Group Type variable (ethno-class, corresponding to foreign implanted groups without a specific territorial characteristic) were filtered out. Laitin seemingly left these groups in his study. I believe that, seeing that these groups are not traditional ethnic groups by our definition, the results of that study may have been erred by their inclusion.

The analysis of the data was done in four parts for the first question, and three for the subsequent three questions. First of all, a preliminary comparison of the totals for each category of ethnic conflicts was undertaken. Afterwards, the means of the conflict intensity measures were tallied and compared in an initial analysis to evaluate the influence of each of the ethnic identities. Thereafter, independent-sample t-tests were performed to compare, in a more thorough and statistically meaningful manner, the means of the conflict measures for the different ethnic identities. The independent-sample t-tests were performed on the five ethnic identity categories and on the variables in the three sub-category classifications for both datasets. Stationary data derived from the conflict averages of MAR's periodic data were used for all the averages and independent-sample t-tests, except for those relating to the first question. For these tests, I chose to use the non-averaged annual data because of the more important significance it could produce. For the last three research questions, the statistical analyses ended at this procedure.

However, for the first question an extra statistical analysis was added. The final step consisted of OLS linear regressions which were carried out to extract the specific influence of each ethnic identity variable on the intensity of the conflicts. Two types of regressions were performed. Given that the MAR dataset includes both periodic and annual values, it allowed for static and dynamic time-series regressions of the data. The static regressions were performed with stationary data derived from the conflict averages of the periodic data and the time-series regressions with the non-averaged annual data. Time-series analyses allow for a more in-depth statistical analysis, especially when it relates to statistical inferences (Hamilton 1994). However, seeing as the BD dataset does not have contiguous data, only a static regression was performed for the dataset. The two types of statistical regressions were conducted in four steps. Initially, only the fundamental ethnic identities

were regressed with each other. Afterwards, the five control variables were added to the three fundamental ethnic identities. Finally, the multiple identities variable was introduced in the two linear regressions; one with only the three fundamental ethnic identities and the other with those variables and the controls. Thus, a total of four linear regressions were performed for each intensity measure.

These statistical analyses allowed for results to accurately evaluate our hypotheses and, hence, answer the questions about the influence of ethnic identity on conflict intensity.

With the research design in place, we now turn our attention in the following chapter to the results of the data analyses.

Chapter 4

Results

This chapter will present the results of the data analyses which were designed in order to answer the questions which form the core of this study and, subsequently, accept or reject the hypotheses which were brought forth. It will be composed of two main sections: a first section will present the results of the statistical analyses and the answers to the four main questions, and a second section will discuss the significance and the impact of the results.

Presentation of the Result:

Which type of ethnic identity leads to a higher intensity in ethnic group conflicts?

In order to properly examine this enquiry, it is important to firstly look at the results of the classifications of the ethnic conflicts into the five fundamental ethnic identity categories. Annexes 1 and 2 provide a full picture of the classification for the retained ethnic conflicts of both datasets into the five ethnic identity categories, as well as the religion and language sub-categories.

Table 1 displays the summary results of the classification of the retained ethnic conflicts for, respectively, the BD dataset and the MAR dataset. The main element which jumps out from these figures has to be the substantial number of ethnic conflicts which possess a linguistic element. This pattern is noticeable in both datasets. Another important element that is visible from the figures presented above is the important role that religion seems to play in ethnic conflicts. Although it does not seem to be as central as language, religion does appear to be a noteworthy feature of ethnic conflicts; it is involved in half of

the ethnic conflicts in both datasets. Furthermore, the figures also reveal the relatively weak amount of ethnic conflicts with a racial difference between the protagonists. It is worth nothing that this situation might simply be due to the fact that groups from different races are not very often in direct contact with each other, especially when compared to the two other fundamental ethnic identities. Another notable trait of the results is that ethnic conflicts often possess multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences; more than a third of the cases involve more than one fundamental ethnic identities. A final, but major, observation of this table indicates that generally there are not very many ethnic conflicts which are not based on fundamental ethnic identities.

Table 1: Ethnic Conflict Classification

	Total Number	Religion	Language	Race	Non-Fundamental	Multiple Identities
BD	84	39	66	4	11	36
MAR	289	142	243	35	20	127

The preceding analysis was based only on the totals of ethnic conflicts; it is, thus, fair to state that it is quite a limited and superficial perspective which is in need of a more in-depth examination. The number of conflicts might simply be caused by the degree of contact of the different ethnicities.

Table 2: Mean Differences for the BD Dataset

	Battle Deaths			Years		
	Mean	Mean Difference	T-Score	Mean	Mean Difference	T-Score
Religion	2672.4	1420.1	1.68*	7.7	-2.51	-1.11
Language	2140.2	935.8	1.45	8.8	-0.86	-0.27
Race	1258.5	-702.6	-0.82	2.5	-6.79	-5.21***
Non-Fundamental	635.2	-1508.8	-2.76***	11.8	3.25	0.72
Multiple Identities	2639.6	1244.5	1.44	7.5	-2.51	-1.13
All Conflicts	1928.5	-	-	9.0	-	-

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A perspective which could give a better insight into the potential influence of the ethnic identities on conflict severity is a comparison of the means for the conflict measures for each ethnic identity. The results of such comparisons for the BD dataset are displayed in Table 2. The table, firstly, displays the means of the specific measures of conflict intensity, the number of battle deaths and the years of conflict, in relation to each ethnic identity. The figures show that the religion and language identities along with conflicts affected by multiple identity differences are on average the deadliest. Our theory would have predicted this sequencing. Nevertheless, in terms of time-span, the results do not show the same tendency. In this measure of conflict intensity, it is the non-fundamental identity, which displays a considerably lower average death toll than the other ethnic identities, which distinguishes itself by the high number of years of conflict associated to it. In addition, one has to note the low number of years of conflict related to the race identity. The results for the years of conflict measure are not at all what our theory would have expected. Figure 1

further emphasizes, by giving a graphical picture, the distinction between the averages of the different identities in relation to the two different measures of intensity for ethnic conflicts in the BD dataset.

Figure 1: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the BD dataset




Figure 1 combines both conflict intensity measures in a single column per ethnic identity category. To prevent any possible confusion, the scale on the left of the figure refers to the Battle Deaths measure (darker grey columns) and the scale on the right side is associated with the Years measure (lighter grey columns).

In an attempt to further comprehend the relationship between the identities and the levels of conflict, Table 2 also displays the results of independent-sample t-tests which were performed on all the ethnic identity categories in order to compare the mean of the specific identity with all those not in that category. The results of these tests show important findings. Firstly, the results for the battle deaths measure indicate that religion positively and significantly affects, at $p < 0.1$, the average of battle deaths. Conflicts with a religious difference show a higher death toll than those without religion as a factor of distinction. These results show that religious identity leads to more battle deaths in ethnic

conflicts. On the reverse end of the death spectrum, non-fundamental identities demonstrate a strong and very significant negative influence on battle deaths in comparison with conflicts with fundamental ethnic identities ($p < 0.01$). Consequently, it can be stated that conflicts which are divided along non-fundamental identities are less deadly than conflicts with fundamental ethnic identity differences. Furthermore, it was surprising for us to find that racial distinction seems to negatively impact conflict intensity; although without reaching any level of significance. The results for the battle deaths measure were, all in all, quite positive for our theory. However, the results were not the same for the years of conflict measure. In that measure, the results did not follow the predictions of our theory. An important observation from these results relates to the means between conflicts distinguished by race and those which are not. Race, once again, seems to negatively influence conflict intensity, but this time very significantly ($p < 0.01$). This observation

Table 3: Mean Differences for the MAR Dataset


	Protest			Rebellion		
	Mean	Mean Difference	T-Score	Mean	Mean Difference	T-Score
Religion	0.29	0.00	0.03	0.15	-0.03	-2.82***
Language	0.31	0.08	7.35***	0.17	0.05	4.54***
Race	0.26	-0.09	-5.93***	0.17	0.02	1.12
Non-Fundamental	0.20	-0.11	-6.70***	0.16	0.00	-0.18
Multiple Identities	0.30	0.01	0.71	0.16	0.00	-0.30
All Conflicts	0.27	-	-	0.16	-	-

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

shows that conflicts with a racial component are significantly shorter in comparison to conflicts without a racial component.

