

Université de Montréal

U. S. Cultural Policy in France 1945 to 1958

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RÉSUMÉ

La Politique culturelle des États-Unis en France (1945 à 1958)

La thèse porte sur une dimension méconnue de la politique étrangère américaine et établit l'existence d'une politique culturelle en France de 1945 à 1958. Bien que des chercheurs américains et français aient reconnu l'influence culturelle des États-Unis en France, ils n'ont pas identifié de politique culturelle articulée. C'est ce que la présente étude se propose de faire en examinant l'administration, la structure, le programme et les finances du «Programme d'information des États-Unis en France» (USIS/France) durant la guerre froide. Afin de démontrer la pratique effective d'une politique culturelle par les États-Unis, la recherche s'appuie sur des archives américaines et françaises. Elle soutient que la culture faisait partie intégrante de la politique étrangère américaine et que les activités culturelles et de divertissement étaient utilisées pour atteindre des objectifs de politique étrangère. Ainsi, la thèse ajoute une nouvelle dimension à la compréhension de la politique américaine en France et révèle l'étendue et l'importance de ses objectifs. Faire de la culture une composante d'une politique étrangère est une initiative du Pentagone prise au courant de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Elle fut officialisée par l'adoption de la «Loi sur l'information et l'éducation» par le Congrès américain qui avalisait un programme d'échange de personnes et la fondation de bibliothèques américaines outre-mer. Cette législation autorisait pour la première fois un plan structuré de propagande officielle visant à disséminer les thèses libérales américaines. Son approbation controversée a été marquée par l'opposition menée par la presse américaine contre une initiative à caractère propagandiste.

L'administration Truman, inquiète de la fiabilité du gouvernement français comme allié des États-Unis en Europe, a présenté le plan comme nécessaire à la préservation du mode de vie américain. Ce mode de vie était menacé, selon elle, par les visées dominatrices des communistes. Elle soutenait que l'Union Soviétique finançait un important programme d'information qui dépassait le programme américain. Cette explication du gouvernement américain servait à justifier l'implantation d'une vigoureuse contre-attaque culturelle répondant au défi représenté par le programme soviétique.

En France, la mission américaine organisa le programme USIS/France à l'intérieur du cadre plus large du programme USIS/France d'outre-mer. Cependant, une stratégie particulière avait été élaborée pour attirer les Français au mode de vie américain. Au travers de son bureau à Paris, le programme se voulait informatif au sujet des États-Unis plutôt que propagandiste. Des programmes et des événements étaient présentés qui, tout en introduisant le mode de vie américain au public français, le faisait d'une manière feutrée. Ostensiblement, cette approche permettait au public de se faire une idée sur les États-Unis et leur politique extérieure basée sur des faits plutôt que sur des exagérations. À partir de ces informations, les spectateurs jugeraient d'eux-mêmes s'ils approuvaient ou non les valeurs américaines. Cette orientation était le fait du personnel d'ambassade américain qui a convaincu les autorités de Washington qu'une approche indirecte s'imposait en France, faute de quoi le programme ne pouvait réussir.

Pour les responsables américains à Washington, cette stratégie comportait plusieurs avantages. Pour commencer, elle mettait l'accent sur le concept de liberté d'opinion chère aux Américains. Ensuite, elle reflétait la nouvelle tendance à l'ouverture au public qui

prétendait préférer s'adresser à l'homme de la rue directement plutôt qu'au travers de multiples paliers gouvernementaux. Plus important, les médias culturels sont graduellement devenus le moyen privilégié de transmission des objectifs de la politique américaine. Initialement les activités de USIS/France se concentraient sur l'information factuelle plutôt que le divertissement. Cependant, la «Campagne de la vérité» de 1950 est devenue le cheval de bataille dans ce que le gouvernement américain représentait comme une guerre idéologique menée par l'URSS, mise en oeuvre en France par le Parti communiste français et destinée à jeter le discrédit sur les États-Unis et leur politique extérieure.

Suite à la «Campagne de la vérité», l'usage accru de divertissements culturels devint la base du programme USIS/France. Un nouvel intérêt dans la culture comme promotrice des objectifs de politique étrangère a entraîné le développement d'un programme unique qui comprenait des activités culturelles portant sur l'art, la musique, la danse, la littérature, les expositions de photos et les publications. Confronté au patrimoine culturel européen et plus particulièrement français, le Département d'État a établi une liste stricte de critères pour ses programmes culturels. Les doutes des Américains quant à la richesse de leur propre culture exigeaient que seul ce qu'il y avait de meilleur dans la culture américaine soit présenté en France. À mesure que la guerre froide gagnait en intensité, des restrictions ont été imposées afin de n'envoyer que les artistes américains ne démontrant aucune sympathie communiste dans leur cheminement tant professionnel que personnel. Parallèlement, les États-Unis ont centralisé leurs activités d'information sous l'égide de USIS/France. On cherchait ainsi à éliminer toute organisation privée qui était susceptible de remettre en cause l'autorité du programme en France. Pour donner une dimension nationale à USIS/France, des bureaux

régionaux ont été ouverts dans plusieurs grandes villes françaises en 1949. Ces centres étaient présentés officiellement comme des bibliothèques américaines afin de s'assurer l'appui du Congrès au financement. Leur fonctionnement était confié au personnel d'ambassade américain dont la tâche principale était d'entrer en contact avec les autorités municipales et gouvernementales locales. Le rôle du personnel correspondait à la philosophie américaine des «racines» (grass roots) car il se rapprochait des groupes de pression régionaux identifiés par l'ambassade américaine comme cibles vulnérables aux idées communistes.

La politique culturelle était déterminée à Washington comme une partie de l'ensemble plus vaste des opérations USIS. Celles-ci étaient soumises à un appareil bureaucratique complexe dirigé par le Département d'État. Les administrations Eisenhower et Truman ont modifié ces structures pour les adapter aux différentes priorités du programme d'information. Mais le Département d'État a toujours conservé la direction. Plusieurs décentralisations, tant au niveau de Paris que de Washington, ont été tentées pour accroître la marge de manoeuvre des dirigeants USIS/France. Les autorités de Washington s'y sont opposées dans la grande majorité des cas, ce qui a suscité des conflits internes dans l'administration et l'activité. Ce point est essentiel pour comprendre le rôle de la politique culturelle comme composante de la politique étrangère. En refusant de céder le contrôle du programme, le Département d'État a confirmé sa place et son importance dans la conduite de la politique étrangère.

La thèse s'arrête aussi sur la réaction du gouvernement et du peuple français face aux opérations de USIS/France. Les archives indiquent que le gouvernement français a acquiescé à la politique culturelle américaine parce qu'il avait ses propres priorités. Il a accepté la présence américaine dans les écoles publiques et les activités officielles américaines dans la mesure où il était convaincu que la France ne pourrait réaffirmer son influence sur le plan international que si son économie réussissait à se relever des dévastations de la guerre. Pour y arriver, le gouvernement avait besoin de l'assistance américaine. De là le souci d'éviter de nuire aux opérations américaines en France. Par ailleurs, cette politique vis-à-vis des États-Unis était confortée par l'assurance du gouvernement que la France, malgré sa dépendance économique, était précieuse pour les intérêts américains. Outre sa position géopolitique centrale en Europe de l'Ouest, la France avait un patrimoine culturel qui pouvait servir à modifier à son tour l'opinion américaine et maintenir l'assistance américaine en France. La réponse populaire à la politique culturelle américaine a été plus complexe. Derrière la façade d'un sentiment anti-américain latent qui se manifestait ponctuellement dans la presse française se trouvait un besoin profond de modernisation. La population réagissait lentement aux nouvelles technologies et à l'industrialisation dans son mode de vie et préférait conserver son grand héritage et ses traditions. Alors que le gouvernement américain s'impatiait vis-à-vis du point de vue français qu'il trouvait archaïque et irresponsable, les intellectuels français réagissaient à la dissémination organisée de la culture américaine en avançant que le type américain de société de consommation était une influence négative et qu'il mènerait éventuellement au désastre.

Le débat houleux qui s'ensuivit n'a pas eu une influence déterminante sur les opinions de la population française à l'égard de la politique culturelle américaine même s'il comportait des critiques sévères des États-Unis. En tant que groupe, la population française n'a pas succombé au déversement des médias culturels américains parce qu'elle préférait son propre mode de vie. Ainsi, la politique culturelle américaine en France n'a pas réussi à convertir les Français aux valeurs libérales américaines fautes. Cette politique a tout de même exercé une influence majeure sur le mode de vie français que l'on peut constater encore aujourd'hui.

Par une ironie du sort, si la culture populaire américaine est présente en France actuellement ce n'est pas tant grâce aux efforts consentis à la fin des années quarante et au début des années cinquante pour imposer des modèles américains à la vie française que le résultat de la popularité mondiale de la culture américaine qui s'est développée bien plus tard.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACAPO	Acting Chief Public Affairs Officer
AE	Affaires Étrangères
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AN	Archives Nationales
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIEPA	Centre International d'Échanges Pédagogiques
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations
CPAO	Chief Public Affairs Officer
DGRC	Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EDC	European Defence Community
EUROCOM	European Commission on Atomic Energy
FADC	Franco-American Audio-Visual Distribution Center
IBD	International Broadcasting Division
IIA	International Information Agency
MSA	Mutual Security Act
MSDAP	Mutual Security and Defence Agency Program
NARA	National Archives and Records Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
OCB	Operations Coordination Board
OEX	Office of Educational Exchange
OF	Official File
OI	Information Officer
OIAA	Office of International American Affairs
OIC	Office of Information and Cultural Affairs
OII	Office of International Information
OWI	Office of War Information
P/POL	Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PCF	Parti communiste français
PPF	President's Personal File
PPP	Post-Presidential Papers
PPS	Program Planning and Evaluation Staff
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
PSF	President's Secretary's Files
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe
SMOF	Staff Member Official File
U. N.	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USIA	U. S. Information Agency

USIE	U. S. Information and Education
USIS	U. S. Information Service
VOA	Voice of America
WHCF	White House Central File

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INTRODUCTION

This work allows the observer to assess the place of culture in the foreign policy of the U. S. vis-à-vis France from 1945 to 1958. It places culture in an interesting role, previously undetermined, because it demonstrates that there was *cultural policy* and not only the previously ascertained *cultural influence*. As a contribution to scientific knowledge, it brings to light new evidence about how international relations and public diplomacy were redefined by the Department of State after World War II in order to use culture as a means to carry out economic and political policy objectives. Therefore, it reveals aspects of foreign policy that were not previously divulged or evaluated. Furthermore, an important corollary emerges from this discovery of cultural policy that makes evident the difference between what the U. S. said its foreign policy objectives were in France and what reality entailed.

Initial investigation of a possible U. S. cultural policy in France revealed that such a study had to be carried out in two parts. It had to examine the role of culture in foreign policy in general in order to understand how it was used in France as a basis for U. S. policy there. Preliminary work provided clues that there was some link between foreign policy and culture; however, it was difficult to define because of the vast and diffuse materials that were involved. The plethora of files in the U. S. archives in Washington, D. C., some of which had not yet been catalogued, at first made the project appear overwhelming, if not impossible.

However, later scrutiny of the Truman Papers in the Truman Library collection proved that there was a definite pattern between culture and foreign policy. It demonstrated how the U. S. government established a strategy to use culture as a component of foreign policy. From this understanding, it gradually became possible to trace the development of a cultural policy that was part of broader U. S. foreign policy. More interestingly, as information emerged, it became clear that U. S. Cold War strategy was dedicated to a novel kind of ideological warfare that worked upon the mind rather than on territorial aggrandizement. It explained, therefore, the extent to which politicization of culture was used to support U. S. economic and political objectives in France through cultural entertainments and information disseminated to the French about the U. S.

A number of recent events made an archival study of cultural policy tempting because they were timed with the lifting of bans on certain previously classified materials. In the U. S., declassification of original files after more than fifty years, occurred in the immediate aftermath of the public anniversaries commemorating the 1944 Normandy landings and the French Liberation, followed a year later by similar half-century memorials marking the end of World War II. In 1997, the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of the Marshall Plan resulted in additional sources being released.

This turned out to be both favorable and discouraging because the more files that were released, the more evident it became that such a comprehensive study would involve complex issues in the relations between France and the U. S. Moreover, many of the relevant documents in the French archives were, and are, still closed, subject to strict regulations forbidding perusal of materials that are less than sixty years old. In particular, the Archives

de la Police that contain information pertinent to French reaction toward U.S.-government activities in France, remain, at this date, inaccessible to researchers.

As well, the generation of diplomats and public servants who designed and executed U. S. cultural policy in France was limited. Those who were still alive at the beginning of this study were at least octogenarians, some of whom were either unable to remember or were reluctant to discuss their previous careers because of concerns that they might divulge details that were still secret. An important chapter in personal diplomatic endeavor would, therefore, be lost unless their story was documented. Oral history, if attempted, had to be done quickly before the witnesses disappeared from the scene.

Thus, the following study establishes a new dimension in the assessment of post-World War II U. S. foreign policy in France. It does so entirely through analysis of original sources discovered in the U. S. and French archives. In particular, it proceeds through examination of the U. S. Information Program in France¹ by demonstrating that its organizational structure, functions, program development, and the amount of public money allotted to it, constituted a genuine cultural policy.

While it was generally accepted by U. S. and French scholarship that there was a growing U. S. trend toward using culture in carrying out foreign policy objectives during the post-World War II era, analysis of its role was not fully addressed. A few scholars recognized some U. S. cultural influence within the French economic sector, but no one advanced the notion of a cultural policy or weighed the significance of official use of

¹Henceforth referred to by its acronym as the USIS or the USIS/France Program. Its several reorganizations during the period under review created other names. For clarity's sake, USIS will be used throughout this work.

culture upon Franco-American diplomatic and international relations. Instead, most historical scholarship focused on other topics that included U. S. economic reconstruction in France, anti-Americanism, the influence of French Communism and, in particular, French reaction to the phenomenon of U. S. mass consumerism.

There were a variety of reasons why scholars were not attracted to this question. First, a study of the use of culture in U. S. foreign policy in France involved centralization of materials drawn from different archives in order to ascertain the importance of culture and its actual role. Culture had to be situated within foreign policy as a basic factor of Cold War politics. Scholars undoubtedly thought that this inquiry would have to wait until more was known about the subject and until there was some understanding of the correlation between culture and policy.

It is evident, therefore, that this lack of previous attention to U. S. cultural activities in France made it difficult to assess this dissertation's point of view in comparison with opinions expressed by scholars who did not acknowledge the importance that the U. S. assigned to culture. A study of the presence of a U. S. cultural policy in France, therefore, could not be based on the historiographical literature of Franco-American relations in the post-World War II era.

There is, however, some common ground. It is universally agreed by French and American scholars that the U. S. intervened directly in the reconstruction of Europe, an involvement that was without precedent in European history. Some academics recognized

a pattern of U. S. cultural presence within this intercession. Gerard Bossuat² acknowledged that it opened the way for modernization that was the focus of French economic policy during the Recovery period. Irwin Wall³ affirmed that it existed in the Economic Cooperation Administration⁴ productivity missions.

U. S. scholars Hogan and Hill concurred with their British colleague, Milward, that inadequate U. S. aid to France was responsible for the widespread destitution that followed the post-Liberation period and consequently gave rise to the Marshall Plan.⁵ Their studies concluded that the U. S. attempted to build an equal partnership in post-World War II Western Europe to support the Atlantic Alliance.

While U. S. and French scholars acknowledged that the Cold War and the impoverished French post-World War II economic situation made France dependent upon the U. S. for financial aid, no study had uncovered the fact that the French government, for reasons of its own, tolerated widespread U. S. interference in French internal affairs.

²Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944 à 1954*. vol. 1. (Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 1992).

³Irwin M. Wall, *L'Influence américaine sur la politique française 1945 à 1954*. Trans. by Philippe-Étienne Raviart. (Paris: Éditions Balland, 1989).

⁴Henceforth known by its acronym ECA.

⁵Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1947 to 1952* (New York: 1987), Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945 to 1955* (London: Methuen and Company 1984), John S. Hill, "American Efforts to Aid French Reconstruction Between Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan," *Journal of Modern History*. Vol 64 (September 1992): 501-524.

French scholars Bossuat and Margairaz⁶ suggested that the French government and the upper echelon of civil servants agreed to U. S. conditions for financial aid because necessary modernization was dependent upon it. Moreover, some French historians criticized the French government for “selling out” to the Americans through their wholehearted acceptance of U. S. terms and agreeing to a liberal partnership⁷ with the U. S.

It is, however, this author’s opinion that both U. S. and French policies were based on necessity, rather than preference. Archival evidence demonstrates that the U. S. was dependent upon France for success of its security and defense objectives, governed as they were by the growth of paranoia during escalation of the Cold War. In effect, the Americans needed the French in the Atlantic Alliance, a factor that the French government used to its own benefit. Furthermore, the new post-war emphasis on culture allowed the French an advantage in their dealings with the U. S. through utilizing French cultural expertise and renowned heritage as the means to further French foreign policy objectives.

U. S. foreign policy changed as the Cold War intensified, making the American position with French leaders ever more tenuous as French leaders realized that U. S. efforts were oriented toward rebuilding Germany. What might have initially been a mutually beneficial policy became increasingly one-sided as it unfolded, placing France in the role

⁶Michel Margairaz, *L’État, les finances et l’économie: Histoire d’une conversion 1932 à 1952*. (Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et Financière de la France. Ministre des Finances Éditions, 1991).

⁷For example, Annie Lacroix-Riz, *Le Choix de Marianne: Les relations franco-américaines 1944 à 1948*. (Paris: Messidor/Éditions sociales, 1985).

of solicitor, while casting the U. S. as its benefactor. This soured Franco-American relations rather than moving them closer together. Negative French reaction to U. S. policy was led by the intellectuals who used the opportunity to further anti-Americanism, through denunciation of U. S. culture. Their claims that American cultural invasion threatened French identity became the basis for a type of “intellectual crisis” that dominated intellectual debate in France and was widely published in the press. In the U. S., American scholars reacted to this question by providing a vast literature of opinion on the matter. It became the catalyst for analysis of French national identity in both countries.

Not only did France become dependent upon the U. S. for aid through which it was offered the chance to rebuild its economy, but new research revealed in this study establishes that it accepted U. S. terms in order to pursue its own foreign policy objectives that were oriented toward making France the principal force in Europe. Ultimately, French objectives were flawed, but they are important because they demonstrate that the French position, while appearing conciliatory to U. S. demands, had both a modus operandi and specific goals. Archival references show that, while Franco-American relations were far from harmonious during the Cold War,⁸ France accepted greater U. S. involvement in its internal affairs than previously recognized because of its long-range foreign policy objectives.

⁸Ibid.

Irwin Wall ⁹ pointed out that every time the French government signed an accord with the U. S. it relinquished some part of its sovereignty. This aspect of his work agrees with that of French scholars Lacroix-Riz and Michel Margairaz. ¹⁰ This dissertation does not dispute that opinion. However, its evaluation of French reaction to U. S. cultural policy through analysis of government and popular response establishes that French reaction was governed by long-range foreign policy objectives as well as popular anti-Americanism organized by French groups rather than by individuals. It was particularly influenced by French intellectuals who used several incidents to submit their grievances to popular response through the French press.

Research indicated, however, that French popular response was not influenced by specific U. S. cultural influences, such as Coca-Cola, anymore than it was about other incidences of American culture. During the 1950s, U. S. cultural gestures were considered more a curiosity, rather than an attempt to dominate French life. Ultimately, they failed to change French lifestyle because the French did not feel any more comfortable with them than Americans would have been with French lifestyle.

⁹Irwin M. Wall, "Les Accords Blum-Byrnes: La modernisation de la France et la Guerre froide." *Vingtième Siècle* (1987): 47.

¹⁰Annie Lacroix-Riz, "Négociation et signature des accords Blum-Byrnes (octobre 1945 à mai 1946). *Revue d'Histoire moderne et contemporaine* XXX1 (1984). Michel Margairaz, "Autour des accords Blum-Byrnes: Jean Monnet entre le Consensus National et le Consensus Atlantique," *Histoire, Économie et Société* (1982).

