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Contacts, Opportunities, and Crime: Relational Foundations of Criminal Enterprise.

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ABSTRACT

The basic argument follows that relative success and criminal achievement depend on how offenders go about doing crime. An offender's search for increasing financial returns and decreasing costs is mediated by the structure of his pool of useful and trustworthy contacts. This social embeddedness or purposive network action framework from which this claim extends is at the core of this study of successful careers in organized crime. More specifically, the thesis combines the structural hole theory of competition in legitimate enterprise (Burt 1992) with past findings on networks in crime in developing a series of theoretical insights and propositions on the evolution of organized crime careers.

Structural hole theory tells us that business-oriented persons who have personal networks designed to promote high levels of disconnectivity achieve and maintain competitive advantages in their earning activities and overall careers. The structural hole concept is used to grasp those entrepreneurial opportunities within the network that allow one to broker between disconnected others in a timesaving and efficient manner. The greater an individual's access to such opportunities, the greater the level of disconnectivity within the personal network, and the greater the potential for success.

Criminal memoirs serve as the primary data sources for two case studies conducted on diametrically-opposed organized crime participants. The study seizes the consistent egocentric-network flow that serves as the backbone for many of these life or career history accounts. In doing so, it became possible to identify various transitions, events, or outcomes throughout each career, and subsequently localize the pertinent co-participants implicated in and around each.

In the organized crime careers studied here, the offenders' advancements within their specific earning activities (international cannabis smuggling and Cosa-Nostra-affiliated construction racketeering) were accounted for by the structural hole content of their personal working networks at various points in time. Opportunities to broker between disconnected others allowed each to yield higher returns in their activities. Such opportunities also allowed the criminal entrepreneurs to decrease their levels of direct exposure to other participants in their criminal activities through network closure. A decrease in exposure permitted them to further insulate themselves from potentially career-damaging targeting forces. Structural hole or brokerage-like opportunities therefore tell us how an offender may structure his network to promote increasing returns from crime while decreasing the costs. In short, this relational approach illustrates how survival and long-term endurance in organized crime is achieved.

In so doing, the argument proposes a framework for a bridging theory of organized crime that incorporates both independent and organizational criminal entrepreneurs. The present thesis provides an alternative to the more standard explanations centering on an individual's capacity for violence, authoritative rule, or market structuring. Personal organization, as indicated by the structure of a participant's personal network and the quality of opportunities that extend from it, is an inherent and common component to successful criminal entrepreneuirs and it is within the overlapping of these personal social networks that organized crime processes are founded.

RÉSUMÉ

L'argument principal de la thèse démontre que la réussite criminelle dépend de la manière dont les personnes réalisent leurs activités, notamment au travers des liens qu'elles établissent. En effet, postulant que la recherche du meilleur profit et du meilleur coût est atteinte par une organisation performante de l'ensemble des contacts utiles et fiables d'un individu, la thèse s'incrit dans le cadre théorique développé par les analyses de l'enchâssement social (social embeddeness) ou du cadre relationnel de l'action. Ces fondements théoriques constituent le coeur de la présente l'étude de carrières dans le crime organisé. De manière plus spécifique, la thèse s'appuie sur la théorie des trous structuraux que Burt (1992) a développée pour mieux comprendre la compétition au sein des entreprises légitimes et sur les propositions explicites ou implicites avancées dans les recherches sur le crime organisé.

La théorie des trous structuraux formalise le caractère performant de l'absence de connection, absence qualifiée alors de trou dans la structure relationelle. Par ces trous, il est possible en effet de montrer comment un individu progresse en affaires en faisant des liens de manière non redondante. Des acteurs bien connectés, dans ce sens, sont souvent des acteurs stratégiquement déconnectés. Cet état de déconnectivité permet alors de maintenir des avantages compétitifs dans leurs activités pécuniaires et dans leur carrière en général.

De plus, le concept de trou structural est utilisé pour appréhender les opportunités entreprenariales au sein d'un réseau qui permettent à une personne de se positioner comme courtier entre des contacts déconnectés. Par le trou, et par cette position de courtier, un individu dont le temps et l'énergie sont limités, peut agir de manière plus efficace. En effet, plus l'accès de l'individu à ces opportunités est grand, plus le niveau de déconnectivité dans le réseau (c'est à dire, une proportion élevée de contacts non-redondants) est élevé, plus le potentiel de succès devra s'accroître pour l'individu concerné.

Deux biographies d'individus dont la position dans le crime organisé est diamétralement opposée (indépendant versus membre de l'organisation) ont servi de données primaires dans cette thèse. En effet, comme la plupart des histoires biographiques consiste à présenter indirectement, au travers du parcours de vie, son réseau personnel, l'utilisation de ce type de données pour la thèse constituait une des meilleures façons d'obtenir des renseignements dans un contexte où nommer ces contacts n'est pas habituel.

Dans le cadre des carrières étudiées ici, l'analyse des cheminements dans des activités lucratives particulières (le trafic international de cannabis et le racket associé à la Cosa Nostra dans le domaine de la construction) a permis de montrer la progression relationnelle. Une amélioration, dans le temps, des opportunités de courtage au sein des réseaux personnels des entrepreneurs témoigne de leur meilleure gestion de leurs affaires. Les opportunités de servir comme intermédiaire entre des individus non connectés permettent à chacun d'obtenir un rendement supérieur. Ces opportunités donnent aussi l'occasion aux entrepreneurs criminels de réduire leur niveau d'exposition directe à d'autres participants dans leurs activités criminelles en fermant leur réseau. En outre, cette diminution dans leur exposition leur permet de se protéger contre les acteurs du contrôle social étatique formel en limitant les possibilités de se faire détecter.

Le trou structural ou les opportunités de courtage montre comment un individu peut structurer son réseau pour retirer de meilleurs profits et diminuer les coûts de ses activités criminelles. Finalement, cette approche relationnelle montre comment la survie et le maintien dans le milieu criminel s'organise.

Ainsi, cet argument permet de proposer un cadre pour construire une théorie du crime organisé qui lie les entrepreneurs indépendants et ceux impliqués dans l'organisation. La thèse constitue donc une alternative aux explications plus traditionnelles centrées sur la capacité individuelle à agir violemment, à adopter un rôle autoritaire ou sur la force structurante du marché. L'organisation personnelle

comme indicateur de la structure d'un réseau personnel et de la qualité des opportunités qui en découle, constitue une manière de comprendre des participants au milieu du crime organisé diamétralement opposés, soit les indépendants et les personnes complètement liées à l'organisation. Les processus fondant le crime organisé sont alors envisagés à partir du chevauchement des réseaux sociaux personnels des différents acteurs.

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It's been just over four years since I began working on this project. Some may consider this a long time, some a short one. It doesn't matter – it's done. The School of Criminology at the Université de Montréal is an astounding working environment to be a part of. I've been part of many work places throughout the past but they have all remained in my mind as representing just that – work. The past years spent in these surroundings have given me my first real taste of a milieu in which the activities that take place (as demanding as they may be) take on a quality that displaces the 'only work' nature of many other places. It is a pleasure.

The actual thesis has had many indirect contributors. Insights and ideas have been exchanged and tested on so many people that I cannot even remember them all. It is certain, however, that everyone that I at least shared an office with had some part in it. Hence, to Manon (finish it!), Julie, Sabine, Clément, Fréderic, Véronique, and Mathieu, thank-you for countless hours of listening (with or without one eyebrow raised) and, for whenever I would shut up, for your comments. Thanks also to Jean-Pierre, Renée, and Paul (not office partners, but frequent visitors) and Rudy, Marty, Martin, Julie, Marc, Céline (from outside the office). Rose May, thanks for the candy. Simona, don't ever forget nowhere.

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Pierre, I won't write much – I'm in a small bistro now on St-Denis (the hamburger was terrible, but the beer is good – there's no soup here) and I'm trying to put everything together – I can't (well I probably can, but it would take too much time). I have one vivid, distant memory from about ten years ago at McGill (at Gertz). I had asked you: 'who makes more money – a lawyer or a criminology professor?'. You told me that money shouldn't be part of that kind of decision. Best advice I've ever had – too bad everyone doesn't follow it. Thanks for the break Pierre. Thanks for the tricks of the trade, the 'tutelage', and the trust. Most of all, thanks for teaching me how to listen. You are my mentor. Oh yeah – I still can't read your handwriting…

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INTRODUCTION

Conflicting Perspectives on Criminals and Work:

> "The criminal's irresponsibility occurs as a pattern throughout his life. His deviousness and exploitation of people at work and his self-serving utilization of a job reflect how he treats the world. He scorns hard workers with modest aspirations. For him, it is far more gratifying to steal a television from the stockroom than to earn and save enough money to buy a set. Earning money is not a criminal's chief inducement to work because he may net far more from a single crime than from weeks of work. The criminal's most pressing business is crime, not his job. The criminal who holds a job may have the intelligence and skill to acquire substantial money and power through legitimate means, but even enormous wealth and supreme power, honestly earned, would count for little. If something is legitimate, to him it is hardly worthwhile. Criminals are at heart antiwork..." (Samenow 1984: p.85).
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> &
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> "Under the appropriate conditions, work becomes criminal. Work is essentially a central life activity, giving meaning to our daily existence. However, we are only relatively free at given times and in specific places to choose that work which fulfills us personally and achieves social good. Much work, consequently, is exploitative of others and detrimental to the self. That there are *careers* made of criminal work activities reflects the nature of the larger social, political, and economic order. The existing political economy, in other words, provides the framework for either pursuing meaningful and socially constructive work, or for the development of a career in crime. Work that is dictated solely by economic survival makes crime a rational and likely possibility in contemporary society" (From Richard Quinney's foreword to Inciardi 1975: p.vii).

Whether a career in crime is work in itself, as Quinney maintains, or an obvious alternative to real, legitimate forms of occupation, as Samenow argues, is of little interest here. Crime, like many forms of legitimate work, is often incited by one's thirst for personal achievement and materialistic success. Samenow's claim that a criminal is devious, exploitive of others, and self-serving in his interests to work is not simply a reflection of how he treats the world, but, as Quinney would add, a reflection of how a world regulated by economically-defined existence often has work taking a form that is exploitive of many. It is not

true that anything that is legitimate is hardly worthwhile for a criminal. It is also not true that the existing political economic framework may be divided dichotomously between meaningful, socially constructive work and the development of a career in crime. Not everyone seeks meaningful, socially constructive work. Some just work for the money (maybe that's what Quinney also meant to incorporate in his 'career in crime' category). Furthermore, criminals, as noncriminals, may or may not be essentially antiwork, but a career in crime requires some of the same hard-working and exploitive qualities that are often required for legitimate forms of work. It is true that some people do not want to work. It is also true that, at times, some people are better off doing crime than being exploited at work. Some, in addition, do not want to compete. Some only want to compete if they are in a position to do so beyond a trivial level. Some who want to compete often do so in less restraining forms of activities, with crime being a key and quite plausible alternative. At the same time, some who want to compete at a higher level never do so because they resist the abandonment of their exploiting and restraining legitimate work. Some just do what they want, but even these people are limited by what they can do. The truth lies in what some aspire to and what they are able and ready to learn and do in order to reach their defined goals and establish their ways amongst and between necessary others.

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This study is about two trips up the queer ladder of socio-economic mobility – that is, of two lengthy and successful careers in crime. The roots of queer ladder theory may be attributed to the work of Merton (1957) who, through his version of anomie theory, illustrated the unconventional, deviant, or criminal means that some individuals use in pursuing the conventionally-defined, yet disproportionately attainable, goal of materialistic success. Merton referred to these unconventional socio-economic climbers as 'innovators'. Bell (1953 and 1960) introduced the queer ladder concept in illustrating the quest of a succession of immigrant groups who sought upward mobility through organized crime activities throughout the first half of twentieth century America. "For crime", writes Bell, "in the language of the sociologists, has a 'functional' role in society,

and the urban rackets - the illicit activity organized for continuing profit, rather than individual illegal acts - is one of the queer ladders of social mobility in American life" (1960: p.129). Since this period, this same quest has continued to be pursued beyond the realms of America. Inaccessible passages to arriving at conventionally-defined (culturally-encouraged) goals has triggered a growing number of people, usually (but not always) found at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy, to seek advancement through quicker (more feasible) means. Bell studied the consequences of this pursuit in various areas in New York City in which illegal gambling was increasingly organized and union labour racketeering (at the city's waterfront, for example) was a lasting presence.

This thesis follows Bell's initiative and seeks to expand on it in explaining how the queer ladder process begins, develops, and may end. To do so, a mix of analytical and theoretical frameworks were blended together in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the long-term criminal career in action. Substantively, the thesis relies on the personal accounts of two individuals who endured and prospered in their respective careers in what may be referred to as organized crime. The most direct research question that may be developed in accounting for the general aim of this thesis is: how does one endure and prosper – get ahead, so to speak – through crime?

In pondering this question, I turn to one aspect of criminal life or criminal ways of making a living that has been considerably overlooked as an analytical focus in past research. This concerns the place of contacts or others. Merton painted the cultural cliché of "it's not what you know, but who you know, that counts" as an "individuated and cynical attitude toward the social structure" (1957: p.149). At the risk of appearing both individuated and cynical within the cultural doctrine professed by Merton, I apply the central focus of this study on precisely how others count in the personal pursuits of business-oriented actors who are illegally active. It would seem fair to say that the actual hypothesis should be at least assessed before it is dismissed on pure moral grounds.

Following such a line of inquiry is facilitated by the presence of an entire paradigm - the social network or relational perspective - in the social sciences that

has been devoted to developing insights and studying the place and influence of others in various facets of life. Such is a person's social capital. The decision to focus on a person's social capital is regarded as neither individuated nor cynical toward any part of society. Quite differently, studying how people cooperate and how networks form around a certain activity or throughout a person's career allows the researcher to discover some of the basic assets of any individual's life – that is, others.

'Others', at the same time, is also one of the main components found at the core of Sutherland's differential association theory. The link between social networks and Sutherland has already been made in past studies (see Sarnecki 1986; Krohn 1986; Matsueda 1988; McCarthy and Hagan 1995; and Hagan and McCarthy 1997). This link will be maintained here. The argument, however, does not put forward that contacts, networks, or social capital 'count' in a hard deterministic way. Instead, such surrogates of the relational foundations of life are perceived as contingencies that 'shape' outcomes and transitions throughout a career in crime. Contacts are, in brief, pivotal to one's career in crime. Independent criminal entrepreneurs seek to expand their networks by connecting with others in one or more business settings. Connecting with others expands their pool of potential opportunities. How one connects influences the scope and form of that expansion. Entrepreneurial criminals operating within fixed unities seek similar expansion of their personal opportunity structures, but, quite differently, concentrate their connecting efforts within established groups of business-oriented offenders or criminally-open legitimate business persons. Vertical advancement within the boundaries of these associations leads to improvements in one's own resources and pool of opportunities. This vertical advancement is, as with the case of the independent entrepreneur, aided by the member's (deliberate or unintended) strategic relations with others who are in a position to expand that member's personal resources.

Participation, advancement, and endurance in both independent and organized contexts of criminal entrepreneurial careers may be firmly observed and subsequently understood by converging on the influence of key contacts

throughout the trajectory. What is most surprising is how minimal the number of key others may be in influencing fundamental shifts throughout an individual's career. Subcultural theories of crime may grasp the normative worlds that allow common-minded members of society to gather within a fixed social setting. Neo-economic theories of crime may reveal the goal-oriented motivations and market-based actions driving atomistic players within specific arenas of competition. Traditional organizational theories of organized crime are effective in illustrating how some offenders create formal and hierarchical groupings in order to increase their efficiency and security. The strength of a network theory of organized crime is that it enables the observer to converge on the process that allows one to become a criminal entrepreneur as well as maintaining and improving on that status. This process cuts through and guides the entrepreneur to learn and blend into the normative aspects of a particular business world. This process also allows us to see how and why an entrepreneur's business activities – his crimes, in this study – are structured the way they are.

In short, it is with network theory that we are able to reveal how an individual made it from there to here. That is the strength of connections in social life in general. It is not cynical to accept that others count in and are needed for one's materialistic success. On the contrary, the fact that others count is indeed encouraging and pro-social. If one feels the need to identify any cynicism, it may be identified in the exploitative form that is often used in the name of an individual's materialistic advancement and encouraged for the sake of healthy and productive competition – call it a fine sense of business. The need for others is pro-social. The exploitive use of others is anti-social and therefore cynical. This latter problem is not identified by one's relational basis of advancement but by one's culturally-compelled competitive drive to advance towards a monetary-based ideal. The problem tainted by cynicism is therefore perceived in the goal, not the means. Organized crime and the queer ladder that accompanies it are beautiful backdrops to flesh out and expose this critical issue.

The analysis throughout the greater part of the thesis focuses on where past criminal entrepreneurs went with their careers and how the structure of their

personal networks surrounding various outcomes and transitions played throughout their personal trajectories. Without the network, both independent and organizationally-entrenched criminal entrepreneurs lose the necessary vehicle that accompanies their drift away from conventional and legitimate activities and guides them towards earning activities that are necessarily lodged within clandestine and often closed working settings. These working settings are overlapping personal networks. Connecting with another's network gives one potential access to that person's direct and indirect resources as well as providing that person with an access to one's own personal resources. Positioning within this world of personal resource exchanges reveals crucial distinctions between the levels of fitness to survive in crime.

In pursuing the place of others in a criminal entrepreneurial career, the thesis also follows Cullen's (1983) structuring perspective in accounting for the specific form that a deviant response may take. Cullen stated that "we have gained considerable insight into the factors that move individuals to transgress social standards, but we have been less successful in demarcating the forces that 'structure' or regulate the exact nature of the deviant activity that emerges" (1983: p.3). While Cullen, who extended primarily from initial efforts in Cloward (1959) and Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) theory of illegitimate means, illustrated the place of the structuring tradition within dominant perspectives of crime and deviance theory, this study takes the approach and converges on the specific criminal practices inherent in organized crime. Furthermore, the thesis adds to this structuring tradition by introducing and illustrating the overlooked forces of various network resources that serve as necessary means within the criminal career and the general formation of crime.

The study does not look at the motivations of criminal entrepreneurs active in organized crime. Queer ladder theory has already accounted for that. Primary concern is, quite differently, with what some criminal entrepreneurs have done and achieved throughout their careers. Motivation, in this analytical scheme, is an extension of what one is able to do and has already done. Success breeds motivation. It is assumed that most pondering the likelihood of a career in crime

aspire and are motivated by alternative yet potentially comfort-yielding earning activities. That all aspire to a life of outlaw freedom and materialistic comfort is one thing; that all achieve this on a long-term and successful basis is quite another. Successful criminal entrepreneurs may indeed be few in number, however, their rare presence does not disqualify the importance they maintain amongst participants in crime. "Successful offenders", as has already been argued, "may significantly shape the differential opportunity expectations (Agnew 1992: p.51) of a much wider range of offenders" (Tremblay and Morselli 2000: p.655). For such reasons, the careers of the individuals' studied here may not be at all representative of the average career in crime and even to a lesser extent of the typical criminal experience. The extent of the study's representative scope coincides with the belief that successful offenders create precedence and a factual basis in the ideals and aspirations of others seeking alternative ways of making a living. Whether others actually act out on these aspirations is, once again, partly a matter of relationally-oriented capacity. This relational capacity can no longer be overlooked.

A final assumption guiding this thesis is that illegal business environments are less regulated competitive settings. The unregulated competitive arenas used as settings here emerge from the working fields associated with organized crime. Such illegal fields of business are amongst the rare competitive forums of action in modern day societies in which the spirit of *free* enterprise is fully practiced. Some may refer to this as the law of the jungle. For now, the apparent pure competitive quality of the jungle that is most often assumed will be substantially downplayed. The notion of cooperation will be used to account for the void left open from the diminishment in the completely competitive assumption. The jungle-like quality of illegal business settings found in organized crime will therefore incorporate the mix between competitive and cooperative forms of behaviour.

Free competition, in this sense, does not mean exclusive competitive behaviour. It means that competing players are allowed to compete in any form that they like or see fit. Free competition is above all unregulated competition. Free competition also allows one to be cooperative with other players if one wishes to. It is argued that those most apt to cooperative skills and capacities will

be the most competitive. Survival of the fittest is therefore not revealing of the player who is most likely to win (although it may be if the competitive spirit is encouraged to reach its ultimate, cynical end), but the player who is most apt in *fitting in* amongst and between others.

Criminal enterprise is not only a prime example of free competition; it is also a unique arena illustrating accelerated competition. External targeting forces (conventional agents of formal control) accelerate the already free competitive arena by removing players. Participants in illegal business settings are therefore confronted with a paradoxical working environment that requires them to cooperate with others in order to be more competitive while, at the same time, avoiding their personal removal from the competition by outside targeting forces. The paradox appears when cooperation is at the root of both one's advancement (by making one more competitive) and one's removal from the competition (by increasing the risks extending from cooperation with other targeted players). Participants in illegal business settings or organized crime must therefore learn how to fit in so as to increase the likelihood of their advancement while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood of confronting potentially career-damaging problems imposed on them by outside targeting forces. This increases the player's chances of survival within such free and accelerated competitive processes. Understanding those who prevailed in remaining fit for lengthy periods allows us to understand the persistence and driving force behind various successful and quite likely inspiring forms of crime.

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL DISCREPENCIES AND AMBIGUITIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME RESEARCH

Success in entrepreneurial settings requires an ability to contour obstacles and potential problems within the context of a competitive-oriented pursuit. Success in crime also requires a similar ability. The consequences of product illegality put forward by Reuter (1983) in his now classic study of loansharking, numbers, and bookmaking markets in New York City during the 1970s tells us that participants in illegal markets are confronted with greater obstacles within the context of their business activities than their legitimate counterparts. These obstacles facing the illegal market participant may be outlined as follows: (1) contracts are not enforceable by law or other official dispute settlers that are available in legitimate business settings; (2) participants are consistently at risk of having their assets seized at any time that they come under the scope of law-enforcement targeting; and (3) participants face the risk of official sanctions, such as arrests or imprisonment (Reuter 1983: p.114). In view of such problems that are exclusive to careers in crime, successful criminals – or successful criminal entrepreneurs – may therefore be perceived as requiring greater entrepreneurial capacities than their legitimate counterparts in the realms of competitive settings.

Through the use of transaction-cost analysis (Williamson 1975), Reuter also revealed a key element that concerned the informal nature of group structuring within illegal markets. Once again because of the consequences of product illegality, Reuter argued that in order to avoid the costs extending from participation in illegal markets, participants tend to come together in small and ephemeral groups in their business ventures (1983: p.109). His central explanation accounting for this finding revolved around the market forces confronting participants who are active in such groups. Such invisible-hand mechanisms were argued to prevail over those visible hand mechanisms (most notably violence) professed by advocates of the bureaucratic or orthodox perspective of organized crime in shaping the structure of groups. Reuter (1983) stated: "it is not generally optimal for such a group to attempt to create monopolies within the underlying illegal markets. The organization of illegal markets is largely determined by economic forces" (p.109). Markets, according to Reuter's transaction cost analysis of illegal market structuring, prevail over hierarchies.

Although Reuter's (1983) seminal refutation of the bureaucratic perspective of organized crime serves as a main lead for this thesis, his explanation pointing to the market as the dominant structuring force in illegal business settings is questioned. The discrepancy is situated in the fact that Reuter did not extend his analysis beyond activity-based group structures. As Tremblay (1993) has accentuated, in rethinking a key aspect of Reiss's (1986 and 1988) work on co-offending, an analysis of co-offending (or groups mobilized for crime) must account for not only event/activity-specific co-offending but the generally overlooked "possibility that a given offender's crime career depends on the way it intersects or consciously parallels the crime sequences of various co-offenders" (Tremblay 1993: p.18).

While Reiss found that most offenders combine a mix of solo and group offending in the specific illicit activities that they actually take part in, Tremblay stressed that this finding may be displaced by focusing on the availability of suitable co-offending contacts that increase (or, in the inverse trend, limit) the scope of opportunities that offenders may take part in. In short, Reiss is concerned with what offenders do and whom they do it with, while Tremblay argues for an understanding of who offenders know and what that subsequently allows them to do.

Tremblay's suggestion takes into consideration the choice-structuring properties put forward by Clarke and Cornish (1985) (see also Cornish and Clarke 1986), and previously emphasized by Akerstrom (1985) and Steffensmeier (1986), that "'finding' a suitable pool of partners, intermediaries, and contacts constitutes in fact a crucial, focal, problematic (...) concern for a wide range of motivated potential offenders" (Tremblay 1993: p.18). This suggestion is maintained in this thesis as well. In following this approach, the focus of analysis converges on the criminal opportunities that extend from one's pool of available and suitable co-offenders. These opportunities allow participation in specific criminal ventures or illegal activities. Such junctures to participate propagate to permit the development, survival, and advancement of a career in crime.

Understanding the structure of illegal market groupings, in this sense, calls

for concern to be placed not on how illegality changes the structure of groups set up to perform a specific task or to mobilize for a short-term venture in a given illegal market, but on how illegal market and trade participants compensate for this substantial inability to adhere to working groups that are organized for long-term participation in a given illegal market. It is quite conceivable that all illegal market participants may be limited by the consequences of product illegality to performing in groups mobilized for short-term projects, however, this does not entail that all are limited to participating in one short-term venture at a time. Simultaneous and varied venturing allows the participant to further compensate for the risks associated with criminal business activities. So, while Reuter (1983) argues that "the most immediate consequence of product illegality (...) is the need to control the flow of information about participation in the illegal activity (...) so as to assure that the risk of exposure about participation is kept to a minimum" (p.114), I argue that one way of avoiding such a limitation in advancing a career in criminal enterprise is to structure the control of information in one's favour (inasmuch as possible). This means that successful illegal market participants are those players that are in a position to control information so as to simultaneously assure their security *and* expand their personal access to opportunities that allow them to venture in a broader and coinciding range of activities. The focus, therefore, is not on one activity or market and how groups are structured therein, but on the participant's capacity to operate in a multitude of ventures in one or more activities or markets.

This thesis therefore challenges Reuter's (1983) invisible hand argument by focusing on the capacities of criminal entrepreneurs to successfully avoid the problems associated with participation in illegal markets. It has been consistently overlooked that the level that an illegal market participant may be active depends on his access to the short-termed, localized groups that serve as the means to his personal accessing, seizing, and executing available opportunities. The accent here is relationally stanced and is on the entrepreneur's available opportunities that are yielded from his network. Reuter was right in highlighting the informal nature of illegal trade and market relations (as opposed to the formal structures put forward

by the bureaucratic perspective of organized crime), however, it is also within the ensemble of these informal groupings that the main vehicle of action – the entrepreneur's personal network of working contacts - may also be found.

In placing the focus on those who succeeded in criminal enterprise, the structural explanation of illegal market or trade groupings is maintained to be found somewhere between visible and invisible hand mechanisms and, more precisely, from extensions of relational processes that combine to embed individual actions and activities within such settings. Within this relational or network framework of analysis, the conceptual distinction between 'organized' (hierarchical) and 'disorganized' (market) crime becomes less crucial. We are looking at the network capacities that offenders require and use in illegal markets *and* in criminally-oriented, vertically-integrated organizations that are set up in certain activities.

The participant's network represents one's key and basic subsistence to both horizontally and vertically structured forms of organized crime. This subsequently allows for a theoretical bridge to be made between two conflicting notions in this particular field of criminological research. The notion of illegal enterprise has been consistently used as a 'safer' alternative to the more popular and sensationalized notion of organized crime. The evolution of the debate revolving around these two notions must be clarified and resolved in order to pursue the main aim of this thesis – that is, to respond to the question: how does one achieve success in criminal business settings?

The relational approach adopted here offers a paradigm that allows one of Reuter's major criticisms to be addressed. Reuter rightly suggests that the field of organized crime should work towards "the development of a consistent line of cumulative research" (Reuter 1987: p.169). The relational framework advanced here aims, among other things, towards responding to this necessary and warranted criticism. Since the early 1970s, as the remainder of this chapter will illustrate, research advancements concerning organized crime have been directed more towards splitting the field than towards encouraging a needed comprehensive theory.

Illegal Enterprise Is Organized Crime: The Twisted Evolution of a Social Scientific Notion

While organized crime had been of academic interest from as early as Landesco's (1929) Chicago-based study, the more elaborate research efforts in the field have emerged throughout the decades following the 1967 President's Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in America. Empirical efforts, in particular, were virtually absent across the four preceding decades. One author describes the state of organized crime research before the late sixties as follows: "Writings about Mafia and organized crime have been noted for emotional content, not 'disciplined objectivity.' They were judged for their ability to arouse strong negative sentiments among the public at large, not for their appeal to the intellect" (Smith 1975: p.291). If the pre-1967 work on organized crime was typically polemic and opinionated, research since the late sixties has been dominated by empirical attempts to further advance the understanding of the phenomena.

The 1967 investigative commission resulted in a document that compiled reports from Gardiner's case study on political corruption, Schelling's economic analysis of organized criminals, a report on investigative techniques to confront organized crime by Blakey, and Cressey's work on the functions and structure of the suspected criminal confederation. Although each of these contributions were crucial in advancing various segments of the field, Cressey's particular influence proved crucial for the substantial rise in research and scientific endeavors that developed throughout the three decades that followed. The subsequent publication of *Theft of the Nation*, in 1969, was basically a revised and more elaborate extension of the initial report prepared in 1967.

Cressey's role in the literature has been a dual one - one of pioneer and one of catalyst. Smith elaborates on Cressey's place in a similar manner:

> "he [*Cressey*] intended to encourage other social scientists to enter the search for new questions and new evidence concerning organized crime. As it turned out, he was the first to answer his own call, but in doing so he retreated to old questions for which new evidence simply

> recapitulated old answers and reinforced old stereotypes. The search for reality was thus dominated by established conventions" (Smith 1975: p.291).

On the one hand, Cressey demonstrated that organized crime was indeed empirically approachable and, in doing so, proposed an image of American organized crime that would challenge and instigate several of his contemporary and future scholars.

Although not all interested in organized crime adhered to Cressey's data and conclusions, the study did provoke many others to take on the phenomenon within their own scientific endeavors. Many did so in direct reaction to Cressey's arguments. Others did so to further investigate and explain where Cressey did not. In many ways, Cressey's stance obliged those who questioned his findings and conclusions to demonstrate otherwise. This is precisely what took place and continues today. A scan of indexes from various studies on organized crime, criminal families, or illegal markets will consistently lead to Cressey, along with more infamous names, such as Al Capone, Lucky Luciano, Joe Valachi, and Vito Genovese, being the most oft-referenced name (maybe not the best of company, but at least he's first amongst academics).

While a significant increase in research on organized crime did indeed take place during the last thirty years, it did not, however, come in the form of a cumulative pattern in regard to the conceptualization of the organized crime notion. For many, the term became synonymous with that, and only that, found by Cressey in his research during the Commission. If findings did not fit Cressey's bureaucratic model, new notions were henceforth introduced to denote phenomena that may have appeared to be organized crime, but, in fact or theory, were not. The most common of these alternative notions to emerge was that of *illegal enterprise*.

The term, organized crime, is repeatedly argued to be exclusive to the bureaucratic model proposed by Cressey. However, the common imagery linked to the notion goes beyond those real events and activities that are formally and hierarchically structured. Journalists and other media agents continue to refer to organized crime in contexts that are not considered as such within the traditional

bureaucratic framework. One possible reason for such problems involves the context within which the organized crime notion was pushed aside, in academic circles, in favour of illegal enterprise. Organized crime had become tainted with stereotypical content mainly through its popular imagery and legal definitions. Any attempts at academic conceptualizations were therefore required to take these problems into consideration. Rather than do so, many took an alternative path towards new and less debatable terms.

Organized crime, and more precisely the Mafia or Cosa Nostra, was argued to have reached mythical status and, at the same time, the propositions put forward by Cressey did not stand up to further empirical verification. That the bureaucratic approach did not fit has been rigourously demonstrated on several other occasions, however, my own interpretation of this intellectual confrontation does not find any justification to refute the notion itself. This particular discrepancy seems to be at the base of much of the confusion surrounding its meaning. While most illegal enterprise proponents also ascribe themselves to the *field* of organized crime, they are in direct confrontation with the term itself. What's in a word, one may ask? Probably very little, but the state of the organized crime field's literature has been considerably effected by such idiosyncrasies.

'Collective ambiguity'[1] (Sartori 1984) is suitable in illustrating the state of the organized crime literature in regard to its most fundamental pre-concept. Both problems of homonymy and synonymy are persistent throughout the literature, with the former representing the state of the pre-Cressey (1969) literature and the latter developing with the rise and dominance of illegal enterprise proponents. The ultimate goal of any field in view of its central terms is to arrive at a one-word/one meaning state. Although this has not yet been achieved in the organized crime field, it is indeed conceivable.

One question that must be resolved is whether the term illegal enterprise, as

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1. Sartori explains collective ambiguity as resulting from either the trend towards *homonymy* or *synonymy*. The former denotes a situation in which one word is appointed more than one meaning or "a situation in which (at the limit) each scholar ascribes his own meanings to his key terms" (1984: p.35). The latter and inverse (synonymy) depicts a situation where many words are used for the same meaning or referent.

an alternative to organized crime, is warranted. Part of the answer is found in pondering the differences between the imagery that is associated with organized crime and the social scientific reasoning or proof behind the creation of alternative notions that are distinguished from organized crime. Why is it that somewhere along the line, the academic conceptualization of organized crime became restricted to Cressey's own definition? Was this restriction relative to the common and historical usage of organized crime a necessary one? More precisely, was a break with the popular and past actually what took place or were new notions put forward simply for purposes of convenience - or, to simply avoid what had become a conceptual mess? The notion may have not begun with Cressey, but several twists in its evolution took place following *Theft of the Nation*. Re-linking some of these wayward paths therefore begins with an assessment of the key findings that extend from Cressey's (1969) work.

Cressey's Theft of the Nation

Since the 1951 Kefauver Commission, a public debate emerged concerning the existence of a criminal society purposely put together in order to dominate and more efficiently organize the illegal distribution of goods and services in America. Cressey, a confessed skeptic of the existence of a nationwide organization of criminals before embarking on this particular endeavor, quickly changed opinion once confronted with the Commission's evidence that led him to state that "no rational man could read the evidence that I have read and still come to the conclusion that an organization variously called 'the Mafia,' 'Cosa Nostra,' and 'the syndicate,' does not exist" (1969: p.x). Unfortunately, not much detail was provided in regard to his sources aside from that he relied primarily on law-enforcement and investigative materials (wire-tapping, other forms of electronic surveillance, interviews with "knowledgeable policemen and investigators") as well as Joe Valachi's testimony during the 1963 McClellan Commission.

Following such data, Cressey developed what would become the academic embodiment of the bureaucratic and nationwide conspiracy model of organized crime. The key findings and propositions from this argument are as follows: (1)

that an exclusively Italian-American nationwide criminal confederation and cartel, known as the Cosa Nostra, had been in existence since the early 1930's; (2) that the Cosa Nostra was rationally designed in a formal hierarchical and dual-positional system; (3) through means of force and corruption, the Cosa Nostra maintained a monopoly on the distribution of illegal goods and services in America; and (4) two trends were expected - (i) a continuing and gradual shift from illegal to legitimate activity and (ii) a shift from a more traditional, authority-based, and vertical structure to a primarily entrepreneurial, expertise-based, and horizontal organizational apparatus. Each of these four propositions will be further elaborated in the following sections.

Organized crime and the Italian-American national syndicate

Information had been gathered by various law-enforcement agencies on about 5000 participants (all of Italian descent) suspected to be linked to the Cosa Nostra, a super-criminal organization found to be in control of all but an insignificant proportion of the distribution of illegal goods and services in the United States (Cressey 1969: p.21). While the Italian presence was indeed a key finding, the organization was argued to be a product of American life and society and not a result of a diffusion process of old world mafiosi (Cressey 1969: p.25). The Italian and American criminal organizations were indeed observed as similar on both structural and cultural dimensions and consistent contacts were detected between old and new world criminals, but Cressey argued that the Cosa Nostra was a direct result of an American demand for illicit goods and services as well as the political and legal context in America since the early 1930's:

> "The social, economic, and political conditions of Sicily determined the shape of the Sicilian Mafia, and the social, economic, and political conditions of the United States determined the shape of the American confederation" (Cressey 1969: p.35).

A further distinction was also made between criminal gangs that appeared during the prohibition years and the Cosa Nostra that extended and was put together over a number of years beginning in 1931 when the transfer of power

from "old-country Mafia mustache Petes" (Cressey 1969: p.35) to Americanized "Young Turks" (Cressey 1969: p.35) was initiated. The aim behind this post-Prohibition shift was towards the rationally-designed monolithic confederation and cartel that was proposed to be the principal structure of the Cosa Nostra.

Governmental structure and functions of the Cosa Nostra

That the American demand for illicit goods and services had resulted in the creation of an illicit government extending across America was another one of Cressey's main assertions (Cressey 1969: p.28). It was also one of the more controversial of his conclusions when considering its confirmation of what was believed to be the object of myth for both academics and law-enforcement officials alike for decades preceding the President's Commission. Cressey, in fact, confronted possible skeptics dead on:

> "It is more difficult to appreciate the fact that there exists in the United States a confederation of criminal organizations which is very similar in structure and even in values (honor, respect, obedience, manliness, honesty) to the confederation of police departments" (Cressey 1969: p.70).

The existence of such a criminal conspiracy had been suspected for many years preceding Cressey's own revelation, however, few had been able to provide any reliable and valid evidence to support their beliefs. Cressey based his own assumptions largely on the 1957 Apalachin gathering in New York State, in which law-enforcement officials broke up a meeting of the criminal minds between seventy-five suspected Cosa Nostra leaders. This incident was not simply a well-timed raid that sent dozens of middle-aged Italian men scattering into the surrounding woods. Cressey explained the pivotal place of this gathering in the history of American organized crime as such:

> "Calling the Apalachin meeting, it turned out, was the most serious single mistake Cosa Nostra rulers have ever made. In the first place, discovery of the conference family convinced some formerly skeptical government officials that a nationwide apparatus does in fact exist. (...) In the second place, these officials became convinced that law-enforcement intelligence is inadequate, and that the procedures for

> disseminating hard facts about organized crime to law-enforcement agencies and the public are inadequate" (Cressey 1969: p.58).

From that point on, law-enforcement agencies' knowledge of the Cosa Nostra criminal confederation, referred to by Reuter (1983) as the orthodox perspective of organized crime and that maintained the existence of "a large-scale criminal organization with a board of directors and a hierarchical structure extending down to the street level of criminal activity" (Cressey 1969: p.59), amplified consistently. The hierarchical structure of the Cosa Nostra confederation was found to be headed by a national commission, which had mostly a judicial function for regulating disputes between members. Below the Commission, and only in major metropolitan areas, was the council for a specific geographic area. The Commission and council overrided the various families, of which Cressey found evidence of at least twenty-four, that were described as "the most significant level of organization and the largest unit of criminal organization in which allegiance is owed to one man, the boss" (Cressey 1969: p.112).

The division of labour making up any Cosa Nostra family indicated the various functions of this particular unit. Each family was found to be made up of roles figuring in two distinct sets of positions - official/rank-oriented and unofficial/task-oriented functions. Official ranks made up the traditional authoritative hierarchical order stemming down from the family boss, to the underboss and advisor, to various lieutenants, and down to a series of soldiers. For instance, the enforcer[2] role, a key task-position that must be occupied within any family, indicated the governmental (visible hand) nature of the family structure.

While the business incentives driving individuals into organized crime has been constant throughout the literature, whether the organization was also, as Cressey argued, a despotic regime ruling over its members (Cressey 1969: p.186) was and remains the subject of considerable debate. Cressey offered the following deduction to defend this rigid governmental function:

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2. The enforcer is "a Cosa Nostra executive position occupied, usually temporarily, by a person whose duty is to make the arrangements for carrying out the judicial decisions of his superiors" (Cressey 1969: p.347).

> "The presence of an enforcer position in Cosa Nostra's division of labor, then, enables us to conclude that the day-to-day interactions of organized criminals are directed by norms which are also used in the adjudication process. The existence of an adjudication process signals, in turn, the existence of a legislative process. 'The law' must somehow be established before it can be enforced, whether it be established by royal decree, by democratic vote, or by some combination of fiat and ballot" (Cressey 1969: p.167).

Cressey pointed out various similarities between the American Cosa Nostra's particular set of rules and the respective codes of prisoners, underground wartime resistance groups in occupied territories, and the Sicilian Mafia. Four rules were particularly stressed:

> "(1) *extreme loyalty* to the organization and its governing elite, (2) *honesty* in relationships with members, (3) *secrecy* regarding the organization's structure and activities, and (4) *honorable behavior* which sets members off as morally superior to those outsiders who would govern them" (Cressey 1969: p.171).

Such a code was found to reveal the basic contract between the illicit government and its members. The fundamental right of all members was also explained:

> "By giving the rulers of the illegal government the power to assist and reward him, then, the member also gives the rulers the right to kill him. This is the basic meaning of 'illicit government,' when viewed from the perspective of the participants" (Cressey 1969: p.211).

Organized crime, therefore, was argued by Cressey to consist of both business *and* governmental formal structuring. The former had a member agreeing to share his profits with the organization, while the latter had him agreeing to a contract in which he put, among other things, his life on the line in exchange for various social security benefits, a network of working contacts, as well as protection and immunity from potential enemies[3].

Business functions: Illegal monopolies and legitimate infiltration

The combination of governmental and business functions, argued Cressey, had permitted the Cosa Nostra to seize and control a wide array of illegal activities, such as usury, drug traffic, bookmaking, numbers, and labour brokering. The incentives pushing various criminal groups to organize revealed the business advantages of the Cosa Nostra:

> "By joining hands, the suppliers of illicit goods and services (1) cut costs, improve their markets, and pool capital; (2) gain monopolies on certain of the illicit services or on all of the illicit services provided in a specific geographic area, whether it be a neighborhood or a large city; (3) centralize the procedures for stimulating the agencies of law enforcement and administration of justice to overlook the illegal operations; and (4) accumulate vast wealth which can be used to attain even wider monopolies on illicit activities, and on legal businesses as well" (Cressey 1969: p.74).

How was such a highly efficient criminal structure possible? First, it was pointed out that if such an organization was able to be put into place and reap continuous and lucrative profits, it was largely due to the overall criminal opportunity context - that being, the American demand for illicit goods and services. Second, through bureaucratic order, tactics, and progression, the Cosa Nostra destroyed any free entrepreneurial spirit that may have previously been manifested by so-called 'mom-and-pop operations' (small illegal enterprises). While, the continuous presence of such small entrepreneurs within illicit activities was not completely dismissed, the potential for their long-term survival and any possible involvement in highly lucrative ventures without any links to Cosa Nostra members was deemed unlikely - "any 'mom and pop' kind of illicit business soon takes in, voluntarily or involuntarily, a Cosa Nostra man as a partner" (Cressey 1969: p.74). Demand, *voluntary or involuntary*, was therefore in abundance and supply was in the monolithic control of the organization.

The means to arriving at such a monolithic status made up Cressey's third

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3. Three potential enemies were pointed out: (1) law-enforcement officials; (2) outside competitors seeking profits; and (3) underlings (Cressey 1969: p.186). Law-enforcement officials were argued to be the less threatening of the three (Cressey 1969: p.187).

point - the use of force and corruptible links. The former represented the principal method of taking care of competitors in illegal activities as well as infiltrating legitimate segments of the business world (Cressey 1969: p.2). Corruptible links rendered members practically immune to those law-enforcement strategies targeting them. Evidence regarding the strong place of such aims within the Cosa Nostra was singled out by converging on another key tactical position in every family - that being, the corrupter. Through outright bribery, political contributions, election rigging, intimidation and threats, and strategic networking, corrupters sought immunity for their own families or syndicates and, therefore, for the Cosa Nostra as a whole. This particular aspect resulted in some of the more fundamental accusations made in *Theft of the Nation*:

> (1) "the rulers of crime syndicates have strong interests in the governmental process and they are 'represented', in one form or another, in legislative, judicial, and executive bodies all over the country" (Cressey 1969: p.3);
>
> (2) "when police have been bribed to let Cosa Nostra operate, any Cosa Nostra member whose illegal business is threatened by outsiders can call on the police for protection" (Cressey 1969: p.51); and
>
> (3) "we must understand, further, that there is no longer any 'underworld' of organized criminals. The penetration of legitimate business and government by organized crime *[referred to as the "nullification of government" (p.248)]*, had been so considerable that it became increasingly difficult to differentiate 'underworld gangsters' from 'upperworld' businessmen and government officials" (Cressey 1969: p.67).

While organized crime groups of the 1920's and 1930's were perceived as being involved exclusively within illegal activities, Cressey maintained that the threat persisted forty years after American Prohibition, whereupon organized crime participants had become so powerful that they had already entered various legitimate activities in addition to their dominance within illegal markets. Unlike past criminal groups, Cosa Nostra members conducted business in the "American way" or, more specifically, with a "tendency to exploit rather than to destroy" (Cressey 1969: p.53). Legitimate businesses were not found to be completely separate operations from illegal activities in that they were linked to the need for

covering up illicit operations, establishing a respectable reputation in society, and laundering illegal profits with little potential for traces back to the criminal source (Cressey 1969: p.107).

This displacement from exclusive involvement in illegal activities to increasing interests in legitimate enterprises was not the only trend observed by Cressey. One principal shift that had been taking place in the Cosa Nostra's internal order, and which was partially a cause of the trend towards legitimate infiltration was the sway away from its traditional totalitarian structuring.

From totalitarianism towards entrepreneurialism

Cressey presented a scenario in which the business and governmental facets of coordinating and ruling over a criminal organization may become conflictual. He stated as follows:

> "Yet the fact that a boss heads an organization which is a business as well as a government poses serious administrative problems for him. Most of all, the business character of his enterprise makes it necessary for him to recognize and reward technical competencies. Men with highly prized skills cannot be 'ordered' to perform in certain ways, as a dictator demanding absolute obedience would have them do. The patterns of authority, influence, recruitment, decision-making, and communication established for totalitarian government are different from the patterns established for productive and profitable business enterprise " (Cressey 1969: p.222).

Various observations were put forward in regard to those trends that the Cosa Nostra would take in the years following the study. Although the Cosa Nostra that Cressey observed was entrenched within a formal organization model, the idea that its participants would shift towards more business ways of functioning and away from traditional totalitarian governing tactics remains a key and oft-neglected formulation extending from this controversial study:

> "While the system of authority in totalitarian government is ideally one of rank, the system in complex business enterprises is ideally one of expertise. When the two systems get intermingled, as they do in a criminal organization which is both a confederation and a cartel, one cannot be sure that subordinates obey because of a sense of duty, because of the fear of consequences of disobedience, because of

> anticipation of personal benefit, or because of some combination of these. The history of organized crime since 1931 shows a tendency to shift from a system in which rank authority was dominant to a system in which authority based on expertise is becoming equally important. The trend, then, seems to be away from totalitarian government bent on securing and maintaining conformity to a code, and toward economic enterprise. Currently, however, both the structure and the operations of illicit enterprises point to the indecision and disorder brought about by attempting to maximize both patterns at the same time" (Cressey 1969: p.223).

In many ways, Cressey develops what would become the core argument of the illegal enterprise framework. This shift was away from bureaucratic behaviour (or a mix of bureaucratic and free enterprise behaviour) towards predominantly business-oriented processes. These trends were indeed observed in research that followed *Theft of the Nation*, however, Cressey's own ideas were not incorporated within the evolution of what would become the illegal enterprise framework. Instead, he was left representing the bureaucratic approach. In view of such omissions, the next section presents a re-assessment of his critics and the rise of their own alternative explanations and concept.

Not Organized Crime, but Illegal Enterprise

Although the idea and term, illegal enterprise, had appeared in earlier works (see, for example, Chamberlin 1932; Bell 1960; and Sellin 1963), it was primarily post-Cressey (1969) scholars who developed the term as an alternative to organized crime. In fact, one of the first to elaborate considerably on the illegal enterprise perspective did not make a distinction with the notion organized crime. Sellin's (1963) reflections were, instead, consistent with a common thread between the two notions:

> "It *[organized crime]* has come to be synonymous with economic enterprises organized for the purpose of conducting illegal activities and which, when they operate legitimate ventures, do so by illegal methods" (p.13).

This link, although minimally developed by Sellin himself, was, as discussed above, not the mandate of others to follow.

Not Mafia, therefore not organized crime

While reaction to Cressey's work on the American Cosa Nostra immediately followed the publication of *Theft of the Nation* (1969) (see, for example, Albini 1971 and Hawkins 1969), the actual proposal to use the notion illegal enterprise as an alternative to organized crime was initially put forward by Smith (1971), who justified the switch as follows:

> "The choice of a name other than "organized crime" is a deliberate effort to escape from a concept so overburdened with stereotyped imagery that it cannot meet the basic requirements of a definition - it does not include all the phenomena that are relevant; it does not exclude all the phenomena that are not relevant" (p.10).

While Smith's assessment of the messy state of the organized crime notion was indeed accurate - then and now – the justification and decision to turn to a newer, less tainted term in resolving the matter was questionable. What occurred as a result of such detours from the real problem at hand was a higher degree of ambiguity in which the organized crime notion was left exclusively to those stereotyped referents that convinced Smith and others to turn elsewhere. Social scientists had chosen to abandon – to escape - the notion.