The same process was undertaken with the MAR dataset and the results are displayed in Table 3. The numbers resulting from the means of the MAR dataset for the protest measure reveal a trend in the same direction as the battle deaths measure for the BD dataset. As for the rebellion measure, the means display almost no difference. Figure 2 provides a clearer image of the variations in averages related to each ethnic identity for the two variables which form the measures of conflict intensity for the MAR dataset.

Figure 2: Averages of Conflict Intensity by Identity Type for the MAR dataset



The results of the independent-sample t-tests for the MAR dataset demonstrate, firstly, and most strikingly, that the language identity shows the most important differences between means of linguistic conflicts and those which are not, in both measures, and both at a significance of $p < 0.01$. Language seems to strongly and positively affect conflict

intensity. As for religious conflicts, they demonstrated no difference from non-religious conflicts in the protest measure, but were significantly less intense in the rebellion measure ($p < 0.01$). These results for the religion identity do not follow our reasoning of what the outcome should have been. The results for the race identity are somewhat mixed. Racial conflicts lead to significantly reduced protest intensity than non-racial conflicts ($p < 0.01$), but they were more intense in the rebellion measure than non-racial conflicts. Also, the non-fundamental identity seems to negatively affect conflict intensity, and quite significantly in the protest measure ($p < 0.01$).

Overall, the results in both Tables 2 and 3 do not perfectly confirm our theory in regards to the comparison of the three fundamental ethnic identities. They also do not permit to clearly rank-order these three ethnic identities. However, the comparison of the means of the various ethnic identities has clearly demonstrated that conflicts based on non-fundamental ethnic differences lead to less conflict intensity than conflicts with fundamental ethnic distinctions, except in terms of the years of conflict measure in the BD dataset. We can, nonetheless, state that these results are generally in accordance with our hypothesis (H1). However, further statistical analysis was needed in order to achieve fuller and more comprehensive results.

The results of the comparison of means of the various ethnic identities, although interesting and insightful, do not allow for an understanding of the specific influence of each ethnic identity on conflict intensity. They permit us to see if there might be patterns in the relationships between the independent and dependent variables. However, such a comparison is quite limited in its explicative ability. Hence, an in-depth statistical analysis would be necessary to examine the true nature of the relationships between the ethnic

identities and the measures of conflict intensity. To achieve this objective, linear regressions were performed on both measures of each datasets.

Table 4: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for the BD Dataset

	Battle Deaths		Years	
Religion	1317.21	1745.79	-3.06	-4.23
Language	517.75	694.49	-1.08	-1.56
Race	239.83	451.91	-8.91	-9.49
Multiple Identities	-	-530.20	-	1.44
Constant	889.19	765.48	11.68	12.02
N	83	83	83	83
R-Squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The results for the linear regressions which were performed on the stationary data of the BD dataset are presented in Table 4. The results of the fundamental ethnic identities performed with battle deaths as the measure of conflict intensity are concordant with the theory we put forward. Religion has the greater positive effect among the fundamental ethnic identities, followed by language and race. Furthermore, when the identities are compared to each other, using the standardized coefficients (not reported), the same order of identity impact is noticed. However, when the years of conflict were used as the dependant variable, the results are quite the contrary; no single fundamental identity displayed a positive effect, the complete opposite of the expectations of our theory. This means that each fundamental identity is associated with shorter conflicts than non-

fundamental identities. The only positive effect was generated by multiple identities. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that none of the results reached any level of significance. Considering the small number of cases in the analyses, the lack of significance is not surprising.

Linear regressions were also performed on the stationary data from the MAR dataset and the results are presented in Table 5. The results show that the race identity was throughout these regression analyses the highest determinant among the three fundamental ethnic identities and the only fundamental identity to have a positive effect on conflict in all the regressions. The impact of the race variable was slightly negatively affected by the addition of the control variables in the rebellion measure; but in contrast, race's influence increased slightly when the control variables were introduced in the protest measure. The results also demonstrate that throughout almost all the regressions the religious identity always negatively affected conflict intensity. This is far from the case of the results of the battle deaths measure of Table 4; and completely contrary to the expectations of our theory. The language identity, for its part, displayed a positive effect on conflict which turned negative when the control variables were added. However, statistical significance was not a feature of the identity variables in these regressions; it was only attained by religion in one instance. This phenomenon is perhaps due to the low number of cases. Though it is also interesting to highlight the strong increase in the R-Squared values after the introduction of the control variables; meaning that identities seemingly contributed little to the explained variance of the conflict measures.

Furthermore, Table 5 presents some interesting results in relation to the control variables. The results show a positive influence with very strong significance for the lost autonomy variable in both conflict intensity measures ($p < 0.01$). The regime type also

shows a positive and significant influence on the protest measure ($p < 0.01$); but is, on the other hand, a significantly, at $p < 0.1$, negative effect in the rebellion measure. These two variables were the only ones to present regular significance values in the results. It is also interesting to note the nil effect of the economic difference and political difference variables for both measures.

Table 5: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Static Data)¹²

	Protest				Rebellion			
Religion	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08*	-0.09	-0.06	0.01	-0.08	-0.05
Language	0.03	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	0.05	0.07	-0.04	-0.03
Race	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.05
Multiple Identities	-	0.01	-	0.01	-	-0.09	-	-0.04
Regime	-	-	0.31***	0.31***	-	-	-0.18*	-0.18*
Lost Autonomy	-	-	0.34**	0.34**	-	-	0.45***	0.45***
Group Concentration	-	-	0.02	0.02	-	-	0.08	0.08
Economic Difference	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00
Political Difference	-	-	0.00	0.00	-	-	0.00	0.00
Constant	0.32	0.32	0.21	0.22	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.18
N	111	111	82	82	111	111	82	82
R-Squared	0.02	0.02	0.33	0.33	0.02	0.03	0.15	0.17

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

¹² It is important to note that the low number of cases actually utilized for the linear regressions is caused by the fact that some of the MAR cases had missing data for specific categories, excluding such cases from the linear regressions. It is also noteworthy to bring forth that most of the exclusions are due to missing data in the race variable.

Statistical regressions were also performed with dynamic data from the MAR dataset. These time-series analyses were performed because they allow for more precise statistical inferences. These results are presented in Table 6. The first highlights of these results are that the fundamental ethnic identities can be significant predictors of conflict intensity, as our theory expected. In the protest measure, the language identity has a significant positive influence ($p < 0.01$). The language identity is actually, based on the standardized coefficients (not reported), a greater determinant than four of the control variables for that measure. However, in the rebellion measure, the results turn round and language displays a negative influence when the controls are in the regressions. The race identity displays a very weak positive impact on the rebellion measure (without ever reaching significance), but it has a significant negative impact on the protest measure. As for religion, it displays a significant negative effect on conflict in all regressions; once again, far from what our theory would have expected. Table 6 also shows that multiple identities are a greater determinant of conflict intensity than single fundamental identities, as our theory predicted; actually increasing in influence when the controls were added in the rebellion regression.

As for the control variables, Table 6 shows some differences from the results obtained in Table 5. Group concentration is the only variable to have a significant positive impact on both measures ($p < 0.01$). Furthermore, we can note that the lost autonomy variable stood out from the other variables as a significant positive predictor, but only in the rebellion regression; displaying a significant negative influence on conflict in the protest variable ($p < 0.05$).

All in all, some important conclusions from the linear regressions must be presented. Firstly, it can be stated that Tables 4 and 5 display a certain effect of the ethnic identities on conflict intensity. However, the significance of these results must be attenuated due to the

weak number of cases utilized for the linear regressions. Nonetheless, we can also conclude that Tables 5 and 6 display a somewhat similar trends but with more significant and noteworthy results in the latter grid. Lastly, it is important to note that generally the R-Squared values are quite weak and it must be stated that the identity variables do not explain the full picture of the dependent variables.

