

Université de Montréal

Al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Feminist Knowledge With/in the History, Education
and Science of the Arab-Islamic Culture

Presented by

Zakia Belhachmi

Faculté des sciences de l'éducation
Département d'études en éducation et d'administration de l'éducation

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Présenté par

Carla Belland

L'Institut de la recherche en éducation
Département d'éducation et de formation de l'éducation

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Presented by:

Zakia Belhachmi

And evaluated by a jury composed of the following people:

Thesis accepted by :

Claude Lessard : President of the jury
Adèle Chemi : Director of Research
Sheila Mc Donough : Co-Director of Research
Suzanne Turcotte : Member of the Jury
Niswat Hafez Baruzangi : External Examiner
André Brassard : Representative of the Dean



SOMMAIRE

La thèse soutient que les savoirs produits par les femmes du monde Arabo-Islamique, particulièrement dans leurs articulations féministes, sont rarement traités de manière systématique dans la littérature de cette région. En conséquence, cette littérature reflète les préjugés au sujet des femmes et de la science, ainsi que les idées fausses au sujet des productions scientifiques féministes des femmes dans la société Arabo-Islamique.

Le but de la thèse est d'étudier le processus mis à l'œuvre par la production et la construction du savoir scientifique féministe dans la société arabo-islamique. L'accent est mis sur la relation entre le mode scientifique féminin contemporain représenté par al-Sa'dawi (Égypte) et Mernissi (Maroc), et la structure de pouvoir propre à l'éducation et aux pratiques des sciences sociales dans la société Arabo-Islamique pendant la période 1970-1990.

La thèse s'appuie sur des travaux théoriques et empiriques d'al-Sa'dawi et de Mernissi pour mettre au jour le discours de féminité de ces auteures, ainsi que leur point de vue de femme sur la réalité sociale. Respectant le lien dialectique du savoir et de l'action sociale avec la culture, c'est avec une approche qui combine théorie et pratique que la thèse aborde l'analyse épistémologique de la recherche féministe d'al-Sa'dawi et de Mernissi, ainsi que les contextes de leur recherche.

Pour explorer de manière systématique le mode scientifique féminin d'al-Sa'dawi et de Mernissi, la thèse propose un modèle d'analyse à trois niveaux, empruntant de manière sélective à la sociologie réflexive de Bourdieu (1992), à la sociologie féministe de la connaissance de Dorothy Smith (1990a, b) et à l'épistémologie féministe de Stanley et Wise (1990). De la sorte, il est possible de rendre compte de la tension entre le déterminisme et la contingence de l'action présente dans le discours féministe des auteures, et d'entrevoir comment la communication et l'occultation de l'information se retrouvent dans le mode scientifique féminin.

À la lumière de cette analyse, la thèse conclut que le mode scientifique féminin d'al-Sa'dawi et de Mernissi est marqué par une conscience féministe ambivalente et qu'il ne peut représenter justement la réalité socio-politique plurielle des femmes, non plus la réalité diverse des pratiques scientifiques des femmes dans la culture Arabo-Musulmane. De plus, en prenant en compte leur manière d'approprier les disciplines, la thèse montre comment les auteures n'ont ni la validité scientifique requise pour leur mode scientifique féminin ni l'autorité morale pour s'imposer dans les études sur les femmes dans la région. Également, la thèse cherche à voir pourquoi ce mode scientifique féminin a échoué à faire progresser le statut et les droits des femmes Arabo-Musulmanes et à présenter des projets sociétaux égalitaires durables dans la région.

Au regard de ces résultats, la thèse se fait l'avocat d'un changement de paradigme scientifique pour la recherche féministe dans la région. Elle propose de combiner le particularisme de l'identité Arabo-Islamique et l'universalisme des buts égalitaires féministes qui dérivent des expériences sociales concrètes des femmes. De plus, elle fournit un exemple de projets locaux qui ont contribué au développement scientifique des études sur les femmes et à l'avancement du statut et des droits des femmes dans la société Arabo-Islamique depuis les années 1980.

ABSTRACT

The thesis argues that women's productions of scientific knowledge in the Arab-Islamic world, particularly in its feminist articulations, are seldom addressed systematically. Consequently, the literature on the region reflects both pre-conceptions about women and science, and misconceptions about women's feminist scientific productions within the Arab-Islamic society.

The purpose of the thesis is to provide a study of the process involved in the production and construction of scientific feminist knowledge in the Arab-Islamic society. The focus is on the contemporary scientific feminine mode represented by al-Sa'dawi (Egypt) and Mernissi (Morocco) in its systemic relation with power-structure of education and that of scientific practice of the social sciences in the Arab-Islamic society during the 1970-90 period.

The thesis selected theoretical and empirical works of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi from 1970-1990 in order to discover the authors' respective articulations of gender from their respective woman's standpoint. From a pro-active perspective that maintains the systemic link between scientific knowledge and social action in their dialectic relation in culture, the thesis adopted a methodology that combined a theory-praxis approach for the epistemological analysis of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research, and its related contexts of scientific discovery.

The thesis provides a reflexive three-levelled model of analysis, drawing selectively from Bourdieu's reflexive sociology (1992), Dorothy Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge (1990.a,b), and Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990) for the systemic investigation and evaluation of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode. Thus, the thesis captures the tensions between determinism and agency contained in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist discourses, and delineates how communication and co-optation of information takes place in their feminine scientific mode.

In light of the analysis, the thesis concludes that al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode is marked by an ambivalent feminist consciousness, and thus is inadequate to represent the plural socio-political reality of the Arab-Muslim women, or the diverse reality of women's scientific practices. Also, on the basis al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's appropriations of the disciplines, the thesis describes how the authors' scientific feminine mode lacks scientific validity and moral authority in women's studies in the region. Equally, the thesis discusses why this mode fails to make realistic progress in the Arab-Muslim women's status and rights, or to offer sustainable egalitarianism societal projects in the region.

In view of these findings the thesis calls for a change of scientific paradigm in feminist research in the region that combines the particularism of the Arab-Islamic identity with the universalism of feminist egalitarian goals derived from women's concrete social experiences. Moreover, the thesis provides an example of local projects that have yielded to both the scientific development of women's studies, and to the advancement of women's status and rights in the Arab-Islamic society since the 1980s.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ADFM: l'Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc
- ACUC: The Arab Cultural Unity Charter
- ALECSO: The Arab-League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization
- AMEWS: Association of Middle East Women's Studies
- AWSA: The Arab Women's Solidarity Association . Also, Jam'iyat Tadmun al-Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya
- BSOAS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
- BC: The British Council
- CEDEJ: Centre d'Études et de Documentation Économiques, Juridiques et Sociales
- CMRI: Centre Maghrébin de Recherche et de l'Information
- EEC: The European Economic Community
- GFIW: The General Federation of Iraqi Women
- IDHR: The International Declaration of Human Rights
- IFM: The International Monetary Fund
- IIIT: The International Institute of Islamic Thought
- INSTRAW. The United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
- LAS: The League of Arab States
- MESA: The Middle East Studies Association
- MQTA: Al-Majlis al-Qawmi li al-Thaqafa al-'Arabiyya
- NGOs: Non-governmental organizations
- SGL. Sisterhood Is Global Institute
- UAF: Union de l'Action Féminine
- UFM: L'Union des Femmes Marocaines
- UIDHR: The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights
- UNESCO: The United Nations Educational Scientific And Cultural Organization
- UNIDW: The United Nations International Decade for Women
- UNRWA: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency
- USIS: The Library of the United States Information Service
- YMCA: The Young Men's Christian Association

Note on Translation and Transliteration

All translations in this thesis are my own, unless otherwise indicated. However, whenever possible, I have included the translated versions of the original documents I used in writing up this thesis for the non-Arabic reader to consult.

As for the transliterations of the documents I have used in this thesis, I have included the symbol [sic] in the titles to indicate the variety in the editions' spelling. Similarly, I have used the symbol [sic] in: a) the quotations I cited, b) the titles of translated books I included in the bibliography on al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi as well as in the list of references. In this manner, I have maintained the accuracy in the citations and the transliterations provided in the sources used for this thesis.

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the following members of my family :

To my mother Khadija al-Idrissi. (1925-1974) who was my first mentor and example of the independent, educated Arab-Muslim woman. She taught me how to combine femininity with feminism, advocacy for my rights and collaboration with others.

My mother was my constant source of inspiration for self-reliance. Although she was a proponent of self-determination, she also valued the positive aspects of dependence on the family unit and empathy towards other people.

To my father Muhammad Belhachmi (1909-1976) who instilled in me pride in my cultural origin and identity without forgetting respect for other cultures. An advocate of free speech and critical thinking, he represented my everlasting mentor in the understanding of the link between language, science, and cultural development . Also, his belief in gender neutral education in the family and society sustained my self-esteem throughout my formative years.

In many ways, my parents values are contained in this dissertation and represent an integral part of my argument.

Finally to my beloved nieces Khadija/Katia, and Sofia whose unconditional love boosted my morale throughout the weary long months of the thesis writing and editing. May they carry the torch for the next generations of the Belhachmis and the Idrissis.

Foreword

The position of women in the Arab-Islamic society has aroused much interest in the last decades, but serious scholarly work on the history of women and their contribution to the education and science of the Arab-Islamic culture has been limited. Several ramifications ensue for the production of scholarship on women in Arab-Islamic education and their scientific productions. First, the available voluminous body of literature by UNESCO, ALECSO and most ministries of education in each country of the region tend to reflect the official liberal political position of the nation-states affiliated with either organization rather than to represent the educational issues and aspirations advocated by the Arab-Muslim people.

Second, while both these organizations recognize the existence of a crisis of education and the need for change, they disagree on the meaning/s of crisis, and the orientation of change. Third, the literature produced by both these organizations on women in the Arab-Islamic world has generally focused on the "woman's question" without fully analyzing the role of the system of education in the reproduction of unequal relations between genders and within the same gender. In short, the representations of women and education in the Arab-Islamic world by UNESCO and ALECSO are marked by the technocratic approach. Such an approach is governed by the political factor, which seeks more the uniformization of education than by the socio-cultural factor, which aims at responding to peoples' actual needs. This raises the issue of voice and the related internal/external power-relations between political forces competing for legitimacy in educational and cultural governance in the region.

In contrast, Al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Feminist Knowledge With/in the History, Education and Science of the Arab-Islamic Culture provides a systemic view of education and women's scientific productions in the Arab-Islamic society. It proposes to investigate precisely those intersections found in its title (feminism, history, education, and science) within the Arab-Islamic society and culture. In this manner the thesis historicizes the production of the social sciences and of women's studies over the 20th century education of the Arab-Islamic society. By the same token, the thesis provides an internal critique of the social sciences, and of feminist/women's studies in the region by showing the scientific mutations these fields of knowledge experienced in education since the 1940s. In brief, the thesis shifts focus from the "woman's question" issue in the social sciences' productions of the Arab-Islamic society to the more radical issue of the "science question" in feminism, education, and society of the Arab-Islamic culture.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The question of women's feminist productions of scientific knowledge in the Arab-Islamic world is complex and raises two fundamental and interlapping issues: the historical process of women's involvement in science, and in feminism within the specific cultural context of the region. To answer these two issues adequately, the exploration of education is central. After all, education in the Arab-Islamic culture, like in other world cultures, is a social institution concerned not only with passing on tradition, but also with emerging cultural patterns likely to accommodate change that occurred, or change under way.

This means that different world systems of education have developed culturally specific socio-pedagogical practices in order to shape both the process of knowledge production in culture, and to regulate the relations between individual/society, and individuals/groups in culture. From the angle of education and its culturally-specific socio-pedagogical practices in knowledge production and social regulation, therefore, Al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Feminist Knowledge With/in the History, Education and Science of the Arab-Islamic Culture offers a systemic portrayal of women's scientific productions in the Arab-Islamic education and society.

The purpose of the thesis is to examine the process involved in the production and construction of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminist knowledge in its systemic relation to the Arab-Islamic education and society during the 1970-90 period. The aim is twofold. First, to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to the power structure of scientific practice in education, and in society during the 1970-1990 period. Second, to examine and evaluate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research in view of the power structure that governs scientific practice in education and society during the 1970-90 period.

Chapter 1 provides a survey of the 13 century intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic culture focused on the role of education in the accommodation of social change before, during and after the Turkish and European colonialism. This systematic survey is crucial and shows the following: (a) that women's involvement in science and social change in the Arab-Islamic world is a cyclical phenomenon that varies according to the socio-political and intellectual movements that this region encounters throughout its history. (b) That Egypt and Morocco are representative countries of an endogenous trend of modernity in the region and were catalyst

in the elaboration of the 19th century cultural and educational renaissance (*al-Nahda*) for the whole region (c) That the feminist age in the Arab-Islamic world is a product of an idiosyncratic self-renewal process along with the cumulative effect of the intellectual movements that have shaped the region's history in a continuum.

In brief, chapter 1 contextualizes the feminist age itself as a cumulative phase in the process of women's involvement in science and knowledge over the 13 century socio-intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic culture. In doing so, chapter 1 identifies the socio-cultural particularity of Arab-Islamic feminism and documents its 120 years old women-led scientific legacy. Equally, chapter 1 highlights al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's discourse of feminism as a new feminine scientific mode on gender within the history of the Arab-Islamic education and society in need of exploration.

Chapter 2 provides a model of analysis for the exploration of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation within the intellectual history of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society and scientific practice of feminist research. There, I describe the model I designed for the analysis of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi as being threefold. First, to portray the macro-micro process involved in the production of feminist research by focusing on the role of education in the social division of knowledge, and in the subordinate integration of feminist research in educational curricula. Second, to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to the intellectual history of Arab-Islamic culture and education in the 20th century. Third, to examine the construction and production of knowledge within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to institutions, and agents that constitute the power structure of the field of feminist research in education and society during the 1970-1990 period.

Chapter 3 applies the first level of the model (Bourdieu's "Analyse praxéologique", 1992) to identify the mechanisms of reproduction of patriarchy in the Arab-Islamic culture at the macro-micro levels. There, I first illustrate the way liberal patriarchy manipulated the formal/informal structure of education to maintain an elitist delivery system of learning and scientific practice in society both in terms of class and gender. On the one hand, I discuss the fundamental issues at stake between various political constituencies in the 20th century Arab-Islamic education. These are (a) the socio-historical context of education, (b) the role of structural organization of the madrasah/university in the advancement of lack thereof in the

region, (c) the place of the Arab-Islamic tradition of teaching and scientific practice in the educational delivery system, (d) the place of Arabization in teaching and scientific practice. Thus, I identify the pattern of education itself as an obstacle to change for both genders, and I highlight the "double closure" (culture/class) women suffer from in education and scientific practice. On the other hand, I show how these educational issues have been critical to the reconstruction process that took place in the Arab-Islamic society since the 1960s. I discuss the restoration of the Islamic scientific tradition of scientific practice in the production of the social sciences in general and in women's studies in particular that took place since the 1970s. In doing so, I provide a historiography of the social sciences, and of women's studies during the 20th century Arab-Islamic education. This historiography documents the scientific mutations in the fields of knowledge within the educational curricula of the 20th century. By the same token, this provides an internal critique of the social sciences, and of feminist-women's studies in the region. Lastly, this situates al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific productions in the structural organization of the Arab-Islamic education and in the institutional evolution of the social sciences and women's studies during the 1970-90 period.

Chapter 4 proceeds to the second level of the model of analysis, which draws jointly from Bourdieu's notion of the "habitus" (1992) and Smith's women's standpointism (1990a, b), to examine al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode as a social organization. There, I describe al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint as a site of struggle (personal history) and as an epistemic position about social reality (scientific discourse of lived femininity). Through the themes they raise I illustrate the way the dual formal/informal location of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi at the structural level of culture structures and informs the content of their feminist knowledge. In doing so, I set the stage for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist sociology of knowledge as being both progressive and regressive.

Chapter 5 and 6 use the third level of the model using Stanley and Wise's Feminist Epistemology (1990). There, I respectively problematize al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint using Stanley and Wise's recommended analytical instruments (methodology, method and epistemology) to trace al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint location across the stages of their scientific context of discovery. With this analysis I illustrate both the positive and the negative scientific articulations of gender within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode. Thus, I highlight the negative/positive scientific input contained in the

authors' feminine scientific mode. Also, I show how this negative/positive input is at the root of the authors' split feminist consciousness and their poor feminist sociology and epistemology.

Finally, chapter 7 relies on Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (a pluralist feminist praxis) to contextualize al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's women's standpoints in their systemic relation within the micro-politics of scientific research production, and within the meta-narratives and social activism over the 1970-90 period in the contemporary Arab-Islamic culture. There, I describe how al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode is hegemonic because it lacks anchorage in Islamic metaphysics, and is not grounded within the Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice. Through some critics of the authors' scientific feminist knowledge and mine, I show al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's lack of dialogue with other agents and social groups that are transforming the reality for both genders in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. In doing so, I illustrate how al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode precludes the authors from having a sustainable effect on women's emancipation today in the Arab-Islamic society. Equally, I discuss how other post modernist social groups affiliated with the Islamic tradition of political governance and scientific practice are actually improving the status and rights of women and have been providing sustainable egalitarian societal projects in the Arab-Islamic society since the 1980s.

CHAPTER I

**ARAB-ISLAMIC CULTURE AND THE ACCOMODATION
OF SOCIAL CHANGE: A SOCIO-CULTURAL PRESPECTIVE.**

Introduction

Systematic studies that document the evolution of science¹ and scientific knowledge² in the socio-intellectual history of Arab-Islamic³ world are rare. Consequently, the literature is still reductionist of the history, science, and culture of the region, and is unable to capture the nature of social change in its contextual evolution over time. This chapter is an attempt to fill in both these gaps by providing a systematic overview of education and its role in social change throughout the 13 century socio-intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic world. The purpose is twofold: (a) To describe the Islamic worldview⁴ of human development and of science as articulated from within the principle of *al-Tawhid*⁵, (b) To illustrate how the principle of *al-Tawhid* sustained the material and spiritual development of the Arab-Islamic society, and shaped the evolution of its socio-political and scientific structures over time. In short, I explain the nature of modernism⁶ and secularization⁷ from within the value-system of the Arab-Islamic culture, and how both components are renewed in the educational system over time to accommodate social change.

This chapter is divided in three parts. In part 1 I describe the role of *al-waqf/hubus*⁸ in the establishment and sustenance of the Islamic pattern of development both at the internal and external levels. That is, I highlight *al-waqf* both as a network and as a process in the evolution of the Arab-Islamic culture into a world civilization.⁹ On the one hand, I portray *al-waqf* as an overall policy based on the principle of *al-Tawhid* and how that institution was catalyst in the socio-political and cultural governance of the initial Islamic society of Arabia and other countries. Here, I describe the consistent role of Morocco and Egypt in utilizing *al-waqf* for the sustenance of *'Uruba/Islam* in the socio-political and cultural organization of their respective people, namely maintaining the Arab-Muslims' leadership at the national, regional

¹ For a definition of science, see item 1 in the glossary.

² For a definition of scientific knowledge see item 2 in the glossary.

³ For an explanation of my choice of the terminology "Arab-Islamic", see item 3 in the glossary.

⁴ For a definition of the Islamic worldview and its systemic approach to science and scientific knowledge see item 4 in the glossary.

⁵ For an explanation of the principle of *al-Tawhid* and its role in the socio-political and cultural organization of Muslim societies see item 5 in the glossary.

⁶ For a definition of modernism from the Islamic worldview and its meaning for the development of Muslim societies, see item 6 in the glossary.

⁷ For a definition of secularization and its meaning in the development of Islamic societies see item 7 in the glossary.

⁸ *Habs (pl. Ahbas)* is the common terminology used in the Maghribi literature to refer to *al-waqf*. For details see item 8 in the glossary.

⁹ Here, I subscribe to Jarbawi's (1981) definition of the process of evolution of a culture into a civilization. (see item 9 in the glossary) In light of that definition, "the developmental ideology of Islam" as a world civilization and its related universal goals were centered on the principle of *al-Tawhid*. It is this principle that enabled the Arabs to establish an idiosyncratic pattern of development based on *'Uruba/Islam* (Arabization and Islam) that sustained the independent evolution of the Arab-Islamic society both at the internal and external levels that endured for centuries. Also this pattern enabled the Arab-Muslim majority to maintain its cultural leadership over other ethnic minorities over time.

(Mashriq/Maghrib), and the external levels (Europe) until the 15th century. Equally, I show how Egypt and Morocco consistently relied on *al-waqf* to sustain the Arab-Muslims' cultural leadership in the Mashriq and the Maghrib even during the high Middle Ages (15th-18th centuries), when the Arab-Islamic civilization engaged in the three-century long process of decline known as *'asr al-Inhitat*.

In Part 2 I discuss the role of *al-Salafiyya* in the reconstruction process of the Arab-Islamic culture through the recapture of the Arab-Islamic know-how both in statehood and in education during the 18th and 19th centuries. Here, I focus on the role of *al-Salafiyya* as "a buffer" between the state and the community in the socio-political and cultural governance of the Arab-Islamic society in the Mashriq and the Maghrib alike. I emphasize on the struggle of *al-Salafiyya* movement in its gradual restoration of the Arab-Muslim majority's power in the socio-political and cultural leadership in the region. Also, I illustrate the change in *al-Salafiyya's* cultural and political orientation during that process of reconstruction and the way that change led to the coexistence of two conflicting patterns of development between the state and the community during the 19th century. This way, I highlight the duality at the core of social and the reforms that took place in the Arab-Islamic society at that time. Equally, I discuss the emergence of Arab-Islamic feminism in this context of cultural duality and colonialism, and I show how this context shaped the Arab-Muslim women's feminist ideology and consciousness in the region.

In part 3, I highlight the persisting tension between the state's and the community's patterns of development throughout the 20 th century, and how that tension remained at the root of the socio-political and cultural evolution of the Arab-Islamic society and its social change. Here, I show that despite the two different styles of modernism proposed by Morocco and Egypt in the Maghrib and the Mashriq, these two countries maintained their leading role in each region, and had a lasting influence in shaping social change and reforms. Finally, I discuss the re-emergence of Morocco and Egypt as leading centres both in reaching cultural *musalaha* (reconciliation), and in engendering post-modernist socio-political and intellectual mutations that occurred within the power-structure of socio-political and cultural governance for the 1970-90 period. In short, I set the stage for the socio-political and intellectual context of Egypt and Morocco as a post-modernist context. Equally, I highlight the changes in the power structure of scientific practice within which al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are advocating various changes.

PART I. The Arab-Islamic Culture: Pattern of Development and Evolution into a World Civilization (1st/7th-4th/10 centuries)

The Arab-Islamic *Ummah* (community) was founded by the prophet Muhammad in the seventh century CE, on the basis of an holistic and comprehensive political and social system that provides Muslim people of Arabia with a balance in their spiritual and material lives. For the sustenance of this balance over time, the prophet established *al-waqf* institution and initiated a distinct pattern of development for the socio-political and cultural organization of Arabia based on '*Uruba/Islam* (Arabic as the language of education and communication, and Islam as the symbol of national unity). How this pattern of development was maintained in the 13 century social-history of the Arab-Islamic society depended largely on the strength or weakness of the state and its enforcement of *al-waqf* law both in political and cultural governance.

1. Al-Waqf Institution As A Policy in Socio-political And Cultural Governance

1.1. Al-Waqf: Definition, Origin, and Significance.

Essentially, *al-waqf* is a charitable trust endowed by an individual of his/her private property for the establishment of religious and non-religious institutions that benefit the public for perpetuity. Bin 'Abdallah (1996a) captures the private/public interlap in the function of this institution when he define *al-waqf* as an: "independent legal institution with specific goals that concern a network of social, economic, political, and cultural relations in society" (p.11). Equally, he explains, *al-waqf* is one of "the greatest social laws at the core of the urbanization of the Islamic lands, and of the moral order of their peoples" (p.17). Accordingly, Bin 'Abdallah highlights the significance of the communal and individual practices of *al-waqf* both in the spiritual and material organization of the Islamic way of life, and in its perpetuation over time. First, he observes, *al-waqf* began as a *tandhim ahli* (a community organization) in the history of Muslims for it is primarily aimed at building "an ideal civil society independent of the state" (p.34). To illustrate, Bin 'Abdallah reports that the prophet Muhammad was inspired by the teachings of the Qur'an "*Wa ta'awanu 'ala al-bir wa al-taqwa*" when he instituted Makhyaryq's lands as a *waqf ahli* to benefit Bani al-Nadhir (pp.118-119). Further, he traces the first *waqf ahli* document to 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab when he established *Dawawin al-Waqf* for the public management of the *Ummah's* finances (p.210).

Second, Bin 'Abdallah notes, the individual practice of *al-waqf* resides in being a means for individual Muslims to participate in the management of the Islamic way of life and its sustenance both in the family and in the community. To substantiate, he traces two kinds of

waqf during the prophet's time: (1) *Waqf khayri* (an individual endowment for public purpose such as a mosque, *madrakah*, hospital, bridge, and waterworks. (2). *Waqf ahli* or *dhurri* (a family endowment for children or other persons). He reports that the prophet's first *waqf khayri* occurred when he endowed his own tent at the mosque of Medina to function as a *bimaristan* (hospital) during the Khandaq Day, and he appointed a woman called Rafida for its management (p.146). Likewise, Bin 'Abdallah traces the first document of *waqf ahli* or *dhurri* to 'Umar, who delegated the management of all his assets to his daughter Hafsa (p.294). In short, Bin 'Abdallah captures the gender-equal nature of *al-waqf* both in the establishment of the Islamic infrastructure, and in the power-relations within the family and the community of the first *Ummah*.

Third, Bin 'Abdallah points out that the whole purpose of *waqf* institutions throughout history has been the maintenance of "a populist effort in governance participation, and the sustenance of the Islamic message at the internal level as well as its expansion at the external level" (p.11). At the internal level, he explains, *al-waqf* constituted the main financial source for education and functioned as a regulator of the balance of power among social groups involved in the economic, socio-political and cultural governance of the community (p.217). As to the external level, *al-waqf* functioned mainly as a foreign policy for the socio-political relations between Muslims and peoples of other faiths. To substantiate, he cites the surviving *waqf* document in the handwriting of 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib dictated by the Prophet to the Christians of "Ayla" (p.345). Clearly, *al-waqf*, as established by the prophet, was a tool of empowerment at the disposal of individuals and the community for the advancement of the Islamic way of life both at the internal and external levels. Similarly, the early stages of *al-waqf* governed Islamic infrastructure were marked by a lack of differentiation between the political, religious, and educational institutions. Soon, however, the internal evolution of the *Ummah* and its external territorial expansion during the first century led to a gradual differentiation between institutions.

1.2. The Evolution of al-Waqf During the 1st/4th Centuries

Tibawi (1983c) reports that the prophet's *masjid* (mosque) in Medina was "a centre for the nation's religion and politics, but soon became a centre of teaching" (p.91). Also, Bin 'Abdallah (1996a) notes that 'Umar was the first to follow the prophet's example by transforming every *masjid* into a *jami'* (a university) in all conquered lands (p.435). Last but

not least, Shalabi (1973) observes, the prophet's used *al-waqf* as an foreign policy ¹⁰ during The Battle of Badr when he negotiated with the detainers of Muslim prisoners of Mecca that they provide teaching and writing to illiterate Muslims in exchange for their liberation (p.35). Overall, therefore, both the prophet and the Companions practiced *al-waqf* as an overall policy both for the internal and external development of the Islamic *Ummah*.

This pattern of development continued in the subsequent centuries despite the *Ummah's* split on questions of policy and doctrine (the disputes between Khawarij, Shi'a and Sunni groups) during the 2nd/8th second century. Tazi.¹¹ (1972) argues that at the root of the *Ummah's* split was the issue of decentralization of authority between the state and the community in the political and cultural organization of the *Ummah*, and its maintenance in compliance with the prophet's style of governance. This issue, he insists, led to two important consequences. First, it brought a cultural recession and a volatile political climate that precluded the evolution of the *jami'/madrasah*. Second, the issue of decentralization of authority prompted an immediate and vast emigration and immigration of people, who fled the Mashriq and al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) in search for safer havens for their political and academic freedom. Thus, a large settlement of immigrants from al-Andalus, in the Eastern part of Fès, Morocco in 808 H; and from Qirawan, Tunisia in the Western part of the city in 809 H. (p.46). Among the emigrants of Qirawan, was a highly educated, rich woman: Fatima al-Fihriyya al-Qirawani ¹² who settled with her family in Morocco and founded the first Jami'/University in the world¹³: *Jami' al-Qarawiyyin* (245/868) in Fès. (Tazi, 1972; AMIDEAST, 1966). Before long, Tazi (1972) asserts, Morocco witnessed the development of *cross-madhahib* studies¹⁴ banned from the Mashriq's educational system ¹⁵, leading to the emergence of Morocco as a new cultural centre (pp. 118-119).

In addition to this volatile political period the Arab-Islamic society experienced a profound and significant social and cultural mutation that spanned the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th

¹⁰ For details on *al-waqf* as a foreign policy in the international history of Islam, and its socio-political role in the promotion of the Muslims' interests outside Muslim lands over time including contemporary history see Tazi (1968, 1981, 1995).

¹¹ Tazi is a scholar of international stature. He is a member of the Royal Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco.

¹² Fatima al-Fihriyya's founding of an educational institution was a common practice by the 2nd/8th century because under Islamic law women could own and dispose of property as they please.

¹³ Tazi's work confirms earlier research in classic Arabic literature on the *jami'-madrasah* such as al-Suyuti, al-Subki, and al-Maqrissi. Also, Pederson (1929) cites these Arabic sources as evidence of the proliferation of the *madrasah* in Khurassan long before Nizam al-Mulk.

¹⁴ For a brief description of the four *madhahibs* (schools of thought) of *Sunni* Islam, see Appendix I.

¹⁵ This data rectifies Hourani (1983) who asserts that the Islamic *Ummah*, split upon fundamental conflicts on doctrine and policy in the 2nd century, and established orthodox Islam at the expense of other forms of Islam (pp.3-4). Similarly, this data corrects Makdisi's assertions that Muslim societies lacked institutions prior to Nizam al-Mulk in the 4th/10th century.

centuries. While the four *madhahibs* that constitute Islamic schools of thought of *Sunni Islam* were still in the making, Tazi explains, the Arab-Islamic society was simultaneously involved in the assimilation the secular knowledge imported from Hellenic thought. This not only shaped the Islamic schools of thought, but also led to the emergence of a vast network of educational institutions¹⁶ throughout the 2nd-4th centuries. Subsequently, the 2nd, 3rd, and the 4th centuries showed a double socio-cultural movement in Arab-Islamic intellectual history: an adjustment phase to the innovations incorporated in Islamic thought; yet a gestation phase that paved the way for the phenomenal cultural renaissance that followed in the 4th/10th century (p.120).

According to Tazi what was critical to the evolution the Arab-Islamic society and its accommodation of social change over time was the compliance with the prophet's decentralized model of political and cultural governance, and its enforcement with *al-waqf* law by the governing powers. First, he observes, the prophet's decentralized model of governance of *al-waqf* sustained a balance in the power structure that regulates the relations between the state and the community. Second, the formal/informal structural organization of *al-waqf* maintained the simultaneous evolution of the religious and civil orders of the Arab-Islamic society throughout the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th centuries (p.121). In fact, Tazi argues, Morocco played a key role in sustaining this decentralized model of governance as evident in the fluidity between and the formal and informal realms of education. In the formal realm, Tazi reports, this fluidity reflected during the first era of al-Qarawiyyin university (245/859) in the inter-alia knowledge within the curriculum¹⁷, namely '*ulum diniyya* (religious sciences), '*ulum 'Arabiyya* (literary sciences), and '*ulum bahtha* (exact sciences) as the three branches of the instructional materials of higher learning in Morocco (p.127). In the informal realm, the diversity was brought by *the riwaq system*¹⁸ promoted by the community under the *waqf* law with the purpose of securing a steady access and vulgarization of formal education to several segments of the population (p.440).

To illustrate further, Tazi describes the interlap between the formal and the informal in shaping the multiple venues of knowledge available to women in the 2nd/8th century:

¹⁶ For further evidence of *al-waqf*'s vast network of educational institutions and how it shaped scientific practice and power-relations between Muslims in terms of class and gender over time, see Appendix II.

¹⁷ Tazi's work on education in the *madrasah* in the 2nd century rectifies Makdisi's (1981) assertion that the *madrasah* was merely a college focused on religious education, and shows the flourishing of both scientific and religious fields of knowledge.

¹⁸ The *riwaq* system, by today's standards, is equivalent to a departmental system whereby quarters of learning and research units are set up within institutions of higher education. For further details, consult Pederson (1986; 1987) and Tazi (1972, 1973, 1976).

The houses of the 'ulama and the fuqaha, including girls and women, remained centres of learning...in addition to King's houses.... In Fès in particular were many schools for girls known as "Dar al-Faqiha". In every quarter of the city and every corner were numbers of these houses usually managed by women who learned and had a close relation with majalis al-Qarawiyyin. Although these women pursued their studies in Houses specific for them, there was in al-Qarawiyyin places for women to listen and enjoy directly the greatest mashayikh equally with other students...This phenomenon was common to other eras of Fès since its establishment to date. (pp. 443-44)

Moreover, Tazi (1973) asserts, in the 3rd/9th century Moroccan women were appointed for professorship positions in the *madrasah* and held titles as *faqihah* (p.443). In fact, Tazi (1972) notes, by the 4th/10th century the Moroccan system of higher education was so sophisticated that the country witnessed the flourishing of university chairs simultaneously in Fès, and Baghdad (pp.121-122). However, he observes, the nascent regional centre of Morocco was unable to withstand the political ascendancy of the Saljuq (Turkish) and its change of *al-waqf* model of governance in the 4th/10th century.

1.3. The Saljuq Change of al-Waqf's Model of Governance

Tazi (1972) traces the first change in *al-Waqf's model of governance* to the Saljuq's wide formalization of education across the Arab-Islamic region, which led to two important consequences. First, this change induced the institutionalization of a duality in educational governance as evident in the state-imposed sectarian education across the Arab-Islamic society, including Morocco. Second, this change prompted the politicization of the *riwaq* system as community-based tool of resistance against the state's Turkization of learning (p.114). In fact, Tazi points out, since the 4th century *the riwaq* system became a socio-political device par excellence for the community's promotion of *Arabization* against the state's Turkization of higher learning in the Maghrib and the Mashriq alike, as evident in the Moroccan *riwaq's* vigorous contribution to the scientific life of al-Azhar in 365.H. (p.114).

Similar developments occurred in the Mashriq. Tibawi (1983c) documents the institutionalization of duality in education under the Saljuqs. First, he traces the dual policy in education in the Mashriq to the institutional shift in education during the 4th/10th century from the individual private spending of *al-waqf* into the state spending "from Bait al-Mal"¹⁹ (p.92). Nonetheless, Tibawi observes, the state imposed shift failed to overshadow *al-waqf's* informality and Arabization of higher learning. In fact, he notes, under the Saljuqs both al-

¹⁹ Literally, *bait al mal* means "house of money", or "the money store". The equivalent of this institution in today's terms would be the ministry of finance.

Azhar madrasah of Egypt; and al-Nizammiyya school of Baghdad, Iraq "continued to teach "the Qur'an, tafsir, 'ilm al-kalam, Shari'a and Arabic studies (Lugha)" (p.92).

Second, Tibawi (1983c) contends, the political pressure of the community to sponsor the informality of higher learning through *al-waqf* prevailed over the state's as evident in the radical change of al-Azhar doctrinal orientation from a *Shi'a* centre into a *Sunni* one through the *riwaq system* (p.93). In brief, both Tazi and Tibawi highlight the formalization of education at the root of serious political and cultural conflicts between the state and the community. Equally, both authors emphasize the role of the vast network of institutions created within *al-waqf* policy in maintaining the decentralization of power between the state and the community in governance.

This scholarly literature, therefore, not only describes the central role of *al-waqf* in the structural and procedural organization of the Arab-Islamic education, but also emphasizes the formal and informal realms as spaces of power-relations where both the state and various political constituencies in the community compete for legitimacy and power. In doing so, this literature identifies Nizam al-Mulk as a process of manipulation of the "authentic" Islamic tradition in political and scientific practice established by the Arab-Muslims.²⁰ Such an analysis considerably changes our understanding of the nature of social change in the Arab-Islamic culture during the Middle Ages as well as the subsequent centuries.

2. Al-Waqf in the Evolution of the Arab-Islamic Civilization in the Middle Ages

2.1. Al-Waqf at the Internal and External Levels

The Middle Ages inaugurated endless political sectarian conflicts in the region. According to Tazi (1972) the early manifestation of these conflicts appeared with the political ascendancy of the Berber Dynasty in Morocco and the Murabittin's change of the capital from Fès to Marrakech. During the Murabittin's rule not only did the state officials name their leader Amir instead of Caliph by decree in 466H, but they also ordered the *imam* of the *jami'* to "teach in Berber" (pp. 119-120). However, Tazi observes, with the victory of the Zallaqa Battle (479) led by Yussif Bin Tashfine under the Muwahhidin the situation changed altogether. Morocco gained its intellectual autonomy from the Mashriq, and emerged as a regional centre of political and intellectual power (p.120).

Soon after, Tazi (1973) reports, education witnessed an unprecedented expansion in terms of class and gender through the informal *riwaq* system of *al-waqf*. First, Tazi

²⁰ This assessment is corroborated by a feminist interpretation of Nizam al-Mulk, namely by Denise A. Spellberg (1988).

underscores the key role of the *riwaq* system in the vulgarization of learning to various segments of the population and the expansion of access to formal education at the national level. To illustrate, he cites the proliferation of the women's *awriqa* (*pl.riwaq*) across the universities of Morocco (p.319). Second, Tazi (1976) discusses the critical role of the *riwaq* system at the regional level. He notes that the *riwaq*, was not only critical for the sustenance of Arabization of learning in the Mashriq, but also for the maintenance of diversity and cross school studies (*madhahib*) as evident in the teaching of the Maliki Madhab in the Moroccan *riwaq* at al-Azhar university in the 5th/11th and 6th century/12th centuries (p.730).

Third Tazi (1972) highlights the role of the *riwaq* system in maintaining Morocco's intellectual prominence at the international level. Quoting Sylvester II (Pope Sylvester), one of the famous Western scholars educated in al-Qarawiyyin, he aptly showed that during the Berber Age of Islam *al-waqf* sustained the Arabization of learning in higher education as evident in the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction, and the language of science both in Morocco and in al-Andalus: "for Jews, Christians and Muslims up to the year 553 H" (p.115). By the 6th/12th century, Tazi (1972) contends, Morocco's intellectual zenith was clear. Even the flourishing European universities of Bologna, Italy (1158), the Sorbonne, France (1200) and Oxford, England, Tazi observes, could not equal the advancement of learning of al-Qarawiyyin or match its international reputation (p.114).

Further, Tazi notes, the zenith of Morocco was sustained by the technological progress of the country during the 13th century as manifested in the flourishing factories of *al-Karid* (paper) and printing companies (p.729). Not only did this technological self-reliance lead to the dissemination of Moroccan publications in Saudi Arabia, Cairo, and Constantine, but it also extended to Morocco's prominence in international cultural production in the Middle Ages as reflected in the publication of "Euclid's... an author who remained rare even in Europe during the Renaissance" (p.730). In fact, Tazi (1973) contends, in the 13th century Morocco was the only country with "guilds of masters"²¹ as recorded by the Dahir issued by Abi-Yussef Ya'coub in 684 H following the Moroccans' victory in al-Andalus" (p.438), and as reflected in the foreign missions from Europe to Morocco (p.449). Equally, Tazi (1976) notes, during the 13th century Moroccan women were so prolific as *mujtahidat* that they were equal to men's mobility in pursuing their career goals as reflected in their teaching both in the city and the countryside (p.727).

²¹ Tazi rectifies Makdisi's (1981) assertion that in medieval Arab-Islamic society there was "no university, that is to say no guild of masters, no one but the individual juri-consult granted a license" (p.271).

Thus, Tazi skillfully illustrated the way *al-waqf* institution was a democratic political vehicle that enabled the community to enhance equal opportunity and bridge several gaps: elite/class, urban/rural, and men/women in higher education in the *madrasah*. At the same time, Tazi aptly showed how *al-waqf* functioned as a powerful political tool for the community both in the sustenance of Arabization in higher learning at the national level, and in the maintenance of the Arabs' leadership in scientific production at the national, regional and international levels during the Middle Ages.²²

2.2. Al-Waqf during 'Asr al-Inhithat (15th-18th Centuries)

Both al-Jabiri (1984a) and Tazi (1973) trace the beginning of '*asr al-Inhithat* to the high Middle Ages (15-18 th centuries). Al-Jabiri argues this era was induced by the political defeat of al-Andalus in 1492 (p.8). This defeat, he observes, changed not only the international balance of power drastically, but also brought along the political ascendancy of Europe and its subsequent ideological incursions in the Arab-Islamic world (p.9). Further, Tazi (1973) argues, during the 15th-17th centuries Oriental studies increased considerably as evident in the foreign missions from Europe to Morocco, and through Muslim scholars who fell prisoners to the Europeans (p.449). In brief, both al-Jabiri and Tazi place the ideological competition between two world civilizations (Islamic and Christian) in the High Middle Ages at the root of conflicts between the Arab-Muslim society and the West (Europe). Equally, both authors situate Orientalism in the Maghrib during the high Middle Ages as the earliest indication of European colonial interests, and not the military invasion of the Mashriq (Napoleon's military occupation of Egypt) during the 19th century.²³ Last but not least, Tazi (1995) argues, during the 13th-17th centuries that marked the conflicts with Europe the '*ulama*²⁴ elaborated *al-waqf* as a foreign policy ²⁵, making this institution a major instrument in diplomatic relations with non-Muslims lands. Equally, Tazi discusses the role of *al-waqf* as a current foreign policy for

²² This rectifies the English literature (Makdisi, 1981; Hourani, 1983), which asserts the demise of the Arab-Islamic civilization occurred in the 13th century. Equally, this data shows women as an integral component in the scientific community of the university, and of mainstream culture in the Middle Ages.

²³ This literature corrects the atomistic portrayal of history (i.e. Hourani, 1983) which emphasize on the Mashriq and overlooks the Maghrib in the history of the Arab-Islamic world.

²⁴ The '*ulama* have been/and continue to be mistakenly portrayed in the literature by historians and feminists alike (Makdisi, 1981; Hourani 1983; and Waardenburg 1966, 1983; Tucker. ED, 1993; Kandiyoti 1995) as being a traditional monolithic group educated in theology across time and place. For an accurate and comprehensive definition of the '*ulama* in the Arab-Islamic society see item 10 in the glossary.

²⁵ For details *al-waqf* as an external foreign policy in the case of Morocco in the 13-17th centuries, see Tazi (1995).

the safeguard the Muslims' political, economic and cultural interests at the international levels both in Islamic²⁶ and non-Islamic lands.²⁷

In a different vein, Berkey (1992) discusses how *al-waqf* continued to play a pivotal role in the socio-political and cultural governance of al-Mashriq under the foreign rule of the Mamalik during the high Middle Ages. First, Berkey discusses how in the 13th century al-Mashriq re-emerged as the new cultural centre with the leadership of Egypt under The Mamalik military elite rule. Second, he shows the way Egypt managed to keep a tremendous socio-political and cultural diversity thanks to the informality of higher education through *al-waqf* and the flexibility of learning dispensed within *al-madrasah* throughout the 13th-17th centuries. In short, Berkey puts into perspective the nature of knowledge production and of scientific practice during the 13-17th century Egypt. To begin with, he notes, despite the remarkable growth in the number of the *madrasah* "the institution never established a monopoly on the inculcation of the Islamic sciences. Lessons continued to be given to informal circles, in mosques and in private homes." (p.169) Moreover, he explains, even the *waqf* institutions that made specific provisions for endowed courses in the *madrasah* "were nevertheless public fora, and many came and went who were not formally enrolled" (p. 169). In fact, Berkey contends the continuing fluidity between the formal and informal realms was central in the socialization of Egyptians, and in the integration of a wide spectrum of people in terms of class and gender (p.217). Equally, Berkey argues, the vast network of learning was a counter-hegemonic means of *al-waqf* to elitism with two specific objectives: to sustain the inclusive participation of the community in an integrated whole, and to combat the intellectual hegemony of the *'ulama* (p. 218).

Overall, the educational system's fluidity between the formal and informal realms of education in the Maghrib and the Mashriq alike secured the development of both religious and scientific fields of knowledge, and the flexibility in learning and social mobility in terms of class and gender. However, the same system contained hegemonic tendencies as evident in some *'ulama's* exploitation of the educational modalities and scientific practices. Therefore,

²⁶ In Islamic lands, *al-waqf* is a tool of socio-political empowerment to all people to participate in the maintenance the holy lands of *al-Quds* (Palestine), *al-Azhar*, Cairo, and in *al-Haramayn* (Saudi Arabia). Equally, *al-waqf* sustains the welfare of the poor inside and outside national borders among the Islamic nations.

²⁷ In non-Islamic lands, *al-waqf* is a tool of empowerment to sustain the Muslims' real estates, and their welfare in the world community. For example, Morocco still uses *al-waqf* as a foreign policy to maintain the real-estate properties of Moroccan Muslims in Jerusalem, just as it allows Israel to maintain its laws in maintaining Jewish holy sites in Morocco. Equally, Morocco is an active member of "al-Quds committee" established during the tenth congress of the Ministers of External Affairs in Rabat, Morocco in 1979. This committee plays a pivotal in the Muslims' legal claims on real estate in Jerusalem taken by the Israeli State in 1967. For a detailed discussion on the continuity of *al-Waqf* as a foreign policy in the diplomatic relations of Morocco with non-Islamic lands in the 20th century, see Tazi (1981).

the tension between the formal and the informal realms lies at the centre of the educational system and ought to be kept in mind in order to understand the process of social change and the evolution power-relations between class and gender in the region during the subsequent centuries. Equally, this tension is at the core of the power-relations between the community and the state and has consistently determined the course of political and cultural governance over time. This is evidenced in the emergence of *al-Salafiyya* movement in the 18th century, which brought fundamental socio-political and intellectual reforms that embarked the Arab-Islamic society in a long process of reconstruction.

Part II. The Reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic Culture and Institutions (18th and 19th Centuries)

1. The First Reform Movement: Al-Salafiyya (18th Century)

The 18th century inaugurated a phase of reconstruction for the Arab-Islamic society with the foundation of the Wahhabi Movement in 1744 and *al-Salafiyya* philosophy led by Muhammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab (1703-1789) of Saudi Arabia. At the ideological level, *al-Salafiyya* protested against any monist doctrine of mystical thought, and blamed *Sunni* schools for the accretions that occurred to pristine Islam over time. On this basis, *al-Salafiyya* reclaimed the Arabs' political leadership in statehood arguing that the initial Islamic state was founded on the '*Uruba/Islam unity*. Accordingly, Ibn Abdal-Wahhab challenged the Turkish authority of the state. Not only, did he argue that "the state was Arab in consciousness" and as such it needed to be conferred to the Arabs rather than the Turks, but he also called for "an Islamic state to which all could adhere" (Hourani, 1983.p.37). In other words, the Wahhabi Movement called for Islam as a symbol of national unity under the leadership of the Arabs; thus denouncing the Turkish and any potential foreign minority likely to overshadow the Arab-Muslim majority's leadership in political and cultural governance.

Soon, Morocco, the only nation free from the Turkish colonization, adopted *al-Salafiyya's* philosophy of statehood and built a political-cultural coalition with Saudi Arabia against the Turkization of Islam in all Arab countries. Al-Jabiri²⁸ (1984a) identifies *al-Salafiyya* in Morocco as a communitarian movement aimed at the safeguard of the community's political and cultural authority, independent of the state at two levels. At the internal national level, he notes, *al-Salafiyya* accepted some religious orders within the

²⁸ Al-Jabiri is one of the most influential thinkers on philosophical and epistemological issues in the contemporary Arab-Islamic thought today (see References). Also, he has been a professor of philosophy and Arab-Islamic thought at the faculty of Letters, Muhammad V University of Rabat since 1967.

community in political solidarity against the central authority of the *makhzen* (the state). At the external level he explains, *al-Salafiyya* focused primarily on maintaining coalitions with some orders known for their political struggle against the Turks (p.13).

In addition, Tazi (1976) describes the Wahhabi Movement as the new cultural framework to which Morocco adhered to in the 18th century, and *al-Salafiyya's* philosophy as the paradigm within which the country construed its system of education. First, Tazi situates the Moroccan cultural missions to Saudi Arabia as a common political shield across the Arab-Islamic countries against Turkish acculturation (pp. 730-731). Second, Tazi discusses how *al-Salafiyya* was pivotal for the sustenance of Arabization in education and prompted the re-organization of curricula in al-Qarawiyyin university under the rule of Sultan Moulay Slimane (p.725). Thus, Tazi places *al-Salafiyya* as a cultural reform movement geared towards the regain of the Arab-Muslims cultural leadership in the 18th century.

In the same vein al-Jabiri (1984a) contends that *al-Salafiyya* relied on '*Uruba/Islam*' pattern in political and cultural governance and produced an Arabic model of reforms. After all, he explains *al-Salafiyya's model* revolved around Islam not only as a civilization and a symbol of national unity, but also around the Arabization of Islamic countries. (p.31) This way, *al-Salafiyya* provided an endogenous ²⁹ model of development for the Arab-Islamic world that was adopted in the Maghrib and the Mashriq alike throughout the 19th century.

2. Al-Salafiyya as a Model of Reform in the 19th Century

From the perspective of the community's political and cultural authority vis-à-vis the state's central authority, al-Jabiri (1984a) clarifies how *al-Salafiyya* was a model both for the Mashriq and the Maghrib. Overall, he argues, the Turkish rule, and the religious minority groups marked both the Maghrib and the Mashriq during the 19th century. In the Mashriq, al-Jabiri explains, the Turkish State led to an acute tension between the Muslim majority and minority groups; especially the Christian one. As a result, the Mashriq experienced the simultaneous competition between *al-Salafiyya* and liberalism in the shaping of reforms (p.2). By imposing the Turkization of the nation and the state, al-Jabiri points out, the Turkish led to a dichotomy between the unity '*Uruba/Islam*' and to unprecedented problems of ethnicity and religion between Muslims and non-Muslims. For the Arab non-Muslim religious minorities, the Turkization of the nation was viewed as a systematization of exploitation and tyranny by

²⁹ Following the definition of the term "endogenous" in item 11 in the glossary, when I use the terminology "endogenous", I mean originating from within the Arab-Islamic society as a body, and its internal, independent pattern of development

the Muslim majority. By opposition, the Turkization of the nation was viewed by the Arab-Muslim majority as a systematization of economic exploitation by the religious minorities; specifically the Christian minority. Thus, '*Uruba* for the Muslim-Arabs meant not only a liberation from the Turkish Empire and its tyranny, but also the economic and political restoration of the Muslim majority (p.50).

It is precisely against the '*Uruba/Islam* dichotomy and the related ethnic conflicts, al-Jabiri contends, that Islamic reformism surfaced in Egypt. The adherence to Islam, or '*Uruba*, or the unity between the two led to three trends in the thought of the Arabic *Nahda* in the Mashriq: a conservative Salafi trend that calls for *asala* (authenticity), an Arabic liberal trend which adheres to liberal modernity, and a *tayyar tawfiqi* (conciliatory trend) which attempts to unite between the two. This trend reconciles "al-Salafiyya and Liberalism at the level of ideology, and Islam and '*Uruba* at the level of identity" (p.50).³⁰

In contrast, al-Jabiri argues, Morocco's independence from the Ottoman authority, and lack of religious minorities except the Jewish³¹ induced a reform thinking from within the Arab-Islamic approach to modernism (*tariqa*), and set an endogenous framework of reform for other countries to follow in the 20th century (p.49). Thus, he notes, Morocco provided a cultural balance by integrating Islam and '*Uruba* at the level of identity and Islamic federation, and Arab nationalism at the level of political choice. As a result, Morocco "articulated the problematic *asala/hadatha* [authenticity modernity] according to the specific criteria of Morocco and its evolution" (pp.50-51).

Al-Jabiri concludes that, while the significance of The Wahhabi Movement lies in enabling Morocco to formulate an endogenous view of modernism³², its cultural power resides in *al-Salafiyya* philosophy. This philosophy, he explains paved the way for Islamic reformism in the Mashriq in the 19th century led by 'Abduh in Egypt, and was later recaptured by Morocco's intelligentsia both in the renewal of Islamic knowledge, and in the mobilization of public opinion against Western acculturation and colonization (p.50). Thus, al-Jabiri shows the

entrenched in the Islamic worldview. Also, I imply the existence of an organic dynamism within this pattern that adapts to new environmental conditions and accommodates social change over time.

³⁰ This data clearly shows that despite the cultural mutations of the 19th century, the "*tawfiqi* trend" maintained *al-Tawhid* as the underlying principle of political and cultural governance through the sustenance of '*Uruba* (Arabization) as the means of expression of the Arab-Islamic culture and Islam as the symbol of the nation and the religion of the state. In doing so, this data rectifies Hourani's (1983) assertion that Islamic modernism in the Mashriq was polarized between Pan-Islamism led by al-Afghani and the Pan-Arabism promoted by al-Boustani.

³¹ Al-Jabiri (1984a) aptly observes how the Jewish minority in Morocco never felt the need to struggle with the Muslim majority because it enjoyed freedom of religion, and shared in the wealth of the country (p.49).

³² By "endogenous view of modernism", I mean founded on the Islamic worldview of modernism and its *tawhidic* ideology of '*Uruba/Islam* identified in item 6 in the glossary.

central role of *al-Salafiyya* movement in the re-emergence of Morocco and Egypt as the leading regional political and cultural centres during the 19th century.

However, other scholars (Tazi 1976; al-Dawway 1984; Tibawi 1983b; Szylowicz, 1973; Ziadé 1987; and Ghalyun 1988) argue, though *al-Salafiyya* remained throughout the 19th century the framework of reforms in the Mashriq and the Maghrib alike, its degree of influence on the reforms in each region varied greatly during the Turkish and the European rule. Also, the extent of *al-Salafiyya's* success/failure in the implementation of its program during each rule was determined by two essential factors. (1) The particular power-relations between the state and the community. (2) The interlap between the formal and informal realms of political and cultural governance.

2.1. The Evolution of Reforms in The Maghrib

2.1.1. At the Formal Level

Al-Dawway (1973) argues that *al-Salafiyya's* whole involvement by in the governance of Morocco was motivated by two reasons: to represent the community's interests at the government level, and to assist the state for a better governance (p.110). Thus, he notes, throughout the first half of the 19th century *al-Salafiyya's* policy remained communitarian both in its political and cultural reforms. However, he observes, during the second half of the 19th century *al-Salafiyya* gradually abandoned the community's socio-political interests and built a political alliance with the state. Two important ramifications ensued after this drastic shift in *al-Salafiyya's* political orientation. First *al-Salafiyya* divided from a united political movement into two distinct groups in the mid-1850s: *al-Salafiyya al-Qadima* (past oriented) and *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* (future oriented) (p.100). Second *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* suffered a dual loss of political and intellectual authority at the community level. Both developments, al-Dawway contends, precluded *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* from consolidating its newly acquired power at the formal level (p.102). In fact, al-Dawway observes, it was only after *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* in the Mashriq elaborated its ideological discourse against colonialism at the end of the 19th century that *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* in Morocco gained ground and consolidated its ideological position (p.106).

Similarly, Tazi (1976) documents the ideological consolidation of *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* in Morocco in the last two decades of 19th century, namely in the institutionalization of a dual cultural framework in education, and in the double movement of the Moroccan cultural missions to the Mashriq and Europe in the mid 1880s:

Muhammad the First (1885) sent several missions to England, France, Italy, and Spain...The communications with the external world increased with France, Spain, England, Germany, Portugal, and America. Belgium, and the Pope, and the Ottoman Empire. However, unlike the past these communications were no longer from a position of equality but from a position of weakness and European threat of colonization. These were the times where al-Salafiyya movement was taking root in Egypt by Muhammad 'Abduh who influenced al-Sahykh Abdallah al-Sanoussi, who in turn taught in al-Qarawiyyin during the times of Moulay al-Hassan the third. (p.734)

In short, both Tazi and al-Dawway highlight the state's inherent fragility and organizational capacity, and *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida's* alliance with the state as being largely responsible for the European "incursions" and intervention in the political and cultural governance during the last two decades of the 19th century. It is precisely for these two reasons that several groups in the community increased their political and cultural mobilization at the informal level. As a result, Morocco witnessed not only a great permeability between the informal and the formal realms in the articulation of reforms during the last two decades of the 19th century, but also a clear predominance of the informal realm in the shaping of reforms.

2.1.2. At the Informal Level

Al-Manuni (1973) traces the Moroccan community's mobilization at the informal level, and its resistance to the state's formal reforms to the first half of the 19th century. He illustrates how the informal realm influenced the formal realm by discussing the three models proposed by social groups to state officials during the rule of Abdal Rahman Ben Hisham (1822-59). First, the economic model focused on diminishing European goods and increasing local production in emulation of Japan (p.12). Second, the political model centered on the military and administrative reforms calling for more missions to Europe (p.16). Third, the cultural model focused on the endogenization of development urging the missionaries to Europe to appropriate Western sciences from the Islamic worldview before application (p.18).

However, state officials during the first half of the 19th century ignored the community's proposals. In response, the community sought other venues at the informal level to promote its political and cultural agendas. This is evidenced in the emergence of the press outside the state's authority in Tanja (Tangiers) in the 1880s. According to al-Jabiri (1984a), the emergence of a free press was facilitated by the political status of Tanja, then an international zone. Also, the multicultural context of Tanja contributed to the thriving of a tri-lingual press (Spanish, French, and Arabic). This meant the political and cultural consolidation

of the Arab voice in the reforms, and the building of new political and cultural coalitions in the country. One of these coalitions, al-Jabiri (1984a) notes, was between state officials and foreign diplomats. Another coalition was between Arab journalists residents in Tanja and Moroccan nationalist groups that gave birth of the first Moroccan paper al-Maghrib in 1889 (p.18). Lastly, the coalition between Christian Lebanese and Muslim Moroccans residents in Tanja was highly influential on the Moroccan¹ intelligentsia particularly at the state level, and among al-Qarawiyyin scholars who "followed with interest the circulation of magazines, journals and books from the Mashriq" (p.19).

Overall, therefore, *al-Salafiyya's* activism at the informal realm consistently opened new venues of political and cultural expressions and sustained diversity in reforms throughout the 19th century Morocco. Above all, *al-Salafiyya* reintegrated the informal realm and voice of the community in the process of socio-political and cultural development. In doing so, *al-Salafiyya* recaptured the formal/informal permeability that distinguished the Arab-Islamic pattern of governance in history. This set the tone for the 20th century modernism and reforms.

2.2. The Evolution of Reforms in the Mashriq

Similar developments occurred in the Mashriq. As Tibawi (1983a) aptly points out, though the Turkish Empire was an enemy, "it was still an Islamic power" (p.86). This meant that the 19th century's institutional and intellectual evolution of the Mashriq under the Turkish authority was essentially a matter of "cultural proximity" (p.86). After all, Tibawi observes, the Ottoman State changed the educational system for military reasons rather than cultural ones. First, he points out, the Ottoman State only brought an institutional shift in education (p.86). However, he argues, this institutional shift led to the establishment of "a new civil system of schools parallel to the original Islamic system and independent of it" (p.87). Second, he contends, the institutional shift undermined the process of endogenous reforms from within. Not only did this parallel system bring the "uneven competition between foreign schools and Islamic schools", but also led to "the degradation of the original schools during the Ottoman rule" (p.87). In short, Tibawi aptly illustrated how the Turkish established a hierarchical structure of institutions, and induced a corollary procedural hierarchy in the elaboration and applications of reforms in the first half of the 19th century.

It is precisely against this structural and procedural hierarchy, Tibawi (1983b) contends that the first half of the 19th century marked a whole cultural renaissance (*al-Nahda*)

headed by both Egypt and Syria (pp.114-115). Other scholars (Ziadé, 1987; Szylowicz, 1973; Ghalyun, 1988) argue that the cultural reconstruction varied considerably in the Mashriq during the first half of the 19th century pending largely on *al-Salafiyya's* ability/inability to recapture the Arab-Islamic know-how in state governance and in the articulation of reforms.

Ziadé (1987) distinguishes between the pre-Tanzimat period (1800-34) and the Tanzimat period (1834-50), and discusses how each period affected *al-Salafiyya's* involvement in the conception, and implementation of the reforms both in the Maghrib and in the Mashriq. First, Ziadé situates the pre-Tanzimat period as the establishment phase of endogenous renaissance both at the structural and ideological levels for the Arab-Islamic world as a whole. At the structural level, he observes, the pre-Tanzimat phase, which coincided with Muhammad 'Ali's rule of Egypt represented the gestation stage of the Arab-Islamic *Nahda* (renaissance). For this reason the pre-Tanzimat was a phase that paved the way for the building of the infrastructure of the modern state, and laid the ground for later deeper cultural renovations as reflected in the simultaneous initiation of several channels of modernity, namely military reforms, education, mass media, and urbanization (p.86-88).

At the ideological level, Ziadé contends, the pre-Tanzimat period was an essential phase in the production of reforms from within the Islamic worldview as evident in *al-Salafiyya* reformers' heavy engagement in inter-alia science and knowledge, and their elaboration of specific methodologies for the modernization of the Arab-Islamic Thought. To substantiate, Ziadé notes, *al-Salafiyya* reformers borrowed *al-Tawhid* from the Wahhabi Movement, and *rationalism* from the Mu'tazila Movement, and elaborated an endogenous framework for the development of political science, sociology, education, and legal reforms (p.102).

Second, Ziadé situates the pre-Tanzimat period as critical phase for the Arabs' elaboration of alternative reforms to meet the challenges brought by the Tanzimat. Essentially, Ziadé contends, the Tanzimat raised for the Arab-Muslims the question of relation between religion and reason. This threatened the foundation of the Arab-Islamic Civilization based on *al-Tawhid* and menaced the continuity of its moral and legal basis (p.100). For this reason, Ziadé explains, the Tanzimat reforms for the Arabs represented a dual process: a process of criticism of the Turkish Age's cultural distortions of Islam as a Civilization, and a process of cultural reconstruction of the 'Uruba/Islam pattern of development.

This meant the restoration of political leadership of the Arabs and the recapture of the Arab-Islamic "know-how" both in state governance and in scientific practice. To illustrate,

Ziadé (1987) first discusses how the state officials' reforms during the Tanzimat represented an Arab alternative to the contested Tanzimat both in Tunisia and Egypt. In the case of Egypt, Ziadé highlights the central role of al-Tahtawi (1801-1880) in the provision of the first comprehensive Arab-Islamic model of modernism outside the West/Islam dichotomy. Ziadé situates al-Tahtawi's editorship of al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya in 1836, as a continuing strategy by the Arabic administration set by Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt against the Turkish. First, he discusses how al-Tahtawi used this paper as a platform for social criticism, and a forum for political debates against Turkish political and social reforms (p.186). Second, Ziadé shows how al-Tahtawi laid out a global civilizational project for the Arab-Islamic society in his work Takhlis (1834). He notes that this project is the first comprehensive model for the emancipation of women because al-Tahtawi shows the historical necessity of women's emancipation and the urgent need to review their status, and increase their education (p.187).

Nonetheless, the internal reconstruction in the Arab-Islamic tradition of statehood and scientific practice was severely curbed at the procedural level by Muhammad 'Ali's marginalization of *al-Salafiyya* during the first half of the 19th century. Szylowicz (1973) observes that the pre-Tanzimat period was twofold: "endogenizing modernity" and "Arabizing learning". Endogenizing modernity, he explains, meant two simultaneous tasks: acquiring military knowledge that made the power of Europe, and the Western "know how" in state administration. To accomplish the first task, Muhammad Ali not only sent students officers to Europe as early as 1809 for military education, but he also opened the first military modern school in Egypt in 1816 (p.103). However, Szylowicz observes, to accomplish the second task, Muhammad Ali upgraded the original system by confiscating *al-waqf* revenues that subsidized original schools in 1812. Soon afterwards, he invented a system of rewards and incentives such as generous subsidies for food, clothing, lodging, and an allowance to sustain the modernization of original schools across Egypt (p.104).

Similarly, Szylowicz explains, Muhammad Ali's Arabization plan involved two main aspects: first, building an Arabic administrative structure to replace the existing one heavily dominated by the Copts and the Circassians; and second coordinating the existing *waqf* schools with the new ones (p.103). Also, he introduced translation in the educational system in 1835; hence replacing the European texts by Arabic ones, and "filling the need for suitable instructional materials in schools" (p.104). On the one hand Szylowicz discusses Muhammad Ali's achievements through Arabization as threefold. First, he engendered "the transformation of the social core group" (p.109), which provided an endogenous group ready to take the

leadership of the country. Second, he displaced the Christian Copts from power; thus providing for the first time "opportunities for Egyptians to share in their country's power and social mobility" (p.110). And third, he restored Arabic as a medium of instruction, and learning; hence vastly contributing to the cultural integration of Egypt (p.110).

On the other hand, Szylowicz highlights Muhammad 'Ali's shortcomings in the Arabization plan of Egypt. First, he observes, Muhammad 'Ali failed in the second aspect of Arabization, which aimed at the coordination between the original and new schools (p.105). Second, he upgraded the teacher training for the newly established schools; and he encouraged the continuity of foreign institutions already established in Egypt by the missionary French Jesuits (p.105). In short, Szylowicz shows how Muhammad 'Ali left Egypt and other countries in the Mashriq with a legacy of cultural duality and institutionalized social hierarchy.

In the same vein, Ghalyun (1988) contends, the cultural duality deepened even more at the procedural level during the Tanzimat period because Egypt experienced the emergence of new generation of Azharaites trained in the Western liberal tradition. This change in training, he explains, led to the socio-ideological division of *al-Salafiyya* movement and manifested itself in the scientific debates within al-Azhar University's intelligentsia. In fact, Ghalyun traces this ideological division to the scientific debates between Shaykh Darwish (1840-1850), the leader of *al-Salafiyya al-Qadima*, and Hassan al-Tawil (1860-1870), the leader of *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* (p.39). The ideological divisions between the two factions of *al-Salafiyya* undermined the momentum of endogenous reforms, and their implementation in the 2nd half of the 19th century in two ways. First, the state official '*ulama* experienced a phase of recession in the reforms for the period (1840-70) due their adjustment to Western Liberal "know how" at the formal level, and their integration of these adjustments in the new policy of *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida*. Second, the community mobilized at the informal level and resisted the state-imposed liberal reforms. Thus, just as in Morocco, in Egypt the informal level outweighed the formal level in the shaping of reforms during the second half of the 19th century.

2.2.1. At the Informal Level

The earliest venues of cultural expressions at the informal level were the harems³³. These spaces represented for many Muslim women, who graduated from *waqf* schools,

³³ Khalifah (1973) was the first scholar who showed the political role of the harems and their change into literary salons during the 19th century. She also drew attention of the political and cultural role of the salons both for women's participation in the reforms, and for gender discourses during the 19th century.

convenient locations to share their poetry and essays in the 1850s and 1860s. Gradually however, some of these women transformed the harems into literary salons³⁴. This maintained the long history the salons have had for women in the Arab-Islamic tradition, and allowed women to pursue the legacy of their foremothers (Zeidan, 1995, p.50). Moreover, in the 1860s and 1870s women expanded on the harems/salons into other fora, namely by engaging in correspondence with each other (Badran & Cooke, 1990. p.xxvi.). This reveals that the literary salons of the harems remained "invisible" fora for cultural expression for a long period underestimated by many historians and feminists alike. Yet, it is these informal salons that represented the springboard for women's public participation in the socio-political and cultural debates of Egypt; starting with the male-led press.

The 1870-1880 decade marked the emergence of a free press informally organized outside the state's control and authority (Badran & Cooke, 1990.p. xxvii). This meant that the press soon became a vehicle par excellence for political and social advocacy by different religious, ethnic and linguistic groups as reflected in the bilingual formats of the journals: Turkish-Arabic, or Arabic-French (Baron, 1994). Among the important issues involved in the creation of journals and periodicals during the 1870s and the 1880s "Were ethnic and religious identifications and concern about political problems of nationalism" (Idem, p. 48). Equally, this tenuous socio-political context fuelled Arab nationalism; resulting in the Christian and Muslim Arabs coalition and set up of an Arab press. Awareness of the meaning of Arab nationalism during the 19th century sheds light on the political and cultural significance of the Arab-press and its place in the general reforms, and brings further understanding of the power-struggles involved in the cultural governance between the Muslim majority and other minority groups during the Turkish age. Hourani (1983) identifies the specificity of Arab nationalism in the 19th century:

The Arabs idea of Nationalism was blended with ideas drawn from other types of Nationalism. It was closely linked with the idea of Islamic Community, and even for Arab Nationalists, who were Christians, their nationalism implied a certain moral adherence to Islam, as a civilization if not as a religion .(p.343)

Equally important, is an awareness of the Arabic literary tradition of the 19th century and the way it shaped the writing style of the press. Not only does this tradition shed light on

³⁴ Hitti (1965) traces the literary salons to the 2nd/10th century (see Appendix II). Moreover, Zeidan (1995) shows that the literary salons were revived by Muslim women, namely Sukaynah bint al-Husayn (d. 735-743); and Walladah Bint al-Mustaki (d. 1087 or 1091) "hundred of years before the concept spread to Europe in the sixteenth century" (p.50). This means that much research still needs to be done to explore importance of the literary salons in women's participation in the Arab-Islamic culture by historians and feminists alike during the interval centuries prior to the 19th century.

the power-struggle between the groups involved in the press during this period, but also on gender power-relations within each group of journalists. As al-Jundi (1979) aptly argued, since the usage of the feminine was the common device in literary expression within the Arabic tradition, the Arab journalists of this period encountered the common technical problem of signing their articles under feminine pseudonyms³⁵ in the press (p.342). He explains that some journalists opted to keep the feminine pseudonyms for commercial benefits in order to maintain an increasing female audience (p. 343). However, he observed, many maintained the feminine pseudonyms because they proved to be efficient tools of political protection for the leaders of the Arab press and journalists alike against reprisals by a powerful Turkish rule (pp.343-4).

2.2.2. At the Formal Level

Nationalism was clearly the underlying motivation of the reforms at the formal level. This is reflected in state officials' consolidation of the Arabic Administrative structure in the government during the 1870-1880 decade. Al-Tahtawi produced his major reforms as a state official during this decade as encapsulated in al-Murshid (1870) and Al-Manahij (1880). While both these books contain al-Tahtawi's endogenous philosophy of education for citizenship and the role of the state in political education and nation building, al-Murshid captures best the author's rationale on the role of public education in promoting equity between men and women as Arab citizens. Khalifah (1973) notes that al-Murshid was written as a textbook for both genders, in response to *Diwan al-Madaris* (the Schools Bureau) in which al-Tahtawi was a prominent figure (p.125). Furthermore, Iqbal Baraka (1988) contends: "This book was published into Turkish, and had a far reaching impact on Arab society, then much influenced by the rigid conservatism of the Ottoman Empire" (p.48). Lastly, Zeidan (1995) points out, al-Murshid remained in use in the Egyptian schools until the British occupation, when its use was banned (p.273).

Until the 1880s, therefore, both formal and informal reform attempts were planned as Arabic counter-programs to the Turkish-imposed reforms. Still, these Arabization attempts failed to remedy the already institutionalized social stratification established by decades of Turkish hierarchical institutional and procedural modalities. As a result, Egypt suffered severe class and gender gaps. In class terms, the access to education was limited to the masses since

³⁵ Clearly, the feminine pseudonym device blurred ethnic, religious, class and gender participation in the press. This data rectifies the assertions made by most scholars such as Hourani (1983), Ahmed (1992) and Badran & Cooke (1990) about the Christians being pioneers and predominant in the press.

neither civil nor *waqf* schools were added to the existing institutions established in the first half of the 19th century. Simultaneously, the available military schools sustained the class cleavage between the Egyptian-Circassian elite by placing the Egyptians in the lowest ranks (Szylowicz, 1973, pp.110-11).

In gender terms, military schools excluded women automatically, while the civil schools at the tertiary level were unavailable to them altogether. Even the government secondary education was late forthcoming and had a limited capacity. The first government school at the secondary level for girls al-Saniyya school opened only in 1873 under the initiative of al-Tahtawi when he was a member of the Schools Bureau; it remained the sole operational formal school for girls for decades (Khalifah, 1973, p.126). Lastly, the situation at the primary level was worse because the *waqf* primary schools for girls had decreased tremendously since the *waqf* subsidies were confiscated by the state. Only in 1917 did the state allow access to girls' formal primary education (Ahmed, 1992, p.138). At length, this context of social stratification and political turmoil climaxed in the 'Urabi Revolution (1881).

The implications of the 'Urabi Revolution were multiple and far reaching for the social change that followed in Egypt. At the socio-political level, the 'Urabi Revolution was a manifestation of the extent of the Egyptians' political conscientization and social differentiation brought by informal channels in terms of class and gender. Also, this revolution was a reflection the political maturity and activism of the masses; especially women. 'Abd al-Baqi (1977) reports that during this revolution, "a group of women volunteered to dispatch secret leaflets across Egypt" (p.271). This reveals that it was the 'Urabi Revolution, and not the state, that provided women with their very first practical opportunities in political and nationalistic struggles, and activism. Equally, this marks women's independent involvement in the political life of their society since the last two decades of the 19th century.³⁶

At the intellectual level, the 'Urabi Revolution epitomized the Arab-Muslim majority's resistance to both domestic and foreign interference in the political cultural governance of Egypt, and the community's determination to keep the venues of cultural expression outside the state's control. In brief, the 'Urabi Revolution was a populist revolution that expressed the community's contestation of the state's political and cultural governance. Nonetheless, the 'Urabi Revolution did not bear the expected fruits as the Ottoman state was waning, leaving space for further European influence and ascendancy both at the political and cultural levels.

This meant that the 1870-1880 marked a transitional phase at the formal level in Egypt as reflected in the increased politicization of Islamic reformism and the birth of the second generation of men reformers. 'Abduh (1849-1930) had just joined al-Azhar university, and was familiarizing himself with al-Salafiyya al-Jadida's philosophy. Ghalyun (1988) explains that 'Abduh's Islamic reformism and program in the 1870-80 decade reflected a twofold approach: the struggle for a philosophical change in the renaissance of Islamic societies, and the building of a resistance movement against inside and outside tyrannical influences (p.39). In short, official Islamic modernism during the 1870-1880 period was rather political than social. For this reason, according to Ghalyun (1988), 'Abduh failed to appreciate the social significance of the 'Urabi Revolution:

The 'Urabi Revolution...came as a surprise to 'Abduh. He did not expect it to bring an advocacy for the constitution and freedom...When he saw the whole nation behind 'Urabi, he threw himself in the revolution and became one of its strongest proponent .(p.40)

What was foremost in 'Abduh's mind during the 1870-1890, Ghalyun (1988) insists, was the cultural integrity of Egypt, and its role in the renaissance of the Arab-Islamic civilization. To this end, he explains, 'Abduh' invested all his energy in the appropriation of Western European knowledge from within the Arab-Islamic worldview and elaborated a comprehensive Islamic modernism focused on two main components of *ijtihad*.³⁷ The first component of *ijtihad*, was *islah*/renovation and related to the creation of a new type of '*ulama*, while the second component was *tajdid*/renewal and concerned the secularization of Islam through the concept of rationality. Both *islah* and *tajdid*, Ghalyun notes, focused on the updating of the Islamic pattern of development to accommodate social change (p.42). Ghalyun puts into perspective 'Abduh's program of Islamic reformism as follows:

The objective behind Muhammad 'Abduh' rational interpretation was not to rescue religion, as some analysts say, as much as it was to open the door for the Arab mind to receive science and incorporate it. It is possible to summarize his religious reform on the basis of three essential activities: 1. To confirm the rational essence of Islam against the traditionalists and the modernist opponents alike 2. To construct the science of 'ilm al-'aqida on modern foundations 3. To reform education in order to allow the rational view to spread at the widest scope. (p.47)

³⁶ Abd al-Baqi's data challenges both Arabic and English sources ('Al-Rafi'i, 1969; Phillip 1978; al-Subki, 1986; Ahmed, 1992; Badran, 1993) who assert that women's independent involvement in politics began only with the 1919 revolution. Also, this data is consistent with women's involvement in the press during the last two decades of the 19th century.

³⁷ For a definition of *ijtihad* see item 12 in the glossary.

Perhaps this explains why 'Abduh's was so vigorously engaged in the revision of the Personal Code and the family law in 1881, and why he also initiated a total restructure of the legal courts of Egypt. 'Amara (1975) supports this theory when he pointed out that 'Abduh's family law was conceived and elaborated within the framework of the moral rebirth of the Islamic society undermined by colonization, and the need for the re-Islamization of the family (p.136). At the same time, 'Abduh proposed these reforms articulated within the framework of Islamic nationalism. With this dual focus 'Abduh grounded women's reforms and emancipation in Islamic jurisprudence and legitimized women's legal rights. Equally, 'Abduh reached a consensus between the conservatives *'ulama* and the liberal nationalists, and their acceptance of reforms on women's issues both at the community and the state's levels. In doing so, 'Abduh established a firm legal ground for later Feminist Movements and National Movements alike in Egypt as well as in other parts of the Arab-Islamic world.

However, the thrust of 'Abduh's reforms did not bring the expected social outreach in the 1880s because they excluded education. The educational gap in 'Abduh's reforms is not surprising, considering that in 1881 the Egyptian state had made provisions "for awqaf to be registered in branch offices thereby putting them under the Diwan's control" (Eccel, 1984,p.75). This new state policy in education prevented the unification between the original and the new structures of education, and sealed the hierarchy between the state and the *waqf* at the procedural level of reforms. Further, the formation of a British-Turkish government under the British colonization of Egypt in 1882 severely limited the chances of redressing the situation.

Immediately after the formation of the new government Egypt witnessed a gradual erosion of the interlap between the formal and informal realms. At first, the erosion began by the new government's displacement of nationalist reformers from formal power such as al-Afghani's exile from Egypt, and 'Abduh's demotion from his position in al-Azhar university and appointment as editor of the journal al-Waqai' al-Misriyya (Ghalyun, 1988,p.40). Yet, 'Abduh made this journal an instrument for the promotion of public interest, a tool for the supervision of the government activities, and a forum for social criticism and advocacy for reforms (p.40). In response, the state officials imprisoned 'Abduh in Egypt and later exiled him in Beirut as a *persona non grata* for three years.

Nonetheless, it was during these years of exile that 'Abduh wrote his most important work Risalat al-Tawhid³⁸ (1884) in which he articulated his rationale of Islamic modernism (Idem, p.41). Also soon after, 'Abduh joined al-Afghani in Paris to edit the paper al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa (p.41). This means that from 1883 to 1888 there was in Egypt an ideological vacuum for the reforms. Indeed, when 'Abduh returned to Egypt in 1888, and started his social and educational reforms, the British had already filled in the ideological gap as reflected in their promotion of missionary schools, and the press.

Respectively, the missionary schools were instrumental in creating a gender discourse that spreads the "supremacy" of Western civilization values among the upper and middle class intelligentsia of Egypt, and in devalorizing Islam as a civilization³⁹. It was during the 1890-1900 that 'Abduh elaborated his policy in education. Ghalyun (1988) contends that 'Abduh's policy in education integrated the concepts of *tajdid* (renovation) and *islah* (reform) as manifested in three areas. First, in "the reform lists he proposed for the renovation of teaching in Syria, and in the Ottoman state, in addition to the list of religious education, and public education in Egypt" (p.50). Second, in "the renovation of teaching through the unification between religious, public, community and foreign schools" (p.50). And third, in 'Abduh's Arabization of scientific fields, making the Arabic language the vehicle for diversity in fields of knowledge and specialization as reflected in his foundation Jam'iyyat Ihya' al-'Ulum al-'Arabiyya [the society for the revival of Arabic sciences] in 1899 (p. 51). Last but not least, 'Abduh's reforms in education relentlessly promoted *waqf* schools that benefited both genders in 1897 (Ahmed, 1992.p.138). This enabled the Egyptian population to have continuous access to endogenous education denied by the British, while sustaining women's participation in mainstream culture.

Similarly, the British had since the 1880's become part of a multicultural free press as evident in the quadri-lingual format of the papers (Arabic, Turkish, French, English) (Baron, 1994). In response, 'Abduh created the paper al-Manar (1890) which he used for his rebuttals against the European's claim that the West and not Islam granted full equality to women until

³⁸ Although Risalat al-Tawhid (1884) represents the major work of 'Abduh both on the nature of Islamic modernism and its significance for the socio-political and cultural governance of Islamic societies, historians and feminist scholars rarely mention this work in the English literature on the Arab-Islamic world. Likewise, 'Abduh's thesis of Islamic modernism from within the Islamic perspective of *al-Tawhid* (unity between the religious and the secular) developed in this book is seldom discussed in this literature. Yet, an English translation of this book exists since the 1960s, namely. Abduh, Muhammad (1966) The Theology of Unity. Trans. Musa'ad & Cragg. London:George Allen & Unwin.

³⁹ This has invariably been the case in other Arab-Muslim countries. For an analysis of the missionary movements and its connection with colonialism in the region, see Khalidi, M., & Farroukh, 'U. (1953). For details on Cromer's role in promoting the missionary schools and their role in the devalorization of Islam as a civilization in English, see Ahmed (1992).

1900⁴⁰ (Ghalyun, Op.cit, p.46). Meanwhile, the Arab press was already witnessing a rise in the feminine voice of Muslims, as reflected in women's signing their own names to their press articles on women in Islam. This political move initiated by Muslim women not only consolidated the nationalist mixed intelligentsia (men and women) of the Muslim majority, but it also provided women of this majority with an unprecedented visibility in 1890s mainstream press.⁴¹

2.2.3. The Origins of Feminism⁴² in the Arab-Islamic Society

The Increase in Muslim women's visibility in the press soon led to the building of political and cultural coalitions among Muslim women as well as the emergence of an Islamic nationalist feminist consciousness and ideology. Evidence of both is reflected in 'Aicha 'Ismat al-Taymuriyya (1840-1902), a Turkish born in Egypt, and Zaynab Fawwaz (1860-1914), a working class Lebanese woman "of a poor, obscure, and illiterate Shiite family" (Zeidan, 1995,p. 64) Al-Taymuriyya wrote a treatise Mir'at al-Ta'amul fi al-Umur (1887/8) (the Mirror of Contemplation of Things), and an article "Asr al Ma'arif" [The age of Education] in 1889 for the paper al-Adab (Badran & Cooke, 1990,p.125) Both works represent a gendered perspective on the Turkish dualities in education and the Turkish distortions in the interpretation and relations of male female dynamics. In comparison Fawwaz was more prolific and radical because she explicitly addressed the issue of the "status of women in Islam" in several journals, among which al-Nil, al-Mu'ayyad, al-Ittihad al-Misri, Al-Ahali. Moreover, Fawwaz criticized her contemporaries of both genders. For instance she attacked a woman colleague Hana Kasbani Kawrani (1870-1889) for her advocacy of women's veiling and role at home, and instead she advocated women's right to work outside as granted by Islam. Similarly, Fawwaz wrote a rebuttal to a contemporary male writer 'Arif al-Zayn, the founder of the magazine al-'Irfan, in which she raised the issue of women's participation in politics as a question of right in Islam (Zeidan, 1995,p.65).

Further evidence of Fawwaz's Islamic feminism is found in her advocacy for women's access to formal education and the work place in her book al-Rassail al-Zaynabiyya (1892). Here, she raises the issue of authenticity of some misogynous *hadiths* on women attributed to

⁴⁰ This places the 1890s as the period of resistance to the colonial narrative of gender initiated by 'Abduh, and rectifies Ahmed's (1992) claim that this resistance emerged only with Amin.

⁴¹ This data challenges Baron's (1994) assertion that only after the constitution of the Society of Women's Progress (1908) women were granted the right to sign their articles under their real names, and thus they became visible in the press.

⁴² For a definition of feminism, see item 27 in the glossary.

the prophet⁴³ (Zeidan, 1995, p.289). In doing so, Fawwaz was the first Muslim woman to denounce men's distortions of women's rights in Islam, and to draw the attention of state officials to the class gap between working-class people, like herself⁴⁴, and upper-class people in terms of access to formal education and employment. As such, Fawwaz's work testifies to the existence of a working class feminism in the 1890s' Egypt that challenges the notion of a monolithic discourse of gender headed by upper-class women⁴⁵. Also, Fawwaz's work marks the emergence of the very first women's feminist critique of Islamic patriarchy⁴⁶ outside the Islam/West dichotomy. Equally, Fawwaz's work is the very first women's feminist critique of the emerging of neo-patriarchy⁴⁷ and its distorted socio-political and intellectual structures of the Arab-Islamic society.

Clearly, Fawwaz's and al-Taymuriyya's work shows that Muslim women were pioneers in discussing issues pertaining to gender in Islam in the public domain of the press a decade before they were taken over by men⁴⁸. Equally, it shows that women's feminist discourses on gender are formulations of national identities that consolidate the writings of their preceding and/or contemporary male reformers.⁴⁹ At the same time Christian women were writing articles on women in Islam, but their views were ignored because they were considered "to a great extent, outsiders unwelcome to discuss thorny questions such as the status of women in Islam" (Zeidan, 1995, p.289). On the whole, women's Islamic feminism emerged in a multicultural context of great exchange, and of great political turmoil and influence of Western Imperialism. This specific context had particular ramifications for women's Islamic feminism and involved a double movement: a vigorous period of cultural exchange, and a formative period for a nationalist feminist consciousness and ideology.

⁴³ This places Fawwaz as a pioneer in raising the issue of authenticity regarding misogynous *hadiths* almost a century before al-Sa'dawi (1977) and Mernissi (1991).

⁴⁴ Zeidan (1995) reports that Fawwaz was a maid at the palace of Bey al-'As'ad al-Saghir who controlled Southern Lebanon before she moved to Egypt (p. 64).

⁴⁵ Although the most recent feminist literature (Badran & Cooke 1990; Ahmed, 1992; Badran, 1993; Tinker, 1993 (Ed)., Badran 1995) acknowledges the interaction between women feminists across classes, they totally overlook the 'Urabi populist revolution (1881) and its role in promoting endogenous feminism. For example, Badran and Cooke (1990) continue to associate feminism in the region with Western liberalism and to view the women's movement from the narrow lens of privileged women affiliated with the Egyptian feminist Union established by Sha'rawi (1923).

⁴⁶ Here I apply the meaning of patriarchy as defined in item 25 in the glossary.

⁴⁷ Here I apply the meaning of neo-patriarchy as defined in item 25 in the glossary.

⁴⁸ Al-Shinnawi (1982) argues that Qassim Amin published *Tahrir al-Mar'ah* in three installments in *al-Mua'yyad* paper (1889), namely on May 15, 20, and 28. (p.43). This places Fawwaz's contributions in the same paper 8 years prior to Amin's *Tahrir al-Mar'ah*.

⁴⁹ The issues addressed by these authors echo the issues addressed by al-Tahtawi and by 'Abduh as well as they raise independent gender issues. The recent women's feminist literature (Badran & Cooke 1990; Ahmed, 1992) mutes the influence of male feminist thought on women's movements and scholarship. This muting reinforces the erroneous assumption that there is no dialogue or cooperation between genders in the Arab-Islamic society. For a full discussion of the influence of male Arab-Muslim reformers on women's movements and scholarship during the 19th and 20th century see Baraka (1988).

In fact, this context paved the way for the birth of an independent women-led populist Islamic feminist movement in Egypt in the 1890s. Equally, this double movement shaped Muslim women's feminist ideology in a specific way. From the start Muslim Egyptian women feminists affirmed simultaneously the specificity of Islamic feminism, and the universality of feminism. In turn, this affected Muslim women's feminist intervention and strategy at the national and international levels. At the national level, Muslim women downplayed their religious and cultural differences with minority and European groups for political expediency, centering their activism on their common struggle against patriarchy. At the international level, Muslim women built ties with other cultural feminisms by supporting common feminist struggles, while seeking an international feminist coalition for their own struggles.

Both feminist strategies are clear in Fawwaz's work. At the national level, Fawwaz wrote her compendium of biographies of famous Arab⁵⁰ and European women in her book Kitab al-Durr (1892). At the international level, Fawwaz previous publication of her article (1891) in al-Nil showed her support for the English women's struggle for the suffrage movement, yet a serious criticism of this movement's gender policy⁵¹. Also, Fawwaz considered sending a copy of Kittab al-Durr to the World's Columbian Exposition, held in Chicago in 1893 "as a sign of support of the exposition" (Zeidan, 1995,p. 290).

In brief, by the early 1890s, women's Islamic feminism focused more on strengthening political feminism and the extension of feminist activism to other fora of expression than on asserting cultural feminism. Another evidence of this feminist extension transpired in the harem/salons with the emergence of "open literary salons" in the 1890s initiated by Le Brun-Rochdi, where upper class women gathered and debated issues of concern to their class.⁵² This indicates an increased mobility and across-class exchange among women than commonly acknowledged in the literature and a great diversity within the venues of cultural participation available to women in the late 19th century. However, the cultural diversity soon brought a trend of comparison between various cultural feminisms as evident in Eugénie Le Brun-Roshdi's salon that was "a forum for upper class women to meet, compare, debate, and analyze

⁵⁰ The famous Arab women Fawwaz refers to are Bedouin women known for their work at war and at work. For details see Fawwaz's article "Fair and Equal Treatment" in Badran & Cooke (1990, p.224).

⁵¹ Here, Fawwaz criticizes the British government and shows how suffrage movement was patriarchal and actually excluded women from the political process. Like the Mashriq's political movements, she argues, the suffrage movement promotes women's issues such as domestic science, and enhanced motherhood. For details see Fawwaz's article in Badran & Cooke, (1990, pp.221-222).

⁵² Two main issues pre-occupied the privileged women: staying at home, and the veil. For poor women, however, these issues were superficial because their life was not subjected to such restrictions. For a full discussion of this aspect of Muslim women's life in the 19th century., see Tucker, Judith E. (1985). Also, for a discussion of the veil's early link with the formation of class and its significance of prestige in a Muslim society see, Lerner (1986b).

their condition as women" (Badran & Cooke, 1990, p.xxvii). Equally, this cultural diversity and exchange soon led to mixing between genders in the informal salons. As of 1894, men invaded some literary salons, transforming them into mixed intellectual and political fora. Khalifah (1973) documents how Princess Nazili's literary salon became the forum where Qassim Amin's first book on women Les Egyptiens: Réponse à M. Le Duc d'Harcourt (1894) was discussed (p.27). Further, 'Amara (1976) explains, this book was a rebuttal to Harcourt's book L'Egypte et les Egyptiens (1893)⁵³ that holds Islam responsible for the inferior status of women. Here, 'Amara reports, Amin not only defends the veiling and segregation, but he also criticizes the Westernization of Egyptian women who were becoming liberal and unveiled (Vol.1, pp. 249-348).

This means that the informal literary salons which originally provided women with independent and invisible fora for their collective debates turned into visible spaces for men's political and cultural contestation in 1894. It also means the consolidation of the resistance discourse of Islamic reformism against the colonial Western liberalist discourse on Islam and gender started by 'Abduh in 1890. Fahmi (1963) reports that prior to the publication of Réponse Amin had maintained a very close relationship with 'Abduh and Al-Afghani through his subscription to al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, and through his job as 'Abduh's personal French tutor and translator (p.37). In addition, Khamis (1978) observes, 1894 marked a volatile political year for the Muslim majority as the Christian Arab minority and the Western Liberalists were consolidating their political coalition, and increasingly criticizing the validity of Islamic institutions. To illustrate, Khamis argues that the Christian Arab scholar Muqrus Fahmi al-Muhami's wrote a book al-Mar'ah fi al-Sharq (1894) [Women in the East], where he emphatically advocated "the legalization of marriage between Muslims and Copts" (p.73).

Since then, many members of Islamic male feminism radically changed from the egalitarian socio-political movement it used to be into an assertive political movement focused on the validity of the Islamic way of life. This radical stance was matched by the British, who vigorously promoted the liberal way of life through their coalitions with the governing Egyptian elite in the literary salons. Khalifah (1973) reports how princess Nazili's sympathy for the British played a key role in pressuring Qassim Amin to change his initial position on Egyptian women in Réponse by writing a second book in 1899: Tahrir al-Mara'h [Women's liberation] (pp.27-28). In this manner official Islamic adaptionism was born. However, it

⁵³ 'Amara (1976) notes that this book on European discourse on Islam and gender was translated into Arabic for the first time and published only in 1976 by Muhammad al-Bukhari ('Amara: Vol.1. 249-348). For this reason, he observes, this

failed to overshadow Islamic reformism. Fahmi (1963) explains that, prior to the official publication of Tahrir al-Mar'ah in a book form in 1899, Amin had met 'Abduh in Geneva in 1898 and read excerpts which he had previously published in installments in the paper al-Mu'ayyad in the presence of Sa'd Zaghlul and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (pp.47-49).

