



On Responsibility-Sensitive Egalitarian Ethics

By/Par **Kurt Devooght**

Faculté d'économie et d'économie appliquée
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Kurt.devooght@econ.kuleuven.ac.be

"The natural distribution of talents is neither just nor unjust but simply a natural fact. What is just or unjust is the way institutions deal with these facts." (Rawls [1971, 102])

1. INTRODUCTION.

Should a drunk driver pay for the costs of the medical care he needs after a car accident he has caused? Should adventurous sky-divers be compensated for the loss of income due to their time-consuming and expensive hobby? How should a manager divide an additional premium among his unequally performing staff? Discussions on the implementation of redistribution schemes or on simple distribution problems are all salient examples of topics saturated by arguments grounded in the concept of responsibility. One, then, says that one should bear the consequences of the situation for which one is responsible. In this view it is obvious that responsibility -or at least an assessment of what it is or why it does not apply in a particular case- is a constitutive part of distributive justice. A (re-)distribution cannot be said to be just if society bears the consequences of the situation for which agents are responsible. Can such unequal treatment - which only in exceptional cases will be avoided - be reconciled with the ideal of equality or is it equality itself that asks for holding people responsible for some of their actions?

A proper articulation of the concept of responsibility in an economic setting will have to indicate an answer to at least three questions. (i) What is meant by responsibility in the context of distributive justice? (ii) When can one be held responsible for a situation? In the past, theories have been developed to distinguish between situations for which agents are responsible and situations for which they are not. Seemingly, the presence or the absence of free choice plays a central role. One can only be held responsible if some voluntary choice in the past has affected or could have affected the current situation. (iii) Finally, how could the notion of responsibility be interwoven in the ideal of equality? What does the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethics stand for?

These substantial issues have, indeed, been dealt with by both philosophers and economists. The upshot is that we are left behind with a clew of contrasting and even conflicting interpretations by both philosophers and economists. My aim is to shed some light on the

dark scene of philosophical arguments and pragmatic interpretations of the concept of responsibility in the sphere of distributive justice.

I start the overview by a brief answer to the first question which gives us also the opportunity to circumscribe the domain of this research and the formal approach (section 2). The third section tackles the material question of when holding agents responsible. Section 4 describes various ways in which theorists recently have accommodated egalitarianism to responsibility. Section 5 examines a major defect of these proposals. In section 6 I argue that responsibility in the sphere of distributive justice is a societal matter and should be attributed on the basis of delegation. Section 7 explicates my own proposal and concludes.

2. JUDGING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

In our daily life we all form almost constantly practical judgements of agreement or disagreement about situations - which I take as a generic term for (the results of) choices, actions, thoughts and decisions. Some of these situations we judge in terms of moral praise or blame i.e. we form ourselves a moral judgement. For centuries responsibility has been one of the prominent concepts in the realm of morality. If you are said to be responsible for a bad situation, it means that you have done something morally wrong according to the prevailing normative system. Accordingly, moral judgements in this sense assign moral dispraise to behaviour for which one is responsible: you are a bad boy or a nasty girl! Similarly, judgements of moral praise are granted for morally good actions. The moral appraisal of agents has its own logic of which the explanation exceeds the scope of this text.

When asked whether a situation is good, one might also give a practical judgement without referring to the moral quality of the act and consequently the agent. One then judges an action (and its consequences) in a morally neutral way which I call the justification of outcomes.

Both practical judgements, the moral and the neutral, are of course related. Therefore, it may be natural to suppose that a difference in the moral appraisal of agents translates into a difference in the justification of outcomes. But on reflection it is by no means obvious how this is so.

Think about it this way. One might perform an act which is (morally) blameworthy but for which one is not supposed to bear the consequences because the outcome is legitimate or justified. An example can make our point clear. Some think it is blameworthy to abort the life of an unborn child. Suppose that in order to save the life of the mother, a seven month old embryo has to be aborted. Those thinking abortion is a blameworthy act will under certain conditions not oppose it. For them, however, the act itself remains morally bad -and some will refuse to do it- although they accept that it is excusable. It then seems reasonable that the blameworthy act of abortion does not forfeit one's claim on others to be (partly) compensated for the consequences or costs. Also the opposite holds: one might be held to bear the consequences of an act which is not blameworthy in itself. Scanlon [1988, 196]

introduces the following story. Suppose some area is seriously polluted. The material is planned to be removed and some precautions have to be taken because during this work some material will be dispersed into the open air. If somebody inhales the material he will get pulmonary problems. So, everybody should stay inside his home; the doors and windows should be closed. Those living in the neighborhood are warned by television, radio and newspapers. If you have forgotten the warnings not to enter the affected area, you cannot be morally blamed for that act, but you have to bear the consequences yourself. You cannot claim from others to pay the health damage you attracted by entering that area.

Moral responsibility is clearly distinct from a practical liability for the consequences of the situation one faces. Moral blame refers to the prevailing moral system and is aiming at the goodness of life of individuals. Being morally good is neither a sufficient nor a necessary reason for outcomes to be justified. Outcomes can -and sometimes should- be justified on other than moral grounds: efficiency, efficacy, rationality, etc. Saving your child who locked herself in the cellar of your house, by destroying the whole house is a morally right action but the outcome is not justified because it is not efficient (forcing the door of the cellar would have been enough). Moral rightness of a situation is not sufficient for the justification of results. Neither is moral rightness of a situation necessary for the justification of results as in the affected area example.

The distinction between the moral judgement and the justification of outcomes is important for the problem under scrutiny. In my opinion, distributive justice is concerned with the justification of outcomes, not with the moral judgement of agents. I consider responsibility in the context of distributive justice as the justification of outcomes and do not at all show interest in the moral appraisal of agents. In this study, I evaluate actions and situations rather than reasons and persons. I just want to hold agents responsible for some situations but this need not be a moral judgement about these persons.

However, since distributive justice aims at a morally good society it does involve moral judgements, not about individual agents or their single actions but about overall situations or social states. Moral principles are at stake in distributive justice and I take equality to be one of those principles. Inequality is a subtopic of the more general topic of justice and fairness.