Table 6: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for MAR Dataset (Time-Series Data)

	Protest					Rebellion		
Religion	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.03**	-0.08***	-0.06***	-0.06*	-0.07***	-0.12***
Language	0.15***	0.13***	0.09***	0.07***	0.02	0.02	-0.10***	-0.12***
Race	-0.07***	-0.10***	-0.04**	-0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00
Multiple Identities	-	0.08**	-	0.07*	-	0.00	-	0.06
Regime	-	-	0.02***	0.02***	-	-	-0.01***	-0.01***
Lost Autonomy	-	-	-0.12**	-0.11**	-	-	0.27***	0.28***
Group Concentration	-	-	0.06***	0.07***	-	-	0.14***	0.14***
Economic Difference	-	-	0.01**	0.00*	-	-	0.00	0.00
Political Difference	-	-	-0.01**	-0.01*	-	-	0.00	0.00
Constant	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.15
N	1322	1322	1243	1243	1318	1318	1240	1240
R-Squared	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.08

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

With all the results presented above, we are, thus, able to answer the first of our research questions. The answer of this question will be made in two parts. Firstly, we will present the results for the categories of ethnic conflicts which we created (fundamental and non-fundamental). Secondly, we will attempt to establish the order of conflict intensity of the three fundamental ethnic identities.

Firstly, I believe that the results presented above lead to a response in terms of which category of ethnic identity presents a higher level of conflict intensity. The results demonstrate that the non-fundamental ethnic identity category generally showed weaker conflict intensity across the conflict measures and examinations when compared to fundamental ethnic identities. Therefore, I believe that we can accept our hypothesis (H1) that was set forth and establish that fundamental ethnic identities lead to higher conflict intensity than non-fundamental ethnic identities.

Secondly, in contradiction to the above answer, I believe that the results do not permit to classify the order of the three fundamental ethnic identities. The analysis performed on the BD dataset demonstrated a general advantage to the religion identity in terms of having higher death tolls. The language variable also showed a strong influence on battle deaths. The race identity, for its part, was shown to have a lesser influence on the two measures of conflict intensity of the BD dataset. As for the MAR dataset, on the other hand, the results demonstrate a general advantage for race in terms of generating a higher propensity of conflict. The linguistic identity occasionally displayed a relatively strong impact on the two measures of conflict intensity. Religion was, however, almost always shown to have a negative impact on conflict intensity; the opposite result of the battle deaths measure of the BD dataset. I believe that it is safe to state that there is no obvious indication of a specific effect on conflict from any of the fundamental ethnic identities. With such results, one

must, thus, acknowledge that there can be no clear order of conflict intensity across datasets amongst the three fundamental ethnic identities. Therefore, a conclusion as to the distinction along conflict intensity of the three fundamental ethnic identities cannot be put forward. Consequently, with the present information, it is impossible to accept or reject our initial hypothesis (H1) on the order of the fundamental ethnic identities in relevance to conflict intensity.

Are conflicts between groups with multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences more prone to higher levels of intensity than conflicts with only one fundamental ethnic identity distinction?

We had also hypothesized that conflicts with more than one fundamental ethnic identity difference between the conflicting groups would have higher conflict intensity than conflicts based on just one fundamental ethnic identity difference. The results of the statistical analyses previously performed provide a tentative answer to this question. The results so far are in line with our hypothesis (H2) which stated that conflicts with multiple fundamental ethnic identities lead to higher conflict intensity than single identity conflicts.

Still, a further exploration of the impact of the number of fundamental ethnic identity distinctions on conflict intensity was undertaken. We examined the multiple identities category in order to extrapolate the impact of the distinction between multiple ethnic identity conflict with two fundamental ethnic identity differences and those with three such distinctions. Due to a lack of conflicts with all three fundamental ethnic identities in the BD dataset, this procedure was only conducted with the MAR dataset.

Table 7: Mean Differences for each Category of Multiple Identity Conflicts

	Total	Protest			Rebellion		
		Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score	Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score
2 Fundamental Ethnic Identities	103	0.31	-	-	0.14	-	-
3 Fundamental Ethnic Identities	26	0.31	0.00	-0.01	0.22	0.08	1.19

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The number of conflicts for each category of multiple identity conflicts is presented in the first column of Table 7. There is a clear pattern demonstrated in these results. It is much rarer to have conflicts with all three fundamental ethnic identities distinguishing the conflicting groups. The averages for each category of multiple identity conflicts are also presented in Table 7. The results suggest an apparent influence of the number of fundamental ethnic identities which differentiate groups in conflict. Although there is no difference for the protest measure, the results of the rebellion measure point to a propensity for conflicts with three fundamental ethnic differences to have greater conflict intensity than conflicts with two such identity differences. The independent-sample t-tests, however, note that none of these results attain statistical significance. Though, we must remember that few cases are involved. Still, they tend to indicate that the greater the number of fundamental ethnic identity differences amongst conflicting groups, the higher conflict gravity will be.

To return to our initial hypothesis (H2) on the effects of multiple ethnic identities on conflict intensity, I believe that the result do show a pattern. Thus, I believe that we can find support for the hypothesis (H2) that multiple ethnic identity conflicts lead to greater conflict intensity than single fundamental ethnic identity conflicts. It would seem that the

more ethnic identity differences are implicated in conflicts the more intense those conflicts will be. Although, it is clear that more research into this question is needed.

Are sectarian religious conflicts prone to weaker levels of intensity than conflicts between religious identities from different major religions?

Let us first look at the number of conflicts for each category that is presented in Table 8 (first column). We can see that sectarian conflicts represent a much smaller proportion of religious conflicts than non-sectarian conflicts. Next, we examined the means of the four conflict measures for both religious identities. The results, also presented in Table 8, show that sectarian conflicts have lower means when compared to non-sectarian conflicts for all four measures of conflict intensity, in accordance with the expectations of our theory. The

Table 8: Mean Differences for Sectarianism

BD							
	Total	Deaths			Years		
		Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score	Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score
Sectarian	8	2603.01	-86.71	-0.06	5.50	-2.69	-0.97
Non-Sectarian	32	2689.72	-	-	8.19	-	-
MAR							
	Total	Protest			Rebellion		
		Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score	Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score
Sectarian	38	0.30	-0.03	-0.59	0.14	-0.04	-0.61
Non-Sectarian	104	0.32	-	-	0.18	-	-

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

results of the independent-sample t-tests indicate that, although no level of significance was attained, all four measures of conflict intensity exhibited weaker intensity for sectarian conflicts.

Thus, with these results, I believe that we are able to answer our research question on the influence of religious sectarianism on conflict intensity. The results of the analyses that were performed denote that religious conflicts based on a sectarian difference tend to have slightly lesser conflict intensity. Therefore, we can tentatively accept our hypothesis (H3) that sectarian religious conflicts have weaker levels of conflict intensity than conflicts between groups from different major religions.

Are linguistic ethnic conflicts between groups who share similar languages less intense than conflicts between groups with non-similar linguistic distinctions?

As with the other questions which we have already examined in this study, we start by examining the number of each category of linguistic conflicts. The first column of Table 9 presents the distribution of the linguistic conflicts for both datasets. These numbers indicate that there are more non-similar linguistic conflicts in both datasets, especially in the MAR data.

When examining means for both categories of linguistic conflicts, also in Table 9, the linguistically similar conflicts continue to demonstrate the same pattern found in the preceding section. The averages for all but one conflict measure indicate a pronounced discrepancy between both linguistic categories with the non-similar linguistic conflicts having higher averages. The only conflict measure which diverges from this direction is the protest measure. Independent-sample t-tests, into the linguistic conflict data, confirm that

only one difference is significant: the rebellion measure ($p < 0.1$). Although only one difference reached a level of significance, there is a noticeable direction to the results.

Table 9: Mean Differences for Linguistic Similarity

BD							
	Total	Deaths			Years		
		Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score	Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score
Similarity	28	1805.14	-474.37	-0.46	7.89	-1.47	-0.56
Non-Similar	38	2279.51	-	-	9.36	-	-
MAR							
	Total	Protest			Rebellion		
		Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score	Mean	Mean Differ.	T-Score
Similarity	7	0.35	0.03	0.33	0.08	-0.09	-1.95*
Non-Similar	236	0.31	-	-	0.16	-	-

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The results of the analyses which were performed on the linguistic conflicts allow us to answer the question on the relationship of linguistic similarity and conflict intensity which was posed. The results show that linguistic conflicts based on a linguistic difference between similar languages tend to have weaker conflict intensity. Therefore, we can tentatively accept our hypothesis (H4) which indicates that linguistic ethnic conflicts between groups who share similar languages are less intense than conflicts between groups with non-similar linguistic distinctions.