Nonetheless, upon its publication Tahrir al-Mar'ah triggered an immediate controversy. At the root of the controversy, 'Amara (1976) explains, is the book's underlying hierarchy between Islam and the West. This hierarchy in his view led to conflicting theories of modernism and a rationale of duality on gender⁵⁴. In fact, 'Amara (1976) shows that Amin's rationale on gender was inherently gradualist in Tahrir al-Mar'ah. This is reflected in his promotion of women's education primarily as a wife and as a mother (Vol.2, pp.79-80), and is manifested in his view of the veil as a mere social custom; thus essentially a matter of choice for women⁵⁵ (Vol.2, p.45).

In my view, Amin's "feminism" was accommodating to both Liberal and Islamic patriarchies. Barely a year later he wrote a third book al-Mar'ah al-Jadida (1900)⁵⁶ [The new Woman] in which he reviewed most of his liberalist positions in Tahrir al-Mar'ah. Here, Amin reiterates his previous position in Réponse: that women's emancipation is necessary if Muslim societies were to develop and be efficient, and that this efficiency had to be compatible with the tenets of Islam. Equally, Amin relies on the Qur'an in his advocacy of education for all women, his condemnation of polygamy, and of divorce laws.⁵⁷ Overall, therefore, the reforms of the second half of 19th century continued to be marked by coexistence of Islamic reformism and Islamic adaptionism despite European colonialism. This set the pattern for the 20th century.

book remained absent from the analysis of Arab-Muslim feminists and historians of social change in the region.

⁵⁴ To illustrate this duality, 'Amara (1976) identifies the particular sections of the book where 'Abduh's Islamic reformism is clear, particularly on gender, marriage and divorce. (Vol.1. pp.70 & 138). Also, 'Amara points out that since the book was written under the urging of Cromer, it defames Islam as an inferior civilization by claiming it degrades women through the veil. ('Amara, 1976. Vol.1.p. 139).

⁵⁵ This data rectifies Ahmed (1992) who asserts that not only Amin called for unveiling, but his discourse of gender became paradigmatic for the 20th century as well.

⁵⁶ Even in the 1990s scholars (Ahmed, 1992, Badran and Cooke, 1995) deal only with Tahrir al-Mar'ah and exclude al-Mar'ah al-Jadidah from its analysis of Amin's modernism. This partial data leads to the false claim that Amin's feminism was liberal and Western-oriented in both his theories on modernism and on gender in Egypt. For an integrated approach to Amin's thought in Arabic see ('Amara, 1976; 1980a; 1980b). Also in English see Abdel Kader (1987).

⁵⁷ For a full discussion of these issues, see Abdel kader (1987).

Part III. The Evolution of the Arab-Islamic Society in the 20th Century

1. The Establishment Decades (1900-1920)

1.1. In the Mashriq

With the rise of unregulated capitalism in the first decade of the 20th century, the Mashriq witnessed deeper class and cultural divisions which rapidly translated into acute tensions between various social groups. The literary salons were at the centre of cultural and social divisions as they became differentiated by specialization. Khamis (1978) reports that princess Nazili's salon was known for its specialization in the non-literary fields of politics, whereas May Ziadah's salon was famous for literary fields and social issues (p.86). This way the literary salons turned into powerful "political vehicles" with the ability to make or break the careers of the rising generations of Egyptians. First, Khamis points out, it was Princess Nazili's salon that paved the way for Sa'd Zaghlul's political career and take over in the 1920s Egyptian government. Not only did Nazili encourage this Azhar student to learn French which later rendered him "ministrable", but she also arranged his marriage with the daughter of Mustapha Fahmi, then a premier of Egypt (p.73). In contrast, Khamis observes, May Ziadah insisted that her salon be entirely conducted in classical Arabic; thus largely reinforcing the nationalists' efforts in the Arab Press in terms of vulgarizing Classical Arabic into a flexible tool of writing and a means of communication to the masses (p.87). Also, Khamis notes, it was May Ziadah's personal invitation to Taha Hussayn to attend her salon, after she was impressed by his doctoral dissertation defense at the Egyptian university, that launched the literary and political career of this Egyptian scholar from rural and modest background (p.179).

Similarly, Mahmud (1980) argues, other salons focused on women's issues such as Labibah Hashim, who formed her own salon in 1906 and launched her periodical Fatat al-Sharq for the exclusive promotion and visibility of women. First, Mahmud underscores Labibah's salon's feminist and cultural orientation as: "Almost entirely dedicated to fighting for women's education, for their right to hold public office, and for a strong unified national school system to end the dependence on the foreign missionary schools in Egypt" (pp.75-76). Second, Mahmud highlights Labibah Hashim's political feminist strategy, namely opening her salon to pro-feminist male journalists such as the editors of Al-Jarida Lutfi al-Sayyid, and that of al-Mua'yyad 'Ali Yussuf (p.76). Simultaneously, the tenuous cultural and social context changed the press into a battlefield. Baron (1994) reports that the newspapers were divided

along ideological lines into three camps: secularists, modernists, and Islamists⁵⁸, and the main causes for division being: "the dominance of Western ideas, the role of Islamic law, and industrialization" (p.52). Also, she notes that "the focus of the articles tended to be on middle-class concerns" (p.54).

Meanwhile, the Arab-led press remained locked in the controversy of Amin's Tahrir al-Mar'ah. According to Kahhalah (1978) this lasting controversy not only deflected attention from many endogenous and vocal reformers such as Faris al-Nimr and Abdalhamid Hamdi who produced numerous progressive articles in the journal al-Sufur, but it also contributed to their invisibility (Vol.1, p.178). Yet, Khamis (1978) points out, this controversy also prompted the nationalists within Islamic reformism to mobilize and form the first national political party. He explains that Mustapha Kamil (1874-1908) founded The National Party of Egypt primarily in opposition to Amin's proposals, fearing that they reflected the British attempts to undermine the unity of the national cause (p.78). Equally, he observes, Kamil articulated his vision of endogenous reformism in his paper al-Liwa, and published several articles that denounced the British campaign for defaming Islam and spreading Amin's works in India (p.78).

Further, Tuhami (1976) contends, it was Kamil's political party's revival of Islam as symbol of national unity that kept the political and cultural integrity of Egypt. He insists that Kamil's view of Islam as a symbol of national unity enabled him not only to situate the meaning of the veil in the national debate as "a national dress code", but also to justify his opposition to Amin's call for unveiling as an immature, and indiscriminate emulation of the West (pp.42-45). Similarly, 'Awad (1966) points out, Kamil's recuperation of Islam as a symbol of national unity, largely sustained the activism of succeeding generations of moderate nationalists and feminists alike. To illustrate, he observes that when Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid founded his new political party Hizb al-Ummah in 1909 he not only endorsed Kamil's view of Islam as a symbol of nationalism, but he also elaborated a new version of Islamic feminism in nationalist terms (p.79). 'Awad notes that al-Sayyid articulated his nationalist feminism clearly in his paper al-Jaridah (1909). There, he argued that equality between men and women was an endogenous practice deeply rooted in the Egyptian tradition as manifested in the country side, while the practice of the veil was an urban custom initiated by upper-class women, and the

⁵⁸ The terminology Baron uses in her classification of the papers is inadequate for this period in history. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives is more appropriate. For an accurate usage of the Islamists' terminology and their development in the history of the Arab-Islamic society, see item 15 in the glossary.

subordination of women was found only in urban areas of the country as a result of capitalism (p.80).⁵⁹

To be sure, al-Sayyid's nationalism within Islamic reformism not only restored to Muslim women their lost visibility as feminist leaders, but it also laid the groundwork for new formal venues of nationalist and feminist struggles for both genders outside the dichotomy Islam/West. Majd al-Din Nasif (1962)⁶⁰ situates Malak Hifni Nasif, best known as Bahitah al-Badiyyah (1886-1918), within Islamic reformism's definition of nationalism (*'Aruba/Islam*), emphasizing the continuity of Islamic ideology in the political, and cultural orientation in her feminist consciousness and scholarship⁶¹. To elucidate, he first argues that it was under the mentorship of his own father and al-Sayyid that Malak gave lectures on Fridays at the women's lectures at the Egyptian University, and at the offices of the al-Jaridah paper in 1909. Second, he observes, Malak sent her speeches as feminist demands to the National Congress and published them in a book entitled al-Nisa'yyat⁶² (women's/feminist Issues) in 1910.

The explicit shift in feminist terminology from *wad' al-mar'ah* (the woman's status) to *nisa'yyat* (women's/feminist issues) by a woman feminist within the ideology of Islamic nationalism is of paramount political and historical significance because it introduces Muslim women's standpoint in official gender discourse, and it integrates a gendered perspective in the formal nationalist debate, mainstream press, and political parties. However, the orientation of this endogenous nationalist feminism was challenged during the second decade of the 20th century by al-Wafd party's liberal nationalist ideology and reforms under the leadership of Sa'd Zaghlul. As Zeidan (1995) duly documented, al-Wafd was essentially composed of people "who distanced themselves from the 'Urabi Revolution"⁶³ (p. 34). In addition, this party was very elitist in its recruitment policy; hence reinforcing its own class visibility and

⁵⁹ This literature rectifies the assumption feminists like Ahmed (1992) and Badran & Cooke (1990) make about al-Sayyid's reforms as being derived from Western liberalism. Also, this literature corroborates Tucker's work (1985).

⁶⁰ Nasif (1962), explains that al-Nisa'yyat was first published in 1910 and consisted of 24 articles previously published by Malak in al-Jaridah, two lectures and a poem, in addition to an introduction by al-Sayyid. After Malak's death, al-Nisa'yyat was re-published in 1920 in two parts (one volume) adding new material: Nasif's biography of his sister, Malak, her correspondences with May Ziadah, and a selection of speeches given at the commemorative ceremony of her death (pp.37-38).

⁶¹ The political and cultural affiliation of Malak Nasif within Islamic reformism is also clear in her lecture to the Umma Party (1909). Here, Malak Nasif not only denounces the distortion of the veil by urban women into the European inspired *izar-wear* which led to Muslim women's *tabarruj* (indecent body display), but she also called for the replacement of the *izar* by the "authentic" custom of the veil in the Turkish style. Also Nasif calls for the elimination of foreign missionary schools, and an increase in reforms of the public schools. For details on this aspect consult the author's article in English in Badran and Cooke (1990, pp.232-234).

⁶² For a definition of the terminology of *nisa'yyat* and its meanings in the Arabic literature, and for women/feminist studies in the Arab-Islamic society see item 13 in the glossary.

⁶³ Among the prominent members of al-Wafd was Muhammad Sultan Basha, Huda Sha'rawi's father, who was "the president of the first chamber of Egypt", and who "governed Egypt during Khedive Tawfiq's brief absence (Zeidan, 1995

monopoly in the nationalist and the feminist debates. For example, when Sa'd Zaghlul formed a women's committee of al-Wafd, he involved only the supporters of his party, making Sharifah Riyad the president the Cairo central Committee, and integrating Huda Sha'rawi as an active member ('Abd al-Baqi, 1977.p. 273). These events led to the National Revolution of 1919; echoing the cultural issue previously raised by the 'Urabi Revolution and the unresolved socio-economic and cultural gaps in terms of class and gender.

Moreover, these events brought a new tension: that of polarization of two patterns of modernism between the Western style liberal modernism, and the Islamic style of modernism both at the state and community levels⁶⁴. In fact, this tension soon translated in the position of nationalists and feminists alike. For instance, the elitist posture of al-Wafd brought divisions among the party members on matters of policy as evident in the revival of the acrimony already existing between Sa'd Zaghlul and Islamil Sidqi, prompting the latter to leave al-Wafd and form his own national party (Kahhalah, 1977.p. 234). Similar developments transpired in women's feminism. In 1919 Munira Thabit⁶⁵, who remained very active in the paper al-Sufur, was emphatically asking for women's right to vote and membership in the parliament (Khalifah, 1973.p.160). In contrast, Huda Sha'rawi, who was the president of the Wafdist women's Central Committee in 1919 attempted to avoid these two issues by claiming that it was still a premature demand (Kahallah,1979. Vol,1.p.89). In short, al-Wafd party "hijacked" the Popular Revolution of 1919 in terms of class and gender, undermining the accomplishments of the nationalist and the feminist groups' alike. In this manner official nationalism and official feminism were established.

Above all, al-Wafd party exploited the state's take over in politics not only to sabotage the community's co-partnership in the society's governance, but also to assimilate women within the male voice of state-led reforms. Nonetheless, women resolutely kept their allegiance to the informal realm and continued their independent activism outside the state's control. For example, when the feminist Nabawiyyah Musa (1890-1951) was fired from her position of inspector of the ministry of education following her criticism of the girls' curricula, she not only established her private schools, *Madaris Banat al-Ashraf* [the Schools for the

p. 34). Also, Ali Sha'rawi, became a founding member al-Wafd upon his marriage to Huda Sultan of whom he was a guardian (Idem, p.34).

⁶⁴ Islamic modernism style, remained deeply entrenched in the ideology of *al-Salafiyya's* reformism. Founded on the principle of *al-Tawhid* Islamic modernism style sought to maintain Islam as the symbol of national unity and 'Uruba (Arabization) as its means of political and cultural expression. Al-Jabiri (1989c) argues that this period represented an important mutation in the ideology of *al-Salafiyya* in the Arab-Islamic world as evident in the movement's evolution into four major groups with diverse reform proposals that endure to date. (See item 29 in the glossary).

⁶⁵ Munira Thabit (1945) documented the "culture of Journalism" during this volatile political period.

Nobles' Daughters] in Cairo and Alexandria, but she also wrote al-Mar'ah wa al-'Amal (1920)⁶⁶ [Women and the Labor Force] where she called for equality of the sexes, and expressed her conviction that only education could bring it about (Kahhalah, 1979.Vol.2, pp.128-129).

On the whole, therefore, Islamic modernism of the Mashriq and the related reforms that occurred in the first two decades of the 20th century continued to emerge from the cooperative effort of a mixed intelligentsia (men and women) within the framework of Islamic reformism, and remained much more populist than previously thought. Simultaneously, Islamic feminism was highly visible and vigorous both during the last two decades of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century.⁶⁷

1.2. In the Maghrib

In the Maghrib, Morocco took the lead of reformism within *al-Salafiyya* framework of modernism. According to al-Jabiri (1984a) the first decade of the 20th century reforms were mainly motivated by the urgency for military improvement (the cause of defeat of Algeria) and economic reforms to curb the spread of European goods in Morocco (pp.14-15). Al-Jabiri records the role of the reformists residing in Tanja in elaborating a memorandum for Sultan Abdal Aziz, and the Moroccan intelligentsia around 3 issues. First, a system of representation that refuses the European nations' demands and reforms (p.19). Second, the constitution of a modern military, and the financing of all reforms through *Ahbas* (*pl.Hubus/Waqf*) after their re-organization (p.20). Third, the provision of government projects that "emulate Japan and its renaissance accomplishments" (p.20). This way, al-Jabiri argues, the question of reforms became in Morocco a modernity issue with a nationalist orientation (p.20).

However, the country's nationalist and developmental aspirations were soon aborted when Sultan Abdal-Hafid signed the French Protectorate in 1912. Immediately after, al-Jabiri notes, a secret group named "*al-Wahda wa al-Taqaddum*" [unity and progress] was formed in Fès and built close ties "with similar other groups in the Ottoman Empire" (p.21). Since then, al-Jabiri observes, *al-Salafiyya* turned into a counter-cultural and developmental program against the Westernization of the Arab-Islamic society, and mobilized for the maintenance of the Arab-Islamic pattern of development and modernity style in the Maghrib (p.22).

⁶⁶ Nabawiyya Musa's book is the very first book written by a Muslim woman feminist on women and labor in the Arab-Islamic society; carrying the legacy of Fawwaz, and preceding al-Haddad (1927) by seven years.

⁶⁷ This data, rectifies Badran & Cooke (1990) who assert that "In the Arab world, the period from 1860 to the early 1920s witnessed the evolution of "invisible feminism" (p.xviii). For further detail on feminism in Egypt between the two revolutions of 1881 and 1919 see al-Subki (1968).

In fact, al-Jabiri observes, a popular revolution, known as Al-Hafidiyya Revolution, had erupted in contestation to the state's capitulation to France, leading to the deposition the sultan from the Throne (p.24). As a result, the following decades of the 20th century were marked by tensions between the community and the state. For example, *al-Salafiyya* mobilized in the Rif Revolution (1921-27) under the leadership of Abdelkrim al-Khattabi in Northern Morocco. This revolution marks a turning point in the history of *al-Salafiyya* because it transformed the movement from an elitist movement of the '*ulama* into a populist socio-political movement with an unprecedented influence "not achieved even in the countries of Muhammad Abduh, and Jamal-Al-Din" (Al-Jabiri, 1984a, p. 29).

Furthermore, al-Manuni (1973) argues, *al-Salafiyya* led an Arabization movement of the whole Maghrib during this period as epitomized in the Spanish zone nationalist group in Tetouan throughout 1923-1937 (p.24). Under the leadership of Abdeslam Benouna, this group not only built an independent Arabic school, but also built political coalitions with similar populist nationalist Arab movement in the Mashriq (p.25). However, *al-Salafiyya's* philosophy of governance founded on *Islam'Uruba* triggered the mobilization of the Christian minority in the Mashriq, and fuelled the old regional divisions between the Mashriq and the Maghrib on questions of ideology and policy. This led to the emergence of two distinct regional schools of thought in the Arab-Islamic society in the early 1920s. The Maghrib School covering Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, and The Mashriq School which started in Syria in 1923 and extended to Lebanon and Iraq (p.26). By and large, the Maghrib school of thought, faithful to Islamic reformism and based on *al-Tawhid*, enforced the interplay between the religious and the civil orders in political and cultural governance. For example, Morocco continued through al-Qarawiyyin to formulate Islamic adaptionism following Abduh's style of Islamic modernism. With the same purpose, Tunisia founded the Sadiqiyya School, and Libya the Al-Sanussiyya school. In contrast, the Mashriq school of thought, focused on the separation between the religious and civil orders, and advocated the secularization of the Arab society through changes in education.

Nonetheless, the polarization at the regional level did not necessarily induce a uniform policy of reforms within the Maghrib or the Mashriq, nor within the countries that constitute each region. In both regions the reforms continued to be shaped by the interlap between the movements of *al-Salafiyya* and Western liberalism. However, the degree of influence of either movement and its respective articulation of reform and gender inclusion at the procedural level in both the Mashriq and the Maghrib remained largely contingent upon the political

situation and the relationship between the state and the community within the nations of each region. This meant, a greater diversity in reforms at the national level during the middle decades than otherwise estimated in the literature.

2. Implications for the Middle Decades (1920-50)

2.1. In the Maghrib

Norma Salem (1984) describes how Tunisia adhered to *al-Salafiyya's* ideological framework of both nationalism and modernism during the 1920-30 decade. To illustrate, she discusses Tunisia's conflicting discourses of gender between Habib Bourguiba (1929) and Tahir al-Haddad (1930). Although a graduate of the French College Carnot, Habib Bourguiba was active in the néo-Destour which clearly adopted the veil as a symbol of resistance (p.150). First, she notes, Bourguiba articulated his discourse on gender along his party line in his article "Le Voile" for the paper l'Étendard Tunisien in 1929, and gained a wide support (p.150). Second, Salem situates Bourguiba's discourse on gender as drawing both from the Wahhabi Movement's philosophy at the core or the Liberation movements headed by Morocco, and from the nationalist movement in the Mashriq headed by Egypt and promoted by Mustapha Kamil. She summarizes the nature of Bourguiba's nationalism in the 1920s and 1930 as follows:

This type of nationalism held that conservatism in the social realm would prevent the disunity of Tunisians (or Egyptian) identity. Only by maintaining that distinctly non-Western identity could Tunisian (or Egyptian) nationalists promote the independence of the country (p. 151).

In contrast, Norma Salem observes, Tahir al-Haddad, who was a graduate of al-Zaytuna Mosque/University, wrote Imra'atuna fi al-Shari'a wa al-Mujtama' (1930) [Our Woman in the law and in Society] calling for unveiling, and caused an immediate opposition (p.180). Yet, Salem points out, al-Haddad's vigorous opposition was not caused by his reform proposals. After all al-Haddad's reforms in Imara'atuna were essentially gradualist and conformed to the Liberal policy of his time. For example, his main emphasis on education rather than the suffrage movement was based on the fact that both men and women under the French Protectorate lacked suffrage (al-Haddad, 1930,p.64). Moreover, al-Haddad's advocacy of education for citizenship was based on an essentialist rationale in conformity with the liberal movement of his time that focused on enhanced motherhood: "By her nature, the woman is the mother, the wife and the home-maker" (p.206). Further, al-Haddad's egalitarianism in Imra'atuna was confined to "legalistic Islam" as evident in his expansion of

Abduh's legal reforms on the status of women in Islam without expanding on "Social Islam" or "political Islam" already started by both his forefathers (al-Tahtawi and 'Abudh) and foremothers (Fawwaz and Zayn al-Din). In short, the opposition concerned his call for unveiling, which was anachronistic with the general position of the nationalist movement in the Maghrib at the time.

The case of Morocco in the 1930s further clarifies why the veil was so important politically for *al-Salafiyya*. As of the 1930s the French imposed Le Dahir Berbère in Morocco. Essentially, this *dahir* was a decree whereby the French put the Berbers under the French state's authority, hence creating for the Berbers a new loyalty to an external Christian power that replace their previous loyalty to the Arab-Islamic state. Immediately after, the Berbers and the Arabs mobilized their revolution by adopting Islam as a symbol of national unity and aborted the French attempt (al-Jabiri, 1984a. pp.52-53).

At the same time, the 1930s inaugurated divisions among *al-Salafiyya's* nationalist movements in terms of ideology and policy, leading to the emergence of two trends within Islamic adaptionism. One conservative trend headed by Said Hajji (1930-1942) focused on creativity within *al-Salafiyya's* Arab-Islamic intellectual *tariqua* (trend). And a liberal trend⁶⁸ led by Allal al-Fassi (1937-1946) and affiliated with the liberal trend of *al-Salafiyya* in Egypt. According to al-Jabiri (1984a) Hajji's adaptionism, despite its conservatism, was the most influential in the 1930-40 decade because it addressed the issue of under-development from the roots. Also, Hajji called for citizenship education to regenerate a modern Muslim Moroccan society capable of competing with developed societies (p.56). To accomplish this kind of citizenship education Hajji proposed the structural unification of the original and the new schools in the national system of education, and the appropriation of universal knowledge⁶⁹.

Unfortunately, the untimely death of Hajji (1942) halted the thrust of endogenous modernism, and strengthened al-Fassi's liberal modernism (Idem.p.56). Inevitably, this induced a wedge between Hajji's group and al-Fassi's group, which further widened when al-Fassi's group endorsed the French policy on education.⁷⁰ Essentially the French General Residence refused the unification of the educational system proposed by Hajji invoking

⁶⁸ For a critique of 'al-Fassi's liberal trend regarding *al-Salafiyya's* modernism, and political governance see al-Dawway (1984).

⁶⁹ The form of appropriation of universal knowledge through language acquisition advocated by Hajji is detailed in al-Qadiri (1978) chapter 1.

⁷⁰ For a full critique of al-Fassi and his followers' introduction of liberal education and promotion of elitism in Moroccan society see Al-Jabiri (1974).

"financial constraints" and reducing the *'ulama* involved in the educational project from 70 to 12 (Tazi,1976,p.756). As a result, the country began to witness a hierarchy between original and new schools (p.767). Soon after, social hierarchy in terms of class and culture accompanied this structural hierarchy. This became increasingly evident in the socio-economic gaps between the Arabic-trained nationals affiliated with populist nationalist groups, and the French-trained nationals affiliated with the elitist liberal intelligentsia and state officials. In fact, it was during this period that the liberal nationalist elite adopted a double standard policy on national education. Al-Jabiri (1974) elaborates: "Just as it opposed the lack of nationalism in Moroccan education, this elite sent its own children the European schools" (p.45).

By the 1950s the unresolved cultural and class issues became so critical that they dominated the news in the national press. Again, Hajji's adaptionism resurfaced in the vigorous debates on education and culture in the paper Risalat al-Maghrib. [Maghrib News] edited by Muhammad Ghazi (al-Jabiri, 1984a. p.46). Surprisingly, however, gender was excluded from these debates. Yet, the parties that had developed in the 1930s and the 1940s included many women who were educated privately at home or in *al-waqf* schools, and wives of nationalists and politicians⁷¹. Also, during the late 1940-50 decades Moroccan women extended their activism to the informal literary salons,⁷² where they were joined by their male-counterparts in the debates about the socio-political and cultural evolution of Morocco.

In addition, the late 1940s brought the formalization of the educational system, and had two important consequences for social change. First, formalization to the integration of original educational schools in a modernized structure. Second, it induced an increased secularization of the fields of knowledge.⁷³ Gradually, Morocco witnessed a class and gender mobility and a cultural diversity. In terms of gender, the integration of the original and the modernized structure of formal education strengthened women's access to formal higher education as evident in al-Qarawiyyin Institute for girls established in 1949 (Tazi,1976. p.767). Equally, the secularization of fields of knowledge at the procedural level of education brought fundamental changes in the socialization of both genders. This new socialization

⁷¹ My mother, Khadija al-Idrissi (1925-1974) was among the Moroccan women educated in *al-waqf* schools. Also, she was vigorously engaged in the nationalist movement with wives of politicians in the 1940s and the 1950s, namely with the group of Sala (Salé) later headed by Fatima Hassar, and the group of Fès later headed by Malika al-Fassi.

⁷² When I was growing up, my mother and aunts used to rave about the literary salon hosted in the house of Basha Hassar in our hometown Sala. There, women across classes shared their poetry and essay productions, and discussed women's issues (i.e. education, work, family planning, and political participation).

⁷³ For a discussion of the secularization of fields of knowledge during this period, see a) Tazi, 1976, b) Salimi (1985).

allowed the new generation of educated Moroccan women to carve for themselves new career possibilities.

Such was the case of Khnata Benouna. Although not known as a feminist in the Moroccan literature, Khnata Benouna was the first woman to found an Arabic woman's periodical in Morocco in the 1960s; inspiring many feminists of later generations⁷⁴. Furthermore, she wrote a novel Li-Yasquta al-Samt (1964) [Let silence fall] in which she not only restored women's role in Moroccan history by documenting Moroccan pioneer women that influenced her, but also reactivated women's claims for egalitarianism in the future of Morocco's political and intellectual life. This reveals that Moroccan women's contributions to the reforms in the Middle decades of the 20th century remain unchronicled. This also shows the complete silence in the literature about the role of Maghribi women in sustaining a gendered perspective in mainstream Maghribi culture. Such a silence is damaging to Arab-Islamic feminism as a whole because it reinforces the mistaken belief that feminism in the Maghrib emerged only after the liberal socio-economic changes of the 1960s⁷⁵, or following in the wave of international feminism of the 1970s promoted by the United Nations' Decades for Women.

2.2. In the Mashriq

Similar developments occurred in Mashriq of the 1920-30 decade. In some countries Islamic modernism *sustained the polarization between al-Salafiyya and Liberalism*, while in others it sustained the evolution of Islamic reformism. For instance, in Egypt where liberalism was clearly orchestrated by state officials, it led to the polarization between the state and the community on gender discourse. As of the 1920s the male-led state co-opted women's previous struggles for equity. As a result, even the women affiliated with the state's official feminism questioned their loyalty to the state. At the organizational level, Huda Sha'rawi, not only convened her upper-class friends at her home in 1922 and founded al-Ittihad al-Nisa'i al-Misri (the Egyptian Feminist Union), but she also led an Egyptian women's delegation to an International Women's Conference in Rome in 1923 (Ahmed, 1984, p.119).

Soon after, the Sha'rawi-led Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) began to reproduce European feminist ideology and terminology. Since French was the dominant language of EFU, its members reproduced the French feminine/feminist dichotomy in their discourse of

⁷⁴ Khnata Benouna set a trend for women's periodicals in Morocco which was followed in the 1970s and the 1980s by other women namely in Thamiyya Mayyu (Eighth of May) and Kalima (A Word).

gender. At first, this reproduction occurred when the members of EFU used the term feminist through their meetings (Badran & Cooke, 1990. Introduction). Then, the replication of Western feminist ideology and terminology grew steadily after the official backing of al-Wafd to the EFU monthly *l'Égyptienne* and lasted over two decades. As Zeidan (1995) aptly observed: "Only in 1937 did the union find it proper to publish its Arabic Language organ al-Misriyyah" (p.48). In doing so, the EFU hijacked women's Islamic feminism, just as the Wafd party hijacked Islamic nationalism⁷⁶.

Conversely, Labibah Ahmad, who was linked with conservative nationalists, spent most of her time in 1923 recruiting women from the popular quarters of Cairo against the British, and founded the monthly al-Nahdah al-Nisa'iyya (Khalifah, 1973, p.65). This journal became the organ of Jam'iyyat Nahdat al-Sayyidat al-Misriyyat (the Association of the Egyptian Women's Awakening) which later "closely associated with the religious political party of the Muslim Brethren" (Zeidan, Op.cit,p.48). Likewise, Tafidah 'Allam launched her monthly Ummahat al-Mustaqbal (Mothers of the Future) which counteracted the Wafd publication by "defending the policy of Ismail Sidqi who was then the archenemy of the Wafd" (p.48).

This context of cultural and political polarization facilitated the emergence of a radical Islamic modernism, *al-ussuliyya al-Islamiyya*/Islamic fundamentalism⁷⁷. Led by Hassan al Bannah, Islamic fundamentalism surfaced with *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Brothers) in 1928 as a resistance movement to Islamic adaptionism's secular reading of Islam and its Westernized vision of governance. Fazlur Rahman (1966) explains how Islamic fundamentalism of this period specifically subscribed to Wahhabism and was geared both to the safeguard, and the advocacy of the Islamic worldview of development and reforms. He showed that this activist movement promoted reforms within the Islamic style of modernity, and in so doing it challenged both the conservatism of the *'ulama*, and the authority of

⁷⁵ Margot Badran (1988) makes this assertion about the Maghribi women's feminism and scholarship and links it to the oil explorations in the Gulf area (pp.87-88).

⁷⁶ This situates the polarization between women on gender discourse in the mid-1920s and after the UFU *l'Égyptienne*. As such, this challenges Ahmed's (1992) assertion that the polarization discourse was encapsulated in Nasif's and Sha'rawi's feminist discourse in the first two decade of the 20th century. For perspective on Islamic nationalism and its epistemological implications for cultural production in the Arab-Islamic society as a whole, consult al-Jabiri (1981; 1984b; 1986).

⁷⁷ I use the terminology *al-Ussuliyya al-Islamiyya*/Islamic fundamentalism as defined in item 15 in the glossary.

westernized liberal reforms imposed by state officials. In short, Rahman highlights the fundamentalists' adherence to *al-Salafiyya* philosophy of modernism⁷⁸.

In my view, the fundamentalists reflect a hybridity between *al-Salafiyya al-Qadima*, and *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida*. This hybridity is encapsulated in their vision of society and program. At the economic level, the Muslim Brothers, like *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* saw the adoption of Western style governments as a vehicle for the perpetuation of class differences and structural inequalities between Egyptians⁷⁹. At the political level, the Muslim Brothers like 'Abduh were concerned with Western imperialism and viewed the importation of Western styles of political and cultural governance as tools of domination.⁸⁰ For both these reasons the Muslim Brothers vigorously opposed the state's Western liberal orientation in the government and in political parties.

However, at the intellectual and cultural level, the Muslim Brothers adhered completely to *al-Salafiyya al-Qadima's* philosophy. Their vision of a reformed Arab-Islamic society was past-oriented as reflected in their call for the return to the Qur'an and the Shari'a as the only sources of socio-political and cultural governance. This stance reflects a radical deviation from the Arab-Islamic pattern of development and social change (*al-Tawhid*), which sustains a balance between the religious and the secular in political and cultural renewal. Also, this stance signals the Muslim Brothers' hegemony and disregard for *ijtihad*⁸¹ as a dual practice in the Arab-Islamic tradition: intellectual creativity, and socio-political deliberation (*shura*) between people. Instead, the Muslim Brothers promoted reform programs that rigidly reflect "legal Islam", and encouraged intolerance for diversity and secularization even within the Islamic worldview.

Finally, unlike *al-Salafiyya al-Jadida* members the Muslim Brothers had a relaxed position about the veil in their gender discourse and programs. This position is not surprising, considering that in the 1930s women of different religious affiliations in the Arab-Islamic society invariably practiced the veil as a national dress code⁸² Thus, the continuity of the veil

⁷⁸ For details on relationship between the fundamentalists of this period and *al-Salafiyya*, see Rahman (1966), especially pp.23-39. Also, this corroborates al-Jabiri's (1989c) identification of *al-Salafiyya* as a pluralist movement with many political affiliations from the left to the right.

⁷⁹ For details on these structural inequalities see Ahmed (1992, p. 193).

⁸⁰ For critical feminist analyses of the Egyptian Westernized style of government as tools of domination compare Ahmed (1992), and al-Ghazali (1995).

⁸¹ For details on *ijtihad*, see item 12 in the glossary.

⁸² Woodsmall (1936) reports that in the 1930s Christian women from conservative Egyptian towns were not only veiled, but they also wore the "habera", the traditional Egyptian garment (pp.53-54). Similarly, she notes, Syrian women of Aleppo, Hamah and Damascus wore the veil in order "to avoid being conspicuous" (pp.50-51).

as a symbol of national Islamic identity in the 1930s Mashriq puts into perspective the nature of social change, and the corollary controversy and vigorous opposition to women's unveiling.

As the case of Lebanon illustrates, the acceptance or refusal of gender discourse, even when situated outside the West/Islam dichotomy depended largely on the treatment of the veil. When Muhammad Jamil Bayhum published his book al-Mar'ah fi al-Tarikh was al-Shara'i (1921) [Women in History and laws], he gained instant popularity because he avoided the veil altogether, and focused on the evolution of Muslim women from the historical and the legalistic view of Islam (Tarabishi, 1980. p.82). In contrast, when Nazirah Zayn al-Din wrote her book Al-Sufur wa al-Hijab (1928) [Unveiling and the Veil] she was met with immediate controversy and acrimonious public debates that reached the international scene⁸³ because she placed the veil at the centre of her gender discourse, and she viewed unveiling as key to women's socio-political change.

Significantly, Zayn al-Din advocated unveiling as an instrument against patriarchal abuse both Western and Islamic, and not as a symbol of cultural identity. She accused both Western colonialists and local state officials of using the veil as a weapon to prevent women from participating in the socio-political evolution of their nations. Zayn al-Din's ideological shift in her treatment of the veil issue had progressive regressive implications. In nationalistic terms, her advocacy for unveiling was unacceptable by the liberation movements because it was anachronistic with the general nationalist movements' policy the 1930s Mashriq that used the veil as a symbol of cultural and national identity.

In feminist terms, however, Zayn al-Din extended the debate on gender in Islam, initiated by her predecessors Fawwaz, and Nasif by relying on an Islamic rationale in her advocacy for women's right to participate in politics and take part in the Lebanese elections. First, she drew on the role of women in politics in the history of the Islamic *Ummah*, invoking women's *bay'a* (allegiance) to the prophet upon his conquest of Mecca (Zeidan, 1995, pp.396-397). In doing so, Zayn al-Din expanded on Muslim women's agency in history, politics, and society. Second, Zayn al-Din used an Islamic methodology in her discourse of gender in Islam. She relied on the primary sources of Islam: The Qur'an and the *hadith* in her own interpretation of the veil both to expose men manipulation of the sources in the exploitation of women, and to call for unveiling. Zayn al-Din (1928) argued that the veil has no basis in

⁸³ Zeidan (1995) lists the international journals about Zayn al-Din's work such as al-Nisr (Brooklyn); al-Sai'h (New York), Mir'at al-Gharb; al-Shams (U.S.A); al-Rafiq (Mexico); al-Khawatir (Mexico) Also, he cites reviews of her book in Jaridat al-Ittihad al-Lubnani (Buenos Aires), Fatat Lubnan (Sao Paulo) al-'Adl (Rio de Janeiro), Abu al-Hawl (Sao Paulo) and al-Zaman (Buenos Aires). (p.288).

Islamic teachings, but is an inherited custom from pagan times. Not only did she accuse the *mufasssirun* (interpreters) of arrogance and misuse of science, but she also exhorted women to use *'aql* (reason) in interpreting the sources (p.225). In fact, Zayn al-Din called for a *feminine ijtihad* that disregard of the efforts of the Medieval *'ulama*. She argued that the *'ulama's ijtihad* was never complete in the first place, and therefore the re-interpretation of the authentic *Sunna* in a new light, and in view of the new discoveries achieved in all fields of knowledge are necessary (Idem.p. 214). In brief, Zayn al-Din extended the progressive debate on gender in Islam *in scientific terms* rather than on nationalistic terms. In doing so, Zayn al-Din expanded on the political and scientific legacies of her foremothers in the *Sunni* tradition of Islam and its misogyny.⁸⁴ Equally, Zayn al-Din (1929) expanded on the feminist advocacy for women's political participation and articulations of gender against neo-patriarchy in the early 20th century. As such, Zayn al-Din represents a role model for many generations of Muslim women scholars and feminists alike in their discourses on gender in the 20th Arab-Islamic society.⁸⁵

Ironically, Egypt considered the cradle of Arab-Islamic feminism was lapsing into further radicalism the mid-1930s. This was manifested in the coexistence of Islamic fundamentalism and two new extremist secular movements: The Communist party and The Young Misr.⁸⁶ While these movements challenged both the state hegemonic mainstream parties' view of modern Arab-Islamic society and the Muslim Brothers', neither one of them offered acceptable alternatives for an egalitarian society for they replicated secular socialist and communist European models. Moreover, these new secular movements were as paternalistic in their styles as the Islamists⁸⁷ in the 1940s in that they attempted to recruit women's groups in their respective agendas, rather than constructed a new egalitarian society based on gender equity and participation.

With the perception of the Islamists' style as a more authoritative alternative to the Western style of modernity, the secularization process under way seemed unjustified,

⁸⁴ In the history of *Sunni* Islam, the political legacy of 'Aicha is essential and cannot be ignored by women scholars. After all, 'Aicha was a vigorous and vocal political opponent of the fourth caliph, 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, and a key participant in the first Islamic civil war. Equally, 'Aicha left a scientific legacy in the interpretation of the *hadith* and *fiqh* for both genders. For an informative discussion of 'Aicha as the legitimate governor (*khalifa*) to the prophet. For an interesting discussion of the legacy of 'Aicha and its interpretation in both the *Sunni* and *Shi'a* traditions of Islam, see Spellberg (1994).

⁸⁵ Zayn al-Din has probably inspired Bint al Shati's writing on women's rights in Islam, which followed only a few years later in Egypt (see References). Also, Zayn al-Din's work is frequently translated by contemporary feminist scholars (i.e. al-Hibri, 1982; Badran and Cooke 1990; Zeidan, 1995).

⁸⁶ For more details on the communist and the Young Misr groups see Ahmed (1992, p.192).

⁸⁷ I deliberately use the terminology Islamist here instead of fundamentalist to mark the change in the philosophy and political orientation from *'Usuliyya* linked with Wahhabism into a radical political movement even against progressive Islamic thinking in the 1940s.

especially that part of the Arab-Islamic lands were still colonized and struggling for independence (Palestine under British rule, and Algeria under French rule). Soon, the tacit social approval of an Islamist style of modernism led Egyptian society to accuse the adaptationist/nationalists of cultural acculturation, and the state of being an instrument of promotion of European interests. In turn, this strengthened The Muslim Brothers movement in the late 1940s and their new discourse on gender. This discourse engaged more into detailed criticisms of women's status in Islamic society than actual analyses of women's conditions per se.

Refusing to be "pawned" by either the liberal state or men's political and cultural projects, Egyptian women pursued their independent feminist and scientific struggles within the legacy of their foremothers. In this manner, women produced gender discourses that were both nationalist and egalitarian. For instance, the vocal Islamist activist Zaynab al-Ghazali started her independent women's association The Muslim Women's Association in 1936. Not only did al-Ghazali refuse to incorporate her association in the Muslim Brothers' Movement, but when she was ordered by the Egyptian government to dissolve her association, she "contested in court and won" (Ahmed, 1992, p. 197). Similarly, the conservative 'Aicha Abd Al-Rahman, (1913-1998), best known by her pseudonym *Bint al-Shati'*, took up the issue of class and gender articulating her attack on both the religious and secular patriarchies. First, *Bint al-Shati'* counteracted the Islamists' patriarchy and discourse on gender by writing biographies exclusively on early Muslim women and their agency in society. These biographies included the mother, wives, and daughters of the Prophet, as well as women of letters such as Sukayna Bint al-Husayn and al-Khansa' (Kahhalah, 1977. p.335). Second, *Bint al-Shati'* counteracted the secularists' patriarchy and discourse on gender when she wrote two significant books criticizing the Egyptian peasantry: Al-Rif al-Misri (1936) [the Egyptian Countryside] and Qadiyyat al-Fallah (1938) [The Peasant's Question] (Idem, p. 336).

Although not identifying herself as a "feminist"⁸⁸, *Bint al-Shati'* relentlessly advocated equity for women and the need for their socio-political and scientific recognition. In fact, under her guidance and participation the first political party exclusively for women, al-Hizb al-Nisa'i al-Qawmi [the national Feminist Party] was founded in 1942. This party included

⁸⁸ *Bint al-Shati'* refused to identify herself as a feminist because she was against some Muslim women's emulation of the Western liberal feminist oppositional thinking. Instead, she promoted "the complementary of genders" in agency for both genders as a more culturally appropriate strategy to advocate and achieve egalitarianism in the Arab-Islamic society. For the author's critique of contemporary Arab women's literature see *Bint al-Shati'* 1961. For the author's definition of the Islamic view of women's liberation details, see *Bint al-Shati'* (1967).

among its members Duriyya Shafik, then the protégée of *Bit al-Shati'*, and was headed Fatmah Ni'mat Rashid. While quickly dissolved under the Islamists' pressure, this party paved the way for Duriyya Shafik in 1945 to found her monthly Bint al-Nil and transform it into a union, The Bint al-Nil Union in 1948, and into a political party in 1951, Hizb Bint al-Nil [The Nile's Daughter's party] (Khamis, 1978, p.87). In short, until the 1950s social change in Egypt continued to be shaped by the hybridity between various movements in the country. This hybridity sustained diversity in reforms, and maintained interaction between generations of women scholars feminist and non-feminist alike.

Nonetheless, the diversity in women's struggle for equity, though noticed, did not bear fruits because the nationalists were involved in the general political crisis over the creation of Israel in 1948, and the Suez Canal situation. This situation brought the emergence of a radical Islamic adaptionism in Egypt during the 1950s and the 1960s with a drastic ideological shift from liberalism to socialism as a more equitable system. Time was ripe for a cultural revolution (Nassirism). Nassir's era (1950-64) brought the nationalization of industry and the land reforms, and the democratization of opportunities in terms of class and gender. The nationalization project brought the state's institutionalization of egalitarianism between citizens, and thus a new age for women. The manifestations of this new age first transpired in education, health, and later the government.

In the educational sector, Nassir not only made the formal primary education free, co-educational, and compulsory by decree in 1952, but he also declared education free at all levels in 1953. In fact, Nassir set up a financial assistance program based on merit and excellence to those in need, and even opened employment venues for university graduates (Khalifah, 1973,p.125) In the health sector, Nassir initiated an official program of population control, and free family clinics in 1955 (Belhachmi, 1987c, p.5). Finally, at the government level Nassir appointed in 1957 two women in the national Assembly, and one woman as a minister of social Affairs in 1962. However, Nassir's regime was lacking on several counts. First, at the political level, Nassir replicated socialist totalitarianism when he banned all political parties in 1953. Equally, he incorporated the women's movements in the state machinery, thus women were incorporated in the male voice and feminism lost its momentum. Second, at the socio-economic level, Nassir's socialist program contained double standards in its socio-economic policy.⁸⁹ Third, at the intellectual level, Nassir ignored the renewal the Islamic pattern of *al-Tawhid* in the political and cultural governance of Egypt, and instead he

duplicated the socialist countries' scientific patterns of development. For this reason, the Family law was only slightly reformed during Nassir's regime. Combined, these factors led once again to the community's contestation of the state's exogenous⁹⁰ style of modernity and its moral authority. Al-Jabiri (1989c) argues that this period marks the rebirth of contemporary *al-Salafiyya* as evident in this movement ideological and scientific shift which focused both on "the fundamentals" of the Arab-Islamic civilization on solid ground, and launched a total reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic society and its Institutions (p.29). Nonetheless, the cultural and political manifestations of contemporary *al-Salafiyya* became articulate only the mid-1970s and more vigorously in the 1980s.

3. The Normalization Decades (1960s-1990s)

The 1960s were a period of normalization in the sense that all countries in the region invariably settled for the liberal style of governance promoted by Islamic adaptionism. Even the most conservative nations engaged in the secularization of their societies as manifested in constitutional, monetary, international, and educational laws (Shibli, 1986.p. 47). However, this selective process of secularization engendered mutations within the existing institutions, and induced numerous distortions in socio-political and cultural governance. Nasif Nassar (1985) aptly shows that the dichotomies encapsulated in the Arab-Islamic constitutions clearly indicate lasting tensions between discourse on, and practice of modernity. Equally, he demonstrated how these constitutions reflect the position and varying agendas of mainstream political parties and scholars alike on gender, and they epitomize a systemic tyranny and oppression of women. The conservative constitutions (the Gulf States), Nassar asserts, view women as having two main functions in society: the biological function and some educational function tied to motherhood. The progressive constitutions (Algeria, Syria, Tunisia Libya, South Yemen) add four more functions, the economic, political, social, and cultural, and view these functions as pre-requisite to equality between men and women as well as to establishing "a new society". The conforming constitutions (Egypt, and Morocco), though concerned with all the above functions, give priority to motherhood, and marriage in compliance with the general principles of the Shari'a (pp.5-25).

By the mid-1960s, Islamic adaptionism was clearly problematic and far from conducive to the self-reliance of the Arab-Islamic society. In response to this situation, the

⁸⁹ For details see Ahmed (1992), especially pp. 204-205.

⁹⁰ According to the definition of "exogenous" in item 14 in the glossary, when I use the terminology "exogenous", I mean external to the Arab-Islamic society as a body, and outside its independent pattern of development and system of thought.

Mashriq countries formulated a contemporary version of Arab Nationalism and Islamic modernism in revolutionary terms. Internally, the revolution was prompted by *al-Nakba* (the loss of Palestine, and the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel), and the related regression of democracy and human rights in Syria. Externally, the revolution was sustained by the cultural exchanges between the Arab world and communist countries.

For the Maghrib, the response was different. By and large, the fragile independent states ushered their countries into a phase of planned dependency on the West in the economic domain, and a corollary de-facto one party system in the political domain; except for Morocco. This meant the deterioration of the social domain and the increase of paternalism by state officials towards women. Even Tunisia, the most progressive Arab-Muslim country, regressed in terms of women's rights. As Norma Salem (1984) aptly noted, the same Habib Bourguiba who promulgated upon independence (1956) the most progressive Personal Code in the Arab world proclaimed women "equal but different" in the mid-1960s (p.157).

By the 1970s the state-imposed Islamic adaptionism in the Mashriq and the Maghrib alike became: "Involved in apologetics and often sterile arguments, so the general tone shifted from intellectual activism and rationalism to a rather vague historical romanticism." (Vol , 1982,p. 154). This romanticism contrasted sharply with the harsh social reality, especially following the state's generalized *siyyassat infitah* (open-door policy) to Western, and Arab oil economic investments. While this policy benefited the professional elite and some emigrants to oil producing countries, it also sustained cultural duality and the state's apathy in the public sector as evident in the worsening life conditions of the majority in terms of employment, housing, health services, etc. Further, the regionalization in the world economy that emerged in the late 1970s contributed to the economic crisis of the Arab-Islamic society and endured until the 1980s. For example, The European Economic Community (EEC) limited considerably the Maghrib's exports to Europe. In adjusting to this new economic situation, the state created new national priorities, hence repealing the feminist programs previously incorporated in the global national development programs.

Faced with economic dependency, scarcity of social programs, and discontinuity of the Arab-Islamic heritage the late 1970's transpired as a period of turmoil, and self-assessment. This opened a new era marked by two trends: Islamic activism, and internal post-modernist reforms. Ghalyun (1988) discusses both trends in the context of Arab-Islamic society. First, he situates the resurgence of Islamic activism reflected in the social formations within the Iranian Revolution (1979) style throughout the Arab-Islamic world (i.e. Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and

Morocco) as the resurgence of class and power struggle between people of this region for equity in socio-political governance. He puts into perspective the significance of the Iranian Revolution for the Arab-Islamic society as follows:

The Iranian Revolution is not just a Wahhabi revolution⁹¹ that reaches its goals by invoking authentic identity old or modern. The religious exploitation did not breed the socio-political exploitation; but it appeared itself as a guarantee to the latter, practiced by an acculturated class with foreign links. The Iranian revolution, therefore, like all revolutions in history, is a social revolution against the ruling class, which holds monopoly of the means of civilization, science, progress and life. (pp.63-64)

Second, Ghalyun situates the Iranian Revolution style as a cultural revolution with a specific post-modernist orientation. For the Arabs, he argues, the enduring ideological power of this revolution resides in the restoration of "Islam as a framework for understanding and articulating social change", and in "the recapture of Islamic style of political empowerment and mobilization of the marginalized classes" (p.63). However, Ghalyun laments the Islamists' authoritarian style and its uncanny resemblance with liberal, Marxist and socialist styles (p.63). Nevertheless, the Islamists have become in many Arab countries important pressure groups for democracy since the mid-1970s. In their view, real democracy is not limited to mere representation and participation, but extends to formal opposition and contestation.⁹² From this standpoint, one can understand why the Islamists today represent an integral part of the democratization process in many Arab-Islamic countries.

In addition, the Islamists' economic and social services to the community⁹³ led to their wide and a popular acceptance as communal counter-program against state hegemonic and elitist reforms in many Arab-Muslim countries since the mid-1970s. Thus, despite their authoritarian style and reactionary methods, the Islamists have become in many countries in the Arab-Islamic world popular tools of civil disobedience, and real devices of coercion against their authoritarian states. As the feminist Norma Salem (1984) aptly observed Tunisia has consistently failed to provide social equality both under socialist and liberal regimes, and only after the bloody Islamist demonstrations in Qafsah in 1979, did the state call for "a multi-

⁹¹ Ghalyun clearly shows the renewed ideological affiliation of the Islamists' with Wahhabism, and their revival of *al-Salafiyya's* philosophy of Islamic modernism in the mid 1970s. On the one hand this corroborates al-Jabiri's work (1981;1984b; 1986; 1989c) on the continuous dynamism of *al-Salafiyya* in the history of the Arab-Islamic society both modern (19th century) and contemporary. On the other hand, this indicates that some Islamist movements are constituted of conservative *al-Salafiyya* groups. For details on *al-Salafiyya* groups see item 29 of the glossary. Also for further details on the changes experienced by the Islamists' movements in the 20th century see item 15 in the glossary.

⁹² For details of the Islamists' notion and practice of democracy as opposition and contestation, see Esposito & Piscatori (1991).

⁹³ For details on the Islamists' economic and social programs that benefited the whole community see Al-Guindi (1981).

party political system" (p.158.) Perhaps this is why the sociologist al-Tahir Labib (1992) also views the Islamists' movements as an essential post-totalitarian transition towards more elaborate endogenous democratic systems⁹⁴ in the Arab-Islamic world.

Equally, I argue, the lasting significance of the Islamists movements in the Arab-Islamic society resides in its ideological force and ability to engender political national unity, and cultural integrity under Islam where all previous movements have failed; except for Islamic reformism. It is precisely for this reason that the Islamists' inspired other progressive forces such as contemporary Islamic revivalism⁹⁵ (Hanafi, 1989, al-Jabiri, 1989b&c; 'Amara, 1993) and its articulations of post-modernist societal projects. Al-Jabiri (1989b) argues that the whole the purpose of Islamic revivalism is to re-capture *al-Tawhid* (unity) in the political and cultural governance of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society. First, he explains, this unity would not only launch a contemporary Arab-Islamic *Nahda* (Renaissance), but it would also yield to a re-articulation of an alternative relationship between the citizen and the state, between culture and politics, and between culture and religion (p.72). Second, al-Jabiri discusses the meaning of unity for the contemporary state. At the ideological level, he points out, the unity entails that the state makes a radical change of paradigm by reconceptualizing government in terms of reconciliation between the religious and the secular. At the procedural level, he notes, this requires that the state engage in a dialogue with the Islamists and the nationalists in view of their integration in government policy. He elaborates:

The first step lies in finding the common ground between the nationalist thought and the Islamist thought. This requires the Islamists' knowledge of contemporary universal thought. Without this common ground, there is no possible constructive dialogue or any achievement of complementarity between the national and religious federations. (p. 74)

Last but not least, even progressive Arab-Muslim feminists (i.e. Dallal al-Bizri, 1988) call for a dialogue between the feminists and the Islamists since both share many of the same concerns. Clearly, Islamic revivalism offers a "third orientation" in governance founded on the balance between the spiritual and material orders of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society. In fact, this third orientation translated into an intellectual regeneration in the mid-1970s as manifested in the secularized scientific mode of production⁹⁶ in the social sciences; including feminist knowledge. As a result, the Arab-Islamic society witnessed a considerable increase in

⁹⁴ On the Islamists' endogenous style of democracy, and their struggle against totalitarianism consult Labib (1992).

⁹⁵ For a definition of contemporary Islamic revivalism see item 30 in the glossary.

⁹⁶ I use the expression the mode production, and mode of scientific knowledge as defined in item 16 in the glossary.

the feminine voice within feminist knowledge since the late 1970s as manifested in the work of Dallal al-Bizri and Fahmia Sharaf-al-Din (Lebanon), Fatma Youssef al-Ali (Kuwait), Fawzia Shalabi (Libya), Samar al-Attar (Syria) Fatima Ibrahim (Sudan) 'Alia al-Dajani (Palestine), Raja'-Abou Ghazala and Leila al-Tahir (Jordan), Raoufa Hassan Shawki (Yemen), Salwa al-Nakkash, Suheir Lutfi, Samia Kamal, Nawal al-Sa'dawi (Egypt), 'Aicha Belarbi, Malika al-Balghiti, Fatima al-Mernissi, and Zoubida Bourhil (Morocco).

In fact, the secularized scientific mode of knowledge production led by women gained more visibility when Nawal al-Sa'dawi (Egypt) and Fatima Mernissi (Morocco) scientific production were gaining international recognition during the 1970-1990 period. This situates Egypt and Morocco as leading Arab-Islamic societies on contemporary discourse on women from women's scientific mode, women's epistemology, and women's voice. Equally, this highlights the double historicity of women's involvement in the production of scientific knowledge at the macro-micro levels both at the national and regional levels of the Arab-Islamic society. This places the 1970-1990 period as a period of fluctuation in the modes of production of knowledge at the macro level in the socio-intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic society as a whole, and as a period of particular power struggle "within the economy of symbolic exchanges" (Bourdieu, 1990) at the micro level of scientific practice between a mixed intelligentsia (both genders) competing for legitimacy and authority.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the Arab-Islamic culture has a distinct pattern of development which it sustained over centuries by relying on educational institutions both as agencies for self-renewal, and as instruments of accommodation and adaptation to change. Equally, this chapter showed, that contrary to common belief the European liberalism and its models of development were not uniformly adhered to by all the countries that constitute the Arab-Islamic society. In fact, many of these countries were more in favor of the Japanese model⁹⁷ because it incarnated both political autonomy and cultural self-reliance.

In addition, this chapter has shown that Morocco and Egypt have consistently played a key role in the renewal of this distinct pattern of development, and in its modernization throughout the 13-century socio-intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic society. For this reason, both Egypt and Morocco have managed, despite colonization and liberalism, to

⁹⁷ The Japanese model not only continued to be a source of inspiration throughout the 20th century, but it also led to the formation of new cultural relations and exchange with Japan since the mid-1970s. For details see a) al-Jabiri (1984a, 1989c), b) Sharabi (1988).

maintain a unique structural set-up in education (formal/informal), and a flexible delivery system of learning (religious/secular) in the socialization of their people. In fact, the formal/informal structure of socio-political, and cultural organization not only enabled Morocco and Egypt to sustain a relative cultural integrity at the national and regional levels (the Arab-Islamic world), but also to integrate women in mainstream culture and scientific productions.

What this means is that women's involvement in science and mainstream culture was a cyclical phenomenon in the Arab-Islamic society and history, but not always visible. The visibility, or lack thereof, of women in the socio-intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic culture depended largely on two main factors: (a) The specific adjustments that each country within the Arab-Islamic world had to make to the dominant socio-political and intellectual movements it encountered over time. (b) The progressive or regressive attitude of the elite class holding power in the government at a given moment in history. This situates the liberal age and the feminist age as cumulative phases in the history of women's struggle for political and cultural recognition in the Arab-Islamic culture. Equally, this establishes women's systemic relation to feminism and feminist scholarship in the Arab-Islamic culture as follows: (a) It shows the continuity in women's struggle for socio-political recognition and participation in mainstream culture and scientific productions, (b) It establishes the link with the one century old women-led feminist scientific legacy existing in the Arab-Islamic culture in a historical continuum, (c) It places al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode of the 1970-90 period as an integral part of the global struggle of women for equity in the Arab-Islamic culture at the macro level, and their struggle in the power-structure at the micro level of scientific practice in contemporary Arab-Islamic society.

Yet, the place of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode of feminist research in the contemporary power structure of scientific practice of the Arab-Islamic society is understudied, and the exploration of this mode's discourse on gender remains under-researched. As a result, the assessment of this scientific mode's contribution to the Arab-Islamic social sciences, and to feminist science is still unclear. This thesis is an attempt to fill in these two gaps. Chapter II problematizes the feminine scientific mode of feminist research represented by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. It also proposes a model of analysis to situate this mode in the power structure of scientific practice of the Arab-Islamic society as well as analytical strategies to examine this mode's discourse on gender.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMATIZING THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC FEMININE

MODE OF ARAB-ISLAMIC FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE

1. Statement of The Problem

The question of women's feminist productions of scientific knowledge in the contemporary Arab-Islamic world is complex and raises two fundamental and interlapping issues: the historical process of women's involvement in science, and in feminism within the Arab-Islamic society. To answer these two issues adequately, it is imperative to engage in a thorough inquiry of the status of science and its evolution in the 20th century Arab-Islamic education and society prior to investigating women's participating in it. This type of inquiry is essential for two reasons:

1. To avoid complicity with Western discourses of domination and their related inscription of the study of women and feminism within the dominating/dominated boundaries that continue to mark the literature on the Arab world, even in the 1990s¹. In short, to reject reinscribing feminist research in the region within the dichotomous West/Islam paradigm of investigation and analysis.

2. To avoid re-inscribing women in the Arab-Islamic meta-narratives of male feminism because this feminism confines women within a value-hierarchical paradigm², and reinscribes gender discourse in the region within cultural relativism.

Instead, this inquiry investigates the double history of macro-micro structures involved in the process women's production and construction of scientific feminist research, and provides a periodization of these structures in the 20th century Arab-Islamic education and society. This periodization is essential because it discloses the systemic relation women have with the general socio-political and intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic society. Also, this periodization illustrates the mutations in women's systemic relations with the power structure of education and scientific practice over time. Ultimately, this type of analysis is critical for two reasons:

1. To highlight the scientific shifts experienced by the educational system during the 20th century, and the way/s these shifts led to the integration of feminist research in academia and shaped the approaches of feminist research within the social sciences.

¹ For instance, Ahmed (1992) asserts that feminist research by women in Arab-Islamic culture in a context of duality, which inscribed women's issues into a recognized narrative on women that reflects the Islam/West duality. (pp.150-151). In doing so, Ahmed makes the context of duality the starting point of her exploration of gender discourse in Arab-Islamic society.

² In chapter 1 and Appendix II, I illustrated how the hierarchical structure that differentiates between people in terms of both class and gender is systemic to the evolution of the Arab-Islamic education. I also traced this value-hierarchical paradigm to the structure of scientific practice in education to the Middle Ages set by the *'ulama*. This way, I situated the patriarchal manipulation/s of the Arab-Islamic education and its socio-pedagogical practices in history. Equally, I traced the *'ulama*'s muting process of women's voice in the region to the (4th/10th century).

2. To describe the way/s several male elites manipulated these scientific shifts to sustain the subordination of women within the power structure of scientific practice, and that of social organization in the Arab-Islamic society.

2. The Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose of the thesis is to examine the process involved in the production and construction of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminist knowledge in its systemic relation to the Arab-Islamic education and society during the 1970-90 period. The aim is twofold. First, to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to the power structure of scientific practice in education, and in society during the 1970-1990 period. Second, to examine and evaluate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research in view of the power structure that governs scientific practice in education and society during the 1970-90 period.

Accordingly, I engage in a critical, reflexive epistemological analysis³ of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research. Equally, I evaluate the contribution/s of the authors' scientific mode to the social advancement of women, and to the social sciences of the contemporary Arab-Islamic education and culture. The diagnosis centers on the organic relationship between structure and construction involved in the production of feminist knowledge. I focus on the process of research production as crucial both in determining the construction of knowledge (interpretation), and in shaping al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's narratives (written accounts) as producers of knowledge (mediation and transmission). In this manner, I attempt to capture the epistemological foundations of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's presentation, and representation of Arab-Muslim women's social reality and needs. The components of this epistemological analysis are: what constitutes the substance of this research as knowledge, how this knowledge is constituted at the conceptual categorical level, for whom, and how the contextual meanings and experiences of Arab-Muslim women are articulated by the authors.

Ultimately, the thesis highlights the interlap between process and practice involved in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode, and how that dual process shapes the authors' articulation of gender in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. With this double focus on process and practice, I show al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist discourse as an objectification of the Arab-Islamic social reality. By the same token, I discuss the exclusion/inclusion in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist discourse. In this manner, the thesis illustrates

how communication and co-optation⁴ of knowledge are exerted within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine mode, and I examine the way both shape the authors' respective egalitarian societal project for the contemporary Arab-Islamic society.

3. Justification

The thesis examines feminist research within the feminine mode as a double process of construction and transmission. Significant in this process, are the social forms of consciousness and their construction both at the level of lived reality of the people investigated in the conduct of research, and at the level of the researcher's account of that reality through representation and objectification. The double process of construction and transmission contained within feminist research reveals a hidden, and powerful pedagogical dimension in need of scholarly exploration. The pedagogical dimension resides in the latent "emancipatory pedagogy" (consciousness raising, and social transformation), or "oppressive pedagogy" (demagogy and hegemony) implicit in scholars' narratives (accounts). From this pedagogical perspective, I contend, feminist research is a deliberate intervention in peoples' subjectivities and identities. As such, feminist research is "a social action" that pertains to people's self and social knowledge in a particular context, and within a set of particular power relations and socio-political experiences.

Being so, feminist research is inherently an educational activity where "knowing" is pivotal. First "knowing" is targeted to an audience as "knowers" and involves their consciousness raising, and ideally the transformation of their lives. Second, "knowing" involves the researchers as "knowers" and entails a constant revision and assessment of their values, theories, and methodologies in knowledge production. In view of the importance of the educational and communication dimensions contained in feminist research, I argue, feminist research needs to be examined as a pedagogical activity involving a double movement of construction and transmission (researcher/researched, researcher/audience).

On these educational and pedagogical grounds, the mode of production within which feminist scholars "process" feminist knowledge, and their representation of women's self and social reality becomes crucial. Not only does the mode of production form the feminists' discourses, but it also informs their content (what is legitimized as knowledge and what is not). In this sense, the analysis of the mode of production allows the researcher to capture how

³ I say "epistemological analysis" based on the definition of "epistemology" in item 18 of the glossary.

⁴ I use the terminology co-optation in the thesis as defined in item 20 in the glossary.

scientific theory and method in feminist research contribute directly to what is recognized as knowledge, who produces it, and where the research fits in the process of knowledge production and legitimation.

Accordingly, I contend, the existence of women's narratives on gender within society in itself is not an evidence or a guarantee for decentering hegemonic histories and subjectivities. What is immensely significant is the way/s these narratives are understood, located, and disseminated in knowledge production. Concerned with the interdependent relationship between theory, history, and struggle against dominance and oppression in knowledge production in education and society, I argue, it is high time to demystify the construction and production of Arab-Islamic feminist research by women and their related narratives on gender. This task involves what Lather (1991) calls: "An emancipatory way of validating critical research...and catalytic validity... as a model that acts on the desire of people to gain self-understanding and self-determination both in research and daily life" (p.ix). One emancipatory way, in my view, is reflexivity on the mode of production within which feminist research is "processed". This reflexivity is crucial as it helps the researcher to identify the exclusionary practices at the core of the cognitive representation of the researchers who practice feminist research.

4. Methodology

4.1 Data Collection: Scope and Limitations

The approach I have adopted is a documentary analysis of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research from the 1970s to the 1990s. I have selected these two authors for four reasons. First, these authors are the proponents of a contemporary scientific feminine mode of feminist research in Arab-Islamic culture, which began in the early 1970s. As such, this feminine mode holds a potential influence on the present and future of Arab Muslim women. Second, this scientific feminine mode represents a gendered perspective of two most influential ideological trends in knowledge production in Arab-Islamic culture in the 1970s: al-Sa'dawi represents a Marxist trend, and Mernissi represents a liberal trend. As such, the feminine mode may contain aspects of gender otherwise not treated by male-scholars within the same political and ideological affiliations. Third, these two authors are translated into various languages. Accordingly, their work is a form of cultural exchange because they disseminate images of both men and women from the Arab-Islamic culture and society.

As such, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research is both formative and informative. It is formative because the knowledge the authors produce affects Arab-Muslim women's self/social consciousness. Equally, the authors' knowledge is formative for the general Arab-Islamic public because it provides a gendered perspective on society, and in doing so, this knowledge influences the representation of social reality in mainstream culture. It is informative, because the knowledge these authors produce may cover areas otherwise not dealt with by men in their portrayals of Arab-Islamic culture or women. It may identify many areas of feminist intervention to achieve equality between genders. Simultaneously, the authors' knowledge is informative because it projects the authors' outlook on their own society and culture. Thus, this knowledge represents not only a testimony to the authors' relationship with their own culture, but also their attitude towards their society. Therefore, whether al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's vision of Arab-Islamic culture, and their representations of Arab-Muslim women's social reality are adequate, complete, and ethical become highly significant.

I have focused only on the non-fiction genre by al-Sa'dawi⁵ and Mernissi during the 1970-1990 period. This focus is suitable for two reasons: (a) It allows me to examine the work of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi within the same genre of writing. (b) It enables me to engage directly the authors' feminist agenda usually more explicit than in the fictional work, which often resorts to other skills of representation of women's reality (dreams, metaphors etc.). Furthermore, I have selected from the non-fictional writings of the author's theoretical and empirical works.⁶ This way, I ensure a thorough coverage of the range of the authors' feminist consciousness and activism, and I attempt to include the issues most recurrent in both varieties of their feminist research

I have analyzed al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's works chronologically for four reasons. (a) To unpack the tensions contained within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode over time in order to show how these tensions directly contribute to the distortions of Arab-Islamic culture and of women's social reality. (b) To explore the continuity or discontinuity of the issues al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi raise in order to assess the evolution in these authors' feminist thought and consciousness in the last two decades (c) to describe the egalitarian projects al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi offer for women in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. (d) To explore the possible contours of the future for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist agendas

⁵ See Appendix IV. B. Also in chapter 4, I explain in detail why I have selected this genre in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's work, and what this genre means for the author's respective woman's standpoint.

⁶ For details see 'sampling al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's discourse of femininity' in chapter IV.

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⁵ See Appendix IV. B. Also in chapter 4, I explain in detail why I have selected this genre in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's work, and what this genre means for the author's respective woman's standpoint.

⁶ For details see 'sampling al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's discourse of femininity' in chapter IV.

action. The implications of this new notion for education and society are considerable and multiple. First, the notion of "rapport to knowledge" refers to the appropriation of fields of knowledge within a process or an activity in which the subject is an active participant. Second, this notion includes the social interactions involved in the appropriation of knowledge, linking the "knowing" process of individuals to their community. Third, this notion contains pedagogical dimensions in that "the knower/s" communicate with other potential "knowers". Beillerot et al. (1989) capture the utility of notion of "rapport to knowledge as follows: "le rapport au savoir peut devenir une notion centrale pour comprendre les relations entre individus-sociétés, individus-groupes, en situation d'éducation et d'apprentissage" (p.10).

Furthermore, the notion of "rapport to knowledge" is inextricably linked with a culturally specific system of education and its socio-pedagogical practices. As such, this notion in education: "élargit alors la question qui traverse toutes les sciences sociales des rapports de la théorie et de la pratique" (Beillerot, 1989, p.198). Equally, this notion captures the knower's autonomous investments and practices in knowledge production and his/her uses of knowledge to exert power and influence in society at large. In brief, the notion of "rapport to knowledge" yields to a new understanding of the underlying socio-pedagogical practices specific to a culture, and allows a reflexive analysis of that culture's attributes⁸ in knowledge production and scientific practices in education and society. In Beillerot terms: "Tel serait le programme d'une auto réflexion, si l'on est capable de proposer l'analyse des soubassements des pratiques sociales pédagogiques, qui assure la confluence de l'individu et du groupe, de l'histoire et de l'Histoire au lieu [sic] et place d'une division sociale" (p.199).

Last but not least, the notion of "rapport to knowledge" is particularly powerful as a methodological instrument to understand women's scientific productions in education and society. Mosconi (1989) describes how the socio-pedagogical practices of the European education and society have produced specific socio-cultural "rapport to knowledge" for women's in Europe, and inhibited their equality in scientific productions in education and society. Overall, therefore, the notion of "rapport to knowledge" refers to the underlying process of knowledge production specific to a society, and suggests the cumulative effect of individuals to the process of knowledge production in that society's culture. As such, this notion is extremely useful to understand the evolution in the individual and collective consciousness specific to a culture in the world community.

⁸ For a summary of a culture's attributes in knowledge production and scientific practice, see item 28 in the glossary.

Informed by this approach to education, society, and culture I offer a new way of examining and understanding the dynamics of feminist research as a pedagogical activity in the contemporary Arab-Islamic education and society. From this angle too, I explore the socio-cultural specificity of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's "rapport to knowledge" in Arab-Islamic education and society, and I examine the underlying epistemological foundations of their feminist knowledge. In other words, I explore al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist knowledge as a discursive site of struggle in the socio-scientific disciplines produced in the Arab-Islamic education and society.

4.2.2. The Thesis Model

According to the above rationale, I have adopted a feminist proactive theoretical stance that maintains the link between feminist history, science, and education in society. From this three-fold approach, I highlight the relationship between feminist scientific knowledge, and the political role feminist science may play in social change. Also, on this basis, I have designed an holistic model that examines gender from a new political sociology, and a new scientific paradigm. Such a model emphasizes the organic relation between the elements involved in socio-cultural production in their integrity, without falling into essentialism. Equally, the model breaks away from both cultural ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, by offering a framework for the analysis of gender in culture that is both culture-grounded and open-ended.

The model draws selectively from Pierre Bourdieu's reflexive sociology (1992), Dorothy Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge (1990a, b), and Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990). I have combined these three approaches to knowledge in the construction of my theoretical framework for the following reasons: (a) these approaches deal with the various stages involved in the construction and production of knowledge in culture, namely interpretation, communication, and dissemination, (b) they highlight the role of the researcher as key in the process of knowledge construction and production, (c) they emphasize scientific inquiry as an ethical and a political activity strongly involved in conflicts over knowledge, resources, and power struggles both inside and outside education, (d) they underscore scientific method as inescapably linked with the researcher's theory.

However, while these three approaches focus on theory as a determining factor in the conduct and the findings of research, they differ tremendously as to the power they concede to theory. As a result, the explanations regarding the researcher's position in the process of

knowledge production and therefore his/her agency or determinism in the construction of knowledge vary greatly from one approach to another. Consequently, I have borrowed from each approach only what it can contribute to the explanation of knowledge construction and production by women in culture. To suit the nature and the context of the problem under study, I have produced a qualitative model that captures the stages involved the production and construction of Arab-Islamic feminist research within the feminine scientific mode.

Accordingly, the first level relies exclusively on Bourdieu's reflexive sociology. Not only does this sociology disclose the relationship between individual and collective history involved in the construction of knowledge, but it also provides the researcher with a theoretical approach, "une praxéologie sociale" to describe the logic of social reproduction contained within the production of knowledge in culture. Bourdieu's praxeology starts by situating knowledge production within a political economy, and shows the interlap between knowledge production (structure) and construction (representation). It highlights the political dimension in knowledge production by underscoring the corespondance between "les différents champs, et les principales visions et divisions que les agents leur appliquent" (p. 20). In the light of the economy of social practice, Bourdieu emphasizes institutionalization as a form of communication, and discloses the arbitrary limits of naming (la nomination) contained within institutional knowledge. Thus, Bourdieu highlights institutional knowledge as a form of communication which obstructs "la totalité des rapports de force qui est présente, quoiqu'à l'état invisible, dans l'échange" (Bourdieu, 1992,p. 118).

Furthermore, Bourdieu proposes intellectual history as a critical approach to account for the totality of communication in knowledge, and as an intellectual tool to explain the social use of culture as a symbolic domination often hidden behind "science". In Bourdieu's terms:

Le sens et l'efficacité sociale des messages ne sont déterminés qu'à l'intérieur d'un champ déterminé...lui-même pris dans un réseau de relations hiérarchiques avec d'autres champs. Sans une compréhension de la structure complète des relations objectives qui définissent les positions dans ce champ, des formes spécifiques de censure que chacune implique, sans une connaissance des trajectoires et des dispositions linguistiques de ceux qui occupent ces positions, il est impossible d'expliquer pleinement les processus de communication. (Idem, pp. 124-125)

In fact, Bourdieu situates patriarchy as the oldest form of institutionnalized domination in cultural production:

Une institution qui a été inscrite pendant des millénaires dans l'objectivité des structures sociales et dans la subjectivité des structures mentales, de telle sorte que

l'analyse a toutes les chances d'utiliser comme instruments de connaissance des catégories de perception ou de pensée qu'elle devrait traiter comme des objets de connaissance. (Idem, p. 145)

Thus, Bourdieu contextualizes masculine domination in the cognitive space as well as he focuses on "la modalité doxique du discours". By doing so, Bourdieu highlights masculine domination in the representation of social reality, as a process of: "une somatisation progressive des relations de domination sexuelle" (Idem, p.147), which imposes its pre-determined social construction and ensures its reproduction in knowledge production. At the same time, he emphasizes "l'asymétrie des statuts assignés à chacun des sexes dans l'économie des échanges symboliques" (Idem.p.148). Ultimately, Bourdieu underscores the social construction of scientific discourse. He captures not only the process of acquisition of scientific discourse (appropriation), but also the way this discourse is recuperated by dominant institutions in culture.

Bourdieu bases his "analyse praxéologique" on the notion of field (le champ), as an integrative principle to examine the process of scientific practice in culture. In Bourdieu's terms:

Un champ peut être défini comme un réseau, ou une configuration de relations objectives entre les positions. Ces positions sont définies objectivement dans leur existence et dans les déterminations qu'elles imposent à leurs occupants, agents ou institutions, par leur situation (situs) actuelle et potentielle dans la structure de la distribution des différentes espèces de pouvoir (ou de capital) dont la possession commande l'accès aux profits spécifiques qui sont en jeu dans le champ, et, du même coup, par leurs relations objectives aux autres positions (domination, subordination, homologie, etc.). (Idem, p. 73)

By Bourdieu's definition, the usage of the field is twofold: first, he allows the researcher to think relationally, that is, to explore any field of knowledge in its systemic relationship with other fields competing in the production of knowledge. Second, he enables the researcher to analyze a field of knowledge separately, that is, to investigate a field of knowledge as an independent network with its own logic. Wacquant (1992) captures the notion of field in his introduction to Bourdieu's work as follows:

Chaque champ sous le capitalisme moderne prescrit ses valeurs particulières et possède ses propres principes de régulation. Ces principes définissent les limites d'un espace socialement structuré dans lequel les agents luttent en fonction de la position qu'ils occupent dans cet espace, soit pour en changer, soit pour en conserver les frontières et la configuration". ("Présentation" p. 24)

In summary, Bourdieu proposes three phases of analysis to understand and explains the logic of a field in scientific practice:

Premièrement, on doit analyser la position du champ par rapport au champ du pouvoir...Deuxièmement, on doit établir la structure objective des relations entre les positions occupées par les agents ou les institutions qui sont en concurrence dans le champ. Troisièmement, on doit analyser les habitus des agents, les différents systèmes de dispositions qu'ils ont acquis à travers l'intériorisation d'un type déterminé de conditions sociales et économiques et qui trouvent dans une trajectoire définie à l'intérieur du champ considéré une occasion plus au moins favorable de s'actualiser. (p. 80)

Figure I outlines the contribution of Bourdieu's praxeology to the explanation of patriarchal domination and its impact on women's agency and determinism in the production of knowledge.

Figure I. Bourdieu's Analyse Praxéologique. (1992)

Tasks	Instrumentation
A) Describing the logic of cultural reproduction in knowledge construction: the macro-analysis.	1. Intellectual history of the production of scientific knowledge in culture. ----- 1.a. Contextualizing patriarchy as the oldest institution of symbolic domination in knowledge production. ----- 1.b. Describing the effects of patriarchy on the social construction of scientific discourse.
B) Problematizing patriarchal subordination of women in knowledge construction: the microanalysis.	1. Positioning the institutions and agents in the field of feminist research. ----- 1.a. Linking the field of feminist research to power. ----- 1.b. Describing the personal history of women researchers and their investment in knowledge production. ----- 1.c. Describing the "habitus" of the agents involved in the field.

Still, while Bourdieu's praxeology is extremely useful as a theoretical stance in capturing the researcher's process of production of objectified knowledge, and the internalization process behind it, it merely problematizes patriarchal subordination of women in knowledge production. As such, Bourdieu's praxeology is locked within the male/female logic and fails to describe how patriarchal subordination really affects women's production of knowledge. In fact, by focusing on the logic of reproduction of masculine domination in knowledge production, Bourdieu's praxeology actually reinforces men's visibility and strips

women of any agency. For this specific reason, I select from Bourdieu's praxeology only the elements that can explain the way institutional patriarchal knowledge structures women's production of knowledge in education and society. I also retain Bourdieu's notion of "habitus" of the agents involved in the scientific field because it contains both the social and intellectual histories that constitute the personal history of scientific researchers.

Thus, I start the first level of my analysis with Bourdieu's praxeology using three phases of analysis: a) the field of knowledge and power, (b) the objective structure of the field and the position of agents and institutions involved in scientific production, (c) the habitus of the agents involved in the field. The first phase enables me to focus on the logic of patriarchal knowledge production and the way/s in which it still governs women's feminist intellectual heritage and methodology. Here, I trace the production and reproduction of patriarchal knowledge through the educational system and the way/s this system institutionalized feminist research. The second phase enables me to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's in the general objective structure of Arab-Islamic feminist research in education during the 1970-1990 period. The third phase allows me to highlight the dual social and intellectual histories contained in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's individual history and how that history may be invested in scientific research.

At this level of analysis, therefore, I position the authors in the power structure of the university and I highlight their individual scientific practices of feminist research. In short, these three phases of analysis allow me to explain the macro-micro relationship involved in the authors' production of Arab-Islamic feminist research as a field of knowledge. By the same token, they enable me to determine al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's structural and institutional position in the global power structure that governs the institutions and agents involved in the production of contemporary Arab-Islamic feminist research. Finally, they allow me to highlight the individuality of each of the authors and how that relates to their respective socio-political and intellectual history.

Ultimately, I rely on Bourdieu's praxeology to "set the stage" for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's systemic relation with education and with institutional knowledge in Arab-Islamic society. Equally, I use this praxeology to describe the underlying condition of the authors' feminist sociology of knowledge. Figure II outlines the way I apply Bourdieu's praxeology to explain patriarchal reproduction in contemporary Arab-Islamic culture and integration of feminism.

**Figure II. Applying Bourdieu's Praxeology to Describe Patriarchal
Reproduction in Culture**

Tasks	Instrumentation
A) Examining the logic of cultural reproduction in the political economy of Arab-Islamic culture: the macro-analysis.	1. Describing patriarchy as the oldest institution of symbolic domination in education, and its social division of knowledge and of scientific practice.
B) The logic of scientific production and practice in culture: the microanalysis.	1. Linking the field of knowledge to the global economy of power in education and in scientific practice.
	2. Locating the institutions and agents involved in the field.
	3. Describing the "habitus" of the agents involved in the field.

The second level of analysis relies on Dorothy Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge (1990a, b). While, like Bourdieu, Smith adheres to a sociology of knowledge that centers around "the social determinations of knowledge" (Smith, 1990b), she, from the outset, situates knowledge as a social organization, and investigates it as such:

Investigating the social organization of knowledge brings the social relations organizing power into light. If we don't examine and explicate the boundaries set by the textual realities of the relations of ruling, their invisible determinations will continue to confine us. (p. 39)

First, Smith underscores textually mediated social organization, and the phenomenon of textually mediated communication often taken for granted by researchers. In doing so, Smith highlights how "the texts themselves have a material presence and are produced in an economic and social process which is part of a political economy" (p.162). In other words, Smith emphasizes on texts as instruments of communication, and discloses their active role in "the social construction of the message or information as such" (pp. 209-210). Second, Smith focuses on women's position as inquirers both in everyday life, and in the text as a constituent part of that reality. Thus, Smith not only renders women visible in textually mediated knowledge; but also explores women's double history (social/intellectual) contained in the process of their production of feminist knowledge.

For this exploration Smith uses the woman's standpoint not as a mere feminist perspective, but as a feminist methodology. Smith (1990a) contends that the standpoint of women as a methodology is key in knowledge production because it affects the nature and the form of knowledge in a drastic way. In fact, Smith shows how the woman's standpoint recuperates women as subjects, and gives women authority and power in the production of

knowledge. In Smith's terms: "The standpoint of women is a distinct epistemic moment as it establishes a place to situate a subject as knower of a sociology that might explore how her life is put together by relations and forces that are not fully available to her experiencing" (Introduction, p. 5).

Thus, the exploration of knowledge from the woman's standpoint allows the researcher to investigate social research from a social consciousness different than the one established by patriarchy. Equally, it enables women researchers to situate their colleagues, mentors, and peer feminists in the conduct of their feminist research both theoretically and methodologically. In short, Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge allows the researcher to explore the logic of femininity⁹ in its own right by investigating the practice of this femininity in knowledge production, and by identifying the obstacles impeding its full growth in culture. Not only does Smith (1990b) underscore the forms of communication in the feminine mode, but she also explores femininity as discourse.¹⁰ In Smith's words:

To explore 'femininity' as discourse means a shift away from viewing it as a normative order, reproduced through socialization, to which somehow women are subordinated. Rather femininity is addressed as a complex of actual relations vested in texts... Social forms of consciousness, 'femininity' included, can be examined as actual practices, actual activities, taking place in real time, in real places, using definite material means and under definite material conditions. (P.163.)

Further, Smith problematizes the logic of femininity by highlighting women's dependency on the scientific method and research norms established by men. In her view, the current scientific method governing social research today "operates as a sort of conceptual imperialism...The boundaries of inquiry are thus set within the framework of what is already established" (p.16). Accordingly, Smith (1990a) explains how in deploying patriarchal scientific methods women researchers actually participate "in the relations of ruling" (p.10). And in doing so, she argues, women separate the knower from the known, and in particular the known from the knowers' interests. In short, Smith unfolds how an impaired discourse of femininity contributes to the co-optation of women's knowing by replicating patriarchal scientific methods. In fact, Smith insists, it is precisely this replication of patriarchal scientific

⁹ For a summary of a culture's attributes in knowledge production and scientific practice, see item 28 in the glossary.

¹⁰ The components of femininity as a discourse vary from one culture to another. For the components of femininity as discourse in the Arab-Islamic culture see item (22 b) in the glossary.

method that represents a major obstacle to women's "knowing" in addition to their reinforcement of universal abstract "knowledge". In Smith's words:

Knowing, of course, is always a subjective activity, that is, an activity of a particular subject. But knowing in this sense cannot be equated with perception or cognition; it always involves a social dimension, the coordination of activities among knowers vis-à-vis an object that is known in common. Moving from knowing to knowledge calls for attention to the disappearing subject. Knowing is still an act; knowledge discards the presence of the knowing subject. (Idem, p. 67)

In a nutshell, Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge enables the researcher to investigate objectified forms of knowledge produced by women, and to explain how these forms transform feminist knowledge into: "an alienated commodity produced within patriarchal capitalism as any other alienated capitalistic commodity" (Smith, 1990a, p.11). Not only does Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge enable the researcher to describe the mechanisms of dependency at the root of women's alienation from their self/social knowledge, but it also allows him/her to examine femininity as discourse and discloses its theoretical and methodological potential to respond more adequately to women's learning needs. Figure III outlines the contribution of Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge to the explanation of women's agency and determinism in the production of knowledge.

Figure III. Smith's Feminist Sociology of Knowledge (1990a, b)

Tasks	Instrumentation
A) Problematizing the logic of the discourse of femininity: the microanalysis.	1. Investigating women's textually mediated communication as a part of "textually mediated relations of ruling".
B) Analysing objectified forms of knowledge by women.	1.Exploring women's agency in texts. ----- 1.a. Highlighting women's replication of patriarchal scientific procedure in objectified knowledge. ----- 1.b Describing women's standpoint as an alternative perspective and methodology in the construction of knowledge.

Clearly, Smith takes up where Bourdieu leaves off. She explores the effects of patriarchy on women's construction of knowledge, and establishes the woman's standpoint as an alternative. Still, Smith's feminist sociology remains problematic for a cross-cultural exploration of gender for three reasons. First, this feminist sociology is still locked in the

binary logic of masculine/feminine that views knowledge production in duality. Second, Smith's woman's standpoint is grounded in the Marxist standpoint epistemology¹¹ heavily inscribed within the master/slave oppositional theory. As such, the standpoint epistemology not only theorizes scientific productions in distinctly structural terms that oppose patriarchal to feminist science, but it also promotes an oppositional scientific consciousness for women. Third, this feminist sociology, being inscribed within the woman's standpoint epistemology, also promotes an oppositional form of agency for women that is based on competition rather than on cooperation.

For these three reasons, I rely on Smith's sociology of knowledge only to describe how al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi objectify social reality, and of gender from their respective woman's standpoint. In this manner, I illustrate the way the woman's standpoint structures the authors' feminist consciousness in their respective feminist research. Figure IV summarizes the way I apply Smith's feminist sociology to highlight al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint.

Figure IV. Applying Smith's Feminist Sociology of Knowledge (1990a, b) to Highlight Women's Standpoint

Tasks	Instrumentation
Discovering women's discourses of femininity in their feminist research: the micro-analysis.	Unfolding the objectification of social reality from the woman's standpoint.

The third level of analysis relies on Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990) to delineate the whole process involved in women's construction and production of feminist knowledge. Stanley and Wise argue that a woman's standpoint, though important, represents only one stage in the process of knowledge construction and production. For them, the woman's standpoint alone is reductionist of the dynamics involved in knowledge production. In their view, human experience is "always constitutive of a lay 'first order' theorizing" (p.42) which governs the nature of any knowledge production. This first order of theorizing, they assert, makes all knowledge contextually located, and shaped by the theories and the analytical practices of the researchers who give voice to it.

¹¹ Essentially, the Marxist standpoint epistemology originates in Hegel's and Marx's thought and analyses of the relation between the slave and the master. In adhering to this epistemology Smith's feminist standpoint epistemology views the

For this reason, Stanley and Wise contend, women researchers need first to start their feminist research with a more inclusive feminist theory, as theory shapes both the structure of knowledge construction and the procedure of scientific inquiry. Second, Stanley and Wise argue, women feminists need to locate their standpoint both within the micro-politics of research production, and within the meta-narratives and ideological discourses occurring in a given time and place. For this location, they recommend that women feminists expand their definition of the category "women" in feminist research because:

"Women" is a socially and politically constructed category, the ontological basis of which lies in a set of experiences rooted in the material world. This is not to say that these experiences are the same; but rather the experience of "women" is ontologically fractured and complex because we do not all share one single material reality. (p.21)

In other words, Stanley and Wise call for an inclusive feminist research beginning with a comprehensive feminism in terms of theory, and an inclusive feminist epistemology (way of knowing) and feminist ontology (way of being) in terms of analysis. Accordingly, Stanley and Wise view the major challenge for women feminists is: "To raise major ontological and epistemological questions concerning the nature of feminist consciousness, whilst insisting that the category 'women' is socially constructed and internally fractured in ways that should be explored in depth " (p.24).

In a nutshell, Stanley and Wise call on women feminist researchers to establish a plural feminist standpoint as a site of struggle in feminist research both in the theorization of women's social reality, and in the representation of that reality. Thus, Stanley and Wise provide women researchers with a new feminist "praxis" ¹² that focuses on "the context of discovery" of feminist research within the feminine mode per se. In addition, they offer concrete analytical instruments namely methodology, method, and epistemology ¹³ to probe the feminine mode's context of discovery. In fact, Stanley and Wise suggest these analytical instruments as components of a textual analysis available for the woman researcher not only to delineate the stages within her own process of knowledge production (interpretation, communication, and dissemination), but also to capture other women researchers' feminist

woman's standpoint as more ethical and scientific than the man's, and presumes the universal slave status of oppression experienced by women.

¹² For a definition of feminist praxis by Stanley and Wise see item 23 in the glossary.

¹³ For a definition by Stanley and Wise (1990) of method, methodology and epistemology, and how I apply them in the thesis see item 24 in the glossary.

consciousness within their texts. Figure V summarizes Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology.

Figure V. Stanley and Wise's Feminist Epistemology (1990)

Tasks	Instrumentation
Exploring the context of discovery of scientific research by women: the micro-analysis.	1. Investigating women's standpoint in the whole process of knowledge production. (Interpretation, communication, and dissemination).
	1.a. Locating women's standpoint throughout the research process: method, methodology, and epistemology.
	1.b. Establishing a plural feminist praxis both in feminist theory, and societal projects.

In view of Stanley and Wise's inclusive feminist praxis and its useful analytical instruments for the process of women's construction of knowledge, I devote the third level of my analysis to the examination of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's "context of discovery" of their feminist research. Here, I problematize al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's respective woman's standpoint. First, I rely on Stanley and Wise's innovative analytical instruments (methodology, method, and epistemology) to locate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint at different stages of their construction of feminist knowledge to capture the tensions of determinism and agency contained in their respective context of discovery. Second, I use these same analytical instruments to illustrate how the context of discovery precludes al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's appropriation of an endogenous scientific discourse of femininity, and their articulation of culturally appropriate emancipatory societal projects. In brief, Stanley and Wise's new method of textual analysis allows me to illustrate how al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's accounts (narratives) contain the potential for both repression and liberation. Equally, this new style of textual analysis enables me to demonstrate whether al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's narratives include the conscientization elements likely to engender emancipatory constructions of feminist research, and to probe their capacity to empower Arab-Muslim women to build their own self-and social knowledge (the pedagogical aspect). Figure VI outlines how I apply Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990) to problematize women's standpoint.

**Figure VI. Applying Stanley and Wise's Feminist Epistemology (1990)
to Problematize Women's Standpoint**

Tasks	Instrumentation
Problematizing the woman's standpoint and its context of scientific discovery.	1. Locating the authors' woman's standpoint as a site of struggle at the levels of method, methodology and epistemology.
	2. Establishing a pluralist feminist praxis as an alternative for feminist research.

To summarize, the model I have designed for the analysis of al-Sa'dawi's and Memissi's construction and production of feminist knowledge combines Bourdieu's, Smith's, and Stanley's & Wise's interpretations in one integrated analytical apparatus. Within this analytical apparatus the three approaches constitute components of the mechanism of production and reproduction of knowledge in the feminine mode. In other words, the model is an integrated three level analytical tool within which each borrowed approach represents only one level of the analysis involved in the construction of feminist knowledge. In turn, each level of the model stands for one stage within the process of feminist knowledge production. Ultimately, the model is primarily a reflexive tool of analysis designed to capture both communication and co-optation contained in the discourse of femininity in culture. Figure VII outlines the three levels of the reflexive model needed to examine the production of feminist knowledge within the feminine mode, and sketches the stages involved in shaping this mode to capture the totality of communication involved in this type of knowledge in culture.