In a later work, Smith (1975) took on the problem in rather similar fashion as it is being addressed here, albeit with specific reference to the Mafia. His own concern was centered on:

> "the extent to which the public has been conditioned by mental pictures that now congregate around the term 'Mafia' and the consequent implications of interchanging the name, with its associated imagery, with the concept of 'organized crime.' Our unfortunate predicament is that imagery has tended to overwhelm fact and to blur our vision of the real world" (Smith 1975: p.8).

The two notions - Mafia and organized crime - are indeed taken as separate terms by Smith. Mafia or Cosa Nostra were regarded as denoting "persons associated with it *[organized crime]*" (Smith 1975: p.13). Like most others who confronted Cressey's study, Smith's problem was not with organized crime *per se*

but with the existence of Cressey's assertion "of a palpable, cohesive, authoritarian, national structure" (Smith 1975: p.21), referred to as the Cosa Nostra, and how this questionable super-organization became the principal referent for the notion organized crime. The evolution of this substantive and conceptual problem is well demonstrated by Smith from one chapter of his book to the next. Highlights in this evolution occurred with the Kefauver hearings that began the trend of merging previously separate notions (i.e. gangster, racketeer, Mafia) under the general heading of organized crime and assigning membership to any individual fitting such imagery to the Mafia. The 1967 President's Commission, in turn, made this faulty labeling process official. Cressey, in the end, was the "reputable sociologist" (Smith 1975: p.307) who brought the perspective into social scientific circles.

More than any other scholar, Smith aimed his criticisms directly at Cressey (1969). Many of the problems raised in regard to *Theft of the Nation* and the state of the organized crime field were indeed crucial assessments. Like Hawkins (1969) and Albini (1971) before him, Smith questioned the actual existence of Cressey's principal object of analysis and the potential problems that may have extended from such interpretations. Such limitations were amply pointed out in the following excerpt:

> "For today's organized crime world, the principal trait we identify is 'Mafia'. (...) How close the interpretation comes to the reality of organized crime depends, then, on the model against which we have compared new events, our accuracy in the matching process, and the appropriateness of the criteria by which subsidiary traits are linked. We do not test the process each time we wish to speak of organized crime; we accept preconceptions that enable us to sort events as they occur. It is possible to step back from the process, to question if we have preconceived accurately. (...) But we seldom do. We take our preconceptions for granted and let them mold our view of the world" (Smith 1975: p.12).

Throughout the remainder of his work, Smith proceeded to present the mythical proportions that the Mafia-organized crime link had taken. Some of Smith's counter arguments against Cressey, however, were less convincing than others. All, regardless of their critical value, seem to have stuck to Cressey until

today. One clear example of unwarranted criticism made towards Cressey's study concerned the issue of the origin of the Cosa Nostra. Between the diffusion of Sicilian immigrants and values versus the indigenous explanation of the rise of organized crime in America, Cressey has been placed amongst the former, who have become more commonly known as proponents of the alien conspiracy theory. Smith's handling of this particular issue and Cressey's place within it had its own limitations. He (Cressey) was accused of remaining ambiguous on how the Cosa Nostra developed and where it actually developed (Smith 1975: p.313), however, Cressey did clearly state that the Cosa Nostra he was observing, although having some similarities with the Sicilian Mafia *and* prisoner groups, was a direct result of American values - and not Sicilian (Cressey 1969: p.35). Such statements, it would seem, tend to relieve claims of decisional ambiguity.

After demythologizing the problem surrounding the conceptual ambiguity within the organized crime field up to and until Cressey (1969), Smith went on to develop the theory of illicit enterprise, with the main concept defined as "the extension of legitimate market activities into areas normally proscribed - i.e., beyond existing limits of the law - for the pursuit of profit and in response to latent illicit demand" (1975: p.335). This definition, in itself, was not novel at the time of this study's publication. That the term illicit enterprise should be used as an alternative to organized crime because of the latter term's messed-up state was, however, a first. Smith went on to explain what would later be coined (see Smith 1980) the 'spectrum-based theory of enterprise', which followed the basic logic that "entrepreneurial transactions can be ranked on a scale that reflects levels of legitimacy within a specific marketplace" (Smith 1975: p.336). The difference between the banker and the usurer or the pharmacist and dope pusher exemplifies the transition of such a continuum. Such a perspective clearly demonstrates the important place Smith gave to moral entrepreneurs throughout the twentieth century in influencing various shifts that took place in regard to organized crime imagery. At the same time, the reasoning behind why organized crime was not a suitable concept, in contrast to illicit enterprise, was explained as follows:

"it is apparent that what we have observed and conventionally called

> 'organized crime' is really the illicit aspects of two widespread entrepreneurial technologies in American life: the mediating technology of power brokering and the service technology of security and enforcement" (Smith 1975: p.343).

For Smith, the difference between legitimate and illicit enterprise was not in the activity itself, but in its legal status. The mechanisms that (business) entrepreneurs turn to in both legal and illegal settings of business were argued to be identical in function. While Cressey argued within a bureaucratic framework, both authors coincide and highlight the same functions. Cressey's emphasis on the roles of corrupters and enforcers within Cosa Nostra families were typical of the brokering and security mechanisms, respectively, accentuated by Smith. Implicitly, the main referent is substantially similar between the two studies. Interpretations of the structure of activities of various referents may be seen as having been debated between what Wrong (1961) termed oversocialized and undersocialized conceptions of man, the former representing a traditional sociological framework based on a structuring system of institutionally or culturally defined values and norms and the latter maintaining a neo-economic approach centering on individualism. The clash in perspective amongst organized crime experts, however, led to more distinctions being declared than needed. One of these unwarranted distinctions was between the old and tainted notion organized crime and the newer illegal enterprise.

The theory of illicit enterprise, rather than advancing a new framework to understand the illegal distribution of goods and services, would have proved more useful in advancing and clarifying the organized crime framework that was there to begin with. Smith's presentation of the mythical state of the Mafia as a social object, while rejecting the notion organized crime along with the existence of that social object, was valuable in pointing out alternative patterns that may represent how participants in illegal markets likely structure their relations and activities.

Smith's conceptual sway away from Cressey, however, seems questionable. His study, if building on Cressey's opposing framework, was above all useful in pointing out that that which had been perceived as organized crime for decades did not necessarily come in the rigid structural form put forward by Cressey. An

alternative theoretical base was indeed an important contribution, as were the various criticisms raised in regard to Cressey's perception of the Cosa Nostra. However, to extend this distinction into a conceptual division consequently led to an unwarranted referent split within the literature. Rather than extend the scope of the organized crime notion into including informal, business-oriented activities, the notion was left to proponents of the bureaucratic framework. Although he was accurate in pointing out that most illegal activity coordination did not fit the Cosa Nostra model put forward by Cressey, Smith jumped the gun in asserting that organized crime was therefore that which fit Cressey's model. This was a restriction of the term made not by Cressey, but by Smith and later critiques. What followed in this and later works by Smith was an alternative and more elaborated theory of organized crime and not, as Smith would maintain, an explanation of something other than organized crime.

Much of what Smith referred to as illegal enterprise was and remains part of the imagery making up the notion of organized crime. Popular notions of organized crime do not formally distinguish hierarchical and bureaucratic-like organized crime from looser illegal market crime. On the contrary, popular and, to a considerable extent, legislative and law-enforcement imagery of organized crime seem to be rather generous in their pool of referents that fall under that particular notion. Academics have taken the reverse strategy tending to create overly specific categorizations of processes and activities that are conceivably compatible in theory. Smith's explicit distinctions between that that was perceived as illegal enterprise and that that was maintained as organized crime by Cressey laid the way for the crooked path that the evolution of the organized crime notion and the overall field would take. What was initially a problem of conceptual clarification became a problem of collective ambiguity for the field as a whole.

Not formally organized, therefore not organized crime

One of the more important contributions to the organized crime field, Haller (1990), perfectly exemplifies how the tendency swayed away from Sellin's perception of the illegal entrepreneurial orientation of much that was referred to as

organized crime. Remaining consistent with Smith's conceptual shift, a clear effort was made to restrict any conceptualization of organized crime within the boundaries of the bureaucratic framework. The distinction put forward by Smith was further developed by Haller who discussed to a considerable extent in regard to criminal partnerships within various illegal businesses as something other than organized crime:

> "The structure of criminal partnerships differs from that often imputed to those involved in such activities - especially if the activities are thought of as 'organized crime'. Yet the structure makes sense theoretically. The 'organized crime' model stresses hierarchy and centralized control, but a partnership model posits that each enterprise is a separate enterprise that pools resources and provides local management" (Haller 1990: p.222).

That decentralization refers to partnership or illegal enterprise and centralization to organized crime is a distinction which, in itself, has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. Clearly, Cressey (1969) found what appeared to be bureaucratic-like structures, which were consequently maintained as *typifying* organized crime. Taking Cressey's findings and conclusions as maintaining the exclusive hold on organized crime conceptualizations proved that the phenomenon at hand was being misunderstood and, more importantly, that one of the more insightful aspects in *Theft of the Nation* was overlooked. While most of Cressey's work was aimed at describing the tightly-structured and dual governmental and business organizational roles of the American Cosa Nostra, he also developed considerably in regard to a decentralization trend that had been taking place and would continue to take place in the years following his study.

That the Cosa Nostra would gradually shift from a rank-ordered to a task-oriented entrepreneurial structuring and, therefore, likely decentralize was an accepted expectation for Cressey. This particular expectation was largely neglected by his critiques who centered on the more stereotypical issues that the author defended. Hence, bureaucratic-like organized crime became "organized crime" and illegal enterprise became the more decentralized alternative to "organized crime".

With Haller's (1990) contribution to further understanding the distribution of illegal activities, the conceptual problem at hand becomes evident. Haller placed much effort on analyzing the Cicero enterprises, or as they may be more familiarly known - Al Capone and cie's operations in Chicago (*circa* late 1920's). The author offered the following twist to popular knowledge of the legendary gangster's activities:

> "The group known to history as the Capone gang is best understood not as a hierarchy directed by Al Capone but as a complex set of partnerships. (...) They *[the senior partners: Al Capone, Ralph Capone, Frank Nitti, and Jack Grezick]* shared more or less equally in their joint income and acted as equals in looking after their varied business interests. The senior partners, in turn, formed partnerships with others to launch numerous bootlegging, gambling, and vice activities in the Chicago hoop, South Side, and several suburbs" (Haller 1990: p.218).

Haller further elaborated as such in a later section of the same article:

> "In short, the various enterprises of the so-called "Capone gang" were not controlled bureaucratically. Each, instead, was a separate enterprise of small or relatively small scale. Most had managers who were also managers. Coordination was possible because the senior partners, with an interest in each of the enterprises, exerted influence across a range of activities" (Haller 1990: p.221).

So, how was all this not organized crime? According to Haller, such business-oriented patterns did not constitute organized crime because they were neither hierarchically structured nor centrally controlled. Instead, the incentives and needs behind criminal partnering consisted of the sharing of risks and the more efficient mobilization of resources (1990: p.215). Smith and others would also concur that such criminal coordination efforts are not organized crime. However, this is in direct confrontation with the bureaucratic interpretation of organized crime. While many argued that Cressey's analysis of organized crime in America was considerably flawed, they nevertheless continued to use a definition of organized crime that fitted his findings and conclusions. In this sense, it would seem more accurate to say that Haller's findings and interpretations did not coincide with Cressey's work during the 1967 Commission and since that study

had serious methodological limitations, a more elaborate and valid understanding of organized crime was needed. This, once again, did not take place.

Haller's interpretation of Capone's activities demonstrates the considerable gap that exists between that which appears to be organized crime and taken largely for granted as such within popular imagery of the phenomenon and the academic distinction between organized crime and illegal enterprise. Rather than accepting the illegal enterprise *notion* as an alternative to one that seemed to have had its day, the argument advanced in this thesis accepts illegal enterprise *theory* as a rich contribution to further understanding organized crime per se - and therefore, further advancing the notion of organized crime itself.

There has been little justification in the literature to warrant such a conceptual switch. The most common reason put forward revolves around efforts to distinguish their work from the largely opinionated and polemic work that characterized the organized crime field into the late sixties. Other than more advanced research efforts, most students interested in understanding the participants and activities that make up the illegal distribution of goods and services are looking at the same phenomenon that Cressey and his own predecessors were examining. The structuring of organized crime activities may have changed considerably since the decades leading to the late 1960's, but this was a temporal transition accounted for and expected by Cressey himself. The development of frameworks developed to understand the less centralized segments of organized crime activities should have been merged with past conceptualizations, no matter how different, in interdisciplinary fashion. In many ways, the debate that illegal enterprise framework proponents developed against the bureaucratic construction of organized crime is the eternal one between the visible and invisible hands of control.

Enter Reuter (1983)

Probably the most rigourous confrontation against the notion of organized crime was Reuter's study of numbers, bookmaking, and loansharking markets in New York City. Reuter's (1983) work, aptly coined *Disorganized Crime*, verified

the validity of the bureaucratic framework using similar empirical sources as Cressey had during the 1967 Commission. The reasoning behind using alternative terms to organized crime was explained by Reuter, in a similar manner as Smith and Haller - "The orthodoxy, entrenched in both popular belief and official statements, is that illegal markets are typically dominated by a single group whose power rests on the control of corrupt public authority and the command of overwhelming violence" (Reuter 1983: p.2). Reuter continues this reasoning in developing his own thesis:

> "These are the forces of the "visible hand". But other forces are at work too. These are the influences usually referred to as the "invisible hand", the work of self-interest and technology that largely shapes the organization of markets for legal goods and services. Often tension exists between the visible and invisible hands in illegal markets. (...) In the three specific markets examined in this book, the weight of evidence is against the claim that they are monopolized or centrally controlled; the invisible hand is victorious" (Reuter 1983: p.2).

That market mechanisms are the key factors structuring the illicit distribution of goods and services is the principal tenet distinguishing Reuter from Cressey. While Cressey repeatedly argued that illegal markets, such as those studied by Reuter himself, were monopolized by organized crime and more specifically by the Cosa Nostra confederation, Reuter made the illicit market the actual object of analysis of his study and set forth, in particular, to refute the monopoly premise. The main interest throughout the study revolved around power and control within illegal markets and such variables were approached within an industrial organization analytical framework:

> "Since the study focused on questions of power relationships in an economic context, variables such as prices and profits seemed to offer the most appropriate kinds of data. Using markets for particular illegal products as the units for observation maximized the amount of economic data generated" (Reuter 1983: p.8).

Although Reuter's study was designed to progress in continuous confrontation with the orthodox view of organized crime, the author extended this important distinction into the either/or dichotomy that has come to represent the

structural state of knowledge within the field of organized crime. While monolithic control of illegal markets, rationally-designed criminal organizations, and ethnically-homogenous groupings were linked strictly to the notion of organized crime, informally-structured activities, lack of division of labour, short-term partnerships, and heterogeneous ethnic clusters were represented within a *dis*organized image of crime.

The principal factors Reuter turned to in explaining the disorganized state of coordination within illegal markets were the consequences of product illegality that influenced how illegal market participants structured business relationships. Reuter summarized the overall counter-argument as follows:

> "Although incentives exist for the emergence of a dominant violent group - one whose resources are believed to be sufficient for victory in any context involving violence - it is not generally optimal for such a group to attempt to create monopolies within the underlying illegal markets" (Reuter 1983: p.109).

It is this risk-opportunity interaction that renders the illegal monopoly unlikely and, at the same time, exposes the limits of Cressey's bureaucratic framework. Reuter's re-interpretation of the social organization of those same illegal markets that Cressey analyzed over a decade earlier was indeed rigourous and convincing. However, and similarly to Smith and Haller, the decision to distance the conceptual choice from organized crime to illegal enterprise was based on the organized crime term's established and discredited notoriety. Reuter defined organized crime in Cressey-like manner, while, at the same time, criticizing the elusive manner in which it had been defined:

> "The term 'organized crime' has never been given satisfactory definition or description. (...) For the present purposes the term refers to a particular type of organization, quite distinct from those represented by illegal enterprises like numbers banks or heroin distribution operations. Organized crime consists of organizations that have durability, hierarchy, and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities" (Reuter 1983: p.175).

Soon after, Reuter adds that the "Mafia provides the most enduring and significant form of organized crime" (1983: p.175). Illegal enterprise was therefore

not organized crime and Reuter went even further in stating that a consistent distinction must be made between organized crime and illegal markets overall (1983: p.177). Such distinctions seem rather unwarranted and confusing to the field as a whole. This criticism is even more evident when a substantive link is made between Reuter and Cressey.

Bridges Between Cressey and Reuter

While Cressey focused on the Cosa Nostra *per se*, Reuter spent most of his study assessing organization within illegal markets. However, the two authors may be compared within the same analytical boundaries by converging on Reuter's discussion of the five-family New York City Mafia system. Both authors addressed the Mafia's governance role within the illegal distribution of goods and services. Cressey did so in constructing a nation-wide confederation of Italian criminals who controlled the greater proportion of illegal markets. Reuter, instead, centered on the Mafia's monolithic role as arbitrator within the three illegal markets he studied. Both, regardless of the temporal split between their respective studies, confessed to a persistent presence of the Mafia - or Cosa Nostra - within some illegal markets.

By arguing that the Mafia had a monopoly over dispute settlements and, to a great extent, over coercive force in illicit markets, Reuter provided the basis for assessing the criminal organization's power in two separate sphere's, the economic and governmental. The Mafia, in a sense, may be reconstructed as having limited economic power in the three client markets and strong governmental power over all the illegal markets studied in this work because of its monolithic role as arbitrator. This distinction lies mainly between the Mafia's status as an economic firm or as a governance structure. For Cressey, on the other hand and as outlined earlier, the American Cosa Nostra was in full control of both economic and governance facets of illegal distribution markets.

Reuter's finding in regard to the Mafia's control of the arbitration market within the other three markets denotes its place within the overall process of distributing illegal goods and services. Numbers, bookmaking, and loansharking

markets may function independently of each other in an economic sphere, but the market for dispute settlements interplays across all three. Two statements expressed by Reuter account for the necessary place of arbitration in each illicit market under observation. First, disputes are claimed to be frequent in illicit market transactions (1983: p.151). Second, conventional means of arbitration are generally avoided because of product illegality (1983: p.109). Since the Mafia is claimed to monopolize this role of dispute settler, its position within each market varies in accordance with the need for such services from illegal market participants. The higher the need for arbitration, the more central the Mafia's role. Just as conventional government intervention may be argued to be more central within certain types of markets, the same assertion may be applied to the degree of 'governmental' control the Mafia has over the distribution of an illicit commodity.

Reuter's claim regarding the limited influence of the Mafia as an economic player in illegal markets may indeed be sound, but this does not extend fully to all forms of power. External players who do not serve any direct economic role may control an illegal market. Mafia families, may not undertake actual economic criminal activity, but they may serve as central forces of control (as third party mediators) within an illicit market. While Reuter did acknowledge the Mafia's place as a social control apparatus, he treated it as a separate and unique market rather than as a necessary service in other illegal markets. Markets that comprise a large proportion of transactions which demand the intrusion of an arbitrator will result in that arbitrator having a decisive role in that market's progression.

That the centrality of the Mafia within illegal markets varies in accordance with the need for arbitration is an implicit assertion from Reuter's study that converges with Cressey's interpretation of the Cosa Nostra. Whether the Mafia (or Cosa Nostra) is in control or not of illegal markets depends on the importance one places on the need for arbitration. A traditional sociological analysis, such as Cressey's, placed more emphasis on the role of the 'state' in structuring the economic activities of participants, yet both account for the presence of the Mafia in the settling of disputes among illegal market participants.

This link between Cressey (1969) and Reuter (1983) demonstrates how

knowledge that reveals the more decentralized aspects of illegal enterprise allows us to further enhance what we know of organized crime in general. The ideas of illegal enterprise and organized crime are quite compatible and should be merged. Gambetta's (1993) study of the Sicilian Mafia helps us defend the justifications for this conceptual blending even further. Although his main argument is that members of the Sicilian Mafia are, above all, in the business of supplying private protection, this does not entail that the typical mafioso cannot broaden his entrepreneurial activities to participation in other forms of illegal activities. Such variety in illegal market or trade participation reveals the entrepreneurial capacities of many organized crime participants. Illegal enterprise theory, in short, helps us advance our knowledge of organized crime because the most organized of criminals are often the most entrepreneurial in their ways. The notion of illegal enterprise is not revealing of anything that is not already inherent within most forms of organized crime. The latter should therefore be broadened in definitional scope rather than rejected in favour of the former.

Studying Organized Crime

The present section will outline a preliminary working definition of organized crime, which incorporates the main premises from the illegal enterprise perspective and that will be used throughout this study. Organized crime, as the partnership and similar models argue (Albini 1971; Ianni 1972 and 1974; Chambliss 1978; Block 1979; Block and Chambliss 1981; Anderson 1979 and 1995; Haller 1990; Alder 1993 [1985]; Potter 1994; and Naylor 1996), signifies cooperation and coordination amongst participants within illegal markets or trades. Those forms of crime that are found to (academically, officially, or popularly) constitute organized crime revolve around the long-term supply of illegal goods and services, such as illicit drugs, or the long-term illegal supply of legitimate goods and services, as is found in consensual forms of racketeering and contraband of non-prohibited commodities (Lippman 1931; Sellin 1963; Clinard and Quinney 1967; Cressey 1969; Vold and Bernard 1986). Organized crime has also been argued to represent a fluctuating, open process that incorporates the

affiliations of a wide array of (criminal and 'legitimate') participants (Brodeur 1997; Potter 1994; and Beare 1996). Potter, for instance, states that "[o]rganized crime must be conceptualized as what it really is, a social process occurring over time interlaced with social relations in order to comprehend organized crime as a social phenomenon" (1994: p.43). This representation directs us towards an image of organized crime that places it in a conceptual category that coincides with connotations similar to 'violent' or 'professional' crime – respectively, violent or professional ways of doing crime. Organized crime represents a way of doing crime and not any specific act or event that may be consistently seized and singularly identified. It is this process that is at the heart of the present inquiry's chase.

The working definition therefore incorporates these various elements to arrive at a conceptualization of organized crime as a cooperative-based process that revolves around the assiduous supply of illegal goods or services or the illegal supply of legitimate goods or services. If we extend this definition somewhat further, it may also be argued that participants who are exclusively active in the supply of illegal goods or services are generally able to remain independent in their earning activities. The disorganized, "vertically unintegrated" groupings that Reuter (1983: p.114) associated with numbers, bookmaking, and loansharking markets and that consistently associated with mass illegal drug markets at various segments of the distribution chain (Dorn, Oette, and White 1998; Dorn, Murji, and South 1992; Adler 1993; Johnson et al. 1985; and Moore 1977), illustrates this link between entrepreneurial independence and the supply of illegal goods and services.

It may also be argued, in turn, that participants who are exclusively or also active in the illegal supply of legitimate goods or services are obliged to get organized in more organizationally-oriented working settings in order to confront legitimate bureaucratic and corporate competitors. Information concerning the Mafia or Cosa Nostra, for example, have consistently maintained the presence of a (quasi or complete) vertical structuring of work groups within such reputed criminal confines (Maas 1968 and 1997; Cressey 1969; Albini 1971; Anderson

1979; Abadinsky 1983). Several have also observed the Mafia's role as a direct competitor to legitimate forms of state and other forms of social control (Arlacchi 1983; Reuter 1983 and 1984; Gambetta 1993; Anderson 1995; Grossman 1995; and Cusson 1998). Competition with state-oriented control mechanisms, as with competition with legitimate bureaucratic or corporate actors in legitimate enterprise, require criminal groups to structure themselves in more systematic, formal organizations. This is not because such forms of organization necessarily give them an advantage in their criminal endeavors. This is because it is a necessary condition for them to appropriately compete against their conventional counterparts.

Members of criminal organizations that are established to profit in and from legitimate business (racketeers) often have an edge over their legitimate competitors. This is so because they are able to remain more flexible in their business dealings and because they have access to a wider array of methods than their legitimate counterparts. Arlacchi (1983) points to some methods offering a competitive business advantage: protection, controlled wages, a more fluid labour force, and greater access to financial resources. An extension of such flexibility is that racketeers are relatively free from the hindering and lagging responses that often plague bureaucracies and other formal operations associated with contractual dealings. Criminal organizations are logically quicker on their feet than their legitimate counterparts because their members have less rules and working protocol to follow. They are more flexible because they are more informal. Once such criminal organizational settings are already in place to confront legitimate competitors in supplying various services or goods to legitimate business persons, participation in the supply of various illegal goods or services may also be conceivably added to the pool of activities extending from its members' endeavors.

The structure of organized crime groupings (temporary or long-term) is therefore partial to the group structuring of the main competitors within the business setting. This calls for participants in defined activities to access and build on the business acumen necessary to commit and survive in various forms of

criminal enterprise. Building such business acumen requires others who provide the entrepreneur with initial opportunities to participate, gather experience, and subsequently expand on such knowledge and resources. A comprehensive understanding of organized crime must therefore concern itself with how participants in the process, whether they are reared towards illegal or legitimate business environments (whether independent or shaped by varying levels of organization), cooperate with other participants in surviving and fitting in within the competitive settings they choose or come to be active in.

CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to arrive at a common paradigm that will encourage cumulative research endeavors, a theory of organized crime must account for the crucial distinctions between independent and organizational participants while focusing on the common elements surrounding diverse careers. For this study, the analysis is built around the evolution of the personal networks of two successful, yet diametrically-opposed careers in crime. The focus is therefore diverted directly at 'others' in a criminal entrepreneurial career.

Two case studies are presented in later chapters. They aim at exposing opposing ideal types that are required for the development of a complete theory of organized crime. One case study (Chapter 4) centers on the career of Howard 'Mr. Nice' Marks, who was an active participant in the international cannabis trade from the late 1960s to his arrest in Spain in 1988. Although Marks often worked with the same co-participants, the structuring of his activities typified the short-term, opportunistic mobilization groups that consistently emerge from studies centered on the distribution of illegal goods and services. He is therefore typical of the *independent criminal entrepreneur* in organized crime.

A second case study (Chapter 5) revolves around the career of Sammy 'the Bull' Gravano, who, in considerable contrast to the independent Marks, practiced his trade within the organizational confines of the Gambino family, one of New York City's five Cosa Nostra families. Gravano, whose career spanned approximately the same time period as Marks and ended with his arrest in 1990, ascended to the second highest rank in the Gambino family (as underboss) while, at the same time, expanding his business activities as a racketeer in New York City's construction industry. He is typical of an *organizationally-bounded criminal entrepreneur*.

Although Marks and Gravano are as distinct and representative of the main schools of thought within the field of organized crime (respectively, illegal enterprise and orthodox organized crime), both had careers that were relationally oriented. The bridge between the independent and organizational participant in organized crime becomes possible when the accent is placed on the fact that such typically opposed players were, above all, network players *par excellence*.

Networks and Purposive Action

How may one endure for two decades as an international cannabis smuggler without having the organizing force and support of a reputed and resource-yielding criminal organization? How, at the same time, may one account for the consistent findings throughout the past three decades that criminal organizations, such as the Mafia or Cosa Nostra (or any other ethnically-defined criminal unity), are not structured along the formal criteria previously professed by pre-Cressey (1969) scholars and consistently maintained in official, law-enforcement accounts (Hawkins 1969; Albini 1971; Smith 1975; Anderson 1979; Haller 1990)? While past studies have generally turned to either bureaucratic-like or market-based explanations in which the capacity and reputation for violence and other forces are typically regarded as the principal regulators of competition, the social network paradigm allows the development of an alternative argument centered on cooperation and relational utility.

In general, individual attribute data methods are used when studying various forms of crime. We look at the individual, gather information on his various characteristics, and aggregate them with the same characteristics of other individuals sampled to arrive at a set of attribute-oriented variables. These types of variables, however, are not able to flesh out the structural components that distinguish the individual's level of connectivity amongst and between others. To do so would require such a relational or social network approach.

Social network analysis has been tremendously rising for over half a century as a framework of choice for social theorists and analysts alike. Rather than present the entire evolution of this relational perspective, I will focus exclusively on a specific branch that has gained increasing attention throughout the past two

decades or so[4]. This specific branch, which centers on the concept of social embeddedness or the relational structuring of purposive or instrumental action, extends from the works of various economic sociologists or, as Granovetter has coined, within the intellectual spectrum of a 'new economic sociology' (Granovetter 1985 and Swedberg 1990).

How a network of contacts embeds individual actions has much to do in explaining the processual twists and turns that a given criminal career in organized crime may take. The concept of social embeddedness is used to grasp the structuring force represented by social networks in curbing, ameliorating, and directing economic action. Such relational structuring of one's business ventures is crucial to "generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (Granovetter 1985: p.490) between co-participants. The network, rather than the market or hierarchy, becomes the principal governance structure designing the economic actions of individuals:

> "Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations"(Granovetter 1985: p.487).

Powell (1990) expands on this approach by discussing the advantages of network organizations in comparison to more traditional organizational systems:

> "Networks are 'lighter on their feet' than hierarchies. In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy. The basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is

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4. For extensive reviews of the social network paradigm as a whole, see Leinhardt 1977; Alba (1982); Wellman (1983); Scott (1991); Wasserman and Faust (1994); and Wellman and Berkowitz (1997 [1988]). For more exclusive theoretical and insightful concerns, see Collins (1988: Chapter 12); Haines (1988); Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1993); Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994); and Emirbayer (1997). Methods and analytical techniques are presented and discussed quite thoroughly in Knoke and Kuklinski (1982); Scott (1991); Wasserman and Faust (1994); and Marsden (1990). For French overviews and method elaborations of network theory and applications, see Degenne and Forsé (1994) and Lemieux (1999).

> dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources" (Powell 1990: p.303).

In elaborating the specific advantage(s) of the network structure, Powell also pointed out that:

> "Networks are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is need for efficient, reliable information. The most useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in an organization, or that which can be inferred from shifting price signals. Rather, it is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the past and found to be reliable. You trust best information that comes from someone you know well" (Powell 1990: p.304).

Such advantages of the network, vis-à-vis other forms of organizations, have also been illustrated by Baker and Faulkner who accentuated its "flexible and self-adapting" qualities in business contexts (Baker and Faulkner 1992: p.422).

Lin (1982), in his theory of instrumental actions, developed a representation of a pyramidal structuring of positioning in a given setting. This pyramidal structure is not designed along authoritarian forms of control, but through differential access to resources. Lin writes that "[t]he pyramidal structure suggests advantages of positions nearer to the top. (...) Then, an individual occupying a higher position, because of its accessibility to more positions, also has a greater command of social resources" (1982: p.132). Social resources were defined, in consistency with Granovetter's early work on weak ties (1973, 1974, and 1982) and the later formulation of social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) as "resources embedded in one's social network" (Lin 1982: p.132). Influence within such vertically-structured settings is differentially allocated in accordance with the resources controlled by the participating actors and the positions that extend from such control. Higher-positioned participants (or participants with the most access to resources) gain an advantage over lower-positioned participants because, through a similar economic supply and demand logic:

> "any 'favor' the lower position may provide can be expected to have a greater future 'payoff', since the higher position has more to offer the lower position than vice versa'. The information factor is associated

> with asymmetric network relations across levels of positions. A higher position tends to have more information or a better view of the structure than a lower position; thus, it is more capable of locating the specific resources embedded in the structure" (Lin 1982: p.133).

Lin (1982) develops three propositions from this theoretical demonstration which are relevant for the thesis at hand. First, "the success of instrumental action is associated positively with the social resources provided by the contact" (p.133). This is so because better allocated resources are more likely to help the searching actor to reach his goal. Second, "the level of the initial position is positively related to social resources reached through a contact" (p.134). This is so because the initial position, whether inherited or acquired, situates the actor within reach of lateral and higher-level resources. Higher initial positioning therefore allows access to more valuable resources within the given setting. Third, "weak ties rather than strong ties tend to lead to better resources" (p.134). This last hypothesis extends directly from Granovetter's (1973) weak-tie argument that quite simply demonstrates the advantages goal-oriented actors (job searchers, in Granovetter's study) have in dealing with weakly-linked contacts who do not share the same channels of information as the actor himself. Strongly-linked contacts (i.e. family and close friends) are more likely to share the same knowledge and social resources as the actor and are therefore less useful when seeking a goal which is not already in reach and which requires access to new forms of information. Weak ties are more beneficial when the actor is seeking something that is beyond his immediate reach.

This overall conceptualization of the network vis-à-vis the market or hierarchy and as a structure with inherent asymmetries developed around differential access to resources (or opportunities) is consistent with the key theoretical and operational framework used throughout various sections of this study. Ron Burt's (1992) structural hole theory of competitive behaviour, which is the main influence for the framework under development, begins with the following representation:

> "Society may be viewed as a market in which people exchange all variety of goods and ideas in pursuit of their interests. Certain people,

> or certain groups of people, do better in the sense of receiving higher returns to their efforts. Some people enjoy higher incomes. Some more quickly become prominent. Some lead more important projects. The interests of some are better served than the interests of others" (Burt 2000a: pp.2-3; 2000b: pp.1-2; and 2001: pp.1-2[5]).

Burt's theory is strongly influenced by the earlier works of Granovetter on weak ties and social embeddedness, Lin's developments around instrumental vertical mobility in social networks, and, as Burt himself has credited, by Freeman's (1977) concept of betweenness centrality, Cook and Emerson's (1978) work on exchange networks, as well as Simmel's (1955) and Merton's (1957) ideas on conflicting social affiliations[6]. Rather than use markets or constraining hierarchy models in designing organized crime participants' scopes of action, the network model provides the main structural components that allow the observer to take into consideration and gather insights on both risk-reducing and opportunity expanding methods to increase personal capacities. While this assumption is at the core of structural hole theory, it is also consistent with those ideas and theories extending from the purposive action approach within the social network paradigm. It leads to an additional assumption that centers on the concept of social capital:

> "Social capital is the contextual complement to human capital. The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somehow better connected. Certain people or certain groups are connected to certain others, trusting certain others, obligated to support certain others, dependent on exchange with certain others. Holding a certain position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right. That asset is social capital, in essence, a concept of location effects in differentiated markets" (Burt 2000a: p.3; 2000b: pp.1-2; and 2001: p.2).

The structural hole argument tells us that having quicker access, timing, and referrals to and for information benefits in the competitive arena leads to some players' success in filling positions that allow them to seize the more rewarding

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5. All these papers may be downloaded at 'http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/ronald.burt/research'.
6. Further influences on Burt's theory may be found in White's demonstrations of holes (vacancies leaving seizeable opportunities) in the network surrounding a person(s) (see White 1970 for vacancy chains; as well as White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976 and Boorman and White 1976 for blockmodeling designs extending from these earlier insights).

opportunities available (Burt 1992). This competitive edge extends from one's capacity to effectively and efficiently enrich a personal network with a proportionally higher set of *entrepreneurial opportunities* or *structural holes*. Because network ties, particularly in a business context, require time and energy to make and maintain, some contacts, in a sense, are better investments than others - "What matters is the number of nonredundant contacts. Contacts are redundant to the extent that they lead to the same people, and so provide the same information benefits" (Burt 1992: p.17). The term structural holes is used to grasp "the separation between nonredundant contacts" (Burt 1992: p.18) or the voids between unconnected players that are available for seizing.

Fitting into a hole puts one in a position to broker a deal between previously unconnected players. This becomes a matter of improved choice selection and differential opportunities. Some players have the freedom to choose to develop the network benefits of information and, therefore, may come to control other competitors to a certain degree. Some players with such freedom choose to develop while others may not. Other players in the competitive arena do not have access to such opportunities; they therefore do not have the choice but to seek and depend on the social capital of others.

Burt's theory and the purposive network perspective from which it extends is key to the advancement of organized crime and more general research in criminology as well. It responds directly to Agnew's (1995) assessment that:

> "[f]ew criminologists have discussed the factors that promote freedom of choice, although it has been argued that free choice is most likely when there is an absence of constraint or there are countervailing constraints, and when the individual has the drive and the capacity to engage in self-directed behavior" (p.88).

Burt (1992) offers the analytical framework that allows us to incorporate the concepts of choice, constraint, and self-directed behavior (the pursuit of structural autonomy). A crime-oriented model guided by such precepts therefore shifts from soft determinism when converging on the early stage of a criminal career that is decisive in guiding the direction of the actor's drift (in Matza's 1964 sense), into an indeterminist position once entry into a milieu is achieved and criminal career

commitment is substantially apparent. Upon entry and commitment, "actors have the freedom of action and freedom of choice on at least some occasions" (Agnew 1995: 89). The level of such occasions increases with one's capacity. Capacity is a precursor to both forms of freedom and although full freedom (complete autonomy) may never be achieved, the likelihood of extensive survival and increasing freedom within an illegal trade or racket is shaped by a player's ability to remain in the interests of others in that milieu and to shape those interests in his favour. It is determinist because others play key roles in deciding what you can do. It is indeterminist because you can control how others are able to control you.

It is therefore through efficient networking and, more specifically, through one's capacity to broker and seize the information benefits needed and sought after by others, that some players achieve more control of opportunities in the business-oriented network than others:

> "A player with a network rich in information benefits has contacts: (a) established in the places where useful bits of information are likely to air, and (b) providing a reliable flow of information to and from those places" (Burt 1992 : p.15).

Those participants in the criminal market or trade who attain such a nonredundantly characterized and entrepreneurially-fit brokerage position place themselves so that they control not others, but the information and resources that others need.

This network-oriented edge offers an alternative mechanism for studying capacity to do crime and be successful at it. It allows us to understand competition for positions in illegal business settings through the informal forces that are systematically at work in both criminal or legitimate settings. One clear advantage of restricting the scope of analysis to the informal is that one does not become hampered by extensions of formalities that have come to be accepted in conventional spheres of action and taken as given when converging on crime. The major distinction between criminal and legitimate business settings, aside from and because of the obvious prohibitive status applied to the former, is that criminal

ways cannot be set in any formal way. Business in crime, by definition, is organized along informal processes. These informal processes are best revealed when set within the context of network structures that are conducive in both criminal and legitimate spheres. Such relationally-based insights may not have been explicitly formulated in past research on organized and other forms of money-oriented crime, but they have been consistently present on an implicit level. Before providing further elaboration on this purposive relational approach to studying organized crime and the main conceptual tools extending from Burt's structural hole theory, a review of various insights extending from research on organized crime or entrepreneurial behaviour in illegal trades will be conducted in order to demonstrate that these ideas have been consistently implicit throughout past studies.

Entrepreneurial Behaviour in Illegal Trades: Insights on Criminal Networks

Many would take the place of contacts in organized crime as given: because the form of behaviour inherent in such criminal processes is above all a transactional (supply for demand) affair, it is obvious that co-participants or co-transactors are needed for continual involvement in any given activity. The ability to suitably search and select one's co-offenders is a crucial necessity for increasing the scope of criminal opportunities. This ability to put together a "loose and open-ended network of weak and useful crime-relevant ties is here again anything but obvious and remains to be researched empirically" (Tremblay 1993: p.27).

Past research on organized crime has left us with a series of snapshots that have yet to be gathered within a common theoretical framework. The following sections aim at working towards this goal in raising a series of issues concerning the cooperative and informal nature of competition in activities associated with organized crime, the incentives for participants to compete in such a cooperative manner, and the inner working relations that allow some participants to get ahead of others over time.

Informal and Interest-Based Cooperation

Organized crime processes are above all competitive processes built on cooperative capacities. Reuter and Haaga (1989) conducted interviews with 40 importers, wholesalers, and retailers incarcerated in American federal prisons. Their study revealed two findings that remain of interest here. First, it was found that "capital in this business consists almost entirely of an inventory which is turned over very rapidly and the 'good will' built up by knowing good suppliers and customers" (Reuter and Haaga 1989: p.35). A second finding revealed that "successful operation does not require creation of a large or enduring organization" (p.54). Although formal organizations may have existed, they were not prerequisites for operational or financial success in the trade, hence, "trading relationships (...) were more like networks than like hierarchical organizations" (p.54). Participants were perceived more as "independent salesmen" dealing in non-exclusive and decentralized "arms-length-buyer-seller relations" (Reuter and Haaga 1989: p.44; see also Naylor 1997 for similar insight). Furthermore, the authors surmised that "the whole structure of the trades is based on asymmetries of information that would preclude formal organization" (Reuter and Haaga 1989: p. 46). Informal cooperation, rather than formal organization, was therefore deemed a more suitable notion in describing the collective nature of participation in drug importing.

Potter (1994) also stressed the cooperative nature of interaction between organized crime groups. He showed, in his analysis of three main crime groups involved in illegal gambling operations, prostitution, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting in an undisclosed geographic city in the United States, that the process of organized crime resembled that of any community-based social exchange network:

> "Organized crime relations often tend to be informal, changing, and predicted upon need and opportunity. (...) At the very least, organized crime represents a social network, a loose interplay of relationships among individuals in the community who come together to pursue a goal" (Potter 1994: p.123).

A more general conceptualization of the process that continues to

incorporate the various forms of organizations that come together in a given business setting and which downplays the place of central players was formulated as follows:

> "The very term organized crime implies collaboration and coordination with others. The concept of criminal masterminds obsfuscates the simple fact that it is networks of criminals who make up organized crime, not modern day versions of Sherlock Holmes arch-rival, Professor Moriarty. Such a view fails to understand the process of organized crime and the complex series of interactions involving many individuals, both criminal and noncriminal, that goes into criminal organizations" (Potter 1994: p.38).

Patron-client models of organized crime, which relate directly with the supply-demand of social resources developed in the purposive network perspective introduced earlier, have also turned to the more network or cooperative aspects inherent in group formations. Cooperation, in such frameworks, is also established with business incentives at the forefront. Common goals are constituted in each transactor's satisfaction with his receiving part in the exchange. Such mutual exchange processes combine to create, as Reuter and Haaga (1989) noted in the case of drug importers, asymmetries in the overall network of overlapping transactors.

The idea of patron-client networks has its roots with Albini (1971). In his study of 'syndicated crime' in the United States and his personal refutation of the Cressey-based formal organizational model, he stressed the informal nature of criminal organizations and described them "in terms of a system of power relationships among its participants" (p.263). Albini maintained that formal titles associated with organizational membership were "not useful since, contrary to the assumption of those who argue formal structure, not all bosses, underbosses, lieutenants, or soldiers are equal in power or status" (p.264)[7]. Formal roles or titles were perceived as minimal indicators of a participant's influence in a given setting when contrasted with "syndicated criminals who have managed to assume strong positions in power, not in a formal structure, but because they are in positions to

serve as patrons to a syndicate criminal clientele" (p.265). This tells us that a participant's title and position amongst others who are active in the same business settings cannot be fully understood unless an in-depth analysis of that person's influence amongst such others is assessed and revealed. A pecking order is constructed around the informal give-and-take (patron-and-client) process that develops over time. The categories claiming patron or client positions, however, are not mutually exclusive in that every patron could conceivable be a client to another or as Albini stated:

> "powerful syndicate figures who serve as patrons to their functionaries may also serve as clients to others more powerful than they. Others may serve on an equal basis in that although they are both patrons having a large number of clients, they may exchange mutual services" (1971: p.265).

Ianni (1972), in his first-hand ethnographic study of the structure of an organized crime family (the Lupollos) across three generations of time also expands using a similar model put forward by Albini (1971). He also found the exchange process to be a more accurate structural force in the Cosa Nostra than the formal organizational aspects of more authoritarian-based explanations. His position, however, centered more on the aspect of kinship and ethnic social ties which were often at the base of those other relationships developed along lines of illegal and legitimate business incentives and social alliances. Ianni explained that:

> "The base of *Mafia* power is personal relationship.(...) Where the law is powerless, say the *mafioso*, the injured must have a recourse to his own strength and that of his friends. Such relationships are not based on functional requisites but on personal connections and relationships. The dependence on influence describes the exchange relationships of *mafia* which finds its persistence in the pattern of obligations and responsibilities established throughout favors and services" (Ianni 1972: p.40).

Ianni also argues in favour of the "canon of reciprocity" (1972: p.148) when accounting for the main mechanisms and motives keeping members of a crime

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7. Also note that Albini (1971) does not deny the existence of formal titles within the syndicated crime under analysis.

family and other affiliates in cooperative relations. However, because Ianni placed the focus on the kinship or clan aspect of that family he was observing, his study of the Italian-American crime family (Ianni 1972), as did his later works on African-American and Puerto Rican crime groups (Ianni 1974), came to center on the ethnic concentration of cooperative relations. Few studies have remained consistent with this ethnic condition for cooperation in organized crime. Those who have raised findings revealing ethnic homogeneity generally focus on an ethnically-defined organized crime group to begin with. A network analysis brings us beyond the scope of analysis bounded by the ethnic-oriented scope of observation. For some, however, it may very well be that ethnic similarities are not a condition but a precursor extending from the social surroundings in which the personal network of participants develop and overlap. Ethnic homogeneity, like gender concentration and other attributes, is more likely indicative of the social basin of the network than it is a requirement for the realization of relations and therefore cooperative and extended business ventures. Organized crime networks may develop within the ethnically concentrated social contexts, but ethnic concentration is not, in any way, a condition for networks to develop.

Haller (1991), in his study of Philadelphia's Bruno family, also supported the cooperation thesis. He related the family to a "fraternal organization" which offered prestige, reputation, insulation, useful contacts, business opportunities, economic advantages, and a setting for the exchange of mutual favors between its members (p.1). Haller described the reciprocal system based on mutual exchange that was in place under the leadership of Angelo Bruno for 21 years and that ended with his murder in 1980:

> "members and associates recognized they were part of a larger network of legal and illegal businessmen who were expected to do favors for each other, avoid acts of unfair competition, and not cheat those who ran businesses that were 'connected' to other members" (1991: p.17).

This cooperative working environment was considerably modified, argued Haller, once Bruno's successor (Nicky Scarfo) began advocating and using more violence and, through his "self-interested policies" weakened the "group loyalty"

(1991: p.24) that was in place throughout the Bruno years. "Scarfo", explains Haller, "seized power within a family that had traditionally been a coalition of independent money-makers involved in a range of legal and illegal operations" (1991: p. 24). Through his less cooperative policies, Scarfo also fell to law-enforcement tactics shortly after taking hold of the Philadelphia family once members and associates, who disapproved of and feared the increased level of instrumental violence and despotic tactics, began turning towards opportunities to cooperate with law-enforcement officials as government witnesses.

Cooperative relations are indeed at the root of the organized crime process. A lack of them would spell the short-lived existence of any form of clandestine transactional setting. Probably one of the more straight forward attempts to develop the image of the network-based model of organized crime groups may be attributed to Hess's (1998) study of the Sicilian mafia. In this study, Hess focused on the actual nature of relationships within family (or *cosca*) unities and between mafiosi:

> "The *cosca* is not a group; interaction and an awareness of 'we', a consciousness of an objective to be jointly striven for, are absent or slight. Essentially it is a multitude of dyadic relationships maintained by the *mafioso* (m) with persons independent of each other (X...Xn). Instead of being a single person, X can also represent a small group, usually a family; in other words, via X, m reaches one or more further persons along a chain of dyadic relationships. (...) This does not mean that X_1 and X_n do not know one another. On the contrary, they usually know very well who the other person is and in what relationship he stands to m, but it is only the *mafioso* who mobilises them for joint action" (pp. 80-81).

Hess's conceptualization of the structure of the *cosca* and the mafioso's place within reveals the brokerage-like quality of relationships in such settings. He further elaborated on this structure and revealed how dyadic reciprocal relationships generally become asymmetrical and transform into the patron-client relationship identified by Albini (1971):

> "X is almost invariably the weaker partner; he is not *[only]* on a lower level economically and socially, but also in the power hierarchy. He therefore tends to regard m as his patron; similarly it is natural for m

> to treat X not as a partner but as a man dependent on him. This asymmetry becomes the more marked the longer a relationship lasts" (Hess 1998: pp.82-83).

Although formal organizational structuring are disregarded by all the studies cited above, inequality between co-participants is nevertheless emphasized. Competitive advantages in the patron-client model and other frameworks put forward to study organized crime are achieved through prolonged exchange processes between participants which, in time, remain reciprocal but become unbalanced in regard to what each participant in the relationship is receiving and to what point one participant becomes systematically dependent on the other for future dealings. This is the basis of the power-based structure that is at the core of this phenomenon and which, in its general frame, concurs completely with the insights provided by those purposive network theorists discussed earlier and, most particularly, the brokerage model put forward in Burt's structural hole argument.

The network framework effectively grasps the cooperative mechanisms which are at the core of both more independently oriented organized crime and more organizationally oriented organized crime because it centers on the relational matter that is at the root of justifications for who one may, should, and does cooperate with. While the insights and specific theoretical models revealed in this section have generally justified cooperation between participants in organized settings along personal and subjective interest-based terms, insights from studies concerned with the relational matter of more general crime patterns provide us with a more common goal keeping criminal trade and market participants in cooperative relations with each other.