In assessing French government position, French scholars were closer to unraveling the significance of U. S. cultural policy than were their U. S. counterparts. Lacroix-Riz identified the reconstruction of Germany as the key to understanding Franco-American relations. She asserted that France was “sacrificed” so that Germany could be rebuilt and restructured as the primary U. S. ally in Europe.¹¹ Bossuat concluded that it was the mineral resources of the Ruhr area that determined who controlled Western Europe and that the French were actually the losers in this situation.

Margairaz¹² and Lacroix-Riz related the French need for economic aid to French desire for modernization. They both stressed that the French government wished to avoid a prolonged dependence upon U. S. financial credits that would further entangle France in a “western bloc” and postpone future French independence. Their opinion is confirmed by this author whose research established that French policy aimed at control of the economy in order to regain French independence as quickly as possible.

An earlier group of scholars debated what it considered the crisis threatening French cultural independence during the 1950s, that it attributed to anti-Americanism. It raised the question of whether or not the French could withstand the onslaught of U. S. cultural influence. Nouailhat, Croizier, Bigsby and Grémion were among the scholars who addressed

¹¹Lacroix-Riz’s work only examines the period from 1944 to 1948 that she states was dominated by U. S. Interim Loans to France and by the rise of the PCF.

¹²Margairaz, *l’État, les finances et l’économie: Histoire d’une conversion 1932 à 1952*. Lacroix-Riz, *Le Choix de Marianne*.

this question.¹³

However, it was Richard Kuisel,¹⁴ who came closest to evaluating the significance of the U. S. cultural role in France through discussion of what he referred to as the attempted Americanization of the French. While his work examined the interrelationship between economics, politics and culture in post-World War II France, it did not study the existence of a cultural policy in France. Nor did he examine the use of U. S. cultural programs that included art, music, education, science or film.¹⁵

Instead, Kuisel's assessment addresses the French obsession with anti-Americanism that he concluded was a reaction to the challenge presented by U. S. modernization. He asserted that French post-World War II desperation emerged when the French were faced with the grim reality of French loss after the Liberation. His conclusions signaled a turn to French cultural heritage as their mainstay in the face of adversity and its use as a reminder of French superiority to the U. S. This author cannot disagree with that statement, yet regards

¹³Yves-Henri Nouailhat, "Franco-American Relations: French Perspectives," *Reviews in American History* (December 1986): 653-669, Michel Croizier, "The Cultural Revolution: Notes on the Changes in the Intellectual Climate in France," Stephen R. Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964): 602-630, Jacques Freymond, "America in European Eyes," *The Annals of American Political and Social Science*. Vol. 295. (September 1954): 33-41, Rose, Arnold, "Anti-Americanism in France," *Antioch Review* 13 (1952): 468-484, C. W. E. Bigsby, ed., "Europe, America and the Cultural Debate," *Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe* (London: Paul Elek, 1975), Pierre Nora, "America and the French Intellectuals," Trans. by Michael Taylor. *Daedalus* (1978): 325-335, Michel Winock, "'U. S. Go Home:' l'Antiaméricanisme français," *l'Histoire*. No. 50 (November 1988): 7-20, Pierre Grémion, *Preuves dans le Paris de Guerre froide*, "Vingtième Siècle" 13 (January to March 1987): 63-82.

¹⁴Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁵*Ibid.*, x. Kuisel refers to a study of this nature as "an impossible task."

the French presentation of its cultural treasure as the natural reaction of a people suffering from severe loss occasioned by the war years and not yet adapted to the new, restricted French economic and political position.

The approach taken by Kuisel selects specific encounters between the U. S. and France to illustrate the fact that the issue of French modernization was paramount in defining French reaction to mass consumerism. His discussion of the differences in French and American mentalities and the negative effect that these had on Franco-American meetings leads to his conclusion that French national identity prevented Americanization.

Kuisel's findings that Americanization failed in France are valid, yet his rationale for this decision has some shortcomings. Research for this dissertation found that French national identity was actually less prominent than group identities. The diverse social categories of French society were also highly diverse in their attitudes toward U. S. attempts to demonstrate the superiority of U. S.-style liberalism.

In view of that assessment, Kuisel's conclusion that national rather than individual identity was responsible for the failure of what he calls Americanization would seem to be an oversimplification. The long history of French individualism appeared to this author to uphold a tradition that valued French lifestyle, making it far more difficult for American cultural practices to take root in France.

The work done by Kuisel, however, provides valuable insight into how so-called Americanization was viewed by U. S. scholars. In contrast, this study proceeds from a different perspective. It traces the rationale for, and the development of U. S. cultural policy as a strategy for use in the light of foreign policy objectives during the Cold War.

Considerable evidence exists that U. S. desire to infiltrate French national life provided the basis for its counter-offensive to a “mythical” Soviet Information Program in France.

Moreover, this dissertation found that, while its publicly-stated objectives aimed at the *containment* of communism, its real goals were its *elimination*. Irwin Wall¹⁶ acknowledged this idea through discussion of the extent of U. S. Embassy efforts to try to persuade French businessmen of the danger that a Communist takeover might represent to their interests.

Wall’s work, a valuable study of U. S. economic and political intervention in France during the Recovery period, dealt primarily with the role of French unions and the creation of Force Ouvrière, a Labor movement that countered the militant French Communist Confédération Générale du Travail. His analysis of the French situation viewed culture in the larger sense of the term,¹⁷ deeming U. S. cultural influence unimportant until after 1958, when France reacted to the world-wide U. S. cultural invasion.

As well, Wall’s opinion that each of the separate Washington government agencies followed its own policy, rather than a centralized format, is contradicted by archival sources that demonstrated the deliberate U. S. policy of centralization in France.

This author agrees with his assessment that the French government was close to the Department of State in its analysis that liberalism was far superior to communism. However, the presence of the popular PCF and the Nationalists under the shadow of General de Gaulle, made the Americans anxious about the state of French liberalism. They feared

¹⁶Wall, *L’Influence américaine*, 15.

¹⁷ Ibid. “Sens large du terme.”

that France could become a fascist state under de Gaulle, about whom they already had serious reservations, or, a puppet state under the aegis of the Soviet Union.

Wall's opinion that the Americans were perfectly conscious of what they enacted in France and their effect upon French morale is also valid. Take for example the various delays over negotiation of the Fulbright Program. French archival documents testified to the extreme frustration that the French felt in dealing with the Americans whom, they were certain, deliberately delayed the procedure in order to gain more concessions from them.

Moreover, Wall points out that U. S. objectives were to safeguard commerce and markets. While this new study does not disagree, it stresses that U. S. cultural policy aimed to hold France firmly tied to the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. However, it denies Wall's claim that it was French dependence on the U. S. that fostered French neutralism. Research demonstrated that neutralism emerged earlier in France and was connected to the post-Liberation destitution and the early Recovery period. It was, moreover, a factor in the U. S. decision to use culture as a weapon against communism during the 1950 Campaign of Truth because of Department of State fears that French neutralism left France open to a Communist takeover.

Finally, debate by U. S. scholars over the extent of U. S. influence in France that was treated by Kuisel and less extensively by Wall, can now be placed in context through the new evidence presented by this dissertation. If one were to suppose that Department of State policy makers in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations were naive enough to believe that France would commit itself to the U. S. based on the presence of U. S. cultural events performed in France, U. S. cultural policy in France appears superficial and amateurish in

its thinly-disguised attempts at promoting U. S. lifestyle. Yet, the U. S. government was able to convince the American people through the domestic press that it was completely desirable to insert U. S. lifestyle into French perspective because of the Communist threat.

The real problem, however, was deeper than abstract fears of a potential Communist invasion, or takeover in France. The U. S. knew that chances of territorial war with the Soviet Union were remote, but it feared that a weakened and disunited France would provide a haven for Communist ideology that could rapidly spread uncontrolled across the Western European liberal nations, depriving the U. S. of its allies, leaving its economic markets and collective defense system vulnerable.

While investigation of U. S. cultural policy revealed that Department of State claims of an extensive Soviet Information Program in France were false, nevertheless this became an important part of U. S. strategy that convinced Congress and the American public of the need for a larger, more involved USIS program in France.

Neither Wall nor Kuisel, the two American scholars who thus far have significantly addressed the problem of U. S. cultural influence, provided any evidence that there was a cultural policy that was used to further U. S. foreign policy objectives during the post-war era. Their work must be seen in context of the earlier recognition that U. S. culture was a viable presence in post-war France. However, this dissertation takes up the challenge of focusing on U. S. cultural policy and inaugurating academic research in this field. It contributes new knowledge to the understanding of post-World War II U. S. foreign policy, Franco-American relations, and French reaction during the intensification of the Cold War.

Chapter One

The Evolution of the U. S. Information Program

I. U. S. Cultural Policy in Post-World War II France

U. S. cultural policy in France, a little-known dimension of global U. S. foreign policy, confirms U. S. use of culture to achieve political and economic hegemony. Formulated by the Department of State during the tense early Cold War period, it was also designed to lessen negative public reaction to U. S. presence in France by promoting goodwill through cultural programs. Furthermore, strategists hoped that through enactment of a cultural policy, U. S. lifestyle would become more acceptable to the sensitive French by creating new awareness about the U.S. and the similarities of French and American lifestyles. U. S. cultural policy, therefore, was conceived upon the idea that unpopular U. S. foreign policy objectives would be “sweetened” by doses of U.S. culture that would, hopefully, also act as a buffer to keep France liberal.

The prominence that the U. S. assigned to use of culture in France is ascertained because they had a *cultural policy* there rather than relying on *cultural influence* to carry out foreign policy objectives. This is evidenced by the amount of public funds that were allocated to this policy. Although a recalcitrant Congress initially cut public monies for the public affairs program that administered cultural policy, the budget was increased every year from 1950 on.¹

U. S. cultural policy in France involved complex strategies determined in Washington, D. C. by Department of State bureaucrats, whom, although they took counsel

¹Statement based on figures provided in the annual appropriations granted by Congress to the USIS Program, 1950 to 1958.

from U. S. Embassy officials, were unfamiliar with France. Once formulated, cultural policy directives were disseminated throughout France by the U. S. Embassy in Paris via a regional public affairs network. Publicly, the policy was portrayed as the harbinger of U.S. goodwill, international cooperation and harmonious relations. Privately, it was used by diplomats to keep France aligned to the U.S., while exerting political and economic pressure to solidify U. S. interests.

Originally oriented around U.S. post-World War II strategies toward information and education, U. S. cultural policy in France evolved with changing U. S. international political commitments, shifting from a pattern of planned information activities to entertainment-oriented programs that featured cultural politicization tactics designed to attract the French masses toward U. S. lifestyle. However, fearing the loss of important, diverse opinion-forming groups in French society that might be easily swayed toward the ideals of communism, the U. S. Embassy requested more specialized activities to keep these groups favorable to the U. S. Thus, the Department of State targeted different audiences; cultural programs were prepared for general French consumption, but a more selective cultural agenda was chosen for smaller groups that included youth, labor, intellectuals, academics, editors, and people in positions of leadership.

Whereas an earlier information and education program had used factual emphasis, demanding attention and decisions from the individual, the entertainments program aimed at presenting an agenda that was relaxing and amusing; pleasant diversions from the mundane drudgery of everyday post-World War II French life. U. S. policy planners hoped that once ensconced in the halls or theaters reserved for these occasions, French viewers

would concentrate on enjoying the entertainment rather than criticize the “hidden content” of U. S. culture and politics that was approved for showing to large audiences by Washington policy planners.

The desirable type of program was one that entertained while sub-consciously educating audiences. Presented subtly, in order not to raise suspicions of propagandizing, or accusations of U. S cultural arrogance from French audiences, these programs included U. S. art, music, films, entertainers, dance, theater and photographs that were sent from the U. S.; a type of “cultural export system” that was selected to entice those who attended to “keep the faith” with U. S.-style democracy.

U. S. cultural policy was executed in France through the U. S. Information Program² that was created by the Truman Administration to officially disseminate information about the U. S. overseas.³ In France, as was the case in all countries where the U. S. maintained an Information Program, USIS/France was its official information organ. There, cultural policy was manifested through information policy objectives that were annually identified and written by U. S. Embassy personnel in Paris to reflect U. S. foreign policy objectives.

The planning for, organization and execution techniques that surrounded U. S. cultural policy in France also demonstrated a broad range of discrepancies in the application

²The U. S. Information Program. Henceforth referred to by the acronym USIS and when referring to the program in France, USIS/France.

³Debate still continues about who actually originated the idea of an official USIS Program. Margaret Truman Daniel, daughter of President Truman, in her biography of her mother, *Bess Wallace Truman* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), claimed that it was Mrs. Truman who first proposed the idea of a U.S. Information Program to President Truman. However, this author was unable to substantiate that information.

of U.S. foreign policy between what the U. S. government *said* its intentions were and what the *reality* entailed. While the U. S. Embassy took pride in the increasing number of U. S. cultural entertainments sent to France from 1945 to 1958, the parallel amount of culture and politics that these programs contained resulted in a *cultural politicization* that colored all of the officially-supported events. As the Cold War heightened, so did the ideological substance that encompassed U. S. cultural agenda. Despite the fact that the Democrats left office in 1952, the Republican Administration maintained U. S. cultural policy in France. As U. S. political interests pivoted in the mid-1950s from Western Europe to the Middle East, Africa and the Far East, there was also a change in application of cultural policy in France, but not in the policy itself.

In order to understand *why* the U. S. government initiated and campaigned for a cultural policy in France, and *how* they used this policy, it is necessary to examine the background influences that led to creation of the U. S. Information Program, the medium through which U. S. cultural policy was executed.

II. Origins of the U. S. Information Service Program

The inception of an official USIS Program overseas was a controversial move in both U.S. government circles and in U. S. public perception. Its growth, from an earlier scheme⁴ successfully used by the U.S. Army during World War I, to its later World War II use provided the framework for U. S. post-World War II use of information and education strategies in U. S. foreign policy objectives.

⁴The Office of War Information (Henceforth referred to by the acronym OWI) was the U.S. Agency responsible for providing official information to the Armed Forces during World War II.

Joining peaceful concepts of information and education together in an Information Program was originally part of Department of Defense strategy for increasing morale among its recruits in the Armed Forces. This plan was conceived on the idea that the American soldier would be a better fighter if his army experience were made meaningful to him. Believing that U. S. military recruit performance would improve if the correct psychological factors were exploited to advantage, the Pentagon determined a course to acknowledge the personal roles of its servicemen. To accomplish this it changed its emphasis in military recruit training from its traditional concentration on formulating the collective will to that of emphasizing individual consciousness. In an unprecedented move during World War II, the Army began to supply its military recruits with updated war news that stressed the situation in U. S. war theaters and the role of the U.S. in international affairs.

U. S. military officials counted on the combined-value effect that it was confident would result from instilling in its soldiers individual pride, patriotism and personal involvement in what it termed a heroic fight for freedom. They rationalized that providing U. S. servicemen with *information* would *educate* them to believe more readily in the cause that they were fighting for, making it easier for the individual fighter to accept his role as a trained soldier in wartime.

By linking individual consciousness with military service to the nation through use of information, the Pentagon, therefore, wished to demonstrate its respect for personal opinion and freedom of choice. Furthermore, through this appearance of attention to individual rights, the Department of Defense was able to successfully utilize the prized

American belief in self-determination. An informed soldier, the Pentagon stated,⁵ was a better soldier because he was personally involved and aware of his own important role in the greater U. S. scheme of international affairs. It followed that if the U. S. Armed Forces could effectively inculcate individual responsibility for the war effort in each of its soldiers serving overseas, recruit morale and job motivation would increase. A soldier would take pride in being part of a great American army that demonstrated its confidence in its servicemen.

This philosophy brought about the reinstatement of the Army Morale Branch in 1940.⁶ It was responsible for diverse cultural activities including army exchanges, recreation, athletics, correspondence courses and had a motion picture service that showed Hollywood films to U. S. troops abroad. Positive reaction from U. S. Armed Service personnel determined the separation of the Morale Services Division into a Special Services Unit that was subsequently renamed Education and Information. Within this new division other name changes followed; for example, "Orientation Officers" were renamed "Information and Education Officers" in August 1944.⁷

Thus began a major public relations success by the U. S. Army. Studies commissioned by the Pentagon demonstrated increased productivity and output on the part

⁵*The Information-Education Officer*. War Department Technical Manual (July 1945): 28-210. Cited in Richard Dyer MacCann. *The People's Films: A Political History of U.S. Government Motion Pictures*. (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1973), 160.

⁶First created in World War I.

⁷MacCann, 160.

of enlisted personnel. Successful in wartime, the "I and E" concept⁸ was readily adapted to peacetime use by the Department of State as a successful technique through which the U. S. government could reach the foreign peoples of Western Europe.

A few months after the war ended in Europe, a Presidential Executive Order⁹ transferred international information activities of the OWI and the Office of International American Affairs¹⁰ to the Department of State pending completion of a study of peacetime needs for the dissemination of information about the U. S. abroad. Following this, the Department of State established an Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs representing the merger of OWI and OIAA activities that were adapted to the U. S. peacetime needs. All overt psychological warfare was eliminated so that the program could be directed to peaceful political efforts.

In May 1946, the Information and Cultural Sources Division was reorganized into the Office of Information and Culture.¹¹ In France, this office was established as the main organ to support and implement U. S. foreign policy. Practical application of information and cultural activities was initially carried out by U. S. Embassy staff in Paris.¹²

⁸U.S. Army terminology for Information and Education.

⁹Presidential Executive Order, published 31 August 1945.

¹⁰Henceforth referred to by the acronym OIAA.

¹¹Henceforth referred to by the acronym OIC.

¹²Thirty-three American employees who had formerly been with the USIS.

III. U. S. Post-World War II Foreign Policy

(a) Novel Beginnings in Traditional Diplomacy

Following the end of World War II in Europe, the U. S. government committed itself to continuing a trend in public affairs that had first been utilized around the time of World War I. Reacting to the post-World War II influx of communication media and U. S. foreign policy objectives that targeted closer interpersonal relations between the U. S. and people overseas, it resolved to boycott heads of government in favor of direct “people to people” interaction. Shifting from established procedure, it moved quickly into the new field of public relations, replacing traditional diplomatic exchanges with public diplomacy. Rationale for this change was that the U. S. could reach the masses directly, thus mobilizing public opinion in favor of the U. S. message of a liberal lifestyle.

U. S.-government entry into public diplomacy was not an entirely new venture. Government involvement in this field had actually begun a decade earlier in the Philippines and in the American republics. The U. S. government's program for the exchange of persons was inaugurated in 1938 when a small number of graduate students, professors and opinion-forming leaders were exchanged between the U. S. and countries of the Western Hemisphere. The successful information programs implemented in these countries were now used as the “pilot project” for the U. S. government's diplomatic initiative in Western Europe.

Because U. S. foreign policy objectives highlighted harmonious interrelations among the U. S. and its allies, Department of State administrators understood the need to reformulate traditional diplomacy so that it would reflect a more humane image of the U.

S. to foreign people overseas. In a bid to make the U. S. appear more personable and concerned with the application of liberal democracy as the means to economic prosperity and improved quality of human life, it sought to remake the U. S. image overseas.

U. S. advances into a new diplomatic mode did not take hold easily among established U. S. diplomats who preferred the older protocol. Therefore, the U. S. government turned to other sources to support its new initiative, relying in particular, upon expert advice from U. S. advertising executives, influential businessmen and faculty members of major U. S. universities. Their recommendations resulted in a fresh diplomatic image of a kind, generous U.S. benefactor, more concerned more with involving people directly self-government than with formal policy-making. Within this novel U. S. diplomatic venture the qualities of the original "I and E" concept can be clearly discerned, successfully linked with new communication media of the post-war era. What remained was to set up the most effective organ to convey the official U.S. message of peace through public diplomacy to the liberal nations of Western Europe.