**Figure VII. A Reflexive Model for the Analysis of Feminist Research
Within the Feminine Mode in Culture**

Level 1. Describing Patriarchy and its Systemic political economy in Culture	
Tasks	Instrumentation
A) Examining the logic of cultural reproduction in a systemic political economy: the macro-analysis.	1. Describing neo-patriarchal domination in education, and its impact on the social division of knowledge, and of scientific practice in education and society.
B) Problematizing the logic of scientific production and practice in scientific fields: The micro-analysis.	1. Linking the field of feminist research to power in society's political economy of scientific practice inside education and outside.
	2. Locating the institutions and agents involved in the field of feminist research.
	3. Describing the personal history of scholars to unfold their scientific "habitus".
Level 2. Discovering Feminist Knowledge as a Social Organization in Culture	
Tasks	Instrumentation
Discovering scholars' discourses of femininity from feminist research: The microanalysis.	1. Unfolding the woman's standpoint as an objectification of social reality.
Level 3. Feminist Knowledge From A Plural Consciousness	
Tasks	Instrumentation
Problematizing the woman's standpoint and its context of scientific discovery.	1. Locating the authors' woman's standpoint as a site of struggle at the levels of method, methodology and epistemology.
	2. Establishing a plural feminist Praxis as an alternative for feminist research.

In chapter 3 I rely on the first level of the model (Bourdieu's "Analyse praxéologique", 1990) to identify the systemic political economy of the 20th century Arab-Islamic culture and its related patriarchal mechanisms of reproduction in society and education. There I use Bourdieu's praxeology to describe the underlying conditions of contemporary feminism in the Arab-Islamic society and education. Equally, I rely on this praxeology to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's systemic place within the institutions and agents competing in the production of feminist research in education and society during the 1970-90 period.

CHAPTER III
FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE ARAB-ISLAMIC
NEO-PATRIARCHAL SOCIAL ORDER, EDUCATION,
AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

Introduction

In this chapter I use the first level of the model (Bourdieu's praxeology) I presented in figure VII in chapter 2 to problematize patriarchy and its systemic political economy within the Arab-Islamic culture. This level of analysis focuses on the interlap between the political economy of the Arab-Islamic culture (macro level) and the scientific practice (micro level) in society and education, and highlights the way this interlap shapes knowledge production in the region.

Accordingly, in part 1 I describe the partial structural and institutional modernization adopted by the liberal state, and the way/s this modernization led to deep distortions of the Arab-Islamic educational modalities (structural organization, philosophy, policy, and practice). First, I show the way the liberal state manipulated the formal/informal organization of society to maintain a culturally specific hierarchical structure of knowledge organization and of scientific practice at the root of class and gender stratification in the Arab-Islamic society. Second, I discuss the key role of Egypt and Morocco in their struggle against this hierarchical structure, and in the reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic society's educational pattern of development before and after independence

In part 2, I examine the tensions within the Arab-Islamic neo-patriarchal social order. Here, I discuss the conflicted relation between the state and the community on cultural governance, and the resulting institutionalized duality in educational modalities at the primary, secondary and tertiary level. To illustrate, I rely on Bourdieu's notion of field (*le champ*) to show the reproduction of neo-patriarchal hierarchical order in knowledge organization at the structural, institutional, and procedural levels, and I situate feminist knowledge within this order in education and in scientific practice .

In part 3, I describe the post-modernist structural developments that occurred in Arab-Islamic society since the 1970s. Here, I first discuss the impact of these developments at the structural, institutional and procedural levels, which led to a drastic shift in the power structure of scientific practice within education, and society during the 1970-90 period. Second, I identify the structural, and institutional location of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi within the power structure of scientific practice inside and outside education during the 1970-90 period. In short, I highlight al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's systemic relation with the institutions and agents involved in the production of scientific feminist knowledge in the Arab-Islamic society.

Part I. Partial Modernization And the Struggle for Endogenous Education

The partial modernization of education dates back to the 19th century when the Arab-Islamic society experienced the dual colonialism of the Turkish, and the Europeans. However, while both colonial rules used different means to exert influence on the evolution of social change in the area,¹ they focused on the marginalization of *al-waqf* in the cultural and political governance of the region. In fact, both the Turkish and European rules were motivated by two main political objectives: (a) to disempower the Arab-Muslim majority and empower the occupying minority in government, (b) to abolish the decentralized system of governance that manages the relation between the state and the community set by the Arabs, and replace it by a centralized system headed by the occupying minority.²

Thus, the 20th century educational governance inherited the colonial *waqf-ministry* hierarchy of socio-political and cultural governance. Awareness of the hierarchical ministry-waqf legacy is critical because it reveals the internal and external dynamics that have shaped the course of education and of social change in the region.³ This puts into perspective the power relations involved in the cultural governance within Arab-Islamic society, and the significance attached by various advocacy groups to the concepts of cultural identity and authenticity in their definition of Arab-Islamic socio-political order. Equally, this reveals the corollary struggle many nationalist movements and other social groups engage in to maintain the Arab-Muslim majority in the political and cultural leadership, and the importance of reviving the distinctive Arab-Islamic tradition of knowledge seeking, and of scientific practice.⁴

By and large, the struggle for national education, and the sustenance of an endogenous learning system in the 20th century Arab-Islamic society experienced three major phases: (a) the gestation phase (1900-50); (b) the nationalization phase (1950-1975); and the evaluation phase (1975-1990). Overall, these three phases reflect a pattern of continuity in the socio-

¹ In Appendix II I describe the role of *al-waqf* in the structural and institutional organization of Arab-Islamic education. Also, I discuss the function of *al-waqf* in the organization of a knowledge delivery system. (Compare, with chapter 1 and how the Turkish and the European marginalized *al-waqf* during their rule).

² In chapter I I discuss the role of *al-waqf* in establishing an idiosyncratic pattern of socio-political and cultural development founded on the interlap between the formal and informal realms in society. Also, I show the socio-political significance of the forma/informal organization in the maintenance of a decentralized power structure between the state and the community over the 19th and 20th centuries. For a detailed discussion of the colonial legacy of organization of education and its direct contribution to the educational crisis in the Arab-Islamic society see (MQTA). Conference. *Al-Wahda* (1985).

³ Chapter I portrays in detail the Turkish hierarchical structure between *al-waqf* and the ministry, and how the European colonization exploited this hierarchy in their introduction of liberal modalities at the procedural level of knowledge dissemination within in the educational system since the last two decades of 19th century, and the 20th century.

political, and cultural reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic society. However, these phases also reflect differential moments in the political relation between the state and the community, which led to several fluctuations in the pattern of development of the education. Also, these three phases capture the dynamics involved in the Arab-Islamic society's struggle for the reconstruction of a self-reliant socio-political, and educational systems.

Awareness of the differential role of each phase in the struggle for the cultural reconstruction process, I argue, is critical to understand the extent of participation or co-optation of various segments of the population, including women, in the cultural and educational governance of contemporary Arab-Islamic society. Similarly, awareness of the role of each phase in the continuity or discontinuity of endogenous cultural renewal, and of the social groups involved in that renewal is key in grasping the degree of equality and democracy, co-optation or manipulation in cultural and gender politics.

1. The Gestation Phase

The gestation phase is the longest period in Arab-Islamic intellectual history (1900-1950). It reflects the evolution of the majority of Arab-Muslim countries from colonization to independence, their struggle for the restoration of endogenous culture, and their establishment of a national educational system. Essential in this phase is the change in the administration of education under the pressure of European colonization, namely the integration of *al-waqf* as a mere branch within the ministry of education. (Tazi, 1976; Eccel, 1984) This meant at the policy level that the Europeans placed the state's ministry as the new overall structure for cultural policy and the organization of education, restricting in the process community's vast participation in educational governance previously granted by *al-waqf*. At the procedural level this translated into a dual strategy that manifested itself in two ways: (a) At the institutional level, the Europeans discouraged the community in the upgrading of original schools in favor of the state's new government schools, (b) At the ideological intellectual level, the Europeans vigorously promoted religious learning through *waqf* institutions under the category of "sectarian education".

The transformation of *al-waqf* policy from its previous position of the overall structure of education into a mere category within sectarian education is of paramount significance. It meant for the Europeans excluding *al-waqf* from the formal realm of power, and considerably

⁴ For a full discussion of the relation between the Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice and the cultural lag in the region see al-Mahdi al-Mas'udi (1985).

limiting its influence at the informal level. In this manner, *al-waqf* was not only replaced by the ministry at the formal level, but it was also placed on equal footing with other sectarian educational policies gaining ground at the informal level as well. Nonetheless, the policy of sectarian education had different consequences for the Mashriq and the Maghrib because it varied according to the specific political conditions of each country within both these regions.

1.1. In the Mashriq

In the Mashriq the advancement of learning and attempts at dissemination of education in the period between World War I and World War II (1914-42) was largely the result of the continued promotion of sectarian schools (private) rather than government schools. Soon, *al-waqf* institutions run by the Arab-Muslim majority began to experience strenuous adjustments to the competition of foreigners and minorities, especially in countries where legacies of ethnocentrism and sectarianism run high such as Lebanon and Palestine. Matthews and Akrawi (1949) duly reported that the relatively advanced standard of education in Lebanon was largely due to: "The efforts of private and foreign schools rather than through publicly supported schools...This gave education in Lebanon a predominantly sectarian character, emphasizing sectarian differences, the remnants of which are felt to this day" (p. 399).

In Palestine, the sectarian policy of education led to dramatic consequences. In addition to the numerous private schools for the Arabs (Muslims and Christians and Jews) that were operational under the sponsorship of philanthropic organizations, Palestine's sectarianism and ethnocentrism reached such a political strain in the 1940s that the country witnessed the emergence of two distinct public educational systems (one for the Arabs and one for the Jews) (Idem, p.217). At the formal level, the change in policy from the *waqf* to the ministry translated into a simultaneous dual strategy at the level on educational institutions. On the one hand, the elimination of a large number of original schools (*kuttabs*) at the elementary and primary level, and the incorporation of the original secondary and tertiary institutions under the supervision of the ministry of education. And on the other hand, the creation of new government schools at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. This way, government schools formally replaced original public schools, and confined original education to the informal realm.

In turn, the policy change translated at the curricula level into a wide process of secularization of the programs of study at all levels of public education. As the study by Matthews and Akrawi (1949) on Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon

from 1900 to 1947 clearly illustrates, the secularization⁵ of the programs of study reflected in a substantial shrinking of the original curriculum to a few hours a week of "religious education" and Arabic language courses with some variations in Palestine and Lebanon.⁶

Higher education remained private and sectarian until the 1950s, despite the state's attempts at control in the 1930s and the 1940s. Lebanon's higher education was dispensed entirely in private foreign institutions and languages (Idem, p. 396). Syria followed the "sectarian" custom started during the French Mandate with regards to original education (Idem, p.393). In fact, it is within the sectarian policy that the Shari'a College of Damascus was founded by a body of *'ulama* in 1942, and the Islamiyah College was built in Aleppo by a Muslim society in support of a modern Islamic education "to counteract the effects of foreign schools" (Idem, p.395). Trans-Jordan followed Syrian policy of higher education, as this country was part of *the wilayya* of Damascus (Idem, p.299). And in Arab Palestine, post-secondary education was scarce as evident in the concentration of post-secondary studies in Jerusalem at the Arab College or at the Rashidiyah school.

Only Egypt provided both original and new styles of higher learning, which it had developed in the 19th century.⁷ This means not only a total absence of state-sponsored institutions at the tertiary level, but also an uneven development of sectarian institutions. Evidence of this uneven development at the regional level is documented by Matthews and Akrawi (1949) who showed how nationals of Palestine and Trans-Jordan in the 1930s and 1940s pursued higher education "in the private universities of Syria or the public/private institutions of Egypt, or in the private foreign institutions of Lebanon such as the American university of Beirut." (Idem, p. 249). Although most educational institutions at the tertiary level in the Mashriq proliferated largely with private donations of *al-waqf*, they failed to withstand the competition with other sectarian higher institutions. Moreover, the new structural situation soon translated into a double tension between the religious and the secular in the structure of knowledge within and between institutions. Within the *madrasah* the tension became apparent in the arbitrary distinction in the curricula of the 1930s between new studies "as secular studies" (*'ulum haditha*) and the original studies as "religious studies" (*'ulum diniyya*) (Eccel, 1984.p.337). According to Hayworth-Dunne (1939), this led to a

⁵ Clearly, the secularization adopted is in the Western style in that it separates the religious from the secular. (Compare with secularization in the Islamic style in item 7 of the glossary, chapter 1 and Appendix II).

⁶ For details on public education at the primary and secondary new schools in the Mashriq, see Matthews & Akrawi (1949) tables 8 and 9 for Egypt; tables 24, and 26 for Iraq; tables 54, and 55 for Trans-Jordan; tables 41 and 42 for Palestine; tables 62 and 63 for Syria; and tables 74 and 79 for Lebanon.

marked scholastic ⁸ curriculum in the *madrasah* as evident in the programs of study's exclusive attention to law and the total neglect of *cross-madhahib* studies and appropriation of new fields of knowledge that had made the greatness of Islamic education in the past.

In addition, I argue, the tension between the institutions of higher education is primarily sustained by the total absence of unification of the system of learning, and coordination between government universities that ruled over general education at the primary and secondary levels, and the private sectarian institutions of higher learning private and sectarian at the informal level. Eccel (1984) captures the formal/informal dynamics in higher education when he summarizes the tension between higher educational institutions and the power struggle involved in the control of various levels of education in Egypt of the 1930s:

When the effort to put Dar al-Ulum and the primary education system under al-Azhar developed in the twenties not only did the secular education elite oppose Azhar monitoring, but it became clear that to the extent that Azhar control extended to general education, formal government control would extend to the Azhar. And in fact this is what led some religious elites also to oppose the plan. (p. 460)

Similar socio-political tensions translated within the curricula of new universities as the programs of study literally eroded original fields of knowledge replacing them with Western ones, especially in the social sciences. As Waardenburg (1966) duly documented, during the 1930s and the 1940s, national universities' curricula followed either the French or the American patterns. The French pattern, he contends, established duality in the institutional and curricular development of Arab-Universities. He elaborates:

Étant donné que le droit dans presque tout le monde Arabe a été fortement imprégné par le Code Napoléon, les facultés Françaises de Droit avaient une importance capitale dans la vie de l'État...Ne parlons pas des Facultés des Lettres: la section française y représente tout un idéal de culture. L'ancienne École Supérieure des Lettres de Damas, et l'actuelle École Supérieure des Lettres de Beyrouth [sic] peuvent être considérées comme les moyens par excellence de 'franciser' l'esprit. (p.80)

The American pattern, Waardenburg argues, consisted more of eroding the local way of life, by infusing the educational system with "the American way of life" as evident in the American University of Beirut, and the Catholic university al-Hikma in Baghdad (p.80). However, Waardenburg observes, the American infiltration became apparent only after World

⁷ Chapter I describes the way Egypt developed both original and new schools in the 19 century.

⁸ Heyworth-Dunne's study (1939) clearly illustrates the scholastic tendency in al-Azhar education in the period between World War I and II. For details on this aspect see pp.41-84.

War II (Idem, p.80). Thus, between World War I and II, the new universities underwent, so to speak, "a formative" period where foreign influence was shaping the political and ideological orientation of "national" education.

The 1940s further exacerbated the acculturation process by the Europeans' and Americans' active engagement in the informal realm. Matthews and Akrawi (1949) underscore the involvement of the Europeans in the Mashriq's informal education, and the increased implication of the Americans as the new "partner" in the informal education of Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq after World War II. Respectively, Egypt in the 1940s had three informal educational agencies operating. The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in Cairo and Alexandria reaching a total of 3,400 in 1945-46 "conducted a vigorous educational program" (p.117). This included secretariat for young men, clubs for underprivileged boys in Cairo and Alexandria (700 members). The library rendered services for those in university such as sponsoring debates, lectures, discussion groups, and book reviews. The British Council (BC) sponsored institutes, which offered classes in subjects required by the external examination of London University, arranged lecture concerts, films for members and guests. And, The Library of the United States Information Service (USIS), established in 1945, provided a large collection of recent books for Egyptians. Educational opportunities were further supplemented by a variety of child welfare agencies with missionary tendencies like the Asyut Orphanage founded by Lillian Trashet in 1910, run with funds from the US⁹ and Egypt (Idem, p.117).

In Palestine, the first agency was the YMCA in Jerusalem with 423 public programs held in 1945 (Idem, p. 254). Classes were held in several languages namely, Arabic, French, Hebrew, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian. Also, there were matriculation classes in mathematics, physics, and chemistry, commercial subjects, short-hand, typing, and bookkeeping, lecture courses in art, and modern history, music, with classes in fundamentals of music and a chorus, tutorial classes for adults, organized by Edwin Samuel, and a school for government messengers. The BC had several institutes across Palestine. The Institute of Higher Studies of Jerusalem, also sponsored by the BC, prepared students for the London intermediate examination. Similarly, in Iraq the BC had several institutes in Baghdad, Basrah,

⁹ Arnove, (1982) argues that most foundations after WWII the Arab-Islamic world were American, namely Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations. Further, he observed, these foundations were similar the missionary schools in the pre-independence period in that both played an active role in promoting the political, ideological and economic interests of the West (the United States). In doing so, he aptly noted the philanthropic foundations prevented alternative changes and models from taking place (pp.322-23).

Mosul, and Kirkuk, "where examinations follow the University of London... and a model kindergarten has been established in Baghdad largely attended by English-speaking children" (Idem, p. 213). As to Trans-Jordan informal schools were also active through the YMCA, and the Boy Scout troops (Idem, p.321).

The cultural and educational situation led to the rise of radical nationalism under the instigation of the Arab-Muslim majority and the backing of its bourgeoisie. This gave more momentum to change in the mid 1940s. As independence was approaching, Arab nationalism found expression in the development of three policies, which endured even after independence: policies of Arabization of the curricula, on foreign schools, and on foreign languages. Again, Egypt did not need a policy of Arabization because from the outset it had kept the original system of education and the new one as parallel systems. Also, Egypt was able to coordinate the programs of original schools with the new ones. As early as 1914, Egypt replaced the *kuttabs*, with "modern schools for the memorization of the koran [sic], which offered a wider curriculum" (Idem, p.36).

These schools provided a program of 4 years sponsored by Arab-Islamic private organizations who "considered that insufficient attention is given to the study of the koran [sic] and Islam in the public elementary schools (Idem, p.37). Moreover, these private schools were free of charge as they received subsidies from a variety of sources: societies, individuals, the *Awqaf* branch of the ministry of education which administered religious foundations, local and central departments of education, and Social Affairs (Idem, p.44). The program included history, and arithmetic in addition to the Qur'an. Students who graduated usually continued in one of the institutes of al-Azhar for secondary and college education, or transferred to public schools after one or two years (Idem, p. 45).

In comparison Syria, after independence (1941) established an educational law (the law No 121 "Embodying the Organization of Public Education") and vigorously enforced it in its pursuit of national policy of education. Following this law the Syrian government eliminated in 1944 the teaching of French in the elementary and primary schools, and made provisions for a first foreign language in the first secondary year, and a second foreign language beginning with the fifth year. This way, Syria put French on an equal footing with any other foreign language in the public school system. The Syrian policy of Arabization led to the deterioration of the Franco-Syrian relationship and culminated in the French bombardment of Damascus in 1945 (Idem, p.326).

In response, the Syrians boycotted all French schools compelling them to close down. By 1945-46 the French schools were allowed to re-open only with the permission of the Syrian ministry of education. French schools were required to submit to the supervision of the ministry their syllabi, and in addition to follow the syllabi of the ministry in the teaching of Arabic language, Arab history, and geography. Moreover, the government forbid private foreign schools from receiving any assistance from foreign sources, except with the knowledge and approval of the ministry of education (Idem, p. 342). Most French schools refused to comply, and therefore remained closed. Only the few schools which complied became registered as "national schools". Ironically, this conflicting situation, led the Syrian government to establish new Arabic private schools which replaced the French schools across the country, namely in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs, Hama, and Tartus (Idem, p. 327).

Before long Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan followed suit and decided against teaching through the medium of a foreign language. This decision, aside from cultural and political solidarity with Syria and Egypt, was prompted by two other important factors. First, all these countries were basically rural, which explains the masses' disinterest in foreign languages in the villages, and hence the decision of the governments concerned (Idem, p. 563). Second, all these countries shared at the social level a high rate of bedouin population¹⁰ in desperate need for basic education in Arabic. And third, at the political and cultural levels, the feasibility of Arabization became possible with the emergence of Syria and Egypt as the leading countries of the Mashriq against Western acculturation.

1.2. In the Maghrib

At all levels the situation in the Maghrib was different. For example, in the French-led nations two trends developed through the marginalization of *al-waqf* at the primary and secondary levels. First, the original schools were transformed into antiquated "traditional schools" and foreign schools, namely "les écoles des missions culturelles" expanded as "modern schools". Second, more secular fields were introduced at the primary and secondary levels and used French as the medium of instruction. Not only did the French erode original education by marginalizing *al-waqf* at the informal level, but they also institutionalized bilingualism at the formal level of the public school system. Consequently, bilingualism

¹⁰ Most studies on education in the Arab world do not distinguish between Bedouin and rural populations. Yet these populations have different socio-economic organizations. For an interesting analysis of the bedouin and rural populations' conceptions of mixing between genders in the 1980s Arab society see Nuh (1985, p. 64).

induced a cultural discontinuity between levels of education as evident in the sharp dichotomy between general education at the primary and secondary levels, and specialized education at the tertiary level. For instance, though Libya and Tunisia managed to keep primary and secondary original schools operating, they had to rely on foreign institutions at the tertiary level.

Only Morocco preserved its original system of education parallel to the new one, and it is still operating today as "enseignement originel" at all levels of education. Nonetheless, the original system of education in Morocco did not bring the expected achievements due to the French formalization of the whole system of education and the bureaucratization of the *'ulama*. Tazi (1976) traces this formalization to the French establishment of the first Council of the *'ulama*: "*Majlis al-'Ulama*" in 1332 /1914 A.D; and a "Higher Council" under the presidency of the Sultan Moulay Youssef in Rabat and included the minister of Justice, the Minister of *Awqaf*, and the *hajib*, chancellor. (p.745) In fact, Tazi contends, the Higher Council by the Dahir (1349 H 1931) was assigned the reorganization of the teaching system¹¹, and the improvement of al-Qarawiyyin teaching methods (pp.756-57).

On the whole, throughout the European occupation the participation of the Arab-Muslim majority in the political and cultural governance of their societies remained marginal in the Mashriq and the Maghrib alike. While the Europeans promoted their new schools, they limited access to the bourgeoisie's locals as "executives" in the French-led administration. At the same time, they encouraged rudimentary education delivered in the original schools for the masses as a way of coercing them into accepting the status quo. The aim was the socialization of the nationals into internalizing "the superiority" of Western civilization and domesticating the elite into "obedient" bureaucrats for the colonizing administration.¹²

This already deplorable situation was further exacerbated by three compounding factors. First, by the reluctance of local reformists during the decades of European colonization to modernize the original institutions for fear of perpetuating foreign occupation (Tazi, 1976; Eccel, 1984). Second, the French and British-led "modern" schools totally neglected the masses and the rural areas. In most cases, the training provided in the public schools had little relevance to the local lives of the people as reflected in the curricula usually copied from Britain or France, and supplemented by some Islamic religious education and a

¹¹ . Tazi reports that the organization of knowledge led to three divisions in curricula. The primary, the secondary, and the tertiary. While the general tendency is scholastic, the tertiary level of al-Qarawiyyin is still somewhat broad based in comparison with al-Azhar's curricula in the 1930s. For details see Tazi (1976, p. 757).

few Arabic courses. (Harby, 1967,p.14). And Third, the "modern" educational systems at the time, which were modeled after 19th century European schools: "were not noted for flexibility and individuality, and instruction by rote and the memorization of accepted data soon came to characterize modern and religious schools alike." (Szylowicz, 1973,p. 448). Ultimately, the system of education was inefficient and dysfunctional. This led the population in the rural areas to lapse into illiteracy, and many people of the urban areas to drop out of school.

Ironically, it was the European sectarian policy of education that allowed the Arab-Muslim majority to keep original education alive and relatively functional in the socio-cultural life of people. Not only did this policy enable the Muslim majority to upgrade *al-waqf* schools, but also to fight back Western acculturation at the formal level in the following decades. Already, the revival of *al-waqf* schools has contributed to the increase of education in the whole area; especially in the rise of literacy rate at the elementary level. Respectively, Lebanon reached a literacy rate of (72.7%), followed by Palestine (51.6); then Egypt (47.4), Syria (39.4); Trans-Jordan (28.0); and Iraq (20.0). (Matthews et al, 1949, p. 544)

In my view, this period of high competition between sectarian schools and government schools signals the early seeds of endogenous education that paved the way for the reconstruction of higher learning institutions on a global scale in the middle decades of the 20th century. However, the creation of Israel in 1948 engendered the Israeli-Arab conflict, which drained the area's economic resources tremendously, and subsequently deferred the much-needed regeneration of endogenous education. (ALECSO, 1981a) At the same time, the challenge of Israel brought a serious questioning by the people of the region about the efficiency of their governments and institutions, leading to a new phase: that of the nationalization and de-Westernization of education.

2. The Nationalization Phase (1950-1970)

2.1. The De-Westernization Decade (1950-1960)

The first symptoms of de-Westernization in the Arab-Islamic society appeared during World War II when various community groups pressured the national movements to make serious attempts at endogenous development. (Adda'im, 1983) Unfortunately, these early attempts at endogenization of education failed for lack of institutional backing. Only when

¹² For details on the colonial policy of education and the domestication of the elite in Morocco, see Salimi (1985, chap.1)

The league of Arab States was formed by seven independent states¹³ in the mid 1940s did the Arab-Muslim majority begin to benefit from a modernized self-reliant education. Not only did these states launch and monitor the renewal of Arab-Islamic religious and scientific heritage logistically and financially, but they also participated in the founding of The United Nations in 1945 where they acted as representatives of the interests of Arab nations. Despite this institutional backing, the nationalization of the system education was late forthcoming. On the one hand these strategies transpired as short-term, mid-term (3 years), and long-term (8 years) educational plans throughout the area (Iraq in 1946, Kuwait in 1955, Sudan in 1958-59, and Tunisia in 1959-60). The focus of these plans was on quality education drawing from Arab-Islamic heritage rather than transplanting foreign models. This brought a whole revision of the teaching and learning processes with a dual emphasis. First, pursuing empirical approaches rather than theoretical ones. Second, broadening the traditional knowledge base and skills through the introduction of literacy, vocational, and life-long education as alternative approaches to the tremendous dropout and repeaters ratio of students (ALECSO, 1981b).

On the other hand, the educational plans changed into profound reforms in the mid-1950s under the pressure of a massive frustrated Arab-Muslim majority, and a powerful bourgeoisie. As a result, the 1950-60 decade marked the state's progressive process of de-Westernization and nationalization of Arab-Islamic culture that entailed a twofold educational perspective. First, the development of Arab nations through the educational system and higher institutes of learning that promote Islamic sciences and Arabic language. And second the ending of the long-standing dualism between religious and secular education through unification and coordination between original and new institutions. From this twofold educational perspective, state officials developed a societal project for implementation in the 1960s within which the primary role of schools and universities was to resume "*al-Nahda*", the cultural renaissance of Arab-Islamic society started in the 19th century. Instrumental in achieving this renaissance was the Arabization of the school system at all levels.

An immediate consequence of the profound reforms was at the structural level with the proliferation of Arabic-speaking universities such as the Lebanese University (1953); the University College of Khartoum (1951) which became later the University of Khartoum (1956); The Libyan University (1956); the University of Baghdad (1957); the University of Mohammed V in Rabat, (1959); the University of King Al-Sa'ud (1960); The University of

¹³ The countries that formed the LAS were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

Tunis (1962); the University of Jordan; (1966); and the University of Kuwait (1966) (Waardenburg, 1983, p.55). Notwithstanding, the state-planned cultural renaissance fell short due partly to the absence of an integrated educational planning that updates the Arab-Islamic epistemology¹⁴ and partly to new political developments.

The lack of educational planning reflected at the procedural level both in curricula development and in the delivery system of teaching and learning. Niqola Ziadeh (1955) lamented the absence of a modernized endogenous epistemology when he denounced the European cultural hegemony in modern universities in the 1940s and the 1950s, and the corollary deterioration of the social sciences in national universities. Ziadeh insists that the decline of endogenous sciences not only led to the decline of Arabic studies, but also to the mediocrity of learning process, which "now merely repeated the subject matter, and excluded the customary free discussion between the teacher and the learner practiced in original education of the past" (p.236).

At the procedural level, therefore, the national universities of the 1950s relied almost exclusively on the Western "know how" and blindly borrowed Western epistemology and its related scientific research methodologies and methods both in teaching and learning. It was during this period that the consolidation of the Western social sciences disciplines took place in the educational system, bringing with them Western discourses of modernity which have had lasting influence on issues pertaining to social change in general, and gender relations in particular (Belhachmi, 1983). From the 1950s onwards, the social sciences developed in national universities produced a substantial scholarship that served not only as a resource for later studies, but also as the norm for the conduct of social research (Idem, p.10). Two trends occurred after this institutionalization: an increasing dependence on formalized data at the expense of informal data, and a severe neglect of worldview and culture in the process of change (Idem, p.12). This way, Western social research patterns of analysis were institutionalized in the national educational system as evident in the newly established fields of social sciences' continual search for improvement and refinement of analysis; particularly in the use of quantitative data, and techniques (Idem, p.12).

¹⁴ Following the definition of epistemology in item 18 of the glossary, the Arab-Islamic epistemology is defined as the theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge, particularly in reference to its limits and validity. These are founded on the Islamic worldview of science in item 5 and articulated by the principle of *al-Tawhid* as defined in item 4 of the glossary. For a full discussion of the importance of an Arab-Islamic epistemology for education in the case of Morocco, see al-Jabiri (1974). For a discussion of the significance of the revival of the Arab-Islamic epistemology for the establishment of a contemporary renaissance as well as the political unity between the 21 countries that constitute the Arab-Islamic society see al-Jabiri (1981, 1986, 1989c).

As to the new political developments, they reflected in the affiliation of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria with socialism in the late 1950s. The radical shift in these countries' politics brought a profound "cultural revolution" in these countries not only disrupted the global momentum of *al-Nahda* barely started at the regional level, but also engendered diverging orientations in the socialization of citizens among the countries in the area. Consequently, the Arab-Islamic society experienced a partition into two distinct groups: the socialist-oriented countries which converged into a more radical nationalism; especially after the Syro-Egyptian Union that lasted from 1958 to 1962. And the rest of the countries which maintained a more conservative style of nationalism (Waardenburg, 1966, p. 276).

However, despite this partition, Syria and Egypt continued to play leading roles in the political and cultural life of the whole area. Not only were these two countries pioneers of the Mashriq's political and intellectual arenas, but they also exerted a tremendous political and cultural influence on the rest of Arab countries through the League of Arab States (LAS). In the Mashriq, Syria and Egypt assisted their neighboring countries politically and militarily in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as culturally by sharing the responsibility for the education of Palestinian refugees, who in the 1950s were placed under Jordan's supervision (AMIDEAST, 1966, p. 21).

Still, the Egyptian cultural assistance to its neighboring countries was much wider in scope than the Syrian due to its surplus of Arabic trained educators from al-Azhar, and Dar-al 'Ulum universities (Eccel, 1984). Thanks to these Arabic-trained educators, both Libya and Sudan could, after their independence in the 1950s, update their systems of education. For Libya, Egypt provided assistance in teachers and in training in order to replace both the non-graded Crank schools, and the Italian-led new schools (AMIDEAST, 1966, p. 39). For Sudan, where the system was literally patterned after the British system since 1924, a more profound assistance was required (Idem, p. 44). Here, Egypt established "a total of 23 schools out of which three are elementary, nineteen are preparatory, and one secondary" (Qubain, 1966, p. 200).

Moreover, in 1955-56, Cairo University opened a branch in Khartoum, which was soon followed by the Peoples' University (1957-8), literacy and an adult education center (Idem, p.200). Similarly, Egypt provided cultural assistance to Morocco and Lebanon. Immediately after the independence of Morocco, Egypt established in 1956-57 a "model" secondary school in Rabat, which was followed in 1962 by a new building for secondary

education, and a teacher-training section (Idem, p.200). In Lebanon, Alexandria University opened a branch at Beirut in 1960-61, known as the Arab University (Idem, p.200).

Unfortunately, the educational assistance of Syria and Egypt did not prove as functional as expected for three reasons. First, the cultural assistance the Maghrib was severely inhibited by the French continued control of the educational system; which until 1962 still supervised primary and secondary education, especially in Algeria, and Morocco (AMIDEAST, 1966, p.41). Second, the Mashriq's cultural assistance programs were "packaged" to the area within the socialist philosophy of education not appreciated by all, especially kingdoms. For them, such assistance was regarded with suspicion as it involved socialist propaganda and potential dangers of subversiveness of their regimes. Third, Egypt and Syria lacked an integrated global Arab-Islamic pedagogy based on *al-Tawhid*, and thus was unable to efficiently breach the gap between the original and the new institutions of education, or the religious/secular gap contained in the curricula of both institutions.

Overall, the 1950-1960 period was still short of an updated Arab-Islamic philosophy of education and a modernized endogenous epistemology. This led to an authority crisis in national education and sustained the absence of a unified educational strategy in the region. Equally, this raised the issues of legitimacy and validity of the new disciplines of the social sciences in the Arab-Islamic social reality and context.¹⁵ Consequently, the regional cultural assistance ceased, and so did the elaboration of a culturally integrated curriculum. Other simultaneous factors added to the complexity the educational situation, and became over time chronic obstacles that prevented the state-planned cultural renaissance. First, the neglect of restructuring and up grading of original education. Second, the continuing application of the outmoded European model of teaching and learning established in the 19th century within the 1960s national schools. Third, the maintenance of existing foreign structures and institutions of learning. And fourth, the persisting obstacles of Arabization in the Maghrib perpetuated the uneven progress at the regional level and sustained the endogenization gap between the Mashriq and the Maghrib. One of the causes of the Maghrib's lag in Arabization was the region's late independence. To illustrate, Algeria, which achieved independence in 1962 started the nationalization and Arabization of its educational system only in 1976 (Schmida, 1983, p.3). Combined, these factors constituted constant technical and administrative problems of adjustments, and coordination between Arab countries.

To sum up, the 1960s decade transpired as a period of cultural disequilibrium in the history of Arab-Islamic education as evidenced in the partial modernization, Arabization, unification, nationalization, and standardization. This disequilibrium was exacerbated in the 1960s by an alarming population explosion¹⁶. To the increasing number of the illiterate or semi-educated old people, the state during independence had to respond to a new generation of young people in need of basic education. (Belhachmi, 1985b, 1991) El-Ghannam (1971) attributed this demographic anarchy to the rapid increase in modern medical practices, which though have led to a drastic decline in death rates, also brought an increase in birth rates of 3% a year. (p.7) In addition, I argued (Belhachmi, 1987c) that the educational crisis of the 1960s was further exacerbated by the state's lethargy in policies and programs on family planning. Thus, not only did the state fail to curb the overwhelming quantitative demands of education, but also to elaborate "equal opportunity" policies and programs to ensure access to all at various levels of formal education (p.148). In brief, the state imposed an elitist modernization, which immersed the Arab-Islamic society into further cultural duality during the 1960-1970 decade.

2.2. The Duality decade (1960-1970)

The duality decade began in the early 1960s with the state's return to liberalism. This not only induced the integration of national educational systems within the framework of "global" economic development promoted by Western capitalism, but also focused on manpower as the educational strategy to achieve modernity. To this end, the liberal states opted for the centralization of education under the sole control of the state. Since the 1960s the state exerted through the ministry of education a direct financial control over the educational system's budget and an indirect ideological control through officials' nominations, and curricula. This profound institutional change allowed the political validation of the state as the major "stakeholder" of national education and culture. Also, this change induced the emergence of an interventionist state on matters of cultural and educational policies and practice, which dispensed with the democratic consultation of the internal political constituencies at the community level (*shura*).¹⁷

¹⁵ For a full discussion of the crisis of authority in education in the Arab world see, (MQTA). Conference. Al-Wahda. (1985, pp.80-96).

¹⁶ On the population question and its relation to education in the region during the 1960-70 decade see, UNESCO (1977).

¹⁷ For a critique of the centralization of education under the state's control and the regression of *shura* and participation of the civil society in the Arab-Islamic society see (MQTA). Conference. Al-Wahda (1985, p.96).

In so doing, the interventionist state further eroded the already waning cultural continuity, and led to an acute structural imbalance. First, the imbalance translated in the state officials' over-emphasis on formal channels of communication and the corollary devaluation of informal channels. Second, the imbalance engendered unequal institutional reforms between the formal and informal channels of communication as well as distorted reforms within formal channels. Awareness of the uneven structural evolution combined with the unequal political representation in the balance of power within each Arab-Muslim country in the 1960-70 decade are essential to understand the subsequent mutations in the power-structure of society, and the evolution, or lack thereof, of social change. In fact, both factors remain of central relevance for the negotiations of various social groups with the state on educational modalities, and on scientific practice.

Part II. The Modern Mutations in Educational Modalities

1. The Institutionalization of A Mixed Policy of Education

In the 1960-70 period the state officials elaborated conflicting ideological and procedural educational reforms by simultaneously pursuing a policy of Western liberal education, and a policy of Arabization of education through the League of Arab States (LAS). Under ALECSO's supervising authority, all Arab countries committed to the development, and implementation of an endogenous education. The goal was to establish a common Arab ground of education on the basis of a unified educational strategy in accordance with The Arab Cultural Unity Charter (ACUC) ratified by the council of the LAS in Cairo in 1964. The ACUC is spelled out by ALECSO (1981b) as:

Reaching equal educational standards [in the region] by means of coordination the educational structure and the educational levels as well as unifying the foundations of the Syllabi, curricula, textbooks, evaluation procedures, admissions requirements, certificate equivalency, teacher training and the administration of educational institutions. (p. 34)

The mandate of ALESCO was to tackle the particular educational needs of Arab-Islamic society both in terms of scope and content. The aim was the revival of Arabization not only as a linguistic issue, but also as a social, political, and cultural issue. At the core of the educational system's Arabization was an essential decision: whether to develop the Arabic language in order to translate and teach Western science in Arabic, or to promote scientific research in Arabic per se. This critical decision was further complicated by the relative

absence of scientific textbooks in the libraries of secondary institutions. Ultimately, the main contention on Arabization concerned the secondary level not only as the "cradle" for the regeneration of Arab-Islamic science, but also as the "bridge" for endogenous modern higher education.

For the hard core Arabization advocates, since language cannot be separated from the thought patterns of a culture, Arabization is the surest path to revive the Arab-Islamic civilization by updating the Arabic language through incorporation of scientific terms. In time, this will induce the development of a modern mentality among the masses. Likewise, using Arabic as a medium of instruction is an essential tool to eliminate the dependency upon foreign technology and materials, and will eventually bring the self-reliance of Arab-Islamic countries. Conversely, for the opponents of Arabization, the lack of sufficient training in foreign languages at the secondary level is the surest path for the decline of the level of education and of science, as students would be unable to follow Western scientific publications once they reach the university level. In brief, the Arabization policy involved questions such as the levels of the educational system where Arabic needs to be used as a medium of instruction; and the scope of coverage (restrict Arabic to the humanities, or expand it to all subjects, textbooks, and examinations). Similarly, Arabization required a dual strategy for a successful implementation: the expansion of curricula by introducing new courses on Arab-Islamic civilization, history, geography, and culture; and the hiring and training of Arabic teachers.

Before long, however, it became clear that the state was using Arabization as a mere political slogan at the level of rhetoric, and not as an instrument in the mobilization of the national educational institutions, nor in the conscientization of people at the level of practice. In reality, the 1960's state opted for the elaboration of a mixed policy of formal education "drawn from an amalgam of three major sources: the Islamic faith and cultural tradition, national sentiments, and Western philosophy, culture and technology."¹⁸ (ALECSO, 1981a p.6). Thus, state officials established a dual framework for educational modalities, leading to the institutionalization of a hybrid formation of formal education within Arab-Islamic culture that is neither purely traditional, nor authentically modern. Equally, state officials relied on the

¹⁸ The vagueness of this statement is typical of the liberal adaptionist governments. No specific meaning is provided for cultural tradition (folk tradition, or tradition of scholarship?). Above all, the reference to Islam as a faith only, is apologetic for the lack of creativity in Islamic sciences and implicitly justifies the corollary reliance on Western science and technology.

dual framework of education to justify conflicting procedural reforms and to sustain the hierarchical changes under way at the level of educational institutions.

2. The Adjustments of Educational Institutions

2.1. At the Primary and Secondary Level

Two main factors severely inhibited the evolution of education at the institutional level. First, serious economic constraints precluded the financing of the reconstruction of original education as well as the appropriation of adequate technical means to modernize the national system of education in an integrated whole. Second, the persisting political Palestinian-Israeli conflict and wars drained the economic resources of the Arab-Islamic world; preventing the mobilization against cultural discontinuity on a global scale. Combined, these two factors weakened the state in the region and its increased reliance on international assistance in the reconstruction of national education. Yet, the international assistance in education is a hotly contested issue in the Arab-World since the 1960s. After all, the cultural cooperation such as the American Peace corps volunteers and the French *coopérants* in the Arab-Islamic world do not promote the self-reliance of the countries they presumably assist, but rather the cultural and political interests of their respective countries.¹⁹

For this reason the nature of international cultural assistance and cooperation varied according to the weakness or strength of the country seeking cooperation, and hence affected differentially the evolution and progress of endogenous learning within the institutions of education in the Maghrib and the Mashriq alike. In the Maghrib, for example, the Moroccan State opted for Arabization of secondary education when France required an increase in the wages of its "*enseignants coopérants*". In the Mashriq, for instance, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, under Israeli military occupation since June 1967, education was scarce because "Israel does not allocate any funding to West Bank or Gaza Strip" (Schmida 1983, p. 113). The war situation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip induced this region to become heavily dependent on The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for elementary and preparatory schools as well as regional Arab cooperation for secondary and tertiary education as "resources are severely limited for secondary and post secondary education" (Idem, p.113). In

¹⁹ For a self-critique of cultural cooperation by the French and its cultural and ideological hegemony in the Francophone countries of Africa including al-Maghrib, see *al-Fikr*, 5. (1971). Also, for an internal critique of both the French *coopérants*, and the American Peace corps volunteers in the developing countries and the Arab-Islamic world in higher education see Abd al-Mawla (1985, p. 35).

turn, this situation meant constant adjustments and constraints for the countries involved in Palestinian education, straining their own progress and development.²⁰

Egypt, in addition to the UNRWA, continued to be highly influential in grounding endogenous education in Lebanon. For this purpose, *al-waqf* proved a suitable governing policy in Lebanon since education there was sectarian at all levels. In response to the Muslim majority's discontent with the system of education in Lebanon and with the backing of the Arab-Muslim bourgeoisie Egypt's cultural assistance established private Arabic primary and secondary institutions especially in the urban areas. Simultaneously, Egypt continued its wide-scope cultural assistance through teachers of Arabic for most Gulf states, which depended heavily on regional Arab cooperation for the elaboration of their educational systems at all levels in the 1960s.

However, the momentum was lost as manifested in the notable regression in the institutional accomplishments of the LAS in the 1960s. Soon the LAS meetings turned into "preparatory meetings" for the 1970s conferences, indicating the gap between the state's declared educational goals and its ability to achieve these goals. To illustrate, the standardization strategy spelled out in the 1964 Charter of cultural unity was never accomplished, but became a "subject" of debate during specialized meetings. One of these meetings was held in Cairo in 1965 to examine the curricula in the Arab World at the first two levels of general education. Another was hosted in Damascus in 1966 and addressed the specific curricula in teacher training institutes in the region. Likewise, the diversity of specialization in the secondary level of education curricula, the establishment of vocational and technical schools was tackled in the Cairo meeting of 1966 (Bashshur, 1977, p.18). And immediately after, Cairo held another regional conference to examine the ways to eradicate illiteracy in the Arab world. (ALECSO, 1981a. p.96).

Thus, the renewal of endogenous education through Arabization remained at the planning stage, and was not applied at the procedural level of educational institutions. Instead, the main focus of procedural reforms at the institutional level was on the application of the mixed policy within the curricula of formal education. This led to a drastic transformation of the process of knowledge acquisition and transmission in Arab-Islamic culture. Essentially, the mixed policy of education not only divided social reality into several dichotomies: religious/secular, urban/rural, traditional/modern, but it also reapplied these dichotomies in the

²⁰ For details on how the Palestinians' education strained the evolution of neighboring countries see Schmida (1983).

organization, and dissemination of knowledge within the curriculum. In doing so, state officials transferred the artificial separation between the formal and informal realms of communication existing at cultural level into the formal level of knowledge production.

This transfer induced the adaptationist state to deploy unequal educational strategies between the primary and secondary levels of general education, and between institutions of specialized education at the tertiary level. Evidence of these unequal strategies is manifested in the total Arabization of the curriculum at the primary level, and bilingualism at the secondary level (Bashshur, 1977,p.24). With bilingualism at the secondary level state officials not only institutionalized cultural duality within the national educational system, but they also brought a severe cultural discontinuity in the learning process between the first and second levels of general education. In turn, this discontinuity engendered a radical change in the training methods of Arab-Islamic education, shifting from a cultural approach into a technical one.

The technical approach is reflected in the 1960s programs of study and training, which focus on manpower as the only educational strategy to achieve modernity. As a result, the curricula witnessed a tremendous decrease in the subject matters derived from original Arab-Islamic culture, and an increase in Western technical courses, and foreign languages. In this fashion, the curricular changes in the 1960-70 general education largely perpetuated the European legacy of separating the religious and the secular in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, and perpetuated dependency of the national educational system on Western methods at the secondary level.²¹

At the same time, the new technical focus engendered an undue emphasis on vocational and professional training at the expense of traditional training skills (Belhachmi, 1985 c). Overall, the technical emphasis was anachronistic with the Arab context largely agricultural and rural, and whose industrial development in the 1960s 1970s was barely at its infancy stage even for the Gulf oil countries. Moreover, since vocational education monopolized the national budget, state officials severely neglected literacy programs for the rural population in dire need for basic education. Tarabishi (1985) noted that the rate of illiteracy rate has increased among the population above the age of 15 to 43 million per year in 1970 (p.54). Also, with vocational education state officials led to a serious crisis of unemployment for teachers at the secondary level, who educated in Arabic, were

²¹ For an analysis of dependency of the national systems of education on Western modernity at the secondary level see a).(MQTA). Conference. *Al-Wahda* .(1985). b) Salimi (1985, chap. 3).

automatically replaced by foreign specialists who had the language and technical skills required for teaching vocational education. (Belhachmi, 1985c, p.8)

Worse still, the technical approach adversely affected the women's population the most because women's work-force is largely composed of illiterates from the rural area, whose skills are considered "pre-industrial" by Western modern standards and unfit for the market demands (Belhachmi, 1985b; 1987d). Clearly, the technical approach to education literally removes the female population from the work-force by virtue of its "technical illiteracy". Above all, this exacerbates the illiteracy problem in the female population in the rural regions rather than providing it with options that responds to its particular needs (Belhachmi, 1987b, 1988a). Equally, this situation pressures women in the urban areas into acquiring the skills that match the Western-style modern market economy in the absence of the conditions and opportunities conducive to the access to that market. In short, the technical approach caters almost exclusively to the needs of the growing male-led "middle-class management" work force in the urban area within the "manpower logic" and its rationale of the national labor market. This not only sustains class inequality for both genders, but also the domestication of women. (Belhachmi, 1983, 1987 b, 1988a)

On the whole, the liberal state's mishandling of Arabization illustrates its severe lag in *ijtihad* (creativity) in the Arabic language as a key factor in the self-reliance of Arab-Islamic culture, and in the renewal of endogenous social sciences for national development. Simultaneously, the liberal state's choice of bilingualism, and the technical approach perpetuates the transfer of Western know-how and dependence within the national system of education.²² In turn, this dependence led the state's neglect of formative evaluation at the secondary level of education and elaboration of "soft technology" more adequate to their own development (Belhachmi, 1985.c, p.30). Two regional conferences: The Marrakech Conference (1970) and The Abu Dhabi Conference (1977) record the marginalization of formative evaluation regarding basic education for the masses, particularly women. The Marrakech Conference (1970) demonstrated that despite the stated educational opportunity offered to girls, the equality of access in secondary education is far from being a reality; especially in vocational and technical education. Likewise, The Abu-Dhabi Conference (1977) reiterated the inequality of access pertaining to girls' education at all levels.

²² For an analysis of the adverse implications of the liberal concept of manpower and of the human capital on education and society in Morocco see Salimi, J.(1985).

In light of the above, I maintain that while the national educational system claims equality between the sexes in the formal realm through compulsory schooling at the primary level, and openness in the secondary level, it also tends to institutionalize a strong class/culture segregation through language and knowledge divisions via the disciplines in educational curricula. Equally, the national educational system reinforces gender segregation through "mainstreaming", and "tracking" at the secondary level; especially through vocational education²³. As such, the educational system at the secondary level relies on an organized structure of knowledge which not only institutionalizes a systemic discrimination against women, but it also reproduces neo-patriarchal dominance in the access to, and benefits of educational and professional opportunities.

2.2. At the Tertiary Level

In the adjustment of universities the adaptationists relied exclusively on Western models both in terms of structure and content. The emulation of Western models of universities was induced by two main factors. First, it was generated at the structural level by the existing foreign universities on the Arab soil and their operation in some countries of the region for over two centuries.²⁴ As such, foreign universities played a procedural role in the Arab-Islamic society, and in the subsequent development of national modern universities in the area. Second, at the institutional level foreign universities served as "role models" for institutional emulation by newly established national universities eager to launch their own national modern higher education. As such, foreign institutions represented the norm and the standard to follow for scientific knowledge production in the 1960s. Third, at the social level, the existing social groups, educated in the Liberal tradition either through foreign universities on Arab soil or in Western universities neatly fitted the institutional and ideological development of Arab universities in the 1960s.

²³ For further details on the role of bilingualism and vocational education in the institutionalizing gender discrimination in the case of Morocco see my work (Belhachmi, 1983; 1985 b; and c)

²⁴ Waardenburg (1966) identifies the oldest institution of higher education in Lebanon as 'Ayn Waraqa founded in 1789 by the Maronite clergy. He argues that this institution was inspired by the French culture and exerted a "considerable influence on the Christian elite in the 19th century" (p.175). Also, he documents the existing foreign universities in the Mashriq area since the 19th century, mainly in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq. Respectively in Lebanon, The Syrian protestant College set up in 1863 became in 1920 The American University of Beirut (A.U.B.). In Egypt, French and American universities were also implanted: L'École Française de Droit du Caire (1893-1956); and The American University in Cairo (1925) In Iraq, foreign universities were set much later such as L'Université al-Hikmah of Baghdad which was founded by the American Jesuits in 1956, and closed a decade later. (Waardenburg.1983.p.54) Likewise, he traces the establishment of foreign institutions in the Maghrib area during colonization in the 20th century. To name a few, L'Université d'Alger was founded by the French as a state university in 1909. In Tunis, L'Institut des Hautes Études de Tunis established in 1945 became The University of Tunis in 1960. In Morocco L'Institut des Études Marocaines (1912); and two centres of law: Centre Études Juridiques were respectively established in Rabat and Casablanca in 1920. (Idem,p.54)

Awareness of the persistence of the Western liberal dominance on educational changes are key in understanding the orientation of national universities since the 1960s and their adversarial impact both at the institutional and content levels ²⁵. However, the existence of dominance and hegemony of the Western Liberal pattern of education does not necessarily connote uniformity, but involves power-hierarchies. These, in turn, entail degrees of conformity and resistance to the hegemonic transfer of knowledge. Often, the degrees of resistance and/or conformity to Western universities were predicated upon by either the absence of, or existence of modern endogenous tertiary education in each individual country. For example, Egypt and Syria not only disposed of modern endogenous higher institutions, but they also played an essential role in alleviating acculturation in the region; especially in 1960-70 decade. In fact, Syria represented the best available option in endogenous education in that The University of Damas distinguished itself from the start as the only university in the area to uphold the tradition of teaching exclusively in Arabic. Over the 1960s and the 1970s the Arab-Muslim bourgeoisie across the region usually secured their children's higher education in this particular university. This way The University of Damas sustained the professional capability of providing Arab-Islamic society with the best of its endogenous intellectual elite and experts.

In comparison, Egypt, which has an established expertise in the coordination between original and new systems of education, channeled its surplus of university professors in the 1960-70 decade across the Arab-Islamic society, while it provided the cultural assistance needed for these countries to restore their cultural integrity. Not only did Egypt volunteer to assist its neighbors by sending Egyptian professors to teach Arabic courses and science courses to replace the Western programs in the whole area, but it also provided a major cultural and political "resistance front" to the European-led higher education in the area. For instance, through the Sectarian policy of education firmly established in Lebanon, Egypt helped the Arab-Muslim bourgeoisie in Lebanon to use *al-Waqf* in co-sponsoring higher institutions with the state. The Beirut Arab University (1960) is a case in point for it was primarily established to counter-act the persisting French cultural dominance in the Lebanese University established in 1952. In fact, by the mid-1960s the Egyptian assistance through teachers of Arabic rose sharply in distribution within Arab countries from 619 in 1953-54 to 4,615 in the 1960s (Qubain, 1966, pp. 200-201).

²⁵ For further analysis of the adversarial impact of liberal education at the institutional and content level in the universities of Morocco see Salimi (1985).

Clearly, it is the pressure by the community and the Arab-Islamic bourgeoisie that induced the state to embark in a total revisionist project of tertiary education. The overall goal of the revisionist project was to dispense a "coherent education" on the basis of converging, rather than diverging cultural values and the adjustment of all higher educational institutions accordingly. From this perspective the state engaged not only in the simultaneous structural upgrading of old and new national higher institutions of education, but also in the revision of the curricula, and the teaching and learning methods applied within both institutions. However, at the implementation level, the state lacked a unified strategy, as well as a global Arab pedagogy. This brought uneven institutional adjustments between original and new institutions.

2.2.1. The Adjustments of Original Universities: Madaris (pl. Madrasah)

Significantly, the institutional adjustments of the *madaris* combined both the structure and the content of these institutions. In terms of structure, the adjustments were twofold: the reorganization of the available original *madaris*, and the creation of new institutions. This resulted in three different types of Islamic teaching institutions. The first type was derived from the fusion of old *madaris* with new universities. For example, Morocco transformed Al-Qarawiyyin (859 A.D) into a university under the supervision of the ministry of education in 1963. Today, Al-Qarawiyyin is composed of four faculties in different cities of Morocco: (the faculty of the Shari'a in Fès; the faculty of Usul al-Din in Tetouan; the faculty of Arabic language and literature in Marrakech; and the faculty of Islamic Studies in Rabat. Likewise, Egypt radically transformed the Islamic teaching dispensed in al-Azhar madrasah (970 A.D) by integrating this teaching in 1962 within in the national system of education (Waardenburg, 1983.p. 43). Today al-Azhar is composed of five different institutions: the university al-Azhar per se; the Higher Council; the Academy of Islamic research, the Directorate of cultural and Islamic missions, and the institutes of primary and secondary teaching (*ma'ahid*). In fact, al-Azhar University added new faculties to the old ones as of 1961, namely the faculty of the Shari'a; the faculty of Usul al-Din; the faculty of the Arabic language; and the Higher Institute of Arab-Islamic studies (Idem, p.43).

The second type of institutions emerged with the creation of a new faculty of Shari'a and its integration in a state university. More often than not, this was deployed by incorporating an original higher institution into a newly established university. This was the case for al-Zaytouna Mosque (732 A.D), which was incorporated with the faculty of the

Shari'a of al-Zaytouna, and with Religious Sciences of the University of Tunis, in Tunisia; hence merging into the University of al-Zaytouna. Syria and Libya deployed the same method. Respectively, the faculty of the Shari'a as well as the faculty of Islamic studies were incorporated into the University of Damas. And the old University of al-Sanussiya in Bayda, Libya was incorporated into the University of Ghar Younis in Benghazi (Idem, p.44).

The third type of institutions was brought with the creation of new Islamic universities altogether. For example, Saudi Arabia established in 1961 the Islamic University of King Al-Sa'ud in Medina. This university was modeled after al-Azhar University. However, it was subjected to a double authority: that of the Great Mufti, who himself was accountable to the State. In addition, Saudi Arabia established in 1974 the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud in Ryad, an off-shoot of three institutions: a College of Shari'a; a College of Arabic Language and social sciences; and a Higher Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence. All these disciplines were incorporated in the field of Usul al-Din as well as some Arabic studies (Idem, p.44). Thus, original education was maintained and deployed within a new structural and institutional set-up that integrates the original institutions within the newly established universities.

In terms of content, the adjustments of the original institutions occurred in the fundamental change of *ijaza*²⁶. In the 1960s, the Adaptionist State reassessed the "core curriculum" of *ijaza* with two interrelated objectives in mind. First, to make *the ijaza's* "core curriculum" an essential component of the inner development of Arab-Islamic society, and of the potential alternatives for its future self-renewal. And second, to prepare modern Muslim citizens to cope with the volatile realities and uncertainties of modern life. To achieve these two objectives, the adaptionists not only broadened the knowledge base of *ijaza* by incorporating new secular fields of knowledge, but they also updated the methods of teaching, learning and research deployed within original institutions. The aim was to open new frontiers of knowledge, and engender new research subjects in accordance with the changing daily life of society, and its job-market possibilities.

However, the *'ulama's secularization* of knowledge and broadening of the *ijaza* curricula varied greatly from one country to another according to the political system adopted in each nation. Awareness of the link between the political orientation of each individual Arab-Muslim nation, and its teaching of "official Islam" in original institutions of higher

²⁶ Compare the *ijaza* program here with the one described in Appendix II.

education, is therefore crucial to understand not only the kind of the "core curriculum" taught in the teaching/learning process, but also the extent of the *'ulama's* role in knowledge transmission and production as a professional corps at all levels of education. For instance, the teaching of Islam in Iraq or Syria, strongly governed by the socialist ideology²⁷ of the Ba'ath party is radically different from the teaching of Islam dispensed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, heavily imbued by the *Wahhabi* tradition, or the Moroccan kingdom strongly entrenched in the conservative *Maliki* tradition.

In turn, the difference in political orientation between the countries and "the official core curriculum" of Islamic knowledge they promote in the *madaris* are likely to have a differential impact on the integration of women in their societies' cultural and educational governance. Obviously, the progressive or conservative political system adhered to by each individual Arab-Islamic country determines the extent of participation of the *'ulama* and other groups in the power structure of scientific practice as a whole. Thus, I maintain, original Islamic education in each individual country, and the "official Islam" it promotes represent a real "barometer" for the extent of the state's control over social change in terms of class and gender, and the state's role in allocating space for women as "as a professional corps" and agents of change. Ultimately, it is the political orientation in contemporary Arab-Islamic State that determines to a great degree the basis of the curricula, and the intellectual status of the social groups involved in the production of religious epistemology in each individual country.

To illustrate, the evolution of original education of Egypt clearly shows the way this country re-negotiated the participation of the *'ulama* in the educational system. Eccel's study on al-Azhar (1984) cogently demonstrates the role of secularization of original education in the socialization of the *'ulama*, and the way this professional group used secularization to maintain its status within the power structure of knowledge production in Egypt. Eccel summarizes the nature of secularization of al-Azhar as follows:

The initial step was to develop a basic organizational structure, necessarily of bureaucratic design, to define and assure an adequate level of role performance. Next, the system had to specialize within its own area, to develop its own natural employment potential. Finally, it needed to expand into secular fields in order to expand the scale of its operations, and thus, the scope of its religious influence (p. 320).

²⁷ For further details on original education and the *'ulama's* integration in knowledge production in socialist Muslim countries, see Carré (1974).

It is in consistence with this particular orientation of the policy of secularization that al-Azhar training program first expanded the original Islamic law program to new legal studies:

Already in 1962-63, the undergraduate program had began to adapt requiring the following: introduction of Legal Studies ('Ulum kanuniya) [sic], Legal Administration (based in Kanun), Public International Law, and Commercial Law. And on the MA level there were specializations in secular law (p.318).

Second, al-Azhar accelerated the secularization of religious knowledge in the 1970s with the newly established institutes (*Ma'ahid*). From Eccel's portrayal of *Azhar ma'ahid* programs reflect an astonishing non-traditional approach of these institutes, despite their religious orientation:

By the 1970s the least secularized program was of course the College of Theology. In the BA ('Aliya) program, we find courses such as philosophy, psychology, sociology, a European language, and July 23 Revolution. Based on contract hours the core program (first two years) is 67% religion, while the entire program for the specialization, all four years is 51% (doctrine and philosophy section), 72% (exegesis and hadith section), and 47% (preaching and missionary work section)...The College of Sharia and kanun (secular law) shows a greater change. The courses that are specifically secular law 26% of the five-year program and the other secular courses are 19%, leaving 47% for sharia. [sic] But the Arabic program is the most secular of all. There, the general program in 1974 was 93% secular. In the same college, 90% of the history program was secular, and 86% of the cultural history program. However even in the case of the theology program, the student must first pass through the Azhar pre-college program (p.430).

A careful analysis of the organization of knowledge of original education within the secularization policy, however, reveals the emergence of two major trends. First, the secular training dispensed in al-Azhar has dramatically changed the socialization of the '*ulama* into "religious experts" to fit the job-market conditions.²⁸ Second, the '*ulama's* new training in religious expertise per-se has transformed the Arab-Islamic tradition of knowledge seeking and dissemination in that it has abandoned *al-Tawhid* principle that sustained the simultaneous evolution of religious and secular sciences that distinguished Arab-Islamic delivery system of knowledge dispensed in the *madaris* of the past. In doing so, the secularization of knowledge in the *madaris* attempted to alter the '*ulama's* original function in society as juri-consults, educators and scientists, and to limit their participation in the scientific knowledge dispensed in the *madrasah* to religious sciences alone. Equally, the secularization of tertiary education in

²⁸ This challenges the assertions found in the literature (Hourani, 1983; Waardenburg, 1966, 1983) that the '*ulama* resisted secularization because they were a traditional groups who wanted to sustain religious epistemology.

the *madrasah* fits the general socialist orientation in the region as well as the secular orientation previously started at the secondary level.²⁹

Nonetheless, the *'ulama* exploited the secularization of the *madrasah* to fit their own socio-political and cultural agendas and re-established themselves as professional corps within the power-structure of knowledge production in the contemporary Arab-Islamic society. On the one hand, the *'ulama* capitalized on the secularization of the field of law to preserve their monopoly in Islamic Jurisprudence, and reclaim their traditional role as "juri-consults". As Eccel (1984) aptly observed the whole orientation towards secularization in law took place as long as the legislature did "Not contradict any presently existing rule, in the Kuran [sic], in a hadith that is beyond suspicion, or in the clear *ijma'* of the first generations of jurists-the Shari'a narrowly construed." (p.427).

On the other hand, the *'ulama* institutionalized a value hierarchical order between secular and religious disciplines in the educational system as well as between scholars involved in the process of knowledge production or scientific practice in those disciplines. An example of this hierarchy is found in the supremacy of the "Islamic Constitution Draft" of al-Azhar over any other secular law. Eccel elaborates: "This 'Constitution' would allow secular legislation to exist, but in a constant state of review by the *'ulama*, in the light of their ongoing derivation of sacred law for modern times" (Idem, p. 427).

To be sure, the *'ulama* cleverly exploited their secularized training to re-invest in their role within original education and re-invent themselves as educators and "as scientists". In doing so, the *'ulama* this time not only reclaimed their "scientific" role as "rational" thinkers granted to them by *'urf* (custom) by the community, but they also re-validated their scientific authority by secular training. Awareness about the *'ulama's* renewed status as facilitated by secularization and rational elaboration of cogent disciplines and methods, rather than spirituality, is critical, especially that Islam has no ecclesiastic hierarchy, and that the Qur'an has no specific definition of the *'ulama's* role in society.³⁰ This fact not only reminds us that the Islamic religious epistemology is based on reason and knowledge (as opposed to faith), but it also sheds light on the dynamics involved with regards to class and gender representation in the power-structure of knowledge production within the *madrasah* over time.

²⁹ For details on the secularization of original education of the *madrasah* and its programs of study at the secondary level see Carré (1971).

³⁰ The Qur'an is *gender neutral* in its reference to the learned people. It states "*Ulu al-albab*", and "*Ulu al-'ilm*", etc. However many traditionalists filled in this gap claiming that religious and scientific authority is granted exclusively to the *'ulama*.

In terms of class, this situates the emergence of radical social groups such as Islamist groups since the late 1940s, who compete for representation in socio-political institutions on "Islamic grounds" as justifiable claims, considering that knowledge production in Islam is not granted to a class of people over another or an individual over another. Similarly, in terms of gender, this places women's claim for the individual right to participate in scientific production granted by Islam, and their collective struggle for political recognition of gender parity in scientific authority in the 1950s as a renewed advocacy for women's rights denied them in some *madaris*³¹ and in scientific practice over time³².

2.2.2. The Adjustments of New Universities.

The new universities duly followed the model of the foreign universities and the professionalization of knowledge as the new orientation of training in national modern universities in the 1960s. The latter orientation changed radically the function of the university from its previous status as a center of education and research into a mere "institution of instruction" (Waardenburg, 1966, p. 121). The professionalization of knowledge led to the exclusion of various disciplines of original fields of knowledge from the curriculum and to their gradual replacement with Western ones. As a result, the university became a "foreign" body within Arab-Islamic culture, and a source of alienation to its people. Waardenburg reports (1966):

À ses débuts, l'Université était un corps étranger dans la société Arabe. Son organisation et ses programmes étaient empruntés à, ou calqués sur, ceux de l'université occidentale. L'université Arabe devenait une institution occidentale avec des "habitants" locaux. (p. 123)

In turn, the professionalization orientation changed the nature of knowledge transmission and acquisition. First, the transmission of knowledge in the 1960s universities was reduced to a mere re-interpretation of Western knowledge (Idem, p.122). And second, scientific research was continually dependent "on favorable circumstances" (Idem.p.123). Third, the whole approach to learning became authoritarian as the teacher became "the professional", and the student a mere "recipient" of knowledge (p.123).

³¹ In chapter 1 I trace women's participation in the scientific practice of the Arab-Islamic society to the 3rd/9th century *madrasah* in Morocco. I also show how women's integration in scientific practice in the *madrasah* has been *uneven* between the Mashriq and the Maghrib during the Middle Ages.

³² For an example on the way/s the *'ulama* of the *madrasah* in Cairo established a hierarchy between men and women in the transmission of scientific knowledge during the 13-17th centuries, see Berkey (1992). Also, see Eccel (1984) on how the *'ulama* of al-Azhar university still discriminated against *Bint al-Shati's* scientific productions in the 1980s.

Moreover, the professionalization of knowledge established a science/culture dichotomy in knowledge transmission and acquisition. One effect of this dichotomy in knowledge transmission is the atomization of knowledge into dualities within original disciplines. For instance, in the field of law, both the Shari'a, and Napoleon Code were taught in new universities. In fact, the French Law not only infiltrated the programs of study within all faculties of law in the universities of the 1960s, but became dominant in other fields of law such as the laws of commerce, trade, and banking. Two additional consequences followed the atomization of knowledge. One is the partition of knowledge realms into fields of specialization, namely between "the humanities" and "the sciences", and within these broad domains of knowledge themselves (i.e. theoretical/applied sciences etc.). In turn, the specialization led to an arbitrary evaluation-scale between "rational empirical sciences" (engineering, physics, mathematics, chemistry etc.) and other scientific disciplines in the humanities (history, literature, sociology, etc). In short, the atomization of knowledge played a procedural role at the transmission level in being instrumental for the state officials' classification and evaluation of the disciplines.

Another effect at the level of knowledge transmission, is the legitimation of certain disciplines at the expense of others. Not only did the state officials rely on the atomization of knowledge to select what field knowledge is relevant for teaching, but also what kind of research is more acceptable in scientific practice. In so doing, state officials institutionalized a value-hierarchical order among the disciplines. At the same time, they established a dichotomous mode of production as the norm for the practice of scientific research within the disciplines, setting an arbitrary division between "scientific" and "non-scientific" fields.

Ultimately, state officials used the mixed policy of education at the curriculum level as an effective "censorship tool" in the regulation of the disciplines. And as a procedural instrument in establishing and legitimizing a hierarchical structure of authority in knowledge production and transmission in Arab-Islamic society. This hierarchical structure engendered two major trends in scientific practice within universities. First, the replication of the dichotomous mode of production existing at the cultural level, that separates between the formal and the informal realms of learning and communication, within national formal education. Second, the institutionalization of the dichotomous mode within the practice of social research. Combined, these two trends adversely affected the institutional integration of feminist knowledge and negatively affected women's participation in the transmission and production of knowledge in general and feminist knowledge in particular.

2.2.3. The Institutional Integration of Feminist Knowledge

A scrutiny of "the administration " of feminist knowledge both within informal and formal education within Arab-Islamic culture indicates an inherent ideology of domestication of women. This is evident in the dichotomous mode of production of feminist knowledge into two categories:

1. Dirasat 'An al-Mar'ah "Studies on Women" incorporated within the informal realm under the sponsorship of independent institutes, non-governmental women organizations.

2. Dirasat Nisa'iyya "Women's/Feminist Studies" incorporated within the realm of formal education in the form of research within the disciplines of higher education (Belhachmi, 1986).³³

This dichotomous mode of production of feminist knowledge signals a lack of recognition and support both at the structural and institutional levels. First, the non-recognition of feminism sanctifies the state's partition of feminist knowledge into dichotomous spaces of communication within culture (formal/informal). And second, it facilitates the state's control of feminist knowledge within formal higher education. Two consequences derived from the dichotomous mode of production for feminist knowledge at the macro level of culture, and at the micro level of scientific practice within Arab-Islamic society.

At the macro-level of culture, the structural partition of feminist knowledge into the formal/informal, legitimized the co-optation by state officials' of feminist knowledge in several spaces of communication within the institutional power structure, and political economy of these institutions in Arab-Islamic society. Some of these spaces are patriarchal technocracy, and development plans, which after independence were mandated by state officials to integrate women. These include male dominated ministries such as the ministry of social affairs, of education, of justice etc. But also women's associations, and NGOs. In fact, since the 1960s all these spaces of integration of women were taken over by the state, just as were other mixed community associations. As a result, the "the woman's question" in the Arab-Islamic culture became heavily dependent on the state's politics and economics, indicating a tight channeling of women's issues in the developmentalist patriarchal discourse.

³³ Notice the two changes in terminology from original *nisai'yyat*. First *nisai'yyat*, previously referred to both women social movements and women's studies changed into the terminology *Dirasat 'An al-Mar'ah* "studies on Women". Second, *Dirasat Nisa'iyya* (Feminist/Women's Studies), which connoted "studies by women" are now confined to academic studies. For further details, see item 13 in the glossary.

This channeling, in my view, is largely responsible for the steady retreat of women's issues and aspirations to the background, and the corollary manipulation by the state of gender identity and politics within the patriarchal universalist voice of modernism. While "the dirigiste state" deployed interventionist measures in formal education, it also excluded the procedural integration of women both from the decision making process, and their autonomous political representation in the negotiation process of cultural and educational governance of their communities. The same state that granted women's new rights also abolished independent women's organizations and associations, leading to their disempowerment at the socio-political level. As a result, Arab-Islamic society witnessed a mushrooming of state-sponsored women's organizations which were usually assimilated in male-led political party/ies, or informal women's organizations usually headed by an upper-class woman, or a princess. A salient example of the state-sponsored organizations is the GFIW strongly governed by the Ba'ath party in Iraq. And an example of an informal women's organization is UFM in Morocco. Both types of organization de-radicalized the feminist movements in Arab-Islamic society and disempowered women. The first prescribed women's agency within the state's framework of social action and patriarchal-led formal power, and the second maintained women's activism in the informal realm of power.

At the micro-level of scientific practice, the application of the dichotomous structure women/feminist studies enabled the state to de-politicize women's studies from their previous reference to women as subjects of history and agency in the Arab-Islamic society into a new reference to women as objects of study. This reductionism of women's studies to an abstraction also allowed state officials to structurally exclude "women's studies" altogether from the process of formal education. Not only did this structural exclusion enable the adaptationist officials to justify the elimination of "Women's Studies" from competing with other fields of knowledge within the power-structure of Arab-Islamic knowledge production, but also to delegitimize these studies within the formal educational space in terms of knowledge transmission. In so doing, state officials eliminated "women's studies" altogether from the teaching process, concealing the pedagogical input this field may have both in the learning process of students, and in their identification process in culture. This indicates an uncanny resemblance in the patriarchal muting process of women's voice in teaching and research both in the *madrrasah* and in the "modern" university.

At the same time, the application of the dichotomous mode enabled state officials to substantially justify the partial integration of "Feminist Studies" within formal higher

education. The partial integration is evidenced by the exclusion of feminist studies from the teaching process and their confinement to research only. This means at the practical level mere tokenism as reflected in the symbolic integration of feminist knowledge within the formal power structure of Arab-Islamic higher education, and the corollary assimilation of feminist research within the male-dominated disciplines (i.e. sociology, anthropology, etc). Ultimately, the omission of the fields of women/feminist studies from the formal teaching of Arab-Islamic education plays an ideological role for state officials and social scientists: that of trivializing the role of women in the intellectual and scientific history of Arab-Islamic culture, and of women's scientific practices.

Similarly, the omission of women/feminist studies functions as a pedagogical strategy in the identification process of both women teachers, and students in Arab-Islamic culture. By excluding women as "peers" from teaching women's/feminist studies, state officials on the one hand ensure the absence of independent feminine "role models" for students, and eliminate social and intellectual links of mentorship with these "foremothers" within the school system. And on the other hand, state officials prevent women teachers and educators from reaching the authority status related to the teaching role. The exclusion of women's population from the authority status is all the more politically effective; considering that the primary role of the university during 1960-70 decade was almost exclusively teaching and instruction rather than research. This way, women are prevented from becoming a normative model of identification for both men and women.

The assimilation of feminist studies within mainstream or rather "malestream" structure of knowledge at the institutional level, allows educators and scholars to assimilate women within the male's scientific voice at the intellectual level. After all, working within power structure and contexts of knowledge production (the university and its multiple departments) leads to practicing research within male-dominated disciplines and promoting men's interests (the projects they encourage, and publish). This monolithic and androcentric context not only marginalizes women and their interests, but it also coerces them to replicate "the context of scientific discovery" set by their "forefathers" as the norm in the conduct of their scientific research. In brief, the practice of feminist research in higher education boils down to subordinating "feminist studies" within the disciplines, and merely "adding feminist ideas" to the already existing institutional knowledge and its established patriarchal paradigms.

Ultimately, the partial integration of feminist knowledge in "modern" national universities actually served state officials as a political strategy to institutionalize a hierarchy

of authority in knowledge dissemination and production on the basis of gender; hence reinforcing the gender inequality already existing at the societal level. Equally, the dichotomous and artificial division of the field of feminist research into studies on women and feminist studies establishes a hierarchy within women's studies, because it privileges academic feminist studies over studies by women involved in women's political struggles in society.

Part. III. The Evaluation Decades (1970-90) and the Post-Modernist Developments

By the 1970s, it became clear that the interventionist measures deployed by the adaptationist State had failed to coordinate the formal and informal realms of education and communication at the core of cultural integrity as well as provide endogenous education on a massive scale. The unpopularity of the state fostered by a large frustrated population with the state officials' double standards and incompetence led to the re-emergence of the Arab-Muslim bourgeoisie in the balance of power in the 1970s. This meant engaging the Arab-Islamic society into a phase of re-evaluation of its intellectual history. However, this also brought the predominance of a "managerial bourgeoisie" whose vested interests became increasingly affiliated with the state. The evaluation phase appeared as a period of conflicting structural adjustments both at the formal and informal levels, bringing the formation of a new socio-cultural situation with far reaching consequences for culture and gender politics in the production of scientific knowledge.

1. Conflicting Structural Adjustments

The new structural adjustment rested on radical re-definitions of priorities, which departed from the state's centralization of the economy, and entered into privatization and foreign investments. As a result, local governments were forced to reduce state subsidies and decrease the already minimal social services, including education. This meant for the structural level further international monitoring of local economies, and structural re-adjustments "packaged" by the World Bank, the IMF, and a variety of "donor" development agencies. Moreover, since most "donor" agencies were only interested in economic development projects, the state officials overlooked the integration of history, and culture as priorities in the process of national development (Belhachmi, 1983). Instead, the state officials continued to apply the dichotomous mode that separates the formal and informal in the cultural and educational governance of Arab-Islamic society as well as they resumed their careful channeling of women's interests in local bureaucracies, and non-formal women's organizations.

The pursuit of the formal/informal dichotomy allowed the state not only to benefit from international Aid at the economic level, but also to pose as a "modern state" at the political level; without making any real contribution either to the renewal of Arab-Islamic culture and education or to the advancement of women.³⁴ At the procedural level privatization meant a tremendous decrease in the access to people to primary education as well as a chronic reproduction of illiteracy, especially in the rural region. As Tarabishi (1985) aptly observed "the population of the Arab rural area will reach 126 Million people in the year 2000, yet no one thought of finding an educational system that responds to their needs" (p.60). Further, the community is powerless against this situation since *al-waqf* system has been integrated in the state's machinery. Awareness of these significant political and economic changes resulting from the state's policy of education reveal the gap between the rhetoric during the 1970s, and the actual accomplishments at the cultural, social, and educational governance both at the informal and formal levels.

1.1. At The Informal Level

With the dismantling of the organic link previously existing between the family, the school and the community brought by Western liberalism, and the deepening of capitalism induced by the policy of privatization in the 1970s, the Arab-Islamic society witnessed the disintegration of the national economic and social programs that particularly affected women. The major expansion of the private sector limited women's access to basic public services rendering women increasingly dependent on foreign aid. For instance, the privatization of medicine precluded the free access of women to family planning, birth control pills, and counseling they previously enjoyed in the 1950s and early 1960s. In face of this deplorable situation, the previous socialist countries suffered the most as women in these countries ceased to enjoy the free national health care system and interrupted their family planning patterns (Belhachmi, 1987c). Meanwhile, the women's organizations and associations did not remedy the situation, as they were incorporated into state machinery, and thus had lost their agency and power within the community.

Equally, the structural re-adjustment induced a whole restructure in the access to knowledge in society. This restructure is evident in the imbalance between religious and

³⁴ For a insightful discussion of the international monitoring of local economies (i.e. IMF and the World Bank), its corollary socio-political and economic re-definitions of priorities by state-led patriarchy, and its effects on gender see Agarwal (1988).

secular knowledge in the media. As of the 1970s, the media programs became predominantly replete with Western programs (films, soaps, and documentaries), which socialized citizens into further Western life styles and their related consumerism and materialism. In counterpart, the local programs lacked cultural integration as evident in the oppositional archetypes they projected, namely between the daily cheap Egyptian love films and belly-dancing that projected lax, sexual patterns of behavior for both genders, and between the weekly religious programs on Fridays sponsored by *al-Awqaf* ministry that projected Islamic patterns of modesty and sexual chastity (Belhachmi, 1986).

Two direct results followed the restructuring of access to knowledge in the media at the community level. First, the cultural collective mobilization of citizens became increasingly problematic with the absence of endogenous integrated cultural programs in the media. Above all, the influence of capitalism and the rise of individual autonomy, especially in the urban areas led to a considerable decrease in spirituality and religious practices. This exacerbated the issue of cultural collective mobilization in general, and the issue of religious mobilization in particular (Idem, p.26). As a result, the cultural arena became the political arena "par excellence" in which civil society may express and preserve its cultural and spiritual cohesiveness away from the state.

This new development at the community level is duly noted by Ghalyun (1988). He argues that since the state has "independently" involved the Arab-Islamic society into new capitalistic patterns, it is hardly surprising to see a structurally dislocated civil society trying to renew itself just as independently (pp.112-113). In fact, Ghalyun observes, the manifestation of the tension between modernity and authenticity is evident in the socio-cultural articulation of people, and in the clear contrast they draw between the concepts of civic society (*mujtama' madani*) and that of civil society (*mujtama' ahli*). What this means is the persisting cleavage between the community and the state in the perception and practice of modernity.

Aware of this cleavage, Ghalyun notes, the modernist state conveniently uses civic society to include modern organizations and structures like political parties, unions, syndicates, and women's associations, against the conservative structures of society in civil society. Above all, he asserts, the recent attempt of the state to revive modernity through the concept of "democracy" is only another expression of a new alliance between the bourgeoisie reluctant to vulgarize democracy among the people, and the monolithic state still believed by many to be the sole safeguard for the continuity of modernity (p.114).

To be sure, while the civic/civil debate was taking place at the political level, the social construction of the "foreignness" of women's emancipation was being firmly consolidated at the level of rhetoric. On the one hand, the state used the dangerous dichotomy of "modernity" and "authenticity" (*hadatha/asala*) to justify its failure in producing women's development programs. At the same time, the civil society was increasingly claiming "communal control" over women both at the family and community levels. A direct consequence of the above socio-economic situation, therefore, is the emergence of the communalization of politics, which first surfaced at the informal level, but over time expanded to the formal level of state politics especially in the 1980s with the rising political power of the Islamist movements.

Understanding the causes of the communalization of politics cannot be underestimated as it sheds light into the dynamics involved between the various social groups and the state in the political and cultural governance of Arab-Islamic society since the 1970s. At the beginning, communalization often served various communities at the informal level as "a compensation strategy" for the capitalist destructure of the family and community's networks as traditional spaces of cultural communication of group and kin solidarities were weakening. This strategy restored communal solidarity and led to the mushrooming of Islamists' charitable associations that benefited the whole community.³⁵

However, with the continuing decrease of the state's socio-economic programs, and the absence of cultural integrity induced by the Western-style secularization of the educational system and the Western dominated programs in the media, communalization gradually filled the "cultural gap" too. It follows that communalization represents not only a "collective" contestation of an unaccepted form of modernity, but also a struggle over public space between various social groups of the civil society and the state. Moreover, communalization stands for a collective enforcement of "public morals"; re-emphasizing Islam as a social religion that organizes both public social life, and family life. In fact, in some countries, such as Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Algeria the increase in the social control of women at the civil level strikingly expanded to the civic level, becoming an integral part of the formal realm of state politics.

Awareness of the expansion of communalization from the civil to the civic in the 1980s signals the establishment of "communalization" as a new orientation in social policy by the community in its struggle with the distortions engendered by contemporary neo-patriarchy

in Arab-Islamic society. In this new socio-cultural environment it is hardly surprising to see "modernity" increasingly appearing as "an alien project" since it promotes individualism, and "authenticity" as the counter-project to regain cultural authority and legitimacy, since it promotes "collective public good" and social agency for the whole community.

1.2. At the formal level

Barely after its entrance of in the balance of power, the adaptionists' published A Pan Arab Strategy for education (1977) which was unanimously adopted during ALECSO general assembly meeting in Khartoum in 1978 (Al-Sharief et al, 1979, p.4). This time, the focus of the educational strategy was on the renewal of Arab-Islamic heritage and civilization not only as an assertive process to recapture the Arab-Islamic leadership in science known in the past, but also to contribute more efficiently in the construction of human civilization and science in the present. To accomplish this new dual task of education, however, the state needed to rectify once more its procedural reforms.

Consequently, the late 1970s and early 1980s transpired as historical periods that reflected more than a mere political unity of the Arabs, but an in-depth and novel self-cultural assessment with a specific consideration to Arab development and modernity from the educational perspective. Within this perspective, priority was given to Arab-Islamic cultural heritage as the source of educational philosophy. This translated into a new educational strategy with two components. The first related to the reassessment of the values of Arab-Islamic heritage according to today's problems. And the second concerned the appropriation of recent world educational and psychological trends in view of their applicability to Arab educational needs. The 1981 ALECSO Report attests to this new self-reliant cultural and educational orientation in two significant ways.

On the one hand this report identifies educational priorities proper to the Arab region as an independent and political unity. On the other hand it views education as an evolutionary process in need for constant assessment both to self-reliance/renewal, and competition with other nations for the future. Above all, the 1981 report attests to the substantial accomplishments of the educational system in absorbing overwhelming quantitative and qualitative demands for education in a very short period. To illustrate, the report documents the accomplishments of the Pan Arab Strategy as follows: first, it asserts the overall

³⁵ For details of the economic and social programs set by the Islamist that benefited the whole community see al-Guindi (1981).

Arabization of the curricula at the elementary, intermediate and secondary levels throughout the Arab world except Lebanon, and Algeria. Second, it records the recognition of equivalency of degrees and matriculation. Third, the report highlights that the purpose of establishing regional research centers under ALECSO auspices are to enhance the efficiency of Arab systems of education as well as re-engage in the cultural Renaissance of Arab-Islamic civilization. These are:

1. Arab States Educational Technology Center (Kuwait).
2. Arab Literacy and Adult Education Organization (ARLO) (Iraq).
3. Arab Literacy and Adult Education leadership Training Centers (Bahrain, and Libya).
4. Khartoum International Institute for Arabic Language (Sudan).
5. Arabization Coordination Bureau (Morocco).
6. Institute of Arab Research and Studies (Iraq).
7. Institute of Arab manuscripts (Kuwait).
8. Higher Education Research Center (Syria). (ALECSO, 1981b, p.12).

Clearly, since its entrance in the political power structure in the mid-1970s, the Arab-Islamic bourgeoisie has rebuilt a new infrastructure for the renewal of the Arab-Islamic civilization and its tradition of scientific practice. This renewal, in addition to altering the formal educational system at the structural and institutional levels, it drastically changed the content of education at the curricula level through Arabization. In turn, Arabization translated into new educational modalities with significant mutations both at the epistemological and social levels. At the epistemological level, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of new Arabic-specializations and fields of knowledge in the social sciences across the local universities. This expanded the scientific base of knowledge production and transmission as evident in the emergence of new fields founded on Arab-Islamic sciences such as contemporary Arabic literature, history, sociology, political science etc. Undoubtedly, the new Arabic fields of knowledge not only enriched contemporary social sciences with the development of new area studies, but they also regenerated the Arab-Islamic civilization into a contemporary form.

Likewise, the epistemological diversity reflected in the social diversity of social scientists within contemporary universities. Since the mid-1970s national universities have been composed of a new mixed class of intelligentsia (men and women), which broadened the knowledge-base of the Arab-Islamic social sciences by including "Islam Civilization" in their knowledge seeking process, and widened the range of scientific inquiry in terms of methodology, method, and epistemology. Combined, the social and scientific diversity not

only disrupted the old structure of education³⁶ from within and created an entirely Arabized structure of contemporary universities, but it also induced a new endogenous power structure of scientific practice. The latter is evident in the flourishing Arabic-speaking departments, and the secularized faculties of original institutions where various disciplines are taught and research units are set-up. In short, the mid-1970s was marked by a process of endogenization of culture and education. In turn, this brought a cultural reconciliation (*musalaha*) in the social sciences as evident in the scientific production of scholars within the new Arabized structure, and in the mixed intelligentsia (men and women) involved in that production.

Similarly, the endogenization process changed drastically the power structure of scientific practice in each field of knowledge in higher education. Respectively, the mixed intelligentsia in the research units within original disciplines brought an unprecedented scientific diversity, but also new power-struggles that renewed the old elite/class issue in knowledge production. This raised once more the issue of representation and participation in terms of class and gender, and the need to broaden the power structure of scientific practice in compliance with the expanded professional corps in Islamic sciences.

Also, the endogenization of the social sciences that occurred through Arabized departments in the new universities since the 1970s dramatically changed the nature of social research in terms of epistemology, methodology and methods of inquiry. These fundamental changes brought a significant diversity to the social research landscape, leading to interdisciplinary approaches to research problems as well as solutions particular to the Arab-Islamic culture and context. These approaches, in turn, informed feminist research and yielded to a multiplicity of interpretations and analytical categories³⁷ as reflected in the socio-ideological differences between the agents practicing in this field of knowledge. In fact, the new diversity in the social sciences destabilized the old power-structure of the field of feminist research and the power-relationship between women social-scientists; reflecting an intra-generational conflict in the process of knowing and appropriation of knowledge.

Before long, women scholars affiliated socio-politically with the neo-nationalists, and women Islamists increasingly acquired space and voice in the scientific practice of feminist

³⁶ Here I refer to method, methodology and epistemology as analytical categories embedded in the Islamic worldview of science as defined in item 1 in the glossary.

³⁷ This means that the analytical categories (method, methodology and epistemology) relied on by both genders involved in feminist research vary according to the worldview they adhere to. One concrete way of finding out about this adherence and how it shapes scholars' feminist consciousness and societal projects is through content analysis. For details see item 24 in the glossary.

research in various departments of the 1970-90s universities.³⁸ Above all, these new feminine voices showed a diversity within Arab-Islamic feminism that contested the false sense of consensus imposed by liberal feminism and its feminist methodology that persisted in women's feminist scholarship. In this new power structure of scientific practice, therefore, the scientific feminine mode of feminist research promoted by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi since the 1970s were justifiably considered dominant and hegemonic both at the structural and intellectual levels. At the structural level the dominance and hegemony of this feminine mode was clear in the multiple women agents and institutions now competing in the production of knowledge in the contemporary field of Arab-Islamic feminist research. Equally, the dominance of this feminine scientific mode at the intellectual level was increasingly apparent in its anachronism with the post-modernist, post-nationalist, and post-Islamist ideological climate of the 1980s and the 1990s.

How does the dominant position of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi in the power structure of scientific practice of feminist research affect their articulation of gender? How does the institutionalization of feminist research as a field of knowledge mould the authors' construction and dissemination of their feminist knowledge as women? From within the perspective of reproduction, chapter IV explores al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's dominant scientific feminine mode as social organization using Smith's feminist sociology of knowledge as an instrument of analysis. There, I describe al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's women's standpoint as a site of struggle (personal history), and as an epistemic position about social reality (scientific discourse of lived femininity). In short, I illustrate the way the dual formal/informal location of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi at the structural level of culture has structured and informed the content of their feminist knowledge. Also, I set the stage for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist sociology of knowledge as being both progressive and regressive.

³⁸ This means that the practice of feminist research included Muslim women ranging from the most radicals (Islamists, socialists, or communists), to moderates, to liberals, or simply Muslim women scholars concerned with social equity and democracy.

CHAPTER IV
EXPLORING FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE
WITHIN THE DOMINANT FEMININE MODE

Introduction

This chapter relies on the second level of the model I outlined in figure VII in chapter 2 to describe al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's dominant feminine mode¹ of feminist knowledge and to explore its discourse of femininity.² In short, this level examines the authors' feminist knowledge as a social organization. The focus is twofold: the authors' socio-political position as inquirers (knowers) in everyday life, and their location in scientific research as a constituent part of social reality. Accordingly, I draw on Bourdieu's praxeology, (personal history, and scientific habitus), and Smith's standpointism. In Part 1 I discuss the selection and sampling of the books I relied on to illustrate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's discourse of femininity. In part 2 I illustrate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's respective woman's standpoint as an objectivation of 'social reality. First, I trace al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's personal and intellectual histories. Second, I show the way the authors' dual history (personal and professional) shapes their woman's standpoint consciousness and is invested in their texts.

Part I. Presenting al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Discourse of Femininity as an Objectification of Women's Standpoints.

1. Selection of the Sample Books³

The sample books I have selected to illustrate the discourse of femininity articulated by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi pertains to both the theoretical and empirical variations of the authors' works. Two reasons prompted this choice. First, to study the two authors within the same realm of their discourse on women. The aim of this first process in the selection is two-fold: (a) to examine al-Sa'dawi's discourse of femininity as articulated in her non-fictional work because this genre of the author's writing remains an uncharted territory in comparison to her fictional work (see Appendix IV. B). (b) To show the wide scope of al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought, and the diverse range of her feminist advocacy and intervention as articulated in her non-fictional writings. Second, to examine the woman's standpoint of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi in its own right (her story). With this approach, I avoid presenting al-Sa'dawi's work either in comparison with Western feminist writing like Park (1988), or in comparison with male

¹ I say dominant feminine mode based on al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's dominant structural and institutional position in the power-structure of scientific practice in feminist knowledge existing within the Arab-Islamic society during the 1970-90 period I discussed in chapter 3.

² For the components of the discourse of femininity in Arab-Islamic culture see item 22 b in the glossary.

³ Most scholars focus on al-Sa'dawi's literary and fictional work. Even the latest feminist study of al-Sa'dawi's work (Malti-Douglas, 1995) continues this trend. In contrast I have deliberately focused the author's understudied non-fictional work to underscore the wide range of her feminist thought. (See Appendix IV.B).

feminists like Tarabishi (1984), and Salah Dean (1989), or in an attempt to rehabilitate her as a feminist scholar like Malti-Douglas (1995, p.ix). Similarly, I avoid presenting Mernissi's work from within the male/female logic like Sharrak (1990); Couturier (1991); Jaber (1992); and Gruenbaum (1995). In short, I deliberately break away from cultural relativism and apologetic feminism. Instead, I unfold al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode from a balanced perspective that shows both the positive and negative elements contained in their feminist consciousness and discourse on gender in the contemporary Arab-Islamic society.