The assessment of the rights and obligations of the agent and others as well as the ideal of equality are part of distributive justice. In what follows I will have to explain how I see the interaction between the concept of responsibility and that of inequality. The main aim of this project is the development of a responsibility-sensitive concept of equality as part of a theory of justice with respect to which income distributions should be evaluated.

3. RESPONSIBILITY DELINEATED.

Since I have taken a position on the formal problem of the nature of judgements on responsibility, the material question of when holding agents responsible comes up almost immediately. One has to explore which criteria are employed to decide whether an agent is

to be held responsible or not. Since political philosophers have taken up egalitarianism extensively, the mainstream position (Cohen [1989], Arneson [1989], Temkin [1993]) seems to be that one is responsible for what has been chosen voluntarily. Responsibility by one's volition or responsibility by voluntariness as I label it, assigns liability for the results of own choices made under no faulty conditions, knowingly, consciously and freely. More generally, responsibility is considered as a consequence of free exercise of will. One could only be responsible for what stems from free will.

The position of Rawls [1975] and Dworkin [1981] is an important variation of the mainstream view. Rawls and Dworkin also relate responsibility to what stems from free will but do not link it to voluntary choices. What people are responsible for are (the consequences of) their preferences, ambitions, wants and desires. This implies that one is held responsible for preferences and wants, even for involuntary ones. Although the different proposals assign responsibility for what emerges from the free will, they differ in the precise dividing line between what has to be seen as coming from free will or not. This dividing line is known as 'Dworkin's cut' or, more generally, the 'responsibility cut' and will play a prominent role in the discussion of the differences in the egalitarian theories of the cited egalitarians which is the topic of the next section.

4. EGALITARIANISM ACCOMMODATING RESPONSIBILITY.

The above mentioned egalitarian theorists believe that the condition which distinguishes between situations for which agents are responsible and those for which they are not, coincides with the distinction between free will and fate. One can only be held responsible for that which emerges from free will. On the contrary, when fate determines a certain situation i.e. where a result does not stem from free will, people cannot be held responsible and should even be indemnified for the bad consequences.

One might wonder why egalitarians are so preoccupied with the responsibility cut since one might expect that they are primarily interested in promoting the ideal of equality. In order to understand the introduction of the responsibility cut in egalitarian theories and how egalitarian theories adopted responsibility, I must make a dense reconstruction of the debate on 'Equality of What?' Basically, Rawls was the first to systematically challenge the then prevailing idea of equality of subjective welfare which was lacking the concept of responsibility.

4.1. Welfare versus Resource Egalitarianism.

Not holding people responsible for what happens to them as in the idea of equality of subjective welfare leads to striking results. Equality of subjective welfare does not allow for any differences in welfare between people. It defines welfare in a subjective way as utility or pleasure or preference satisfaction. In his seminal work Rawls [1971] focuses on two problems of subjective welfare egalitarianism. The first problem deals with offensive

preferences i.e. desires concerning the welfare of others. The sadist's welfare may partly consist of the desire that others suffer. But all this seems grossly unfair. Why should we grant the sadist's preferences any weight at all - even if this results in lower preference satisfaction on his behalf? The second problem of welfare egalitarianism is that of expensive tastes. Suppose I have a taste for exotic meals and fine wines which is deeply fixed in my subconsciousness so that I cannot get rid of it without significant withdrawal symptoms. Subjective welfare egalitarianism would urge us to take from the modest resources of someone who has been saving a lot and to hand over his savings to a wasteful person. This seems counter-intuitive and unfair.

In order to avoid the problems of subjective welfare egalitarianism, Rawls develops a version of equality of resources. Resource egalitarians hold that human beings are entitled to equally valuable shares of the basic resources. Rawls' proposal holds that disadvantages for which a person himself is responsible may lead to differences in the distribution of basic resources. This element of responsibility is one of his main reasons for rejecting equality of welfare theories. But how has this to be done? Expensive and offensive tastes are not worth taking into account and have to be excluded directly. It means that one should use objective judgements about the importance of what goods 'do' to people rather than to lean on tastes and preferences. What emerges from the source of the free will is too subjective to serve as ground for compensation at the bar of justice or equality¹. Rawls therefore introduces the concept of social primary goods, i.e. those goods or values every rational person is willing to own irrespective of his own conception of the good or welfare.

"For simplicity, assume the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth." (Rawls [1971, 62]).

In Dworkin's resource view [1981], offensive tastes and expensive tastes are excluded not because they are not judged as valuable, but because tastes and preferences should not be taken into account at all, only resources should. Expensive tastes are excluded with an appeal to responsibility. Dworkin develops this claim by means of the distinction between brute luck and option luck. Brute luck happens to somebody without being the result of choice. Brute luck is imposed on someone: a risk one could not anticipate or did not choose to run. An instance of brute bad luck is lung cancer developing in the course of a normal life. Option luck, to the contrary, is the result of a voluntary action. In the case of, for example, lung cancer after a life of heavy smoking, one has chosen an option that turned out to be an unsuccessful gamble.

Inequalities which are the result of personal effort, ambitions or preferences cannot be subject to compensation whereas inequalities which are the result of personal resources such as talents, handicaps, mental diseases, do entitle people to compensation. From an egalitarian point of view people should pay the price for the life they have decided to lead. This price is measured in terms of what others have to give up in order to allow me to lead the life I want. This idea is the basic element of Dworkin's equality of resources, which explains why

¹ In line with the literature on compensation, I exclude cases where compensation is impossible.

optional disadvantages should not be compensated, but brute bad luck should. Responsibility is considered to be essential in the ideal of equality of resources.

4.2. A Third Way.

As could be expected, a third alternative somewhere in between welfare and resource egalitarianism has been suggested. A.K. Sen [1980] was the first author to devise a theory that takes something in between resources and welfare as *equalisandum*. He develops a powerful critique of welfarism, that only takes utility under consideration as equalisandum. On the other hand, Sen calls resourcist versions of egalitarianism fetishistic: they focus exclusively on resources. The proposal of Sen can then be labelled as a non-welfarist outcome theory of equality. Sen therefore introduces the idea of 'functionings': these functionings reflect what the person is succeeding in 'doing' or 'being'.