Discussion

Ethnic identity seems to matter, so can be summed up the above mentioned results of our study. Our findings have demonstrated that ethnic identities play a role on the level of intensity in conflicts. The results lead to a series of major implications. The first major significance of this affirmation is that ethnic identity should, thus, be regarded as a variable which influences the gravity of ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity has to, hence, be added to the commonly referred factors which are used to account for intensity in ethnic conflicts. Ethnicity does not lead to conflicts; it is not a direct cause of conflicts between groups. However, it can be stated that it does impact on the dynamics of groups in conflict. As the results presented in this study have shown, different types of ethnic difference between groups in conflict will, in general, lead to different levels of conflict intensity. Therefore, our findings indicate that ethnic identity is an element that affects the intensity of the conflict.

The results, secondly, impact the theory that we proposed. The results of our study re-enforce, although not perfectly, the theory we developed on the relationship between ethnic identities and conflict intensity and, also, allow for a better understanding of this phenomenon. The findings, firstly, allow to demonstrate that ethnic conflicts based on fundamental ethnic differences lead to greater conflict intensity. The emotional attachments related to fundamental ethnic identities prove to be stronger and more volatile than those of non-fundamental ethnic identities; rendering conflicts involving such ethnic identities more passionate and intense. What this signifies for “real life” is that ethnic groups who share the same religion, speak the same language and are racially the same tend to have conflicts that are weaker in intensity.

The results also bring a second major implication for our theory. Unfortunately, the findings are not as positive for our theory in respects to the difference among the three fundamental ethnic identities. They do not permit us to establish which of the fundamental ethnic identities lead to greater conflict intensities. This situation can be due to either one of two possibilities. Firstly, the data or the measures utilized were improperly used or were simply inadequate to arrive at a proper conclusion. The second possibility is that there is truly no intensity distinction between the three fundamental ethnic identities. It might, thus, very well be that there is no viable difference in terms of conflict gravity amongst all three fundamental ethnic identities because they all represent fundamental emotional attachments. In other words, our initial hypothesis (H1) which tried to establish prevalence among the three fundamental ethnic identities might be misconstrued. All three ethnic identities might represent the strongest form of ethnic attachment, the reason why we classified them as fundamental in the first place. It could, therefore, be that there are no weaker emotional connections among the three. Hence, distinction in terms of conflict intensity might only be possible when compared to non-fundamental ethnic identities. Comparisons with each other, as the results have shown, will not bring forth a conclusive sequence of intensity.

As for conflicts centered on multiple ethnic identity differences, our third major impact, the results of the study suggest that the more fundamental ethnic identities involved in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. The findings did permit to grasp the general assertion that the number of fundamental ethnic identities positively influences conflict intensity. Greater emotional attachments related to fundamental ethnic identities gathered together bring more hazardous conflicts.

The final major impact of the findings on our theory relates to the influence of the similarity of the ethnic groups on conflict intensity. Ethnic resemblance seems to have a way of mitigating the intensity of conflicts. The tension and hatred seem to be attenuated by a sense of distant attachment to the conflicting rival.

The overall results of our study underline the importance of the emotional attachments in conflict intensity. Therefore, it can safely be stated that the varying levels of emotional strength related to the different fundamental ethnic identities, and from which distinct levels of passionate actions are derived, directly influence the gravity of the conflicts.

Although the results derived from the study that we designed to test the influence of ethnic identities on conflict intensity presented us with some positive findings for our theory, there must be the admission of some problematic issues. The first critic should center on the fact that not all the tests came to the exact conclusion for which we hoped. We often had the case where one series of tests would lead to one conclusion and another would lead to a different one. This situation can be problematic. However, seldom are findings in studies completely linear in one direction. The importance lies on the conclusion derived from the myriad of the tests undertaken; and, furthermore, those conclusions are the results of the entirety of the results process. Another critic, still related to the results, has to do with the fact that some of the ethnic identities were in some tests found to have negative influences on conflict. This is obviously a problem because it can downgrade the importance of our results and, even, of our theory. However, once again, we should remember that rarely are results in a study one dimensional and focus on the total sum of the findings. Still, one more issue which might be seen as problematic with our study would have to relate to the coding of the ethnic conflicts and of the parameters of the test

variables.¹³ Surely some will find that a number of ethnic conflicts were coded in a different manner than they would have preferred; truthfully, even I came across this sentiment. Certain problems will surely be felt about the coding process; that the variables are not clearly distinguished or the coding is improper. These are all sound concerns. However, one must keep in mind that this is normally the case with such studies. This is one of the benefits of using a large-N dataset. The aggregation of the large test population will mitigate the possible effects of some issues with the coding process.

Even if the results of the study, and even the study itself, are not perfect; they represent, nonetheless, a contribution to the understanding of ethnic conflicts. The findings isolate patterns in dynamics between ethnic identities and conflict intensities. They demonstrate that ethnic identity is a determinant of conflict intensity. These results are, furthermore, found in two separate datasets which were, moreover, differently coded. The fact that the same overall findings were ascertained from two different collections of conflict data is undoubtedly a re-enforcement to the results. Although not without some flaws, our research, through its overall findings and its conception, is an important addition to the comprehension of a very important phenomenon.

The study should not be seen as the end to the questioning that we brought forward. It should be taken as a reference for further research on how ethnicity influences conflicts. More research on the influence of ethnicity on the gravity of ethnic conflicts should help further understand the exploration that this study sought to convey, assist in bringing more determined conclusions to some of the enquiries which we could not fully resolve and,

¹³ It is interesting to note that the results of the death toll measure of the BD dataset, in which the identity variables were coded by me, are almost perfectly in line with our theory. The results might be due to possibly a more appropriate coding of the conflicts than the MAR dataset. However, the results for the other measure of the BD dataset, the years measure, are completely the opposite of our theory. One reason for the latter situation might be that the non-contiguous nature of the measure impacted the results; or, another reason, it might that length is not an adequate measure of conflict intensity.

hopefully, further emphasize the conclusions which we were able to achieve. It should be part of a basis for a line of research questioning. It is a research that, I believe, explores the political psychology of ethnic conflicts.¹⁴ I would advance that this notion should correspond to understanding how ethnic identity influences groups and individuals.

The discoveries which research brings are interesting, but what truly makes them important is their tangible nature. In other words, how are these findings applicable to real life? What makes them important? As we have already stated, the true aim of seeking further understanding of ethnic conflict dynamics is done, generally, in an attempt to help find some sort of rectifying contribution which would help lead to a resolution strategy or, at the very least, a sort of mitigation of intensity.

The results of our research lead to, I believe, three important findings for the development of conflict prevention or resolution. Firstly, with ethnic identities being found to be determinants of conflict intensity, resolution strategies should, thus, take into account ethnicity as an important element in their strategies. If ethnic identities represent a factor which influences the gravity of ethnic conflicts, it is, hence, simply normal to examine the type of ethnic identities which are salient in a given conflict. As we have seen, the type of ethnic difference will differently affect the intensity of the conflicts. Furthermore, multiple identity conflicts might represent an important malleable element able to mitigate conflict intensity. To elaborate, researchers who specialize in ethnic conflict resolution or mitigation when dealing with conflicts based on multiple fundamental ethnic identity differences might consider strategies which emphasize the promotion of one fundamental ethnic identity. In other words, attempt to artificially render the multiple ethnic identity

¹⁴ The term political psychology of ethnic conflicts to our knowledge does not exist in the literature. Ross (1997) does refer to political psychology and ethnic conflicts; however, not as one term. Furthermore, Ross' reference is to the impact of culture on both political psychology and ethnic conflicts and not on the influence of ethnic identity on group or individual behaviour.

conflict into a single salient identity conflict and, thus, attempt to reduce its intensity. Lastly, the findings of this study, or all other future studies which examine the impact of ethnic identity on conflict intensity, should be utilized in a preventative manner. More attention should, obviously, be paid to areas deemed to be riskier. A proper identification of the type of fundamental ethnic difference involved in group interactions should be established. This type of project, which to the best of my knowledge does not currently exist, would be a welcomed contribution to the work of researchers attempting to ascertain areas of concern for possible future ethnic discourse. Having the knowledge that certain types of ethnic differences are more prone to develop into conflict of a certain intensity is, unquestionable, beneficial information to have.

The findings of our study have lead to important implications for the study of ethnic conflicts and, also, the development of prevention and resolution strategies for ethnic conflicts. Such new contributions have, therefore, to be considered as a welcomed addition to the understanding of ethnic conflicts.