2. Sampling al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Discourse of Femininity

From al-Sa'dawi's work, I have selected: Al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins (1973) [The woman and sex; not translated so far]; Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya (1977) [translated: The hidden face of Eve: Women in the Arab world (1980), and La face cachée d'Ève (1983)]; and Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira'a al-Nafsi (1974) [translated: Femmes Égyptiennes: Tradition et modernité (1991)]. These books represent the most important studies on Arab women written by al-Sa'dawi in a form other than literary or fictional (see Appendix IV. B). Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins is the first study ever written by an Arab-Muslim woman on gender and sexuality in Arab-Islamic culture. Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira'a al-Nafsi is the only non-fictional book whereby al-Sa'dawi describes Arab-Islamic social reality entirely in women's voices and explores various layers of their oppression. Also, it is a pioneer study on women's neurosis, domestic violence, abuse, incest and rape in Arab-Islamic society. Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya is al-Sa'dawi's most mature work whereby she positions herself as a feminist Arab-Muslim woman with respect to the status of women in Islam, their role in the advancement of Arab-Islamic culture in general, and their role in women's liberation in particular.

From Mernissi's work, I have selected: Beyond the veil: Male-female dynamics in a modern society (1975) [translated: Sexe, idéologie, et Islam (1985)]. Le Maroc raconté par ses femmes [translated: Doing daily battle: interviews with Moroccan women (1988)]; and Le harem politique: Le prophète et les femmes (1987) [translated and reproduced under two different titles: Women and Islam: An historical theological enquiry (1991), and The veil and the male elite: A feminist interpretation of women's rights in Islam (1991)]. The first book describes the tensions in male-female dynamics in an Islamic society torn between tradition and modernity. This book attempts not only to clarify women's sexuality in Islam, but also to explain Moroccan women's oppression under patriarchal Islam. The second book deals with

Moroccan social reality in women's voices, and describes various levels of their oppression. The third book represents the most mature of Mernissi's work where she actually "anchors" women's rights in Islam and Arab culture, positions herself as a feminist Arab-Muslim woman, and "grounds" women's equality in Arab-Islamic heritage. Table I presents the books I selected to illustrate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's dominant feminine mode from 1970 to 1990.

Table I. Sampling Arab-Islamic Feminist Research Within the Feminine Mode from the 1970s to the 1990s

Authors	Original Books	Translations
A) Al-Sa'dawi Nawal	1. <u>Al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins</u> (1973) [The woman and sex].	No translation.
	2. <u>Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi</u> (1974)	Femmes égyptiennes: Tradition et modernité (1991).
	3. <u>Al-Wajh al-'Ari Lil Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya</u> (1977)	The hidden face of Eve (1980). La face cachée d'Ève: les femmes dans le monde Arabe (1983).
B) Mernissi Fatima	1. <u>Beyond the veil: Male-female dynamics in a modern society</u> (1975)	Sexe, idéologie et Islam (1985).
	2. <u>Le Maroc raconté par ses femmes</u> (1983).	Doing daily battle: Interviews with Moroccan women (1988).
	3. <u>Le harem politique: le prophète et les femmes</u> (1987).	Women and Islam: An historical theological enquiry (1991). The veil and the male elite: A feminist interpretation of women's rights in Islam (1991).

After consultation of the available editions of the selected books, and a careful study of the translated versions for accuracy, I found out the following for al-Sa'dawi: (a) Both the French and English editions omit crucial information on Arab-Muslim women, yet emphasized by al-Sa'dawi in the Arabic editions. In doing so, the translated versions exclude essential elements of al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought. These concern the author's critique of Western cultural imperialism, gender egalitarianism in Arab-Islamic heritage, and the role of socialism in the liberation of Arab-Muslim women from all forms of patriarchy. (b) The English versions contain additional data, or explanations of themes raised by al-Sa'dawi. (c) All the selected books are compiled with two more books; namely al-Untha Hiya al-Asl (1974) [Woman is the Origin] and al-Rajul wa al-Jins (1975) [The man and sex] in a volume

entitled Dirasat 'An al-Mar'ah wa al-Rajul fi al-Mujtama' al-'Arabi (1990), 2nd ed. [Studies on the man and the woman in Arab Society].

For these reasons, I have relied on the Arabic version of al-Sa'dawi's work to illustrate her standpoint, and I have translated the excerpts from the Arabic edition compiled in Dirasat (1990). Two additional reasons justify this selection: (a) To portray al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought as originally articulated for the Arab-Muslim audience. (b) To capture the issues concerning gender in Arab-Islamic culture in the order of importance articulated by al-Sa'dawi and not that of her English and French editors. This way, I maintain accuracy of al-Sa'dawi's standpoint, and I avoid distortion of her feminist thought and consciousness. However, I have occasionally relied on the English editions for the following reasons: (a) whenever I encountered difficulties in translation. (b) Whenever the English editions included additional data that expanded on the information or explanations of themes raised by al-Sa'dawi in the original Arabic editions.

For Mernissi I found that: (a) The first book is a polished version of the author's doctoral thesis The Effects of modernization on the male-female dynamics in a Muslim society: Morocco (1973). The second book is translated verbatim from its original French version. And the third is re-edited twice in English as listed in figure I. These findings led me to rely on the English version of the selected books to illustrate Mernissi's standpoint. Two reasons prompted this choice: first, most of the sections that illustrate Mernissi's standpoint do not differ from the original version. Second, the English version allows me to avoid problems of translation and ensure accuracy in the presentation of the author's text. Table II lists the books I use as working documents to illustrate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's standpoints.

Table II. List of Books that Capture al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Woman's Standpoints

Authors	Working Documents
A) Al-Sa'dawi Nawal	1. Al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins (1973). In <u>Dirasat</u> (1990).
	2. Al-Mara'h wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi (1974). In <u>Dirasat</u> (1990).
	3. Al-Wajh al-'Ari Li Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya (1977). In <u>Dirasat</u> (1990).
B) Mernissi Fatima	1. <u>Beyond the veil</u> (1975).
	2. <u>Doing daily battle</u> (1988).
	3. <u>Women and Islam</u> (1991).

3. Illustrating al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Women's Standpoints

I have relied on the "documentary method" to illustrate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's women's standpoints. This has the following advantages: (a) to distinguish between feminist knowledge construed in a given historical period, and the re-utilization of that knowledge in other discourses over time (1970-1990), (b) to focus on al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's standpoint at the time of its actual production and construction in order to show the authors' standpoint both as a perspective and as an epistemology. (c) to illustrate how al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi merge both their women's standpoint perspective and epistemology in their objectivation of the social reality of the Arab-Muslim women. In short, I highlight al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's standpoint on women's issues (themes) as a product of a dual process of the authors' social and professional "rapport to knowledge"⁴ within the Arab-Islamic culture.

Equally, I have summarized the extremely rich and varied themes that constitute the substance of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoints across the selected books (see Appendix IV.A). For my illustration of the author's standpoints, however, I have only retained the most recurrent themes per author, and I have classified them in Table III as follows: (a) themes common to both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi (b) themes specific to each author.

Table III. Summary of themes raised by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi.

Authors	Themes
A) Al-Sa'dawi	1. Socialization 2. Marriage/Divorce 3. The family 4. Family planning 5. Work ----- 6. Special theme: Female circumcision
B) Mernissi	1. Socialization 2. Marriage/Divorce 3. The family 4. Family-planning 5. Work ----- 6. Special theme: Women and politics

⁴ I say "rapport to knowledge" instead of "relation to knowledge" in conformity with my rationale in chapter 2.

Part II. The Articulation al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Women's Standpoints

A. Al-Sa'dawi

1. Discovering the Personal History of Nawal al-Sa'dawi⁵

Nawal al-Sa'dawi was born in 1931 in the village of Tahla in Qalubiyya Province in the Egyptian Delta. Her schooling and formal education took place in Egypt's Arabic schools.⁶ Also, her talent and inclination to write emerged when she was thirteen. In 1944 she wrote her first memoirs which were published as Mudhakkirat Tifla Ismuha Su'ad (1990) [Memoirs of a child named Su'ad]. In 1955, she graduated from the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University and qualified for the post of Egypt's Director of Public Health. Her practice of general medicine and psychiatry, both in the countryside and the city in Egypt, informed her writings a great deal. Her reflections on these experiences are found in her book Imra'atan fi Imra'a (1975) [translated : Two Women in One, 1985] (See Appendix. IV.B).

During her work as a Director of Public Health, al-Sa'dawi also founded the Association for Health Education, and was the editor of a popular magazine on health information. In fact, she was the first Arab-Muslim feminist to publicly confront sexual issues such as virginity, sexually transmitted diseases, prostitution, female circumcision, incest, and various forms of sexual exploitation. These experiences informed her first non-fiction book Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins [The woman and sex] in 1973, where she ventured to write on gender and sexuality. In fact, this book cost her job at the Ministry of Health, because she raised "taboo" and controversial issues, and she provoked the antagonism of highly political and theological authorities of Egypt. Under similar pressures, al-Sa'dawi lost her job as Chief editor of a health journal, and as an assistant general secretary in the Medical Association of Egypt.

Despite these difficulties and challenges, al-Sa'dawi's relentless commitment to feminism and women continued even more vigorously. From 1973 to 1976 she worked as a researcher at 'Ain Shams University, Faculty of Medicine in Cairo, specializing in "women's neurosis". This experience informed several of her fictional and non-fictional writings such as Imra'a 'Inda Nuqtat al-Sifr (1974), Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi (1975), and al-Wajh al-'Ari

⁵ My first encounter with al-Sa'dawi was through my reading of her book The woman and sex (1974) when I was growing up. Then I met her professionally, when I was a Moroccan delegate to the (UNIDW). Nairobi, Kenya (1985). That year I joined (AWSA), and engaged in a fruitful working relationship with the author and other members of the association that lasted from 1985 to 1990, when I immigrated to Canada. For further details on the author's life see al-Sa'dawi (1997).

lil Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya (1977), translated respectively as Woman at point zero (1983b) and Ferdaous: Une voix en enfer (1981), Femmes égyptiennes: tradition et modernité (1991), and The hidden face of Eve (1980)/ La face cachée d'Ève. Les femmes dans le monde Arabe (1983). From 1979 to 1980 al-Sa'dawi took the position of advisor for The United Nations' Women's Program in Africa (ECA), and the Middle East (ECWA).

All job opportunities were closed for al-Sa'dawi upon her return to Egypt in the 1980s due to her relentless fight for the Egyptian women's social and intellectual freedom. In fact, the author's confrontation with Egyptian officials under Sadat's regime reached its climax in 1981, and led to her incarceration. In response, al-Sa'dawi duly documented her prison experiences in her play al-Insan (1983) [The human being] and in her book *Fi Sijn al-Nisa'*. (1984). [Translated. Memoirs from the women's prison (1986). Also, *Douze femmes dans Kanater*. (1991). (See, Appendix IV.B). Equally, al-Sa'dawi's carceral experience inspired the writing of her powerful novel Suqut al-Imam (1987) [the fall of the imam] and placed her name in the death list of some conservative Islamists groups.

In 1982, she founded a Pan-Arab feminist organization, The Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA). However she was elected president to AWSA only in 1985 when the Egyptian authorities granted her permission. This delay is not surprising, given the rise of the Islamists as pressure groups, whose agenda is to maintain a neo-patriarchal socio-political order⁷ in Egypt, based on selective borrowings of both tradition and modernity. Similarly, this was predictable considering the Egyptian government's collaboration with the Islamists at the time, and the conflicting egalitarian societal project proposed by AWSA. The objective of AWSA is: "to liberate all Arab people especially women by freeing Arab land, economy, culture, and knowledge". The mandate is "to publish non-sexist material by Arab women in general, particularly material dealing with The Shari'a, The Family Code, and Islamic jurisprudence".⁸ By 1985 AWSA was granted "consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations as an Arab non-governmental organization."⁹

Al-Sa'dawi is a Muslim and a nationalist, who supported the Iranian Revolution (1979), and continues to support the Palestinian Liberation Movement and feminist activism in both Iran and the West Bank. In 1982, al-Sa'dawi received the prize for Franco-Arab

⁶ Personal communication with al-Sa'dawi during the (UNIDW), Nairobi, (1985).

⁷ I say neo-patriarchal order in conformity with my definition of neo-patriarchy in item 25 of the glossary.

⁸ In al-Sa'dawi (1986b, p. 8)

⁹ For a detailed discussion of AWSA see al-Sa'dawi (1986a. Introduction, pp.7-12).

friendship [Le prix de l'Amitié Franco-Arabe] in France. In 1989 al-Sa'dawi founded a pan-Arab magazine Nun within the mandate of AWSA, but the duration of the magazine was short-lived due to lack of financing and the authorities' relentless political pressure.¹⁰

The authorities' political pressures and some Islamists' death threats led to al-Sa'dawi's exile in the US in 1992. Nonetheless, she used her US exile experience during 1992-1996 to clarify her position on many issues (i.e. cultural identity, fundamentalism etc). This led to the publication of her latest book North/South: The Nawal El Saadawi [sic]Reader (1997). Here, al-Sa'dawi criticizes the persisting discrimination inflicted on women scholars from the South in the US institutions (p.124). Equally in this book she makes fundamental revisions to her previous feminist positions.

Al-Sa'dawi writes in Arabic and is widely published in the Arab-Islamic world, especially in Egypt and Lebanon. Furthermore, most of her literary books have been translated into several languages: English, French, German, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Italian, Portuguese, Persian, and Hebrew. Malti-Douglas (1995) views al-Sa'dawi as "a literary iconoclast" (p.12). Also, she rightly observes: "No other Arab woman (and a few Arab men) approaches El Saadawi [sic] in the breadth of her writing" (p.12).

2. Illustrating The Articulation of al-Sa'dawi's woman's Standpoint

The central question around which al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint is articulated is the patriarchal concept of "a feminine nature" which distinguishes women's physical, emotional, moral, and spiritual constitution from that of men's. In her view, this concept emanates from an essentialist ideology, which empowers men to impose inequality and to legitimize sexism within society. Subsequently, she argues, men established distinct categories of femininity and masculinity (social constructs) and femaleness and maleness (biological constitutions) in the representation of people in culture. That is, men elaborated a patriarchal construction of femininity and a feminine ideal, both of which attribute women's subordinate status to their biological make-up.¹¹

In fact, al-Sa'dawi argues, though this conventional belief in the feminine nature is a-historical, it permeates the whole Arab-Islamic social order as well as the intellectual order that sustains the representation of women's social reality. Throughout the selected books al-Sa'dawi relentlessly deconstructs the Arab-Islamic patriarchal social order and unfolds its

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the fate of Nun magazine, see al-Sa'dawi (1992b. Appendix.IV.B).

corollary intellectual order and mechanisms of power (institutions, and canonical knowledge). Her intent is to demonstrate the mutual effect of both orders on the Arab-Muslim women's identity in general and that of Egyptian women in particular. Accordingly, the themes al-Sa'dawi raises document both the tight control of patriarchy over Arab-Muslim women's private and public spaces, and the history of oppression of Arab-Muslim women.

2.1. Socialization

The patriarchal construction of femininity, al-Sa'dawi contends, is at the root of women's oppression in Arab-Islamic culture because it brought the colonization of women's body and its use as a space for patriarchal oppression and exploitation. In her view, men exploit the female body to define the nature of women's sexuality, and to control women's role in the family and society. The control of women's sexuality within the family, al-Sa'dawi argues, occurs through the differential socialization of girls and boys concerning femininity and masculinity in all aspects of life. In *Al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins*, she argues that the differential socialization starts at birth with the overemphasis on the sexual organs of girls: "When a girl is born, though unable to speak or express herself, she can still see from the looks of people around her that she is not like her brother. As a child, when she starts toddling or walking, she is socialized to fear and guard her sexual organs" (p. 31).

Al-Sa'dawi highlights the over-emphasis on a woman's body as the beginning of an identification process whereby the patriarchal family prepares a girl to assume only roles based on her biology: those of a wife and a mother. Not only does al-Sa'dawi demonstrate how the identification process of women emanates from a reductionist view of women's roles in society, but she also elucidates the role of identification in the socialization of girls in Arab-Islamic culture as a learned process. Thus, al-Sa'dawi describes the way the identification process of women is firmly sustained with a formative process of feminization that institutes women's inferiority and cements women's internalization of negativity and dependency on others. In her words: "The negativity of women is not a natural feature in women... It is a product of social pressure and repression of women's growth... A girl is born natural, but she learns at the moment of birth how to become feminine" (p.38).

For al-Sa'dawi, the aim of the patriarchal formative process of girls is to transform women's nature from a total person into a half person with merely a body. This transformation

¹¹ For details on femininity see item 22a in the glossary.

is performed through a vigorous conditioning process that eliminates women's sense of individuality, leading them to neurosis. In Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi, al-Sa'dawi captures in the voice of Zeinab the way family members use the conditioning process to sustain women's selflessness in the family and society (Dirasat, 1990,p. 613). Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi views femininity and masculinity in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah as categories of identification imposed on people both at the private and public levels, and she shows how these categories are manifested in the family and in the educational system. From her own childhood experience al-Sa'dawi recalls:

Why do they distinguish between me and my brother in food, clothing and presents... A girl has to clean the house, help in cooking, and study too if she goes to school. But the boy has only to study....When I went to school I noticed that they wrote my father's name on my satchel and books and not my mother's name. When I asked my mother for the reason she answered it is so. But my father told me those children lineage is attributed to the father only. And when I asked him why, he said: It is so. (pp.707-8)

2.2 Marriage and Divorce

In al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi draws on her own experience with patients to describe marriage and divorce in Arab-Islamic culture as "a master-slave contract" whereby women are literally the property of men:

I asked her about her life, and I learned that her father...was approached by a 'widow' who was fifty-five years old, a rich trader with a land property...The father did not hesitate to marry off his daughter who was then eighteen years old. The wife told me in despair: I felt every night that I sold my body like a prostitute to this old stranger in compensation for the dollars he gave my father. (p.75)

Likewise, in al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi al-Sa'dawi documents the oppression of women sexuality in 'Alia's voice, and shows the way required virginity leads to women's social alienation, and even to divorce (Dirasat, 1990, pp.622-3). However, it is in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah that al-Sa'dawi portrays the significance of required virginity as a means of social control of women's sexuality in an Arab-Islamic society: "Marriage is the only means for women to have sex. Pre-marital sex is totally forbidden for Arab girls in any Arab country today... A woman may sometimes risk her reputation by engaging in a free relationship with a man, but in the view of society, she becomes a scorned woman akin to a prostitute" (p.853).

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi unfolds the specific inequality of the Islamic family law and its preferential treatment of men, namely through the unique institution of *'idda*, and the unilateral right of men to marry non-Muslims:

The law and legislation allow men to have four wives at the same time. Yet the man can have more than four legal wives under the same law though the "idda", the freedom of divorce, and his ability to return his wife at any moment before the end of the "idda" (three months). A man could have four wives at home and four others in "idda" so that when he returns one in "idda" he divorces another at home. This way a man can have as many wives at any time by means of getting them out of "home" and getting them in by the "idda», and divorce the supplementary one according to circumstances.

Islam permits a man to marry a non-Muslim woman, but forbids a woman to marry a non-Muslim man. Marriage from non-Muslim women is guaranteed by the Shari'a, and Muslims practiced it from pristine Islam to date. The Muslim woman cannot marry anybody except a Muslim man; otherwise, she leaves her religion. (pp.854-55)

In fact, al-Sa'dawi accuses the judicial system of double standards as it claims change in gender relations while it maintains the status quo by keeping the institutions of *bait al-ta'a* (house of obedience), and *qawama* (tutelage). From the daily paper al-Ahram of 1976, al-Sa'dawi unravels the way the actual laws on marriage and divorce are practiced in Egypt:

Recently, a new reform project was published... The suggested amendments were published in the daily al-Ahram in February 29, 1976. From these amendments, we can see that the essence of the law was untouched. The right of the man to sexual whim still exists and so does his irresponsibility in divorce. The project states that the man is the only one who initiates divorce. That divorce requires that the husband is not mentally ill, drunk, in a state of chock or anger....Regarding the *beit al-Ta'a* [the house of obedience] the execution of the obedience law by means of the police no longer applies. All this in my view represent minor changes that does not affect the essence of the injustice inflicted on the married woman and it is in conflict with the spirit of the Shari'a founded on humane coexistence or separation. (pp. 844-45)

Last but not least, al-Sa'dawi denounces the continuous practice in Egypt of *zawaj 'orfi*, an old tribal marriage in the form of an un-written contract between the partners, yet recognized as legal. Al-Sa'dawi reports, that this type of marriage is particularly exploitative to women by men both in the family and in the state because it denies women's right to their husbands' pension while it protects men's right (pp.855-6).

2.3. The Family

In Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins, al-Sa'dawi observes that the first division of labor within the family starts with marriage:

Marriage is based on the division between the roles of the sexes in life. The man works outside the home to provide for the family. And the woman works inside the house and is provided for by the man. Thus, marriage confirms disparities between the man and the woman, and consolidates the relationship between the two in terms of provider/provided, owner/owned, served/serving. (p.101)

For al-Sa'dawi, it is this division of labor within the couple that enabled men to institutionalize discrimination in women's roles in the family. As a result, she notes, undue emphasis is placed on women's biological function at the expense of their equally important economic, political, educational, and religious functions (p.102). In Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi, al-Sa'dawi documents, in Suzanne's voice, the psychological abuse inflicted on women by their own husbands on the basis of gender and the stripping of women's agency within the family and society (pp.642-43).

Still, it is in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah that al-Sa'dawi explains the particularity and the complexity of the Arab-Islamic family, whereby custom and religion interlap in the oppression of women. She observes that in most cases the Arab family is an extended family, whose members control the whole decision making process of women's lives:

The woman could be divorced from a poor husband to be remarried to a rich one. Also, the woman could never get a divorce and be brought back to her husband by force or beating if the family is unable to feed and shelter her, and her children.... However the man is not required to preserve the family and the children although these are his property and not the woman's. Moreover the law, custom, and legislation help men to exploit women. (p.858)

Ultimately, al-Sa'dawi denounces the practice of the family law as a dehumanization process of women; even "an aggression against the orders of God and the principles of religion" (p. 912). In fact, al-Sa'dawi contends, the pattern of partial agency granted to women observed in the family is systemic as it is replicated within society through other institutions and practices; namely family planning and abortion, work, the judicial system, and canonical knowledge.

2.4. Family-Planning

The policies of family-planning, al-Sa'dawi argues, are heavily imbued with the double standard existing at the cultural level, and lead to a marked inequality between men and

women at the social level. In al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins, al-Sa'dawi highlights how the policies of family-planning are based exclusively on the biological role of women and not on the benefits they could bring to their lives:

The importance of the woman in the view of society is based on her bearing children....Procreation is all that concerns society as it directly affects its economic interest. The clearest evidence of this is what happens in... family planning.... When society suffers a decrease in population and, therefore, in the work force necessary for production, society makes a concerted effort to discover means of increasing fertility and treating causes of sterility in women. When the work force increases beyond the need of production and threatens the economics of society with the increase of population, society makes a concerted effort to discover means of contraception and women's sterility. (pp.47-48)

As to abortion, al-Sa'dawi asserts, it is strictly forbidden even in situations of rape, and sexual abuse. In al Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi, Khadija reports her story as a maid who was raped at the age of eleven by her master and had to resort to murder her own son in order to free him from experiencing her fate of poverty and exploitation. (pp.692-9). Further, in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi presents family planning as a double standard issue in the political life of Egyptians. First, she raises this issue from the Islamic worldview, and highlights the relationship between religion and power and the contradictory positions of the 'ulama on family-planning: "The Muslim religious men have conflicting positions regarding the subject of family planning. Some maintain that Islam approves of family planning and even abortion; yet others view that Islam not only forbids family planning, but also the use of contraception" (p.902).

Second, al-Sa'dawi describes the way the conflicting views of the 'ulama translate in ambiguity in social practice. Illustrating with Nassir's era, she shows how this ambiguity adversely affects the policies of family planning and their implementation in Egypt (pp.902-3). Third, al-Sa'dawi contends that contraception is a socio-economic matter and not a religious one. To substantiate, she traces the adoption of contraception and family planning in the history of Egypt to 1937, when both issues were freely debated in the press (pp.907-8).

Still, al-Sa'dawi observes, despite the endorsement of religious authorities of family planning, abortion remains illegal in Egypt. On the one hand al-Sa'dawi attributes this situation to the religious authorities' reduction of "the abortion issue" to its medical dimension: "Unless it is proven that the abortion was essential to save the mother...Such cases are placed under a category known as 'committing the lesser of two ills', which is one of the general principles of

religious jurisprudence and legislation" (p.909). On the other hand, al-Sa'dawi considers the religious authorities' attitude as an integral part of the judicial system's continuous attempt to control the sexuality of poor and working class women:

If a poor girl becomes pregnant without being married, she is in deep trouble as she pays the price with her own life, even if she is not at fault and is simply a poor helpless child raped by a man from an upper class. A girl from a rich family will usually not be exposed to such a cruelty because rich families find quick solutions by marrying the girl to a man from a lower class...Or take her to a doctor since they have the money to abort the girlThe operation of abortion still suffers in our Arab society from a contradiction in values and double standards which are the essential characteristics of any patriarchal class society. (pp.909-10)

2.5. Work

In al-Mar'ah Wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi addresses the duality of women's work inside the home and outside. Not only does she accuse society of reinforcing this duality by keeping the status quo, but she also blames the state for sustaining this duality and denying women equal pay for equal work:

A woman faces obstacles in society that prevent her from practicing a job she chooses or a field she excels in. In addition, marital and home problems preclude her performance at work. Thus, society sets obstacles for the woman in every step she takes regarding work in addition to violating her right to work and decreasing her salary which often reaches half the salary of a man's for the same work. (p. 81)

In fact, al-Sa'dawi views the family and the state as mutually reinforcing institutions in the exploitation of married women by imposing on them exclusively the responsibility of the work at home. As a result, she concludes, married women, become "pawned" by both the husband, and the state to stay at home (pp. 138-9). Further, al-Sa'dawi captures in al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi the psychological and emotional effects of women's double exploitation at home and outside the home from the accounts of her patients. The story of Leila, a secretary in a ministry, reflects the tension she suffered as a working class woman, and her husband's tyranny and refusal to share in the responsibilities of their home:

I get up at five AM every morning to prepare breakfast for my husband and children. My husband goes to work, and the eldest children to school. The youngest child stays with me. I carry him on my shoulders and I walk to my mother in law's house two kilometers away from our home... Then I leave the child and take the bus to the ministry... My husband gets home at four in the afternoon tired and in need for food and rest. And I get home only an hour before him... During this hour despite my exhaustion I cook lunch quickly, and prepare food for my children who return from school. When my husband sleeps after

lunch I go to my mother in law's to get my child. In the evening I prepare diner for everybody, and I help my child study. At ten in the evening I rest.... When I ask him to stay with me at home and help, we get into a fight and he says that he cannot stand staying at home in the evening. I told him that I also do not stand staying at home and do all the chores alone. But he says that all wives work at home, and all men go out in the evening, and that it is the nature of life. (pp. 633-34)

In al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah, al-Sa'dawi illustrates how the judicial system is fiercely guarded as a male turf, and how men usually invoke Islam to exclude women from practicing the profession of qadi (judge). Quoting the newspaper al-Akhbar of January 12, 1976, she shows the judicial system's discrimination against women as a manifestation of men's imposition of a hierarchy between genders:

The latest I read on this subject is an article in the daily newspaper al-Akhbar on January 12, 1976 where the author clarifies the meaning of preventing a woman from occupying the post of a judge in Islam: 'It is superfluous to clarify that Jurisprudence in Islam has ten criteria without which the very essence of judging is nil and void. These are: Islamic belief, reason, masculinity, freedom, maturity, justice, knowledge, and to be a completely healthy individual with a capacity to hear, to see and to speak. (pp.819-20)

Moreover, al-Sa'dawi addresses the duality of laws in Egypt that govern women's life. To substantiate, she describes the way the Constitution contradicts the family law, while reinforcing the institutionalization of sexism and discrimination against women at work in Egypt:

The article 19 of the Constitution of 1957 stipulates that the state facilitates the woman's conciliation between her work in society and her obligation in the family. Yet the state did not do this, the majority of working women is crushed physically and emotionally under the pressure of work outside and inside the house. In Egypt as in other Arab countries the woman is still believed to have been originally born to play the role of a mother and a wife and to raise children.... The Arab society allowed the woman to work only for the pressing economic needs of the family and society. She is allowed to work outside the house under the condition she comes back home to comply with her essential obligation toward the husband, the family and the children... Therefore, the work with a wage for the Arab woman in general did not liberate her but rather added to her responsibilities and provided her with new problems. (pp.821-22)

In fact, al-Sa'dawi asserts the law of work exploits women at home by labeling them as "homemakers", and thus excluding them from the workforce. She explains:

There is a large group of oppressed women in the work law. These are women working at home, and referred to as 'housewives'. The oppression of the working woman at home and her exploitation is a three times oppression as follows:

1. Her deprivation from the honor of production as a human being and ignoring her work by following productive work criteria.
2. Her deprivation from earning a salary.
3. Imposing housework on her simply because she is a female. (pp. 827-28)

Last but not least, al-Sa'dawi observes, illiteracy and ignorance of the majority of the Arab population are also responsible for the status quo. She attributes this situation to the educational system's failure to provide consciousness-raising programs likely to improve the mentality and attitudes of both men and women towards work in the Arab world:

Despite the increasing number of educated and employed women in Arab countries, the great majority is still suffering from illiteracy. Moreover, the educational system does not play a role in the eradication of outmoded ideas and conventions, which are spread between men and women. Thus, even educated people are still dominated by backward ideas handed down to them by their mothers and fathers, and which are repeated by Arab rulers and politicians in order to continue misleading and exploiting their people. (pp.823-4)

2.6. Special Theme: Female Circumcision¹²

Al-Sa'dawi is the first Arab-Muslim woman who broke the silence in 1974 that surrounded the subject of girls' circumcision. Today, girls' circumcision takes a particular urgency as a crucial issue not just for Egypt but for all Muslim countries because some Islamists groups are vigorously promoting this practice as a religious duty to be enforced in parts of the Islamic world where it did not exist before.¹³ As for Egypt, female circumcision reappeared in the political agenda of the government, which issued a decree on October 29, 1994 for the legalization of this practice under medical supervision.¹⁴

Al-Sa'dawi captures the practice of girls' circumcision in Egypt as follows in Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins: "As a girl barely reaches the age of nine or ten, before reaching puberty, she is visited by the 'dayya' who hold her legs like a chicken before slaughter, and takes off with a razor 'the clitoris'" (p. 86). In fact, al-Sa'dawi denounces the circumcision of girls as a form of physical "castration" akin to the castration performed on slaves in feudal societies in

¹² Female circumcision is the terminology I use to keep the equivalent meaning of this operation in Arabic known as *Khitan*. Also, al-Sa'dawi uses *khitan* throughout the Arabic versions of her books. In contrast, the English and the French editions of al-Sa'dawi's books replace circumcision with "female genital mutilation", and "clitoridectomy". These shifts in meanings not only distort the author's articulation of this operation, but also its contextual meanings. In chapter 5 I deal with the issue of *khitan* in more details.

¹³ AMEWS. Newsletter. Vol . X. No. 2. May, 1995. "Communication" .n.p.

order to impose chastity: "Doesn't this operation resemble in its essence the castration of slaves? Isn't this an evidence that a man owns a woman as he would a slave?" (p.87).

However, in al-Mar'ah wa-al-Sira' al-Nafsi Al-Sa'dawi describes some lasting medical and emotional effects resulting from circumcision such as enuresis¹⁵ and fear of emotional rejection: "She experienced circumcision when she was six years old... She strongly wants to love a man, but her enuresis makes her fearful (p. 630). In fact, al-Sa'dawi emphasizes the life-long debilitating psychological and emotional impact of circumcision on women's life in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah. From her own experience she poignantly reminisces:

I was six years old...I do not remember whether they were men or women... All I realized is that my legs where spread apart and that each thigh was held by iron-like fingers... I felt something metallic drop sharply and cut off a part of my body....The incident of circumcision continued to haunt me in my dreams like a nightmare. I did not know exactly what was in store for me in the future....Even when I grew up, and became a doctor in 1955, I could not forget the painful incident that ruined my childhood, and deprived me during my youth and marriage from a complete sexual and emotional life. Nightmares of similar kind followed me especially when I was a medical doctor in the rural areas, where they brought little girls for rescue, profusely bleeding from circumcision. (pp.705-6)

For al-Sa'dawi, therefore, the practice of female circumcision in Egypt illustrates society's view of women as mere bodies whose main function is procreation. In fact, she insists, this view of women as mere bodies is further exacerbated by marriage and divorce institutions which legalize women as commodities.

B. Mernissi¹⁶

1. Discovering the Personal History of Mernissi

Fatima Mernissi was born in Fès, Morocco in 1940 where she was brought up in a traditional household. She studied Political Science and Law at Muhammad V University in Rabat, and at The Sorbonne, and earned a Ph.D. in sociology in 1973 from Brandeis University, MA. From 1974 to 1980, she taught sociology at Muhammad V University, Rabat. Currently, she is a researcher at l'Institut Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique in Rabat. Mernissi's combined training in political science, law, and journalism, as well as her

¹⁴ Idem.

¹⁵ *Enuresis* is a physical condition that engenders urinary incontinence. Al-Sa'dawi argues that *enuresis* is a debilitating chronic physical condition that results from female circumcision. Moreover, she insists, this physical condition is often accompanied by a psychological condition as well, namely fear of intimacy, and of emotional rejection from men.

¹⁶ For the personal history of Mernissi, I draw on the various interviews and journals listed in Appendix IV B, and my personal knowledge of the author.

specialization in sociology, informed her feminist writings and gave perspective to her sociological work in a distinctive way.

While Mernissi is among of the first Moroccan generation of sociologists, her discourse differs from their dominant discourses regarding the sociology of women and the family. The difference is clear in Mernissi's methodological approach: she usually contrasts the laws of the state with the laws of the Islamic family, and she analyzes the impact of these contradictory laws on the male-female dynamics. Manifestation of this is found in all her writings from her first book: Beyond the veil (1975), to one of her latest work: Chahrazade n'est pas Marocaine: Autrement elle serait salariée (1991). (See Appendix IV.B)

Moreover, Mernissi's interest in the relationship of the state and the family in Morocco led her to widen her analysis to the State and the family in the Arab-Islamic civilization. This in turn induced her to fathom the relationship between the state and the family as key institutions that govern male-female dynamics, and diagnose their implications for equality and democracy between genders. Manifestation of this deep analysis is found in Le harem politique: Le prophète et les femmes (1987). Last but not least, Mernissi is an outspoken feminist, who lectures widely on women's issues in the Arab world and abroad. Among her journalistic activities is her work with Jeune Afrique and Peuples Méditerranéens in France, and Kalima in Morocco.

Mernissi writes in French, but some of her work is translated into Arabic and English (Figure I). This brought serious criticism of Mernissi's work in the national press of Morocco; labeling her as an "acculturated" scholar whose work serves the interests of the West rather than national/and Arab interests. Debates on the acculturated nature of Mernissi's work and her lack of understanding of Moroccan and Arab-Muslim realities are found in Moroccan newspapers such as: al-Balagh al-Maghribi, and al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki since 1983 and continue to date. (See Appendix. IV.B)

2. Illustrating the Articulation of Mernissi's Woman's Standpoint

The central concept around which most of Mernissi's themes are articulated is *fitna*. Mernissi attributes the root of women's inequality of status in Arab-Islamic society to *fitna* (women's irresistible temptation, civil war). Not only does she trace the origins of this concept to Islamic ideology on sexuality, but she also explains the role of this concept as an organizer of spatial division between men and women, and a regulator of the female-male dynamics in

Arab-Islamic culture. Throughout the selected books Mernissi documents the way the concept of *fitna* permeates the whole of Arab-Islamic social order, and affects the division of labor within the couple, the family, and the community. For Mernissi, *fitna* is a pivotal concept, as it brings insight into the separation between the public and private spaces of Arab-Muslim women, as well as an understanding of the status of Arab-Muslim women in the past and in the present. Table II lists the totality of the themes Mernissi deals with in the three books selected for this thesis. In this section I present the most recurrent themes presented in figure II to illustrate Mernissi's representation of women's social reality.

2.1. Socialization

In *Beyond the veil* Mernissi argues that the segregation of women in Arab-Islamic culture is based on fear of female sexuality, and identification with: "fitna, chaos, and with the anti-divine and anti-social forces of the universe" (p.11). In fact, Mernissi contends, the segregation of women is an institution for the protection of the Islamic social order from profanity and disorder by the human being, and the promotion of God's obedience and love. In such a social order, she insists, sexual segregation is the pillar of the social control of both men and women. Likewise, she asserts, female sexuality within this social order is based on an ideal type of male-female dynamics. What is at stake, Mernissi notes, is neither female sexuality per-se, nor women's emancipation in Islamic polity, but rather the "fate of the heterosexual unit" (p.13). For this reason, she contends, the socialization of men and women occurs in a segregated social order, and the sexual segregation is primarily intended to promote the emotional separation between men and women and the channeling of emotions to the worship of God.

For Mernissi, sexual inequality is not inherent to the doctrine of Islam but to the patriarchal Islamic ideology and is manifested in the continuous perception by today's men of women's liberation as a religious issue. To illustrate, she quotes a Moroccan man who, preoccupied by desegregation in the 1970s, wrote to the counseling service of the Moroccan Broadcast System for advice:

Nowadays, the majority of the people go....to beaches during the summer months. Then, men, women, boys, and girls meet and mix together. They mix with Christians and Jews; everyone looking at everybody else's nudity. Is this permissible in a Moslem society? (p. 51-52).

Similarly, Mernissi depicts segregation in Doing daily battle as a hierarchical system of discrimination based on sex as well as class. Batul, who experienced harem life in the 1930 reports: "The free wives ate separately from us, and the slaves too. The free wives had their own dishes, their own furniture, and even their own slaves" (p. 25). Conversely, Mernissi portrays the social organization between genders as egalitarian in Women and Islam. To substantiate, she deals with the origin, dimensions, and implications of segregation on women in Arab-Islamic culture in her description of the *hijab* (the veil). First, Mernissi traces the origins of the *hijab*, assumed to be designed for the segregation and seclusion of women, as an institution initially revealed to cover two different but simultaneous events in the history of Islam: "On the one hand the descent of the Quranic verse on the prophet, hence related to the intellectual realm, and on the other hand the descent of the *hijab* cloth, a material *hijab*, a curtain that the prophet drew between himself and the man who was at the threshold of his nuptial chamber." (p.85) .

Second, Mernissi contextualizes the socio-historical and geo-political circumstances of the *hijab's* revelation: " The incident had occurred during the wedding night of the prophet and Zaynab, and must be replaced in its context, an era of doubts and military defeats which devastated the morale of the Medina inhabitants." (p.92). Third, Mernissi shows the role of the political developments in the history of Islam in the transformation of the meaning of the *hijab* from: "a separation of the public and private space, or indeed the profane from the sacred....into a segregation of the sexes" (p. 101). To illustrate, Mernissi documents the permeability between the public and private spaces during the prophet's life, and the parallel culture of resistance to male-female equality advocated by the prophet's own fathers in law Abu Bakr and Umar in Madina in the years 4,5, and 6 of Hijra (pp.105-6).

2.2. Marriage/divorce

In Beyond the veil Mernissi criticises the 1957 Moroccan Code that governs family life and the master-slave relationship of the conjugal unit. To substantiate, she quotes the self-explanatory rights of the husband and the wife as stipulated in the Code:

Art. 36-The rights of the Husbands vis-à-vis his wife

1.Fidelity

2. Obedience according to the accepted standards

3. Breastfeeding, if possible, of the children born from the marriage

4. The management of the household and its organization

5. Deference towards the mother and father and close relatives of the husband

Art. 35- The Rights of the Wife Towards Her Husband

1. Financial support as stated by the law, such as food, clothing, medical care, and housing
2. In case of polygamy, the right to be treated equally with the other wives
3. The authorization to go and visit her parents and the right to receive them according to limits imposed by the accepted standards
4. Complete liberty to administer and dispose of her possessions with no control on the part of the husband, the latter has no power over his wife's possessions. (p.60)

In addition, Mernissi notes, divorce in the Arab-Islamic society is an institution of repudiation that reflects a unilateral practice and privilege of men. However, she notes this institution is both for and against men; and as such it represents an oppressive institution for both genders. To illustrate she quotes a man's letter to the counseling service of the Moroccan Broadcast system: "I pronounced the repudiation formula while I was boiling in anger. I pray your highness to tell me if there is anything I can do to have my wife back in spite of what happened. I must confess that I love my wife deeply and intensely." (p.66)

Nonetheless, Mernissi documents women's resistance to the exploitation in marriage and divorce. A teenaged girl sent a letter to the Counseling Service of the Moroccan Broadcast System that denounces the institution of tutelage in Islamic marriage:

I am fifteen years old. A man came and asked for my hand from my parents...and of course my parents gave me to him. I have not accepted the marriage and I am not going to. But the problem is that when the contract is about to be written by the justice officer..., they do not intend to let me know. They intend to take another girl and write a fake contract. Then I will be sacrificed... What does the religious law say concerning parents who fake their daughter's marriage? I prefer to kill myself whatever the law says. (p. 57)

In Doing daily battle Mernissi describes the nature of the master-slave relationship entailed in marriage and divorce, and the legitimation of women's oppression by the judicial system. In Zubaida's voice:

I went to my maternal uncle... My husband resorted again to the court: 'My wife has fled', he told them... Finally they found out where I was and came to fetch me by force. But I only stayed one more night at my husband's house. My father had to give some money and move heaven and earth for me to get a divorce. I ceded everything to my husband. But I had the guardianship of my daughter Farida. (p.70)

Likewise, Mernissi documents men's unilateral right for divorce leading women to become "pawnd" such as Rabi'a who was trapped in a marriage to an impotent and alcoholic husband:

Q: It never occurred to you that you could leave him?

A: No, not at all. Moreover, at the beginning, it was he who threatened me with divorce: 'if you do not keep quiet, I'll repudiate you'. And this threat terrified me, you know, I was so young. It was idiotic, but for me it was a humiliation, the end of the world. My husband exploited this tactic to the utmost. I was the first to bend, to make concessions. (p.59)

In contrast, Mernissi describes women in Women and Islam as independent individuals endowed with self-determination in contracting marriage or dissolving it. For instance, she reports that one of the great granddaughter of the prophet, Sukayna: "never pledged ta'a" (p.192). In fact, Mernissi argues, in her marriage contracts, Sukayna: "Stipulated that she would not obey her husband, but would do as she pleased, and that she did not acknowledge that her husband had the right to practice polygyny." (p.192). Equally, Mernissi reports, the prophet not only respected women's self determination by applying the verse of choice with his wives, but he also conceded to them the independence from guardians on matters of divorce: " When.... He advised Aicha, the youngest, to consult with her parents before deciding, she took offence at this and answered that she never asked the opinion of her parents in such matters." (p.175).

2.3. The Family

In Beyond the veil Mernissi argues that the Moroccan Code reflects Islam's traditional status of women, and denies women access to the labor market. This, in her view, contrasts sharply with the economic necessities of the family since women are induced to seek a job to supplement the husband's income (p.90). Mernissi attributes this situation to a discrepancy between ideology and reality, and to the nationalists' lack of socio-economic reforms (p.91). However, it is in Doing daily battle that Mernissi actually unfolds various layers of oppression inflicted on women by the family. In Mariam's voice, she highlights the abuse of power by the guardian of the family regarding women's inheritance: "I went to see my younger brother. I told him that I wanted my share of the family's inheritance. He told me that he had never seen me at the house when he was growing up, and so I was not his sister." (p. 31).

Similarly, Mernissi portrays in her interviewees' voices the dynamics of the Moroccan family that contrast sharply with men's perception and expectations. On the one hand,

Mernissi demystifies men's belief and policies regarding men's capacity of *nafaqa* (up-keep). In the voice of Rabi'a, Mernissi portrays how women participate in the economics of the family, even when the husband is "well-off" :

You see, we did not have a definite budget. I did not know how much my husband earned, nor how much he spent...He had a very extravagant life style because of the parties we gave...I did all the shopping at once; I bought the supplies by the month. My husband was totally uninterested in household matters...I used my salary to buy the small pieces of furniture, to buy my clothes and the children's clothes. Sometimes my husband used to say: 'I do not know what she does with her money. I don't know if she's got it salted in a bank'. He knew perfectly well what I used it for. Our furniture didn't fall out of the sky. (pp. 50-51)

On the other hand, Mernissi argues for the inapplicability of the *wali* institution (guardian) to Moroccan women's reality in the 1970s. In the case of Nezha coming from low-income family, Mernissi exemplifies the majority of the women she interviewed, who were supposedly "kept" by their fathers, husbands, or other male guardians, and who proved in reality compelled to seek a job in order to meet their daily needs:

You know I was a school boarder in Rabat. There was a local person there (a sort of a guardian) who was supposed to look after me, but I never saw him...

Q: You had a scholarship at boarding school. Was it enough?

A: In the beginning, my uncle supported us. But starting the third year, my uncle began to have some difficulties...So my sister and I began to work.

Q: How old were you?

A: I was not even fifteen. The first year I got a job as a typist....

After that experience, I developed the habit of working the whole three months of the school vacations. I saved the money that I earned and used it throughout the school year to cover my needs-my clothes, trips, books, everything. (pp.83-84)

Conversely, in Women and Islam Mernissi draws on the life of the prophet to describe the Islamic family. First, she documents the indivisibility between the private (the family) and the public (*the Ummah*) spaces, as well as the sacred and the profane spaces in the life of prophet. To illustrate, Mernissi describes the way Umm Salama played a key role in the negotiation of the treaty of Hudaibiya with the Meccans in AD 628, and how she counseled the prophet to govern by acting as an example for the community to follow (pp.104-105). Second, Mernissi documents the prophet's democratic style and equality in male/female dynamics as evidenced in the spatial arrangements of his headquarters within the Islamic *Ummah*, and his life-style:

The simplicity of the lodgings, their closeness to each other, and their closeness to the mosque gave a democratic dimension to the Islamic community...The prophet's simple manner of living was a threat to those around him, for he cared nothing for the virtues of the public/private division of space, and male supremacy can only exist and be consolidated if the public/private division is maintained as an almost sacred matter. (p.111)

2.4. Family Planning

The theme of family planning, while surprisingly non-existent in both Beyond the veil and Women and Islam, permeates Doing daily battle. Here, Mernissi deals with family planning as an all-pervasive problem confronting Moroccan women. She duly documents the lonely journey of both low-class and well-off Moroccans in their search for coping mechanisms to deal with family planning in a patriarchal society. First, Mernissi describes women's inability to control their pregnancies as the direct result of their husband's lack of cooperation and responsibility. Rabi'a reports: " The first child arrived just like that. We did not expect it. We were idiots, the two of us. He was aware of my ignorance in this matter and did nothing about it." (p.51).

Second, Mernissi highlights women's preoccupation with family-planning as multifaceted: their concern with infant mortality, the effect of poverty on the welfare of their children, and their own deteriorating health induced by frequent pregnancies. Worried, and helpless, Moroccan women seek single-handedly solutions to space their pregnancies, varying from traditional to modern methods, and sometimes resorting to desperate means such as magic as in the case of Tahra (pp. 189-90). Third, Mernissi describes the way men violate the principles of Islam regarding sex and alcohol, and conveniently use abortion as a strategy to cover their track of rape and sexual abuse of lower class women. Mariam Talbiya recalls:

The man I worked for, Muhammad was very ill... I served him, mothered him...Then he recovered and became handsome, elegant, refined, distinguished....In time I took to enjoying wine and pleasure. I was a virgin, and so he deflowered me. After a few months he became vulgar and violent with me. When I wanted to leave him, he threatened to set the police on my trail... The members of these families could steal and kill with impunity; the law did not apply to them...He could arrange my disappearance, and nothing would happen. So each time I agreed to stay. One day...I told him that I had missed my period for a month and that I must be pregnant. He told me to see about getting an abortion. Then he left for France. (p.32)

2.5. Work

In Beyond the veil Mernissi argues that women's right to work is denied by the Moroccan Code because it grants the man total control over his wife's access to the public space: " Article 35 of the Modern Code states that among the woman's rights vis-à-vis the husband is the right to visit her parents, implying that she has no right to leave the house without the husband's permission." (p.90) In contrast, she points out, The Constitution "in the name of equality between all citizens" grants women access to the public space and "thus by implication the right to work outside the home" (p.90).

In Mernissi's view, not only are the laws regarding women contradictory, but also the Moroccan legislators contribute to maintain women in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the husband. Accordingly, Mernissi infers, the contradictory Moroccan legislation emphasizes "the need for the woman to negotiate such rights with her husband" (p.90). Furthermore, Mernissi exposes Moroccan officials' representation of women's presence in the public space. She discloses the officials' attitude towards women's work by quoting the way they handled the position of women in the labor market in the 1971 census: "The woman, encouraged on the one hand by socio-economic changes which are taking place, and on the other hand by a rising level of education, is becoming a serious competitor to men in the labor market. Out of 100 active individuals 30 are young women." (p.93).

Also, Mernissi highlights the way Moroccan officials conceal women's presence at work in official statistics by defining the "economically active" as inclusive of "people holding jobs and those looking for jobs" (p.93). Last but not least, Mernissi quotes Moroccan officials' acknowledgement that: "In rural areas women's participation in economical activity is confused with housework, and a certain reticence on the part of the husband to declare his wife active was noticed" (p.94). Thus, Mernissi illustrates the prevailing ambiguity on women's right to work in Moroccan society, and the way Moroccan officials legitimize the status quo regarding women's economic contribution to Moroccan society. Accordingly, she concludes:

Because the woman's right to work is ambiguous, the state is only responsible to provide jobs for the men. Providing enough jobs for women becomes not an obligation but an act of benevolent generosity. Keeping women in the home under the control of men satisfies both psychological and economic needs of a depressed economy. (p.94)

In Doing daily battle Mernissi, through the voice of Dawiya, describes the conditions of working women in factories and the striking injustices and exploitations inflicted upon them:

Q: And when you are ill, do they help you out a little?

A: When I am ill or worn out, they hide me in the piles of wool to be washed, to keep the foreman from knowing what's going on...

Q: Do you have a doctor at the factory?

A: No, outside, but the factory pays. But only for the trip to the doctor. We have to pay for the medicines ourselves. (p.99)

Conversely, Mernissi presents the variety of workwomen practiced during the life of the prophet in Women and Islam. For example, she reminds us that Khadija, the first wife of the prophet, was a successful businesswoman in "international trade" (p.146). Likewise she argues Hind Bint 'Utba, was a political activist: " Who played a central role in the opposition of Mecca people against Muhammad, to the extent that her name figured in the rare list of the Mecca people whom the prophet wanted dead " (p.147). Finally, Mernissi insists that Sukayna was actively involved in Arabian political affairs to the extent that her career took precedence over her marital life: " She continued...despite her several marriages, to attend the meetings of the Qurayshi tribal council, the equivalent of today's democratic municipal councils" (p.192).

2.6. Special Theme: Women and Politics

In Women and Islam, Mernissi raises the issue of women's political leadership in Islamic countries. First, she reports her encounter with her grocer about a woman's ability to command the Muslims in connection with Benazir Bhutto: "Can a woman be a leader of Muslims? I asked my grocer, who, like most grocers in Morocco, is a true "barometer" of public opinion... I take refuge in Allah! he exclaimed, shocked." (p.1) Mernissi reports that soon another customer, a schoolteacher, intervened and objected with an implacable popular Hadith: "Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity!" (p.1) In Mernissi's opinion, the grocer's reaction seemed to be a prevalent position on the participation of women in politics. She summarizes the situation as follows:

A glance at the latest Moroccan election statistics supports the "prediction" uttered in the grocery store. Although the constitution gives women the right to vote and be elected, political reality grants them only the former. In the legislative elections of 1977, the eight women who stood for election found no favor with the six and a half million voters, of whom three millions were women. At the parliament, there was not one woman present, and the men were settled among their male peers as usual, just as in the cafes. Six years later, in the municipal elections of 1983, 307

women were bold enough to stand as candidates, and almost three and a half million women voters went to the polls. Only 36 women won the elections, as against 65,502 men! (p.2)

Baffled by this situation, Mernissi decided to find out why power continues to be viewed as necessarily male, and why women's subordination to men persists as unquestioned in the opinion of Moroccan citizens in the 1980s. Accordingly, Mernissi embarked in a journey of verification of the "truth" of the *hadith* on Muslim women in politics, and examined other misogynous *hadiths* and the provisions pertaining to women in the Qur'an and in the *hadith*. Mernissi starts her journey of verification by problematizing women's participation in the political life of Islamic society as an organic existential issue pertaining to the Islamic polity's fear of democracy. In her view this fear is mainly caused by the Islamic society's mismanagement of civil society, namely in terms of rights between the sexes, and between individual and collective rights. Accordingly, Mernissi situates men's persistence to return to tradition and the past as a continuous political ploy to reinstate a previous unequal social order.

In contrast, Mernissi highlights the egalitarian social order established by the prophet. This way she emphasizes men's hegemony and tyranny as well as women's continuous resistance and their struggle for liberation:

The return to the past, the return to tradition that men are demanding, is a means of putting things "back in order". An order that no longer satisfies everybody, especially not the women who never accepted it. The "return" to the veil invites women who have left "their" place (the "their" refers to the place that was designated for them) to leave their newly conquered territories. And it is implied that this place in which society wants to confine them again is to be marginal, and above all subordinate, in accordance with the ideal Islam, that Muhammad-the prophet who, on the contrary, preached in AD 610 a message so revolutionary that the aristocracy forced him to exile. (p.24)

Then, Mernissi explores gender in knowledge production in the Islamic society by demonstrating the existence of a tradition of misogyny in the interpretation of religious texts. To illustrate, Mernissi challenges the authenticity of the *hadith*: "Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity", attributed by Muslims to al-Bukhari on the participation of Muslim women in politics. First, Mernissi describes the historical and social circumstances of this *hadith* using al-'Asqalani's work Fath al-Bari (pp.49-51). Second, she explains, Abu Bakr's social background (One of the prophet's Companions) as a former slave, and his yearning for a quick social mobility among the notables of Basra to be the motivating

factors in his affirmation of the *hadith*. In fact, Mernissi notes, Abu Bakr had vested interest in keeping his newly acquired social status among the notables of his time; especially that these were the enemies of 'Aicha (pp.53-54). Third, she highlights the lack of *Ijma'* (consensus) on the *hadith* concerning women's participation in politics between the *fuqaha* themselves:

Even though it was collected as Sahih (authentic) by al-Bukhari and others, that hadith was hotly contested and debated by many. The fuquaha did not agree on the weight to give to that hadith on women and politics. Assuredly there were some who used it as an argument for excluding women from decision making. But there were others who found that argument unfounded and unconvincing. Al-Tabari was one of those religious authorities who took a position against it, not finding it a sufficient basis for depriving women of their power of decision making and for justifying their exclusion from politics. (p.61)

C. Findings

In view of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's representation of Arab-Islamic social reality from their woman's standpoints, I have come to the following conclusions:

1. That al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's treatment of gender deals with the formal and informal spaces of social interaction in the Arab-Islamic society both past and present.
2. That al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint is local and covers various realms of discrimination and oppression of Arab-Islamic patriarchy and their effects on women.
3. That in covering various realms of oppression inflicted on women, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's may expand on the Arab-Islamic feminist epistemology¹⁷ and build on the feminist and scientific legacy accumulated over generations of women within the Arab-Islamic tradition.
4. That the new knowledge created from the woman's standpoint may be a breakthrough in Arab-Islamic social sciences in that it could yield to new understandings both of Arab-Islamic patriarchy in its idiosyncratic articulation as a social power structure, and of the status of women under the influence of this power structure.
5. That in covering the various layers of patriarchal oppression of women, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are unfolding various spaces of inequality where feminist intervention is mostly needed.
6. That the themes articulated in the authors' standpoint illustrate Arab-Islamic patriarchy as a class society and thus a repressive authoritarian system for both men and

women. As such, the presentation of reality from the woman's standpoint, or feminism in women's voice is a form of cultural criticism of the Arab-Islamic society as a whole, not just the abuses of patriarchy.

7. That the themes addressed by the authors reflect both the processes of patriarchal oppression and repression of women's voices and attempts at resistance. The authors' aim is to illustrate the predominance of patriarchal influence and authority over women, and the various difficulties women encounter to liberate themselves from patriarchal hegemony.

8. That the themes raised from the authors' standpoint attempt to portray lived femininity time and space and contrast sharply with the patriarchal ideal of femininity.¹⁸ In doing so, the themes capture the authors' subjectivity and inter-subjectivities with other Arab-Muslim women (the researcher/researched relationship).

Conclusion

This chapter has described al-Sadawi's and Mernissi's feminist knowledge from their respective woman's standpoint. It suggested that both the authors' woman's standpoint and struggle are situated at two simultaneous levels: a discursive level, which raises questions of representation of women in the Arab-Islamic culture. And a material level which addresses daily life-experiences of women and their survival in a patriarchal socio-political organization. To what extent is al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's respective woman's standpoint really representative of the discursive and material levels that constitute the social reality of Arab-Muslim women? Is al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's discourse of femininity liberating and representative of the diversity of Arab-Muslim reality and experience? In chapter 5 and 6, I attempt to answer these two questions by exploring al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's "context of scientific discovery" using Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990) and their recommended analytical instruments (methodology, method, and epistemology).

¹⁷ I use the term feminist epistemology as described in item 24 in the glossary.

¹⁸ For a brief description of lived femininity and the patriarchal feminine ideal see item 22a in the glossary.

CHAPTER V
PROBLEMATIZING AL-SA'DAWI'S
WOMAN'S STANDPOINT

Introduction

In this chapter, I rely on the third level of my model outlined in figure VII of chapter 2 to describe al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's feminist knowledge from a plural feminist consciousness. The focus at this level of analysis is the scientific context of discovery of al-Sa'dawi's feminist research. In part 1 I apply the three analytical instruments (methodology, method, and epistemology) recommended by Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (1990) to locate al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint throughout her scientific context of discovery. In part 2 I illustrate how al-Sa'dawi invests her woman's standpoint in the articulation of her feminist societal project for Arab-Muslim women in general and those of Egypt in particular.

Part I. Exploring al-Sa'dawi's Context of Discovery

A. Methodology

1. The Marxist Approach to Human History

1.1. The Evolution of Marriage and the Family

In al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi declares that the real reasons behind the differences between men and women are clear: "to those who read history and study the socio-economic developments since the beginning of human history to our day" (p. 63). To substantiate, she relies on Frederick Engels' The Origin of the Family to describe the development the family as an integral part of the economic system and the process of evolution of society from agriculture to industrialization (pp.63-64). This way, al-Sa'dawi traces the development of patriarchy as corollary to that of private property in societal evolution.

Moreover, al-Sa'dawi applies the Marxist concepts of "latent slavery" and "private property" to describe marriage and divorce in Arab-Islamic culture. However, instead of demonstrating how these two concepts actually unfold in the history of gender in Egypt as an illustrative case, al-Sa'dawi merely asserts this:

Property is the cause of hostility and egotism in today's world...The ownership of women by men is not very different from the master/slave ownership. Men buy women with dowry. Furthermore, the marriage contract stipulates in its first items that a wife is a husband's property to whom she owes total obedience. In addition

a wife serves her husband without salary. Should she disobey, rebel, get sick or exhausted, the husband sells her by virtue of his absolute right to divorce. (pp.82-3)

1.2. Monotheism in Human History

In fact, al-Sa'dawi applies the Marxist materialist analysis in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah to trace monotheism in various world-civilizations and to contextualize the monotheistic system of Islam¹ and its social institutions within human history. From the Marxist approach al-Sa'dawi views history as an evolutionary process between various races and civilizations of humanity. First, she traces the inception of monotheism in the Ancient Egyptian Civilization. This enables her to illustrate the influence of Egyptian civilization on the development of monotheism in Judaism. By the same token, this allows her to highlight the interlap between the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as evolutionary phases in Human thought and history (p.715). Based on this evolutionist perspective al-Sa'dawi considers Islam in human history as a socio-historical development of Judaism and Christianity, and identifies the status of women in Islam as being the product of the three monotheistic religions.

Likewise, al-Sa'dawi views religion itself to be an organic part to the evolutionary process of non-religious systems that have preceded it in history (p.715). To illustrate, she shows how the concept of latent slavery emerged in Arab-Islamic culture and shaped social institutions such as polygamy, virginity, and punishment of adultery. She argues that polygamy, usually associated with Arab-Islamic culture, actually originated in "primitive" feudal Judaic societies with the increase of private property:

The owner in primitive societies needed slaves and hiring of labor to work in the fields he owned with the expansion of property and feudalism. This new economic life...required polygamy to increase man's wealth so that the woman would perform all manual work in the field and at home without a wage... With the inception of private property..., and the growth of the patriarchal system, the man started to demand fidelity after marriage...and chastity and virginity before marriage. Thus, patriarchal societies in their early era elaborated solutions to adultery inspired from their tyrannical regimes and in agreement with the man's supremacy. Among these were the sons of Israel, who stipulated death penalty on

¹ Here, al-Sa'dawi is engaging with both original Islam as a moral order established by the prophet in Arabia, and with *Sunni* Islam and its evolution in history (see Appendix I).

an adulterous woman either by "burning" like "Yehuda" did with his wife "Themara"; or by throwing stones. (p.724-228)

1.3. Islam and its Institutions

Based on this historical contextualization of polygamy, virginity and adultery, al-Sa'dawi puts into perspective the way these Judaic institutions were integrated in Islamic societies:

Islam also emerged within a patriarchal society founded on private property and a class system constituted of masters and slaves. This way authority in Islam became held by man as the head of the family. The judge, the khalifah, the wali, the qadi, and the witness are all positions particular to the man alone. Moreover, Islam inherited from Judaism punishment with stones on the question of adultery, so much so that women were stoned to death during the era of Muhammad and during the first era of Islam. (p.729)

Similarly, al-Sa'dawi unfolds aspects of Christianity that improved some of the Judaic institutions, namely polygamy and concubinage to show Christianity's restrictions on man's excessive sexual freedom. Still, she observes, Christianity maintained some of the sexual privileges of men. She elaborates: "The Christian ethics led to the prohibition of polygamy and the engagement in successive marriages. Nonetheless, later Christianity allowed the man the system of secrecy known as "*Tassarriyyan*" (pp.729-30). Finally, al-Sa'dawi highlights the way Islam improved the social organization of all systems that preceded it in human history. Yet, she insists that the Islamic system maintained the status quo in women's condition:

Undoubtedly, slaves and concubines have benefited within Islam of rights they were denied before Islam...However, the man in Islam remained the master and the provider for the woman. Marriage in Islam remained akin to a contract of appropriation whereby the husband owns his wife by virtue of the dowry and the up-keep, and the obligation of the wife is obedience. (pp.732-33)

Clearly, al-Sa'dawi attempts to show the close relationship between economy and religion, and to highlight the changes in sexual and moral values as being dependent on the economic and political contingencies of each phase in human history. However, her articulation of women's status quo within the Islamic system is merely asserted rather than explained from historical evidence. Further, al-Sa'dawi draws conclusions about marriage and divorce practices during *al-Jahiliyya* without any economic analysis of this period. To substantiate, she merely reports the co-existence of matriarchal forms of marriage with

patriarchal and feudalistic polygamous marriages during *al-Jahiliyya*, namely polyandry known as *musharaka marriage* (literally "participatory marriage"), and *istibda' marriage*, a marriage whereby a woman uses another man than her husband as a fertilizer for a "better progeny" or in the case of sterility (p.737).

Then, al-Sa'dawi traces contemporary remnants of forms of marriages "between marriage and non-marriage" akin to those of *al-Jahiliyya* that Muslim men maintain for themselves under the Shari'a. Al-Sa'dawi cites *mahr Sharti* practiced in Somalia and other Islamic countries as a type of marriage that holds a remarkable resemblance to *mut'a marriage*. Likewise, she observes that *al-Khotba al-Sirriyya*, literally a "secret marriage", is another form of unions among many that men commonly practice to avoid the anger and jealousy of the first wife/ves (p.855). Finally, al-Sa'dawi reports, that the worst of all marriages is *zawaj 'orfi*, a custom marriage without a written contract still practiced in contemporary Egypt, because it allows the husband to benefit from his wife's pension, while denying the wife the same benefit (p.855).

Accordingly, al-Sa'dawi concludes, the laws of marriage and divorce in the Arab society are unlikely to change as long as the society remains a class and patriarchal society. However, instead of exploring patriarchy from the social reality of Egypt, or other Arab-Islamic countries, al-Sa'dawi relies on Marxist theory of property to generalize her prediction of divorce in the region at large:

In all social systems since the birth of the patriarchal family class, sex, slavery and feudalism, the right to divorce has only been the exclusive prerogative of man. Class and patriarchal society has made the woman a commodity to be bought and sold with dowry and alimony. Capitalist society liberated the peasants from the slavery of feudalism not for humane, liberating reasons, but because capitalism needed the peasants' work force in the new industries...If the capitalist society accorded the woman the right to divorce like men in some advanced industrial countries, it was only to make women an active alternative workforce in the market...for economic exploitative reasons. (pp. 851-52)

Al-Sa'dawi's application of Marxist materialist theory and categories of analysis to the Arab-Islamic social reality is inadequate on several counts. First, she includes feudalism with capitalism as part of the patriarchal system without specifically explaining any of them singly, nor how in combination they affected the status of Arab-Muslim women. As a result, her description of patriarchal forms of *al-Jahiliyya's* marriages are more argumentative than

descriptive or analytical of social reality. Second, al-Sa'dawi fails to establish a link between Islamic practices of marriage in the past, and those in the present of the Arab-Islamic society. This is due to her view of the class system as a universal concept that leads to patriarchal control, without any socio-historical specificity or connection with capitalism. Thus, al-Sa'dawi is unable to link the evolution of the institutions of marriage and divorce to the broader processes of social transformation that occurred at the macro level in the contemporary history of the Arab-Islamic society.

Third, in replicating the Marxist analytical concepts of class and labor, al-Sa'dawi is imposing the Marxist structural analysis of production to the Arab-Islamic social reality. This analysis leads to abstraction and artificial universalization of the structural evolution of the society under study. By the same token, this analysis conceals the socio-political and economic history of the Arab-Islamic society during pre-capitalist and pre-colonial periods and their related modes of productions, which have actually shaped gender relations. Fourth, al-Sa'dawi's use of the Marxist theory to historical evolution, leads her to dismiss the changing cultural definitions of gender roles and sexuality in the specific Islamic system and its evolution in history. This at once perpetuates a static view of patriarchy, and mistakenly portrays all socio-political regimes in the region as being necessarily adversarial to women.² Equally, this leads her to overlook the endogenous scientific materialist theories contained within the Arab-Islamic philosophy in her analysis of social change.³ Overall, al-Sa'dawi's blind adherence to the Marxist theory of social change leads her not only to view social practices as universal, but also to embark into comparisons between social institutions on women across religions and cultures.

2. Universalism

2.1. In the Exploitation of Women's body

In al-Mar'ah Wa al-Jins, al-Sa'dawi denounces inequality in the practice of family planning between men and women as a universal practice across cultures and societies. In the absence of experience or historical evidence, she makes these sweeping generalizations:

² For criticism of Marxism and the need to explore the autonomous development of patriarchy and its periodization in the history of the Islamic Middle East, see Hatem (1987).

³ For an exploration of materialist theories in Islam and a discussion of the controversies raised by these theories in the Arab-Islamic society, see a) Muruwwa (1978), b) Al-Jabiri (1989a).

Society in all areas of the world entrusts women with the greatest responsibility, and encourages them to swallow great amounts of oral contraception without any consideration to their effect on women's physical and psychological health. All that interests society is the problem of population increase that threatens its economy. Many years have gone by since the use of these pills before scientists discovered that they inflict 30% of women with depression in addition to some organic and psychological repercussions that may happen...And when someone suggests equality in taking responsibility in family planning, and that scientists look for means to limit procreation in men as they do in women voices of objection rise. (p.90)

Similarly, al-Sa'dawi traces the origins of the practice of girls' circumcision (*khitan*) in the Arab-Islamic region to *al-Jahiliyya* in Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi, and argues that the prophet vehemently opposed this practice. In a single move she absolves Islam from any responsibility regarding girls' circumcision, and attributes that responsibility to the patriarchal and class social order of Arab-Islamic society. However, instead of describing the way the specific Arab-Islamic patriarchy affects the practice of women's circumcision, she merely denounces patriarchy as a universal phenomenon that predominates the social organization of all societies, regardless of cultural or religious differences:

Many people believe that the female circumcision only started with the advent of Islam. But this is a mistaken belief because this practice was well known and widespread in some areas of the world before the Islamic era, including the Arab Peninsula. Muhammad the Prophet tried to oppose this custom he found among the Arabs...This means that the circumcision of girls is not originally an Islamic custom, and was not related to monotheistic religions, but was practiced in societies with widely varying religious backgrounds, in countries of the East and the West, and among peoples who believed in Christianity, or in Islam, or were atheistic... Circumcision was known in Europe as late as the 19th century, as well as in countries like Egypt, the Sudan, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, and Nigeria. It was also practiced in many Asian countries such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and in parts of Latin America... (p.595)

Al-Sa'dawi's belief in the universal oppression of women's sexuality by men across cultures is an inadequate theory for the Arab-Muslim women's sexuality on several counts. First, this theory not only identifies women as "victims", but also as a sociological group unified by its victim status. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi transforms descriptive gender differences into divisions between men and women. This way she can easily "unify" women as sexual-political subjects, yet describe them as a "powerless" group within the societal network of power-relations. In the process, however, al-Sa'dawi construes women prior to their entry in

social relations and she imposes an artificial female/male paradigm as a universal mode of organization to all societies. As a result, al-Sa'dawi denies any cultural and historical specificity to the Arab-Islamic society as well as she rules out any subversive aspects existing within this particular socio-historical system to the so called universal practice of female sexuality.

Second, in dismissing how female sexuality is actually articulated "from within", al-Sa'dawi engages in the polemical debate concerning whether women's circumcision is an "Islamic" or "Un-Islamic" practice, instead of contextualizing this operation in the diverse socio-cultural milieu where it is practiced. Third, in ignoring the articulation of female sexuality from within, al-Sa'dawi dis-engages from the prolific Arabic literature on female circumcision and the rationale articulated by male-jurists⁴ on the subject. Yet, the exploration of *khitan* and its corollary rationale of *kafd/kifad* (curbing women's lust and passion) in the Arab-Islamic literature sheds considerable insight into the manipulation and control of female sexuality within the socio-political milieus in which female circumcision is practiced. To begin with, the intellectual exploration of *khitan* in this literature clears the semantic confusion created by some male jurists in claiming *khitan* for both genders as "Islamic". On the one hand, it shows that the term *khitan*, not mentioned in the Qur'an for either gender, is wrongly associated with Islam and is in reality only an old 'urf, custom. On the other hand, this literature demonstrates that the *khitan* terminology is deliberately used by some jurists in the generic sense for both sexes indiscriminately in order to sanctify this operation for both genders. This situates *khitan* as a socio-political construct invented by some male jurists, and sanctified by them in *hadiths* with the purpose of controlling women's sexuality.

Furthermore, the exploration of *khitan* in the Arab-Islamic literature sheds light on the view of its proponents from the sociological point view. Most jurists who promote *khitan*, do so on the basis that this practice is a rite of passage in both genders' sexuality that captures a phase of their biological growth and physical maturity: *bulugh*. For these proponents, *khitan*, is an important component of the socialization process of both genders because it represents a rite of initiation for each sex into manhood or womanhood. As such, the Arabic literature yields to further understanding of the way *khitan* practice is manipulated in female sexuality

⁴ For example, Malik Ibn Anas, al-Muwatta'; al-Bukhari, al-Jami' al-Sahih, and al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din.

and is falsely portrayed as a rite of passage. It shows how the proponents of *khitan* establish this practice as an enhancement of both genders' sexual identity into becoming fully male or female, while they dismiss *darrar* (harm) this practice causes to female's body and psyche.

Last but not least, the engagement with the Arab-Islamic literature on *khitan* reveals that the elaborate rationale *kafd* or *kifad* behind the practice of female circumcision is intimately linked with the concept of *fitna*, and serves as a justification for its practice as "Islamic". Had al-Sa'dawi engaged with the Arab-Islamic literature on *khitan*, therefore, she would have shown more persuasively two things: (a) that the concept of *khitan* is manipulated by some jurist to control women's sexuality, (b) that the rationale of *kafd* at the core of this practice, reflects some jurists' agenda in the social control of women, and their ambivalence towards the egalitarian Islamic ethics of sexuality for both genders.

2.2. In Reactionary Orthodox Movements

In Al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins al-Sa'dawi addresses the issue of the periodic emergence of Orthodox movements in society as a universal phenomenon across cultures. To substantiate, however, she provides no comparative analysis. Instead, she attacks the Moral Majority in the United States as a reactionary orthodox movement against women's emancipation (p.123). In the absence of historical explanation, therefore, al-Sa'dawi applies a logic of correlation to highlight the universalism of reactionary movements worldwide. Equally, al-Sa'dawi relies on logic of correlation as a substitute for her lack of explanation theory of Orthodox movements in Egypt or the Arab-Islamic society at large. In fact the logic of correlation engages her in a meta-discourse about the Moral Majority as an organization that pays lip service to capitalistic America against social movements seeking justice, racial parity, peace, and equity in the world:

If the moral majority association in America was a real moral association or an association of real principles and religion, why doesn't it call in the name of morality and religion to stop of the Vietnam war, or equality between blacks and whites?...Undoubtedly, such an association works against morality and real religion because it stands against equality between people, against justice, and against peace. (p.124)

2.3. In the Solution to Women's Liberation

Similarly, al-Sa'dawi asserts in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah that a universal and comprehensive solution to women's oppression is possible, and insists that the abolition of

patriarchy and the establishment of a socialist political system is the only real solution to women's liberation. However, instead of describing how various forms of patriarchy (feudal, capitalist, and socialist) are to be abolished, she merely denounces these forms of patriarchy as though identical or similar in their effect on women:

The real liberation of women in the Arab East, the Far East, or the West is not possible until the patriarchal class system is abolished whether in feudal or capitalistic societies. In other words, women's liberation will not be achieved unless under a real socialist society. And this did not happen yet in any country...However, it would happen in the future when women become a political power able to take its rights. (pp.814-15)

In the above examples, al-Sa'dawi again relies on the female/male paradigm as a universal mode of organization regardless of socio-historical or cultural specificity. Here, she assumes that all cultures universally rely on the nature/culture dualism in the oppression of women. Further, she uses the logic of correlation in her analysis. This logic substitutes discourse on reality for experience of gender in empirical reality. Equally, this logic homogenizes and systematizes women's experiences, paving the way for women's need for socialist resistance as the only possible means for their liberation.

3. The Comparative Approach

3.1. Misogyny in the West and in Islam⁵

3.1.1. Western and Islamic Castration of Women

In al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi equates the castration of women with slavery and argues that the practice of female circumcision in Arab-Islamic society as one form of distortion of women's body is caused by patriarchy and not Islam. To substantiate, al-Sa'dawi sees the imposition of the "chastity belt" on women in Western culture as a similar form of female castration:

In history and in various era and societies there are numerous examples that show us how patriarchal society allowed itself the distortion of women's body and soul under the name of chastity. History knew "the chastity belt", a metal belt that

⁵ I am using the terminology "the West and Islam" as articulated by al-Sa'dawi in Arabic "al-Gharb wa-l-Islam" in order to highlight the author's taxonomic error throughout the text, and her uncritical stance on terminology. Since al-Sa'dawi's "signified" in the comparison between the Western countries and the Arab countries is religion (Christianity/Islam), a more accurate comparison needs to be "the Christian World" versus "the Islamic World" For a different use of the "the West" see item 21 in the glossary.

covered women's sexual organs, leaving two holes one of them for peeing, and the other for the menstrual flow. (p.86)

Likewise, al-Sa'dawi cites Desmond Morris's work The Naked Ape (1967), where he explained how female sexual organs were closed and opened according to men's sexual needs:

The female external genital organs were closed before marriage with steel pins and or sown with a needle and a thread. Desmond Morris describes how a man made two wholes in which he introduced an iron lock he closed with a key after every sexual intercourse as though he closed his shop. (pp.86-7)

3.1.2 Western and Islam's Religious Laws

In al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mara'h al-Sa'dawi's views the roots of women's oppression as caused by the stagnation of religious laws. However, instead of explaining how the Shari'a is static, she compares it to Christian religious laws:

Just as the Church developed in Europe to adapt to modernity, so did the Islamic religious institutions develop the ideas and explanations to suit modern times. As much as the political authorities hastened in changing religious laws to fit the economic changes from feudalism, to capitalism, and to socialism, they hesitated in changing the laws related to marriage and women's life. The reason for that is clear. The political authority at all times and places does not reflect women's interests. And in most Arab and non-Arab countries this authority is patriarchal founded on the authority of men inside and outside the family. (p.839)

Here, al-Sa'dawi uncritically adheres to the Western modernist theory of development which establishes religion as the cause of gender inequality and oppression. This modernist theory imposes once more a universal pattern for women's liberation that necessarily requires fighting against religion in order to achieve equality. Likewise, this modernist theory denies the ideological specificity to world religions and focuses on economic relations alone as the basis for the so-called universal comparisons.

3.2. Medical Practice in Islamic and Western Societies.

In Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi al-Sa'dawi compares her own clinical work on mental illness to that of Freud's. Through the case of Ouadida, al-Sa'dawi brilliantly demonstrates how the doctor supervising the progress of Ouadida's therapy, a follower of Freud's psychoanalytic theory in the treatment of mental illness, still believes mental illness to be hereditary. On the one hand, she denounces this doctor's attempts to cure Ouadida with sedatives instead of looking at the roots of her problem: her social condition. On the other

hand, she compares Ouadida's case to Dora's treated by Freud. In her view both cases are typical examples of patriarchal medicine's misdiagnosis of women's mental illness as well as they represent the length to which men go to distort the real causes of women's oppression:

As I expected, the specialist thought....that Ouadida inherited mental illness from her mother...It was clear that no pills....were going to cure her. The cure ought to be directed to the depraved father and to the bad social conditions that she has lived. This case reminds me of Dora whom Freud was attempting to cure from hysteria...Of course Dora's situation did not improve with Freud's treatment. Her father took her to another doctor Leonard Simon who was able to study the circumstances of her family and realize facts unknown by Freud.(pp. 683-84)

3.3. Islamic and Western Sciences on Sexuality and Psychology

In al-Wajh al'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi relies on al-Ghazali not only to note the importance of sexual satisfaction in Islamic philosophy for intellectual and cultural creativity, but also to argue for the superiority of Islamic philosophy on sexual satisfaction over Western philosophies both old and new:

There is a gap between the Muslim philosophies on sex and other Western philosophies focused on making sex a sin, and denying sexual pleasure, especially the woman's. The personality of the prophet, the messenger of Muslims, and his Hadiths were the source of this philosophy.... Among the most important ideas in which the Islamic sciences were superior to the Western ones on matters of sex is the idea of sexual satisfaction rather than repression as the latter is more conducive to a better performance at work, and the devotion to the affairs of life and of religion. Al-Ghazali said that the mind is the most essential of gifts that God has endowed the human being with to search for knowledge about life, the sciences, the earth, people and God...Here, al-Ghazali is in agreement with Baron and the new ideas in psychology which maintain that sexual satisfaction is necessary for intellectual and cultural creativity. He also surpasses Freud and his colleagues who viewed sexual 'sublimation' or repression necessary for cultural progress and the establishment of civilization. (pp.743-44)

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi highlights the influence of religious thought on secular thought and illustrates the way Freud's theory on the psychology of women is anchored in Judaism. She insists that the masochistic pain attributed by Freud to women was: "inspired by the Torah when it stated 'thou shalt give birth to children in sorrow and pain'" (p.770). Thus, she concludes, Freud's theory is flawed because it makes masochism the exclusive characteristic of women while it is a common trait shared by both genders as "victims of the separation between the body and the soul" (p. 770). In contrast, al-Sa'dawi argues for the superiority of the Islamic Tradition and its *tawhidic* view of *al-Insan* (holistic view of the

human being). To substantiate, she cites Ibn Sina as a much superior scholar to Freud because held an integrated view of human sexuality and psychology:

The Sheikh Abou Ali al-Hassan Ibn Sina who died in 437 of the Hegire preceded Western philosophers with his holistic scientific view of the human being and his assessment of the body and sensual perceptions. Ibn Sina was the very first in the world to have advocated the indivisibility between the body and the soul and the recovery of the original link existing between sex and love in the human being. (p.770-71)

In fact, al-Sa'dawi pursues this argument further in the English version (The hidden face of Eve (1980)). Here, she not only highlights how Ibn Sina described the human psyche in his book Al Qanun fi al-Tib as a combination of the conscious and the subconscious, but she also compares his theory to Freud's:

Ibn Seena [sic] perceived with a degree of clarity remarkable for his time, and certainly ahead of Western science, the bridges that related psyche to body and the fact that the former was divided into conscious and subconscious. Freud was, therefore, not the first to conceptualize this division of the human psyche claimed as a discovery of Western science. Another of the most important contribution of Ibn Seena was his essay on love. In this essay, perhaps for the first time, love between man and woman was considered to play a positive role...Love of human beauty, or in other words sexual love, is considered a vehicle by which man can approach closer to God. Thus Ibn Seena in this essay upheld his essential thinking about the self or psyche, and its components, and accorded it a rightful place in the totality of his philosophical thought. He surpassed his predecessors and was the first man of knowledge and science to build up a concept of graduated harmony between the body and the self (the soul, psyche or mind). (p. 151)

In the two above excerpts al-Sa'dawi raises the crucial Islamic principle of *al-Tawhid* (unity), and its implications for the conceptualizations of the human being by Muslim scholars. Unfortunately al-Sa'dawi does not explore these implications for both genders in Islam; hence locking her explanation in the comparative mode with the West. This at once forecloses her analysis of gender and reduces the potency of her feminist interpretation and message as a Muslim woman. As a result, no further insight is really gained on the *tawhidic* symbiosis of the body and the soul, nor on the ramifications this symbiosis has for gender issues.

Moreover, al-Sa'dawi's inscription within the comparative mode engages her in a cultural meta-discourse with the West. This deflects her attention from the issue at hand: the status of Muslim women from a woman's standpoint epistemology and in view of the *tawhidic*

perspective. Instead, she merely highlights the importance of *al-Tawhid* in the Islamic tradition and the superiority of Islamic sciences vis-à-vis Western sciences. In doing so, she seems more apologetic for Islam than explaining Islamic sciences. Such a stance is worsened even more when al-Sa'dawi immediately accuses the West of concealing the pioneering achievements of Ibn Sina in Science and medicine as part of Western conspiracy; and a ploy of the Western imperialists' agenda to erase the cultural heritage of the Arabs as a source of inspiration in the decolonization and the reconstruction of their endogenous culture. In fact, al-Sa'dawi articulates Western imperialism as a racial issue designed by Western scholars to impose white supremacy in the East:

Ibn Seena [sic] was nevertheless an exceptionally brilliant philosopher, thinker, and man of science. He was not given his due in the Western world and lesser men by far have been given greater prominence. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. We do not live in a neutral world and our civilization has been biased in favor of the minds and contributions of white Westerners, rather than those of more dark-skinned Easterners, just as it has had an age-long bias by men against women. This bias cannot be explained by the natural superiority claimed by some 'scientists' for the Western brain and its alleged qualities of greater intelligence and creativity, but rather by a deliberate attempt to erase the cultural heritage between their past, present, and future, and thus to render easier the attempts at imperialist and reactionary subjugation for those who still dream of maintaining more modern versions of colonial empires. (pp.151-52)

3.3.1. Superiority of Islamic Sciences and Western Imperialism

3.3.1.1. Superiority of Islamic Sciences in Artificial Insemination and Contraception.

In al-Wajh al 'Ari lil-Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi highlights the continuous practice of *Istibda'* in today's Egypt as a form of artificial insemination commonly practiced by Arab women, and a coping strategy against sterility long before Western methods.

Undoubtedly, the marriage of *Istibda'* among the Arabs, or the piece of wool are both methods of indirect insemination which resemble the modern idea of artificial insemination. Instead of preserving the sperm in sterilized receptacle, it is used in a piece of wool. The West has debated in recent years the idea of artificial insemination and considered it among the latest innovations in the domain of sexuality science or freedom while the Arab men during al-Jahiliyya before Islam knew about this idea and even practiced it in the *Istibda'* marriage. (pp.737-38)

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi traces the origins of the methods of contraception to Muslim doctors; hence anchoring family planning within Islamic Sciences and medicine of the 9th century and throughout the Middle Ages long before Western Modern sciences. Quoting from

Abu Bakr al-Razi book al-Hawi, al-Sa'dawi reports the several methods of birth control described in details by this author:

The first method is coitus interruptus. The second is to prevent ejaculation completely...The third procedure is to place some medication at the opening of the woman's uterus before penetration. These medications either close up the entrance of the uterus or expel the semen and therefore prevent pregnancy. Examples of these are tablets or suppositories of cabbage, hanzal, kar, bull's gall, the wax secreted from animal's ears, the dropping of elephants, and calcium water. In addition these medications may be used separately or in various combinations. (p. 906)

In fact, al-Sa'dawi insists, Europe inherited from the Arab-Islamic science and medicine many of its modern information in addition to other medical sources such as Al-Irshad by Ibn Jami', Tadkrat Daoud al-Antaki⁶, and Kitab al-Malki by Ismail al-Girjani (p.907). Thus, al-Sa'dawi shows how many of the modern methods of contraception believed to be Western inventions are in reality part of Islamic sciences as the case for men's condom:

Many people think that the methods of contraception and the idea of birth control are western inventions. Some people are convinced that a condom used by men as a contraception is a Western invention despite the fact that Imam al-Ghazali mentioned it in his writings as 'the skin sack of the male' or 'the preventive retainer' which was made of gut. (p.907)

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi traces the practice of contraception in the contemporary history of Egypt to 1937, and documents the contribution of Egyptian doctors in the debate on birth control and contraception from the social, legal, religious, and statistic aspects. Still, al-Sa'dawi compares the status of Arab-Islamic thought and science in the 1930's to that of the West, especially Europe to show the superiority of the Arab-Muslims in this field of knowledge:

It is clear that contraception and abortion before the end of 16 weeks of pregnancy was allowed by religion in Egypt in 1937, at a time when in most European countries they were prohibited by law. During the same year the Egyptian Medical Association organized a seminar to study these question in all their aspects, medical, social, legal, religious, and statistical. (p.708)

3.3.1.2. Superiority of the Arabic Language in Gender Egalitarianism.

⁶ Al-Sa'dawi refers to this document as: The Prescriptions of David of Antioch in The hidden face of Eve (1980, p.68).

Al-Sa'dawi contends that the Arabic language is superior to Western ones in terms of gender egalitarianism because it tackled the question of gender in linguistics for centuries and long before the age of modern feminisms. To substantiate, she presents the egalitarian language of the Qur'an by quoting excerpts where women and men are addressed equally. Accordingly, she contends that the Arab-Muslim women were pioneers to the Western women in fighting patriarchy, and in dealing with misogyny in the language of the Qur'an as a symbol of collective memory:

The Arab woman preceded the European and the American women in fighting the patriarchal class system. The American woman only realized in recent years of the 20th century that pervasive language is the language of man, and that the word "man" means the human being of the entire humanity...This is why women's liberation movements in Europe and America today attempt to change language...As to the Arab woman, she already did change the language 14 centuries ago, when the masculine gender referred to both men and women in the Qur'an. (p. 734)

B. Method

1. Biography

1.1. Biography of the Prophet

Al-Sa'dawi relies on the biography of the prophet in both Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira'al-Nafsi and in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil-Mar'ah. In the first, she uses the prophet's biography to argue that female circumcision is an un-Islamic practice that started long before Islam and was practiced in many areas of the world. To illustrate, al-Sa'dawi reports the prophet's personal intervention in opposition to this practice in the Arab Peninsula, quoting a *hadith* on this issue:

Many people think that female circumcision only started with the advent of Islam. But as a matter of fact it was well known and widespread in some areas of the world before the Islamic era, including in the Arab Peninsula. Muhammad the prophet tried to oppose this custom since he considered it harmful to the sexual health of the woman. In one of his sayings the advice reported as having been given by him to Om Attiah, a woman who did tattooing and circumcisions, runs as follows: 'If you circumcise, take only a small part and refrain from cutting the clitoris off...The woman will have a bright and happy face, and is more welcome to her husband, if her pleasure is complete. This means that the circumcision of girls was not originally an Islamic custom. (p.39)⁷

⁷ This excerpt is originally from al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi (1974, p. 559). But the English edition The hidden face of Eve (1980) re-integrated this part in chapter 6 entitled "Circumcision of Girls" (p.39). Also, the translation does not

However, in the second book al-Sa'dawi draws more extensively on the prophet's life to show either Islam's support of, or opposition to several issues concerning women. For instance, on the issues of marriage and divorce, she documents the way the Arab woman not only gave herself the right to choose her husband, but also to propose marriage. Relying on Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat she reports the self-determination of Leila Bint al-Hatim who went to the prophet and said to him:

I am Leila Bint al-Hatim. I have come to propose myself to you, marry me. And Muhammad said, "I hereby marry you". But when she went back to her relatives, they told her that she had made a big mistake. She was of a jealous nature and would not stand the other wives of the prophet.... So she went back to the prophet and said: 'I am a woman with a sharp tongue and I cannot bear other wives. So set me free. He answered: 'I hereby set you free'. (p.739)

Immediately after, al-Sa'dawi comments, the reality of women's practice of marriage and divorce today contrasts sharply with the common practice of self determination enjoyed by women during the life of the prophet. This change, she contends, indicates today's patriarchal abuse of power, and even a deviation from the principles of Islam:

I do not know how many Arab women today can do what Leila Bint al-Hatim did thirteen centuries ago. And I do not know how many Arab men would give women the freedom to choose and refuse him as Muhammad the prophet of Muslims did. If the life of Muhammad is the highest example for Muslim men, what is sure is that Arab men of today do not follow their highest example of freedom that he gave to women. And in doing so, they have deviated from the prophet and from Islam when they imposed obedience or 'the house of obedience'. (p.739)

Moreover, al-Sa'dawi asserts, the life of the prophet clearly indicates numerous incidents where his wives refused him, rebelled against him, and protested to voice their rights. Relying on Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat she reminds us of the case of Zainab Bint Jahsh, who represented the rebellious confrontational model:

According to Aicha :'the Prophet of Allah slaughtered for meat and instructed me to divide it up among his wives. He sent Zainab Bint Jahsh her share but she

convey the spirit of the hadith attributed to the prophet: "*La-Tunkihi fa-inna dhalika adha lil mar'a wa-ahhab ila' l ba'l*" Abu Dawd, Sunna, 4: 368 ("Adab", No. 127).

returned it. He said: 'Increase her share'. But once again she met his offer with refusal. I said to him: 'her refusal means that she now hates you '. (p.130)⁸

In fact, al-Sa'dawi quotes from Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat (1970) to illustrate how our foremothers relied on their own knowledge and education to oppose patriarchy. To substantiate, she described the way 'Aicha used her knowledge of the Qur'an to oppose and contradict the prophet himself as in the case of polygamy:

'Aicha went as far as to challenge him in relation to some of the Koranic [sic] verses which descended upon him from Heaven. When, in one of these verses, Allah permitted Mahomet [sic] to marry as many women as he wished, she commented with heat: 'Allah always responds immediately to your needs'. (p.131)⁹

Likewise, al-Sa'dawi describes how the prophet himself was accustomed to be criticized by his wives, and listened to their free expression of opinion in the economic, social and political activities of the Islamic community. In fact, al-Sa'dawi points out the active role of our foremothers in a variety of fields as consultants; including the transmission of religion. To illustrate, she again cites the case of 'Aicha:

'Aicha did not only criticize her husband, but also other men. She freely and courageously expressed her opinion, with understanding and wisdom to the extent that the prophet pointed at her while sitting with men and said: "Take half of your religion from this Humaira". Aicha also participated in wars and battles with Muslims, and was widely active in politics, culture, and literature to the extent that the scholar of Muslims Aroua Bin Zubeir said: "I have not seen anyone more knowledgeable in Fiqh medicine, and poetry than 'Aicha". (p.745)

Last but not least, al-Sa'dawi draws on the biography of the prophet to show that he himself was unable to be just towards his wives and preferred 'Aicha. To substantiate, al-Sa'dawi quotes 'Aicha to situate *nushuz* in Islam as referring originally to men rather than women:

Souda, the daughter of Zama'a (one of the prophet's wives) grew old. The prophet, Allah's blessings and peace be upon him, did not visit her often. She knew the position I had in the prophet's heart, and how often he spent his nights with me. Fearing his abandonment and sceptic about her position in his heart, she told him 'Oh prophet of Allah, the day that is meant for me you can take for 'Aicha, and

⁸ I have used this quote from the English version: The hidden face of Eve.. Still, a more accurate description of this part is found in the Arabic version. pp.744-5.