"A functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be. It reflects, as it were, a part of the 'state' of that person. It has to be distinguished from the commodities which are used to achieve those functionings. For example, bicycling has to be distinguished from possessing a bike. It has to be distinguished also from the happiness generated by the functioning; for example, actually cycling around must not be identified with the pleasure obtained from that act. A functioning is thus different both from (1) having goods (and the corresponding characteristics), to which it is posterior, and (2) having utility (in the form of happiness resulting from that functioning), to which it is, in an important way, prior." (Sen [1985, 10-11]).

He claims that the well-being and the living standard of individuals are determined by 'capabilities to function' (for example the ability to meet one's nutritional requirements, the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, the power to participate in the social life of the community). The concept of equality then refers to these basic capabilities. These capabilities to function are interpreted by Sen as positive freedoms.

Also Cohen [1989, 1990, 1992] designs a coherent theory which could be labelled midfare egalitarianism². On the one hand he holds that resources are not the proper equalisandum. He gives the example of a person who does not lack any capacities and has enough resources, who can move his arms very well, but who suffers from a terrible pain after moving his arms. According to equality of resource theories this man has no claim to a medicine which could relieve his pain, he does not lack any resources for which he should be compensated. But not lacking any resources he really suffers from a disadvantage and so according to Cohen he has a claim to the medicine. So, equality of resources is not the proper equalisandum³.

² Midfare is a term coined by Cohen [1989] expressing something posterior to having resources and prior to having subjective welfare.

³ Although I think this is not a convincing argument to counter Dworkin's proposal, given his interpretation of resources and concrete distribution scheme (auctions).

In a similar way Cohen argues by means of an example that welfare is not the defining characteristic of the equalisandum either. Consider a very well-off person who has a high level of welfare but who is paralysed in both legs. Compared with the previous example, this person has no pain and thus does not face any disadvantage in welfare for that reason. However, the person is lacking resources since he can not use his legs - contrary to the man in the previous example who is able to move all his limbs (albeit with pain)⁴. According to equality of welfare theories the person's high level of welfare is a reason for rejecting his claim for help in the form of a wheelchair. But as Cohen holds, his level of welfare has nothing to do with his paralysis. His paralysis is a disadvantage such that it is right to compensate for it.

Cohen holds that one should take only involuntary disadvantages into account irrespective whether the involuntary disadvantage is in welfare or in resources. As a consequence to help a person building a religious building is not against equality if he is not responsible for having this particular belief. It is not against equality even if we do not endorse the value of the particular religious belief. It is however a different matter if the person because of his particular belief has to suffer for building the monument and that suffering is part of his religious commission. In that case the suffering is intrinsically connected with the religious project that it is hardly defensible that he should be compensated for his suffering. The person in the example would - if he could choose - not choose not to suffer from the building of the monument. Cohen holds that the equalisandum is access to advantages⁵ so that compensation is demanded for those disadvantages which are not due to the subject's choice and which the subject would not choose to suffer. The last part of the circumscription refers to the case, as cited in the example, in which the suffering of the person is an inherent element of his project and should not be compensated. In Cohen's line of reasoning responsibility is decisive in the question of the compensation demanded by equality.

4.3. A First Warning.

The theories of Sen and Cohen discussed above have, apart from their shared equalisandum, another important feature in common. They both advocate some kind of equality of opportunity, or equality of positive freedoms. One of the other main protagonists in the

⁴ It is important to note that Cohen in both examples identifies 'pain' as part of welfare and 'ability to use limbs' as resources or capacities. It might seem fairly extreme and therefore less convincing that a person who is paralysed in both legs has no disadvantage in *welfare* as well. Less extreme examples might be more convincing. For instance, the man in the first example could be replaced by someone suffering from irritation of the eyes (welfare disadvantage) when he is in the sunlight although his sight is perfect. The second example could then be about another person who has no irritation at all but is colour blind (resource disadvantage).

⁵ Every involuntary disadvantage in welfare and in resources has to be equalized. Cohen cannot explain exactly what he means by advantage. But according to Sen advantage has not to be so far from what he calls the set of capabilities. In this sense it can be labelled midfare (which Cohen defines very similar to Sen): "*Midfare is constituted of states of the person produced by goods, states in virtue of which utility levels take the values they do. It is 'posterior' to 'having goods' and 'prior' to 'having utility'.*" (Cohen [1989, 943])

debate 'Equality of What?', Richard Arneson [1989; 1990; 1991], shares this common concern as he proposes a theory called equality of opportunities for welfare. Arneson admits that the equal opportunity ideal is primarily an attempt to capture the concern for personal responsibility: Assure people equal opportunities and hold them responsible for wasted chances. In a two-person world, equality of opportunity for welfare obtains when both persons face effectively equivalent decision trees. A *decision tree* maps all possible future sequences of choices among those options open to the person. In other words, a decision tree maps all possible life-histories of which eventually one and only one is realized. Two decision trees are *equivalent* if "*the expected value [that is, welfare] of each person's best (most prudent), second best, ... n-th best choice of options is the same. The opportunities persons encounter are ranked by the prospects for welfare they afford*" (Arneson [1990, 178]). Two equivalent decision trees are said to be *effectively* equivalent decision trees if the persons to whom these decisions trees pertain do not differ in "*their awareness of these options, their ability to choose reasonably among them, and the strength of character that enables a person to persist in carrying out a chosen decision.*" (Arneson [1989, 86]). This condition excludes that persons with the same equivalent decision tree have personal characteristics which impair the assessment and the realization of their decision tree. Equal opportunity for welfare, then, obtains when all persons face effectively equivalent arrays of options.

Although Arneson's proposal is a full-blooded welfarist approach it caters for the expensive tastes objection. Someone with expensive tastes will eventually be worse off in welfare terms than one without those extravagant tastes but this will not be the ground for any claim for compensation. It is not the actually obtained welfare level that gives rise to an equalizing compensation but the fact that one faced a decision tree that is not effectively equivalent to the decision tree pertaining to the other persons.