Conclusion

This study began with a poem which emphasized the perversion related to group distinction. Kipling's poem presented the groups, composed of artificial entities that make up the "us versus them", as non-concrete and malleable human creations. Our theoretical research re-enforced this notion suggesting that the lines which divide human beings truly do not exist; they are psychological in nature. Thus, the distinctions between groups of humans seem only to, strictly, exist in our heads.

Although they may not be tangible and concrete phenomena, it is undeniable that group divisions considerably influence our lives. They can even be stated as being the cause of great destruction and death; leading to wars and battles which have plagued human kind forever. The data on conflicts demonstrates that they have taken a recent internal turn. To be more explicit, the findings reveal that conflicts of an ethnic nature are tied to that rise. Conflicts which are based on ethnic groups have been increasing. This fact is a great concern because ethnic conflicts represented a source of tremendous instability and volatility which can lead to passionate and intense violence and can, subsequently, result in great pain and death. Due to the danger and risk represented by ethnic conflicts, we sought to examine the phenomenon in order to bring a greater understanding to it.

In order to examine the dynamics which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts, it was important to, firstly, examine the concept itself. At the outset of the study, a proper definition of ethnic conflicts was established in order to allow for the isolation of the proper conflict population. Ethnic conflicts can, thus, be said to be defined as a confrontation of parties with incompatible goals, who possess territorial attachments, and that are distinguished along ethnic identities. Furthermore, those ethnic identities are defined as dynamic and malleable group identities which are based on perceived values and connections and which become salient in an individual and group in a given situation.

They, further, possess an intrinsic emotion which renders them more dangerous than other group identities.

Research into ethnic conflicts can be said to have a twofold purpose. It, firstly, seeks to inquire and explain the causes and dynamics of ethnic conflicts, and, thereafter, it ultimately attempts to find resolutions in order to end or, at the very least, control these disastrous manifestations of ethnic tensions. Ethnic conflict research could, thus, be summed up into three categories: studies examining the causal factors which lead to the onset of ethnic conflicts, those dealing with the variables which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts, and, finally, researches which seek to prevent, mitigate or resolve ethnic conflicts.

The literature on the causal factors of ethnic conflicts reveals that there are a myriad of elements which can be considered as causes of conflicts, none specifically exclusive to ethnic tensions. Furthermore, no one causal factor can be considered to be the single determining cause of a conflict. In other words, conflicts are complex phenomena which have multiple causal factors interacting with each other. The literature also exposes that the same conclusions are related to variables which influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts. Once again, there is not one single element which fully determines the intensity of a conflict between ethnic groups. Therefore, the complex social, cultural and psychological nature of ethnic conflicts demands multifaceted perspectives in order to properly comprehend the factors which cause and influence them.

Although the literature presents a number of variables which have been demonstrated to influence the intensity of ethnic conflicts, it cannot be said to be exhaustive. One such gap relates to ethnic identities themselves. Although there have been studies undertaken to examine the manner in which ethnic identities impact on group behaviour and even on

conflict intensity, there is, however, one major problem with these studies. There has not, to our knowledge, been any study which has developed proper ethnic parameters to correctly examine the influence of ethnic identities on conflict intensity. Therefore, this study decided to correct this inaccuracy and developed such ethnic boundaries. There was, nevertheless, one inspiration which guided our theory. Sambanis (2001) brought forth the basis of our theory, stating that ethnicity should be examined through three identities: religion, language and race. I concur with that assertion and added that ethnicity itself should be seen as an umbrella notion incorporating all ethnic identities. Thus, ethnicity should not be seen as a group identity in itself, but, instead, as a category of group identities.

Therefore, our study proposed a theory on ethnic distinction which presented the notion that there are three true ways of accurately distinguishing ethnic groups: religious beliefs, languages spoken and racial features. These, I believe, are the three clearest and most profound ways of distinguishing ethnic groups without the possibility of overlap and, thus, form what was presented as the fundamental ethnic identities. There can be no mistaking in the distinction of these three ethnic identities, unlike others. As we have stated, it is possible to confuse a Canadian from an American, or an Albertan from an Ontarian. But that mistake is much harder to make with a Muslim and a Christian, a Francophone and an Anglophone or an East Asian and a Black person. Furthermore, our theory also proposed that ethnic identities which cannot be classified in any of these three categories, tribes and regions for example, should be defined as non-fundamental ethnic identities.

Hence, with this new manner of distinguishing ethnic groups, the necessity was laid forth to verify how these ethnic identities influenced conflict intensity. The theory was that

ethnic identities which have a more profound emotional attachment when rendered salient in conflicts would lead to greater intensity in those conflicts. Therefore, we brought forth a series of questions dealing with the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict intensity. A sequence of tests were, thus, undertaken to examine the hypotheses which were advanced in order to answer our questions on the interaction of ethnic identity and conflict intensity.

The results of the tests, overall, demonstrated that ethnic identities with more intense emotional attachments lead to greater conflict intensity. Fundamental ethnic conflicts were shown to lead to more intense conflicts than non-fundamental ethnic conflicts. Also, similarity amongst ethnic groups was demonstrated to weaken conflict intensity. The assumption is that similarity between ethnic groups decreases the emotional volatility of conflicts; in other words, the passionate reaction involved in conflicts is alleviated. Furthermore, our study concluded that the more fundamental ethnic identity differences are involved in a conflict the more intense that conflict will be. The explanation of these findings derives from the fact that the more emotional attachments are salient the greater those attachments will positively impact the gravity of conflicts. However, the findings were unable to find any meaningful difference among the three fundamental ethnic identities. This result might be caused by the fact that there is truly no intensity distinction between the three fundamental ethnic identities because they all represent fundamental emotional attachments, the strongest form of ethnic relation.

With the importance associated to ethnic conflicts, in academia and beyond, the findings of this study should lead to three major impacts for the development of strategies for conflict prevention or resolution. Strategies which seek to resolve conflicts should take into consideration ethnicity as an important element of their plan; it is simply normal to

identify and examine the type of ethnic identities which are salient in a given conflict. Furthermore, multiple identity conflicts might represent an important malleable element able to mitigate conflict intensity; resolution or mitigation strategies should, thus, focus on promoting one fundamental ethnic identity in these conflicts. They should attempt to artificially render the multiple ethnic identity conflict into a single salient identity conflict in order to reduce its intensity; hence, more easily resolving or alleviating ethnic conflicts. Moreover, findings on the impact of ethnic identity on conflict intensity should be used in a preventative manner. More attention should, thus, be given to areas deemed to be riskier for the onset or escalation of ethnic conflicts. A proper identification of the type of fundamental ethnic difference involved in group interactions would, hence, be a welcomed contribution to the work of researchers attempting to isolate areas of concern for possible future ethnic discourse.

To conclude, one should be wary of which identities are involved in conflicts because some are more dangerous than others.

References

- The 2008 World Factbook. 2008. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency.
- Encarta Encyclopaedia. 2008. On line. <http://encarta.msn.com> (page consulted on September 15th until 22nd 2008).
- Minorities at Risk Project. 2005. "Minorities at Risk Dataset". College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. On line. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/> (page consulted on September 5th 2008).
- Anderson, B. R. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Ardrey, R. 1966. *The Territorial Imperative*. New York: Dell.
- Ayres, R. W. & S. Saideman, 2000. "Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer?: Testing International and Domestic Explanations". *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6 (3): 91-113.
- Barth, F. 1969. "Introduction". In F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press Inc.
- Becker, F. D. 1973. "Study of Spatial Markers". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 26 (3): 439-445.
- Bettencourt, B. A., M. B. Brewer, M. B. Croak & N. Miller. 1992. "Cooperation and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias: The Role of Reward Structure and Social Orientation". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 28: 301-319.
- Blake, R. & J. Mouton. 1964. *The Managerial Grid*. Houston: Gulf Publishing.
- Boulding, K. E. 1962. *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Boulding, K. E. 1945. *The Economics of Peace*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Bourdieu, P. 1962. *The Algerians*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Brass, P. 1985. "Ethnic Groups and the State". In P. Brass (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and the States*. London: Croom Helm.
- Brewer, M. B. 1979. "The Role of Ethnocentrism in Intergroup Conflict". In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Belmont: Wadsworth.