⁹ I have relied on the English version for this excerpt. However, it does not capture the hadith: "*Inna Allaha Yu Tawi'u'Ka fi ma turid*". For accuracy consult the Arabic version, p.745.

you are relieved of your promise.' The prophet accepted Allah's blessings, and peace be upon him. On this circumstance the Quranic verse 'If a woman feared her husband's Nushuz or refusal' was revealed. (p. 841)

As these excerpts illustrate, al-Sa'dawi not only skillfully applies *isnad* (chain of transmitters) as a component of biography in conformity with the Islamic tradition in quoting and verifying *hadiths*, but she also restores the feminine in Islamic theology by relying on 'Aicha as a chronicler of the life of Muhammad. This way, al-Sa'dawi engagement with tradition is twofold: to base her feminist claims and portrayal of the model of the confrontational women in Islam, and to anchor women as authoritative voices in the transmission of *hadith*. This is of paramount importance to Islamic feminism, considering that the *hadith* is one of the sources of *Ijma'* between the *'ulama* (collective consensus). Nonetheless, in privileging the remote historical context of Arabia over the more immediate one, al-Sa'dawi falls short in her aim of demonstrating how Muslim women could get involved today, including herself, into contemporary debates on various issues on women in Islam.

Above all, in engaging with the remote context of Arabia, al-Sa'dawi overlooked the principle of complementarity of genders¹⁰ at the core of Islamic metaphysics in terms of social organization (sexuality, gender socialization, gender relations, and gender agency). In doing so, al-Sa'dawi's analysis of women's agency in Arabia is outside the Islamic metaphysics, thus, the meaning of women's self-determination and gender relations in Islam is lost. Likewise, the meaning of men's *nushuz* is a moot point outside the complementarity of genders, and so is the importance of the rebellious model of agency. In other words, al-Sa'dawi's dis-engagement with the Islamic complementarity of genders leads her to inscribe her presentation of women's agency within the male/female dichotomy. This in turn, leads her to highlight the negative, oppositional model of womanhood alone, instead of exploring the positive and the negative meanings of agency within the Islamic view for both genders.

1.2. Personal Biography

In al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi draws on her medical practice to describe the extent of patriarchal abuse of power. The excerpt below illustrates how the father of a woman and

¹⁰ For a brief description of the notion of complementarity of genders and its applications by Muslim social scientists see item 26 in the glossary.

her husband conspired together in contracting a marriage for money, knowing that in the process they rob the woman from experiencing motherhood:

The wife told me in despair: I felt every night that I sold my body like a prostitute to this old stranger man in compensation for the pounds he gave my father. Can we call this relationship between this husband and his wife an honorable relationship? ...Does honor mean that all these years the young girl against her will has to be prevented from any enjoyment of her right to motherhood? (p.75)

However, in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi highlights women's coping strategies against their victimization by patriarchy. From her childhood memories, al-Sa'dawi reminisces the extreme case of a woman who resorted to the *Istibda' technique* (artificial insemination) as a coping strategy of the powerless in case of sterility, and as a protection mechanism against the ruthlessness of patriarchal society where fertility and procreation are the criteria for womanhood and femininity:

When I was a child I used to hear rural women in my village, Kafr Tahla, talk about sterile women who visited the village Machaiekh [religious men] in order to wear a charm to cure them from sterility and become pregnant. I found out later that the charm was sometimes a piece of wool the woman put in her vagina. After questions on the secret of the piece of wool that cured women from sterility, I knew that some of those machaiekh used to moisten that piece of wool with their semen and ask the woman to put it in the vagina immediately. The meeting between the Sheikh and the woman always took place in a dark room, and therefore she did not know what he was doing, and sometimes she pretended not to notice, but kept the matter in desperation for pregnancy. (pp.737-8)

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi relies on her childhood experiences to refute the private/public dichotomy imposed on women within the Arab-Islamic society. Using the examples of her own grandmothers, she skillfully illustrates that the private/public dichotomy is an urban, middle-class phenomenon:

I heard about my grandmother on my mother's side that she only went out to the street twice in her entire life, once when she left her father's home, and the second time and the last when she left her husband's home to her tomb. On both occasions, she was covered. (pp.765-6)

In a note to this quote, al-Sa'dawi further explains that this grandmother lived in Cairo (1898-1948), was unemployed "except the job of the house and child-raising. She came from a middle-class or upper-class family" (p.766). In fact, al-Sa'dawi compares this grandmother's status to that of her grandmother on her father's side:

However my grandmother on my father's side, who lived in the same period in our village "Kafr Tahla" never knew the veil. In addition, she used to go out everyday from home to work in the field or to buy or sell in the market as all the poor peasants in the rural area. (p. 766)

2. Newspapers as Social Documents of Reality

In both Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins and Al- Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi relies heavily on newspapers to document the oppression of women as an underprivileged group in society. In the first book, for instance, she presents women's oppression as a universal cross-cultural phenomenon. She argues that psychologists and followers of Freud support the capitalist system with false theories in order to "abort any revolution attempted by women, blacks, the youth, workers and other groups from the underprivileged and oppressed in society." (p.120). Yet, instead of illustrating how Freudians contribute to the creation of a false consciousness among the under-privileged cross-culturally, al-Sa'dawi confines her illustration to the United States by quoting Herbert Henden on the rebellious youth against Nixon in his article in The New York Times of January, 1971 (p.120).

In contrast, al-Sa'dawi departs from the local context of Egypt, and relies on Egyptian newspapers in the second book to illustrate the oppression of women at various levels in Egyptian society. For example, she quotes Akhbar al-Youm of 1976 to expose the Egyptian men's abuse of power in divorce as well as the institutionalization of abuse by the judiciary system:

In the newspaper Akhbar al-Youm was published an article entitled «A father went to a PTA meeting, and his wife and children left home". This paper reports that this high official fell in love with the supervisor...of his daughter's school... He went back to that school several times... pretexting the welfare of his daughter, while in fact his objective was to see the supervisor- His wife was surprised to see him come home with the supervisor he had married...She took her purse and children and left home....The wife stood in court to ask for alimony for her three children of whom the eldest was at his final medicine school, the second at the School of Commerce, and the third in high school. The court decided that the husband spends on the alimony of the wife and children the amount of 70 pounds a month. (pp. 843-44)

Al-Sa'dawi not only denounces this "sexual chaos" (p.844), but she also exposes the endorsement of abuse of power by the Judiciary system in allowing the husband to spend 70 Egyptian pounds only, and not according to his monthly salary.

3. Historical Documentation

Throughout the selected books al-Sa'dawi locks her historical documentation of Arab-Islamic society within the male/female logic. Still, in both Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins and al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi she compensates for her notable lack of historical portrayal of women's oppression from within the general historical movements in the region, or in Egypt, by merging her personal experience with the Egyptian women's daily life. As to Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah, al-Sa'dawi's historical documentation, though linked to the history of the Arab-Islamic society, is still atomistic in that it is confined to the 19th and 20th centuries.

3.1. Historical Documentation Merged with Personal History

In al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi al-Sa'dawi raises the issue of men's fear of women's knowledge about sexuality as a typical misperception that this knowledge is an imported Western trend. To illustrate, she skillfully merges her personal experience in medicine with Islamic scientific productions on sexuality to highlight men's abuse of power and oppression of women:

I have noticed that husbands are annoyed when the awareness of their wives increases. Some of them may accept the increase of awareness provided it does not include any sexual awareness. One of them told me that sexual awareness is a danger to women, and that the science on sex is foreign to our eastern society, and that it is one of the sciences imported from the West. I told this husband that Ibn Sina was the first scientist in Human history, if not the first ever to have acknowledged the science on sex. The thesis of Ibn Sina on Love is considered the first scientific thesis that endowed love and sex with a positive role. For the first time Ibn Sina ...was able to establish a link between the two sides of love, the natural (sexual), and the psychological...He wrote thousand years ago his large volume the *Kanon* in support of this notion. (pp. 593-94)

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi invokes Islamic scientific sources in support for women's sexual self-determination, sexual education, and sexual pleasure in her narration of her meeting with the husband of one her interviewees mentioned above. These are: Ibn Sina's The Kanon, The Qur'an, the *hadith*, and some references of the Ministry of Awqaf. However, instead of substantiating her argument by quoting from and explaining these sources, al-Sa'dawi merely cites them in the form of notes that she appends to her encounter with the husband. As a result, al-Sa'dawi's claim about Islam's support to women's sexual self-determination remains a mere assertion locked within the male-female logic:

The husband answered angrily: I do not know anything about Ibn Sina or the history of World science, but I am a Muslim man, and Islam is against any eye opening of the wives on sex. The woman is not created for the enjoyment of sex, but for the service of her husband and the devotion to her children. And if the wives ask for sexual pleasure in the West it is because it is in conformity with their morality and religion. It is not however, in conformity with our ethics and with Islam...I told the husband that Islam does not oppose sexual education. In fact, Islam advocates scientific knowledge and education on every aspect of life including sex-life.... In fact, some paragraphs of the Kuran and the Hadith [sic] study some aspects of sex. (pp. 594-95)

However, in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil-Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi largely compensates for this partial treatment of history. Here, she moves beyond the factual, and actually explores the political and intellectual movements that have affected women of Egypt. Still, as the passages below illustrate, her historical documentation is conceived and articulated from the male/female dichotomous perspective and logic, rather than from the history of the Arab-Islamic polity in its continuity. This binary conception of history induces al-Sa'dawi to provide an atomistic view of human history based on socialism alone, and an equally atomistic history of Egypt.

3.2. Atomistic Portrayal of Human History.

3.2.1. Socialism in Human History.

The historical documentation of socialism is central in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah. Al-Sa'dawi not only traces the origin of Socialism in human history to Egypt, but also relies on socialism to anchor her advocacy for socialism as "a better" system for women across cultures and historical periods of Human history. She starts by tracing the birth of the first socialist revolution to Pharaonic Egypt: "The first socialist revolution occurred against feudalism in the year (2420 BC) during the era of the VII th dynasty. This historic revolution is known as the Memph Revolution and was directed against feudalism and monarchs." (p.723).

Then, al-Sa'dawi attributes a large credit to socialist thinkers in disclosing the real causes of women's oppression in Human history, and in improving women's conditions worldwide. However, al-Sa'dawi observes, "real" socialism and its meaning of freedom remains a distant ideal, yet to be achieved in reality by most existing socialist countries as patriarchy persists within these countries:

It is not easy to deny the essential role played by the socialist thinkers in exposing the real causes which led to the oppression of women in human history. And it is

not difficult for anyone to observe the firm relation between the degree of women's freedom and the degree of societal change to socialism. The more the increase in the change towards real socialism, the more freedom of women in the real sense of freedom...All these essential rights and freedoms.... will not be recovered by the woman until society successfully frees itself from both class and patriarchal regimes. And this has not occurred yet in any socialist society. (p.833)

3.2.2. Socialism in Egypt.

While al-Sa'dawi highlights the accomplishments of the socialist revolution under Nassir's regime, she denounces the socialist government's failure to eliminate the obstacles to women's freedom. In the absence of historical description or evidence al-Sa'dawi asserts:

Perhaps the most important accomplishments of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 are those decisions pertaining to land ownership, the elimination of feudalism, and the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and big corporations. The National Charter of May 21 1962 contains the following provision: 'the necessity to abolish the remaining chains and constraints that impede the free action of women, so that they are enabled to participate positively and efficiently in building a new life'. Despite the increasing number of girls and women in schools, universities and work in society, the chains have not been lifted from the vast majority of Egyptian women. (p.835)

Worse still, in the absence of historical evidence as to the way socialism actually constricted the "real" emancipation of women in Egypt, al-Sa'dawi asserts that the situation of Arab women is similar in other Arab socialist countries. Accordingly, she calls for "new socialist decisions" to establish an alternative relationship between men and women in the family:

In other Arab countries socialist slogans were raised and national charters of these countries stipulate the need to remove all obstacles that prevent women from participating in their societies; yet the majority of Arab women are not free as they should be. The governments of these countries were supposed to provide new socialist decisions regarding the relationship between the man and the woman; one that abolishes the tyranny of the man within the family and provides the woman with the personal, moral, social and economic freedom it provides for the man. (pp. 835-36)

3.3. Conservative Movements in Egypt

Based on her socialist/feminist advocacy, al-Sa'dawi criticizes the conservative movements of Egypt that call for "the woman's return to home". This call in her view is subjective and indicates an ignorance of the life conditions of Egyptian women. However,

instead of describing these conditions, al-Sa'dawi makes the following sweeping generalizations:

And those who...call the woman's return to home do not study reality in an objective scientific way. For if they did, they would find that the motive of the vast majority of working women in the fields, the factories and the offices is society's and the family's economic need. The majority of Egyptian women for example are peasants...And the majority of working women other than in agriculture is proletariat workers in factories. (p. 831)

Here, al-Sa'dawi directly attacks the Islamist movements which were gaining ground in the mid-1970s. This portrayal is limited and biased for two reasons. It is simplistic, because it does not contextualize the Islamists movement in Egypt's history as a political movement of contestation against the state's Western style of modernity. It is biased, because it masks the state's responsibility in the high unemployment crisis that Egypt experienced following the Liberal modernist policies of government at the time. Also this portrayal does not acknowledge the Islamists economic activities and services to the whole community which largely compensated for the state's lethargy in the economic field.¹¹ Missing from al-Sa'dawi's analysis of the Islamists is the fact that many of these movements and programs are founded on the socialist principle contained in Islam as a doctrine and as a social organization, namely *takafu' ijtimai'*. As Knauss (1987) aptly observed:

Islam is ... based on rough equality among believers. While Islam neither calls for a classless society, nor for the abolition of private property, there is an imperative obligation for Muslims to share their wealth with others and to work actively for the betterment of the community. There is therefore, a firm doctrinal basis for "socialist" experimentation in the Kuran, [sic] the Hadith, and the Shari'a. (p.104)

Equally, al-Sa'dawi portrays the Islamists as a monolithic political reactionary movement and overlooks the important role these movements played as cultural movements of contestation in the history of contemporary Arab-Islamic culture.¹² Yet, in leaving unexplored the socio-political and cultural rationalization of the social projects of the Islamists, al-Sa'dawi's portrayal of them remains a mere denunciation and fails in its feminist message. Similarly, in the absence of an in-depth analysis of the political, socio-economic and cultural

¹¹ For a description of the economic programs for both genders in Egypt see al-Guindi (1981 & 1982).

¹² See chapter 1 about the multi-facets of the Islamist movements and their evolution in the history of the Arab-Islamic society. Also for details see al-Guindi (1982) and Ghalyun (1988).

context of Egypt of the 1970s and the place of the Islamists' movements in this equation, the reader is unable to grasp what is at stake for Muslim women in Egypt. As such, al-Sa'dawi's historical documentation is heavily underlined by the male/female binary vision. For this reason, this documentation does not portray social reality and movements in terms of what they bring to both genders, but revolves around al-Sa'dawi's feminist advocacy and themes.

3.4. Reduction of the Arab-Islamic Sciences to Gender.

In al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi raises the issue of monism in the interpretation of Islamic sources when she highlights the variety of the sources at the foundation of the laws of marriage and divorce in Arab-Islamic polity, namely The Qur'an, the *hadith*, and *tafsir*. First, she points out the existence of conflicting verses in the Qur'an pertaining to women. She attributes these conflicting verses to the periodization of The Qur'an as a historical document, and its revelation during specific historical and social circumstances (p. 838). Second, al-Sa'dawi emphasizes the mediation of the *'ulama* and highlights their dual political and intellectual role both in the evolution, and in the adaptation of the Shari'a to the changes experienced by Arab-Islamic society. To substantiate, she shows the application of this dual role in the law on theft: "The Shari'a stipulates the cutting off of the hand of the thief, yet the legal systems in Arab countries, including Egypt, do not put this into practice, but instead apply other laws to punish the thief" (p.838).

Third, al-Sa'dawi addresses the controversial issue of authority in Islam. She maintains that the political authority in Islamic countries not only varies according to their economic conditions, but also according to the Muslim scholars' interpretations, their personal interests, their relationships to political authority in place, and their intellectual and cultural levels. To substantiate, she cites Muhammad 'Abduh as the pioneer of Muslim scholars against polygamy in the 20th century (p.840). Also, she quotes Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim for his advocacy for the renewal of the Personal Code according to the various Islamic schools, and their adaptation in view of new scientific evidence that occur in different times and places (p.848).

Thus, al-Sa'dawi illustrates the *'ulama's* manipulation of the concept of authority as a "fixed" concept. By the same token, she exposes the *'ulama's* manipulation of authority as a clear abuse of power, and a violation of *ijtihad*. Based on the diversity of the Islamic

madhahib (schools of thought) and their adjustments to changing times, al-Sa'dawi argues for *historicized ijihad* and shows how it was an organic component of Islamic thought and all of its schools, even the most conservative ones:

Islam is considered one of the most flexible of religions to adapt to the mind and progress due to its opening of the door of *ijihad*. Even Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the leader of the Hanbali madhhab, one of the most orthodox and conservative of the four Islamic schools, saw the necessity of *ijihad* and the existence of independent thinkers a requirement for every era. Ibn Tymiyya also viewed *ijihad* by any able person without commitment to any specific madhhab. On the freedom of *ijihad* and independence of mujathidin, he said: 'this is a difference in time, and not a difference in truth. And if the Imam had lived in our time, he would have said what we say. (p.840)

Here, al-Sa'dawi raises the tension between *individual ijihad* and *Ijma'* (collective consensus) of the *'ulama* existing in Islamic Jurisprudence. By highlighting that this tension is constantly determined by the evolution of knowledge over time rather than by the mere "consensus" of a social group affiliated with a particular *madhab* and its conception of truth, al-Sa'dawi successfully exposes the *'ulama's* abuse of authority. In fact, she illustrates this abuse of authority by revealing the wide difference and controversy over polygamy between Muslim scholars (pp.840-42).

Still, while al-Sa'dawi skillfully shows the persistence of patriarchy in the history of Arab-Islamic society past and present, and the abuse of the *'ulama* regarding *ijihad*, she totally overlooks that an essential component of *ijihad* is social deliberation among the members of the Islamic *Ummah*. By confining her presentation of *ijihad* to a mere individual intellectual exertion (*fard 'ayn*), and totally ignoring *ijihad* as a democratic social deliberation (*fard kifayya*) between Muslims, al-Sa'dawi unfairly indicts the *'ulama* as though a monolithic group. At the same time she extricates herself from any socio-intellectual accountability to her community, and she omits the place of her own *ijihad* as a Muslim woman in the articulation of gender. In doing so, she diminishes considerably her feminist agenda in regards to *ijihad* and what it can contribute to Muslim women, and to gender relations.

3.5. Restoring Women in Arab-Islamic History

In *Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah* al-Sa'dawi's engages in the rewriting of Arab women's history by documenting their role in the social, political, and intellectual movements of Arab-Islamic polity of the 19th and the 20th centuries. Yet, when she situates nationalism, the

liberation movement, feminism, and socialism as important phases within the global Arab-Islamic *Nahda* (renaissance), she omits to describe and analyze the role of each phase in the evolution, or lack thereof, in gender relationships.

***Women's Role in al-Nahda (Renaissance).** First, al-Sa'dawi contextualizes *al-Nahda* (cultural renaissance) of the 19th century as an endogenous political movement initiated by Arab-Islamic society against external foreign colonization, as well as internal domination, illustrating with Egypt:

Egypt and the Arab world lived through many dark decades especially during the 19th century. The conditions of its people regressed visibly. The rulers of the country, in close cooperation with British and French imperialists imposed heavy burdens upon them in all areas of life whether economic, political or cultural. Woman's lot, as usual, was the worst since she had to support the double load of a patriarchal as well as autocratic class system. However, extending through the second half of the 19th century, the people's resistance to foreign and local domination was mounting steadily, despite periods of retreat. (p. 804)

Second, al-Sa'dawi highlights *al-Nahda* of the 19th and 20th centuries as a vast revisionist intellectual movement in political thought, namely in nationalism, philosophy, and education. However, instead of exploring this revisionist movement as a cumulative reform process¹³ and the considerable contribution it made over time to the general welfare of the Arab-Islamic society, or even to Egypt, al-Sa'dawi reduces the input of *al-Nahda* to gender and colonial issues:

The Arab cultural awakening started at the end of the 19th century with Jamal Al-Din al-Afghani and his disciples. Ahmed Faris al-Shidyak published his book in 1855 *al-Sak 'ala al-Sak*. This is considered one of the first Arab books in advocacy of women's liberation. Another pioneer thinker, Rafa'a al-Tahtawi called for women's education and their liberation from injustice. He published his book *Al-Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wa al Banin* in 1872 and *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* in 1905. These pioneers played a major role in inducing the Arab masses' resistance to colonization and breaking all obstacles to freedom and independence. Their enlightened nationalist thought led them to deal with the woman's cause as one of the essential causes in the war against underdevelopment and foreign colonization. (p.804)

¹³ Here, al-Sa'dawi dismisses from her analysis the central role of al-Salafiyya al-Jadida in Egypt's *Nahda* and its cumulative effect on the reforms in the history of the Arab-Islamic society. In chapter 1 I briefly discuss the lasting role of *al-Salafiyya* in the nationalists' revisionist programs in terms of philosophy, nationalism, and education.

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi reduces the pioneering contribution of Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples to Islamic Jurisprudence, and masks the important role this reformer played in the scientific and cultural reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic society at large. Worse still, al-Sa'dawi misses the whole intellectual mutations under way at that time in the Arab-Islamic society and what these mutations meant for the scientific discourses on gender in the region.¹⁴ For this reason, she attributes the opposition experienced by all reformers to the conservatives' collaboration with Egypt's reactionary regime to merely one cause, the British colonialism:

Sheikh Muhamad 'Abduh was exposed to violent attacks by the religious authorities of the time. But he did not hesitate in pursuing his advocacy...Although Qassim Amin insisted on the education of women so that they can protect the family and bring up children, and based his advocacy on the teachings of Islam and in no way infringed upon them, he became the target of the religious authorities of al-Azhar University. These authorities were the supporting pillars of the tyrannical Khedive who was collaborating with British colonialism. (p. 805)

* **Women's Role in The Liberation and Feminist Movements.** From the above binary perspective, al-Sa'dawi documents the silencing process of women's voice, as well as the occultation of their participation in The Liberation Movement and The Feminist Movement in Egypt. First, she records the history of women pioneers who were contemporary to men, namely 'Aicha al-Taymuriyya, Zaynab Fawwaz, and Malak Hifni Nasif (pp. 805-806). Yet she omits the description and analysis of the lasting scientific contributions these pioneering women made to Islamic nationalism, sciences, and women's studies that endured throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁵

Second, al-Sa'dawi denounces the oppression of the whole class of rural and working women in Egypt, and accuses the official Egyptian feminist movement (1923) of elitism and distortion of the real issues pertaining to women's conditions. She elaborates:

Poor unhappy women, exhausted in body and soul, whether at work or in their homes, were the first to rebel in the 20 th century...During the same period women of the upper classes had started to form the first women's organization. These efforts bore fruit in 1923. However in view of their wealth, and the fact that they were isolated from the poor classes, they knew nothing about the conditions of working women, and the inhuman exploitation which was their lot...the

¹⁴ For a brief discussion of the conflicts between the state nationalist groups and *al-Salafiyya* community groups regarding the acculturation of the Arab-Islamic society, and how these conflicts led to scientific mutations in education at the core of the conflicting gender discourses in the region see chapter 1.

¹⁵ For details on the scientific contributions of our founding mothers to Islamic nationalism, sciences, and women's studies in the 19th and 20th centuries see chapter 1.

aristocratic leaders paid no attention to the grievances of these poor women, and concentrated on the issue of abolishing the veil, which was unlikely to evoke much enthusiasm amongst them since in any case the working women in factories and fields had never known what it was to wear a veil. (p.810)

Immediately after, al-Sa'dawi restores the role of Egyptian working women in contemporary history. Not only does she record their role as key in the liberation Movement and the Feminist Movement, but she also accuses the Egyptian government of using nationalist women as "pawns" by preventing them from the power-sharing, and the decision-making process of their societies. In short, al-Sa'dawi situates women's exclusion from power in Egypt as a manifestation of a systemic elitism and discrimination against the working class as a whole:

It was these toiling poor women who were martyrs of the 1919 revolution. Amongst them is the martyr Shafika Muhammad killed by the British in March 14, 1919, and Hamida Khalil from Kafr al-Zaghari in Jamalia, and Sayida Hassan, Fahima Ryad, and Aicha Umar and other hundred poor and ignored Egyptian women.

Men of the toiling and rural class also played a great role in the revolution of 1919. But their role was not as visible as that of the men from higher class. Likewise, the role of working women was not visible in the revolution as the one from higher class. This is so because those who write history are those who possess money and power. (p. 811)

*** Women's Role in Socialism.** Al-Sa'dawi denounces the tokenism suffered by Arab-Muslim women in the field of politics; especially under Socialism. She argues that, though Arab women have the right to vote, they do not really participate in the political life of their countries. To substantiate, however, she merely accuses the Egyptian Socialist government of excluding their women comrades from political power:

Although the Egyptian revolution (1952) gave workers and peasants 50% of the seats in the National Assembly, it did not provide women with seats.... Despite the fact that an Arab woman became a minister for the first time in Egypt in 1962 and five or six women members of parliament, the vast majority of Egyptian women are still poor, ignorant, toiling day long and part of the night in the fields, offices and houses (the rate of illiteracy among girls is 84% in 1960, and decreased in 1976 to 71%. (pp.813-14)

This presentation presumes that Egyptians uniformly accepted socialism as an egalitarian system, and all that remains for the socialist regime is "fixing the gender gap". This

is inaccurate historically. After all, some socialist movements such as Leninism abolished religion altogether in the organization of society. For this specific reason many groups opposed socialism in Egypt because it undermined the Islamic socio-political and cultural organization at its core and threatened the Islamic moral order founded on *al-Tawhid* (fusion between the religious and the secular). Thus in leaving socialism as a monolith without the destruction of all its socio-economic, political and spiritual implications, al-Sa'dawi's feminist discourse on socialism is highly misleading. In fact, many segments of the population contested the socialist regime in Egypt, including women ¹⁶ because it did not bring the systemic answers needed for both genders in Egypt.

C. Epistemology

1. Ambivalence Towards Women in Arab-Islamic Heritage

In al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi argues that the Arab-Islamic heritage whether religious and secular is both progressive/regressive as reflected in knowledge production on women. Accordingly, al-Sa'dawi unfolds the ambivalence prevalent in knowledge production on women in Arab-Islamic culture in the past and the present alike.

1.1. Ambivalence Towards Women in Islamic Sciences

In her description of Islamic sciences al-Sa'dawi attributes the positive view of Arab women on love and sex to women's matriarchal heritage as well as Islamic ideology on female sexuality, and their negative view to patriarchal interpretations of cultural heritage and of Islamic ideology. To illustrate, she highlights misogyny in *hadith*. First, she examines al-Ghazali's interpretation of Islamic ideology of female sexuality, especially his treatment of the concept of *fitna*:

The honour of the woman is the man's duty, and he should satisfy her sexual needs to avoid fitna [chaos] and ensure his woman's virtue...However al-Ghazali declares that the satisfaction of a woman's sexual need is a difficult matter ...Al-Ghazali is almost in agreement with some modern opinions on women's sexual strength and the difficulty of its satisfaction, he is also in agreement with the primitive man on this strength and his fear from it for a very long time. (p.751-2)

¹⁶ For a critique of the socialist regime under Nassir by women compare Ahmed (1992), and al-Ghazali (1995).

Further, al-Sa'dawi contends the legacy of women's devilization is salient in *tafsir* (exegesis interpretations). For instance, she quotes al-Bokhari's Kitab-al-Jamih al-Sahih which attributes the following *hadith* to the prophet: "After I have gone, there will be no greater danger menacing my nation and more liable to create anarchy and trouble than women." (p.136).¹⁷ In fact, al-Sa'dawi suggests, *tafsir* deliberately dehumanizes women by depicting them as creatures devoid of any intellectual capacity or wisdom. To substantiate, she quotes from al-Ghazali's Ihya'a 'Ulum al-Din this saying allegedly uttered by the prophet: "I have not seen creatures as lacking in mind and wisdom than you [women]" (Idem.p.137)¹⁸.

Second, al-Sa'dawi highlights the leniency of male jurists in *tafsir* regarding men's sexuality. She comments that while the *mufasssirun* (exegesis interpreters) recognize the sexual potency and passion in both men and women, they place constraints only on women. In contrast, she notes, those same *mufasssirun* are extremely lenient towards men and provide them with solutions that ensure their complete sexual satisfaction. The reason behind this leniency towards men, al-Sa'dawi insists, is to sustain male hegemony in social institutions, and deflect attention from men's inherent weakness and double standards regarding morality and sexual behavior. Accordingly, she contextualizes the "real" meanings of the veil and segregation in Arab-Islamic society:

The veil which did not exist at the beginning of Islam, neither during the life of Muhammad...was disseminated in Arab societies after that. Some Arab countries still veil their women completely like Saudi Arabia. The veil was not created to protect women but created essentially for the protection of men. Likewise, women were not confined at home for their protection and morals but rather for the protection of men and their morals. (p.763)

This engagement with *tafsir* is inadequate because it is inscribed within the male/female logic rather than it explores *tafsir* on both genders. Also, this engagement is misleading, because it suggests that all *tafsir* is negative and restrictive to women.¹⁹ Finally, al-Sa'dawi's engagement with *tafsir* does not expand on her foremothers' women's standpoints on *tafsir*, or build on the cumulative feminist legacy of generations of women scholars.²⁰ Yet,

¹⁷ I have relied on the English version, due to the difficulty of translation. However, it does not convey the spirit of the *hadith* attributed to the prophet.

¹⁸ Idem.

¹⁹ Here I refer to the progressive work of al-Tabari's Jami' al-bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an. (1392/1972).

²⁰ Here I refer to Zayn al-Din, N. (1928; 1929) and Bint al-Shati' (1962; 1963b; and 1970).

these women's standpoint on gender is outside the male/female dichotomy and logic, and Islam/West polarization. As such, these women's standpoint on gender brought breakthroughs in Islamic sciences, and gender-relation that actually contributed to the advancement of the common good of community as a whole.

1.2. Ambivalence Towards Women in Secular Knowledge

Al-Sa'dawi argues that just as in the Islamic sciences, the whole secular knowledge in Arab culture is pervaded with the devilization of women. This in her view confirms the deep-seated fear of women's power and the relentless male attempt to "tame" that power and subjugate women to men's control in society. To illustrate, she engages in an extensive examination of Arabic literature; namely, the work of al-'Aqqad, Taha Hussein, Hussein Haykal, Zaki Mubarak, and Najib Mahfud.²¹ For instance, she asserts, al-'Aqqad is notorious as "the enemy of women" in Arabic literature mainly for his hatred and hostility towards women, especially in his book al-Mar'ah fi al-Qur'an. To substantiate, al-Sa'dawi observes that al-'Aqqad relies on the passage in the Qur'an that stipulates men's superiority over women and depicts them as: "less able than men to use reason, incisiveness of opinion, or strength of will" (p.778). However, al-Sa'dawi omits to quote the passage from the Qur'an that allegedly describes women as weak, and does not discuss the verse. In doing so, her claim of 'Aqqad's misogyny remains unsubstantiated.

Likewise, al-Sa'dawi accuses Najib Mahfud of dehumanizing women and associating them with the devil. To illustrate the devil-like image, in Mahfud's work, al-Sa'dawi comments on Bidayya wa Nihayya (A beginning and an end):

Although Najib Mahfud's is progressive and views a new role for women, namely work and provision for the family like men, he does not consider them equal to men in their moral life.... And despite his clarification of the role of poverty and social conditions in women's downfall, yet he decides in the voice of 'Ibrahim Faraj' that she is a "prostitute by nature" and that she is "the source of devilishness". (p.793)

Further, al-Sa'dawi contends, Najib Mahfud's al-Tulathia (The Trilogy) illustrates the patriarchal Egyptian society's coping with socialism. She observes that this work captures the general confusion, and insecurity experienced by most Arab men regarding egalitarianism

and women's emancipation since the socialist ideas of equality pervaded the Arab society. This is manifested, in her view in Mahfud's classification of two kinds of love: the romantic and the sexual. Likewise, this is encapsulated in his two archetypes of the virtuous and the prostitute (p.801).

Al-Sa'dawi's tracing of misogyny both in the history of religious and secular knowledge in Arab-Islamic society is twofold. It illustrates the systemic discrimination against women in this polity, and it emphasizes the reinforcing role of both religious and secular knowledge in the legitimation of the oppression of women regardless of the political systems of Arab-Islamic countries over time. However, it fails to demonstrate both from social experience or historical evidence. Missing from al-Sa'dawi's presentation of Egypt's patriarchy are two main elements. First, the tension between the Sadat's capitalistic regime and its US link which led to the Islamists' counter-project against the Americanization of the Egyptian society. This omission projects Egyptian patriarchy in a monolithic way and leads al-Sa'dawi to leave unexplored the conflicting images that socialist Egyptian literary production had on women's identification.

After all, the socialist theories and narratives on socio-political change had consequential ideological²² repercussions on the socio-political and cultural formations in the Arab-Islamic society. Equally, the Marxist narrative was an integral part of the hegemonic and discursive socialist scientific productions in the region particularly in the context of the Cold War during the 1970s. In fact, the socialist discursive productions in the 1970s were highly influential in the Arab-Muslim social scientist's theories of dependency, including the feminists' during this period. Both issues are totally muted by al-Sa'dawi. Consequently, without the integration of these elements that have shaped the socio-political context of the Arabic literature of the contemporary era, al-Sa'dawi's criticism of this literature is dogmatic and limited to the male-female opposition.

²¹ Najib Mahfud was the winner of the Noble Prize for literature in 1988.

²² One of the earliest studies on Marxist Ideology and its impact on the Arab society is found in the work of Tarabishi (1971). For recent discussions of Marxism and Islam see Mahmud (1987;1989)

2. The Feminine in Arab-Islamic Heritage

2.1. The Feminine During al-Jahiliyya

Al-Sa'dawi contends in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah that during *al-Jahiliyya* Arab society experienced both matriarchal and patriarchal systems to the extent that even the deity symbolization of *al-Jahiliyya* was marked by a dual representation of Gods and Goddesses:

The Arabs of the Jahiliyya had male and female Goddesses and believed that each tribe's God played a role in the tribe's war and victory. This is why the tribes carried into battles paintings and statues of their Gods...Abu Suffian carried the female Goddesses "Allat" and "al-Uzza". During this battle, Abu Suffian and his wife "Hind" were victorious over the Muslims, which reinforced their belief in their female Goddesses and in their power. (p.736)

Al-Sa'dawi comments that the female Goddesses are only a reflection of the high position of women in Arab tribes as well as that of matriarchal Arab society at the time. She insists that:

For this reason the history of the Arabs whether before Islam or after contains models of many women noted for their strong personalities, their positiveness in both their private and public life, as evident in their work in the economy and production. (p. 736)

In highlighting and discussing the Goddesses in pre-Islamic Arabia and the models of strong Arab women, al-Sa'dawi removes the assumption of exclusive ontological normativeness of the male God with respect to the community in general. At the same time, her Goddess description is geared to raising women's consciousness to their previous religious power because it links the ontological with the metaphysical both needed for individual and collective religious-social participation. However, the Goddess consciousness as a metaphor for the role of religious experience in personal and collective agency is irrelevant to the Arab-Islamic context because the very existence of the Islamic moral order depended on the abolition of polytheism and its replacement with monotheism. From this perspective, the Goddess consciousness via the transformative power of spirituality via polytheism is counter-productive because it is likely to be perceived as a direct attack against Islam as a religion, and as a socio-political organization.

Moreover, the Goddess metaphor is anachronistic with the gender-neutral metaphoric representations in the Islamic tradition. After all, The Qur'an describes God as an omni-present

Abstract with no human features or associations with either gender. What this means is that al-Sa'dawi's metaphoric representation of the Goddess is useless from the ethical standpoint because it dismisses the Islamic metaphors of spirituality, and of individual and collective agency articulated in the Qur'an. Equally, the Goddess metaphor is a moot point from the pedagogical stance, because it is an inadequate pedagogical strategy for the conscientization of Arab-Muslim women. In short, al-Sa'dawi's metaphoric feminist message would have been much more powerful and efficient, had she explored gender egalitarianism in the Qur'an and its socio-political and spiritual implications for gender identity, identification, and relations.

2.2. The Feminine in Islam

* **Femininity In the Language of the Qur'an.** In Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah al-Sa'dawi presents femininity in the Qur'an as the result of women's resistance to patriarchy in Islam, and not to Islam as a doctrine. She argues that since the birth of Islam women resisted misogyny as evident in their struggle for egalitarianism in the language of the Qur'an during the life of the prophet. To substantiate, al-Sa'dawi quotes al-Tabaqat al-Kubra, where Ibn Sa'd duly reports the story of Umm Salama: "We have become Muslims just like you, and we did what you did, and you are cited in the Qur'an and we are not?" (p.734). In response to the generic term 'Muslimun' which referred to Humanity, al-Sa'dawi asserts, God addressed both genders separately in the Qur'an as evident in: "Ina l'muslimun was al-muslimat wal muminin wa al muminat" (p.734).

* **Misogyny in the Stories of the Qur'an.** Al-Sa'dawi claims that the stories of the Qur'an are misogynous in nature. To substantiate, however, she avoids quoting the Qur'an, and instead she compares the stories in the Qur'an to those in One Thousand and One Night to highlight the similarity between the stories of these sources, and to describe their common influence by previous stories from other cultures. For example, she asserts that the concept of *kaid* (cunning, conniving) attributed to women is similar in the stories contained in both these sources. She elaborates:

The *kaid* and cunning are linked in A Thousand and One Night to women on matters of love, sex, and fitna...This proves the depth of the story of Eve in the psyche of the Arabs during those times. In addition, the Koran contains similar stories such as the story of Yussuf and the wife of al-Aziz. Thus, the Qu'ranic verse "The women's Kaid is great" is a confirmation that the woman's cunning as the truth of the essence of women....

In the stories of *One Thousand and One Night* we find stories similar to Eve's story who causes Adam to leave Heaven...And we find women similar to the wife of al-Aziz who caused the imprisonment of her husband in the story of kamal al-Zaman. (pp. 781-2)

Clearly, al-Sa'dawi's claimed misogyny in the Qur'an is unsubstantiated. However, she largely compensates for this lack of substantiation in her treatment of femininity in the Arabic literature. Here, she brilliantly shows the ambivalence towards the feminine in the Arabic literature, namely through the analyses she makes of official and popular folk literature in the Arab-Islamic society.

3. The Feminine in Arab-Islamic Literature

3.1. The Feminine in Official Folk Literature

Al-Sa'dawi asserts that in the stories of the folk literature One Thousand and One Night, women are depicted as cunning and plotting just "for the sake of it" (p. 782). In fact, she argues, this literature is replete with predominant models of old witches and women who practice magic and sorcery:

One of the prominent models of these is Shawahi...This woman did not use her cunning in fitna, love and sex alone, but also in wars and politics as well. She led armies and defeated kings. She also pretended spirituality and mocked her Muslim adversaries...In wars Shawahi is the center of the fight between Muslim and Christians, both of whom she betrays. She causes harm and defeat to everybody, and this is why people plotted against her in the end of the story to be crucified at the door of Baghdad. (p. 782)

Al-Sa'dawi contends that the *kaid* (cunning) attributed to women explains the reasons why the woman warrior in One Thousand and One Night was "never portrayed as a Muslim, but as a nasty old witch" (p. 783). Such a portrayal of women in folk literature, in al-Sa'dawi's view reflects:

The Muslims' desire in the beginning of Islam to recruit strong women such as "Hind Bint Rabia " in Islam...And reflects the strong image of Arab women and their participation in War, politics religion and the public life both before Islam and during the life of the prophet. In addition it reflects fitna with strength and positiveness in women. I found that most women warriors in the stories of *One Thousand and One Night* are beautiful surpassing other women whether concubines, singers or lovers. In most of these stories, the woman warrior does not

uncover her face until the last moment; which represents the climax at which everything stops, either the ugly defeat or the ultimate victory (p. 783)

3.2. The Feminine in Popular Islamic Literature

In contrast to this official literature, al-Sa'dawi claims, popular Arab-Islamic literature is replete with powerful women. She not only demonstrates the representation of women as superior to men, but she also unravels the extent to which this literature is full with *men's kaid* and their devilization of women. Above all, al-Sa'dawi relies on the Muslims' popular literature to show women as leaders and protectors of Islam.

* **The All-Powerful Superior Woman.** Al-Sa'dawi explores the heroine in Islamic folk literature whereby women are invariably portrayed as superior to men, and asserts that this portrayal reflects the position of Arab women at the time. To illustrate she contends that women-warriors are depicted as: "courageous women whose ability at combat surpasses that of men" (p.785). In fact, al-Sa'dawi notes, the "desirable woman is the killer of the courageous...who marries only the man she chooses, and who can withstand her power" (p. 785). To illustrate, al-Sa'dawi reports the story of the Princess Dat al-Himma:

The summary of Dat al-Himma's story is that her father wanted a male to inherit his throne; which was taken by force by his tyrannical brother who had a son... the father did not want her...and she was given to one of his concubines Sa'da...She learned the skills of fighting...Her master trusted her ability and courage and used her help at war against other tribes. She won all her wars... and became the protector of Bani Tay both men and women.

In one of her wars, namely that of Bani Kilab to which her father belonged, she wins over that tribe and takes her father as a defeated prisoner to Bani Tay. The tribe decides to kill him, but Sa'da recognizes the father, and Dat al-Himma discovers the secret that was kept from her. She saves her father from death and returns to her tribe. (p. 786)

* **The Man's Kaid to Subdue the All-Powerful Woman.** Moreover, al-Sa'dawi highlights the way folk literature reflects *men's kaid* and plots to subdue women's power to their will. Among men's *kaid*, al-Sa'dawi asserts, are marriage and motherhood. The first, according to her, is used by men as a way of breaking women's spirit; while the second is relied on by men as a strategy to curb women's activities in public life. To illustrate, she continues the story of Dat al-Himma:

Her father becomes rich thanks to her; which threatens the influence of his tyrannical brother...In order to contain her power, her tyrannical uncle wanted to marry her off to his son so that he could break her strength...However with her

intelligence Dat al-Himma discovers the trick and refuses to marry her cousin.... The khalifah intervenes in the matter, and Dat al-Himma marries her cousin but does not allow him any sexual intercourse. He puts an anaesthetic in her drink, and when she loses consciousness he has sex with her. When she awakes she threatens him with vengeance, but she gets pregnant. (p. 782)

*** The Woman as Leader and Guardian of Islam.** Al-Sa'dawi maintains that women in the history of the Arab-Islamic polity were not just mere warriors, but pioneer leaders of the people and protectors of Islam against its enemies. Again, al-Sa'dawi reports from the story of Dat al-Himma:

The war increases between the Arabs and Romans. The forces of the Abbassid Khalif al-Mansour fail to withstand the Romans' attacks. The khalif seeks the help of Bani Kilab of whom is Dat al-Himma. The Muslims are victorious over the Romans thanks to the skills of Dat-al-Himma in wars and her intelligence... This epic story reflects the strength of women in Arab society... and that the greatest armies were under the leadership of women and not men.... All these models of women reflect women's abilities at the time and their unlimited possibilities... These models are frequent in most folklore epics and not just that of the Princess Dat al-Himma; which proves that the heroism of women and their participation in public life was the rule and not the exception. (p.787)

Nonetheless, al-Sa'dawi observes: "the narrator portrays women warriors as stoic, who neglect their sexuality and devote their entire life to the defense of Islam" (p.788). In fact, the narrator of the folk literature has two pervasive models of the single and the married woman that fits his notion of women as asexual beings and sustains this particular paradigmatic view of womanhood in the collective imagination in its representation of heroic Muslim women:

Although the popular epics reflect women's capacity in combat and her participation in war and politics, they however always view the chastity of women as represented by the independent woman who lives alone without a husband, and who is a spiritual fighter. As to the character of the married woman or lover, she is a woman who lives through her husband or her son. If her husband is a hero, she helps him in his success. And she is devoted to him to death. Such examples are the epics of Antara Ibn Shaddad and his wife 'Abla who stood by him until he succeeded. (p.788)

In the preceding, al-Sa'dawi taps into the religious and secular components of the Arab-Islamic heritage to emphasize their ambivalence; and hence their openness to various interpretations according to the progressive or reactionary tendency of the researcher. This way she demonstrates the availability of two voices in Islam: one is the voice of official Islam

and is misogynist. The other is the voice of lay popular Islam, which is deeply ingrained in the masses' psyche, and is egalitarian, and ethical. Thus, al-Sa'dawi not only anchors women's emancipation in its endogenous history and culture, but she also shows the untapped rich and flexible heritage. In this manner, she shows the Arab-Islamic heritage as a framework for future alternative models of womanhood in Arab-Islamic society, and its elaboration of egalitarian projects. By the same token, al-Sa'dawi unfolds the complexity of the Arab-Islamic heritage by highlighting two simultaneous things: (a) The fluidity between the religious and the secular and their coexistence both at the formal and informal levels of knowledge production within the Arab-Islamic culture, (b) The ambivalence of both the religious and the secular with regards to women's access to formal power and men's manipulations to maintain women's roles limited to a wife and a mother.

Part II. Al-Sa'dawi's Societal Project

Paradoxically, al-Sa'dawi overlooks the untapped heritage she so insists on in the elaboration of her feminist societal project. In fact, the societal project she proposes differs in each of the selected books under study. In Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins al-Sa'dawi argues that the first measure to prompt women's liberation lies in the abolition of capitalism as its commercial and moral values are at the root of women's enslavement:

The liberation of women is not possible in a capitalist society. Equality between men and women cannot happen in a society that distinguishes between one individual and another, and between one class and another. Therefore the first thing that women should realize is that their liberation is only the liberation of all society from the capitalist system. (p. 126)

In al-Sa'dawi's view the establishment of a socialist order is the most viable socio-political system to guarantee equality between men and women. However, she warns, any socialist order needs to move beyond the declaration of socialist slogans and change of laws, into the implementation of socialism in daily life. Accordingly, al-Sa'dawi proposes a whole action program with fundamental changes in key institutions in society and specific corrective measures for practice.

*** In Education.** Al-Sa'dawi calls for a radical change in education both in the family and in schools in order to prepare girls and boys to participate in nation building on equal footing. She advocates a life-long education based on socialist egalitarian values in order to sustain

both the formative years of girls and boys, and the durability of equality between them throughout life. The focus of this new education is: "Total equality between men and women in all phases of their life from birth to death, equality in rights and obligations, inside the home and outside it, and in child raising" (p. 126).

Furthermore, al-Sa'dawi proposes an individual-centered type of education aimed at influencing character and shaping personality. Accordingly, al-Sa'dawi promotes an action-oriented education that is deliberately interventionist in its strategies in regards to the division of labor both within the family and society (p.127). Also, al-Sa'dawi recommends co-education in schools, in classrooms, and the introduction of new educational principles in both educational content and approach in order to achieve these egalitarian goals (p. 129).

*** In Marriage Law and the Family.** Al-Sa'dawi argues that while change in marriage law and the family are important measures to establish equality, they remain insufficient because they are unaccompanied by change of institutions through which these laws are practiced. This is why, she insists, knowledge about rights and obligations in marriage and the family is key to effect change in women's reality (p.132). In fact, al-Sa'dawi argues, equality in rights and obligations need to extend beyond familial, social, economic and cultural rights and obligations and include sharing in house expenditures, housework, parenting, and sexual fulfillment (p.132).

*** In Mass Media and Communications.** Al-Sa'dawi calls on media institutions, namely the radio, television, newspapers, books, journals, magazines to adopt an entirely new approach of communications. This approach in her view needs to abolish commercial values responsible for the exploitation of women's body and replace them with new values that promote equality. Still, al-Sa'dawi leaves the alternative values she proposes too vague, and their implementation even more:

Cultural programs must be oriented equally to the man and the woman. They must play a role in changing the traditional concept that limits women's role to cooking, cleaning and cosmetics. Likewise, journals and magazines must change all that is women oriented. They should not divide the culture delivered to people on the basis of being female or male. The so-called section for women that gives advice on how to keep the softness of the skin, the thickness of hair, the length of lashes must be discontinued. What is needed, is that these journals and magazines disseminate the comprehensive meaning of beauty...They must present men and women with information that would help them beautify their bodies, souls, and mind. (p.135)

*** In Work.** Al-Sa'dawi argues that the responsibility given to women alone to work inside the home, namely cooking, and child raising represents a fundamental obstacle that cannot be ignored, for it inhibits a married woman's capacity to work outside the home. In her view, society coerces women into choosing between a married life at home and work outside the home. This coercive solution, in al-Sa'dawi opinion, apart from sacrificing women's aspirations in life, deprives women of their humanity and leads to their failure in marital life, should they choose to continue to work. Al-Sa'dawi not only rejects this attitude as a physical and psychological exploitation of Arab women, but she also urges women to choose celibacy and work rather than slavery within marriage: "The failure in married life is less harmful to the woman than the failure in her entire life between the walls of the house." (p.139). To conclude, al-Sa'dawi draws on Western history to show the model of independent women that the Arab-Muslim women need to emulate for their emancipation. Invariably, the models incarnate the autonomous independent woman who refuses marriage for the sake of pursuing an intellectual career:

Undoubtedly, history has confirmed that most gifted women failed in their marital life or refused marriage altogether. Among these are George Elliot, George Sand, and Simone de Beauvoir. In my view if marriage is in conflict with the work of a woman outside the home and her excellence in life, what should change is not woman's work or her will to excel, but marriage, its basis, concepts, and laws so that it no longer opposes the woman's work and her excellence. (p.139)

Ultimately, al-Sa'dawi urges women to participate in the reform of society and partake in the elaboration of a socialist society because, in her view, it is most likely to yield to social equity regardless of gender, colour, or class: "The woman needs to realize that the success of her liberation is founded on the degree of her success in participation in changing society into a real socialist society that grants equality and justice to all people regardless of their color, sex, or social class." (pp. 139-40).

Evidently, the egalitarian project in Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins indicates an over-reliance on the 1970s international socialist feminist programs, and al-Sa'dawi's aspiration to establish similar programs in Egypt. However, the corrective measures she proposes remain inadequate for practice in the Arab-Islamic context because they are presented as "formulas" instead of being anchored in Arab-Islamic history, or its cultural heritage. In addition, al-Sa'dawi's

reference to Western women as models to emulate diminishes the acceptability of al-Sa'dawi's feminist project. Her vision of women's emancipation and the knowledge upon which she bases that emancipation are exogenous. Being so, the proposed societal projects undermine the chances of applicability by the majority of Arab-Muslim women looking for endogenous models to counteract patriarchy in their societies, and weary of inefficient feminist strategies that contribute to the status quo in their life conditions.

In Al-Mar'ah Wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi, al-Sa'dawi has no specific societal project, nor any particular solutions to gender oppression from women's perspectives. This is surprising and anachronistic, considering that this book was written to represent social reality from women's voices. Here, al-Sa'dawi depicts women as constantly struggling against an overwhelming patriarchy with no success, and without a sense of resolution to their unbearable condition. Moreover, al-Sa'dawi, heavily influenced by the international feminist notion of "the underprivileged", portrays "neurosis" as a communal phenomenon whereby the Egyptian women incarnate archetypes of the oppressed against an all-pervasive and powerful patriarchal society. As her diagnosis of and solutions to women's neurosis indicate, al-Sa'dawi continues to view society from a binary female/male perspective, and to conceive "underprivileged" women as a monolithic group of people in opposition to another monolithic group of "privileged" men:

The women's cure of neurosis is intimately linked with women's liberation. And the woman's question is intimately linked with the question of liberation of society from the causes of exploitation of one human being to another, segregation between humans, and divisions between proletariat poor groups sick with hunger and exhaustion and rich groups sick with idleness, and divisions between people into two genders. A feminine gender oppressed sickened by submission and blind obedience, and a masculine gender hostile and sickened by tyranny and monopoly in opinion...

This is why it is so important not to separate political science from medical science...Politics in the real sense does not mean conspiracies and plots or vote games, but the provision of food health, consciousness, and knowledge to people.... Those under-privileged in society whether patients or prisoners possess in their lives many facts that society hides. Ghandi said that: 'to abolish the caste system society needs to focus on the oppressed' and I say: 'to abolish the exploitation in society and in the patriarchal family, society need to focus on women suffering from neurosis'. (pp. 608-9)

Finally, the societal project al-Sa'dawi proposes in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah is surprisingly fragmented. It does not emanate from a serious endogenous feminist vision, nor reflect a work plan compatible with the Arab-Muslim reality. Instead, the societal project is compartmentalized and focuses mainly on al-Sa'dawi's feminist advocacy and areas of intervention, namely in marriage, abortion, and education. For instance, in the area of marriage, al-Sa'dawi advocates civil marriage as an alternative to the Islamic marriage. Moreover, she presents this alternative in comparison with Christian Western societies:

In Arab society there is no 'civil marriage' as in the West. European society was able with industrial and scientific progress to get away from the monopoly of the Church's spiritual authority, without which there is no marriage.... Civil marriage is among the matters now to be dealt with at the level of the Islamic and the Arab world, and within underdeveloped societies that include Muslims and non-Muslims. Civil marriage. means only one thing: the freedom of the Muslim woman in marriage to a non-Muslim man. (p. 855)

In addition, al-Sa'dawi's project contains a deep ambivalence in her ideology on female sexuality. This is best evident in her advocacy for the legalization of abortion. While, she calls for this legalization as an individual human right for all women to benefit from as well as a solution to abortion in the black market, she justifies her call on "accepted sexuality" within Islamic ethics and within the institution of marriage:

It is known that cases of abortion happening in Egypt are not cases of unmarried mothers because 90% at least of the cases of illegal abortion are married mothers between the ages of 25 and 35...The legalization of abortion in Egypt or other Arab countries will not increase the huge number of illegal abortion, but it would remove abortion from the black market. It will also allow poor women to benefit from clean medicine like the one provided for their richer counterparts. (p.911)

Al-Sa'dawi's articulation of abortion is problematic on two counts. First, it leaves unexplored Islam's view on the issue. Second, it reflects double standards because it automatically excludes "unmarried" Arab-Muslim women victims of sexual abuse and rape al-Sa'dawi so vigorously criticizes, and who may need abortion even more badly than the married ones.

Last but not least, the societal program in Al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah is still formulated in comparison with the West; only this time al-Sa'dawi makes the comparison to highlight "the Arab-Muslim women's superiority to Western women" in terms of their cultural heritage, and resistance to patriarchy. The following excerpt leaves no doubt as to al-Sa'dawi's belief that

what Arab-Muslim women need for their liberation is *ijtihad* in the Arab-Islamic tradition to establish endogenous feminist ethics, and to take positions regarding their personal and public lives. Still, she articulates the *ijtihad* in question in a series of claims rather than an actual program:

The Arab woman needs to fight the logic that says that the essential origin of her oppression and underdevelopment is Islam or the Eastern culture, because the Western culture, Christianity and the other patriarchal religions are not any less oppressive of women but more oppressive than Islam...

Our heritage has many positive and negative aspects. The Arab woman need to study her heritage...and criticize the hostile ideas towards women without fear of touching the sacred....The Arab woman needs to realize that the question of women's liberation is...against the colonizing systems in the Arab region and the outside world. It is also against all forms of constraints and exploitation whether economic, sexual, social, cultural or moral. (pp.860-63)

Findings

From the analysis of al-Sa'dawi's scientific context of discovery, I draw the following conclusions:

(1) A marked and drastic shift in al-Sa'dawi's approach from Marxist oriented approaches, and radical Marxist feminist theories of social change heavily present in Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins (1973) to Islamic approaches in both Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi (1974) Al-Wajh al'Ari lil-Mar'ah (1977). This signals the author's continual reflexivity about her feminist thought. Indeed, only one year separates the production of the first (1973) and the second book (1974), and the third book followed soon after (1977). Nonetheless, because al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint is deeply entrenched within the Marxist ideology and its standpoint epistemology of master/slave division of labor, her entire scientific discovery and feminist epistemology remained heavily imbued with the Marxist paradigm than the Islamic one.

(2) Al-Sa'dawi's treatment of Islamic issues of gender from the comparative mode with Western societies' theories on gender, precludes her from the full exploration of the particularism of patriarchy and gender in the Arab-Islamic society. On the one hand, the comparative mode leads her to view feminist issues as universal cross-culturally, creating a paradox in her scientific context of discovery. On the other hand, the comparative mode induces her to create knowledge on Western culture and feminism, hence limiting the

scientific contributions she could have made to the Arab-Islamic culture and to feminism. This being the case, al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint epistemology and feminist knowledge are representative of the "Occidental trend"²³ that has characterized the productions of the social sciences within the Arab-Islamic culture during the 1970-1980 decade. (Belhachmi, 1988a, p.56)

(3) The fundamental problem with al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint is that it is devoid of a feminist Islamic view of sexuality or an Islamic epistemology on gender. Being embedded within the Marxist ideology and standpoint, al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint both as a perspective and as an epistemology automatically replicate the nature/culture dualism of Marxism and its related sex/gender dichotomy in the analysis of gender. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi assigns meanings to gender/sex from the dichotomized social behavior associated with masculinity and femininity, as though universal cross-culturally. In turn, this leads her to be implicitly ambivalent about the Islamic notion of gender complementarity as a scientific notion in her analysis of gender. As a result, al-Sa'dawi's standpoint contains many internal incoherences both as a perspective and as an epistemology.

(4) As a perspective, al-Sa'dawi's standpoint on social change is flawed because it is inscribed within the Marxist ideology and its related economic model, which imposes an artificial structural analysis that separates men and women as two distinct entities in opposition to each other. As an epistemology, al-Sa'dawi's standpoint is impaired because it is founded on the flawed notion of universal oppression of women, and on a "juridico-discursive" model of resistance against this alleged oppression. Such an epistemology may be rightly perceived as a direct attack on Islam.

(5) The Marxist ideology prevents al-Sa'dawi from exploring Islamic metaphysics and the way the concept of *al-Tawhid* applies to genders' relations, and agency from within Islamic sociology. Not only does the Marxist ideology preclude her direct engagement with the notion of complementarity of genders, but it also prevents her from making scientific contributions to the field of sociology from the Islamic worldview as she did in psychology.

²³ I use the expression "the Occidental trend" to emphasize the fact that feminist work of many Arab-Muslim feminists and other social scientists during the 1970-90 decades is still heavily involved in knowledge production on Western culture and institutions rather than merely reacting to Orientalist approaches to the Arab-Islamic culture by Western scholars. Accordingly, I reject the expression "Istishraq Ma'kus", (reversed Orientalism) that al-'Adm (1981) uses to describe social scientists in the region because it conveys the impression that the work of the Arab-Muslim social scientists is merely defensive and devoid of any scientific value for its people, or to other people.

(6) Al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint as an epistemology produces an inadequate model of agency for Arab-Muslim women agency because it invariably offers a "negative, oppositional relation" of agency to Muslim women, which promotes an oppositional consciousness for women. Such a feminist model of agency clashes directly with the Islamic model of agency that promotes "a positive, co-operative relation" between genders within their systemic socio-political and cultural networks.

(7) In reproducing the Marxist ideology and its exogenous woman's standpoint perspective and epistemology of the master/slave division of labor, al-Sa'dawi dismisses both the Islamic worldview of gender and of science. For this reason, al-Sa'dawi's engagement with the Islamic worldview of gender sexuality, and gender discourses remains confined within the binary male/female logic. For the same reason also, al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint epistemology excludes the Islamic woman's standpoint epistemology of her foremothers, and their scientific legacy on gender.

(8) The Marxist scientific paradigm induces al-Sa'dawi to embark in articulations of Islamic concepts in juxtaposition to Marxist concepts. These juxtapositions severely preclude the understanding of the Arab-Muslim women's particularities, and obscure the insights from within the Islamic sciences and ideology. Also, these juxtapositions produce a duality in the author's feminist consciousness that limits the understanding of the Arab-Muslim women's situation, and the possible contributions of Islamic sciences to their self-actualization and advancement.

(9) Al-Sa'dawi's Islamic/Marxist juxtapositions lead to a cultural critique of neo-patriarchy riddled with contradictions and ambiguities. One of the strongest contradictions lies in al-Sa'dawi's articulation of women's social reality as a fluid space where the formal and the informal structures interlap constantly; especially in al-Wajh al-'Ari li al-Mar'ah. While this enables her to avoid replicating the Western private/public dichotomy, or to assign artificial meanings to the condition of Egyptian women, it contradicts sharply her Marxist structural view of women in society and their agency.

(10) Another salient ambiguity lies in al-Sa'dawi's view of education and its role in women's liberation. Heavily informed by Marxist feminist ideologies of the 1970s, al-Sa'dawi's educational proposals reflect unrealistic strategies for the advancement of the Arab-Muslim lives as illustrated in Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins. On the one hand she uncritically replicates

the Western liberal education's liberating project which calls for women's access to formal realms of power. (Formal education, government positions etc...) Such a replication reflects the author's uncritical stance towards liberal education and its role in the separation between the formal and informal realms of learning and masks the role of liberal education in the maintenance of gender and class inequities in the Arab-Islamic society.²⁴

(12) Al-Sa'dawi's adherence to the Marxist theory of history and its related focus on structural analysis of class prevented her from portraying gender pluralism in the Egyptian society. Likewise, it led her to focus on the 19th and 20th century history of women and to neglect the socio-political linkages these two centuries had with the systemic history of women in the Arab-Islamic society as a whole. This is inadequate because it obscures the role of other movements to the advancement of women in the history of the Arab-Islamic society, and overstates the cumulative role of the liberal and feminist age in the global development of the Arab-Islamic society as a community. Equally, this occults the scientific contributions of the Arab-Muslim women to their culture throughout its 13-century intellectual history.

(13) Al-Sa'dawi overstates the view that socialism is the only possible solution for women's liberation in the Arab-Islamic society throughout the selected books. Yet, she omits to engage with socialist egalitarianism in Islam and its potential positive effects on women in Egypt. Last but not least, al-Sa'dawi's stance towards socialism is uncritical and dogmatic. This is striking, considering her relentless struggle against all forms of cultural imperialism and their ideological hegemony in the Arab-Islamic society.

(14) Al-Sa'dawi skillfully uses a variety of techniques to capture women's subjectivity as a scientific data including her own, such as personal biography, and newspapers reports. However, she fails to anchor women's conditions at the micro-social reality and environment within the macro-socio-cultural reality, except partially in the last book.

(15) Al-Sa'dawi maintains colloquial Egyptian in the transcription of the interviewed women, and in the representation of their biographies throughout the three selected books. This technique enables her on the one hand to maintain accuracy of information and the emotional components of the women portrayed. On the other hand, this technique allows her

²⁴ For a critique of liberal education and its class and gender inequities in the Arab-Islamic society, see chaps.1 & 3.

to keep her feminist activism and links at the grass-roots level, and to share information with a wider feminine audience, rather than a purely academic audience.

(16) Al-Sa'dawi's standpoint as an epistemology reflects an evident mastery of the Arabic language and Islamic sciences, as manifested in her engagement with the Islamic tradition captured from social interaction in al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al Nafsi, and from textual productions in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah. These essential competencies enable her to explain the variety in the institutions of marriage and divorce in Arab-Islamic society as lived experiences. Equally, these competencies allow her to show the flexibility of Arab-Islamic thought and its untapped potential for the Arab-Muslim women's identity and identification. Nonetheless, because her woman's standpoint epistemology is deeply entrenched in the Marxist epistemology, she locks her exploration of gender either within the victimology logic, or within the West/Islam comparative mode.

(17) Al-Sa'dawi's periodization of *hadith* is a tour de force in her engagement with tradition. This allows her to establish the link between laws and social policies and the way they interlap in shaping women's status. In the same move, al-Sa'dawi successfully manages with her *feminist ijtiḥad* in *hadith* to re-contextualize concepts and attributes previously imputed to women for both genders (i.e. *kaid*, and *nushuz*). In doing so, she exposes the abuse of power of male scholars in *ijtiḥad*, and demonstrates the major difference *ijtiḥad* can make from feminist perspectives in the improvement of Muslim women's lives. Unfortunately, she does not engage with *nushuz* and self-determination from the Islamic principle of complementarity of genders. This obscures her epistemological stance on the principle of complementarity, and precludes her creativity regarding the ways this principle may positively affect the status of women. Equally, this leads her to promote the rebellious confrontational model (*nushuz*) as the only Islamic model of womanhood.

(18) Al-Sa'dawi's application of *al-Tawḥid* (unity between the religious and the secular) as a method of scientific practice is evident in her criticism of Freud's psychoanalysis theory both in al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira' al-Nafsi and al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah. This application enables her not only to provide an endogenous psychoanalysis theory more adequate for the Arab-Islamic social reality, but also to expand on Islamic epistemology existing in the field of psychology. Unfortunately, al-Sa'dawi dismisses the principle *al-Tawḥid* in human agency,

and how it affects the notion of complementarity of genders and their relation in society. In doing so, she produces an exogenous sociology for Muslim women.

Overall, al-Sa'dawi's standpoint both as a perspective and as an epistemology reflects an intrinsic ambivalence about gender in Islam. This is precisely why she fails to provide causal analyses of the micro-processes of gender relations vis-à-vis the macro-tendencies in the socio/moral order which shape both the social relations and scientific practices on gender in the Arab-Islamic society.

CHAPTER VI
PROBLEMATIZING MERNISSI'S
WOMAN'S STANDPOINT

Introduction

In this chapter I use the third level of analysis (Stanley and Wise's feminist Epistemology, 1990) of the model outlined in figure VII in chapter 2 to problematize Mernissi's woman's standpoint and articulations of feminist research on the Arab-Muslim women in general and the women of Morocco in particular. In Part 1, I use the three analytical instruments (methodology, method, and epistemology) recommended by these authors to locate Mernissi's woman's standpoint at different stages in her scientific context of discovery of her feminist research. In part 2, I illustrate the way Mernissi invests her woman's standpoint in her feminist societal project for Arab-Muslim women, and/or Moroccan women.

A. Methodology

Part I. Exploring Mernissi's Context of Scientific Discovery

1. The Comparative Paradigm

1.1. Islamic vs. Western Theories¹ of Sexuality

In Beyond the veil (1975) Mernissi asserts that Muslim women's socialization is through segregation as it is an integral part of Islam's² unique view of the social order, its particular ideology on sexuality, and male-female dynamics. Yet, instead of unfolding sexuality from the unique view of the social order Mernissi attributes to Sunni Islam, she compares Western and Islamic theories of the individual's instincts in a monolithic way:

The concept of the individual as tragically torn between two poles- good and evil, flesh and spirit, instinct and reason-is very different from the Muslim concept. Islam has a more sophisticated theory of the instincts, more akin to the Freudian concept of the libido. It views the raw instincts as energy. The energy of instincts is pure in the sense that it has no connotation of good or bad. The question of good or bad arises only when the social destiny of men is considered. The individual cannot survive except within a social order. Any social order has a set of laws. The set of laws decides what use of the instincts is good or bad. It is the use made of the instincts, not the instincts themselves, which is beneficial or harmful to the social order. Therefore, in the Muslim order it is not necessary for the individual to eradicate his instincts or to control them for the sake of control itself, but he must use them according to the demands of the religious law. (p.1)

¹ I have reproduced the terminology "Islamic versus Western" from Mernissi's writing to highlight the author's taxonomic error throughout the text, and her uncritical stance on terminology.

² Mernissi refers here to the *Sunni* worldview of Islam. (See Appendix I).

Moreover, Mernissi contends that the whole sexual regulation of men and women in Muslim society is built on an institutionalized Islamic ideology of sexuality which relies on "a double machismo-theory" (p.3). That perceives women in the Islamic social system as a distraction from the male's full attention and allegiance to God (*fitna*). First, she identifies this double machismo theory as involving "an explicit theory" represented by al-Ghazali, and an "implicit theory" represented by al-'Aqqad without explaining the way/s in which this theory affects the nature of women's sexuality, nor the male-female dynamics in the Islamic system. However, instead of comparing the two authors' theories on sexuality, Mernissi compares al-Ghazali's and al-'Aqqad's theories with Freud's. In the case of al-'Aqqad, she declares: "Although Aqqad [sic] has neither the depth nor the brilliant systematic deductive approach of Freud, his ideas on male-female dynamics are very similar to Freud's...Like Freud, Aqqad endows the woman with a hearty appetite for suffering." (p.5).

While Mernissi acknowledges that the comparison between al-Ghazali and al-'Aqqad would bring insight to the nature of the implicit and explicit theories, she justifies her dismissal of al-'Aqqad's theory by simply asserting that this theory is "an amateurish mixture of history, religion, his own brand of biology, and anthropology" (p.6). Similarly, Mernissi justifies her comparison between al-Ghazali and Freud on the grounds that Freud: "has the advantage of possessing a machismo theory which is systematic in the elaboration of its premises" (p.6).

Second, Mernissi compares the Western theory of sexuality (she attributes to Freud) and the Islamic one (she attributes to al-Ghazali). In her view the Western theory of sexuality is based on the polarization between masculine and feminine sexuality, while the Islamic theory is not polarized because "it conceives of both female and male sexuality partaking and belonging to the same kind of sexuality" (p.7). Yet, after quoting the work of each author on sex cells, Mernissi concludes:

The puzzling question is not why Imam Ghazali failed to see the difference between the male and female cell, but why Freud, who was more than knowledgeable about biological facts, saw the ovum as a passive cell whose contribution to procreation was minor compared to that of the sperm. In spite of their technical advancement, European theories clung for centuries to the idea that the sperm was the only determining factor in the procreation process; babies were fabricated by the sperm and the uterus was just a cosy place where it developed. (p. 8)

Even in Women and Islam (1991), presumably focused on the historical and theological interpretation of Islam, Mernissi theorizes the Muslims' relationship to time in comparison to the Westerners. Quoting Serge Moscovici's observation on the West's transformation of time, Mernissi not only argues for the superiority of Western civilization due to temporalization, but she also predicts the evolution or regression of Arab cultures in reference to the West:

The post-industrial Western society obliges all other cultures to fall into line with its rhythm. Through its time-rhythm, which standardizes behavior whatever the place or culture, the West manifests its domination of our era. The era of the colonial army...is finished... In our day domination infiltrates through the familiar presence of a wristwatch...With this temporalization, which is, among other things, a devaluation of geopolitics, the control of space, which is the basis and essence of the political and economic power of a nation, is today replaced by that of time. Today it is the control of time that is the basis of this power...The new imperialism that dominates us, non-Westerners, no longer appears as a physical occupation. The new imperialism is not even economic; it is more insidious- it is a way of reckoning, of calculating, of evaluation...America does not have to occupy the Muslim countries in order to bring them to their knees. (pp.17-18)

To be sure, Mernissi begins her research inquiry from the comparative view that places the West as the norm for progress and the model to emulate. This theoretical position in itself is flawed since it is inherently value hierarchical and equates the West with "superiority". Also, this equation predetermines Mernissi's analytical process since it constantly tries to measure up to the Western model and its intellectual standards. Moreover, even if one subscribes to this theoretical position, Mernissi presents the West as a monolithic entity and the pattern of progress that Muslim cultures are likely to take as the same over time. From the outset, therefore, Mernissi predicts and imposes a pre-defined course of evolution for Muslim societies rather than unfolding them from historical description. This theoretical position is problematic in a number of ways. First, not all cultures are "developed" equally, including Western cultures. Lacking from Mernissi's presentation of "culture" and "development" is the notion of process and pace of development between Western nations and within the various strata of each nation. For instance America, the model of development for the author, contains various populations that are far from "developed" in comparison to the dominant "Anglo-Saxon" white majority. The salients of these populations are the Afro-American population, or the Hispanics pejoratively labeled "Chicanos".

Moreover, while Mernissi acknowledges that: "The difference between the Westerners and "us" is not so much about attitude to change as about attitude to time" (p.19), she does not explain how the attitude is linked to time, nor does she describe the way this attitude affects the process of social change in contemporary Muslim societies. Instead, she asserts:

The difference between us and the West is the way we consume death, the past. Westerners make it into a last course, and we try to make it the main dish. Westerners consume the past as a hobby, as a pastime, as a rest from the stress of the present. We persist in making it a profession, a vocation, an outlook. By invoking our ancestors at every turn we live the present as an interlude in which we are little involved. (p.20)

Not only does this assertion assume "the West", and "us" from a polarized binary thinking, but it also presumes that the "West" and "us" do exist as entities in reality. By the same token, this binary theorization assumes that the "attitude" toward time is uniform among "us". Most of all, this theorization tends to treat Islam as a "fixed" uniform ideology separate from its social relations and contexts (Islam as a way of life). Such a stance replicates modernist views of Islam, which essentialize Islam and refuse to acknowledge its idiosyncratic moral order, or the validity of its independent worldview of science for the interpretation of the social sciences even for Muslim scholars.³ Equally, this stance arbitrarily dismisses Islam as an ideology devoid of theories of materialism.⁴ Finally, Mernissi's monolithic conceptions of both Islam and the West leads her to create erroneous taxonomies for drawing comparisons not only between Western and Arabic countries, but also within the religions adhered to by these countries. As a result, she makes the following misleading equations: "So we see the hijab is a key concept in Muslim civilization, just as sin in the Christian context, or credit is in American capitalist society." (p.95).

1.2. Islamic vs. Western Governments

Mernissi views the contemporary Islamic State, and its government policies in comparison with the West. From a transhistorical perspective, she starts by defining what it

³ An example of such a modernist views that distort Islam is found in Rodinson (1979) who argues, that despite the various interpretations of the socio-political and economic implications of Islam Muslim scholars tend to perceive their moral order as unchanging (p.8). For an internal view of the moral order and its significance for scientific interpretations, see items 1, 4 and 5 in the glossary.

⁴ For an exploration of materialist theories in Islam and a discussion of the controversies raised by these theories in the Arab-Islamic society, see: a) Muruwwa (1978), b). Al-Jabiri (1989a).

means to be a "Muslim" in "a theocratic Islamic state", as if the Islamic state can exist out of socio-historical developments and geographies, and as though all Islamic states today ascribe to the same form of theocracy. Further, she accuses the so-called Islamic theocratic state of being ambiguous about the meaning of "the Muslim citizen" and of creating confusion between individual and collective rights:

I define being Muslim as belonging to a theocratic state. What the individual thinks is secondary for this definition. Being Marxist or Maoist or atheist does not keep one from obeying the national laws, those of the theocratic state, which define the crimes and set the punishment. Being Muslim is a civil matter, a national identity, a passport, a family code of laws, a code of public rights. (pp.20-21)

This assertion is untenable historically. 'Amara (1980), after a survey of instances from the history of Muslims, aptly shows that Islam is far from being a theocracy. He describes the lay character of political authority in Islam (*sulta madaniyya*) and highlights Islam's emphasis on *shura* (consultation) between the members of the *Ummah*. (pp.101-102). Mernissi entirely overlooks the *Sunni* Islamic worldview of government, the individual, the community, and more importantly the evolution of these concepts in the Muslims' history, especially contemporary history. Short of this description, Mernissi's presentation of "the theocratic state" is reduced to a mere accusation of the Muslims' maladjustment to time and refusal of democracy, as reflected in this statement:

After independence...The nascent Muslim states, desirous of recognition by the colonial powers who had cut them adrift, surged onto the international scene. Enthusiastically they thronged into the corridors of the United Nations to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to assert their respect for the fundamental freedoms as the principle and spirit of their constitutions. In redefining themselves in the eyes of their former colonizers, they were forced to grant their new citizenship to all their new nationals, men and women. But in doing this, the Muslim State itself, preoccupied with its own renaissance undermined the sexual hierarchy and destroyed the scale of values that constituted male identity. There were no longer just men as citizens among the Muslims after independence; there were only asexual citizens-at any rate, vis-à-vis the state and its laws. (pp.21-22)

The comparison with the West, as this quote shows, contains three flawed assumptions Mernissi makes and believes to be "true" and uniform for all Muslim societies and for "the theocratic state". First, that the historical transformation of the Muslim states occurred from a state of "purely" traditional religious formation into a modern secular formation, whereby all

citizens are governed by secular laws (the Constitution). Second, the assumption that all Muslim states during the post colonial era were desirous to emulate "Modern Western states", their previous colonizers, and were anxious to adopt Western styles of modernity⁵. And third, that all-Muslim states adhere to The International Declaration of Human Rights (IDHR) and have integrated the principles thereof into their state laws.⁶

Immediately after, Mernissi even argues that Muslim women have been "transformed" from marginalized objects into active subjects, and that "that transformation" signals the beginning for women of an identity as individuals free from the hierarchical relationship they had with men within the traditional socio-political order: "The metamorphosis of the Muslim woman from a veiled, secluded, marginalized object, reduced to inertia, into a subject with constitutional rights, erased the lines that defined the identity hierarchy which organized politics and relations between the sexes." (p.22).

In the above excerpts, Mernissi raises the complex issues of colonialism, the Muslim State, citizenship, and gender without any analysis or historical evidence. Not only does she omit the historical process of the Muslim state formation that led to the independence era, but she totally overlooks the power-relations between colonialism and "the Muslim state", and the effect of these relationships in shaping the post-independence Muslim state. Yet, these relationships remain crucial both for the definitions of the state, citizenship, and gender in contemporary Muslim societies. Equally, these relationships are essential for the significance given to social change by various social groups in these societies. After all, colonial institutions and policies have had a significant impact on local patriarchies, namely in consolidating hegemonic liberal elite and middle-classes in previously colonized Arab-Islamic lands. As such, the relationship between colonialism and national patriarchies is an integral part of the history of the state, and of the ideological construction of masculinity and femininity within these societies. By omitting this part of paramount significance in theorizing and analyzing gender relations from the history of Islamic patriarchy, Mernissi masks the project of sexualization contained in colonialism. Also, she conceals the way this sexualization project affected the construction of the ideal model of "womanhood", and later "the woman

⁵ This assertion is not substantiated by historical evidence. As I illustrated in chapter 1, the state and its laws are a product of a hybridity between the *Shari'a* and some Western laws. For details on this hybridity in the Arab-Islamic state's Constitutions, see Nasif (1985). Also for more accurate portrayals of Islam, the state and gender, see a) Asad (1980), b) Enayat (1982).

⁶ This is inaccurate. Most Muslim nations have signed adhere to (IDHR) agreements with many reservations. For details see An-Na'im (1990). Also for a discussion of the (IDHR) from a cross-cultural perspective see An-Na'im (1992a, b).

question" advocated by Westernized nationalists, feminists, and other constituencies involved within the politics of Arab-Islamic societies during the pre-independence and post-independence eras.

Similarly, Mernissi does not question the newly established moral order imposed by post-independent states. This is misleading, because it assumes that the new moral order was uncontested and so was the new regulation of gender relations at the level of marriage, the family and the state. Likewise, Mernissi occults the role of the new moral order in the replication of the liberal model, and its notion of citizenship in capitalist patriarchies of the post-independence era. In short, Mernissi from the outset endorses theoretically a Western liberal citizenship model and its related socio-political, economic and intellectual structures. Further, it is against this model that Mernissi views and observes "the Islamic social order", and not how it works as a system. Above all, in adhering to the Western liberal model in her theorization, Mernissi pre-determines the boundaries of private/public spaces in "the Muslim social order", and accordingly she construes "the victimization" of Muslim women and their need for a counter power structure for their liberation.

This underlying evaluation of "the" Muslim social order limits from the start Mernissi's theorization of the systemic institutions that govern gender relations (marriage, the family, the state), and precludes her analysis of the dynamics involved within the Islamic social reality. As a result, Mernissi reduces Islam itself to a mere ideology whose internalization contributes to the status quo in the political, economic, cultural and social organization of the Arab-Islamic society. This way also, anything Islamic, starting from "Islamic theology" or "jurisprudence" is easily imposed on a given entity designated as "women" (read as all Muslim women), and the differing positions of women within various Muslim societies are easily glossed in monoliths. In an uncanny manner, Mernissi's theorization of Islam reflects the way in which some conservative *'ulama* and Muslim male theorists view and interpret Islam. Such a theoretical stance robs Muslim women of their agency because it presents them as subjected to Islam in essentialist terms and attributes to them uniformity and coherence outside history.

In turn, this theoretical stance already forecloses the interpretation and analysis of social change. For instance, Mernissi contends that the confusion between individual and collective rights of Muslim citizens is translated in conflicting agreements and laws to which Muslim societies adhere to simultaneously; namely the (UIDHR) that grants equal individual

rights to women as citizens and The Family Code that confines those same rights within the family and society:

Imagine the effect of a phrase as inoffensive as "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) in societies where inequality of the sexes reproduces, guarantees, and paves the way for political inequality and affirms it as the foundation of cultural existence, as identity! Especially if it is compared to Article I of the 1957 Moroccan Code of Personal Status, which states: "marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman are united...under the direction of the husband". (p.23)

Here, Mernissi assumes that both the IDHR and The Family Code represent "*blueprints*" uniformly followed by Muslim countries. In reality, however, Arab states have different Family Codes that were negotiated by the political constituencies in power before the Independence era. Also, similar processes of negotiation occurred regarding the issue of gender and the state within nationalism.⁷ Equally, the IDHR was conceived and intended to operate within the framework of international relations. (An-Na'im, 1990) This means that at the national level the practice of these international declarations represent only a general guidance that the world communities adhere to in principle, with the understanding that these declarations respect cultural difference. What this entails for implementation is the integration of cultural traditions as integral components and normative propositions in the conception and observance of human rights.

In fact, since 1985 various Muslim nations in the world community convened and issued The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR)⁸. As far as they are concerned, the fundamental issue of contention in governance between them and other nations lies in the supremacy of the Divine Law over any other secular/human law be it the (IDHR), the Constitution or any other human-made law. Likewise, the Muslim nations are concerned with the moral order at the core of the relationships within and between nations and how it translates at the level of the family, the state, or the community. This addresses the issue of diversity in the moral orders among the world community, and their related independent styles in socio-political and cultural governance. Essentially, this diversity raises two central questions. The question of sovereignty of the nations that constitute the world community.

⁷ For an informative study of the changes and evolution of the family and gender relations in the Middle East see a) Fernea (Ed.). (1985). Also, for a discussion of the "regressive" negotiation of the family code, and gender with the state in Egypt, see Hatem (1986). Conversely, for the progressive negotiation on the same issues in Tunisia, see Charad (1990).

⁸ For a summary of both the (UIDHR, 1985), and the (IDHR, 1948) see Appendix III.

Equally, this raises the question of equality in international relations between world nations, and the right of independent nations to refuse the universalization of laws of governance across cultures. None of these issues and questions is addressed by Mernissi. Yet, at the international level these issues continue to constitute the major conflicts between countries of the North and those of the South, and they still represent the fundamental spiritual and intellectual crises of the contemporary world.⁹

Accordingly, the (IDHR) is problematic at the national level of the Arab-Islamic society because it clashes with the Islamic notions of equality, agency, and governance. The question of equality presented in the (IUDHR) concerns the relationship of people regardless of gender and their allegiance to God. As to the equality between genders, it is derived from Islamic metaphysics and the notion complementarity between genders¹⁰ in human agency. Mernissi entirely overlooks how this notion produces a different cultural conception of equality, gender relations and of agency. Instead, she adheres to the Western liberal notion of symmetrical equality and agency, and accordingly she analyzes "gender discrimination" in Muslim communities. A more fruitful analysis of equality and agency would be to show the way/s the notion of "of complementarity between genders" actually shapes women's equality and agency in Muslim societies, and how it inflicts harm or discrimination against women.

In addition, Mernissi disregards the fact that at the ethical level both the family and human rights declaration in Muslim societies do not rely on individualism alone. This is so because the Islamic worldview of human agency takes into consideration the relationship between the individual/family, the community/state, and God in an idiosyncratic holistic cosmology (*al-Tawhid*)¹¹. This fundamental relationship is totally missing from Mernissi's theorization of "the Muslim Order" she identifies both in the past and in the present. Yet, without a theoretical description and explanation of the nature this relationship in Islam, it is impossible to understand the significance of human rights and their relation to gender dynamics in contemporary Muslim societies.

It is precisely the omission of the Islamic notion of agency that precluded Mernissi's conception of the head of "the Muslim State». In her dealing with the succession of the

⁹ For a discussion of the spiritual and intellectual crises between the North and the South see, Senghor (1981). Also, for the particular spiritual and intellectual conflicts between Muslim countries and Western countries see, Garaudy (1981).

¹⁰ For a brief description of the notion of complementarity of genders and its importance for scholars' interpretation of social change in the Islamic Middle East see item 26 of the glossary.

¹¹ For details on this aspect, consult the references on *al-Tawhid* in item 5 in the glossary.

prophet (*khilafah*), she neither defines the concept of *khilafah*, nor explains its dual religious/secular significance for political and social Islam. After all, the very legitimacy of any head of state in the Muslims' history¹² has consistently been construed over time on the dual spiritual/secular role of this top official in compliance with the prophet's style of government (*al-Tawhid*). This idiosyncratic style of Islamic government is dismissed altogether by Mernissi, and instead she locks her inquiry in the comparative mode. In the absence of the dual spiritual/secular role of the Muslim leader from her definition of the head of state, Mernissi's portrayal of *khilafah* does not yield to an explanation of the full meaning of *khilafah* for both genders, nor does it bring insights as to its significance for women as heads of state or as citizens. As the passage below clearly illustrates, Mernissi's portrayal of the *khilafah* reduces this institution to a mere gender conflict over succession to the prophet, instead of explaining what it means for political governance for both genders from the Islamic worldview:

At the time of his death the prophet did not have a male heir.... However, in his immediate entourage four men played a prominent role. First there was 'Ali...The closest man to the Prophet was 'Uthman Ibn Affan'...The two other men who were extremely close to him were Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and 'Umar Ibn al Khattab...According to all evidence his preferences were for abu Bakr and 'Umar, who would become respectively the first and second orthodox caliphs...The assassination of 'Uthman, the third khaliph, pitched the community into the first fitna (civil war). 'Ali chosen as the fourth caliph in the middle of the civil war, never really exercised power, the era of turmoil having begun. It was against him that 'Aicha took arms at the Battle of the Camel in year 36 of the Hejira (AD 658). (pp.32-34)

Finally, Mernissi's engagement with the (IDHR) is uncritical and merely argumentative. Other Muslim women (Afkhani, 1996) explain why it is so essential to engage critically with the (IDHR):

The declarations, concepts and conventions that have come out of the international human rights are usually quite Western-Oriented, both in concept and in language...Indeed, the terminology of some international conventions and declarations alienate people in non-Western cultures, even to the extent that these declarations are seen as a continuation of the cultural hegemony of the West in the formerly colonized countries of the world...At the same time, this emphasis on international human rights conventions masks some of the deeply-rooted human rights concepts that are indigenous to non-Western cultures. (pp.13-14)

¹² Even Ibn Khaldun's (1970) *Muqaddimah* refers to the *Imamah* as a part of the functions of the leader of a Muslim *Ummah*. Also, Zubaida (1988) discusses the nature of the contemporary state and its relation to people in Islamic communities.

Furthermore, an increasing number of Non-Muslim scholars are specifically concerned with de-essentializing Islam and acknowledging its international content in their exploration of gender, citizenship, and human rights.¹³ This means that the issue of self-definition, and scientific representation continue to be at the center of women's debates in international feminists scholarship, and that some national and international feminists persist in framing women's issues in the Islamic world within the West/Islam dichotomous paradigm. Such a dichotomous paradigm of analysis in the interpretation of women's rights in the Islamic world leads to a rising contestation criticism by some Muslim women scholars.¹⁴

2. Islam as a Social Order

2.1. In Marriage

In Beyond the veil Mernissi asserts that sexuality in Islam is conceived from a unique view of a social order that considers sexuality as positive for both sexes. To substantiate, however, Mernissi omits to explore the view of sexuality from the Qur'an that contains an ideal concept of sexuality whereby the earthly and the heavenly are merged for the sake of the *Ummah's maslaha* (the community's material and spiritual good). Instead, she relies on Ibn Khaldun's and al-Ghazali's explanations of sexuality in Islam and in the Muslim order. First, she quotes from Ibn Khaldun's Al-Muqaddimah (1969) to show how sex as part of human instincts intended by the messenger of Islam to be at the service of God and in the public interest of the *Ummah* (pp.1-2).

Then, Mernissi relies on al-Ghazali's 'Ulum Ihaya' al-Din to demonstrate how Islam viewed sexuality at the service of both the social order and God: "The desire of the flesh serves God's and the individual's interests in both worlds, and enhances life on earth and in heaven" (p.2). Accordingly, Mernissi deduces that sexuality is conceived: "In accordance with God's interests, the regulation of the sexual instinct was the key devices in Muhammad's implementation on earth of a new social order in then pagan Arabia." (p.3). Equally, Mernissi argues, female sexuality is founded on an ideal type of male-female dynamics that promotes emotional separation in the Muslim couple, and the social order in view of channeling

¹³ See for example. Joseph (1994; 1996).

¹⁴ For example, Afkhami & Vaziri. (Ed). (1996), and Barazangi (1997).

the most likely outcome is the woman's dislike of and rebellion against the husband." (p. 59). To substantiate, Mernissi reports Hayat's perception of "l'entente conjugale" as something exceptional: "We never fought each other. He always treated me like a guest, with a lot of respect; he will do things before I express the need for them... It is a gift of God when there is respect." (p. 59).

Again, Mernissi believes that al-Ghazali's model of the ideal wife is not only uniform in al-Ghazali's time (11th century) and similar to the 1970's Morocco, but that it is also an active model of the ideal wife in contemporary Moroccan reality. This belief prevents her from exploring the actual dynamics of marriage from Moroccan reality, and from illustrating the claimed emotional separation between the couple. Third, Mernissi depicts marriage and divorce as uniform and unilateral practices; showing only their negative aspects. This distorts the nature of the institutions of marriage and divorce as well as their social function. By totally overlooking the key notions of *darrar* and *maslaha*, Mernissi oversimplifies the meaning of marriage and divorce in Islam and the way they apply to both partners. For instance, while *Talaq khul'* (when a woman buys her freedom from a marriage) may be considered as a guarantee for men's *maslaha* (interest) and his protection from *darrar* (damage), *muta'* (enjoyment, benefit) is also a concept applied to women in case of divorce in terms of money compensation during *'idda* (the waiting period), or as her *sadaq* (dowry) usually stipulated in her pre-nuptial agreement. In this case the *muta'* becomes a positive concept for the benefit of women and their protection from *darrar*. Similarly, *muta'* can constitute a psychological ground for divorce in case of polygamy (in this case *muta'* is incomplete as it entails sexual deprivation), and as such it is interpreted as *darrar* (harm) to women.

Third, Mernissi interprets marriage and divorce as static institutions and overlooks their evolution and adaptation to history. A salient example of this evolution is the increase of *fatiha marriage* abolished by the state after independence. Yet, at the social level, *fatiha marriage* has re-emerged since in the 1970s as a coping strategy for sexuality by both genders in the context of a neo-patriarchal order that disrupted sexual patterns. After all, new social problems in the urban setting such as pursuing careers and delayed marriage needed new sexual arrangements. *fatiha marriage* in this situation was adopted as a pragmatic Islamic solution as well as a new accommodation strategy to new social problems. In fact, Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1993) showed how *fatiha marriage* practice extended to the 1980s and the 1990s

and was seen by individuals (the couple) and their respective families as a morally adequate strategy of accommodation for sexual arrangement. As such, this study challenges Mernissi's interpretation of marriage and divorce in Morocco. Further, this study is particularly valuable because it successfully illustrates how the Shari'a is a problem solving tool that adapts to a particular soil within which it functions.

2.2. In the Family and the State

In Beyond the veil Mernissi relies on Montgomery Watt's analysis of Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad at Medina (1956) to theorize the Islamic family. The focus is on the socio-economic changes experienced by Arabia in the 6th and 7th centuries, namely the passage from traditional tribal communalism to modern urbanization and trade, which allegedly led Arabia to experience a fundamental structural change from matrilineage to patrilineage (pp. 38-39). In light of this structural change, Mernissi deduces that the social order created by the prophet was based on:

A patrilineal monotheistic state, which could only exist if the tribe and its allegiances gave way to the Umma. [sic] .The Prophet ...saw the tightly controlled patriarchal family as necessary to the creation of the Umma ...The assumptions behind the Muslim social structure-male dominance, the fear of fitna, the need for sexual satisfaction, the need for men to love Allah above all else-were embodied in specific laws which have regulated male-female relations in Muslim countries to this day. (pp.40-41)

To speak of "the patriarchal family" or "the tribal kinship structure" as the source of the socio-economic position of women in Arabia is once more to assume that women are sexual political subjects before their entry in the family structure. There is no such thing as a singular system of patriarchal kinship common to all Muslim people in the past or in the present which affects women in a uniform way. Furthermore, even the notion of "the patriarchal family" is imposed by Mernissi as an already existing structure within which women are simply located. In doing so, the so-called patriarchal family is construed in the abstract, and not out of kinship structures of the Islamic society. Without an exploration of the nature of these structures as well as their effects that construe women in the Islamic family, the location of women in the family is impossible, let alone an adequate theorization of gender relationships within the *Ummah*.