Many objections have been offered against this theory over time (e.g. Christiano [1991], Roemer [1996]) but it was one particular objection by Lippert-Rasmussen [1999] which forced Arneson to abandon his approach. The objection is important since it applies to all equality of opportunity theories⁶. The attack is on the equality of opportunity aspect, not on the welfarist aspect. The objection goes as follows. Suppose two, otherwise completely equal, persons only differ in their 10th best option: in the decision tree of Dorothy the 10th best option yields a higher welfare than in the decision tree of Charlotte. According to Arneson's theory, everything should be done to remove this difference between the respective options. It is, however, not sure that societies could reach this very expensive goal. But there is a more thoroughgoing objection: if Charlotte voluntarily chooses her second best option whereas Dorothy chooses her best option, then obviously Charlotte is worse off in welfare terms and might claim compensation because her 10th option was lower

⁶ Note however that the objection does not apply to theories which argue for (ex ante) equality of opportunity sets. In such context equal opportunity sets are provided to all irrespective of the choices and decisions of the individuals. Lippert-Rasmussen's argument is completely irrelevant in a context of opportunity sets. Arneson's theory rather equalizes opportunities ex post i.e. partly taking into account personal welfare levels and decisions as becomes clear in the example of Charlotte and Dorothy.

in welfare. There is nothing in Arneson's theory to prevent the validation of this claim. One should have learned something from Frankfurt [1969] however. An application of Frankfurt's insights to distributive justice shows

" ... that if an individual faces worse opportunities than others, but comes to a bad outcome for himself through his own will, which would not have varied had his options been better, then the absence of better options does not diminish the individual's responsibility for the bad quality of life his freely chosen actions produces." (Arneson [1999, 494])

This argument forces Arneson to concede and to regard the freedom to achieve welfare as a means to gaining outcomes that people reasonably value rather than as an independent ideal. From a moral point of view it is not the opportunities one gets that matter but the outcomes one's opportunities generate.

This is a first warning one should keep in mind while designing a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethics. One should try to avoid a theory of equal opportunity although it could be salvaged by limiting the equalisandum to some selected opportunities which should be equalized (e.g. Sen's equality of basic capabilities). One then needs a compelling theory to adequately select a limited number of opportunities which (outcomes) are valuable. What could do as well but is not considered to be feasible by Arneson, is an outcome-based theory that caters for personal responsibility.

The appealing feature of all equality of opportunity proposals is that they offer versions of egalitarianism which do not neglect individual responsibility. More could be said: the concept of personal responsibility decides what should be equalized; egalitarianism driven by responsibility. There seems to be a natural link between the notion of responsibility as voluntariness and some kind of equality of opportunity theory: equalize opportunities and let the people bear the consequences of the opportunities they voluntarily forego. Lippert-Rasmussen's argument seems, at least for Arneson, to point to a (first) crack in the intimate connection between the notion of responsibility and equality. Focusing on opportunities because it nicely fits in personal responsibility should definitely be qualified. It seems that there are important outcomes which on the one hand should be equalized, and on the other hand should never be lost even if one is taken to be responsible for the loss. More fundamentally, there seems to be a too close connection between responsibility as voluntariness and equality as the next section explains in more detail.

5. THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF FREE WILL.

The fact that egalitarianism leans so heavily on such a notion as responsibility by which metaphysics about free will and determinism is introduced in questions of equality and distributive justice is highly problematic. The most common form of the metaphysical problem of free will is the threat posed by determinism to the freedom to act otherwise than one in fact did or will. Determinism holds that our actions are determined. Determinism however appears in a variety of forms: physical determinism, psychological determinism

(choices are determined by the pull of our instincts), economic determinism (man's life depends on his social and economic situation) and theological determinism.

The problem of free will is particularly threatening to the class of opportunity-egalitarian theories⁷. What this class requires is not equality of individuals' final achievements but equality of the individual opportunities to reach a final achievement. The opportunities from which each individual can choose freely what he prefers should be equally distributed. Once the opportunities to reach a valuable outcome have been equally distributed, which particular opportunity, from those open to her, the individual chooses, is outside the scope of justice. But: Should one then also equalize the opportunities of someone who has deliberately destroyed his opportunities? And what if a disaster has harmed someone's opportunities? Each opportunity-egalitarian theory should therefore have a cutting edge: Inequalities of opportunities due to factors beyond the individual responsibility are inequitable and to be compensated by society, whereas inequalities of opportunities due to personal responsibility are equitable and not to be compensated. Basically, one is held responsible for (the consequences of) what stems from the free will.

This responsibility cut requires that every situation or outcome should be judged from a metaphysical point of view in order to determine whether a particular choice is the result of the exercise of free will or not. Such judgements are not only highly inappropriate but also practically impossible.

But can one really sustain this distinction between what is beyond and what is within our free will? What is called laziness can also be considered as a defect like lameness, which may be present from birth or inflicted by mishandling in the early years of life. In other words, is what we do the result of our free choice or is it determined by external factors (and to what extent?). This brings us to the heart of the problem. Is one ever able to say without hesitation that a particular situation came about because of the free choice of the person and he is for that very reason responsible for it? One can never be sure unless the problem of free will is settled which is for now definitely not the case.

Three remarks should be added. First of all, it seems that no line can ultimately be drawn between, on the one hand, those personal resources such as hereditary defect that is clearly not within a person's freedom of choice, and, on the other, those resources of achievement or failure for which people are commonly held responsible. If, then, all person's capabilities, physical, mental and emotional, are regarded as the product of heredity and environment, the person himself or herself remains as a centre of consciousness without distinguishing characteristics. So envisaged, every human being as such deserves as much esteem as any other, because all share a common humanity. The ideal of equality is reduced to the principle of equality of consideration -'All souls are equal in the sight of God'- which in the domain of distributive justice requires complete equal treatment of persons irrespective of personal responsibility⁸. In my view, equality of consideration is acceptable as an ideal of political

⁷ For recent surveys, see Fleurbaey [1998], Peragine [1999] and for a reconstruction of the philosophical debate on opportunity egalitarianism, see Roemer [1996].

⁸ This is the 'slippery slope' discussed by Roemer [1985, 176-178; 1986, 751-784].

equality but is unsuitable as an ideal of distributional or economic equality which is part of justice⁹. I indeed agree with the distinction between justice-based and non-justice-based justifications of equality and the possibility of consistent coexistence of both.