Embeddedness and a Common Front

McCarthy and Hagan's work on homeless youth street networks in Toronto and Vancouver (McCarthy and Hagan 1995; and Hagan and McCarthy 1997) made the link between the relational and the learned. They merged social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985), social capital (in Coleman's 1990 sense), and

Sutherland's general differential association statement in arriving at the following synthesis:

> "Embeddedness in tutelage relationships with those already proficient in crime is a source of social capital, for example, as a channel of information. This flow of information provides access to skills and knowledge about crime in the same way that contacts, associations, or ties in more conventional lines of work supply actors with leads to jobs and other business-related knowledge" (McCarthy and Hagan 1995: p.66).

Further arguments maintained that because of its tutelage function, such "criminal capital" facilitates successful participation in crime. A later article, building on studies by game and social dilemma theorists, further pursued the makings of criminal capital by analyzing offenders' decisions regarding who to cooperate or co-offend with in crime (McCarthy, Hagan, and Cohen 1998). They suggested that in "instances of uncertainty, the decision to co-offend is influenced by people's mutual use of collective rationality and their willingness to trust others" (McCarthy, Hagan, and Cohen 1998: p.162). In inquiring on what makes criminal participants risk the chance of trusting other criminal participants, they focused on the place of adversity within such decision-making - "people in dire straits may be even more willing than others to make or accept cooperative overtures to pool resources and co-offend" (McCarthy, Hagan, and Cohen 1998: p.163).

For participants in organized crime and long-term money-oriented criminal activities in general, tutelage[8] and criminal forms of social capital are themselves key requirements for endurance and any level of achievement. While not all illegal trade or racket participants may be considered people in dire straits, all have one common adversary - law-enforcement officials and the conventional system that the law represents. This recalls Sutherland's assertion that "[r]egardless of how strong the ill feeling between two thieves, neither of them would want to see the other pinched, and each would exert much effort to prevent it" (Sutherland 1937:

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8. See also McCarthy's (1996) article accentuating the pivotal place of tutelage in a criminal trajectory and in interpreting differential association.

p.5). It also revives Jack Black's personal observation that "the masonry of the road and jungle would protect him against the common enemy - the law" (Black 2000 [1926]: p.165). Recall also that a key incentive pointed to by Cressey in explaining Italian-American-based organized crime was the 'nullification of government' (1969: p.248). Beating the conventional system of rules and formal control may therefore be perceived as an added incentive encouraging cooperation in illegal business settings. Aside from the pursuit of materialistic success, this is the common front keeping Merton's innovators and their 'joiners' (Warr 1996) cooperating together.

While subcultural theories of crime have accentuated a cohesive normative social environment that brings segments of the offender population together under a similar way of life, the common-front framework put forward here emphasizes cooperation amongst extensively different criminal participants who pool resources and transmit information in a process that extends from a learned collective incentive to beat the systemic odds facing them all. The main theoretical distinction is therefore between a normative/pull versus anarchic/rejection process shaping working relations between outlaws. The organized crime process is argued to offer an appropriate earning environment for outlaws who continue to reject conventional standards of work while simultaneously seeking, in queer ladder fashion, various routes to conventionally-encouraged materialistic success.

Resource Pooling and Prolonged Scamming

Once in cooperation, there is a considerable collective interest for co-transactors in a given venture to keep a good thing going. This 'good thing' is not simply the potential financial yield that may result from such continuous cooperation and resource mobilization, but the opportunity to repeatedly cooperate within the boundaries and relative security of trusted and network-worthy contacts. There are some available enhancements to this inquiry. Haller (1990), in discussing 'criminal partnerships', coincides directly with Powell's network conceptualization provided earlier:

> "a partnership model posits that each enterprise is a separate enterprise that pools resources and provides local management. (...) [R]eliability as a partner (or, at least, the appearance of reliability) is important for career success. Smart entrepreneurs fulfill their obligations in order to be offered future opportunities. (...) [S]uccessful early cooperation [is] the key to more lucrative opportunities in subsequent years" (Haller 1990: p.222).

Illegal trade participants must be able to overcome the consequences of product illegality and particularly the risk of detection by law-enforcement. Haller accentuates the need for participants to remain proactive and flexible in their activities. Social network theory tells us that for this to be possible, the participants must have access to an efficient network of working contacts. The ability to raise capital and mobilize a venture is therefore a function of a participant's extended pool of contacts.

Block and Chambliss's (1981) study, as well as Block's (1979) article on the cocaine trade in New York (*circa* 1910-1917), like Adler's (1993) ethnography of cocaine and marijuana smugglers in the southwest United States, stressed the decentralized state of organization that was the norm in illegal drug trafficking. The shape or structure of business-oriented cooperation, in consistency with the groups usually identified in other trades built around the supply of illegal goods and services, was found to be "fragmented", "kaleidoscope", and "sprawling" (Block and Chambliss 1981: p.56). Somewhat differently, Adler revealed the deviant business and social subculture within which smugglers were clustered to insulate themselves from the potential outgrowths of their illicit trafficking activities (Adler 1993).

Block and Chambliss (1981) explained the transitory and opportunistic nature of trade combinations:

> "their informal structures and probably short life spans were exceptionally responsive to the necessities of the drug trade. First of all, entry into the trade was fairly simple, involving few costs beyond the initial capital investment, few contacts in the area of supply, and hardly any organization for distribution. (...) It would be foolish to stake one's criminal career around a particular combination, given the chances that there would be nothing to sell. (...) It demanded entrepreneurs who were flexible, who had numerous contacts, and

> who were able to raise capital at unexpected times and to pull together a small organization with little effort" (Block and Chambliss 1981: p.56).

As for future commitments not implemented in on-going criminal ventures, it may very well be that two individuals interacting for the first time in an illegal transaction may never see each other after that particular event, but Reuter and Haaga did maintain that interests for suppliers and customers (at various intersections of links along the distribution chain) "were held together by considerations of long-term mutual benefit; neither side would press its advantage in negotiating a single transaction to the point where the long-term relationship was destroyed" (Reuter and Haaga 1989: p.48).

The more general scenario would therefore have criminal participants who are motivated to stay in contact with each other and continue maintaining proper and trusting work relations. In this sense, future commitments are not obligatory, but a good contact, marked by reliability, trustworthiness, and a capacity to offer consistent access to new or stable opportunities, is a contact which much be retained. Since one cannot realistically trust everyone, those who have established themselves as reliable and trustworthy are usually those with whom additional transactions will subsequently be made.

The limited selection of accomplices and partners in crime means that criminal opportunities for action are embedded within the realms of personal networks of family, friends, and acquaintances. One's direct contacts' contacts (Boissevain's [1974] friends of friends) also entail a latent pool of co-participants available through one's personal network. Finckenauer and Waring (1998) concluded along similar lines in their network study of the crimes of Russian immigrants in the Tri-State region of the United States (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) during the 1990s. They reject growing claims of an organizational monopolization of crime in the form of a 'Russian Mafia'. Instead, they find and accentuate the "broad connectivity among most of the actors" (Finckenauer and Waring 1998: p.198) who were included in the various sociograms offered in their study:

> "They may not be directly connected to a large number of others, but they are indirectly connected to many. This allows the networks a great deal of flexibility in the organization of their offenses, which means they can be responsive to the opportunities for illegal undertakings that develop. Given such an opportunity, a member of these large networks can access partners who are either generalists or specialists, can raise capital, and can access other needed resources" Finckenauer and Waring 1998: p.198).

The network grasps the suitable social basin from which outlaw partnerships, criminal ventures, and organized crime processes extend from and continue. Relational positioning within this interest-based and exchange network of potential co-participants should therefore be the focus of analysis. Such relational positioning is marked by an actor's ability to be entrepreneurially flexible. Such entrepreneurial flexibility is indicated by the capacity to control the resources needed by others or, in other words, place oneself within the interests of others. Simultaneous operating also comes with one's ability to acquire a place between the interests of others. Positioning oneself on the efficient side of the resource asymmetry makes one attractive to others who are seeking to supplement and ameliorate their own actions by accessing better quality information benefits.

The thesis builds on these past insights from research on organized crime, in both its independent and organizational forms. Networks have always been fundamental to the organized crime process. Networks have therefore always been fundamental (albeit implicitly) in research on organized crime. The task now is to center the focus of analysis directly on this relational matter. Clinard and Quinney (1967) pointed out that "organized crime may provide a person with the opportunity for a lifetime career in crime" (p.384). The authors furthered this reflection by stating that "little is known, however, of the specific mobility of the criminal from one position to another once he is part of the hierarchy of organized crime. The career histories of organized criminals are not usually available because of the immunity of these persons from detection and imprisonment" (p.384). The thesis pursues this void, which is still empty after three full decades since this excerpt was initially published.

The next section will further elaborate the specific network theory that will help develop an analytical framework for studying the mobility of participants within quite distinct organized crime processes. This network theory also helps in bridging the unnecessary gap between conflicting perspectives within the organized crime field of research by explaining extreme processes within a common framework. The chapter that follows will detail the sources and strategies used to overcome the consistent and inevitable data problems that face those studying the careers of generally undetectable and immune organized crime participants.

Structural Hole Theory and Organized Crime

Although, as the preceding section has illustrated, the relational fabric of organized crime activities and group structuring has been repeatedly identified in past research, the actual application of network theory and methods to study organized crime has remained rather minimal. As with many fields in the social sciences and in more official governmental or law-enforcement agencies, the network notion has been more commonly used as a catch-all expression used to denote the apparent utility that comes with the incentives of individual actors (persons, groups, institutions, for example) to merge their separate operations under a common unity.

Using network-based theories and applications as analytical tools and conceptual frameworks allows us to go beyond the catch-all phrasing of the in-vogue notion that the network became throughout the 1990s. The network concept is apt for organized crime concepts not simply because organized crime participants seem to be increasing their business horizons in very much the same way that legitimate actors have been seemingly doing for quite some time. The foundations of network theory or the relational perspective as a whole are key to the study of organized crime (and other co-offending contexts) because the facts and findings extending from observations of organized crime processes fit the models that emerge from this paradigm. Burt's (1992) structural hole theory, the main relational framework inspiring the various analyses throughout this study, is

a prime example from which our understanding of organized crime may be further enhanced.

Nonredundant Networking

Structural hole theory focuses on how a participant or competitive player (ego) invests his limited time and energy across direct or first-order contacts (alters). The key for ego's advancement is *nonredundant* networking - "Contacts are redundant to the extent that they lead to the same people, and so provide the same information benefits" (Burt 1992: p.17). Ego is in a redundant relationship with alter A if alter A is in direct contact with most or all of ego's other alters. Redundant networking means that ego is investing his relationally-based time and energy in an ineffective fashion. Successful business persons are those persons who have personal networks that are flexible, offer a wide array and scope of opportunities, and are expansive in potential. Business persons with networks yielding such advantages on a consistent basis are structurally autonomous players. They are also valuable and sought after contacts by others. The competitively advantageous are those players in a business setting that are positioned to quickly and consistently access and control the informational resources sought after by others. The competitively advantageous are those who have learned and come to be nonredundant in their necessary cooperative relations with others.

To be increasingly nonredundant in one's business-oriented activities, ego must work at filling his personal network with the most structural holes possible. The structural hole is defined as "an opportunity to broker the flow of information between people, and control the form of projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the hole" (Burt 1999: p.6[9]). These structural holes are therefore opportunities to broker between disconnected others. The competitive edge that some players may achieve over others extends from one's capacity to effectively and efficiently enrich his personal network with a proportionally higher set of

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9. Please note that the page number location accords with the version of this paper that may be downloaded at 'http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/ronald.burt/research'.

these entrepreneurial opportunities. Because network ties, particularly in a business context, require time and energy to make and maintain, and because time and energy are both limited to any person, some contacts, in a sense, are better investments than others.

It is therefore not sufficient to simply know to whom one is connected in order to understand who is well-connected. In order to fully clarify this question, we must understand how one is connected. This calls for a focus on the structure of an individual's network or his position within a wider or whole network. For example, if we are looking to discover to what extent successful others are well-connected, we realize the importance of understanding the overall structuring of their personal networks and not simply their one-to-one links with prominent others. What structural hole theory directs us towards, via its emphasis on nonredundant networking, is the importance of disconnections (Burt 1992, 2000a, 2001, and Lemieux 1999). Such voids are an indication of a player's ability to progress in business-oriented activities by nonredundantly allocating the time and energy invested in necessary others. Well-connected business persons are therefore strategically disconnected persons.

Such an insight is not only crucial, as Burt demonstrated, to understanding successful legitimate entrepreneurs. It is key to developing further knowledge in regard to success in criminal forms of enterprise as well. This allows us to see that the most central players that are typically targeted and often receive the most attention are not necessarily the most successful players within a given illicit market, trade, or organization. The idea of the most successful players as being those positioned in the peripheries of organizations or in the shadows of the most obvious spheres of action is very much revealed here. These are the brokers of information between more visible players who are most insulated yet strategically positioned to participate consistently and for a longer duration in a wider range of ventures.

Career organized crime participants are simultaneously actors who have some things to offer and who are personally in search of more things to access. In this, they are not different from their legitimate business counterparts. The

reciprocal, give-and-take image is not consistently in place between interacting actors, but its potential is ever-present. This is especially vivid in business settings, such as the drug distribution and racketeering settings studied here. Career organized crime participants are also simultaneously in the process of seeking ways of accessing action and keeping various forms of action hidden. In this, they may be assumed to be quite different from most of their legitimate counterparts. Advancing one's business activities within the clandestine working setting surrounding organized crime processes is the challenge facing those seeking to get into and ahead in a given activity. Structural hole theory allows us to establish that the seizing of opportunities structured around disconnected others permits the organized crime participant to simultaneously serve as a functional security buffer between others, efficiently expand his business opportunities by cumulating the number of structural holes in his network, and through this same nonredundant and efficient networking, increase his own security by narrowing down the number of others he has to *directly* deal with in order to expand his activities[10]. Hence, structural hole theory allows us to understand how criminally-active business persons increase their materialistic status in a disconnected and therefore relatively insulated expansive process. Increases in profits and security, as will be demonstrated, are both captured within the scope of this theory.

Network Efficiency

Measures in Burt's structural hole theory revolve around the number of nonredundant contacts or the *effective size* of ego's personal network. An effective size of 6,2 means that ego is in direct contact with approximately 6 alters who are not in contact with other alters in his personal network. *Observed size* measures the total number of others (alters) or direct ties that ego is connected to in a given

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10. This latter point, it must be added, is particularly dependent on the level to which the criminal entrepreneur intends to push his criminal endeavours. The level of security one expects to have in his criminal venturing is inversely related to the ambition one has to expand his opportunities. Nonredundant networking helps one expand while remaining relatively – but not completely – insulated. Pushing the limits of one's nonredundant expansion (increasing the number of contacts within the personal network) is expected, as argued by Burt, to increase

outcome-defined setting. An observed size of 10 means that ego is in direct contact with a total of 10 (redundant or nonredundant) others in the observed segment of his personal network. *Network efficiency* indicates the proportion of nonredundant ties per all direct ties (effective size / observed size). Our ego, displaying an effective size of 6,2 and an observed size of 10, has a network efficiency ratio of 62%. This percentage represents the proportion of disconnectivity in his personal network. Efficiency is essentially an indication of brokerage in that pure brokerage is denoted by a maximum 100%, indicating that all direct contacts are nonredundant, no alters are connected amongst themselves, and all come into contact with each other through ego.

Constraint

While efficiency is a straightforward measure seizing the basic nonredundant quality inherent in entrepreneurial networks, Burt generally relies on the more elaborate *constraint* (or aggregate constraint) measure in studying differentiation in personal networks. Constraint, in its most candid form, indicates the 'knots' (the level of redundancy) within one's personal network or the proportion of alters in a network that lead back to other alters. Unlike efficiency, constraint provide us with an indication of exactly how alters are positioned vis-à-vis ego. Ego is connected to A and B. B and A are also connected to each other. Ego's specific relationship with A is therefore constrained by A's relationship with B. Ego's relationship with B, similarly, is specifically constrained by B's relationship with A. The sum of all *contact-specific constraints* in ego's personal network amounts to *aggregate constraint*. Aggregate constraint (from here on, constraint) measures the "aggregate lack of structural holes" or entrepreneurial opportunities in ego's contact network (Burt 1992: p.140).

Network freedom or increasing access to relational disconnections is blocked by such constrained relations because the circulation of information flowing through ego remains bounded within the redundant circle of interconnected

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returns; however, criminally active players must also consider that at some point, overexposure hampers all that was efficiently built until that point.

contacts. For ego to increase his scope and variety of opportunities, the relational knots in his personal network must be loosened by connecting with others that permit extensive expansion beyond his established set of direct or first-order contacts. Such network branching-out offers ego a higher likelihood of accessing new opportunities, an increasing importance amongst alters, and subsequently a higher likelihood of attaining and maintaining a competitive edge in regard to sought after resources.

How free are organized crime participants to expand such network-based opportunities? Reuter's (1983) discussion on the consequences of product illegality, Erickson's (1981) work on secret societies, and Baker and Faulkner's (1993) findings regarding price-fixing schemes would have us conclude that constraint-free networking in criminal and clandestine contexts remain far from given. Because of threats associated with wide exposure of one's illegal activities, risks of expansion are numerous and career damaging and, as a result, participants in prolonged illegal activities prefer to invest in security over efficiency in their working methods.

Constraint is a positive indication that an organized crime participant is at the building (or re-building) stage of his career. It is an indication that ego is in a relatively low opportunity context. It is expected to decrease as ego's career ascends. An ascending organized crime participant is one who is decreasingly constrained and therefore increasingly non-redundant (and increasingly efficient) in his networking throughout his career.

A constrained personal network is a likely reality facing most organized crime participants at the onset and initial building phases of their careers. Constraint in criminally-oriented business networks suggests the level of relationally-situated risk that ego is facing at any given time. The higher the constraint in ego's network, the higher the likelihood that ego is compelled into seizing opportunities that he himself must seek out. More entrepreneurial (less constrained) personal networks permit ego to increase, broaden, and vary his activities by participating in or simultaneously brokering between more clusters of

co-participants. Accessing information from such an improved entrepreneurial position allows one to be the vector of more information and control benefits. As a broker within a bounded network, one receives information from and about various resources that is subsequently transmitted to others within the network. Brokers (highly-efficient or low-constrained entrepreneurs) are well-positioned to receive quicker, newer, and better information-based opportunities within a wider network of business contacts. Who receives the information once it reaches the broker is the decisive privilege of that broker. Indeed, more than one broker may exist within the same bounded working setting, but the position is apt for only a specific few.

The inverse case occurs for ego who is situated in a clique, in which everyone is connected to everyone else. A clique indicates that ego is devoting approximately equal time and energy to all contacts within the clique. A clique also indicates that all of ego's alters (all members of the clique) are connected to each other. Because time and energy is allocated equally amongst contacts, ego cannot benefit from the additional resources and opportunities he would access if investing more in one contact who was already linked to some of the others. This would allow ego to increase the returns on his relational investment because rather then spending X time and energy with Y contacts, he would spend 1/X time and energy on 1/Y of the contacts. He would still have indirect access to and therefore make use of the Y-1 contacts because he would remain connected with 1 who remains connected to others in the clique.

This is not only efficient and low-constrained networking, but it is also crucial for successful long-term criminal action in that it permits ego to reduce his exposure to other contacts. Subsequently, larger and denser (clique-like) criminal personal networks place someone at a higher likelihood of being detected and grasped within the surveillance and career damaging nets of external-positioned law-enforcement agents. Criminally-based networks that expand non-redundantly (away from the clique and toward the brokerage-like strategy) decrease constraints and therefore increase opportunities for ego. However, an increase is also expected in the likelihood that ego must confront the detrimental and inconvenient

extensions of defecting contacts in non-contractual settings. Expanding networks, in short, increase opportunities but also increase one's likelihood of experiencing the consequences of product illegality (Reuter 1983).

Structural hole measures are indicative of both ego's opportunities and exposure within a clandestine working environment and to external targeting forces. Efficiency or low personal network constraint suggests high opportunities and relatively lower risk. Burt would argue that low constraint indicates higher risk because ego is transacting with others who are not as tightly linked within ego's personal network. Matters of trust and security have Burt (2001) arguing that high constraint is less risky than low constraint. It is true that trust and security is more likely established amongst strong contacts. It is also true, as game theory would point out, that your most trusting contact is also in the best position to impede your security. Taking the prisoner dilemma into consideration would therefore have us maintaining that although Burt's argument regarding constraint and security does make sense, it may also be argued that low constraint offers a less risky working network for players who are essentially trying to diminish the probability of personal detection because ego is generally playing in the buffer zone or within the holes in his network. High constraint, in turn, suggests dependence on others within the working network, hence pointing to access to opportunities controlled by others and higher operational visibility[11].

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11. Furthermore, knowing that personal network constraint is positively linked to risk gives us an indication of the more vulnerable or resistant areas within wider 'whole' networks (overlapping personal networks) of criminal co-participants.

Hierarchical-constraint

Because constraint is a likely obstacle during the building phase of an criminal entrepreneurial career, ego is best suited to become *hierarchically-constrained* - that is, ego should concentrate his constraints in one or a small set of strategically selected established alters. This should be especially the case for organizationally-confined organized crime participants who are members of closed working settings. Burt (1992 and 1998), in studying legitimate members of organizations, found that certain members of a firm (women and entry-level men who were regarded as outsiders or illegitimate members of the firm) who are intent in getting ahead are obliged to invest their relationally-based time and energy in a more strategic fashion in order to make the most of their inevitably low-opportunity positions. Burt states that the "key for outsiders breaking into the game is to borrow social capital rather than build it. Legitimate *[accepted and established]* members of a population succeed by building their own social capital. Illegitimate members of the population have to borrow" (1998: p.6). Borrowing a legitimate or established member's social capital puts one in a hierarchically-constrained relation with that strategic sponsor. In this sense, ego is structuring his network to have one or two large knots rather than many small ones.

In shaping personal network constraints via a hierarchical strategy, ego is able to increase his personal exposure with the assurance of a sponsor who serves as a screening and vouching device between ego and other alters within the sponsor's network. The sponsor is essentially brokering between ego and others. Indirect access to such an entrepreneurial player's network may be beneficial to criminal business persons who are at the building phase of their careers, however, such a personal network design also keeps ego dependent on the sponsor.

Once ego gets accepted as a trusted insider within the firm and is able to have consistent direct business relations with the sponsor's contacts, he must branch out on his own at some point. If he does so by decreasing the hierarchical dependency he has on the sponsor and expand his network to be more entrepreneurial, he is then indicative of an organizational member whose career is ascending. Within the firm, this may result in earlier, faster (Burt 1992), and more

promotions. Within business activities, ego is expected to increase returns on his investment of relationally-oriented time and energy because he is able to spread his resources more efficiently and decrease his risks across a better selection of network-based opportunities. This combination is expected to allow one to be more prolific in earnings while remaining more resilient in criminal endeavors.

The organized crime participant, within a high structural hole relational context, is more capable of adapting to crisis throughout his career. This is so because he is more "robust" in his actions (Padgett and Ansell, 1993) and in a more suitable position to adapt to incoming events and life sequences that are beyond one's full control. He is, in short, more flexible in the informal working environment that generally wraps his earning activities. Criminal careers that reach successful heights are therefore expected to proceed through various movements that are relationally structured. The transitions that take one from increasing efficiency in one's investment of time and energy in others, decreasing constraint, and, if necessary, an abandoning of hierarchical-constraint dependency brings one towards structural autonomy and privilege in one's business activities.

CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHOD

Preliminary Phase: Assessing Various Paths of Research

As with a life in crime, the task of a researcher often calls for considerable capacities of adaptation when confronted with (positive and negative) chance happenings beyond one's personal control. In a sense, the researcher is also in a position that requires an avoidance of problems that extend beyond the central task at hand. Flexibility is, once again, the key. This chapter will provide the reader with an account of my own personal path to getting the thesis from there to here. Key others, decisions, and transitions will be exposed as the account unfolds.

When I started a project roughly four years ago which had me seeking various ways to study social networks in organized crime, I contemplated various avenues of research. The main obstacle confronting me was the source. Three options were available: (1) access to participants themselves; (2) information extending from law-enforcement investigations; and (3) archival records from the past which documented the evolution of specific activities, the lives and experiences of particular people, or overall contexts within a specific geographical setting and time period.

Using Reuter's (1983) study of illegal markets in New York City as a lead, I began by exploring the feasibility of the second option. An initial research project proposing a study of cocaine distribution networks in Montreal was written and contact with high-ranking officials (the second-in-command and the heads of the specialized investigative squads and criminal intelligence teams) in the Montreal Urban Community Police Force (MUCP) was made (via the personal contacts of my thesis director, Pierre Tremblay). Formal meetings were arranged and conducted during the summer of 1997. Requests were made towards these law-enforcement officials to access various forms of information that would be useful in developing the project at hand. After the first meeting, it was decided that I would be provided access to drug squad investigative files. Which files and the extent of this access would be left to the discretion of the drug squad investigators and administrators who would be supervising my fieldwork. It must be noted that no member of the actual drug squad was present at any of these meetings which authorized my access to their files.

After additional official authorization was obtained from the provincial (Quebec) governmental body controlling general access to confidential information, we (Pierre Tremblay and I) initiated contact with the drug squad. After a security check was conducted on both Tremblay and myself, initial meetings took place in the early fall of 1997 with some of the higher-ranking members of the drug squad. These encounters proved promising. The officers that we met understood that the project was still at its early stages and that an exploration of various forms of information would be required before specific requests could be made. Some conditions concerning the exploratory fieldwork, however, were established from the start. It was understood that I would not be allowed access to any files extending from on-going investigations or concerning active suspects[12]. An investigator was assigned the task of helping me during this exploratory stage. Apparently, he was also asked to screen what information I was coming across and seemed interested in.

Problems in dealing with and accessing law-enforcement data have been continuously remarked by researchers studying organized crime and illegal markets in general. This is one of the few aspects with which advocates of both organized and disorganized crime are in agreement (see, for example, both Cressey 1967 and Reuter 1983 for their personal problems with access to official data). My experiences in developing this early stage of the thesis taught me that although I was given initial access to a wide array of interesting and potentially telling forms of data, authorization to actually collect this information and pursue its research potential any further proved to be a whole other matter. In a sense, I was allowed to see very much, but I was permitted to touch and use very little. Standard procedure would have the supervising investigator presenting me with various files and information bases on drug transaction arrest and surveillance records[13]. When I would return with various strategies on how to use such data, access was consistently denied. Typical explanations involved my supervising

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12. Please note that the notions of 'on-going' and 'active' remained somewhat ambiguous and at the supervisor's discretion.
13. Rather quickly, I expanded the exploratory task of the research to include all drugs rather than simply the cocaine market with which I was initially interested

investigator at the Montreal drug squad assuring me that he personally had no problems with my intents regarding the data, but that higher-ranked members preferred that the information remained inaccessible. In short, he was only following orders from above. This took place on at least five occasions over a two-month span. On each occasion, I failed to convince him or any of his own supervisors to change their minds on each of these matters.

At one point, this same supervising investigator presented me with an ensemble of evidence collected during a lengthy two-year task-force surveillance of a cannabis and cocaine importation network operating primarily from Montreal. The case was conducted in tandem with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the evidence that was issued to me was originally presented as prosecutorial proof at the arraignments and trials of 15 members of this importation ring. Because the surveillance information was used as evidence in court, Canadian law permits its accessibility to the public at large. The ensemble of information, consisting mainly of selected bits and pieces of transcripts obtained from the electronic monitoring of the traffickers' telephone conversations with each other, provided an excellent basis for a network-oriented case study. The main core of the evidence (roughly 1000 pages) was obtained. By this time (March 1998), the investigator who had been supervising my fieldwork since I had been granted entrance into the drug squad offices had been promoted and was no longer in charge of me. Although I was losing my main inside source, the loss proved to be rather advantageous. The new supervising investigator was much more understanding of the task facing a researcher of criminal matters and used his personal discretion in providing me with various additions to the initial investigative source.

A main source for the thesis had been found and all that was needed was to complete the search by obtaining the remainder of the surveillance information surrounding this task force case. While the Montreal drug squad was very much open in providing me with the public-accessible evidence that they had in their immediate access, problems arose when I inquired on obtaining access to that information from the two-year drug importation investigation that was not

incorporated within the prosecutorial and public evidence. With the help of my new and flexible supervising investigator, I was able to locate various additions at Montreal's courthouse and amongst other investigators from the Montreal police force, however, obtaining any further portions of the investigative project would require that I contact and get authorization to access such information from the other law-enforcement agency that was part of the surveillance team - the RCMP.

These summary remarks depicting my experience of attempting to access law-enforcement-based information accentuate the need for the researcher to invest considerable time and energy in establishing trusting relations with various members of the law-enforcement branch in question[14]. Although official protocol (i.e. police force authorization, governmental authorization to access confidential information) must be followed in order to initially enter this extremely closed setting, acceptance of one's presence does not guarantee free or even extensive access to information. I discuss this particular problem within the frame of this present study because I have seen several other researchers pass considerable effort attempting to gain access to law-enforcement information only to be repeatedly told that the door that was seemingly opened is now closed. For those who have succeeded in attaining a decent level of access, the place of the individual contact(s) within the organizational setting becomes crucial. Established relations with one or a small set of investigators who are able to act and think independently when deciding which information to turn over to the researcher are principal assets. A trusting and open contact allows one to avoid the 'I have to follow orders' dilemma or typical justification with weaker, less-interested contacts. The fortunate switch from my first to second supervising investigators taught me that. The researcher, in the end, must be ready to work with a considerable level of patience, openness, and creativity in mind when dealing with law-enforcement officials, their information, and their discretionary powers.

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14. Note that these attempts of establishing trusting relations are completely one-sided. The researcher must convince the law-enforcement members that he/she should be trusted. For obvious reasons, the inverse is much less necessary if one's goal is to simply access data and little beyond theoretical considerations and research results is offered in return.

After repeated failures attempting to establish efficient working relations with a series of investigators who were assigned to simultaneously aid and supervise me, I did indeed come across one very trusting (or understanding) person. This investigator gave me all that was available at the Montreal drug squad for the particular case on the cocaine and cannabis importers. With the aid of this investigator and a couple of his superiors, I turned to the RCMP official who was in possession of the substantial remainder of the case's information. Quite surprisingly, I was flatly refused and told that any information that was not included in the prosecutorial evidence was not to be accessed for reasons of confidentiality and for the protection of the individuals who were monitored during the investigation but not arraigned once the surveillance period was completed. The RCMP official justified this denial by referring me to Article 193 of the Canadian Criminal Code which prohibits the disclosure of the existence, access, consultation, and use of documents containing the private communications of persons that were intercepted and monitored via electronic, acoustic, or mechanical means. Exemptions to this rule, however, did pertain to investigators, Canadian government agents, or individuals acting under the functions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Act. Unfortunately, I, as few researchers would, did not fit into any of these exemptions.

Curiously, the individuals that this RCMP official and Article 193 were seemingly trying to protect were already considerably exposed in that although 15 members of the drug ring were actually arraigned for their participation in the prohibitive activities, over 200 additional names (as well as dates of births, addresses of personal residences and businesses, telephone numbers, and past judicial antecedents) were included in the prosecutorial evidence that was made accessible to any citizen that had an interest in having a look at the documentation surrounding the case. All one really needs is the court number of the case and access to the evidence deemed worthy of proof by the investigators and prosecutor is permitted. What we are not given access to is anything that was not deemed worthy of proof by investigators or prosecutors. The RCMP official also explained to me that although such information is sometimes made accessible to non-RCMP

individuals, he was not ready to take the personal risk with me. After repeated failed attempts to gain access to the rest of this case's information[15] and having become completely exasperated with the succession of events extending as far back as my initial encounters with law-enforcement officials, I decided to abandon the entire research strategy revolving around the law-enforcement source.

It was not simply that the data was not accessible; it was that the data that was made available to me was only done so in partial form, while the rest of the ensemble remained stored and secured away somewhere else. Because I failed to understand, after I had obtained and passed all security authorizations and checks, why only selected portions of the information was accessible and no law-enforcement contact was prepared to provide me with a better explanation than "those are the rules, you know – I have to follow my orders or else I would help you out", I decided to turn elsewhere. In time, I came to realize that this decision had me abandoning the potential for a wide-scoped analysis in exchange for extensive research freedom. The decision has never been regretted.

Law-enforcement data is valuable data for studying the actions of organized crime participants and their wide range of activities. It is secondary-hand information, but its abundance offers a researcher a strong basis for constructing the social worlds that are often sought after. The strength of such second-hand data, of course, relies on the potential to get as much of it as possible. Because I was only able to get portions of larger, more complete sets, and because I had grown rather tired and revolted with negotiating, making my case, and attaining the necessary trust to attain the rest of the data that I already had a part of and that had already infringed the privacy rights of many individuals monitored throughout this lengthy investigation, I started thinking of new ways to go around the source problem.

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15. To no avail, I tried going over his head by making requests with a series of higher-ranking RCMP officials.

Finding the Source: The Criminal Memoir

The alternative that became the factual basis of the present thesis sprung forward not in a formalized and elaborately planned fieldwork project, but in a casual encounter. It was suggested (by a Scottish optometrist that I had met while travelling in Sitges, Spain) that I read the autobiography of Howard Marks, a famous Welsh cannabis smuggler. In making each other's acquaintances, we began discussing what each did for a living. When she learned that I was researching drug trafficking networks, her immediate reaction was to refer me to Marks's personal account (Marks 1997). She explained to me that the book was a great read and that the author explained how he operated as an international cannabis trafficker as well as revealing a wide array of contacts who were implicated in his activities throughout his lengthy career. Could you imagine that a traveling optometrist from Scotland would prove to be more of a help to the final product presented here than the Montreal drug squad and the RCMP put together?

At the moment of my return from Spain in July 1998, I purchased Marks's book (*Mr. Nice*) and found it to be amazingly detailed. I passed the autobiography on to my thesis director, Pierre Tremblay. Pierre, after reading it, suggested that I conduct an analysis and write a paper using the network approach that I had been studying and developing throughout the previous two years and with Marks's account as the main data source. The final product extending from this suggestion appears in the first of the thesis's case studies (see Chapter 4).

That the project came to an interesting product (and mainly that the project came to an end) convinced me that the criminal memoir may have been an overlooked source and potential informational gold-mine sitting at our direct availability. I began scanning through various other auto/biographies of organized crime figures, illegal market participants, and other career outlaws. The relational strength of such sources was immediately apparent and quite consistent. Some were, of course, superior accounts than others, but most had the details that researchers often seek when attempting to construct an empirical world. What was common across all the biographical accounts was the place of others (the network, in other words) throughout the central character's life. These key others that help

shape and guide the events and transitions throughout one's career are named in the criminal memoir. The ensemble of names that emerge throughout such personal accounts constitute the makings of an important portion of the central character's personal network. This relational foundation often serves as the story line for such life history accounts. The network, as social embeddedness theory (Granovetter 1985) tells us, often serves as the story line to most of our long-term and key endeavors. Try it - try describing your life, your key individual realizations, and personal progressions without mentioning or thinking of anyone else. "We are all constituted of the same ingredients; we make one another what we are", wrote Collins (1998: p.79), in studying the overlapping conflict-oriented networks that linked major and minor philosophers throughout history and across cultures. This is not only true for philosophers and researchers alike, but, in accordance with differential association theory, for offenders as well. It is a fact that may be applied to any form of extensive interaction process which surrounds people seeking to build on similar interests together. This gave me the perceptual backing that I was looking for to pursue this research matter further.

I became more selective and theoretically strategic in the case study that would follow Marks and replicate the approach that developed throughout this initial analysis. In assessing a wide array of criminal auto/biographies, I came across Maas's (1997) biography of Sammy (the Bull) Gravano (*Underboss: Sammy the Bull Gravano's Story of Life in the Mafia*). Gravano was a member of New York City's Gambino family who defected from that way of life after accepting a deal from the FBI which had him substantially diminishing his expected sentence in return for his testimony against his Gambino boss, John Gotti, and other members of New York City's Cosa Nostra. After reading this account, the network basis of the career in crime was once again quite clear. While this remained rather evident and largely expected, another (distinguishing) aspect extending from these two criminal memoirs also struck me. While Marks was typical of the independent organized crime participant, Gravano's career distinguished all the elements associated with the organizational form of Italian-American organized crime. These two forms of organized crime participants have

been consistently contrasted in past research (see Chapter 1), yet the most revealing insight that emerged from their respective career histories was how similar they were in their reliance and use of others throughout their trajectories. The scheme was now in place. The thesis would incorporate a comparative approach that would focus on the structure and influences of the career personal networks of two diametrically-opposed organized crime participants - the independent Marks and the organization-based Gravano.

Primary and Supplementary Data Sources for the Marks Case Study

Marks wrote his autobiography after his release from Indiana's Terre Haute maximum security prison in 1995. In an interview with a British daily shortly after the publication release of *Mr. Nice*, Marks was asked to describe the challenge of writing his life story. His answer provides some strength regarding the accuracy of this principal source: "Writing the book was easy in one way because my life was so heavily documented by the American government that all I had to do was read Drug Enforcement Agency Observation Records to find out where I was at a particular time" (interview with the *Evening Herald* from September 6, 1996[16]).

Although Marks's reply allows us to account for how he was able to reconstruct the previous decades of his life through documentation assembled by his law-enforcement targeters, some level of triangulation of the primary data source was nevertheless required. The principal venue for finding the minimal secondary or back-up data sources available was Marks's personal internet home page[17]. Two sources were located at this website that permitted some cannabis trade ventures to be confirmed. Newspaper clippings from the 1980s are available and provide a media confirmation of Marks's and his co-participants' larger drug-busts and judicial experiences. Confirmation for activities taking place throughout the 1970s were unattainable (aside from the ensemble of newspaper clippings included within the autobiography), however, the scope of activities throughout

16. This interview is available at Marks's website: 'www.mrnice.co.uk/articles/kids.htm'.
17. Marks's web page may be located at 'www.mrnice.co.uk'.

this earlier period in his career proved consistently smaller[18] than for later, more ambitious periods. Marks also provides his web-page visitors with access to some of the actual DEA electronic surveillance recordings from the first half of 1986 that were used in building a case against him. These recordings situate him and his co-participants within the context of his venturing with the largest loads of his career. Confirmations (newspaper clippings and electronic surveillance) were therefore retrievable for the largest consignments and less for the more conceivable and standard one-ton shipments. Finally, while the tapped telephone conversations put him in contact with many of the contacts and events documented throughout his autobiography, several new, undocumented names appeared as well. These latter names were excluded from the set of possible contacts because of their absence in the principal data source[19].

Primary and Supplementary Data Sources for the Gravano Case Study

One primary source and various secondary information bases were used in reconstructing the relational and activity rudiments of Gravano's career. Maas's (1997) biography of Gravano, which was written in collaboration with the central character, served as the main source throughout this study. Although all of *Mr. Nice* was used as analytical material, only a portion of the Gravano biography remained as such. During an interview following the publication of *Underboss*[20], Peter Maas, in discussing the writing of this biography and Gravano's personal role in this process, stated as such: "as much as possible I would let Gravano

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18. None of the importation shipments documented from the 1970s surpassed the acceptable 1-ton consignment of cannabis that Adler found to be conventional for marijuana smuggling (1993: p.56).
19. Additional information on Marks's career may also be attained through an earlier journalistic account (Eddy and Walden 1991) and a less personalized biography (Leigh 1988). Neither of these sources was used as supplements for the case study presented here. Both biographies are out of print and a used copy was obtained only for the Eddy and Walden (1991) account which documents DEA efforts in 'hunting' Marks during the latter half of the 1980s. Although this account was only obtained after the analyses were conducted and the thesis was practically completed, a thorough assessment of the facts used throughout further confirmed the ensemble of information extracted from Marks (1997) for the study at hand. The Leigh (1988) biography (written with Marks's partial collaboration), which I am still trying to find, would be useful in assessing the accuracy of the central character's activities throughout the 1970s.
20. This interview may be found at the following internet address: 'www.titlepage.com/cgi-local/shop.pl/page=mass.htm/SID=817210'.

describe them *[scenes from his life]* because he had a good eye for detail. (...) So the book ended up being about 45% his *[Gravano's]* words, which I did deliberately". It is primarily this 45% of Maas's biography that was used as the main evidence for the case study of Gravano's career in the Cosa Nostra.

The principal data source was further supplemented by various biographical, journalistic, law-enforcement, prosecutorial, and academic sources. Among these sources was a biography of one of Gravano's key contacts at the height of his career, John Gotti (Capeci and Mustain 1996). This source proved useful in further elaborating Gravano's career, particularly throughout the 1980s. Because Gotti and Gravano worked in close proximity and came to share a common relational entourage, an account of the former's career provided considerable overlapping evidence for the latter's.

An additional biographical source that provided similarly confirming evidence focused on the Gambino family as a whole (Davis 1996). A third supplementary source extended from the sensationalist attention surrounding Gravano's defection from the Cosa Nostra and Gotti's subsequent conviction. Electronic surveillance was the key law-enforcement tactic used by the FBI in their targeting of various Gambino family members during the 1980s. The scope of attention that surrounded the prosecution of Gotti proved extensive and marketable enough for the large portion of electronic-surveillance-based evidence as well as an edited version of Gravano's personal testimony (direct and cross-examination) used throughout the trial to be published and sold on the mass market (Blumenthal and Miller 1992)[21].

Another law-enforcement source was retrieved on the internet. Between November 1991 and February 1992 (immediately following his defection from the Cosa Nostra to the FBI), Gravano went through a series of debriefings by the FBI. The contents of 51 of these debriefings could be downloaded at the Smoking Gun website[22]. These two law-enforcement and prosecutorial sources proved valuable in further substantiating the biographical information from the opposing, law-

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21. The existence of this particular source was referred to me through an e-mail communication with New York City organized crime reporter, Jerry Capeci.

enforcement perspective.

Finally, additional supplementary sources were found to confirm a large part of Gravano's activities, particularly for his most prominent period during the 1980s. Three studies providing material on racketeering in New York City's construction industry (Jacobs 1999 and 1994; and Goldstock, Marcus, Thacher, and Jacobs 1990), Gravano's main business activity from the late seventies to his 1990 arrest, helped situate and further specify Gravano's contacts and venturing within that particular business activity. As with the Marks's case study, the selection of contacts was limited only to that which was documented in the primary biographical source (Maas 1997). Supplementary sources were only used to confirm or provide additional information regarding those contacts already selected.

Evaluating the Criminal Memoir for Network-Oriented Case Study Analysis

Criminal memoirs have been a part of the popular and academic landscape for as long as criminal life has been of interest to non-criminals. Marks's autobiography and Maas's biography of Gravano are but two documents in a mass of other potential case studies. Although such documents have often been dismissed for their spontaneous reporting style, anecdotal story-telling, and considerable subjective view of various facets of crime, much past research has nevertheless turned to published criminal auto/biographies as main or complementary factual sources (Sutherland 1937; Klockars 1974; Arlacchi 1983; Steffensmeier 1986; Katz 1988; Gambetta 1993; Firestone 1993; and Jacobs 1999). The criminal memoir has the full benefit of offering an insider's vision within any given offender's life trajectory.

Various other advantages and evident limits surround the information available in these sources. Overall, the autobiography's value is determined by the author's discretion in disclosing the truth. However, the author is above all important as a teller of facts extending from lived personal experiences. He is not necessarily important as an object of analysis in himself. It is the information

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22. Go to 'www.thesmokinggun.com/gravano'.

surrounding events that we should be interested in (Znaniecki 1987: p.34). An evaluation of the criminal memoir's factual basis must therefore be specific to the precise information that is sought after for analytical purposes. These analytical purposes are entrenched within a practice requiring one to read between the lines, seize the non-obvious thread, and follow it to its substantive end. Structuring that sequence of interconnected findings is the second purpose which permits a framework to be developed for subsequent applications in other sets of information. What is needed from the start of analysis is a push in the 'right' direction.

My analytical purposes are clearly micro-sociological[23] in their foundation. I do not attempt to enter the psyche of either of the case study's central characters; I have no immediate concern with their personality types; nor do I attempt to explore and reveal the cultural, market, or institutional forces weighing on each entrepreneur. I simply aim at demonstrating that who these two entrepreneurs became and what they achieved was a result of who they knew, who they associated with, and how they (purposely, naturally, or accidentally) positioned themselves within the context of this immediate and reachable social world. Before entering into the pros and cons of this thesis's main source, it is established that two sets of information that were particularly sought within each biographical source consisted of: (1) information on contacts or co-participants in crime and (2) information on earning (illegal or legitimate) activities, career-relevant events, and other achievements. Although the criminal memoir does contain additional informational qualities (i.e. the central character's self-perception and justifications for his endeavors), its use in this study generally relied on the data that revealed various patterns and processes throughout each person's career. The basic aim of the data collection and organization process was therefore to reconstruct each organized crime participant's career from a social embeddedness or network-oriented purposive action perspective.

Pros

The strength of the criminal memoir as an empirical source depends on what information the researcher is concerned with. With a major concern of the thesis accentuating the place of contacts or networks in crime, the criminal memoir proves to be an extremely valuable source. For both Marks's autobiography and Gravano's biography, over 200 different names were documented for each. This established the basis for a potential quantitative setting of analysis, albeit with a frame restricted to the personal networks of each of the central characters in these accounts.

That the criminal memoir lends itself to the feasibility of a network analytical strategy was not simply a chance occurrence. Such life histories provide a wide array of research opportunities for studying the makings of criminal networks from the points of view of participants in outlawed activities. One of the most striking characteristics readily evident to any reader of such literature is the consistent relational flow that serves as the backbone for many of these accounts. This is the egocentric-network quality of many criminal memoirs. The chronology of a participant's evolution from his initial entry into a given illegal activity, gradual rise and establishment of reputation, and eventual fall[24] generally takes place via a contact to contact narrative pattern. Associating major events and turning points throughout one's career with a name or group of names is common practice amongst writers of such accounts. The aim of the researcher should therefore be toward identifying various transitions, events, or outcomes, and subsequently localizing the pertinent participants implicated in and around each.

Such a source gives us access to *at least* the core personal network of the account's central character. This fact is especially crucial for criminological purposes which are branded by the key obstacle of accessing a story teller to begin

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23. Some may make a strong case that the approach is more 'meso' than 'micro'. My tentative response to such inquiries is that both are analytically inherent in that the meso unit (the personal network) is embedding the micro (the individual's actions).
24. I include the fall among the general phases of the criminal auto/biographical account with a respectable level of certainty. While not all criminal participants are expected to experience a career fall, its potential amongst those who have had their stories published, many of them being informants to begin with, is clearly much higher.

with. It is true that only a portion of the lifetime and consistently fluctuating personal network may be captured, but what may be argued is that those others that are incorporated in the biographical source meet the same requirements that are met in social network studies. Burt's structural hole theory, for example, was built on an empirical basis designed around a self-reported survey of legitimate corporate managers in regard to their working experiences and the networks surrounding this segment of their lives. The network data collection tool was designed so as to obtain information concerning a maximum of twenty core contacts in the respondent's working environment. Similar requirements were easily met in both Marks and Gravano's personal accounts. Neither of these organized crime participants were directly accessible[25], but both revealed, through their accounts, a considerable level of information regarding their careers and the people who figured throughout to warrant the basis for a data extraction process. Such information may be accessed through other methods and sources, such as face-to-face interviews with the criminally active entrepreneur or via law-enforcement investigative files, but neither is simultaneously directly accessible and first-hand material.

The criminal memoir remains a first-hand account when the central character is either the author, co-author, or cooperative part of the writing. An in-depth analysis of information available in such first-hand sources is therefore as or more pertinent to furthering our understanding of criminal careers and inherent activities than partial segments of secondary sources. Firestone (1993) stressed the benefits of such first-hand accounts in conducting exploratory analyses of evidence from criminal memoirs that developed insights regarding the possibilities of using established criminological theories (strain theory, control theory, and particularly differential association theory) to explain an individual's onset into organized crime. That the first-hand accounts of high-status offenders are particularly

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25. I did, however, contact Marks via e-mail on two separate occasions. On the first attempt (February 2000), I received an answer demonstrating his interest in reading the paper, however, he never gave me any feedback on that version of Morselli (2001). On the second attempt (October 2000), he assured me that he would indeed make some comments on the published version of the paper. I am still waiting for his response...

available in published criminal memoirs is yet another asset in that such successful entrepreneurs may be assumed to be even less directly accessible and negatively compelled to participate in matters of research[26].

An additional strength regarding the personal network analysis of these accounts extends from the longitudinal basis within which the analysis may be entrenched. While law-enforcement-based studies have been instrumental in elaborating our understanding of illegal markets, specific crime working unities, and more macro levels of observation, the case studies developed here provide a complementary assessment and explanation of how a participant within these macro units of analysis maneuvers and establishes himself. We end up with a study on the structured actions of participants who would learn to become successful players within any given collectivity.

This network approach via criminal memoirs is also incredibly inexpensive in addition to being directly accessible to all. This is a considerable asset for social science researchers and, in particular, to criminological researchers who generally face the sizable task of seeking ways to reach understandably hidden sources of information. The financial costs of the fieldwork essentially consist of the fees associated with each memoir and any supplementary sources deemed necessary. An extension of this financial consideration and its direct availability is that the memoir permits the replication of any model developed in previous case studies.

