Université de Montréal

Defamiliarization in A Tale of a Tub

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Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures
en vue de l'obtention du grade de
maître en études anglaises

novembre 2000

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures

Ce mémoire intitulé :
Defamiliarization in A Tale of a Tub

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a été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

président-rapporteur

ecteur de recherches

..... membre du jury

mémoire accepté le : ..... 12 nov. 2000 .....

"I'm sorry, Mr. Kippling, but you don't know how to use the English language"

-Editor of the San Francisco Examiner, *informing Rudyard Kipling (who had had one article published in the newspaper) that he needn't bother submitting a second, 1889(The Experts Speak.* Cerf, Christopher and Victor Navasky eds. New York: Villard Revised ed., 1998).

to

my daughter Elisabeth

and her dedicated mother, Brigitte,

and

to my inimitable Mentor,

Professor W. Kinsley.

Résumé:

Ce mémoire tient à démontrer comment Swift perçoit le monde des auteurs et éditeurs dixuitièmistes, vu au-travers du paradigme de la défamiliarisation shklovskienne dans le *Conte du Tonneau* - un conte reconnu en qualité de quintessence ménippéenne - par le biais de la 'focalisation(foregrounding), 'défacilitation'. 'éloignement' ('estrangement' en anglais, comportant aussi la notion de rendre étrange), ainsi que d'autres techniques défamiliarisantes. Dans l'accomplissement de cette tâche, après une identification sommaire de la satire, de la satire ménippée ainsi que de la défamiliarisation, je réconcilie les tropes ménippéens aux artifices de la défamiliarisation, les prouvant ultîmement et intîmement liés dans plusieurs passages du *Conte,* tout en démontrant comment Swift, à l'aide de ces nouvelles perspectives, entrevoit le monde des auteurs et éditeurs dixuitièmistes, laquelle démonstration est complétée et finalisée dans les dernier chapîtres, son principal actif étant logé dans la Tête, comme il en est pour la baleine. L'exercice permet également de saisir d'une clarté étonnante le point de vue de Swift en focalisant notre attention sur des tropes défamiliarisantes méconnues qui ont pourtant toujours fait partie intégrale de la littérature, et de les amener finalement au rang de la reconnaissance littéraire.

Le texte du présent Mémoire adhère aux traditions ménippéennes et défamiliarisantes: il adopte la forme de la baleine (tête, queue, et palmes), tête et queue évidentes, les palmes évoquant son moteur, son corps se dissimulant au sein de ses deux premiers éléments; il pro-

met aussi de faire le point sans jamais y parvenir ouvertement, malgré qu'il y arrive dans son ensemble; il badine avec les conventions livresques ainsi qu'avec certaines citations étrangères, sollicitant une recherche de la part du lecteur qui, non seulement se fait balader au gré du vent mais qui, quelques fois, est mis sur une fausse piste, et se voit aussi invité malgré lui à remplir le rôle d'éditeur, requérant sa participation active - le tout déréglant sa lecture robotique du texte grâce aux bienfaits des artifices conjoints de la satire ménippéenne et de la 'défamiliarisation' .

Abstract:

This thesis wishes to show how Swift views the world of eighteenth-century authors and booksellers through Shklovsky's defamiliarization paradigm in the *Tale* - itself a recognised quintessential Menippean satire - through foregrounding, defacilitation, estrangement and other defamiliarizing techniques. In so doing, and after a summary identification of the genres of satire, Menippean satire and defamiliarization, I reconcile Menippean ploys to the defamiliarization tropes to find them ultimately and intimately related in numerous passages of the *Tale*, all the while demonstrating how Swift views the world of eighteenth-century authors and booksellers through new perspectives, which demonstration is complemented and finalised in the last chapters, its main part lodged in the Head, as it is with the whale. The exercise also enables us to view Swift's perceptions with strange clarity by focusing our attention on the less known defamiliarization tropes that have always been part and parcel of literature, and bringing them upstage under the spotlight.

The thesis itself follows Menippean and defamiliarization traditions: it is shaped like a whale (head, tail and flukes), the head and the tail obvious with the flukes as its motor, its incorporated body almost indistinguishable from its symbiotic parts; it also promises to come to the point without never really doing so obviously, though it does as a reunited text; some book conventions are trifled with, along with a few quotations other than in Modern English requiring the reader to search for their translation elsewhere, the reader not only sent back and forth, sometimes on a red-herring, but also invited to act as an editor, demanding his active participation in the process, all of the above jarring

automatic responses to reading via the joint Menippean and defamiliarization tropes.

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The Head:

The Tail:

The Flukes:

List of abbreviations:

GT: Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings.
Anatomy: Anatomy of Criticism; Four Essays.
Symposium: "The Concept of the Persona in Satire: A Symposium"(In *Satura).*
MS: Eric McLuhan's "On Menippean Satire".
Muse: The Muse of Satire.
Norton 1: The Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol.1.
Norton 2: The Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol. 2.
Norton Poetry: The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry.
Renaissance: The Oxford Anthology of English Literature; *The Literature of Renaissance England.*
Satura: Satura: Ein Kompendium moderner Studien zur Satire.

.....*.....

The Articles are indexed in the Bibliography.

First,

it is generally affirmed, or confess'd that

Learning *puffeth Men up*:

and Secondly,

they proved it by the following Syllogism;

Words are but Wind; and Learning is nothing but Words;

Ergo,

Learning is nothing but Wind

(Tale, 153*).*

The Head

Foreword:

Both "Defamiliarization" and "Menippean satire" lend themselves to wide speculations owing to their individual spacious nature. In the case of defamiliarization, Shklovsky's own style sets the tone:

> His style is intensely personal; he is a leisurely storyteller rather than a scholar. His paragraphs are short; they frequently amount to one sentence, in the biblical fashion. He jumps from subject to subject without providing customary links; he likes to quote and to get his point through by juxtaposing quotations rather than by commentary. His most significant remarks are dropped casually at the places one least expects them(Thomson, 26).

A careful reader might overcome this difficulty were it not for the added complication that Shklovsky never clearly formulates his arguments:

> Notwithstanding all the idealistic derivations of Sklovskij [sic], it must be emphasised that he seldom brought his arguments to their logical conclusions. He was a great master in blurring the consistency of these arguments(ibid, 70).

Were it not for Stacy and Thomson's penetrating insights into Shklovsky's essence, my attempt at *defamiliarization* in regard to *The Tale* would have been laborious if not unrealisable.

The third difficulty lies in the inherent pitfall of trying to encapsulate such a vast concept as Menippean Satire; this, however, does not represent a major threat since Bakhtin, Frye and Korkorwsky have already paved the way. I also use Eric McLuhan's excellent yet unpublished M.S. in which, ironically enough, he proposes to rename Menippean satire *cynical*, all the while berating Frye for attempting to christen it *anatomy*, much to Korkovsky's exasperation, while Bakhtin fancies *menippea*,

and other worthy critics wish it *Lucianic*; a healthy symptom, as Menippists will attack anything, even their own - as McLuhan succinctly puts it:

> They were a most unphilosophical and unsentimental lot: they never formed or joined a school -- unlike Stoics or Epicureans or Phenomenologists or post modern deconstructionists, for example -- and regularly attacked each other and even their own followers(*MS,*14).

According to this postulate, Menippists are anything but sycophants; more on this in Chapter 2.

For the sake of clarity on such terms such as "satire", "Menippean satire" and "defamiliarization", they are reviewed at the onset so that those unfamiliar with some of the terms - or for whom the notions might ring distant bells - may follow the arguments comfortably and hopefully refute some of them, proposing better ones for the General Benefit of Mankind.

Introduction.

A Tale of a Tub is generally considered a quintessential Menippean satire. One purpose of Menippean satire, according to Eric McLuhan, is to wake up its readers and make them see the world differently. Viktor Shklovsky's concept of defamiliarization can make one see more clearly the new perspectives through which Swift views the familiar world of eighteenth-century authors and booksellers. The exercise also demonstrates that the manifold applications of defamiliarization processes have always been lock, stock and barrel of the Menippean arsenal.

I first propose a broad and expeditious introduction to satire to swiftly focus on the Menippean genre, followed by an overview of Shklovsky's defamiliarization process, after which I explore the *Tale* according to Shklovskian logic, concentrating on the world of eighteenth-century authors and booksellers.

Much has been written on Swift but no critical analysis on the *Tale* has ever applied Shklovsky's concept of defamiliarization to it. On the other hand, Shklovsky's defamiliarization theory has been used by many on various other Menippean authors such as Peacock, Burton, Rabelais, Voltaiire, et al, but no critical essay to date has yet connected Menippean Satire with Defamiliarization -- a link our Professor Kinsley established -- and which, in his preoccupation with cynicism, McLuhan almost secured but brushed off as "recent", urging us to "keep our gaze firmly on fixed on Cynicism as providing the deep structure on Menippism"(*MS,* 80-1). It is rather ironic that McLuhan should come so close to Shklovsky's *ostranenie priem* to dismiss it in favour of Frye's "displace-

ment" theory - which is but another synonym for "defamiliarization". Stacy, a renowned Shklovskian scholar, says that "the word *ostranenie* [...] is also rendered into English as 'estrangement', 'alienation' and 'defamiliarization'"(Stacy, 3). As we understand the governing principle of "defamiliarization", it becomes transparent that conceptual key-words such as "distancing", "displacement" or any other tropes that jar the reader from robotism should be recognised as shipmates. Why such a remarkable critic as Frye disregarded Shklovsky altogether escapes me , especially when he takes the trouble to redefine "displacement" in more than six pages(*Anatomy,* 136-38; 155-56; 188; 190), almost repeating Shklovsky but for the inclusion of reader responsibility:

> The culture of the past is not only the memory of mankind, but our own buried life, and study of it leads to a recognition scene, a discovery in which we see, not our past lives, but the total cultural form of our present life. It is not only the poet but his reader who is subject to the obligation to "make it new"(*Anatomy,* 346).

To "make it new" is what defamiliarization is about, a process the eminent Ezra Pound -who also befriended Windham Lewis- not only understood but chose "make it new for the present day" as his motto. Another of Pound's friends, Robert Frost, born and raised in San Francisco until the age of eleven, whose very life spells *defamiliarization,* passed himself off as a patristic New Englander, going as far as changing his speech pattern from Western to Eastern in the recreation of his identity(*Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry,* 329;190-94).

Ignorance or dismissal of Shklovsky's works is not new, unfortunately, as Stacy observes that

> it is extremely unusual to find, in the critical literature on writers who employ something like the Tolstoyan type of irony - i.e., on writers such as Huxley, Buechner, Golding, Durrell or Nabokov, or in stylistic studies of their individual novels - references either to Shklovsky and *ostranenie* or even to defamiliarization in a more general sense, viz., enhancing the "effect by presenting ordinary things in an unusual form or in an unusual perspective". In studies of Tolstoyan defamiliarization by Slavists, of course, the name of Shklovsky is always mentioned, and quite frequently such names as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Swift - or even Kafka are referred to (Stacy, 6).

Frye argues that the "intellectual structure built up from the story makes for violent dislocations"(*Anatomy,* 310). Unless mistaken, Frye's 'dislocation' and Shklovsky's defamiliarization tropes of 'making strange' all spell *distopia*, whether the dislocation occurs by alienation, defacilitation, deformation, disautomatisation, dishabituation, distancing, estrangement, foregrounding, fragmentariness, and so on(c.f.: p.76 below); whichever artifice is applied will invariably result in a *dislocation,* the disturbing effect *ostranenie* lives for. Far from being the sole culprit in disregarding Shklovsky, Frye nevertheless writes about defamiliarization: "That is why he [the satirist] so often gives to ordinary life a logical and self-consistent shift of perspective" (*Anatomy,* 234). Isn't this generic to defamiliarization in terms of *alienation, defacilitation* &c.? Frye perseveres:

> When we fall back from the outworks of faith and reason to the tangible realities of the senses, satire follows us up. A slight shift of perspective, a different tinge in the emotional colouring, and the solid earth becomes an intolerable horror(ibid, 235).

McLuhan toes Frye's line that "dislocation" applies to 'digression', as I do, yet digressions are but a symptom of an author's activity in *making strange*; the rhetorical ploy of dislocation may be obtained in a number

of ways through a slight shift in time, place, form, event, characters, tone - just about anything under the sun moon and stars can be dislocated or made to appear strange by a resourceful writer. Digressions represent but one of the manifold defamiliarization tropes that rescue a somnambulistic reader from the danger of automatisation (repetition in time and space), as the chapter on Defamiliarization concludes, because it keeps its reader awake:

> This key role of time in Shlovskij's [isic]theory (a first time, an aes thetic expansion of duration) is later complemented by his concept of device as the "rotation" of an object in the semantic space (like "turning a log on the fire"), the shifting of the object out of its typical association into radically different ones, thus presenting a fresh and uneffaced side in a sort of textual space for our perception. Hence, Shklovskij [sic] can speak of "semantic shift" (*sdvig*) as a physical metaphor(*PoeticsJ,* 1994 Apr, 22:5, 389-407).

Whether we call a metaphor a *semantic shift*, and any dislocation a *retardation device* or *estrangement*, we still spell *ostranenie priem*.

It is my intention to rectify (what I would call) Frye's unusual oversight, and assign due credit to Shklovsky - speaking of which: my indebtedness to Prof. W. Kinsley for introducing me to the subject matter and for his proverbial patience and care as a Thesis Director; my gratitude to Prof. J. Bochner for his considerate warning on the damage vagueness on "Menippean satire" and "defamiliarization" may produce, and to all of my instructors - who have exercised their office with unimpeachable integrity, and for whom I am grateful for a variety of insights into diverse modes of Literature, all trying hopelessly to make a wit out of me, succeeding only half-way due to a lack of potential in their apprentice.

I would also like to express my special gratitude to all of the Professor who sent me their Letters of Recommendation for my Master's candidacy upon hearing about my delirious ambition to become a certified wit; limited to only a few Patrons by official requirements, I have pondered a long time upon my choices, not wishing to hurt any feelings, and, finally, had to send my excuses to Forty other caring Patrons much eager to endorse me in my new epic. Professors Kinsley, Mahoney, O'Neill, Bowen and Helfield are here mentioned on account of their speedy and caring replies. I am also grateful to other anonymous god-heads - as the Faculty operates in close consortium(woe to the poor tyro who does not yet understand the many ways in which the Department rules his destiny).

It is scientifically proven that Panegyrics lull one into sleep: You are now under the inevitable spell of boredom; head and eyelids heavy, mind wandering. Turn the pages slowly, nodding approvingly occasionally , floating in a white, warm, puffy feathered sea of bliss...

&c.

Senes ut in otia tuta recedant
(*Tale*, 57)

Upon the *Tale*:

Eighteenth-century scholars were indebted to the "humanist" movement.

> That movement, generally known as the Renaissance, involved the rebirth of letters and arts stimulated by the recovery and study of texts from classical antiquity and the development of new aesthetical norms based on classical models. It also unleashed new ideas and new social, political, and economic forces that displaced the otherworldly and communal values of the Middle Ages, emphasizing instead the dignity and potential of the individual and the worth of life in this world. [...] From the outset, English humanism was vitally concerned with Christianity as well as classical learning(Norton 1, 396-97).

The preservation of integrity in both Christianity and classical learning constitutes the core of the *Tale*: the Hack condemns corruption in religion through the allegory of the Coats and ridicules abuses in learning through digressions. To recapitulate briefly on how these abuses came into being, a quick overview of the times should do for my polite readership. The Humanist movement triggered two major revolutions that metamorphosed the World as they knew it:

> The years from 1500 to 1700 witnessed not one, but two, staggering revolutions of thought. In cosmology, the Copernican revolution, culminating in the discoveries of Brahe and Kepler, totally changed man's conception of the physical universe. Simultaneously with this cosmological revolution came a theological revolution - the Reformation(Craven,1).

These major changes brought about conflicts between two dominant interest groups: the land-owning gentry from the First Estate, and the new vigorous capitalists from the emerging Third: "[t]he relatively conservative 'landed interest' tended toward the court while the 'money interest' found its chief support in the City[London], a network of ban-

kers and merchants, financiers, jobbers, brokers, tradesmen and credit managers"(Norton 1, 1072); Adams and Logan further expatiate on the particular character of the time, when

> the whole character of society had shifted, from a strict authoritative regime legitimated (in its own eyes) by eternal divine constitutions - to a vigorous, materialistic, pragmatic community of competing pressure groups(ibid, 1073).

The proliferation of Caxton's printing press making books cheaper, more accessible to the general public, not only destroyed the intellectual monopoly of the learned but also gave way to a new fad of pretended knowledge and uninformed criticisms from the shallow read, an invasion of the Scholar's territory by the unlearned, the mercenaries and the idle rich; one could boast of having great books(many of them props), but a lack of proper education failed to surrender the essential keys that unlock the treasures buried within, a deficiency they attempted to camouflage through index learning, a fad Swift and company proceeded to censure:

> In 1714 this group[Swift, Pope, Gay and Arbuthnot], at the instigation of Pope, formed a club that was to cooperate in a scheme for satirizing all sorts of false learning and pedantry. The friends proposed to write jointly the biography of a learned fool whom they named Martinus Scriblerus (Martin the Scribbler), whose life and opinions would be a running commentary on whatever they considered the abuses of learning and the follies of the learned (Norton 1, 2213).

One of the changes that affected Swift and his contemporary writers came from the shift in relative powers opposing the above-mentioned Landed and Moneyed interests, the court no longer wielding a monopoly as patrons for word smiths, as Griffin defends in his article "Swift and Patronage":

> In the seventy-five years between 1675 and 1750 the system of patronage, in which writers in England were sustained by wealthy peers and ultimately by the court, yielded to a system based on booksellers and ultimately on the market place(*Studies*, 197).

Griffin cautions that the change was not 'steady and uniform' but gradual, and that Swift also benefited from it, himself a patron for gifted poets, Pope among them. Editors Adams and Logan also agree that "booksellers began to supplant the once unchallenged courtly patrons as makers of public taste", and in a purely business-like manner, booksellers "began to hire writers to turn out titles on order"- upsetting Swift's conservative reality that true and immortal Literature only came from refined works which are obviously not turned out over-night, fuelled by hunger and a want of money(Norton1, 1073). William N. Free writes about the Grub Street archetype that

> [h}e writes for money, and his vision of blessedness is the state of possessing a splendid shilling, with all the material comfort it implies. Nevertheless, he is far from attaining his ideal, for as Pope shows in "The Epistle to Arbuthnot" and *The Dunciad*, to write for money is to be without it. Such a motive can only spring from a poverty of intellect and imagination(Symposium, 344).

Outraged by the growing popularity of mediocre literary output, Swift proceeds to torpedo prostitute Grub Street 'writers', offended that poets were now cheap 'makers' as opposed to their initial poetical nature as refined 'creators': the modern poet the usurper, the misrepresentor of art, in the same manner non-Anglican piety was held to misrepresent the true essence of religion.

Swift and the Scriblerians vigorously defended the Antients against the Moderns. Conservatism, by its very nature, proceeds in such a cautious way as to deter *revolutions* that would otherwise upset the ship of

state, all the while advocating slow but steady growth. Conservatism protects the establishment against 'new brooms'. For a more comprehensive insight of the Scriblerian attitude, Patricia Carr Brückmann published a revealing picture of the group in which she defends the position that the Scriblerians were not only ultra-conservative, but out of step with their time:

> The group was in many ways out of step with its own time and much more attuned to ancient and traditional images of felicity and to ancient authors who subscribed to these values, as well as to a satiric spirit and method to be displayed when these values were menaced(4).