In addition, Mernissi's theoretical leap encapsulated in the descriptive generalizations from "the patriarchal Islamic family" to "the patriarchal Islamic state" is highly questionable because she assumes that the process of social change from matriarchy to patriarchy is a uniform process across time and place. Although Bedouin clans are known to be matrilineal both in the past and the present of Arab-Islamic society, the evidence of the change from matrilineality to patrilineality has not been yet substantiated, nor determined conclusively. What has been substantiated is the existence of both forms of society rather than either/or type¹⁶. The problem with Mernissi's theorization lies in her establishment of a presumed structural opposition between men and women in Muslim society both at the family and the state levels, with the intent of explaining women's subordination in terms of a universal public/private dichotomy.

Clearly, Mernissi fails to examine the re-organization of the family and the state from the Islamic worldview. It is precisely this failure that induces her to distort the real nature of the Muslim family: a loose institution whereby individuals hold private property while at the same time they maintain their rights to communal property via their membership to their respective descent groups. Yet, considerable literature both historical and sociological exists and describes the negative tendencies of the family in Arab-Islamic culture as being pre-Islamic, non-Islamic, or the result of a process of the ideologization of Islam. (Izzeddin, 1953; 'Abdel'ati, 1977; and Al-Hibri, (1982 a & b). Similarly, it is Mernissi's misconception of the family as a structure that prompts her to equate the division of labor and allocation of power in the family to be equivalent to those in the state. Nasif, N. (1985) study on the state and gender examines the nature of the Constitutions of the Arab-Islamic states, and shows that the ideological discrepancies between countries at the national levels are products of the ideologization of Islam, and/or lack of creativity in Islamic sciences.

Another theoretical leap by Mernissi is when she observes that the new socio-economic history of Arab-Islamic society today further disrupts the traditional sexual patterns both within the social structure of the *Ummah* and within the patriarchal family. From this abstraction, she infers, the pattern of modernity in sexual organization resembles *al-Jahiliyya's* and brings back chaos:

¹⁶ Scholars like Tillion (1966) and Hussain (1984) refute this argument pointing out Islam's abolition of many feudalistic institutions, and observing Islam's condemnation of *Wa'd al-Banat* (female infanticide) and its limitations on polygamy.

Since modernization grants women more independence and self-determination, modern Muslim society is in some way moving closer to pre-Muslim sexual patterns...Any change in male-female relations is a threat to the *Ummah's* strength and a direct attack on the traditional coherence between Muslim ideology and Muslim reality. (p. 41)

In an uncanny way Mernissi's feminist interpretation of women's modern sexuality resembles that of some conservative *'ulama* and/or some Islamists. Again, in this instance Mernissi assumes that there is one single patriarchal system that actually governs the Moroccan family and is being challenged by modernity. Furthermore, she imposes Western modernist views of spatial boundaries to explain the meaning of social boundaries in the so-called Muslim social order in the past and in the present. First, Mernissi relies on E. Hall's The hidden dimension (1969) analysis of culture's use of space, to assert that according to the Islamic ideology and social order:

Sexuality is a territorial one, i.e., a sexuality whose regulatory mechanisms consist primarily of a strict allocation of space to each sex and an elaborate ritual for resolving the contradictions arising from the inevitable interference between the spaces. Apart from the ritualized trespasses of women into public spaces which are, by definition, male spaces, there are no accepted patterns for interaction between unrelated men and women. (p.81)

In accepting Hall's conception of culture's usage of space uncritically, Mernissi transcends social experience and explains the meaning of spatial boundaries in the Muslim order as the expression of society's hierarchy and power allocation to its members on the basis of sex: "The division is based on the physical separation of the Umma [sic]. and the domestic universe. These two universes of social interaction are regulated according to antithetical concepts of human relations, one based on community, the other on conflict" (p.81). Accordingly, Mernissi identifies the membership of the Muslim believers in the public universe of the *Ummah* as primarily male. And she declares that the position of women in the *Ummah* is "ambiguous; Allah does not speak to them" (p. 81). In contrast, she asserts, the domestic universe classifies membership on the basis of sexuality: men and women are "primarily sexual beings" (p.81).

Based on this dichotomized classification, Mernissi quickly deduces that members of the domestic universe are women only "because men are not supposed to spend their time in the domestic sphere." (p.81). What's more, Mernissi relies Max Weber's definitions of "communal relationship" and "conflict relationship" (p.82) and labels the relationship between

members of the *Ummah* as "communal" as opposed to the "conflictual" relationship between the family members. Based on this artificial classification and not history or descriptive social account of Arabia, Mernissi hastily infers:

The citizens of the sexuality universe...are not united but rather divided into two categories of individuals, strictly defined according to sex, which division justifies the granting or denial of privileges. This universe is based on sexual segregation and the subordination of one sex to the other. Women, members of the domestic universe, are subject to the authority of men, members of the Umma [sic] universe. Separation and subordination are embodied in institutions that enforce non-communication and non-interaction between the members of each universe. (p.82)

Likewise, Mernissi deduces that the meaning of the veil in the Islamic society is not only a crucial instrument of social control of women in the public place according to Islamic ideology, but also a material device that conceals their visibility and presence in men's world: "the veil means that the woman is present in the man's world, but invisible; she has no right to be in the street" (p.84). Conversely, Mernissi describes "the Muslim Order" in Women and Islam in a different light that totally contradicts her previous description in Beyond the veil. First, she argues for *the permeability* between the private (the family) and the public (the *Ummah*) spaces. Second, she draws exclusively on the life of the prophet and Islamic sources to show the indivisibility between the two spaces in the initial Arab-Islamic polity. To substantiate, Mernissi relies on the Islamic historical resources such al-Tabari's Sira to unfold the way the prophet resorted to his wife Khadija for the marital bond, comfort and support he needed to alleviate the suffering he was experiencing as the Messenger of God of a new religion. Mernissi not only traces the role of Khadija during the first revelation of Islam itself, but she also contextualizes her role as an educated woman who, upon hearing the name of Gabriel, grasps the significance of the Message bestowed on Muhammad as a prophet (pp.102-103).

Unlike in Beyond the veil, Mernissi' theorization of the couple in Women and Islam emphasizes both the intimacy and the cohesion of the family as the microcosm of the society at large. Not only is the family depicted as a metaphor for the public life at large, but it is also portrayed as the "cradle of the faith", and presented as a political space where women are at the center of decision-making. In fact, Mernissi describes the fluidity in the spatial arrangement of the *Ummah's* private and public spaces, and the prophet's inherent democratic

organization of space in the family, the community, and his style of government in an integrated whole. Quoting Ibn Sa'd, she elaborates:

The prophet constructed 'Aicha's apartment, and he opened a door in the wall of the mosque that faced 'Aicha's apartment. He used that door when he went to pray in the mosque. The mosque and 'Aicha's room were so close together that sometimes for the purification ritual the Prophet had 'Aicha wash his hair without having to leave the mosque: 'The prophet had only to lean his head from the mosque to 'Aicha's doorstep, and she then washed his head while she was having her period.'...In fact, the arrangement of space was such that the mosque and the apartments of the prophet and his intimates and Companions formed a single unit. (p.107)

Finally, Mernissi justifies the prophet's acceptance of the *hijab* (veil) by the permeability between spaces, and she situates *hijab* a punctual political response to a specific socio-spatial context of early Islam where the prophet:

Chooses a home among the people he "governs", lives in the same conditions as they do, and is linked to them by neighborly relations and constant contact. This closeness between governor and governed should help us understand the Prophet's extreme sensitiveness to rumors and gossip, an everything that was going on in the city. Because of the compactness of the living space he had arranged, he was immersed in the daily preoccupation of the people and could feel the tensions, pressures, and opposition that surrounded him. (pp.108-109)

Furthermore, based on the permeability of spaces Mernissi describes Muslim women's self-determination as "all-encompassing" and shows how it extended to public decisions in the daily life of the community during the prophet's time. First, she points out that Umm Salama held "the privilege of being consulted on matters of vital concerns to the community" (p. 116). Second, Mernissi notes, Umm Salama's concern with women's status in the Qur'an was an act of active involvement in the governance of the community at all levels. Third, Mernissi quotes the Qur'an and argues that God not only answered Umm Salama's question, but "He" was also very clear as to the equality between genders since he spoke to them equally in the Qur'an.

The answer of the Muslim God to Umm Salama was very clear: Allah spoke to the two sexes in terms of total equality as believers, that is as members of the community. God identifies those who are part of his kingdom, those who have right to his "vast reward". And it is not sex that determines who earns his grace; it is faith and the desire to serve and obey him. The verse that Umm Salama heard is revolutionary, and reading it leaves no doubt about it. (pp. 118-19)

In fact, Mernissi insists, Umm Salama's concern was the expression of a collective claim by the women of Medina and not "just a purely individual initiative, an eccentricity on the part of an arrogant aristocrat" (p. 119). To substantiate, she relies on Tabari's *tafsir*, quoting his work on the circumstances of the above verse: "The initiative came from the women of the community. Some women came to the wives of the prophet and said to them: "Allah has spoken of you [the Prophet's wives] by name in the Kuran [sic], but he has said nothing about us. Is there then nothing about us that merits mention" (p. 119). Thus, Mernissi concludes that the answer of God about women's role in the community was "a break with pre-Islamic practices, the calling into question of the customs that ruled relations between the sexes" (p.119). Here, Mernissi clearly emphasizes the liberating role of Islam from the patriarchal practices of *al-Jahiliyya*; a conflicting description of Islam in Beyond the veil which presented Islam as the loss of matriarchy and its advantages to women and the subjugation to women to patriarchal control. Also, here not only does God "speak to women" but he addresses them equally to men in the Qur'an.

To be sure, when Mernissi relies on Western modernist, or Orientalist theories on Islam she portrays Islam, its institutions and the prophet as severely inimical, and adversary to women. In contrast, when Mernissi uses Arab-Islamic sources, she not only captures the fluidity between the public and the private spaces, but also the permeability between the sacred and the profane spaces at the core of ideal *Ummah* and social Islam established by the prophet. In my view, the above conflicting descriptions about the couple, the family, the state, and the community signal Mernissi's difficulties in coming to terms with her own cultural heritage, and her ambiguous stand vis-à-vis Islam on the one hand. On the other hand, these description reflect Mernissi's dichotomous thinking about Islam that vacillates between Western and Islamic epistemologies and theories on gender.

It is precisely this vacillation that prevented Mernissi from producing an Islamic feminist sociological interpretation of Arabia at the time of the prophet. While she relies on the permeability of spaces to describe Umm Salama's interaction in "authentic Islam" at the level of the couple, the family, and the community, she is disinclined to pursue her sociological analysis of gender relations in Arabia to its logical conclusions by dismissing the complementarity of genders in sex/gender roles in Arabia. Equally, the West/Islam vacillation led her to generate an exogenous feminist political interpretation of space arrangement

(private/public dichotomy) in Morocco of the 1970s instead of appropriating the permeability between the private and the public spaces of "authentic Islam" and what it means for gender politics and political participation today. Had she explored the permeability of space today, like she did during the prophet's era, she would have reached different conclusions as well as she would have also been more persuasive in her advocacy of women's right for political participation in the 20th century¹⁷.

B. Method.

1. Biography

1.1. To Describe the Prophet's Life

Mernissi relies on biographical method throughout the selected books, but for different purposes. For instance, both in Beyond the veil and Women and Islam Mernissi relies on biography to argue that the self-determination and agency for Muslim women is an endogenous phenomenon as evidenced in the life history of the prophet. Yet, her use of the prophet's biography provides contradictory data about the prophet and about women. In Beyond the veil, Mernissi draws from the life of the prophet (lay Islam) to contend that the institutions of marriage and divorce are not fixed institutions, but changing ones pending on the historical evolution of the *Ummah*:

The prophet's marital life seems to be symbolic of the transition Arabia was undergoing. He lived for 62 years (born in 570 AD of the Christian Calendar, died in 632). He married his first wife, Khadija, had a monogamous marriage which lasted 25 years, until her death in 620. It was only then that the Prophet started a new marital life, where in a span of twelve years (620-632) he married twelve women, arranged three other marriages which did not take place, and rejected several female suitors who asked for his hand, or rather "offered themselves" according to the consecrated formula. (p.18)

Similarly, Mernissi draws on the prophet's biography to show not only the self-determination of Arab-Muslim women in matters of marriage and divorce, but also their initiative as partners in both institutions. This way, she emphasizes the institutions as personal/individual choices emanating from peoples' own volition, not from family coercion.

¹⁷ For more persuasive arguments on the private/public space permeability in today's Arab-Islamic society, and how modernists, nationalists and Islamists use this permeability in their respective discourses on political participation by both genders see Ghalyun (1987).

In regards to marriage, she reports the case of Leila Bint Al Khatim who proposed marriage to the prophet and changed her mind after consultation with her kin group (p.19).

Likewise, Mernissi documents how Arab-Muslim women often initiated the repudiation of their husbands as evidenced by several women 's repudiation of the prophet himself:

There are several women with whom the Prophet contracted marriages but did not consummate them. In three cases the marriage was broken by the repudiation formula pronounced by the woman. (This makes it look identical to the repudiation formula which was institutionalized by Islam as a man's privilege...Every time the formula was pronounced by the woman, the Prophet covered his face with his sleeve, left the nuptial room and asked for the woman to be returned to her tribe immediately. (p.19)

Nonetheless, Mernissi is unclear about the prophet's fairness towards women. For example, she uses Ibn Hisham's Sirat al-Nabbi (1963) to emphasize the prophet's disregard for the difference of age as a factor in contracting marriage as was the case with his first wife Khadija: " He was then twenty-five years old, and it was his first marriage. She was forty years old, and it was her third. She bore him all his children (four daughter and two sons who died young) except Ibrahim, the son of Maria, the Copt concubine." (p.19). Soon after, Mernissi contradicts herself. Using Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat al-Kubra (1958), she describes the prophet as whimsical about his marriage to Dubaa Bint Amr, and argues that his main motivation in changing his mind concerning this marriage was based on the fact that his potential bride was aging:

Dubaa Bint Amr...was the most beautiful of Arab women...The prophet heard about her beauty, went to her son and asked him if he could marry his mother. The son following the custom in such instances told the prophet that he had to ask his mother's opinion. He did...But when the son went to the Prophet with the hope that the subject of his mother would be discussed, the Prophet never brought it up again. He had heard meanwhile that she was indeed beautiful, but that she also was aging. (p. 22)

In fact, Mernissi asserts, the prophet often contradicted himself and seldom practiced what he preached to his own community. Relying on at-Tarmidi's Sunan at-Tarmidi (H:1092), and Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat (1958) she comments:

The prophet said that the woman can be married for her religion [Muslim faith], for her fortune, or her beauty. Be motivated in your choice by her religion. Although many of his marriages were motivated by religious and political

ones...many of his marriages were motivated solely by the woman's beauty. His marriage to the Jewess, Safiyya Bint Huyay, could not possibly have been motivated by the need for an alliance, the Jews being his defeated enemies at the time....His marriage with another Jewish woman, Rayhana Bint Zayd, could not have been motivated by alliance either. Like Safiya, she belonged to a Jewish tribe, was captured after her people's defeat, and was known to be a beautiful woman. (p. 21)

Above all, Mernissi relies on Ibn Sa'd's al-Tabaqat and argues that the prophet violated the principle of equity, normally required in a polygamous marriage. She attributes the prophet's violation to his weakness for women's beauty as in the case of his overwhelming attraction to his Copt wife Maria, and his neglect of his other wife Safiyya (pp. 21-22). Last but not least, Mernissi accuses the prophet of inconsistency regarding the institution of polygamy, and even nepotism and favoritism towards his own kin-group. To substantiate, she reports the prophet's refusal to allow 'Ali, his son-in law, to marry another woman and thus inflict on his own daughter, Fatima, a polygamous marriage:

Although he himself married thirteen women, he adamantly opposed Ali, his son in law, when the latter decided to contract a second marriage and thus provide his Fatima, the Prophet's favorite daughter (who was not particularly known for her beauty) with an unwelcome co-wife. [sic]

I will not allow Ali Ibn Taleb, and I repeat, I will not allow Ali to marry another woman except under the condition that he will divorce my daughter. She is part of me, and what harms her, harms me.

The prophet appears to have known that it was a harmful arrangement for a woman to share her husband. (p.31)

Conversely, in Women and Islam Mernissi downplays the prophet's agency and authority on women's sexuality and instead over-emphasizes the agency of women around him. Here, she describes the prophet angelic-like extremely conciliatory (perfect), and respectful of women's independence and self-determination in contracting marriage. The excerpts Mernissi chooses to portray the prophet's convey his agency only in reaction to the independent women surrounding him. First, Mernissi points out that Khadija, the first wife of the prophet, "asked the hand of the prophet" as he embodied the qualities she most appreciated in a man. (p.146). Second, Mernissi relies on al-Tabari to observe how the Qur'an granted the wives of the prophet the right to divorce when his sexual prowess declined with age as reflected in the verse 51, "the verse of Choice" (p.220). In fact, Mernissi asserts, the prophet not only respected women's self determination by applying the verse of choice with his wives,

but he also conceded to women the right to dispense with guardians on matters of personal nature such as divorce as was the case with his beloved wife 'Aicha (p.221).

1.2. To Document Women's Resistance to Islam

Mernissi portrays the biography of Hind Bint 'Utba as the representative of the oppositional voice of women to Islam. Relying on al-Tabari, Ibn Hisham, and al-Asqalani she emphasizes Hind's political dissidence and confrontational attitude to the prophet himself, as an expression of Arab Women's resistance to Islam in two ways. First, Mernissi relies on al-Asqalani to argue that the confrontational attitude of Hind to Islam is justified by the killing of her kin group and clans in the process of conversion to Islam (p. 117). Second, she argues that Hind's resistance to Islam and that of other Arab women are also justified on the basis of their "right to self expression" (p. 117). To substantiate this particular aspect of women's autonomy, Mernissi on the one hand describes Hind's confrontational oath of allegiance to the Prophet once she converted to Islam. On the other hand, she strongly suggests that Arab women were justified in rebelling against Islam itself as a new moral order.

From the example of Hind, Mernissi describes Arab women's resistance to Islam as concerning their sexual identity and their self-determination on matters of sexuality. Her tale of the exchange between the Prophet and Hind during the oath allegiance attempts to illustrate that women during *al-Jahilyya* were more satisfied with their status as women because it was by far more advantageous in terms of their sexual autonomy than during Islam:

Hind's oath of allegiance, which has been transcribed word by word by historians, is a masterpiece of political insolence by a woman forced to submit, but in no way renouncing her right to self-expression. When the prophet commanded her to swear to "not commit adultery." Hind replied: "A free woman never commits adultery: The prophet is supposed to have thrown an amused glance at 'Umar, "because he was aware of Hind's love affairs and her relation with 'Umar before his conversion to Islam. (pp.117-18)

With this confrontational model of women against Islam's moral order, and *al-Jahiliyya's model* of women's autonomous sexuality Mernissi hopes to restore to Muslim women their political role in the decision-making process of their community and their right to political dissidence. While the right of self-expression is a laudable feature of our foremothers, it remains a right within the framework of Islamic ethics for both genders and the way these ethics impact on their respective sexual behavior. From this perspective Mernissi's portrayal of

Hind's defense of sexual identity of *al-Jahiliyya* is counterproductive, especially for Muslim women today looking for endogenous models other than the modernists' or the Islamists' models for their sexual identity.

1.3. To Document Nushuz as an Islamic Model of Womanhood.

In addition to the confrontational model, Mernissi documents in Women and Islam the way one of the great grand-daughter of the prophet, Sukayna, epitomized an Islamic womanhood model of confrontation: *nushuz*. Here again, Mernissi justifies the confrontation by the massacres that Islam inflicted on Sukayna's family. Only this time it is not Islam that is directly blamed, but "Muslim political history". To substantiate, Mernissi once more relies on Isbahani's Al-Aghani to assert that:

All her life Sukayna harbored feelings of contempt, which she never hesitated to express, for the Umayyad dynasty and its bloody methods. She attacked the dynasty in the mosques and insulted its governors and representatives every time she had the opportunity, even arranging occasions for this purpose. (p.193)

Similarly, Mernissi emphasizes Sukayna's contempt for men as a distraction from her political career and fulfillment. She insists that Sukayna's *nushuz* is every woman's right, and one of her most admirable traits. Thus, she asserts that Sukayna:

Was celebrated for her beauty, for what the Arabs call beauty-an explosive mixture of physical attractiveness, critical intelligence, and caustic wit. The most powerful men debated with her; caliphs and princes proposed marriage to her, which she disdained for political reasons...She made one of her husbands sign a marriage contract that officially specified her right to *nushuz* that rebellion against marital control that so tortured the fuqaha. She claimed the right to be *nashiz*, and paraded it, like she did her beauty and her talent, to assert the importance and vitality in the Arab tradition. Admiring and respectful, the historians delight in evoking her family dramas-for instance, the case that she brought against one of her husbands who had violated the rule of monogamy that she had imposed on him in the marriage contract. Dumbfounded by the conditions in the contract, the judge nevertheless was obliged to hear her case, with his own wife attending the trial of the century and the caliph sending emissary to keep him au courant with the course of the trial. (pp. 192-93)

Immediately after, Mernissi draws on her own experience as a career woman to illustrate the continuity of misogyny in the Muslim world today, and to reclaim her right to be *Nashiz* in order to "flaunt" her own "intellectual superiority" over men:

When I was accused of lying at a conference in Penang, Malaysia in 1984, where I presented Sukayna as a type of Traditional Muslim woman for us to think about. My accuser was a Pakistani, editor of an Islamic journal in London, interrupted me, shouting to the audience: "Sukayna died at the age of six!" Trying to snatch the microphone away from me in a vindictive rage... Then smugly assuming the role of qadi, he demanded that I name the sources where I found my version of Sukayna's history. I furnished him a list on the spot-in Arabic obviously. He looked at it with disdain and told me it was very scanty. (p.193)

Clearly Mernissi's portrayal of women's sexual identity and roles are viewed from within the male/female binary logic. In addition she overstates *nushuz* as an Islamic model of womanhood and agency. Such interpretations of Muslim women's sexual identity and womanhood are counter-productive because they promote an oppositional consciousness for women's agency and justify a reversal of roles (women > men) rather than equity as a legitimate reaction to a patriarchal moral order that allegedly victimizes them. It is precisely such models of womanhood and agency that give ground and validity to some Islamists' claim that feminists in the Arab-Islamic society seek to re-instate *al-Jahiliyya's* moral order.

1.4. To Frame Feminist Issues

In Doing daily battle Mernissi uses biography for entirely different purposes than in Beyond the veil, and in Women and Islam. Here, she relies on biography as an introductory presentation of each interviewee to the reader, and as a technique "to frame the issues" pertaining to Moroccan women. The biography of Rabi'a presented prior to the interview illustrates the juncture between Mernissi's feminist discourse and the reality of Rabi'a's life. In Mernissi's words:

Born in 1940 into the urban bourgeoisie of Safi, Rabi'a should have aspired to become a woman of the harem like her mother, like all the 'young ladies of good family' of colonial Morocco. It was the obligation of the class.

But the nationalist struggles of the fathers were going to overturn a realm to which their fantasies had given a privileged position and defined as immutable, a-historical, and outside time and struggles; the realm of intimacy, the realm of privacy, the realm of mothers and daughters, the domestic realm.

Among the notables of colonial Morocco, those who were drawn to the nationalist vision did not at all incorporate into it the liberation of family relationships. For them, the nationalist struggle was a struggle for a political redistribution of the cards among the male elites. These called 'schools for Muslim ladies'...The nationalists dreamed of a new Morocco, industrialized, educated, democratized, where young ladies would continue to be veiled, to be secluded, to watch the course of history from behind the grillwork of arched windows.

Rabi'a, a young lady of good family, longed for something else; she dreamed of self-realization, of education, of the right to self-expression and reflection. Rabi'a dreamed of living.

Decidedly, the nationalists who had hoped to shatter the dream of the colonialists were totally lost without an answer when faced with the dream of their daughters. (p.36)

Significantly, Mernissi presents the wedge between the nationalists, and women of Morocco in the form of an assertion rather than an historical description. Moreover, Mernissi assumes that the nationalists were solely constituted of "the notables of colonial Morocco" while the history of Morocco attests to the diversity of the social, economic and intellectual status of "the nationalists". Above all, Mernissi assumes that the nationalists' had "a uniform vision" of culture and gender, while history attests to the divergence between the nationalists' on cultural issues precisely because their ethnic, class, and language affiliations were so diverse¹⁸. All these essential components of the history of Morocco are hastily glossed in the category "the nationalists", and presented in opposition to another category believed to exist as an entity of the underprivileged: Moroccan women.

Similarly, Mernissi presents the biography of Habiba "the psychic" and her engagement with magic and witchcraft as a normative uniform reaction of the powerless, ignorant Moroccan women against the powerful and the knowledgeable male elite:

To imagine that a woman could be an imam or a caliph is the purest blasphemy. So in order to have access to the non-material resources, and especially to the use of religion (monopolized by the powerful), the less powerful had to go outside orthodoxy and establish religious areas judged heretical by the guardians of the monopoly. They set up shrines and erected tombs for their saints, trying in this way to resolve the everyday hunger for food and dignity...

Habiba, illiterate and handicapped, embarked at the age of fifty on a journey of initiation to the shrine of the saint Sidi Ali Hamdush. She returned confirmed in her vocation as a psychic. She built a temple in honor of Aisha Qandisha, where the yearnings of those who suffered were welcomed-those who suffered from not being able to work out a decent life amid the upheavals of present-day Morocco... Habiba who had no advantages in life; she had nothing but handicaps. But she transformed them into a source of life. (pp. 126-7)

¹⁸ In chapter 1 and chapter 3 I describe the variety within the nationalist groups and I show the role they played in the inclusion/exclusion of women in education. Also I discuss in chapter 3 how the conservative nationalist groups used the informal *waqf* to integrate women both at the structural and procedural levels of education in many countries that constitute the Arab-Islamic society throughout the 20th century.

While this may be true for some women of Morocco, the attitude to spirituality and struggle of Habiba are far from being uniform among Moroccan women. Moreover, manipulation of the religious and the sacred does not exist only in the formal realm of orthodoxy. Manipulation coexists and interlaps between the formal and the informal realm, especially in Arab-Islamic cultures where the separation between the two realms is blurred. As presented Habiba's biography reaches the status of "a cliché". In the process, the whole fluidity and complexity of the women's spirituality in Moroccan culture is missed out. Above all, Mernissi equates religion with superstition. In her description of Habiba, she endorses Habiba's "superstition" and magic rituals as a religious expression of the powerless, and as a survival counter-strategy against the male hegemony in religious expression in Morocco. Such an equation is inadequate as it presents both genders' spirituality in Morocco in opposing categories as well as it distorts the multiple forms of spiritual expression existing within each category. Equally, this equation is inadequate because it identifies Moroccan women by their "victim-status". Presenting the spirituality of the Moroccan women from a victimology logic is inappropriate because it contributes to the pathologization of Moroccan women rather than unfolding their struggles, or agency.

2. Historical Documentation

2.1. Abstraction

Except for Women and Islam the selected books are marked by a lack of historical documentation. In Beyond the veil for example, Mernissi argues that the root of the anomie in male-female dynamics in modern Morocco is the discrepancy between ideology and reality. However, instead of providing historical or experiential evidence, Mernissi attributes the discrepancy between ideology and reality to the nationalists' lack of reforms in laws and socio-economic programs (p.91). Likewise, Mernissi attributes the discrepancy between ideology and practice to inadequacy of the process of integration of women in nation building in the 1930s and the 1940s. She explains:

They wanted to defeat the French at any cost, even if it meant interfering in the family structure...Under these circumstances Moroccan girls were pushed into classrooms, entrusted to the hands of male teachers and allowed to walk through the streets four times a day. (p.92)

Clearly, Mernissi suggests that the education of women was launched by Moroccan nationalists for religious and patriotic reasons rather than a practice of a human right that women are entitled to. In fact, Mernissi observes, women's education increased so unexpectedly that it disrupted the nationalists' plan: "The movement for women's education apparently snowballed, because, starting in 1945, girls did not stop going to school at the age of thirteen as had been decided by the Nationalists; they had gained access to secondary schools." (pp.92-93). This assertion is in contradiction with historical evidence. The nationalists did not launch education, but increased its formalization.¹⁹ This explains the "unexpected increase" and the "sudden" visibility of women in education. Mernissi's account of women's education in Morocco reflects her liberal bias both in the theorization and historiography of education in Morocco as a whole. First, the liberal theorization conceals the permeability between the informal and formal realms and their simultaneity in the education of Moroccans despite the modernist state's attempts at formalization since independence. This is a critical issue, considering the population explosion of the 1960's and the newly established state's inability to absorb quantitative demands of education for both genders.²⁰ Second, Mernissi's liberal historiography of education distorts the history of various political constituencies within the nationalist movements, including women, in shaping the national system of education. By totally disregarding the continuity in the struggle of the Moroccan people to maintain their distinctive style in the Arab-Islamic education in Morocco, Mernissi distorts the history of Moroccan education, and that of women's education in the 1970s' Morocco.²¹

2.2. The Exotic as a Technique to Document Cultural Difference

Mernissi uses "the exotic" as a technique to describe the cultural and gender difference in Arab-Islamic society as well as to capitalize on "the mysterious Orient". Mostly, this technique allows Mernissi to compensate for her failure to provide either historical or empirical evidence on women. For example, when she describes sexual anomie from Moroccan data regarding segregation in Beyond the veil, she relies on the exotic conception of

¹⁹ In chapter 1 and chapter 3 I describe in detail how the nationalists contributed to the formalization of education. For additional information on the adversial effect of formalization on oral narration of both Berber and Arab traditions in Morocco during the French rule and after see Assimi (1987). In fact this author shows how formalization is largely responsible for the marginalization of women in both oral traditions of Morocco.

²⁰ For a discussion of the population question and education see chapter 3.

space known in some Moroccan milieus, namely within some bourgeois urban families of the 19th and early 20th century, and presents it as a normative space division in the "traditional Moroccan family" of the 1970s:

Sexual segregation divides all social space into male and female spaces. The overlap between male and female areas are limited and regulated by a host of rituals. When a man invites a friend to share a meal in his house, he knocks on his own door and asks with a loud voice for the women "to make way" ('amlu triq). The women then run to hide in dark corners, leaving the courtyard free to be crossed by the stranger. The guest will remain with his host, seated in the men's rooms, until he leaves. If he needs to go to the toilet, the ritual of 'amlu triq' is again staged, preventing the taboo situation of interaction between strangers of different sexes. (p.51)

Immediately after, Mernissi extends the normativeness of the division of space to the 1970s Moroccan family and society at large. She asserts that:

Similar rituals surround the trespassing of the woman into male spaces which was, until recently, limited to a very few occasions,-the visit to the Saint's tomb, the visit to the Hammam and the visits of relatives at births, deaths and marriages. The veil is an expression of the invisibility of women on the street, a male space par excellence. (p. 51)

This description conveys the mistaken idea that the family's organization of space is replicated in the public space, and gives the impression that Moroccan society is actually divided into two separate spaces containing two distinct entities: men and women. Above all, this description conveys a misleading belief: that the pattern of behavior of women regarding space is also uniform and standard across Morocco, regardless of class, or geographic region. From this erroneous belief, Mernissi describes and analyzes the Muslim family and society as "static" structures. Worse still, Mernissi's investment on the exotic reaches its highest in Doing daily battle when she describes in great detail Habiba's journey of initiation into becoming a professional psychic, and her pilgrimage to lalla Aicha's shrine:

So I left that house and went to the daughter toward the saint's shrine. She pointed out to me the grotto of Lalla Aicha... So I went to the saint's shrine... The day of the ritual procession, we went to the saint's shrine, taking the dabiha. Each group had its own special ritual. So we left with the procession going to Sidi Ali Ibn Hamdoush, then to Sidi Ahmad Dughughi. We walked the whole route of the procession in bare feet...The march was accompanied by the music of bagpipes.

²¹ For a specific analysis of the issue of culture and education, in the 1970s, and the contestations of several groups of the modernist's distortions of the national educational system, see al-Jabiri (1974), and Salimi (1985).

Meanwhile, if a crowd of those performing the dance of possession saw someone passing with a goat, they wrested it from him, brought it into their midst, tore it into shreds, and ate it raw....

Q: You have to wait for your own rhythm?

A: Yes, you must wait until the musicians are playing your rhythm. When I heard mine, I got up and danced until I went into a trance...Everybody does the same, while some emit ululations, and others invoke the name of the Prophet. Almost everyone is in a state of trance by this time. Some crack their heads wit and running down their faces; they are covered in blood both back and front. Others devour a hatchet, others break earthen pots on their skulls... You see blood spurring mud, and still others swallow spiny cactus-all according to their own rhythms. (pp.134-6)

As presented, Mernissi's description is highly misleading because it conveys the impression that Habiba's mis-appropriation of religion as a normative behavior shared by "the powerless" Moroccan women as an entity. In characterizing Moroccan women by their victim status, Mernissi once again contributes to the pathologization of Moroccan women's condition and masks other existing forms of spirituality shared by both genders in Morocco that are not as exotic or shocking as those of Habiba's.

Finally, even Women and Islam does not escape Mernissi's manipulation of the exotic Orient. This is particularly manifested in her description of the five duties of Islam; which are clearly for the benefit of the non-Muslim reader:

The Shahadda is the first duty; it is a profession of faith that consists of recognizing that Allah is the sole God and that Muhammad is his prophet. The salat, praying five times a day, is the second. It is an extremely rapid exercise of meditation. You must wherever you are, at home, at work, or in transit, stop what you are doing, face Mecca, and try through the discipline of concentration to transcend your daily problems and put yourself in contact with the divine, and do all this in a very short period of time...etc. (p.27)

Similarly, when Mernissi describes Hind as the model of *nushuz* and political resistance to the Prophet's conquest of Mecca, she emphasizes on Hind's colorful and bohemian-like attitude as a distinctive trait of individuality and political expression of Muslim women (p.117).

C. Epistemology

1. Language and History

1.1. The Interview as a Tool to Document Women's History

From the epistemological point of view, Mernissi's use of the interview and biography allows her access to information about women, otherwise occulted by other scholars or masked through methods such as statistical studies or surveys. First, in Doing daily battle the interview enables Mernissi to write the history of women, previously thought without history, or whose history has been distorted. Second, it allows her to use women's personal history and experience as scientific data for research and inquiry. In doing so, Mernissi departs from women as subjects rather than objects of research and starts from women's experience as a basis for social movements and change. Third, it enables Mernissi to report Moroccan women's oral history, hence restoring the role of oral information in the Moroccan culture otherwise inaccessible in written documents. In the same move Mernissi not only restores the whole culture from within, but she also restores the sociological and intellectual status of the oral in the Arab-Muslim tradition.

More importantly, Mernissi reintroduces the oral tradition of women in the Arab-Muslim tradition by giving them voice. By the same token, she attempts to restore the inter-subjectivities involved in the method of the interview through tales, biography, etc. doing the interview, Mernissi also attempts to capture the nature of relationships existing in society at large and the power-structure underlying them. This way, she tries to link the individual and the collective in Moroccan culture. The aim is dual: to destructure and re-structure the cultural models existing in Moroccan society. In doing so, Mernissi moves from the social (individuality) to the sociological (collective shared experience), and she shifts her focus from the representativeness of experience to the diversity in the experience of Moroccan women and their inter-personal relationships.

Nonetheless, Mernissi's use of the interview only partly succeeds in representing the diversity in the experience of Moroccan women. First, by omitting the structural economic and political data and changes at the core of women's inter-relationships, the interview remains "mute", for, without this essential data, the ramifications of these factors on women and the related mutations on their lives can not be fully assessed. Above all, the representation of women's diverse experience remains merely "factual". For example, Mernissi's portrayal of

Moroccan women's oppression ignores the fundamental description of the massive proletarianization of women in multinational, and national factories in the urban setting, as well as it overlooks the impact of the political, economic and social processes of the post-independence era regarding the distinctions made between the private/and the public spaces. As a result, the distinction she makes between the private and public spaces is attributed solely to men's perception and thus to patriarchal Islam, rather than to the fundamental historical and structural changes that affected the lives of both genders in Morocco.

Second, even when Mernissi depicts women as economic agents, they still come across as limited in their choices of jobs because they are posited theoretically as victims of the capitalist system that governs multinational and national capital, the traditional family, and the sexist culture they live in. The crux of the problem in this theorization lies in the victimization of women in the present and in the future that views all women as "potential victims" of those systems. Third, despite Mernissi's description of women's oppression in diverse settings in Doing daily battle, the diversity often takes the form of the "exotic different stories", whereby the interviewees authenticate their oppression within their own voice. This kind of description keeps the portrayal of women's experience in the Orientalist, folkloric style which only highlights the dark side of Moroccan women's experiences "in the name of authenticity" instead of representing these experiences in their complexity.

Fourth, the interview is "oriented" in that Mernissi continually "coaches" the interviewed to highlight certain themes rather than others, namely marriage, the family, work, education, contraception, and self-determination. What this means for Mernissi's feminist epistemology is that the frequency of themes from the interview have been pre-selected by the author in her data collection rather than emerged from the data. By the same token, the frequency of the themes noted in the interview is equated with the frequency of women's oppression in Mernissi's mind; and as such, they do not necessarily reflect the reality "as is". Other themes, not as frequent may be equally important and yet do not transpire in the interview due to the author's self-censorship.

1.2. The Interview as a Cognitive Space of Communication

Mernissi uses the interview as an oral space of communication in Doing daily battle. In one move, she relies on the interview as an instrument to restore women's oral history as scientific data to rewrite women's history for the collective memory of Moroccan future

generations. This process of remembering is of paramount political significance because it builds a politicized consciousness for women's self-identity, while at the same time it corrects masculinist history. In doing so, Mernissi's discursive space itself, becomes a space for political contestation and resistance, as well as a new frontier for exploring alternatives for the future.

Nonetheless, Mernissi "hijacks" the oral history of Morocco several ways. First and foremost, in the transcription of the interview. This process in itself reduces the reality of women because the language of the interviewees is filtered through several phases. Among these, the initial phase of "the raw interview" from the colloquial Arabic (*darija*) into Standard Arabic or Classical (most interviewed women were illiterate), followed by the interview change into French (the writing language of the author), and into English (the translated version) of the interview. All three phases constitute problems in the production of knowledge and the relationship in this production between language and thought, and the concepts used in the observation and analysis of data on women.

After all, the first move from the oral to the written in itself carries difficulties in capturing the link between the general and the particular in women's experience. These difficulties are further compounded by the problem of finding the equivalent terms in translation. Thus, in omitting the original interview in the colloquial Arabic, Mernissi "severs" the emotional bond she had initially built with the interviewed, and moves into the rational structure of their experience. This move from the emotional to the rational mode, changes the meaning of the experience for it isolates it from its context of reality and replaces it in a context of textuality. In doing so, Mernissi, replicates patriarchal methods of writing and of representing data. By the same token, she dismisses her role in the re-writing process of the interview, and its effect on the meaning of the reality described. In short, Mernissi does not acknowledge her active role in the totalization of women's experience, implying that her representation of the Moroccan women's reality is "truer" than men's.

Second, Mernissi's interview is tempered with in the recording process of women's oral history because she focuses exclusively on women's perception of reality and omits women's daily lives in interaction with men. Such an encoding of reality, in addition to being partial, replicates the monolithic strategy used in masculinist literature. Above all, this encoding leads Mernissi not only to distort the communal significance of struggle shared by both genders, but

also to establish women's view of oppression as the paradigmatic view of oppression for both sexes. This indicates Mernissi's internalization and replication of patriarchal monolithic concepts of struggle, oppression, and power and their articulation in her research.

Third, in replicating the above monolithic concept, Mernissi's uncritically reproduces the liberal patriarchal notion of agency in the analysis of gender, and gender politics. This is problematic at least at two levels. First, in reproducing the mythical notion of the individual as autonomous and self-determining outside social interaction. Second, in replicating the flawed logic of identification that separates the individual's self-consciousness from collective consciousness. It is precisely this liberalist philosophy of the human being and agency in society that leads Mernissi to view agency in polarization between the singular and the plural, the individual and the group. Above all, this liberal view of agency clashes with the *tawhidic* and gender-neutral philosophy of *al-Insan* (the human being) and agency in Islam and this reduces considerably Mernissi's feminist message as a Muslim woman.

Such a theorization is severely reductionist of agency and politics both in history and geography, and by extension is extremely simplistic of the politics of agency in everyday struggles. Further, Mernissi's reproduction of the liberal notion of agency produces alternatives from within the logic of opposition that conflicts with the logic of cooperation contained the *tawhidic* perspective of agency. From this perspective, the oral history of the interviewees in Doing daily battle is itself part of the relationship the author has established and constructed as a "testimony" of oppression, and as the "true" voice of women who "bear witness" through the story-telling of their victimization. In brief, Mernissi's recording of the testimony of women's oppression is an integral part of her own political agenda and location, and not necessarily a manifestation of the interviewees' reality. As such, the testimony is altered and becomes a constitutive part of the discursive process and the legitimation of space for Mernissi's feminist voice and agenda rather than the actual dynamics of gender under observation.

2. Language and Cultural Identity

2.1. Reduction of the Arabic Language to Gender

By and large, Mernissi's interest in the Arabic language is mainly from a binary male/female view rather than from a cultural view that attempt to explore the Arabic language and linguistics in terms of their significance for both genders. For example, though Beyond the

veil is presumably dealing with the male-female dynamics of the 1970s, Mernissi totally ignores Arabization as a cultural issue and how it affects the power-relation between genders. This is striking, especially that in the 1970s Arabization was foremost in the political agenda of the government, and of the opposition as the main cultural and language question that needed immediate attention. In doing so, Mernissi dismisses Arabization as an integral part in Morocco's reconstruction process of its cultural integrity, and its central role the rebuilding of the national educational system. Instead, she locks her treatment of Arabic to gender alone, as though gender can be analyzed outside the cultural environment in which it is embedded.

What's more, even when Mernissi tackles the issue of the Arabic language in Beyond the veil, she does so in an a-historical fashion. Again, from the binary male/female perspective, she highlights the survival of matrilineal past in the Arabic language, and stresses women's "superiority" over men:

The word *rahim*, meaning the "womb" is "the most general word for "kinship". *Batn* ("belly") is the technical term for a clan or a subtribe. The word *Umm* ("mother") is the origin of the *Umma* ("community" in general, and, after Islam, the Muslim community). According to Salama Musa, the fact that the word *haya*, which means life, is also the name for reproductive apparatus of the woman, expresses the old Arab belief which endowed the woman with the gift of giving life and limited the male's role to "pure sexual pleasure". (p. 37)

Clearly, Mernissi makes no attempt to show the implications of Salama Musa's work for gender in modern Arab-Islamic society, nor the linkages necessary to the contemporary society in regards to language and gender. As such, Mernissi's presentation of the Arabic language is purely argumentative and devoid of analysis or insight into the role of Arabic language in gender equity in the past and in the present. Conversely, Mernissi raises the issue of the Arabic language in Women and Islam as a critical cultural issue upon which depended the very survival of the initial Islamic *Ummah* established by the prophet. Here, Mernissi appropriates the "*Uruba/Islam*" compound from *al-Tawhid* principle and shows the central importance of this compound for the development of Islam as a civilization.

First, Mernissi unfolds the interlap between "political Islam" and "social Islam", and the importance of the occurrence of the revelation of Islam in Arabic, the native language of the prophet and of his people in Arabia. Second, Mernissi highlights the central role of the Arabic language as an instrument in the socio-political cohesiveness and cultural integrity of the people of Arabia in the 7th century. Third, Mernissi signals with this emphasis, the

nationalistic nature of Islam and the significance of the Arabic language to the prophet both as the political leader, and transmitter of the Message of Islam (God's knowledge) to his own people:

He was the chosen prophet, the one who was going to give the Arabs what they lacked: a book revealed by God, which was the foundation of the prestige of Judaism and Christianity, the two religions that had successfully taken root in Arabic despite the strength of polytheism... Over a period of 22 years...the moments of wahy (inspiration), also called al-tanzil (revelation)- the two words referring to the flowing movement of knowledge that came from Heaven and flooded the earth through the intermediary of al-rasul, the Arab messenger. For- and this was the miracle-God spoke to Muhammad in his native tongue, Arabic: Qur'an 'Arabi (Koran in the Arabic language). Only the Jews and the Christians had this honor and privilege of direct revelation from God in their native languages. (pp.28-9)

2.2. The Oral/Written Dichotomy in Arabic Cultural production

Next, Mernissi highlights the oral/written duality in Arabic and its implications in the Islamic production of knowledge. First, she points out the oral nature of the Qur'an reminding us that the prophet received Allah's message orally and transmitted it orally (p.29). Second, she argues that the order of the revelation in which the Qur'an was recorded was highly determined by the socio-political history of Muslims (p.29) This way, Mernissi aptly highlights human mediation in the writing process of the Qur'an and the intervention of the 'ulama/experts in the re-classification of the revealed verses in that process. At the same time, she successfully records the 'ulama's fusion of "political Islam" and "social Islam" (*al-Tawhid*):

The order in which the suras were revealed to the prophet (*tartib nuzuli*) is different from the order in the text that we have today (*tartib mushafi*). The order of the revelations corresponded to the needs of the moment. The suras revealed at Mecca set forth dogma and the duties of the Muslim. The suras revealed later at Medina related to problems that the prophet faced and to questions asked of him by the first Muslims. The order given to the revelations in the written text of the koran, according to the experts, answered a more pedagogic need. The first suras, it is true, were those setting forth the main arrangements of Islam regarding marriage, inheritance, etc, It can be said that it was at Medina that Islam as shari'a, social law of divine origin, was born. (p.29)

However, Mernissi leaves unexplained the 'ulama's *tawhidic* appropriations of 'ilm bi-l *Wahy* (revealed knowledge) and 'ilm bi al-Ray (human knowledge) and their productions of the Shari'a. Yet, the 'ulama's *tawhidic* appropriations were central in shaping the Shari'a as a Divine/human space for both political and social Islam as a system for both genders, not just

women.²² Instead, Mernissi relies on Taha Hussayn's analysis of the Arabic language in his critical work *Fi al-Adab al-Jahili* (1965) to explain the nature of socio-political governance of Arabia at the time. First, she quotes Taha Hussayn's work to denounce pre-Islamic poetry, usually relied on by *mufassirun* (traditionalists interpreters), as an inadequate instrument for the study and interpretation of the Qur'an, and to argue that pre-Islamic poetry was widely used as means of manipulation and distortion by both the masses and the elite:

The storytellers came to recite tales to crowds in provincial mosques. They recounted to them the old stories of the Arabs and the non-Arabs; they spoke to them of the prophets and used this material to slip in explications of the Koran, the Hadith, and the biography of the Prophet...The storytellers...carried along by imagination, knowing nothing of the limits imposed by scientific discipline and the rigor of authentication. The crowds, fascinated by the storytellers, gulped down all the stories they were told. The caliphs and princes, quickly realizing the political and religious importance of this new means of communication, encouraged and controlled it. They used and exploited it for their own purposes. (p.47)

Here, Mernissi raises the important issue that *al-Jahiliyya/Islam* debate was about *authority* over the past. Yet, she makes no attempt to describe the events that are allegedly being forged neither at the time of the prophet, nor at the time of caliphs and princes. Short of this temporal description of the alleged forged events, however, the reader cannot gain any insight as to the particular significance of the forgery for the Muslim community. Above all, Mernissi's omits from her portrayal the fact that poetry was the principle vehicle of communication through which the Arabs represented *al-Jahiliyya's* way of life in all its aspects, including their moral order and their socio-political organization. For instance some poets relied on prose literary genre such as *khutbah* (oration) to preach morality to people. Others used *mufakhara* (boasting) or *madh* (praising) to boast about their tribal honor, or boost its morale in times of war. Some used *madh* as a validating political tool for the praise of authorities democracy. A few others used another genre of poetry *hija'* (bashing) as a form of cultural criticism of political contestation against the authoritarianism of their governing authorities.

In omitting the pre-Islamic poetry an its centrality in the mediation of collective memory of Arabians, Mernissi is glossing the dynamics of socio-political and cultural

²² See 'Amara (1981) in item 5 in the glossary.

organization of the Arabs at the time. Above all, Mernissi's failure to present the fundamental function of poetry in *al-Jahiliyya* as a cultural symbolic structure reduces the debate on authority on Arabian culture at large to a debate on religious representation alone. Yet, short of the description of Arabic poetry as a symbolic structure of *al-Jahiliyya* in its totality, one can not understand what is really at stake in the construction of social reality then, nor the nature of the authority debate involved in relation to Islam as a new cultural order, nor for that matter what this whole symbolic heritage means for gender.

After all, the main source of conflict between the *Jahili* poets and the Prophet Muhammad and his followers was precisely the central function of Arabic poetry in *al-Jahiliyya* as the symbolic structure for cultural representation and contestation. Mernissi overlooks this cultural tension entirely in her dealing with *al-Jahiliyya's* poetry and how it relates to Islam a new cultural revolution with an independent moral order, and a new symbolic structure for Arabia. With this major oversight Mernissi occults the linguistic changes of the Arabic language and what they mean for gender-relations from the standpoint of Islam as a new cultural order. Equally, she leaves unexplored the way/s *al-Jahiliyya's* symbolic system of representation merged with the Islamic one, and how that merging affected social change, and Arab-Islamic epistemology at the time. Such severe omissions by Mernissi obscure the role of language in cultural representation both in *al-Jahiliyya* and in Islam. Similarly, these omissions prevent the reader from assessing what is being forged by the gatekeepers of the Islamic cultural order and what is not.

Last but not least, Mernissi is uncritical of the fact that *al-Jahiliyya* as presented in classical Arabic literature has been projected from the traditional academic concern of "fixing" a true historical picture of this era, rather than with its cultural representation. The Muslim traditionalists have been overly concerned with the positivist portrayals of "the actual historical facts" of their times, rather than with the cultural significance of these facts. Similarly, Taha Hussayn, and by extension Mernissi, are seeking to discredit the authenticity of *al-Jahiliyya* poetry, and are attempting to establish "the more correct chronology" of the events instead of accounting for the context and meanings of the cultural practices identified as "forgery". From this perspective, Mernissi replicates Husayn's uncritical modernist historiography and his positivist portrayal of the Arab-Islamic society and culture.

2.3. Language and Ethnicity

Mernissi endorses Taha Hussayn's questioning the authenticity and legitimacy of pre-Islamic poetry as a "fabrication pure and simple" (p.48), and she dismisses it as an inadequate instrument to understand the sacred literature; especially the Qur'an and the *hadith*. To substantiate, she merely quotes Taha Hussayn's description of the heterogeneous ethnic origin of the corpus of the *'ulama* that highlights the various power relations involved in interpretation. In doing so, however, Mernissi replicates Hussayn's questioning of the very legitimacy of the "Arabness" of interpretation of the Qur'an and the *hadith* as a form of hegemony in the past. Worse still, Mernissi extends her questioning of the alleged past hegemony by correlation to the present and accuses contemporary scholars of hegemony in the construction of the disciplines. Without any description of the complex relationship between the Arab and non-Arab *'ulama* in the production of scientific disciplines of the long history of Islam as a Civilization, nor how that links to the present situation, Mernissi again quotes Hussayn:

He adds that if poetry and genealogies were the object of business deals, it is easy to imagine what conflicts there were over interpretation of the power-texts-the Koran and the Hadith. The body of the *ulama* (scholars) was very heterogeneous, riddled with conflicting interests of all kinds, with ethnic conflicts not being the least. There were not only experts of Arab origin. Many specialists on the interpretation and elaboration of religious literature were foreigners, belonging to other cultures (al-Tabari was from Tabaristan, al-Bukhari from Bukhara, etc.). Other conflicts were internal to the profession, like the rivalries that we know so well today between experts belonging to different disciplines. (p.48)

Here, Mernissi is in direct conflict with her previous statement about *al-tawhidic* socio-political structure established by the prophet, whereby she highlighted the importance of *'Uruba/Islam* for the sustenance of Islam as a civilization. In insisting so much about other ethnic groups' contributions to Islam, Mernissi demystifies the Arabs pioneering of Islam as an ethnic group while at the same time she questions the Arabs' continuing leadership of Islam as a form of hegemony. Such a statement is severely misleading. While it is true that the corpus of the *'ulama* throughout the Muslims' history was not constituted exclusively by the Arabs, and that other ethnic groups have contributed substantially to the advancement of Islam as a civilization, it is equally true that non-Arab *'ulama* throughout the history of Islam privileged Arabic, and maintained the special role of the Arabs as *madat al-Islam*, (the matter of Islam).

Even during the heyday of the Liberal Age in the history of Muslims, namely during the modern Ottoman Empire, the Arabs kept their "special status" in Islam and its scientific production. Albert Hourani (1983) elaborates:

Ethnic divisions were not recognized and were not reorganized by the Ottoman Empire, and indeed any Islamic state after the primitive distinction of Arabs and Non-Arabs converts was blurred and before the rise of Modern nationalism.... Whenever Islam exists, there exists an awareness of the special role of the Arabs in history: the prophet was Arab, the Quran [sic] is written in Arabic, the Bedouin Arabs were "the matter of Islam" (*madat al-Islam*), the human means by which it conquered the world. The care given by the Ottoman Sultans to the Orthodox schools and the law preserved and indeed encouraged the "national" consciousness of the Arabs. Through the *ulama* [sic].this consciousness took the form of pride in language, culture, and ancestry, and a sense of responsibility towards Islam. (p. 33)

Further, in leaving unexplored the importance of *'Uruba/Islam* for today's appropriations of different disciplines, Mernissi is dismissing the central role of *al-Tawhid* (the religious and the secular) in the appropriations of political and social theories by present and future generations of Muslim scholars. In the same move, she dismisses the role of the *tawhidic* appropriations and what they imply for political and social theories. Equally, she conceals her lack of engagement with *al-Tawhid* principle in her feminist critique of the present Arab-Islamic culture, and what it means for her own discourse on gender liberation in the Arab-Islamic society.

2.4. Language and Interpretation

Mernissi addresses the problem of reading and interpreting the Qur'an in the Islamic tradition, which advocates a comprehensive investigation of information in all its dimensions. She particularly criticizes the *fuqaha's* and *mufasssirun's* reductionist work in their interpretation of the *hijab* (the veil), especially their neglect of the linguistic dimension. However, instead of using the Qur'an as a linguistic space and exploring the various meanings of the word "*hijab*" whenever it appears in a *sura* (verse), Mernissi only quotes Verse 53 *sura* 33, where the *hijab* means a spatial division between the prophet and Anas Ibn Malik. (p.85) This compartmentalized reading and presentation of the *hijab* in the Qur'an in itself is inadequate as it overlooks the meaning of the way the word *hijab* is determined linguistically in the Qur'an and how it is used throughout the Qur'anic text as a whole, and in light of the overriding Qur'anic principles. Without the unfolding of the contexts, the language meanings,

and the worldview of the Qur'anic text as an entity, the presentation of the *hijab* remains biased and scanty.

Similarly, Mernissi draws from the dictionary Lisan al-'Arab to explain the various dimensions of the word "*hijab*" in the Arabic language; namely the visual, the spatial, and the ethical without quoting this dictionary or referring the reader to the pages where these multiple meanings are articulated. Instead, she presents the dimensions of the *hijab* in the form of an assertion; emphasising on the visual and the spatial, and limiting the scope of the ethical space to "the forbidden" (p.93). Immediately after she discredits the dictionary she just relied on, impatiently dismissing it as an "unhelpful" linguistic source (pp.93-94). What's more, Mernissi claims that the Qur'an contains negative meanings concerning women. Yet, instead of quoting the Qur'an, she quotes the Encyclopedia of Islam. On this basis alone, Mernissi asserts that she has summarized the metaphorical meanings of the *hijab* in the Qur'an as well as the evolution of the *hijab* in the history of Muslims (p.96).

Above all, Mernissi infers from the Encyclopedia of Islam that the Qur'an carries "negative connotation" of the *hijab* to exclude women from "privileges and spiritual grace" enjoyed by men. With this linguistic manipulation, Mernissi claims to have disclosed "the modern" patriarchal manipulation of the concept of the *hijab* as a continuing search for the control of cultural and gender identity:

So it is strange indeed to observe the modern course of this concept, which from the beginning had such a strongly negative connotation in the Koran. [sic] The very sign of the person who is damned, excluded from the privileges and spiritual grace to which the Muslim has access, is claimed in our day as a symbol of Muslim identity, manna for the Muslim woman. (p.97)

The above excerpts illustrate Mernissi's selective data in her assertions about the linguistic misogyny in the Qur'an, *fiqh*, and *tafsir*. These selective appropriations and analyses are problematic on several counts. First, they are locked in the male/female logic to "prove" misogyny. Such a focus inhibits Mernissi's engagement with the richness of Arabic linguistics in general. Further, this binary logic induces her to occult the rich linguistic scientific legacy within the Arab-Islamic tradition of central relevance to both genders' interpretations of the Qur'an, the *hadith*, *tafsir* and *fiqh*. The linguistic scientific legacy is encapsulated in the Batinists and the Zahirits controversy during the 11th century Andalusia. Briefly, the Batinists were conservative linguists who considered the meanings of the Qur'an to be concealed in the

words of the exegesis. Accordingly they declared that words had only surface meaning, anchored in a particular historical and religious experience. In contrast, the Zahirits²³ were progressive linguists who focused on the phenomenal in language. They argued that the very function of *nahw* (grammar) is an open space for multiple interpretations of the public beyond the limited groups of the initiates.

In fact, the contribution of the Zahirits resides in the importance they placed on the interplay between speech and writing²⁴, and the analyses they made of the intimate relations contained in the Qur'an between speaking, writing, reading, and telling (Said, 1983,p.39). Thus, engagement with this scientific medieval linguistic legacy is of paramount importance in the readings of the Qur'an, if only because it attests to the existence of both the reactionary and the progressive tendencies among the social groups called "*fuqaha*", or "*mufasssirun*". Second, the linguistic scientific legacy within the Arab-Islamic tradition shows the importance assigned by Medieval scientists to the "human factor" in the transmission, and reception of the Qur'an as a text. As such, this tradition reflects the importance accorded by Islamic medieval epistemology to scientific complementary interpretations of the Qur'an as opposed to supplementary interpretations restricted to theology. Therefore, in the absence of historiography of linguistics in the Arab-Islamic tradition in its totality, and the place of the *fuqaha* and the *mufasssirun* in this tradition she so criticizes, Mernissi's portrayal of the linguistic dimension is more argumentative than analytical. Third, Mernissi's dis-engagement from the scientific legacy of reading the Qur'an conceals her own lack of scientific contribution to complementary interpretations of the Qur'an appropriations, and how it would remediate the alleged misogyny in the Arab-Islamic tradition.

Last but not least, Mernissi's descriptions of the meanings of the *hijab* and their implications for gender remain mere assertions without a direct linguistic analysis of the Qur'an as a primary source. After all, The Qur'an is a vast linguistic space where many discourses such as the prophetic and the legislative intersect. Mernissi's failure to account for these discourses and their intersecting spaces render her feminist Islamic discourse on the hijab closed, and dogmatic. Other Muslim women scholars (Amina Wadud Muhsin, 1992)

²³ Among the Zahirits were Ibn Hazm, Ibn Mada al-Qurtobi who intended by rationalization to establish a system of reading focused on the phenomenal words themselves.

²⁴ Said (1983) masterfully discussed the pre-eminence of the spoken over the written of the Qur'an in the Arab-Islamic tradition is one authority. He noted that, the Qur'an was "*spoken*" to the prophet. Moreover, he observed, the Qur'an is overridden, by the imperative mode as reflected in "two paradigmatic imperatives, *iqra'* (read, recite, and *qul* (tell))" (p.36).

provide considerable insight into gender in Islam by directly using the Qur'an as a primary source. Muhsin offers a hermeneutical method for understanding the place and the meaning of gender in the Qur'an based on the various contexts, language, and the worldview of the text as a whole. The author's aim is to provide the reader with broader reading methods and a fuller appreciation of the Qur'anic text as a guidance for both men and women.

Wadud-Muhsin's significant contribution lies in her holistic approach of the Qur'an in terms of understanding the implication of a particular verse in the immediate context in which it was revealed. Also, her input resides in its exploration of ways in which the universal implications of the verse can be manifested in the new environment and contexts in which it is "newly read". The use of language is key, Wadud Muhsin warns us. The meaning of a word in the Qur'an, she insists is determined by how it is used throughout the text as a whole, and in light of the overriding Qur'anic principles. For instance in the word *faddala* (past tense singular of "to prefer" in the verse which has been translated as "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, [on the basis] of what Allah has preferred some of them over others" (4:34), cannot be understood without a review of how the word *faddala* is used in other verses, nor can it be interpreted in a manner that contradicts the overriding Qur'anic principle of equality of souls in the original basis of their relationship to God. By setting these criteria Wadud Muhsin, unlike Mernissi, deliberately shuns the position of relativism and affirms that human interpretations can yield to meaningful understandings of the text. At the same time, the author notes that the Qur'anic interpretation is a continuous process that never ends. As long as human history unfolds, ongoing interpretation is required to understand how the goals of the Qur'an can be manifested in each given set of historical circumstances.

Part II. Mernissi's Societal Project

Mernissi's societal project vacillates between a modernist model, she believes to be a universal phenomenon, and an "authentic" Islamic model akin to the one established in Medina by the prophet. However, the modernist model outweighs the Islamic one as reflected in the selected works. In Beyond the veil Mernissi complains about "the scarcity of effective models for "liberated women" and the "inadequacy of the only two models available in the Arabo-Muslim world." (p.100). She explains that the first model is an endogenous Arab model of al-Jahiliyya's family and sexuality patterns, and the second is an exogenous Western model of an overly exposed woman; both of which are traumatizing for Arab-Islamic society:

Both the pre-Islamic model and the Western model provoke traumatizing images of sexuality, although for different reasons. Pre-Islamic sexuality is described in Arab literature as a chaotic, all-embracing, rampant promiscuity whose essence is the woman's self-determination, her freedom to choose...The striking characteristic of the Western model is the mutilation of the woman's integrity, her reduction to a few inches of nude flesh whose shades and forms are photographed ad infinitum with no goal other than profit. While Muslim exploitation of the female is clad under veil and buried behind walls, Western exploitation has the bad taste of being unclad, and over-exposed. (pp. 100-101)

What is significant in Mernissi's articulation of her societal model for women is her disregard of Islam as a model, and her preference for *al-Jahiliyya* as an "endogenous" model. This indicates that Mernissi's interpretation and evaluation of women's liberation is founded purely on the basis of their sexual identity, as though the formation of sexual identity were possible outside the moral order and cultural context in which it is embedded. Paradoxically, Mernissi explains the officials' fear of women's liberation from within the moral order that governs sexual identity in Morocco. First, she notes that the discard of the veil for the Western dress, and speaking a foreign language are an emulation of the behavior of the colonizer's wife. Second, that the emulation of Western lifestyle reflects the Westernization of the ruling classes. Third, that women's discard of the veil can reflect their inability to select, hence confirming "classical Muslim view of women as unable to judge what is good and what is bad." Fourth, the Westernization of women "violates Islamic ethic of modesty, by enhancing women's seductiveness through clothing and ornaments." (p. 101).

For these reasons, Mernissi contends the nationalist movements provided Arab-Muslim women only with partial rights. However, Mernissi observes, this particularity of change indicates that "the Muslim women's liberation is likely therefore, to follow a *sui generis* pattern" (p.102). Yet by a *sui generis* pattern she means the mutation of Arab-Islamic polity from tradition to modernity as triggered by socio-economic change, the disintegration of the traditional extended family structure, and the emergence of the nuclear family. To substantiate, Mernissi makes the following assertion:

The territoriality of Muslim sexuality sets ranks, tasks, and authority patterns. Spatially confined, the woman was taken care of materially by the man who possessed her, in exchange of her total obedience and her sexual and reproductive services.... This territoriality (the confining of the woman) is in the process of being dismantled, modernization having triggered mechanisms of socio-economic change no group is able to control. Philip Slater, in his studies of societies built

upon sex-antagonisms, came to the conclusion that such systems are only manageable 'under conditions of strong ties to residential stability. Morocco's family structure and tradition of residential stability are disintegrating with the increase of individual salaries and the breakdown of the corporate family system, at least in the group under study, the urban petite bourgeoisie. (p. 103)

Mernissi's articulation of her societal project in Beyond the veil is problematic on several counts. First, her articulation of women's sexual identity and roles is inscribed within the male/female binary logic. This artificially separates between men's and women's experiences of reality, as though they were separate entities in culture. Second, this articulation imposes the dichotomized social behaviors and meanings associated with masculinity and femininity as universal concepts applicable to the context of Morocco. Third, Mernissi's articulation of women's project from the male/female logic serves Mernissi as a tactical strategy. In the same move, this strategy allows her to establish her victimology theory of women under Islam as a moral order instead of describing women's struggle. Also, this strategy enables her to argue for the need of Muslim women to subvert the moral order of Islam since it is allegedly responsible for their victimization. Fourth, this articulation provides Mernissi with a justification theory to dispense with the Islamic worldview in her interpretation of gender sexual identity and roles. This way she can easily impose Western modernist meanings of sex/gender and the nature/culture dichotomy in the analysis of the social reality of Morocco. By the same token, she can easily dis-engage from the Islamic metaphysics and view of gender complementarity, and how that view affects gender sexuality, relations, and agency.

Overall, Mernissi's so-called "territorial Muslim sexuality" was not established from an Islamic rationale on gender, nor out of historical or experiential description of women's sexuality in Morocco; least of all "the Muslim society". The territoriality in question stems from the rationalization Mernissi makes about territoriality. Indeed, it is from Slater's modernist rationale that Mernissi equates Muslim "residential stability" with the Western one, and she even makes predictions about the so-called "corporate family system". In the process, however, she not only misses the actual male/female dynamics in Moroccan society, but she also distorts their contextual meanings. Similarly, Mernissi's modernist vision of women's societal project and liberation pervades Doing daily battle as reflected in her description of the struggles women engage into (education, work, and contraception). Here, in the voices of

various Moroccan women, the ideal liberated woman is unveiled, an economic agent who yearns for a professional job in her field of specialty, and an autonomous individual who struggles to control her sexuality and to contract her marriages and divorces on her own terms. In the case of Khadija al-Jabliyya, Mernissi captures at its best women's struggle for self-control in marriage and work under the weight of patriarchy (159-160).

In the follow-up period of Khadija's interview (1979-83), Mernissi highlights Khadija both as a mobile economic agent with a high self-esteem, and a woman who takes charge of her destiny and that of other members of her family:

She looked for work in Rabat. She found work as a housemaid with a high government official in the capital. She left that job after three years because of a petty dispute. Then she went to Germany as a maid with the family of a Moroccan diplomat. She came back to Morocco a year later.

In September 1982 she went to Spain with the same family with whom she had gone to Germany. Before leaving, she interceded with the official for whom she had worked to get jobs for her brother and cousins in the various security forces. She also supervised the marriage arrangements for her younger sister...

In November 1982, Khadija came back to Morocco. She had left her job in Spain. After three months of unemployment, because she refused to work for a salary less than 400 dirhams, she left for Iraq to take a job arranged by the Iraqi Embassy in Rabat. She was promised a wage of 1,000 dirhams a month in addition to room and board. She left for Iraq on 15 February 1983. (pp. 161-2)

Nevertheless, in the update phase of Khadija's interview (1986) Mernissi depicts her as an insecure woman, who fatally surrenders to her destiny. Despite the fact that she has come full circle in her life in that she had finally gained some financial security through work, and managed to meet and marry a man she loved and chose, Khadija is a "worn out", aging woman who is fearful for the future. This time, Khadija the "independent" woman surrenders to her own destiny and marries a bigamous man after all. In fact, Mernissi explains, though Khadija "gives in" by compromising her principles against polygamy and marries an already married man, she does so on her own terms: mutual respect. She elaborates:

After Iraq...I bought a little land in the village. And then I left for France to look for work. And that's how I met my husband. He was already married -if you can imagine! He has another wife who is in Morocco. All my life I rejected the idea of polygyny. But I was younger then, and he was very nice. He respects me. We discuss everything and we make decisions together. (p. 163)

Through Khadija's case, Mernissi attempts to illustrate the intensity and weight of patriarchy on all aspects of women's life, especially their sexuality. Since sexuality is only allowed and accepted within the marriage institution, Mernissi implicitly argues, women are coerced into conforming to social norms; and that entails accepting a polygamous marriage for the sake of social acceptance, and in order to lead a "normal" sexual life. This presentation of Moroccan women is highly deterministic. While this may be true for some women, many Moroccan women prefer to settle for other marital arrangements based on mutual respect with single men than love with bigamous men. Others who have not encountered love, may decide to get married to have children, or for companionship. A few others may choose not to get married altogether.

In contrast, Mernissi's vision of the societal project and women's liberation in Women and Islam alters drastically. Here, Mernissi asserts that women's liberation is in conformity with "authentic Islam", by which she means the kind of Islam practiced and lived during the Prophet's time and within the matrilineal city of Medina. Mernissi deliberately contrasts Medina with Mecca to show the way the patrilineal and original city of the prophet played a central role in altering the initial Islamic values and ethics that promoted equality for women into misogynous ones. In contrasting Mecca and Medina, Mernissi intentionally highlights the coexistence of both egalitarian and authoritarian models in the history of Islam, and she shows the availability of two examples for contemporary Muslim societies to choose from.

However, as I illustrated earlier, the model of Medina by Mernissi is divorced from the Islamic logic of complementarity of genders at the level of the couple, family and the community. Instead the model of Medina is still entrenched within the male/female binary logic. Only this time, women are not defined by their victim status, but by their "superiority" status to men of Arabia. Here Mernissi uses as role models for the societal project in Women and Islam women who are invariably portrayed as superior to men in all aspects of life. Such a model is clearly artificial as it merely inverts the patriarchal social hierarchy between genders by a new matriarchal social hierarchy. Equally, this model presents women as dominant paradigmatic models for both genders' identification. In doing so, Mernissi's model is counterproductive because it replicates monolithism in her presentation of the societal project for the Arab-Muslim community, instead of exploring egalitarian systems for both genders. Overall, Mernissi's societal project is heavily marked by a duality as evident in her vacillation

between the modernist framework of modernity and that of "authentic Islam". In my view, this duality signals the persistence of a dichotomous thinking of Mernissi's feminist thought as well as between Western and Islamic sciences.

It is precisely this dichotomous thinking in terms of theory and epistemology that prevents Mernissi from having a clear vision of what a Muslim woman's liberation entails, and what type of societal project can optimally enable her to live in a more egalitarian society. In turn, the dichotomous thinking affects Mernissi's articulation of the societal project, leading her to propose fragmentary feminist strategies such as the family law further access to work, education, contraception and politics. Finally, the dichotomous thinking precludes Mernissi from grounding women's issues in the history of the Arab-Muslim societies, or examine them within the general socio-political and economic structures of these societies, or for that matter articulate them from within contemporary Islamic sciences. In brief, Mernissi's societal project does not yield to any clear plan for implementation. It remains locked in feminist advocacy.

Findings

From the analysis of Mernissi's scientific context of discovery I have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) Mernissi's feminist consciousness indicates a move towards Islamic epistemology and approaches to gender as evident in Women and Islam, and a break from both orientalist approaches to Islam, and Western modernist analyses of gender that marked both Beyond the veil and Doing daily battle.

(2) Mernissi's feminist consciousness is devoid of a feminist Islamic theory on women's sexuality or an Islamic epistemology on gender. Instead, her feminist consciousness is heavily underlined by a Western liberal modernist consciousness. As a result, her whole scientific context of discovery is marked by a comparative mode (Islam/West) in the approach and analysis of the Arab-Islamic social reality. This establishes a hierarchical value structure of knowledge that places the West as a superior model to which Islamic societies are compared to throughout the author's research. Further, the comparative mode triggers the chain effect in that it sustains Mernissi's adoption of Western scientific methods. This in turn, leads her to have constant juxtapositions between Western and Islamic analytical categories (methodology, method, and epistemology) throughout her scientific discovery.

(3) The Western/Islamic juxtapositions also induce Mernissi to produce partial appropriations of Islamic sciences. As illustrated in Women and Islam she uses *al-Tawhid* principle selectively in order to show the importance of this principle for the socio-political and cultural organization of Arabia by the prophet (*Uruba/Islam*). Yet, she omits this principle in her exploration of gender sexuality, identity and agency. This way, Mernissi disengages from Islamic sociology and its related notion of "complementarity of genders". Equally, she dismisses altogether the theories of equality and of agency contained in Islamic epistemology. As a result, she fails to portray the discourses on gender in the Arab-Islamic society both in the Medieval and contemporary periods.

(4) In contrast, Mernissi makes several links between Islamic metaphysics and women's sociology in Women and Islam to support her feminist advocacy when she adheres to the formal/informal permeability of space particular to the Arab-Islamic socio-political organization. These are: (a) the link between Islamic metaphysics and women's daily lives as evident in her exploration of gender during the life of the prophet. In this exploration Mernissi shows how Islamic metaphysics are articulated in social reality (lived Islam), and how these metaphysics led to egalitarianism for women in the initial Muslim community. (b) The link between individual and collective agency as an integral part of social Islam, (i.e. the description of Umm Salama in the community.) As a result, Mernissi re-defines gender identity and politics from within Islamic structural organization of space in Women and Islam. In the process, she re-articulates agency from within the Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice. By the same token, Mernissi makes fundamental revisions of her previous theoretical positions on Islam previously presented in Beyond the veil. These are: (a) The role of Islam in liberating women in comparison with *al-Jahiliyya*. (b) Gender cooperative relations in the couple, the family, and the *Ummah* as practiced by Islam as a way of life. (c) The fluid spatial organization between the private and the public in original Islam established by the prophet and its role of the institutionalization of egalitarianism in social practice.

(5) Mernissi manipulates the sources in tradition from the perspective of male/female dichotomy rather than exploring what tradition has to say about gender in Islam. This indicates Mernissi's internalization of patriarchal monolithic research methods as well as it illustrates her *reactive stance* to Islamic masculinist productions. Equally, Mernissi blindly adheres to

Western masculinist modernist productions, and she replicates its liberal notions in her woman's standpoint epistemology on gender in Islam.

(6) Mernissi uses tradition mainly to show the oppositional model for women rather than explain the Islamic model of womanhood, or gender relationship from the Islamic worldview as articulated in the Qur'an or in the *hadith*. This represents a partial study of Islamic sources that avoids engaging with the primary sources' discourse as paradigmatic models for both genders in Islam as a way of life.

(7) In avoiding the Islamic model of womanhood in the Qur'an, Mernissi also dismisses the articulation of sexuality in Islam for both genders. This technique of avoidance is highly misleading because it leaves undistinguished the articulation of sexuality in the Qur'an, and within the post-Qur'anic productions of *hadith* and *tafsir*. Also, this technique allows Mernissi to disengage from a dialogue with 20th century theorists on sexuality in Islam.²⁵ Above all, the technique of avoidance deflects attention from Mernissi's feminist theory of sexuality and its lack of grounded theory from within the Islamic ethics.

(8) In both Beyond the veil, and Women and Islam Mernissi relies on Arabic sources from the male/female dichotomous perspective in order to "prove" misogyny in Arabic culture. This binary perspective occults the richness of the Arabic language, and leads Mernissi to neglect the linguistic scientific legacy existing within the Arab-Islamic tradition, and its role both in the evolution of Arabic linguistics, and in complementary interpretations of the Qur'an. Ultimately, the binary perspective distorts the presentation of the Arab women's reality from the linguistic point of view since no descriptions are provided from linguistic sources to illustrate that the Arabic language is in fact "misogynous".

(9) Mernissi's portrayals of Morocco are marked by the absence of historical descriptions and analyses of economic, political and socio-cultural movements, namely, capitalism, nationalism, and feminism that have shaped the status of women in contemporary Morocco. These portrayals sustain a monolithic view of each of these movements, and prevents the reader from assessing what is really at stake in gender relations.

(10) Mernissi severely omits from her feminist research the historical documentation of women's patriarchal oppression in the Arab-Islamic society, especially during the 20th

²⁵ One of the earliest modern theorists is Boudhiba (1975). The most recent are Musallam (1983), al-Dialmi (1985, 1987) and Zay'ur (1988).

century. This is unfortunate because it is the present condition of the Arab-Muslim women that Mernissi refutes and seeks to change.

(11) Mernissi's historiography of women of Morocco is atomistic, and as such it lacks a systematic approach and replicates the methodological flaws of colonial history that haunted the study of the Maghrib history.²⁶ Further, Mernissi's historiography leaves unexplored the Maghribi historians methodological breakthroughs together with their new political outlooks. What this means is that the historiography of the Maghrib is very much in the making by feminists and non-feminist alike. Since Moroccan history is still a work in progress, Mernissi's historiography is not only dogmatic, but obscures the role of Moroccan women in social change on several counts. (a) It leaves unexplored the pioneering role of Moroccan women in social change and their influence in the Arab-Islamic society since the 2nd/10th century. (b) It conveys the impression that women in contemporary Morocco are not involved in social change because they are oppressed by the so-called Islamic patriarchy. (c) It conveys the impression that feminism is monolithic in its articulation of gender in Morocco. (d) It dismisses the scientific role of pioneering women in gender analyses in contemporary Morocco.²⁷ This denies political and scientific recognition to pioneering Moroccan women scientists. (e) Finally, it denies political and scientific validity to contemporary endogenous discourses of gender that co-exist with the author's own discourse.

(12) Mernissi's historiography of the Arab-Islamic society and of Morocco from within the male-female logic is counterproductive. Not only does this logic prevent her from exploring the oppression of women in the region systematically, but it also prevents her from engaging in a dialogue with both genders involved in the construction of a contemporary egalitarian Arab-Islamic society.²⁸

(13) Mernissi's standpoint includes the importance of education and knowledge production for women. But this inclusion is more inscribed within the male/female logic than within a systemic analysis of the Arab-Islamic education and what it can accomplish for both genders.

²⁶ For a first systematic treatment of Maghribi historiography in English is found in Le Gall, & Perkins. (Ed). (1997).

²⁷ For example Khnata Bennouna (1960).

²⁸ In chapter 1 I discuss the active and multiple roles of Arab-Muslim women in shaping egalitarianism in their respective societies in the 20th century. Also, in chapter 3 I unfold the diversity in the voices of feminist research by Arab-Muslim women in contemporary universities during the 1970-90 period. Finally in chapter 7 I illustrate how both genders have been implementing the notion of complementarity of gender and succeeded in negotiating an egalitarian societal project in Morocco since the 1980s.

(14) Mernissi emphasizes the daily life in the relation between genders, yet she fails to make the connection between daily life experiences and her own feminist analyses of gender. Equally, her portrayal of daily life provides no reciprocal empowerment in terms of social agency, or in terms of educational strategies for both genders. Such severe omissions of consciousness-raising programs or activities from Mernissi's standpoint is striking, considering that she is both a sociologist and a feminist.

CHAPTER VII
RETHINKING THE FEMININE MODE
OF ARAB-ISLAMIC FEMINIST RESEARCH

Introduction

In this chapter I rely on the pluralist feminist praxis of the model outlined in Figure VII in chapter 2 to revisit al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research. Here, I locate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoints both within the power-structure of scientific practice that governs the production of feminist research in contemporary Arab-Islamic society, and within the meta-narratives and ideological discourses during the 1970-1990 period. In Part 1, I survey the critics' evaluation of the authors' feminist discourses from a cross-reference literature in English and Arabic. In part 2, I present my critique of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode in terms of their systematic relation to the Arab-Islamic society and tradition of scientific practice. Equally, I examine the authors' appropriation of tradition and of the contemporary social sciences. In part 3, I discuss the importance of endogenous scientific paradigm for the study of gender in Arab-Islamic culture. Here, I show the relevance of the systematic approach I used in the thesis to analyze al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode, and for the production of the fields of knowledge in the social sciences. I conclude with the specific contribution of the thesis model to the contextualization of these authors within the power structure of scientific research, and within the current Arab-Islamic scientific practices.

Part I. The Critique of Al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's Work ¹

1. Al-Sa'dawi

Despite the fact that al-Sa'dawi's non-fictional work encapsulates one of the most explosive feminist narratives of the second half of the 20th century in Arab-Islamic culture, there is virtually no critique in Arabic of this narrative.² Several factors explain this silence towards the work of this seminal feminist figure in Egypt and outside. First, the cultural tendency to associate women's production in "the literary realm" in opposition to the scientific realm traditionally occupied by men. This leads to the trivialization of feminist productions and reinforces the belief that women have no scientific contribution to the Arab-Islamic thought both past and present.³ Second, the general volatile political climate in the Arab-Islamic world in the 1970s which led to the rise of the authoritarian state, and its corollary

¹ The critique I am using is in conformity with the selection of data I explained in chapter 4.

² Both the Arabic-written (Shalabi, 1986) and the English-written critiques (Malti-Douglas, 1991; 1995) of al-Sa'dawi's work focus on the enormous literary corpus of the author's work and her fictional writings only.

repression and censorship campaign against any rising critical voices that demanded the state's accountability for its inefficient modernist programs and the worsening conditions of the majority of people.⁴ Third, the re-emergence in Egypt of the Islamists' and their increased popularity among the masses, which posed a real threat for the modernist regime in place. Fourth, the persisting double standards of the moderate "progressive" male-intelligentsia, which typically pays lip service to the state authorities in times of crises.⁵ This double standard policy sustains the elite's political interests linked with the state policy of governance, and denies any dialogue with grassroots forces of change in society feminist and non-feminist alike.

In this authoritarian socio-political climate and elitist cultural environment, it is no surprise that al-Sa'dawi's work was foremost in the "state's critique" of scholarship in Egypt, and received the harshest form of coercive tactics of censorship with incredible impunity. For example, when al-Sa'dawi published al-Mar'ah wa-l-Jins, she was immediately dismissed from her post at the Ministry of Health as well as her editorship of a health journal, under the pressure of both religious and political authorities of Egypt. Moreover, upon her return from her assignment with the United Nations program for Women in Africa at Addis Ababa in 1981, al-Sa'dawi was jailed on orders from Anwar Sadat for her controversial feminist advocacy and views on women in Egypt.

As to al-Sa'dawi's English critique (Park, 1988; Boullata, 1990; and Ahmed, 1992)⁶, it reveals the critics' misconceptions of the author's feminism, and their fragmented study of the author's extensive feminist work. Consequently, these critics are unable to understand or appreciate the complexity of al-Sa'dawi's feminist knowledge. Park (1988) hastily labels al-Sa'dawi's Women and Sex as "a pseudo scientific study of the female body and its impact on women's psychology" (p.66). Although, he acknowledges that this book: "is written to demystify the myth of the female body and mind" he reduces the purpose of this book to a mere call "for the need of proper sex education for both women and men to reduce the number of female victims of sex crimes" (p. 67). Yet, from al-Sa'dawi's detailed accounts of her

³ For the trivialization of women's scientific contribution to contemporary Arab-Islamic thought and the demonization of women scholars see my work (1989a).

⁴ See chapters 1 and 3 for details on this volatile period.

⁵ See chapter 1 for details on how the elite over time remained indifferent to the masses' demands for reforms at the grassroots levels.

⁶ Unlike Park (1988) who devotes his work to a substantial portion of al-Sa'dawi's fictional and non-fictional work (see Appendix IV.B), both Boullata (1990) and Ahmed (1992) only integrate al-Sa'dawi in the general discourses of Arab-Islamic feminist thought on gender and Islam (see References).

encounters with patients during her medical practice, it is clear that the main thrust of the book is to describe the complex issue of sexuality, and the ways it affects gender relationships in Egypt as an Arab-Islamic society.

Nonetheless, Park's evaluation of Women and Sex as "a pseudo scientific study" is partly justified because al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint contains an inherent ambivalence about women's sexuality. As a perspective al-Sa'dawi's standpoint insists that Egyptian women's sexuality is governed by an Islamic moral social order. Yet, as an epistemology al-Sa'dawi's standpoint interprets the Egyptian women's sexual identity and roles from within the logic of Marxist ideology and its associated dichotomous logic of the master/salve division of labor and of sexuality (see chapter 5). Such an ambivalent epistemology on gender precludes scholars, unfamiliar with the *Sunni* Islamic moral order, from understanding the dynamics of gender and sexuality within the particular context of Egypt as Arab-Islamic society.

Furthermore, Park invariably evaluates al-Sa'dawi's view on sexuality and psychology against Freud's:

Despite her denial of Freud's methodology of female psychoanalysis as libidinal, her own findings on female psychoanalysis emphasize female sexuality, childhood experiences, and spouse and family relationships. That is, she is using the very patriarchal scientific discovery she criticizes. (p. 67)

This evaluation is untenable on two counts. First, it is based on the assumption that Freud is representative of human theories of psychology and psychoanalysis. This assumption is unacceptable because it imposes universalism of Freud's psychoanalytical theories, and their uniform applicability in the interpretation of women's psyche and the subconscious to all cultures. This is exactly the assumption al-Sa'dawi refutes. As I discussed in chapter 5, al-Sa'dawi not only described the scientific inadequacy, and lack of scientific authority of Freudian's psychoanalysis for the analysis Arab-Islamic patriarchy and feminism alike, but she also skillfully shows the ways the application of Freudian psychoanalysis negatively affects the practice of Egyptian psychiatrists and psychologists.

Second, Park evaluates al-Sa'dawi's articulation of gender agency according to his Western definition of femininity and masculinity rather than al-Sa'dawi's articulations of them in al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins: "Motherhood, marriage, or love are not seen as an obstacle to women's emancipation as long as the woman is free to work outside the family; and as long as there is harmony and understanding between the members of the family" (p.134).

Accordingly, Park infers that al-Sa'dawi's theorization of motherhood is problematic and limited because she "cannot see" these issues as obstacles to women's emancipation:

Neither heterosexual love relationship nor male leftist politics are questioned as desirable or efficient for the emancipation of women. They are romantically juxtaposed as the only possible through which women can be free from their sex roles in the family and society. (p. 194)

Decidedly, it is Park who fails "to see" al-Sa'dawi's definitions of sexuality, gender and agency. In missing entirely this ambivalence in al-Sa'dawi's standpoint and her articulation of sexuality and gender roles Park is unable to understand why al-Sa'dawi attacks the traditional roles of women-wife, mother, daughter, housewife, and praises love between a couple and motherhood as a source of emotional support for all members of the family. The fundamental problem with Park's evaluation of al-Sa'dawi's feminist articulations of sex/gender roles lies in his attempt to impose his own "universal" approach of feminism to al-Sa'dawi's cultural feminism. In doing so, Park cannot appreciate al-Sa'dawi's scientific contributions to gender articulation, or the difficulties she experienced in redefining gender roles and gender agency outside the Islamic logic of complementarity of genders.⁷

Similarly, Park's analysis of al-Sa'dawi of al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah reflects severe oversimplifications and distortions of al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought. The first oversimplification resides in Park's entire dismissal of al-Sa'dawi's critique of Western imperialism, and its role in undermining the cultural identity of both men and women in the Arab-Islamic region. Yet, as I have shown in chapter 5 al-Sa'dawi deals extensively with the internal colonization of Western imperialism of the Arab-Islamic region in the 19th century. Equally, she discusses the Arab-Islamic *Nahda* (cultural renaissance) as an important revisionist movement for the cultural reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic identity. Finally, al-Sa'dawi shows the significant importance of ethnocentrism both for the Arab-Islamic epistemology and for women's identity and identification.

In omitting the explanations al-Sa'dawi provides of the importance of ethnocentrism in the articulation of gender in Egypt and the Arab-Islamic world, Park denies al-Sa'dawi the right to narrate the particularism of the Arab-Islamic feminism. Likewise, he refuses al-Sa'dawi the right to draw from the Arab-Islamic epistemology in the analysis of feminism. By omission, therefore, Park occults the essential feminist contribution al-Sa'dawi makes to

⁷For details on the Islamic logic of complementarity of genders see item 26 in the glossary.

the Arab-Islamic epistemology and its articulations of gender. This occultation is typical of scholars within the Orientalist trend, who persist in denying other cultural feminisms the right to independent self-referential representations and scientific paradigms of analysis. Equally, this stance obscures the scientific hegemony inherent to cultural imperialism and its monopoly in the cognitive representation of other societies and cultures in the world community. As Callaway (1987) aptly put it, in addition to physical occupation imperial culture exerted its power through its comprehensive cognitive symbolic order that "constituted permissible thinking and action and prevented other worlds from emerging" (p.57).

The second oversimplification by Park of al-Sa'dawi's articulation of gender in al-Wah al-'Ari lil-Mar'ah is found in his presentation of al-Sa'dawi's treatment of socialism and how it affects gender relations in Egypt. On the one hand, Park notes that al-Sa'dawi accepts Engels' materialist theory of class and gender oppression without criticism and applies it to the rule of the Egyptian pharaohs: "As Engels, al-Sa'adawi [sic] proclaims that with the disappearance of private property, ownership class and gender conflicts will be resolved and the peasantry and working class people will recover their equal rights" (p. 260) .

While this is true, Park omits al-Sa'dawi's description of socialism in relation to monotheism in the history of Pharaonic Egypt. In doing so, he misses al-Sa'dawi's political intent: that the birth of monotheism⁸ under Pharaonic rule brought along a class society which disrupted the egalitarian system during "socialist period" of the Pharaonic era. The problem with al-Sa'dawi's engagement with socialism during the Pharaonic era lies elsewhere: in the inferences al-Sa'dawi makes about monotheism during the Pharaonic era and its universal class oppression, and how these inferences relate to monotheistic Judaism, and Islam. Unable to grasp these inferences in al-Sa'dawi's thought, Park misses entirely the author's message as a Marxist-feminist.

On the other hand, Park argues that al-Sa'dawi's belief in equality guaranteed for all today is a "socialist utopia" (p.260). In fact, Park speculates that:

The idea of a return to a communal agricultural society as the way forward to women's liberation and equality for all people is naive and idealistic. Al-Sa'adawi's [sic] descriptions of Egyptian peasant life as an ideal is romantic, revealing the author's nostalgia for her own childhood. (p.261)

⁸ For details on the change from socialism to monotheism during the Pharaonic era of Egypt, consult The hidden face of Eve, (1980).

Again, this statement is unsubstantiated from al-Sa'dawi's work. As I showed in chapter 5, in al-Wajh al-'Ari li-l Mar'ah, al-Sa'dawi describes at length socialism during Nassir's regime. Also, al-Sa'dawi opposes Nassir's socialist regime to both the Liberal and the Islamists' phases that followed, and shows how both these phases negatively effected women. Thus, al-Sa'dawi's yearning for "a communal agricultural society" as a more equitable way for Egyptian women's liberation was far from being "romantic". Rather the author's stance was a lucid one and her proposal a realistic solution for the pace of Egypt's economic development in that period of history. After all, al-Sa'dawi's hope for a socialist regime was informed by the Egyptian women's negative experiences with liberal socio-political regimes and their adversial impact on their daily life. In dismissing al-Sa'dawi's socialism as a mere "socialist utopia", Park is not only reductionist of the central place of socialism in al-Sa'dawi's articulation of gender in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil-Mara'h, but he is also distortive of al-Sa'dawi's analysis of socialism and gender relations in the past and in the present of Egypt.

Conversely, Boullata (1990) and Ahmed (1992) attempt to provide a critique of al-Sa'dawi's non-fictional work "from within". First, Boullata captures the distinctive way al-Sa'dawi deals with sex in al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins, and her purpose in the analysis of gender equity in Egypt:

The distinctive quality of Nawal al-Sa'dawi's thought is not that it deals with the physiological and psychological aspects of sex in women and men, which many in the Arab world still consider to be taboos, but also it puts all gender relations in social, economic and political perspectives that are meant to analyze and explain the prevailing oppression in society, and particularly highlight the inferior status of women. The purpose being to subvert the present social structure and help bring about a more humane and equitable one. (p.128)

However, Boullata merely summarizes al-Sa'dawi's main thesis of al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins without any exploration of the distinctive way she articulates sexuality and gender relations. Such a cursory presentation of the author's work is counter-productive, especially that Boullata asserts earlier that Arab-women "speak with the specificity of an-Arab-Islamic cultural background that affects their lives in a particular way" (p.119). Equally, this critique conveys the impression that al-Sa'dawi is merely reactive to men's standpoint on sexuality. Yet as I showed in chapter 5, al-Sa'dawi's woman's standpoint on sexuality suffers from an inherent tension, namely between al-Sa'dawi's representation of women's perspectives and experiences of sexuality, and her "processing" of these experiences through a Marxist standpoint epistemology based on the master/slave theory, and the sex/gender dichotomy.

Second, Boullata criticizes al-Sa'dawi's position on Islam as inadequate in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil Mar'ah. In his view al-Sa'dawi's Marxist analysis "implies that Islam's standards and values are shaped by the economy, and not by divine revelation in the Qur'an" (p.130). Thus, Boullata infers, al-Sa'dawi's adherence to Marxist theory indicates her uncertainty about the origins of Islam. In his words: "Such Marxist ideas clearly show that she has not made up her mind whether Islam is a revealed religion or a product of human society in history." (p.130).