To complete this endeavor, in 1945 the U. S. government established the Bureau of Public Affairs, an agency of the Department of State in Washington, D. C., that was charged with responsibility for disseminating official information about the U.S. abroad. Working within the framework of the agency administrative policy, the government relied on its personnel to justify the need for the new diplomacy to Congress and the U.S. public. This strategy, begun with the birth of the new agency, was maintained over the next several years in order to facilitate legislation for the new program. Thus, the government strategy behind

the statement made by George V. Allen in 1948 can be easily recognized:¹³

I also believe in the old adage, ' the best way to spread an idea is to wrap it in a human being.' Undoubtedly the specialists, professors, teachers and students we bring to this country for training are our best ambassadors in their home countries. Likewise, the American specialists and students we send abroad accomplish much in stimulating mutual respect and understanding of the United States, its policies and its people.¹⁴

Likewise, public speeches made by Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, echoed the government call for use of education and information techniques overseas in order to bring U. S. foreign policy objectives to fruition.

Sargeant, a Truman Administration appointee in 1946, was a tireless ambassador for the USIS Program, whose public speeches and published articles consistently emphasized the beneficial results obtained for international understanding from using joint themes of education and information through cultural exchanges. Promoting the USIS Program to influential U.S. businessmen, trade groups and ordinary Americans across the U. S., his remarks always focused on the achievement of U. S. foreign policy objectives through direct interaction between the U. S. government and foreign people. Whenever there was an opposing opinion, Sargeant repeated the official U. S.-policy line that open discussion that allowed the individual to make an informed opinion based on factual information would far outweigh any formal diplomatic exchange.

¹³George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1949.

¹⁴Ibid. Allen was testifying before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations during the Hearing on the State Appropriations Bill for 1950, 21 February 1949. *Hearings. House. Appropriations 1950*. (Washington, D.C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 715.

This type of approach reflected the new trend undertaken by Department of State policy-makers. An open, informative manner that would appear to *educate*, rather than *propagandize* or patronize foreign audiences, would seem to place responsibility upon the individual to personally assess and evaluate the merits of the U. S. political system and free enterprise.

Sargeant explained the public affairs program in terms of the U. S. search for international peace through use of education and U. S.-aided technology. In this way he attempted to unite U. S.-government calls for political stability and economic well-being as the most beneficial way to promote liberal democracy in Western Europe:

Our paramount purpose must be the cultivation at home and the encouragement abroad of the living, dynamic spirit of democracy. We do not invite these guests into our national home to indoctrinate them with ready-made opinions or to spoon-feed them prescribed doses of American culture or thought. We welcome them so that they may partake with us, on equal terms of a way of life which we believe offers the greatest opportunities for the growth and development of the individual, the nation, mankind. We invite them to experience and to observe American democracy with an inquiring mind and a discerning eye. They are free to judge us as they see fit. They are exposed, as we are, to the clash of contending views. They may examine our defects and appraise the sincerity and vigor with which we strive to correct them.¹⁵

In order to support the U. S. idea that prosperity was the best way to a more qualitative life, and that this would be better achieved through sharing information, Sargeant used the universal theme that all basic life experiences are shared and emphasized that similarity of the human experience transcends distance between people:

¹⁵Howland H. Sargeant, "Helping the World to Know Us Better," *Bulletin*. Vol. XIX, No. 491, 672. 22 November 1948. Department of State. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. UNESCO. UNESCO: Paris Speech File. Master File 1940-52. Box 7. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

Only through freely creative and freely-shared cultural expression, we believe, can every people see its own values, its own fundamental humanity, mirrored in its neighbor. Only through such cultural expression can they arrive at that sense of identity and common purpose that must underlie all efforts at common political and economic action.¹⁶

(b) Post-World War II Foreign Policy Objectives

U. S. post-World War II foreign policy objectives, while tied to traditional U. S. attitudes toward liberty for all people, stressed the importance of liberal democracy in a new world where the U. S. acted as the self-appointed guardian of peace. To this end, the U. S. government unconditionally supported the United Nations¹⁷ and called upon its Western European allies to do the same. U. S.-government ideology closely connected its foreign policy objectives with the novel U. S.-supported political organisms of the post-World War II era that established collective defense systems in the name of international cooperation and understanding.

Three organizations formed the nucleus for the U. S. call for preservation of liberal ideology among Western European nations. Of these, the U. N. was the logical organization around which the U. S. could base its official bid for world peace and harmony because of its lofty appeal to the dignity of man and its vision for the future. Secondly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,¹⁸ signed in 1949, promoted security through collective defense. Dominated by the U. S., it bound the former allies of World War II together in a

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Henceforth referred to as the U. N.

¹⁸Henceforth referred to by the acronym NATO.

common security arrangement. In addition to the U. N. and NATO, the U. S. began to launch the idea of European union among the Western European nations.

In short, U. S. post-World War II foreign policy was based on the concept of security in numbers accompanied by government rhetoric that singled out the necessity for global interaction among the U. S. and liberal nations. If the Western European democracies stood together, U. S. government analysts rationalized, the danger of war would be lessened. Collective security arrangements would foster closer cooperation, effectively reducing the risk that forms of government alien to the U. S. might come to power in the Western European countries. Such a fear originated from a U. S.-government perception of the USSR as aggressive and public expression of concern about them.

However, the U. S. certainly knew from its Intelligence Reports that, by 1946, USSR policy was not oriented toward territorial conquest. From 1947, on these accounts clearly indicated that the Soviets did not have the necessary military might to wage physical warfare in Western Europe.¹⁹ According to these Reports, the Soviets were concentrating on instituting psychological measures that were designed to undermine all non-Communist elements that opposed Soviet aspirations. Worried about the effects on U. S. foreign policy that ideological warfare would create abroad, U. S.-government strategy effectively formulated a defense mechanism that divided the world into two distinct spheres: those nations that were friendly to the U. S. and supported the ideals and objectives of the U. N.

¹⁹George P. Kennan, "Resume of World Situation," 6 November 1947, p. 129. PPS/13. *The State Department Planning Papers 1947*. Vol. I. (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1983).

as opposed to those countries that were hostile to U. N. and U. S. objectives for peace. Thus, the political divisions that would result in Cold War polarization between East and West were clearly articulated.

(c) U. S. Domestic Reaction to Foreign Policy

U. S. foreign policy has, traditionally, been conditioned by a combination of historical and geographical factors. In the decades before the outbreak of World War II, its formal policy was one of Isolationism²⁰ and withdrawal from European affairs. Ultimately, the U. S. government was compelled to abandon both Isolationism and Neutralism in the early years of World War II in Europe following collapse of the balance of power and failure of U. S. diplomatic efforts to maintain its traditional position within international affairs.

Despite the fact that U. S. leadership initiated the first serious attempt at construction of a Western European collective defense system, a move that resulted in the establishment of NATO in 1949, U. S. public support for a return to Isolationism remained strong. Yet, pro-Isolationist sentiment made foreign policy unpopular at home, creating a serious problem for the Truman Administration. While it publicly avowed its intention to promote liberal democracy in Western Europe through political stability and economic well-being achieved through loans and financial aid programs, pro-Isolationists demanded that the U. S. withdraw from international affairs. Such a platform contradicted the Truman Administration policy of U. S. leadership on the international stage and threatened the loss

²⁰In the 1952 U. S. presidential campaign, the Republican Party still promoted a return to Isolationism and withdrawal from foreign affairs within its official party platform. In that year, Senator William J. Taft ran as Republic Party presidential nominee on a campaign of U. S. Isolationism and national prosperity.

of lucrative economic markets overseas.

In an attempt to discourage the pro-Isolationist leaning at home so that it could pursue its political and economic interests abroad, the U. S. government turned once again to intellectuals and academics whose support for an education and information program as the best means for assuring a secure and enduring peace could be counted upon. Having obtained this backing, the Truman Administration authorized cultural exchanges among the liberal nations of Western Europe as an integral part of U. S. foreign policy. At the same time the Department of State sponsored U. S. involvement with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization,²¹ an agency of the U. N., as a medium for cultural exchange between countries. Thus, the Truman Administration was able to successfully utilize its new cultural agenda as a component of U. S. foreign policy objectives.

As well, research studies commissioned by the Department of State supported government statements that portrayed universal themes of family, religion and moral beliefs as winning positive reactions from Western European people and Americans. These similarities in lifestyle indicated the potential value of the “human touch” to government strategists as a means for organizing a public affairs program. Thus, through linking U. S. foreign policy objectives to a platform of social responsibility and analogous moral attitudes, Department of State analysts began a policy initiative to convince Western Europeans that the American people shared their basic desire for peace. To make this plan operational policy planners addressed the need to effectively publicize U. S. lifestyle abroad.

²¹Henceforth referred to by the acronym UNESCO.

(d) U. S. Post-World War II Involvement in Europe

Post-World War II U. S. foreign policy objectives focused on economic recovery in Western Europe. The U. S. alone was capable of providing aid; it did so through promulgation of two major financial plans: Interim Aid and the European Recovery Plan, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan that was first proposed in June 1947.²² These plans could not fail to profoundly affect the U. S. government's own interests.

The U. S. had very real concerns in Western Europe because of that continent's past role as a market for the U. S. and as a major source of supply for a diverse variety of products and services. Furthermore, U. S. security was predicated upon a strong, united Europe that offered protection for U. S. affairs. The broad pattern of U. S. foreign policy that included confidence in the U. N. focused upon the continuation of a number of Western European states that recognized the heritage of civil liberties and personal responsibility. Should these premises be compromised, the U. S. would then be forced to revise the entire concept of its international position:

...A revision which might logically demand of us material sacrifices and restraints far exceeding the maximum implications of a program of aid to European reconstruction. But in addition, the U. S. in common with most of the rest of the world, would suffer cultural and spiritual losses incalculable in its long-term effects.²³

²²The Marshall Plan was first presented by U. S. Secretary of State General George C. Marshall in his Commencement Address delivered at Harvard College, 4 June 1947. Treaties were subsequently signed between the U. S. government and sixteen countries the following year.

²³Quoted in *The State Department Policy Planning*. PPS/4, 23 July 1947, pp. 32-33. Record Group 59. Department of State. Miscellaneous Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs. Box 3. National Administration and Records Agency (NARA), Washington, D. C.

Therefore, policy planners in Washington, advising the Truman Administration stressed that the future of U. S. nationhood depended upon the pattern of its relationships with the Western European environment:

When we speak of aid to Europe it is not only the future of Europe we are dealing with. This is not a case of take it or leave it. It is our own future, no less than that of Europe that we are talking about.²⁴

Analysis of the situation by Department of State policy makers concluded that if the U. S. failed to carry out financial aid to Europe there would be a major deterioration in its dominant world position. A Europe abandoned by the U. S. could only be hostile to it; the dimensions of such a deterioration would result, not only in costly political and military strategies, but also in changes in U. S. domestic life that would exceed any cost of the financial aid program.²⁵ Accordingly, strategists determined that U. S. foreign policy objectives had to be primarily targeted at keeping Western European countries allied to the U. S.-controlled system of collective defense that would unify Europe and produce international markets for the U. S. economy. Hence, the attempt by the Truman Administration to keep the U. S. in Europe while calming the pro-Isolationist faction at home.

Affairs. Box 3. National Administration and Records Agency (NARA), Washington, D. C.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

IV. Reaction to the U. S.-Government Information Program

(a) U. S.-Government Initiatives

When it became apparent to the U. S. government after the end of World War II that it would have to undertake a major mission in Western Europe to successfully present itself to foreign people, the Department of State first attempted to do so through a series of programs that distributed information about the U. S. These included student exchange programs and support for American libraries and information centers that functioned as U. S. resource centers overseas.

However, the Truman Administration had already begun work on a policy that would go much further. It viewed the creation of a public information program as a necessary medium from which the U. S. could effectively tell the world what it regarded as the truth about U. S. foreign policy objectives. It justified the need for such a program by declaring that it would make U. S. lifestyle better understood in the still liberal countries of Western Europe, thus making foreign people conscious of the superiority of U. S. lifestyle. Truth, in U. S. policy makers' estimation, would be elaborated through informed opinion based on factual information that was the key to program success. As little was known about the U. S. in the early post-World War II era, it would quickly and effectively tell the "American Story," through authentic data that supported foreign policy goals. More importantly, this strategy would underscore the necessity for a public affairs program to the public, while utilizing U. S. lifestyle through dissemination of direct information abroad.

This attempt to “sell” the public affairs program through the notion of truth justified the need for its existence in the perception of many government officials who came to believe that honest, open accounts of U. S.-government intentions were what would differentiate an information program from that of an actual propaganda program. Such a view provided validity for this initiative at a time when U. S. foreign policy in Western European countries was shown to be challenged in the U. S. press by the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union.

(b) U. S. Public Reaction and the Press

In 1946, the Truman Administration introduced a nine-point agenda that promoted an official USIS Program overseas, a move that generated considerable controversy among U. S. citizens and the press. Initially, public reaction against an official information program was motivated by the press campaign that stressed the negative aspects of the Hitler and Mussolini propaganda campaigns in influential U. S. newspapers. Popular response was that the country had just fought a war in Europe in order to suppress dictatorial regimes that supported large propaganda programs. For many Americans, a public information program simply masked traditional propaganda; their opinion tended to view an information program as a new name with an old theme. Some Americans felt so strongly against official U. S. backing for an information program that they wrote letters to their congressional representatives and to major U. S. newspapers criticizing government steps in this direction.

Public debate, however, remained divided; a segment of public opinion agreed with the government that there should be a program to make the U. S. better known overseas. Controversy was particularly strong concerning France where the U.S. government clashed

with public opinion over whether U. S. financial aid should be continued.

Some U. S. government officials objected to an information program on grounds that it was not only contrary to U.S.-government tradition, but that it placed an unnecessary burden on U. S. taxpayers. Others agreed that information and education were the best weapons that the U. S. had to help U. S. lifestyle penetrate in Western Europe.

Among those in the "pro-information" group was then Assistant Secretary of State, William Benton,²⁶ who launched his own campaign for a public information program overseas. Through popular U. S. magazines, Benton publicized his belief in disseminating truthful information about the U. S. overseas. He based his ideas on the premise that if the former Axis powers had understood their opponents better, they would never have made war on them. An advocate of the themes of universal cooperation and understanding, Benton argued that, "It is this failure of understanding among peoples, and particularly the misunderstandings of foreign peoples about the United States, that is my primary concern in the Department of State."²⁷

As justification Benton pointed to interviews with former Japanese military officials who had been removed from their positions because they objected to Japanese policy of military aggrandizement and aggression. Had these men been listened to and, had there been greater emphasis on communication, he rationalized, war with Japan would have been avoided. Benton campaigned openly for the use of peaceful diplomacy through information

²⁶William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1945 to 1948.

²⁷William Benton, "Let's Speak Up," *The American Legion Magazine* (May 1946): 14. Record Group 59. Department of State. Miscellaneous Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

and education to try to defend the peace. To the themes of international cooperation and understanding he added:

Better understanding of America by foreign peoples will contribute to our national security and probably will contribute more to it than will extra battleships for our fleet. But by 'better understanding' I do not mean that we have to persuade the world that we are mighty in our wrath.. We need to be understood just as we are, without distortion: as a nation that seeks peace, that desires no aggrandizement at the expense of others, that is firmly committed to a policy of international collaboration; that is working toward world-wide freedom and security; a nation with a political, social and economic system which, while far from perfect, has much to commend its example.²⁸

(c) Application of USIS Policy from 1945 to 1948

Benson's initiative was well-received by the Department of State where administrators were preoccupied with winning public approval for its proposed public affairs program. President Truman set the tone for establishing information activities that his Administration intended to integrate within U. S. foreign policy objectives:

The nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs...The government's international information program will be designed to assist American private enterprises engaged in the dissemination of information abroad, and to supplement them in those specialized informational activities in which commercial or other limitations make it difficult for private concerns to carry on all necessary information work. This government will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States government.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., 15.

²⁹President Truman in statement accompanying Executive Order 9608. Quoted in MacCann, 175.

Truman's statement was intended to quell public criticism in the U. S. that the government was becoming involved in what some Americans increasingly perceived as a costly propaganda rather than information program; that, while benefitting foreign countries, it would ultimately be at the expense of the U. S. taxpayer. The President's speech carefully avoided any mention of what might be interpreted as propaganda, selecting instead to focus on the phrase, "providing a full and fair picture of American life," thus supporting U. S. foreign policy objectives aimed at closer interrelationships with foreign people through providing information about U. S. intentions.

In fact, early post-World War II information objectives could be successfully oriented toward factual content because of the existing European situation. Before 1947, U. S. foreign policy was not yet affected by what the U. S. later regarded as a full-flung Soviet initiative to discredit U. S. foreign policy objectives. Therefore, government documents during this period promoted U. S. lifestyle and world stability through elected governments and economic prosperity achieved through the benefits of the free enterprise system.

Furthermore, from 1945 to 1947, the U. S. government was concerned with the problems of economic reconstruction in Western Europe. Although the Interim Aid Program and the Marshall Plan were government priorities, by 1947 U. S. attention began to focus on the increasing polarization between East and West and the growth of the Cold War. Of particular interest to the U. S. government was the reported increase in anti-American sentiment in Western Europe. U. S.-government attention turned to France where it believed that an escalation in anti-Americanism presented a unique opportunity to demonstrate the need for a public affairs program to the American public.

Anti-American feeling in France was not a new phenomenon. U. S. diplomats explained French animosity toward the U. S. as natural in light of the fact that France was no longer a leader on the world stage. This attitude complicated U. S. relations with successive French governments that felt that France, having been included among the Allied victors, had a right to be involved in major post-World War II political decisions. Outbreaks of anti-Americanism in France were tempered by French government realization of its dependency upon the U. S. to restart the French economy. U. S. Intelligence wrote, "At the same time, France realizes that the U. S. represents her best, her only hope for the reconstruction of her industry, of her cities and for the re-establishment of her national economy on a sound basis."³⁰

Negative French reaction to the U. S. was, however, well received by the Soviets who hoped that their support of the popular PCF would intensify French antagonism toward the U. S. U.S. Intelligence Reports thought that Soviet opinion inclined toward continuing anti-Americanism, hoping that it might eventually result in the U. S. discontinuing its financial support to France.³¹

U. S. Embassy warnings to the Department of State about a rise in anti-American feeling in France proved to be timely for government strategy. While poor U. S. image and negative reactions to foreign policy objectives were worrisome to the government, they also provided the opportunity for mobilizing public reaction in the U. S. to justify government

³⁰Department of State, "France: Policy and Information Statement," 15 September 1946, 10. Harry S. Truman Papers. President's Secretary's Files (PSF). Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³¹Ibid.

plans for an official information program overseas.

In U. S.-government perspective, public support required further incentive. The American public was slow to react to criticisms of foreign policy partly because in the immediate years following the end of the war in Europe, Americans did not demonstrate great interest in world events. This attitude may have been carried over from the Isolationist period, or, it may have resulted from lack of American public awareness of problems emerging in East/West relations. Also, in the immediate post-war years, the U. S. press and government officials did not highlight the growing animosity between the the U. S. and the USSR.

V. U. S. Foreign Policy Objectives in France

In the heady, emotional atmosphere of the French Liberation, American soldiers were warmly welcomed in France. The public joy that greeted their arrival was, however, short-lived. In the weeks that followed the French Liberation public enthusiasm evaporated as France came to grips with the reality of its post-war situation. Four arduous years of Occupation followed by Allied and enemy bombings resulted in unprecedented devastation that was accompanied by coal, fuel and housing shortages throughout France.

The Franco-American alliance was the oldest in Europe, dating from the American War of Independence when the Marquis de La Fayette, had come to the aid of the American rebels. The memory of La Fayette, a popular, historical figure in the U. S. and France would be frequently invoked by the U. S. and French governments at their convenience as a symbol in future Franco-American diplomatic and cultural relations. Although the U. S. and France were old allies, little was really known about Americans or about American lifestyle

in France. In the interim period between the two world wars, few Americans traveled to France. The exception to this was the small, colorful colony of U. S. artists and writers who lived in Paris during the early years of the twentieth century. This group included Gertrude Stein, F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway, and popularized bohemian lifestyle in Paris during the 1920s.

Tourists who visited France during this era were usually wealthy Americans. Thus, the impression portrayed to the French population was that the U. S. was the “rich uncle” of the world, an image that would continue to haunt Franco-American relations in the post-World War II era.