Furthermore, the criminal memoir is an extensively open account which largely avoids confidentiality and trust considerations associated with ethnographic and face-to-face research. The central character has voluntary decided to tell the story depicting his career. The non-directive style in which such life trajectories are told also exemplifies an absence of researcher effects in the actual 'interview' process (this, of course, is less so for biographies than autobiographies). The tale is provided and in order for the tale to be told, both events and the social network must be revealed to one extent or other. The approach developed here seizes the structuring basis of one's account and

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26. See, however, Arlacchi's (1994 and 1992) interviews with high-profile Sicilian organized crime participants. Tommaso Buscetta and Antonio Calderone as well as Cottino's (1998)

therefore the natural basis of one's life trajectory – other people and the happenings they help shape.

Cons

What are the limits of the network analysis of a criminal memoir? One may not expect all contacts made throughout an offender's career and all key or minor events to be provided within the context of such accounts. It may be presumed, however, that at least core contacts and events are extensively provided. The differences between what is fact and fiction in regard to both networks and events is a difficult task at hand. Triangulating such information with other sources (i.e. biographies or accounts concerning the same person, newspaper sources, or police and court records) will indeed increase the validity of the initial data source. Note, however, that such additional sources are not always available nor accessible.

Many would be quick in discounting the offender's personal account simply because the offender has to be up to something in order for him to be writing his story. Both Marks and Gravano may be perceived as having respective personal agendas behind their decisions to write and publish their stories. Marks was clearly aiming at revealing the absurdity behind the severity of the punishment he received for supplying cannabis to consensual others for several years. Gravano was explicitly incited in having his name partially cleansed after the immense battering it took following his decision to testify against his former Cosa Nostra colleagues. Not only was Gravano's name (and life) completely threatened in organized crime circles, but media and public opinion surrounding his controversial decision to cooperate with the FBI reflected the negative emphasis placed in his becoming a bonafide 'rat'[27]. In both cases, financial profits extending from book sales would be secondary to these more personal discrepancies that had to be resolved. These personal agendas, however, do not disclaim any accusations of distortions of the truth. They simply dampen the simplistic and obvious claims

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discerning life history analysis of Antonio Saia.

27. The final chapter in Maas's (1997) biography of Gravano displays the media circus and attack within news outlets in New York City. Capeci and Mustain (1996) also document this negative, stigmatizing press and outlook Gravano faced at that turning point in his career.

that some may make regarding the financial incentive possibility. In order to establish the level of accuracy throughout the account, we must be able to situate when throughout the account the facts are most and least likely to be distorted. Once this contextualization of the problem is clarified, we are then in a position to assess how the precise data extracted from these accounts are themselves hampered by this evident possibility.

There is of course a considerable amount of error that may be associated with any biographical source. This would be true for an account on conventional or criminal lives. Gambetta (1993) explicitly pointed towards some of the limits that may be associated with information of this type. For instance, testimonies by mafiosi were described as being influenced by "melodramatic distortion, self-interest, or the desire for revenge" (Gambetta 1993: p.116). A second caution put forward by the author was directed towards information obtained by more popular outlets. This point was elaborated as such: "Most accounts of mafia protection are biased by the way they become known to us, for we usually hear only about those occasions when something goes wrong and blood is spilled. When things go well, there is either nothing to reveal or no reason to reveal it" (p.159). The information sought after in this thesis was not exclusively dependent on the more sensationalist aspects of each of the criminal entrepreneur's careers. This is particular true for the network aspects of these careers because recalling such elements requires the story teller to retrace the full extension of facts surrounding a particular event. Clearly, the possibility for distortion is ever present, but the likelihood of distortion and outright lying decreases as the scope of the recall process expands beyond the actual incident.

The present study also has the considerable limitation of not being representative of criminal careers in general or even more specific careers in organized crime. One must consider that offenders who do have the facts of their careers exposed in such sources are particular in their own way and may not likely represent a more general type of offender. Both Marks and Gravano may be regarded as rather unique offenders, but, at this point, the extent of their respective atypicalities is restricted to the present analysis. Further case studies using this

network approach and biographical data source would progressively resolve problems of and pursuits towards more general propositions regarding socially embedded criminal ways of making a living. What is represented here is therefore limited to the careers of Marks and Gravano and all the atypicalities that may extend from their personal experiences. The inability to reach propositions that may be generalized to a farther reaching proportion of a population or subpopulation is, however, somewhat offset by the success of each criminal entrepreneur. Successful criminals are not common fixtures in any society. Success criminals are atypical to begin with, hence, uniqueness is therefore a common fixture amongst successful criminals. Two in-depth case studies of successful criminals therefore reach a better representation of that select group of offenders than if the scope of analysis was on the 'average criminal'. The denominating 'N' for successful entrepreneurs in organized crime, in short, is much smaller than for average criminals. An analytical model that succeeds in taking into account and explaining the careers of two diametrically-opposed successful criminals may likely be expanded and applied to successful criminals in general. It must also be noted, once again, that although accounts of the more successful careers in crime may be atypical, the notoriety and achievement of successful criminals often serve as models for others looking to commit to and advance through a criminal way of life. They establish an ideal that it is possible to make it through crime. In all their uniqueness, they establish the reality for a much more general portion of onlookers. How one gets ahead in crime is not simply of interest to criminologists and other scholars; it is particularly fundamental to many practicing and learning such trades, which, in turn, should further increase the level of interest for those studying crime.

A final matter hampering the value of a criminal memoir for research purposes concerns the subjectivity of the account. That each story is guided by a one-sided interpretation of key events and outcomes that occurred throughout the offender's trajectory is not so much a problem dismissing the validity of criminal memoirs as useful and telling data sources as it is an indication of what to watch out for when working with such sources. Personal justifications of past deeds and

voluntary or involuntary exaggerations or omissions of facts surrounding these deeds represent the most obvious limits of such subjective accounts.

Both events and the coming-and-going of contacts are provided throughout each account in a chronological order. That key events and the set of contacts embedding them have been put forward is sufficient to warrant the empirical basis of criminal memoirs. A prime example illustrating this point extends from Gravano's career-ending experience. A profound conflict took place between Gravano and his former boss, John Gotti, in the events succeeding the former's decision to become an informant. Gotti and his followers, supported in part by members of various New York City media outlets, portrayed Gravano as the principal character responsible for the turnaround in events that all took part in to some extent or other. Gravano, in the Maas biography, defended his reputation and provided his own interpretation which largely pointed the finger to Gotti. The events leading to the 1990 arrests of the Gambino family administration may have been due to Gotti's flamboyance, Gravano's business ambition, or, more likely, a mix of both. One may take sides between the two, but it is not necessary for present research purposes. What is crucial is that both are referring to the same events and identifying the involvement of the same mutual contacts. Within all the noise surrounding their designation of the blame for each other's problems, they combined to confirm the information that I was interested in.

The more a researcher seeks beyond the more evident forms of information appearing in the source, the more he distances himself from the central character's main purpose(s) in publishing the account. This distancing process that accompanies the increasingly guided analytical procedure also diverts the more likely elements of distortion that may be present in an auto/biography. We want contacts and the events they structure. Criminal memoirs consistently offer us that at a much less transparent level. Since revealing the network is not a conceivable element in the central character's incentive to publish his story and is more likely a necessary element to reveal while telling his story, it is maintained that the relational fabric of criminal memoirs is indeed an overlooked form of information that is potentially rich for a field of inquiry lacking data from the onset.

Developing the Method

The following provides a step-by-step description of how the data and approach for each case study were organized and developed. As already pointed out earlier, the analytical portion of this thesis developed in two general phases. The first phase revolved around the Marks's case study. The main analytical strategy and representations were created throughout an inductive analysis of Marks's career. Although the social network perspective was a mainstay from the onset of analysis, the actual relevance of Burt's structural hole theory within the scope of this thesis only emerged once the network and event aspects of Marks's career were extracted and organized. Once that case study was completed, the same representations were replicated within the context of Gravano's career, albeit with various modifications which accounted for some of the key differences between the two criminal entrepreneurs.

Establishing the Core Working Network and Identifying Outcomes

The first step in this method required a selection of contacts that were relevant to the criminal activities and events in which each criminal entrepreneur took part in throughout his career. For both case studies, the core working network was extracted from each account through a contact elimination strategy. As already noted, only principal sources (Marks 1997 and Maas 1997) were used in establishing the overall pool of contacts that served as the starting network sample. Supplementary sources helped in providing further information regarding contacts, but not in adding new contacts to the network.

Those contacts that were retained in the final core working network were accorded this status because of their implications in the main activities under analysis for both case studies. For Marks, the exercise was somewhat straightforward in that any contact documented as having participated within any of the cannabis importation ventures that served as that case study's outcome generator were not removed in the elimination process. Gravano's activities were not as easily segmented. His street crime activities at the beginning of his career

usually came in sprees and his racketeering operations also had the same temporal flow which made it rather difficult to identify separate outcomes within. Because Gravano was generally functioning in systematic, routine operations in his criminal endeavors, the career outcomes had to be located elsewhere. His organizational affiliation with the Gambino family offered a solution in that promotions within the family demarcated key transitions throughout his career as well as providing him with opportunities to further elaborate his earning activities. The various promotions that Gravano obtained throughout his career and that helped shape the nature of his activities were therefore held as suitable outcomes indicating his achievements at various points in time. More will be elaborated on the promotional aspect of Gravano's career in a later section. For now, it is only necessary to specify that those of Gravano's contacts that were not removed from his core working network were persons who were in proximity to his earning operations around and at the time of each of his promotions. The following details the process of elimination that followed the initial extraction and final selection of contacts for Marks's and Gravano's core working networks.

Constructing Marks's core working network

An initial extraction of all names from Marks's autobiography yielded a total of 323 different people to whom the author made mention of to some extent or other throughout his account (see Table 3.1 - names appear in the order that they emerge in *Mr. Nice*).

A considerable number of the names referred to in *Mr. Nice* were only mentioned in contextualizing the period within which Marks was describing an event. Several others were simply famous people that he came across while conducting his business activities at various locations throughout the world. None were part of Marks's proximate social entourage and in many cases, Marks never even met them. These were the first set of names to be removed from the starting ensemble. The 26 names that fall into this category are coded as '1' in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1:
Initial Name Extraction and Coded Eliminations from Marks (1997).

-Mother (3)	**-Dutch Nik**	-M.Hemingway(1)	-M.Stephenson (7)	-E. Marcos (1)	-G. Rodriguez (2)
-Father (3)	**-Dutch Pete**	-B. Cornfield (1)	-Leaf (4)	-R. Cruz (2)	-G.Badalementi(2)
-Sister (3)	**-P. Lane**	-J. Lennon (1)	-P. Rogers (7)	-F. Marcos (1)	-W. Lovato (2)
-M. Langford	**-J. Lane**	-M. Jagger (1)	-J. Rogers (7)	-B. Marcos (1)	-T. Lundy (7)
-A. Hancock (4)	-R. O'Hanlon (4)	-Sabrina (2)	-S. Solley (5)	**-G. Wills**	-Zacarias (2)
-P.C. Hamilton (7)	**-B. O'Hanlon**	-Miranda (2)	-J. Miskin (6)	-Wyonna (4)	-Claude (2)
-H.J. Davies (2)	-A. Woodhead (4)	-A. Guinness (2)	-Masha (3)	**-Daniel**	-Pierre (2)
-R. Meiggs (2)	**-A. Woodhead**	-J.B. Carter (2)	-Appleton (7)	**-R. Allen**	-Juan (2)
-J. Peto (4)	-M. Bell (4)	-R. Fraser (2)	-J. Fort (2)	-H.D. Yi (2)	-D. Bufalino (2)
-George (2)	-D. Thomas (4)	-Harvey (2)	-Ronnie (2)	-X. Hing (2)	-M. Lane (3)
-D.L. Keir (2)	-A. Marcuson (2)	-F. Amadi (2)	-P.P. Reid (1)	-P. Brooke (2)	-P. Khalid (2)
-J. Minford (2)	-M. Lessor (2)	-A. Malmik (2)	-S. Rosenthal (2)	-L. Bethall (2)	-El Fiscal (7)
-H. McMillan (5)	-R. Neville (2)	-P. Ustinov (1)	-Price (7)	-Ellie (2)	-Gustavo (2)
-D. Irving (4)	**-J. McCann**	-J. Betteridge (2)	-Spencer (7)	-Eddie (4)	-Marcus (2)
-W. Bund (2)	-C. Richardson (4)	-A. Lehmann (2)	-Liz (4)	-R. Robb (6)	-G.E. Lynch (5)
-George's repl. (2)	-B. McCann (6)	-N. Douglas (2)	-M. Pocock (5)	-Brian (4)	-F. Losada (7)
-D. Yardley (2)	-J. Weaver (6)	-P. Slinger (4)	-Kathy (5)	-D. Embley (4)	-J. Parry (2)
-J. Esam (2)	-N.Hoogstratten(1)	-S. Minford (4)	-D. Leigh (5)	-G. Kenion (4)	-J. Paine (7)
-F. Lincoln (2)	-D. Murray (2)	-M. O'Connell (4)	-H. Rubenstein (5)	-Justo (2)	-B. Lee (2)
-A. Montefore (2)	-R. Murray (5)	-R.D. Laing (2)	-Heinemann (5)	-Pritchard (7)	-D. Re (5)
-S. Balogh (2)	-Eamonn (6)	-L. Watson (2)	-M.B. Smith (7)	**-R. Reaves**	-F. Nugan (2)
-G. Friesm (2)	-Gus (6)	**-S. Malik**	-Dr. Punt (5)	-C. Lovato (7)	-M. Hand (2)
-I. Kadegis (4)	**-Raoul**	-P. Whitehead (5)	-J.P. Belmondo (1)	**-B. Light**	-S. Bronis (5)
-Dia (4)	**-E. Combs**	-Mohammed (6)	-R. Polanski (1)	**-Frederick**	-A. Acceturo (2)
-G. Plinston	-M. Jardine (4)	-Willy (6)	-N. Kinnock (1)	-R. Llofriu (7)	-Mona (5)
-H. Weightman(4)	**-'Old Oxford**	**-S. Prentiss**	-Balendo (5)	-A. Scalzo (7)	-P. Eddy (2)
-Uncle Mostyn (3)	**Acquaintance'**	**-N. Lane**	-S. Ng (5)	-M. Khadri (2)	-S. Walden (2)
-B. Jefferson (4)	**-Eric**	**-Sharif**	**-J. Warren**	-I. Donaldson (5)	-C. Olgiati (2)
-C. Lee (4)	-Donald (2)	-P.J. Proby (2)	**-L. Moynihan**	-Nesty (2)	-M. Berg (2)
-M. Dummett (2)	-R. Carr (4)	-T. Baker (2)	-Sompop (2)	-J. Lee (2)	-K. Reaves (4)
-J. Sparrow (2)	**-J. Gater**	-D. Campbell (2)	**-B. Aitken**	-Maria (2)	-W. Pearson (7)
-J. Stein (2)	-Arend (4)	-E. Clamp (6)	-A. Chung (2)	-R. Richards (2)	-G. Langella (2)
-F. Hill Stein (4)	**-G. Lickert**	**-S. Trafficante**	-April (2)	-M. Katz (2)	-J. Nolan (2)
-C. Hill (4)	-A. McNulty (4)	-S. Giancana (1)	-Selena (2)	-L. Pina (2)	-J. Carneglia (2)
-C. Logue (1)	-Silvia (4)	-D. Goldsmith (4)	-R. Webborn (5)	-P. Gibbons (2)	-V. Amuso (2)
-B. Patten (1)	**-J. Morris**	-B. Jagger (1)	**-Flash**	-Marie (4)	-F. Locascio (2)
-J. Martin	-B. Simons (5)	-J. Magazine (6)	**-Bill**	-Nigel (3)	-A. Indelicato (2)
-G. Martin (4)	-B. Moldese (6)	-W. Nath (6)	-S. Sherman (6)	-J. Morell (5)	-A. Aiello (2)
-J. Giedymin (2)	-P. Fairweather 2)	-B. Kenningale (6)	-S. Tailor (6)	-Rafael (2)	-J. Testa (2)
-Lebanese Joe	-Patty (4)	-N. Baker (7)	-S. Alraji (4)	-B. O'Neill (7)	-J. Coonan (2)
-R. Lewis (2)	**-R. Crimball**	-T. Byrne (7)	-Aftab (6)	-Pres. Zia (1)	-L. Fiocconi (2)
-Rosie	**-J. Denbigh**	-N. Cole (6)	-H.L. Bowe (7)	-T. Cash (7)	-V. Bower (2)
-M. Plinston (4)	**-T. Sunde**	-A. Grey (6)	**-Carl**	-J. Mejuto (7)	-Webster (7)
-K. Becker (6)	-C. Gambino (1)	-H. Morgan (6)	-Orca (5)	-T. Caballero (2)	-T.B. Taylor (2)
-M. Durrani	-C. Galante (4)	-J. Kern (2)	-D. Jenkins (4)	-J. Francis (2)	-Jacobi (2)
-S. Hiraoui	**-D. Brown**	-R. Knight (2)	**-F. Hillard**	-B. Daniels (2)	-R. Bonner (7)
-D. Pollard	**-R. Sherman**	-B. Windsor (2)	-B. Edwards (2)	-B. Alexander (2)	-B. Clinton (1)
-Jarvis	**-P. Sparrowhawk**	-D. Arif (2)	-G. Lane (3)	-R. Brown (2)	-Bear (2)
-C. Radcliffe	-M. Ratledge (4)	-D. Arif (2)	-A. O'Brien (3)	-J. Canavaggio (2)	-D. Roche (2)
-C. Weatherley	-A. Tunnicliffe (4)	-T. Wiskey (2)	-Spencer (7)	-J. Ochoa (2)	-W. Griffith (2)
-D. Laurie	**-L. Ippolito**	**-M. Williams**	-Editha (4)	-F. Ochoa (1)	-J. Yacoub (2)
-J. Goldsack	-J. Coburn (1)	**-S. Hobbs**	**-J. Newton**	-M. Ochoa (1)	-J. Jones (2)
-T. Radcliffe (4)	-B. Coburn (1)	-L. Hutchinson (5)	-Helen (2)	-C. Lehder (1)	-J. Meko (7)
-Lang	**-A. Schwarz**	-J. del Rio (2)	**-J. Smith**	-P. Escobar (1)	-T. Burke (7)

The second set of contacts that were eliminated from the initial 323 names were comprised of people that Marks met at various stages throughout his career, but who simply remained brief encounters who left no impact whatsoever in regard to Marks's cannabis trade activities (coded as '2' in Table 3.1). Inmates that

Marks encountered during his prison spells and who had no additional link to any of his cannabis trade activities were included in this group. In all, 117 names were eliminated under this criterion.

Contacts that are coded '3' in Table 3.1 consisted of family members who maintained no business links with Marks. Nine were removed in this selection. Also, 43 friends who maintained no business links with Marks were also removed from the remaining set of contacts (coded as '4' in Table 3.1). Friends and family of these friends and family were also included within the definitional boundaries of these two categories.

The fifth set of contacts that were eliminated in this selection process were comprised of people with whom Marks had maintained business links, but with whom he had no relation within the context of his illicit endeavors (coded as '5' in Table 3.1). Lawyers throughout Marks's career who had no direct involvement in the actual operations extending from his cannabis trade ventures were also included in this group. Twenty-two of the remaining names fitted this criterion.

Several names were mentioned throughout the account that were associated with others who were implicated in Marks's cannabis trade ventures, albeit in an indirect link (direct link of Marks's direct link) *and* only to a minimal extent (coded as '6' in Table 3.1). A clear example of this set of eliminated contacts is the case of B. Moldese who once brought Marks $100 000 from E. Combs, one of Marks's main cannabis trade contacts. Although B. Moldese may be indeed associated with the cannabis trade activities at that point in time, he was not a 'core' contact at that or any other point throughout Marks's career. In all, 20 contacts were removed under this criterion.

The final set of excluded names in Table 3.1 were comprised of law-enforcement, judicial, or correctional officials that Marks came across throughout his past (coded as '7'). In all, 28 were grouped in this set of eliminated names.

This left 58 contacts (in bold lettering in Table 3.1) that were directly implicated in the various cannabis trade activities described. These contacts served as the pool of network nodes for the various analyses throughout the Marks case study.

Constructing Gravano's core working network

A total of 249 names were mentioned at least once throughout Gravano's biography (Maas 1997). The following accounts for the elimination process used to arrive at his core working network. Once again, names do not necessarily qualify as contacts. All individuals who were referred to but who were never actually met by Gravano or were simply mentioned as contextual references were removed. These included past figures in illegal enterprise who were temporally, geographically, or relationally detached from Gravano but whose reputations and own experiences were referred to in various anecdotes (i.e. Al Capone, Lucky Luciano, Frankie Yale). A total of 41 names fit this criterion (coded as '1' in Table 3.2).

Forty contacts were briefly encountered throughout his career or who had no impact on his earning activities and entrepreneurial progression (code 2). Family members who had no business links with Gravano were eliminated and coded as '3' (10 contacts). Another 10 were removed from the contact list as friends of a non-business nature (code 4).

Noncriminal business links (code 5) also made up a group of 10 contacts. Note, however, that 'legitimate' contacts that were implicated in Gravano's racketeering activities (illegal practices in legitimate business settings) were not removed under this criterion.

An additional 49 contacts were eliminated because their involvement in Gravano's criminal activities was not direct or extensive enough to warrant classification within his 'core' working network (code 6). Most of the contacts in this relatively large group were others who were documented as being members of various families in the Cosa Nostra. For example, Gravano mentioned his interactions with a wide array of Cosa Nostra members in New York City and elsewhere, but never revealed any real working relationships with them. Such contacts did not constitute a place within his core working network. Although full proof cannot be documented that these contacts were indeed actual participants in Gravano's own criminal activities, the overlapping social web that knits the

various collective units in the Cosa Nostra does permit us to document them as criminal participants in proximity to the central character.

Table 3.2:
Initial Name Extraction and Coded Eliminations from Maas (1997).

-J. Profaci (1)	**-B. Stagg**	-C. Aurello (6)	**-R. DiBernardo**	**-Ja. Colucci**	**-B. Radonjic**
-J. Colombo	**-J. Rizzo**	-F. the Wop (6)	**-J. Madonia**	**-R. Scopo**	**-L. Vallario**
-F. Yale (1)	**-M. Gambino**	**-J.N. Gallo**	**-L. DiBono**	**-M. Carbone**	**-L. Saccente**
-A. Capone (1)	-N. Rockefeller (1)	**-J. Failla**	**-J. Cody**	-E.J. Halloran (6)	-B. Boriello (6)
-C. Gravano (3)	-Camille (4)	**-F. DiCicco**	**-B. Sasso**	-S. LeFrak (2)	-J. D'Angelo Jr.(4)
-G. Gravano (3)	**-R. Spero**	**-B. DiCicco**	-D. Trump (1)	-J. Kravec (7)	**-P.Gotti**
-Zuzito (2)	-G. Langella (6)	**-T. Bilotti**	-J. Luciano (5)	-J. Cantamessa (7)	-J. Giordano (6)
-Mandracchia (2)	-S. Albanese (6)	-N.Scibetta (3)	-J. Simone (2)	-J. Bonavolenta (7)	-B. Mangano (6)
-L. Gallo (1)	-A.B. Persico (6)	-T. Jets (6)	-A. Bruno (1)	-G. Olarte (4)	-V. Amuso (6)
-J. Gallo (1)	-H. McIntosh (6)	-G. DiCicco (6)	-T. Bananas (1)	-N. Castellano (4)	-V. Orena (6)
-J. Emma	-Butchy (2)	**-Stymie D'Angelo**	-P. Testa (1)	-D. Shacks (6)	-J. Bilotti (6)
-G. Pappa	-De. Scibetta (3)	**-J. Paruta**	**-N. Russo**	**-J. Armone**	-Johnny G. (2)
-Joe V.	-Di. Scibetta (3)	**-V. Oil**	**-P. Joey**	-J. Corrao (6)	-A. Squitieri (2)
-T. Snake	-J. Zicarelli (3)	-tipster (6)	-F. Steele (1)	-E. Garafalo (6)	-N. Pileggi (1)
-Lenny the Mole	**-A.B. Cuomo**	**-Ma. DeBatt**	-C. Gigante (6)	-L. Giardino (6)	-Fat Bobby (2)
-Benocchio (7)	**-M. Hardy**	**-Mi. DeBatt**	-Salty (6)	-F. Piccolo (6)	-J. Amico (6)
-Lawyer 1 (5)	-J. Brassiere (6)	-JoJo (2)	-Vinnie Sicilian(6)	-N. Auletta (6)	-J. Miller (1)
-Lorraine (4)	**-S. Aurello**	-Biker (2)	**-T. Carbonaro**	-C. Marcello (1)	-J. O'Connor (2)
-Nick the Baker(4)	-J. Valachi (1)	-C. Fatico (6)	-J. Skaggs (5)	-R. Giuliani (7)	-G. Gabriel (7)
-L. Grimaldi (4)	-N. Scarfo (6)	-E. Gambino (1)	-F. Fiala (2)	-A. Corallo (6)	-A. Maloney (7)
-Little Louie (4)	-Karen (3)	-J. McBratney (1)	-J. Ingrassia (6)	-P. Rastelli (6)	-R. Morgenthau(7)
-J. Grimaldi (4)	-Gerard (3)	-R. Galione (2)	**-N. Mormando**	-J. Messino (6)	-J. Gleeson (7)
-L. Milito	**-E. Garafola**	-R. Cohn (2)	-N. Gravanti (5)	-A. Casso (6)	-Gina (3)
-T. Spero	-Dominick (2)	**-R. DeMeo**	-G. Shargel (5)	-J. La Rossa (7)	-B. Saccente (2)
-Dutchie (2)	-Danny (5)	-S. Maggadino (1)	-T. Scarpatti (6)	-D. Marino (6)	-R. Snipes (1)
-G. LaTorroca (2)	-M. Perry (5)	-S. Giancana (1)	-J.E. Hoover (1)	**-J. Alogna**	-Diane (4)
-Frannie (3)	-Dunn Br. 1 (2)	-N. Civella (1)	-G.R. Blakey (1)	**-V. Artuso**	-Norman (2)
-D. Scialo (2)	-Dunn Br. 2 (2)	-J. Scalish (1)	-W. Webster (7)	-S. Ciccone (6)	-J. Fox (7)
-J. Vitale (2)	-L. Martieri (6)	-L. Trafficante (1)	-J. Kallstrom (7)	-E. McCarthy (1)	-I.L. Glasser (7)
-T. Shorty Spero	-E. Gold (7)	-J. Ida (1)	-B. Mouw (7)	-F.H. Bellino (2)	-A. Krieger (5)
-L. Luciano (1)	-J. Bonnano (1)	-F. DiSimone (1)	-S. Ruggiero (6)	-A. Aronne (2)	-S. Bronfman (5)
-V. Genovese (1)	**-A. Dellacroce**	-J. Lanza (1)	**-G. Gotti**	-Butterass (2)	-A. D'Arco (6)
-F. Costello (1)	-T. Anastasio (1)	-P. Conte (6)	**-J. Carneglia**	-Oscar (2)	-A. Quinn (1)
-A. Anastasia (1)	-A. Scotto (6)	-P.CastellanoJr.(2)	**-T. Rampino**	-Paulie (2)	-M. Rourke (1)
-C. Gambino	-R.F. Kennedy (1)	-J. Castellano (2)	**-S. Scala**	-F.Spero (7)	-A. Cardinale (5)
-C. Persico Jr.	-T. Gambino (6)	-Ph. Castellano (2)	**-E. Lino**	-M. Tricorio (7)	-L. Ward (7)
-J. Colombo Jr. (2)	**-P. Castellano**	-F. Perdue (1)	-W.B. Johnson (6)	-R. Piecyk (2)	-Corrupt juror (2)
-A. Colombo (2)	-A. Gaggi (6)	-J. O'Brien (7)	-J. Favara (2)	-F. Colletta (2)	-F.L. Bailey (2)
-Frankie	-D. Gaggi (6)	-T. Salerno (6)	-F. Gotti (2)	-D. Giacalone (7)	-O.J. Simpson (1)
-R. Ronga	**-J. Gotti**	-F. Mosca (6)	**-Dino**	-O. North (1)	
-J. Colucci	-J. Gotti Jr. (6)	**-J. Watts**	**-J. Polito**	**-F. Locascio**	
-Sam 'Plumber'(2)	**-A. Ruggiero**	**-V. Di Napoli**	**-M.Mastromari.**	-B. Cutler (7)	

The final group, comprised of formal control agents (code 7), was made up of 22 names that were removed from the list. This left us with a core personal working network of 67 contacts (indicated in bold lettering in Table 3.2).

Once the core working network members were identified for Marks and Gravano, each contact was identified by the year in which he was documented as

having come into contact with the case study's central character. An additional piece of information collected concerned through whom Marks or Gravano met each contact[28]. The combination of when and through whom each contact appeared constituted the basic components designing the career working network representations displayed in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 and Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5.

It is evident that the selection process was determined by my personal interests with Marks's and Gravano's careers - that is how they fitted in amongst and between others within the context of their criminal earning activities. While code '1' and code '2' eliminations would be unlikely to pass the selection test in most studies (unless, of course, the study is concerned with the extreme peripheries of an offender's personal network), the remaining set of excluded others could be incorporated within the analysis if the researcher deems that the ensemble of family members (code 3), friends (code 4), non-criminal business links (code 5), exhaustive set of criminal trade participants (code 6), or formal agents of control (code 7) in Tables 3.1 or 3.2 had theoretical relevance to the analysis at hand. Justification for the inclusion of any one of these excluded groups in the present analysis may indeed be convincingly made.

The complete scope of both Marks's and Gravano's working networks, and therefore the complete scope of their respective earning activities, may evidently be expected to surpass that documented in Marks's personal account or in the Maas's biography of Gravano. It was with this limit in mind that the frame of analysis was narrowed down to the core aspects of their careers. These core aspects are assumed to be indicated by those elements that the central characters perceived as crucial enough to include in their life history accounts.

Career Representations: Cumulative Contact Curves and Event/Sequence Transitions

Once the members of Marks's and Gravano's core working networks were established, further details on each contact were extracted in order to establish a

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28. Please note that some contacts were incorporated in the working networks simply because of their key place in introducing Marks or Gravano to key contacts throughout their careers.

longitudinal evolution of these relational representations. The aim of this time-ordered network representation was to arrive at a clear assessment regarding the size of each network at various points throughout the career. Information concerning the entrance of each contact into the network was already documented in the creation of the career working networks detailed in the previous section. What was required was additional indications of the year in which each contact exited the criminal entrepreneur's core network.

Contacts exiting Marks's or Gravano's working networks were determined by the last period during which they were mentioned as participants in the general activities under analysis. Some contacts were arrested, imprisoned, and no longer alluded to in later accounts. Others were revealed to have become junkies and unreliable working contacts. Some, particularly in Gravano's case, were simply stated as dead. Although many of these contacts may be assumed to have been continuous network members, they were no longer introduced as participants in any of the subsequent activities or phases of each career. In short, the contact may have remained in social proximity to the criminal entrepreneur, but he no longer warranted the status as a core working network member. With information on both years of entry and exit, a time-ordered additive contact count of Marks's and Gravano's personal networks from one year to the next was created.

Aside from contacts, information permitting the time ordering of all criminal and legitimate earning activities and events, as well as any confrontations with law-enforcement officials, courts, or correctional institutions was collected. For Gravano, whose achievement outcome was indicated by his promotional rank within the Gambino family, additional information was obtained in order to specify the time period in which he climbed from one promotion to the next.

Time-ordered axes were created for each entrepreneur[29]. Each axes was comprised of detailed events or phases which made up the particular themes and in respect to each criminal entrepreneur. For Marks, the ensemble of event-based information documented in *Mr. Nice* is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (Chapter 4) and

superimposed on his cumulative working network distribution. The three axes in Figure 4.2 identify Marks's cannabis trade scams (Axis 1), arrests and incarcerations (Axis 2), and legitimate or front ventures (Axis 3). Each cannabis trade venture (in Axis 1) is initiated by an entrepreneurial opportunity (E.O.). These entrepreneurial opportunities are represented by co-participants who were directly linked to Marks's capacity to participate in the trade - they were essentially the vehicles of Marks's opportunities. Fourteen ventures were compiled from the information provided throughout *Mr. Nice*. Venture 1 (V1), for example, had Marks as an initial planner, but was only executable with the addition of Jim McCann (N23 in Figure 4.1). Venture 9, quite differently, had the same E.O. in McCann, but for a scam designed by McCann and offered to Marks. Each venture/scam is comprised of a series of consignments (ranging from 1 to 10) that were part of the same set-up. The temporal order of scams follows the onset of a venture (the initiation of the first consignment). Temporal overlap between ventures was also observed.

For Gravano, organizational promotions, street crime activities, legitimate/racketeering ventures, and law-enforcement experiences represented the axes for his career representation (see Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5).

Both Marks's and Gravano's respective event or sequence based axes were subsequently plotted on the cumulative network curves detailing the evolution of each of the central characters' core working networks. The ensemble of thematic axes on cumulative network curves offers us an indication of what each criminal entrepreneur was active in, the extent of these activities, and the various transitions therein in accordance with an indication of the size of the pool of key contacts along that trajectory. These are essentially criminal career representations that permitted the descriptive aspects of Marks's and Gravano's experiences to be revealed in a concise and substantially elaborated extent. More explanatory aims required the inclusion of Burt's theory of structural holes and the operations particular to it.

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29. Through the use of primary and supplementary data sources, I was generally able to situate various events or phases within each thematic sequence by the month (or season) and year in

Burt's Structural Hole Properties

Although the social network analytical framework offers a wide array of measures and techniques which may be applied to research in criminology, the study relies exclusively on the specific components of structural hole theory (aside from other network methods and techniques developed for the particular purposes of the criminal career case studies and discussed in the preceding sections).

Social network analysis is generally divided along two distinct lines: (1) analysis of whole networks; and (2) analysis of egocentric or personal networks. Whole networks are generally a challenge in research aimed at developing the relational side of crime. Past studies using this technique within the criminological field have focused on emphasizing the way networks are built around particular members via measures of centrality as well as assessing the level of density within networks constructed around a particular activity, a given geographical setting, or both (McAndrew 1999; and Finckenauer and Waring 1998). The challenge revolving around research aiming at seizing such whole networks is that considerable attention must be aimed at assuring that information is obtained on all node members in a balanced fashion. Research using police investigations, for example, often achieve in constructing whole networks, but central nodes or offenders within the network are often those who served as the initial target of the investigation (see Sparrow 1991). What may seem to be a central player in the whole network is quite likely a finding extending from the fact that the law-enforcement investigation that compiled the information began with that particular player and increased its own observational scope of the network by following the contacts around that initial player. In short, that player is central to the investigation. Whether that player remains central to the actual activity under surveillance and being researched depends considerably on the extent to which the law-enforcement thread was accurate to begin with.

With the main data source of this thesis coming in the form of biographical material, the idea of creating whole networks was equally limited. An egocentric

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which the happening occurred.

approach was therefore opted for. Although cross-sectional research designs were available from past studies (Fischer 1977; see Warr 1996 for such an application in a study on co-offending and delinquency), the limits in the number of actual case studies which could realistically be conducted in the scope of this thesis hampered the possibility for such an application. To compensate for the more general cross-sectional option, a theoretically-driven longitudinal design emerged as the analysis of Marks's career developed[30]. Longitudinal analysis have been considerably advanced in recent research on whole and personal networks (Morgan, Neal, and Carder 1997; Wellman, Wong, Tindall, and Nazar 1997; Leik and Chalkley 1997; Feld 1997; and Doreian and Stockman 1997). However, the thesis did not build on such past research endeavors and remained, once again, consistent with developing Burt's structural hole properties (that were developed in a cross-sectional research) and applying them within a temporal criminal career framework. The reason why structural hole theory emerged as the exclusive model for the present study is more aptly explained by its theoretical contribution and not its more technical applications. Structural hole theory provided a framework for combining the concepts of social capital, purposive action, personal networks, opportunity, achievement, and success. This framework and its principal idea of nonredundancy (or disconnectivity) were extremely fitting for the central question of this thesis concerning how contacts permit some to get ahead in and achieve materialistic success through crime. The only aspect that was missing from this particular network theory was the criminal element. The combination of applying structural hole theory to crime within the backdrop of a long-term career analysis permitted the potential to enhance both criminological and social network research.

Burt's structural hole theory requires two initial components - personal networks and outcomes indicating some form of achievement. The immersion of outcomes within the boundaries specified by the personal networks remained specific to each case study. Although the most accurate outcome variable indicating the extent of a criminal entrepreneur's materialistic success would be a

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30. Note, however, that several of the personal network methods developed in this study are being put to the test in a current research of a cross-sectional sample of 400 Quebec inmates.

straightforward figure measuring the actual profits that are made around a series of events or sequences, such information is rarely provided in criminal memoirs on a systematic basis. Alternatives, however, may be identified that provide us with respectable proxies for the financial achievements of a criminal entrepreneur. The present section describes the procedures leading to the identification of case-specific outcomes and the establishment of personal networks around them. A final piece of this section will present the formal measurements that were used from Burt's theory.

Operationalizing Marks's cannabis importation ventures

For the Marks's case study, a consignment-based outcome variable was designed by using the weights of importation consignments. *Mr. Nice* provided details on 41 cannabis shipments in which Marks participated throughout his career. Complete information was obtained on 35 of the 41 consignments in regard to the weight of each shipment. Estimations for the remaining consignments were established in accordance with the overall design and systematic weight of a venture that the consignment was part of. Indications, for example, were made on a number of occasions that a 'load' of cannabis referred to a one-ton shipment.

Regarding Marks's personal profits from these importation ventures, valid information was derived for only 19 consignments. Correlation tests, however, proved strong and positive between the weight of a consignment and the actual profits obtained by Marks ($r = .97$; $\alpha < .001$). Since individual smuggling profits are generally a percentage cut of successful consignments, weights were therefore deemed as suitable proxies for Marks's financial returns in the trade. These weights were subsequently logged in order to reduce the outlying effects of 3 considerably large consignments (10, 20, and 30 tons).

Once the outcome variable was determined, symmetrical, binary (0 or 1 tie-strength values) network matrices were designed for each of the 41 consignments in accordance with the information made available in the Marks's account. The 58 contacts that passed the network elimination process outlined above constituted the pool of network nodes from which the consignment-based contact matrices were

founded on. Connected participants in a given consignment were assigned a direct link (coded 1) in a contact matrix, while unconnected players were indicated by the absence of a direct link (coded 0). The ensemble of Marks's venture-based contact matrices are included in Appendix A.

Operationalizing Gravano's promotional phases

While achievement in Marks's career was appropriately depicted by focusing on his cannabis trade activities, the greater variations in crimes and the more routine quality that characterized Gravano's racketeering activities made it difficult to replicate the same specific event-oriented network modeling that was possible for Marks. For the Gravano case study, the operationalization procedures adhered much more closely to those operations used by Burt (1992).

An abridged and modified version of Burt's social capital questionnaire (see Appendix B) was used in creating core personal working networks from one promotional phase in Gravano's career to the next. The 67 contacts that passed the elimination process (see Table 3.2) that led to the construction of Gravano's core working network constituted the population for his working pool throughout his career. Symmetrical and valued network matrices were designed for periods at the time of each of the 6 promotions. The 6 matrices (see Appendix C) were created to account for the relational circumstances embedding these major transitions throughout the twenty-five years spanning Gravano's career. In consistency with Burt's own data collection phase, each network matrix was limited to a maximum of 20 contacts that were implicated, crucial to, or influential in Gravano's career at the time of each promotion.

Matrix-generating questions remained consistent with Burt's original format. In building Gravano's 20-contact personal network from one promotion to the next, the strength of ties were also estimated. In consistency with Burt's own estimations[31], 'especially close' (value = 100) indicated Gravano's closest

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31. Further elaboration concerning these tie-strength values may be found in Burt (1992: p.287-288, footnote 2). Burt showed that these values provided an empirically adequate log-linear fit that was also consistent with balance theory principles («friends of my friends are my friends and enemies of my friends are my enemies»).

contacts; 'close' (value = 69) indicated those contacts with whom Gravano seemed to have a positive personal relation, but who were not amongst his closest personal contacts; 'less than close' (value = 37) indicated that Gravano did not mind working with this person, but had no desire to develop a friendship (strictly business relationship); and 'distant' (value = 0) indicated that Gravano did not really seem to enjoy spending time with this person unless it was necessary. The duration of the relationship had already been established in the making of the cumulative working network curve. Frequency of contact was also measured by accounting for whether Gravano talked with contacts on a daily, weekly, monthly, or less frequent basis. Evidently, estimations were required for most cases, but a knowledge of the events, relational environment, and working activities at any given period allowed a fair assessment to be made in regard to the frequency of contact he had with each network member.

The preparation of these network matrices, in short, demanded that I situate myself intensely within the confines of Gravano's core relational world. This permitted me to complete the social capital questionnaire for Gravano from a second-degree analytical position from Gravano's first-order network. It also allowed me to complete the final section of the questionnaire (which placed me in a third-degree from Gravano's second-order network) which dealt with the strength of relationships between nodes, hence allowing an assessment of structural holes around Gravano's contacts and how he personally fit in. Relationships between contacts remained consistent with Burt's criteria in that ties were either classified as 'especially close' or 'distant' (in the sense that they rarely worked together, were total strangers, or did not enjoy one another's company). Any relationship deemed as falling in between these two extreme classifications were grouped together in a mid-range relational strength category. The focus of analysis was therefore based on those 'especially close' (value = 100), 'mid-range' (value = 34), and 'distant' (value = 0) relationships. 'Extreme' relationships were more easily and accurately accounted for from my perceptual position than the less distinguishable 'mid-range' ties. It was precisely these extreme relationships that were crucial for the precise purposes of structural hole analysis.

Once all of Marks's cannabis venture networks and Gravano's promotional contact matrices were constructed, the various structural hole properties were calculated[32] and incorporated in the analysis.

Disconnectivity

The main premise guiding structural hole theory is that we are all limited by the amount of time and energy that we may invest in our relationships or make accessible to others. This postulate becomes fundamental in competitive arenas centered around various forms of business and utilitarian action. Two contrary brokerage and clique relational settings (and their contact matrices) are illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for demonstrative purposes.

Figure 3.1: Brokerage Model



Ego	-					
A	1	-				
B	1	0	-			
C	0	0	1	-		
D	0	0	1	1	-	
E	0	1	0	0	0	-
F	0	1	0	0	0	0
G	0	1	0	0	0	0

Figure 3.2: Clique Model



Ego	-			
A	1	-		
B	1	1	-	
C	1	1	1	-
D	1	1	1	1

In Figure 3.1, ego is connected only to A and B. A and B are not connected to each other, hence ego is in a brokerage position between them. A and B, however, both have their own personal contacts aside from ego. The area selected in the dotted boxed indicates the boundaries of ego's first-order personal network for this particular setting (a transaction, for example).

In Figure 3.2, ego is connected to A, B, and C. A, B, and C are also all

32. UCINET 5.0 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999) was used in making the network matrices and in calculating the structural hole measures.

connected to each other. Figure 3.2 therefore illustrates a clique model in which the setting is marked by full connectivity or complete density between contacts.

These two illustrations are network extremes when converging on entrepreneurial contexts in which ego is suggested to increase the level of disconnectivity in his networking. Figure 3.1 exemplifies complete disconnectivity (for ego). Figure 3.2 illustrates the complete absence of disconnectivity (for ego and all alters). These two extremes offer us suitable hypothetical scenarios for calculating Burt's structural hole components.

Measuring nonredundancy and network efficiency (for Marks)

Three structural hole measures were used to account for Marks's networking strategies throughout his career and the 41 consignments detailed in *Mr. Nice*.

Observed size (*N*) measures the number of alters or direct ties that ego is connected to in a given setting. This measure indicates the number of participants (excluding Marks) that were part of the network matrix embedding a given cannabis shipment. In the hypothetical extremes in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, ego's observed network size is, respectively, 2 (A and B) and 3 (A, B, and C). Observed size in Marks's consignment networks ranged from 1 to 9 direct contacts and averaged about 4 contacts per event.

Accounting for nonredundancy is the key in structural hole theory. *Effective size* measures the number of nonredundant contacts that ego is connected to in these same settings. Burt (1992: p.52) offers the following formalization for this particular component:

$$\textbf{Effective Size} = \sum_j [1 - \sum_q \mathbf{p}_{iq}\, \mathbf{m}_{jq}\,], \; q \neq i, j \; ;$$

where,
i = ego ; j = selected alter ; q = all other alters ;
$p_{iq} = (z_{iq} + z_{qi}) \,/\, [\sum_j (z_{ij} + z_{ji})]$, $i \neq j$;
or
the strength of the interaction ($z = 0$ or 1 in a binary network) between (to and from) i and q divided by the sum of the strength of all interactions between i and j;
or
the proportion of i's network time and energy invested in the relationship with q.

$m_{jq} = (z_{jq} + z_{qj}) / \max(z_{jk} + z_{kj})$, $j \neq k$;

or

the strength of the interaction between j and q divided by the strongest interaction between j and any other alter (k);

or

the marginal strength of contact j's relation with contact q.

$\sum_q p_{iq} m_{jq}$ = the portion of i's relationship with j that is redundant with all other alters (q);

$1 - \sum_q p_{iq} m_{jq}$ = the portion of nonredundant contacts in i's network

The sum of all portions results in the number of nonredundant contacts or effective size in i's network[33]. Ego's effective size is 2 in Figure 3.1 (all ego's contacts are nonredundant) and 1, or minimal effective size, in Figure 3.2. Marks's consignment networks averaged 2,3 nonredundant contacts with a low of 1 and a high of approximately 5[34].

The combination of observed and effective network size yields a *network efficiency* ratio which is indicated as follows:

Network Efficiency = Effective size / Observed size

As a perfect broker in Figure 3.1, ego illustrates maximum network efficiency at 100%. As a clique member in Figure 3.2, ego portrays minimal network efficiency (1 / Number of alters) at 33%, which indicates that all observed contacts are redundant or in contact with all other observed contacts. Throughout his career, Marks was successful in keeping his network efficiency at an average 60% with a range of 22% to the maximum 100%.

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33. Borgatti (1997: p.37) offers a simplification to the Burt calculation with the following formula:
Effective Size = N – (2t / N) ;
where, N = the number of ego's alters; and
t = the number of ties between ego's alters (not including ties to ego).

34. Note that effective size is considerably effected by the total amount of time and energy that ego invests in personal network resources (inherent in the denominator for p_{iq}). This is essentially spelled out in the number of direct contacts that ego has (observed size) and the overall strength of these relations or $\sum_j (z_{ij} + z_{ji})$. Borgatti (1997: p.38) has demonstrated that effective size and the size of ego's network are highly correlated (r = 0,98). Although this may lead many to conclude that network size can be used as a simplified proxy for effective size, one must take into strong consideration that variations from person to person in regard to the extent and shape of their relational investments, as Borgatti has also pointed out, are not likely to follow linear re-scaling patterns (1997: p.38). Intuitively, the notion of nonredundancy also improves substantially on the more straightforward network size indicator by leading to the enhanced constraint measure.

Measuring constraints and hierarchical-constraints (for Gravano)

While Marks's importation matrices did not contain any values indicating the strength of the relationship between contacts, the promotional matrices constructed for the study of Gravano's career did. The fact that Gravano's networks were built for extended periods of time revolving around his promotions rather than the event-based importation networks constructed for Marks allowed the strength of contacts to be substantially estimated for the former but not for the latter. Marks was involved in activities which required his constant making and breaking of relationships from one venture to the next. Whether he was or was not involved in strong or weak relationships with his contacts could not be estimated on a consistent basis. For Gravano, who was more consistent and progressive in his earning activities, it was possible to construct his relational world, and the strength of relations therein, beyond the particular event-based option. The inclusion of these interrelational values, in Gravano's case, permitted the use of Burt's more elaborate structural properties of constraint and hierarchical-constraint to be derived.

Contact-specific constraint (c_{ij}) is measured as follows

$$\mathbf{c_{ij} = (p_{ij} + \sum_q p_{iq}\, p_{qj})^2 \,,\; q \neq i \,,\, j. \,;}$$

where,
i = ego;
j = specific alter;
q = other alters (aside from j);
p_{ij} = proportion of i's network time and energy invested in j; and
$\sum_q p_{iq}\, p_{qj} = \sum_q$ [(proportion of i's network time and energy invested in q) (proportion of q's network time and energy invested in j)].

Min. c_{ij} = (1 / Observed Size) / Observed Size
Max. c_{ij} = 1, when j is i's only contact.

An alter's contact-specific constraint on ego measures the extent to which ego's primary (direct: p_{ij}) and secondary (indirect: $\sum_q p_{iq}\, p_{qj}$) relational time and energy diverts back to that alter. In Figure 3.1, both of ego's direct contacts constrain a quarter of his network investments (c_{ij} = 0,25 for both A and B on ego).

This essentially indicates the minimal time and energy (and therefore contact-specific constraint) that ego must face when making and maintaining contact with someone else. The moment that some level of direct contact is established, some level of constraint appears from that particular relationship.

Once each alter's specific constraints on ego are derived, the ensemble of constraint that ego faces in his personal network under observation is calculated in aggregate form. *Aggregate constraint* (*C*), the measure used for the Gravano case study, sums all of ego's contact-specific constraints:

$$C = \sum_j c_{ij}.$$

In Figure 3.1, the broker is minimally constrained at 0,5 (1 / Observed Size) while the clique member in Figure 3.2 illustrates maximum constraint at 0,93. Throughout his 6 promotional phases, Gravano ranged from a high of 0,4 to a low of 0,18 constraint. He averaged 0,3 constraint across all career phases.