They were not necessarily archaic; the Scriblerian's known predilection for the Pastoral pleads for the restoration of an earthly Eden where the 'traditional images of felicity' remain sacrosanct, unadulterated by new chaotic trends, saner, closer to Nature and cosmic harmony:

> The Scriblerian ideal most often takes the form of some version of pastoral. [...] This positive image was, they thought, perpetually threatened by the monstrous corruption of uncivilized cities and the consequent threat of ruination or loss of a possible earthly paradise. It was important that this ideal be articulated and sustained in the world, for it seems clear, to me at least,[...] that the members of the Scriblerus Club, even those in holy orders, were by no means persuaded that they would find a paradise elsewhere. Their sensibilities are in every way secular(ibid).

Whether secular or not, it refreshes the view for the eighteenth-century enthusiasts who possibly, as I did, find themselves swayed by Swift's eloquent and enticing rhetoric. Brückmann further remarks on the changing of the times, that some scholars had a tough time landing on their feet, shaken as they were by 'modern' concepts that muscled in and threatened to overthrow the established order of things, the way a son

will inevitably challenge his father. Brückmann also observes that the Scriblerians

> [f]ar from sitting tenants in a world of sweet reason, these are now more often perceived as dwellers in a universe where the shades of Bedlam fell across the enlightened, casting a double darkness across an age when the new philosophy had long since called all in doubt and no comfortable new technology had come to replace it(8).

Scepticism having successfully called everything into doubt found no substitute at hand to fill the vacuum which their queries elicited. Not quite viewing the Scriblerians as ultra-conservatives -- as Brückmann does -- I propose that they hoisted the Cross-Bones, unwilling to lower literary standards in order to accommodate the plebeian temper of the times. Supporting this contention, Philip Pinkus maintains that the satirist

> offers no opposing dogma, no divine plan to save the world. He is no conservative, in the sense of rejecting innovations and clinging to old forms because they are old. He is the rebel who asserts the civilized forms of society, old and new, so long as they permit man to fulfil himself. His rebellion is the will to live, the impulse of life determined to overcome its chains(*Satura*, 213).

The Dean is reported to be a man of much integrity who condemned any sort of abuses - even the ones perpetrated on the Catholic Irish (viz.: *A Modest Proposal*). He was not one to allow misapplication in learning go unchecked, since learning enhances man's nature, and brings him closer to his full potential as an *animal rationis capax.*

"Thaes ofereode; thisses swa maeg"
(*Anatomy*, 237).

The Title.

It is generally recognised that Swift, in writing another *Tale,* created a game with which wits of the time (Toland, Marsh, Browne, Dennis, Wotton, Bentley, Curll, *et al.*.) would be so preoccupied with their petty quarrels that they would leave the ship of state alone:

> Sea-men have a Custom when they meet a *Whale,* to fling him out an empty *Tub,* by way of Amusement, to divert him from laying violent Hands upon the Ship. This Parable was immediately mythologiz'd: The *Whale* was interpreted to be *Hobbes' Leviathan,* which tosses and plays with all other Schemes of Religion and Government, whereof a great many are hollow, and dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to Rotation. This is the *Leviathan* from whence the terrible Wits or our Age are said to borrow their Weapons. The *Ship* in danger, is easily understood to be its Antitype the *Commonwealth*(*Tale,* 40-41).

Therefore, not only the tubs but the terrible wits are hollow, dry, empty, noisy, wooden(crazy), and given to Rotation - vide my last chapter, a description of Bentley's girth, from whence, I wager, the idea of a whale took shape.

> But, how to analyse the *Tub,* was a Matter of difficulty; when after long Enquiry and Debate, the literal Meaning was preserved: And it was decreed, that in order to prevent these *Leviathans* from tossing and sporting with the *Commonwealth,* (which of it self is too apt to *fluctuate*) they should be diverted from that Game by a *Tale of a Tub*(ibid).

The *Tale* was designed to sport with the *modern* wits whose decadent professionalism provided Swift with sufficient material to fire his Menippean ire (*Tale,* xxix), and although mysterious most of the time, Swift is clear about his strategy:

> Great Wits should always be provided with Objects of Scorn and contempt, in order to exercise and improve their Talents, and divert their Spleen from falling on each other, or to themselves (qt in Griffin, 157).

Richelieu had the same goal in mind when he established his 'Académie Littéraire', "to amuse busy & turbulent wits & divert them from speculating into matters of state". The crafty Louis Quatorze thought along the same lines when he created Versailles, and the Royal Society in England shares the same vocation(*Tale,* 39 n1;). The Hack takes us then on a tour of new Schools, which are but a parody of the Royal Society *Beaux Esprits,* the pedantic dandies defended by the Moderns incorporated by Bentley and *his Darling* Wotton.

It has also been suggested that the idea of the *Tub* was to divert shallow readers, as Kenneth Craven supports:

> The *Tale* has made a deluded fool, *à priori,* of every modern reader, to the extent that the reader subscribes to the modern rational information synthesis. To believe that everything necessary for the human to know can be rationally established seems impertinent pride and sure disaster to Swift. If one takes the modern world seriously on these terms, Swift recommends that true happiness for fools -that is, the *tale*'s persona, the whales, the reader and all moderns - consists in staying at the information surface of things within the comforting purviews of credulity and self-deception. The rational pursuit of serene happiness "is *a perpetual Possession of being well Deceived*" (Craven, 8).

Pinkus comments on the *Tale* in a concise and conversant criticism:

> Every satire, of course, gives the dragon [evil] a different face. It may be grotesque as in *A Tale of a Tub,* where Swift reveals a world of mountebanks and their fools who sell the universal pill: all learning in one easy nutshell, philosophical systems that explain everything, virtuoso projects that do everything, the alchemist's gold, the religious quack's zeal; a world of grasping, gouging, pushing, robbing, bullying leeching madmen, strutting, bawling, defiling what they touch, physically and mentally sunk in inexpressible filth(*Satura,* 199).

This is a most dynamic and encompassing critical overview of the *Tale.*

Swift never pardons mankind for its arrogance and general stupidity in its attempts at universal codification, as if it were possible or even useful to know everything that can be known (overabundance of meaningless or useless information dramatised in the *Tale*), and as if labelling something would increase its understanding. Craven continues:

> It is part of Swift's sophisticated jest, shown in the warp and woof of his art, that he fully anticipated that the *Tale* would challenge friend and foe, contemporaries and latter-day scholars alike, to ransack its myriad contemporary allusions with little to show for their pains. Therefore, when literary historians of the *Tale* attempt to move from "conjectures" and monographs Swift anticipated to the substantive evidence he hid, they must be exceedingly wary of his devious bent. Although Rabelais warned his readers with the Silenus metaphor of the treasures they might be missing, Swift, without fair warning, has seduced generations of learned critics to remain at the surface of the *Tale* even as they have professed as a given the received opinion of their evolving world. Wickedly, his Rabelesian wit has contributed to burying the *Tale*'s treasure, thereby leaving deluded moderns happily bobbing in their private tub. Processing disposable information remains, in Swift's view, the easy escape from painful truth for scholars. Should they insist on lingering about the vacant surfaces of the *Tale*, let them remain there and be damned. Let them wander off on the wrong scent. Let them be overwhelmed, stranded in half light, by dank rational information and dark private conjectures(14-15).

True knowledge does not come from superficial or dark conjectures but through "exantlation", dipping deep into the reservoir of learning (*Tale,* 67).

Through the *bathos* signifier, Swift sports with its three paradoxical Latinate definitions of depth, profundity and the sublime, playfully confounding high with low, leaving the unsuspecting reader at "the very *bottom* of the *Sublime*"(ibid). Peter's ability to fix "Tropes and Allegories to the *Letter*, and refining what is Literal into Figure and Mystery"(190)

illustrates Swift's contempt for modern self-serving authors and critics: "[...] he began to entertain a Fancy, that the Matter was *deeper* and *darker*, and therefore must needs have a great deal more of Mystery at the Bottom" (*Tale,* 55;190). This is the "shift in perspective" Frye proposes, recognised and understood as both a defamiliarization trope and a Menippean ploy, creating a jarring and defacilitating effect on the reader, as McLuhan's thesis defends , and on which topic William Kinsley opens "The Malicious World" and the Meaning of Satire:

> In order to incite ridicule of a foolish or wicked victim, which is one of the most frequently announced aims of satire, the satirist needs the help of his audience: many individuals must be persuaded to laugh at the hapless victim(*Satura*, 257).

This ties in with McLuhan's thesis on the effect satire creates on the reader; unfortunately, this effect Eric McLuhan never formulates clearly, though he defends everything else brilliantly. But what happens, questions Kinsley, "when a satire that aims at ridicule is ambiguous, thus forcing the satirist's hoped-for collaborators to make critical judgements before letting their laughter escape? What happens if their critical judgement is not sufficiently delicate?"(ibid). This is taken up later in the Menippean satire chapter.

The corpus.

It is generally agreed that the *Tale, The Battel of the Books* and *The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* coalesce into a symbiotic sortie against the "Moderns" in favour of the "Antients"; the reader usually understands the battle in terms of the Classics (Greek, and Latin) versus Moderns (*cum* English translations), but this understanding lacks another essential key: in his essay entitled "The Eel of Science: Index Learning, Scriblerian Satire, and the Rise of Information Culture", Roger D. Lund draws a comprehensive picture of that particular period where indexes, dedications, prefaces, compendiums, footnotes, translations &c. materialised. Antient scholars, although fostered by some rudimentary indexes, had to read manuscripts often difficult to decipher. Print made reading easier and faster for the commoner; the appearance of more elaborate indexes, foot-notes , prefaces &c., accelerated the new information highway, but, according to the Scriblerians, did not necessarily make it qualitatively better:

> [...]Scriblerian complaints regarding "index-learning" point to the recent emergence of a whole new universe of discourse from which the Dunces could borrow -with minimal effort- whatever learning they needed(Lund, 20).

"With minimal effort" deplores the facility with which anyone could access superficial information in Prefaces, Compendiums and Indexes without the "inconvenience" of Study, an exercise Swift ridicules in the *Tale* as not only unworthy but illegitimate:

> For the Scriblerians in particular it [preface] came to be regarded as a repository of unearned, hence, illegitimate knowledge. Much the same thing happened to the index whether it appeared at the beginning or the end of the volume(Lund, 19).

These, the Scriblerians decried, were depriving people of "ancient sources of inspiration", breeding a new kind of pretended wits lacking essential knowledge and whose ephemeral works are doomed, as the Hack in "The **Epistle Dedicatory**, to **His Royal Highness** Prince of Posterity" parodies:

> [...] the *Person* [time] it seems to whose Care the Education of *Your Highness* is committed, has resolved (as I am told) to keep you in almost an Universal Ignorance of our Studies, which it is Your inherent Birth-right to inspect(*Tale,* 31).

Swift ridicules the present state of learning not by attacking directly but through his Horatian impersonation of a pompous and superficial Modern, the radiant image of the philosophus gloriosus:

> [The] whole Course of Things being thus entirely changed between Us and the Antients, we of this Age have discovered a shorter, and more prudent Method to become *Scholars,* and *Wits,* without the Fatigue of *Reading* or of *Thinking*. The most accomplished Way of using Books at present is two-fold: Either first, to serve them as some Men do *Lords,* learn their *Titles* exactly, and then brag of their Acquaintance. Or Secondly, which is indeed the choicer, the profounder and politer Method, to get a thorough Insight into the *Index,* by which the whole Book is governed and turned, like *Fishes* by the *Tail* . For to enter the Palace of Learning at the *great Gate,* requires an Expense of Time and Forms; therefore Men of much Haste and little Ceremony, are content to get in by the *Back-Door.* For, the Arts are all in a *flying* March, and therefore more easily subdued by attacking them in the *Rear.* Thus Physicians discover the state of the whole Body, by consulting only what comes from Behind. Thus Men catch knowledge by throwing their Wit on the *Posteriors* of a book, as Boys do Sparrows with flinging *Salt* upon their *Tails.* Thus Human Life is best understood by the wise man's rule of *Regard ing the End*(*Tale,* 144-45).

The *End* refers to both the purpose and the fruit of the quest, as well as its anal and scatological implications(i.e.: the wise modern has his head up his arse). Gentlemen enter and exit through the front door, the back

being for the hired help, deliveries, or the evacuation of garbage and excrement, lacking the plumbing we now enjoy, and made explicit through the medical metaphor - the scatological inferences truly Menippean, mixing high and low for a jarring effect. The Arts are in a "flying march", new discoveries advance by leaps and bounds *à la* 'Keystone Cops', with such alacrity that only the tail-end of it can be grasped by the slow and the dull. Knowing Swift's *penchant* for irony, the passage may also read as: moderns are fast regressing into barbaric nonsense, in the way a straight line grows into a full circle, the flying vanguard attacking its own rear(c.f.: *Tale,* 158). It is true that Swift's satire is primarily aimed at authors and book-sellers, yet the Modern reader's head is also on the block:

> I am wonderfully well acquainted with the present Relish of Courteous Readers; and have often observed, with singular Pleasure, that a *Fly* driven from a *Honey-pot*, will immediately, with very good Appetite alight, and finish his Meal on an *Excrement*(*Tale* 207).

This is not a general denunciation but one aimed at two out of three kinds of readers (number 3 again surfaces) whom the Hack identifies and for whose general edification he pretends to write:

> Readers may be divided into three Classes, the *Superficial*, the *Ignorant*, and the *Learned:* And I have with much Felicity fitted my Pen to the Genious and Advantage of each. The *Superficial* Reader will be strangely provoked to *Laughter*; which clears the Breast and Lungs, is Soverain against the *Spleen*, and the most innocent of all *Diureticks*. The *Ignorant* Reader (between whom and the former, the Distinction is extremely nice) will find himself disposed to *Stare*; which is an admirable Remedy for ill Eyes, serves to raise and enliv en the Spirits, and wonderfully helps *Perspiration*. But the Reader truly *Learned*, chiefly for whose Benefit I wake, when others sleep, and sleep when others wake, will here find sufficient Matter to employ his Speculations for the rest of his Life(*Tale* 185).

The superficial reader wets his pants (diureticks) tragically laughing (mis-

sing the whole point) while the ignorant sweats out of confusion- both possibly dropping the book altogether in favour of lighter reading (as with the fly), while the *Learned* Reader is set upon a red herring, feeding the *Dark Author* with an equally frustrating and sterile quest:

> Lastly, Whoever will be at the Pains to calculate the whole Number of each Letter in this Treatise, and sum up the Difference exactly between several Numbers, assigning the true natural Cause for such a Difference; the Discoveries in the Product, will plentifully reward his Labour(*Tale, 187*).

A useless *dark* quest he sports with:

> I do hereby propose for an experiment, that every Prince in *Christendom* will take seven of the *deepest Scholars* in his Dominions, and shut them up for *seven* Years, in *seven* Chambers, with a Command to write *seven* ample Commentaries on this comprehensive Discourse. I shall venture to affirm, that whatever Differ ence may be found in their several Conjectures, they will be all, without the least Distortion, manifestly deduceable from the Text (*Tale,*185).

This back-fired as 'Distortions' abounded, which disqualified him from a Bishopric. BUT *this* should be inserted later, in the last chapter, and I would be grateful if my reader would kindly oblige and transfer *it* to its proper station.

For Swift, if so much trash is being published, the customer is at fault: were the reader better educated, the quality of written productions would accordingly be nobler.

The pun on "tub" and "tale", "fish" and "tail" was not accidental, as is the possible pun on 'ass' and 'arse' considered due to the many scatalogical inferences. What is a Leviathan but a dangling reader, a Modern (t)wit, as Hobbe's opening sentence suggests: "By art is created

that great Leviathan, called the Commonwealth of State - (in Latin, Civitas), which is but an artificial man", thus, an artificial wit -- a target Menippean censure could not ignore.

The new information culture elbowing on the classical past upset old and comfortable aristocratic values. In order to appreciate the swift and dramatic changes in a renewed perspective, consider that within a short period not only vast amounts of indexes came into being, but also dictionaries of every kind, compendia, digests, and grammars, along with an impressive number of translated Classics, all 'for the general benefit of mankind':

> It is significant that along with dictionaries and grammars translations should also be listed as questionable forms of index learn ing. That they are so listed provides clear evidence of the growing rift between the classical past and the new information cul ture. Certainly the eighteenth century was a great age of translations: the ESTC lists over 7600 titles published between 1700 and 1800 that include "translated" as a keyword [...] and over 1200 specialized dictionaries(Lund, 21).

An impressive shift in Literary conventions: most of the Classics (Hesiod, Homer, Virgil &c.) went through translations (Pope, Dryden, et al.), losing some of their inherent virtues in the process, and further alienated by the translator's attitude: a gentleman translating rough Homeric epics may tone them down according to his polite spirit, as Bentley made them more literal and prosaic, contrasting with their original metaphorical content. Swift not only objects to these literary inventions but, according to Lund, disputes all new and changing values and the

> transformation in the signification of knowledge, the elevation of practical utility as the *raison d'être* of modern learning. [...] Beneath the surface of complaints regarding index-learning and

> information culture was the suspicion that the definition of what constituted worthwhile knowledge was shifting(33).

The aristocratic concept of "being" shifted to plebeian pragmatic utility. Knowledge, previously meaning self-knowledge directed toward ethical political action, gradually slipped, transforming itself into "a resource and a utility". Lund points out that

> [i]t had previously been assumed that knowledge largely meant self-knowledge, and while there were clearly disagreements among philosophers, they were in total agreement as to what it (knowledge) did not mean. It did not mean *ability to do*. It did not mean *utility*. Utility was not knowledge; it was *skill*. It was not *logos*, but *techné*(34).

Lund further argues that the rise in specialisation was a threat to "Augustan visions of cultural integration - the rise of specialisation" where one had to "depend on the assistance of his fellows since the relative mastery of all that is known - one Renaissance model of the learned - was no longer possible.[...] What, after all was the value of scientific learning to a gentleman?"(Lund, 37). Furthermore, still according to Lund, the Scriblerians were most offended by the "development of the distinctive voice of the 'vile specialist', the new vocabularies and professional ideolects that necessarily derived from specialisation", another destructive tower of Babel, which is but another term for *Chaos* which the Leviathan also stands for(c.f.: *Tale*, 194). Although not necessarily subscribing to the same philosophies, Reformation scholars united into some sort of a brotherhood, were it only for their shared reality about hard-earned *logos*; these were the noble fellows, the moral elite, man-kind's benevolent aristocratic intellectuals. Some of these scholars strayed from the agreed-upon Classical conservative Tradition and aroused Swift:

> Throughout his writing, Swift constantly raised the question of whether the achievements of civilization - its advancing technology, its institutions, its refinement of manners - cannot be seen as complex forms of barbarism. With this theme in mind, Swift wrote what he is best known for: "A Tale of a Tub" (McVey & Rodriguez - internet).