- Caprioli, M. & P. F. Trumbore. 2003. "Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior". *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (1): 5-23.
- Cetinyan, R. 2002. "Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention". *International Organization* 56 (3): 645-677.
- Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler. 2002. "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (February): 13-28.
- Connor, W. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Connor, W. 1972. "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?". *World Politics* 24 (3): 319-55.
- Coser, L. A. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe: Free press.
- Curle, A. 1971. *Making Peace*. New York: Barnes and Noble.
- Das Gupta, J. 1970. *Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Davis, D. R., & W. H. Moore. 1997. "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior". *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 171-184.
- De Jong, J. J. 1956. *Overheid en Onderdaan (Government and Citizen)*. Wageningen: Zomer en Keunings
- De Levita, D. J. 1965. *The Concept of Identity*. New York: Basic Books Inc.
- De Vos, G. A. 1995. "Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation". In L. Romanucci-Ross, & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation (3rd ed.)*. London: Altamira Press.
- De Vos, G. A., & L. Romanucci-Ross. 1995. "Ethnic Identity: A Psychocultural Perspective". In L. Romanucci-Ross, & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation (3rd ed.)*. London: Altamira Press.
- Drooger, A. 2002. "Why do Religious Groups become involved in Conflict?". In J. D. Gort, H. Jansen & H. M. Vroom (eds.), *Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Dustin, D. W. & H. P. Davis. 1970. "Evaluative Bias in Group and Individual Competition". *Journal of Social Psychology* 80: 103-108.
- Edwards, J. 1992. "Language in Group and Individual Identity". In G. M. Breakwell (ed.), *Social Psychology of Identity and the Self Concept*. London: Surrey University Press.

- Ellingsen, T. 2000. "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?: Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44: 228-249.
- Essed, P. 1991. *Understanding Everyday Racism*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Esty, D. C., J. A. Goldstone, T. R. Gurr, B. Harff, M. Levy, G. D. Dabelko, P. T. Surko & A. N. Unger. 1999. "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings". *Environmental Change & Security Project Report* 5 (Summer): 49-72.
- Fearon, J. D. & D. D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War". *American Political Science Review* 97 (March): 75-90.
- Fox, J. 2004. "Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996". *International Political Science Review* 25 (1) : 55-76.
- Fox, J. 2003. "Counting the Causes and Dynamics of Ethnoreligious Violence". *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4 (3): 119-144.
- Fox, J. 2002. "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis". *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 415-434.
- Fox, J. 2001. "Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions: Which is a More Important Determinant of Ethnic Conflict?". *Ethnicities* 1(3): 295-320.
- Fox, J. 2000a. "Religious Causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities". *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (3): 423-450.
- Fox, J. 2000b. "Is Islam more conflict prone than other religions? A cross-sectional study of ethnoreligious conflict". *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6 (2):1-24.
- Fox, J. 1999. "Toward a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict". *Nations and Nationalism* 5 (4): 431 - 463.
- Fox, J. 1997. "The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study". *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3 (3): 1-19.
- Fox, J. & S. Sandler. 2003. "Regime Types and Discrimination against Ethnoreligious Minorities: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Autocracy-Democracy Continuum". *Political Studies* 51: 469-489.
- Fuchs, L. H. 1993. "An Agenda for Tomorrow: Immigration Policy and Ethnic Policies". *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530 (Nov): 171-186.
- Fukuyama, F. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.

- Gilliland, M. K. 1995. "Nationalism and Ethnogenesis in the Former Yugoslavia". In L. Romanucci-Ross & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (3rd ed.). London: Altamira Press.
- Geertz, C. 1963. "The Interactive revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States". In C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Goffman, E. 1963. *Behavior in Public Places*. New York: The Free Press.
- Gordon, R. G., Jr. 2005. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World* (15th ed.). Dallas: SIL International.
- Gurr, T. R. 1994. "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address". *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3): 347-377.
- Gurr, T. R. 1993a. "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945". *International Political Science Review* 14 (2): 161-201.
- Gurr, T. R. 1993b. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hamilton, J. D. 1994 *Time Series Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Harbom, L., E. Melander & P. Wallensteen. 2008. "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946–2007". *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (5): 697–710.
- Harrell, S. 1995. "Languages Defining Ethnicity in Southwest China". In L. Romanucci-Ross & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (3rd ed.). London: Altamira Press.
- Henderson, E. A. 1997. "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (5): 649-688.
- Hewitt J. J., J. Wilkenfeld & T. R. Gurr. 2008. *Peace and Conflict*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Horowitz, D. L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California press.
- Huntington, S. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Shuster.
- Huth, P. & B. Valentino 2008. "Mass Killings of Civilians in Times of War, 1945–2000". In Hewitt J. J., J. Wilkenfeld & T. R. Gurr (eds.), 2008. *Peace and Conflict*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Ignatieff, M. 1993. *Blood and Belonging*. London: Noonday Press.

- Isaacs, H. 1975. *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Jervis, R. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma". *World Politics* 30 (2): 167–213.
- Johnson, C. 1966. *Revolutionary Change*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- Kegley, C. & E. Wittkopf. 1995. *World Politics: Trends and Transformation (5th ed)*. New York: Saint-Martin's.
- Kipling, R. 1926. "We and They". In Rudyard Kipling, *Debits and Credits*. London: Macmillan.
- Lacina, B. 2006. *Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2005: Codebook for Version 2.0*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- Lacina, B. & N. P. Gleditsch. 2005. "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths". *European Journal of Population* 21(2–3): 145–166.
- Laitin, D. D. 2000a. "Language Conflict and Violence: The Straw That Strengthens the Camel's Back". *European Journal of Sociology* 41 (1): 97-137.
- Laitin, D. D. 2000b. "What Is a Language Community?". *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 142-155.
- Laitin, D. D. 1992. *Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Liebkind, K. 1982. "The Swedish-speaking Finns: A Case Study of Ethnolinguistic Identity". In H. Tajfel (ed.), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1979. "Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The "Crucial Experiment" of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland". *American Political Science Review* 73 (2): 442-458.
- Lindström, R. & W. H. Moore. 1995. "Deprived, Rational, or Both? "Why Minorities Rebel" Revisited". *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 23: 167-190.
- Lipset, S. M. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City: Doubleday.
- Lorenz, K. 1969. *On Aggression*. New York: Bantam.
- Lund, M. 1996. *Preventing Violent Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

- Lyman, S. M. & M. B. Scott. 1967. "Territoriality: A Neglected Sociological Dimension". *Social Problems* 15: 235-249.
- Marshall, M. & K. Jagers. 2009. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007". Severn: Center for Systemic Peace. www.systemicpeace.org/polity4 (page consulted April 9th 2009).
- McTernan, O. 2003. *Violence in God's Name: Religion in an Age of Conflict*. Maryknoll: Orbis Book.
- Merelman, R. M. 1994. "Racial Conflict and Cultural Politics in the United States". *The Journal of Politics* 56 (1): 1-20.
- Miguel, E., S. Satyanath & E. Sergenti. 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach". *Journal of Political Economy* 112: 725-754.
- Miller, Ross A. 1995. "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force". *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (3): 760-785.
- Moynihan, D. P. 1993. *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oberschall, A. 1973. *Social Conflict and Social Movement*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Parsons, T. 1951. *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Philpot, T. S. 2004. "A Party of a Different Color? Race, Campaign Communication, and Party Politics". *Political Behavior* 26 (3): 249-270.
- Posen, B. R. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict". *Survival* 35 (1): 27-47.
- Rabushka, A. & K. A. Shepsle. 1972. *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus: Merrill.
- Ramsbotham, O., T. Woodhouse & H. Miall. 2005. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (2nd ed.)*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Reynal-Querol, M. 2002. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1): 29-54.
- Richardson, L. F. 1960. *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.
- Rogers, P. & M. Dando. 1992. *A Violent Peace: Global Security after the Cold War*. London: Brassey's.