"... there are two different kinds of valuable equality, one connected with justice, and the other standing independently of it. Equality of the first kind is distributive in nature. It specifies that benefits of a certain kind - rights for instance - should be distributed equally, because justice requires this. The second kind of equality is not in this sense distributive. It does not specify directly any distribution of rights or resources. Instead it identifies a social ideal, the ideal of a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals, in other words a society that is not marked by status divisions such that one can place different people in hierarchically ranked categories, in different classes for instance. We can call this second kind of equality equality of status, or simply social equality." (Miller [1997, 224])

Second, is a theory of equality of outcome a valuable alternative? Theories of equality of outcomes are vulnerable to a commonly stated conflict between equality and freedom. If theories aim at equalizing outcomes as income, wealth, welfare and succeed, one might ask what in such a situation is left of the personal freedom of choice? What is left of our freedom if everything we have is the same? Any individual act of choice generating inequality of the equalisandum will immediately induce the inequality to be wiped out. Theories of equality of opportunity aim at avoiding this conflict between equality and freedom by equalizing the set of options and holding agents responsible for the results of their choice made afterwards.

Third, one should not overlook a related problem. The introduction of a responsibility cut implies that what should be equalized is determined by the notion of responsibility one holds. Responsibility determines the equalisandum. In the case one considers responsibility as voluntariness it is a factual distinction that becomes a moral distinction. For many moralists, this is unacceptable (Rawls [1971], Anderson [1999]). Nature as such cannot be normative. The distribution of nature's fortune is neither just or unjust, good or bad. Natural distinctions as e.g. between men and women, black and white, are morally neutral. One cannot adequately build an ethical distinction upon distinctions made by nature or fate since such principle leads us to quite unacceptable conclusions. To claim for instance that because human beings are given teeth by nature they ought to eat meat (or hard food) is as unacceptable as to claim that surgery should be forbidden because it is unnatural to remove elements from the body. Then it is equally risky to derive moral conclusions from the degree of freedom nature (or fate or any other metaphysical authority) gives to us in any particular case¹⁰.

⁹ On the distinction between political equality and distributional equality, see Cohen [2000]; Miller [1997].

¹⁰ This objection applies both to moral judgments and to the justification of outcomes. Whatever stems from nature is neutral in any case.

6. RESPONSIBILITY BY DELEGATION.

6.1. The Problem of Free Will: A Non-Metaphysical Approach.

Are the problems of free will in any sense fatal for the ideal of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism? I do not think so. Scanlon [1975, 1988] examines the possibility of egalitarianism that is sensitive to differences in needs and at the same time includes personal responsibility in a non-metaphysical manner. He defends that, even if the Causal Thesis is true¹¹, people can be held responsible under the conditions I will discuss below. It is called a non-metaphysical approach because the assignment of responsibility to persons does not depend on metaphysical distinctions. He simply takes the metaphysical situation for granted and assigns responsibility by delegation.

Scanlon [1975, 1986] takes account of differences in needs by choosing objective welfare as the proper equalisandum. According to the view that objective welfare is the proper equalisandum offensive preferences and expensive tastes are excluded directly by objective evaluations. On the basis of those objective judgements, they do not have a high priority in a distribution problem. They should be excluded, not as in Rawls' proposal because people can be held responsible for them, but because they are less urgent. That people can develop some preferences and can be held responsible for them, should only mean that people can do without them; they are not necessities and so lose their urgency. Responsibility for preferences in itself is not a reason for rejecting claims, it is at most a sign of being not very urgent if one considers objective welfare as equalisandum.

Subjective judgements are not to be seen as unimportant altogether, but their value is determined by objective judgements. This view is illustrated by Scanlon in taking it for granted that we judge a claim for help for building a religious monument by somebody who foregoes a decent diet for it, not a priori as strong as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat. Someone's own judgement on the importance of claims is not decisive. To be clear, it is not held by Scanlon that both claims, the one for help for building and the one for obtaining food, should not count as the same degree of urgency, but it is not a priori necessarily so because of their being subjective evaluations. The degree of urgency depends on the objective value of such a building.

Of course, this proposal has to be supplied with a theory that counts for objective judgements. Scanlon mentions two sources for such objective judgements, ethical naturalism and conventionalism. The latter he thinks the most plausible one because in conventionalism consensus has a morally proper place, which is denied in the former. Scanlon strongly

¹¹ Scanlon [1988] urges that it is not determinism that is the main problem of Free Will but the Causal Thesis: the thesis that the events which are human actions, thoughts and decisions are linked to antecedents by causal laws as deterministic as those governing other goings-on in the universe (i.e. there is an indeterminacy due to change factors of the sort involved in other natural processes, opposite to determinism).

believes that all parties involved in reaching agreement or consensus about moral matters are not merely seeking self-interested advantage but are also moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. Such contractualist view, that people are willing to modify private demands in order to find a basis of justification that others also have reason to accept, goes back to Rousseau¹².

Does Scanlon exclude responsibility from playing a role in egalitarian ethics? He certainly rejects what he calls the forfeiture view which holds that a person to whom a certain outcome was available, but who knowingly and voluntarily passed it up, cannot complain about not having it. In a crucial passage -which is cited below- he rejects the forfeiture view and develops at the same time his own approach.

"From the fact that a person chose, under good conditions, to take a risk, we may conclude that he alone is responsible for what happens to him as a result. But this conclusion need not be seen as a reflection of the special legitimating force of voluntary action. Rather, the fact that an outcome resulted from a person's choice under good conditions shows that he was given the choice and provided with good conditions for making it, and it is these facts which make it the case that he alone is responsible. A conscious decision to 'take the risk' is not necessary. ... [The Forfeiture View] also exaggerates the importance of the fact of choice relative to that of the conditions under which the choice was made. The Forfeiture View suggests that these conditions are important only insofar as they bear on the voluntariness of the choice. This is a mistake. The fact that a choice was voluntary does not always establish that we 'did enough' for an agent by placing him or her in the position from which the choice was made. Nor does the fact that an agent did not voluntarily choose an outcome, or choose to take a certain risk, establish that what resulted was not his fault." (Scanlon [1988, 196])

This view is known as 'responsibility by delegation' or as 'responsibility as attributability' as Scanlon [1998] labels it: we are responsible because we are given the choice and the government has made sufficiently large efforts to provide the good conditions for us to make responsible decisions. Whether we have control over these decisions is unimportant. Whether we have taken the choice voluntarily is unimportant. The matter is whether a society gives to its citizens the good conditions to make decisions of which the society decides that agents are responsible for the outcomes. According to this view neither control nor voluntariness nor even personal fault are the distinctive elements for the assessment of the rights and obligations of situations and outcomes. The whole weight lies on the shoulders of what society does. This means that the voluntariness of an act underlying the current consequences has no distinctive force in moral matters of the kind we are discussing here. Responsibility is not to be traced back to metaphysical distinctions but is simply assigned by society. In sum, contrary to equality of opportunity theories, Scanlon holds that responsibility is not densely interwoven in the tissue of egalitarian ideas; responsibility and equality are disconnected at the conceptual level.