While Boullata's critique of al-Sa'dawi's application of Marxist theory to the evolution of Islam is accurate, his evaluation of al-Sa'dawi's position on Islam is reductionist and partial. After all, al-Sa'dawi does criticize Islam as a way of life under the abusive practices of patriarchal governments and people in various social institutions in Egypt. Boullata only focuses on al-Sa'dawi's position on intellectual Islam, and omits totally the author's comprehensive analysis of contemporary patriarchal practices of social Islam and its manipulations of existing institutions for the control of women (the judicial system, the courts, divorce-marriage practice, the family law...). In doing so, Boullata misses entirely al-Sa'dawi's point: how "religious patriarchy" inhabits the same socio-political space of power as "secular patriarchy" in the Arab-Islamic society and culture.

In fact, al-Sa'dawi's "*tour de force*" in al-Wajh al-'Ari li-l- Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya lies precisely in showing how both secular and religious spaces intermingle to form an idiosyncratic power-structure of the Arab-Islamic patriarchy at the core of the oppression of women. The problem of al-Sa'dawi's Marxist view lies beyond the ambiguity about the origins of Islam. It extends to conflicting analyses al-Sa'dawi makes about Islam as a moral socio-political order and how it affects gender relations. Such conflicting analyses lead to al-Sa'dawi's portrayal of Islam as egalitarian at times, and as unegalitarian at others.

Leila Ahmed's (1992) critique of al-Sa'dawi's work is the most reductionist of all critiques. First, Ahmed's arbitrary focus on the themes of sexuality and ethnocentrism to evaluate al-Sa'dawi's feminist discourse is highly superficial, considering that her intent is to place al-Sa'dawi's discourse on gender "in the general cultural productions and discourses from the 1950 to the 1980s" (p.214). Second, Ahmed's treatment of sexuality and ethnocentrism is over-simplistic and biased. In her portrayal of al-Sa'dawi's exposition of the physical abuses inflicted on women in Egypt in al-Mar'ah wa-al-Jins, Ahmed merely states that this portrayal is an assertive process of "naming the unnamed" (p.215). Immediately after,

she comments that this reflects al-Sa'dawi's attempt to expose the invisible cruelties, and thus: "expose no more than a fraction of the pervasive cruelties to which they may be subjected" (p.215). In the absence of al-Sa'dawi's alleged articulation of physical abuse of women in Egypt, Ahmed's statement remains speculative.

Similarly, in her dealing with al-Sa'dawi's discourse of resistance to the West (ethnocentrism) in al-Wajh al-'Ari lil-Mar'ah, Ahmed contends that this discourse is in itself embedded in Western culture. This, in her view, indicates an inherent difficulty of language in al-Sa'dawi's feminist discourse. In fact, Ahmed places al-Sa'dawi's resistance discourse to the West itself as part of a global acculturated discourse typical of scholars in Arabic culture. Again, without any substantiation from al-Sa'dawi's work, Leila Ahmed formulates her criticism of al-Sa'dawi's ethnocentrism in monolithic terms:

At least as regards the Islamic world, the discourses of resistance and rejection are inextricably informed by the languages and ideas developed and disseminated by the West to no less a degree than are the languages of those openly advocating emulation of the West or those who, like Franz Fanon or Nawal El-Saadawi, [sic] are critical of the West but nonetheless ground themselves in intellectual assumptions and political ideas, including a belief in the rights of the individual, formulated by Western bourgeois capitalism and spread over the globe as a result of Western hegemony....Marxists such as Fanon, Samir Amin and El-Saadawi; and liberal intellectuals whole heartedly embracing the colonial thesis of Western Superiority and advocating the importance of emulating the West all differ fundamentally in their political stance, but they do not differ in the extent to which, whether they acknowledge it or not, they draw on Western thought and Western political and intellectual languages. (p. 236)

Such a formulation is an oversimplification of ethnocentrism in the "Islamic World" because it assigns uniformity of acculturation to ethnocentric discourses within all Muslim countries, and assumes their automatic affiliation with Western thought. At least for the Arab region within "the Islamic world", ethnocentrism has a long history in the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition.⁹ Equally, there is a substantial ethnocentric contemporary Arabic literature that is neither interested, nor involved in ideological political discourses from within the Islam/West dichotomy. This literature uses ethnocentrism as an assertive process for the global reconstruction and development of Arab-Islamic society via new appropriations of knowledge from the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition. For instance, Muhammad Ahmad

⁹ I have traced ethnocentrism within the Arab-Islamic tradition in chapter 1 to the Middle Ages in the Maghrib, and its re-emergence with *al-Salafiyya*. Also, in chapter 3 I discussed the significance of ethnocentrism for the reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition in education and scientific practice in the contemporary Arab-Islamic society.

Khalfallah (1985) and Salim Yafut (1985) tackle the issues of the economic and political system from within various theories within the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition, and they show the implications of such theories for an endogenous egalitarian societal order beneficial to both genders in contemporary Arab-Islamic culture.

It is in a similar fashion that al-Sa'dawi deals with ethnocentrism. By totally ignoring the important tension between gender liberation and cultural appropriation of the Arab-Islamic scientific heritage articulated in al-Sa'dawi's ethnocentrism, therefore, Leila Ahmed misses the role of ethnocentrism in the context of Egypt as an Arab-Islamic society, and in al-Sa'dawi's cultural production of feminism. For both these reasons Ahmed is unable to assess the difficulties and the accomplishments in al-Sa'dawi's articulation of gender in Egypt. The problem with al-Sa'dawi's ethnocentric discourse lies elsewhere: in the author's juxtaposition of two conflicting paradigms (Islamic/Western) in her articulation of gender. It is this juxtaposition that traps al-Sa'dawi in a problem of language and meanings of Arab-Islamic definitions of gender identity and politics. Furthermore, this juxtaposition led her to adopt a reactive stance to Western ethnocentrism and to apply a reversed psychology, which advocates the thesis of "the superiority of the Islamic thought" in her feminist ethnocentric discourse. Thus, while it is true that al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought is still heavily influenced by Western thought, her ethnocentric discourse however does not "embrace the colonial thesis of superiority". Quite the opposite.

To conclude, the available critique fails to provide a balanced evaluation of al-Sa'dawi's work, or appreciate her intellectual complexity. As such, this critique severely reduces al-Sa'dawi's feminist thought by omitting the essential cultural criticism she makes of both the Arab-Islamic society and of the Arab-Islamic epistemology. In doing so, the critique occults al-Sa'dawi's feminist contribution to the Arab-Islamic social sciences both religious and secular. Consequently, this critique obscures the significance of al-Sa'dawi's feminist epistemology to Arab-Islamic culture as a whole. And in doing so, this critique inhibits a real appreciation of al-Sa'dawi's feminist scholarship and its relevance to feminist and non-feminist audiences alike.

2. Mernissi

There are two kinds of critiques on Mernissi's work: an English critique (Boullata, 1990; Kandiyoti, 1993)¹⁰, and an Arabic critique (Boushikhi, 1984¹¹; Sharrak 1990). Boullata (1990) criticizes Mernissi's position on Islam by focusing on Beyond the veil and excluding her main work on Islam: Le harem politique (1985). In doing so, Boullata's critique of Mernissi's position on Islam is partial from the outset. Moreover, Boullata evaluates Mernissi's engagement with Islamic sources and ethics in Beyond the veil is more argumentative than explanatory:

She cannot be said to speak with a specialist's expertise of the intricacies of Islamic law and ethics on the subject of gender relation in traditional Islamic society, but can be fairly said that she used the material she collected in this respect with the critical attitude of a convinced feminist, employing modern sociological categories with an evident independence of judgement. (p.132)

Boullata's statement is riddled with monoliths: "traditional Islamic society" and "modern sociological categories". Moreover, he excludes the way Mernissi applies the "modern sociological categories" to "the traditional Islamic society" from his critique. Instead, Boullata merely shows how Mernissi uses the concept of *fitna* to describe male-female dynamics in Beyond the veil (p.133). In so doing, Boullata's critique remains unsubstantiated. Above all, Boullata's critique leaves out the fundamental tension existing in Mernissi's woman's standpoint: that between her liberal modernist epistemology, and her Marxist standpoint epistemology and its related analyses of the social division of labor.

In a different line of thought, Kandiyoti's (1993) critique focuses on Mernissi's feminist discourse on gender as articulated in Women and Islam. First, Kandiyoti sees Mernissi's reliance on the past literature as problematic because it lacks temporalization in the treatment of women and gender. She elaborates:

Given the terrain she had chosen, discursive initiative did not lie with the author. Hers reminded me of Alice in Wonderland's futile attempts to invite the White Queen to speak grammatically, only to be told that she had no control over the other's language, because 'I am the Queen and it is I who decides the meanings of the words....The practice and interpretation of Islam is necessarily determined in a field of temporal power relations and mediated by the complex interactions of state apparatuses and multiple internal constituencies. Contestations over the family and the role of women are inscribed in a complex and changing political

¹⁰ It is noteworthy to know that these critiques are not devoted exclusively to Mernissi but feminism in general within the region.

¹¹ Boushikhi also places his critique of Mernissi within feminism in the Arab-Islamic society. (See References).

landscape which exhibits significant local variations. Struggles over women's rights cannot afford to situate themselves outside this temporality and to not engage with the present directly. (p.9)

Second, Kandiyoti argues that Mernissi's discourse on gender suffers from a genuine difficulty "in finding an adequate language" that can yield to further understanding of women beyond the binary categories of the colonizer/colonized, Islam/West, etc (p.9). These binary categories, Kandiyoti insists, are problematic precisely because they severely inhibit the exploration of: "self-referential analyses, which can form the basis of an internal critique so essential to any feminist project" (p.9). While Kandiyoti is right on both counts in her critique of Mernissi, she is silent about the role of the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition and epistemology in finding "adequate language" for self-representation and feminist projects. In the same move, Kandiyoti omits the fundamental relation between language and epistemology in any feminist discourse and articulation of gender. Equally, she dismisses Mernissi's dialogue with, and feminist interpretation of the scientific Arab-Islamic tradition. In doing so, Kandiyoti occults Mernissi's feminist re-reading of Arab-Islamic epistemology and its multiple sources whether historical (al-Tabari, in particular), religious (*fiqh* by al-Bukhari), or literary (biography of the prophet). For this reason, Kandiyoti is unable to appreciate Mernissi's feminist internal reading of the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition, or assess the significance of Mernissi's re-reading of this tradition for present feminist societal projects.

In contrast, the Arabic critique of Mernissi's work squarely addresses the issue of self-representation in Mernissi's feminist discourse from within the Islamic worldview of gender, and from within the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition. For example, Boushikhi's (1984) critique of Mernissi focuses on the scientific theories and methods Mernissi relies on in Beyond the veil in her articulation of gender. First, Boushikhi argues that Mernissi introduces at the theoretical level conflicting Islamic and Western paradigms of analysis as manifested in her dual analytical instruments and opposition between Freud and al-Ghazali in Beyond the veil (p.4). This theoretical opposition, Boushikhi explains is inadequate because Freud's analysis represents a Western psychological paradigm on women that centers around "the Phallus"; whereas al-Ghazali's represents an Islamic psychological paradigm that centers around "pleasure" and "*fitna*" (p.8). Second, Boushikhi observes, Freud's paradigm portrays a negative relation of women to both their body and psyche (castration), while al-Ghazali's paradigm

conveys a positive relation of women to both their body and psyche (*al-Tawhid*), and keeps their integrity as human beings (p.12).

Third, Boushikhi argues the Freudian psychoanalysis conflicts with Islamic epistemology, and does not yield to any insights about the "Islamic social order" Mernissi attempts to capture, nor of women's agency in that order (p.13). Yet, Boushikhi points out, al-Ghazali's paradigm affects women's agency in a much more positive way as he departs from the Islamic notion of complementarity between genders in agency and its importance for the harmony within the couple, the family, and the community in their systemic relation within the Islamic social order (p.16). Thus, Boushikhi concludes:

The Freudian analysis as a theoretical position is shaky and has no scientific adequacy when applied to Arab Women's reality. In fact, this position leads to the disintegration of the theoretical structure of analysis from within, and reflects a crisis in the representation of contemporary Arab women. (p.38)

In comparison, Sharrak (1990) provides a more comprehensive and balanced critique of Mernissi's work. To begin with, he examines the entire work of Mernissi both theoretical and empirical from 1975 to 1987. Equally, Sharrak makes an informed evaluation of the author's feminist thought based on her entire production, and in light of the general discursive context of Morocco and the Arab-Islamic region in which Mernissi's work is embedded. Not only does Sharrak present and analyses Mernissi's work chronologically, but he also argues that the author's primary feminist scientific contribution lies in her empirical field research rather than in her theoretical research on gender in Islam.¹² From the outset, therefore, Sharrak sets the record straight by underlining the nature of Mernissi's feminist work and engagement: the sociological field.

First, Sharrak argues Mernissi presents the interview in Doing daily battle "raw" without analysis or interpretation. As such, Sharrak contends: "the interview by and large outweighs other instrumentation such as textual analysis" (p. 29). This emphasis, in his view, leaves the interview "mute" for it does "not provide conclusions, nor analytical accounts on the field data." (p. 29). Second, Sharrak criticizes Mernissi's woman's standpoint's epistemology as essentialist because it claims to be "a truer" version of reality:

If the matter concerns the presentation of reality "as is", isn't this presentation a representation of reality only ?...Couldn't this representation be far from the

¹² Sharrak bases his assessment of Mernissi's feminist scientific contribution in the empirical field on his co-edited annotated bibliography: Sharrak & al-Zine. (1990).

presentation of reality in the interviews ? Is it possible to speak of scientific neutrality when the author did not provide any analysis or explanations on the discourse of the interviews ? Is it possible to eliminate the mediation in knowledge (self-researcher) and between the field and the receiver? (p. 30)

Third, Sharrak notes that in Beyond the veil and Doing daily battle Mernissi's standpoint relies on the male/female duality as a technique with a double goal: the presentation of women's condition, and the promotion of her own feminist agenda. For him, this male/female duality is a problematic technique on two counts. On the one hand, he notes, the male/female logic stems from "A logic of separation of struggle between the sexes outside sociological explanation" (p. 56). On the other hand, he observes, this logic tends to merely replicate patriarchal theory and method (p.43). In brief, Sharrak views Mernissi's use of the male-female duality as a problem of appropriation: "The duality as a norm in research production is indicative of the author's internalization of patriarchal ideology, logic, and instruments in knowledge production." (p. 73).

Based on the above analysis, Sharrak evaluates Mernissi's contribution to the discipline of sociology in Morocco as limited to "women and the family" at the expense of other essential sub-fields of sociology such as : "The sociology of the state, the sociology of religion, sociology of culture, the sociology of urban area and the sociology of rural area." (p.74). Furthermore, Sharrak attributes this limitation to Mernissi's adherence to "the colonial epistemological legacy...whether sociological, political, or cultural" (p.74). On the one hand, Sharrak highlights the important link between the Arabic language, theory and epistemology, and how Mernissi's neglect of *Arabization* is detrimental to the scientific authority of Mernissi's feminist production in Morocco as an Arab-Islamic society: "At the level of language Mernissi still writes in French or English...Knowing that Arabization is a national preoccupation and that language is not neutral but organic to the development of thought and civilization." (p.74). On the other hand, Sharrak questions Mernissi's silence on the colonial epistemology as a "non-scientific stance" ; especially that in Morocco "the debate on this issue has not been resolved yet." (75).

In fact, Sharrak insists, the absence of a dialogue with the colonial epistemological legacy represents a major scientific flaw in Mernissi's work and "raises the fundamental issue of the relation between particularism and universalism." (p.76). Thus, Sharrak situates Mernissi's writing in foreign languages (French or English) as an integral part of "Mernissi's

relationship with the whole Western productions in sociology" (p.76). Further, Sharrak views Mernissi's relation with Western productions of sociology as problematic because it represents the main obstacle to the author's articulation of an holistic feminist societal project for Morocco. More specifically, Sharrak identifies Mernissi's limitations in the field of sociology as follows:

1. Absence of a long-term scientific project.
 2. Limitation to the diagnosis of Moroccan women's situation-though the diagnosis phase. Yet this phase is necessary to move to qualitative contribution to improve women's lives.
 3. The presence of self as an epistemological obstacle (feminism and ideology).
- (p.78)

Sharrak concludes that the fundamental problem with Mernissi's sociology derives from the American "functional sociology" which governs her "entire acquisition of knowledge about reality, and its presentation" (p. 79). In his view the affiliation of Mernissi with American sociology greatly limits the scope of her contribution to sociology. Above all, Sharrak considers this affiliation to be detrimental to Mernissi's scientific analysis because it: "Does not extend beyond "the theory of reflection" to building new theoretical frameworks. And this requirement is the crux of the sociologist work or what distinguishes the sociological discourse from the social discourse." (p. 80).

Sharrak's critique of Mernissi's sociological fieldwork is thorough and corroborates my analysis and findings articulated in chapter 6. Nonetheless, his critique reflects an uncritical adherence to the positivist approaches of Western social sciences. Such a positivist stance is dogmatic and manifests itself in two ways. First, the positivist stance tends to perpetuate the myth of complete objectivity and denies subjectivity as scientific data in the conduct of social research. Second, this stance equates subjectivity with women's appropriations of science. The latter reflects a typical paternalistic attitude in masculinist Arabic literature which arbitrarily classifies women in the realm of the emotional and men in the realm of the rational. Yet, subjectivity or "embodied knowledge" is an integral part of the process of appropriation for both genders simply because all forms of scientific research are social constructions. In making such a totalizing positivist assertion, therefore, Sharrak suggests that men's positivist approach is a more adequate scientific norm than women's. With this assertion, Sharrak re-inscribes his critique of Mernissi's work in the binary male/female perspective he accuses Mernissi of using.

As to Mernissi's theoretical work, Sharrak considers it to be captured by Le harem politique (p.31). First, he asserts that this book is "extremely simplistic in its presentation of the Arab-Islamic heritage" (p.24). To illustrate, Sharrak criticizes Mernissi's omission of an evaluation of the Arabic language in the Qur'an on the issue of *hijab* (the veil) as a major methodological flaw in Le harem politique: "For the veil issue the focus is on circumstances of the veil, informed by psychological and historical analyses without any emphasis on the linguistic dimension, or the process of evolution of the Arabic language in which the Qur'an was revealed. " (p.47).

Second, Sharrak considers Mernissi's theoretical position on Islam (in reference to Original Islam) flawed because it is underlined by a male-female binary logic. He elaborates:

As far as her position on Islam, it vacillates between two theories: a theory that views Islam as masculinist at the level of discourse, and a theory that Islam is feminist (promotes women) at the level of practice, specifically the practice of Islam by the prophet Muhammad towards women. (p.60)

Sharrak attributes Mernissi's vacillation between the masculinist and feminist theories to the binary female/male theoretical framework from which she reads Islam (p.61). This framework, in his view, leads Mernissi to analyze Islam in relativist terms that often "lead to dogmatic stands that make Islam at times masculinist and at others liberal feminist" (p.61). Third, Sharrak examines Mernissi's stand on Islam shaky at the level of epistemology:

Can we from the epistemological aspect, distinguish between Islam and mediators ? Isn't any distinction in itself, a knowledge and an ideological mediation also ? Is it possible to declare certitude in objective knowledge and preciseness in the domain thought, knowledge and the social sciences ? (pp. 61-62)

In fact, Sharrak accuses Mernissi of reading Islam from "outside Islamic epistemology, and its inherent logic and instruments of analysis" (p.63). To illustrate, Sharrak examines Mernissi's treatment of the concept of equality regarding polygamy in the historical context of original Islam giving two examples. First, he notes that Mernissi's analysis of equality is outside the logic of plurality of relations (polygamy) that was an historical necessity in the context of original Islam. At the same time, he observes, "Mernissi rationalizes equality in the context of plurality" and relies on this rationalization to pursue her feminist agenda (p.63). Thus, Sharrak concludes, Mernissi's articulation of genders equality is a paradox in that specific context: "Is it possible to talk about a relation of equality in the singular or a relation of equality in the plural ?" (p.63).

Second, Sharrak argues that Mernissi's treatment of space and the organization of urbanization during the life of the prophet to argue for gender equity is also heavily permeated by "feminist advocacy from a narrow lens" as reflected in the suggestion she makes about 'Aicha's apartment facing the mosque as a symbol of women's participation in politics (p.65). In his view, Mernissi's feminist explanation of space is artificial, especially from within the context of plurality which Mernissi uses to rationalize Muslim women's participation in politics. He elaborates:

Yes, it is possible to explain the facing of 'Aicha's apartment of the mosque (the space for political decision making during that period in history) as a glimpse on the political life or a symbol of women political participation at least to some extent. Equally, the facing of 'Aicha's apartment can also be explained in terms of 'Aicha's preference by the prophet as documented by several hadiths. (p.65)

In light of the above analysis, Sharrak infers that Mernissi's reading of Islam is severely reductionist of the Arab-Islamic epistemology as it deliberately ignores the existing "multiple readings of Islam from various specialities, namely the psychology of sexuality, women in the family, and psychoanalysis." (p.65). Further, Sharrak observes, the absence of the multiple readings:

Led Mernissi's writing in many instances to be trapped in judgements, and hasty analyses of essential indicators that she could have capitalized on. Therefore, had she used the sociology of sex for example in her analysis of urbanization she would probably have reached conclusions different in Le harem politique. (p.65)

Similarly, Sharrak considers Mernissi's sociological approach to the Arab-Islamic heritage as equally suffering from "the colonial epistemological legacy" (p.75). This legacy, he insists, is clearly reflected "in the return to the past from the logic of modernity and her use of modernist concepts and analytical tools." (p.75). Likewise, Sharrak notes, this legacy is also manifested in Mernissi's "recuperative strategies" to anchor her discourse in the Arab-Islamic heritage in Women and Islam, namely:

Anchoring methodological tools such as the interview as reflected in her consideration of al-Bukhari "the founder" of this instrument of research. And relying on Arab-Islamic cultural references specifically concerning the return to reading primary sources and references existing in Arabic culture. (p.77)

Sharrak's critique of Mernissi's Women and Islam is invaluable because it provides a systematic analysis of Mernissi's feminist scientific exploration of gender from within the

Islamic view of science and vis-à-vis the Islamic epistemology and tradition of scientific practice. However, Sharrak's critique and assessment of Mernissi's engagement with Arab-Islamic sciences in general, and her articulation of feminist knowledge in particular loses its powerful message because it is dis-engaged from any dialogue with Mernissi's woman's standpoint. In doing so, Sharrak's gender analysis is still inscribed within cultural relativism already existing in Arab-Islamic narrative productions on gender. This stance on gender is locked in a discursive account on gender rather than yielding to a systematic account and/or a scientific exploration of the diverse situations of Arab-Muslim women.

In summary, the available critique of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist knowledge in itself revolves around the global issue of particularism and universalism of social research in the Arab-Islamic culture. Equally, this critique captures the unresolved scientific contentions at the core of the politics of reception of feminist research both at the national and international levels. These politics are evident in the three persisting tensions between the critics regarding the scientific validity of internal approaches to gender in the Arab-Islamic society, namely "self-representation", "referential scientific paradigms", and "the role of Islamic ethics in gender identity, equality, and agency". As such, the available critique encapsulates the persisting tension between scholars in regards to the scientific and the ideological in social research. For this reason, this critique is underlined by two interlapping tendencies: (1) Oversimplification and misinterpretations of the forces at work on gender in the region because these forces are interpreted from within the scholars' ideological frameworks, and particular agendas and not the processes at work in social change. (2) Analyses and evaluations of gender within the scholars' pre-established ideological parameters and in view of their respective agendas.

As a result, the critique contains the following drawbacks. (a) While it faults al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi for over-relying on Western theoretical paradigms, the critique does not hesitate to impose its own Western theories (modernist, positivistic etc.) in the evaluation of the authors' work. (2) Though the critique successfully argues that al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have failed to establish distinctive endogenous feminist scientific discourses on women free from acculturative Western epistemology, it omits to define what "endogenous epistemology" means, and what it entails for Arab-Muslim women's scientific practice and analyses of women's issues. In doing so, this critique may be regarded as a critique of "feminist

methodology" since it is mostly concerned with the methodological approaches of the authors than with the authors' feminist theory .

(3) The critique is strikingly partial in its epistemological analysis of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist work in that it focuses mainly on the negative aspects and dismisses the positive aspects of the authors' work. In doing so, this critique may be characterized as a "negative critique" because it implicitly, or explicitly claims scientific evaluations of the authors, yet it occults the authors' contributions to Arab-Islamic sociology and sciences in general, and to the field of women's studies in particular. (4) The critique merely problematizes the authors' feminist thought and knowledge rather than engages in a dialogue with it. As such, this critique deflects attention from its own political agenda and its own scientific hegemony. In brief, the available critique relies on occultation and reductionism in the presentation of feminism in the Arab-Islamic society and culture, and does not situate Arab-Islamic feminism in its socio-political, cultural history, or scientific practice. In doing so, the critique prevents the reader from making informed appreciations of the particularism of Arab-Islamic feminism as articulated in the feminine voice. Also, the critique precludes the reader from assessing the international aspects that the Arab-Islamic feminism shares with and other cultural feminisms.

Overall, the critique is trapped in the politics of particularism and universalism regarding the scientific practice of feminist knowledge instead of showing the scientific implications of both for the articulation of gender in the region. For this reason, the available critique is unable to move beyond problematizing feminist scientific approaches to knowledge and into theorizing how these approaches can integrate social research and common scientific knowledge of the Arab-Islamic culture into their feminist epistemologies. Similarly, this critique does not provide endogenous open frameworks of gender representations, nor alternative feminist praxes that capture both the socio-political evolution of the Arab-Islamic society, and its scientific practices. Part II, and Part III attempt to fill in these two gaps.

Part II. Al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's Scientific Knowledge: Between the Reactive and the Accommodation Stance.

1. The Appropriation of Tradition

Both authors attempt to "prove" the equality of genders during *al-Jahiliyya* despite the uncertainty of data on the status of women during this period. To begin with, there is a severe lack of pertinent sources on *al-Jahiliyya* period within the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition.

Furthermore, the surviving source available in this tradition, *al-Shi'r al-Jahili* (pre-Islamic poetry), is insufficient for conclusive analyses or informed understandings of the changing status of women during this period of history. So, the task of scholars in the portrayals of *al-Jahiliyya* period can only be historical approximations at best.

Compounded with this initial difficulty al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi replicate Western modernist and positivist analyses of *al-Jahiliyya*, which rely exclusively on economic models and artificially speculate on societal changes from matriarchy to patriarchy, and the transition from nomadic life to urbanization. However, as I have shown in chapter 5 and 6, these analyses transcend the socio-political and cultural processes of *al-Jahiliyya*. Further, the modernist analyses serve as paradigms of analysis for the Islamic period. Thus, in their portrayal of the Islamic period, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's modernist analysis focus on this period as an urban period only. Yet, the Islamic period was a hybrid between the nomadic way of life in the desert and the urban life of the city. And it is this hybrid formation that constituted the social reality of gender relations.

So, by excluding the nomadic way of life, the authors' portrayal neglects the kin-ordered mode of production where women were predominant economic agents. Simultaneously, by emphasizing on urban life, they highlight the change of the kin-order of matriarchal nomadic Arabia allegedly brought by the patriarchal order that accompanied urbanization during the Islamic period. This modernist rationale of gender relations in the Islamic period is paradoxical. If the kin-order of matriarchy was actually changed by patriarchy, then al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's assertions about women's public visibility and participation to the socio-political life of the initial Islamic *Ummah* as a common widely practice is shaky and not conducive to the generalizations they make about women's equality and self-determination at that time.

For historical perspective in regards to the portrayal of gender relations during the Islamic period, therefore, the researcher needs to re-integrate the hybrid nomadic/urban social-economic context in order to provide a closer approximation of the social history of that period both in terms of patterns of gender-relations and controls. This hybrid context of social change, in turn, would bring full understandings of the volatile nature of social change during that period, and the contradictory ways in which Islamic ideology shaped gender relations in Arabia during that specific period of transition. This means that the portrayal of Islamic period requires the inclusion of the process of transition of social change, and the corollary formation

of the legislation of women's rights that accompanied it. This necessarily entails the integration of the analysis of the Qur'an as a central component in the description of the Islamic period both as a new phase in the historiography of gender relations in Islamic Arabia, and as a new legislation for both genders, not just women. Not only is the integration of the Qur'an essential to show the development of Islamic social institutions that affected both genders at that period, but also to unfold the elaboration of Islamic sociology as a whole.¹³

In contrast, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi emphasize on the hadith over the Qur'an in their portrayal of social Islam during the Islamic period. This immediately introduces significant methodological problems. First, this method disrupts the authority scale and hierarchy of Islamic sources, and ignores the unanimous agreement between Muslims on the supremacy of the Qur'an over the *hadith*; especially on matters of controversy¹⁴. In overlooking this hierarchy as a scientific criterion in their context of discovery, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi dangerously reverse the hierarchy in the authority between the Qur'an (the word of God), and the *hadith* (the word of men) in their engagement with tradition. Above all, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi make a major theoretical shift; namely the analytical displacement in the approach of gender from within Islam as embodied in the Qur'an, into an approach of gender from within Islamic thought as embodied in the *hadith*. In other words, the method reversal led al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi to sanctify knowledge from, *'aql* (reason) embodied in the *hadith*, and to privilege it over knowledge from *wahy* (revelation) embodied in The Qur'an. Yet, as Mohd Nor Wan Daud (1995) forcefully reminds us the Qur'an makes a clear distinction between revealed knowledge (from God) and human knowledge even that of the prophets (p.49). He aptly argues that the Qur'an constantly emphasizes the humanity of the prophet as a reminder to Muslims that the prophet is merely a mediator of God's knowledge; whence "the axiological limitations of his knowledge" (p.49).

In fact, Mohd Nor Wan Daud asserts, the Qur'an specifically distinguishes between the certitude of God's knowledge (*'ilm bi al-wahy*/revelation), and the prophet's knowledge (*'ilm bi al-ray*/reason) liable to change and revisions. He elaborates :

¹³ This is usually the approach adopted by scholars in the Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice (i.e. see Bint al-Shati' in the References). For an example of Western scholars' use of this approach in their study of early Islamic Arabia, see Levy (1933, 1969), and Stowasser (1992, 1994).

¹⁴ The hierarchy of Islamic sources in *Sunni* Islam as put forward by the *'ulama* is as follows: the Qur'an, followed by *the hadith*, *ijma'*, *ijtihad*, and *qiyas*. In contrast, most progressive social groups within *Sunni Islam* place *ijtihad* immediately after *hadith* in the scale of hierarchy, and accord varying emphases on *qiyas* to counteract what they identify as the hegemonic *ijma'* of the *'ulama*. Thus, despite the continuing controversy among Muslim groups against *Ijma'* (consensus) imposed by the *'ulama*, there is a recognized consensus among Muslim scholars on the supremacy of the Qur'an over the *hadith*, and on the indivisible link between the two as the major two components of the Shari'a. For further details see item 19 in the glossary.

The Kuran [sic]testifies to the fact that the prophet was corrected on several occasions. For example in his eagerness to succeed in his message, he ignored Abd al-Allah ibn Maktun over an important Quraish elite (80:1-10). On another occasion, he was tempted to compromise with Quraish in order to gain their conversion (68:9; 17:73, 73-5); and in his tenderness he chose to obtain ransom for his prisoners from the battle of Badr rather than kill them (8:67). (p, 50)

Moreover, Mohd Nor Wan Daud insists, even the prophet's *hadiths* distinguish between *'ibadat* (rituals vis-à-vis God) and *mua'malat* (behavior, social transactions between believers) as manifested in the distinction the prophet makes between *hadith Qudsi* and other forms of *hadiths*. (p.52) In addition, Mohd Nor Wan Daud shows that the *hadith* contains a sociological component that is constantly inspired from the *Ummah's* experience; hence its openness to revision over time. To illustrate, he describes how the prophet did not rely solely on the Shari'a, but he also applied the available empirical evidence and new knowledge of his time to the socio-ethical conduct of the original Islamic society (pp.51-52).

The foregoing has considerable consequences for scientific practice in relation to tradition. The hierarchy between the Qur'an and the *hadith* is a democratic strategy in the practice of *ijtihad* instrumental to all Muslims both as a political and an intellectual strategy to counteract the tyranny of reason brought by any group of scholars seeking hegemony in scientific production in the history of Muslims. At the same time, this puts in perspective the methodological requirements involved in the interpretation of Islamic sources and epistemology. First, the fact that the Qur'an records the complementarity between *'ilm bi al wahy* and *'ilm bi-al-ray (al-Tawhid)*, provides all concerned Muslims with a moral rationale to explore the *hadith* as a corpus of knowledge according to the principles stipulated in the Qur'an. Second, this establishes a continuity between the sacred and the profane fields of knowledge (*al-Tawhid*) as a requirement for the scientific context of discovery of all Muslims involved in scientific practice. Thus, the *'ilm bi al-wahy* and *'ilm bi al-ray* combination is a scientific method for individual and collective *ijtihad* (intellectual exertion) in the production of scientific knowledge in a Muslim society that links intellectual creativity to social activism and deliberation.¹⁵

In light of the above, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific practice vis-à-vis tradition is problematic from the ethical point of view at least on two counts. First, in dismissing the

¹⁵ The individual *ijtihad* is known in Arab-Islamic scientific practice as *fard 'ayn*, while the collective *ijtihad* is known as *fard kifayya*. Both individual creativity and collective deliberation are required for social policy and practice. For details see item 12

Qur'an in the exploration of gender, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi totally ignore the important historical and ethical continuity between the Qur'an and the *hadith*. Second, both authors separate moral rationality from instrumental rationality in their appropriation of the Qur'an, and in their respective engagement with the context of discovery of tradition. This technique is paradoxical because it leads both authors to avoid the representation of gender in cultural terms, yet they claim a "truer" feminist cultural version of gender in Islamic culture and society.

The maintenance of the continuity between Qur'anic and post-Qur'anic egalitarianism is central to an internal critique of tradition and of gender in Islam. For one thing, this immediately discloses that the post-Qur'anic productions of gender are divided into two competing trends: anti-egalitarian and pro-egalitarian. This at once dispels the myth of an a-historical Islamic Medieval thought and its articulations of gender. Equally, this challenges al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's insistence that the Medieval thought on gender is mostly static, regressive, and misogynist. In this regard, it is highly significant that both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi, who heavily rely on Ibn Sa'd's biographical dictionary al-Tabaqat al-Kubra to promote gender equality in Islam, choose to ignore this source as an essential part in the post-Qur'anic metaphoric representations of gender agency. Yet, Ibn Sa'd's metaphoric explanations of *Hawwa'* (Eve) in the Qur'an are not only central for their function as post-Qur'anic productions, but also for establishing the continuity between Qur'anic and post-Qur'anic productions in the Arab-Islamic intellectual history (the sacred and the profane). Simultaneously, Ibn Sa'd's metaphoric explanations are important for the understanding of the complementarity of genders within the Islamic metaphysics and their conception of gender agency, and relations.

After all, Ibn Sa'd begins his work with an account of the creation and the life of Adam and *Hawwa'* as distant ancestors of the Prophet. This way, he establishes an ethical continuity between God's creation and human procreation in accordance with the Qur'anic statements. At the same time, Ibn Sa'd's account is extremely potent in its ethical message for both genders' agency metaphorized in Adam and Eve, their relationship to both monotheism in Islam, and to the unity between all creations in the universe from the Islamic metaphysics (*al-Tawhid*). In this account, God addresses both genders who have disobeyed God's order and succumbed to

in the glossary. Also for the practice of *ijtihad* as both an intellectual and social deliberation see my discussion of the case of Morocco in chapter 7.

temptation. Therefore, Ibn Sa'd's post-Qur'anic production contains a radical and divergent account from mainstream traditionalist historiography (*the hadith*) in terms of gender definitions identity, and agency yet to be explored for the presentation of egalitarian Islam.

This links the ethical with the theoretical. The entire neglect of the existing tension between Qur'anic egalitarianism and post-Qur'anic productions on Islamic egalitarianism by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi, occults the openness of the Qur'anic egalitarianism to historical evolution. Yet, at the theoretical level the Qur'an describes gender relations as well as moments of subjectivity and inter-subjectivities between genders during the life of the prophet. Moreover, the Qur'an contains multiple verses on women's issues; found in *Surat al-Baqara*, *al-Nisa*, *al-Nur*, *al-Ahzab* that demonstrate the adaptability of Qur'anic verses to historical situations and social circumstances, and show the flexibility of Islamic ideology on gender both intellectually and historically.

This at once shows that the Qur'an is neither an "ahistorical book", nor "a blue-print" to be followed literally by generations of Muslims. Rather, this establishes the Qur'an as a guide for the renewal of the Islamic way of life over time, and the openness of the Qur'anic text to multiple readings according to the historical evolution of Muslim societies. In this regard, the Qur'an speaks for itself: "It is a guide and a mercy for those who believe" (27:77).¹⁶ At the same time this signals that the patriarchal interpretations contained in the post-Qur'anic interpretations found in *tafsir* and *hadith* are far more restrictive than the Qur'an.¹⁷ Thus, caution is required about reliability of these sources in terms of content. Consequently, while the *hadith* is an important part of the *Sunnah* right after the Qur'an, it is not as reliable a source as the Qur'an to demonstrate Islamic egalitarianism in social Islam. For one thing, the *hadith* is a product a socio-historical transitional period of Islamization that reflects many elements of Jewish and Christian influences (*Isra'iliyyat*)¹⁸ which were integrated in the male scholars' *isnad* methods that preceded the accounts of the collections of the *hadiths*, biographical dictionaries, and encyclopedias.

By unquestioning the focus of the *muhadithun* on method (*isnad*) over content (*matn*), al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are not critical about the interplay between the method and the methodology of the *hadith* as a corpus of knowledge. For instance, both authors ignore the

¹⁶ The Kuran, [sic] (1974).Trans. with notes by Dawood, N.J.London: Penguin Books.

¹⁷ For an exploration of the patriarchal restrictions contained in the *hadith* and *tafsir* in English see Stowasser (1992, pp. 25-36).

¹⁸ For more details on the Jewish influences, consult Goldziher(1902). For the Christian influences see Rosenthal (1962). For a study of *Isra'iliyyat* see Newby (1979).

important methodological manipulation by the *muhaddithun* of *akhabar* genre (story telling) and the parallel *hadith* genre in the shaping of the written product of the *hadith* collection¹⁹ as a cultural narrative. Yet, this double movement within the oral tradition itself between the historical phase whereby *khavar* and *hadith* genres were fused, and the following phase of the *isnad* method that has shaped the passage from the oral tradition to the written tradition are essential socio-historical processes involved in the cultural production of the *hadith*. In ignoring these processes al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are actually contributing to the mystification of the *hadith*.

Furthermore, in ignoring the *hadith* as process of Islamization, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are uncritical of the tensions contained in the substance of the *hadith* between the Islamic and non-Islamic values brought by the transitional socio-historical process of Islamization. Yet it is these mixed values that have directly affected the shaping of social Islam in general, and the family in particular. Accordingly, the *hadith* tends to reflect mostly the evolution of the *'ulama's* theories on gender and the family. As such, the *hadith* not only exhibits the male narrative of Islam as a cultural process, but it also outlines male post-Qur'anic gender definitions which often contradict the Qur'anic ones. In fact, scholars who delved in comparative data between Eve in the Qur'an and Eve in the post-Qur'anic literature (Smith, J. I., & Haddad, Y. 1982; Stowasser, B. 1994) have clearly demonstrated a disjuncture in metaphoric representations; indicating discrepancies in gender definitions in the Qur'an and those in the post-Qur'anic productions of the *hadith*. Thus, when the authors selected the anti-egalitarian collection of *hadith*, they not only provided partial data, but they also distorted representations of gender that contradict the ones provided in the Qur'an.

Moreover, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's reliance on the *hadith's* substance and endorsement of its authority leads them to uncritically replicate some of the themes addressed in this corpus of knowledge; especially those that allegedly describe Eve. This way, themes like Eve's demonization (read as demonization of all women), and spousal deceit (*kaid*) are reproduced by both authors as though they were Islamic paradigmatic representations of all Muslim women. Yet, these themes and issues do not exist at all in the Qur'an. Nowhere does

¹⁹ While this classification between the *muhaddithun* and the *akhbariyyun* indicates the *muhaddithun's* suspicion toward the historians, it would be a mistake to confuse the two fields as constituting the corpus of *hadith*. Still, this distinction is important as an integrative part of the process that has shaped the *hadith*. For a detailed explanation between these two genres see Rosenthal (1968).

the Qur'an equate Eve with any negative connotation or demonize her as a conniving deceitful wife.

In brief, by reproducing the *hadith* methodology al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi reflect a severe dependency on the *'ulama's* cultural theories, methods, and epistemologies as scientific norms in their own studies of Muslim women. In doing so, the authors exhibit an uncritical stance both in terms of the *hadith's* narrative structure and substantive structure. Three ramifications ensue al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's replications of the *hadith*. First, the dangerous and erroneous assumption that the post-Qur'anic production (the *hadith*) is an Islamic legacy, while it mainly represents the opinion of its producers. Second, the approach of the *hadith* as though a monolithic corpus, and as though invested with a monolithic Arabic historical tradition. Yet, the *hadith* is a collection of strands of knowledge varying from *Sira*, *Maghazi* literature, to historical and theological works. As such, the *hadith* can neither be reduced to a single undifferentiated entity, nor be compared with other historical works as discreet units. Moreover, the Arabic historical tradition is extremely diverse and involves numerous genres, which even in their treatment of the same issues and handling of similar materials differ significantly from one another in the way they approach the issues, and to what end. Without such recognitions, interpreting the meaning and significance of particular texts, their link to other texts of the same or other genres, and assessments about their place in Islamic historiography and intellectual history yields more to confusion than further understanding.

Third, in lacking the awareness about the *hadith* as a collection, the Arab-Islamic tradition as multiple, and the interlap between supplementary and complementary interpretations, both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are unable to appreciate the Arab-Islamic tradition, and the ways the extremely diversified genres of this tradition affect many areas of Islamic studies; including women's studies. It is precisely this lack of engagement with the diverse scholarship of the Arab-Islamic tradition, I argue, that is responsible for the authors' distortion of medieval Arab-Islamic epistemology. Yet, this could have represented a golden opportunity for both authors to provide an internal feminist critique of legal Islam. As Hallaq (1995) aptly argues, the field of Islamic legal research is still relatively unexplored. He forcefully demonstrated that, contrary to Shacht's opinion, the gate of *ijtihad* was certainly not closed by jurists of the 4th/10th century of Islam. Also, he showed that the lack of recognition of the Arab-Islamic tradition in the scholarship on medieval Islamic legal theory has been

largely responsible for the lack of *ijtihad* in the field of law, and has adversely affected the elaboration of classical legal theories.²⁰

In my view, the issues addressed by Hallaq are highly significant for women scholars today not just as *mujtahidat* in the field of law, but also as social scientists engaged in elaborations of theoretical frameworks of an Islamic anthropology of law²¹ crucial for an Islamic feminist sociology, or more accurately a feminist interpretation of *'ilm al-'umran*²². Equally, I argue, in dis-engaging from the diverse scholarship of the Arab-Islamic tradition, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are actually occulting the founding scientific discourses of gender in Islam articulated by the pioneer Arab-Muslim women (Fawwaz, and Zayn al-Din). This mutes the scientific contributions of our foremothers to complementary appropriations of the Qur'an and the *hadith*, and the key role these appropriations played in the advent of Islamic women's studies and in scientific feminist discourses on gender over time. Equally, in excluding our foremothers' scientific productions on tradition and on gender, both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi are implicitly dismissing the Islamic scientific feminist legacy, and de-legitimizing its scientific validity and relevance to contemporary interpretations of gender. Yet as I demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's appropriations of tradition did not add much to our foremothers founding discourses on gender.²³ In fact, the authors' appropriations of gender within the Marxist or liberal standpoints added more confusion than clarity to the issues of gender.

In a similar vein to Hallaq, Carré (1993) argues for the epistemological diversity of the Arab-Islamic tradition and its implications for today's political sciences and policies of governance in contemporary Islamic societies. At the philosophical level, Carré notes, this tradition itself distinguishes between the prophetic period as progressive and the post-prophetic period as regressive: "The great tradition makes a clear distinction between the prophetic period and the post-prophetic one; it distinguishes between prophecy, sanctity (holiness) and political authority." (p.72). Furthermore, Carré calls the post-prophetic period "a short tradition", which he asserts has bred "deviant orthodoxy" (p.73). In contrast, he

²⁰ For a brilliant critique of the lack of recognition of the Arab-Islamic tradition in the scholarship on Medieval Islamic legal theory, see Hallaq (1995).

²¹ For further details on the definition and nature of Islamic anthropology see the International Institute of Islamic Thought (1986).

²² I am borrowing this expression from Davies (1988) who aptly defines Islamic anthropology as *'ilm al-'umran* in the footsteps of the sociologist Ibn Khaldun.

²³ Except for female sexuality (which is a sign of the times) both authors reproduced themes already dealt by their foremothers. (Compare with chapter.1, and see Appendix IV).

considers "l'islam laïque", which he carefully distinguishes from the French "laïcization", to be an integral part of "the long tradition" in the history of secularization of Islamic thought (p.74). Above all, Carré suggests that "secular Islam" contained in the long tradition to be of considerable relevance and significance for the 1990s "post-Islamist Islam" both for the theorization of socio-political policies, and for the epistemological renewal of "the forgotten Great tradition" (p.75).

In light of the above analyses of the Arab-Islamic tradition, one can grasp the extent of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's mis-engagement with tradition. First, this mis-engagement resides in the authors' outlook on tradition from a binary modernist framework that conceives tradition in opposition to modernity; hence confusing tradition with traditionalism. While the former is an assertive process of reconstruction through a recovery of collective memory and the secularization involved in *ijtihad*, the latter denies tradition as reconstruction and focuses only on a return to an eternal Islamic essence allegedly existing in the original *Ummah*. Therefore, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's equation of tradition with essentialised traditionalism is highly misleading.

Second, in equating tradition with traditionalism al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi entirely disregard the notion of change in the Arab-Islamic tradition sustained through continuing *ijtihad* in the long tradition of secularization that existed over time in the Arab-Islamic intellectual history. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi wrongly portray tradition as being uniformly restorative of religious epistemology. They fail to acknowledge the tension between complementary interpretations (historical) and supplementary interpretations (locked in theological productions) at the core of the controversy in scientific practice and production of the social sciences over time between Muslims feminists and non-feminists alike. Third, in equating tradition with traditionalism al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi do not engage in a dialogue with the continuing *ijtihad* in the long tradition of secularization which exists in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. Yet, since the 1970s' there is a substantial contemporary tradition²⁴ that provides a balance between *'ibadat* (religious observance) and *mu'amalat* (social transactions) for both genders. In contrast to the interpretations of the family law within the modernist tradition²⁵, this contemporary tradition emphasizes the general ideology of gender in the

²⁴ The main voice of this contemporary tradition of secularization in Egypt is Khalafallah, (1977), and in Morocco Khamlishi (1985).

²⁵ Here I am referring to 'Abduh's family law (1881) that most modernists in the 20th century continue to draw from in the reforms of *al-Mudawanna*. Yet, as 'Amara (1975) pointed out this family law was conceived and elaborated within the framework of the moral rebirth of the Islamic society undermined by colonization, and the need for the "re-Islamization" of the

Qur'an, and its openness for interpretation according to the historical and socio-political evolution of the Arab-Islamic society.

Also, this tradition insists that modernity in Islam is *historicized ijihad* that takes into consideration both historical change, and the changing concept of the *Ummah's maslaha* (the community's common good). As such, this tradition reflects post-colonial, post-modernist Arab-Islamic epistemology that provides fresh re-interpretations of Islamic institutions, including the family, in tune with the new socio-political context and historical evolution. In doing so, the post-modernist tradition breaks away from the modernist notions of private/public dichotomy in its discourse on women, and instead focuses on the right of women's participation in the public and the private life. In ignoring entirely this contemporary post-Qur'anic production that allows considerable flexibility in the interpretation and adaptation of the sources within the Islamic tradition for the present and future generations, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi unfairly indict tradition and distort its nature.

Finally, both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi neglect the concrete implications of women lawyers and judges engaged in changing both the Shari'a, and the biased practices that occur in the judiciary system of the family law in the daily-life of women today. At least in the case of Morocco, the work of women lawyers (Amina Messaoudi) and that of women judges (Sa'dia Belmir²⁶) is known at the national and International levels since the 1970s for their criticism of the judiciary system, namely in showing the judges' limited training and ability to use *qiyas* (analogy) in the court judgements. This puts in perspective the ambivalent attitude al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have in their engagement with medieval, modernist, and contemporary tradition. Likewise, this reveals the authors' own manipulations of the post-Qur'anic traditions past and present.

Taking Islamic ethics seriously, therefore, entails both reforming the contents of Islamic sources in their totality as a common stock of symbolic knowledge, and avoiding rationales that yield to distortions both masculine and feminine. By excluding the Islamic rationale of gender in the Qur'an from their accounts, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have failed to identify and explore the dual sexual symbolism as the two normative forms of humanity contained in the Qur'anic metaphoric representations. Similarly, in avoiding affiliation with Islamic rationality, both authors' feminist knowledge encounters a problem of scientific

family (p.136). As such, this model of the family law is inadequate for the post-colonial, post-modernist, post-nationalist context of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society.

²⁶ See Belmir (1987).

authority and validity in their respective societies as this knowledge is far removed from Islamic metaphysics, sociology, and epistemology.

Yet, the moral authority and force of Islam can neither be underestimated, nor easily dispensed with without serious consequences of socio-political and cultural alienation. As al-Hibri (1982b) forcefully reminds us, it is from the moral force of Islam, after all, that the patriarchal dominance over women was sustained and Muslim men able to outlaw certain social institutions to suit their own interests from the original *Ummah* onwards. In fact, al-Hibri explains, it is from the moral force of Islam that women's issues were rationalized like *sadica marriage* which was dismissed as illicit while *ba'al marriage* was retained as licit (p.184). For this reason, al-Hibri (1982a) asserts, Muslim women feminists need to explore women's issues from the rationale of Islam, and use jointly, the Qur'an and the *hadith* in the reinterpretation of gender in order to provide a proper treatment of women. She elaborates:

Feminist Muslims should not be intimidated by the Muslim patriarchal authority. Instead, they should be guided by the fact that there is no clergy in Islam, each person being responsible directly to God for her own beliefs. Furthermore, if patriarchy itself was able to justify within its ideological bounds the existence of five different schools of thought, then feminists can surely justify the addition of at least one more. (Editorial, p.ix)

In contrast to al-Hibri, I argue, the moral force of Islam for Muslim women feminists' productions on gender need not be inscribed once again in the female/male dichotomy, nor rely on traditionalist' mainstream interpretations of the *hadith*. Women feminist scholars ought to deliberately shun cultural relativism and start a hermeneutical exploration of the Qur'an. To begin with the Qur'an as a common symbolic heritage means not only to draw on the primary source of Islam for gender egalitarianism, but also to rely on this source for the moral authority and legitimation of one's account on gender. This way one ensures, once and for all, the complete moral and spiritual independence of Muslim women from the intellectual tutelage imposed by any religious authority.

2. The Appropriations of the Contemporary Social Sciences²⁷

2.1. In History

Both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi inscribe their view of history within the female/male logic. This leads them to analyze different phases in the history of Muslims in terms of women

alone rather than the process of change particular to a socio-historical moment that affected gender relations and evolution. For example, the authors focus on the original history of the Islamic *Ummah* to show egalitarianism of the prophet, at the expense of gender politics during that phase. Likewise, they examine the Middle Ages sciences to show misogyny, and they provide cursory treatments of nationalism in contemporary history to "prove" the inequality of women in the nationalist projects. This treatment of history is both atomistic, and fragmentary. It is atomistic, because it arbitrarily selects empirical, or intellectual data for descriptions and analyses of these periods separately from the global contextual reality that shaped them. It is fragmentary, because it omits the continuities and discontinuities that occurred in Muslims' history in a systematic way, and how both have affected social change and gender relations.

In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi also overlooked various historical periods in the history of the Arab-Islamic society that contributed to gender equality. For instance, the 2nd/8th, 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries when the Arab-Islamic schools of thought were shaped (*madhahib*) and when new regional cultural centers were forming based on new educational systems that integrated religious and secular studies, and included women. Also, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi neglected the role of centuries that preceded the Middle Ages (10th-15th) where the cultural centers of the 8th-10th centuries were consolidated (Morocco, Andalusia, Egypt, and Iraq), and the educational systems were modernized; creating an unprecedented cultural and socio-political diversity that vastly integrated women. These centuries cannot be dismissed because they are crucial for the wide cross-regional practices of social Islam that benefited the whole Arab-Islamic community.

Similarly, both authors totally neglect the important transitional period of the high Middle Ages prior to *al-Nahda* (19th) and its importance in socio-historical evolution of the Arab-Islamic society. Yet, as I have discussed in chapter I, the high Middle Ages (17th & 18th centuries) witnessed a continuity in women's participation in the Islamic sciences. As such, this period represents an important evolution in social change that challenges the notion that the Middle Ages were uniformly exclusive of women. Equally, this period is essential for Islamic ideology on gender outside the West/Islam dichotomy that no Muslim women can afford to ignore; especially the feminist. Finally, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi leave unexamined the nationalist and Islamist movements and how both these movements relate systematically in

²⁷ The fields dealt with in this section represent the fields of knowledge recurrent both in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist appropriations of contemporary social sciences. I have maintained them to highlight the scope and limitations of the authors' feminist epistemology.

socio-political and cultural evolution of the Arab-Islamic society during the 19th and 20th centuries. This raises the central issues of cultural nationalism and Islam ignored entirely by al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi. Yet, in reality the evolution of the history of Muslims and their nations has shown substantial shifting definitions of nationhood and of Islam which remain unexplored to date (al-Jabiri, 1984a, 1986; al-Azmeh, 1988; Sharabi, 1988).

This means that al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have over-emphasized gender in its own terms at the expense of a cultural analysis of gender. In doing so, both authors have occulted the role played by cultural nationalism in the shaping of Arab-Islamic feminism, and in the emergence of an independent women-led feminist epistemology that has spanned over a century in the history of the Arab-Islamic society. Therefore, an analysis of cultural nationalism is essential to Arab-Muslim women feminists today not just because it challenges traditionalists', nationalists', and Islamists' conceptions of nationhood, but also because it involves cultural re-constructions based on re-definitions of nationhood that carry new notions of "womanhood" and re-arrangements that affect both genders and politics. Equally, cultural nationalism is central to Arab-Muslim women feminists because it unfolds the nature of struggle between various socio-political groups, and the pluralism of these groups' discourses on gender.

This unfolds the unresolved cultural and political tensions between feminism and nationalism²⁸, and between feminism and Islamism²⁹ not fully explored by al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode. Yet, both tensions are of paramount importance for all Arab-Islamic feminists today not only to sort out the particularities of each movement in terms of gender identity and politics, but also to understand the common elements contained within each movement for the present and future of the Arab-Islamic society as a socio-cultural entity. Equally, such explorations are critical because they contain emerging post-nationalist and post-Islamist feminist discourses existing within the Arab-Islamic feminist scholarship since the mid 1970s.³⁰

²⁸ For the tension between nationalism and feminism and the particular issue of the state and gender in Arab-Islamic polity see (Belhachmi, 1987a, 1988a ; Hatem, 1993, and Kandiyoti, 1991). My work argues for the importance for women to find an independent voice that mixes the macro-political projects of nationalism and the micro-political projects in a systematic way. In contrast, Hatem's work advocates an independent voice outside the current political projects. Also, Kandiyoti (1991) shows how the political projects of modern nation-states, nationalists' histories and the positions of Islam have significant variations in legislations and policies pertaining to women.

²⁹ For a discussion of Islamism and feminism see a) Zakaria (1986), b) Al-Bizri (1988).

³⁰ In chapter 1, I highlight the post modernist evolution of both the nationalists' and Islamists' history in the Arab-Islamic society and the unprecedented agreement between some feminists and non-feminists alike in their call for a dialogue between the nationalist and the Islamist movements during the 1970-90 period. For details, see al-Jabiri (1989a) and al-Bizri (1988).

In light of the preceding analysis, both al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's accounts of history omit the periodization of historical events and facts. This leads both authors to disregard major historical periods that show the evolution of gender relations in the Arab-Islamic society and their related discourses on gender. Four consequences can be noted from al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's lack of periodization and its impact on their respective contributions, or lack thereof, in the field of history. (1) Al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have overstated the woman's standpoint "her story", without considering the totality of historical conditions, and movements that have shaped the status of Arab-Muslim women in a systemic way. (2) Both authors have taken up old problems and themes presented by male scholars from women's standpoints. In doing so, they have emphasized on the process of knowledge production, and not the agents involved in that production. This method occults the role of women as agents and the role of their woman's standpoint epistemology in the production of scientific research, and in their own manipulations of data.

(3) The authors' replication of patriarchal method in history (historicism) led them to neglect the systematic link between gender to other movements in the history of society under study. This neglect, in turn, engendered the authors' abstraction of the process of social change in their research, and their advocacy of a universal feminist project common to all women of the world. (4) The authors overlooked totally the women-led feminist scientific legacy existing in the Arab-Islamic society, and the significance of this legacy for the history of women's science and feminist scholarship in the Arab-Islamic society. (5) The authors disengaged from any dialogue with women's groups affiliated with the Arab-Islamic worldview of modernism and its scientific legacy.

In my view, failure to integrate the above movements, not only separates feminism from other resistance movements in the history of Arab-Islamic society, but it also occults the contribution of other endogenous movements to equality between genders. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi replicate patriarchal method of writing history which combines occultation and reduction in their historical narratives of gender in the Arab-Islamic society. Equally, in dismissing the women-led feminist legacy, and the contemporary women's articulations of gender within this legacy, both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi conceal the essential role played by Muslim women in the history of feminism, and in the history of Islamic

feminist science within the Arab-Islamic culture and its long struggle for political recognition both domestically and abroad.³¹

Finally, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's occultation of this legacy conceals their own uncritical stance on the role of history in their scientific feminist productions. In doing so, both authors leave mysterious the origins of their respective standpoint epistemology and its Enlightenment scientific affiliation. This stance on the one hand obscures the Arab-Muslim women's feminist struggles for voice and narration in scientific productions as an essential component of Arab-Islamic feminist history during the context of colonization and after. On the other hand, this stance mutes the continuity in the struggle by the Arab-Muslim women feminists today for scientific self-reliance and their diverse articulations within nationalist struggles today.³² In short, this dual occultation dismisses the link between struggle and feminist consciousness across generations of women in the history of Arab-Islamic society. Such an omission is counter-productive because the legacy of struggle remains critical not only for the renewal of collective feminist activism in contemporary Arab-Islamic society, but also for the sustenance of women's participation in scientific practice, and their resistance to any monolithic scientific interpretation of gender, whether masculine or feminine.

2.2. In Economy

Both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi replicate the liberal nationalist modernist approaches to their macro-analysis of the socio-economic development of women that conflict with their independent feminist goals on several counts. First, the authors' adherence to the liberal nationalist frameworks of economic analysis attributes gender inequality and women's oppression to a single cause: the systemic economic under-development. Such an analysis is simplistic. In addition to omitting the cultural dimensions that determine economic patterns, this analysis under-estimates the relative autonomy of the Arab-Islamic patriarchy, and its mutations and accommodations to the changing economic systems experienced by society at the macro level. After all, new forms of patriarchy (neo-patriarchies) have persisted in the Arab-Islamic culture regardless of the changes of the socio-political systems experienced by the Arab-Islamic society. Whether under liberalism, socialism, or Islamism, women continue

³¹ In chapter 1, I trace the participation of Arab-Muslim women to national and international feminisms through political activism and journalism to the 19th century. I also describe how Fawwaz participated with her book *Kittab al-Durr* (1892) in the World's Columbian Exposition held in Chicago in 1893. In that book Fawwaz articulated Islamic feminist particularism, and supported international struggles of women for equity (universalism).

³² I am referring to Palestinian feminism in the Israeli occupied West Bank, and South Lebanon under Israeli occupation since 1978.

to be marginalized in the Arab-Islamic society. Also, the cumulative effect of the economic systems of socialism and liberalism have produced distorted neo-patriarchal economies which affect the economic status of the Arab-Muslim women in complex ways. This means that the hierarchical relationship of power between women in the dominant and dominated groups is not only untenable but highly misleading.

Further, the authors' uncritical adherence to liberal theories of economy, tends to replicate the liberal mythical notion that economic independence necessarily translates into power and agency. Yet, in the Arab-Islamic context power and agency remain determined by women's location in the particular social structure of their respective society as well as the class status of their respective families. In this regards, *al-waqf* economic system addresses the larger issue of access to power and agency in their familial/social structures by giving women across classes a legal protection of ownership, access to revenues, and administration throughout their lifetime.³³

Second, the inscription of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi in the modernist liberalist discourse replicates the flawed theory that the state is the only safeguard for a modern economy, and as such the state is the only institution able to improve women's lives as a class of "underprivileged" within the policy of the market economy. This analysis of gender oversimplifies the various spaces of patriarchal economic dominion in the Arab-Islamic culture where the formal and informal spaces of socio-economic spaces are blurred. Equally, this analysis is anachronistic with privatization and *siyyassat Infitah* (open policy) adopted by many Arab-Islamic states in the late 1970s precisely as a coping strategy against the state's inefficient economic management and its lack of development programs that allow social mobility for both genders.

Third, the liberal economic theory is incongruent with the authors' own feminist theory because it neglects the "informal economy" where the majority of women are situated. In fact, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's over-focus on the market economy induces them to totally ignore the blooming informal channels of the economy which have increased steadily since the mid-1970s in response to the failures of state-sponsored market economies. These informal channels are actively sponsored and operated by various benevolent Islamic organizations at the community level and outside the government's political power. Their range varies from

³³ For further explanation of the *waqf ahli* for public use, and *waqf ahli* for family use and how both affect women's access to power across classes, see Bin 'Abdallah (1996). Vol 2.

urban occupations of real estate through *waqf* for upper-middle class women, and private-owned business totally managed by women. Other informal economic organizations of women in the rural space of economy are found in rural occupations such as *waqf* property and land ownership through inheritance, or communitarian agricultural projects that benefit the whole community (*jama'at ahliyya*).

Fourth, the authors' replication of the liberal modernist model of economy leads them to over-focus on "the urban economy" as though an entity in opposition to another "rural economy". Not only does this polarized approach obscure the existing permeability between the urban and the rural economies in Arab-Islamic society, but it also occults the wide range of women's participation in different informal spaces of both the urban and rural economies. As a result, even when al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi provide a portrayal of rural women, it remains cursory, and superficial. Fifth, the authors leave unreported a host of economic activities shared by both urban and rural women of lower-class such as peddling, cosmology, midwifery, entertainment, and catering which take women outside the confines of the home and into the public space. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi not only ignore the permeability between the private and the public economic spaces, but they also occult how these in-between spaces' activities change women's lives positively.

2.3. In Education

While al-Sa'dawi's dealing with women's education is more extensive than Mernissi's, both authors overlook the importance of basic literacy as an important feminist agenda. Equally, when al-Sa'dawi focuses on sexism in education in al-Marah wa al-Jins she leaves unexplored the deep connection between the contextual sexist exploitation of women and its relation to the degree of women's education in the Arab Islamic society (i.e. basic reading and writing skills). Al-Sa'dawi is equating schooling with functional literacy. Yet, it is the absence of functional literacy that is the major cause of women's lack of agency and self-determination both in the rural and urban areas. Similarly, while both authors do recognize women's lack of access to education they tend to overstate schooling (the approach of knowledge via the written materials). The fact that rural women have no access to schooling and the written materials does not necessarily mean that they are "illiterate", or "unaware" of their rights. In this regard, local literacy takes place via the oral tradition and awareness is spread by word of mouth through "gossip" on a massive scale and in different spaces (public market, public baths, mosques, and communal festivities).

This is to say that both authors have severely neglected the importance of verbal communication in the dissemination of literacy, feminist ideas and theories to various female populations and audiences. In turn, this means that both al-Sa'dawi and Memissi associate feminist education with institutionalized education in universities or political women's organizations. Yet, as I have shown in chapter 3, the women's/feminist studies organization in the Arab-Islamic universities have little impact, if any on the majority of men and women. Once again, the authors' view and approach to women's education in the region are not only elitist, but they also associate "feminist theory" with women's educational status. Such an attitude about women's education and feminist theory replicates men's hierarchical scale of power among the various women's groups that imposes "the schooled" as the only constitutive members of "the literate" within the female population. In my view both feminist education and theory will remain meaningless unless educators develop educational methodologies and strategies that expand horizontal relationships among women as essential to their feminist agendas against intellectual hegemony.

2.4. In Political Science

In their criticism of the state politics vis-à-vis women both al-Sa'dawi's and Memissi produce ambiguous and confusing portrayals. The ambiguity and confusion come from the authors' inability to find an adequate language to define what "a modern Muslim state" means, and the nature of this state's relationship with Muslim citizens. As a result their theorization is inadequate and problematic on several counts. First, both authors draw their respective theorization of statehood from Western modernist theoretical frameworks that view and analyze human historical evolution in a linear fashion from tradition to modernity³⁴. In doing so, both authors impose an arbitrary and artificial classification of the past as traditional and the present/future as modern to their analysis of the history of political Islam. By the same token, both authors inscribe social change in the Arab-Islamic society past and present in the Western liberal patterns of social change, and within the Western feminist modernist consciousness.

From the outset, therefore, the authors' theoretical stance on the modern Islamic State is distortive because it equates the modern Arab-Islamic government with the Western one.

³⁴ I reject the modernist tradition/modernity dichotomy because it is entrenched within the Christian view of modernism and because it imposes a universal view of human development. For a comparison between Christian Western modernism and Islamic modernism see item 6 item 17 in the glossary. Also, for the nature of governance in the Arab-Islamic society and the relation of the religious and the secular in this society see 'Amara (1981).

This falsely assumes that the political institutions are similar to the Western ones (government, parliament bodies etc...), and that the Arab-Islamic state has completely changed into a secularized Western-style institution. This assumption is both inaccurate and misleading. It is inaccurate, because the head of state in a Muslim country, whether a president of a republic, an *imam*, or *amir al-muminin*, is not just a political leader of a modern Muslim state, he/she is also expected to perform some form of a spiritual leadership in order for him/her to retain moral authority and political legitimacy as the head of state of a Muslim nation. It is misleading, because it promotes the mistaken belief that the roles of people involved in governance in Arab-Islamic governments are similar to their counterparts in Western governments.

In reality, political governance in contemporary Arab-Islamic nations is a complex mix of the Shari'a with other Western forms of statehood. All the Arab-Islamic Constitutions, in varying degrees, refer to the Shari'a as the basis of the Constitutions and the foundation of the family law. This is evident in the explicit mention of Islam as the religion of the state, and the constant reminder of *al-Mudawwana* as the family law.³⁵ Yet, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi entirely overlook this mix in the socio-political governance across the Arab-Islamic nations, and persist on imposing a false duality between the Constitution and the Shari'a in their study of the Islamic nations and states.

In doing so, both authors distort the *sui-generis* character of political governance in contemporary states, and the process of evolution it has experienced in the 20th century. On the one hand both authors occult that state officials and politicians still draw on the principle of *al-Tawhid*. (unity between the religious and the secular), to update legislatures and socio-political institutions in adjustment to the evolution taking place in today's Arab-Islamic society. As 'Amara (1981) explains the issue of religious authority in Islam and in the political order does not mean a call for the establishment of an Islamic state (p.11). Also, 'Amara notes that the fact that Islam makes a distinction between religion and politics, and between religion and public affairs, does not mean separation between these realms but a distinction in the extent of their spheres of power. In his words "Islam makes a distinction (*tamyiz*) of spheres [of power], not a separation (*fasl*) (p.14). On the other hand both authors conceal the way the

³⁵ For a detailed analysis of the mix between the Shari'a and Western sources in the Constitutions and the family that govern the Arab-Islamic countries see Nasif (1985). Also, for an in depth analysis of Islam as the foundation of State and the family in Morocco see Belmir (1985). Finally, for a critical analysis of the Shari'a and its temporal nature, as well as a description of the four Islamic schools of thoughts as historical socio-political movements linked with the nature of Islamic governance, see Bennani (1993).

changing complex mix of governance actually shapes social change, and gender relationships in the family, and in the community today.

In short, both authors omit from their respective feminist political discourse the compound *asalah/hadathah*³⁶ (authenticity modernity) at the core of the particular style of governance of contemporary Arab-Islamic society over time. Instead, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's political feminist discourse draws selectively the notion of *asalah* (cultural authenticity) from the Arab-Islamic heritage, and the notion of *hadatha* from the Western heritage. The first (*asalah*) is clear in the authors' reliance on the socio-political governance of the initial Arab-Islamic *Ummah* established by the prophet and their portrayals of this style of governance as "authentic Islam". The second (*hadatha*) is evident in their reliance on the Western liberal view of modernity, and their imposition of this view in the analyses of the contemporary style of government in the Arab-Islamic society. Such a theoretical stance is paradoxical because the authors draw on the concept of authenticity from Arab-Islamic epistemology to anchor their feminist claims and authenticate their feminist discourse of equality. At the same time, they are disinclined to continue with this concept to its logical conclusions for today's societal projects of gender equality.

This constitutes an epistemological break which implicitly imposes the erroneous notion that cultural authenticity in Arab-Islamic culture is an essentialist static concept no longer useful for the present conceptualizations of gender egalitarianism needed in the Arab-Islamic culture.³⁷ In the same move, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi delegitimize the concept of authenticity in contemporary Arab-Islamic society, and they exclude the existing explorations of the meanings of this concept and its multiple applications in today's Arab-Islamic styles of governance. In doing so, both authors focus on the "legalities" of the Constitution and the Shari'a rather than on the changing social practices of these legislatures in the Arab-Islamic society, and how they affect gender politics and sociology over time. Such a stance by both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi reproduces in an uncanny way the legal interpretations of laws of both the male *'ulama* and the politicians.

³⁶ The *asalah/hadatha* (authenticity/modernity) compound is based on *historicized ijthad* which affirms the Islamic way of life and its renewal on the basis of history and knowledge.

³⁷ Arab-Muslim authenticists come from all walks of life, nationalists, feminists, Islamists, or simply concerned citizens. All reject the tradition/modernity dichotomy in socio-political and cultural governance. Instead, they promote the compound as *asalah/hadatha* to affirm the Islamic way of life, and their struggle to channel the process of change in a comprehensible way suitable for the distinctive spiritual and material lifestyles of the Arab-Islamic society. For an informative and interesting comparison between European and Muslim authenticists, see Lee (1997).

In contrast, examples from the recent socio-political history in the Arab-Islamic culture of both these legislatures, as lived changing social practices, yield to a better understanding of the degree of change in gender notions and relations in contemporary Arab-Islamic societies. For instance, the case of Morocco throughout the 1980s attests to both patriarchal resistance to the evolution of the family law and the Constitution, and the patriarchal "loosening" and democratization of women's rights. The patriarchal resistance is illustrated by the Council of the 'ulama's veto of the change of *al-Mudawwana* (Personal Code) despite the fact that this project was proposed by both feminist and non-feminists who rallied in 1982 the signature of petition of over 1 million³⁸ of people.

Equally, the loosening of patriarchy is clear in the mid-1980s' collaboration between men in the oppositional political parties of Morocco and women's groups, feminists and non-feminists alike for the change of *al-Mudawwana*. Significantly, both genders within these groups viewed the 'ulama's veto as a violation of "*political ijtihad*" crucial to the evolution of political Islam. Thus, the mid-1980's saw the emergence of new women's groups, namely l'Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc in 1985 (ADFM), and l'Union de l'Action Féminine (UAF) in 1987. The ADFM invoked the gender-neutral notion of power in Islam, and Morocco's need to ratify The Copenhagen convention for the elimination of all forms of discrimination towards women³⁹. Also, l'ADFM set up a program of legal literacy to enhance women's full knowledge of their rights within the Shari'a, and sponsored a series of seminars, round tables for the re-reading of law texts, and the analysis of all practices of discriminations against women.

In the same vein, l'UAF pursued political literacy campaigns through the publication of its monthly magazine "8 Mars". First, l'UAF acknowledged the openness of the Shari'a to gender egalitarianism. Second, it inscribed its political advocacy within the spirit of international solidarity for democracy. In brief, these social groups took into consideration the particularism of the Shari'a legislature from a fresh outlook, and the universalism they share with international laws in their campaign for gender egalitarianism in Morocco. In doing so, these groups have created post-nationalist *post-'ulama*, and *post-Islamist*⁴⁰ interpretations of

³⁸ This million of people was constituted by a majority of the female population. The latter included many women lawyers, judges, writers, social scientists, social workers, but also concerned citizens, among whom many housewives.

³⁹ Morocco adhered in June 1993 to the Copenhagen international convention against discrimination towards women.

⁴⁰ Although the Islamist movements in Morocco have been vigorously persecuted by the Moroccan government since the late 1970s, the movements continued to work underground. The new Shari'a project of 1982 needs to be placed in context as being a political showdown against any potential Islamist reactionary essentialist interpretation of the Shari'a as the only legislature. Also, this project is a testimony of the temporality of contemporary Moroccan society's reading of the Shari'a, and a re-

the Shari'a. At the same time, these groups have created a new endogenous pattern of social change based on a hybridity between the Shari'a and international laws.

In fact, even the Moroccan Broadcasting System diffused the debates on *al-Mudawwana* in their integrity during the political speeches of the opposition at the 1987 Parliamentary sessions. Perhaps this explains why the ADFM and the UAF women's groups and the opposition succeeded in gathering another million of signatures for the revision of *al-Mudawwana* in 1992. Above all, these groups initiated "Le Conseil National pour le Changement de la Mudawwana, et la Défense des Droits de la Femme" in March 1992. One of the immediate results of these endeavors was the integration of women for the very first time in the legislative elections in June, and September 1993, and the election of 10 women in the Moroccan Parliament. Another concrete result was the modification of *al-Mudawwana* by royal decree: Royal Dahir. No. 10 (1993).

The Moroccan experience illustrates that culture is not uniformly perceived by all groups as fixed in a period of history. Rather, culture is being produced and reproduced by every generation following the immediate historical junctures, and the environmental socio-political circumstances of an individual nation. Equally, this experience shows that the application of *ijtihad* in political governance within the Arab-Islamic society still relies on the Islamic notion of agency founded on gender-complementarity in the reforms of laws as well as on *al-Tawhid* in the elaboration of new socio-political policies. Finally, the Moroccan experience shows that agency in socio-political *ijtihad* requires *collective ijtihad* (social deliberation) for acceptance and application in the community.

Still, while the Islamic process of *ijtihad* gives both genders a procedure of legal interpretation and application, it does not guarantee their enforcement in reality, nor the elimination of discrimination against women. Rkia Mossadeq (1993) argued that the concept of complementarity of genders can be easily manipulated by men to institutionalize discrimination against women. She aptly demonstrated that despite local improvements in women's participation in the political life of Morocco in general (Parliament election in 1993), women's absence from positions of power derive from the erroneous notion that power is masculine.⁴¹ Accordingly, Mosadeq calls for a continuous "feminine political ijtihad"⁴²

negotiated egalitarian socio-political contract by all official political constituencies of Morocco based on the religious/secular fusion.

⁴¹ This study corroborates my earlier study (Belhachmi, 1989b), where I argued that in Islam power is not just masculine as evident in the verse 23 of Surah "the Ant" in reference to Balkis Queen of Saba' (Yemen today).

inviting women to appropriate Islamic concepts creatively in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women's participation in politics⁴³. Similarly Farida Bennani⁴⁴ argues for a creative application of the concept of *asalah* (authenticity) by relying on *qiyas* (analogy) in the interpretation of Islamic sources. Also, she advocates a corollary application of *hadatha* (modernity) from Islamic epistemology that emphasizes *ijtihad* as a renewal process in the interpretation of sources in view of the changing conditions of society. Accordingly, Bennani calls for an increased "feminine Intellectual *ijtihad*"⁴⁵ in the readings of Islamic laws, combined with a temporal codification of *al-Mudawwana* in view of the social transformations of society.⁴⁶

The foregoing attests to the existence of progressive post-modernist feminine discourses on gender within the Arab-Islamic tradition and epistemology that pursue simultaneously the sui-generis evolution of Arab-Muslim women according to context (particularism), and that maintain solidarity with world-wide egalitarian laws (universalism). In doing so, these feminine discourses carry on the pattern of social change set by the feminine scientific legacy of their foremothers, and build on the cumulative effect of feminist struggle to advance women's rights. Equally, these discourses situate their feminist struggle in a systematic way at the national level, and within the universal struggle of world feminisms at the international level.

3. Concluding Remarks

To summarize, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine mode strongly reflects an inherent ambivalence in the authors' feminist consciousness that underlies both their theories about social reality, and their appropriations of the social sciences that inform their observation of that reality. This led al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi to produce a dependent scientific feminist knowledge that vacillates between "the reactive stance" to the patriarchal voice of Arab-Islamic tradition and its scientific practices, and "the accommodating stance" to the Western tradition and its universalizing scientific practices and analyses of feminism.

⁴² It is significant that the post-modernist political discourses of women uses terminology "*ijtihad féminine*" instead of "*ijtihad féministe*", unambiguously rejecting the feminine/feminist dichotomy contained in many Arab-Muslim women feminists affiliated with Western modernist approaches to gender. Compare with chapter 1.

⁴³ This is the crux of Mosadeq's paper (1993).

⁴⁴ Farida Bennani is Dean of Muhammad V University, Mohammadia, Morocco.

⁴⁵ Again, the scientific post-modernist discourses of gender unambiguously reject the feminine/feminist dichotomy in gender identity contained within modernist feminist epistemologies.

⁴⁶ Feminine *Ijtihad* that combines theory and practice in their simultaneous temporality is the thrust of Bennani's paper (1993).

In turn, this vacillation translated into a feminine scientific mode characterized by a split feminist consciousness that permeated the authors' respective context of scientific discovery and articulation of gender. From the outset, therefore, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have imposed a dual structure of knowledge as a framework of observation and analysis of gender in Arab-Islamic society. This dual structure assigned a pre-established dual paradigm of investigation (the comparative mode), and set prescriptive comparative analytical juxtapositions to the whole conduct of the authors' research. Above all, this dual structure brought a simultaneous distortion of the authors' theories of social reality, and of the actual conditions of the relations between gender. The theoretical distortions reside in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's adoption of monolithic conception of patriarchy. This not only assigns an artificial distinction between "the Islamic patriarchy" and "the Western patriarchy", but it also imposes false equations between the institutions within each form of patriarchy and the ways they affect women. Such a theoretical stance is inadequate because it is still locked in the West/Islam dialogue instead of engaging in a systemic dialogue that yields to the dynamics of gender relations from context and provides concrete solution for women's emancipation and freedom.

As to the actual conditions of the Arab-Muslim women, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi view them as part of a universal conception of women's condition of oppression prior to their entry in social relations. As Suheir Lutfi (1984) aptly put it: "The conditions of Arab-Muslim women have been described at best, as criteria for modernity or, rather, criteria for the similarities or dissimilarities with Western culture." (p. 287). In the same move, the daily experiences of women are transformed into "proofs" of the Arab-Muslim women condition of oppression, and the systemic dynamics that shape gender relations are left unexplored. As such, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode reflects both a feminist "dependent science" and a feminist "pseudo-science". This "dependent/pseudo science" is all the more problematic because it serves as the "scientific ground" for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's justification theories for their feminist claims and agendas.

Yet, in inscribing their feminine scientific research in a dependent feminine scientific mode al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have been heavily engaged in the ideologization of Islam, and in the application of that ideologization to their observation and interpretation of gender within the Arab-Islamic society. In doing so, both authors have produced an inadequate feminist ideology in the portrayal of contemporary Arab-Islamic culture as well as poor feminist

sociology in the explanation of social change and agency in the contemporary Arab-Islamic society. Similarly, in inscribing their feminine scientific research in the Western liberal tradition of science established by their peers in the social sciences, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's feminine mode adopted an uncritical stance towards institutional scientific knowledge within the Arab-Islamic culture. Not only did they neglect to problematize the impact of institutional knowledge and its related hierarchical approach in the Arab-Islamic scientific production, but they also ignored the effect of this institutionalization on their own production of scientific feminist knowledge, and feminist sociology. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi adhered to the logic of scientific knowledge construction and production deployed by male intelligentsia in the practice of their own feminist research. This led them to replicate the "value hierarchical" notion of power established in mainstream scientific research; hence disregarding the diversity of Arab-Muslim women and the representation of their realities in their feminist research. As a result, both authors produced a dominant scientific feminine mode within Arab-Islamic feminist research similar to the patriarchal mode established by their forefathers.

Finally, in emulating the Western-women's standpoint theories and epistemologies (Marxist/liberal) both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have reproduced notions of power and agency in their approach to feminist research pertaining to the history of Western liberal feminism or Marxist feminism. This induced them to use "feminism" in universal monolithic terms without fully exploring the academic implications nor the socio-political, ethical, and epistemological differences which exist within Arab-Islamic feminism and between women. In turn, this led them to adopt a monolithic feminist methodology that begins with a uniform feminist perspective and epistemology that claim to represent all women just like patriarchal methodology. Yet, with this uniform feminist perspective and methodology both al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi have pre-determined the whole conduct of their scientific inquiry as manifested in their reliance on monolithic scientific methods and overgeneralized theoretical categories such as "women" "structure", and "gender".

Therefore, the fundamental problem with al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine mode, consciousness, and voice is precisely "the science question"⁴⁷. Consequently, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode is highly problematic because it tends to:

1. Examine social change outside Islamic metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. Instead it inscribes social change within Western Liberal scientism and its universalist analytical tools.

⁴⁷ I have borrowed this expression from Harding's book The Science Question in Feminism. (1986).

This maintains from the outset the authors' interpretation of the socio-political history and cultural development of the Arab-Islamic society within the Western "modernist consciousness" and leaves unchallenged the scientific norms of modernist practices established in the Arab-Islamic social sciences. Equally, this imposes a context of scientific discovery that is exogenous to the socio-historical and scientific reality of the Arab-Islamic society.

2. Dis-engage from the Islamic worldview of science, modernism and of gender (i.e. *al-Tawhid*, and complementarity of genders), and instead re-apply modernist scientific theories and methods of analysis in their observation of Arab-Islamic social reality and in their evaluations of the Arab-Islamic productions on gender.

3. Impose a woman's standpoint (a distinct feminine worldview) that is exogenous to the Arab-Muslim women's socio-political and cultural contexts. This separates the women's standpoint from both the socio-political and scientific movements and struggles that have shaped the Arab-Muslim women's consciousness. Likewise, this imposes a false uniformity to the Arab-Muslim women's consciousness that obscures both the particularities and the commonalities of their socio-political and scientific struggles at the national and international levels alike.

4. Dismiss altogether the complementarity of genders at the core of the Islamic Worldview of power and how this view regulates gender identity, relations, and agency. Instead, the authors' mode replicates patriarchal liberal or Marxist notions of power and scientific method in their analysis of gender relations and agency within the Arab-Islamic society. Such a stance precludes a systemic understanding of gender relations and distorts the actual dynamics at the core of social change existing in context.

5. Apply a universal theory of feminism as a uniform category in their knowledge-seeking process of feminist research, and politics of gender in the context of the Arab-Islamic culture. Such a feminist stance indicates that al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine mode is still deeply entrenched within the trend of "sisterhood feminism"⁴⁸ that claims universality of feminist issues among different world-communities.

6. Impose the Marxist/liberal woman's standpoint epistemologies as the adequate scientific exploration of gender for the Arab-Islamic society. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi's and

⁴⁸ While sisterhood feminism was a powerful slogan in the 1960s and rallied many feminisms world-wide, it became widely contested as early as the 1970s because it masked the opportunism and variety of manipulations by women in positions of power. For a critique of sisterhood feminism see Kennedy (1970).

Mernissi's standpoint epistemologies introduce the sex/gender dichotomy and culture/nature dualisms exogenous to the socio-historical reality of the Arab-Muslim women. After all the sex/gender analytical system as an object of scientific knowledge emerged from the socio-political and historical reality of the Western culture after the "sexual revolution". Thus, in imposing the sex/gender analytical system to the Arab-Islamic social reality, both authors not only distort the contextual gender relations, but they also twist the Islamic epistemology of human nature, sexuality, agency and gender politics.

7. Overgeneralize findings and replicability of their feminist research to all Arab-Muslim women, despite the fact that this mode's whole scientific discovery is based on the *essentialist Eurocentric woman's standpoint*. Such a stance is not only unethical but also scientifically misleading because it claims scientific grounds for the feminist knowledge produced on the Arab-Muslim women.

8. Be ambivalent about the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition and its articulations of gender both in the past and in the present. This precludes the exploration of the scientific practices within this tradition, and leaves unclear the actual feminist scientific stance and input of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi vis-à-vis this tradition.

9. Ignore one century of independent women-led Arab-Islamic feminist science and epistemology. This distorts both the nature of Arab-Islamic feminism, and obscures the scientific legacy and input of the founding mothers of the Islamic women's studies.

10. Overlook the key role of the women-led scientific legacy in the establishment of an Arab-Islamic feminist epistemology. This trivializes the role of this feminine scientific legacy in the collective consciousness of both genders, and in the advancement of pluralism and egalitarianism within the contemporary Arab-Islamic culture.

11. Leave undefined its own scientific stance vis-à-vis the other feminine scientific discourses on gender existing within the Arab-Islamic feminist epistemology. This creates a discontinuity in the history of women's scientific practice in Arab-Islamic society, and robs Arab-Muslim women of endogenous role models of identification existing locally.

12. Dis-engage from a dialogue with the current feminine scientific discourses on gender. This creates discontinuity in contemporary women's studies affiliated with the Arab-Islamic tradition, and occults the plurality of the Arab-Islamic feminism and its corollary struggle for scientific diversity.

In a nutshell, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi neglected the dual macro-micro process of production involved in their feminist research, and the impact of this process on the construction and dissemination of their feminist knowledge in Arab-Islamic society and culture. With the neglect of process al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi not only transcended the social lives of Arab-Muslim women into abstractions and cancelled their voices, but they also concealed their active role in this muting process. Above all, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi overlooked the epistemological locus of their own feminist research as "knowledge", vis-à-vis the history of science in the Arab-Islamic culture. In doing so, both authors' obscured the implications of their feminist scientific knowledge in relation to the knower, and the process of knowing. Thus, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine mode contains an "oppressive pedagogy" that sustains a dogmatic, hegemonic scientific feminist knowledge similar to the one existing within contemporary Arab-Islamic meta-narratives and their intellectual orthodoxies. For this reason, the authors' mode lacks "conscientization tools", and skills (emotional cognitive, and relational) that can induce women's socio-political, and intellectual autonomy.

In light of this analysis, the scientific feminine mode of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi in the contemporary Arab-Islamic culture is far from representing the multiple social reality of Arab-Muslim women, or the diverse voices of feminist scholarship existing within Arab-Islamic culture. In keeping the institutional scientific paradigm in their interpretation of the "woman question", both authors took for granted the relationship between theory (meaning) and method (observation) in the conduct of their own context of discovery, and in their portrayal of objective facts. Yet, the so-called objective facts in any research are sought with respect to the worldview one holds. As Kuhn (1970) so forcefully argues, progress in scientific thought or scientific "revolutions" occur not because of observed facts but because of changed paradigm.⁴⁹

Moreover, I contend, because science contains ideology and the history of science is the history of various social constructions of reality, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode needs to integrate the Islamic worldview of science⁵⁰ as a "sense-making frame of reference" for the observation and interpretation of the social reality and social change of contemporary Arab-Islamic society, the identification process of women, and the evaluation of scientific work. This immediately raises the issue of the relationship between worldviews and

⁴⁹ Kuhn (1970) argues persuasively that science contains ideology, and that the history of science is the history of various social constructions of reality. For this reason, progress in scientific thought is contingent upon paradigmatic change.

⁵⁰ For a definition of the independent Islamic worldview of science see item 1 and 4 in the glossary.

the disciplines within the social sciences. Parvez Manzoor (1984) aptly reminds us that all disciplines are in a hierarchically "subordinate relation to worldviews". Moreover, he notes, by virtue of this relationship, disciplines "can never pass judgement on the values themselves" (p.35).

This highlights the researcher's critical consciousness and accountability in knowledge transmission via the disciplines. In their production of feminist knowledge, al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's have neglected that culture is a body of disciplines, and that cultural authority and power are based on cultural disciplines. In doing so, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi severely overlooked the balance between particularism and universalism of the social sciences they appropriated in their respective analysis of the woman question, and of Arab-Islamic feminisms. Simultaneously, al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi disregarded the relation between meaning and observation within the worldview they adhered to in their analysis of gender in the Arab-Islamic culture. This major oversight, has serious implications for feminist knowledge seeking. First, meaning (theory) precedes the observation of facts. Second, the values, which stem from a particular worldview and shape meaning has tremendous consequences both for scientific verification and evaluation. Third, meaning (theory) and observation (method) constitute not just a context of discovery of scientific research, but they also serve their producers as justification theories of knowledge (epistemology). These three major oversights, in my view, are responsible not only for the authors' epistemological poverty, but also for their self-imposed dual theories and methods.

Accordingly, I argue, what Arab-Muslim feminist researchers at present need urgently is a shift of scientific paradigm. The latter begins by giving up the totalizing theories of a universal feminism, and its epistemology. This entails on the one hand to start feminist research from within a plural feminist praxis that incorporates the diversity between women in their existential experiences, and across the socio-political and cultural movements in society. On the other hand, this means transcending the ideology of pure science and its hegemonic philosophy that claims "the truth" and imposes a universal ability to read social change cross-culturally. In brief, this involves embracing other spaces of truth offered by progressive groups engaged in the reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition and epistemology. In short, the shift of paradigm requires "a scientific revolution" that restores both the political, and epistemological grounds that shape gender relations and politics in their simultaneous temporality.

Part III Towards a Systematic Scientific Paradigm for Understanding Gender Dynamism in Arab-Islamic Culture

How to restore the dual epistemic and political ground of Arab-Islamic feminism depends largely on whether the scientific paradigm adopted by researchers yields to a systematic approach of gender in relation to both the socio-political structures, and the scientific intellectual structures that mutually shape social reality and change in the Arab-Islamic society. The systematic approach necessarily entails the periodization of the socio-political and cultural structures that have shaped the social reality of feminism and gender relations/politics, and a corollary periodization of women's involvement with science within a specific place and time.

It is precisely from such a feminist proactive theoretical stance that maintains the link between feminist scientific knowledge and society, and the role feminist science in social change, that I have provided a systematic analysis of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode in Arab-Islamic society. I have begun the analysis in chapter 1 by providing a survey of the 13-century intellectual history of the Arab-Islamic culture focusing on the role of Arab-Islamic education in the socio-historical evolution of the Arab-Islamic society and gender relations. This survey was crucial and showed the following: (a) that women's involvement in science and social change in the Arab-Islamic world is a cyclical phenomenon that varied according to the socio-political and intellectual movements that this region encountered throughout its history, (b) that Egypt and Morocco are representative countries of an endogenous trend of modernity in the region and were catalyst in the elaboration of a cultural and educational renaissance (*al-Nahda*) for the whole region, (c) that the feminist age in the Arab-Islamic world is a product of an idiosyncratic self-renewal process along with the cumulative effect of the intellectual movements that have shaped the region's history in a continuum.

In chapter 2 I provided a model of analysis for the exploration of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation within the intellectual history of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society and scientific practice of feminist research. There, I described the model I designed for the analysis of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi as being threefold. First, to portray the macro-micro process involved in the production of feminist research by focusing on the role of education in the social division of knowledge, and in the subordinate

integration of feminist research in educational curricula. Second, to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to the intellectual history of Arab-Islamic society and education in the 20th century. Third, to examine the construction and production of knowledge within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to institutions, and agents that constitute the power structure of the field of feminist research in education and society during the 1970-1990 period.

In chapter 3 I applied the first level of the model (Bourdieu's analyse praxéologique, 1992) to identify the mechanisms of reproduction of patriarchy in the Arab-Islamic culture at the macro-micro levels. There, I first illustrated the way liberal patriarchy manipulated the formal/informal structure of education to maintain an elitist delivery system of learning and scientific practice in society both in terms of class and gender. On the one hand, I discussed the fundamental issues at stake between various political constituencies in the 20th century Arab-Islamic education. These are (a) the socio-historical context of education, (b) the role of structural organization of the *madrasah/university* in the advancement of lack thereof in the region, (c) the place of the Arab-Islamic tradition of teaching and scientific practice in the educational delivery system, (d) the place of *Arabization* in teaching and scientific practice. Thus, I identified the pattern of education itself as an obstacle to change for both genders, and I highlighted the "double closure" (culture/class) women suffer from in education and scientific practice. On the other hand, I showed how these educational issues are critical to the reconstruction process that took place in the Arab-Islamic society since the 1960s. I discussed the restoration of the Islamic scientific tradition of scientific practice in the production of the social sciences in general and in women's studies in particular that took place since the 1960s. In doing so, I provided a historiography of the social sciences, and of women's studies during the 20th century Arab-Islamic education. This historiography documented the scientific mutations in the fields of knowledge within the educational curricula of the 20th century. By the same token, this provided an internal critique of the social sciences, and of feminist-women's studies in the region. Lastly, this historiography situated al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific productions in the structural organization of the Arab-Islamic education and in the institutional evolution of the social sciences and of women's studies during the 1970-90 period.