Early twentieth-century American tourists in France seldom denied that they were neophytes to the world of culture and artistry. French art, music, architecture, fashion and style were not only popular in the U. S., but were generally sought after by Americans who considered France the leader in culture and refinement. This was another factor that would influence U. S. cultural policy in France as well as French cultural policy in the U. S. after 1945.

Conscious of the role of France as the traditional leader in European culture, the U. S. government felt inferior in its ability to equal the French artistic tradition. By 1949 Western European countries placed strong emphasis upon cultural interchange through a series of international festivals held across Europe. These included the Florence Festival of the Arts and the Queen Elisabeth of Belgium Music Festival. Frustrating to the Department of State was the fact that Soviet and Western European artists generally won more awards than participating American artists. Soviet success in the international cultural arena

motivated the U. S. government to examine Soviet cultural influence in Western Europe, particularly in France. There, the Truman Administration announced, the Soviet government had begun an Information Program that it was using to disseminate information that discredited the U. S. government and its foreign policy objectives. U. S. Intelligence Reports concurred that the Soviets had, by 1946, spent an equivalent of \$5 million on this program.³²

Government publicity warning about the dangers posed to the U. S. by the presence of a Soviet Information Program in France became widespread in 1947. To meet the challenge of the assumed Soviet Information Program in France directly, U. S. diplomats advised the Department of State to “provide the French people and the official world with information on the U. S. that will enable them to form sound opinions and a balanced judgment.”³³ Hence, the U. S. government had much-needed justification for intensifying U. S. information activities in France. However, whether there was an actual Soviet Information Program in France is doubtful. Several factors demonstrate that it was convenient for the government to insist on its existence.

Foremost among these reasons was the position of the Parti communiste français.³⁴ Its popularity in post-World War II France was a constant source of anxiety to the U. S. government who viewed its appeal to the French population as dangerous to U. S. foreign policy objectives. Moreover, U. S. worries about possible Soviet expansion into Western Europe intensified during French labor unrest in 1946, increasing U. S. fears that the PCF

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Henceforth referred to by the acronym PCF.

would become the government in France. The U. S. saw such an event as a direct challenge to its economic and political interests.

What the U. S. failed to grasp, however, was that the PCF captured French public imagination in the early post-World War II era because of its wartime Resistance record and its demonstrated concern with poverty and unemployment. Because of PCF public approval in France, General de Gaulle was forced to include PCF members in his first coalition cabinet in August 1944. However, by 1947, the PCF had lost much of its reputation because of French political instability and the chaotic labor situation of 1946 when the PCF supported the General Strike of that year.

Dogged by widespread disapproval at home of a public information program, the Truman Administration took advantage of reports from France about increased anti-Americanism. It realized the opportunity presented for winning acceptance of a public affairs program if it could convince the American people that there was far greater French popular interest in the PCF than was actually the case. Believing that publicizing Communist activity in France would earn U.S.-citizen support necessary for creation of an official information program, the U. S. government began an intensive campaign that focused on the dangers to U. S. lifestyle if Soviet expansion into Western Europe were not stopped. In France, it maintained,³⁵ a counterpart Soviet Information Program was making rapid gains in the cultural domain through its movie program, cultural entertainments and

³⁵ "Broadcasts to France in the Cold War and the Korean War Period," Spring 1950 and Winter 1951. A Content Analysis Conducted by The Research Center for Human Relations. North York University, 16 July 1951. Papers of Charles Hulten. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

dissemination of information about decadent U. S. lifestyle.

Government strategy was to increase American support for a public information program through highlighting the need for continued U. S. presence in France in order to contain communism. Moreover, an information Program permitted the Truman Administration to address the greater issues of potential loss of markets for U. S. business and industry through establishment of a special advertising campaign that solicited the help of business and industry.³⁶

This approach suited the purposes of the Department of State where policy makers ascertained that the problem that had to be addressed in the U. S. was the susceptibility of the French population to communism. Therefore, it recommended that the government support closer Franco-American ties through official information activities that were designed to counteract what it stated was a parallel Soviet Information Program in effect in France.

In this manner, U. S.-government tactics centered upon getting the public information program through Congress. Some government officials readily agreed³⁷ with the plan for a public affairs program, feeling that lack of a concrete foreign policy was responsible for the deterioration of the U. S. image in Western Europe. They thought³⁸ that

³⁶The U. S. Advisory Commission on Education. *Sixth Semi-Annual Report* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 3.

³⁷“Broadcasts to France in the Cold War and the Korean War Period,” Spring 1950 and Winter 1951. A Content Analysis by the Research Center for Human Relations. North York University, 16 July 1951. Papers of Charles Hulten. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³⁸*Ibid.*

the best way to change this situation would be to strengthen U. S. foreign policy with tangible examples through an aggressive information program that would effectively bring the U. S. democratic message to foreign people living in the Western European democracies.

What played well into government initiative for an official information program at the time was the popular feeling in the U. S. that financial aid to France ought to be terminated because of anti-American incidents and French unreliability as Allies. American journalists stationed in France and U. S. tourists returning home were parties to this; both groups reported a poor welcome for Americans in France and only lackluster support for American foreign policy.

Reacting to these complaints, the Truman Administration found it expedient to invoke once again the principle of harmonious relations with its Allies. It concluded that misunderstandings between the French and American people could be overcome if more were known about the U. S. and its lifestyle in France. In particular, it publicized the theme of interaction among people by emphasizing that although distance separated the American and French population, it could not prevent individual contacts. Congressional debate ensued; angered by press criticism of an information program, coupled with popular opinion against France, the House Appropriations Committee in 1946 cut the budget for the USIS Program by almost fifty percent. Press reaction now regretted the program reduction.

It seems inconceivable that we have so soon forgotten the tragic cost to us of our failure to promote an adequate understanding before the war of American policies, of American objectives and, indeed, of the American people themselves. The people of Europe are hungry for information about America. They are receptive and responsible to a constructive program that can give

them a better understanding of the American people and their foreign policy.. Such being the case, we find the House Appropriations Committee recommendation that the State Department budget be cut from nineteen million to ten million a deplorable and potentially harmful action. It is to be hoped that the cut will be restored in full by the Senate Appropriations Committee.³⁹

This type of press coverage forced a congressional debate in the U. S. Senate that ultimately resulted in restoration of the previous budget while publicizing government's ambitions for the public affairs program.

VI. U. S. Government Strategy and France

The government campaign within the U. S. to gain support for its intended public affairs program was oriented around its belief in the strategic, political and economic importance of keeping France within the Atlantic Alliance. The geographical location of France in the center of Western Europe made the country a vital site for U. S. military bases. France was, moreover, a key factor in the U. S. objective of collective security and defense in post-war Europe. If France were to come under Communist control, or forge an alliance with the USSR, the result for the U. S. could be disastrous. Losing France would mean not only the disappearance of U. S. markets and trade in Western Europe; valuable French influence which the U. S. depended upon to keep up its image in other Western European countries would be removed. U. S. Intelligence Reports also feared that a takeover by the Communists would quickly spread throughout the still democratic nations of Western Europe. The feeling in the U. S. was that if France fell to communism, then all of Europe was lost to the U. S. Hence, the need for a strong public affairs program in France to

³⁹*The New York Herald Tribune*, 20 May 1946.

officially disseminate information about the U. S. and to promote its image.

Alarmed by U. S. Intelligence reports that French political instability and French labor unrest might result in a turn to the PCF, the Truman Administration concurred that the dire post-World War II economic situation in France necessitated increased U. S. aid. At the same time it conceived the idea of giving aid to Europe as a whole and not to any one particular country. President Truman himself set the pattern in the following statement:

...Recent events have brought about increasingly critical economic conditions in some of the countries of Western Europe. The prospect of a general recovery program for Western Europe, aided by the United States, has raised their hopes for eventual recovery and has strengthened democratic forces. But, if this recovery program is to have a chance of success, means must be found for aiding France and Italy to survive this critical winter as free and independent nations.⁴⁰

French Ambassador to the U. S., Henri Bonnet,⁴¹ saw the situation from a different perspective. Increased difficulties between the Russians and the Americans, the growing military strength of the USSR and the emergence of the Russian satellite countries may have provided U.S. rationale for the Marshall Plan, however, Bonnet found the real motivation for U. S. interest lay in a united Europe. The fact that Russia referred to the satellite countries and its military growth as a security precaution,⁴² made many Americans fear that

⁴⁰ "Statement by the President," 29 September 1947. Papers of Harry S. Truman. Official File (OF). Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴¹ Henri Bonnet (1888 to 1978). French Ambassador to the U. S. from 1945 to 1954.

⁴² Department of State publication, "France, Policy and Information Statement," p. 14 September 1946. Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

this was proof of Soviet intentions to invade Western Europe through Germany and France. For some Kremlin watchers this amounted to tangible evidence of the inevitable “push to the Atlantic” by Stalin.

U. S. diplomats, including former Ambassador to the USSR, Averell Harriman, had been predicting Soviet expansion into Western Europe since the Potsdam Conference in 1945. Harriman recalled that when he congratulated Stalin in Potsdam on the Soviet troops breakthrough into Germany, Stalin’s response was that Czar Alexander II had made it all the way to the Atlantic Ocean.⁴³ Taking this as evidence of the Russian leader's intentions, Harriman reported his remarks to the Department of State where administrators charged with writing U. S. foreign policy objectives found Stalin's purported comments useful in further justifying the need for a strong, united Europe.

U. S. Intelligence Reports, pointing to an intensified Soviet Information Program in France, claimed that the Communists were attempting to discredit the U. S. by targeting its foreign policy objectives and casting the U. S. as warmongers in the eyes of the French public. A statement by Paul Hoffman, estimated Soviet government expenditure for its Information Program to be more than the equivalent of \$15 million.⁴⁴

The Truman Administration, in a bid to win approval for its information program and to keep France within the Atlantic Alliance, tried to minimize public opposition. Privately

⁴³Interview with Averell Harriman. Oral Interview Collection, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁴Hoffman was the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration henceforth known by its acronym ECA. Papers of C. W. Jackson. Overseas Information. Box 3. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

however, the government worried about the situation. Although France was the United States' oldest ally in Europe and the recipient of Marshall aid, its ambivalent attitude toward the U. S. made the American government wary about future French commitment to NATO and the West.

However, conscious of press reports targeting growing anti-Americanism in France, while consistently claiming that the Soviet aggrandizement represented a threat to U. S. lifestyle, the Truman Administration succeeded in getting its information program through Congress. In June 1946 the House of Representatives passed a Bill⁴⁵ that was sent to the Senate for approval. Senate debate continued for the unusually long period of five days because of the delaying tactics of a group of "hard-core Isolationists." However, on 20 June 1947 a motion was passed to resume debate, followed by passing the Bill on 24 June 1947, with 272 votes in favor and ninety-seven opposed.

VII. Congressional Legislation

(a) The Fulbright Bill, 1946⁴⁶

The Fulbright Bill created the Exchange of Persons Act by which the U. S. government committed itself to a program of student exchanges with countries that were signatories of the agreement with the U. S. It was the first large-scale government exchange of persons, allowing U. S. and foreign students to spend periods of time in each other's countries before returning home. It enacted, therefore, U. S. policy of direct interaction among people through promoting education as one of the fundamental necessities for

⁴⁵House of Representatives (H. R.) Bill No. 33342. June 1947.

⁴⁶Officially Public Law (P. L.) 584, passed by the U. S. Congress in June 1946.

maintenance of peace. More precisely, it promoted U. S. foreign policy objectives and interests as was clearly expressed by Senator J. William Fulbright:

The Information and Educational Exchange Program is not a program designed particularly or primarily to benefit individuals; nor is it designed to increase knowledge, nor the cultural accomplishments of individuals. It is a very important part of foreign policy as I see it. That was the reason for passing it.⁴⁷

The Fulbright Act was an amendment to the Surplus Property Act that provided that certain foreign currencies acquired through the sale of surplus U. S. property overseas might be used for educational exchanges. Twenty foreign countries⁴⁸ signed the agreement with the U. S. government to participate in such exchanges. Four major U. S. agencies shared in its administration: the Institute of International Education, the U. S. Office of Education, the American Council on Education and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils. The U. S. Educational Foundations or Commissions assisted the program in each participating country while the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the U. S. President supervised the program and made final selection of candidates and educational institutions qualified to participate.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Senator J. William Fulbright in a statement to the U. S. House Sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations for 1950. *Hearings. House. Appropriations 1950.* (Washington, D. C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949).

⁴⁸Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Burma, China (suspended), Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Korea (suspended), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁹Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Correspondence File 1950 to 1954. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

(b) **The Smith-Mundt Act, 1948**⁵⁰

By 1948, fearful that French political instability might result in the loss of valuable markets for the U. S., the Department of State determined to change public perception about U. S. foreign policy objectives.

In the same year, the U. S. press reported a further increase in anti-American sentiment in Western Europe. Press reaction was heightened when government statements were published explaining how a negative U. S. image overseas would adversely affect U. S. foreign policy objectives. Official acknowledgment of poor U. S. image during the early Cold War, alarmed many government officials who received complaints and inquiries from constituents. At the same time, the 1948 presidential campaign provided opportunity for the government to publicize its new public affairs program as the most effective way to counter anti-American attitudes in Western Europe. This strategy proved timely as the Truman Administration did not wish to be reminded of public and press accusations that it had not previously done enough to promote U. S. interests overseas.

Reacting to public concern in mid-1948, Congress passed Public Law 402. Popularly known as the Smith-Mundt Bill after the two Senators who sponsored it, this legislation authorized an official Information and Education Program⁵¹ that allowed the U. S. government to officially disseminate information about its activities abroad:

⁵⁰Officially Public Law (P. L.) 402. The Smith-Mundt Act, passed by the U. S. Congress in 1948, set up an Information and Education Service to disseminate government information overseas.

⁵¹Henceforth referred to by the acronym USIE.

To promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.⁵²

Its objectives, paralleling those of U. S. foreign policy goals, were to keep democracy alive in Western Europe, while trying to contain communism. To do so, this Act granted legal authority to the use of cultural activities to support U. S. foreign policy objectives, military security and technical progress in Western Europe.

The Smith-Mundt Act provided for a reciprocal exchange of students, teachers, lecturers, specialists and leaders between the U. S. and other countries. It set up cultural exchanges between the U. S. and other nations through five major programs: the Student Exchange Program, the Film program, the Book Program, the International Broadcasting Program, and the Exhibits Program. It authorized U. S. government assistance to foreign schools, libraries and community centers founded, or sponsored by U. S. citizens, that served as demonstration centers for methods and practices used in the U. S.

The USIE Program was administered by the Institute of International Education and the Office of Education; both were responsible for recommending candidates, placement overseas, counseling and other related services. U. S. foreign service establishments carried out the administrative functions connected with this program in other countries where they were assisted in the selection of candidates by the Committee on Study and Training in the U. S.

⁵²Senator J. William Fulbright. Statement to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 23 June 1948. *Hearings. House 1949*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 5.

In addition to these government-financed programs, diverse npr-funded services were also rendered to individuals, voluntary organizations, international agencies and foreign governments interested in the exchange of persons. Congress tasked the Department of State with keeping itself up-to date with plans and development of these organizations and encouraged their activities and cooperation in Department projects.

Although at first Congress refused to take seriously claims from a few officials in the Department of State that the Soviets had launched a full-scale information program in Western Europe directed at discrediting the U. S. government and its foreign policy, a 1948 visit to Europe by members of the U. S. Advisory Commission abruptly changed this opinion. Confirmation by commission members helped to convince Congress of the validity of an official information program needed to fight what was described to them as the "Communist cultural offensive." However, documented evidence⁵³ demonstrates that the Advisory Commission members talked to U. S. Embassy officials, regional public affairs officers and selected members of French regional communities where they visited farms that had received U.S. economic aid. No written evidence of a Soviet Information Program was produced for their scrutiny; nor did they visit any program offices, or speak with any officials involved in it.⁵⁴ Their confirmation to members of Congress of the existence of a Soviet Information Program does not rest on proof.

⁵³Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State.(France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁴Ibid.

In March 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall testified before the Subcommittee on Appropriations,⁵⁵ that world conditions had deteriorated in recent weeks. Subsequent budget cuts in the Department of State would leave the U.S. government definitely “weakened.”⁵⁶ During Marshall’s testimony Senator Joseph H. Ball⁵⁷ stated:

While we do not do much, if we just let misrepresentation of our policy go without any opposition at all, then a very definite reaction against us is built up among foreign people. I have received many different reports as to what has happened in the satellite countries and very skimpy reports as to what is going on in the Soviet Union. The general tenor of the reactions that I receive from our people is that it would leave a very unfortunate vacuum if we did not do our level best to answer false charges and to depict the American way of life.⁵⁸

Ball’s comments received support from fellow Subcommittee member, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge who expressed his conviction of the necessity to provide official government information about America overseas:

We have to tell it [the American story] not only effectively and plentifully, but we have to tell it with tact and with shrewdness. It seems to me it is very much like any kind of political campaign. A man in this country running for office, I do not think, finds it the most effective thing to say, ‘what a great

⁵⁵General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State in a statement to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 23 March 1948. *Hearings. Senate 1949.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office 1948), 5.

⁵⁶Senator Joseph H. Ball in a statement during the testimony of General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 23 March 1948 in *ibid.*

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

fellow I am.' It is always much better for someone else to say it.⁵⁹

The justification for the Information and Education program appropriation for 1948 stated that the cuts in the previous fiscal year had resulted in the Office of Information and Education doing an "adequate" job in twenty-four posts in twenty European countries.⁶⁰ An "adequate" job meant that information activities were only being carried out in major cities and often by alien personnel⁶¹ that would reach only "a small proportion of the population in any of the countries."⁶² Additional funds were requested that would provide both for geographical expansion and growth of activities in all information and educational field

VIII. U. S. Information Policy Objectives for France

As was the case in other Western European nations where the U. S. had political and economic interests, specific information policy objectives for France were prepared within the context of U. S. global foreign policy. These objectives, published annually in the U. S./France Country Plan Papers, were written by Cultural Officers in the U. S. Embassy in

⁵⁹Senator Henry Cabot Lodge commenting to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U. S. Senate, 23 March 1948 in *ibid*.

⁶⁰Figures are from Senate Hearings Appropriations for 1949. *Hearings. Senate 1949*. (Washington, D. C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

⁶¹The word used by U. S. government to classify an employee in the OIE Program who was not an American citizen.

⁶²Testimony by William R. Stone, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriations 1949. *Hearings. Senate 1949*. (Washington, D. C.,: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949).

Paris⁶³ who developed objectives for France from information contained in semi-annual provincial USIS/France Justification Reports.⁶⁴

From 1945 on information objectives took on an intensified, “hard-core,” political line in the U. S. /France Country Papers. Their primary goal was, “to make France as staunch an ally of the U.S. as possible in the long-run.”⁶⁵ Short-term objectives were no less politicized: “to expose the nature and aims of Soviet Communism as a threat to the security and freedom of France and to identify the PCF as an instrument of the larger Soviet Communist threat.”⁶⁶

In early 1950, the Bureau of Public Affairs acknowledged the need for a basic planning mechanism through which all media divisions and operations of the Public Affairs Program could be centrally oriented toward the accomplishment of specific country objectives. Selected groups would be the focus of interest through specialized activities or materials that were calculated by the Department of Public Affairs to best achieve the desired results for U. S. foreign policy.

⁶³Mary Vance Trent, Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy, Paris, wrote the first of the U. S./France Country Plan Papers in 1948.

⁶⁴Justification Reports were written by U. S. Regional Public Affairs Officers who reported on the political, economic and social situation of their particular regions. These reports were submitted semi-annually to the U. S. Embassy in Paris.

⁶⁵U. S./France Country Plan Papers, 1950 to 53. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁶“Broadcasts to France in The Cold War and the Korean War Period,” Spring 1950 and Winter 1951. A Content Analysis Conducted by the Research Center for Human Relations. North York University, 16 July 1951. Papers of Charles Hulten. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

In France distance and awkward communications between the U. S. Embassy in Paris and Washington, D. C. permitted delegation of USIS matters within program administration. Directives from the Department of State were sent by diplomatic pouch or telegram to the Embassy. Upon arrival they were routinely passed to the Paris USIS staff before being sent to the regional Information Centers and to the Visa and Consular Affairs offices.