Both contact-specific constraints (c_{ij}) and aggregate constraint (*C*) are used in determining the level of hierarchization that is found in ego's investment of network time and energy. *Hierarchical-constraint* (*H*), a measure indicating a high concentration of ego's constraint in one or a select few alters, is derived as follows:

$$H = \sum_j (c_{ij} / C/N) \ln(c_{ij} / C/N) / N \ln(N);$$

where,
c_{ij} measures specific constraint between ego (*i*) and each alter (*j*);
C is the aggregate constraint on *i*;
C/N is the average level of constraint per alter on *i*; and
c_{ij} / C/N is the ratio indicating the extent to which each *j*'s constraint on *i* deviates from the average constraint from all other alters on *i* (this ratio is 1 when *j* poses an average level of constraint on *i*).

Min. H = 0 when constraint is equal across all of *i*'s relationships.
Max. H =1 when all constraint is concentrated in one alter (Burt 1992: p.71).

In developing *H*, Burt uses the Coleman-Theil disorder index by summing the ensemble of contact-specific products of the ratio and its natural logarithm[35], and dividing it by the maximum sum possible. The hierarchical-constraint measure is a direct extension of the Coleman-Theil inequality index in which maximum 'disorder' in the structure (equality across contacts) equals a "complete lack of hierarchization" while minimum 'disorder' (or maximum order) indicates all choices "directed to one person" (Coleman 1964: p.442).

In both Figures 3.1 and 3.2, hierarchical constraints are absent. In the clique model, this is so because all contacts (ego included) are equally 'invested' in by all other contacts. Quite differently, equality in the brokerage model is revealed via the absence of investment in interconnected others. Pure clique members treat all as equal while staying in contact with others (cohesiveness), while pure brokers treat all as equal in a disconnected fashion (efficient networking). Business environments tend to encourage and create the boundaries for the domination of the latter, more competitive use of others.

A Research Agenda

The approach developed in this thesis has the potential for replication. Adherence to the steps presented throughout this chapter is not strict in any way. What is needed, above all, are network representations of criminal career processes. New and more innovative ways of arriving at this research end could only improve the developing framework. Wider participation in such analyses would therefore result in a cooperative research agenda that is case-oriented and egocentric at each separate addition to the framework, but offering the possibility for increasing generality as more and various types of careers are subjected to increasingly systematic network investigations and consistent synthesis. The approach, at each individual investigation, offers the rich insights that extend from profound case study analysis.

Table 3.3 displays a set of criminal memoirs (in English, French, and Italian)

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35. Coleman (1964: p.442, ftnt.5) concept is an extension of information theory and earlier formulations based on the notion of entropy.

that have been published in the past and are easily accessible in any university library[36] and new or used bookstores (sources appear in alphabetical order by 'ego' name). Each account was either written by or with the participation of the career offender. All are excellent sources for a social network analysis of criminal life events and transitions. The ensemble of criminal auto/biographies in Table 3.3 represents only a portion of analytically-feasible memoirs. The wide array of criminal activities, geographical regions, and time periods contextualizing the ensemble of this set of criminal career accounts provides a rich basis for a variety of temporal, cultural, and crime-specific comparative analytical efforts. The list is clearly not exhaustive and any addition would increase the value of this approach. Adding criminal memoirs published in languages and at periods not incorporated in this list would clearly expand the scope of the research agenda that is being initiated here. Memoirs that are presented in a chronological narrative form are the most accommodating to the researcher in that the lay-out of events and sequences throughout the criminal career concur directly with the time-oriented analytical framework. Life histories or other biographical case studies conducted by criminologists, sociologists, or other social scientists generally appear with greater emphasis placed on thematic or analytical partitions of the criminal career (see, for example, Cottino 1998; Arlacchi 1994 and 1992; Steffensmeier 1986; Klockars 1974; Chambliss 1972; Williamson 1965; Shaw 1938, 1931, and 1930; and Sutherland 1937). Those examples displayed in Table 3.3 fit the more feasible chronological presentation.

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36. Such sources are usually found in the range of HV6248 or HV5805 university library call numbers.

Table 3.3:
Analytically-Feasible Criminal Memoirs
(auto/biographies with ego's participation).

Ego	Author*	Title of Account	Pub. Year	Period of Career	Geographical Scope of career	Main criminal Activity
John Allen	John Allen	*Assault with a Deadly Weapon*	1977	1950s-1970s	Washington D.C.	Robbery
Robert Beck (Iceberg Slim)	Robert Beck	*Pimp: The Story of My Life*	1967	1950s-1960s	Chicago	Pimping
Jack Black	Jack Black	*You Can't Win*	1926	1900s-1920s	U.S.. Canada	Theft, Burglary, Opium dealing
Joseph Bonanno	Joseph Bonanno	*Man of Honor*	1983	1930s-1970s	New York City	Cosa Nostra (various)
Malcolm Braly	Malcolm Braly	*False Starts*	1976	1940s-1960s	Western U.S.	Burglary
Charles Brooks	Trevor Allen	*Underworld*	1932	1900s-1920s	England, Germany	Theft, Graft, Pimping
Joseph Cantalupo	Joseph Cantalupo	*Body Mike*	1990	1960s-1980s	New York City	Cosa Nostra (various)
Billy J. Chambers	William M. Adler	*Land of Opportunity*	1995	1970s-1980s	Detroit	Crack dealing (retail)
Raffaele Cutolo	Giuseppe Marrazzo	*Il camorrista*	1992	1960s-1980s	Naples	Camorra (various)
Willie Fopiano	Willie Fopiano	*The Godson*	1993	1960s-1980s	New England	Cosa Nostra (various)
Henry Hill	Nicolas Pileggi	*Wiseguy*	1985	1950s-1980s	New York City	Robbery, Drug Dealing, Cosa Nostra
John Manca	John Manca	*Tin for Sale*	1991	1950s-1980s	New York City	Corrupt Police, Cosa Nostra (various)
John B. Martin	J. B. Martin	*My Life in Crime*	1970	1930s-1960s	United States	Robbery
Jacques Mesrine	Jacques Mesrine	*L'instinct de mort: récit*	1977	1950s-1970s	France, Quebec	Robbery
Bernard Provençal	Bernard Provençal	*Big Ben*	1983	1960s-1970s	Montreal	Robbery, Drug Importation
Willie Sutton	Willie Sutton	*Where the Money Was*	1976	1920s-1960s	New York City, Philadelphia	Robbery, Burglary
Zachary Swan	Robert Sabbag	*Snowblind*	1990	1960s-1970s	U.S., Colombia	Cocaine smuggler
Vincent Teresa	Vincent Teresa	*My Life in the Mafia*	1973	1940s-1960s	New England	Cosa Nostra (various)
Joe Valachi	Peter Maas	*The Valachi Papers*	1968	1920s-1960s	New York City	Cosa Nostra (various)
Edward Wilson	Peter Maas	*Manhunt*	1986	1960s-1980s	International	CIA and Naval Agent; front operations; arms smuggling; etc.

* Note that secondary or co-authors of these auto/biographies are fully disclosed in the 'References' section at the end of the thesis.

Each case study offers the potential for a demonstration and relational explanation of one person's criminal career. I converged on the 'success' assessment within the careers studied here. 'Less successful' or 'unsuccessful'

careers may also be handled in the same manner[37]. With time and through additional case studies of this sort, variations in cumulative network sizes and curves, variety in activities, as well as structural hole or other network measures may be exposed. The more case studies are conducted, the more we will be able to develop towards more general arguments concerning fluctuations, transitions, and the structuring of criminal careers throughout time. While cross-sectional analyses will indeed reach generality more quickly, this approach encourages an in-depth understanding of one offender at a time.

The need for an outcome component offered a valuable guide for the study and allowed the data to fit into Burt's (1992) overall framework requirements. Across this list of auto/biographies, success in the ensemble of careers would seem to be a considerable variant. How one measures success depends on what possibilities extend from the data source itself and what assessment of achievement is made from both the researcher's developed opinion and that revealed within the memoir. Although financial success may be regarded as a given goal for observers of criminal and legitimate careers, other pursuits may surpass this most obvious indictor of advancement. Power, vengeance, escape, systemic confrontation, comfort, pleasure, freedom, or independence may all be unique or interconnected indicators of career pursuits.

Regardless of these variations and questions, a post-facto analysis of criminal careers enable the researcher to fit the trajectory within a single or multiple goal pursuit. It may be that the offender under analysis was never conscious of this goal and applied limited or no meaning to it, but such analyses permit us to concretize not what the offender meant with his career, but what the offender attained through it. Focusing on outcomes resulting from long-term and shorter sequences in such analyses permit us to further rationalize the short and long-term decisions, happenings, and structural components that consistently combine over a period to make up a career.

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37. See, for example, Black's (1926) autobiography of his career as a thief or Pileggi's (1985) account of Henry Hill's career as an associate in New York City's Lucchese family. Both had extensive careers spanning 20 to 30 years, but neither never really 'made it'.

The research agenda proposed here begins with the Marks and Gravano case studies that will be presented in the following two chapters. Each required a lengthy period of analysis to develop the makings of a more systematic approach and theory. Further case studies following this approach would add to the overall set of careers making up the presently diminutive sample. The creation of this sample is a long-term project which will result in an opportunity to conduct an increasingly general analysis and framework for understanding the social network dynamics of criminal ways of making a living. The contacts of criminals are available and measurable in the memoirs of criminals. Because this research approach is extremely cost efficient, it may be convincingly expected that additional case studies may be pursued in a group fashion. While I relied specifically on Burt's (1992) structural hole argument as an analytical and theoretical framework for studying criminal entrepreneurs, the approach is new and open enough to warrant further innovations from other network approaches on a wide array of offenders who have decided to tell their stories. The more ideas and variations we have, the wider and more general a framework may be developed in the long run. Cumulative replications of a variety of network analyses of criminal careers would permit a collective theoretical and empirical foundation that would further advance our understanding of more expansive social processes structuring crime. The agenda is indeed long-term in its vision. What it requires, at this point, and along its evolution is more interested participants and cumulative efforts.

CHAPTER 4

STRUCTURING MR. NICE: ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND BROKERAGE POSITIONING IN THE CANNABIS TRADE

In July 1988, Dennis Howard Marks (*a.k.a.* Donald Nice, Brendan McCarthy, Stephen McCarthy, Peter Hughes, Anthony Tunnicliffe, etc.) was arrested by members of the Spanish National Police at his residence in Palma de Majorca, Spain. This arrest was the beginning of a judicial process which would have him extradited to the United States for prosecution under charges including conspiracy, money laundering, and participation in Racketeering-Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO). Following a two-year battle against his extradition and the charges laid out against him in the United States, Marks pleaded guilty to racketeering and conspiracy to racketeer. He was subsequently sentenced to two consecutive terms of ten and fifteen years. After serving seven years at Indiana's maximum security prison, Terre Haute Penitentiary, he was released (in April 1995) and immediately returned to England.

The investigation targeting Marks and the charges brought against him were rooted in a lengthy task force operation, known as 'Operation Eclectic', headed by members of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in alliance with domestic police forces from various countries (United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Holland, Pakistan, Philippines, Hong Kong, Thailand, Portugal, and Australia). The law-enforcement tandem built a case against Marks that alleged that he was responsible for a series of cannabis smuggling schemes circulating across international borders dating as far back as 1970. Marks was argued to be the principal member of an international cannabis smuggling ring, referred to as the 'Marks Cartel', that DEA officials claimed was responsible for 15% of the cannabis entering the U.S. throughout the seventies and eighties.

Marks was indeed a cannabis trade participant for two decades. His capacity to persist on a consistent basis in the trade, however, was not achieved at the helm of any international smuggling cartel[38]. Marks wasn't even a member of a cartel; nor was he a member of any fixed criminal organization. Marks was neither part of a monopolist nor oligopolist attempt to control the cannabis trade at any level or in any region of the world. He was indeed a liberal-minded, free-willed, and

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38. A cartel is defined as "a conspiracy in restraint of trade, an illegal clique of businesses determined to restrict quantity, divide up the market and push up prices" (Naylor 1995: p.40).

independent criminal entrepreneur, but a closer analysis of the inner workings of his cannabis smuggling activities brings us to see that there was a structure to this apparent disorganization. The structure came in the form of his personal working network that, in its own waxing and waning, embedded his career in the international cannabis trade.

Howard Marks's career represents that of a cannabis trade participant that entered the business via an Oxford-based basin of strong ties during the late sixties, effectively and efficiently expanded an already prosperous working set of contacts throughout the early seventies, seized his way to a privileged between-link (between importer and exporter links in the distribution chain) brokerage position during the latter half of the seventies, attempted to retire to legitimate life in 1982, returned to the trade in 1983, and finally fell to a multi-national tandem of law-enforcement agencies in his return to cannabis smuggling. This chapter traces the network processes that led to Marks becoming, maintaining, and losing the brokerage position in criminal enterprise.

Academic Background

Marks's story begins in his native Wales, but his initial encounters with the cannabis trade are revealed in his years as an undergraduate and graduate student at Oxford's Baillol College. This Oxford background figured quite decisively throughout his account because it was there that one may say it all started. He entered Oxford in 1963 and, as he himself stated: "*My success went completely to my head, and I have been living off it to some extent ever since*" (Marks 1997: p.32)[39]. This and later success, as will be demonstrated, had both positive and negative effects throughout the evolution of his career. It was here that Marks became a popular figure on campus, grew acquainted with the mid-sixties drug culture, and took his first steps into the cannabis trade.

The core of Marks's wholesaling and early importation action-sets were

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39. Note that all and only excerpts taken from Marks (1997) appear in italics throughout this chapter.

made up of what was referred to as an "*odd collection of Welsh drop-outs and Oxford academics*" (Marks 1997: p.105). Many members of this nucleus of Marks's early working network remained participants in various ventures well into his career. Others withdrew from the trade after arrests, incarcerations, or becoming junkies. In a sense, the old boys network that Marks was such a key part of at Oxford followed and opened several opportunities throughout his career as a cannabis trade entrepreneur.

Success breeds success regardless of which end of Smith's (1975 and 1980) entrepreneurial continuum (legal to illegal) one finds himself in. If criminal enterprise is, in a Mertonian sense, a short-cut to achieving the American (or capitalist) dream, then stepping into crime after four years of studying, making acquaintances, and dealing at Oxford gives one a head-start on others making their way from, say, the slums of London. The opportunity structure has it that Marks was able to make contact with key exporters in a matter of two short years in the trade. This movement into the trade had him jumping from retail dealer to wholesaler within the same period. It was through the friends and acquaintances that he made while at Oxford that Marks found the early seeds of what would become his working network and career for two decades to follow.

Going Up: Network Expansion As An Importation Coordinator[40]

Adler and Adler found that middle-level entry traffickers, as opposed to less ambitious low-level entry dealers, were more likely to advance and expand in the trade through their access to established dealing friends who allowed the newcomer entry into the scene and its fast-paced lifestyle - "Individuals who found this lifestyle attractive became increasingly drawn to the subculture, building networks of social associations within it" (Adler and Adler 1983: p.98). The present section demonstrates how the building phase of a criminal entrepreneur's career takes place precisely within the builder's scope of relationally-defined opportunities and not necessarily within the scope of an established subculture.

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40. 'Coordinator' and later 'liaison' and 'representative' concepts are based on Gould and Fernandez's (1989) brokerage classification.

Marks entered the cannabis trade in an apprentice-like relationship with his principal hashish dealer, Graham Plinston, who he met at Oxford during the mid-sixties and remained in contact with while gradually shifting from being a relatively heavy cannabis consumer (20 joints per day), to a progressively popular provincial retail dealer, to a London wholesaler and trans-border courier.

Concentrated Contact Allotment: Being Made, Network Style

In Figure 4.1, Marks's contacts are plotted along a temporal continuum that is determined by their entry into his core personal working network. Marks (Node 1 or N1) is assigned 'ego status'. He had made direct working contact with all but 4 (indicated by a dotted line) of the nodes in his personal network. Each contact is designated by the year in which he first came into contact with Marks and by the already established contact that connected him to Marks. For example, James Morris (N28) first co-participated with Marks in 1973 and was encountered through Graham Plinston (N3), who Marks met on his own in 1966. Six of the nodes in Figure 4.1 were never stated by the author as being implicated in cannabis trade activities (non-trade members are those underlined), however, because they led to contacts with later trade co-participants, they were included in this representation.

Figure 4.1:
Marks's Career Working Network



Figure 4.1 shows that of Marks's personal network members throughout his twenty-year career, Plinston (N3) was the largest contact provider. Only Ernie Combs (N26), Plinston and Marks's main American importer, neared Plinston's network provision to Marks. Almost half of the contacts in Figure 4.1 came either from Marks's direct encounters (10 contacts; 17,2%), indirectly through Plinston (8 contacts; 13,8%) or through Combs (10 contacts; 17,2%). Such concentrated contact allotment (high accumulation of eventual contacts extending from a relatively few number of network providers) should be somewhat expected in that the consequences of product illegality limits not only the scope and size of criminal organizations and consistent working groups (Reuter 1983), but also the boundaries within which criminal entrepreneurs have to work - that being the size and amplifying qualities of their networks of potential co-participants, accomplices, and information sources (Tremblay, Cusson, and Morselli 1998).

Plinston figured even more considerably as a central player in Marks's career when we take into account that Marks met Combs through him. From the 8 working ties in Figure 4.1 that Plinston put into contact with Marks grew an additional 36 network members resulting in 4,5 (36/8) subsequent ties per tie already made. Combs' proved much lower at 1,7 (17/10). In many ways, Plinston *made* Marks in the cannabis trade, but not in the ritualized, formalized, and required exchange that is often found for more traditional organized crime contexts. In Marks's business, being made meant gaining direct access to the resources of the maker. One may have been expected to return a favour, but such reciprocity was neither absolute nor enforced.

The business relationship between Plinston and Marks eventually grew from a strict apprenticeship to a gradual partnership. Both had become independent British cannabis importers together in 1970 when they attained contact, through Radcliffe (N10), with James McCann (N23), an IRA, gun smuggling, pot-smoking 'living legend'[41] who was ready and able to import hashish sent by Plinston's export contacts. Ventures 1 to 3 (see Axis 1 in Figure 4.2) represent these initial importation ventures with McCann and the onset of the building phase of Marks's

career. It was during the period (1971 to the turn of 1974-1975) that Marks made his own place and reputation amongst an increasingly propagating web of business ties in the trade.

Vouched Network Expansion

Tremblay has argued that "the search for suitable co-offenders involves the attempt to combine two goals: the search for the strongest ties possible with co-offenders so as to minimize the chances of betrayal and failure; and the search for weak but useful ties so as to increase the scope and value of crime opportunities" (Tremblay 1993: pp.26-27). Marks, during this building phase, succeeded in using a few strong ties to extend towards reaching weaker, yet vouched for, ties.

During the 5-year period indicating the building phase of his career (1971-1975), Marks's working network increased from 14 to the 20 contact peak in 1975 (see cumulative working network backdrop to Figure 4.2). Cumulatively, 29 new contacts were added to the network during this period, while 12 exited. The co-participants entering this already prosperous network are indicated in Figure 4.1. The first 3 years of this period were largely due directly or indirectly to Plinston (N3). This gave Marks his links to various exporters in Pakistan (N11 and N25) and Lebanon (N12), as well as to a motley set of other co-participants.

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41. See Marks's own description of McCann (Marks 1997: p.78-79).

Figure 4.2:
Marks's Career Representation



While a cumulative increase of 6 contacts between 1971 and 1975 may seem rather meager as a network building indicator, the fact that Marks was operating within early links in the drug distribution chain must be accentuated. The ensemble of suppliers and clients increases as the distribution chain nears the street level or final sale to the actual consumer. Within and around the importation link in the distribution chain, an addition of 6 new contacts and an indirect access to contacts in their respective personal networks substantially increases one's pool of potential opportunities. Second, network expansion and exposure is a delicate matter amongst criminal trade participants. Six new contacts means six additional persons who are aware of your illegal activities and who may subsequently diffuse such knowledge across their respective personal networks. This building phase required that Marks open his network to further contacts and opportunities. Such expansion resulted in Marks attaining increased and quicker access to useful information for seizing more lucrative opportunities. Unlike in legitimate contexts, however, the illegal setting renders the task of searching for new contacts a more constrained and selective process.

Furthermore, the 20-contact peak from 1975 to 1977 and the 15-contact average throughout his career coincides with findings and estimations made by Adler, who found that smuggling crews were generally composed of 3 to 8 members (Adler 1993: p.81). Marks was not a member of any specific crew of smugglers. He had a consistent pool of contacts in place to turn to when necessary, but who he dealt with varied from venture to venture. If one considers that Marks was involved in roughly 2 ventures per year (assuming that the entire venture was executed with the same co-participants) and that each venture corresponded with Adler's own findings, then the autobiographical information may be taken as offering reasonable estimates for a participant operating in or around the importation segment of cannabis distribution.

Greater access to information and therefore opportunities, as Granovetter pointed out in a study on legitimate job searchers, is a result of the number of weak ties in one's personal network (Granovetter 1974). For criminal entrepreneurs, dealing with weak ties is necessary if one seeks to increase opportunities and

achieve upward mobility for similar reasons as in the legitimate arena of action. However, and in another contrast to legitimate actors or players, seeking such network expansion increases exposure and risks of defection by weakly-linked co-participants. Building one's reputation and increasing the scope of one's opportunities and activities in criminal networks calls for ambitious participants to take such risks. Marks succeeded in surviving this precarious stage of an increasingly international cannabis trade career. He was also able to come out of it all with strong links with both exporters and importers. Marks, however, had the 'illegitimate means' (Cloward and Ohlin 1960) to seize new opportunities to begin with in that all new working contacts that were encountered were met through an already established contact. All were new and weak ties, but all were also contacts that were vouched for by established (trade or non-trade) members of his working network, with most, once again, having their relational roots with Graham Plinston (N3). Marks consistently used those people that were already relationally in place to advance his own career. Some mutual contacts were weaker ties than others (i.e. meeting N27 through N4 in contrast to meeting N32 through N6 or N26 through N3), but the vouch was nevertheless present and necessary.

It may very well be that personal networks amply filled with new and vouched-for opportunities are far from reachable for most participants in illicit trades. That Marks had access to such a network and was able to maintain and further improve the make-up of this network for cannabis trade purposes was a sign of his force in the cannabis trade. Which position one finds himself in and what one's role becomes in any given trade revolving around the distribution of illegal goods and services has much to do with who one knows and how one is able to depend and use his personal network to adapt and better one's place within the trade. Money and wealth is clearly a facilitator for such upward mobility, but without the social capital in place to convince other participants to trust and accept participants with high financial capital as investors, partners, or associates, it remains questionable whether any cooperation will emerge. Marks had, first and foremost, the social capital component to participate on a full-time basis in the trade; financial capital soon followed.

By-Passing the Maker

Early ventures generally had Plinston dealing with Combs (i.e. V3 in Figure 4.2). While still partnering with Plinston (N3), Marks began communicating directly with Combs (N26), which eventually led to the two establishing a direct business relationship for later consignments in the same scam. The partnership with Plinston, at that point, went through some important changes. Plinston had continued side-dealing with the more erratic Jim McCann (N23), while Marks was more hesitant toward pursuing unnecessary risks with this Irish importer. Curiously, it was McCann, during the first venture (V1 in Figure 4.2), who first tried to convince Marks to operate without Plinston. At that time, Marks was quite aware of the value of Plinston's resources as his response to McCann tells us: "*Jim, we need Graham. I don't know anyone else who can send stuff from Pakistan and Afghanistan*" (Marks 1997: p.88). Such contacts were eventually attained by Marks through Plinston. Three years later, he was in a position to operate without him.

Marks focused his business on Combs' American importation schemes and this eventually grew to a complete by-passing of Plinston's involvement - "*Ernie* [Combs] *gave me $100,000 for my assistance. Graham* [Plinston] *said that I could keep it all. He wouldn't interfere with any deal I made with Ernie as long as I did not interfere with deals he intended doing with McCann. We would remain partners on all other deals and could invest in each other's individual deals without participation*" (Marks 1997: p.119).

This was the beginning of the end of the partnership with Plinston who had become a redundant contact for Marks the moment that a direct working link was made with Combs. Through one strong tie (N3), Marks accessed a series of key trade participants that further developed his status, abilities, and reputation amongst other players. Plinston's influence may not have been the sole explanation for Marks's ascendancy in the trade, but it would be difficult to see this progression without his presence and network allotment.

Plinston fell completely out of Marks's working network by 1974, but not

before leaving him in contact with his Pakistani exporter Durrani (N11) and his associate Raoul (N25), his Lebanese exporters Sam Hiraoui (N12) and Lebanese Joe (N9), his American importer Ernie Combs (N26), and a wide array of other useful contacts that were able to move and distribute cannabis across international borders and within the boundaries of the United Kingdom. Plinston gave Marks direct working contact with key and reliable exporters from producing/exporting nations and a strong contact with an established importer in the United States.

While Adler and Adler have explained that the specific social milieu within which their own cannabis and cocaine traffickers resided and operated "facilitated forming connections and doing business at the upper levels of the drug world" (Adler and Adler 1983: p.198), this analysis of Marks's own building experience demonstrates how such ascendancy in an illegal trade may be a function of less cultural and more relationally-embedded individual purposive actions. The individual, in this sense, is not offered a subculturally-defined set of opportunities to seize in as much as he is making the most of those resources that extend from his own personal network.

Figure 4.2 shows that Marks was arrested in the Netherlands in 1973. This arrest was linked to the Rock-Group scam (V3). Marks was transferred to England for prosecution, granted bail after 3 weeks in Brixton Prison, and headed for a minimum 3-year sentence. He eventually skipped bail. This context is described as follows: "*I had just skipped bail. The trial had started without me the previous day, May 1, 1974. My co-defendants pleaded guilty and got sentences ranging from six months to four years. Ernie* [Combs] *had promised to pay off any sureties demanded by the judge as the result of my skipping bail. He felt indebted to me because at the time of my arrest in Amsterdam I was the only person in the world who knew his whereabouts, and I had not disclosed them to the authorities* " (Marks 1997: pp.130). For the next six-and-a-half years, Marks would flourish in the cannabis trade while remaining a fugitive from the law.

Attaining Positional Privilege: Liaison and Representative Brokerage

The network of exporters, importers, wholesale distributors, and other trusting co-participants that Marks had successfully put together through his apprenticeship and partnering with Plinston had become a rather efficient relational working base for a cannabis trade smuggler. By the turn of 1974-1975, Marks reached his peak in terms of network expansion (see cumulative working network distribution in Figure 4.2). While Burt (1992) and Granovetter (1974 and 1973) argue that larger networks are better when attempting to increase potential opportunities extending from weak ties or nonredundant contacts (larger networks increase the potential for both types of contacts), the criminal entrepreneur is often faced with upper boundaries in regard to expansion. This coincides with Erickson (1981) and Baker and Faulkner (1993) who argue that groups, organizations, and individuals operating under risky and clandestine circumstances are distinct in that the need to maximize security often surpasses desires for efficiency. This peak or limit in network expansion is not necessarily a sign of failure. It may, however, spell failure for many who push the limits further in that one is increasingly exposed to a wider set of weak, albeit vouched for, ties and, therefore, an increased likelihood of exposure to external regulatory agents and defections amongst co-participants.

For Marks, such weak ties proved rather useful and reliable until this phase, but he did adapt to those privileged circumstances that were before him at the onset of his fugitive years. One privilege extended from a contextual change which had him receiving offers to participate rather than seeking opportunities to initiate, compliment, or complete his own coordinating ventures. What was sought from Marks by other trade members was his ability to fit in between exporting and importing links as a liaison or importation representative amongst exporters. Attaining this *between-link* brokerage position had Marks in a most convenient arrangement in that he was able to simultaneously increase his own security, while assuring and even increasing the efficiency of his working network. Both advantages and risks of this position will be outlined in the following sections.

Between-Link Advantages

According to Adler (1993) and others (Naylor 1997; Haller 1990; and Block and Chambliss 1981), few participants in drug dealing, trafficking, and smuggling have the capacity to coordinate and meet all resource requirements (i.e. financial, connections, skills, experience) necessary to conduct a successful drug smuggling venture. However, amongst co-participants, there are positions which result in some achieving a competitive and safer edge than others.

Baker and Faulkner stated the following in their price-fixing study: "As an agent of a company, an individual conspirator wants to be a *central player* in the illegal network. (...) Personally, however, an actor wants to be a *peripheral player* (if a player at all) to avoid detection, prosecution, and sanctioning" (1993: p.845). It may be assumed that delegation is a common strategy for central players to protect themselves and the most privileged players (and likely the most cautious players) are those who are able to establish cushions of social contacts between themselves and the actual activity under surveillance. Brokers are such peripheral players. They are players who remain relatively distant from the actual distribution of illegal goods (hence, decreasing the risks of detection) while consistently receiving a portion of the profits extending from the circulation process. Being at the center of the action, in this sense, does not necessarily mean that one has a privileged role in the distribution process and mobilization procedures across a chain. Social distance from the actual passage of the illegal goods in question is an asset in organized crime – it offers a player ampler insulation and a capacity to invest one's time and energy in simultaneous ventures.

Such incentives for security over efficiency also influence how the circulation process from one end of a distribution chain to the other is structured. The business of mobilizers found *within* each link in a given chain ceases the moment that the illegal commodity moves into the boundaries of the succeeding link (i.e. from exporter link to importer link). Marks's main Pakistani exporter (Malik: N40) during the latter part of his career, for example, implied this on a series of occasions – "*Where product ends up and with who it ends up is not my concern. I meet only you, D.H. Marks. How I give product, you say. How you give*

money, I say" (Marks 1997: p.219) and "*My commitment is to you, not to any American. You are most welcome to accompany me to NWFP to my tribe's factory near Peshawar in Khyber Pass. You can choose quality. You can make inspection. But no American can go there.* (...) *If you are satisfied, I will bring hashish to Karachi and out in warehouse. Then, if you want, you can show to Americans. That is your affair*" (Marks 1997: p.291). The drug distribution process is a take-and-give procedure. The image is more reminiscent of a children's game of hot potato than it is of a formal organization structuring and authoritarian control of passage. The privileged positions along the chain go to those players who achieve in taking part in the action, but who also remain distant from the proof that is actually sought after in law-enforcement targeting. Such positioning is illustrated in the liaison or representative brokering that represented Marks's place in the trade during his post-Plinston years.

While between-link brokers may be found along various segments of the distribution chain, it is clearly between geographically distant and relationally time consuming exporting and importing links that they would seem to fit in most appropriately. Marks's personal network, by 1975, was exquisitely designed for him to seize such a position. Successful illegal trade brokers are those players who are not exclusively dependent on any one participant. Their nonredundant positioning and needed resources has it that they are more likely sought after by others than vice-versa.

Adler, in her assessment of intermediaries or 'middlers', found evidence of 2 types of brokering - that initiated by suppliers and that initiated by interested buyers (1993: p.52). Somewhat differently, Marks's brokerage experiences were initiated exclusively by buyers (by importers). Although Marks was neither an exclusive insider amongst importers nor exporters, between-link brokerage opportunities consistently came from importers looking to make the link with exporters, whereupon he would either represent importers' interests within the exporter link or serve as a connecting vector in liaison fashion. Although Adler found middling to be a 'last resort' form of dealing or a position held by peripheral and struggling dealers who proved "unable to successfully establish and maintain

regular buying and selling connections" (1993: p.54), a re-interpretation of this brokerage position would seem to merit additional insight which would further support Ekland-Olson, Lieb, and Zurcher's assertion that because "[t]he possibilities of making a profit by dealing drugs within any given friendship circle are limited[, i]t is persons able to bridge otherwise separated groups who are in a particularly profitable position" (1984: p.171). As one of Adler's own interviewees pointed out, brokering is not necessarily a low-status position: "It's not really dealing - it's just putting together two connections, but the trick is to keep them apart so they don't know who each other are and they need you to complete the link" (1993: p.54). The trick, in Burt' (1992) terms, is to keep nonredundant contacts nonredundant.

Liaison brokers have a slight advantage over representative brokers in view of distance from the targeted action. Marks, for example, took on the representative role on several occasions (see excerpts with Malik above). In contrast to those consignments for which he served as a liaison between nonredundant importers-exporters and for which no other investment was called upon him but to simply connect the two within-links, the importer representative amongst exporters positioned him closer to the illegal commodity, albeit in the generally impunitive confines typical of production and exportation regions. Marks's presence in Malik's Afghanistan-Pakistan border operational compound, for example, did place him right in the middle of the action and called for considerable investment of his own time and energy (i.e. testing drug, assuring logistics of a shipment, and managing costs of importers). However, such implications and risks associated with the representative brokerage position remained much less extensive than those associated with his earlier ventures as a coordinator of importation scams in demand-side regions, such as the United Kingdom or the United States. It remains, nevertheless, that the liaison brokerage position, with its less concretized and visible investment on the part of the broker, is clearly the least time and financially consuming and most insulated of the three possible brokerage positions.

Compensating the Sucker's Pay-Off

The between-link brokerage position does not come without its risks. While all players in a chain make some form of investment, the between-link broker is placed in a rather privileged position in that although he may invest his energy and time to a considerable extent, he does not generally make a financial investment in the actual mobilization process. By investing his social capital (or connecting nonredundant contacts), however, he takes the risks that come with vouching for and investing the financial resources of two otherwise non-connected parties. If one party does not fulfill his part of the brokered contract, it is the broker who becomes responsible in compensating the second, unfulfilled party. Although the broker is in a highly profitable position (in terms of financial returns per initial investment) when all turns out well, he risks facing substantial financial losses if one of his contacts decides to break his side of the deal. In a non-contractual setting, such as the cannabis trade, there are consequences of product illegality that are unique to the broker.

Marks explains this arrangement quite clearly: "*There is a general rule in most hashish-smuggling ventures: if the scam gets busted by the authorities, the scam shareholders lose their investment, pay any costs, and no one else is held responsible for the loss. There is another general rule: if there is any kind of rip-off, the shareholders do not lose their investment, get paid their profit, and the person who ripped off is held responsible. The logic is sound: bonding together against the enemy during troubled times but paying the penalty for trusting the wrong person during untroubled times*" (Marks 1997: p.160). The second of these rules may be modified and coined the 'broker rule' because if the person behind the rip-off is not found, it is he who vouched for his trust that is held responsible. This was the experience faced by Marks when he coordinated a venture between his Pakistani hashish exporting contacts and Anthony Woodhead (N22), a consistent co-participant in several of Marks's ventures during the building phase of his career. Woodhead, in V5, defected from the venture's arrangements and was never found. As Marks writes: "*According to the rules, I owed $750,000 to Raoul* [N25]

and Durrani [N11]" (Marks 1997: p.161). If the rip-off would not have occurred, Marks stood to make 25% of $1 000 000 (Marks 1997: p.160) for brokering the deal. His initial financial investment was $0.

Between-link brokers gain a percentage of the profits (Marks's details allow general estimates to be made of approximately 15% of after-sales profits going to liaison brokers and about 20% for representatives) that would otherwise be split amongst succeeding within-link participants. If one party defects, the broker is fully responsible and losses become considerable - in the rip-off detailed above, this amounted to three times more than what the expected reward would have been. The broker is in the business of controlling and assuring type-1 results (no defectors or mutual cooperation) of the Prisoner's Dilemma that is consistently in place between (directly or indirectly) transacting criminal entrepreneurs. He pays when the result takes on a sucker's pay-off (one player defects from the deal). He invests his time and energy making and breaking relations and tending to those who have proved trustworthy and reliable on a consistent basis. Although players in succeeding links lose a proportion of the profits to be made in employing a broker to vector the deal, the incentive is quite understandable. The broker serves as a buffer between buyers and sellers in the illegal trade while, at the same time, providing a guarantee that their financial investment will come through whether the consignment runs accordingly or not. In a business lacking the formal and conventional fallbacks for regulating contracts, the use of a broker for within-link participants serves to overcome a large part of the risks linked to the non-contractual nature of illegal trades.

Network Closure

Marks's positional privilege came as a result of a cumulative process of seizing and accessing one entrepreneurial opportunity after another until he himself became the entrepreneurial opportunity to be seized by others. His favourable reputation established with those players with whom he was in business, particularly Ernie Combs (N27), added to the circumstances which led to his fitting between-links in the trade. The mix of becoming an entrepreneurial

opportunity for others and his between-link positioning is partly indicated in Figure 4.2 by the stability of his cumulative working network between 1975 and 1977 and the subsequent drop in this distribution throughout the years leading to his arrest in 1980. During this period, Marks's network contracted. The 20-contact peak in Figure 4.2 persisted for three years, henceforth dropping to 17 in 1978 (3 new contacts in, 6 former contacts out) and 1979 (2 in, 2 out) and 13 in 1980 (2 in, 6 out). This network closure coincides with the height of Marks's fugitive years and the introduction to his network of additional exporters (N37 and N40), importers and investors (mostly through Combs), as well as other key participants for his various scams.

The ability to select incoming opportunities from such a privileged position means that one may choose to participate only on relatively safe and profitable terms. The drop in cumulative contacts and the consistency in cannabis trade ventures in Figure 4.2 that represented Marks's career from the mid-seventies to 1980 illustrate how he was able to continue participating, while, at the same time, decreasing the overall number of people with which he had to deal. This tells us that Marks was involved less extensively with new contacts and for those rare new contacts that did enter his network during those years, most came with a vouching of trust by Combs. As a between-link broker, he was also in direct contact with a fewer number of co-participants for each venture. Here, we are able to see the network closure pattern that is a strategic reaction to the formal control and sanctioning process confronting offenders (Ekland-Olson, Lieb, and Zurcher 1984). It remains, however, that although Marks did partially decrease the number of contacts in his overall working network, he did so in a context in which his entrepreneurial opportunities did not follow suit - in fact, they increased. Privileged positioning means that one may stay away from the action, work and get into contact with as few other participants as possible, select the choice opportunities that are offered, reap the profits that come with brokering, and dabble simultaneously in a number of similarly-designed ventures. This represents Marks's networking that structured his trade activities during the height of his career.

The Makings of a Good Scam

The combination of durability, stability, and consistent profit define the makings of a successful scam. This mix provides the incentives for all players involved and entering the venture to keep a good thing going - "*If*', as Marks tells us, "*a scam works, it is rational to repeat it*" (Marks 1997: p.266). Marks provides the summations of his most successful scam (V4 in Figure 4.2) that was finally busted by the DEA in 1979: "*Between 1975 and 1978, twenty-four loads totaling 55,000 pounds of marijuana and hashish had been successfully imported through John F. Kennedy Airport, New York. They had involved the Mafia, the Yakuza, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, the Thai army, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Pakistani Armed Forces, Nepalese monks, and other individuals from all walks of like. The total profit made by all concerned was $48,000,000. They'd had a good run*" (Marks 1997: p.166). The author provides details on 10 of the 24 consignments that made up this particular venture. The ensemble of these consignments demonstrates the similarities between criteria for success (the 'good thing') in criminal and legitimate forms of enterprise.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the logged weights for all 41 consignments documented in *Mr. Nice*. The attainment or Marks's most successful phase begins with consignment 16, the onset of V4 (see Figure 4.2) in 1975. This phase ends with consignment 30, a busted 1979 scam (V8) that resulted in Marks's subsequent arrest. The attainment phase consignments (16 to 30) illustrate a relatively stable operating period in Marks's career. During these years, he was consistently involved in consignments made up of about 1000 kilograms (or 3 logged kilograms). The four first ventures (V4 to V7 in Figure 4.2) were designed to operate in one-ton standard and the most successful of these ventures (V4) ran steadily for almost 4 years with few interruptions. Such stability is less apparent during the building phase and even less so during the final years of Marks's career. The failure of consignment 30 is in itself an indication of the problems that may extend from a more erratic operating system. Between consignments 16 and 29, Marks had prospered in the trade. While his networking and between-link positioning had much influence on the endurance of this peak period, it also

remains that Marks had consistently implicated himself in scams which more or less fit the same operating model – in regard to his own positioning and shipment weights. Marks was a between-link broker who was most effective in moving one-ton consignments of cannabis.

Figure 4.3:
Weight of Consignments Across Marks's Career



A good scam is one that could be repeated. The more it could be repeated, the better the scam. During this attainment phase, Marks had experienced such operational stability as an criminal entrepreneur. The scam that ended this peak period (consignment 30) had him smuggling 15 tons of marijuana from Colombia to the UK. Such sizable ventures do guarantee the criminal entrepreneur large sums of profits if successful, however, Marks's story tells us that such over-ambitious venturing spelled his downfall more than anything else. It remains that his most successful period was that which represented a proven working system, a manageable weight for each shipment, privileged positioning, and regularity, albeit not maximization, in profits.

In 1980, Marks's lengthy six-and-a-half-year flee from justice came to an end with an arrest in England following the bust of consignment 30. He spent just over 2 'easy' years in Brixton Prison - "*The two years had gone by quickly enough, and I'd beaten the real charge*" (Marks 1997: p.194). Upon release, he

found himself in a rather financially-sound situation in that most wholesale profits from the unseized portion of the busted consignment had been collected. This triggered the onset of his first retirement. He succeeded in remaining fully legitimate for roughly one year before re-entering the trade in 1983.

Going Down: The Network Dynamics Structuring an Independent Criminal Entrepreneur's Career

The present section wraps up Marks's career by extending the focus to the final phase of his international cannabis trade endeavors and analyzing, with the use of Burt's structural hole measures, the relation between event and career-based outcomes and personal network strategies. This final phase begins with his decision to re-enter the trade in 1983 and ends with his fall, in 1987, to the international law-enforcement tandem that had been targeting his actions and those of his regular co-participants.

Becoming Redundant: Being By-passed

Although he continued to be solicited by various interested parties to broker or mobilize a deal through his own working network, Marks seemed to have lost that competitive edge that he had built and maintained for over ten years. On two occasions, for example, he did exactly what brokers are not supposed to do if they want their position to remain a necessary one. For ventures 11 and 13 (Figure 4.2), he permitted participants between which he was brokering to contact each other and operate together (N45 and N37 for V11 and N57 and N23 for V13). This naturally led to Marks's exclusion from each scam – his position had become an obsolete one because he had given each player direct access to his social resources. Marks later became aware of what had taken place, as his reaction regarding the first event makes rather clear: "*So Mickey Williams* [N45] *had somehow got hold of Phil* [N37], *and the Dutch air-freight scam had, presumably, been resurrected, this time without me. I couldn't really complain. I didn't really own Phil, and it wasn't I who introduced him to Mickey. But I was glad to know what was going on*" (Marks 1997: p.296). His encounter with Reaves (N57) in

1986 was marked by a similar faulty brokerage strategy from the onset. Reaves went to Marks, as many others had done before, to set up a consignment so that he may invest some of his own money. Reaves, unlike other participants referred to in *Mr. Nice*, asked Marks to put him in direct contact with his exportation contacts, rather than set the deal up for him. He used trust and security as a justification to warrant direct contact with such highly sought after contacts. First, Reaves aimed for Marks's Pakistan exporter, Malik (N40). He then inquired in regard to reaching Moynihan (N51), one of Marks's later contacts who maintained strong corruptible relations with politicians and smugglers in various countries in southeast Asia. Finally, Reaves succeeded in attaining direct contact with Marks's longtime associate, Jim McCann (N23). Marks's reaction to what was to follow proved somewhat less understanding - but still forgiving - then the previous incident: "*Roger had given Jim the £50,000 he required. Jim was ready to deliver. I felt a bit disgruntled about the two of them just carrying on as if I didn't exist, but I certainly didn't want to get in the way*" (Marks 1997: p.329).

These two incidents are not the only examples of how Marks was leaving his rich social capital resources open to others and having his crucial brokerage position by-passed. He was giving away that competitive edge that allowed him to endure and thrive in the trade to begin with. Marks was in the process of becoming redundant for some of his key contacts in precisely the same manner that Plinston had become redundant for him in the early 1970s[42]. This pattern emerges when converging on fluctuations in the structural hole content in his network throughout his career.

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42. Although the present analysis presumes that Marks was unintentionally losing his competitive edge, a later reading of Eddy and Walden (1991), which provides an account of Marks's fall, offered a quite different outlook regarding the relational pattern that took place at the later stages of his career. As the following excerpt (obtained through a commentary from Judy Marks – Howard's wife) reveals, operational redundancy was indeed taking place, albeit with considerable awareness: «'Just a couple of more years', he'd told Judy. His intention, he said, was to back out of the dope business gradually by acting only as a middleman, bringing together suppliers and distributors. They would pay him a commission at first, but after a couple of deals they wouldn't need him any more and he'd be cut out – whatever the promises they made. It was his way of making himself redundant, eventually» (Eddy and Walden 1991: p.222).

Outcomes

Logged weights (kg) per smuggling consignment served as the principal outcome variable in this study. Total weight indicators, as already pointed out in Chapter 3, were excellent proxies for the less complete percentage-cut or profit measures. These specific activity outcomes were merged in three separate groups to account for Marks's movement in the cannabis trade. These phases constitute career outcomes in themselves. Relations between observed size, effective size, and network efficiency and the two set of outcomes proved telling in fitting a model to Marks's overall career and activities.

The three separate phases highlight the principal transitions (building, attainment, and fall) throughout Marks's career in and around importation segments of the cannabis trade. The 41 consignments in Figure 4.3 were regrouped in the following manner: the building phase groups consignments 1 to 15; the attainment phase groups consignment 16 to 30; and the last return or 'fall' phase is represented by consignments 31 to 41 that were executed after Marks's release from prison in 1982. Means for each of Burt's structural hole indicators were subsequently calculated for each phase.

Figure 4.4 illustrates the patterns extending from these brokerage measures for the three phases across Marks's career. Results show that the building phase had Marks in direct working contact with the most co-participants (an average of almost 5 contacts per consignment), at his least effective (approximately 2 nonredundant contacts) and, therefore, at his least efficient (a low 39,7%). Although his brokering seems somewhat inferior to the two later phases in his career, it must be noted that during this phase in which he was building his network as a within-link importation coordinator, he was not venturing with the same sizable shipments as he later would. Also, he was not yet a reputed player in the trade nor was he an obvious target for law-enforcement agents.

Figure 4.4:
Marks's Personal Network Transitions per Career Phase



The attainment phase seems rightly coined. Marks, while maintaining, on average, direct contact with the least number of co-participants per consignment (3,33 - recall also the drop in his cumulative working network during this period in Figure 4.2), was at his most effective (2,4 contacts), and therefore at his most efficient, in regard to filling his consignment-based networks with the most nonredundant contacts possible. For those consignments located during this phase of positional privilege, Marks averaged an efficiency of 78% nonredundant contacts per all direct contacts. This illustrates a considerable increase from the approximate 40% that he averaged during the building phase. Fitting-in between links in the trade increased his efficiency and decreased his exposure to other co-participants. If we also take into consideration that, at this point, his trade activities were at their most stable (as indicated in Figure 4.3 and discussed earlier) with steady ventures in motion offering repeated shipments and consistent profits from 1-ton loads, it becomes clear that the late seventies in Marks's career were indeed his most prolific and successful.

His return to the trade in 1983, although increasing the average effective size of his consignment networks (to 2,76 in Figure 4.4), also had him dealing directly

with a slightly higher number of co-participants (observed size = 4,5). We have already seen in Figure 4.2 that Marks re-opened his network during this phase while continuing to fill the privileged between-link position. While he successfully closed his network during the attainment phase and therefore decreased the risks that come with increasing exposure, he was no longer practicing the same relational strategies in this return phase. The increase in observed size resulted in a decrease in his brokerage strategy as indicated by the drop in network efficiency (64,7%). Marks re-opened his network, but unlike his early years in the trade (the building phase), his reputation within the trade (in popular venues and amongst law-enforcement officials) was no longer as discreet and low-key. It was therefore more necessary for his actions to be properly insulated. He had attained a public figure status with the publication of one book on his career and the media circus linked to his pasts arrests, trials, and subsequent incarceration. He had been released from prison just one year before this return to the trade. Such celebrity status and past reputation within law-enforcement circles made him an obvious target for surveillance. Throughout many smuggling episodes during this last phase, it was quite evident that Marks and many of his co-participants were increasingly under the surveillance of DEA officials stationed in various cities across the world.

The nonlinear trend (up, peak, and drop) representing the flow of Marks's networking throughout his career also emerges when analyzing the relation between individual consignment weights and relational indicators. Correlation results between logged weights and observed size for each smuggling network assembled for the 41 consignments proved strong and positive ($r = 0,408$; $\alpha < .01$). This finding may seem somewhat given in that larger consignments do call for larger networks to be mobilized. That Marks was, himself, in direct contact with increasingly more people (the observed size of his network), however, is less obvious, and, as the phase transition analysis demonstrated, an indication of his own operating from one stage of his career to the next.