In chapter 4 I applied the second level of my model which draws jointly from Bourdieu's notion of the "habitus" (1990) and Smith's women's standpointism (1990) to

examine al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminine scientific mode as a social organization. There, I described al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint as a site of struggle (personal history) and as an epistemic position about social reality (scientific discourse of lived femininity). Through the themes they raise I illustrated the way the dual formal/informal location of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi at the structural level of culture structures and informs the content of their feminist knowledge. In doing so, I set the stage for al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist sociology of knowledge as being both progressive and regressive.

In chapter 5 and 6 I applied the third level of the model using Stanley and Wise's *Feminist Epistemology* (1990). There, I respectively problematized al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint using Stanley and Wise's recommended analytical instruments (methodology, method and epistemology) to trace al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's woman's standpoint location across the stages of their scientific context of discovery. With this analysis I illustrated both the positive and the negative scientific articulations of gender within al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific mode. Thus, I highlighted the negative/positive scientific inputs contained in the authors' feminine scientific mode. Also, I showed how this negative/positive input is at the root of the authors' split feminist consciousness and their poor feminist sociology and epistemology.

Finally, In chapter 7 I relied on Stanley and Wise's feminist epistemology (a pluralist feminist praxis) to contextualize al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's women's standpoints in their systemic relation within the micro-politics of scientific research production, and within the meta-narratives and social activism over the 1970-90 period in the contemporary Arab-Islamic culture. Here, I demonstrated that al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode is hegemonic because it lacks anchorage in Islamic metaphysics, and is not grounded within the Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice. Through some critics of the authors' scientific feminist knowledge and mine, I showed al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's lack of dialogue with other agents and social groups that are transforming the reality for both genders in contemporary Arab-Islamic society. In doing so, I illustrated how al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode precluded them from having a sustainable effect on women's emancipation today in the Arab-Islamic society. Equally, I discussed how other post-modernist social groups affiliated with the Islamic tradition of political governance and scientific practice are actually improving the status and rights of women and providing sustainable egalitarian societal projects in the Arab-Islamic society of the 1990s.

1. The Thesis Model and Applications

The thesis model maintained the systematic relation involved in gender relationships beyond the everyday by including the changing socio-political structures in the dynamics that govern gender in a variety of contexts within culture. The strength of the model lied in its challenge to both the "normalcy" of the everyday struggles portrayed through everyday-life, and its avoidance of presenting gender as a fixed category plagued forever by a "given cultural context". In doing so, the model has shed light on the persistence of patriarchy, and has shown the evolution and changes that have occurred in gender relationships within the family, the state, and the community over time. As such, the model has captured the systematic dynamism taking place in the society under study, and the significant cultural reconstruction process taking place in the renewals of cultural identity and gender re-definitions in their simultaneous political and scientific temporality.

1.1. Applications of the Model at the Local Level

The model's emphasis on the epistemological analysis and representation in the field of feminist research according to periodization retains the relationship between the ethics of the culture under study, and the moral authority and accountability of the scientific research being produced (triangulation between the researcher, society, and research). This way the model keeps the process of scientific research in its integrity as holding a dual form of consciousness: "self-consciousness, and social consciousness" both crucial in the identification process of women, and in the shaping of women's identities, subjectivities and inter-subjectivities within culture.

Likewise, the specific emphasis of the model on the critical consciousness of the researcher plays a key-role as a feminist pedagogy against determinism in knowledge production and transmission via cultural disciplines. As such, the model represents a critical feminist pedagogy in that it shows that the research act itself is a pedagogical activity with consequential ramifications for women's ways of knowing. As such, the model yields to applications at the local level of countries that constitute the Arab-Islamic region in three ways. First, the model releases the researcher from the duality paradigm of West versus Islam that has become the paradigmatic discourse of any research on Arab-Muslim women. Second, the model involves the researcher in a direct and deep criticism of the field of feminist research within the specific socio-political context this field is embedded in, and from the epistemological ground it is rooted in. Third, the model enables the researcher to identify and

evaluate the scientific contribution of the agents (including him/herself), and institutions involved in the network of feminist research as a field of knowledge in a systemic way.

The aim is dual: to engage in hermeneutic and autonomous feminist productions of knowledge, and to counteract dogmatism inherent to contemporary productions on gender. Thus, the practice of the model accomplishes a dual task. On the one hand, it induces research agents to relate to culture: "as a body of disciplines", and to place a new emphasis on textuality as constitutive of authority and power based on "cultural disciplines". On the other hand, the model enables the researcher to practice his/her critical consciousness about knowledge transmission via institutionalized cultural disciplines from a balanced feminist perspective that integrates the particularism and universalism of gender in society.

In brief, the model is an empowering scientific method with considerable potential freedom and agency against institutionalized knowledge. Simultaneously, the model is a self-evaluation method for the researcher to ensure that the feminist knowledge he/she produces is "genuine" in its representation and observation of the social reality under study. As such, the model is a practical tool for the researcher to keep the balance between theory and practice by integrating cultural authenticity in representation, and avoiding the universalist abuses of science in the production of social research.

1.2. Applications of the Model at the International Level

The usefulness of the model at the international level lies in its ability to delineate the actual examination of the dual process of construction and production involved in feminist knowledge within different socio-cultural contexts. On the one hand, the application of the model requires a particular emphasis on the process of education (both formal and informal) existing in the cultural context under study. This engages the researcher in direct and systematic investigation of the particularities of cultural patriarchies and their mechanisms of reproduction. On the other hand, the application of model leads the researcher to periodize the existing scientific practices in education and culture. This identifies the actual power relations existing between people and institutions involved in the production of knowledge in their temporality within the specific cultural context under study. As such, the model is a practical scientific tool to identify co-optation and communication across the social groups involved in contextual scientific practice in a given culture. Equally, the model functions as a device to demystify the myth of neutral scientific objectivity manipulated by social groups, and acknowledges the role of subjectivity in all scientific research productions. This way the

model allows the exploration of other spaces of truth beyond the artificial spaces imposed by scientism.

On the whole, the model is a replicable apparatus of analysis cross-culturally as follows: (a) A theoretical tool to anchor feminist research in context by providing a macro-micro analysis of patriarchy and feminism in the socio-intellectual history of a particular culture and its system of education. (b) A scientific method to understand the mechanism of reproduction of patriarchy, and the subordination of feminism in their systematic relation and temporality at the formal and informal levels of society. (c) A tool for the periodization of the analysis of feminist research as a field of science, and of power-relations between genders (agents) in a particular cultural context. (d) An evaluation instrument of feminist scientific research that offers concrete analytical instruments (methodology, method, epistemology) to track the scientific context of discovery of the researcher. (e) An evaluation device for the epistemological validity and the reliability of the feminist knowledge produced for the socio-political context it is embedded in, and for the advancement of women it claims to represent. (f) A pedagogical method as it combines theory-praxis and maintains the link between feminist knowledge and social action in their dialectic relation in culture.

1.3. Limitations of the Model

Despite the model's replicability in other cultures, it has limitations in terms of reliability and generalizability. Considering that social settings are different, the model's reliability depends on its internal validity to the settings under study. Thus, in applying the model to other cultural contexts, the researcher needs to give careful consideration to two provisions: (a) The process of education (both formal and informal) existing in the cultural context under study. (b) The actual power relations existing between people and institutions involved in the production of scientific feminist knowledge in a specific time and place.

Similarly, the generalizability of the model cannot be standardized. It will heavily depend on the concrete universals reached through studying a specific case in great detail, and then comparing that case with other cases studied in equally great detail. Finally, the social similarities existing within the Arab-Islamic setting, though informative about other similar settings and relevant to them, can not be generalized culturally (the Arab-Islamic world), nor cross-culturally (the world community). Culturally, generalizations are applicable only to this moment in history because the internal validity of the thesis is itself a temporal social

construction likely to change in the future with the evolution of history, and of scientific knowledge in the Arab-Islamic society.

Cross-culturally, the generalizations are limited because the future applications of the model, its modifications to context, and its supplement with new creative strategies by future researchers would affect its future internal validity and reliability as well. This means that this qualitative model uses the notions of validity, reliability, objectivity, and generalizability as "evolving concepts" always contingent upon social constructions of knowledge; which in turn is highly contextual and ever changing. Ultimately, the model is an open-ended scientific paradigm of research that captures the dynamics of social change along with the progress of scientific practice in their simultaneous occurrence in history and in culture over time.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The purpose of the thesis was to examine the process involved in the production and construction of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminist knowledge in its systemic relation to the Arab-Islamic education and society during the 1970-90 period. The aim was twofold. First, to situate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific feminine mode in its systematic relation to the power structure of scientific practice in education, and in society during the 1970-1990 period. Second, to evaluate al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist research in view of the power structure that governs scientific practice in education and society during the 1970-90 period.

To this end the thesis offered a periodized history of education in the Arab-Islamic world. This periodization showed the continuities and the discontinuities with the Arab-Islamic heritage, and how both shaped education and social change in the region. On the one hand, the thesis described the nature of education in this society as a hybrid between the formal and informal realms, and showed the significance of this hybridity both in the development of educational institutions and in the sustenance of the simultaneous evolution of religious and secular sciences in curricula over time. On the other hand, the thesis described the mutations in the formal/informal educational organization and how these mutations altered the philosophy and scientific practices at the core of the socio-political and cultural power-relations and politics of scientific production in the Arab-Islamic education and society. In doing so, the thesis made the following contributions.

1. Contributions to Education on the Arab-Islamic world

1.1. To the History of Education

The thesis periodized the history of education in the Arab-Islamic society showed the continuity of the idiosyncratic pattern of education and its place in the reproduction of the Arab-Islamic value-system (religious/secular), and in the hierarchical division of labour in the scientific practice in education and society in terms of class and gender. Equally, the thesis showed the way/s colonial and post-colonial state officials in the 20th century exploited this pattern of education to sustain the hierarchical division of labour in education and society, and to further their elitist liberal socio-political and cultural agendas. In doing so, the thesis accomplished three things: (a) It showed the continuity and discontinuities in the pattern of

educational development, and how both reflect the internal and external power-relations at work in the educational system's delivery system and scientific practice, (b) It challenged Waardernberg's (1966, 1983) history of contemporary education in the region, by discussing the persisting place of the madrasah both in the structural organization of education, and in the socio-political and scientific development of the contemporary Arab-Islamic society, (c) It provided a historiography of the post-modernist reconstruction of the educational system in the region and the significance of this reconstruction for the restoration of the religious/secular fusion both in the delivery system of learning and in scientific practice. In doing so, the thesis expanded on the rare literature on the history of contemporary education in the Arab-Islamic world which shows the simultaneous growth of religious/secular institutions, and epistemologies in the development of education and society in the Arab-Islamic world (Szylowicz, 1973; Eccel, 1984).

1.2. To Methodology in Research in Education.

The thesis relied on research in education and training (Beillerot et al (1989) and its related rationale for the cultural specificity of the system of education and its socio-pedagogical practices in society in the world community. Equally, the thesis used this rationale's notion of "rapport to knowledge" to examine the underlying process of knowledge production specific to the Arab-Islamic education and to show the cumulative effect of individuals to the process of knowledge production in that society. In doing so, the thesis provided a new understanding of the evolution in the individual and collective consciousness specific to the Arab-Islamic education and scientific production. From this angle too, the thesis explored the socio-cultural specificity of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's "rapport to knowledge" in Arab-Islamic education and society, and examined the underlying epistemological foundations of their feminist knowledge in education and society during the 1970-90 period. In other words, the thesis explored al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist knowledge as a discursive site of struggle in the socio-scientific disciplines produced in the Arab-Islamic society. Such an approach is akin to Mosconi's (1989; 1994) exploration of women's specific rapport to education in the European culture, and may be used for comparative purposes in order to understand the cultural specificity of women's "rapport to knowledge" in education and society and how that rapport shapes women's scientific productions.

To illustrate, the thesis offered a theory-praxis model of three levels to explore the cultural specificity of the Arab-Islamic education and of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's systemic "rapport to knowledge" to education and scientific practice in society. In using this model, the thesis made the following contributions: to Feminist sociology of knowledge by maintaining a triangular relation (educator/educated-reality-and educated/educator) contained in scientific research as a socio-educational activity. This offered an alternative feminist sociology of knowledge suitable for the sociology of mutations, especially for developing societies where neo-patriarchal socio-political and cultural organizations are deeply entrenched. Equally, this allowed an internal feminist critique of education. On the one hand the thesis discussed the specific socio-pedagogical practices in the 20th century Arab-Islamic education, and showed the way/s various patriarchies manipulated these practices to sustain an unequitable delivery system (teaching and research) that directly excludes women, and women's science from the process of education. Such a feminist critique may be used for comparative studies with other feminist critiques of education (i.e. Spender, 1981a&b). On the one hand the thesis historicized the production of the social sciences, and of women's studies over the 20th century Arab-Islamic education and culture, and situated al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's scientific productions in the scientific history of these fields of knowledge. This internal feminist critique of the disciplines may be added to other international feminist critiques of the disciplines (Mura's 1990).

2. To Feminism and Women's Studies in/on the Arab-Islamic World

2.1. At the Level of Methodology

In documenting the continuing fluidity between the religious and secular spaces, and their related ideologies both in women's lives and in the feminist discourses on gender in the contemporary Arab-Islamic society, the thesis made the following contributions: (a) It challenged the recent literature on gender in the region (Kandiyoti. Ed, 1991; Tucker. Ed, 1993; and Badran, 1995) that overemphasizes patriarchal constructs in nationalist agendas over religious ideology, (b) It restored the balance between the religious and the secular ideologies missing from the analyses and evaluations of gender in this literature.

Equally, the thesis challenged the recent literature on gender in the region focused exclusively on the everyday life (Abu al-Lughud 1986; 1991), and provided an integrated study that combined the everyday struggles (micro level) and the changing cultural context of

the whole community over time (the macro-level) in their synergetic relation. Further, the thesis illustrated with the case of Morocco how social change is much more effective when it takes place in collective negotiations between genders, and in concert with the macro-micro evolution that governs gender relations in society.

2.2 At the Level of Epistemology

Above all, by tackling the scientific question in Arab-Islamic feminism in a systemic way, the thesis showed the existence of an independent Arab-Islamic tradition of scientific practice and traced the corollary feminist epistemology affiliated with this tradition in education and society. In doing so, the thesis showed the continuities and the discontinuities within the history of the Arab-Islamic feminist epistemology. Also, the thesis placed al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's feminist epistemology in the history of the Arab-Islamic feminist epistemology. In doing so, the thesis' feminist epistemological critique is an internal critique of contemporary feminist science in Arab-Islamic culture that shows both the progressive/regressive scientific inputs contained in al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's standpoint epistemologies.

In this manner, the thesis challenged the recent literature on the Arab-Islamic world (Tucker, Ed., 1993) which overemphasizes the positive understandings of gender by women. Equally, in this fashion the thesis provided a cultural critique of the scientific question in feminism that may be added to Harding's (1986; 1987) feminist epistemological critique of feminist science in Western culture. As such the thesis may be used as a reference in the history of international epistemological feminist critiques of feminist science in culture.

3. Perspectives for Future Research

The thesis is a systemic exploration of contemporary feminist research in the Arab-Islamic culture has opened new avenues of research in three areas.

3.1 Feminist/Women's Studies

The thesis illustrated the fundamental epistemological problems contained in contemporary scientific articulations of feminist research in the Arab-Islamic education and society. This opened the way for further analyses of individual disciplines that inform feminist scientific discourses on gender. Similarly, the thesis identified the urgent need for interdisciplinary women's studies at the national level by highlighting the variety of women's

studies created since the 1970s in the new departments of the Arab-Islamic university that inform the scientific productions of feminist research in the social sciences. This inter-disciplinarity would have at least four major consequences: (a) It would build an endogenous contemporary feminist science based on the cumulative effect of the approaches to the social sciences existing in the Arab-Islamic educational system, and their scientific practices, (b) It would bring more perspective on feminist/women's studies and the epistemological diversity existing in feminist scholarship at the level of each country, (c) It would identify duplications of studies and locate areas for intervention, (d) It would lead to trans-disciplinarity in the field.

3.2. Experiential Studies on Gender

Given the emerging political sociology around the civil/civic tension in state policy and gender, experiential studies on gender are essential to capture the systematic dynamism of political sociology in each individual country in the Arab-Islamic culture. These studies would: (a) Keep feminist research grounded in context, and within Islamic ethics of agency for the formulation of egalitarian socio-political projects. (b) Unfold group strategies of agency negotiated between social scientists, and political decision-makers that engage women's groups in egalitarian socio-political projects in today's Arab-Islamic society. In short, these studies would promote change on the basis of concrete experiences between gender, and sustain open-ended paradigms and provisional strategies of negotiation between genders according to contextual historical evolution, and scientific practices.

3.3. Studies in Education

The thesis described the patterns of continuity in patriarchal hegemony in the Arab-Islamic educational system over time both in terms of class and gender. This showed the central role of the pattern of educational development itself as an obstacle to change, and as one major cause in the double closure (culture/class) of women in the Arab-Islamic society. In doing so, the thesis opened new spaces for research in education in the Arab-Islamic world beyond the modernity/tradition dichotomous paradigms of analysis. These spaces are the procedural aspects of educational institutions and their role in sustaining a hierarchical educational pattern that maintains social stratification both in terms of class and gender. The functional aspects of education open several research areas initiated in the thesis such as: the procedural aspects of education and the inclusion/exclusion of feminism and feminist science in the delivery system of learning. This would lead to sub-topics of research like: (a) The role

of the pattern of education in the structure of knowledge within the educational curricula, and in the integration of women's studies, (b) The role of the structure of knowledge in the social regulation and reproduction, (c) The political and pedagogical implications of the structure of educational curricula for the social division of labour both in scientific practice, and in teaching and learning.

Equally, the thesis contributed to feminist critiques in comparative education. This space opens multiple areas of research such as: (a) Commonalities, and differences of integration/exclusion of feminist/women's studies among world systems of education, (b) Trends and Issues in Women's studies in world systems of education, (c) Comparative studies on feminist theories on teaching and learning among different countries, (d) Comparative studies in feminist epistemologies and the role of these epistemologies in gender equity/hegemony. These areas of study are likely to foster scientific and cultural feminist exchange, enhance partnerships and co-operation between women scholars involved in education and women across cultures. In turn, these studies would show the diversity of feminist scientific articulations in the world community, and influence public policy at the national and international levels with regards to the nature, structure, and funding of the international women and development programs. In brief, these studies would enhance a multicultural feminist agenda, and induce the political and scientific power of international feminism as a force of change for humanity.

In the final analysis, what scientific research on women needs culturally and cross-culturally are concrete solutions regarding theory and practice. These solutions consist of the elimination of patriarchal theoretical frameworks as a norm, and the eradication of universalist monolithic feminist approaches by both genders. Systematic analyses open a new way for understanding the dynamism of gender in culture in that they adequately preserve the relation between scientific/cognitive structures and social structures that constitute reality. Similarly, systematic analyses offer opportunities for understanding commonalities and differences between world-feminisms. Following such approaches may be an answer for scientific research by, for, and with women for the future.

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GLOSSARY

Glossary

1. The question of "science" raises the fundamental issue of definition. What constitutes science? Whose science are we referring to? From which civilization? If by science one means the evolution of cultural "thought patterns" and institutions, that constitute the social sciences (sociology, political science, jurisprudence etc.), then every culture has its independent "social sciences" that draw from inter-alia sources of knowledge, both religious and secular. For a study on the history and philosophy of science in the world community see Sarton (1927).

This reveals the relation between science and culture, and indicates that the history of science is the history of various social constructions of reality, mediated by scientists and scholars. Equally, this raises the issue of ideology contained in the scientists' definitions of "science" and "scientific knowledge" in the history of humanity. For a detailed explanation on the relation between science and ideology, see Kuhn (1970). Also, for a documentation of an independent Islamic framework of science see Sarton (1927). For a comparison of the meanings of "science" in Islam and in the West, and the existence of an Islamic paradigm of science with an independent epistemology and issues see Sardar (Ed.). (1984).

For a discussion of the transformation of Islamic science by Western imperialism in general see a) Rahman (1982) For a discussion of the transformation of Islamic science and the crisis of education see b) (MQTA). Conference. *Al-Wahda* (1985). Also, for further systemic portrayals of Islamic science, theories of scientific knowledge, and scientific institutions see (a) Sayili (1941), (b) Nasr (1976), and (c) Abul-al-Fadl (1990). For an analysis of scientific inquiry and methodology of Islamic Social studies see Nasr (Ed.). (1996). For a discussion of the Islamic worldview of science in the Arabic literature, and its importance for the production of endogenous Social Sciences, see (a) Khalifah (1984), b) Rajab (1992).

2. "Scientific knowledge" is a socio-cultural construction that is deeply rooted in a particular cultural worldview. Also, scientific knowledge evolves with the particular socio-political and cultural process of given society over time. Accordingly, I define scientific knowledge as follows: (a) Knowledge inclusive of the history and culture of the people it claims to represent, (b) Constantly testing its hypotheses and assumptions with data from social reality (c) Takes into consideration the importance of time in building theory, testing theory and applying theory in practice, (d) Keeps theory and practice united in the process of its production. This means that scientific knowledge entails making a constant double movement between theory and practice and vice versa, and checking its own validity and legitimacy for the context in which it is produced.

For a detailed evolution of the concept of scientific knowledge (*'ilm*) philosophically and historically in Muslim societies, see (a) Ibn Khaldun (1970), b) Rosenthal (1970). Also, for a discussion of the concept of scientific knowledge from the

epistemological standpoint, see a) Nasr (1976, 1988, 1978), b) Sardar (1984, 1989). For the significance of the concept of Islamic scientific knowledge and its implications both for Islamic thought and for education see b) Mohd NorWan Daud (1989). Finally, for a discussion of the specificity of cultural attributes of scientific knowledge production in society see Beillerot (1989) and item 28 in this glossary.

3. I use the terminology "Arab-Islamic" to identify my research target-group. First, I am interested in the cultural development of Muslim people of Arab ethnic background because it not only represents the majority but also the dominant ethnic, religious, and political group in the Arab world. Other scholars might choose to investigate minority groups such as "Arab-Jewish" or "Arab-Christian" as their target group. Thus, the "Arab-Islamic" terminology refers to the geographic region of the world where Islam is the religion of the state (except for Lebanon), and Arabic is the language of the nation, education, and of communication with the world community. Second, I use the terminology " Arab-Islamic" world to underline the double standards of the League of Arab-States, which for political unity between Christian and Muslim Arabs does not use the terminology Arab-Islamic.

Yet all of the League of Arab States scientific productions sponsored by ALECSO invariably refers to Islam as the foundation of unity between the 21 Arab nations it represents (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, 'Uman, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Sumal, Djibouti). Also, this organization emphasizes that Arabic is the language of communication between the countries of the region and the world community. Third, I use "Arab-Islamic" terminology for taxonomic precision: I highlight that al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's signified and object of criticism within the category "Arab-Islamic" refers exclusively to women and feminism within this majority than their equivalent within the minority groups.

However, while the "Arab-Islamic" terminology designates the socio-political, and cultural specificity of the Arab-Islamic society, and its distinct socio-pedagogical modalities in education and scientific practice, it does not imply that this region is monolithic, nor that its peoples' scientific productions are uniform. Rather what this terminology implies is a dynamic socio-political and scientific diversity and evolution within cultural unity.

4. The Islamic worldview (Weltanschauung) of science and scientific knowledge, (*'ilm*) is embedded in Islamic metaphysics, which conceives reason and revelation as two organic aspects of the same reality. The Islamic metaphysics contains a unique cosmology (structure of the space-time relation in the universe) based on the principle of *al-Tawhid* (unity and balance between the spiritual and temporal orders in the organization of the universe). From this perspective the prophet originally created a new socio-political and cultural order based on the *'Uruba/Islam* unity (unity between the Islamic doctrine and the Arabic culture).

Kettani (1984) explains the socio-political and scientific ramifications of *'Uruba/Islam* unity established by the prophet for the development of the Arab-Islamic society and Islam as a world civilization. Islam, he points out, meant the development and

the renewal of the Arab society according to the Islamic message delivered by the prophet. 'Uruba meant using the Arabic language as a universal language of communication between all people of the world, both in the transmission of the Islamic Message, and in the scientific development of the Islamic *Ummah* (pp.67-68). Thus, Kettani concludes the Arab-Muslim *'ulama* elaborated a tradition of scientific practice for all Muslim scholars to follow.

Without an understanding of how the principle of *al-Tawhid* operates in the organization of the Islamic order at the internal and external levels, I argue, it is impossible to grasp the nature and pattern of the development of Muslim societies, or the place of scientific knowledge in the process of social change, or cultural exchange within these societies.

5. The principle of al-Tawhid. The concept of *al-Tawhid* suffers from reductionism when translated. Not only do most orientalist translate this concept as monotheism, or monism, but they also limit its scope to theology. In contrast, Muslim thinkers view the concept of *al-Tawhid* as all encompassing both in metaphysics and nature. Also, *al-Tawhid* unites the spiritual and material life of people, thus signifying the integrity and unity of truth. Accordingly, *al-Tawhid* is an holistic concept with far reaching implications on all aspects of the Muslims' life. For details on *al-Tawhid* as a representative concept of the Islamic worldview and the Islamic way of life (i.e. economics, sociology, politics, and the arts) see Manzoor (1984a).

For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on *al-Tawhid* as articulated in the Arab-Islamic tradition and its varied implication for epistemology. Within this tradition, therefore, *al-Tawhid* is based on 'Uruba/Islam as defined above. Furthermore, *al-Tawhid principle* has 3 main functions in the Arab-Islamic order: (1) maintaining the religious and the secular in the philosophical domain (metaphysical/ontological), (2) in the socio-political organization of society, (3) and in the scientific practice of society. Each of these three functions is dealt with by Ziadé (1987).

Furthermore, some scholars ('Abduh 1966; Tazi, 1976; al-Jabiri, 1984a) have pointed out the essential role of *al-Tawhid* principle in the socio-political and cultural reconstruction of the Arab-Islamic society during and in the aftermath of Western colonialism. Last but not least, other scholars (Rahman 1982; Mohd Nor Wan Daud; 1989; and Abu al-Fadl 1990) have discussed the pivotal role of *al-Tawhid* principle for the evaluation of the historical performance of generations of Muslims involved in political and scientific productions over time. For further details on each aspect of *al-Tawhid* raised above see the following works: a) 'Amara (1980c, 1981; 1992 a, b), b) Ziadé (1987), c) Kettani (1984).

For the importance of *al-Tawhid principle* in the reconstruction process of the Arab-Islamic pattern of development in the wake of colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries, see a) 'Abduh (1966), b) Rahman (1982), c) al-Jabiri (1984a). For the importance of *al-Tawhid principle* in education and in knowledge production see: a) Mohd Nor Wan Daud (1989), b) 'Amara (1992a) , c) Abul-Fadl (1990), d) Manzoor (1984a). Finally, for the importance of *al-Tawhid* in feminist scientific knowledge by Arab-Muslim women see al-Sa'dawi's articulation of this principle in chapter 5 and Mernissi's in chapter 6 of this thesis.

Equally, see chapter 7 and my criticism of al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's appropriation of the social sciences in light of *al-Tawhid* principle.

6. Modernism. The concept of modernism, just as the concept of science, suffers from several ambiguities. The ambiguities stem from the tendency of most social scientists and politicians to equate modernism in Muslim societies with modernism defined and practiced in Western societies. The Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary A Merriam-Webster. (1971) defines modernism as: " 1. a practice, usage peculiar to modern times. 2 a. a movement in Protestant Christianity that seeks to establish the meaning and validity of the Christian faith for present human experience" (p.544).

The equation of Islamic modernism with Western modernism by many scholars is highly problematic at least on three counts: a) it reifies the history of modernism in Islamic societies, b) it implies that all modernist scholars are necessarily affiliated with Western definition of modernism, c) it promotes the misconception that modernist scholars are invariably validating the Christian way of life. And as such, modernists are perceived as promoters of an acculturated form of social change that undermines the Islamic identity and the Islamic way of life at its core.

Clearly the concept of modernism reveals not only a failure in conceptualization, but also a distortion of the meaning of Islamic modernism. The failure in conceptualization as I demonstrated in my work (1983) is due to the failure to distinguish between what is modern and what is Western. Implicitly, the two are assumed to be identical. Nevertheless, to a non Western society the process of modernism and Westernization are two different matters altogether. Similarly, the distortion of the meaning of Islamic modernism stems from two factors: First, the absence of definition of Islamic modernism from most scholars' work on the Islamic Middle East feminists and non-feminists alike (i.e. Hourani, 1983; Badran and Cooke 1990, Ahmed 1992 etc...). Second, the assumption that Islamic modernism is a movement and practice that began only in the 19th century under Western influence.

Yet, many Muslim scholars (Tazi 1972, 1973, 1976; F. Rahman 1982; 'Amara 1992a, b; al-Jabiri 1984a; al-Nabhan, 1987; and Ghalyun 1987) have defined Islamic modernism as being deeply embedded in the Islamic worldview and its independent pattern of development based on *al-Tawhid*. First and foremost, all these scholars point out that Islamic modernism is not a practice peculiar to the 19th century or the present times, but a cyclical practice in the history of Muslims. Second, these scholars maintain, Islamic modernism has an idiosyncratic scientific tradition and scholarship founded in Islamic epistemology (both religious and secular). To elucidate, they invariably discuss the two axes of Islamic modernism *tajdid/islah* (renewal/renovation) focal to the '*ulama's ijtihad* over time.

Third, these scholars insist on the differential application of the two axes of *tajdid* and *islah* from one group to another according to the degree of conservatism or progressivism in the position of the group involved in *ijtihad*. For instance, al-Nabhan (1987) points out that even orthodox Islam (adhered to by the ultra-conservative Muslims) encompasses the two axes of *ijtihad (tajdid/islah)*. At once this challenges the notion that

orthodox Islam invariably opposes social and scientific progress. Equally, this highlights the power-relations at the core of the endeavor of *ijtihad*. Finally, this highlights the problem of interpretation as a problem of emphasis determined by the ideological and political orientation of the scholars who give voice to *ijtihad*. For example the *ijtihad* of 'Abduh' school and his followers entrenched in *the Tawfiqi trend* (balance between the religious and the secular) is different from that of some Islamists in the 1970s whose understanding of *ijtihad* means renewing the traditional beliefs and values of Islam by reviving the Shari'ah as interpreted by means of *fiqh* by the first generation of the '*ulama*. Likewise, *the ijtihad* of Muslim women scholars (i.e. Zayn al-Din 1928) is fundamentally different from both the first two examples, and much more progressive because it introduces gender perspectives to *ijtihad* practice.

In view of the above discussion, I use modernism in this study in the following meanings: (1) modernism is a universal phenomenon in human history and experience aiming at the increase of knowledge and the ability to control nature with the ultimate purpose of achieving happiness for different societies that constitute the world community. (2) Modernism contains criteria that vary according to the specific worldview and value-system adhered to by the societies that constitute the world community. (3) The criteria of modernism, though embedded in a worldview, are not "fixed". They evolve according to the process of development experienced by each society, and its pattern of development and thought. (4) The articulations of modernism also vary according to the scholars involved in social change across generations and their respective appropriations of knowledge. For these reasons, the periodization of modernism in each individual society is essential because it allows the researcher to trace the mutations, continuities and discontinuities experienced by the society under study in their systemic historical, socio-political and cultural evolution and context.

For a definition of the Islamic worldview of modernism and its tradition of scientific practice of *ijtihad* see 'Amara (1992). For a systematic exploration of the original legal sources that capture the practice of *ijtihad* through the chronological study of jurists' writings from the 3rd/9th century to the 16th/19th century see Hallaq (1984). For a discussion of the Islamic worldview of modernism and the changes of the Islamic tradition of modernism see Rahman (1982). Also, for a discussion of Islamic modernism by several social groups ranging from *al-Salafiyya* to politicians to nationalists, and their articulations of *al-Tawhid* ('*Uruba/Islam*) in the *tajdid* and *islah* of the reform programs during the 19th and 20th centuries, see Al-Jabiri (1984a, 1989c).

7. Secularization/Secularism are concepts that most social scientists use the interchangeably, leading to a confusion. The confusion lies in these concepts being couched within a framework of polarization "alien" and inapplicable to Islamic societies. Berkes (1964) distinguishes between the process of secularization and the doctrine of secularism when he so aptly observed:

The process of secularization is inherently a social process, which takes place as a result of factors, which are beyond individuals' control. Whereas the doctrine of secularism involves individual ideas, attitudes, beliefs, or interests. Unfortunately, the two are interrelated; but the latter is not necessarily the accompaniment or a necessary product of the former. (p. 3)

Thus, Berkes acknowledges the evolution of society as corollary to the evolution of thought and culture. From this integrated view, he not only explains how the secularization process is part of a continuum within the Islamic thought, but he also describes how secularization is experienced differently according to history and context. For a comparison with secularism and secularization in the West, see item 17 on secularism in this glossary. Also, for insights on secularism both in the East and the West as an integral part of the disintegration of centralized religious empires as well as the manifestation of the state's attempt to achieve national unity around notions of sovereignty and citizenship, see Sonn (1987).

For the particular articulations of secularism and secularization in the Arab-Islamic context see a) 'Amara (1980c; 1981), b) Shibli (1986). For an informative discussion of secularization in the Islamic political tradition see Carré (1993).

8. Waqf/Hubus is the common terminology used in the Maghribi literature to refer to *al-waqf* law and its institutions. Heffening (1987) restricts his definition of *al-waqf* to be merely an endowment "of a definitely religious public nature" (p.1097) for the purpose of *qurba* "pleasing of God" (p.1096). Also, he explains the variety of *waqf* deeds (*dhuri* and *ahli*) (p.1097). However, Heffening's definition of *al-waqf* remains highly reductionist because he neither explains the organic role of *al-waqf* in the new moral order established by the prophet, nor how it worked as a foreign policy with non-Muslims. In doing so, Heffening overlooks the integrative role of *al-waqf* in the economic, socio-political and cultural aspects of the Muslims' life both at the internal and external levels.

For a more accurate and comprehensive definition of *al-waqf* and its role in the Islamic society, see Bin 'Abdallah (1996a, b). Also, for a portrayal of *al-waqf's* role in the history of Muslim societies, see the collective work: Le Waqf Dans l'espace Islamique outil de pouvoir socio-politique. (1995). Further, scholarly works on *al-waqf* in the international history of Islam and its socio-political role inside and outside Muslim societies and abroad see: a) Ibn Khaldun al-Muqaddimah. (1970), and Tazi (1968; 1981; 1995).

9.a. Culture/Civilization. I adhere to the distinction Jarbawi (1981) makes between culture and civilization. According to him, civilization means a core culture expanding beyond its environment to incorporate other cultures. Through this process the core culture is transformed into a civilization, a super-culture, by adapting new elements from the cultures it encounters. Thus, the core culture is able to expand because it has acquired a coherent, well integrated 'developmental ideology with universal goals" (pp.12-13). In contrast, Jarbawi argues a culture cannot be considered a civilization unless it becomes a core culture with expansive powers and a strong developmental ideology. Following this definition what distinguished the Arab-Islamic Civilization from any other civilization and sustained its developmental ideology was the principle of *al-Tawhid* (see Appendix II). In a different way, yet in the same vein, Malti-Douglas (1991) captures the Arab-Islamic cultural constituents of the region as follows: "Historically, Arabic culture has been, and remains, an essentially Islamic one, though there are, of course non-Arabic Islamic cultures." (p.4).

9.b. Cultural identity. I do not view cultural identity as an abstract "closed" concept. Rather I define cultural identity as the manifestation of people's specific way of life that can

be determined both in history and geography and that distinguishes a particular culture from another. Thus, cultural identity contains its autonomous dynamic and dialectic contents, which affirm the qualitative differences among cultures as much as they emphasize the values shared between cultures in the world community.

10. The 'ulama. Contemporary scholars on the Arab-Islamic culture (Waardenburg 1966, 1983; 1981 and Hourani 1983) continue to portray the *'ulama* in a highly reductionist way. On the one hand these scholars are mistaken in identifying the *'ulama* as a monolithic group of a traditional educated elite across time and place. On the other hand, they disseminate the view of the *'ulama* as having a high education and wide knowledge of Islamic theology. Such reductionist definitions lead to both taxonomic error, and polemical distortions. Taxonomic error resides in implying that the Muslim jurists are equivalent to "ministers" or "clergymen" (i.e. Makdisi 1981, and Waardenburg 1966, 1983). Although the *'ulama* are by and large endowed with religious authority, their difference in training, roles and socio-cultural environments rules out this false equation. Polemical distortion because such definitions lead to negative connotations about the *'ulama*. For example, implying that the *'ulama's* training is "obsolete" and antiquated; thus, an obstacle to "modern" life-styles and the Muslims' societies' accommodation of social change.

Clearly, the above definitions of the *'ulama* stem from dichotomous view of tradition and modernity. Above all, these definitions do not contribute to the meaning and place of the *'ulama* in the systemic evolution of the Arab-Islamic society. In order to avoid both taxonomic error, and polemical distortions the work of 'Amara (1981) is invaluable. From the outset, he identifies the *'ulama* as guardians of the Islamic worldview and its idiosyncratic pattern of development (*al-Tawhid*) both in the socio-political and cultural organization Muslim societies. Accordingly, 'Amara identifies the role of the *'ulama* as promoters of *al-wasitiyya* (middle position) contained in *al-Tawhid* principle both in socio-political and cultural theories. (p. 12).

Al-wasitiyya, 'Amara observes, enabled the *'ulama* not only to sustain both continuity and change throughout Arab-Islamic history; but also to keep a balance between the religious and secular epistemological sources in their articulation of Arab-Islamic knowledge. From the perspective of balance, 'Amara explains, the Shari'ah did not constitute the only basis of government; and was not applicable to all purposes of life. Instead, he insists it is the rationality within the Shari'ah blended with the principle of *shura* (consultation of the community) that constitute the ground of Islamic political and social theory and system. Thus, 'Amara highlights the historical role of the *'ulama* role as catalysts in integrating both science and religion in the evolution of the Arab-Islamic culture. In fact, 'Amara (1992) points out, the *'ulama* relied on the principle of *al-Tawhid* required and consistently focused on *tajdid* and *islah*, renewal/renovation as the two axes of *ijtihad* development throughout the history of the Arab-Islamic society.

For taxonomic precision on the *'ulama* and further details see, Szylowicz (1973), 'Amara (1981) and Al-Haj Moinuddin (1990). This literature portrays the *'ulama* as being a polyvalent educated elite ranging from educators, juri-consults, theologians, social scientists, politicians, and scientists. Equally, see Tazi (1972, 1973 and 1976), Eccel (1984), and Berkey (1992). This literature portrays the diversity in the training of the

'*ulama* as elites in the Arab-Islamic society, and their adaptive role and function the socio-political and cultural life of the Arab-Islamic society over time and place.

11. Endogenous/Indigenous. The Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. A Merriam-Webster. (1971) defines "endogenous" as 1a. Growing from or on the inside: developing within the cell wall. 1b. Originating within the body. (p.274). Thus, the term "endogenous" connotes not only "coming from the inside", but it also implies a "dynamism" in the internal evolution. In contrast, this source defines "indigenous" as "inborn" and "innate" (p.427). It also defines "indigenous" as "simple", "unaffected" and in an "unadulterated form" (p.563). It is precisely for this pejorative connotation of "static" and "unchanged" state that I reject the term "indigenous".

Following the above definition of "endogenous", when I use this term I mean originating from within the Arab-Islamic society as a body, and its internal pattern of thought. Also, I mean the internal dynamism involved in the evolution of this pattern and its adaptive ability to new environments and its capacity to accommodate social change over time. Also, for a feminist articulation of "endogenous development" see, al-Sa'dawi in chapter 5 in this thesis.

12. Ijtihad. *Ijtihad* is an ongoing controversial issue between scholars. Some scholars (i.e., 1981) identify *ijtihad* as an intellectual exertion/creativity endowed exclusively to the '*ulama* trained in the *madrasah*, and that this elitism induced the "closing" of the process of *ijtihad* in the 13th century. Conversely others have demonstrated that the 13th century marked "the re-opening of *ijtihad*" as evident in the work of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) (Hourani 1983; al-Haj-Moimuddin 1990). Hallaq (1984) considers that the view of the *insidad*, closing of *ijtihad* believed by many to have occurred after the second/eighth century is "entirely baseless and inaccurate" (p.4). He brilliantly shows that *ijtihad* was neither closed in theory, nor in practice. First, he noted that "all groups and individuals who opposed it were finally excluded from Sunism" (p. 4). Second, he pointed out "that the more important point is that indivisibility (*tajzi'a*) of *ijtihad* was recognized to be lawful in Sunni laws." (p.7). A few scholars (Mohd Nor Wan Daud 1989) view *Ijtihad* as a process of *both* individual intellectual exertion (*fard 'ayn*), and a social deliberative process (*fard kifayya*) geared for the common good of the Islamic *Ummah*. As such, these scholars place *ijtihad* as an on-going process open to the evolution of history and the Muslims' interpretative process over time. In addition, other scholars explain the criteria for *ijtihad*, namely that scholars follow the tradition of knowledge seeking and verification of the Islamic worldview of science, and comply with *tajdid* and *islah* as parallel axes of the process of their scientific discovery. (Ghalyun, 1988; 'Amara, 1981, and 1992a, b).

For additional information on the differential application of the two axes of *tajdid* and *islah* according to the degree of conservatism or progressivism in the position of the group involved in *ijtihad* see the following works. a) Al-Nabhan (1987) on the practice of *ijtihad* by orthodox Islam (adhered to by the ultra-conservative Muslims). b) Ghalyun (1988) for the practice of *ijtihad* by 'Abduh and his disciples. c) For a glimpse of the practice of *ijtihad* by Muslim women scholars (i.e Zayn al-Din 1928) and Muslim women feminists (i.e. Fawwaz and Nasif) see chapter 1 of this thesis. d) For an idea about the importance of *ijtihad* for

contemporary women feminists, see al-Sa'dawi's articulation of this concept in chapter 5 of this thesis, and my interpretation of *ijtihad* in chapter 7.

13. Nisa'iyat (pl. of Nisa'i). The Arabic terminology "*nisa'i*" "*nisa'iyat*" connotes feminist issues, and refers to women. The dual referral of feminism and women contained in the Arabic terminology reflects the absence of the duality feminine/feminist in gender identity from the original Arab-Islamic feminist discourse established by women. Therefore, to this day the Arabic terminology *nisa'i* remains a comprehensive concept that refers to women with no distinction of gender identities (sexual, social, etc.), or feminist struggles. The only way to assess the degree of feminist activism in Arabic literature is through an examination of the content of women's writings. Similarly, the only way to ascertain about the nature of women's definitions of gender identity is through an examination of women's definitions of the concept of femininity and how they articulate this concept in their discourses on femininity (see item 22 in the glossary).

For taxonomic accuracy *nisa'iyat* experienced three phase. First, *nisa'iyat*, (though not using the term) were initiated by al-Taymuriyya and Fawwaz through their involvement in the socio-political and cultural movements of Egypt. The second phase of *nisa'iyat* occurred when Malak Hifni Nasif presented women's demands as feminist demands to the Egyptian parliament (1909), and published these demands and other works in her book Nisa'iyat (1910). The third phase of *nisa'iyat* happened with the institutionalization of women's studies/feminist studies in academia in the 1940s. For the first two phases see chapter 1. For the third phase see chapter 3.

14. Exogenous. The Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. A Merriam-Webster. (1971) defines "exogenous" as a) Originating from or due to external causes. b). Having a cause external to the body (p.292). Following this definition, when I use the term "exogenous", I mean external to the Arab-Islamic society as a body, and outside its internal pattern of development and its independent system of thought.

15. Al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya/Islamic Fundamentalism. Hanafi (1989) argues that "*usuliyya*" (fundamentalism) in Islam connotes a very different "signified" than in the West. First, he points out, "*usuliyya*" refers to the scholarly endeavor of identifying the fundamental principles of the religious doctrine of Islam and law, and seeks to implement that legality in the socio-political and cultural organization of the Muslim people. As such, Hanafi explains, "*usuliyya*" is not a product of the modern age but has existed throughout the history of Islam as evident in the invariable call to Muslims by conservatives, progressives, reformers, and enlightened to recapture "the fundamentals of Islam" in order to preserve the continuity of the Islamic identity and renew the Islamic civilization over time in the foundations of society.

Second, Hanafi identifies the agenda Islamic fundamentalism in light the "signified" within this movement. On the one hand, he contends, "*usuliyya*" is a movement that seeks to re-capture the multiple variables of Islam as a civilization, namely religion, law, morality, worldview, culture, language (Arabic) as the sacred language in which the Islamic Message was revealed to all Muslims in the world, and the vehicle of the scientific productions of the Islamic Civilization. On the other hand, Hanafi argues, since the

multiple referents of Islam affect both identity and identification of the Muslim people, caution against reductionism of Islamic fundamentalism to either monolithism or essentialism is recommended. Such a reductionism, he warns, obscures the various layers and meanings of identity and identification between Militant "Islamists", Muslim modernists, Muslim feminists, or simply conservative Muslims.

Furthermore, 'Amara (1993) argues, the concept "*usuliyya*" has been indigenized by Muslim social scientists and politicians since the mid 1970s. This indigenization, he observes, has altered the nature of "*usuliyya*" from its original meaning of "progress and reason" into the Western meaning "backwardness" it is associated with by its counterpart "fundamentalism" in Western culture. For this reason, 'Amara considers the concept fundamentalism in its widely disseminated meaning in the West totally invalid for Islam and the description of Islamic civilization. Instead, he calls on the Muslim social scientists to mobilize against the indigenization of *usuliyya*, and for the retrieval of its original signified.

Both the positions of Hanafi and 'Amara are endorsed by some of their Western counterparts. Munson (1988) cautions scholars against the problems of comparativism when dealing with fundamentalism. First he notes that most scholars tend to equate Islamic fundamentalisms with Western fundamentalisms instead of comparing these movements. Second, Munson argues, most scholars tend to focus on religion rather than on worldview. For both these reasons, Munson views the term fundamentalism to be an inadequate and inaccurate term for fundamentalism in Islamic societies. In fact, Munson prefers the terminology communalism to fundamentalism when describing the emphasis on religion as the primary source of collective identity in Muslim societies (p.155).

Furthermore, Campo (1995) traces the rise of the neologism "fundamentalism" to Rahman (1966), and shows how soon after the concept of fundamentalism has been gradually ex-appropriated from its *Wahhabi* essence by Western scholars. First, Campo traces the initial attempt of ex-appropriation to Geertz (1968) as evident in his tacit reduction of fundamentalism to "scripturalism" in his portrayal of Morocco and Indonesia (p.169). Second, Campo contends, as late as 1976, the concept of "fundamentalism" was not widely used to designate Islam as evidenced in the Middle East studies literature. In fact, he observes, the rise of "Islamic fundamentalism" as a dominant discursive subject occurred only in the wake of historical and political events in Muslim regions and the Middle east region: the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the assassination of Sadat the president of Egypt in 1981 by the Islamists groups; and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. These events have had profound regional and global political ramification especially on Western interests in the area on the one hand. And on the other hand, the troubling involvement of religious groups in politics gave western scholars and agencies further reason for investigation.

In light of the above, I use *usuliyya* in the sense attributed to it by Hanafi. For details on the aspects discussed above see the following works: Rahman (1966), Hanafi (1989) 'Amara (1993), Binder, L. (Ed). (1976;1988), and Munson (1988). For the particular discussion of the rise of the hegemonic discourse on Islamic fundamentalism in the West, see Campo (1995). Finally, for a particular discussion of the meanings of various fundamentalist movements since the 1970s in the Arab-Islamic society see Ghalyun (1988).

16. Mode of production. Although I borrow the terms "mode of production" and "mode of analysis" from the Marxist ideology, and I use them as interchangeable analytical categories, I do so critically. I do not consider women's mode of analysis to have a separate structure likely to subvert the established mode of knowledge production set by a patriarchal structure in culture. Rather I see the feminine mode as embedded in a network of relations and struggles both in society and scientific practice within a specific culture. According to this definition, a feminine mode of analysis, though it has its own set of politics and ideology, its structural and scientific existence are determined by the whole societal and scientific network of the culture in which it is embedded.

17. Secularism in the West. According to The Shorter Oxford English dictionary On Historical Principles. (1973). Vol .II. 3 rd ed.

Secularism 1846: 1. The doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future state. 2. The view that national education should be purely secular 1872.

Secularization. 1706. Fr, Secularisation (XVI-XVII).1. The conversion of an ecclesiastical or religious institution or its property to secular possession and use; the conversion of an ecclesiastical state or sovereignty to a lay one. 2. The giving of a secular or non-sacred character or direction to (art, studies, etc.); the placing (of morals) on a secular basis; the restricting (of education) to secular subjects 1863.

Secularize: 1611. Fr. Seculariser. 1. Trans. To make secular, to convert from ecclesiastical to civil possession or use. b. To laicize 1864. 2. To make (a monk or monastic order) secular 1683. 3. To convert from religious or spiritual to material and temporal purposes; to turn (a person, his mind, etc.) from a spiritual state to worldliness 1711. (p.1926)

Historically, secularism came about as a solution for the religious conflicts between the Catholics and the Protestants in the West. Equating secularism in the West with secularism (*'ilmaniyya*) in Muslim societies reifies the history of *'ilmaniyya* in Muslim societies, and distorts the meaning of the secularization process in these societies. For the meanings of both the concepts of secularism and secularization in the context of Muslim societies see item 7 in the glossary.

18. Epistemology. I use the term "epistemology" as defined in The Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. (1971). In this source, epistemology is defined as deriving from Greek episteme, knowledge. It refers to: "The study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially in reference to its limits and validity (p.280). From this definition, I argue, the Islamic epistemology's limits and validity are determined by the Islamic worldview of science as defined in item 5 and by the principle of *al-Tawhid* as explained in item 4 of the glossary.

Accordingly, Islamic education is composed of both scientific and religious epistemologies traceable in the history of the Arab-Islamic scientific tradition and its practices. Also, both religious and secular epistemologies in the Arab-Islamic education emphasize the moral validity of Islamic doctrine both in knowledge seeking process and in verification. This raises the issue of knowledge production in the social sciences and their affiliations to a worldview and an epistemology. Since every sociology, psychology, history assumes an epistemology as well as it assumes that its scientific practices produce knowledge, then the place of feminist epistemology and its link to Islamic epistemology is central to the analysis of gender in the Arab-Islamic world. Accordingly, the questions of authority and validity that Kuhn (1970) asked about the philosophies of science become essential for epistemologies whether feminist or non-feminist .

For further details on Islamic epistemology consult the following works: a) Sardar. Ed. (1984), b) Rajab (1992), c) 'Amara (1992), d) Abul-Fadl (1990).

19. Ijma'/Consensus. There is a controversy between both classic and modern scholars on *ijma'*, consensus. At the core of the controversy is a contestation by several groups of the definition of *ijma'* as the codified opinions agreed upon by consensus among the '*ulama*. Similarly, the controversy relates to the definition assigned by the '*ulama* to the counterpart of '*ijma'*: *khilaf* (disagreement). For the '*ulama khilaf* relates to the codified opinions on which there was disagreement among the authoritative '*ulama* only and not a deliberative process emanating from the *Ummah*. Last but not least, the controversy relates to the whole process of achieving *ijma'*. As set by the '*ulama*, the *ijma'* concept applies both to *ibadat* (religious observance) and *mua'malat* (social transactions). This all-encompassing aspect of the *ijma'* is a source of divisiveness between various segments of the Islamic population; including women. All consider that the *ijma'* is restricted to '*ibadat*, while *mua'malat* are subject to other components of the Shari'a such as *ray* (opinion), *qiyas* (analogy) in conformity with the prophet's practice.

For a contemporary feminist critique of '*ijma'*, see al-Sa'dawi's articulation of this concept in chapter 5.

20. Co-optation. For the purpose of the thesis, co-optation refers to three things: a) occultation of feminist ideals by both genders. b) The subsequent assimilation of feminist ideals in patriarchal structures, and/or neo-patriarchal structures. c) The assimilation of pluralism of feminism by some women feminist in monolithic theories of feminism.

21. The West. My usage of "the West" or "Western" is not in a monolithic form: assuming that all western communities share the same experiences, or that individuals within these communities evolve in identical ways. In addition, by "Western", I am specifically, referring to the U.S, and a part of Europe, mainly France and England, who have had historically long-standing relationships with the Arab-Islamic world either through colonization, cultural imperialism, or tourist and cultural exchanges. Last but not least, I focus on these particular countries due their current scientific and technological advancement, which through various training programs of Arab-Islamic intelligentsia sustain Arab-Islamic cultures' scientific and cultural dependency.

22. Femininity.

a. The concept of femininity. For the concept of femininity, I draw from Parker (1984, p.4). The author makes 4 distinctions in the concept of femininity: the construction of femininity; lived femininity; the feminine ideal; and the feminine stereotype. The construction of femininity refers to the psychoanalytic and social account of sexual differentiation. Lived femininity is a social experience either embraced or resisted by women. The feminine ideal is a historical changing concept of what women should be. And the feminine stereotype is a collection of attributes which is imputed to women and against which all their concerns are measured.

b. The components of the discourse of femininity. These components in the Arab-Islamic culture are extremely rich and articulated in different "genres" of writing. I have classified them as follows:

1. Essays, studies, articles, books (non-fictional works; themselves divided in theoretical and field works).
2. Autobiographies, diaries and interviews.
3. Poems, short stories, novels.
4. Working papers for women's organizations, associations, clubs, conferences, and national, regional and international meetings.

23. Feminist Praxis. Stanley (1990b) define feminist praxis as: a) An indication of a shared feminist commitment to a political position in which knowledge is not merely defined as "knowledge what", but also as "knowledge for". b) A rejection of the "theory/research" division calling instead for their unity. c) An emphasis on the interconnection between feminist methodology and epistemology in the investigation of feminist research; hence transforming the nature of knowledge (what), and the nature of knowing (how), to become knowledge for (Why). (p.15)

24. Method, methodology, and epistemology. Stanley & Wise (1990) use these three terms in the way they are defined by Harding (1987). A method is a technique for gathering evidence (e.g. interview, participant observation etc). A methodology is a theory of analysis of how research should proceed (e.g. phenomenology, ethnography etc). Epistemology is a theory of knowledge. It answers questions about who is the knower? What constitutes knowledge? And what kinds of knowledge?

Further, these authors' essential feminist contribution lies in recommending these three terms as analytical instruments not only to locate women's standpoints in the context of their feminist scientific discovery, but also to evaluate the degree of feminists' textual reality with the social reality experienced by women under study.

Based on the link Stanley and Wise make between the feminists' textual reality and the social reality of women under study, I use method, methodology and epistemology as analytical categories to problematize al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's woman's standpoints, and to discuss the epistemological problems within the authors' respective contexts of scientific discoveries, and the gaps between the scientific contexts with the social contexts of reality experienced by Arab-Muslim women during the 1970-90 period (see chapters 5 and 6).

Also, I criticize in chapter 7 al-Sa'dawi's and Mernissi's usage of the analytical categories (method, methodology, and epistemology) in view of the Islamic worldview of science and its tradition of scientific practice and applications of these three categories.

25. Patriarchy/ Neo-patriarchy. I define patriarchy as a historical socio-cultural system of institutionalized control by men in order to submit women to their authority in all walks of life. To sustain women's submission over time, patriarchy perpetuates itself in history through rituals, custom, law, language, education, and the division of labor in the social, political, religious and intellectual structures systemic to a society.

As such, patriarchy is a dynamic socio-cultural system in the history of cultures, which evolves and reproduces itself differently according to the systemic evolution of each society that constitutes the world community. Therefore, in order to understand the nature of patriarchy in the context of the Arab-Islamic society, it is essential to trace the evolution of its particular socio-political and cultural system over time. For this reason, I find the analysis of patriarchy and neo-patriarchy in the work of Sharabi (1986; 1988) very useful.

In the context of Arab society, Sharabi explains there are two kinds of patriarchies: a "traditional patriarchy" and a "neo-patriarchy". Traditional patriarchy, he states (1986) has been not only the dominant form of the family but also that of the state. The patriarchal form of family organization extends to the state and infuses all aspects of the traditional Arab culture, and exercises a hierarchy of power in a pyramidal form that permeates the social, political, religious and intellectual spaces within society. As such, traditional patriarchy is authoritarian in its political, social, religious, or intellectual manifestations. The authority is not only absolute and final, but it is also exercised in a vertical hierarchy of power (pp.2-3).

In contrast, Sharabi (1988) argues neo-patriarchy "is neither traditional nor modern...It is an entropic social formation characterized by its transitory nature and by specific kinds of underdevelopment and non-modernity-visible in its economy and class structure as well as its political, social and cultural organization. Moreover, it is a highly unstable formation, replete with inner contradictions and conflicts." (p.4). In fact he notes, "It is impossible to grasp the concept of neo-patriarchy without recognizing its two implicit and prior terms, patriarchy and dependency. This recognition enables us to understand neo-patriarchy as a totality-in its social, economic, political and cultural aspects- and to see it as a concrete historical formation shaped simultaneously by internal and external forces." (p.5). In fact, Sharabi identifies the emergence of "neopatriarchal society...as the outcome of modern Europe's colonization of the patriarchal Arab world, of the marriage of imperialism and patriarchy" (p. 21).

Although by and large I adhere to Sharabi's definitions of patriarchy and neo-patriarchy to put into perspective social change in the context of the Arab-Islamic society over time, I do so critically in two ways. First, I reject his definition of modernity as "a uniquely European phenomenon...which has had a devastating existential consequences for the non-Western world" (p.18). This definition is monolithic and universalizing in that it denies other "non-Western" forms of modernity that existed before (Islamic) and after the Western modernity (i.e. Japan). Also, this definition is apologetic for the non-Western countries, which

did not provide their people with endogenous models of modernity. Instead I view modernity as inextricably linked with a particular worldview (i.e. the Islamic worldview view of modernism) as outlined in item 6 of this glossary.

Second, like Sharabi, I agree that all neo-patriarchies share "the absence equally of genuine traditionalism and of authentic modernity" (p.23). However, unlike Sharabi, I do not view Arab neo-patriarchy as a monolith that uniformly affects all countries that constitute the Arab-Islamic society. This is so, because on the one hand Western colonialism and imperialism have affected differentially both the Mashriq and the Maghrib, and the individual countries within each region. On the other hand, the neo-patriarchal forms that occurred in each country since the 19th century also varied according to the particular internal and external factors of each country. This led to a wide range of neo-patriarchies with specific hybrid experiences of tradition and modernity.

For further exploration of Sharabi's analysis of Arab patriarchy, see Sharabi (1986). For the author's interpretation of neo-patriarchy in the region since *al-Nahda* see Sharabi (1988). Also, for an illustration of neo-patriarchy in the case of Algeria see Knauss (1987). Finally, for a feminist interpretation and illustration of patriarchy and neo-patriarchy in both in Egypt and Morocco see chapters 1 and 3 in this thesis.

26. The Complementarity of Genders. The notion of complementarity of genders stems from the Islamic metaphysics, worldview of the universe and of the human being; all of which are founded on the principle of *al-Tawhid* (item 5 of this glossary). For a discussion of the importance of the notion of complementarity of genders in the history of nationalism and of feminism both in the past in the present see Ziadé's observations in *Al-Raida/The Pioneer*: International Women's Day. (1992). Vol. X, No. 57, 5-6.

However, the notion of complementarity of genders is often manipulated in the context of the Arab-Islamic society by various political constituencies to scholars in order to fit their respective agendas. Afkhami aptly observes in *al-Raida/the Pioneer* (1996) how the notion of complementarity of genders is manipulated equally by fundamentalists and feminists constituencies in Muslim societies in the formulation of Islamic human Rights (p.15). Further, she notes that nobody challenges the fact that: "complementarity implies unequal treatment of men and women, as well as inherent limitations of roles, not only for women" (pp.15-16).

In addition, I show in chapter 7 how the notion of complementarity of genders has been positively integrated in scientific appropriations of Moroccan social scientists, in their critique of the discourses of feminism, and in their promotion of agency for both genders in society. Likewise, I illustrate in chapter 7 the way Moroccan citizens (ranging from nationalists, social scientists, and feminists) have integrated the notion of complementarity of genders both in their political and intellectual *ijtihad* in since the mid 1980s.

27. Feminism. Although there is a large body of literature on the history of feminism in the world community, the specific history of Arab-Islamic feminism is still in short supply. To begin with this history has been reified by scholars in four ways. 1) The integration of this region's feminism within a single category of "Third-World women" (i.e. Jayawardena, 1986; Mohanty Russo and Torres 1991). 2) The designation of feminism/women as

“Middle Eastern”, or in the Middle East. (I.e. Keddie & Baron. Ed., 1991) This designation falsely includes the populations from North Africa in the Middle East or excludes them. 3) The designation of this region's feminism by religion, hence producing a false monolithic category of analysis called "Muslim women" or "women in the Muslim world" (i.e. Beck & Keddie, 1979; Hussain, 1984; Ahmed, 1992). This category masks the cultural manifestations other than religion in the identity and identification of women in this region. 4) The designation of feminism of this region of the world by language/ethnicity (Arabic) (i.e. Badran & Cooke, 1990; Tucker. Ed., 1993). The “Arab world” or “Arab women” as a classification produces an equally artificial category of analysis in that it masks the role of Islam as a socio-cultural meaning-scheme for both genders within the majority in the region. Yet researchers using this category (i.e. Tucker. Ed., 1993) invariably attack the judico-social system of Islam as oppressive to women and do not address the judico-social system that governs the "Jewish" or "Christian" minority groups which they so insist on as being an integral part of the category "Arab women" or the "Arab world".

For these reasons, the term feminism in the region remains highly contested because it does not represent the diverse struggle and histories of women in the Arab-Islamic world. Equally, the feminist movements and scholarship in this region have been challenged by many on the grounds of cultural imperialism by both conservative and progressive political constituencies in the nations that constitute the Arab-Islamic world. Finally, feminism of the region have been criticized for its elitist vision and its ambiguous stance with the state's policy of governance (see chapter 1 of this thesis)

Accordingly, I define feminism as an international socio-political movement with plural ethnic origins and multiple cultural historical manifestations in the world community. That being the case, feminism raises two inter-related issues: 1) the issue of definition. 2) the issue of context. Combined, these issues form the discursive practices of feminism cross-culturally. This is precisely why the practice of feminist scholarship in a specific culture within the world community is an essential discursive site of struggle. After all, the whole purpose of recording any struggle is not a mere activity of documentation. What is immensely important is the way this documentation is recorded, theorized, and disseminated.

A notable exception in English on feminism and feminist scholarship in the region emerged in the 1990s namely in the writings of Malti-Douglas (1991; 1995). This type of feminism is holistic in approach in that it views feminism as a socio-political and cultural issue grounded in a specific geographical area and its dynamics, and interacting with other international feminisms. Nonetheless, this type of "holistic feminism" lacks an holistic terminology in that it still uses non-inclusive categories that designate feminism of the region as "Middle Eastern", or from the Middle East. Such a classification of feminism artificially separates North African feminism (al-Maghrib) from al-Mashriq. Also, it fails to recognize the political importance of cultural diversity within unity and its significance in the Arab-Islamic region.

28. Culture's attributes in knowledge production and scientific practice. Beillerot (1989) defines four attributes of knowledge production (*caractères du savoir*) and scientific practice in any culture as follows:

-Le savoir est proche de savoir-faire parce qu'il n'existe réellement que par l'action qu'il permet: c'est la mise en oeuvre du savoir, et non son stockage, qui importe ici.

-Les savoir-faire sont toujours discourus, et se déploient dans une réalité sociale et culturelle; ils deviennent ainsi des pratiques sociales de savoirs, elles-mêmes sources des pratiques sociales de productions de biens et de symboles;

-Les pratiques sociales de savoirs impliquent la conscience d'elles-mêmes: le savoir implique une conscience de savoir;

-Les pratiques sociales et discourues de savoirs s'exercent toujours en interaction, voire collectivement. Le rôle organisateur de la réalité sociale est donc essentiel, y compris celui de l'imaginaire social qui, pour ce qui est du savoir, s'exprime en particulier dans le mythe d'une totalité unifiée des savoirs. (pp.180-182)

29. Al-Salafiyya. Just as modernism, *al-Salafiyya* suffers from monolithic interpretations, which reduce the range and vitality of this movement both in the 19th and the 20th centuries. Al-Jabiri (1989c) largely compensates for this lacuna when he defines *al-Salafiyya* in the Arab-Islamic world as a complex and diverse movement that is organic to contemporary history in the region. He classifies *al-Salafiyya* into four major groups a) *Salafiyyin rafidin* (the group of refusal). This group views today's governance and institutions as a sort of "al-Jahiliyya" and advocates a return to the "original" system of governance set by the prophet. b) *Salafiyyin mu'tadilin* (the moderate group). Those who accept change as long as it does not contradict Islamic teachings. c) *Salafiyyin mu'awwilin* (the interpreter group) Those who seek in the Arab-Islamic values and institutions equivalent concepts in the contemporary civilization that can enable the development of Islamic institutions and concepts to fit contemporary situations (i.e. *shura* vs. parliament representation) d) *Salafiyyin tawfiqiyyin* This group is the most complex in that it includes people with liberal, Marxist, or socialist tendencies, yet who attempt to reconcile their political tendencies with their *Salafi* thinking (p. 12).

30. Islamic revivalism is an intellectual movement focused on the rebirth of the Islam as a civilization. Composed of scholars and politicians of conservative and progressive variants of the Arab-Islamic society, this movement advocates the return to the fundamentals of the Arab-Islamic thought in the reconstruction of society at all levels in order to establish a contemporary *nahda* (renaissance). Al-Jabiri (1989c) captures the spirit of contemporary *nahda* as follows: "the question of al-Nahda is not a question of struggle between tradition and modernity, or choosing between the two, but how to approach the turath (heritage) and update its usul [fundamentals] for the present and the future" (p.45).

APPENDICES

Appendix I. The Four Schools Of Sunni Islam.

Sunni Islam is constituted of four *Madhahibs* (schools of thought) as follows:

1. The Hanafi Madhab. Founded by Abu Hanifa (699-769). He emphasized on *Qiyas* (analogy) and the elaboration of the deductive method in conformity with the first four Caliphs. This *madhab* is found mainly in Central Asia, Northern India, Turkey, Pakistan, China and Japan.

2. The Shafi'i Madhab. Founded by Abu Abdallah Muhammad Ash-shafi'i (770-819). He emphasized upon the methodologies and the foundations of the law. This *madhab* is mainly found in lower Egypt, Southern India, and in Malaysia.

3. The Maliki Madhab. Founded by Malik Ibn Anas (705-795). This *madhab* is the closest to the "fundamentals" of the *Sunna*, and is mainly found in North Africa and in upper Egypt.

4. The Hanbali Madhab. Founded by Ibn Hanbal (780-855), this *madhab* is more "puritanical" than the rest of schools" because it seeks to perpetuate pristine Islam.

Although these four schools by and large agree with respect to the fundamentals of the doctrine of *Sunni Islam*, they differ in the application of *Ray* (opinion, judgement) and in the interpretation of the Qur'an. Furthermore, historically these four schools were not just mere schools of theology. Rather, these schools were/are inextricably linked to the political and cultural governance of the Islamic states as evident in various periods in the history of Muslims.¹

¹ For details on the controversies raised by these four schools in the early history of the Arab-Islamic society see Tazi (1972). Also, for a full discussion of how political theory was an extension of the basic principles of Islamic law during the middle ages see a) Rosenthal (1973), b) 'Amara (1981), c) Hallaq (1984). Likewise for an interpretation of the link between political theory and the Shari'a in contemporary Muslim societies, see a)'Amara (1980), b) Enayat (1982). Further, for a progressive interpretation of egalitarian Islam that links these schools and the state in terms of governance for *both* genders see Asad (1980). Finally, for a feminist interpretation of how these schools continue to shape the socio-political and cultural governance of Muslims, and their significance for "*a feminine Ijtihad*" in Arab-Islamic political science as well as a feminist epistemology see Bennani (1993).

Appendix II. Al-Waqf in the Structural and Procedural Process of Education: Implications for Class and Gender.

Introduction

Thanks to the unique Islamic law of *waqf* the initial Arab-Muslim community managed its educational institutions as independent and personal enterprises away from any central authority. Essentially, the law of *waqf* was a law of decentralization of power among the governing authority and the governed, and as such it was twofold in the socio-political and cultural governance of Muslims. First, *al-waqf* represented an "overall policy" of education that governed the establishment of all educational institutions and their evolution at the structural level. Second, *al-waqf* functioned as a global structure for the organization and institutionalization of learning. Accordingly, *al-waqf* functioned as a twofold policy combining the macro-micro levels of cultural and educational governance in the Islamic society.

At the macro level, *al-waqf* represented a cultural policy in two ways. On the one hand, it was highly instrumental in safeguarding the political and intellectual freedom of educational institutions from the state control. On the other hand, *al-waqf* was a political empowerment tool for all constitutive social groups within the Muslim community against any form of hegemony by advocacy groups in cultural governance, including the 'ulama. At the micro level, *al waqf* functioned as an educational strategy for the protection of the balance of power between individuals and collectivities at the procedural level of teaching and learning within institutions. This way *al-waqf* was key in sustaining individual fulfillment as well as in maintaining an Islamic identity for the collective political and cultural cohesion of the community both at the structural and procedural levels.

I. Al-Waqf as a Global Structural Organization of Institutions.

Tibawi (1983c) argues that the earliest institution of learning established by the Prophet was *the mosque, masjid*; where education started initially as *a spoken* tradition for the purpose of learning the Qur'an (p.91). However, Tazi (1972) observes under the pressures of the inner development needs of the initial Arab-Islamic *Ummah* (population increase, urbanization, and economic growth) educational institutions experienced new forms of evolution. For instance, Tazi notes, the population increase led to the evolution of the *masjid* transformed into two categories: a congregational *masjid* for everyday prayer, and a *masjid* as "a center of learning exclusively" (p.112).

Further, urbanization brought more differentiation between levels of learning as reflected in the emergence of two-leveled system of education: a lower level in *the maktab*, and a higher level in *the masjid* (Tibawi, 1983c, p.92). Before long, educational institutions surfaced according to levels of learning. For instance, the lower level made a distinction between the elementary education dispensed in *the maktab*, and the general education offered in *the kuttab*. Similarly, the higher level of the masjid evolved into two separate institutions: *the masjid* and *the jami'*. Overall, therefore, the maktab prepared the learner for the more advanced stage of learning in the kuttab, while the kuttab prepared the learner for the higher level of education provided in the *masjid*, and the *jami'*.

Still, despite this institutional evolution in the 1st century century, the differentiation of learning at the curriculum level remained "blurred" for two essential reasons: (1) The changing ethnic, cultural and social make-up of a growing multicultural Muslim society following the territorial expansion of Islam. (2) The corollary new cultural and educational process of various groups in need of accommodation. These two developments required immediate adjustments of the Islamic educational system at the institutional and curricula levels. At the curriculum level, *writing* became an important component in the general learning of the kuttab and was incorporated in the *lawh*² as an essential instructional aid (Sayili, 1941, p.285). Similarly, the masjid's curriculum witnessed a simultaneous proliferation of religious and secular sciences. (Pederson, 1987. p.354)

At the institutional level, the *kuttab*, the *masjid*, and the *jami'* expanded their role from mere venues of instruction into centers of socialization and agencies of cultural integration. Szylowicz (1973) highlights *the kuttab* as an integrating institution in response to the socialization of an increasingly multicultural population:

The Koranic schools [sic]. (Kuttabs) provided remarkably similar training ...The importance of these schools cannot be overestimated, for not only did they socialize many different people and ethnic groups into a universal Islamic faith, but they also provided the foundation for all further education. Whether the student was to pursue a military, administrative, religious, or commercial career, his early training was in these schools. (p.54)

² *Lawh* is a wooden board for reading and writing drills.

Likewise, Szylowicz depicts the way the learning system in the *masjid* enabled the *'ulama* to benefit from a polyvalent training as well as sustain the Islamic identity in cultural cohesion of the community:

Merchants would often combine a journey to distant places with study there and upon returning home would teach what they had learned to other interested persons in the mosque. Similarly, craftsmen and artisans would acquire knowledge about Islam and thus become eligible for membership in a law school and recognition as a member of the ulema. (p. 83)

Clearly, during the transitional stage of institutional evolution of education in the 1st century, both the lower and higher levels were guided by a common philosophical orientation: the provision of a "polyvalent training" that caters to the learning needs of a multicultural clientele within a policy of integration into the Islamic *Ummah*. Accordingly, the curriculum was twofold: a socializing tool in the cultural integration of diverse social groups, and an inclusive device for the increasingly diverse learning needs of the *Ummah*. Likewise, educational institutions reinforced the orientation of curriculum: the *kuttab* became the institution of general education par excellence, and the *masjid* dispensed diversified training in higher education. Overall, Islamic education of the 1st century was marked by a lack of formality at all levels, and a blurred differentiation both at the institutional and curricular levels at the higher level.

However, with the economic growth of Arab-Muslim polity that occurred in the 2nd century, the high level of education became clearly differentiated and its educational institutions sharply defined, and diversified. Gradually, other "seats of learning" than the *masjid* or the *jami'* started to surface such as *dar al-'Ilm*, *dar-al-Hikmah*, and *dar al-Kutub*. Pederson (1929) argues that the *madrasah-jami'*³, university-mosque, was an outgrowth of such institutions. Other scholars argue that the *madrasah* surfaced as a continuation of other institutions of learning. Goldziher (1955) maintains that the *madrasah* was "an academy of theology" (p.202). And Tibawi (1962) asserts that the *madrasah* grew "Out of the public and private libraries which were established with endowments (*waqf*), and housed in permanent buildings with a salaried staff and a professional group of scholars." (p.227)

³ For further details on the *jami'/madrasah* see (a) Tibawi (1962), and Pederson (1986, 1987).

All three speculations are consistent with the proliferation of libraries and academies⁴ in the 2nd century. Sayili (1941) duly reports that the schools of Basra and Kufa were the first academies established by the Muslims, and later they became famous rival centers of grammatical study in the 8th, 9th and 10th century (p.257). Also, he noted, the 2nd century witnessed the proliferation of scientific institutions such as hospitals and observatories (p.415). In addition, Hitti (1965) documented that bookshops and literary salons emerged in the 2nd century. These two kinds of institutions, he explains, appeared in society following the Arabs' interest in translations in the second century under The Abbassids rule of Iraq. And since then, he observes, both institutions became the intellectual fora par excellence for the elite and the caliphs (p. 414).

To be sure, by the end of the 2nd century the Arab-Islamic society has, thanks to the waqf law, developed a vast informal and dynamic network of higher education that included both religious and scientific institutions. This vast network of institutions of higher education produced an idiosyncratic political economy of cultural governance characterized by a high degree of fluidity between the formal and informal spaces at the structural level of institutional organization and communication. Equally, this political economy has generated a particular mode of production⁵ at the procedural level within institutions as reflected in the delivery process of higher education (educational administration, and curricula).

II. Al-Waqf at the Procedural Level

***Al-Waqf in Educational Administration**

In theory, *al-waqf* policy endowed all Muslim men and women with the right to establish charitable foundations and dedicate them for public use. *Al-waqf* policy enabled the founder to enjoy a great latitude in the establishment of his/her foundation. For instance, in regards to the administration of the foundation, the appointment of trustee, the designation of beneficiaries, the distribution of income, the choice of trustee, and the restriction of the waqf foundation to a certain segment of society (Makdisi, 1981. p.35).

Nonetheless, the flexibility of the *waqf* policy did not mean a total absence of structural administration. Rather, it meant a high decentralization of authority both in the power structure of educational institutions' administration, and in the authority of

⁴ I use the term academy in agreement with the terminology by Sarton (1927).

⁵ The particular mode of production in the delivery system of education stems from the Islamic worldview of science (see item 4 of the glossary) and the Islamic scientific knowledge inquiry as defined by the principle of *al-Tawhid* (see item 5 of the glossary).

knowledge dispensed within these institutions. To ensure these two ends in practice, *al-waqf* deed is the usually thorough in the job descriptions and specifications of the permanent people involved in the administration of a waqf institution. Equally, *al-waqf* deed often includes provisions for people involved in the transmission of knowledge in conformity with the wishes of the founder.

Invariably, a waqf deed includes *a mutawalli*⁶ (administrator, manager of educational institution), sometimes *an amin* (a trustee), and often *a qadi*, (judge)⁷. Respectively, the Mutawalli job is open for competition to any Muslim on an equal basis (Makdisi, 1981.p.45). The *mutawalli* job qualifications required high intellectual and managerial abilities in the administration of the foundation. These varied from building the *waqf* institution, to hiring, firing, and handling all disputes and litigation (Idem, p.48). However, the *mutawalli's* rights and duties may be counterbalanced, if the waqf deed incorporated among its constitutive elements an item allowing the *mutawalli* to seek the assistance of a trustee. A trustee is usually a talented trustworthy person appointed to ensure the appropriate execution of the *waqf* deed to the letter. As such, he/she could compensate the experience failures of the *mutawalli*, or substitute for him-her in case of emergency. Finally, the *mutawalli's* authority is always counterbalanced by that of the qadi. The *qadi*, by law, is given the authority to supervise the implementation of the *waqf* deed. In fact, by virtue of his job description, the *qadi* alone "had the right to sell the original waqf and buy another one (*istibdal*), more productive for the purposes of the waqf." (Idem. p.55).

In essence, therefore, the administration of a waqf institution was conceived with a minimal concern for institutional power or institutional relations in mind. What was vital was to guarantee the learner's education according to the wishes of the founder and in the terms stipulated in the *waqf* deed. This translated in practice in a marked diversity in the administration of *al-waqf* institutions rather than uniformity. There were, so to speak, as many educational institutions as there were *waqfiyyat* (pl. waqf deed). At the same time, *al-waqf* administrative policy contained a potential for abuse of power, which led to the

⁶ All Islamic *Madhahibs* described in Appendix I (the *Hanafi*, *Shafi'i*, and *Hanbali*) allow the founder of *a waqf* to constitute himself/herself *a mutawalli*. This practice however is outlawed by the *Maliki Madhab* for two reasons. First, to diffuse the power-relationship that may occur between the founder (sponsor), the administrator, and the teaching corps within the *waqf* institution. Second, to safeguard the academic freedom of *the waqf* both in terms of knowledge transmission and acquisition.

⁷ The need for a qadi varies according to the terms of the *waqf's wilayya* (management). Usually, the distinction is made between *wilayya asliyya* (where the need of *qadi* is often stipulated, and *wilayya far'iyya* (where the management of the *waqf deed* is by delegation, or will). For further details, see Bin 'Abdallah (1996.b)

discrimination is enforced by virtue of the '*ulama's Ijma'*'⁸ which excludes women from assuming the position of a qadi in the waqf administration altogether. In terms of class, discrimination is contained in the execution aspect of the *waqf* deed, namely in the assignments allocated to the *mutawalli* and the *amin*, and in the supervision aspect of the *waqf*, allocated exclusively to the *qadi*. In short, the '*ulama* imposed a hierarchy in educational management as well as in authority whereby they designated themselves as the supervising body of cultural governance and knowledge production in the Arab-Islamic society. In short, the *waqf* administration, while democratic in principle, it may in practice institutionalize elitism and a division of labor based on class and gender.

* **Al-Waqf in Knowledge Organization**

Being individualistic, the *waqf* policy also meant that the state, as a governing power, had no control whatsoever over the curriculum, or the methods of instruction. Usually, when a layperson chose to be the founder of a *waqf* institution, he/she was guided by the wishes of the professor for whom he/she instituted the foundation both in terms of the choice of the institution and its organization. In this manner, the content of education and methods were left entirely to the teaching profession itself. This meant that the curriculum was neither uniform, nor determined by any prescribed pattern. What was essential was the maintenance of the integrity of knowledge in the design of the curriculum, and in the delivery system of knowledge according to the principle of *al-Tawhid*. This reflected in the emphasis on the inter-relatedness of the sciences, and the humanities as component disciplines of the core curriculum (Majali, 1971.p.3). Similarly, this meant a diversity of the disciplines and in the methods used in the delivery system of knowledge and its transmission (Idem, p.5). The diversified delivery system of learning is reflected in the instruction and acquisition of knowledge. In terms of instruction, the spatial arrangement of the classroom matched the instructional progress of the student. Accordingly, the *majlis* (session) of each *halaqa* (circle) followed the scientific set up of the *majlis* at the time of the prophet. The latter, usually involved "seating one *halaqa* after the other...the best students in the first *halaqa* followed by the next" (Tazi, 1972.p.127). In this manner, not only was the learning process incremental and progressive, but the role of the professor was also that of a facilitator rather than an instructor. For the instruction task, the

⁸ The notion of *ijma'* (consensus) in Islamic law developed with its counterpart notion *khilaf*, difference of *ray* (opinion) or disagreement. But the '*ulama* arbitrarily and conveniently decided that *khilaf* applies only to the '*ulama*' in regards to a madhab or another. This unilateral and hegemonic decision validates *ijma'* only when it refers to the codified opinions

majlis of a *halaqa* always included *assarid*, a mediator of the halaqa's proceedings on whom the scholar relied "to follow the components of the course" (Idem, p.127).

In terms of knowledge acquisition, the seating of the *halaqa* was indicative of the student's learning progress as students were seated according to grade: "the greater one's knowledge of the subject, the closer his position to the professor" (Makdisi, 1981.p. 92). Moreover, students invariably debated a *mas'ala*, a question, in the course of a *halaqa*, and "the professor would step in only when there was need for clarification and to help them to carry the discussion to a conclusion" (p.93). As such, the learning acquisition was focused on critical thinking and problem solving. In brief, the seating of the classroom served two purposes: to establish a system of individual tutorship, and to keep track of students' academic achievements and excellence.

To ensure this dual task Islamic education relied on the unique institution of *suhba* (fellowship, and discipleship) in emulation of the prophet's method of communication with his disciples, companions (*ashab, sahaba*). While the *Suhba* originally served to transmit the prophet's *Sunna* (tradition) and religious knowledge, it soon extended to other fields of knowledge as well. This way, the *suhba* paved the way for the *ijaza* (license to transmit). At first, the *ijaza* started as an authorization for the transmission of religious knowledge, which the prophet passed on orally to his companions. But soon thereafter, the *ijaza* evolved into "a certification" process established by the 'ulama through the centuries. Tazi (1972) elaborates: "In early Islam the *ijaza* served as a declaration for the ability to practice a scientific profession or a job such as teaching (*tadriss*) fatwa, and judging (*Qada'*) similar to the present modern diplomas" (p. 125).

In a nutshell, the whole educational activity involved the personal mediation of the master, and reciprocation by the learner-disciple. This meant that the venue of knowledge transmission was of secondary importance in the learning process. What was critical was the relationship the learner developed with a prominent scholar and the authority he/she acquired with him/her as a disciple. Teaching took place in a variety of venues: in the master's home, the master's shop, some merchant's shop, a hostel, a hospital, the outdoors. Also, the

agreed to by authoritative 'ulama-jurists exclusive of the variety of other professional scholars that constitute the Islamic Intellegentsia. This led to an everlasting controversy that persists to date. For details on *ijma'* see item 19 in the glossary.

methodology of learning was learner-centered as evidenced in the teaching aids used by the master.⁹

Nonetheless, the delivery system of knowledge contained a potential for the abuse of power, which manifested itself in the two trends that evolved in the system of learning. One, is the prescription of the fields of knowledge according to the founder's *madhab* (political and intellectual orientation). Second, the authority of knowledge is primarily placed on the relationship the learner developed with the scholar and his/her academic authority rather than with the institution as a venue of knowledge. Combined, these two trends led to the valuation of personal authority over institutional authority in knowledge transmission and production in Arab-Islamic culture. Above all, these two trends held a high potential for a systemic class and gender discrimination in knowledge transmission and production.

Indeed, during the completion of the four schools of Islamic thought (*madhahibs*) in the 3rd/9th 4th/10 centuries most of the *'ulama* largely exploited the oral/written relation of authority contained in revealed knowledge (the Qur'an) and established a structure of hierarchical authority that underlined the production of knowledge throughout the Middle Ages. On the one hand, the *'ulama* relied on the personal and oral instruction to establish a hierarchical structure in the disciplines, namely the arbitrary division between the oral speech and memory for *hadith*, and dialectics and writing in *fiqh*¹⁰. On the other hand, the *'ulama* on the oral/written relation of authority to establish hierarchical structure of scientific authority in the Arab-Islamic textual tradition. Throughout the manuscript Age (7th-15th centuries) the *'ulama* relied on specific scientific methods and validation techniques to sustain a scientific hierarchy both in knowledge transmission, and in scientific practice. In knowledge transmission some *'ulama* established the *ijaza* techniques (*isnads*) as global rules for all written manuscripts (Said, 1983.p.199). Equally, other *'ulama* invented the *ijaz method* as a paradigmatic scientific method for all scientific inquiry and textual productions (Idem.p.199)¹¹ In short, the *'ulama* of the Middle Ages relied on methods of instruction and research scientific techniques as co-optation methods in order to set up an un-egalitarian mode of production in teaching and research scientific practices in the educational system.

⁹ For a detailed description of learner centered methods and their role in forging interaction in learning, consult the section "Islamic methodology of learning" (Makdisi, 1981.pp. 99-104) .

¹⁰ For details see Said (1983) .

¹¹ Idem.

It is precisely this hierarchical mode of production that was highly instrumental for the *'ulama's* institutionalization of a systemic hierarchical social division of labor in terms of class and gender. In fact, the mechanisms of reproduction of this mode of production relies on particular co-optation methods of women's involvement in mainstream culture. One of these mechanisms of reproduction was the concept of *fitna*. For example, during the 4th/10th century Mashriq, some *'ulama* of the *madrasah* in Baghdad used the concept of *fitna* (attraction, chaos) to restrict mixing and coeducation between genders. As Makdisi (1981) duly reports co-education occurred in the mixed residences of the *waqf* "in the case of married students and professors and other members of the staff in *waqf* establishments if stipulated by the *waqf* deed (p. 63). In fact, over time the *'ulama* perfected the validation techniques of the concept of *fitna* for the structural displacement of women from the formal institutions of education (the *madrasah*) into the informal ones (*ribats*).

Similarly, throughout the 13th-17th centuries, the *'ulama* of Cairo used the concept of *fitna* to exclude large segments of the population from the *madrasah* such as single, widowed, or elderly women and "place" them in *ribats*. (Berkey, 1992.p.180). Other *'ulama* of Cairo *madrasah* during the 13th-17 th centuries relied on the institution of *suhba* for the procedural displacements of women from within specific scientific fields of knowledge, hence restricting women's participation in the scientific productions in the *madrasah*. For example, some *'ulama* used the technique of *jadal* in *hadith*, and the technique *munazara* in *fiqh*¹² to restrict women's scientific participation to *hadith* only (Idem, pp.181-182).

Combined, the structural and procedural displacements of women from the formal realm of power of the *madrasah*, I contend, signal the beginning of a muting process of women's voice in Arab-Islamic society, and the emergence of a masculinist resistance to women's participation in scientific practice¹³. Awareness of this muting process of women's voices as a component of the systemic mode of production and reproduction of the Arab-Islamic culture is essential to understand the nature of social change, and that of patriarchal co-optation of women and its related mechanisms of reproduction over time.

¹² Rosenthal (1973) also argues that the *'ulama* made an arbitrary distinction between *jadal* (disputation) and *munazara* (consultation) in Islamic Theology in the Middle Ages, despite the fact that this distinction applied to all controversial issues in knowledge fields in the Middle Ages. For details see the section on Technique (pp.45-53).

¹³ My theory on the masculinist resistance to women's scientific productions in the Middle Ages is corroborated by other feminist researchers who showed a corollary muting process of women in the literary field as well. For example Malti-Douglas (1991) provides an interesting analysis of gender discourse in the literary productions of Ibn al-Batannuni (900/1494) and Ibn Tufayl (581/1181-1186).

In fact, I maintain, various male-elite groups other than the *'ulama* have contributed to the sustenance of systemic mode of production of the Arab-Islamic culture, though in different forms and using different means. Chapter 3 exposes the ways various elite groups, ranging from the *'ulama*, the nationalists, and state officials manipulated the modernization of the educational system to sustain the systemic mode of production of the Arab-Islamic culture and its corollary muting process of women's voice both in teaching and in research scientific practices including the fields of women/feminist studies.

Appendix III. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights And the International Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR,1985) reads as follows:

The human rights decreed by Divine Law aim at conferring dignity and honor on all humankind and are designed to eliminate oppression and injustice...By virtue of the Divine source and sanction these rights can neither be curtailed, abrogated, or disregarded by authorities... nor can they be surrendered or alienated...All persons are equal before the Law and are entitled to equal opportunities and the protection of the Law. No person shall be denied the opportunity to work or be discriminated against in any manner or exposed to any physical risk by reason of religious belief, color, race, sex or language.

In comparison the International Declaration of Human Rights (IDHR) adopted by The United Nations General Assembly, 10 December 1948 reads as follows:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights...Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property or other status.

Source: King-Irani, Laurie. (1996) Women's rights are human rights. Al Raida Vol. XIII, Nos. 74 & 75, Summer/Fall. p.11.

Appendix IV: Tables and Bibliography on al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi

Appendix IV. A: Tables on al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi

IV. A.1. Al-Sa'dawi

Table 1: Al-Sa'dawi's Themes

Table 1.1.

Book 1.	Themes
<u>Al-Mar'ah wa al-Jins</u> (1974)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ignorance of women's body and sexuality. 2. Socialization (Femininity and Masculinity). 3. Female circumcision. 4. Marriage/Divorce. 5. Love. 5. Virginity. 6. Honour. 7. Abortion. 8. Sexual abuse. 9. Inception of patriarchy. 10. Patriarchal family. 11. Double standards. 12. Male-female relationship. 13. Family planning. 14. Women and work. 15. Capitalism. 16. Socialism. 17. Education/knowledge. 18. Media.

Table 1.2.

Book 2.	Themes
<u>Al-Mar'ah wa al-Sira'a al-Nafsi</u> (1974)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Socialization. 2. Virginity. 3. Marriage. 4. Repudiation. 5. Rape. 6. Female circumcision. 7. Prostitution. 8. Double standards. 8. Sexual abuse. 9. Patriarchal family. 10. Patriarchal Islam. 11. Patriarchal medicine.

Table 1. 3.

Book 3.	Themes
<u>Al-Wajh al-Ari lil Mar'ah al-'Arabiyya (1977)</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Socialization (Femininity and Masculinity). 2. Virginity. 3. Female circumcision. 4. Marriage/Divorce. 5. Abortion/fertility. 6. Family planning. 7. Seclusion/Hijab. 8. Sex/Love. 9. Double standards. 10. Women and work. 11. Education. 12. Imperialism 13. Western ethnocentrism. 14. Capitalism (patriarchy and Economy). 15. Patriarchy and religion (Moral values and the economy). 16. Patriarchy and knowledge (women in literature). 17. Matriarchy in Ancient Egypt. 18. Matriarchy in al-Jahiliyya. 19. Matriarchy in Islam. 20. Self-determination of women in Islam. 21. Reclaiming self in the history of Islam. 22. Women's liberation (pioneers, and women's participation in Arab movements).

IV.A.2. Mersissi.

Table 2: Mernissi's Themes

Table 2. 1.

Book 1	Themes
<u>Beyond the veil</u> (1974)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Western ethnocentrism. 2. Initial Islam and Human Rights. 3. Conflicts in legislation (class). 4. Masculinity and Femininity. 5. Polygamy. 6. Seclusion. 7. Repudiation. 8. Self-determination and Matriarchy in Islam. 9. Resistance to patriarchy in Islam. 10. Desegregation and modernity. 11. Self-determination and modernity. 12. The Nationalist Movements and women's liberation. 13. State Oppression of women. 14. Family oppression of women (family law: polygamy and repudiation). 15. Islam as empowerment for women's liberation.

Table 2.2

Book 2.	Themes
<u>Le Maroc raconté par ses femmes</u> (1984)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perception of male-Female dynamics. 2. Family Law. 3. Family planning (contraception). 4. Patriarchal monopoly of scientific and symbolic heritage. 5. Ijtihad as an Individual right in Islam. 6. Segregation. 7. Nafaqa (up-keep). 8. Repudiation. 9. Tutelage. 10. Sexual abuse and abortion. 11. Marriage. 12. Love. 13. Women and work.

Table 2.3

Book 3.	Themes
<u>Le harem politique</u> (1987)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Misogyny in Islam 2. The veil 3. Individual and collective rights in Islam 4. The prophet and space 5. The prophet and women

Appendix IV. B. Bibliography of al-Sa'dawi and Mernissi's Writings

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