¹² See Scanlon [1982, 1998] for an extensive elaboration of his contractualist approach.

6.2. Responsibility by Delegation: A Second Argument.

Responsibility has been interwoven in the ethics of equality. In the previous paragraph we saw that Scanlon loosens the close connection between responsibility and equality. Hartkamp [1999] pursues this line of thinking. He asserts that what is valuable for people is also worthwhile to be distributed equally.

"These considerations lead me to the suggestion that possibilities to perform actions, to effectuate choices, or to enjoy situations are the proper candidates for equalisanda. One could call these liberties. These should be equalised. Liberties are those choices, actions and possibilities that are considered to be valuable; they are the normal elements of a person's life and so in a sense necessities for a normal way of life. That they are valuable is the reason that they should be possible for all. Because of that, they are subsumed under the name of liberties and not the other way round. We should care that they are equalised. Something is an equalisandum in virtue of being valuable and not because of a special characteristic." (Hartkamp [1999, 147])¹³.

The argument is of course determined by what one considers to make life valuable, i.e. what counts as a normal life. The ideas on what is valuable are necessarily presupposed. Hartkamp clearly wants to avoid that one wrong choice should have harsh consequences as when responsibility forfeits any claim on compensation for disadvantages due to one's own choices. The natural jungle then would be replaced by the social jungle. It seems as if the advocates of incorporating responsibility into the equalisandum have persons in mind who bring disadvantages onto themselves by performing actions in a reckless way. Instead of denying them medical help or compensation for the disadvantages, it could be argued they should be helped in overcoming this reckless behaviour. Holding people responsible for some disadvantages can be interpreted as deliberately punishing people which immediately raises questions about the humanity, the proportionality and the purpose of the punishment. One liberty that looks important to Hartkamp, with whose view I sympathize on this point, is the liberty to make some mistakes. A world in which everybody is neurotically anxious avoiding mistakes and in which every mistake results in a disadvantage, is awful. There should be some liberty for performing mistakes and some forgiveness. How much depends on society's view on that matter.

In short, the view that what is valuable is also an equalisandum results in the fact that responsibility has merely a secondary role in equality. Society decides upon the set of liberties for which one should never be held responsible whereas for all the remaining domains of life responsibility is assumed. Responsibility's role in equality is dependent upon the judgement on the value of choice and responsibility and on some idea about to what degree someone should suffer from his wrong actions as a kind of punishment in order to discourage these actions. If actions or activities are considered valuable, these should be possible to be performed without serious consequences. If someone suffers from a serious

13 Remark that he distinguishes equality of liberties from equality of opportunity: opportunities are, according to Hartkamp, not concerned with the value of what they are the opportunity for. On the other hand, what is called liberties seems to me very similar to Sen's capabilities.

health condition due to himself, for instance because he saved a child, he should be helped and compensated for the costs of treatment, despite the fact he brought the serious condition onto himself, because saving a child is a valuable element of life.

6.3. Responsibility by Delegation: More Support.

In a survey article Fleurbaey [1998] examines in a comprehensive way the various distinctions which are relevant for responsibility-sensitive ethics. He first discusses the distinction between responsibility attributed on the basis of control and responsibility attributed on the basis of delegation.

"Responsibility by delegation, on the contrary, is assigned to an agent, on a particular variable when the rest of society decides not to spend any resource on the value obtained by the individual for this variable. This does not mean that social intervention does not interfere with the fate of this variable, but only that this fate is not a part of any direct social objective. The individual is left to his own means if he decides to drive this variable to a better level. Responsibility by delegation can be given quite independently of the actual degree of control of the individual over the variable." (Fleurbaey [1998, 208])

A variable stands here for any personal characteristic or outcome. Fleurbaey [1995d, 1998] suggests to restrict responsibility to outcomes (as opposed to opportunities) and to grant it by delegation. He suggests to take selected functionings, as health care, shelter and social integration, as the relevant equalisandum. These or other functionings should be selected by society. This criterium may result in compensation even when individuals are causally responsible (all individuals who have car accidents will receive the medical assistance they need, given that health is a selected functioning). Symmetrically, there will be no compensation outside the basic functionings even in the absence of responsibility.

Fleurbaey finally refutes two objections which can be raised against responsibility by delegation. First, advocates of equal opportunity argue that if hard determinism were true, then full equality of outcome should be the social goal. Fleurbaey replies that respect for a private sphere in which the individual can form plans and try to realize them is fundamental to the kind of society desired by many people nowadays.

"Whatever the actual degree of freedom of the will enjoyed by individuals, it is unreasonable to consider social equality going beyond the few basic functionings which are significant in social interactions. If individuals are not free from deterministic causation, at least should they be free from social scrutiny and interference in intimate functionings such as satisfaction, life-style, etc." (Fleurbaey [1998, 230])

A second objection is that compensating individuals who behave recklessly by deliberately wasting opportunities, as far as selected functions are concerned, contradicts a basic moral intuition. One could however counter this objection with an appeal to own intuitions. Should one really refuse crashed reckless drivers any professional medical care leaving them to the mercy of untrained volunteers? Should losing gamblers be refused shelter and food by

official organizations for aid to the poor and homeless? Should the fire brigade stay put when one's house is burning down because she is responsible for not extinguishing a candle? I suspect that intuition supports restoring equality of selected functionings rather than leaving the people in these examples in poor and pitiful conditions.