The Scriblerian conservatives attacked the new popular utilitarian chic, and feeling the basic values of Learning threatened, fought back with the best weapon at hand: Satire, the "attack arm of grammar" (*MS,* 6). As with any attack, invectives thrive. Frye maintains that panegyrics lull their readers to sleep whilst invectives wake them up, spelling out the purpose of both Menippean satire and Defamiliarization:

> [...]invective is one of the most readable forms of literary art, just as panegyric is one of the dullest. It is an established datum of literature that we like hearing people cursed and are bored with hearing them praised, and almost any denunciation, if vigorous enough, is followed by a reader with the kind of pleasure that soon breaks into a smile(*Anatomy,* 224).

This definition stands pretty close to the Hack's (c.f.: p.41 below), and since the Hack's could be a satirical one, should we be cautious with Frye? The Hack further suggests that panegyrics foster jealousies while satire is understood to attack somebody else. He goes as far as suggesting a maso/sadistic streak in mankind:

> Nature her self has taken order, that Fame and Honour should be purchased at a better Pennyworth by Satyr, than by any other Productions of the Brain; the World being soonest provoked to Praise by Lashes, as Men are to Love(*Tale,* 49).

In a joco-serious rhetorical sortie, the Hack argues in favour of satire that

> the Materials of Panegyrick being very few in Number, have been long since exhausted: For , as Health is but One Thing, and has always been the same, whereas Diseases are by the thousands, besides new and daily Additions; So, all the Virtues that have been ever in Mankind, are to be counted on a few Fingers,

> but his Follies and Vices are innumerable, and Time adds hourly to the Heap(*Tale,* 49-50).

The satirist, often accused of copying his peers, is here invited to *view* the cornucopia of potential targets *with strange clarity.*

McLuhan's thesis of 'waking its readers up' concords with Frye's postulate that the intended effect of Menippean satire is to act as a jarring device, a distorting mirror doubled as a magnifying glass foregrounding selected attributes. Gulliver's description of the nurse's enormous teat in Brobdingnag, for example, qualifies as a fine exemplum of distorting familiarity through foregrounding with the designated purpose of refreshing our perceptions by viewing life through a *violent dislocation*:

> I must confess no object ever disgusted me so much as the sight of her monstrous breasts, which I cannot tell what to compare with, so as to give the curious reader and idea of its bulk, shape and colour. It stood prominent six foot, and could not be less than sixteen in circumference. The nipple was about half the bigness of my head, and the hue both of that and the dug so varied with spots, pimples and freckles, that nothing could appear more nauseous(*GT,* 74).

More on this in the Foregrounding chapter.

According to Lund, the Scriblerians not only fought index-learning but pretty much anything that was new; to them all of the new facilitating styles offended what true learning should consist of, and of course, they mocked them:

> As with their response to so much else that was new in the world, the Scriblerians fell back on mock-form as a means of managing their uncertainty about the implications of alphabetic classification (Lund. 27).

I wonder how the Dean would react to the Gutchkelch & Smith's laborious *Index* of his *Tale.* It was not only uncertainty but also perhaps a

feeling of decay, an apprehension that the old Tradition was going to the kennels. Editors Monk and Lipking note that the

> satire of both Swift and Pope is animated by moral urgency and heightened by a tragic sense of doom. Pope saw the issue as a struggle between Darkness and Light. Chaos and Order, Barbarism and Civilization[...] For Swift the issue was one between "right reason" and "madness" - not clinical insanity, of course, but a blindness to anything but one's private illusions, which is an abandonment of practical reality(Norton 1,1781).

To understand the Scriblerian mind better, it is imperative that we consider the erosion of the formerly inviolate Three Estates and the increasing power of the *vulgus*, and the distinction between the pragmatic and the utilitarian must be taken into account: learning which did not forward one's own enlightenment but merely his social *façade* is seen here as an 'abandonment of practical reality'. The Editors further argue that

> [t]hey [Scriblerians] looked with gloomy foreboding on the rising tide of popular taste, on what they considered an invasion and debasement of the polite world by the barbarians from the middle classes and the idle rich and on the increase of corruption in public life. The satire of both Swift and Pope is animated by moral urgency and heightened by a tragic sense of doom(ibid.).

For Swift and the Scriblerians, safeguarding integrity from the degenerating literary trend seemed imperative, which they chose to attack in mock form, so as to delight while instructing. Mock-form is irony which the satirist brandishes as one of his principal mordant tools, as Test concurs: "[...] satire exploits the ability of irony to expose, undercut, ridicule, and otherwise attack indirectly, playfully, wittily, profoundly, artfully(17)." Irony tones the *Tale*, a device Swift lays bare in the 'Apology': "*another Thing to be observed is, that there generally runs an Irony through the*

Thread of the whole Book" (*Tale,* 8). Swift and the Scriblerians adopted Menippean satire (rich in Irony and other useful vitamins) in order to both vent their own indignation and marshal their otherwise uninvolved readership by alerting them to the dangers of the new facilitating practices that made learning easy but wisdom difficult. Swift satirises the new wits, exposing them as fools and knaves. Frye clarifies the link between irony and satire:

> The chief distinction between irony and satire is that satire is militant irony: its moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes standards against which the grotesque and the absurd are measured(*Anatomy,* 223).

Irony and satire conjure up for the kill when the measure is taken, as Test reasons:

> When an ironic technique or device encompasses an entire work of satire, as with a beast fable of a dystopian fantasy or as in many satiric imitations, we can say that the irony and the satire are the same thing(Test, ,250).

Swift's ironic intent is to lampoon the Moderns and their "unearned knowledge" as ludicrous, foregrounded by the great Wits in Bedlam whose lunatics are elevated to key positions in a definite barb against political preferment where consideration of the aptitudes to carry the Office is the least considered criterion for appointment. On the subject of irony, Griffin stresses that:

> irony should be understood not simply as a binary switch, either "on" or "off", but more like a rheostat, a rhetorical dimmer switch that allows for a continuous range of effects between "I almost meant what I say" and " I mean the opposite of what I say" [...] difficulty arises when, of course, when we try to determine the *degree* of irony(Griffin, 66).

Before ventilating on the subject of Satire, a brief word on the term 'porch', if you will: the word Stoic is said to come from Greek *stoa poikilé* meaning 'porch', where they usually met; the homeless Cynics, our satirists' forefathers, also used porches and porticoes for shelter. Swift uses the term as a suitable metaphor (*semantic shift*) for prefaces, a notion the respected critic Jon Rowland anatomises in his *Another Turn of the Screw: Prefaces in Swift, Marvell, and Genette*. Borrowing his terminology from Genette, Rowland opens his treatise with a direct quote from Richard L. Barnett:

> Nous sommes au seuil d'une époque paratextuelle, au seuil d'un seuil, stationnés à la frontière d'un moment exégésique, 'dispositionel' qui préviligie les marges, s'y institue, s'en fait partie(Rowland, 129).

Rowland discerns two forms of paratextuality identified as a "seuil", a threshold between the inside (le 'texte') and the outside ('le discours du monde sur le texte'): the 'épitexte' and the 'péritexte' - the latter defining all messages "autour du texte", viz.: prefaces, postfaces and other symbiotic additions (foot-notes, end-notes, and other liminary annotations)- concurring with Genette's position that these are not distinct from "but may, in fact, *be* the text(ibid, 130)". This is a result of the departure from the earlier conservative convention where, as Lund argues, "the lowly preface had gradually assumed a symbolic resonance for a number of Augustan writers"(Lund, 19). Prefaces, Rowland writes, "provide what Genette describes for us as directions 'how to read'" (Rowland, 131). In his insightful anatomy of the *Tale*, Rowland notes that

> prefatory pieces comprise the first five parts (six if you count "The Introduction"), plus "Section V: A Digression of the Modern Kind", which performs functions "proper in a preface", and

> "Section X: A Further Digression," which acts like a postface although it is only the penultimate section. Such exaggerated emphasis on the threshold may give "Readers truly learned" of *A Tale* pause, especially if they require (or desire) no instruction (131).

The reader finds himself not only in a succession of redundant porches, but whirling in well-greased revolving doors. Tongue-in-cheek, the Hack condones the erection of porches bigger than the principal it is supposed to lead into, because

> it would be very seasonable, and much in the *Modern* way, to inform the *gentle Reader*, and would also be of great Assistance towards extending this Preface into the Size now in Vogue which by Rule ought to be *large* in proportion as the subsequent Volume is *small*(Tale, 54).

Notice the typographical shift in *gentle Reader*, misdirecting the emphasis from 'inform', in the true superficial spirit of the times, its pretentious, bombastic and omniscient tone mimicking the pseudo-erudition and self-elevated importance Moderns have vainly bequeathed upon themselves, not unlike some of ours today: *plus ça change, plus c'est pareil.*

vanitas, vanitatis, amen.

I

shall now dismiss our impatient Reader

from any farther

Attendance at the *Porch*;

and having duly prepared his Mind

by a preliminary discourse,

shall gladly introduce him

to the sublime Mysteries that ensue.

(*Tale*, 54)

Upon Satire

David Penso draws a comprehensive chronological aspect of satire, whose parentage takes us back to Greek antiquity; In his "Philosophy of the Hellenistic Age", he unfolds the historical sequence of events that lead to various philosophical enquiries:

> The conquests of Alexander the Great had radically changed the social and political conditions of the ancient Greek world. During the fifth century and fourth century B.C.E. philosophy had emerged to deal with radically different societies and their respective concerns. The new concerns became more personal, and Philosophy prior to the Hellenistic era was more mundane in its concerns and was more fixated on affairs d'état. The Hellenistic philosophers were more concerned with the personal problems in coping with the radical changes, as the elites sought guidance. They primarily sought a philosophy that would achieve for themselves and their followers *eudaimonia* or happiness through inner peace and *autarkia* or self-sufficiency in an ethical system for the necessary personal guidance and they attempt ed to do so with Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism, Cynicism and other ideologies(Penso, internet).

No longer obsessed with mutual annihilation, the Greeks found themselves both united and disoriented in a great Empire, exterior threats no longer haunting their daily thoughts; life thus drastically changed, politicians turned to the philosophers for guidance. Cynicism was but another ideology promoting simplicity -almost *in extremis* - by shedding all worldly artifices:

> Greek citizens had become déraciné , or uprooted and lost their personal identity to this new, impersonal world, and philosophers worked to help them cope. The respective philosophies of the Hellenistic era sought to help their followers to successfully achieve *ataraxia* or "freedom from worry or suffering" to overcome the tribulations caused by Tyche[fortune], yet still have a raison d'être. One attempt to achieve *ataraxia* was through alienation from one's society and to acquire *eudaimonia* or hap-

> piness and *autarkia* or self-sufficiency by the most simple means possible, which was proposed by the philosophy of Cynicism (ibid).

The Cynics attacked deceit as our satirists continue to do; in their quest for integrity, some even removed themselves from society in disapproval and rejection of its inherent vices, corruption and apparent insanity, as Luis E. Navia's *Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study* rationalises:

> the entire human world appears as an immense madhouse and a vertigo-producing series of circus acts, meaning nothing and accomplishing nothing. Empires rise and fall, nations conquer and obliterate other nations while the soldiers march never knowing the purpose of their marching; politicians shout nonsense in the ears of enthralled party members, while statesmen and leaders repeat worn-out platitudes that appease the multitudes; actors clown aimlessly on the stage for the entertainment of people afflicted by incurable boredom; religions come and go, each one claiming infallibility, while promising salvation to the faithful and damnation to all others; philosophers spin out of their heads amazing cobwebs of mystifying and empty ideas, creating the illusion of knowledge and understanding, but ultimately not meaning or saying anything; rhetoricians and speech writers create the semblance of language in order to confuse and manipulate the masses; scientists aim at the conquest of nature, pontificating about their always changing truths, as if they were a gift of the gods, disrupting the balance of natural world; ath letes reap the financial benefits of their undeserved fame and their exalted reputation. In the background millions upon millions of people live secret lives of quiet desperation, moving thoughtlessly from birth to death and mechanically procreating countless similar millions of their likes, all running after empty illusions- the illusions of power, fame, pleasure, knowledge, a long life-and are captivated by blurry images that... are thrice removed from what is real(Hippias, internet).

Cynics were earnest in their aversion of corruption which, for some, eventually developed into apathy, a *je m'en-foutisme* towards life in general, because of their disillusionment, while others became sour, as is reported of Diogenes who copulated, defecated, and masturbated

in public, out of contempt for individual and collective hypocrisy, while other cynics simply removed themselves from the genetic pool, unable to bear or cope, much to a relief for themselves and no great loss for humanity. It is also reported that when the Great Alexander said that he would grant Diogenes whatever he could wish for, Diogenes simply asked the mighty conqueror to stand on the side because he was blocking the sun(ibid- paraphrased).

Definition of Satire

Satire, as defined by The Oxford Anthology of Literature; *The Literature of Renaissance England* [henceforth referred to as *Renaissance*] goes like this:

> A literary mode painting a distorted picture of part of the world in order to show its true moral, as opposed merely to its physical, nature. In this sense, Circe, the enchanteress in Homer's *Odyssey* who changed Odysseus' men into pigs(because they made pigs of themselves while eating) and would have changed Odysseus into a fox (for he was indeed foxy), was the first satirist. Originally the Latin word *satura* meant a kind of literary grab bag, or medley, and a satire was a fanciful kind of tale in mixed prose and verse; but later a false etymology connected the word with *satyr* and thus with the grotesque. Satire may be in verse or in prose; in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Roman poets Horace and Juvenal were imitated and expanded upon by writers of satiric moral verse, the tone of the verse being wise, smooth, skeptical, and urbane[Horatian], that of the prose, sharp, harsh, and sometimes nasty[Juvenal]. A tradition of English verse satire runs through Donne, [Ben] Jonson, Dryden, Pope, and Samuel Johnson; of prose satire, Addison, Swift, and Fielding(*Renaissance,* 1065).

Another definition of satire we owe to Frye:

> The word "satire", in Roman and Renaissance times, meant either of two specific literary forms of that name, one prose and the other verse. Now it means a structural principle or attitude, what we have called *mythos* (*Anatomy,* 310).

Defining *mythos*, Frye states that satire belongs to "[o]ne of the four archetypal narratives classified as comic, romantic, tragic, and ironic", with satire as militant irony(*Anatomy,* 367). Frye also upholds that the satirist is a moral man:

> Satire demands at least a token of fantasy, a content which the reader recognizes as grotesque, and at least an implicit moral standard, the latter being essential in a militant attitude to experience. [...]The satirist has to select his absurdities, and the act of selection is a moral act(ibid, 224).

McLuhan proposes that "Play prohibits Menippists from assuming a moral stance"(*MS,* 21). The conflicting viewpoints may be reconciled should we read McLuhan's as: "Play prohibits Menippists from taking themselves seriously", yet a moral preoccupation definitely animates the Menippists. Satire, long considered a low form in Literature (Peacock, for one, long underestimated until recently) fights for high principles. On 'play', defending the proposition that life is a game, distinguishing between those who are aware of it from the dull, Test writes that: " satirists have used the concept of playfulness to indict those who are too much like children and those who are not enough like them(Test, 20). There is always an element of play in satire, a notion often ignored in its critical *anatomy*. Pertinently humorous, viewing through cross-hairs, index on trigger, breathing stilled, Kinsley's *Malicious World* fires that

> many satires(not necessarily all) are fictional bullets aimed at real skunks, not imaginary gardens where real toads live in peace. In many cases only the sociologist cares whether the skunk is really hit, or is really a skunk, but the announced aim is always the critic's province. It is the energetic interaction of fact and fiction -- poet, persona, poem, victim, audience -- that helps distinguish satire from other literary forms. Uneasy formalists may take comfort from the fact that a well-wrought urn can be a missile as well as an object of contemplation, and, if wrought well enough, can survive throwing to be contemplated again(*Satura,* 258).

Mack opens *The Muse of Satire* instilling 'rhetoric' in the mind of the reader and states that: "in the case of satire, at any rate, what is desperately needed today is enquiry that deals neither with origins nor effects but with artifice"(Mack, 55-56). Defamiliarization utilises artifices lavishly but with an emphasis different from Mack's - this is to say, a dynamic

prescription to produce an effect, to shock its readers into wakefulness, while Mack's quest is, by necessity, descriptive. McLuhan drew up a list of classic Menippean defamiliarizing artifices in his MS which I partially reproduce in the Defamiliarization chapter.

Swift satirically storms the modern causes which could lead to a tragic decadence in learning, since satire is most suited for the task, apt as it is to semantically shift the tragic reality into caricature:

> It is largely through the tragedies of Greek culture that the sense of the authentic natural basis of human character comes into literature. In romance the characters are still largely dream-characters; in satire they tend to be caricatures(*Anatomy*, 206).

Since caricatures are nothing more than selected foregrounded characteristics, the rediscovery of the familiar we owe to satirical *cum* defamiliarizing strategies. Mack shares his views on the link between satire and tragedy in "The Muse of Satire":

> Tragedy and satire, I suspect, are two ends of a literary spectrum. Tragedy tends to exhibit the inadequacy of norms to dissolve systematized values, to precipitate a meaning containing - but not necessarily contained by - recognizable ethical codes. Satire, on the contrary, asserts the validity and necessity of norms, systematic values, and meanings that *are* contained by recognizable codes. Where tragedy fortifies the sense of irrationality and complexity in experience because it presents us a world in which man is more victim than agent, in which our commodities prove to be our defects (and vice-versa), and in which blindness and madness are likely to be symbols of insight, satire tends to fortify our feeling that life makes more immediate moral sense(Mack, 58).

Philip Pinkus contributes that tragedy

> like satire, leads man into an awareness of the evil of life, the demonic, taking its hero step by step into the heart of darkness until the burden of the knowledge destroys him(*Satura*, 204).

Satire, I argue, reverses the gloom-doom current of tragedy into a healthy fighting spirit. Mack and Frye share complementing views and reconcile the conflicting dichotomies of fool and/or knave; caricature rejects Aristotelian or Manichean critical binaries in favour of a displacement towards a third and often ridiculous alternative. Kinsley helps on the subject of 'ridicule' and its value in satire:

> Ridicule is an attempt to arouse laughter at someone or something. Hostile, aggressive except in its mildest forms. Satire's main weapon(AM, 4).

Enlarging the concept of attack, Pinkus notes that

> satire does tend to spill over on the innocent, for the simple reason that no one is completely innocent - including the satirist. To put this another way, the satirist has to enlarge his image to show its significance. In doing so, he shows not only the evil in the hypocrite but the potential evil of the good man. When you ridicule a man you strip away his comfortable cloak of respectability and reveal him naked(*Satura*, 211).

Naked is to be without armour, a vulnerable state that requires a *Passionate State of Mind*(Hoffer) for the love of life, almost to the point of folly, as Swift points out in "Thoughts on Religion":

> Although reason were intended by providence to govern our passions, yet it seems that, in two points of the greatest moment to the being and continuance of the world, God hath intended our passions to prevail over reason. The first is, the propagation of our species ....The other is the love of life, which from the dictates of reason, every man would despise, and wish it at an end, or that it never had a beginning(qt by Pinkus in *Satura*, 207).

Cross-hairs overlapping his vision, pretending "having neither a Talent nor an Inclination for Satyr"(*Tale,* 53), Swift arms himself with the power of ridicule, as he argues in his Apology, an *Apologia pro vita sua*:

> *Why should any Clergyman of our Church be angry to see the Follies of Fanaticism and superstition exposed, tho' in the most ridiculous Manner?* (ibid, 5)

Caricature is both irony and ridicule combined and, as we have seen, a means of attack. Leonard Feinberg, commenting on Fielding, advances that caricature "falls within the province of satire and not comedy", and questions:

> Why should exaggeration exist, but to make folly and vice more apparent and more ridiculous or reprehensible? By accentuating certain traits or qualities, the caricaturist upsets the equilibrium between correction, entertainment, and reconciliation that always exists in true comedy. He sacrifices the reconcilia tion scene with which comic plots end, and he sacrifices the delicate system of balances and compensations which makes the characters like Parson Adams so appealing(*Satura*, 347).