U. S./France Country Plan objectives, while coordinated to U. S. global foreign policy, specifically referred to the French situation. France was subject to the Department of State scheme for prioritizing countries⁶⁷ where the U. S. government had overseas information offices. Prioritizing countries according to their susceptibility toward communism was part of a scheme instituted by the Department of State during the early years of the Cold War. It was originally recommended by the U. S. Advisory Commission: "In order to establish priorities of importance and as the first step in pinpointing operations, the countries of the world to which information is now being sent are classified under priority groups." Individual countries that the Department of State considered might fall into Communist alliances or be overtaken by the Communists were assigned numerical "priority ratings" that reflected their risk to U. S. political and economic interests. France was classified as a "Priority Three" country because the U. S. government judged that a

⁶⁷Papers of Charles Hulten, "The U. S. Advisory Commission on Information. *Semi-Annual Report to Congress*," 1 July 1952. Box 14. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

Communist alliance or takeover might be possible there.⁶⁸

Prioritized countries targeted essential “priority groups” within the national population that the U. S. government feared might be “vulnerable”⁶⁹ to communism. In France, diverse groups were identified by U. S. Embassy staff in Paris according to their perceived susceptibility to Communist influences. Youth, labor, and opinion-forming groups were high-priorities. Embassy officials also identified low French morale and the “defeatist” French attitude as factors that they claimed made the French unreliable allies.

IX. The Campaign of Truth, 1950

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, President Truman spoke out against what he termed “Communist aggression in Korea.” He called for a vigorous “Campaign of Truth”⁷⁰ to promote U. S. foreign policy objectives while exposing and contradicting Communist propaganda.

⁶⁸Memorandum from the OII to the Public Affairs Department, “Revised Priorities for USIE Country Programs,” Record Group 59 Department of State. Records Relating to Informational Activities 1938 to 1953. Box 113. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁹Wording used in the U. S./France Country Plan for 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷⁰Phrase coined by President Truman when he wrote to Congress in Spring 1950 to request a special appropriation supplement to expand U. S. overseas information and educational activities and to launch, “A great campaign of truth.”

The Campaign of Truth was, in President Truman's words, "a battle for the control of mens' minds"⁷¹ rather than one for territorial acquisition. The Department of State, in an effort to explain what it considered the urgency of the situation to the American people, wrote:

The Campaign of Truth is a necessary instrument of the foreign policy of the United States. It brings out the psychological effect of the political, economic, military and diplomatic measures taken by the U. S. government to strengthen world freedom. It contributes to the effort to deter Soviet communism from undertaking aggression, whether by force of arms or by civil subversion.⁷²

To more effectively fight what it termed an ideological, not a territorial, battle, U. S. administrators intended to pursue a new policy within the USIS/France Program that focused on entertainment-type programs rather than the previous information activities. Policy planners considered this justifiable strategy because, "There is nothing that can have greater meaning in reaching out to other people than to present the sharing of cultural experiences to the full."⁷³

On the premise that a threat to the U. S. existed because of intended Soviet expansion in the realm of ideological warfare, President Truman wrote to the Seventy-ninth U. S. Congress to request a supplemental appropriation of funds to provide for

⁷¹This phrase comes from the Department of State publication, *The Campaign of Truth* (Washington, D. C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

⁷²Ibid. Howland S. Sargeant Papers. Correspondence File. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷³Ibid.

intensification of U. S. efforts in the realm of information activities.⁷⁴ This money would be used to reach people in critical areas of the world through greatly expanded international broadcasting facilities and through intensified programs for the exchange of persons, press and publications, libraries and motion pictures. In 1951, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, Howland H. Sargeant, redefined the program:

It is important to keep in mind that what we are attempting to do with this Information and Educational Exchange Program as an entity is not something that is distinct and separate from what we are trying to do in the conduct of our foreign policy. This is simply one of the means, just like our economic program, our military assistance program, our diplomatic negotiations, by which this country is attempting to carry out the conduct of its foreign relations. It is to bring this kind of understanding to other people as to what our motives are, what our policies are, and what kind of people we are, and what this way of life is that has brought us to our present position in the world.⁷⁵

While Sargeant equated the public affairs program with other existing U. S. programs including the economic program and the Military Assistance Program, he also stated that the information policy was oriented toward familiarizing foreign people with U. S. foreign policy. However, there is a discrepancy here: the conduct of diplomatic affairs cannot be considered the same as that followed in U. S. military and economic programs. Whereas the USIS program may have officially sanctioned "people to people" diplomacy, it remained the official U. S. information organ, responsible for carrying out foreign policy

⁷⁴Truman requested a supplemental appropriation of \$79 million for fiscal year 1950.

⁷⁵Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs in response to a question from Senator Sam Green. *Hearings. Senate 1951*. (Washington, D. C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 1034-45.

objectives through its own information objectives. Designated as an *information* machine, it actually worked toward *propagandizing* while publicly portraying a humane interest in the fate of foreign people.

When the USIE Act was passed in 1948, U. S. foreign policy objectives were still directed toward the dissemination of factual information that provided the individual with tools for making an informed decision about U. S. foreign policy. However, the growing Cold War deepened the polarization between East and West and intensified psychological warfare. By 1950, the Truman Administration addressed the concerns of U. S. citizens, press and congressional officials when it denounced the USSR for carrying on what officials termed a “propaganda war” against the U. S. In retaliation, it used the Campaign of Truth to put greater intensity into what the Truman Administration termed “hardhitting propaganda”⁷⁶ that it hoped would “counterattack”⁷⁷ the aims of the Soviet Information Program in Western Europe.

The Campaign of Truth resulted in a major shift of emphasis in the information program. From its onset in 1946 format had been factual, employing techniques that informed Western European people about U. S. lifestyle. Beginning in 1950, the U. S. government began to use more subtle entertainment-oriented activities that were cultural in a bid to win wider audiences toward U. S.-type government. A multi-cultural agenda was

⁷⁶ “Broadcasts to France in The Cold War and the Korean War Period,” Spring 1950 and Winter 1951. A Content Analysis Conducted by The Research Center for Human Relations. North York University, 16 July 1951. Papers of Charles Hulten. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷⁷Ibid.

then activated through the USIS Program.

X. The Influence of the U. S. Advisory Commission

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 established the U. S. Advisory Commission on Information to formulate and recommend policies and programs to the Secretary of State for executing the USIS Program. Appointed by Congress, this Commission consisted of academics and scholars from diverse U.S. universities who agreed to participate at the request of the U. S. President.

In this capacity, the U. S. Advisory Commission made semi-annual recommendations to Congress on the execution of U. S. foreign policy objectives overseas:

The Advisory Commission has been of outstanding service in establishing the International Information Program of this government upon a firm foundation and in fostering a realization that the program is as real as the military and economic components of our foreign policy. I agree with you that this program carried on by the Department of State is effectively interpreting the U.S. and its policies to the rest of the world and that with the recent appropriation by the Congress for the Campaign of Truth, this effectiveness will be increased.⁷⁸

Reacting positively to the Truman Administration's promotion of education as the new weapon for peace and harmonious interpersonal relations in post-World War II Western Europe the U. S. Advisory Commission favored using foreign policy objectives to underline its recommendations: "The greatest usefulness of educational exchange programs will be in relations with the free and democratic countries of the world, which are glad to avail

⁷⁸President Truman in letter accepting the resignation of the Honorable Mark Ethridge, Chairman of the U. S. Advisory Commission of Information. Harry S. Truman Papers. OF. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

themselves of its reciprocal advantages.⁷⁹

Chairman Harvey Braniscomb⁸⁰ drew the distinction between cultural and educational exchange and that of penetration. Information objectives closely linked to foreign policy aims would be obtained through rational use of exchange and culture; not by dogma, but by access to information.

Rationale for U. S. Advisory Commission recommendations also closely echoed the government's global doctrine of peaceful co-existence based on political stability and economic well-being. The International Information Agency⁸¹ had a principal objective to convince the world that the U. S. strongly desired peace and freedom for all people; every nation was free to choose its own destiny while providing a higher standard of living for the masses.

To carry out this resolve in 1951, the U. S. classified the information program with others developed under U. S. Programs for National Defense.⁸² These were programs created by the National Security Council that were approved by President Truman on 18 October 1951. Efforts were made to integrate the IIA with other defense programs including those with military and economic platforms.

⁷⁹Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁰Harvey Braniscomb, Chairman of the U. S. Advisory Commission, 1948 to 1952.

⁸¹The 1951 reorganization of the information program renamed it the International Information Agency in 1951. Henceforth referred to in this document by the acronym IIA.

⁸²This set the stage for the 1951 unification of USIS with the Mutual Security and Defense Agency Program, henceforth referred to by the acronym MSDAP.

In July 1952, the U. S. Advisory Commission presented its sixth *Semi-Annual Report to Congress*.⁸³ It gave full approval to the shift in policy in the USIS Program from information activities to entertainment-oriented programs. It also endorsed the Department of State decision to reorganize the program for more efficient and effective organization. Although the program's change of name was approved, it remained a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State. The Commission also supported the Benton-Wiley Resolution⁸⁴ that permitted annual congressional investigation into IIA Program activities and finances.

The U. S. Advisory Commission submitted two important recommendations that were significant for the IIA's future. It counseled that greater explanation be given explaining the program's shift in emphasis so that the American people would understand the necessity for this. While the Commission agreed with the reasons for the shift in emphasis, it pointed out the need for additional explanation about field operations. The Commission perceived a problem between the stated objectives of the program and the reactions of program personnel. Commission hesitation resulted from the 1950 fact-finding mission that members undertook to several European countries where the U. S. government maintained information offices. Meetings with U. S. diplomatic personnel responsible for field operations increased Commission apprehension that they did not appreciate fully the

⁸³U. S. Advisory Commission. *Sixth Semi-Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, D. C.,: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952).

⁸⁴U. S. Senators Benton and Wiley introduced a Resolution that was passed in the U. S. Senate. It recommended that the Information and Education Program be investigated by the Senate Appropriations Committee.

significance of the new USIS objectives. Therefore, it stated that, "Need for further explanation and re-emphasis is particularly true because it is at the country level that our propaganda purpose must guide our operational procedures."⁸⁵

XI. U. S. Strategies for Psychological Warfare in USIS

(a) U. S. Government Use of Advertising

As a result of the declaration of the 1950 Campaign of Truth, the Department of State solicited increased use of advertising to counteract what it claimed was ideological war in Western Europe by the USSR. It launched a public campaign directed toward involvement of U. S. business and industry in Western Europe.

As a supplement to U. S.-government efforts already in effect from 1947 on, the Department of State believed that using advertising overseas could render service to its foreign policy objectives while benefitting U. S. government and industry. Aimed at securing markets in Western Europe by trying to interest U. S. companies in investing in Western European countries, it sought interaction from large U. S. concerns under the guise of patriotism and duty toward the all-out containment of communism. This strategy provided benefits for the U. S. government because advertising was paid for by American dollars and could tell the American story exactly as the storytellers (i.e. the Department of State) wished it to be told. It also accomplished the psychological benefit of involving business and industry leaders in a display of U. S. patriotism, an important factor for morale and for providing the impression that the government was involving its citizens in U. S. concerns

⁸⁵U. S. Advisory Commission on Education. *Sixth Semi-Annual Report* (Washington, D. C., : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 3.

overseas.

Besides, participation in this campaign was portrayed as a *patriotic duty* for U. S. businesses and industry in light of the Campaign of Truth call for intensification of U. S. presence overseas because of the dangers posed to U. S. lifestyle by the aggrandizement of communism in Western Europe.

Department of State strategists outlined simple advertising techniques that could be successfully used to U. S. advantage in Western Europe: the same measures that were used in the U. S. by street vendors to hawk their merchandise could be easily adapted to sell facts about superiority of U. S. lifestyle to Western European people. Rationale for this included the knowledge that advertising could be repeated consistently, without ever wearing out as was the case with news stories. Furthermore, advertisements would effectively reach literate citizens of Western European nations who were targeted by Department of State policymakers as leaders and heads of opinion-forming influential groups. Ultimately, advertising techniques would penetrate the homes of ordinary people where individuals could feel that they were on their own initiative to decide about advertised U.S. way of life without having to attend group meetings where they might be influenced to show their approval or disapproval in public.

(b) U. S. Foreign Policy and Advertising

The Psychological Strategy Board⁸⁶ took a leading role in issuing directives on the use of advertising copy overseas. In an attempt to discourage advertisements that appeared similar to those placed by Communists, it endorsed themes that were associated with the product involved. Two results were hoped for: to produce goodwill for the publicized product and the company that produced it, while providing more intimate examples of the benefits of the American way of life. In this way, PSB strategy explained, a subtle suggestion that the benefits of U. S. lifestyle could help other countries help themselves would be introduced into the reader's psyche. In this way the Board thought that the U. S. would not appear to be promoting its own superiority; instead, the message transmitted would allow the reader to conclude U. S. excellence through his own reasoning.

(c) The Campaign of Total Diplomacy

Secretary of State Dean Acheson launched a "Campaign of Total Diplomacy" in 1950 that was designed to bring different aspects of U. S. business and industry into the psychological fight against communism overseas. As part of the Campaign of Truth, the Department of State tried to coordinate a plan to involve U. S. business, industry and trade in the government campaign on both the domestic and the foreign fronts. Because government policy ultimately depended upon public opinion, the Department of State invited private industry, business and advertising to join with it in promoting U. S. lifestyle

⁸⁶The Psychological Strategy Board, henceforth referred to by the acronym PSB. It was created by President Truman in 1948 to deal with psychological warfare.

overseas.

Then, in 1948, the Department of Public Affairs asked the Advertising Council of America to attend a conference about “the very serious struggle now being waged to prevent the further spread of Communism in Europe.”⁸⁷ The President of the Advertising Council stated that it would emphasize two fronts that required the help of business and industry in order to save advantageous foreign markets abroad that might otherwise fall into Communist alliances: the economic front represented by the industrial reconstruction of Europe and the propaganda front repudiating Communist ideology.⁸⁸

Other members of the Advertising Council were delegated to talk to major U. S. magazines about problems in export. Contradictory to U. S. public perception that the big problem in exports at the time was the dollar shortage and that Western European countries such as France and Germany were hit hard by it, these talks endeavored to show that the real fault, from U. S. viewpoint, lay with communism.⁸⁹ U. S. companies were targeted by the Department of State to sponsor this “small but unique campaign”⁹⁰ that, if successful, would promote the government overseas.

⁸⁷Letter from the Department of State sent to leading businesses and industry in the U. S. soliciting the help of business and industry to contain communism in Western Europe. Staff Member and Office Files (SMOF): C. W. Jackson Files. Office of Government Reports, File 1947 to 1948. Box 11. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁸⁸Memo from T. S. Replier, President of the Advertising Council of America to Mr. Eugene Holman, President, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 16 March 1948 in *ibid*.

⁸⁹ “Our Cold War has two Fronts,” 3 in *ibid*.

⁹⁰For example, a talk give by Jere Patterson of *Life International* to the Export Advertising Association, 26 April 1950.

Therefore, U. S. government attempts to bring in big business and industry to help fight an ideological battle with the Soviets could not have been motivated simply by the fact that U. S. image was suffering overseas. A successful campaign by major industrialists and companies overseas would mean increased foreign markets for the U. S. and help to reinvigorate the foreign economies where it was involved. By bringing big business and industry to the side of the government, the Department of State publicized the goals of the new Campaign of Truth while setting up a lucrative economic situation for companies that became involved in the government agenda. Secondly, it advanced the U. S. cause in countries where these companies participated through use of advertisements and publicity. Finally, it demonstrated to the American people that there was a foreign policy that required the USIS Program for its support, making the program justifiable to U.S. citizens, big business and industry and Congress, where elected officials could bring pressure upon committees to maintain the program.

Moreover, there is evidence that the Department of State attempted to influence American Labor to join in the overseas advertising plans.⁹¹ Government planning for the labor group was extensive: a general guidance requisite to the intelligence of foreign peoples was drawn up that identified diverse possibilities for advertising in foreign countries. Included were newspaper, magazine and trade-paper advertising; use of radio time on foreign news stations; publicity releases to foreign press; brochures and pamphlets

⁹¹In particular, the CIO and the AFL. See "Memo for the Advertising Council," 20 January 1948. SMOF: C. W. Jackson Files. Office of Government Reports. File 1947 to 1948. Box 11. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

that could be distributed abroad; labels and stickers saying “USA.”⁹²

In spite of U. S. claims that the USIS Program was not a propaganda operation, in 1948 the Advertising Council used language that included such phrases as “indoctrination of American employees in overseas offices.”⁹³ It did not, however, state whether or not “alien” employees were to be treated in the same manner as American workers, thus giving rise to speculation that the Department of State feared recriminations from the employees or from the strong Communist-dominated labor unions in the smaller towns and industrial areas of France.

To deflect public criticism at home, the Bureau of Public Affairs published a paper⁹⁴ on the Department's psychological objectives for the second part of 1950. It focused on the significance of the next three-month period in the U. S. and overseas, a period when, it stated, the psychological attitudes of people could be “powerfully influenced along lines favorable to achievement of U. S. foreign policy objectives.”⁹⁵ It proposed a series of subjects on U. S. foreign policy that could be successfully utilized in speeches and press conferences given by influential government officials including the Secretary of State⁹⁶ that

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴ “Psychological Objectives for the Next Three Months,” 2 June 1950. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Miscellaneous Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs 1944 to 1962. Box 3.

⁹⁵Ibid., 3.

⁹⁶Topics included, “The U. S. Has A Foreign Policy,” that was a recapitulation of recent U. S. achievements in international affairs. Another subject was, “It Requires Work and Sacrifice,” that emphasized U. S. economic goals in foreign policy. “The Future Belongs

would be delivered in prestigious northeastern universities. A series of advertisements was proposed that stressed the need for U. S. strength overseas to counter Soviet aggression.

Conclusion

The establishment of the overseas information program was represented to the U. S. public as necessary to answer government claims about ideological warfare waged by the the USSR to discredit U. S. foreign policy. It was supposed to improve U. S. image while building constructive relations between the U. S. and people abroad. In France, it became the mechanism for a U. S. cultural counter-offensive to a supposed Soviet Cultural Program that the U. S. said was an important part of Communist policy in Western Europe. While it was portrayed to the American public as an information program vital to the U. S. cause in France because of reported increases in anti-Americanism, it became a full-fledged propaganda operation.

More significantly, while the USIS/France Program provided the means through which the U. S. could outwardly use information and entertainment programs to promote support for U. S. lifestyle, it had a more relevant function as the mechanism through which a cultural policy was implemented to eliminate Communist influence. Thus, the role of the USIS/France Program was far more important in foreign policy than the U. S. government publicly admitted. This confirms that the place of culture in U. S. foreign policy was deliberately emphasized by Department of State policy makers for use in post-World War II France.

to the Free World,” was another example that targeted international organization and collective defense systems.

Chapter Two

The Organization of the USIS Program in France

I. Administrative Organization

(a) Program Authority

Overall authority for the public affairs program overseas was retained by the Department of State. Program administration was directed by its agency, the Bureau of Public Affairs, whose creation resulted from a 1945 U. S. Advisory Commission¹ recommendation. Central USIS Program operations in Washington were executed under a Program Administrator appointed by the President. Within the separate organizations that evolved from 1945 to 1958,² candidates selected from the academic and communications sector were favorite choices for USIS Program Administrators.³ Their appointment proved useful to government strategists because of their influence with other U. S. scholars whom they could persuade to support the USIS Program. Thus, the U.S. government solidified its liaison with the information and education orientation that began after World War II.

At individual country levels, the program functioned under the global organization regulated by Washington. However, U. S. diplomats were authorized to make changes

¹See Chapter One for explanation of U. S. Advisory Commission role.

²From 1945 to 1948 the central office of the public affairs program in Washington, D. C. was USIS. In 1948 it became the U. S. Information and Education Program (USIE); from 1950-1952, the International Information Agency (IIA) and from 1953 to 1958, the U.S. Information Agency Program (USIA). For clarity, USIS or USIS/France will be used throughout this study.