Even if one defends that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is universal, e.g. with an appeal to the result of bargaining under some kind of veil of ignorance (Scanlon [1998]), the decision on the concrete location of the responsibility cut is often considered as the duty of the democratic institutions acting in respect for the hierarchy of moral ideals¹⁴. When the assignment of responsibility is by political 'consensus', one might object that changes in the overall economic situation might lead to changes in the egalitarian ideal and 'second best' considerations might play a role¹⁵. For instance, if a society's economic overall situation declines, it is likely that the set of selected functionings the involved parties agree upon diminishes as well. Or, in the Scanlonian approach, that people reach a consensus on a list with fewer objective urgencies compared with the list during prosperous times. That an egalitarian ideal that integrates the notion of responsibility by delegation basically is an economic driven egalitarian ideal is, I believe, the main objection one might raise against it. The extent of egalitarianism might well be proportional to the overall level of prosperity and wealth. However, this is neither a new nor a threatening diagnosis. Economics is about surviving and in situations of extreme poverty, the first (and often only) thing that matters is filling one's stomach. Building a moral society or civilization is only possible when the community encounters prosperity and wealth. This has nothing to do with ethical relativism but everything with ethical realism, i.e. accepting the place of egalitarianism within the hierarchy of moral ideals. On the other hand, the ideal of equality is in essence a moral ideal attuned to scarcity. Equality will not be a topic if one faces complete abundance of goods and services¹⁶. Everyone could have what he wants, how bizarre his tastes may be, how great his needs may be, how outrageous the preferences, voluntary choices or even gambles may be. There should always be enough. Equality is a principle of distribution and distribution is only necessary in times of scarcity. So, the dependence of equality on the economical situation is only a part of a much broader topic of the relationship between prosperity and moral ideals.

7. A RESPONSIBILITY-SENSITIVE EGALITARIAN PROPOSAL.

¹⁴ Although I believe that such hierarchy of ideals is part of the social contract, it is outside the scope of this text to argue this through.

¹⁵ Since some information is only privately known, people engaged in the search for consensus about distributive principles will have incentives to hide or misrepresent information in order to promote their own objectives. Dasgupta [1982] argues that certain regions of decision-making should be private and even should be encouraged if one were to promote distributive justice. He describes that second-best solutions exist if people have such personal freedom and if the government has at least some knowledge about some variables (such as hours worked (effort), innate ability or wages).

¹⁶ See Hume [1740, 267-268]: " 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants that justice derives its origin."

Throughout this text I have taken up several positions with respect to distinct topics inherent to any egalitarian theory that intends to incorporate the notion of personal responsibility. Now, I bring these positions together into a particular proposal of responsibility-sensitive egalitarian theory.

First of all, I have explained that too often the discussion on the concept of responsibility in egalitarian theories is in terms of personal responsibility which distorts the debate. With the introduction of the distinction between the moral appraisal of agents and the justification of outcomes I have tried to bring back the discussion to its right perspective. The worse-off are not morally blameworthy only because they are worse off, even when they have chosen freely and knowingly for that situation. It may be that their bad situation came about after the performance of a highly praiseworthy act. It is quite another thing to say whether the outcomes are justified or not. I think that responsibility in egalitarian theories should refer to the latter, that is, the assessment of the rights and obligations after an act has been performed.

Second, the former distinction does not withdraw the moral dimension of the ideal of equality. I think the opposite is true. I clearly state that an unequal distribution of what is valuable in life is not merely an empirical fact but may also be bad or unjust. I think responsibility-sensitive egalitarians are committed to the view that inequality of the chosen equalisandum is bad or unjust if one cannot be held responsible for it. All this means that the ideal of equality regains its moral status usually as part of a theory of justice.

Third, as I envisage the ideal of distributional equality as part of a theory of justice there might exist differences between persons that justify an unequal treatment. This, however, does not prevent to adhere at the same time an ideal of political equality that considers all souls as equals because I find it positively valuable that absolute equality should be affirmed in this area.

Fourth, the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethics as I see it can be formulated as follows: it is bad (unfair or unjust) if there is inequality of the equalisandum among individuals due to factors which are beyond the personal responsibility of the individuals; whereas it is considered just and fair if inequality is due to the exertion of personal responsibility. The first part of the principle is sometimes called the Principle of Compensation (Fleurbaey [1995]); the latter part, the Principle of Natural Reward (Fleurbaey [1995]), or the Principle of Responsibility (Barry [1991]). It is evident that both principles remain empty boxes, unless one defines precisely what are the factors within and beyond individual responsibility. Additionally, a second - related but distinct - question has to be answered: What should be equalized?

I have discussed the ideas that responsibility determines the equalisandum (Cohen, Arneson e.g.). Since they consider responsibility as voluntariness, inequalities of the equalisandum which do not arise from voluntary choices, i.e. for which people are not responsible, must be eliminated. Those authors assign responsibility for what emerges from the free will but they differ in the precise 'responsibility cut' between what has to be seen as coming from free will and what has not. It seems that according to Dworkin preferences or, more generally,

anything that constitutes the personal identity originate in the will. Cohen thinks that the dividing line is between voluntary and involuntary disadvantages. Anyway, incorporating responsibility as voluntariness in the equalisandum is a tremendously tricky task: you soon get stuck in disentangling metaphysical distinctions. Moreover, whether the situation of which one wants to cancel out the inequality is valuable in itself is not important. I have argued that the value of the equalisandum does matter. Of course, this proposal has to be supplied with a theory that counts for value judgements. I have mentioned various proposals which establish what is valuable for a normal life and therefore should be equalized: liberties (Hartkamp), basic capabilities (Sen), selected functionings (Fleurbaey) or that what has objective urgency (Scanlon).

The view that what is valuable determines the equalisandum (and not: what came about involuntarily should be equalized and is therefore valuable) results in the fact that responsibility has an independent role in equality. Therefore, I prefer to call this proposal responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism properly naming both notions separately. I have provided three arguments for what is called 'responsibility by delegation'. Against responsibility as voluntariness Scanlon argued that the moral ground of responsibility does not stem from the free will because we are given the choice and are provided with the good conditions to choose. Hartkamp argues that we should have the right to make mistakes and that inequalities should not be used as a kind of punishment. Fleurbaey pleads moreover for respect for a private sphere in which the individual can make his own life project. This comes close to my objection against responsibility as voluntariness that it requires metaphysical judgements.