Read exaggeration as a foregrounding trope, and the imbalance is precisely what the author wishes the reader to rectify, his own judgement under trial, his participation required - another aspect of satire as a rhetoric of inquiry. Frye continues:

> Two things, then, are essential to satire; one is wit or humour founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd, the other is an object of attack(*Anatomy*, 224).

The objects of attack in satire are social absurdities; society is composed of individuals who swell into groups that subscribe to agreed-upon realities. The *Tale* is an attack on a dissident group, the Moderns. In his *Frye, Anatomy of His Criticism*, H.C. Hamilton recognises the implication of attack in satire:

> First phase satire defines the enemy as someone whose behaviour is absurd according to society's norms; the second phase judges these norms to be absurd; and 'true comic irony or satire' is the third phase: with irony most militant, it attacks society's common sense as a norm for behaviour and even the sense of experience as a guide(Hamilton, 150).

In *The Nature of Satire*, Frye upholds that irony is

> not simply the small man's way of fighting a bigger one: it is a kind of intellectual tear-gas that breaks the nerves and paralyses the muscles of everyone in its vicinity, an acid that will corrode healthy as well as decayed tissues. We have said that satire is primari ly directed at the impediments of society; but irony has an automatically expansive and destroying force; it is a bomb dropped on an objective which, if it misses that, will at any rate hit something in an enemy's territory(*Satura,* 115).

Kinsley proposes this simpler yet precise definition: "*an attack carried on by means of a fiction.* Or perhaps simpler still, merely *fiction plus attack*". This attack may be delivered in either a suave or severe style, i.e.: Horatian or Juvenalian. McLuhan suggests that: "The two other forms of satire ---Horatian and Juvenalian--- target some private vice or public folly"(*MS, 12*). Horatian and Juvenalian satires are not "other forms of satire" but merely modes from which satirists may choose.

While I could comment on this in learned and pedantic prose, Kinsley nicely sums-up the difference graphically in the columns below, cautioning that the following are "not exclusive oppositions":

Horace	Juvenal
Gentle	Fierce, Harsh
Fools	Knaves
Folly	Vice
Ridicule	Rage
Smile	Frown
Irony	Invectives
(apparently) Friendly	Hostile

Horace is covert, Juvenal, overt; one gentle, the other fierce; the choice of which form to use remains with the author, according to the effect desired. William S. Anderson, in his *Roman Satirists and their Tradition* specifies that

takes a humanitarian precedence over its rivalling panegyric through a sophistic argument:

> BUT, tho' the Matter for Panegyrick were as fruitful as the Topicks of Satyr, yet would it not be hard to find out a sufficient Reason, why the latter will always be better received that the first. For, this being bestowed upon one or a few Persons at a time, is sure to raise Envy, and consequently ill words from the rest, who have no share in the Blessing; but Satyr being levelled at all, is never resented for offence by any, since every individual Person makes bold to understand it of others, and very wisely removes his particular Part of the Burthen upon the shoulders of the World, which are broad enough, and able to bear it(*Tale,* 51).

The Hack refreshes his definition of satire as: "but a Ball bandied to and fro, and every Man carries a Racket about Him to strike it from himself among the rest of the Company", further musing that: "*Satyr is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally discover every body's face but their own*(*Tale,* 52; 215). Unless mistaken, there is an equivalent to this in the Bible ... something to do with seeing a speck of dust in the other's eye but not being able to distinguish a rafter in one's own.

Since I've brought the subject of rhetoric up:

Rhetoric

Rhetoric belongs to the four essential parts of Discourse, namely:

1- REFERENTIAL: stressed objective on the SUBJECT MATTER,
2- RHETORICAL: stressed objective on the AUDIENCE = TO PERSUADE,
3- EXPRESSIVE: stressed objective on the AUTHOR / WRITER,
4- LITERARY: stressed objective on STRUCTURE.

While Plato claims that Dialectics is basically a scientific method of investigation, Rhetoric's purpose is manifold. *Renaissance's* extensive definition of Rhetoric also suggests that

> in the 17th century, Juvenal was the most highly considered satiric poet in England, and as late as Dryden critics could find reasons for preferring his satire to Horace's. In the 18th century, Horace steadily replaced Juvenal in the esteem of British men of letters(*Satura,* 33).

This is understandable even by our own twentieth-century standards: deliberate abuses leading to destruction have always triggered fierce indignation, as I have recently experienced in the brief study of the reported life of Catherine of Siena and other *illuminati* who self-destruct in the name of life. Some low wits have abused the Juvenalian quality of satire and transformed it into 'personal revenge satire', confusing its virtues in the minds of the simple.

McLuhan proposes that Horatian satire would represent the satiric arm of rhetoric, and Juvenal, that of dialectic"(*MS,* 6) - rhetoric being that part of discourse intended to exhort its audience(more below). As for *dialectics,* Roget's Online Thesaurus suggests 'ventilation' as a subordinate term, a principal *sdvig* active in the *Tale* which Griffin dissects:

> "[v]ent" is nicely ambiguous: it can mean to let out either in the sense of to utter or publish, or in the sense of to release, discharge, get rid of. [...] In the *Tale,* [...], he [Swift] suggests that speculations, like vapours, should be "vented" - that is, safely released into the air, lest by being repressed or directed against the state they disturb social order(Griffin, 158).

'Venting' stems from *ventus* meaning to displace more or less rapidly in the air(French 'vent')- linked with *animus* signifying 'breath', 'wind' and 'soul', a Miltonic pun widely used in the allegory of the Coats. And since these vapours will vent faster in periods of agitation, a good work-out with a tub accelerates the process. The Hack joco-defends that satire

> [a]nother area of rhetorical theory was concerned with classification of devices of language into *schemes, tropes,* and *figures.* A basic but somewhat confused distinction between figures of speech and figures of thought need not concern us here, but we may roughly distinguish between schemes (or patterns) of words, and tropes as manipulations of meanings, and of making words non-literal(*Renaissance,* 1063).

Rhetoric encompasses more than manipulation. Griffin identifies two kinds of rhetoric in satire: inquiry and provocation (covered later), and clarifies that

> rhetoric has not always been conceived as persuasion. In sholarly disputation, rhetoric is a means for detecting error: the truth (or the heresy) will emerge only through rhetorical contest in which arguments and counterarguments are offered to challenge and discredit an opponent(Griffin, 40-41).

This is how Griffin reports satire as being an open form of inquiry as opposed to the closed one of conclusion. This argument is close to H.M. Abrams' defence in *The Mirror and the Lamp*:

> Within its pragmatic design, ancient rhetorical theory incorporated a number of elements which can be traced, in a straight line of descent, to central components of romantic theory. The attention, for example, to 'nature', or innate capacity in the orator and poet, in addition to his art and acquired skills; the tendency to conceive of the invention, disposition, and expression of material as mental powers and processes, and not only as the overt manipulation of words [...] What is particularily noteworthy, for our present concern, is the stress rhetoricians had always put on the role of emotions in the art of persuasion(Abrams, 71).

The notion of emotions links directly with defamiliarization whose rhetorical purpose is to 'make the stone stony', to *feel* the difference. Griffin also suggests that

> If satire is enquiry and provocation, it shares a boundary not (as we usually hear) with polemical rhetoric but with philosophical (and especially ethical) writing. But by focusing on the way satire explores a moral problem or presses against our complacency, we run the risk of overemphasizing its moral intensity - to the ex-

> clusion of some other important elements. Here I want to suggest that we also need to think of much satire as a kind of rhetorical performance or rhetorical contest: as display, and as play (Griffin, 71).

The playfulness of the satirist - albeit at times harsh - constitutes the paramount attribute of the genre, as a satirist mocks foolishness, and in order to do so, foregrounds chosen mental attitudes, just as Swift may speak through the *persona* or *ethos* of the Hack in the *Tale*, a persona different but not totally alien from the one his uses in his *Letters to Stella*. As Ehrenpries defends in his *Personæ*,

> there would be little charm if we abandoned the postulate of an essence distinct from all its manifestations, if we admitted that not only communication but personality is impossible apart from the learned, conventional behaviour - "poses", if you like. When there is no audience, we act for ourselves. We cannot think or even dream without "posing"(*Satura*, 313-14).

I don't mean to dwell much on this, as it has been the subject of debate by better scholars(c.f.: Satura Symposium, 308-385); the main point I wish to make is that we do have a variety of attitudes vis-à-vis a number of subjects, and the persona we select on any of them is often the one dictated by emotions generated by the topic, a persona chosen for its winning attitude in a similar earlier situation. But are all situations identical?

As a fish is a slippery animal to grasp either by the corpus or the tale (c.f.: 147), so is Swift elusive regarding his satirical intention. In the Preface, he solemnly declares: " 'TIS a great Ease to my Conscience that I ha-ve writ so elaborate and useful a Discourse without one grain of Satyr intermixt (*Tale*, 48); typically, he reopens the subject of satire only a

few pages later, transforming its absence into a presence (as he does with the Bench): " BUT I forget that I am expatiating on a Subject, wherein I have no concern, having neither a Talent nor an Inclination for Satyr", only to further contradict the issue in the Apology: "Thus prepared, he thought the numerous and gross Corruptions in Religion and Learning might furnish Matter for Satyr, that would be useful and diverting"(ibid, 53; 4).

He keeps the reader off-balance as to where he is leading and maintains this instability throughout. His caustic attitude stems from the conflict between his well-known love for the individual and deep resentment of mankind as a group, which he openly expresses in *Gulliver's Travels* through the metaphor of the Houyhnhnms' nobility of character, contrasted with the savagery, pettiness and destructive enthusiasm of the Yahoos whom he renames *animal rationis capax* when *homo sapiens* fails as a true generic description.

But what are the traditional subjects of satire?

Traditional subjects of satire

Critics agree that the traditional subjects of satire are social vice and folly. Satire, far from being a destructive tool, acts as a watch-dog over human fickleness, barking, grinning as it bites. Satire is an attack on pomp, an exercise in logic long ago recognised as profitable to society, as Frye defends:

> [...] satire shows literature assuming a special function of analysis, of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossillized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement (not necessarily the progress) of society(*Anatomy,* 229; 233).

Satire is an attack, a provocation, often misunderstood in its pursuit because:

> [i]f the rhetoric of inquiry is "positive", an exploratory attempt to arrive at truth, the rhetoric of provocation is "negative", a critique of false understanding(Griffin, 52).

The difficulty here is that satire preys on false understanding and fabrications through irony and ridicule, almost begging the negative label, but its goal is definitely positive: it does not mean to destroy but to foreground silly fashions(see Korkowsky below, p. 48). Since many mis-used the genre in personal skirmishes, Satire itself was under attack in the Restoration as to its dangers, which would explain the cautious shift from the outrageous Juvenalian satire to the more subdued Horatian. Griffin reports that:

> [t]he critical controversy to which Dryden made his most important contribution was not an old issue but a new one, still on the horizon of the early 1690's: the eighteenth-century argument over the dangers and usefulness of satire. When Dryden was writing, the battle lines had not yet been drawn. But within a ge-

> neration many voices were declaring that satire was a lawless form that ought to be restrained, and that it threatened innocent victims and endangered the state(15-16).

Inclined to contradict Dryden, Swift uses both satire and the Leviathan to *preserve* the state. But while some used low-form satire to satisfy personal vendettas, Swift soars beyond the traditional praising of virtue and attacks on vice and folly, in a wider, more ethical social scope:

> It is now a common-place of satire criticism to note that Swift teases the reader out of (or into) thought. Eighteenth-century satiric theory is not able to explain that process. Is Swift's work really the exception to the rule, or is it closer to the norm?" (Griffin, 27-28).

Conventional criticism won't explain Menippean virtues, but I would venture to rejoin to the above as 'exceptional' because 'closer to the norm', should we consider the initial purpose of satire which, according to McLuhan, is to wake its readers up to a moral imperative. Swift was not only exceptional in his satire, but also as a rational man:

> it is a Sketch of Human Vanity, for every Individual, to imagine the whole Universe is interess'd in his meanest Concern[...]Who, that sees a little paultry Mortal, droning, and dreaming, and drivelling to a Multitude, can think it agreeable to common good Sense, that either Heaven or Hell should be put to the Trouble of Influ ence or Inspection upon what he is about?(*Tale*, 276)

Only a superior intellect can reconcile the raw meaning of life and the precarious nature of his own spirituality. To state that the Dean *teases* the reader out of or into thought is either poetical licence or an understatement: Swift *provokes* into thought. Griffin sustains the gestaltic virtue of satire while arguing upon the notion of 'para-doxes attacking ortho-doxies'[sic]:

> The challenge is not merely destructive: in John Dunton's words, a paradox serves to "rouze and awaken the Reason of Men a-sleep, into a *Thinking and Philosophical Temper* (Griffin, 53).

In this respect, Swift's satire satisfies the norm, drawing generously on all the elements of aggression, play, laughter and justice; these elements Test explains, may be combined in varying degrees to suit the satirist's goal, but cautions that

> Satirists do not use the four elements like the ingredients in a recipe, nor do they create their works to satisfy schemes of anal ysis and systems of classification dreamed up by critics and scholars. And since such schemes and classification cannot anticipate the seemingly infinite number of ways in which the devices and techniques of rhetoric and literature can be blended and ordered, it is unlikely that this approach will be without cracks and faults(Test, 35).

Although the satiric quest of unearthing truth may be branded 'negative', its recognised postulated goal is paradoxically positive in provoking the reader into re-evaluations through open-ended inquiries: "Satire in effect asks - demands - that its audience engage in a dialogue of a special kind" (Test 32). Even though a few critics rightly claim that Swift desires only to reform the reader through his satire, Test also reads Swift's satire as a "metaphorical substitute for hanging"(23).

Every tragic hero has pronounced satiric tendencies.
(Alvin Kernan, A Theory of Satire, Satura, 162)

Upon Menippean Satire

McLuhan, in his yet unpublished manuscript "On Menippean Satire", introduces Menippus as

> a Cynic philosopher (3rd century b.c.). Now, cynics are unique among philosophers. They sling no party line;they have no "school", no body of theory to expound, no policy to promote. Their constant aim is to restore balance to perception: they combat delusion and illusion and pretentiousness and intellectu al boneheadedness of every stripe. The Cynics declared war on robotism; their target was -- and is -- any robot, any somnam bulist or group that crossed their paths. They will swipe any technique, resort to any extreme, to jolt the target (the-man -in-the-street reader) into wakefulness, to restore a sense of proportion, and to limber up the senses. Their techniques are satiric; their satires, polymorphic, topsy-turvy and perverse. They will use ANY form. The Cynics are utterly democratic: they attack each other and even their own followers as readily as they attack anyone else(*MS,* 1).

McLuhan favours Korkosvky's definition of Menippean satire as a 'more functional, less essentialistic notion of the genre', a verdict I also endorse for its practical intelligence, which definition follows(ibid, 52).

Definition of Menippean satire

According to Korkovsky,

> Menippean satire is a kind of tradition of writing undertaken by learned men, usually addressed to less learned men, telling and showing them what they should (or should not) have in the way of learning, especially where learning is concerned with ethics or ultimate beliefs. Menippean satires display what false (or true) learning is, and have startling features of both thematic and structural attractiveness, to keep the unlearned reader interest ed. The genre has two species, a negative (the earlier, sprung from Greek Cynicism) and a positive (the latter, sprung from Roman didascalism). The Greek involves "satire", understood as ridicule or attack, upon the philosopher, theologian, or other learned individual; the Roman sometimes is not satirical, but follows (as does the Greek) the concept of a *satura,* a medley of diverse *topoi* and literary forms, usually a mixture of prose and verse. Menippean authors either admit they have followed Menippus or one of Menippus' known imitators, or else borrow both in manner and matter (structure and theme) that could only have come from a Menippean text to which they had access (qt in MS, 52-53).

Sherbert foregrounds Menippean satire's most distinctive feature:

> The most distinctive feature of Menippean satire that Dryden mentions is its mixture of satire and philosophy. One of Dryden's sources for this point is Cicero, who has Varro say that he imitat ed Menippus by sprinkling his works with "mirth and gaiety, yet many things are there inserted, which are drawn from the very entrails of philosophy"(Sherbert, 33).

Menippean satire, far from being but a headless carnival, roots in moral urgencies - more on this later. Frye - as with Relihan, Bakhtin, Sherbert, McLuhan, Mack and other worthy scholars - establishes the link between Menippus, Varro, Swift, Rabelais, Erasmus and Lucian, and recognises their distinctive craftsmanship (for a tentative "Outline of the Menippean Tradition" see Appendix):

> But while much has been said about the style and thought of Rabelais, Swift, and Voltaire, very little has been made of them as craftsmen working in a specific medium, a point no one dealing with a novelist would ignore. [...] The form used by these authors is the Menippean satire, also more rarely called the Varronian satire, allegedly invented by a Greek cynic named Menippus. His works are lost but he had two great disciples, the Greek Lucian and the Roman Varro, and the tradition of Varro, who has not survived either except in fragments, was carried on by Petronius and Apuleius. The Menippean satire appears to have developed out of verse satire through the practice of adding prose interludes, but we know it only as a prose form, though one of its recurrent features (seen in Peacock) is the use of incidental verse (*Anatomy,* 308-9; underscore mine).

Relihan also agrees with Frye that Menippean satire warrants due recognition as a genre:

> What is clear to me is that Menippean satire has not in effect been invoked in modern discussion of classical texts as often as anatomy, menippea, prosimetrum, and *spoudogeloion*(Relihan, 9).

Menippean satire (along with Defamiliarization), long remained unacknowledged in favour of 'copy-cat' pet theories. Relihan continues:

> Menippean satire rises through time to philosophical formulations of the inadequacy of human knowledge and the existence of a reality that transcends reason, but in its origins the genre merely thumbs its nose at pretenders to the truth by a denial that anything other than common sense is valuable or apprehensible (ibid, 29).

This is precisely Swift's position on common-sense as he derides the *philosophus gloriosus'* with his 'edifices in the air' : "the Foundations being laid too high, they have been often out of Sight, and ever out of *Hearing*" - the ideal *garret* for the poor all-pretending poet(c.f.: Tale, 56). Finally, the term Gloriosus is but another pun on the subject of vanity, the explication of which my polite reader will thank me for not dwelling on laboriously.

Bakhtin isolates fourteen basic characteristics of Menippean satire expounded upon in *Problems in Dostoevsky's Politics.* The ones I arrest here are of the *testing* of truths - for Bakhtin its most important characteristic; that the menippea identifies with "all violations of the generally accepted, ordinary course of events and of the established norms of behaviour and etiquette", including the verbal (violation of conventions with a purpose); and its "topicality and publicistic quality" which Bakhtin positions with the "journalistic" genre of antiquity, "pointedly reacting to the ideological issues of the day"(*Problems,* 97). It is not my intention to comment on these axiomatic truths, eloquent in the *Tale* and elsewhere. Griffin expatiates on the peculiarity between Bakhtin and Frye's viewpoints:

> Bakhtin is explicitly concerned to define Menippea as "ambivalent" and satire as purely "negative". His Marxism disposes him to idealize the "folk" and all folkish ways. He does not see the ele ment of erudition that Frye finds central or the tradition of "learned wit" that links Erasmus, Rabelais, Burton, Swift and Sterne. For him, "the Menippea" grow out of the marketplace, not the study(Griffin, 33).