³Included were William C. Johnstone, Administrator, USIS Program from 1948 to 1950, former Rector, Columbia University and Wilson H. Compton, Director, from 1950 to 1952, who was a former President of the State College of Washington.

within the overall pattern in order to accommodate specific needs for program success in their assigned countries. The USIS/France Program was an affiliate of the larger USIS organization. It acted, "in loco parentis," for the Bureau of Public Affairs. This arrangement permitted the U. S. Embassy to maintain the same relationship to other USIS agencies and to official French organizations as its parent structure.

(b) Role of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs reported directly to the Secretary of State and was responsible for directing department-wide public information policies and programs, including a news policy program and press relations. He served as principal advisor and confidant to the Secretary of State, other U. S.-government officials and agencies in press, media relations and information activities. He also interacted with non-governmental organizations concerned with foreign affairs, information and education.

From 1945 to 1953, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs directed the largest aggregation of responsibilities in the Department of State. His duties entailed contact with major U. S. universities, international cultural and scientific cooperation programs and international information programs. As chief U. S. public affairs officer, his responsibilities embraced the central translation function, geographical and cartographical tasks, historical research, publications, and liaison with the secretariat of the National Commission for UNESCO.

(c) Responsibilities of Program-Planning and Evaluation Staff⁴

Organizationally, the Bureau of Public Affairs maintained its own policy-planning staff responsible for developing policy statements and issuing directives to U. S. missions and consulates overseas. However, distance forced delegation of responsibilities; aside from occasional official visits, contact with USIS/Paris was through formal, administrative procedure, while communication with regional field offices was almost nil.

The growing Cold War motivated PPS staff to design a basic-planning mechanism through which all media and external post operations could be directed toward common U. S. foreign policy objectives. This was accomplished by reaching out to designated target groups in each country through activities and audio-visual materials best calculated to achieve U. S. objectives.

(c.i) Policy-development Procedure

U. S. information objectives that paralleled foreign policy objectives and identified target groups with assigned criteria were published annually. These documents first appeared in January 1950 at PPS weekly meetings in Washington with the Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff.⁵ A check and balance system that operated through the vertical line authority structure controlled development.

⁴Henceforth referred to by its acronym PPS.

⁵Henceforth referred to by its acronym P/POL.

This procedure involved a bi-weekly series of meetings with Regional Bureau and Public Affairs staff, Directors of the Office of Educational Exchange⁶ and the Office of International Information.⁷ Each office had specific objectives that had to be met before the working papers could be moved up to the next level for appraisal and revisions. For example, PPS prepared initial instructions for country-paper development by Regional Bureau staff. Four country papers that contained the basic elements on USIS country objectives, target audiences and the best medium for reaching each target group were used as models.

Policy development began in the Regional Bureau that submitted a prototype country paper to PPS where it was studied by P/POL. Copies of drafts were forwarded to OEX and OII managers and to media divisions for recommendations that were transmitted back to PPS. Field post interaction was ensured through a circular instruction⁸ that requested additional information and directed that a written report be sent to PPS within two weeks. Rereading of completed papers by Regional Affairs staff and PPS took place before they were forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of State for signature. Papers were disseminated to all operating units and field posts. Copies were distributed to OEX with instructions to

⁶Henceforth referred to by its acronym OEX.

⁷Henceforth referred to by its acronym OII.

⁸Circular instructions from the Department of State to its Embassies, Posts, Visa and Consular offices overseas took the form of circular telegrams. The original telegram was circulated for action through several different offices attached to U. S. missions.

provide copies⁹ for each of its media divisions and staff of the Commission on Educational Exchange and to the International Broadcasting Division.¹⁰

Revisions were at Department initiative, in consultation with field posts involved; or, at field request, with Department agreement. Semi-annual evaluation and justification reports prepared by field officers contained statistical information that was used for country paper annual review.

II. The Bureau of Public Affairs and UNESCO

Situating UNESCO Head Offices in Paris held considerable advantage for U. S. interests; numerous, large U. S.-dominated outfits served as clear indication to the French of where power and authority lay¹¹ in the new world order. The U. S.-government did not fail to remind the French of this; particularly, in their dealings with French delegations to annual UNESCO Conferences.

When UNESCO was formally linked to the emerging U. N. system of specialized agencies in 1946, its objectives were to bring together individuals, groups, governments and popular and scholarly interests in science, education, and cultural activities. These goals adapted well to U. S. foreign policy objectives and to the new diplomacy.

⁹Twenty-five copies were to OEX and thirty-five copies to OII. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹⁰Henceforth referred to by its acronym IBD.

¹¹Other U. S.-dominated organizations in Paris included the Head Offices of NATO and SHAPE.

The 1946 UNESCO constitution¹² identified UNESCO conferences as its official policy-making body. Annual meetings, therefore, were allocated high priority by the Department of State because of the international spotlight¹³ they afforded for dissemination of U. S. foreign policy objectives through cultural politicization as well as opportunities for political manipulation.

The official U. S. delegation at UNESCO Conferences was made up of academics, researchers¹⁴ and Department of State strategists. The Assistant Secretary of State attended as Chief Delegate and Head of the U. S.-government contingent. Policy makers, therefore, had a double advantage; designers of U. S. information policy overseas, they were also at the vortex of UNESCO policy formation where they used planned political and diplomatic pressure to safeguard U. S. interests. Primary among these were the bi-annual election of the UNESCO Director-General and assessment of U. S.-allies support.

¹² This constitution came into effect, 26 November 1945.

¹³For example, journalists representing six hundred U.S. newspapers attended the Seventh UNESCO General Conference in Paris in 1952. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. UNESCO General Conference 1952, (Folder 2). Box 6. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹⁴ Academics included Walter H. C. Laves who was Vice-President for Research at the Government Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C. Laves was U. S.-delegation Vice-Chairman at the 1952 UNESCO conference. Other U.S.-delegation members were, Robert C. Angell, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan and Paul H. Sheats, Professor of Education at University of California.

(a) The U. S. and the UNESCO Director-General

At the first UNESCO Conference in 1946, U. S. and British-delegation pressure forced the election of Julian Huxley¹⁵ as Director-General. At the next conference, in 1948, the U. S. delegation that had lobbied for Huxley did not wish to see him reinstated. Instead, it successfully backed another nominee¹⁶ who was known to be more favorable to U. S. interests.

At the seventh conference in 1952, when political disagreement over the question of Chinese representation occasioned the Director-General's resignation, U. S. pressure on the other conference delegates resulted in Howland H. Sargeant's election.¹⁷ This move catapulted the U. S. into an excellent maneuvering position from which it could manipulate the other delegations.

Sargeant, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, used his new position to promote U. S. foreign policy objectives by declaring UNESCO, "a test of our ability to protect and extend freedom while arming for possible war and while guarding against subversion."¹⁸ Thus, threatening military force as necessary for the U. S. to defend liberty, he justified the position of NATO and its collective defense policy for the Western European states.

¹⁵Huxley, (later Sir Julian Huxley), was the first UNESCO Director-General from 1946 to 1948. A biologist and author, his teaching career had been spent in prestigious universities in England and the U. S.

¹⁶Jaimie Torres-Bodet, UNESCO Director-General, 1948 to 1952.

¹⁷Howland H. Sargeant, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, was the U. S. delegate to the UNESCO Conference in 1951.

¹⁸UNESCO. General Conference, Paris, 1952. (Folder 1). Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Box 6. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

Sargeant directed conference work toward these goals in order to secure mutually beneficial decisions for UNESCO and U. S. pursuits.¹⁹

While Sargeant played the public role of UNESCO Director-General, his work was carefully orchestrated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson whose interest in UNESCO was conditioned by U. S. economic and political concerns. Determined to avoid increased payments to UNESCO because of negative press reports²⁰ that complained about “unequal” budget distribution²¹ and doubts about continuing U. S. foreign aid, Acheson issued strong directives to the U. S. delegation:

The Delegation will go to the conference with the following primary purposes: to avoid any increase in the financial contributions asked of the United States; to amend UNESCO’s constitution to provide that Executive Board members be designated as representatives of their governments; and to obtain a better utilization of UNESCO’s available resources through concentration of effort on the most valuable and practicable projects. In connection with such priority activities, the two most significant areas are UNESCO’s program of fundamental education and of education for international cooperation, both of which are to be strengthened and accelerated.²²

¹⁹Howland H. Sargeant, “Confidential Report on Sixth UNESCO General Conference.” UNESCO General Conference, Paris 1952--Conference: Florence, Italy 1950-Scrapbook Sheets. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Box 6. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²⁰For example, U. S. journalist James Daniel, “Special Report on American Opinion,” *The Washington News*, 26 November 1952 in *ibid.*

²¹UNESCO operated on a small, annual budget (\$9 million in 1952), of which the U. S. share was one-third. Information found in *ibid.*

²²Memorandum from Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, to Howland H. Sargeant, Chairman of the U. S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of the General Conference of UNESCO in *ibid.*

(b) U. S. Use of the UNESCO Conference to Assess French Support

In 1950, U. S.-government attention focused on the French delegation in order to try to evaluate French reliability as U.S. allies. Under pretext of the election of a new Director-General, the U. S. asked the French delegation to use its good offices to determine the willingness of the nominee, Paulo Carneiro.²³

For the French delegation, this opportunity to actively participate in UNESCO policy appeared favorable. Carneiro's proposed candidacy presented the possibility of a Director-General who spoke their language, understood French culture and possessed the diplomatic experience to place France in the international arena:

Quant au Département, qui ne souhaite pas non plus le renouvellement du mandat du Dr. Huxley...il se rallierait volontiers à la candidature d'une personnalité connaissant notre langue, favorable à notre culture et qui, tout en étant suffisamment connue dans les milieux intellectuels, posséderait le sens diplomatique et l'expérience administrative indispensables à la direction d'une importante organisation internationale.²⁴

Therefore, when Sargeant requested that the French delegate approach Carneiro, initial French reaction was positive. However, U. S. request for French diplomatic initiative placed the French government in a difficult position.

The request came at a time when Franco-American relations were tense because of U. S. interest in the new German state, a situation that revived French fears of German aggression. Moreover, knowledge that Germany had replaced France as chief U. S. ally in

²³Paulo Carneiro was from Chile.

²⁴Affaires Étrangères (hereafter AE) France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Échanges Culturels. Série II. États-Unis. Vol. 124. 6 April 1948. Telegram from Bonnet, French Ambassador, to the Director-General, Affaires Étrangères, France.

Western Europe became a bone of contention with the French, who worried that this move was detrimental to France. The relationship became further complicated because French foreign policy objectives that prioritized keeping U. S. money coming to France forced the French to walk a tightrope with their U. S. benefactors. Consultation with the Direction d'Amérique²⁵ in Paris advised caution. Thus, it was in this context that the French delegation to the UNESCO Conference became the reluctant negotiators between the U. S. and Carneiro.

Sargeant asked André Marie,²⁶ Head of the French delegation, to ascertain Carneiro's reaction to his proposed appointment. At first Marie supported U. S. strategy, telling Carneiro that the French thought he was the right man for the position.²⁷ However, Carneiro surprised Marie by speaking of the need for collective support from all member nations; not just from the U. S. and the United Kingdom. To U. S. consternation, although Marie "seemed surprised," at Carneiro's response, he did not attempt to persuade him, "to hold any other views."²⁸ His failure to sway Carneiro toward U. S. position appeared to the U. S. delegates as further evidence of French ambivalence and cast doubts upon reliability of the French as allies:

²⁵The Direction d'Amérique was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agency in charge of Franco-American relations.

²⁶André Marie, Ministère de l'Instruction nationale. Head of the French delegation to the UNESCO General Conference, 1950.

²⁷Memorandum of Conversation, 13 December 1952. Howland H. Sargeant, "My Conversation with Paulo Carneiro, 12 December 1952," pp. 2-3. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant, Box 6. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²⁸Ibid.

The strong German participation at the conference did not go unnoticed by the French delegation whose influence at the conference was seriously weakened by the fact that it seemed to be divided into a number of conflicting factions which contradicted each other. The French delegation did not seem to be able to make up its mind. Dr. Torres Bodet was upset because he thought that the French could have gotten the conference to carry his budget position. Dr. Laves said that Mr. Pinay was said to have instructed the French delegation to vote against an increased budget.²⁹

These examples demonstrate the double nature of the Bureau of Public Affairs liaison to UNESCO. Publicly, the U. S.-delegation promoted UNESCO objectives of peace through education and information; privately, it employed cultural politicization and U. S.-government pressure on other member delegations in order to promote U. S.-style democracy, collective defense and security for Western Europe. Outwardly demonstrating its concern as a member delegation of UNESCO committed to world peace, the U. S. government used its public affairs department as its conference weapon, to manipulate other states toward U. S. foreign policy objectives.

III. The Bureau of Public Affairs and Scientific and Technological Programs

To reach out to new technology, the Bureau of Public Affairs expanded into international technological and scientific programs. France, one of the original signers of the Marshall Plan in 1948, provided ample opportunity for exhibiting U. S. expertise in scientific and technological fields. U. S. policy was carried out under guise of attempting to help the French help themselves:

²⁹Memorandum from Richard Heindel to Howland H. Sargeant, 22 December 1952, p.3. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Box 6. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

Our paramount purpose, I submit, must be the cultivation at home and the encouragement abroad of the living, dynamic spirit of democracy. We do not invite these guests into our national home to indoctrinate them with ready-made opinions or to spoon-feed them prescribed doses of American culture or thought. We welcome them so that they may partake with us, on equal terms, of a way of life which we believe offers the greatest opportunities for the growth and development of the individual, the nation, mankind. We invite them to experience and to observe American democracy with an inquiring mind and a discerning eye. They are free to judge us as they see fit. They are exposed, as we are, to the clash of contending views. They may examine our defects, and appraise the sincerity and vigor with which we strive to correct them... Many of us believe that we should maintain and broaden educational contacts, among both democratic and totalitarian nations. For education can lead strongly and vigorously in the ultimate transformation of the present precarious peace into an enduring peace.³⁰

In the early Recovery period, the U. S. government pursued a policy that often hired U. S. personnel and industrial workers to carry out scientific and technological projects in France. U. S.-state of the art industrial equipment was brought to France in order to demonstrate U.S. effectiveness. By 1951, scientific and technological cooperation between the U. S. and France included hiring U. S. oil surveyors to open oil wells in the Pyrenees regions as well as inviting several French engineers to attend U. S. Federal Mining Institutes in the western U. S.

Placing U. S. personnel on work sites in French regions was an effective way to ensure dissemination of positive information about the U. S. while fostering good working relations between U. S. and French workers. Moreover, sending workers from France to the U. S. provided unique opportunity and experience. As well, it generally assured positive reaction about the U. S. to colleagues upon the French worker's return.

³⁰Ibid.

In the regions, there was a program to systematically place USIS scientific abstracts³¹ in the proper professional circles. The objective was to build up a large, faithful following of professionals who were dependent upon this information and on the scientific journals in USIS/France libraries to keep abreast of current research in American science.

To further ally U. S. academia to the public affairs program, significant U. S.-government press conferences often took place at major U. S. universities, thereby publicly demonstrating government confidence in academic institutions and demonstrating its support for educational programs. This provided a convenient means for publicizing U. S. commitment toward pursuing world peace through education and information. These occasions were frequently used by the Secretary of State to promulgate foreign policy.

IV. Organization of USIS/France Operations³²

(a) The U. S. Mission in France

In each country where the government operated a USIS Program, the U.S. Embassy became its delegated representative. Although there was a global organigram with compulsory posts identified, each country embassy was permitted to establish its own specific organization according to its size, importance and the resources necessary for program execution. Functioning as U. S. missions in respective countries, the U. S. Embassy acted as official government agent for the absent Department of State.

³¹Included were data on dentistry, surgery, pharmaceuticals, and chemistry.

³²Space restrictions in this chapter prevent discussion of the individual units within the USIS/France organization. These will be dealt with in Chapter Three.

In France, responsibility for the U. S. Mission was delegated by the Department of State to the U. S. Ambassador who was chief emissary. USIS/France central offices were located in the U. S. Embassy in Paris. From there a network fanned out across France, dividing the country into regional USIS operations. Central-office organization paralleled that of the Bureau of Public Affairs; operations were carried out through a vertical line of managerial authority.

Directives were received from Washington D. C. by diplomatic pouch and telegram. Official communications, unless urgent, were timed to leave Washington in the evening in order to arrive in Paris the next morning. Co-ordination of timing between Washington and Paris allowed news bulletins to appear in early morning French newspapers.

Official communication protocol between the U. S. Embassy and government was at ambassadorial level, but further deputation permitted other embassy officers to correspond with Washington. Office organization included ambassadorial secretaries and clerical staff charged with administrative duties. An administrative officer and a Press Attaché completed the organization of the ambassador's office.

(b) The Public Affairs Division³³

The PAD consisted of the Office of the Division Chief and five attached sections.³⁴ Each had its own organization with staff supervised by a section manager who was an embassy officer. Sections were divided into operational units that were further segregated

³³Henceforth referred to by its acronym PAD.

³⁴These were the Cultural Affairs, Area Services and Information Sections, Press Attaché Office and Administrative Unit.

into individual departments. The PAD operated under direction of the Counselor of the Embassy and was charged with general responsibility for the planning, organization and execution of informational and cultural activities concerning France and Algeria. Its priority was dissemination of information and stimulation of sympathy for the U. S.

Table 1. Organization of the USIS/France Program, U.S. Embassy, Paris, 1951³⁵

USIS Administrative Unit	Information Section	Area Services	Cultural Relations Unit
Photo Lab Unit	Press Unit	PAO Bordeaux	Library
Delivery Services Unit	Exhibits Unit	PAO Lille	Educational Exchange
Print Shop Unit	Motion Picture Unit	PAO Lyons	Art/Special Groups
Mail and Assembly Unit	Radio Unit	PAO Marseilles	Book/Publications
Vartype Unit		PAO Strasbourg	Music Unit
Theater Unit			Fulbright Exchange

The USIS/Paris operation was divided into units that followed a vertical line management pattern. Supervisors were Embassy officers who were responsible for the overall functioning of assigned units. Each unit contained sub-divisions that comprised a section of USIS/France operations. Table 1 demonstrates the various divisions, while Table 2 shows the breakdown of USIS staff within the units. Employees included U. S. and French personnel. The latter were employed in clerical positions.

³⁵Information in Table 1 is from "Foreign Service Inspection Report, 6 December 1951." Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C. Mission administration had its own Embassy Press Officer and Press Attaché. The U. S. Ambassador's Office and the CPAO's Office included ambassadorial and CPAO clerks and secretaries. Individual units maintained their own clerical staff.

Table 2. Paris Office Employee Breakdown According to Function, 1951³⁶

Paris	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerical Staff	Local Staff
Chief of Division Office	3	2	1
Information Section	10	3	51
Cultural Relations Section	6	8	43
Area Services	2	2	7
Press Attaché	3	1	1
Administrative Section	0	0	46
Total Employees	24	16	49

Table 3 demonstrates the increase in USIS/France personnel following the initiation of the Campaign of Truth. Between 1951 and 1952, USIS/France operations expanded in the Paris headquarters and in regional operations. For example, individual units including the Information and Cultural Relations Section expanded while the overall program increased from 149 to 174 employees.

³⁶Ibid. In 1952, employees increased overall in every category except U. S. clerks where numbers diminished by four. Analysis of individual breakdown in different categories from 1951 to 1952 shows that whereas U. S. officers declined by one Division Chief, the Information Section (responsible for press and media liaison) was increased by four employees. Whereas the Cultural Relations Section showed a decrease of six jobs, the Area Section increased by one. This demonstrates U. S. policy of increasing provincial offices to reach larger French population in rural areas, while maintaining press and media services during the aftermath of the Korean War and the Campaign of Truth.