- Romanucci-Ross, L. & G. A. De Vos. 1995. "Preface". In L. Romanucci-Ross & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (3rd ed.). London: Altamira Press.
- Roosens, E. 1995. "Subtle Primitives: Ethnic Formation among the Central Yaka of Zaire". In L. Romanucci-Ross & G. A. De Vos (eds.), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (3rd ed.). London: Altamira Press.
- Ross, M. H. 1997. "The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict". *Political Psychology* 18 (2): 299-326.
- Rothchild, D. 1986. "Interethnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in Africa". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 9 (1): 66-86.
- Rubenstein, R. 1990. "Unanticipated Conflict and The Crisis of Social Theory". In J. Burton & F. Dukes (eds.), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*. New York: St-Martin's Press.
- Saideman, S. M. 1997. "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability versus Ethnic Ties". *International Organization* 51 (4): 721-753.
- Saideman, S. M. & R. W. Ayres. 2000. "Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s". *The Journal of Politics* 62 (4): 1126-1144.
- Sambanis, N. 2001. "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (3): 259-282.
- Sanders, J. M. 2002. "Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies". *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 327-357
- Seul, J. R. 1999. "Ours Is the Way of God!: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict". *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (5): 553-569.
- Sherif, M., L. J. Harvey, B. J. White, W.R. Hood & C. W. Sherif. 1961. *The Robbers Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Smelser, N. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York; Free Press.
- Smith, A. D. 1981. *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soeters, J. 2005. *Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars*. London: Routledge
- Sommer, R. 1966. "Man's Proximate Environment". *Journal of Social Issues* 22: 59-70.
- Sorokin, P. A. 1962. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. New York: The Bedminster Press.

- Stea, D. 1965. "Territoriality, the Interior Aspect: Space, Territory, and Human Movements". *Landscape* (Autumn): 13-17.
- Strauss, A. L. 1959. *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity*. Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Tajfel, H. & J. C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory on Intergroup Conflict". In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterrey: Brooks/ Cole.
- Tooby, J. & L. Cosmides. 1992. "The Psychological Foundations of Culture". In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides & J. Tooby. *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Van Dijk, T. 1987. *Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Wallensteen, P. & M. Sollenberg. 1997. "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-96". *Journal of Peace Research* 34 (3): 339-358.
- Wehr, P. 1979. *Conflict Regulation*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Wright, Q. 1935. *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*. New York: Green & Co.
- Wright, Q. 1964. *A Study of War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Annex 1- BD Dataset Group Classification

Country	Group	Religion		Language		Race	Non-Fundamental	Multiple Identities
		Sectarian	Non-Sectarian	Similar	Non- Similar			
Angola	Cabinda						X	
Azerbaijan	Armenians		X		X			X
Bangladesh	Jumma/Chittagong Hill Tracts		X		X			X
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croats		X	X				X
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbs		X	X				X
Burma (Myanmar)	Arakanese			X				
Burma (Myanmar)	Kachins		X	X				X
Burma (Myanmar)	Karenni		X	X				X
Burma (Myanmar)	Karens			X				
Burma (Myanmar)	Mons				X			
Burma (Myanmar)	Shans				X			
Burma (Myanmar)	Wa				X			
Burundi	Hutus						X	
China	Taiwanese			X				
China	Tibet				X			
Comoros	Anjouan						X	
Congo	Laris			X				
Cote D'Ivoire	Northerners		X		X			X
Croatia	Serbs	X		X				X
Cyprus, Turkey	Turks		X		X			X
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	Katanga			X				
Djibouti	Afars			X				
Ethiopia	Eritreans		X		X			X
Ethiopia	Ogaden		X		X			X
Ethiopia	Oromo				X			
Georgia	Abkhazians				X			
Georgia	Ossetians				X			
India	Assamese			X				
India	Bodos		X		X			X
India	Kashmiris		X	X				X
India	Manipur				X			

India	Mizoram		X		X		X
India	Nagas		X	X			X
India	Sikhs		X	X			X
India	Tripura		X		X		X
Indonesia	Acehnese			X			
Indonesia	East Timorese		X	X			X
Indonesia	Papuans		X		X		
Iran	Azeris				X		
Iran	Kurds	X		X			X
Laos	Hmong				X		
Lebanon	Sunnis	X					
Liberia	Gios and Manos					X	
Liberia	Mandingos					X	
Macedonia	Albanians		X		X		X
Madagascar	Southern Tulear Province					X	
Mexico	Chiapas				X		
Morocco	Saharawis			X			
Niger	Toubous				X		
Niger	Tuaregss				X		
Nigeria	Biafra		X		X		X
Nigeria	Ijaws		X		X		X
Nigeria	Muslims		X		X		X
Oman	Dhofar region			X			
Oman	State of Oman/Free Oman					X	
Pakistan	Baluchis			X			
Pakistan	Bangladesh			X			
Pakistan	Mohajirs					X	
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville					X	
Philippines	Moros		X	X			X
Russia (Soviet Union)	Armenians				X		
Russia (Soviet Union)	Azeris		X		X		X
Russia (Soviet Union)	Baltics		X		X		X
Russia (Soviet Union)	Chechens		X		X		X
Russia (Soviet Union)	Dagestan		X		X		X
Russia (Soviet Union)	Ukraine			X			
Rwanda	Tutsis and Hutus					X	

Senegal	Casamance		X	X				X
Somalia	Darod clan						X	
Somalia	Somaliland						X	
South Africa	Blacks				X	X		X
South Africa	Namibians					X		
Spain	Basques				X			
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	Tamils		X		X			X
Sudan	Darfuris				X			
Sudan	Southerners		X	X				X
Surinam	Maroons					X		
Thailand	Patani (Malay Muslims)		X		X			X
United Kingdom	Catholics	X						
Yemen (People's Republic of Yemen and Arab Republic of Yemen)	Shias and Sunnis	X						
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Albanians		X		X			X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Croats	X		X				X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Slovenes	X		X				X
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	Blacks					X		
84		7	32	28	38	4	11	36
			39		66			

Annex 2-MAR Dataset Group Classification

Country	Group	Religion		Language		Race	Non-Fundamental	Multiple Identities
		Sectarian	Non-Sectarian	Similar	Non-Similar			
Afghanistan	Hazaras	X			X			X
Afghanistan	Pashtuns				X			
Afghanistan	Tajiks				X			
Afghanistan	Uzbeks				X			
Albania	Greeks		X		X			X
Algeria	Berbers				X			
Angola	Bakongo				X			
Angola	Cabinda				X			
Angola	Ovimbundu				X			
Argentina	Indigenous Peoples				X			
Australia	Aborigines		X		X			X
Azerbaijan	Armenians		X		X			X
Azerbaijan	Lezgins	X			X			X
Azerbaijan	Russians	X			X			X
Bahrain	Shias						X	
Bangladesh	Biharis				X			
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes		X		X	X		X
Bangladesh	Hindus		X					
Belarus	Poles		X		X			X
Belarus	Russians						X	
Bhutan	Lhotshampas		X		X			X
Bolivia	Indigenous Highland Peoples				X			
Bolivia	Lowland Indigenous Peoples				X			
Bosnia	Croats		X		X			X
Bosnia	Muslims		X					
Bosnia	Serbs		X		X			X
Botswana	San Bushmen		X		X			X
Brazil	Amazonian Indians				X			
Bulgaria	Turks		X		X	X		X
Burma	Hill Tribals		X		X			X
Burma	Kachins		X		X			X
Burma	Karens				X			
Burma	Mons						X	
Burma	Rohingya (Arakanese)		X		X			X
Burma	Shans				X			

Burma	Zomis (Chins)		X		X		X
Burundi	Hutus					X	
Burundi	Tutsis					X	
Cambodia	Chams		X		X		X
Cambodia	Vietnamese					X	
Cameroon	Bamileke		X		X		X
Cameroon	Kirdis				X		
Cameroon	Westerners				X		
Canada	French Canadians	X			X		X
Canada	Indigenous Peoples				X		
Canada	Quebecois	X			X		X
Chad	Northerners		X		X		X
Chad	Southerners		X		X		X
Chile	Indigenous Peoples		X		X		X
China	Hui Muslims	X					
China	Tibetans		X		X		X
China	Turkmen		X		X		X
Colombia	Indigenous Peoples				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Bakongo				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Kivu Region				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Lingala				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Luba				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Lunda, Yeke				X		
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the (ZAIRE)	Ngbandi					X	
Congo, Rep. of the	Laris					X	
Congo, Rep. of the	M'boshi			X			
Croatia	Serbs		X		X		X
Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots		X		X		X
Czechoslovakia	Hungarians				X		
Czechoslovakia	Slovaks					X	
Czech Republic	Slovaks					X	
Djibouti	Afars				X		
Ecuador	Indigenous Highland Peoples				X		
Ecuador	Lowland Indigenous Peoples				X		
Egypt	Copts		X				
El Salvador	Indigenous Peoples	X			X		X