A Democrat and a Marxist cannot view the world through the same lenses; and although they may disagree in theory, both the democratic Canadian and the Russian Marxist agree to ignore Shklovsky. Is it political? If so, literature plays a capital role in politics, proven by most dictatorships in the "early retirement" of their intellectual elite.

Traditional Subjects of Menippean Satire

Eric McLuhan focuses on the Menippist's targets:

> Cynic/Menippean satires attack excesses of all kinds, whether of ignorance, of (as Northrop Frye puts it) "maddened pedantry", of luxury, snobbery, power --- in short, anything that obscures continued clear awareness of one's essential humanity and the limitations it imposes(*MS,* 20).

Menippean satire distinguishes itself from other kinds by attracting attention to the text while conventional satire attracts attention to its author, as Kernan supports:

> We might at this point sharpen our distinction between formal and Menippean satire somewhat and say that in formal satire the satirist is stressed and dominates the scene, while in Menippean satire the scene is stressed and absorbs the artist, to some degree or all together(*Modern Essays in Criticism,* 259).

Kinsley, for whom it seems nothing escapes without close scrutiny, directed my attention to the fact that Kernan downplays the role of the satirist by this definition; agreeing with the observation, I humbly propose that the foregrounding in the Menippean satire may be enough to obscure the author temporarily, until a profounder critical analysis -- perhaps one of the *persona* -- is undertaken, as recommended by Ehrenpreis, an exercise not to be over-done if we heed Kinsley's informed caution(Symposium, 354-57).

Menippean satire also characterizes itself in its object of attack: while conventional satire attacks vice and folly in society, Menippean satire denounces perverted mental attitudes in a professional approach to life:

> Menippean satire deals less with people as such than with mental attitudes. Pedants, bigots, cranks, parvenus, virtuosi, enthusiasts, rapacious and incompetent professional men of all kinds, are handled in terms of their occupational approach to life as distinct from their social behaviour(*Anatomy*, 309).

Hence, the pet target of the Menippist is the *philosophus gloriosus*:

> A constant theme in the tradition is the ridicule of the philosophus *gloriosus* [...]. The novelist sees evil and folly as social diseases, but the Menippean satirist sees them as diseases of the intellect, as a kind of maddened pedantry which the *philosophus gloriosus* at once symbolizes and defines(ibid).

Frye anatomizes: "At its most concentrated the Menippean satire presents us with a vision of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern" (ibid-> vide also Freud and his penile tunnel vision). In Bakhtin's view, it is not the single intellectual pattern itself which is the target of the Menippist, but the testing of that pattern. Stating that Menippean satire may be either fantastic (as with *Alice in Wonderland*) or moral. Frye consolidates : "The purely moral type is a serious vision of society as a single intellectual pattern, in other words a Utopia"(ibid). The *philosophus gloriosus* fails to "fulfil the Delphic maxim of self-knowledge" yet pretends omniscience. Sherbert contributes that

> [t]he satirist ridicules the boasting philosopher, or what Northrop Frye call the *philosophus gloriosus* by simply allowing him to display his knowledge and thereby expose it as impractical and even dangerous(Sherbert, 30).

Impractical and dangerous because

> [his] narcissic narrative only reflects the designs of his learned wit and, rather than holding a mirror up to nature, he holds the mirror up to the vanity of his art(ibid).

Pinkus joins the chat:

> While madness is the dominant image of satire, the immediate target of society is the *alazon*, the impostor, the universal race of

> quacks and humbugs. The madman who is recognized and certifiable is usually a problem for the psychiatrist not the satirist. Even the madman as criminal, the Hitler, whose crime is observed by society in all its appalling nature, is not satiric material. The satiric target is the madman on the loose, the local mayor or the bishop, or the female social worker, the respectable, dignified pillars of the community with their bland, smooth faces, fat with their own importance, who cover their crimes, their madness, with the pomp of office(*Satura*, 201).

Swift goes ballistic against these professional narcissistic tubs in his digressions on learning and madness, along with his sortie on various schools of superficiality such as the Pederastic, Spelling, Looking-glass, Swearing &c., mostly a parody on the Royal Society, revealing modern shallow wits, the beaux revelling in the most absurd pseudo-intellectual topics in a vain attempt at profundity(c.f.: *Tale*, 41-2). The finally recognised Thomas Love Peacock, in his *Headlong Hall*, sums up the mental habit of the *philosophus gloriosus* " with a motto from Petronius:

> All philosophers, who find
> Some favourite system to their mind,
> In every point to make it fit,
> Will force all nature to submit(qt in Sherbert, 13).

Which Swift rephrases as:

> For, what Man in the natural State, or Course of Thinking, did ever conceive it in his Power, to reduce the Notions of all Mankind, exactly to the same Length, and Breadth, and Height of his own?(*Tale*, 166)

Disliking *mathematicks* and *dark authors*, he sarcastically proposes a panegyric essay on Number *THREE:*

> *I* have by most convincing Proofs, not only reduced the *Senses* and the *Elements* under its Banner, but brought over several Deserters from its two great Rivals *SEVEN* and *NINE*"(*ibid*, 58).

Ancient Greek mythology tells of a metaphorical Procrustes seducing travellers into his beds -one small, one great -misapplying both - to then

either stretch or cut them up according his own (mental) sizes; the gods, eventually tired of his antics, laid him down in his own berth and removed him from his head, as Menippists slice through bombastic and pretentious professional mental absurdities. Reformation Scholars were conversant with Greek Mythology and surely understood the allusive warning. This 'sleeper' in Procruste's bed is precisely whom Eric McLuhan proposes to rescue.

Before closing this chapter, another contribution from Sherbert in terms of Menippean ideology:

> Varro borrows only the form of his work from Menippus, for the concerns of a Roman, landowning patriot must be different from those of a Hellenistic, cosmopolitan nihilist. Varro favours the techniques of the diatribe to enforce moral preaching. He is a true Roman satirist, and champions the cause of the old, patriotic, religious, rustic Roman life over the decadence, indulgence, and impiety of modern sensual Rome(52-3).

This I find to be a healthy resemblance with Swift in terms of championing the "cause of the old, patriotic, religious &c.", demonstrating Menippist not as a "fiendish monkey" or a "wretch", as the brave Lytton Strachey would have it, but as a caring intellectual whose integrity inclines favourably towards his fellow man, as Monk and Lipking defend in their Introduction to Swift's *A Description of a City Shower*:

> Like the prose, it is predominantly satiric in purpose, but not without its moments of comedy and light-heartedness, though written most often not so much to divert as to reform the reader (Norton 1, 2009).

Upon Defamiliarization

1- Origin and explication:

Since I cannot read myself, let alone Russian, I must allow Stacy's translations and cognitive interpretations to stand for most of my references, along with Russian translator Benjamin Sheer, who is responsible for the excerpts below from Shklovsky's *Tetiva* (*Bow-string,* 1970) linking us intimately with Shklovsky:

> I began writing as a young man. I was a student at the university then, though I never had the time to graduate. I was born in 1893, before the 1905 revolution, but that revolution stirred my soul as did premonitions of a future one. We knew that it would soon break out. We tried to anticipate it and prophesied its coming in our poems. We looked forward to the revolution, to fundamental changes in which we ourselves would take part. We wanted not so much to apprehend or depict the world as understand and change it. But how? Alas, that we didn't know.
>
> The poetry of Mayakovsky and Khlebnikov- and the art of the time - - was intent on seeing the world anew. To this end they changed the very sound of their verse. Yet, in our polemics we came to see that we weren't alone, that poets and prose writers of the past had also sought to speak with a new voice because they saw things in their own light.
>
> It was in 1916 that the theory of "enstrangement" first made its appearance. By means of this theory, I sought to generalize the way in which perception is renewed and phenomena represented. "Enstrangement" has to do with time, pain, inspiration and a sense of wonder at the world. Yet, at the same time, I said: "A literary work is pure form. It is neither thing nor material but a relation among materials. Like every relation, it too represents zero dimensionality. For this reason, the scale, the dimension of a literary work, the arithmetical significance of its numerator and denominator are of little moment. What is important is the relation
>
> between them. Works of human tragedies, chamber or universal works, the juxtaposition of world to world or of cat to stone -- all are of equal value".

[...]
Mayakovksy said: "You see life from an entirely different angle. You grasp great things through nonsense."

If in art we compare one cat with another cat or one flower with another flower, we do not thereby bring artistic form into being. At least, not through this act of interbreeding alone. On the contrary, we are dealing here with detonators that set off great explosions, with entryways into knowledge, with reconnaissance of the new.

If we renounce emotion or ideology in art, we renounce also the possibility of knowing form and, consequently, the goal of knowledge and the path of experience that leads to the apprehension of the world.

In that case, form and content go their separate ways. Such a provocative formulation is in fact a formula for capitulation. It brings about a breach in the world of art, an annihilation of the integral wholeness of perception.
[...]
Art knows its objects by applying old models in a new way and by creating new models as well. Art moves by changing. It may change its methods, but the past does not disappear from the scene. Art moves by making use of its old lexicon, by reinterpreting its old structures. At the same time, it moves as if it were not moving at all. Yet, though changing swiftly, art does not change for change's sake. Rather, by shifting and transposing things, it seeks to disclose their sensuousness and diversity.

In a work of art a man moves forward by using the past as a stepping-stone. He makes use of the contradictory nature of the past. He lives both by recollecting the past and by remembering the future. Batyushkov regarded hope as the remembrance of the future. But remembrance of the future is not only hope. It is also invention.
[...]
Poetics seems to have come full circle once again. In certain respects, the process of working out a literary theory has led us back to ancient rhetoric. This isn't so bad if we take cognizance of this return without letting it become a repetition, that is, if we see in this return a new approach to the pulse of essence. One ought not to separate the plot structure of a literary work from its linguistic structure. They may be related, but they are not congruent.

> Structure is an isolated part of movement. Movement -- change of states -- shifts structures around.
>
> Art moves and yet stands still. It moves before your very eyes in poetry, prose and the visual arts.
>
> It moves by overcoming contradictions, by creating new ones (see Internet resources: Shklovsky).

Shklovsky views plot structure and linguistic contents as separate entities, in opposition to his Marxist peers. While some scholars (Jameson, for one, in *The Prison House of Language*) claim that there is some ambiguity about whether Shklovsky meant the defamiliarization of form or content; Stacy replies that it is not too important, that the writer may defamiliarize either form or content, do both or none(Stacy, 42). The *Tale* does both: the Hack sides with the Moderns as a ploy and adopts their lack of respect for polite taste and traditional value, a device Sherbert calls an 'unreliable narrator':

> In a Menippean satire, fantasy undermines interpretation and is but another example of form fighting content, of the frustration of reasonable expectations, of irony. There is an unreliable narrator or source, no driving unity of purpose (whence the digressions), and no fixed point of view. Such plot as there is very simple; rhetoric and persuasion are minimal. Because the genre strives for effect through impropriety, the author of a Menippean satire accuses himself of a lack of respect for taste, tradition and decorum, and this is usually translated into self-parody when the author identifies himself with his narrator. Self-parody extends to the parody of the author's own knowledge, and the rejection of all dogma which the form implies leads to the rejec tion of the author's ability to preach, or even to understand (Sherbert, 35).

Although it is difficult to disagree with such a definition, I should like to make an exception for "no fixed point of view", and reformulate it as "no *apparent* fixed point of view" in the case of the *Tale*, a calculated

satiric ploy. In his unsigned footnotes, Swift, following one of his stigmonyms, roguishly claims that he 'doesn't know what the author means here', refers to something else, translates from Latin whenever inclined, explains chosen difficult passages for the dull and projects himself via the Hack as a "modern", through which artifice he demonstrates their inability to fulfil the Delphic maxim of self-knowledge(*Tale,* xxiv).

Whenever Swift refers to 'taste', he also invites the Latinate pun of 'sapere', to taste, and 'sapiens', meaning knowledge or wisdom - which summons the presence of food, be it 'all pork', or as represented by asses pruning shrubs or again, the staple of flies, spiders and bees. As with Milton, we must read him through many levels; Swift was fluent in English, French, Greek and Latin, and it is obvious that he enjoyed toying with his learning, as do most scholars(*Tale,* liii). A keen mind is a *bee* harvesting nectar from various flowers, producing honey and wax, sweetness and light, while dark authors parody natural harmony, the proud emissaries of the chaotic Leviathan.

Definition of Defamiliarization:

Defamiliarization is simply the act of making the familiar strange. Since this simple definition simply won't do for a scholarly treatise, I have invited Thomson to elaborate:

> Defamiliarization is a method of presentation of things and ideas; using it, we arrange the artistic elements in such a way as to make them represent these things or ideas to us with strange clarity.[...] Defacilitation relates to the effort to arrange artistic elements in an intricate and difficult way, so that we have to attend them more than if we met them in everyday life. [...] A critic has to 'lay bare' all these, and other strategies, in his discussion of the literary work. On the other hand, the writer himself may lay them bare: thus does Sterne, for instance, when he playfully arranges the narrative units in *Tristram Shandy* contrary to the logical motivated sequence which a great majority of prose fiction works has accustomed us to expect(Thomson, 27).

So is it with Swift: he arranges the narrative sequence in the *Tale* differently from the usual book form into a mock-book(more on this later). "Defamiliarization" is a process by which familiar things are presented in a different light in order to short-circuit our automatic perception of them:

> As perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic. We see the object as though it was enveloped in a sack. We know what it is by its configuration, but we see only its silhouette(Stacy, 83).

Defamiliarization compels us to view the forgotten familiar with *strange clarity*. Shklovsky explains: "It is the purpose of defamiliarization to jolt the reader's perceptions into wakefulness"(ibid). Scholes notes that "Shklovsky's concept is grounded in a theory of perception that is essentially Gestaltist" (see Gurdjieff later), and pursues: "Habitualisation devours objects, clothes, furniture, one's wife and the fear of war"(ibid.). In his

Introduction, Stacy affirms that "[t]he method strips the world of the labels attached to it by habit and social convention, and gives it a 'disci-vilized' appearance, as it might have appeared to Adam on the day of creation" (Stacy, 2). He also refers to Victor Erlich, who subscribes to the same notion:

> It is this inexorable pull of routine, of habit, that the artist is called upon to counteract. By tearing the object out of its habitual context, by bringing together disparate notions, the poet gives a *coup de grâce* to the verbal cliché and to the stock responses attendant upon it and forces us into heightened awareness of things and their sensory texture. The act of creative deformation restores sharpness to our vision(ibid, 33; emphasis mine).

All who have read the *Tale* will agree that this is precisely what Swift has accomplished: a creative deformation of the modern wits' ephemeral fashions. Through astute observations Shklovsky deduces that we only perceive the outline of the familiar, automatically recognising its form, and taking it for granted, fail to view it in its present time. Let us consult him directly:

> If we start to examine the general laws of perception, we see that as perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic. Thus, for example, all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously automatic; if one remembers the sensations of holding a pen or of speaking a foreign language for the first time and compares that with his feeling at performing the action for the ten thousandth time, he will agree with us (Stacy tr., 32-3).

It is true that we can't always afford the luxury of gazing at door-knobs like children do, but we do operate more or less robotically in familiar surroundings, which defamiliarization aims to debunk.

Boris Ouspensky worked intimately with Shklovsky, and as a matter of coincidence, another Uspensky, (P.D. Ouspensky - Stacy spells 'Uspen-

sky' both ways) collaborated with Gurdjieff in "The Work", whose gestaltist philosophy, *The Fourth Way*, ties in with Shklovsky's defamiliarization purpose of renewing perceptions:

> The Work tells us that to have a chance of developing, we have to understand that we are not what we think. We cannot wake up until we have understood that we sleep. To see this, we have to observe ourselves. This is very difficult, because not only must we glimpse things as they are, we must also resist our ingrained tendency to explain things away. If what we see clashes with our imaginary picture of ourselves, we will find that thoughts, feelings, and movements automatically arise in defence of that picture. To be sincere, we have to struggle with these reactions, with these buffers. This is why sincerity is more elusive than we think. There is a difference between sincerity and expressing whichever `I' happens to be in control at the time(Gurdjieff, internet).

We are many "eyes" from which we evaluate life, all of them valid yet incomplete unless united under a renewed global perception through a shift in perspective[c.f.: *persona*]. This is not new: most religions affirm that we are almost like buses, hoarding a multitude of "I"'s , many of them striving for control (c.f.: Gnostic writings of Valentius circa 300 A.D.); this is possibly how some exorcists made a name for themselves while others 'heard God' speaking directly, as with Joan of Arc, Marjorie Kempe, Julian of Norwich, Catherine of Siena and a host of other *enthusiasts*. This notion still thrives today as either 'schizoid' or 'schizophrenic', and although unceremoniously criticised by some as quacks, Psychologists and Psychiatrists strive to awaken the sleepers by inviting them to view life via a different perspective, a most honourable undertaking. The concept of *persona* is alive in most 'personal growth' schools, serving as a tool or scapegoat on which to pin unwanted attitudes, emotions and memories, whether real or imagined: 'It was not really me but a diffe-

rent entity/ persona hard at work' &c., and now that I've gone through the required rituals, that entity is gone"(I've seen this practised). Yet the cluster notion of identities is not as farfetched as it may at first appear; Ehrenpreis defends in his *Personæ* that

> [a]s long as a man's character is alive, it is trying out roles in language, in conduct. At the same time, although one "self" does not continually displace another, each remains a form or mode of revelation of the real person. It is not illusory appearances that the real person sets before us: it is visible influences, aspects, reflections -however indirect- of an inner being that cannot be defined apart from them. In order to understand any literary work, we must view it as a transaction between us and that inner being(*Satura,* 314).

Gurdjieff proposes that the individual should "distance"(defamiliarize) himself from whichever "self" rules at the time (disautomatisation) so that the Self may come to realisation as distinct from its synthetic personalities. Compare and contrast this with Shklovsky:

> Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war. "If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been." And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, <u>to make the stone *stony*</u>. The purpose of art is to impart the sensations of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar", to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. *Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object is not important* [sic](Stacy, 34; underscore mine).

Defamiliarization shifts information and coerces the individual to shift his viewpoints so as to reassess perception and re-evaluate data. Gurdjieff, Shklovsky and the Menippists share the same argument: we are partially asleep and must awaken in order to fully experience life. The gestaltic notion in *ostranenie* encompasses as such artifices as defacilitation

(*zatrudnenie*), retardation (*zamedlenie*), alienation(*otchuzhdenie*), dis-habituation, stair-case structure (*stupencatoe postroenie*), laying bare the device(*obnazenie*), distancing, debunking, along with a host of literary tropes and ploys that could be classified laboriously starting with the first letter in the alphabet(see Stacy's extensive Index, pp.179-93), inducing Thomson to state that

> the device of defamiliarization may appear in different varieties and may be used in a number of ways with various intentions and effects(Stacy,7; Thompson, 26).