My position can be summarized as follows. I start with the dichotomy that people should be kept responsible for some outcomes and not for other. On the one hand, responsibility should have an upper bound above which one should never bear the consequences of one's actions: the right to make mistakes with respect to what is valuable for a normal life. I believe that equal selected functionings - which are outcomes, not opportunities - should be guaranteed by the society in any case (e.g. a decent diet, a certain degree of health care, minimal shelter, basic education). On the other hand, some aspects of life should be left at the disposal of the agents. Government should only create the good conditions for the individuals to make responsible choices. This dichotomy implicitly allows for different degrees of (shared) responsibility which is a common view among people but is rarely discussed in a systematic and theoretic way. For instance, for an intermediate class of less urgent functionings the society should only provide equality of opportunity to obtain these functionings (capabilities thus, for instance, further education, being able to engage in sports). In short, almost all responsibility w.r.t. the fate of the set of selected functionings lies on the shoulders of the government; almost all responsibility w.r.t. the second class of variables is with the individual person; and finally the intermediate class of selected capabilities is an eminent example of a shared responsibility.

The mere existence of the two opposite positions and a continuum in between seems to me to be universal. Evidently the question arises how to decide which aspects of life should be in the first, second or intermediate class. I believe that an approach that aims at finding consensus in a systematic and rational way in moral matters is the most suitable way to

decide upon the place of this non-metaphysical responsibility cut. Moral ideals are often strong, powerful and fundamentally not attuned to coexistence with other ideals. A moral community which decides upon which ideals to accept must take the burden to define exactly the limits and the role of the moral ideals it likes to share. Any normative system, any system of moral ideals, even as appealing and apt as the adage of the French Revolution is not an appeal to fulfill each separate maxim. The three ideals "*Egalité, liberté et fraternité*" are in pure and unadulterated form incompatible. To bring economic equality some must be forced to hand over money to the authorities in order to be redistributed hereby offending personal liberties (in the name of fraternity). Also the conflict between equality and freedom is central to this debate. Indeed, freedom is inherently connected to responsibility. What would freedom mean if one could not obtain, maintain, retain the fruits of free choices or the consequences of free thinking? But freedom as responsibility inevitably clashes with the ideal of equality since freedom is vacuous if different consequences of differing choices are wiped out. The ideal of equality puts pressure on the ideal of freedom and vice versa. Ideals are often so powerful that they do not tolerate other ideals. Communities have to strike the right balance and agree upon the limits one puts on the respective ideals to build a viable community-tailored normative system.

REFERENCES.

- ANDERSON, E.S., *What Is the Point of Equality*, in *Ethics* 109 (1999), 287-337.
- ARNESON, R.J., *Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare*, in *Philosophical Studies* 56 (1989), 77-93.
- ARNESON, R.J., *Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare*, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 19 (1990), 158-194.
- ARNESON, R.J., *A Defence of Equal Opportunity for Welfare*, in *Philosophical Studies* 62 (1991), 187-195.
- ARNESON, R.J., *Debate: Equality of Opportunity for Welfare: Defended and Recanted*, in *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7 (1999), 488-497.
- BARRY, B., *Chance, Choice and Justice*, in Barry, B., *Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory*, Volume 2, 1991, Oxford U.P.
- CHRISTIANO, T., *Difficulties with the Principle of Equal Opportunity for Welfare*, in *Philosophical Studies* 62 (1991), 179-185.
- COHEN, G.A., *On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice*, in *Ethics* 99 (1989), 906-944.
- COHEN, G.A., *Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities*, in *Recherches Economiques de Louvain* 56 (1990), 357-382.
- COHEN, G.A., *Incentives, Inequality and Community. Tanner Lectures on Human Values XIII*, Salt Lake City, 1992, 263-329.
- COHEN, G.A., *If You Are A Egalitarian, How come You're So Rich?*, in *Journal of Ethics* 4 (2000), 1-26.
- DASGUPTA, P., *Utilitarianism, Information, and Rights*, in Sen, A.K. & Williams, B., *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge, 1982, 199-218.
- DWORKIN, R., *What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources*, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10 (1981), 283-345.
- FLEURBAEY, M., *Equality and Responsibility*, in *European Economic Review* 39 (1995), 683-689.
- FLEURBAEY, M., *Equality Among Responsible Individuals*, in Gravel, N., Fleurbaey, M., Laslier, J.F. & Trannoy, A., *Freedom in Economics*, Routledge, 1998, 76-92.

- FRANKFURT, H., *Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility*, in *Journal of Philosophy* 46 (1969), 829-839.
- HARTKAMP, S.F., *Equality; A Moral Realistic View*, Ph.D. Groningen, 1999.
- HUME, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1740. Edition: A New London Reprint, 1886.
- LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, K., *Debate: Arneson on Equality of Opportunity for Welfare*, in *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7 (1999), 478-487.
- MILLER, D., *Equality and Justice*, in *Ratio* 10 (1997), 222-237.
- PERAGINE, V., *The Distribution and Redistribution of Opportunity*, in *Journal of Economic Surveys* 13 (1999), 37-69.
- RAWLS, J., *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford, 1971.
- RAWLS, J., *Fairness to Goodness*, 1975.
- ROEMER, J.E., *Equality of Talent*, in *Economics and Philosophy* 1 (1985), 151-188.
- ROEMER, J.E., *Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare*, in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 101 (1986), 751-784.
- ROEMER, J.E., *Theories of Distributive Justice*, Harvard, 1996.
- SCANLON, T.M., *Preference and Urgency*, in *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (1975) 655-669 .
- SCANLON, T.M., *Contractualism and Utilitarianism*, in Sen, A.K. & Williams, B. (eds.), *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge, 1982, 103-128.
- SCANLON, T.M., *Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A Forced Marriage?*, in *Ethics* 97 (1986), 111-118.
- SCANLON, T.M., *The Significance of Choice. Tanner Lectures on Human Values XIII*, Salt Lake City, 1988, 149-216.
- SCANLON, T.M., *What We Owe Each Other*, Harvard U.P., 1998.
- SEN, A.K., *Equality of What? Tanner Lectures on Human Values I*, Salt Lake City, 1980, 195-220.
- SEN, A.K., *Commodities and Capabilities*, Amsterdam, 1985.
- TEMKIN, L., *Inequality*, Oxford, 1993.