Similarly, the number of nonredundant contacts (effective size) across consignments also varied in a strong positive relation with the size of

consignments (r = 0,590; $\alpha < .001$). In legitimate network terms, bigger is better (Burt 1992) but as already pointed out earlier, privileged positioning comes with greater efficiency - that is by having the most proportionally nonredundant network possible. From this level of analysis, the number of nonredundant contacts remains closely related to the observed size of a working network (r = 0,599; $\alpha <$ .001). However, this does not entail that more nonredundant contacts through larger networks results in higher efficiency. This is demonstrated in applying a quadratic fit (see Figure 4.5) between network efficiency and logged weights (r = 0,44; $\alpha < .05$) which improves considerably on the linear model (r = 0,17; n.s.) and remains consistent with the nonlinearity of the career phase outcomes discussed previously and illustrated with the network efficiency trend in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.5:
Marks's Network Efficiency by Size of Consignment



The pattern in Figure 4.5 establishes the initial increase and subsequent dampening-off that network efficiency takes when in relation with consignment weights. Marks was at his most efficient when dealing with 1000 to about 3000 kg (between 3 and 3,5 logged kg) shipments. Although he had the personal network in place to receive offers to participate in multi-ton consignments, a downward trend was observed beyond the 3,5 logged kilogram point (more than 3 tons), illustrating that he was decreasingly efficient as a broker and therefore losing his competitive

edge in comparison with consignments dealing with more personally optimally-sized 1-ton shipments. This results in decreasing returns for increasing network efficiency.

Limits are therefore observed in regard to Marks's own brokerage strategies. These limits would appear to correspond with upper boundaries in the size of the tasks he chose to take part in. It also remains (from previous observations in Figure 4.3) that the decreasingly inefficient brokered series of multi-ton consignments (the downward trend) took place in Marks's return to the trade after 1983.

The combination of increasing exposure within his personal network, decreasing efficiency while operating, increases in the size and amplitude of each consignment, and the obvious potential of being a prime target of external regulatory agents amount to the circumstances that led to his ultimate downfall. Overall, the structural hole measures illustrate how Marks's cannabis trade ventures throughout his career (individual event outcomes) and the transitions between each (aggregate level outcomes) were structured by his personal working network and his own positioning within.

Accounting for Risks and Insulation

While the information extractable from *Mr. Nice* did not offer any suitable indicators for accounting for the level of surveillance that was targeting Marks from one phase or consignment to the next, a demonstration may nevertheless be made to make the link between Marks's most successful and network efficient period as constituting the period in which he was arguably the least likely targeted. During the attainment phase of his career (1975 to 1980), Marks was a fugitive for the entire 6-year period. The name Howard Marks, *per se*, did not figure in any transaction throughout this entire spell. Instead, Donald Nice, Marks's principal alias during this period, was the identity or front in usage. If there was any form of physical detection on Marks, he would have presumably been arrested and subsequently tried for the smuggling charges that had been established in 1974. As a fugitive, he would have been removed from the trade whether he was smuggling

or not. Because he lasted for over 6 years as a fugitive under another identity, it may be assumed that he was not physically targeted. This provides some evidence for the level of insulation he maintained during the smuggling ventures throughout this prolific period. A plausible assertion extending from this finding accentuates the likely positive relation representing the interplay between network closure, network efficiency, and insulation from external regulatory agents. This, of course, assumes that the player has the relational capacity and privilege to practice network closure while remaining operationally efficient.

The Independent Criminal Entrepreneur

Results extending from information extracted and organized from this autobiographical source show that Marks was not the puppeteer of any criminal organization. He was a highly-resourceful player that fit in well with the needs and wants of other individuals or groups in the trade. He also seized and accumulated one entrepreneurial opportunity after another until he himself became the entrepreneurial opportunity to be seized by others also looking to get ahead. Converging on the brokerage position amongst criminal entrepreneurs illustrates how in business contexts in which non-contractual transactions and relations prevail and the consequences of product illegality (Reuter 1983) are continuous obstacles to any player's livelihood and durability in the illegal trade, one's ability to reliably, consistently, and conveniently fit between other participants offers a more privileged *position* than that of an authoritarian *role* in any formal organization.

Marks's privileged status came more from his resourcefulness than from his ability to directly control the actions of others within a common organization. More specifically, Marks's ability to mobilize drug smuggling assignments for others and serve as a network vector between key suppliers and buyers in early links of several cannabis trade chains led him to play the brokerage position within a specified network of participants to an increasingly greater extent. The distinction must therefore be made between "international trader" and "transnational boss" (Van Duyne 1996: p.373) - the former he was; the latter he

was not.

Whether Marks's form of "flexible opportunism" or "robust action" (Padgett and Ansell 1993) proves to be atypical for a criminal entrepreneur remains a question of inquiry on its own. Past researchers have found evidence of intermediaries and middlemen in drug trade settings (Dorn, Oette, and White 1998; Adler 1993; and Reuter and Haaga 1989), but this position has been largely left in the shadows of more conventional exporter, importer, wholesaler, or retailer categories. Brokers have been identified in these past studies, but they have yet to be fully assessed. Few suggestions, at the same time, have been made to further investigate this seemingly crucial position within distribution chains of various illegal commodities. Deeper consideration of the broker in illegal trades shows, however, that although those trade participants occupying this position are clearly not controlling the chain or a given link in any formal authoritarian way, they are pivotal players for many buyers and sellers and therefore for the overall informal circulation process.

Interestingly, some of the most revealing insight on intermediaries in illegal trades extends from analyses of traditional forms of organized crime, and most particularly of Sicilian and American versions of the Mafia (or Cosa Nostra). Whether as power brokers (Blok 1974), arbitrators of illegal market disputes (Reuter 1983), or suppliers of protection (Gambetta 1993), the middling roles and positions of Sicilian and North American mafia-based entrepreneurs have been considerably raised as valid conceptualizations throughout recent decades. One principal difference, however, between mafia-linked brokerage and Marks's own brand is the apparent dependence on violence (or the threat of violence) in the former and its irrelevance in the latter.

It has been argued that the threat or use of violence is the obvious mechanism regulating competition in illegal trades (Schelling 1984). Burt's structural hole argument offers an alternative way for framing competition - that is, from a more cooperative angle. Marks's career provides evidence that it is possible to persist and actually succeed in criminal forms of enterprise without having to rely on instrumental violence. Structuring one's personal working network to

include trade members who are not directly connected to each other but who may have interests in dealing with one another represents a cooperative way of being competitive. The combination of reputation, know-how, consistent and quick access to privileged information sources, and non-redundant personal networking gives a player the competitive edge needed for further advancement. Whether many others have been able to endure for several years in organized crime without experiencing the typical violence associated with this particular line of work remains a question on its own, however, it does remain rather clear that our preconceptions of organized crime often have us following the thread of violence to begin with.

Violence is seemingly one strategy used in attaining transitions towards more prestigious positioning within an illegal market or traditional organized crime setting, but Marks explains that away for his own personal experiences by presenting the context within which he generally operated and the changes that were gradually arising - "*The money we had made tended to dwarf that made by robbers, fraudsters, and thieves.* (...) *Accordingly, many heavy criminals had begun to deal dope, all kinds from anywhere. Some of the results were predictable. A lot more ruthlessness and violence was injected into dope-trading activity. Rip-offs and guns became more common*" (p.181).

Whether instrumental violence in a given illegal trade is a consequence of prolonged prohibition or the natural inclinations of criminal entrepreneurs themselves may be partially responded by observing that non-violent cannabis smuggling, as documented by Marks, did indeed precede violent cannabis smuggling. Violence is not an attractive instrument, nor is it feasibly useful when compared with other alternatives. Arlacchi elaborates on the consistent alternative working option between trust and violence that are available to illegal drug trade participants (Arlacchi 1988). Trust is the initial contractual force. This force is entrenched within a player's or group's relational strength in a segment of the trade. Violence is the long-term sanctioning reaction for regulating disrespected informal contracts and not a proactive mechanism for personal advancement. The "rip-off ", in this sense, precedes the "gun". A trade or market setting that was

initially structured on trust, loyalty, and therefore network fundamentals may, after repeated trials to turn to violence to sanction uncooperative players, evolve into a setting designed on coercive and persistent fraudulent methods for domination (Arlacchi 1988: p.40). In a case study of a career organized crime participant in Italy, Cottino (1998) also found that killing was a final recourse (p.107). Similarly, Gambetta (1988) has discussed in regard to the limits of violence as a sole instrument within the context of the mafia in southern Italy. "Violence by itself", writes Gambetta, "will not do. It is risky, costly, and generates instability and conflict: explaining the persistence of the mafia simply by its capacity for coercion would be nearly as limited as explaining the persistence of capitalism on the same basis" (1988: p.170). The author argues in favour of understanding other "more powerful" (p.170) weapons to promote cooperation and assure persistence - that being, the mutual satisfaction of economic interests.

Trust and relational mechanisms precede the development of violence. Mutual aid precedes outright regulatory competition. Within such a framework, instrumental violence becomes a supplementary or back-up resource used when one's overall relational force within this prohibited transactional setting proves insufficient in assuring proper and expected working protocol between co-participants. The matter, however, does warrant additional research attention in contexts where violence is indeed made obviously visible.

CHAPTER 5

FITTING THE BULL: CAREER OPPORTUNITIES AND NETWORK-BASED ADVANCEMENT IN THE COSA NOSTRA

In December 1990, the FBI terminated a decade-long surveillance mandate which targeted one of the key Cosa Nostra units in New York City. The arrests of the Gambino family administration – boss, John Gotti; underboss, Salvatore Gravano (a.k.a. Sammy the Bull); and consigliere, Frank Locascio – led to a series of subsequent turnabouts resulting from Gravano's decision, in October 1991, to become an FBI informant.

Gravano provided evidence that led to the eventual conviction of Gotti and Locascio. Both received life sentences without parole. He also attested to his own participation in 19 murders as well as a wide array of other criminal activities throughout his 25-year career within the ranks of the Cosa Nostra. In exchange for this ensemble of information, Gravano took a guilty plea for a single count of racketeering with a maximum 20-year sentence and all other charges dropped. With the praise of several law enforcement officials who prepared written referrals vouching for his value, courage, and truthfulness (Capeci and Mustain 1996: p.444), Gravano received, in September 1994, a 5-year sentence and a 3-year supervised release to follow. He actually served an additional year in prison since the 5-year term had incorporated the 4 previous years that he had been detained while serving as an informant.

Gravano's confessions of the series of murder plots in which he was implicated had many pointing the finger to his capacity for violence as the key factor accounting for his advancement in the Cosa Nostra. Indeed, Gravano was both violent and successful in his ways and while many may be quick to argue that such a capacity explains that outcome, a closer analysis of the non-violent aspects of his career help us develop an alternative framework explaining his progression within ranks of the Gambino family.

Jacobs, in his study of Cosa Nostra legitimate industry infiltration in New York City preceding the crackdown that took place during the 1980s provided the following account of Gravano's career:

> "The career of Gambino underboss Sammy 'The Bull' Gravano provides an excellent example of the energy, imagination, and entrepreneurship that characterize the Italian American organized crime families. Sammy Gravano, a man with only a grade-school

> education, made millions of dollars in legitimate businesses. He was a consummate mobster-entrepreneur: energetic, imaginative, and resourceful. He advanced from small-time hustler to owner of nightclubs and plumbing, drywall, carpeting, and painting companies. Ultimately, Gravano acquired interests in several parts of the construction industry: concrete pouring, asbestos, floor-inlay, and steel-erection companies. His status in the mob enabled him to carry out contracts and guarantee labor peace to cooperative subcontractors, who repaid the favor with kickbacks ranging from $15,000 to $20,000 per contract. In 1989, he handed over close to $1.2 million in profits from rigged construction bids to Gambino family crime boss John Gotti. Gravano, like many of the Cosa Nostra figures, kept seeking opportunities to make money in one business scheme and racket after another. He capitalized on his reputation as a Cosa Nostra member and on the network of connections that Cosa Nostra membership provided him. In addition, and like many of his underworld colleagues, his outgoing, even charismatic, personality was an asset in dealing with business people who apparently concluded that Gravano was no mobster, but an 'underworld' figure who shared their passion for business" (1999: p.119).

Viewing a mafioso in an entrepreneurial sense is not new to this particular field of research. Arlacchi (1983), for example, made this link in demonstrating the innovative and capitalistic character that became the Sicilian mafia's ideal during the 1970s:

> «For the most articulate *mafiosi*, the adoption of modern capitalist values is expressed in terms of a religion of accumulation whose seriousness should not be underestimated: profit and power are regarded, not as a means to the satisfaction of material needs, but as the goals of life. (...) Profit and power denote that the *mafioso* is an able exponent of his 'profession', and this ability is the alpha and omega of his moral universe» (pp.119-120).

This chapter begins with the notion of the mafioso as an entrepreneur. However, the obvious place of violence in the mafia method is downplayed for immediate purposes so that other means may emerge[43]. It is therefore maintained that Gravano did not get ahead in the Gambino family simply because he was willing and able to use violence. Like the independent Marks (see Chapter 4), he

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43. Chapter 6 of the thesis centers on the place of violence throughout Gravano's career.

was relationally capable and it was through opportunities to advance that extended from his personal network of working contacts that he was able to climb the promotional ladder within the family and expand his business ventures and financial yields as a racketeer and increasingly legitimate construction entrepreneur. To understand the place of (lethal) violence in Gravano's career, we must first situate this career within the socially embedded opportunity structural process that was more generally at the root of his advancement as an entrepreneur.

The Career Working Network

Figure 5.1 presents the 68 nodes (Gravano + 67 contacts) that made up Gravano's core working network from his early street-gang years during the late 1950s in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn to his December 1990 arrest and ultimate career fall within the Cosa Nostra. Gravano is assigned ego status and is indicated as Node 1 (N1). Each contact (all are male and most are of Italian descent) is identified by the date he entered Gravano's working network. Of the 67, 35 were documented as having become official (made) members in various family units in New York City (all 35 made members are underlined in Figure 5.1). Of these 35, 27 were members of the Gambino family. As Gravano's career progressed, his network became increasingly filled with such made members.

Figure 5.1:
Gravano's Career Working Network



Network Channels and Concentrated Contact Allotment

A phasal pattern of contact entrance throughout his career is observed in Figure 5.1. Contacts enter in clusters that correspond with time periods denoting Gravano's promotions within the Cosa Nostra. Each time period is also marked by a central contact. These promotions and central contacts intertwine to offer ego access to new opportunities that are attained through and realized with others. New opportunities are therefore concretized by the contacts that offer and help effectuate them. The centralized clustering pattern that emerges from Figure 5.1 marks the concentrated manner in which contacts and business resources were allotted to Gravano throughout the building stages of his career.

Each phase or cluster is constructed through one person in the previous phase. The N2 to N8 link, for example, represents Gravano's years as a member of a juvenile gang (the Rampers). In 1968, N8 connected Gravano to his uncle, N9, who later initiated Gravano's entrance and association within the Colombo family (N9 to N14). Gravano remained associated to the Colombo family until 1972 when a conflict arose with N9's brother, N22. The resolution of this conflict resulted in his transfer to the Gambino family through the aid of N16 who allowed Gravano to connect with and move under the supervision of a Gambino captain, N23. Throughout the following years, N23 ('Toddo' Aurello) became Gravano's mentor, tutor, supervisor, and initial sponsor within that family.

This established the onset of his long-term affiliation with the Gambinos. Immediate contacts were made through N23 with the working crew (N25 to N29) that Gravano would be a part of for various criminal activities. Contact was also made with the family boss (N24, Carlo Gambino) at the time, but this boss's influence was insignificant to Gravano's own career. In 1977, N23 sponsored Gravano to be made as an official Gambino soldier. N23 also gave Gravano access to a wide network of new contacts and therefore new opportunities within the family by connecting him with four Gambino members (N34 to N37).

In officially entering the family and connecting with the new family boss (N34, Paul Castellano) through N23, Gravano succeeded in gaining *direct* access

to Gambino resources (namely, via N38 to N44; N43 and N44 were part of N34's personal social capital who were well-positioned within contracting and labour sectors in New York City's construction industry). N38 and N39 were key Gambino construction entrepreneurs or racketeers as was another Gambino member (N19) who Gravano had been acquainted with since 1969. The remainder of the contacts who entered Gravano's network in 1977 through N34 would become more influential to Gravano's venturing and advancement somewhat later in his career. Aside from these immediate contacts that Gravano accessed through N34 in 1977, 4 others - all linked to the construction industry (N52, N55, N56, and N58) - entered his network during the early eighties via N34. This established Gravano's full transition as a construction racketeer and increasing detachment as a street gangster/bandit and small-business scammer.

The N23-N34 channel of connections structured Gravano's movement from Gambino associate, soldier, to construction racketeer. At this point, Gravano branched out on his own and sought out newer opportunities. One of these came through his link with N50 (John Gotti), who was, at that time (1978) also an official member of another faction (crew) within the family. N50 became an acquaintance of Gravano through an informal introduction made by N31 in 1978. N31's place within Gravano's working network is only justified by this one crucial introduction.

The remaining contacts in Figure 5.1 represent those contacts made by Gravano himself (or for whom I was not able to account for the actual contact provider) or individuals who proved useful for certain events/transitions but remained minor figures throughout the ensemble of his career. For example, the main channel in Gravano's personal working network (N23-N34) was triggered by his contact with N15 - a minor figure in his career, but key during that particular period (1969) in making Gravano aware of an opportunity to participate in a Brooklyn after-hours club venture. This connection led to an immediate link with N16 who would later connect Gravano to likely the most important figure and mentor throughout his career - N23. N23 would later connect Gravano to N34 who would provide him access to the elite within the Cosa Nostra.

A secondary network channel triggered by an early relation with another eventual Gambino strongman, N19, led to the subsequent connection to N50 which would create an alternative and supplement channel to by-pass and overcome a break-up in the major N23-N34 vein. Notice that no significant contacts were documented as entering Gravano's personal working network after 1986.

Overall, contact allotment in Gravano's career is concentrated amongst 4 key contacts who combined to contribute 52 percent of his working network (5 contacts or 7,5% from N9; 10 or 14,9% from N23; 11 or 16,4% from N34; and 9 or 13,3% from N50). Each of these 4 contacts marked pivotal transitions in Gravano's career. N9 brought Gravano out of the street gang and into the Cosa Nostra; N23 was Gravano's maker in the Gambino family; N34 was his link to the family elite and the construction industry; and N50 was the connection that allowed Gravano to independently transcend beyond that formerly made available by the gatekeeper N34.

Network Dynamics and Event/Phase Associations

All contacts in Figure 5.1 were traced for their years of entrance and exit in Gravano's network. This established the cumulative working network (see Figure 5.2). Entering contacts are added to the sum of contacts already in place for the previous year, while exiting contacts are subtracted from that annual total. For example, Gravano began with 6 contacts in 1965, added another contact (1 in, 0 out) in 1966, remained stable at 7 contacts for 1967, and increased to 9 (6 in, 4 out) in 1968. The cumulative distribution collapses in 1990-1991 after Gravano was arrested by the FBI and subsequently defected from the Cosa Nostra to become a government informant.

Figure 5.2:
Gravano's Career Representation



Four separate event/activity axes detailing Gravano's career were superimposed over the cumulative working network in Figure 5.2. Each axis details: (1) Gravano's promotions within the Cosa Nostra; (2) his street crime activities; (3) his experiences with law-enforcement and other external pressures (courts, correctional facilities, and tax collectors); and (4) his (quasi-legitimate or racketeering) activities in legitimate business.

The ensemble of the cumulative working network and the superimposed event/activity axes in Figure 5.2 provides a representation of Gravano's career as an organizationally-bounded criminal entrepreneur. It also allows us to converge on associations between network dynamics and actual experiences throughout this career. The following section presents the links between key relational qualities and event/activities across various phases (onset, early building, advanced building, attainment) in Gravano's career.

Pre-Cosa Nostra Experiences

From as early as 1958 (when he was 13 years of age), Gravano was connected to one of the many juvenile street gangs (the Rampers) active in the Bensonhurst district of Brooklyn. Fighting, robbing, and stealing are described as the main activities during his years with the Rampers. Gravano dropped out of school at age sixteen[44] after which he became fully entrenched within the same criminal activities that he had been already implicated in until this point. This phase lasted until he was drafted to the army in 1964. For the next two years, Gravano fulfilled his draft duties while finding time to experience his first gambling and loan-sharking operations within the confines of his military training. In 1966, he was honourably discharged from the army and returned to Bensonhurst where he reconnected with the Rampers and their expanding activities. By 1968 (when Gravano was 23), the limits of street-gang affiliation become increasingly apparent and newer opportunities were sought.

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44. He was in the 8th grade at the time and had problems reportedly linked to dyslexia throughout his schooling.

Early Building Phase (Apprenticeship)

The building phase in Gravano's career as a criminal entrepreneur began with his entrance into Cosa Nostra working circles. This transition took place through one of his fellow Ramper members (N8 in Figure 5.1) who connected him to his uncle (N9) who was affiliated to one of the five established Cosa Nostra unities in New York City (the Colombo family). Gravano recalled this recruitment as follows: *"His* [N9's] *message wasn't anything I hadn't heard before. Eventually, I'd have to hook up with the right people. But the way he put it was different. 'I've had my eye on you,' he says. 'Why not come with me? You're a tough guy, but you can't keep doing things your own way. You can't live your whole life on your own. Sooner or later, you're going to get in real trouble or get killed. I'll give you a different relationship, where you can be somebody"* (Maas 1997: p.35)[45]. During these early years as a Colombo and later Gambino associate, Gravano continued to be primarily active in street crimes (robbery, burglary, auto-theft, fencing). In addition, Figure 5.2 points out that he also became an active street-level loanshark[46] soon after he associated himself with the Colombo family (see Axis 2).

Axis 3 in Figure 5.2 shows us that Gravano had been successful during his street gang years in having potential felonies plea-bargained down to misdemeanors - *"I don't mind taking a plea, because misdemeanors really don't count. It's felonies that screw up your life"* (Maas 1997: 23). Connecting with the Cosa Nostra unity allowed him to be more proactive in his earning activities and also more suitably reactive or resistant to forces looking to deter one from conducting such business. His affiliation with the Colombo family offered the added resource of extended connections that more likely allowed the judicial process to be avoided altogether. In two robbery incidents, Gravano was arrested and faced witness-backed prosecutions. In both cases, witnesses were dealt with

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45. Excerpts extracted from Maas's (1997) biography of Gravano appear in *italics* throughout this chapter.
46. Gravano made a distinction between street-level loansharking (lending *"ninety-six for a hundred-twenty for twelve weeks ... to the bottom of the barrel"* Mass 1997: p.41) and the upgraded 'shylock's shylock' that he would become by the early eighties.

through the Colombo family's extended connections. For the first robbery, Gravano explained: *"it turns out the guy, the owner of the store, is a friend of a made guy in Sam the Plumber's family – the DeCalvacante family – over in Jersey. Shorty* [N9], *whoever, gets in touch with him and he talks to the owner. It was all set up the next time I was in court. The owner walks in and goes in front of the judge and says, 'Your Honor, I picked the defendant out from this picture, but now that I see him in person, that's not him.' And the case is thrown out"* (Maas 1997: p.36). For the second robbery accusation, Gravano provided the following account: *"Sure enough, we find out one of the guards made me. And the cops are looking to arrest me. But guess what? The guard knows Carmine Persico's* [N13] *cousin and is a little crooked himself. The guard reaches out and says for ten thousand he ain't going to see nothing. He won't testify"* (Maas 1997: p.38).

Gravano's promotional axis (Axis 1) in Figure 5.2 indicates that his first contractual assignments were also conducted during his Colombo association. It has been found that one way for legitimate organizational members to increase their potential for promotion is to take part in high-profile assignments (Burt 1992: p.127). The contract beating and murder are such assignments in Cosa Nostra-like unities. For the former, Gravano was assigned to beat up and return with the ear of a man who had been in conflict with N13's brother. Gravano executed the orders and reported back to N13 without the man's ear, but with news that he had succeeded in completely knocking off his little finger with a blackjack. The well-ranked N13 proved satisfied with Gravano's accomplishment - *"Carmine* [N13] *did find out that the finger was gone. He and Shorty* [N9] *thought it was the greatest thing in the world. Carmine must have told Joe Colombo* [N14] *because after that, instead of me waiting for the right moment to say hello to him, he would come over with a big smile and say, 'Hey, Sammy, how you doing?'"* (Maas 1997: p.46).

The change in his organizational profile after his first contract murder in 1970 was similarly well praised - *"I would say that this was my stepping-stone in the mob. I mean, after the hit. (...) Rumor had it that we – Shorty's crew – had done work and that Sammy the Bull was the workhorse in the crew. So I wasn't*

waiting on lines no more. I wasn't just another tough guy on the street. I was getting a different kind of respect and so on and so forth. The word was that I ranked high with Carmine Persico [N13] *and they had the intention someday after the books were open that Sammy was going to be made"* (Maas 1997: p.53).

Connecting with the Colombo family also gave Gravano his initial opportunities to start his own (quasi-)legitimate businesses (see Axis 4 in Figure 5.2) and decrease his higher-risk street-crime activities - *"Even if they're not stone legitimate businesses, they're real on a business level"* (Maas 1997: p.39). One of these business ventures led to the conflict that had him transferred to the Gambino family in 1972.

Between his association with the Gambino family in 1972 and his official entrance in 1977, Gravano remained under the strict tutelage of N23 - *"Toddo* [N23] *was an honest man within the life. It may be hard to understand that. He was a gangster and a crook, but to us he had honor. You hear the expression about honor among thieves. Well, some thieves do have honor among other thieves. A good part of them don't, but some do"* (Maas 1997: p.69). Under N23's supervision, Gravano's network increased slightly during the first years (from 12 contacts in 1971 to 18 in 1974). This gradual rise may be accounted for by the fellow crew members allocated and supervised by N23.

A drop, however, takes place in his criminal working network at the moment that he decided to retire from crime (see Axis 2 in Figure 5.2) for the first and only time in his career. Gravano, until that point, had remained largely active in the same street crimes and low-level loansharking activities. He had also continued to venture in various after-hour and gambling clubs (Axis 4). Little progress was made in regard to his criminal earnings. In 1974, he worked at two consecutive legitimate jobs, obtained through family contacts, as a construction labourer. While he remained in contact with N23, Gravano relied on legitimate work in his earning activities for about one year - *"After about eight months, Mike* [his construction boss) *raised me to two fifty a week, a seventy-five-dollar raise. I'm looking ahead to a real good future, maybe going into construction on my own"* (Maas 1997: p.75).

This legitimate phase in Gravano's career came to an end with his arrest and indictment on a double-murder charge (along with N18 in Figure 5.1) in late 1974. While out on bail for these murder charges and faced with heavy legal fees and debts to N23 (and others within the Gambino family), Gravano quit his legitimate construction job and embarked in an approximate year-and-a-half robbery and stealing spree with N18 – *"I had to go back to Brooklyn. (...) [T]here's no way I could work for two fifty with the expenses I got now (...). To pay the lawyer, to pay back Toddo* [N23] *– that ten thousand sounds like nothing now, but it was a lot then – I'm out every single night, seven days a week, robbing and stealing with Alley Boy* [N18]" (Maas 1997: p.78). The combination of his decision to go straight, the subsequent murder charges that brought him back into crime, and the intensively high-risk street-crime spree accounts for the slight drop in his cumulative working network between 1974 and 1976 (from 18 to 14 contacts). During this particular period, Gravano also faced three other criminal charges of which two were successfully plea-bargained to misdemeanors and one was successfully appealed (see Axis 3 between 1974 and 1976). In addition to the street-crime spree, he also operated a convenient store and luncheonette with N18 in order to supplement his earnings and pay back his growing debts extending from his judicial situation.

Figure 5.2 (Axis 3) shows that this double-murder charge was finally dropped in 1976, but Gravano maintains that this event sealed his working affiliation to crime and the Cosa Nostra - *"That pinch changed my whole life. I never, ever stopped a second from there on in. I was like a madman. Never stopped stealing. Never stopped robbing. I was obsessed. I had been looking to pull away, going out to Long Island with my wife, raising a family, going to work and maybe going into my own business as soon as I got on my feet a little bit. Maybe it wasn't meant to be. But that Dunn brothers thing* [the double-murder charge] *glued me to the mob, that's for shit sure. And then Toddo Aurello* [N23] *proposed me to be made in the Gambino family. So that was it"* (Maas 1997: p.80).

Advanced Building Phase (Being Made)

The key transition of being made (becoming an official member of or accepted insider in the family) in 1977 (see Axis 1 in Figure 5.2) is marked by the sharp rise in his cumulative network in 1977 (from 14 in 1976 to 30 in 1977). While Gravano had been able to access various Cosa Nostra resources as an associate, the magnitude of these resources was largely limited to that which was made available through his supervisor, N23. As a soldier in the family, Gravano was able to work and expand beyond N23's personal resources. He was now inside the organization and in a position to explore a wide array of business opportunities that branched out beyond that organization.

Gravano was no longer only a 'friend' of N23's but a 'friend' of all other officially made members. This was in part due to the immediate reputation that came with becoming an official member, but this reputation is in itself an offspring of an individual's status within the communication grapevine diffusing information regarding him before he becomes made. This reputation is personally established and heightened within the organization and its extensions through a wider diffusion process. This diffusion is enhanced through those direct contacts that transmit information about oneself to their own direct contacts. The more contacts one has, the more expansive this diffusion process may be. Furthermore, the more one's contacts are entrenched within key discussion groups – makers and shakers, so to speak – the more one is able to gain direct access to such critical others in a career. Being formally made brought Gravano inside the Gambino family and the Cosa Nostra. The size of his network and the quality of his newly made direct contacts led to his activities and ventures changing and expanding in accordance.

Soon after Gravano was made, his street-crime activities faded away (see Axis 2). Aside from a few robbery incidents in 1977, loansharking was the only activity that continued from his pre-soldier period. No other street-crimes were documented in his biography after 1977. Similarly, no confrontations with law-enforcement agents were found for several years after he was made (Axis 3). Instead, a considerable increase was observed in his legitimate or racketeering

ventures (Axis 4). Gravano began his first construction company in 1977 (Ace Partitions), opened two after-hour clubs (Bus Stop and 20/20) around the same period, and established his personal Bensonhurst headquarters (Tali's Bar) around 1978. Aside from another venture with a Brooklyn discotheque (Plaza Suite) in 1979, all other businesses appearing along Axis 4 were oriented towards the construction industry.

How was his entrance and increasing involvement in New York City's construction industry linked to his rise in the Cosa Nostra? First, one must accentuate the role of the family unit in providing the made member with improved opportunities to accumulate various forms of capital. Becoming a soldier meant that Gravano was allowed to set up his own personal links with associates looking to get into or improve their own status with Cosa Nostra members. Such associates had their own (legitimate or criminal) businesses and activities in operation and, as Gravano had done and continued to do with his own sponsor, N23, were required to mete out portions of their earnings to their supervisors. This upward allocation of earnings allows higher ranked members to supplement their personal revenues from their own ventures with those portions or cuts contributed by their underlings. This supplement, which varies in accordance with the financial achievements of the ensemble of contributing underlings, allows accumulation of financial capital to increase as rank within the family increases. The higher one is in this vertical distribution process, the more likely one is to have a receiving hand in a wider array of profits from other members and associates[47]. For Gravano, the promotion to soldier allowed him to supplement his personal earnings (profits from clubs and loansharking) with those of his new associates. His expanding social capital allowed him to accumulate enough financial capital to begin his own construction company.

In starting his first construction company (plumbing and drywall) with his brother-in-law (N33), he attracted the interests of the Gambino family boss, N34.

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47. This financial allocation process is more akin to particular 'corporations', such as Amway (see Chapter 7 in Butterfield 1986), than it is to any military-like order. However, and as Butterfield makes mention of: "As in the military, one becomes a leader only by first becoming a follower. I learn to command by learning to obey" (1986: p.75).

This established the second relational quality of Gravano's emergence in New York City's construction industry. With N34's support, Gravano came to realize the utility of such contacts within legitimate industries. He recalled N34 assuring him as follows: *"You need entree into the unions, the contractors, anybody, you let me know. We know them all. I'll help you"*. Gravano added: *"And he* [N34] *did. The better I did, the better it is for the borgata, the family"* (Maas 1997: p.106).

It was through N34 and around this period that Gravano began the final segment of the building phase in his career. The cumulative working network in Figure 5.2 increases to a peak of 35 contacts in 1983. From the time following Gravano's official entrance into the Gambino family in 1977 and his full-time emergence in the construction industry in 1983, 9 construction-based contacts were added to his network (N43, N44, N49, N55-N60). Six of the 9 contacts were allocated by N34. In addition to these contacts, Gravano also established dealing relations (once again, through N34) with at least 3 other Gambino family members who were also active in various sectors of the construction industry (N38, N39, and N52). The increasing concentration of his earning activities in construction is especially revealed between 1981 and 1983 in that 7 of all 9 contacts entering his network were amongst these construction-based contacts.

In a time span of approximately 6 years, Gravano expanded his businesses into various areas of any given industrial construction project – plumbing, drywall, carpet and hardwood floor installations, painting, steel erection, and concrete pouring. His edge in these sectors of the construction industry was indeed due to his new contacts. Gravano explains the advantages and basic strategy behind this Cosa Nostra link in the following excerpt: *"Let's say we're dealing with a Donald Trump, not really Donald Trump but somebody like him.* (...) *I'm going to bid on the drywall work on this project and Mr. Trump says no, he's dealing with his own people. He's a hundred percent union. So a guy from* [Teamster's Local] *282 goes over and whispers in his ear, or his general contractor's ear, that it would be very advantageous to him to hire this certain drywall company. He still don't want to do it. OK. Fine. I get my lazy-ass nephew, who never worked a full day in his life, that I've made a teamster foreman, and I tell him he's going to be doing a full*

eight-hour day on the job. He's going to stay at that gate. I say, 'Every truck that comes in, you're gonna check if it's a union company number. Number two, you ask the driver to let you see his union book. You walk over to the shanty. You call up. Is his union dues up to date? OK, they are. The guy is straight as an arrow. Now you come out and check his tires, the brake lights, the this, the that. And you're gonna do this like a snail and by the book.' So what happens is this huge construction project has forty or fifty trucks lined up waiting to get in, with my nephew, the snail, at the gate. Now Mr. Trump catches the drift real quick. He calls up John Cody [N44], *or later, Bobby Sasso* [N55], *and he says, 'What are you doing? (...) He's killing me. The job, instead of being a year or two, it'll be five years. I'll never get done. I borrowed big money. I'll lose my shirt.' (...) Bobby says, 'Listen, I know you got this other project ready to go and I'm sure there's a drywall contract there. Maybe this time you'll take my advice and give it to the company I recommended for this one.' (...) Boom! Now I tell my nephew, 'All right, just show up for two or three hours and go home. And stop breaking balls.' (...) Mr. Trump, whatever, can call the feds, they'll find the kid at the gate who's just doing his job. What could Mr. Trump say? I didn't threaten him. I didn't beat him up. I never even met him. So now he's boxed in [and] he goes along with the program"* (Maas: pp.117-118). This strategic play around legitimate organizational fiat gives Cosa Nostra members the opportunity to enter into the business ventures of legitimate entrepreneurs. They do not necessarily force their way into legitimate business through criminal means; they adapt to the legitimate business context and its rules and play within the boundaries of this system by exploiting its many fallacies.

While the place of the Cosa Nostra in Gravano's success cannot be overlooked, it is important to emphasize Gravano's personal capacities as well. The Cosa Nostra offers the potential for its members to access better opportunities and therefore to advance their own careers, but this is not given for all its members nor is it accurately applicable as a typified personification of the Cosa Nostra as a whole. Gravano successfully established himself in the construction industry because he successfully accessed the rich resources through N34's and not

necessarily the Gambino family's network - *"The more I was in construction, the more Paul* [N34] *got interested in me. He was helping me. He was watching to see what kind of a guy I really was business-wise. I guess he liked what he saw because he started calling me in more and more"* (Maas 1997: p.115). Not all members could be expected to have or desire such access to opportunities for advancement. That Gravano did and that he subsequently expanded such relationally-based opportunities is indicated by the drop that follows his network peak between 1983 and 1985.

Career Attainment and Elite Membership

By 1985, Gravano was well positioned in a growing number of sectors in New York City's construction industry. Through N34, he had attained working relations with the consecutive presidents of Teamster Local 282 (N44 and later N55), the Gambino representative to this local (N39), the president for the Local District Council of the Cement and Concrete Workers Union (N58), as well as various subcontractors. A blend of costly labour tactics, contract arrangements, price-fixing, kickbacks, and good quality work allowed Gravano to substantially increase his personal earnings and enhance his name in this legitimate trade.

Although minimal information was available to establish accurate estimates of his revenue throughout the period spanning his transition from street criminal to construction racketeer, some of his personal investments offered indications pointing to an increase in wealth. Aside from the ever expansive investments in a wide array of construction companies (Axis 4 in Figure 5.2), Gravano also bought a Brooklyn discotheque (Plaza Suite) in 1979 which he later sold in 1982 for the round sum of one million dollars. He was subsequently indicted by the IRS in 1985 (see Axis 3) for reportedly evading $300 000 in taxes from that sale. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, these IRS charges were dropped that same year. Gravano also purchased, at some point during the early eighties, a New Jersey 30-acre ranch. The monetary amounts associated with these two investments and his continual expansion in the construction industry, although not providing exact figures on his earnings, do constitute the basis of an increasingly lucrative career

in progress.

These indications accompany the peak and drop in the size of his working network to maintain Gravano's attainment of success as a criminal entrepreneur. His financial capital had reached a point to which he was able to cease searching for new contacts, thrive off his rich personal network that was in already in place, and reduce the overall number of contacts that made up his working network. He also upgraded his criminal loansharking to that of a shylock's shylock status (see Axis 2). By the mid-eighties, his wealth was consistently on the rise and his business activities were progressively expanding. Within the Gambino family, however, he remained a soldier and had not had a promotion in rank since officially entering the family unit in 1977. One key event, his direct participation in the assassination of the family boss (N34), would subsequently open further promotional opportunities for Gravano.

The 'taking out' of N34 from his and other Gambino family members' working networks permitted the removal of a once necessary opportunity provider who had become, for Gravano and likely for others in the family, an obstacle to further career progression. Immediately after N34 was murdered by a small clique assembled amongst his own underlings, Gravano obtained a promotion to capo under the new Gambino boss, John Gotti (N50). Gravano and N50 had been acquainted since 1978, but their relationship really tightened throughout the first half of the eighties. The preparations surrounding the assassination of N34 served as the main transition bringing them together on a more consistent basis. This transition offered Gravano an alternative opportunity outlook for the future - one that went beyond the opportunities that were accessed through and with N34's consent. This transition also spelled his complete entrance into the elite core of the Gambino family.

The network closure trend found in the cumulative working network in Figure 5.2 began around the same period that Gravano was promoted to capo. The drop took place between 1985 and 1986 (a drop from 35 to 29 contacts) and pursued consistently until 1990 (24 contacts in 1987, 23 in 1988, 19 in 1989, and 17 in 1990), the year that Gravano fell to the FBI task force that had been

investigating and intensively monitoring him and several other Gambino family members. Figure 5.2 shows that Gravano was first detected in the FBI surveillance net in 1985 and became a direct target in 1986 (see Axis 3). The career representation also shows that he had not been arrested since the period preceding his official entrance as a soldier in the Gambino family.

Closing one's network is a privilege and allows the criminal entrepreneur to remain selective in choosing opportunities. As a Gambino captain, Gravano was in the most suitably entrepreneurial position of his career. At this rank, he was able to broker between at least three separate clusters of contacts: (1) his personal crew of soldiers; (2) the family administration; and (3) various legitimate partners with whom he was increasingly involved. His focus on the construction industry was further enhanced after he took on the crucial role of Gambino link to the Teamsters Local 282 in 1986 (see Axis 1) which gave him quasi-exclusive control of family members' interests in that industry - *"I had control of the whole thing. The president, who was Bobby Sasso* [N55], *the vice-president, the secretary/treasurer, delegates, foremen.* (...) *I said to report directly to me if he* [N55] *heard anything. From here on in he was to answer to me on the construction jobs. He wasn't to meet with anybody from any other family unless it was strictly union business. Anything else, any schemes they had, was to go through me or John Gotti* [N50]*"* (Maas 1997: p.220). Later Gravano further clarified his exclusive control of the family's construction interests in that *"John* [N50] *didn't know anything about construction"* (Maas 1997: p.230).

As a capo, Gravano's personal network was therefore spanning three fundamental holes (between his crew, the family administration, and the construction industry). The attainment of such a position allowed Gravano to reduce the number of new contacts entering his network. This is the privilege of well-positioned participants in an organized crime process. Their ability to restrict the number of contacts that must be dealt with for their personal illegal operations allows them to remain increasingly insulated from prosecution. While their reputation and status increases amongst both criminal participants and law-enforcement targeters alike, their distance from the riskier segments of action in

any venture permit them to remain in the shadows of effective prosecution while possibly remaining at the center of systematic forms of surveillance. Such shadow or brokering players constitute the highly suspected, yet difficult to catch players. These players have a hand, yet not necessarily control, in a wide array of illegal operations, but are not directly implicated in the most visible and detectable segments of these activities. Gravano's control in the family, for example, was fully oriented towards legitimate operations.

The paradox that extends from this position, as illustrated in Figure 5.2 (Axis 3), results in the criminal entrepreneur facing an increased possibility of being the target of surveillance but a decreased likelihood of arrest and subsequent prosecution. The cliché 'you ain't got nothing on me' appropriately grasps the privilege and confidence that some organized crime participants are able to attain through such relational structuring of their business operations. That the cumulative network drop pursues throughout the following years and in accordance with his later two promotions into the family's administration (to consigliere in 1988 and underboss in 1989) illustrates the continuous exclusiveness of Gravano's working network and business opportunities embedded therein.

Promotional advancement within the Gambino family allowed Gravano to modify his earnings activities throughout his career. Such modifications extending from organizational promotions resulted in Gravano's decreasing involvement in street crimes, increasing involvement in racketeering in legitimate business, decreasing arrests, and increasing surveillance. Figure 5.2 also allows an initial demonstration of how such promotional transitions coincide with fluctuations in an in-and-out cumulative count of Gravano's core working network throughout his career.

This network explanation of organizational promotion has been more fully developed, albeit in fully legitimate contexts, in Burt's (1992) structural hole theory of entrepreneurial competition. Applying this theory and its operations to Gravano's own career will allow us to further investigate the inner mechanisms that account for the promotion-network relation that has been found to be so

crucial to success, resistance, adaptability (flexibility), and persistence in such criminal forms of enterprise.

Network Properties and Organized Criminal Entrepreneurial Careers

Criminal professions (in comparison to legitimate professions) call for participants to be able to adapt to high constrained contingencies. This is especially applicable to organized criminal enterprise (orthodox organized crime) contexts. The setting requires the establishment of a continuous working or co-offending process. Attaining a privileged position demands that some entrepreneurs distinguish themselves from their co-participants and competitors. While not all organizationally-bounded criminal entrepreneurs may follow the same processes that Gravano went through during his career, it remains clear that the model grasping this particular trajectory in the Cosa Nostra remains crucial to understanding high levels of achievement in organized crime and other long-term criminal processes.

Promotion and Achievement

Success in a Cosa Nostra family is indicated by one's capacity to climb the promotional ranks within the unit. Understanding the likelihood of ascending within the family allows us to understand the task facing the criminal participant. In a span of approximately 13 years beginning with his official entrance into the family (in 1977), Gravano attained the underboss position (second in command) within the Gambino family. Such advancement, as in legitimate contexts, is not given. Reports on the structure of a typical Cosa Nostra family unit have remained consistent since Valachi's initial 1963 testimony (Maas 1968). Gravano's biography provides further confirmation for the inner ranks maintained in both North American and Sicilian Mafia/Cosa Nostra contexts by Cressey (1969), Albini (1971), Anderson (1979), Abadinsky (1983), and Arlacchi (1994 and 1992).

Aside from the three individually-occupied ranks at its administrative core (boss, underboss, and consigliere), Gravano identified 22 captains in the Gambino

family[48]. A New York State Organized Crime Task Force revealed a similar estimate of 23 Gambino captains in a 1986 report (see Davis 1993: p.291). Davis (1993) estimated each of the Gambino captain's crews to contain between 20-25 soldiers. While Davis's law-enforcement-based estimate may be accurate, the information provided by Gravano (in Maas 1997) revealed a much lower count in regard to crew membership. Gravano never seemed to be a part of or responsible for a crew that comprised more than 10 soldiers. This analysis will therefore opt for this latter, more conservative estimate of 10 soldiers over the Davis (1993) count of 20. The actual number of associates remains somewhat difficult to estimate as Davis's (1993) rough guess of 'several thousand' would appear to tell us (p.291). Other estimates ranged from 4 to 10 associates for each soldier (Jacobs 1999). Because of such discrepancies, only official ranks (soldier to boss) will be retained for the immediate demonstration.

With only a maximum of four conceivable official ranks (soldier, captain, secondary administration, and boss), opportunities for promotion in the Cosa Nostra's Gambino family appear extremely limited. Other roles are available for seizing within the organization (i.e. union local representative, coordinator for a specific illegal activity, etc.)[49], but remain secondary to the made ranks. Using the lower-count estimates provided by Gravano, the Gambino family consisted of approximately 220 (10 x 22) soldiers[50], 22 captains, 2 secondary administrators, and 1 boss.

Holding all other differential factors constant, the probability of advancement remain relatively slim for any given official member. Each soldier

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48. This information was obtained from FBI debriefings available at the Smoking Gun website (November 15, 1991): 'www.thesmokinggun.com/gravano/gravano19b.html'.
49. Little indication was made available by Gravano in regard to the presence of official corrupter and enforcer roles as identified by Cressey (1969). It seemed that the need for corruption was more specific to separate activities. In regard to killing or applying violence for the family, observations made on those events detailed by Gravano point out that while some members are consistently involved in the act of regulating within the organization, the actual shooter, orchestrator, and back-up members of a hit tend to vary. Everyone was expected to kill for the family (that was part of the membership oath), but no one was exclusively assigned this role. Gravano's explanation, however, does indicate that while the role was not assigned to any one member, contract killing was generally a group assignment and taken care of by various crews.
50. Using Davis's (1993) higher count, the number of soldiers would increase to 440 (20x22).

has a 1 in 10 chance of being promoted to captain[51]. Each captain faces a 9% (2/22) chance of becoming either a consigliere or underboss. The long-term odds for any given soldier to enter this secondary administrative core[52] throughout his career are therefore approximately 1 in 100 (0,9% = 2/220 or 0,09 x 0,1)[53]. These are the odds that Gravano beat. That he beat them constitutes his status as a successful organizationally-affiliated criminal entrepreneur. How he beat them is our concern here.

Movements in the Organizational Organized Crime Career

The *early building* phase marked Gravano's years as a Colombo and Gambino associate. A more *advanced building* phase which had Gravano progressing towards more prosperous and secure activities was displayed following his official attachment as a soldier in the Gambino family. After a lengthy period as a soldier, Gravano was promoted to crew capo. This established the *attainment* phase of his career that would be further privileged by subsequent promotions into and within the family administration as consigliere and underboss. These three phases highlight the movements that Gravano went through during his criminal entrepreneurial career.

As already demonstrated, these three general movements coincide with overall network transitions throughout his career. The following analysis will demonstrate, more specifically, how these movements are structured by constraint and hierarchical-constraint variations within the evolution of his overall networking.

Figure 5.3 reveals the cyclical progression of Gravano's career and provides further relational substance to the idea that rank, promotion, or organization are plausible components to some forms of crime. Both network constraints (upper sequence) and hierarchical-constraints (lower sequence) are plotted across

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51. Note, however, that the turnover - ins and outs - of individual crew membership is not accounted for here.
52. I assume that each soldier must first become a captain in order to have a chance to enter the administrative core.
53. Using Davis's (1993) estimates, each soldier would have a 0,45% (2/440) chance of making it to the administration.

promotional phases. Throughout the first two promotions (Colombo and Gambino associate), Gravano was at his most relationally constrained (C=0,4 for both periods). He was also weakly positioned as an outsider (unofficial member) to each of the affiliated families, hence leaving him in an unlikely standing to seize the strategic sponsoring of a high-ranked and entrepreneurially-bent official member beyond the opportunity scope offered by his own supervisor (hierarchical constraints for Colombo and Gambino associate periods are, respectively, 0,12 and 0,15).

Figure 5.3:
Gravano's Network Constraints and Hierarchical-Constraints Across Promotions



Once Gravano was made as a soldier in the family and gained official access to established others, constraints decreased by 18% (to 0,33) while hierarchical-constraints increased by 27% (to 0,19). Soldiers, as official members, have access to more resources and therefore somewhat more network range and freedom than the fully outside associates. One of these useful resources available to the soldier and not to the associate is access to higher-ranked members within the family. While both associates and soldiers work under supervisors, the former are typically limited to such relations while the latter, if willing, have the added

advantage of making links with interesting and interested established others. An associate with the potential to be made (to become a soldier) is generally sponsored by his supervisor (as N23 did for Gravano). If the sponsor succeeds in convincing higher-ranked members of the family to officialize the associate's link to that of soldier, the newly-made member gains a position which allows him increasing opportunities to move beyond that offered by the supervisor himself.