Table 3. USIS/ Paris Office Employee Breakdown According to Function, 1952³⁷

Paris Offices	U. S. Officers	U. S. Secretaries	Local Employees
Division Chief	2	2	1
Information Section	14	3	54
Cultural Relations Section	12	2	46
Area Section	4	3	11
Press Office	3	1	1
Administrative Section	2	1	61
Total Employees	38	12	174

(c) The Cultural Relations Section

The Cultural Relations Section was responsible for the development, direction and coordination of cultural activities in metropolitan France and in Algeria. It disseminated information about U. S. art, literature, music and theater. Supervision of the Educational Exchange Program was carried out by this Section and it also maintained contact with youth groups, womens' organizations and other associations in order to stimulate exchanges between them and corresponding U. S. groups. As well, the Lecture Bureau was also under control of this office. In addition to the USIS Paris library, the Cultural Relations Section serviced provincial information centers and libraries. Attempts to communicate understanding and trust of the U. S. to the French population was undertaken through diverse reference and advisory services, including lending publications, exhibitions, group visits, lectures, representations of libraries at outside meetings and through establishment of

³⁷ "Description and Assessment of U. S. Information Services in France," 1 October 1952, p. 3. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

effective interpersonal relations between library staff and the French public.

The Cultural Relations Officer was delegated locally as the Cultural Attaché.³⁸ This officer negotiated with the appropriate-ranking French official in organizing and setting up cultural matters involving France and the U. S.³⁹ Frequently called upon as a guest lecturer in English or French, the Cultural Attaché represented the ambassador at cultural functions⁴⁰ and ceremonies. This position was considered significant from U. S.-government viewpoint because of the belief that the French looked upon the Cultural Attaché as the “normal” channel to all phases of U. S. cultural, intellectual and educational life. Therefore, the Cultural Affairs Section defined culture very broadly, in order to answer the many calls upon its service.

The Cultural Attaché was a member of the U.S. Educational Commission for France and the Fulbright representative for the U.S. Ambassador on the Board of Trustees of the American Library in France⁴¹ An ex-officio member of the Administrative Council of the U. S. Foundation at the Cité Universitaire, he liaised with the ranking official of the Office of Cultural Relations in the Quai d’Orsay and Ministère de l’Education nationale as well as being the official liaison with French provincial university rectors and academics.

³⁸This is the terminology used in U. S. Embassy correspondence.

³⁹Examples include the President Wilson Centennial in 1956 and the La Fayette Bicentennial in 1957 as well as annual ceremonies commemorating those who died in the two world wars.

⁴⁰For example, the awarding of literary prizes, unveiling of statues, naming of streets for U. S. dignitaries, and the conferring of degrees.

⁴¹The U. S. Ambassador was Honorary President of the American Library in Paris.

Within the PAD and in the embassy, there were several Assistant Cultural Attachés who were responsible for individual units and who later became Public Affairs Officers⁴² in regional operations. They were assigned according to their skills and interests.⁴³

(d) The Information Section

The Information Section was headed by an Information Officer⁴⁴ who reported to the Chief Public Affairs Officer.⁴⁵ He directed and supervised the USIS/France information programs and worked closely with other embassy divisions. In touch with other U. S. agencies in France, he also liaised with the ECA and representatives of special projects carried out in conjunction with information services.

In particular, the IO was responsible for military-civilian relationships, a prominent issue in France after the unification of USIS with the Mutual Security Defense Agency Program in 1950. An important aspect of his job was to integrate U. S. troops into French society after U.S. military forces were billeted there as part of NATO during the Korean war.

The Information Section consisted of press, exhibits, film and radio units that were oriented toward providing information about U. S. lifestyle through these media. During the intensification of the Cold War and, in particular, after implementation of the Campaign of

⁴²Henceforth known by the acronym PAO(s).

⁴³The Area Section office in the U. S. Embassy had nine Assistant Cultural Attachés in 1950. For example, Darthea Speyer, who was interested in art and had a degree in Fine Arts from University of Chicago was Assistant Cultural Attaché in the Cultural Relations Section where she was responsible for the Art and Exhibits Unit.

⁴⁴Henceforth referred to by its acronym IO.

⁴⁵Henceforth referred to by its acronym CPAO.

Truth, the activities of the Information Section were escalated to reflect the international political situation.⁴⁶

(e) The Role of the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy

Organization of the USIS/France Program included a Country Counselor⁴⁷ who was Chief, PAD and CPAO. His office, attached to that of the U. S. ambassador, but staffed independently, formed part of general mission administration. Office staff provision included a Deputy PAO in charge of administrative aspects of the program and an Assistant to the Counselor.

The U. S. ambassador delegated authority for USIS/France operations to the CPAO whose duties were administrative and supervisory. As program administrator he was accountable for policy planning, programming and program supervision. Through detailed memoranda he kept the ambassador and Washington apprised about French reactions to U. S. foreign policy, wrote reports analyzing French political trends and studied French press and media commentaries about the U. S.

The CPAO held overall responsibility for production of the annual U. S./France Country Papers. This phase of his job description included development, preparation and revision of U. S./France information objectives, as well as breakdown and analysis of priority target groups and selection of appropriate criteria for each. In practice, he delegated responsibility while retaining overall managerial authority. For example,

⁴⁶See Tables 1 and 2 for evidence of increased activities of the Information Section in the 1950 to 1952 period.

⁴⁷Sometimes designated as IO, but in USIS/France organization this position was designated Country Counselor.

embassy Cultural Attachés wrote⁴⁸ information objectives for U. S. Country Papers for France that were submitted to Washington policy makers under CPAO signature.

Other CPAO duties were consultation with the ambassador and Washington concerning cultural activities suitable for presentation in France. He ordered audio-visual materials, evaluated information and entertainment activities, wrote composite evaluation and justification reports and collated statistical data about the USIS/France Program to send to the Department of State to support annual appropriation requests to Congress.

In short, the CPAO was responsible for ensuring that operational requirements were met and that the program ran effectively so that Washington staff could justify USIE/France as a necessary component for the success of U. S. foreign policy in France. He had to present evidence for maintenance of the regional program and the USIS/Paris offices in order to avoid job cutbacks and service restrictions. Therefore, he functioned as a type of “senior manager,” liaising between regional USIS/France managers, U. S. Embassy hierarchy and Washington. As chief embassy officer, he met with French government agencies for consultation about U.S. cultural and educational interests in France. He was a member of the Franco-American Fulbright Exchange Board, and the Fulbright Evaluation Committee that selected candidates for Fulbright appointments.

⁴⁸The first information objectives for the U. S/France Country Paper in 1950 were written by U. S. Embassy Cultural Attaché, Mary Vance Trent.

(f) Employee Characteristics

After the establishment of the USIE Act in 1948, increased requests for materials from USIS/France by editors, Franco-American groups, and local officials of all political parties other than the PCF, resulted in increased activities within the program.

Escalated French interest in U. S. assistance, however, coincided with budget cuts. Staff was severely curtailed; eight Americans and twenty-three French nationals remained at their posts in contrast to the previous twenty-three Americans and sixty-three French employees.⁴⁹ As congressional legislation forbade additional hiring, USIS/France staff personally endeavored to augment the program, an effort that was rewarded by increased program effectiveness.⁵⁰ This type of personal commitment demonstrates the character of the program in France.

(g) Analysis of Job Commitment

Longtime service within the same diplomatic network increased program commitment and fostered close interpersonal relations. It also ensured that newcomers did not join the embassy staff, thus making job acquisition in the USIS/France Program a select assignment. This "closed door" hiring policy that operated within the confines of the upper hierarchy was carried on informally. Officially, hiring was the responsibility of the Department of State. However, a telephone call, or a note to supervisors, was enough to

⁴⁹Papers of Charles Hulten. State Department Information Program (1946-48). Box 9. "Fiscal 1949 Allotments - European Branch." Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁵⁰Ibid.

formalize the hiring process.⁵¹ The reason why this procedure worked effectively in France was that Washington policy makers remained largely unaware of it. Furthermore, embassy officials were permitted to allocate staff resources; for example, employees who went on long home leave were not replaced by temporary staff. Instead, colleagues took over urgent work; a personal service that made part-time hiring unnecessary and appealed to administrators because there was no cost involved. As well, supervisor complaints about employee performance from 1948 to 1953 were minimal.⁵² Ironically, hiring procedure and staff work load appear contrary to the democratic principle that USIS employees were supposed to uphold.

This “hands off” policy by Washington, and, to a large extent, by senior embassy managers, permitted employees to fulfill their job descriptions unobstructed by supervisory personnel. Thus, they worked in a more relaxed environment that encouraged staff initiative and commitment. Whereas information objectives prioritized establishing personal links with French leaders and the public, how employees initiated this contact was undefined by managerial policy.

⁵¹William R. Tyler, who became the first CPAO in the USIS/France Program, recalled, in an interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, that he received a telephone call from Ambassador David Bruce asking him to join the program. Charles Stuart Kennedy, “Interview with Ambassador William R. Tyler,” p. 42., Oral History Interviews. Foreign Service Institute, George Washington University, Washington, D. C. 1987. Historical Files Room. Historical Collection. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

⁵²Correspondence reference employee performance indicates satisfactory or above ratings by Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Paris during this period. There are, however, a few references to poor quality performance by French clerical employees, who were dismissed or transferred to other positions by supervisors.

U. S. Embassy officials advised Washington that a special approach toward successful implementation of informational and educational activities was necessary because of French sensitivity toward U. S. cultural policy. This was a polite phrase for U. S.-diplomatic apprehension that the French would react negatively to traditional approaches toward information and entertainments, regarding them as propaganda and examples of U. S. imperialism. U. S. diplomats in France often criticized the French as “cultural prima donnas,” who over-reacted to U. S. cultural presentations. They feared that French expertise, a bastion of the finest tradition in art, literature and theater, would result in negative attitudes toward U. S. entertainments. Moreover, U. S. political sensitivities were suspicious of PCF reaction to U. S. programs in France, fearing that they would be used to bolster anti-American sentiment.

Administrators were swayed by these arguments because of U.S. feelings of cultural inferiority in comparison to demonstrated French cultural proficiency. Lack of confidence in cultural affairs inspired Department of State policy for individuals and groups performing in France. Beginning in 1945, strategists advocated selectivity in allocating government backing for U. S. artists. Criteria was developed to determine who could receive official support and the format that it would take.

V. U. S. Approach to Cultural Policy in France

The stereotype “prima donna” image of the Frenchman was one, among many epithets, that U.S. officials used to demonstrate their feelings toward the French. Lack of cultural understanding about French lifestyle was responsible for U.S.-government perception about the French. U. S. opinion toward France hinged on cultural values

associated with U. S. lifestyle that were in stark contrast to those of France. Unable to identify with French preferences, officials often found French attitudes difficult to understand.

U. S. Embassy staff, however, who were experienced with French attitudes, warned Washington that successful implementation of U. S. information activities and entertainments in France required careful preparation in choice of materials and mode of presentation. Hence, its recommendation that an indirect approach toward program objectives⁵³ be official strategy.

In policy planners' perspective, this procedure referred to an unobtrusive and subtle attitude toward integrating ideas about U. S. lifestyle into the French national psyche. Traditional techniques that involved flag-waving and U. S. bravado considered too brash to succeed in France were abandoned; instead, a "grass roots" personal initiative based upon individual employee effort in developing contacts with French people was substituted.

This approach parallels U. S. government interest in psychological strategy of the period. From 1948 on, the PSB,⁵⁴ experimented with diverse ways of changing behavioral patterns and inducing particular thought processes for use abroad. In France, the type of work began through building individual and group contacts, followed patterns instituted by the PSB. For example, USIS/France staffers were encouraged to go out into the different Paris arrondissements to try to find outlets for dissemination of U.S. materials.

⁵³This phrase was used in the first U. S./France Country Paper in 1950. It continued to be used in all subsequent Country Papers as well as in working drafts and information papers.

⁵⁴See Chapter One for discussion of the PSB.

Through personal ingenuity and effort, interpersonal relations were forged in a multitude of ways. For example, Assistant Cultural Attaché Darthea Speyer, discovered a problem in ordering U. S. art books because of the severe controls imposed on booksellers by the French government.

Speyer contacted the proprietor of a small bookstore on the Boulevard Saint-Germain.⁵⁵ His establishment was situated near the area cafés, meeting place of many students and intellectuals. In the back of this store was an art gallery where contemporary art exhibitions were held. Both the bookstore and the gallery were popular and always crowded. The owner complained that he could not carry American art books even if the material were requested by his clientele because French government controls made importation of foreign books impossible. Speyer reported this to the U. S. Embassy who contacted the Office des Changes in Paris to bring pressure upon the French cabinet to lift the restrictions on importing books into France.⁵⁶ This type of close attention to detail was not only profitable for USIS/France objectives, but also ensured individual gratitude and support for the program.

William R. Tyler, Counselor and CPAO in the U. S. Embassy, exemplified the type of personal commitment and dedication to the USIS/France program that was its hallmark during the 1948 to 1953 period. He personified what the French called, "le feu sacré," the

⁵⁵Called "La Hune," this bookstore was situated at 170 Boulevard Saint-Germain.

⁵⁶Memorandum from William Koren Jr. Acting CPAO (henceforth ACPAO), U. S. Embassy, Paris, to Leslie S. Brady, Cultural Attaché, U. S. Embassy, Paris, 25 November 1953. Record Group 84. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

driving inner force that was the backbone of the public affairs program.⁵⁷ Initially in charge of the five area divisions, Tyler became Policy Planning Chief for USIS/France in 1947.

Tyler championed the invisible, but vital, aspect of foreign policy that functioned well in France. Hidden diplomacy that took the format of building personal contacts and trust within French communities was often successful in nebulous areas of interpersonal relations that were difficult to define and evaluate.

In 1946, Tyler, concerned about the impact that French attitude would have on Franco-American relations, wrote a memorandum in which he tried to assess what he referred to as the “missing U. S. dimension in France.” Acknowledging that the Marshall Plan furnished the impetus for the U. S.- provider image, he stated that what still needed to be done was to demonstrate that the U. S. could also play the role of morale builder:

Everyone was talking about democracy and freedom of people. People are what they can live by and what they can hope for. It seems we ought to recognize that.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Phrase used by William R. Tyler in Charles Stuart Kennedy, “Interview With Ambassador William R. Tyler,” p. 52. Oral History Interviews. Foreign Service Institute, George Washington University, 1987. Historical Files Room. Historical Collection. USIA Library, Washington, D. C. Tyler was a protégé of Senator William Benton (see Chapter One) who had been the major proponent of a public affairs program.

⁵⁸Memo from William R. Tyler to Eric Bellfist, Director, Area Services, USIS/France Program in *ibid.*, 50. Tyler was unable to state precisely the date of this memo, but remembered that he wrote it before the Marshall Plan was announced.

In Tyler's view, therefore, maintenance of democracy in France meant that the U. S. had to live out the democratic principle; thus, implementation of U. S. information objectives had to be applied by quiet example in order to work. Tyler's recommendation became the basis for U. S./France Country Papers short-range objectives in 1950.

VI. The Development of U. S./France Country Papers

(a) The Preparation of Information Objectives

Information objectives for U. S./France Country Papers were written by U. S. Embassy Cultural Attachés to reflect U. S. global foreign policy objectives. Information objectives for France were developed by embassy staff from information provided in regional semi-annual evaluation reports. On basis of information gathered by regional and USIS/Paris personnel about French political trends and press reaction, target groups with defined criteria were identified.

(b) Long-Range Information Objectives

U. S. Country Papers for France contained long and short-range information objectives. Long-Range U.S. information goals were:

to make France as staunch an ally of the U.S. as possible while exposing the nature and aims of Soviet Communism as a threat to the security and freedom of France, and to identify the French Communist Party as an instrument of this policy.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ "Description and Assessment of U. S. Information Services in France," 1 October 1952." Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2486. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Although the language utilized for long-range information aims varied slightly during different years according to the U. S. world view, protracted information objectives for France remained constant.

(c) Short-Range Objectives

Short-Range information objectives, however, were developed around U. S. perception of current problems within France resulting from the political and economic situation. U. S. bureaucrats believed that French democracy was unstable because of the inability of successive French governments to remain in office for long. Political instability, they reasoned, was a by-product of economic chaos.

Economic short-range information objectives, therefore, encouraged the French to accept U. S. foreign policy as a way of preventing another war, by effectively creating enduring economic conditions for peace and prosperity. In this way, the concept of a strong, vibrant economy was linked to U.S. maintenance of world freedom and liberal-style government.

(d) Strategy

U. S. attempts at establishing sympathy and understanding reflect U. S. perception of the threat to its leadership position during the early Cold War. Washington decision makers feared the loss of lucrative U. S. markets⁶⁰ as much as the loss of liberal government. As a preventive measure, administrators employed psychological tactics designed to

⁶⁰ "Country Plan, Priority Zone III USIS - France, August 1952," p. 3. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

inculcate French suspicions that the PCF and, by extension, the Soviet Communists, constituted a threat to the security and welfare of France.

Strategy was directed toward diverse groups of French population that the U. S. considered vulnerable to Communist ideology. Policy makers, anxious that the U.S. not lay itself open to public criticism of interference in French affairs investigated ways of marketing U.S. lifestyle unobtrusively so that public belief in the power of French self-determination would prevail. Hence, acceptance of U. S. diplomats' recommendation of a subtle and low-key approach in information and entertainment activities.

U. S. psychological strategy, therefore, worked on French intellect and the mind through a multitude of cultural activities that demonstrated democratic lifestyle rather than praising its merits. Philosophy was based on the belief that the greater the amount of U. S. culture and information disseminated in France, the more chance there was of French opinion turning favorably toward the U. S. and away from communism. By making it appear, publicly, that the French had determined this attitude themselves, the U. S. reduced the risk of charges of propagandizing.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, U. S. troops were billeted on French soil for the first time since the end of World War II. As NATO members, the French government had to accept U. S. forces in France. To contradict negative French reaction, specific information objectives were written for U. S./France Country Papers that targeted "understanding and sympathy for the presence of U. S. troops and installations on French soil."⁶¹ Other goals focused on convincing the French that U. S. foreign policy remained

⁶¹Ibid.

their best hope of deterring aggression and of building a politically stable and economically prosperous France.

Short-Range objectives also encouraged a sense of self-reliance and initiative in order to dispel the commonly-held belief that France was dominated by the U. S. and that no amount of self-effort would ever be able to change it. However, U. S. categorization of priority target groups in France demonstrates that it was anxious about the political sympathies of certain population elements that it considered potentially opposed to U. S. lifestyle and liberalism.

(e) U. S. Country Priority Ratings

The 1950 Campaign of Truth marked the beginning of more intense U. S.-government publicity for the U. S. to strengthen and develop the Western world. To emphasize this, Department of State planners instituted a priority-system categorization applicable to all countries where the U. S. maintained diplomatic relations.

Department of State criteria classified countries according to policy-makers' perception of the amount of risk that the country held for the U. S. Categorization was assigned according to "primary factors for determining a given country's importance to the U. S."⁶²

⁶²Wording used in Bureau of Public Affairs memorandum, "Revised Priorities for USIE Country Programs," 31 August 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. Records Relating to Information Activities 1938 to 1953. Box 113. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Primary-selection factors were divided into two categories: those used for determining the limits of a USIS Program in a given country, and those for determining a given country's importance to the U. S.

Diverse secondary factors accompanied each of the primary categories in order to ascertain the amount of effort, financial commitment and information work that the country team should undertake. As criteria, U. S. policy makers included susceptibility to information and education influences, accessibility of varied target groups to media; the capability of certain groups to act if influenced, and the presence of conditions favorable to the maintenance of USIS/France. Political, military, economic and psychological elements were also taken into consideration.

Countries were classified into priority zones that reflected U. S.-government perception of its relationships with each country involved. Zones were rated numerically on a broad scale that ranged from hostile to sympathetic to U. S. interests.

In 1951, policy makers placed France in Priority Zone Three, designated crucial to U. S. interests. Although France and the U. S. were old allies, placement was based upon U. S.-perceived attitudes about PCF popularity among what it considered to be vulnerable target groups that included French youth, labor and intellectuals.

Table 4. Examples of U. S. Country Classification, 1950⁶³

Country	Zone	Classification
The Soviet Orbit	I	Hard Core
Iron Curtain Countries	II	Hostile
France	III	crucial

⁶³Ibid.

(f) Criteria for French Target Groups

In accordance with broad USIS policy criteria for target group selection, U. S. Embassy Cultural Attachés prepared lists of diverse French population groups that they felt represented a potential threat to U. S. foreign policy in France.