Ergo: anything goes, as long as it refreshes perceptions. The notion of retardation through defacilitation is alive in satire: "One obvious way in which satire provokes its readers is in its calculated 'difficulty'" (Griffin, 52). Further on, Griffin states that "Swift and Pope likewise demonstrate satire's ability to *displace* history", supporting his argument with the 'death' of Partridge and the failure of Wood's coin(ibid, 129). The whole purpose of 'making strange' is to unsettle and divert an otherwise dazed readership. Although seeming like a rather wide explanation at first, the basic concept of defamiliarization narrows down to a manageable 'animal' whenever approached through its essential nature. Evelyn Waugh un-derstood the linked process of satire/ defamiliarization in *The Loved One* (see Appendix 2). Any literature worth its salt represents life with *strange clarity*: Shakespeare, Milton, Coleridge, Frost, Wordsworth, Herbert... the whole canon of Literature bulges with examples too numerous to pen down. Defamiliarization does not lead one into another world but brings one back .

flage or costumes, dissimulation "practised by members of oppressed or persecuted races" often involving a "secret languages": Professor Robert K. Martin, a qualified Queer Theorist, interprets a *drop of blood* in a Whitman poem as *semen*, its colour not the obvious and unimaginative one of blood but one of *shame* - not that I dispute the possible interpretation here, as homosexuals in Whitman's days probably shared a secret language. Stacy also inventories tattoos, piercing, &c., along with a generous overview of archetypes in the Arts where language also stands trial on charges of "*obscurantisme et déception*" in several professional domains, principally medical, legal, scientific, government and industrial jargon, along with deceptive advertising cant(ibid.).

Eric McLuhan refers to Shklovsky's *ostranenie priem* on the subject of dystopia, suggesting that "Even one's own culture could be explored as if it were bizarre and exotic", enumerating a few examples, and concluding with:

> However it is managed, the basic strategy is still to provide the audience with a means of seeing itself and its own culture afresh -- "the same anew". Casting the familiar in unfamiliar terms and vice-versa is but a variant on or extrapolation of techniques already discussed (*MS,* 72-73; emphasis mine).

These are tropes or litrary ploys the inventive Menippist uses in his art to capture his reader. McLuhan observes about Menippists that

> they do not confine themselves to any one ideal pattern or form or set of themes or styles. The result: *innovations of both form and* structure occur frequently in Menippean satire, and the catalogue of features and themes soon grows unweildy(ibid, 36).

A tighter link between Defamiliarization and Menippean satire could hardly be better argued. Commenting on the *carnivalesque* aspect of

The Essence of defamiliarization:

As Stacy propounds:

> [...] the essence of what we call defamiliarization involves, above and beyond specific stylistic devices and tropes, something more general. And that general, distinguishing feature is simply this: something ordinary, commonplace, or familiar an object, event, situation, or tradition is, in one way or another, made to appear unfamiliar(8).

Something familiar is being made purposely unfamiliar with the intention of attracting attention to itself; Stacy supports this proposition with an example from Buechner's *A Long Day's Dying*:

> The mirror reflected what seemed at first a priest. A white robe, which fell from his thick shoulders in crescent folds, circumscribed with diminishing accuracy the ponderous art of his great head, and gave to his obesity the suggestion of vulnerability rather than strength as he sat face to face with the fact of himself. This effect was intensified by the resignation with which he suffered what might have been his acolyte, also dressed in white, either to anoint his flourishing, grey-brown hair as if in preparation for some imminent solemnity or to give it a tonsure(4).

To simply state that someone is getting a haircut affects nothing in the reader; but, defended as above, it captures the reader's attention.

Analogical forms of defamiliarization:

> It might be useful at this point to consider briefly, as a background for viewing the linguistic and literary phenomena under discussion, some analogical forms of defamiliarization in the world around us(Stacy, 16-31).

Stacy enumerates a plethora of examples of defamiliarisation in life, such as uses of cosmetics, clothing, hair colouring, food preparation, a coat of paint, clothing, typographical eccentricities as with e.e.cummings, Jay Bochner's "dA-dAmAgs" et al.; animal and human camou-

Menippean satire, Eric McLuhan perceives that

> like most other commentators, Bakhtin attaches no pertinence to these aspects of Menippean satire as regards any effect they might have on the sensibilities of the reader[...] The real function, however, of Menippean carnivalism is to renew the reader's percepts and sensibilities"(*MS,* 51).

I ask: How else can an artist present the familiar in new perspectives if not through the channels of percepts and sensibilities? Unfortunately, and possibly in the throes of keeping his main thesis within a true compass, Eric McLuhan brushed 'defamiliarization' off as "new", but recognizes that it is a "familiar-sounding territory"(ibid, 80-81). Defamiliarization is not new but has been with us forever, as Stacy defends:

> It need hardly be pointed out that criticism of habitualization, automatization, and triteness in literature is nothing new; such criticism, explicit or implicit, has been a marked feature especially of baroque-type poetics in many literary contexts [*tapeinos*]. The clearest style is that which uses only poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs strange[*xenikos*] words. I mean strange, metaphorical, and lengthened words - anything that differs from normal idiom" (Stacy, 33-4).

These rhetorical devices support that defamiliarization is as old as language itself. It has also been prized in Zen Buddhism as it frees the mind from the restricted Aristotelian binary trap. Quoting two passages from the writings of the late E.D. Suzuki on the subject:

> Satori may be defined as an intuitive looking into the nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical or logical understanding of it. Practically, it means the unfolding of a new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a dualistically trained mind. Or we may say that with satori our entire surroundings are viewed from quite an unexpected angle of perception(ibid, 36).

Suzuki further quotes the Zen master, Seigen Ishin:

> Before a man studies Zen, to him mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after he gets an insight into the truth of Zen through the instructions of a good master, mountains are not mountains and waters are not waters; but after this when he really attains to the abode of rest, mountains are once more mountains and waters are waters"(ibid).

"Satori (Chinese *wu*)" is, according to Suzuki, another name for "enlightenment (*anuttara-smyak-sambodhi*)(Stacy, 37n13). Suzuki makes "the stone stony". This reminds me of some of Donovan's lyrics: "First there is a mountain/ Then there is no mountain / Then there is", an honour to the Satorical philosophy, and "Caterpillar sheds his skin/ To find a butterfly within" in accord with Gurdjieff and Bergson, amongst others. Take into consideration, for example, the music fashions of every decade of the 20th century, from the 50's, 60's and 70's, let alone the pesky anthropoid "rap" noise of the 90's, consult their individual and general approach to life and it would seem that every age contributes in its own way to defamiliarize life as we know it. Perhaps that, cosmically speaking, defamiliarization is but another of Nature's ways of rekindling the otherwise dormant genetic pool; our offspring, far from robotical clones, reconsider the invention of the wheel and create new forms, create the future now.

Defamiliarization is to music what jazz is to literature.



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— STAIR-CASE structure —

- AKin To Swift's "bathos" imagery -

142. Relativity. 1953 - ESCHER

Foregrounding

The term *foregrounding*

> had its origin with the Czech theorist Jan Mukarovsky [...]. It refers to the range of stylistic variations that occur in literature, whether at the phonetic level (e.g. alliteration, rhyme), the grammatical level (e.g. inversion, ellipsis), or at the semantic level (e.g. metaphor, irony)(Miall & Kuiken, *PoeticsJ* 22 (1994) 390).

Foregrounding is one of defamiliarization's main characteristics; Stacy elaborates, quoting from another Czech scholar, B.Havranek:

> By *foregrounding* ... we mean the use of the devices of language in such a way that this use itself attracts attention and is perceived as uncommon, as deprived of automatization, as deautomatized, such as live poetic metaphor (as opposed to a lexicalized one, which is automatized)(Stacy, 43).

It not only 'attracts attention' but also attracts attention to itself in the same way Menippean satire does, through wit (live poetic metaphors):

> Wit in fact serves as an important index of self-consciousness in Menippean satire and its central character the gloriosus philosopher. The kinds of self-conscious wit most commonly used in the genre are narrative digression and some form of wordplay (such as the pun), or paradoxical metaphor (such as the conceit)[sic] (Sherbert, 17).

Developing his argument further, Stacy leans on Mukarovsky:

> The function of poetic language consists in the maximum of foregrounding of the utterance. Foregrounding is the opposite of automatization. ... In poetic language foregrounding achieves maximum intensity to the extent ... of being used for its own sake; it is not used in the services of communication, but in order to place in the foreground the act of expression(Stacy, 43).

Miall and Kuiken also support that

> the immediate effect of foregrounding is to make strange (ostranenie), to acheive defamiliarization. In this respect, Mukarovsky and Shklovsky, although they seem unaware of it, show continuity with earlier work by Coleridge and Shelly(*PoeticsJ* 22 (1994) 389-407).

Yet, foregrounding thrives as much in prose as in verse. Foregrounding may be compared to a camera "zoom-in": what was hidden as a part of a whole now appears *in camera*. This term is also referred to as a "semiolinguistic manipulation" whereby linguists exploit this rhetorical device in order to sell products by foregrounding some of their specific and desired (buyable) aspects, leaving the undesired in the back-ground, such as tobacco companies do: foregrounding the "manly", "social" or "sportive" aspect of cigarette smoking, hiding its controlled addictive and carcinogenic virtues within the background. Advertisements about women's sanitary artefacts also foreground trivia (skiing, tennis, riding, diving; ruling mature male scientists as twenty-two year-old Nuclear Fission experts or Cardio-Vascular Surgeons commenting on the virtues of This cough sirup, &c.), leaving the concerned body part out of the picture (distancing). This is how Stacy defends that

> Shklovsky's term may also be applied to such matters as the creative manipulation, radical upsetting,and distortion of familiar traditions or the "foregrounding" of certain artifices formerly employed less manneristically(Stacy, x).

Foregrounding artifices 'formerly employed less manneristically', can also lead to ridicule, a ploy Kinsley defines:

> Ridicule is an attempt to arouse laughter at someone or something. Hostile, aggressive except in its mildest forms. Satire's main weapon(AM, 4).

Foregrounding is a powerful tool, as

> [a]lmost any individual word of formal linguistic element may be "foregrounded" - and thus made to appear strange - through repetition (Gertrude Stein, Samuel Beckett), typographical emphasis (italics, letter spacing, various fonts - e.g., the occasional use of black letters in *Tristram Shandy*), or even through omission.

> Aside from the body of lipogrammatic works of prose and poetry, I would include here the widespread use of dots or dashes to replace words and of suspension points(Stacy, 59-60).

This trope (dots and dashes imposturing words) is known by scholars by the pompous epithet of "stigmonym", used by Swift playfully, as he does with other printing conventions. Politicians and Advertisers are known enthusiasts of omitted data and foregrounders of carefully chosen trivial or pompous terms that Orwell exposes in "Politics and the English Language", Brian Wilson Key anatomizes in *Subliminal Seduction* and as Vance Packard's *The Hidden Persuaders* analyses. Besides 'foregrounding' and 'irony'(including ridicule), 'digressions' play a vital role in the *Tale*: the Hack even diverts us with "A Digression in Praise of Digressions". Shklovsky refers to Digressions as a defacilitating trope. But what is a digression and to what rhetorical purpose?

According to Eric McLuhan, a

> [d]igression, the heart and soul of Cynic satire, is managed in many ways. Nearly every Menippean topic is a form of digression from the normal or expected, ranging from violations of stylistic decorum to violations of narrative sequence, of time (Dialogues of the Dead), of probability (the author writes before birth or after death), of physical size or capacity (Rabelais, Joyce), and so on [...] Digressiveness can also take the form of repeatedly promising to come to the point and never doing so(*MS,* 112).

If Menippean satire is "a form of digression from the normal or expected", a displacement occurs. It signifies that 'displacement' is but another manifestation of 'making strange' - its chief operative - corroborating my contention that "defamiliarization" and "Menippean satire" not only conjugate together well, but also confirm that Menippists have always been ardent users of defamiliarizing techniques, vindicating Mc-

Luhan's stated purpose of satire 'waking the reader up' through rhetorical twists.

It is true that "defamiliarization" helps us to better understand Menippean satire , but, if it does, it is precisely because Menippean satire uses defamiliarization techniques lavishly, its ploys dystopic, utopic or picaresque, along with just about any combination of stylistic devices such as synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor, hyperbole, litote and other retarding or defacilitating devices. What is a thesis but a foregrounding exercise where the scholar summons any and all justifying materials within the scope of a thesis, information which would have otherwise remained unsolicited?

Stacy observes that: "a writer may defamiliarize either his form or his content, or do neither, or do both"(42). Swift defamiliarizes both form and content in the *Tale*, with one major distinction: while defamiliarization operates in a positive and elevating manner, Menippean satire defamiliarzes in a negative and debasing one through irony, where what is said differs from what it meant, baiting the learned reader into the reinterpretation of the information, and, himself hooked, fishes for meanings which may or may not reflect Swift's initial views:

> He issued a solemn warning to 'those whom the *Learned* among Posterity will appoint for Commentators upon this elaborate Treatise'; and they dare never forget that he may be playing a gamewith them. The modern editor must always be conscious of the shade of Swift finding amused pleasure in the false surmises that send him searching on the wrong track, and when the hunt is successful, as often by luck as by skill, in the explanations that sometimes come perilously near pedantry(*Tale,* liv).

'Near pedantry' is humbly put: I would say, agreeing with Kinsley, that since the *Tale* is a mock-book, we are dealing with mock-everything, including pedantry.

List of Menippean Ploys

As laboriously catalogued by Eric McLuhan, here is partial list from sixty-plus Menippean ploys, from which I have retained twenty-eight relevant characteristics to the *Tale*.

1-Anonymous Author.
2-Apologiæ for the Work.
3-Autonomous Author.
4-Autonomous Character.
5-Autonomous Pen.
6-Bookseller (as authority).
7-Diagrams and Drawings.
8-Digressiveness.
9-Do it Yourself (Autonomous Reader).
10-Fake Books.
11-Fake Table of Content.
12-Force the Reader to Think.
13-Honesty.
14-How to Read the Book.
15-Inability to Edit Anything Out.
16-Lacunæ.
17-Language (many sub-divisions).
18-Learning.
19-Medicinal.
20-Moderns.
21-Mutilated Text.
22-Nothing.
23-New Forms.
24-Philosophus Gloriosus.
25-Printing Conventions Trifled With.
26-Tailors.
27-Tubs or Barrels,
28-Universalizing.
(*MS*, 103-148)

To which I may add *mock-book*, as with Sterne or Melville's *Moby Dick*. The above do not only accommodate Menippean linguistic ploys but also some of its generic conventions. Compare them to the following

compilation of selected defamiliarization tropes gleaned from Stacy's elaborate index (may the Dean forgive my modern sin).

Defamiliarization Tropes, a Partial List

In praise of index learning, and as alphabetized by Stacy, I have compiled a tentative digest of defamiliarizating tropes, a paradigm to be mirrored, compared to and integrated with Menippean ploys where applicable, so that we may better understand how Swift views the world of eighteenth-century authors and book-sellers:

1-Alienation,
2-Allegory,
3-Bathos (vertical imagery),
4-Buried metaphor,
5-Chiasmus,
6-Cliché,
7-Decadence(and decadent),
8-Defacilitation,
9-Deformation,
10-Desheorization,
11-Diatribe,
12-Disautomatization,
13-Dishabituation,
14-Disproportioning,
15-Distancing,
16-Ears, defamiliarization of,
17-Erotic defamiliarization,
18-Estrangement,
19-Excessive detail,
20-Foregrounding,
21-Fragmentariness,
22-Greek language and literature,
23-Imagery(any and all),
24-Insanity,
25-Irony,
26-Language and deception; Janus-faced aspect of,
27-Latin language and literature,
28-Laying bare the device,
29-Legal jargon,
30-Making strange,

31-Medical jargon,
32-Negative allegory,
33-Originality of incompetence,
34-Oxymoron,
35-Palindrome,
36-Paradox,
37-Parody,
38-Periphrasis,
39-Prostitution,
40-Retardation,
41-Scatological imagery,
42-Scholasticism,
43-Sea metaphor,
44-Semantic shift(metaphor),
45-Simile,
46-Stigmonym,
47-Surrealism,
48-Symbolism,
49-Synecdoche (and metonymy),
50-Taboos,
51-Titles,
52-Translations.

Since Stacey's index focuses on defamiliarization of language and literature, it follows that his terms apply to language artifices and literary conventions. Since no single list pretends to contain the sum total of linguistic idiosyncrasies, I clip to the above selection X. J. Kennedy's "Index of Terms"; as Kennedy's 190-term list focuses particularly on poetic conventions, only those relevant to prose are elected:

1-Abstract,
2-Allegory,
3-Allusion,
4-Anticlimax,
5-Bathos,
6-Carpe diem,
7-Connotation,
8-Convention,
9-Decorum,
10-Diction,
11-Editing,
12-Epigraph,

13-Figures of speech,
14-Imagery,
15-Irony,
16-Myth,
17-Sarcasm,
18-Surrealism, and
19-Translations.

These19 terms stand out for themselves in the *Tale*. Succumbing to my inherent penchant for simplicity (fencing with the dangers stalking almanackers) I now reverse gears and, as with Russian dolls, repack the nest of boxes into a workeable frame; working back towards the Menippean roster, Kennedy's reincrudinates into the 'defamiliarization' body. From the 'defamiliarization' inventory, quite a few interconnect with the Menippean roll, but not all: while several terms on the defamiliarization list fuse with the Menippean 'language' trope, while others, such as 'alienation', defacilitation', 'deformation', 'disautomatisation', 'dishabituation', 'distancing', 'estrangement', 'retardation', 'staircase-structure' and 'laying bare the device' remain typical Shklovskian attitudes, much seized-upon by Menippists under ploy #12. Likewise with the Menippean register: some of its generic terms can only flag Menippean ships, as covered earlier. Menippus and Shklovsky supplement each other in a yin-yang symbiotic unity, yet retain their respective intrinsic virtues.

-But what did Swift NOT defamiliarize?
-"Very little if any", replies the little voice in the vortex.

The Tail

Physical Construction of the *Tale* & Observanda

Considering the initial allegory of Peter, Jack and Martin, the story itself would be only some seventy-five pages long, footnotes and plates included. What makes it a remarkable example of defamiliarization is that it draws quite a bit of attention to itself- also a Menippean virtue. The book, minus its symbiotic *Battel of the Books* and the *Mechanical Operation of the Spirit*, along with the Keys, divides thus:

1- Eleven treatises to come (few mentioned in the *Tale*) ------ 1 page,
2- Apology ---------- - ---------- 21 pages,
3- Bookseller's Dedication----------6 pages,
4- Bookseller to Reader (the masked Author) ----------2 pages,
5- Epistle Dedicatory (dedication to Posterity) - ----------9 pages,
6- Preface---------- 16 pages,
7- Introduction - ---------- 21 pages,
8- Section Two - (the story) ----------21 pages,
9- Digression Concerning Criticks - ----------13 pages,
10- Section Four, (the story) ---------- 20 pages,
11- Section Five: Digression in the Modern Kind ----------10 pages,
12- Section Six: back to the Story ---------- 12 pages,
13- Section Seven: Digression in Praise of Digressions---------- 7 pages,
14- Section Eight: on Aeolists and others---------- --12 pages,
15- Section Nine: Digression on Madness ---------- -- 20 pages,
16- Section Ten: on anything but the story----------20 pages,
17- Section Eleven: on Jack ---------- ---19 pages,
18- Conclusion----------4 pages

Sub Total for the story(Religion): 76 pages
Sub Total for digressions(Learning): 158 pages
Total: 234 pages

The attention to both subjects is typical for the period: "From the outset, English humanism was vitally concerned with Christianity as well as classical learning(Norton 1, 397).