Although remaining constrained, the soldier is able to invest more strategically in high-ranked members aside from his supervisor. Gravano, as a soldier, gradually detached himself from the clique-like crew working relationships he had held until then and began to explore newer opportunities in the construction industry through the more opportune personal networks of established others. This tells us that as a soldier, he was more efficient in investing his inevitable constraints so as to increase his own legitimacy within the family and subsequently branch out in extended social frontiers. The construction industry would be that extended frontier. Fitting into the prosperous personal networks of others while increasingly expanding his own independent venturing increased the scope and variety of relationally-based opportunities. As pointed out in previous sections throughout this chapter, Gravano's venturing in the construction industry caught the interests of the family boss, N34. While he was still under the supervision of N23, Gravano was informed that for matters concerning construction projects, he was to deal directly with the boss. The 'by-passing of his maker (N23)' allowed Gravano to extend beyond the resources directly available through N23 and toward the richer resources that could be accessed through N34's sponsoring.

Figure 5.3 shows that once Gravano ascended to the capo rank, personal network constraints dropped by 45% (to 0,18) and hierarchical-constraints decreased even more sharply (by 63%, to 0,07). The considerable decrease in constraints indicates the increasingly non-redundant brokerage-like quality and greater network freedom that Gravano obtained in his activities. The drop in the hierarchical-constraints accentuates the fact that he was no longer in a position that required him to depend on a strategic partner for his own advancement. In many

ways, Gravano had ascended to a position that made him a likely and attractive sponsor for others seeking the benefits extending from hierarchical-constraints. Gravano had become minimally constrained and therefore entrepreneurially fit. As a fully legitimate member of the Gambino family, he was now in a position to build his own social capital and no longer strategically dependent on less constrained, better positioned members of the family. As a capo, he was at his most entrepreneurial period in his career. Recall also that it was during this transition that Gravano's cumulative working network in Figure 5.2 began to close towards greater exclusivity.

While very slight increases in both constraint and hierarchical-constraint measures were found upon his entrance into the more centralized and closed family administration as a consigliere (C=0,22 and H=0,09), Gravano's continuing expansive movement into the construction industry as well as his ability to sustain working relations with his former crew and a wide array of other lower-ranked members kept him brokering in personal network terms. Although the acceptance of such an administrative role did result in a very minimal decrease in his entrepreneurial capacities, it also supplemented his already privileged business and working setting with additional resources - namely, decision-making power.

The ensemble of these findings representing Gravano's personal network capacities from his promotion to capo to his December 1990 arrest (at which point he held the underboss rank) illustrate the privileged relational positioning that is associated with successful careers in criminal forms of enterprise. Decreasing constraints reveals increasing and less time consuming opportunities (increased access to structural holes), increasing autonomy in business ventures, increased attraction from others also looking to get ahead, and a capacity to pursue one's activities within a more insulated, exclusive, and restrictive working network. High in opportunity and low in risk: this is the optimal working setting that privileged criminal entrepreneurs access after years of relational maneuvering.

CHAPTER 6:

PRIVILEGED POSITIONING AND ACCESS TO ELITE RESOURCES OF LETHAL VIOLENCE

One of the principal distinctions between Marks's independent career in the international cannabis trade and Gravano's career as a Cosa Nostra affiliated construction racketeer was the absence of violence in the former and its substantial presence in the latter. The previous two chapters have demonstrated that both criminal entrepreneurs shared common relational qualities that allowed them to advance within their respective earning activities. This chapter will converge on the presence of violence, and more particularly lethal forms of violence, throughout Gravano's career.

The role of homicide or lethal violence in Gravano's career within the ranks of the Cosa Nostra takes on the elite quality that emerged from Cooney's (1997) study of homicide in modern and premodern eras. Cooney argues that while lethal violence has been typically found to be associated to lower-status people in modern periods, it was more equally distributed throughout the social hierarchy in past 'stateless' or minimally governed societies. Following Black's theory of social control in contexts of virtual statelessness or anarchy (1983 and 1976), Cooney maintained that in social contexts defined by minimal and unequally distributed state control and lack of third party dispute settlers (see also Cusson 1999), high status or elite members[54] from the past, were able to emerge above the law, while low status members of present day are faced with a similar situation of having to settle their own disputes because law is effectively unavailable.

The unavailability of law may be taken as a constant in any organized crime process. This establishes the stateless or ultra-liberal nature of such business-oriented activity. Committed participants in an organized crime process are at once capitalistic in their goals and lawless (anarchic) in their relation to conventional forms of authority and order. Lethal violence in organized crime arises from competition that remains unregulated. As long as competition defines the pursuit, some form of control is deemed necessary. Statelessness is therefore a problem within environments where competitive pursuits are encouraged. In arenas where competition is promoted and left unregulated, control is restricted to the discretion

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54. Cooney defines the elite as «individuals who have more wealth or influence than others» (1997: p.389).

of those who succeed in remaining in the interests of most or all others. The regulation of competition, in this sense, becomes a resource defined by a parallel power struggle taking place within the sphere of working relations. Those who control the interests of others or who have exclusive access to resources sought after by others prevail as the competitively advantaged. Arriving at such a privileged position, as the relational analysis of Gravano's career tells us, is not a matter of the entrepreneur's ability to kill. Instead, homicide in the Cosa Nostra remains consistent with the observation that "socially prominent people in stateless societies were more assertive than most in using lethal violence to avenge insults, injuries, and killings" (Cooney 1997: p.389). The use of lethal violence for personal purposes in criminal or stateless forms of enterprise must be understood as a privilege - a manifestation of power within a defined relational setting that embeds an activity.

The Pseudo-Hierarchy

To understand the use and role of lethal violence in Cosa-Nostra-like working settings, one must first understand the setting itself. The working environment defining a family unit is structured along three vertical allocation systems - one representing the upward flow of profits, a second representing a downward flow of sought-after resources, and a third representing the downward flow of authority and regulation. Of the three, the third is of most interest for the present discussion. The first two have been the underlying subjects of the greater portion of previous analyses in this case study of Gravano's career and are the key structures upheld within the patron-client perspective in organized crime research (Albini 1971).

To understand the authoritative or 'governing' allocation system, however, one must also understand the economic structure emerging from the exchange of profits for resources. Anderson has maintained that observers should be careful not to confuse the economic and quasi-governance structures inherent in the Cosa Nostra family (1995: p.40). A closer analysis of these parallel vertical flows, however, accentuates the fact that the two (economic) allocation structures often

displace the third (authority or governance). Although economic and governance allocation processes are not alike, they remain interrelated.

Such a working environment is established within a vertical, interest-based (Lupsha 1981), and situational sanctioning system defined by elite members therein. As already put forward, the setting is represented by an ultra-liberal state of business activities. The bureaucratic and rigid hierarchical image that emerged from 'orthodox' conceptualizations of organized crime (Cressey 1969) does not emerge from Gravano's experience. Post-Cressey studies of the Cosa Nostra (North American and Sicilian) have dismissed past forms of formal organization (Albini 1971; Ianni 1972; Arlacchi 1983; Abadinsky 1983), but have continued to stress the unchallenged authoritarianism practiced by the head or boss of a Cosa Nostra family unit (Jacobs and Gouldin 1999). The family is perceived as a "patriarchical organization" in which "soldiers and crews must be entrepreneurs in crime, seeking out profitable opportunities in both the underworld and upperworld" (Jacobs and Gouldin 1999: p.138).

While Gravano's experiences and the analyses of his career do provide considerable support for the assessment that a member's value to the family is primarily based on business and earning capacities, the dictatorial role assigned to the top echelon of the unit may be contested. To do so, one must converge not simply on the presence of rules and regulations, but on the actual application of sanctions within the family. In an in-depth case study of a career organized crime member in Italy, Cottino (1998: p.89) revealed that in circumstances in which a group member's elimination (by murder) was suggested, a unanimous decision was required amongst members in order for the execution to take place. Although the working environment put forward by Cottino was based primarily on democratic and friendship principles, the link nevertheless remains consistent with Gravano's experiences in that what is revealed is not a totalitarian system guided by the wills of the boss and defended by the traditions and rituals of a rigid, absolute governing system. Instead, the application of sanctions - most typically in the form of lethal violence - amongst rule transgressors is flexible and situationalized in accordance with the influence and interests that the transgressor

maintains amongst other influential and interesting members of the unit. Maltz's (1985) assessment regarding the erosion of discipline in organized crime groups throughout past decades provides a similar argument:

> "[D]iscipline within *organized crime* groups has been less than rigid. One should not expect otherwise. When all individuals in a group are armed and have no compunction about using their weapons - which may be one of the criteria for acceptance by the group - then the ability to govern them must depend to a great extent on the consent of the governed. Discipline of a group's members can be maintained only if it is shown to be in their own self-interest" (Maltz 1985: p.29).

At the time of the ceremony officializing his entrance as a soldier into the Gambino family, Gravano was introduced to a series of rules and the basic working protocol that were to be respected by made members of the family. Obtaining permission from the family was a key condition to several of the rules, as he, himself, explained: *"[T]he man we answered to was our captain. He was our direct father. You do everything with him. You check with him, you put everything on record with him. You can't kill unless you get permission. You can't do anything, basically, until you get permission from the family. You don't run to the boss. You go to your captain. That was the protocol. Your captain will go to the administration of the family, which is the boss, the underboss and the consigliere"* (Maas 1997: p.87). Further specifications of this protocol were subsequently added: *"Anytime you are sent for by the boss of your family, you must come in.* (...) *If you refuse, you will be killed.* (...) *You couldn't go with each other's wives and daughters. You couldn't raise your hands against one another. All these things meant the death penalty"* (p.88).

While order seems to be assured in the Cosa Nostra by such rules and capital penalties facing inner transgressors, Gravano quickly dismissed the reality of such ideals in looking back to his personal experiences: *"I bought this all one hundred percent. I really felt that I belonged to a brotherhood that had honor and respect. All the things I looked for in life was in a good part of that oath. A lot later on, I got to learn that the whole thing was bullshit. I mean, we broke every rule in the book. Like, at one of the trials* [for which he was a key informant after his

defection in October 1991], *a lawyer asked me, 'How could you break the oath of omerta?' I said, 'There's a hundred rules. We broke ninety-nine of them. This was the last rule. It wasn't that hard anymore'"* (p.88).

The structuring of order that emerges is neither one of strict rule obedience nor of absolute sanctioning. While Gravano did confirm the family rank and formal title structure that was first revealed by Valachi in 1963 (Maas 1968), his prominent positioning within the Gambino family, relative to Valachi's lower soldier status within the Genovese family, provided further elaboration in regard to the flexibility of the vertical system that was in place and which appeared to be rigidly designed from Valachi's perception almost forty years before. Valachi gave us the image of the American Cosa Nostra from a stagnant, low-status member's experiences. Gravano offers rather different insights from one who was able to experience the Cosa Nostra from the point of view from both its lower and elite levels.

Although promotional ranks do divide the Cosa Nostra family vertically, this division remains consistent with the business nature and flexibly inconsistent with authoritarian qualifications of the working unit. Vertical allotment of revenues is practiced, but authority is often challenged and questioned. Sanctions, furthermore, may be consistently negotiated and avoided. The following sections will demonstrate the flexibility and application of order in the Gambino family.

Indispensable Some

One is as safe as his relational pull and earning abilities it seems. While Gravano's distaste with the contradictions inherent in the Cosa Nostra's governing system may be accounted for as justifying his decision to defect when confronted with an FBI deal, one does not have to rely exclusively on such judgement calls in order to confirm the flexibility of the ruling and sanctioning system that he worked under and was increasingly a part of throughout his career. Instead, an analysis of his own personal transgressions and his ability to avoid the extreme death sanction on various occasions provides us with a more elaborate understanding of the use and application of lethal violence in the Cosa Nostra.

The argument follows that those who remain in the interests of interesting and influential others gain a status that brings them to become indispensable to the family. Gravano, because of his network and financial resources, was among the indispensable in the Gambino family. The Cosa Nostra that was revealed throughout his account follows the relationally-based portrayal offered by Hess (1998) in his own study of the Sicilian *cosca* (or family) and is consistent with the 'crisscross' pattern of relationships that Flap (1988) argued to be a key factor in determining the level of violence or peacefulness in a stateless society. This resolves the problem of order in anarchic or stateless settings[55]. The crisscross thesis follows suit with the relational argument put forward by Hess (1998) and defended here. The idea follows that in a crisscross social context, one's enemy may quite conceivably be a friend's friend. Acting out in a conflicting manner with that enemy may therefore lead to subsequent problems with the mutual friend. In view of such consequences, alternative, more peaceful means of reconciliation are more likely turned to.

Gravano's strength was in his dyadic relationships. From as early as his official entrance into the Gambino family, he was in direct contact with the family boss (N34 in Figure 5.1) and other key and influential members. Any targeting on Gravano within the family would have clearly interfered in the business activities of one or more influential members within the Gambinos. Although all made members may be perceived as having direct links to any other made member of the family, working relations warrant a more important form of contact than mere official membership. Gravano's early and extensive endeavors in the construction industry made him an interesting working contact for many other members in the family. This network-based quality gave him the edge that he needed to avoid sanctioning when the threat presented itself. Two of these episodes will be illustrated here.

On the first occasion, Gravano was summoned by the family boss, Paul Castellano (N34), after he had killed a flamboyant, yet unconnected, drug trafficker and night-club owner (Frank Fiala) without the family's permission.

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55. Flap roots this argument in the work of anthropologist Evans-Pritchard (1940).

Gravano, a soldier at the time (1982), had been in the midst of selling his nightclub (Plaza Suite in Figure 5.2) to Fiala when business matters became increasingly complicated. Although reluctant at first, he accepted a bid for his thriving Brooklyn nightclub when Fiala increased the amount to one million dollars. Before the deal was completely sealed, Gravano became increasingly irked by Fiala's presence and indiscretion at the nightclub - *"I'm gritting my teeth. I tell myself business is business. Take it easy. Be quiet. Let me just get through this. Then, after that, so what? We're through with him and I got the million. I'll just swallow a little abuse. Be smart. It don't mean nothing"* (Maas 1997: p.142).

His composure finally collapsed when Fiala threatened him and his brother-in-law (N33) with a gun during a disagreement. Although both left the incident unscarred, Gravano did have additional intentions: *"I've never been so mad in my life. As soon as we're outside, I said, 'Eddie* [N33], *this fucker is going tonight. He should have killed me right then and there. He would've had a better shot with the law than with me"* (Maas 1997: p.144). This led to the first of Gravano's 'off-the-record' hits. Fiala was killed by Gravano and his crew (N2, N32, N33, N46, N47, and N48) that same night just outside the nightclub. How and why Gravano was able to avoid the consequences of this unsanctioned hit is now of central importance here.

About three weeks after the murder of Fiala, Gravano and Louie Milito (N2: the actual shooter in the incident) were summoned to a Manhattan restaurant, through Frank DiCicco (N19), by N34. After sorting the facts of the case and listening to Gravano's justification for not seeking permission before killing Fiala, N34 provided his final verdict, which Gravano recalled as follows: *"You're definitely not going to die over this bum. But I want your word from now on that you won't ever, ever do a piece of work unless it's approved by me, or unless somebody - and you better have the bullet holes to prove it - shot at you first and you had to kill him* (...) *Just be a good friend of ours like you always have been. You can go now"* (p.150). This ended the Fiala incident within the family. The death sanction was overlooked in light of the justifiable circumstances that the principal decision-maker, N34, associated with the facts that he had acquired.

Gravano, who was rapidly rising as an aggressive construction entrepreneur, largely through the benefits of N34's connections, and who was turning over a substantial portion of his profits to N34, was dismissed without any form of sanction.

The second occasion was not linked to any off-the-record hit, but was treated as a more serious internal matter which called for a more extensive hearing of Gravano's situation. The incident, in 1983, involved Louie DiBono (N52), who would later (in 1990) join Gravano's list of murder victims. Once again, the initial discrepancy began with problems rising from business dealings. DiBono, another Gambino soldier active in the construction industry, was Gravano's principal subcontractor for his drywall company (Ace Partitions in Figure 5.2). At one point, it became evident that DiBono was not paying Gravano and his partners (N33 and N49) the full amount for past contracts. DiBono was confronted with the matter and subsequently threatened by Gravano. This led to DiBono making a complaint with his own capo, Pat Conte (not included in Figure 5.1), who subsequently reported the matter to N34.

A sit-down was ordered by N34 soon after he was made aware of the incident that had Gravano transgressing the rule prohibiting threats or physical aggression against made members. As with off-the-record hits, the standard punishment for such transgressors is death. The meeting took place in the basement of another made member's house. Aside from DiBono, his own capo, and Gravano, N33 (who served as a witness to the episode), the family administration (N34, N35, and N36), and other influential Gambino family members (N19 and N38) were also present. Rather than deny the fact that he threatened DiBono, Gravano freely admitted his transgression of this family rule. This seemingly would increase the likelihood that the death sanction would be applied. However, the situational quality of Cosa Nostra justice manifested itself when N35, the family underboss, vouched for Gravano's actions as justifiable under the circumstances - *"Maybe he did wrong, but he's right"* (Maas 1997: p.172). The matter was finally dismissed as a misunderstanding between the two entrepreneurs and resolved over a handshake.

In both cases, the situational flexibility of sanctioning disobedience within the Cosa Nostra is apparent. While sanctions are firmly entrenched within the extreme rationale of capital punishment, their actual applications are preceded by negotiations. In both cases, Gravano claimed that his ability to avoid death was due to his ability to be direct and honest regarding the matter. He also repeatedly pleaded along the lines that he was consistently dealing with the best interests of the family and its boss at heart.

That he was spared the death sanction on these two occasions because of his integrity and honourable behaviour may indeed account for part of the explanation. Another possibility, which did not explicitly emerge from his personal account, but which may be assessed after understanding the ameliorating entrepreneurial qualities of Gravano's personal working network throughout his career, is that he never faced the actual application of a death sanction because he was too valuable to key members in the family - namely to his own capo and, most importantly, to the family boss and administration who received a proportion of all his earnings. As Gravano made clear during his defence in the DiBono case, *"This fat scumbag* (DiBono) *was robbing me. He was* [therefore] *robbing the family"* (p.172). Gravano therefore justified his actions as serving the interests of the elite within the family.

It was in the interests of the family elite (the decision makers) that Gravano was to be allowed to continue venturing, earning, and expanding in the construction industry. If a criminal entrepreneur successfully maintains an entrepreneurial, brokerage-like (low in constraints) personal working network, he decreases his chances of being the target of a sanctioned or unsanctioned hit. It would be less conceivable to see him taken out of the network of action because although he may be in conflict with some, he is in the consistent interests of others who rely on his entrepreneurial resources. The latter saves him from potential reprisals from the former.

Decision-makers in the Cosa Nostra also have a stake in the profits and business aspects of the family unit. They must therefore be attentive to whose interests are being affected by the sanctioning of an internal transgressor. Aside

from the obvious motivation to keep a high earner alive and earning, Gravano's life was spared on a series of occasions because he was backed by others who had interests in him and who, in turn, were of interest to the decision-makers. Add the fact that Gravano was in close working contact with the actual family boss and we begin to understand why he was not to be taken out of anybody's network in any form. The family's vertical allocation of financial profits, in this sense, may be perceived as outweighing its vertical allocation of authority and legitimized lethal violence. The interaction between elite interests and the flexibility/rigidity of the sanctioning system can be appreciated only when actual applications of sanctions and the decisions surrounding them are observed.

Expendable Others

Although Gravano was able to avoid being the target of lethal sanctioning by remaining in the financial or relational interests of influential members in the Gambino family, others proved less successful in shunning the sanctioning of their own personal transgressions. Figure 6.1 presents the 27 murders that Gravano was implicated in to varying degrees, had knowledge of, or, more generally, was in proximity to throughout his career. Of these 27 murders which were documented in the principal and supplementary sources used in this case study, 17 targeted made members of the Cosa Nostra. For 6 (lower level in Figure 6.1) of these 27 murders, Gravano had no previous knowledge of their execution. The remaining 21 murders had Gravano implicated in either: (1) the awareness of the murder before its actual execution (but for which he was not physically involved; n=7); (2) the personal execution of an order to kill for the family (but for which he was always active in the crew assembled for the hit; n=6); or (3) the actual decision to take someone out (n=8).

Only for one of these murder (victim 2 in Figure 6.1) was Gravano documented as being the actual shooter. He was, however, reported as being the principal orchestrator of the hit for 4 (victims 6, 8, 9, and 18) and co-orchestrator for 9 (victims 13-15, 20, 22-26). To further account for the degree of Gravano's involvement in such events throughout his career, his physical presence at each murder was documented (he was physically present at 12 and absent at 15). The top axis in Figure 6.1 keeps track of Gravano's rank within the Gambino family throughout his career, while the bottom axis identifies the year in which each murder took place. From these 27 murders, 2 forms of lethal violence emerge.

It is crucial to distinguish between *reactive* and *proactive* forms of lethal violence. Reactive violence grasps what many committed criminal entrepreneurs are ready to do if provoked to do so. Proactive violence reveals what fewer committed criminal entrepreneurs are ready to do to assure or increase their own personal interests within a defined milieu. Reactive violence is a secondary resource that comes forward when problems emerge within the boundaries of one's central business activities. If problems do not emerge, reactive violence is not expected. Proactive violence, quite differently, is a resource which is maintained at the forefront along with other qualities of an entrepreneur's business acumen. Violence and business, in this proactive scheme, are one in the same. Proactive violence is therefore used in the interests of one's personal business endeavors.

Figure 6.1:
Murders in Proximity to Gravano Throughout Career



Victim	Name	Yr. Dead	Gravano's role	Gravano's physical presence at hit
(1)	Jimmy Emma	1968	None	No
(2)	Joe Colucci	1970	Shooter	Yes
(3)	Joe Colombo[a]	1971	None	No
(4)	Dominic Scialo	1974	None	No
(5)	Gerry Pappa	1975	None	No
(6)	Anonymous Biker[b]	1977	Ochestrator	Yes
(7)	Nicky Scibetta	1978	None	No
(8)	Johnny Simone	1980	Orchestrator	Yes
(9)	Frank Fiala[b]	1982	Orchestrator	Yes
(10)	Roy DeMeo	1983	None	No
(11)	Frank Piccolo	1984	None	No
(12)	Joe D'Angelo	1985	None	No
(13)	Paul Castellano[b]	1986	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(14)	Tommy Bilotti[b]	1986	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(15)	Nicky Mormando	1986	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(16)	Gus Sclafani	1986	None	No
(17)	Frank DeCicco	1986	None	Yes
(18)	Robert DiBernardo	1986	Orchestrator	Yes
(19)	James Hydell	1987	None	No
(20)	Mike DeBatt	1987	Co-Orchestrator	No
(21)	Thomas DeBrizzi	1988	None	No
(22)	Louie Milito	1988	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(23)	Frank Oliverri	1988	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(24)	Willie Boy Johnson	1988	Co-orchestrator	No
(25)	Tommy Spinelli	1989	Co-orchestrator	Yes
(26)	Louie DiBono	1990	Co-orchestrator	No
(27)	Eddie Lino	1990	None	No

a: Colombo died in 1977, but was physically inactive after being shot in 1971.

b: Off-the-record hits.

Name = Made members

Many may assume that Gravano made his way to the top of the Gambino family through the systematic and proactive use of lethal violence. Many may also take for granted that most successful organized crime participants made their way to the top through the indiscriminant use of violence. The distribution of murders identified in Figure 6.1 illustrate, however, that Gravano's proximity to lethal violence increased in accordance with his rise in status within the Gambino family. This is more accurately observed in Figure 6.2 which plots the number of murders per year that Gravano was in proximity to and had at least knowledge of (n=21) from one promotional phase to the next. A clear shift in his personal implication in lethal violence is observed when he enters the elite of the family following his capo promotion in early 1986.

Figure 6.2:
Murders in Proximity to Gravano By Career Promotions.



His first proactive murder was the Castellano (victim 13 in Figure 6.1) hit in December 1985. That his promotion to capo immediately followed this major event may have some argue that Gravano's entrance into the family elite was a result of this act of lethal violence, but, relationally, he was already in a resourceful position to assume such a rank. The early 1986 capo promotion is

deemed more a result of his relational strength. This relational strength, in turn, is also maintained as being the key factor in justifying Gravano's part in the assassination team to take out Castellano. Gravano's indispensability to the family was clear to both satisfied members and disenchanted-plotting members alike. Castellano's murder was a reflection of Gravano's ability to use lethal violence for his own personal business benefits. It was Gravano's first act of proactive lethal violence. Taking out Castellano meant diminishing the constraints concentrated in his working network at that time. That he was able and invited to do so reflects his positioning within the interests of key others at that time.

As Gravano's own words tell us, misgivings about taking part in a plot to kill the family boss were not simply limited to rule transgressions or regicide-sort of challenge that may be associated with a threat to authoritarian order. Instead, the risks of killing Castellano would come from the backlash it would create amongst Castellano's own personal contacts who would lose a highly influential co-participant - *"I mean, this is some massive guy we're taking out, with massive connections. And we're breaking the Golden Rule. We could be looking at a war that could take eight, ten years"* (Maas 1997: p.199). Once Castellano was removed and Gravano officially entered the elite, such proactive forms of lethal violence became more common throughout his career.

A second proactive murder involved the death of Robert DiBernardo (victim 18 in Figure 6.1). Although DiBernardo had conflicts with other key members in the family (N50 and N51), Gravano did little to vouch for and argue in favour of the avoidance of sanctioning for this long-time Gambino construction earner. He therefore took on the order to orchestrate this contact's murder. Gravano justified this application of order in a quite different manner than for his own transgressions in earlier episodes of his career: *"What was I going to do? What can I do? It's an order from the boss. This was the life I chose, and the boss is the boss"* (Maas 1997: p.217). Although he maintains that the decision to take out DiBernardo was initiated by the family boss (N50), immediately after the murder of DiBernardo, Gravano took hold of the crucial Teamsters Local 282 (previously occupied by DiBernardo), which gave him full control of Gambino family interests in New

York City's construction industry and which subsequently allowed his own endeavors in that line of work to progress accordingly.

Another proactive murder that took place during Gravano's privileged years in the Cosa Nostra involved his contact of thirty years, Louie Milito (victim 22). While he and Milito were partners in various criminal and legitimate ventures throughout the majority of their years together, the relation grew distant when Milito became more directly active in business activities with the family boss, N34, and his right-hand man, N38. The death of both N34 and N38 left Milito in an increasingly isolated position within the family. Although his close working relationship with influential members of the family in previous years placed him among the more indispensable members, the loss of these two contacts left Milito somewhat expendable throughout the latter half of the 1980s. Milito, who remained a soldier, was killed because he was perceived as a threat to higher-ranked members (Gravano included). His transgression which justified the application of a death sanction was described as follows: *"When I became consigliere, I appointed Big Lou Vallario* [N25] *captain of my crew. And now Louie Milito was going around bad-mouthing Big Lou and saying he should be captain.* (...) *This is a serious matter when a soldier is backbiting his captain. And John Gotti* [N50] *hears about it. We both discussed Milito. He's got to go"* (Maas 1997: p.245). Gravano justified the taking out of Milito along the same rigid line of respect for the principles and rules of Cosa Nostra that were associated with other proactive murders committed in the latter part of his career: *"Louie was no innocent. He was a made guy and a killer. He knew the rules, and he went against them. He played a very dangerous game - and he lost"* (Maas 1997: p.246). At the same time, another key, isolated Gambino construction entrepreneur was taken out of the action.

Gravano also used his privileged access to lethal violence to take care of his past conflicts with DiBono (victim 26). Approximately 8 years after he threatened DiBono for not respecting the payment agreement they had made in regard to their common drywall contracting ventures and for which Gravano, then a soldier, appeared before the family elite to resolve the matter, another business conflict

emerged between the two. Unlike the previous episode which had Gravano facing a potential death sanction, he was now in a position to actually apply the same threat as a decision maker of death sanctions. Gravano sought permission to take out DiBono from the family boss (N50). DiBono's interests in the family prevailed in the same manner that Gravano's did in the previous occasion - *"He was still robbing the family and I asked John* [N50] *for permission to take him out. But John had a meeting with DiBono, and DiBono told John that he had a billion dollars of drywall work that was coming out of the World Trade Center. John bit, hook, line and sinker, and refused my request. John said he would handle DiBono personally and become his partner"* (Maas 1997: p.249). DiBono's interests to the family boss, however, subsequently faded when conflicts arose in that relationship: *"But DiBono was up to his old tricks - double-dealing. He had obviously been bullshitting John. So when John called Louie* [DiBono] *in for meetings to discuss their new partnership, DiBono didn't show up. John was humiliated"* (Maas 1997: p.249). DiBono became expendable and was taken out shortly after N50 followed suit with Gravano's suggestion to remove him. As a member of the family administration, Gravano was able to apply the same threat and capital punishment which he personal faced and avoided when he was a soldier. The two conflicts between Gravano and DiBono consisted of the same general circumstances. What was different was Gravano's more privileged positioning and DiBono's decreased importance or expendability within the interest-based network structuring the family

The 'settling of an account' identifies the reactive nature of killings between criminal trade and activity participants. Problems arise between co-participants or competitors and matters must be settled. However, not all problems, as Gravano's own personal experiences in avoiding sanctions show us, are settled in a violent manner. Who is the target of the potential account settlement and who is applying the sanction covers the dyadic context of such events. For a settlement to be sought after, a relational problem must first be in place. This relational problem is a precursor to such sanctions. To fully appreciate the lethal settling of accounts, one must first understand the relational dimensions embedding the victim's

livelihood. Without taking into consideration the network aspects of the account settlement we fail to observe why it took place to begin with. 'Why', in this explanation, must consider not only with whom this person was in conflict with, but also which (formal or informal) contractual rules he transgressed and the lack of social capital that hindered his capacity to avoid the sanction extending from that transgression. One is expendable for the death sanction if no others stand up in his favour to offer the sanctioner alternative ways of settling or dismissing the account. One is expendable if he falls out of or fails to gain the interests of well-positioned others.

Network Trimming and Staying Fit

Killing for personal reasons is a privilege exercised by elite members in the Cosa Nostra. The values of members' lives, as Arlacchi has already demonstrated, are not placed on equal footing: «Certain men may be killed without this calling for any condemnation: they are in the category of the 'non-elect'» (1983: p.129). The non-elect are treated as expendable to influential others here. Because lower-ranked members must obtain permission to kill, their personal interests may not be exercised through such means. They must earn the right to use it for their own interests. Privilege to use proactive lethal violence and the expendability of a member's life are inversely related. Higher-ranked or more privileged members are positioned to apply and use the flexibility of the rule and sanctioning system in their favour. Although he was responsible for two previous off-the-record and unsanctioned hits (victims 6 and 9 in Figure 6.1), Gravano had not used lethal violence as a direct, personal incentive to advance his career. As a lower ranking member, Gravano was involved in lethal violence to some extent or other, but such participation was typically reactive (whereupon he would subsequently risk facing a death sanction) or under the order of a more influential member (hence, in the proactive and personal interests of elite members). The decision to take out Castellano was the first step in this direction.

Proactive lethal violence and situational sanctioning were accessed and practiced in accordance with the personal business interests of those members who

attained an elite positioning within the family. Once Gravano attained the capo rank and was further promoted into the family administration, the idea of 'off-the-record' hits become irrelevant because he became increasingly part of the decision regarding who to take out. What was or was not on the record became, in many ways, partial to his personal discretion. His personal interests, in this sense, could be served through the contract that official members submitted to within their respective family units. His use of lethal violence for proactive purposes, in this sense, became legitimized within the boundaries of the Gambino family once he entered the family elite as a capo.

Only in converging on such influential members does this form of lethal violence manifest itself. It is this proactivity which may explain the use of violence for personal reasons and advancement. Its use is accessible only after the relational foundations of one's working network (as demonstrated in Chapter 5) have brought one to a position to seize this instrumental resource.

Accessing a decision-making position allowed Gravano to trim his network of contacts and therefore decrease his own personal exposure. The expendability that was associated with these murder victims revealed that while assuring insulation, he was not hampering his relational capacities in that he was removing the 'less fit' of his contacts. No one that was useful to him was taken out. Because sanctioning in the Gambino family was neither absolute nor systematic and explained primarily by rational network utilities, it remains that if one is chosen to succumb to the typical death sanction, it may be, as is often believed, because that person is a threat to the group as a whole or simply to well-placed others within that whole, but also because that person has failed to remain in the interests of these well-placed others.

A drop in the proximity to lethal violence between Gravano's transition from capo to the administrative ranks of the Gambino family is also observed in Figure 6.2. Although this breaks the suspected linear association between improved promotions and proximity to lethal violence in his career, the drop may be more likely due to the fact that the trimming process had already been considerably progressed – although not fully completed. Emphasis, at this point, should

therefore be placed not on who was exiting his network, but who was entering and who remained in the network at that point in his career.

Death sanctions against the privileged, as was the case with the Castellano hit, are few not because the privileged are more law-abiding and morally adequate, but because the privileged in the Cosa Nostra are the same people influencing the decision concerning when a death sanction is to be applied or diverted in the interests of themselves or interesting others. Gravano's ability to bypass the sanctioning system of the Cosa Nostra and the overall differential treatment that was applied by himself and others before him is consistent with Coleman's (1990) observation of the unequal manner in which sanctions are often applied in legitimate contexts:

> "One social characteristic possessed by a potential target actor is reported by anthropologists and sociologists as reducing the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed: especially high status or power in the social system which contains the norm holders (...). This provides confirmation of the view that the act of sanctioning imposes costs on the sanctioner since such costs can be expected to be especially high if the target of the sanctioning is someone with whom a continued relation is of special interest to the potential sanctioner. (...) This implies that even a conjoint norm, for which the targets and the holders are the same actors, may be differentially applied because of the varying costs of sanctioning different actors. The consequence is that those actors with greater power in a social system are less constrained by norms than are those with less power. There are, in fact, institutionalized excuses and indulgences available to high-status persons who fail to obey norms. A high-status person may merely be said to be eccentric, whereas the same behavior would bring severe sanctions upon a lower-status person" (p.286).

Violence does not increase one's prestige; relationally-earned prestige gives one the privilege to use legitimized violence in a personal way. The mafioso method is not violent *per se*. Instead, it is within the governmental capacity that mafiosi award higher-ranked members and administrators that the roots and means of lethal violence in such forms of criminal enterprise are situated. Violence is rooted in situational authority that is legitimized by all takers of the business exchange process. Its means are, consequently, judged by the few and applied to the many. Cosa Nostra members are therefore not like soldiers because they are

organized in a military-like or rigid work environment. They are like soldiers because killing others in the interests of some, more privileged members is a behaviour that makes sense to many of them.

CONCLUSION:
CAPACITIES, PURSUITS, AND PARADOXES IN CRIMINAL ENTREPRENEURIAL CAREERS

Aside from the independent vs. organizational and violent vs. non-violent distinctions between these two career criminal entrepreneurs, several other characteristics emerge to further heighten the level of contrast separating these opposing types.

Diametrically-Opposed

A first additional distinction between Marks's and Gravano's careers concerns the geographical scope of working activities and surrounding networks. Marks's career and network spanned a transnational plane, including working relations with cannabis smugglers and other participants in the trade from several countries in Europe, northern Africa, central and southeast Asia, Australia, South America, and North America. The DEA-led law-enforcement tandem that brought Marks down and in confrontation with the American RICO (Racketeering-Influenced Corrupt Organizations) statutes during the late eighties and early nineties involved the cooperation of the domestic police forces from at least ten countries (United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Holland, Pakistan, Philippines, Hong Kong, Thailand, Portugal, and Australia). Gravano was much less the jet-set illegal trade participant that Marks was. All of Gravano's activities and the major core of his working network were concentrated within the vicinity of New York City. Details from accounts detailing his career provide evidence that extremely rare business departures outside of New York City brought him only as far as Florida.

The second career distinction may be plausibly related to the first. While Marks entered the cannabis trade via his friendship network developed while he was an undergraduate and graduate student at Oxford University during the late 60s, Gravano made his way into the New York Cosa Nostra after dropping out of school at age 15 and through the juvenile street gangs that often serve as a recruiting base for adult organized crime unities. Aside from the fact that Marks was well into his twenties when he committed himself to crime and Gravano was considerably active from his early teen years, Marks's Oxford beginnings and Gravano's street-level entrance into crime may indeed account for the

geographical scope of their respective networks. Marks learned how to adapt to others in open, academic settings while Gravano was consistently maintained within the closed cohesive groupings found in his native Brooklyn (and more specifically, in the Bensonhurst district).

This second distinction similarly accounts for the third key disparity between Marks's and Gravano's careers in crime. Oxford-bred and internationally-connected, Marks's personal network was represented by a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Gravano, inversely, was generally involved with other Italian Americans, hence maintaining a network that was consistently ethnically homogeneous. As with the previous distinctions, the initial stages of each career were engulfed in opposing social settings. The openness of Marks's social world and the restrictiveness of Gravano's have much to do in accounting for the ethnic make-up of the ensemble of contacts in their careers.

Aside from such distinctions in the ethnic make-up, cultural origins, and geographical scope of their personal networks, both entrepreneurs, in a fourth distinction, were quite divergent in the variety of activities that they took part in. Gravano, although spending the last half of his career concentrating primarily on his operations in the construction industry, was also a very active street criminal (robbery, burglary, and other forms of predatory crime) during earlier periods in his career. Marks was uniquely involved in cannabis, and only cannabis, smuggling. This distinction does remain consistent with the preceding differences in as much as a regular participant in crime may be seen as having the choice of varying his activities within a specific geographical setting and across a particular set of similar contacts or spreading out the same business activity across a varying set of settings and differing contacts. Variations in earning activities are therefore geographically concentrated while a more singular concentration of one's activities may be geographically diffused.

The fifth distinction concerns the incentives for involvement in legitimate enterprise. Because of Gravano's efforts to concentrate his business endeavors in a localized and homogeneous setting, he was able to expand his venturing into the legitimate sphere of business. Gravano actually used legitimate enterprise, such as

the construction industry, as a venue to expand his overall earning activities. Marks's ventures in legitimate business were generally meant to create fronts for his cannabis trade activities. Fronts had been a factor in Gravano's career, albeit to a much lesser extent than for Marks, but his participation in the legitimate construction industry may be more accurately perceived as constituting the setting for real earning ventures. This distinction also accounted for the fact that Gravano was quite prosperous in his legitimate ventures, while Marks was consistently in search of a legitimate operation that would operate on a long-term basis.

This distinction between Gravano as the racketeering entrepreneur in the legitimate construction industry may be strikingly contrasted to Marks's higher priorities with the exclusive criminal trade that he was involved in. This sixth distinction fits appropriately in the working definition of organized crime put forward in Chapter 1. Gravano, who typifies the orthodox organized crime participant, was not reported as being involved in the supply of illegal goods or services. Marks, who was far from what would constitute an orthodox organized crime participant, was primarily involved in the distribution of illegal goods. Involvement in illegal venturing in legitimate goods and services, for Marks, was primarily to complement the more prominent supply of cannabis.

Seventh, the paradox between the two and their link to the organized crime phenomenon may be even further developed when violence enters the picture. This was the key theme in Chapter 6. Marks used non-violent ways to advance in the supply of an illegal good while Gravano often used (lethal) violent ways once he advanced in a legitimate industry. Gravano was reported as being directly implicated in the murders of at least 19 others. Marks was not. This distinction may be constituted along lines distinguished by one's 'legitimate' (nonviolent) ways to do crime (Marks) and the other's 'criminal' (violent) ways to be legitimate (Gravano).

The eighth point contrasting Marks and Gravano continues to work around their respective links with legitimate enterprise. At the time of each of their career-ending arrests, Marks was expanding the scope of his business ventures in crime (in the cannabis trade) while Gravano was increasingly distancing himself from his

criminal ways and investing more and more in legitimate business alternatives. Gravano was clearly headed for legitimation. Marks, although having experienced previous attempts with retirement from crime, was seemingly intent on further pursuing his endeavors in the criminal trade. Once again and re-incorporating the previous point, Marks was nonviolent and seemingly set on remaining criminally active. He repeated on several occasions that he did not see what he was doing as wrong – illegal yes, wrong no. Gravano, who was lethally violent in his ways, did not provide any moral basis justifying his crimes. He was, consequently, increasingly oriented toward legitimate activities. Although neither Marks nor Gravano achieved legitimation, they neared it closely enough for a projection to be made in regard to the idealistic end of a criminal entrepreneurial career within the contextual images put forward by queer ladder theory.

Relationally-Akin

The principal argument guiding this thesis maintains that the queer ladder route is relationally embedded. The emphasis placed on the network as the vehicle bringing the criminal trade participant to attaining and maintaining success amongst and between a larger ensemble of working contacts is not, as network studies of legitimate settings demonstrate, unique to the criminally active. Instead, the relational argument put forward here allows us to divert the attention generally placed on violent and authoritarian means of advancement that have been consistent in guiding theories of organized crime. These 'obvious' means generally associated with criminal professions are limited because they continue to emphasize the criminal element over the business drive that is inherent within activities associated with organized crime. This is not to say that violence, and particularly lethal forms of violence, is not a considerable problem emerging from organized crime processes. Gravano's career tells us that it is, but Marks's career tells us that it is not, by definition, an absolute problem.

It would be extremely precarious to argue that all individuals incited by a career in organized crime are ready to physically fight, maim, or kill for their personal profits and security. The common thread inciting organized crime

participants into a working process and keeping them together is one of mutual interests to make a living via alternative, risky, and demanding ways. Potential participants must learn and find their place within these alternative ways. They must also position themselves so as to reduce the risks that come with such prohibited actions. Finally, they must be able to cooperate with others so as to meet the ever-present demand for their goods and services. The case may be made that any participant may choose force and violence as the means to establishing one's own alternative, reducing risks, and obliging others to procure that which is being 'offered', however, this would not only spell a limited working environment for that participant, but a short-lived career as well. Cooperation between participants and their consumers, quite differently, creates the foundation for the prolonged profit rearing and risk reducing settings that have consistently been associated with organized processes and, once again, confirmed in this study.

The queer ladder route is common to all. This route captures the cooperative spirit that keeps criminal trade participants working together. The incentive, once again, is emphasized in the alternative – the common goal of beating the conventional means to arriving at a conventional goal. Progression along this alternative path, however, varies from one participant to the next and it is within such differentiation that the competitive side of organized crime emerges. Competition must be rooted within the cooperative contexts that keep organized crime processes operative over prolonged periods.

As within any clandestine social setting, information takes on an exclusive quality. The quality of access to the informal grapevine diffusing information regarding opportunities to initiate, enhance, or protect one's business priorities is not equally distributed amongst participants. A participant cannot simply force his way to obtaining this information. He must be accepted and invited to give and take within this circulation process. This takes place between people in a consensual manner. This informal exchange process has it that some participants come out ahead over others because they invest their cooperative resources in timely fashion so as to increase the exclusiveness of what they have access to. The course bringing the participant to attain such privileged access to the grapevine

calls for commitment. It is a long-term investment that may be hampered or ceased at any point because the participant is not only competing for better positioning within the diffusion of information, but is also competing with outside targeting forces looking to remove players from such alternative forms of making a living. This external factor accelerates the overall competition. In consequence, the need for exclusivity of information-sharing increases and the level of cooperation is restricted. Those participants who have achieved in accessing a higher quality of information therefore become more protective of their resources in light of the threat imposed by the external competitor. With time and through the benefits of advancement, the participant who is increasingly in proximity to higher quality information benefits is able to restrict access to his own personal resources. In doing so, the criminal entrepreneur is distancing himself from that action which is most likely targeted from the outside. Because he remains more distant from the action, yet continues to be in demand to those who continue to take the higher risks, this privileged criminal entrepreneur is able to spread his participation across a series of simultaneous ventures. He has a less proximate hand in any one venture, but he compensates for this loss of profit by spreading his available time and energy to a multitude of earning activities.

Within the context of this dual competitive setting (with one competition established along the principles of cooperative forms of exchange and the other maintained along strict adversarial standards), the organized crime participant survives by fitting in in a manner that betters his position in the cooperative sphere of action and reduces his exposure to external, conventional targeters.

An organized crime process entails an overlapping of the personal networks (and their resources) of participants who are incited by unconventional routes towards materialistic success. Some players may get involved for short-term incentives, but the process itself is built around those who are committed to the alternative route on a long-term basis. It is a prolonged, profit-oriented process because the participants involved have the resources in place and are ready to exchange information concerning these resources in order to sustain their mutual interests and actions. As with legitimate business persons who are fully dedicated

to the long-term pursuit of materialistic success, dedicated criminal business persons (organized crime participants) structure their social worlds in accordance with that which is necessary to maintaining that pursuit and progress towards that goal. Structural hole theory allows us to see that business-oriented persons who have personal networks designed to promote high levels of disconnectivity achieve and maintain competitive advantages in their earning activities and overall careers. Such entrepreneurial behaviour allows one to broker between disconnected others in a time-saving and efficient manner. In the organized crime careers studied here, the offenders' advancements within their specific earning activities were accounted for by the structural hole content (network efficiency or network constraint) of their personal working networks at various points in time. Opportunities to broker between disconnected others allowed each to yield higher returns in their activities. Such opportunities also allowed the criminal entrepreneurs to decrease their levels of direct exposure to other participants in their criminal activities. A decrease in exposure permitted them to further insulate themselves from potentially career-damaging targeting forces. Structural hole or brokerage-like opportunities therefore tell us how an offender may structure his network to promote increasing returns from crime while decreasing the costs. The combination of profit yielding opportunities and exposure-reducing positioning establishes the necessary working environment required by participants who keep an organized crime process thriving over the long-term.

Force and violence does not explain how an organized crime process may persist for a lengthy period. If force and violence were the principal means in such settings, competition would be accelerated to an even greater extent. Non-redundant networking permits us to explain how the process and many of its participants survive and how some attain a competitive advantage over others. This is applicable to and bridges both independent and organizationally-bounded criminal entrepreneurs.

'Organized' and 'disorganized' crime approaches differ in that studies that follow or conclude along the former's line of argument generally look at groups and their place in legitimate industry while those in the latter line of argument

generally look at criminal activities with little or no emphasis placed on the structure of groups. The distinction is therefore maintained within the choice of unit of analysis. The selection of an alternative unit of analysis – the personal network – offers a resolution filling the consistent cleavage separating these two seemingly opposing, yet completely compatible, approaches. The bridge is made by converging on the common relational foundation inherent in each of these 'extremes'.

Accumulating Social Capital

The rise, peak, and drop pattern that grasps the cumulative working networks is that which is expected for a successful criminal entrepreneurial career marked by substantial length, consistent progression and achievement, and the eventual privilege to insulate oneself behind a well-maintained an increasingly nonredundant network.

Concentrated Contact Allotment

The process of concentrated contact allotment – high accumulation of eventual contacts extending from a relatively few numbers of network providers – is consistent with the perennial notion of tutelage that emerged from Sutherland's *Professional Thief* (1937) and has since been revised in McCarthy and Hagan's research program on street youths (Hagan and McCarthy 1997; McCarthy and Hagan 1995; and McCarthy 1996).

Results extending from this study's findings demonstrate that both Marks and Gravano were considerably reared and prepared for their respective trades by incredibly few others. The seeds of Marks's career may be grouped around 2 early contacts who were crucial in providing the starting social capital that was required for him to break in and build his own place within the international cannabis trade. Gravano's network may be rooted in 4 key contacts, with 2 having had crucial roles in the early building stages of his career.

The critical building stage of the criminal entrepreneurial career depends on such key others who offer an opportunity to get into the action, provide additional

resources to expand within and commit to that action, and eventually bring one to the brink of independence. The evolution may be perceived as a builder's rise from joiner to instigator (Warr 1996). This also tells us that the seeds of such criminal careers are few yet productively giving, hence providing, once again, the required blend of limited contact (promoting security) and expansive opportunities (providing the potential for profit).

The process of concentrated contact allotment concerns how an individual 'gets made' in a given trade or criminal profession. It tells us how he comes to be accepted and of interest to established others via mutual contacts. For Marks, the objective at the onset of his career was to gather opportunities in order to create his own social capital base to warrant a detachment from his own maker. His advancement began with very little and involved a connecting process that required (in order to advance) that he apply his limited time and energy in an efficient manner. Loosening constraints in his network was not a preoccupation for Marks because his activities did not take place in social settings that carried much relational weight to begin with. Gravano, quite differently, was made in a working setting that came with substantially more relational weight than in Marks's case. Although he was not personally in direct working contact with all members and associates that the Gambino family offered, the extensions of this fixed unity was ever present. Hence, Gravano advanced in a phasal pattern whereupon a set of (necessary or unnecessary) contacts were added to his personal network every time he stepped forward and changed sponsor within the family. Because contacts entered his network in clusters and because not all relational additions were necessary, Gravano's task throughout the building stage of his career was to decrease the constraint that was added on to his network through the extensions of the Gambino family.

Both Marks and Gravano maintained networks that were rooted in the personal networks of a select few of their contacts. They subsequently grew increasingly nonredundant in their investments in others. Marks accumulated efficiently, while Gravano loosened unwanted constraints. The objective is identical, but the distinct working settings create contextual differences that shape

the meaning of their personal progressions during the network building phase.