Eritrea	Afars	X			X		X
Estonia	Russians				X		
Ethiopia	Afars	X			X		X
Ethiopia	Amhara		X		X		X
Ethiopia	Eritreans				X		
Ethiopia	Nilo-Saharans		X		X	X	X
Ethiopia	Oromo				X		
Ethiopia	Somalis		X		X		X
Ethiopia	Tigreans				X		
Fiji	East Indians		X		X	X	X
Fiji	Fijians				X	X	
France	Basques				X		
France	Bretons				X		
France	Corsicans				X		
Georgia	Abkhazians				X		
Georgia	Adzhars		X				
Georgia	Ossetians (South)				X		
Georgia	Russians				X		
Ghana	Ashanti				X		
Ghana	Ewe				X		
Ghana	Mossi-Dagomba		X		X		X
Greece	Muslims		X		X		X
Guatemala	Indigenous Peoples		X		X		X
Guinea	Fulani				X		
Guinea	Malinka				X		
Guinea	Susu				X		
Guyana	Africans		X			X	X
Guyana	East Indians		X			X	X
Honduras	Indigenous Peoples				X		
India	Assamese				X		
India	Bodos				X		
India	Kashmiris		X		X		X
India	Mizos		X		X	X	X
India	Muslims		X		X		X
India	Nagas		X		X	X	X
India	Santals		X		X	X	X
India	Scheduled Tribes				X		
India	Sikhs		X		X		X
India	Tripuras				X	X	X
Indonesia	Acehnese						X
Indonesia	East Timorese				X		
Indonesia	Papuans		X		X	X	X
Iran	Arabs				X		
Iran	Azerbaijanis				X		

Iran	Baha'is		X				
Iran	Bakhtiari				X		
Iran	Baluchis	X			X		X
Iran	Christians		X		X		X
Iran	Kurds				X		
Iran	Turkmen	X			X		X
Iraq	Kurds				X		
Iraq	Shias	X					
Iraq	Sunnis					X	
Israel	Palestinians		X		X		X
Italy	Sardinians				X		
Italy	South Tyrolians				X		
Jordan	Palestinians					X	
Kazakhstan	Germans		X		X	X	X
Kazakhstan	Russians		X		X	X	X
Kenya	Kalenjins				X		
Kenya	Kikuyu					X	
Kenya	Kisii					X	
Kenya	Luhya				X		
Kenya	Luo	X					
Kenya	Maasais		X		X		X
Kenya	Rendille/Borana		X		X		X
Kenya	Somalis		X		X		X
Kenya	Turkana/Pokot		X		X		X
Korea, South	Honamese				X		
Kyrgyzstan	Russians		X		X	X	X
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks				X		
Laos	Hmong		X		X	X	X
Latvia	Russians				X		
Lebanon	Druze		X				
Lebanon	Maronite Christians		X				
Lebanon	Palestinians		X				
Lebanon	Shias		X				
Lebanon	Sunnis		X				
Lithuania	Poles				X		
Lithuania	Russians		X		X		X
Macedonia	Albanians				X		
Macedonia	Serbs	X			X		X
Madagascar	Merina				X		
Malaysia	Chinese		X		X		X
Malaysia	Dayaks		X		X		X
Malaysia	East Indians		X		X	X	X
Malaysia	Kadazans		X		X		X
Mali	Mande				X		

Mali	Tuaregs				X		
Mauritania	Kewri				X	X	X
Mexico	Mayans				X		
Mexico	Other Indigenous Peoples				X		
Mexico	Zapotecs				X		
Moldova	Gagauz				X		
Moldova	Slavs				X		
Morocco	Berbers				X		
Morocco	Saharawis				X		
Namibia	Basters				X		
Namibia	East Caprivians			X			
Namibia	San Bushmen		X		X		X
New Zealand	Maori	X			X		X
Nicaragua	Indigenous Peoples	X			X		X
Niger	Djerema-Songhai	X			X		X
Niger	Hausa				X		
Niger	Tuaregs				X		
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani		X		X		X
Nigeria	Ibo		X		X		X
Nigeria	Ijaw		X	X			X
Nigeria	Ogani		X		X		X
Nigeria	Yoruba				X		
Pakistan	Ahmadis	X					
Pakistan	Baluchis				X		
Pakistan	Hindus		X				
Pakistan	Mohajirs				X		
Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pushtuns)				X		
Pakistan	Sindhis				X		
Panama	Indigenous Peoples				X		
Papua New Guinea	Bouganvilleans				X		
Paraguay	Indigenous Peoples				X		
Peru	Indigenous Highland Peoples				X		
Peru	Lowland Indigenous Peoples				X		
Philippines	Igorots				X		
Philippines	Moros		X		X		X
Romania	Germans				X		
Romania	Hungarians	X			X		X
Russia	Avars		X		X		X
Russia	Buryat		X		X	X	X
Russia	Chechens		X		X		X
Russia	Ingush		X		X		X

Russia	Karachay		X		X		X
Russia	Kumyks		X		X		X
Russia	Lezgins		X		X		X
Russia	Tatars		X		X	X	X
Russia	Tuvinians		X		X	X	X
Russia	Yakut	X			X		X
Rwanda	Hutus					X	
Rwanda	Tutsis					X	
Saudi Arabia	Shias	X					
Senegal	Diolas in Casamance	X			X		X
Sierra Leone	Limba				X		
Sierra Leone	Mende				X		
Sierra Leone	Temne				X		
Singapore	Malays		X		X		X
Slovakia	Hungarians				X		
Somalia	Issaq					X	
South Africa	Asians		X			X	X
South Africa	Coloreds					X	
South Africa	Europeans				X	X	X
South Africa	Xhosa				X	X	X
South Africa	Zulus				X	X	X
Spain	Basques				X		
Spain	Catalans				X		
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils		X		X		X
Sudan	Darfur Black Muslims	X			X		X
Sudan	Nuba				X		
Sudan	Southerners				X	X	X
Switzerland	Jurassians				X		
Syria	Alawi	X					
Syria	Kurds	X			X		X
Taiwan	Aboriginal Taiwanese				X		
Taiwan	Mainland Chinese					X	
Taiwan	Taiwanese				X		
Tajikistan	Russians		X		X	X	X
Tanzania	Zanzibaris		X				
Thailand	Malay-Muslims		X		X		X
Thailand	Northern Hill Tribes		X		X		X
Togo	Ewe				X		
Togo	Kabre				X		
Turkey	Kurds	X			X		X

Turkmenistan	Russians		X		X	X		X
Uganda	Acholi				X			
Uganda	Ankole				X			
Uganda	Baganda				X			
Uganda	Kakwa		X		X			X
Uganda	Karamojong				X			
Uganda	Konjo/Amba				X			
Uganda	Langi				X			
Uganda	Lugbara/Madi				X			
Uganda	Nyarwanda				X			
Ukraine	Crimean Russians				X			
Ukraine	Crimean Tartars	X			X			X
Ukraine	Russians	X			X			X
United Kingdom	Catholics in Northern Ireland	X						
United Kingdom	Scots	X						
United States of America	Native Americans				X			
United States of America	Native Hawaiians				X			
USSR	Armenians	X			X			X
USSR	Azerbaijanis		X		X	X		X
USSR	Chechen/Ingush		X		X			X
USSR	Estonians	X			X			X
USSR	Georgians	X			X			X
USSR	Germans	X		X				X
USSR	Kazakhs		X		X	X		X
USSR	Kirghiz		X			X		X
USSR	Kurds		X		X			X
USSR	Latvians	X			X			X
USSR	Lithuanians	X			X			X
USSR	Moldavians				X			
USSR	Tadzhiks		X		X			X
USSR	Tatars		X		X	X		X
USSR	Turkmens		X		X	X		X
USSR	Ukrainians			X				
USSR	Uzbeks		X		X	X		X
Uzbekistan	Russians		X		X	X		X
Venezuela	Indigenous Peoples				X			
Vietnam	Montagnards		X		X			X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Croats A	X						
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Croats B	X			X			X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Hungarians		X		X			X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Kosovo Albanians				X			

Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Sandzak Muslims		X		X			X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Serbs		X	X				X
Yugoslavia (Serbia)	Slovenes		X	X				X
Zambia	Bemebe				X			
Zambia	Lozi				X			
Zambia	Tonga				X			
Zimbabwe	Ndebele				X			
289		38	104	7	236	35	20	127
		142		243				