Swift uses Wotton and Bentley as unwitting contributors of footnotes, once more confirming the Hack as an unreliable narrator. His original treatment of the world of authors and booksellers reflects such quick and playful wit that it has fascinated scholars for centuries, and this fascination is generally inspired by the wealth of allusions to a myriad of classical authors, , and the canny way he covers his tracks, keeping the reader conjecturing through various planted traps, some of them triggered by the reader's own mind via missing text (*Hiatus in MS*) or foregrounded by the unorthodox manipulation of printing conventions, which device he lays tauntingly bare:

> THERE are certain common Privileges of a Writer, the Benefit whereof, I hope, there will be no Reason to doubt; Particularly, that where I am not understood, it shall be concluded, that something very useful and profound is coucht underneath: And again, that whatever word or Sentence is Printed in a different Character, shall be judged to contain something extraordinary either of *Wit* or Sublime(*Tale,* 47).

The reader, whose attention is now trained to detect these anomalies in terms of printing deviations, actively looks for them, only to be misled: the *leviathan* has swallowed the hook, bait, sinker, line, and wharf.

Because the Dean's style is so rich and colourful and also because he dwells on details which would otherwise escape a lesser mind, the critical analysis of the *Tale* requires a greater amount of discipline than with the more conventional texts, as a kaleidoscope blazes with more vitality than an arrested portrait. Since the whole controversy lies with learning, it would only be fair to give it precedence.

Swift On Learning; a Pre-Quel

In his Dedication to Lord Sommers, under the guise of a bookseller in need of an English translation for *DETUR DIGNISSIMO*, Swift defamiliarizes the issue with a parody on the fickle and synthetic learning of the new pens: "none of the Authors I employ, understood *Latin* (tho' I have them often in pay, to translate out of that Language)"(23). These are the utterances of a *distanced* and seemingly bewildered bookseller objecting that modern authors not only cheat him and his public with pretended literacy but who actually are uneducated charlatans whom he derides with glee - I can just see him chuckle (if not in full mirth), as he scrawls:

> IN two Days, they brought me ten Sheets of Paper, fill'd up on every Side. They swore to me, that they had ransack'd whatever could be found in the Characters of *Socrates, Aristides, Epaminondas, Cato, Tully, Atticus,* and other hard Names, which I cannot now recollect(*Tale,* 24).

Considering Swift's extensive readings, the pretended ignorance is not his but the Modern he impersonates. From his p.o.v., the overabundance of new and unlearned prostitute writers shows them as being more preoccupied with their personal fragile financial necessities than concerned with decent scholarly achievement; what is considered fashionable today does not necessarily meet the fahsionable criteria for tomorrow - in direct opposition to the imperishable pertinence of the classics- an ephemereal condition he views through the cloud metaphor:

> So that I can only avow in general to *Your Highness,* that we do abound in Learning and Wit; but to fix upon Particulars, is a Task too slippery for my slender Abilities. If I should venture in a windy Day, to affirm to your *Highness,* that there is a large Cloud near the *Horizon* in the form of a *Bear,* another in the *Zenith* with the Head of an *Ass,* a third to the *Westward* with claws like a *Dra-*

> *gon*; and *Your Highness* should in a few Minutes think fit to examine the Truth, t'is certain, they would all be changed in Figure and Position, new ones would arise, and all we could agree upon would be, that Clouds there were, but that I was grossly mistaken in the *Zoography* and *Topography* of them(ibid, 35).

The recurring punny theme of 'wind' links with animal (animus) imagery. So as to clarify any misunderstandings, the Hack further expatiates on the transitory nature of modern wit, as opposed to the immortal contributions of the *Antients*:

> I am living fast to see the Time, when a *Book* misses its Tide, shall be neglected, as the *Moon* by Day, or like *Mackarel* a Week after the Season. No Man hath more observed our Climate than the Bookseller who bought the Copy of this Work; He knows to a Title what Subjects will best go off in a *dry Year*, and which it is proper to expose foremost, when the Weather-glass is fallen to *much Rain*. When he had seen this Treatise, and consulted his *Almanach* upon it; he gave me to understand, that he had maturely considered the two Principal Things, which were the *Bulk*, and the *Subject*; and found, it would never *take*, but after a long Vacation, and then only, in case it should happen to be a hard Year for Turnips(ibid, 206-7)

What almanachs and turnips have to do with the sale of books, I leave you to find out, unless it behaves as a *deformation* of logic. Even at the fourteenth reading of the *Tale*, I find still more 'buried treasures' that were not obvious earlier. The *Tale* was Not designed overnight but is the product of a laboured undertaking, contrasting with the evanescent Grubean productions whose authors turn out rubbish on order to satisfy the book-seller's calculated financial prediction, cupid writers he dresses as *whores* and *calones* who pervert the classical Renascent quest for immortality into pedestrian financial pursuits, going as far as glorifying themselves in the process:

> I call'd at a Poet's Chamber (who works for my Shop) in an Alley hard by, shewed him the Translation, and desired his opinion who it was that the Author could mean; He told me, after some Consideration, that Vanity is a Thing he abhorr'd; but by the Description, he thought Himself to be the Person aimed at; And at the same time, he very kindly offer'd his own Assistance *gratis*, toward penning a Dedication to Himself(ibid, 24).

While masturbation is another good name for auto-gratification(jerks -a pun quite possible with Swift), 'Shop' refers to a merchant's place of affairs - definitely not a true poet's setting, as poets belonged to the polite world by either birth or merit, and did not live in a garret manufacturing 'profound' chronicles at an instant's notice, which the Hack castigates:

> I have one Word to say upon the Subject of *Profound Writers*, who are grown very numerous of late; [...] I conceive therefore, as to the Business of being *Profound*, that it is with *Writers*, as with *Wells*; a Person with good Eyes may see to the Bottom of the deepest, provided any Water be there; and, that often, when there is nothing in the World at the Bottom, besides *Dryness* and *Dirt*, tho' it be but a Yard and half under Ground, it shall pass, however, for wondrous *Deep*, upon no wiser a Reason than because it is wondrous *Dark*(ibid, 207-8).

I don't suppose *Dryness* and *Dirt* has anything to do with *Dryden* whom he likes to sport with, but I'll leave this in the hands of the True Criticks. Book-sellers had much to say about book subjects and titles, liable for the financial losses as they were, and exerted a great amount of editing control over their hacks in order to turn out whatever flighty fashion favoured, and as businessmen - not scholars - more preoccupied with sales quantity than product quality. He defamiliarizes his world via *metonimy*, which is taken up later. His *cotemporaries* might well have been familiar with the settings, but it is *defacilitating* for the twentieth-century reader, except for one clever metaphorical (*sdvig*) use of *Parnassus*,

too well-wrought to anatomize without losing much of its flavour but delicious to taste in its original, ditto for the actual *Battel* which tempo would keep Schwartzenegger breathless (*schwartz* means *black*).

The Hack addresses the leading Modern heroes, with a biblical metaphor as a concerned and caring parent:

> THIS is the utmost I am authorized to say upon so ungrateful and melancholy a Subject; because We are extreme unwilling to inflame a Controversy, whose Continuance may be so fatal to the Interests of Us All, desiring much rather that Things be amicably composed; and We shall so far advance on our Side, as to be ready to receive the two *Prodigals* with open Arms, whenever they shall think fit to return from their *Husks* and their Harlots; which I think for the present Course of their Studies they most properly be said to be engaged in; and like an indulgent Parent, continue to them our Affection and our Blessing (Tale, 65).

The parable (metaphor) of the prodigal son acts as an irrefutable argument that time does not run backwards, the Bible being older than the modern 'ancestors', reminding the *Moderns* that the chronological reversal of authority their conjectures defied means nothing unless they also renege the Bible. -Why the Bible? -Because it represents cosmic harmony. And the Bible was written. It was written in a book. The few who knew how to read back then usually held the king's ear and acted as opinion leaders. This gave them power and it also- by association- throned the book as Knowledge of the Universe, as William Kinsley wittingly defends in *Le Mock-Book*.

Insigne, recens, indictum ore alio.
(*Tale,* 43)

Swift's Perspective on the World of Authors and Booksellers; the Quel:

Le Mock-Book (tr. Benoît Mélançon) defends the arresting notion that books, both in '*contenu* et *contenant*', reflect cosmic harmony, and acknowledges the Bible as the Christian literary ancestor of the book-form, simultaneously associating Literature with The Word, Command, Decision and Authority. Since the Bible is accepted as the Word of God and that He is the recognized creator of the universe, the book, by association, reflects cosmic harmony. Kinsley enlarges the metaphor to embrace individual human life-forms as letters in the book of Nature - perhaps also clarifying why some of us are refered to as 'characters'.

But when the Book becomes a *mock-book*, it no longer personifies cosmic harmony but *chaos*, precisely defining *The Tale* in both *contenu* and *contenant* as a satiric impersonation of what it attacks. *Chaos*, according to Greek mythology, defines the original state of matter before creation, wherein all matter exists without harmony. The preferment of chaos over creation underlines the *Tale's* theme that justifies the satirical demolition of the Modern's concept of antiquity with its oxymoronic claim of recent ancestry, demolished through imitative rhetoric in a mock- book for the imitated modern. The Leviathan is but an artificial man, the *mock-man* for whom the *mock-book* is intended.

Now that the parentage between the Menippean satire and Defamiliarization tropes is credibly established, I now proced to demonstrate how Swift the Menippist, through the defamiliarizing efforts of the Hack, views the world of eighteenth-century authors and book-sellers.

New Perspectives through which Swift views the World of Eighteenth-Century Authors and Book-sellers; the Se-Quel:

Warning*: due to its polymorphic nature, I can only achieve this in fragments and I do Not pretend to comprehend All of Swift's genious, let alone a trickle. Here is *Nothing

The Hack crucifies Bentley principally, both as an individual and as the metonymic Modern; he also nails Wotton, Dryden, and a host of other secondary characters guilty by association.

At this juncture, where the slow reader has not yet landed, I must own to my learned reader, as he has already discovered, that most of my general arguments cataloguing Swift's defamiliarized perspective on the world of eigtheenth-century authors and book-sellers have already been exemplified within my earlier chapters, so that I could keep the principal, the flamboyant, and the delicious for the end, as desserts tickle the Epicurian palate, especially after a full-coarse meal.

Swift's Perspective on Bentley

The 'Captain' of the Moderns the Hack early and anonymously introduces in the *Mountebank* allegory as the lard-tub in the crowd: "*Bring your own Guts to a reasonable Compass (and be d---n'd) and then I'll engage we shall have room enough for us all*"(46). The Hack never relaxes his harpoons on this leviathan:

> THE *Guardian* of the *Regal Library*, a Person of great Valor, but chiefly renowned for his *Humanity* [...] but endeavouring to climb up, was cruelly obstructed by his own unhappy Weight, and a tendency towards his Center [...] a Captain whose Name was

> *B--ntl--y*; in Person, the most deformed of all the *Moderns*; Tall, but without Shape or Comeliness; Large, but without Strength or Proportion(224-25; 250).

This identifies with Milton's description of Death in *Paradise Lost*, Sin's incestual offspring minus 'without strength' (Sin described in the *Tale*, p. 86, which number, in terms of camera gels [filters], does not exist ¬ on the set, it means 'remove', e.g.: "86 that chair") - further debasing the subject via his facial features, as exemplified through the dislocation of the Coach metaphor:

> the *Grubean* Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts and their Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and Fables, which having been perhaps more careful and curious in adorning, than was altogether necessary, it has fared with these Vehicles after the usual FAte of Coaches over-finely painted and gilt; that the transitory Gazers have so dazzled their Eyes, and fill'd their Imagination with the outward Lustre, as neither to regard or consider, the Person or the Parts of the Owner within. A Misfortune we understand with somewhat less Reluctancy, because it has been common to us with *Pythagoras, Æsop, Socrates*, and other of our Predecessors(*Tale*, 66).

Predictably, the foot-note specifies that these "were all men of mean or ugly appearance"(ibid). In terms of defamiliarization, this is a roundabout way of coming to the point. One of Swift's greatest talents resides in the sculptured details of trivia that become foregrounded, becoming the focal point of discussion - vertical imagery reversed. Here is another ironic reversal of antecedants, as cherished by the modern point of view:

> Every *True Critick* is a Hero born, descending in a direct line from a Celestial Stem, by *Momus* and *Hybris*, who begat *Zoilus*, who begat *Tigellius*, who begat *Etcætera* the Elder, who begat *B-tly*, and *R-mer*, and *W-tton*,[&c.](ibid, 94).

He also reverses chronology, in the Modern way, when he renames Descartes *Cartesius*. Once Bentley has gone through the *vortex* of reversible time(one of the Hack's major annoyances) and brought to prominence, the Hero soon finds the floor giving under his feet, as Praise paved the tragic way to Scorn through caricature, satire's inevitable alter-ego. Holding the mythologic logic, some of *Criticism*'s infant qualities point an accusing finger at Bentley in a parallel Parnassus parody:

> She dwelt on the Top of a snowy Montain in *Nova Zembla*; there *Momus* found her extended in her Den, upon the Spoils of numberless Volumes half devoured. At her right Hand sat *Ignorance, her Father and Husband,* blind with Age; at her left, *Pride*, her Mother, dressing her up in the Scraps of Paper herself had torn. There was *Opinion*, her Sister, light on Foot, hoodwinkt, and headstrong, yet giddy and perpetually turning. About her play'd her Children, *Noise* and *Impudence*, *Dullness* and *Vanity, Positiveness, Pedantry*, and *Ill-Manners*(*Tale,* 240).

Anyone conversant with the Gutchkelch & Smith edition of the *Tale* is already aware of Bentley's notorious ill-mannerism, which is impossible to ignore in the above. Of course, this belongs to the Critick sub-chapter, and since my reader is already well drilled in the exercise, I'll go for an ale, while this momentous anectdote, through the courteous collaboration of my learned colleagues, finds its way home below(*).

Mocking Bentley's confusion in the Royal Library, along with his purported erudition through index-learning, the Hack diagnoses that

> [s]ome imputed it to a great heap of *learned Dust*, which a perverse Wind blew off from a Shelf of the *Moderns* into the *Keeper's* Eyes. Others affirmed, He had a Humour to pick the *worms* out of *Schoolmen*, and swallowed them fresh and fasting; whereof some fell upon his *Spleen*, and some climbed up into his Head, to the great Perturbation of both(*Tale,* 226).

Learned dust? Who but a playful defamiliarizing Menippist impelled by a moral imperative could come up with that transferred epithet? But let us continue with the Hack's unmerciful praise of the great Bentley as a coward(ibid, 252;254;258) and his *darling* Wotton, the mock-lovers(242; 253; 254;): Wotton is called a *bastard* -something that gets one into a duel right smartly - unless graciously covered under the *deformed* guise of Praise:"*W--tt--n*, a young Hero, whom an unknown Father of Mortal Race, begot by stollen Embraces with this Goddess" (242). *La déesse à la cuisse légère.*

(*Insert here). Criticks, worthy descendents of the Gods, are rightly and *mythologically*-correctly defamiliarized by Zeus Swift as asses, sserpents, whoress(98;100; 101) beess and sspiders(227-32), the last bestowed upon Wotton, painted as a Shit-Head: "*Erect your Schemes with as much Method as you please; yet, if the materials be nothing but Dirt, spun out of your own Entrails (the Guts of* Modern *Brains) the Edifice will conclude at last in a Cobweb*(234), while Dryden is refered to as a Pin-Head:

> For the Helmet was nine times too large for the Head, which appeared Situated far in the Hinder Part, even like the Lady in a Lobster, or like a Mouse under a Canopy of State, or like a shriveled Beau from within the Penthouse of a Perewig(247).

Brains get furthermore alienated through other deformations, viz: Round-Heads and Long-Heads(268-69), including the incrdible crab-lice metaphor:

> For it is the Opinion of choice *Virtuosi*, that the Brain is only a Crowd of little Animals, but with their Teeth and Claws extremely sharp, and therefore cling [...] all invention is formed by the Mor-

> sure of two or more of these Animals [...] nothing less violent than Heat, can disentangle these Creatures from their hamated Station of Life, or give them Vigour and Humour, to imprint the Mark of their little Teeth. That the Morsure be Hexagonal(277).

Anyone having observed this blood-sucking lice through a magnifying glass will recall its shape forever. Now that the brain is viewed through a different perspective, let us see how the Hack, via a mock-scientific dissertation observes the mechanical operation of the spirit:

> Mists arise from the Earth, Steams from Dunghills, Exhalations from the Sea, and Smoak from Fire; yet all Clouds are the same in Composition, as well as Consequences: and the Fumes issuing from a Jakes, will furnish as comely and useful a Vapor, as Incense from an Altar. Thus far, I suppose will easily be granted me; and then it will follow, that as the Face of Nature never produces Rain, but when it is overcast and disturbed, so Human Understanding, seated in the Brain, must be troubled or overspread by Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, to water the Invention and render it fruitful(*Tale*,163).

This outlandish explication revolves around the same theme of 'shit-for-brains' and in direct imitation of Burton's *Anatomy,* Of the Inward Senses(sub-sect. VII):

> This litigation of senses proceeds from an inhibition of spirits, the way being stopped by which they should come; this stopping is caused of vapours arising out of the stomach, filling nerves, by which the spirits should be conveyed. When these vapours are spent, the passage is open and the spirits perform their accustomed duties: so that waking is the action and motion of the senses, which the spirits dispersed over all parts cause'(*Renaissance,* 973).

This is another evidence that Menippists borrow from each other. And since Invention dominates the modern scene, there is no valid reason why the Hack would not invent his own dark authors, viz: a deceased Philosopher of *O. Brazile* (utopic = distancing trope) who has discove-

red a faster method for writing abstracts without the hindrance of learning:

> *YOU take fair correct Copies, well bound in Calfs Skin, and Lettered at the Back, of all Modern Bodies of Arts and Science whatsoever, and in what Language you please. These you distill in* balneo Mariæ, *infusing* Quintessence of Poppy Q.S. *together with three Pints of* Lethe, *to be had from Apothecaries. You cleanse away carefully the* Sordes *and* Caput mortuum, *letting all that is volatile evaporate. You preserve only the first Running, which is again to be distilled seventeen times, till what remains will amount to about two Drams. This you keep in a Glass Viol* Her metically *sealed, for one and twenty Days. Then you begin your Catholic Treatise, taking every Morning fasting, (first shaking the Viol) three Drops of this* Elexir, *snuffing it strongly up your Nose. It will dilate it self about the Brain (where there is any) in Fourteen Minutes, and you immediately perceive in your Head an infinite Number of* Abstracts, Summaries, Compendiums, Extracts, Col lections, Medulla's, Excerpta quœdam, Florigegia's *and the like, all disposed in great Order, and reducible upon Paper*(*Tale,* 126-27).