A rise in the size of one's working network for a given activity corresponds with a rise in opportunities (albeit not the quality of these opportunities) within that activity. Less successful careers would, in this sense, be expected to remain flatter and more consistent across time. The absence of a rise in the cumulative working network would indicate the entrepreneur's inability (or unwillingness) to seize and expand on newer and more earning possibilities. A flat cumulative network would therefore be indicative of a stagnant and low-status career.

Flat cumulative working networks, however, may represent some successful careers. These are networks held by those who are born into or inherit an already established network from a successful criminal entrepreneur. The network, in such instances, should be interpreted more as an ascribed than acquired resource. Few, however, may be expected to profit from such rare concentrated contact allotment benefits from the start. It may be presumed that a more typical career in organized crime would require the individual to acquire a network and therefore search, seize (connect), and build in the manner portrayed in Marks's and Gravano's careers.

The building phase is critical for criminal career endurance and success. It is during this phase that an individual's reputation diffuses across information channels of direct and extended contacts. It is also during this phase that the ascending criminal business person accesses his own information channels for learning and experience within an activity or defined working setting. Most would refer to this phase as an apprenticeship, but because the building phase extends to the height of a career, the connecting and learning process evolving throughout surpasses any form of apprenticeship.

Network Closure, Exclusivity, and Privilege

All peak at some point or other in their careers, but not all attain a privileged position within the boundaries of their illicit activities. For those for whom the peak is simply an indication of their personal height in their own career, the downward cumulative network pattern is expected to take place only once some level of personal satisfaction or demise is attained. A downward trend in the

cumulative working network may therefore be a result of two occurrences: (1) an end to the career whether due to voluntary desistance, forced incapacitation, or exhaustion of network opportunities; or (2) privileged positioning and the opportunity to practice exclusivity or network closure. These occurrences are associated, respectively, with decreasingly and increasingly successful careers. Gravano's career was due to the second trend, but did collapse once the intense surveillance aimed at his boss, John Gotti, brought him into the law-enforcement targeting net as well. Marks's career contains both trends: privileged network closure leading up to his 1980 arrest and network collapse resulting from overtly ambitious venturing and intense DEA surveillance during the latter part of the eighties.

The privileged form of network closure that was found for both Marks and Gravano has been described as an identification of an entrepreneur's capacity to cease building his working network, close the network in exclusive fashion, and thrive off the choice opportunities that remain from the increasingly trimmed relational surroundings. This attainment phase (as it was termed in both case studies) took place when the entrepreneur was no longer in a obligated position to seek opportunities (necessary others, in other words) and had become, himself, an entrepreneurial opportunity to be sought after and seized by others. Network closure was an indication of the entrepreneur's shift to this privileged side of the asymmetric information grapevine. Both the quality of profit-oriented opportunities and the level of insulation increase in accordance with the shift towards greater exclusivity.

Marks was indeed arrested and incarcerated during this peak in his career and in the midst of his network closure period. This tells us the obvious: insulation is not absolute and the criminal entrepreneur is always at risk. His goal must therefore be to increase insulation in as much as possible. As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, Marks's release in 1982 and subsequent inability to remain legitimate in his business ventures brought him back into the cannabis trade. This period was marked by his most ambitious smuggling ventures. It was during this period that he was least cautious in his efforts to insulate himself. The mix between ambitious

venturing and decreasing insulation (increasing exposure) spelled Marks's fall. Gravano did not fall in the same way. Quite differently, he applied much more attention to insulation efforts once he attained a privileged position within his own personal working network. This accent on insulation is revealed in the sharp rise that may be observed in the proximity to lethal violence that took place for proactive reasons after his promotion to the elite capo position.

Marks (before 1980) closed his network by reducing the scope of people he was in direct contact with during the height (the attainment phase) of his career. Throughout his career, Marks generally ceased relations and distanced himself with unreliable or uninteresting co-participants. Gravano, whose working environment was less geographically diffused than Marks, closed part of his network by taking unnecessary members out through instrumental violence.

Organized Crime and Mainstream Criminology

One of the more unfortunate aspects concerning research on organized crime has been its striking separation from the greater scope of criminological research conducted throughout recent decades. The division between organized crime and 'conventional' crime may be due to several reasons, with the most evident of them being the fact that traditional criminological theories have generally aimed at searching for the causes of crime at the early juvenile delinquent stage. Adult criminals have often remained in the shadow of their juvenile counterparts.

Clearly one of the reasons that may account for mainstream criminologists' disinterests with organized crime extends from the inability of organized crime experts to clearly define their central concept and establish the actual existence of the problem at hand. As Chapter 1 pointed out, considerable research attention had been devoted to debating whether organized crime was out there to begin with. Much of this debate, I argue, was due to a lop-sided interpretation of Cressey's *Theft of the Nation* (1969). By looking beyond the consistent critiques made against Cressey (1969), it is held that although the work's fallacies were indeed evident and therefore susceptible to considerable criticism, a substantial portion of that research was also quite accurate and unfortunately dismissed within the scope

of its limits. Much was made out that Cressey was by and large confirming the law-enforcement views at the time when, in many ways, he was establishing and shaping law-enforcement opinions that would follow the 1967 President's Commission for which the bulk of *Theft of the Nation* was prepared. A complete assessment of *Theft of the Nation*, however, in light of the three decades that have passed since, does bring me to accept that some of Cressey's observations (i.e. family structure; nullification of government) and predictions (i.e. trend towards entrepreneurialism) were indeed accurate and useful for subsequent research endeavors.

Organized crime research should not remain a separate field of study. Its place in criminology as a whole is crucial in that not only does it provide an outlook on long-term experiences in crime, it also points out the limits of the more general theories of crime that are established along individualistic lines of argument. It is true that organized crime does not generally fit conveniently within the explanatory scope provided by theories of crime and criminality. This problem does not, however, reveal the limits of organized crime research in as much as it demonstrates to what point crime cannot be conveniently grasped within a common, all-uniting theory. To do so would require an explanation incorporating shoplifting and racketeering. Doing so would be 'unrealistic' or it would probably entail a necessity to direct the scope of the problem towards 'unrealistic' issues. Explanations highlighting the perverse extensions of governing systems developed around capitalistic (or more general competitive) pursuits and materialistic consumption are consistently pushed aside for raising such unrealistic issues, however, it does remain that one link between the shoplifter and the racketeer is the individual's decision to acquire regardless of the potential risk involved. Rather than concern ourselves primarily with the risks, try asking why the shoplifter and the racketeer want to acquire to begin with and what they gain from it? The pursuit is a competitive one. Getting away with it is always the option and is more than often the outcome. There is much to be achieved through crime. The problems associated with risks take place when you get caught and even when you do get caught, the potential for getting away with it is ever present. The difference

between the shoplifter and the racketeer is that the racketeer (like the well-connected drug trafficker) is able to make a full-fledged career through his personal pursuit. He is able to do so because he is not alone in his endeavors and is able to pool his resources with those of others so that the likelihood and amplitude of consistent gains pursues. It is a goal shared by many. The shoplifter, I speculate, is generally alone in his exploits and is therefore required to supplement his obligation to earn through additional sources of income. He therefore cannot be career oriented.

Organized Crime and the General Theory of Low Self Control

The queer ladder process as a whole and the relationally-compelled organized crime process that guides it are long-term in aim. This challenges the «crime and criminality perspective» (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: p.203) that when applied to organized crime, and more generally to organization and crime, argues that crime is «incompatible» (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: p.213) with notions of long-term cooperation, trustworthiness, and reliability as well as being a creation of «post-hoc interpretations by scholars or law enforcement officials to account for a series of events that otherwise has no inherent structure or coherent purpose» (p.203). Ultimately, Gottfredson and Hirschi's crime and criminality perspective further denounce the very thought of organization and crime by reducing it to a «natural attraction to the idea that organization underlies all human activities» (p.203). The 'naturalness' of this attraction is subsequently reinterpreted, by the authors, as an extension of the imperialistic influence and continuous persistence of «sociological positivism» in maintaining a «*fully social* interpretation of the causes of crime» (p.203) [56]. This criticism is further refined in stating that:

> «'fully social' alternatives to standard sociological theories of the crimes of individuals do not make reference to the properties of individuals. They attend only to the properties of the environment.

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56. The authors further hamper this speculation with the statement that «the task of sociological theory was to explain how a social animal can be caused to commit antisocial acts» (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: p.203)

> Typically, the major aspect of the environment of interest to sociologists is 'other people' or 'the group'» (p.204).

This thesis addresses the issues of both Marks and Gravano's career by demonstrating their specific capacities to shape the returns and risks extending from their core working networks in their favour and for their own personal advancements. 'Other people' brought Marks and Gravano into their particular professions. 'Other people' were also at the root of each of their ascendencies in their trades and specific working environments. In both cases, 'other people' continued to be key, albeit decreasing, components once the entrepreneur attained an established position between them. Without these others, neither would have survived in their vocations. Purposive action approaches within the social network perspective and the basic concepts of social embeddedness and social capital allow us to pursue the classical notions of free will and choice within the environmental scope of others.

The main difference with the low-self-control version of the crime and criminality perspective and the crime and criminality perspective developed here is that economic action or the pursuit of self-interest is placed back into the sociological premise that has guided much of the advancement in criminology. Like successful legitimate entrepreneurs, successful criminal entrepreneurs are those individuals who know how to use others to advance their own personal aims. Hence, I do come to the conclusion that «crime *[at least the entrepreneurial forms of crime studied here]* is like other rationally structured forms of human activity and can be explained in the same way: people organize to increase their safety and profit» (Gottfredson and Hirschi: p.211).

In defending their view against organization and crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) illustrate via a critique of the social organization of juvenile gangs that was initially developed by Thrasher (1927) along formal organizational principles. First, they maintain, but do not document, that «serious studies of gang leadership and role structure have failed to substantiate the classical image of the gang» (p.207). Low-self-control theory, however, does accept the possibility of some level of informal friendship structure in juvenile gangs (p.207). Second, they

refute the likelihood of individual commitment and loyalty to fixed delinquent groups on the basis of a «general lack of friendship, affection, or trust among them» (p.208) which brings them to point out the transitive state of gang attachments. Third, they oppose those maintaining the place of the peer group (the organization) in causing «behavior by providing the motivation» (p.209).

Once Gottfredson and Hirschi have pushed aside the possibility for organization in juvenile gangs within the shadow of the general cause of low-self-control, they finally take on the organized crime issue. The critique is somewhat minimal in that although they point to some of the more consistent findings from Cressey's past research, they divert the discussion to incorporate the idea of professionalism and crime and pursue the critique by converging on the professions of fencing and thievery. Never do Gottfredson and Hirschi discuss the organization and crime issue within the context of the supply and demand of goods and services. Consensual demand by the general public is never raised. This would have obliged them to accept the place of standard business practices and strategies within the context of crime. In not doing so, the authors are left expressing how «impressed» they continue to be «by the incompatibility of the idea of organized crime and the ideas of crime and self-control» (p.213). The career experiences of both Marks and Gravano and the analyses that emerge from the present thesis leave me with the same impression. Organized crime is not crime that is explained by the theory of low-self-control. The process of organized crime demonstrated here is not compatible with that general theory of crime. This is because continuous participation within this form of crime requires network capacities that are economic in nature yet social in context, long-term in aim and preparation, and strategically cooperative. Insulated risk-taking, adaptability, an intense belief in free competition, and an acceptance of the doctrine of materialistic accumulation are additional prerequisites that emerge from organized crime processes and remain inconsistent with the low-self-control theory of crime.

This thesis also overcomes another sideline raised against organized crime research: «Apparently, it is easier to assume structure than to document it» (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: p.207). By actually documenting and making

structure the analytical target and main finding of the entire study, the incisiveness of the authors' criticism is completely dismissed. Organized crime is not an «illusion» (p.213) and social organization in crime is not a myth (p.214).

The present thesis is not representative and statistical inference is in no way attempted. At the same time, Marks and Gravano may or may not be atypical players in the organized crime process. They are, however and for certain, diametrically-opposed types within the scope of knowledge that has been documented within the general field of organized crime research (illegal enterprise included, of course). The theory developed here demonstrates that even in the midst of all their evident differences, they both built their careers on what may be maintained as relational foundations. That a network framework of analysis grasps the common thread uniting each of these entrepreneur's advancement within their specific earning activities may not, with sufficient certitude, establish a general theory for the majority of organized crime participants. Instead, it is the extremes – the ideal types – that are seized within this shared explanation.

Whether an explanation incorporating opposing extreme cases constitutes a convincing understanding of other cases falling in between these poles is left to the reader to decide. From my assessment of the overall argument presented here, *personal* social organization is required in order to persist within the personal social organization of others. This condition cannot be stripped away because it is within the overlapping of these personal social networks that organized crime is built. Strip it away and one is indeed left with unattached individuals with very little capacities to maintain a living through crime. The problem, of course and as demonstrated here, is that such personal social networks are there. They are just not available to everyone.

Contacts and Opportunities: Respectively, Sutherland and Merton

The theoretical hybridization at the core of this study has its criminological roots with both Merton's opportunity structure theory and Sutherland's differential association theory. The former reveals the macro-based pursuit, while the latter explains the micro-level processes engulfing the means to reaching the goal.

Merton's focus on opportunity is blended with Sutherland's accent on others in an individual's life. Others, in short, are the means through which opportunities are accessed and subsequently become seizeable.

Merton supplied the theoretical perspective that accounted for the opportunity structure's place within the deviation towards crime as a way of achieving materialist success, but his unfounded refutation of contacts as a means to arriving at this goal not only denied a necessary element within his own theory but also in subsequent extensions of that theory. The most notable of these extensions was Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) own work on juvenile gangs. While the concept of illegal means was a major contribution from this work, the place of contacts – of others – as constituting means in themselves was never taken into consideration. Although Merton has made certain theoretical links in accentuating the compatibility between Sutherland's differential association and his anomie theory of crime (Merton 1997), this bridge cannot be completely made unless one considers the crucial and obvious place of social capital in explaining the shift away from the legitimate and towards crime, a commitment to a career in the latter, and the level of achievement that this career brings to its central character.

Following social embeddedness theory (Granovetter 1985) and insights from McCarthy and Hagan (1995; or Hagan and McCarthy 1997), it is argued that the main component in Sutherland's differential association theory – others – provides the substantive focus bridging the gap between these two theories. By seeing contacts throughout a career in legitimate or criminal trades as essential to either process, we begin to see that the notion of differential association grasps the micro-processes indicative of a person's trajectory within a career and world that finds its way through the differential opportunity structure. Differential association accounts for one's place within a wider context of differential opportunities. The positive associations that were argued by Sutherland to be so crucial to establishing an attraction towards crime in a person's life may be indicated by the opportunities that they lead to. Differential associations nourish and shape one's personal opportunity structure. Differential association accounts for the likelihood of one's career being oriented towards crime because those others that make up

these associations also provide the opportunities to further persist and pursue the criminal (and queer ladder) trajectory. Favourable opportunities are therefore favourable associations that extend from established others in a person's life. Negative associations, in turn, may be concretized by negative opportunities. The unit of analysis therefore remains less on the individual and more on those around him. The individual is perceived as taking on a personal pursuit, but such purposive action, although based on utilitarian principles, requires other individuals to be in place in order for advancement to occur. Advancement and therefore persistence, durability, and survival in crime requires a personal network to be in place. This personal network reveals the scope of one's personal opportunity structure.

Brokerage Opportunities, Personal Opportunity Structures, and Legitimation

Network efficiency and constraint may be taken as indicators of an individual's blocked opportunities that are at the core of Merton's (1957) and Bell's (1960) theories. Burt (1992) offers measurable concepts that allow us to illustrate how opportunities may be differentially accessible or blocked within the basic social fabric of human relations. For example, new arrivals in a defined setting are relationally constrained in that they are not generally in a position to broker with different groups within a larger portion of that setting. Not being able to broker means that they are not in a position to branch out and expand the scope and quality of their economically-induced opportunities beyond confines defined by strong-tied and redundant personal networks. They are, at the onset, outsiders. For outsiders wanting to get into the defined conventional setting, network constraints must be overcome.

The queer ladder route represents an alternate way of shaping network-embedded opportunities in a constrained (or inefficient) individual's favour. The less constraining the networking, the quicker one gets ahead. Getting ahead in organized crime has been found to direct one towards a potential exit from crime. This has been referred to as the legitimation process (Ianni 1972). The more an organized crime participant is able to expand and increase his earning activities,

the more he finds himself in a position to shift back to legitimate forms of business.

This legitimation process may be best observed when converging on inter-generational continuation in the Cosa Nostra (generally, father-to-son), which is less a sign of familial commitment to crime as a way of life than an indication of the father's inability to accelerate and complete the shift back to conventional ways. It is therefore expected that within Cosa Nostra and other prolonged criminal collectivities, inter-generational continuation will more likely be present amongst the most constrained members and largely absent amongst the more autonomous, higher-ranked, and privileged. Decreased network constraints indicates increased privileged positioning within the Cosa Nostra family. This, at least in Gravano's case, increased the likelihood of involvement in legitimate enterprise which, subsequently cleared the path towards potential legitimation. Less successful (more constrained) members are more likely to be found in predominantly criminal activities. In regard to earning activities and networking capacities, the apparent Cosa Nostra kingpins or elite members are closer to legitimate entrepreneurs than they are to those who find themselves at the criminal onset of the queer ladder sway.

The more privileged members are those who are able to broker at the social frontier between criminal and legitimate forms of enterprise. The quicker the criminal entrepreneur attains a position at that frontier and becomes increasingly proximate to legitimate opportunities, the less likely the inter-generational continuation of criminal participation will take place. One occurrence detailed by Gravano describes John Gotti, at the time he was the Gambino family boss, revealing the news regarding his son being recently made: *"John was telling Chin* [Genovese family boss, 'Chin' Gigante] *in a sort of proud way that his son, John Jr., had just been made. Instead of congratulating him, Chin said, 'Jeez, I'm sorry to hear that.' We were a little shocked by this, but Chin was right. Paul Castellano didn't want his kids in the life. None of Chin's sons were made. I myself would be dead set against it. I wanted my son to be legitimate, to have nothing to do with what I did"* (Maas 1997: pp.239-240). This anecdote does not constitute a

confirmation of the inter-generational strength of the Cosa Nostra. Quite differently, it illustrates to what point Gotti and his actions were exceptional to the more typical pattern taken by elite members.

During the same period that Gotti was pulling the relational strings to have his son made as an official member in the Cosa Nostra, Gravano was investing his efforts into attaining further control of the Gambino family's construction interests. While Gravano was setting up new and larger ventures at the criminal-legitimate frontier and becoming increasingly legitimate in his earning activities, Gotti was seemingly focused on more political matters within the family. A key pattern extending from Gravano's working network during this attainment phase in his career was his increasing distancing from conventional racketeering tactics in his construction ventures. The creation of his last construction consulting firm, strongly represented the direction he had taken in his earning activities. Gravano personally had a quarter of the stock in this business. His wife and two children owned the remainder. As he explained: *"I don't want no kickbacks no more. I'll do my own thing. I'd rather give the kickback. And we never twisted arms. You know, maybe to get on the first job, I'll intimidate a little bit. But I never intimidated again"* (Maas 1997: p.231). He later added: *"I'm going to be paying my taxes. I don't want to be like a lot of made guys who end up in front of a jury and can't explain their sources of income"* (Maas 1997: p.234). The direction in which Gravano was taking his business activities strongly constitutes the legitimation process. Gravano's drive was in conformity with the conventional business-oriented goal of materialistic success. Gotti, it would seem, was more likely driven by personal principles strictly aimed at beating the system.

Marks, at various points throughout his career, was also quite intent on shifting his business ventures increasingly away from cannabis importing and towards legitimate operations. Quite differently from Gravano, who concentrated an increasing portion of his time and energy in contacts and businesses within the boundaries of New York City's construction industry, Marks was in a consistent shift and oscillation process (Adler 1993 and 1983) in regard to his legitimate and illegal venturing. Also quite differently from Gravano, who oriented his career

exclusively within the construction industry, Marks experimented with a much wider array of shorter-term legitimate enterprises.

These two distinctions may be substantially accounted for by raising two other key components distinguishing the two entrepreneurs at the heart of this thesis. First, Gravano's career in crime was oriented along racketeering activities. It is clear that a player's initiative and subsequent ability to infiltrate legitimate industries through illegal means will, in the long run, lead to a higher likelihood that that player may make the complete shift to legitimate enterprise than the player who remains primarily active in the distribution of illegal goods and services. Racketeering in legitimate enterprise allows a player to establish and refine his working network within that industry. Contacts in legitimate industries may be, as is often assumed, forced to cooperate with the racketeer, but many others may also be quite voluntary and interested in their decisions to be cooperative with the racketeer. These and other contacts remain whether the player participates as a racketeer or in pure legitimate fashion.

For the racketeer, like Gravano, the shift towards complete legitimation becomes possible because the working setting is already in place when and if the decision to make the shift is made. For Marks, the shift to legitimate enterprise demanded the establishment of a new working environment that also required the creation of new contacts. Participants whose careers revolve completely around the supply of illegal goods and services cannot make the same convenient transition as legitimate-bounded racketeers. Marks, for example, amongst the many legitimate ventures that he did dabble in throughout his career, applied his knowledge and experience in importing cannabis towards the importation of wine after his release from Brixton Prison in 1982. Although the logistics of this business continued to revolve around the importation of goods, the difference between the more informal illegal and considerably regulated legitimate venturing hampers the criminal entrepreneur seeking legitimate opportunities as a career alternative.

Gravano was therefore in a position to focus on his legitimate business activities in a more stable and systematic fashion. Once he got into the

construction industry as a racketeer, he stayed and expanded to assure his survival with or without racketeering tactics. Marks's jet-set lifestyle, although allowing him an increasing scope in his cannabis trade opportunities, rarely allowed him to be in place long enough to assure the proper establishment and survival of a legitimate enterprise. It is in large part for these reasons that Marks's endeavors in legitimate enterprise usually took on the function of a front. Legitimation was therefore evident in Gravano's career, but somewhat less so in Marks's.

Marks did desist from cannabis trade action just previous to his 1987 arrest, as he did following his release from prison in 1982. His various justifications for why he decided to leave 'once and for all' was stated as such: "*This was not a case of my suddenly seeing the light and realising that dope-dealing is a wicked and anti-social crime. I was simply not enjoying myself any more. Most of my close partners were in prison. Some were understandably blaming me for their fate. Others were correctly accusing me of endangering scams by doing too many. I was criticized and ridiculed for not being prepared to deal in cocaine. Some associates were trying to set me up. Others were deliberately excluding me from scams that would not have begun without me. I was under surveillance. I was paying fortunes to the CIA to keep the DEA off my back. I wasn't making any money. I wasn't seeing my family*" (Marks 1997: pp.332-333). In short, his network was falling apart and the action of the trade that fed his incentives for two decades had lost its attraction. The legitimate alternative became more attractive in light of the demise of the criminal option. For Gravano, the movement between the two general fields of business was more suitably illustrated by a unidirectional drive taking him from street crimes to a full emergence and commitment into the construction industry.

Gravano was clearly aiming towards the eventual shift towards legitimation. An assessment of his business activities and working network during the period immediately preceding his 1990 arrest tells us that the odds of him achieving this shift were quite strong. It may indeed be speculated that Gravano was not likely to make the full shift to legitimate enterprise in view of the permanent affiliation he made with the Gambino family. Once again, the full shift must take into account

what the entrepreneur leaves as a heritage to his family.

Marks showed less of a capacity to find a steady legitimate operation to allow him to detach completely from cannabis importation: *"A careful scrutiny of my businesses revealed that they were actually losing money rather than making it. As a result of my money-laundering, the businesses' accounts looked good, and they had from time to time provided some sort of cover; but I longed for a front that would actually make money rather than merely deplete my marijuana profits"* (Marks 1997: p.272). Furthermore, the complete shift to legitimate enterprise was never achieved by Marks not only because he was incapable to do so, but also, as the following excerpt concerning his wine importation venture points out, because he was lacking the full incentive: *"Meticulous accounts were maintained, and national insurance, income tax, graduated pensions, corporation tax, and value-added tax were most conscientiously paid. I was very busy and very straight. I was also very bored. None of this was exciting and none of it was making any real money"* (Marks: p.207). The shift and oscillation process which highlighted Marks's career was created by a similar inability, inexperience, and/or unwillingness shared by entrepreneurs who have been accustomed to and successful at dealing in informal contexts in applying their business aptitudes in settings which require more formal procedures and organization. Gravano had become accustomed to investing in this capacity through his racketeering experiences. Marks had not.

It is not a complete coincidence that the process of legitimation has been a phenomenon captured exclusively by students of organized crime. It is likely amongst the most committed and entrepreneurially-oriented criminals that "the goal" is desired most to begin with and the means to achieving it are most likely accessible. It is therefore amongst students of organized crime that the question "where are they taking their criminal careers?" was most obvious and conceivable. While the criminal career may be ended by lengthy incarceration spells, death or serious injury, submission to informal controls, loss or substantial decrease in criminal opportunities, and voluntary desistance as an outcome of consistent failures to make it through crime, one answer to this question came in the form of

the process of legitimation that successful criminals enter once the goal has been satisfied and achieved.

Achievement is a condition to the legitimation process. This legitimation process is expected to take form after the individual peaks in his criminal endeavors. The peak and drop structuring both careers studied throughout this thesis indicate goal-oriented achievement as well as the potential shift away from crime and towards legitimate ways. Marks was much less oriented towards legitimate activities than Gravano, but both had contemplated a move towards legitimation and a distancing from their criminal ways. This becomes possible because with an increase in disconnectivity within one's criminally-entrenched personal working network, the entrepreneur is able to invest an increasing portion of his left-over relationally-based time and energy in noncriminal others and endeavors. This shift takes place because one has the time to do so and has come to attain a position to make a living at a satisfactory and autonomous level in legitimate enterprise. This capacity, as with previous stages in their careers, is revealed through the individual's social and financial capital. Associations towards the conventional grow increasingly positive and come to dampen the attractiveness of criminal associations.

The complete and successful criminal entrepreneur is, ultimately, the one who is able to shift his fortune back into the legitimate side of business and cease the queer ladder process. 'The Dream' is reached (or neared comfortably enough) and subsequent generations of descendants may flourish through its extensions. Studying the personal networks of those individuals who choose to expand their possibilities through such avenues allow us to converge and appraise the respective opportunity structures available to each.

Successful criminals have the opportunity to become successful legitimate entrepreneurs. The successful and complete criminal career is that which avoids, resists, and/or absorbs other career-ending shocks and makes its ways towards the progressive seizing and creation of new opportunities that are increasingly conventional and decreasingly criminal. Because the pursuit remains conventional to begin with, the successful and complete criminal career is that which ends

legitimately.

To near or complete this shift to the legitimate, one must focus on structuring one's personal network to accumulate entrepreneurial business opportunities in an increasingly legitimate manner. The most entrepreneurial participants in organized crime processes are also the best suited to adapt to both criminal and legitimate contexts of business. The transition from criminal to legitimate enterprise takes place with a participant's ability to make the complete crossover to the other side – the legitimate side. Motive to crossover is an important factor but it is also dependent on the capacity to 'comfortably' do so. This is the end of the queer ladder. This end shows us the opportunity that extends from one's flexibility and autonomy in make a living that was initially developed through crime and which may be subsequently transferred to legitimate contexts.

What's the Matter With RICO?

Neither Marks nor Gravano succeeded in making the complete and successful shift to the legitimate side of business. As the previous section discussed, they were only in a plausible position to do so. Instead, the circumstances bringing Marks and Gravano to shift to the legitimate side were not consensual on either of the entrepreneurs' parts. Both were removed from their respective long-term criminal activities by the external targeters that have been raised on occasion throughout the thesis. Marks was removed by the DEA while Gravano was removed by the FBI. Both, however, were indicted and prosecuted under the American RICO (Racketeering-Influenced Corrupt Organizations) statutes during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was the second key element uniting Marks's and Gravano's careers. It should not come as a surprise to anyone that both entrepreneurs' careers, maintained throughout this thesis as typifying distinguished cases of organized crime, would come to an end under a legislation that was designed to extirpate organized crime in the United States.

RICO-like legislation is based on strict principles of deterrence. However, this aggressive policy is distorted by the negotiation procedures that precede the sanctioning process. What often takes place, as both Marks's and Gravano's

experiences with this legislation demonstrate, is that the transgressors are offered a deal by representatives of the law-enforcement agencies that have been targeting them for quite some time. Marks did not take the deal offered to him by the DEA. However, many of his co-participants did and, in doing so, aided the DEA in bringing Marks to RICO-like justice. Gravano did take the deal offered to him by the FBI. In taking this deal, he aided the FBI in serving justice to John Gotti, his Gambino family boss, his fellow elite-family member, Frank Locascio, and several other Cosa Nostra members and associates.

Marks obtained 25 years to be served in a maximum-security prison not simply because he had chosen cannabis smuggling as a career choice. In large part, this sentence would have been drastically diminished if he would have cooperated with the DEA and prosecuting agents by providing career damaging information on others in his personal network. He did not cooperate. He served 7 years in an American prison whereupon he was sent back to the United Kingdom to continue his sentence. Marks' writes that he was released on full parole just before being deported back to England[57]. Marks also continues to maintain that distributing cannabis, through nonviolent means, is not wrong.

Gravano received 5 years, of which he served 4 before the sanction was revealed. During that period, he confessed to having had a part in the murder of 19 others throughout his career. Gravano never even tried to defend the moral value of these particular business actions. He apparently did not have to. He served the 4 years preceding the official sanction as a government witness in the prosecutions of his former personal working contacts. The FBI and the prosecutors applying the RICO statutes wanted to make sure that its side of the deal with Gravano was fully met before it officially sanctioned him (hence displacing any form of celerity of punishment). Gravano, who had considerable experience dealing with Cosa Nostra-like sanctioning knew that the key to avoiding it was to remain in the

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57. Please note, however, that Howard Marks, since his release from Indiana's Terre Haute prison in 1995, seems to have found a successful position within the legitimate sphere of activities as a key spokesman for the legalization of cannabis in the United Kingdom. Aside from this political agenda, Marks also performs a one-man show dealing with his legendary past in various venues throughout the UK. In short, Marks is still thriving off the cannabis trade but through legitimate means.

interests of the decision makers. In the same way that his edge between Gambino family members, which had him accessing increasingly exclusive information concerning opportunities to earn, saved him from the death sanctions that were applied to many others, his knowledge and evidence on his personal network members allowed him to avoid the equally severe RICO penalty (both Gotti and Locascio received life sentences without parole). He was holding exclusive information on one party and ready to share it with another interested party. He was useful to his prosecutors[58].

The problem with RICO-like statutes is that they are designed to suggest the appearance of being driven by a rigid process regulated by severe sanctioning, when, in fact, they are more accurately flexible forms of justice that may be considerably avoided if one remains of interest to those in a position to make a decision. Elite criminal entrepreneurs are in a better position to play around with such flexibility because they have built and sustained their careers on accessing such exclusive information. It is at this phase that successful criminal entrepreneurs come to realize that what made and soared them in the criminal side is also quite applicable in the legitimate side. They therefore continue to survive because what they know about who they know is of interest to key others, and therefore beneficial for themselves – same racket, different players.

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58. Please note that Gravano, since his decision to leave the American Witness Protection Program in 1997, continued to invest his substantial experience in construction as a small entrepreneur in Arizona. In February 2000, however, he was arrested, along with his wife, daughter, and son, for his suspected role in an ecstasy distribution ring in Phoenix.

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APPENDIX A

Contact Matrices for Marks's Importation Consignments

V-1 (Consignment 1 in Venture 1):

	1	3	19	23	25	2	11	6	10	13
N1	-	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N19	1	1	-	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
N23	1	1	1	-	0	1	0	0	0	1
N25	0	1	0	0	-	0	1	0	0	0
N2	1	1	1	1	0	-	0	1	1	1
N11	0	1	0	0	1	0	-	0	0	0
N6	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	-	1	1
N10	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	-	1
N13	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	-

V1-2:

	1	3	2	23	11	25	22	7	15
N1	-	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N2	1	1	-	1	0	0	1	1	1
N23	1	1	1	-	0	0	1	1	0
N11	0	1	0	0	-	1	0	0	0
N250	1	0	0	1	-	0	0	0	
N22	1	1	1	1	0	0	-	1	1
N7	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	-	1
N15	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	-

V1-3:

	1	3	23	17	18	15	6	2	11	25
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N23	1	1	-	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
N17	1	1	1	-	1	0	0	1	0	0
N18	1	1	1	1	-	0	0	1	0	0
N15	1	1	0	0	0	-	1	1	0	0
N6	1	1	0	0	0	1	-	1	0	0
N2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	0	0
N11	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	1
N25	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-

V2-1:

	1	27	12	22	3
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N27	1	-	1	0	1
N12	1	1	-	0	1
N22	1	0	0	-	1
N3	1	1	1	1	-

V3-1:

	1	3	28	26	12
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1
N28	1	1	-	1	0
N26	1	1	1	-	0
N12	1	1	0	0	-

V3-2:

	1	3	11	28	26
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1
N11	1	1	-	0	0
N28	1	1	0	-	1
N26	1	1	0	1	-

V2-2:

	1	3	22	11	25
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1
N22	1	1	-	1	1
N11	1	1	1	-	1
N25	1	1	1	1	-

V1-4:

	1	3	23	28	22	11	25	15	19	6
N1	-	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N23	1	1	-	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
N28	0	1	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0
N22	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	0	0	1
N11	0	1	0	0	0	-	1	0	0	0
N25	0	1	0	0	0	1	-	0	0	0
N15	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	-	1	1
N19	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	-	1
N6	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	-

V3-3:

	1	3	23	28	22	11	25	26
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1	0	1
N23	1	1	-	0	1	0	0	0
N28	1	1	0	-	0	0	0	1
N22	1	1	1	0	-	0	0	0
N11	1	1	0	0	0	-	1	0
N25	0	0	0	0	0	1	-	0
N26	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	-

V3-4:

	1	3	2	26
N1	-	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1
N2	1	1	-	0
N26	1	1	0	-

V3-5:

	1	3	12	28	27	19
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1
N3	1	-	1	1	1	1
N12	1	1	-	0	1	0
N28	1	1	0	-	0	0
N27	1	1	1	0	-	0
N19	1	1	0	0	0	-

V3-6:

	1	26	28	30	7
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N26	1	-	1	1	0
N28	1	1	-	1	1
N30	1	1	1	-	1
N7	1	0	1	1	-

V3-7:

	1	26	30	29	28
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N26	1	-	1	1	1
N30	1	1	-	1	1
N29	1	1	1	-	1
N28	1	1	1	1	-

V2-3:

	1	27	22	3
N1	-	1	1	1
N27	1	-	1	1
N22	1	1	-	1
N3	1	1	1	-

V1-5:

	1	23	3	2	13
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N23	1	-	1	1	1
N3	1	1	-	1	1
N2	1	1	1	-	1
N13	1	1	1	1	-

V4-1:

	1	26	6	32	36	33
N1	-	1	1	1	0	1
N26	1	-	0	0	1	1
N6	1	0	-	1	0	0
N32	1	0	1	-	0	0
N36	0	1	0	0	-	1
N33	1	1	0	0	1	-

V4-2:

	1	26	32	36
N1	-	1	1	0
N26	1	-	0	1
N32	1	0	-	0
N36	0	1	0	-

V4-3:

	1	26	31	36
N1	-	1	0	0
N26	1	-	1	1
N31	0	1	-	0
N36	0	1	0	-

V4-4:

	1	26	11	25	12
N1	-	1	1	0	1
N26	1	-	0	0	0
N11	1	0	-	1	1
N25	1	0	1	-	1
N12	1	0	1	1	-

V4-5:

	1	12	36	26	11
N1	-	1	0	1	1
N12	1	-	0	0	1
N36	0	0	-	1	0
N26	1	0	1	-	0
N11	1	1	0	0	-

V5-1:

	1	22	11	25
N1	-	1	1	1
N22	1	-	0	0
N11	1	0	-	1
N25	1	0	1	-

V4-6:

	1	26	36	25	11	19
N1	-	1	0	1	1	1
N26	1	-	1	0	0	0
N36	0	1	-	0	0	0
N25	1	0	0	-	1	1
N11	1	0	0	1	-	0
N19	1	0	0	1	0	-

V4-7:

	1	26	36	25
N1	-	1	0	1
N26	1	-	1	0
N36	0	1	-	0
N25	1	0	0	-

V4-8:

	1	26	36	25	39
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N26	1	-	1	0	1
N36	1	1	-	0	1
N25	1	0	0	-	0
N39	1	1	1	0	-

V4-9:

	1	26	37	36	31
N1	-	1	1	1	0
N26	1	-	1	1	1
N37	1	1	-	0	1
N36	1	1	0	-	0
N31	0	1	1	0	-

V4-10:

	1	26	37	36	31
N1	-	1	1	1	0
N26	1	-	1	1	1
N37	1	1	-	0	1
N36	1	1	0	-	0
N31	0	1	1	0	-

V6-1:

	1	41	42	27
N1	-	1	0	1
N41	1	-	1	0
N42	0	1	-	1
N27	1	0	1	-

V7-1:

	1	41	42	27
N1	-	1	0	1
N41	1	-	1	0
N42	0	1	-	1
N27	1	0	1	-

V7-2:

	1	23	37	6
N1	-	1	1	1
N23	1	-	0	0
N37	1	0	-	0
N6	1	0	0	-

V8-1:

	1	41	15	6	7	32	19	26	33	39	2	38	43
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
N41	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
N15	1	1	-	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
N6	1	1	1	-	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
N7	1	1	1	1	-	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
N32	1	1	1	1	1	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
N19	1	1	0	0	0	0	-	1	0	0	1	0	0
N26	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	-	1	1	0	1	1
N33	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	-	1	0	0	0
N39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	-	0	0	0
N2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	-	0	0
N38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	-	1
N43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	-

V9-1:

	1	23	45
N1	-	1	1
N23	1	-	0
N45	1	0	-

V10-1:

	1	26	40	49	33	34
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1
N26	1	-	0	1	1	1
N40	1	0	-	0	0	0
N49	1	1	0	-	0	0
N33	1	1	0	0	-	1
N34	1	1	0	0	1	-

V10-2:

	1	26	37	49	46
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N26	1	-	0	1	0
N37	1	0	-	0	1
N49	1	1	0	-	0
N46	1	0	1	0	-

V11-2:

	1	37	45
N1	-	1	1
N37	1	-	1
N45	1	1	-

V12-1:

	1	54	40	56	55	32	6	19	47
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N54	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
N40	1	1	-	0	1	0	0	0	0
N56	1	1	0	-	1	0	1	0	0
N55	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	0	0
N32	1	1	0	0	1	-	1	1	0
N6	1	1	0	1	1	1	-	0	0
N19	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	-	1
N47	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-

V12-2:

	1	40	54	56	48
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N40	1	-	0	0	0
N54	1	0	-	1	1
N56	1	0	1	-	1
N48	1	0	1	1	-

V12-3:

	1	37	56	57	6	58	55	32	54
N1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
N37	1	-	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
N56	1	0	-	0	1	0	1	0	1
N57	1	1	0	-	0	0	1	0	1
N6	1	0	1	0	-	1	1	1	1
N58	1	0	0	0	1	-	1	1	1
N55	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1
N32	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	-	1
N54	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-

V13-1:

	1	23	57	7
N1	-	1	1	1
N23	1	-	1	0
N57	1	1	-	1
N7	1	0	1	-

V14-1:

	1	59	58	32	37
N1	-	1	1	1	1
N59	1	-	1	0	0
N58	1	1	-	1	1
N32	1	0	1	-	1
N37	1	0	1	1	-

APPENDIX B

Gravano's Promotional Inquiry (Based on Burt's social capital questionnaire)

Basic Information

1. Year of Promotion:
2. Sammy's age:
3. Name of family:
4. General rank in family:

5. Sammy's immediate supervisor: _____

Rounding out Sammy's Contact Network (names could be used more than once)

6. Suppose Sammy was moving to a new job and wanted to leave behind the best network advice he could for someone moving into his old job. Who are the three or four people he would name to his replacement as essential sources of support for success in his job? This could be people in or out of the family...

_____ _____
_____ _____

7. Of his colleagues, who has been the most difficult? _____

8. Consider all of Sammy's professional contacts made in his career so far, who have been the most valued contacts in the sense that they were the most important to his achievements?

_____ _____
_____ _____

9. Over the last six months, who are the two or three people Sammy has been with most often for informal social activities such as going out to lunch, dinner, drinks, visiting one another's homes, etc.?

_____
_____
_____

Assembling the Contacts (a nonredundant list is needed for reference - maximum 20 names)

10. List names in order in which they have appeared in questions 5-9. (make sure that no one is repeated and add anyone significant that is missing)

1- _____	11- _____
2- _____	12- _____
3- _____	13- _____
4- _____	14- _____
5- _____	15- _____
6- _____	16- _____
7- _____	17- _____
8- _____	18- _____
9- _____	19- _____
10- _____	20- _____

11. How close is Sammy with each person?

(EC = especially close; C = close; LC = less than close; D = distant)

1- _____	11- _____
2- _____	12- _____
3- _____	13- _____
4- _____	14- _____
5- _____	15- _____
6- _____	16- _____
7- _____	17- _____
8- _____	18- _____
9- _____	19- _____
10- _____	20- _____

12. How long has Sammy known each person? (in approximate years)

1- _____	11- _____
2- _____	12- _____
3- _____	13- _____
4- _____	14- _____
5- _____	15- _____
6- _____	16- _____
7- _____	17- _____
8- _____	18- _____
9- _____	19- _____
10- _____	20- _____

13. On average, how often does Sammy talk with each person? (best approximation)
(D = daily; W = weekly; M = monthly; LO = less often)

1- _____	11- _____
2- _____	12- _____
3- _____	13- _____
4- _____	14- _____
5- _____	15- _____
6- _____	16- _____
7- _____	17- _____
8- _____	18- _____
9- _____	19- _____
10- _____	20- _____

Strength of Relations Between Contacts (just answer on bottom half of the matrix's diagonal)
(D = distant; EC = especially close; Blank = neither, somewhere between distant and especially close)

- Do not feel obliged to write D or EC (leave blank when not sure) - the task, here, is to identify the extremes of distant versus especially close relations.

- Indicate node numbers assigned in Figure 5.1.

- For column 1 (strength of relations between Gravano and his contacts), insert values from question 11.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1 ( )	-																			
2 ( )		-																		
3 ( )			-																	
4 ( )				-																
5 ( )					-															
6 ( )						-														
7 ( )							-													
8 ( )								-												
9 ( )									-											
10 ( )										-										
11 ( )											-									
12 ( )												-								
13 ( )													-							
14 ( )														-						
15 ( )															-					
16 ( )																-				
17 ( )																	-			
18 ( )																		-		
19 ( )																			-	
20 ( )																				-

APPENDIX C

Contact Matrices for Gravano's Promotional Phases

P1: Colombo Associate

	1	**9**	**8**	**13**	**12**	**11**	**5**	**14**	**10**	**2**
N1	-	100	100	37	69	69	69	1	69	100
N9	100	-	100	34	34	34	34	0	34	0
N8	100	100	-	0	100	100	34	0	100	34
N13	37	34	0	-	0	0	0	34	0	0
N12	69	34	100	0	-	100	34	0	100	0
N11	69	34	100	0	100	-	34	0	100	0
N5	69	34	34	0	34	34	-	0	34	34
N14	1	0	0	34	0	0	0	-	0	0
N10	69	34	100	0	100	100	34	0	-	0
N2	100	0	34	0	0	0	34	0	0	-

P2: Gambino Associate

	1	**23**	**16**	**2**	**24**	**18**	**25**	**26**	**27**	**28**	**29**
N1	-	100	100	100	1	100	37	37	37	37	37
N23	100	-	100	0	34	0	100	100	100	100	100
N16	100	100	-	100	0	34	34	34	34	34	34
N2	100	0	100	-	0	100	34	34	34	34	34
N24	1	34	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0
N18	100	0	34	100	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
N25	37	100	34	0	0	0	-	34	34	34	34
N26	37	100	34	0	0	0	34	-	100	34	34
N27	37	100	34	0	0	0	34	100	-	34	34
N28	37	100	34	0	0	0	34	34	34	-	100
N29	37	100	34	0	0	0	34	34	34	100	-

P3: Gambino Soldier

	1	**23**	**19**	**32**	**27**	**2**	**36**	**16**	**25**	**33**	**37**	**26**	**34**	**38**	**35**
N1	-	100	100	100	100	100	1	69	37	100	1	100	1	1	1
N23	100	-	34	34	100	0	34	34	100	0	34	100	34	34	0
N19	100	34	-	34	34	34	0	34	0	0	0	34	34	34	34
N32	100	34	34	-	100	34	0	0	34	34	0	100	0	0	0
N27	100	100	34	100	-	34	0	34	34	34	0	100	0	0	0
N2	100	0	34	34	34	-	0	100	34	34	0	34	0	0	0
N36	1	34	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	34	0	100	100	100
N16	69	34	34	0	34	100	0	-	34	0	34	34	100	100	100
N25	37	100	0	34	34	34	0	34	-	0	0	34	0	0	0
N33	100	0	0	34	34	34	0	0	0	-	0	34	0	0	0
N37	1	34	0	0	0	0	34	34	0	0	-	0	34	34	34
N26	100	100	34	100	100	34	0	34	34	34	0	-	0	0	0
N34	1	34	34	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	34	0	-	100	100
N38	1	34	34	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	34	0	100	-	100
N35	1	0	34	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	34	0	100	100	-

P4: Gambino Capo

	1	50	19	52	20	57	60	55	56	30	33	37	49	47	59	36	51	27	46	39	42
N1	-	100	100	1	100	69	69	69	69	69	100	69	100	100	69	69	69	100	100	37	37
N50	100	-	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	34	34
N19	100	100	-	34	0	0	0	34	0	100	34	34	0	34	0	100	100	34	34	34	34
N52	1	0	34	-	34	34	0	34	0	34	0	34	34	0	0	34	34	0	0	34	34
N20	100	0	0	34	-	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N57	69	0	0	34	100	-	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N60	69	0	0	34	100	100	-	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N55	69	0	34	34	0	0	0	-	100	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0
N56	69	0	0	34	0	0	0	100	-	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	0
N30	69	34	100	34	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	34	0	0	0	34	34	34	34	34	34
N33	100	34	34	34	100	100	100	34	34	0	-	34	100	34	0	34	34	34	34	34	34
N37	69	34	34	34	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	-	0	34	0	34	34	34	34	34	34
N49	100	0	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N47	100	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	0	-	0	0	34	100	100	34	34
N59	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0
N36	69	100	100	34	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	0	0	-	34	0	0	34	100
N51	69	100	100	34	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	34	0	34	-	34	34	34	34
N27	100	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	100	0	0	34	-	100	34	34
N46	100	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	100	0	0	34	100	-	34	34
N39	37	34	34	34	0	0	0	100	34	34	34	34	0	34	0	34	34	34	34	-	34
N42	37	34	34	34	0	0	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	34	0	100	34	34	34	34	-

P5: Gambino Consigliere

	1	**50**	**55**	**52**	**20**	**25**	**33**	**41**	**47**	**53**	**59**	**68**	**51**	**49**	**30**
N1	-	100	100	1	100	69	100	100	69	37	69	100	69	69	37
N50	100	-	0	34	34	34	34	100	0	100	0	0	100	0	100
N55	100	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N52	1	34	0	-	34	0	34	34	0	34	0	0	34	0	34
N20	100	34	0	34	-	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N25	69	34	0	0	0	-	34	34	100	34	0	34	34	0	34
N33	100	34	0	34	100	34	-	34	34	34	0	34	34	100	34
N41	100	100	0	34	0	34	34	-	0	34	0	0	100	0	34
N47	69	0	0	0	0	100	34	0	-	34	0	34	34	0	34
N53	37	100	0	34	0	34	34	34	34	-	0	34	100	0	34
N59	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0
N68	100	0	0	0	0	34	34	0	34	34	0	-	34	0	34
N51	69	100	0	34	0	34	34	100	34	100	0	34	-	0	34
N49	69	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0
N30	37	100	0	34	0	34	34	34	34	34	0	34	34	0	-

P6: Gambino Underboss

	1	**50**	**55**	**52**	**25**	**30**	**33**	**41**	**47**	**49**	**53**	**20**	**59**	**62**	**68**
N1	-	100	100	1	69	37	100	100	69	69	37	100	69	37	100
N50	100	-	0	34	34	100	34	100	0	0	100	0	0	34	0
N55	100	0	-	34	0	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N52	1	34	34	-	34	34	34	34	0	34	34	34	0	0	0
N25	69	34	0	34	-	34	34	34	100	0	34	0	0	34	34
N30	37	100	0	34	34	-	34	34	34	0	34	0	0	34	34
N33	100	34	34	34	34	34	-	34	34	100	34	34	0	34	34
N41	100	100	0	34	34	34	34	-	0	0	34	0	0	34	0
N47	69	0	0	0	100	34	34	0	-	0	34	0	0	34	34
N49	69	0	0	34	0	0	100	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
N53	37	100	0	34	34	34	34	34	34	0	-	34	0	34	34
N20	100	0	0	34	0	0	34	0	0	0	34	-	0	0	0
N59	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
N62	37	34	0	0	34	34	34	34	34	0	34	0	0	-	34
N68	100	0	0	0	34	34	34	0	34	0	34	0	0	34	-