A remarkeable parody of the new sciences that reduce everything to the physical . BUT to return to our last quote, it so happens that it also parodies Bacon's *On Studies*: "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested"(*Renaissance,* 943). Bacon explains the metaphor in the following lines, but the Hack makes sure to ignore its logic, his imagination fueled and already soaring in the diatribe. The *Troglodyte* Philosopher -- its foot-note roguishly claiming: 'This still awaits explanation'(183, n1) -- reveals the secret of how some authors eventually ascend to the top:

> *'Tis certain* (said he) *some Grains of Folly are of course annexed, as Part of the Composition of Human Nature, only the Choice is left us, whether we please to wear them* Inlaid *or Embossed; And we need not go very far to seek how that is usually determined, when we remember it, it is with Human Faculties as with Liquors, the lightest will ever be at the Top*(*Tale,* 183).

When we remember the Ladder metaphor at the begining, where the author never reaches the top for long because he is beheaded, we come to a full circle. Again, a reversal of the *bathos* found through-out the *Tale* to match the Modern concept of reversed time; there is a passage, which, for the life of me, I can't find anymore, that specifies something to the effect that 'children die before their parents', mocking the very insanity of Modern thought. Should anyone find a duplicate of this passage in their own edition, please send it back to mine, as it appears it has walked off and errs by itself.

If I mention so much about 'brains', it is because it reflects the persona, the Hack's foremost sensibility, which is the Intellect, the mirror of the individual; should one not be clever and know it, at least there is no imposture. But it is a different story for Modern authors and booksellers who claim so much brilliance as to go as far as to pretend to eclipse the *Antients,* an impardonnable arrogance, if not out-right stupidity - thus, Swift's outrage and principal fuel, paired and additionally catalysed by his loyalty, in defence of Sir William Temple, a recognized gentleman and a scholar, his mentor and protector.

As metonymic topography serves to *estrange* the reader(below), so it is with the transference of literary disciplines into martial terminology: Engineers become mathematicians, Light Horse a poet, Armed Foot for historians (pedestrian?), Bowmen for philosophers and Dragoons for writers on Medical subjects. If the concept of Mock-book is held before the text, it follows that the text is a mock-text, then little else needs additional explanation for the learned reader (I am just informed that the

slow reader has now made it to page 13, the dull using my document to swat flies).

Before taking leave, I must bring to light another telling passage on how Swift views the world of eighteenth-century authors and book-sellers, and their reversal of logic blatantly again ridiculed in the last paragraph of SectionVIII, which, for all intents and purposes, should be transfered to the begining of the *Tale*'s next chapter as an Introduction but serves as an epilogue:

> I have long sought for after this Opportunity, of doing Justice to a Society of Men, for whom I have a peculiar Honour, and whose Opinions, as well as Practices, have been extreamely misrepresented, and traduced by the Malice and Ignorance of their Adversaries. For, I think it one of the greatest, and best humane Actions, to remove Prejudices, and place Things in their truest and fairest Light; which I therefore boldly undertake without any Regards of my own, beside the Conscience, the Honour, and the Thanks(*Tale,* 161).

Another one for the General Benefit of Mankind. The irony is obvious and does not work as a rheostat this time but as an on/off switch: it means exactly the revealing opposite of Swift's appreciation of the world around him. This text is immediately followd by *A Digression concerning the Original, the Use and the Improvement of* Madness *in a Commonwealth*(ibid, 162). There is no guessing as to intent.

Modern Authors: In his attack on illiterate and fickle modern authors, the Hack defends (read: attacks) them in the Dedication to the Prince of Posterity. Referring to Time (Posterity's Governor), the Hack laments that

> [h]is inveterate Malice is such to the Writings of our Age, that several Thousands produced yearly from this renowned City, before the next Revolution of the Sun, there is not one to be heard

> of: Unhappy Infants, many of them barbarously destroyed, before they have so much as learnt their *Mother-Tongue* to beg for pity(33)

In this brief text, ironic allusions thrive, all covered under the mantle of *distancing* and the ever-present *foregrounding* of an ironic bias: he claims that yearly, the grandees produce thousands of books; he blames time for the writers' evanescent ineptitude; and mostly, that the so-called writers don't even know their mother-tongue -i.e.: illiterate. Pondering on the destiny of the bales of paper required for such an output, he descries that they are used for anything but reading: "If it ill befits the distance between *Your Highness* and Me (vide the capital 'M') to send You for ocular Conviction to a *Jakes,* or an *Oven;* to the Windows of a *Bawdy-House*" - &c.(36; underscore mine). A defamiliarization on the use of literary papers used as 'wipe' &c., anything but its use in a Library, and a defamiliarization of Burton's *cuduntque libellos / In quorum foliis vix simia nuda cacaret* (translated as:" They run off books on whose pages a naked ape would scarcely deign to shit"(*Renaissance,* 969; n45).

The violation of typographical conventions plays a key role in foregrounding certain words, most of them either unimportant or ironically meaning the opposite of what is meant, as with: "I shall bequeath this Piece of Justice to a larger work: wherein I intend to write a Character of the present Set of *Wits* in our Nation: their Persons I shall describe particularly, and at Length, their Genius and Understandings in *Mignature*" - where 'mignature' should be in lower case and plain text, according to

its diminutive inference. **Wit**, by the way, meant also *intellectual fickleness* (c.f.: *Renaissance* 936 n1). So he sees the world around him.

Now that we are appraised that Modern writers can't spell and that most 'wits' are flakes, a prescription follows:

> It is intended that a large Academy be erected, capable of containing nine thousand seven hundred forty and three Persons [...] There is first, a large *Pederastick* School, [...] There is also, the *Spelling* School, *a very spacious Building*(42).

The number of Persons being the approximate number of ecclesiasticals living in England at the time. Out of respect for my 'gentle reader', I refuse to dilate upon *pederastick*.

<u>On the fickleness of Modern Wits:</u>

> Because I have remarked, that nothing is so very tender as a *Modern* Piece of Wit, and which is apt to suffer much in the Carriage"- to vehicule it- "Some things are extreamly witty *to day*, or *fasting*, or *in this place*, or *at eight a clock*, or *over a Bottle*, or *spoke by Mr.* What d'y'call'm, or *in a Summer's Morning*: any of which, by the smallest Transposal or Misapplication, is utterly annihilitate (43).

This is followed later by the Cloud metaphor where clouds represent certain configurations, as with fashionable current trends, easily blown by the tiniest wind: not a stable base to build on, but a great show for those with edifices in the air.

<u>On the Number of Modern Writers:</u>

> I apprehend some *Wit* may object against me, for proceeding thus far in a Preface, without disclaiming, according to the Custom, against the Multitude of writers whereof the whole Multitude of Writers most reasonable complains(45).

Follow this with the *Mountebank* metaphor, and it seals it. I don't really know how to present this Formalisticly in either Russian, English, French or Sclavonian, but the renewed perspective of the serpent biting its own *tail* resurfaces, as it does in the 'flying march', a self-consuming *sdvig* which has Nothing to do with Phoenician rebirth. We ARE going around in circles in the *Tale*, as sure as tubs are round and full of wind. As to the putative whoring of the Grubeans, I'll leave it on the hook for now.

On the Vanity of Modern Writers

> AS for the Liberty I have thought fit to take of praising myself, upon some Occasion or none; I am sure it will need no Excuse, if a Multitude of great Examples be allowed sufficient Authority(47).

Were this a Juvenalian satire, ink would turn to acid, as someone said. In order to elevate themselves, the Hack recommends machines because they can't do it spiritually - thus, the inverted link between spirit and matter(56-60).

On Metonymy

Metonymy acts as a *defacilitation* trope: one must seek meanings 'out of the common road' as I have, consulting many annotated Scriblerian texts for clues , the garret excepted, which stands for paucity as well as for Edifices in the Air = disconnected from reality.

Will's Coffe House= true poets' meeting place.
Gresham = Royal Society.
Grub Street = poor poets, both in finance and imagination.
Newgate = infamous prison.
Chocolate House = fashionable male gambling meeting-place.
Covent Garden = important flower, vegetable and prostitution place.
Drury Lane = near Covent Garden - prostitutes.
Moore Fields -= underworld meeting-place - different from Moore Park.

For Swift, the mention of any of the above describes the tribes.

Anti-Climax

The most anti 'stair-case structure' (*stupencatoe postronoenie*) ever devised: the concoction of Menippean satire and Defamiliarization combined. Happens everywhere in the *Tale*, especially on the subject of patrons:

> But it seems, there is an unhappy Expense usually annexed to the Calling of a God-Father, which was clearly out of my Head, as is very reasonable to believe. Where the Pich lay, I cannot certainly affirm; but having employ'd a World of Thoughts and Pains, to split my Treatise into forty Sections, and having entreated forty Lords of my Acquaintance, that they would do me the Honor to stand, thay all made it a Matter of Conscience, and sent me their Excuses(72).

This is a violent dislocation of the expected issue. I now believe that we have enough supporting evidence of the new vistas through which Swift views the world of eighteenth-century authors and book-sellers.

Conclusion

GOING *too long* is a Cause of Abortion as effectual, tho' not so frequent, as *Going too short;* and holds true especially in the *Labors* of the *Brain*(206). We must here part, but before we do,

> I have one concluding Favour, to request of my Reader; that he will not expect to be equally diverted and informed by every Line, or every Page of this Discourse; but give some Allowance to the Author's Spleen, and short Fits or Intervals of Dulness, as well as his own(*Tale,* 209).

FinISH.

"In art, it is our experience of the process of construction that counts, not the finished product"(Scholes, qt in Stacy, 84).

The Flukes

Appendix 1-

Mostly from Eric McLuhan's "Appendix 2" in *The Role of Thunder in Finnigan's Wake,* with some minor additions.

Outline of the Menippean Tradition:

Homer (800 B.C.?-1100B.C.?): *Margites.*
Gorgias, (5th c. B.C.): *Praise of Helen.*
Diogenes the Cynic (404-323 B.C.)
Menippus of Gadara (fl.. c. 250 B.C.)
Varro (116-27 B.C.): more than 600 Menippean satires.
Seneca (4 B.C. - A.D.): *Apokolocyntosis / Ludus de morte Claudii.*
Petrionius Arbiter (d. A.D. 66): *Satiricon.*
Plutarch (est. A.D. 46-120): *Gryllus.*
Lucian of Samosata (est. A.D. 120-180): works.
Apuleius of Madaura (est.A.D. 25 -?): *Metamorphoses / The Golden Ass.*
Macrobius (A.D. 339-422): *Saturnalia.*
Martianus Capella (late 4th /early 5th c. ?): *De nuptiis Philoloigae et Mercurii / The Marriage of Mercury and Philology.*
Sylvestris or Tours, Bernardus (fl. c. 1136): *Cosmographia.*
Allen of Lille (est. 1128-1202): *De Planctu Naturae.*
Dante Alighieri (1292-94): *La Vita Nuova.*
Chaucer, Geoffrey (1387ff.): *The Canterbury Tales.*
Erasmus, Desiderius (1466?-1536): *Moriae Encomium / The Praise of Folly.*
Sir Thomas More (1478-1535): *Utopia.*
Andreas Guarnas of Salerno (est. 1435 - ?): *Bellum Gramaticale: A Discourse of Great War and Dissention between the Two Worthy Princes, the Noune and the Verb.*
Anonymous (various hands): *La Satyre Ménippée* (1594).
Berkley, John (1605): *Euphormionis lusini satyricon / Euphormio's Satyricon.*
Dekker, Thomas (1570?-1641?): *The Guls Horne-Booke.*
Bouchet, Guillaume (1513-93): *Les Serees / The Evening Sequences.*

Verville, François Beroalde de (1556 - est.1612): *Le Moyen de Parvenir, Oeuvre contenant la Raison de Tout ce qui estait, est, et sera / How to Win.*

Agrippa, Andreas Cornelius von Nettleshiem (1530): *De Incertitudine et vanitate scientarium et artium / On the Vanity and Uncertainty of the Arts and Sciences.*

Rabelais, François(est. 1495-1553): *Gargantua and Pantagruel.*

Cervantes, Miguel (1605-1715): *Don Quixote*

Bruno,Giordano (Nolanus,1546-1600): various texts.

Nashe, Thomas (1567-1601): *The Unfortunate Traveler,* &c.

Sir John Harington(1561-1612): *A New Discourse of a State Subject Called the Metamorphosis of AJAX.*

Keppler, Johannes (1571-1630):*Sumnium, sive Astronomia lunaris / A Dream, or the Astronomy of the Moon;*
Dissertatio cum nuncio siderio nuper at mortales misso a Galiæo / A Discourse with the Sidereal Messenger Lately Sent to Mortals by Galileo.

Bouchet, Guillaume(1513-93): *Les Serees / The Evening Sequences.*

Taylor, John , 'the water poet' (1580-1653): many texts

Dornavius / Caspar Dornau (1577-1632): many texts, esp. *Amphiteatrum SapientiaeSocraticae Joco-Seriae, Hoc Est Encomia et Commentaria Autorum, quia Recentorium propre omnium: Quibus res, aut pro vilibus vulgo an amœnitatem, sapientiam, virtutem, publice privatimque utilissimum / The Amphitheatre of Joco-Serious Socratic Wisdom, That Is, Encomia and Commentaries of NearlyAll Authors up to the Present Time, Who Found Virtue, Wisdom, or Utility in Vile and Vulgar Things.*

Jonson, Ben (1573?-1637): *News from the New World Discovered in the Moon.*

Burton, Robert (1577-1640): *The Anatomy of Melancholy*

Quevedo (Gomez Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas,1580-1641): *Los Suenos / The Visions.*

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Pound, Ezra: *The Cantos.*

Eliot, T.S.: *The Waste Land.*

Allen, Woody: *Mighty Aphrodite;*

Rushdie, Salman: *Midnight's Children* and *The Satanic Verses.*

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THE LOVED ONE

An Anglo-American Tragedy

by

EVELYN WAUGH

Illustrated by

STUART BOYLE

Chapman & Hall

1948

LL day the heat had been barely supportable but at evening a breeze arose in the west, blowing from the heart of the setting sun and from the ocean, which lay unseen, unheard behind the scrubby foothills. It shook the rusty fingers of palm-leaf and swelled the dry sounds of summer, the frog-voices, the grating cicadas, and the ever present pulse of music from the neighbouring native huts.

In that kindly light the stained and blistered paint of the bungalow and the plot of weeds between the veranda and the dry water-hole lost their extreme shabbiness, and the two Englishmen, each in his rocking-chair, each with his whisky and soda and his outdated magazine, the counterparts of numberless fellow-countrymen exiled in the barbarous regions of the world, shared in the brief illusory rehabilitation.

'Ambrose Abercrombie will be here shortly,' said the elder. 'I don't know why. He left a message he would come. Find another glass, Dennis, if you can.' Then he added more petulantly: 'Kierkegaard, Kafka, Connolly, Compton Burnet, Sartre, "Scottie" Wilson. Who are they? What do they want?'

'I've heard of some of them. They were being talked about in London at the time I left.'

'They talked of "Scottie" Wilson?"

'No. I don't think so. Not of him.'

'That's "Scottie" Wilson. Those drawings there. Do they make any sense to you?'

'No.'

'No.'

Sir Francis Hinsley's momentary animation subsided. He let fall his copy of *Horizon* and gazed towards the patch of deepening shadow which had once been a pool. His was a sensitive, intelligent face, blurred somewhat by soft living and long boredom. 'It was Hopkins once,' he said; 'Joyce and Freud and Gertrude Stein. I couldn't make any sense of *them* either. I never was much good at anything new. "Arnold Bennett's debt to Zola"; "Flecker's debt to Henley." That was the nearest I went to the moderns. My best subjects were "The English Parson in English Prose" or "Cavalry Actions with the Poets"—that kind of thing. People seemed to like them once. Then they lost interest. I did too. I was always the most defatigable of hacks. I needed a change. I've never regretted coming away. The climate suits me. They are a very decent generous

lot of people out here and *they don't expect you to listen.* Always remember that, dear boy. It's the secret of social ease in this country. They talk entirely for their own pleasure. Nothing they say is designed to be heard."

'Here comes Ambrose Abercrombie,' said the young man.

'Evening, Frank. Evening, Barlow,' said Sir Ambrose Abercrombie coming up the steps. 'It's been another scorcher, eh? Mind if I take a pew? When,' he added aside to the young man who helped him to whisky. 'Right up with soda, please.'

Sir Ambrose wore dark grey flannels, an Eton Rambler tie, an I Zingari ribbon in his boater hat. This was his invariable dress on sunny days; whenever the weather allowed it he wore a deer-stalker cap and an Inverness cape. He was still on what Lady Abercrombie fatuously called the 'right' side of sixty but having for many years painfully feigned youth, he now aspired to the honours of age. It was his latest quite vain wish that people should say of him: 'Grand old boy.'

'Been meaning to look you up for a long time. Trouble about a place like this one's so darn busy, one gets in a groove and loses touch. Doesn't do to lose touch. We limeys have to stick together. You shouldn't hide yourself away, Frank, you old hermit.'

'I remember a time when you lived not so far away.'

'Did I? 'Pon my soul I believe you're right. That takes one back a bit. It was before we went to

Beverly Hills. Now, as of course you know, we're in Bel Air. But to tell you the truth I'm getting a bit restless there. I've got a bit of land out on Pacific Palisades. Just waiting for building costs to drop. Where was it I used to live? Just across the street, wasn't it?'

Just across the street, twenty years or more ago, when this neglected district was the centre of fashion; Sir Francis, in prime middle-age, was then the only knight in Hollywood, the doyen of English society, chief script-writer in Megalopolitan Pictures and President of the Cricket Club. Then the young, or youngish Ambrose Abercrombie used to bounce about the lots in his famous series of fatiguing roles, acrobatic heroic historic, and come almost nightly to Sir Francis for refreshment. English titles abounded now in Hollywood, several of them authentic, and Sir Ambrose had been known to speak slightingly of Sir Francis as a 'Lloyd George creation.' The seven-league boots of failure had carried the old and the ageing man far apart. Sir Francis had descended to the Publicity Department and now held rank, one of a dozen, as Vice-President of the Cricket Club. His swimming-pool which had once flashed like an aquarium with the limbs of long-departed beauties was empty now and cracked and over-grown with weed.

Yet there was a chivalric bond between the two.

'How are things at Megalo?' asked Sir Ambrose.

'Greatly disturbed. We are having trouble with Juanita del Pablo.'

'"Luscious, languid and lustful"?'

'Those are not the correct epithets. She is—or rather was—"Surly, lustrous and sadistic." I should know because I composed the phrase myself. It was a "smash-hit," as they say, and set a new note in personal publicity.'

'Miss del Pablo has been a particular protégée of mine from the first. I remember the day she arrived. Poor Leo bought her for her eyes. She was called Baby Aaronson then—splendid eyes and a fine head of black hair. So Leo made her Spanish. He had most of her nose cut off and sent her to Mexico for six weeks to learn Flamenco singing. Then he handed her over to me. *I* named her. *I* made her an anti-fascist refugee. *I* said she hated men because of her treatment by Franco's Moors. That was a new angle then. It caught on. And she was really quite good in her way, you know—with a truly horrifying natural scowl. Her legs were never *photogénique* but we kept her in long skirts and used an understudy for the lower half in scenes of violence. I was proud of her and she was good for another ten years' work at least.

'And now there's been a change of policy at the top. We are only making healthy films this year to please the League of Decency. So poor Juanita has to start at the beginning again as an Irish colleen. They've bleached her hair and dyed it vermilion. I told them colleens were dark but the technicolor men insisted. She's working ten hours a day learning the brogue and to make it harder for the poor girl they've pulled all her teeth out. She never had to smile before

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