Target groups were formulated by study of the general political, economic and social conditions in France in a given year. Criteria for selection was carried out by analysis of the French tradition of individualism that the U. S. government considered basic to the French experience.

Aware of a historical context that fostered ideas, cultural refinement, literary and philosophical thought, the U. S. defined youth, labor and intellectuals as comprising the most influential of organized groups. During the period under study, these were changed from first to second or from second to third positions on the priority list. French youth became the most important for reasons that are analyzed in Chapter Five. The following Tables demonstrate how the U. S. perceived the makeup and attitudes of priority target groups.

Table 5. Primary Target Groups, U. S./France Country Paper, 1951⁶⁴

Priorities	Group Makeup	Attitude toward the U.S.
Labor	industrial workers; blue/white collar workers; artisans, personal service workers	Unknown. This group remained untouched by USIS/France indirect approach
Intellectuals	statesmen, government leaders, teachers, journalists, writers, publishers, scientists, technicians, artists	(i) those favorably disposed to the U. S. (ii) those still undecided (iii) those opposed to the U. S.
Youth	university, secondary school students	Likely to be easily influenced by teachers, professors.

⁶⁴ "U.S. Country Plan For France, 1951," Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2388. NARA, Washington, D. C. In given years the three priority target groups changed places but remained within the first three priorities. Sometimes youth replaced labor, and intellectuals were moved from second to third position in the priority category.

Table 6. Secondary Target Groups in France, 1950⁶⁵

Priorities	Group Makeup	Attitude toward U. S.
rural, agricultural workers	50%farmers; who were highly individualistic	positive due to known U. S. agricultural methods
Armed Forces personnel	young French males	ambivalent
religious groups and leaders	strongly conservative Catholics	suspicious because of non-Catholic tradition, separation of Church and state.

Table 7. U. S. Country Paper for France. Priority Target groups, 1952⁶⁶

Group	Group Makeup
Labor Leaders	Top trade-union leaders; labor-affiliated government officials; labor representatives in local/national politics; individual trade union officials; Heads of trade unions, shop foremen. Strong PCF preference prevalent in this group.
Opinion Leaders/Policy Makers	National, local government officials, members of the National Assembly, newspaper publishers, editors, reporters; agricultural press; public information specialists; writers, artists; rural, agricultural leaders in general pro-U. S. foreign policy.
Educators	teachers, professors, secondary /university officials, intellectuals, who were pro-Communist in sentiment.
Youth	politically-conscious adolescents approaching military/ voting age. Often opposed to U. S. foreign policy.
Armed Forces	junior officers/ non-commissioned men. Generally pro-U. S. foreign policy.
Rank and file labor, white collar workers, farmers, housewives	Same. Group included women, agricultural workers, war veterans, merchants, members of local National Front Organizations sympathetic to Communist policies.
Religious Groups	Catholic clergy/worshippers. Strong anti-Communist sentiment.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶“Country Plan-USIS/France - Priority Zone III, August 1952,” pp. 18-19. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

VII. The Role of the Lecture Bureau

In 1950, the Department of State inaugurated a project to provide U. S. missions overseas with periodic information concerning American citizens traveling and living abroad “for varying purposes and under varying sponsorship,”⁶⁷ who were well known in educational, scientific and cultural affairs.

Program creation was an outcome of the 1950 Campaign of Truth. The Lecture Bureau was one of the specialized programs set up by the Bureau of Public Affairs in hope of maximizing the services of prestigious Americans traveling overseas. Previously, the U. S. government had refused information about citizens abroad. However, the tense political atmosphere generated by the buildup of the Cold War changed this policy. In effect, U. S. study awards, official sponsorship and cultural subsidization all became linked to political partisanship.

The philosophy behind this program was that sufficient use of these resources had not been made and that visitors, upon request, might be willing to lecture to foreign audiences about their fields of interest, or upon some aspect of U. S. lifestyle. Moreover, U. S. strategists viewed this as a golden opportunity to present America’s most distinguished personalities without having to pay high-cost transportation and booking fees. Therefore, information about travelers was sent to country missions by the Department of State upon visa application for travel abroad.

⁶⁷ Memorandum from Howland H. Sargeant, Deputy Assistant of Public Affairs, to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, “Information Concerning Visiting American Lecturers, Musicians and Artists,” 9 March 1950 in *ibid.*

The Department of State requested that missions make the information available to interested foreign organizations that might be willing to finance lectures by visiting Americans. Directives emphasized avoiding giving the impression that individual travelers would be subject to “undue pressure in this regard, or that will be required to deliver such lectures.”⁶⁸

In France, the U. S. Embassy received a list of U. S. personalities who were traveling in the country. Cultural Attachés and/or regional PAOs contacted the visitor so that they could ascertain his willingness to speak to French groups in the region. To make the proposal more attractive to the visitor, the Embassy was directed by the Department of State to provide courtesy and conveniences by helping with practical matters such as hotel bookings, transportation and luggage. Moreover, surveillance upon academics by the U. S. Embassy, under guise of providing courtesy in making travel arrangements, provided a convenient way for embassy officials to keep an eye on individual scholars and their activities.

Lecture Bureau achievements vis-à-vis French organizations were well-received. In December 1953, the Director of the Centre d’Amitié Internationale, contacted the officer in charge of the Lecture Bureau and explained that his organization was devoted to promoting international understanding by sponsoring weekly lectures and related activities concerning different countries. Disturbed about a book on Alaska containing derogatory information relative to U.S.-government policies, the Director requested embassy help in locating a U. S. citizen living in France who was the author of another Alaska study. An embassy search

⁶⁸Ibid., 2.

revealed Jean Potter, a former Alaska resident, who agreed to lecture to the French organization about her experiences.⁶⁹ Particularly important to USIS/France administrators was the fact that her talk dispelled the previous derogatory remarks about U. S. handling of Alaskan problems. Furthermore, the nature of this request fulfilled U. S. strategy; it made the U. S. appear uninvolved in the matter by putting the initiative on a French organization.

The Exchange of Persons Program, the most popular of the U. S. overseas programs, was often the focus of informational activities in France.⁷⁰ Names and addresses of Fulbright grantees, with a brief resumé of their background, destination and purpose was sent to the U. S. Embassy. Recipients were expected to lecture at least twice during their stay for the USIS/France program; either at the Paris Embassy or in the regions. Favorite occasions for lectures by visiting Americans were Americana days.⁷¹

⁶⁹Ibid. Lecture by Jean Potter, author of *The Flying North*, a book about Alaska translated into French as *Pilotes du Grand Nord*. This lecture took place at the Sorbonne on 7 May 1953. It was attended by 270 people.

⁷⁰Under the category of "Visiting Lecturer, Research Scholar and Exchange Teacher," the U. S. Embassy evaluated the performance of Fulbright grantees.

⁷¹Special celebrations organized by USIS/France in order to celebrate U. S. public holidays.

A special program concerned French grantees returning from the U. S. The Fulbright Alumni Association⁷² developed a regular lecture program that included films, discussions and social events. Returning grantees were added to the association mailing list so that they could receive invitations⁷³ to regular USIS/France functions. As well, they were sent copies of the Association publications, *Documents et Information* and *Rives*.

Special attention was accorded to exchange-teacher grantees who were carefully monitored by USIS/France operations to ensure that they were incorporating "Americana"⁷⁴ into their courses. Returning students were also frequently used to provide information to new grantees who were departing for the U. S. Topics included practical briefings on shipboard travel, arrival procedures in New York City, academic program and adaptation to the U. S. lifestyle. Above all, departing grantees were encouraged to call at the embassy and at provincial information centers, so that close contacts between themselves and

⁷²By 1956, the Association Amicale Universitaire France-Amérique membership included more than seven hundred former grantees. As total French grantees had surpassed 2,000 in number, USIS/France officials were searching for ways to increase former grantee participation. Branches were located in Bordeaux, Lyons, Strasbourg, Grenoble and Algiers with two-thirds of the membership situated in the Paris branch. Record Group 59. Department of State. General and Classified Files of the Department of State, 1944 to 1959. Box 2388. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷³They also received copies of the USIS publications, *Documents et Information* (Paris: USIS Press) and *Rives* (Paris: USIS Press). The former was a monthly review published in France. While some journals are available at the Centre de Documentation Benjamin Franklin in the U. S. Embassy, Paris reading room, the U. S. archive remains partially classified. *Rives* was financed by USIS/France, but edited by the French alumni association. Head of the editorial committee was Jean Simon, Smith-Mundt Research Scholar for 1951 to 1952. Articles were written by former Fulbright grantees.

⁷⁴Vocabulary used in U. S. Embassy memoranda, "Follow-up of Returned Grantees," 16 September 1955. Record Group 59. Department of State. General and Classified Files of the Bureau of Public Affairs, 1944 to 1959. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

embassy officers could be assured for future reference on the grantee's return to France.

Returning grantees were frequently sought after as speakers and panel members for activities and information sessions presented by USIS/Paris and regional programs. Although participation was not obligatory, it was expected; invitations issued from the U. S. Embassy in Paris were seldom turned down. Often, French students returning home from the U. S. were asked by the U. S. Embassy to participate in community events where they spoke to local audiences about their experiences.⁷⁵ The audience could not fail to react well to its neighbor, friend and family member whom it had known since birth. Watched by USIS personnel, candidates seldom reported negative impressions toward the U. S. in these public meetings. More often, they praised American hospitality, generosity, warm welcome and open lifestyle. These complimentary remarks were well-received by USIS/France officials because they furthered U. S. foreign policy objectives.

VIII. Criteria for U. S.-Government Backing

(a) Government Support for U. S. Entertainers

U. S. artists and groups sent to France for official performances were subsidized by the U. S. government. This included return passage from the U. S. to France, living

⁷⁵For example, an English teacher named Heintz in Caen who was an exchange teacher in Boston in 1952. Upon his return to Caen he worked with student groups to encourage Franco-American activities. Other activities by returned grantees included a talk entitled "Three Months in the U. S. A." by Andrée Bas of the Lycée Hélène Boucher, Paris (15 October 1954). André Meyer, Lycée Mignet, Aix-en-Provence who presented a lecture "Fifteen Thousand Kilometers In the U. S. A" to the Association des Excursionnistes provençaux (25 November 1954). "Educational Exchange: Follow-Up on Former Grantees in France," 26 January 1955. No. 1524. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

expenses, shipment of instruments and required equipment.

Primary criteria was based on demonstrated entertainer-quality performance. Only the highest echelon of U. S. cultural entertainments presented in France received U. S.-government support. Established artists and troupes were entitled to top billing, an official welcome by the U. S. Embassy, with publicity, support and courtesy extended to them during their stay. If the performance were considered international caliber, it merited patronage by the ambassador on opening night. The French debut was followed by a reception at the embassy or at the ambassador's official residence where invited guests included French government and opposition leaders, French artists and intellectuals and members of the press corps.

For top artists and entertainments, embassy Press Attachés often arranged press conferences in order to maximize publicity for the scheduled event and to try to ensure a full house for performances. Ticket sales were advertised ⁷⁶ in major French newspapers well-before the event and on the day of the presentation.

(b) Rejection Policy for U. S. Entertainers

Political partisanship became priority criteria for U. S.-government endorsement. U. S. performers invited to France, therefore, were subject to different levels of security clearance by the Department of State.

⁷⁶Advertisements were placed in French newspapers by U. S. Embassy Cultural Officers and Press Officers. In the provinces, regional PAOs placed advertisements for upcoming U. S. activities. Cost was assumed by the U. S. Embassy.

Official Department of State security clearance was a procedure initiated when the U. S. Embassy in Paris proposed names of artists and entertainments that it judged satisfactory for appearances in France. There were various levels of investigation but U. S. Embassy recommendation involved scrutiny of the artist's past professional and personal life. Any performer suspected of membership in the Communist Party, or affiliation with groups that the Department of State considered hostile was rejected outright. If evidence showed that the entertainer was, or had ever been involved in activities considered opposed to U. S. political interests, or if he or she belonged to a political group opposed to U. S. policy, security clearance was refused by the Department of Immigration.

At a lower security level, the Department of State undertook its own clearance procedure that was a departmental check, but not at sufficiently high level to be considered a security check. If an entertainer were found to have participated in Leftist political elements, or, if he had signed petitions or protests⁷⁷ on behalf of entertainers known to be Communist sympathizers, the U.S. Embassy was warned to be cautious in its contacts with that individual. Furthermore, this type of misdemeanor indicated withdrawal of all embassy support.

⁷⁷Archival materials indicate rejection for a dozen U. S. entertainers in the 1950 to 1953 period. In most cases, the artists involved, or their immediate relatives, were rejected after Department of State security checks revealed their support for Leftist political elements, or because they had signed petitions for groups that were suspected Communist sympathizers. Artists rejected included an orchestra conductor named Dixon and his pianist wife. He was refused a visa because his wife was suspected of pro-Communist activities in 1947. Other performers were rejected because Department of State sources reported that they were not high-enough caliber to perform for the U. S. overseas.

An informal check on performer ability was carried out by Department of State contacts in the same entertainment field. If results were negative, the Department warned the embassy not to give the performer any hope of official backing, but emphasized that the entertainer or organization was free to arrange private performances at his own cost.

There were, as well, other less-defined categories for helping U. S. artists who wanted to perform in France. In the case of music students who were Educational Exchange Program grantees, the Department of State occasionally undertook the cost of shipping their musical instruments and instructed the Embassy to be helpful to them.

In both France and the U. S. the presence of undesirable entertainers caused government concern. For example, Charlie Chaplin's⁷⁸ warm welcome in France in 1951 alarmed the U. S. government who equated his popularity with PCF voter preference.

Chaplin had been proposed by a Franco-American organization⁷⁹ in the U. S. as a candidate for a Nobel Peace Prize. However, French-government support was hesitant because of known U. S.-government sentiment toward Chaplin's political orientation:

⁷⁸Chaplin, British by birth, was for many years a Hollywood film star. He left the U. S. in 1949 after being questioned by U. S. authorities about his suspected membership in the Communist Party.

⁷⁹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Échanges Culturels. Série II. États-Unis. Vol. 124. Letter from René Jeanne, President of l'Association Française de la Critique de Cinéma to A. Manziarly, French Consul/Los Angeles. 4 April 1949.

Si une intervention officielle française devait avoir lieu, il me semble que ce n'est pas à l'échelon de ce Consulat, surtout en raison des polémiques de caractère politique dont M. Chaplin est l'objet à l'heure actuelle aux États-Unis.⁸⁰

In order to keep abreast of public reaction to U. S. presentations in France, Press Attachés and Cultural Relations Officers documented French-media coverage of visiting performers. Embassy files contained favorable and unfavorable reviews and clippings including photos from French newspapers. Files recorded the numbers of newspapers columns devoted to U. S. cultural presentations and the number of photographs included.

IX. The USIS/Paris Library

The USIS Library in Paris served as a documentation and research center for subjects on the U. S. and American lifestyle, with emphasis on materials about U. S. political movements, trends and developments since 1940. This Library, originally situated on the Boulevard Saint-Germain⁸¹ after the end of World War II, moved to the U. S. Embassy in 1949 where it was staffed by a trained U. S. librarian and French employees who assisted her. Library staff members answered public telephone enquiries, helped visitors find information and ran the circulation desk. The library reading room had extended hours daily from 10:00 AM to 7:00 PM; one evening per week it remained open late to accommodate evening visitors. Special groups were frequent visitors on Sunday.

⁸⁰Manziarly, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 300/RC. 24 August 1949 in *ibid.*

⁸¹Information related to author by Julia Child in a letter dated 9 October 1994. She described her experiences in Paris where her husband, Paul Child, was Head of the Exhibits Unit, USIS/Paris from 1948 to 1952 and later PAO/Marseilles.

Part of the library appeal was the fact that visitors were received without restrictions or charge. The Library cooperated closely with other embassy-media divisions in preparing special exhibitions of reading materials for any occasion. The original card catalogue, at first only available in the Paris library, was eventually expanded to include provincial libraries. Circulation of collections was wide-ranging; included were French rural, municipal and university libraries, schools, documentation centers, groups and individuals.

The Paris Library liaised with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foundation des Sciences Politiques, the American Library, the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Ministère des Affaires des Marines, the Institut National des Techniques de la Documentation, the Sorbonne, the Library School of the Institut Catholique and the French Library Association. These institutions were dedicated to various projects that aimed to promote better understanding of the U. S. in France.

X. The Establishment of USIS/France Regional Services

In 1946, the USIS central office in Paris contained an Area Section responsible for regional activities in France and Algeria. Conveniently, the 1948-budget cuts became the catalyst that provided policy makers with the necessary argument for increasing, rather than decreasing, or maintaining the program in its straitened circumstances. Administrative chaos within the program was blamed on elimination of personnel and respective posts. Furthermore, U. S.-government insistence that expansive Soviet cultural initiative in France was making a mockery of U. S. information program efforts, became the congressional justification to increase USIS/France services. This move resulted in central USIS Program office expansion into a much broader organization.

Previously, USIS/France had covered all of France through its main Paris office, with one regional branch situated in Lyons. Organization was problematic for program efficiency; limited facilities left significant centers uncovered. By increasing the regional program to include six offices, the Area Section assumed responsibility for liaising activities between the Department of State and the new regions; it also carried out PAO functions for the Paris-Cherbourg consular district. Regional programs were coordinated and supervised by the Deputy PAO in Paris, who was responsible for handling problems not resolved by local staff.

In 1949, new regional offices opened in the strategic cities of Lille, Strasbourg, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Toulouse and Algiers. With the Paris operation, they provided the desired nation-wide USIS/France coverage. In northeastern France, Lille and Strasbourg regional offices constituted new posts in French industrial areas. In the south and southwest, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Toulouse reopened with expanded facilities. Each provincial post was assigned a PAO and a Deputy PAO; one of these officers was responsible for educational activities.

Table 8. Regional Operations, December 1951⁸²

Region	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerks	Local Employees
Bordeaux	1	1	11
Lille	1	1	6
Lyons	1	1	6
Marseilles	1	2	7
Strasbourg	1	2	9
Total	5	7	39

Table 9. Regional Operations Breakdown According to Employee Function, 1952⁸³

Provinces	U. S. Officers	U. S. Secretaries	Local Employees
Bordeaux	2	2	23
Lille	2	1	9
Marseilles	2	1	10
Strasbourg	2	1	11
Total	8	5	53

Algiers was a fourth post that had operated actively before the fiscal constraints of 1948. Under the 1949 fiscal development program, it reopened to permit better coordination and servicing of a strategic region whose press, radio and other information media were

⁸²“Foreign Service Inspection Report,” 6 December 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C. Figures given indicate an increase in every category except U.S. clerks in 1952. Overall totals reflect increases in all categories except U. S. clerks where there is a decrease of two jobs. Note that figures for local French employees in Bordeaux are greater than those in other regions. This may be related to the presence of U. S. military troops billeted in the area during the Korean War and the Campaign of Truth in 1950. See Table 9 for further evidence.

⁸³“Description and Assessment of U. S. Information Services in France,” 1 October 1952. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2483. NARA, Washington, D. C.

closely linked to metropolitan France. Thus, the importance of Algiers as a European and Arab crossroads and the key geographical position it occupied was recognized.

(a) The Regional Information Centers

(a.i) Exterior Design

French regional offices⁸⁴ were information centers that contained a library and reading room, as well as press, radio, film services, distribution networks, and lecture bureaus. Regional operations were often situated in a building or a complex that included U. S. consular and visa operations. Although this was not uniquely the case in every region, it was considered beneficial by the U. S. Embassy to situate regional operation centers, particularly those in isolated areas, close to consular offices. This combined effect presented a more powerful, efficient operation representing the U. S.

Information Centers were located in a store-front building in the central area of a town, or city, in order to attract maximum numbers of visitors. Buildings were chosen for visual appeal as well as for proximity to central business and shopping districts; sites had to be both physically attractive and prominently placed to ensure heavy pedestrian traffic. Furthermore, operational locations were based on accessibility to French population; students en route to and from school, businessmen on the way to their offices and workers going to factory jobs or other small business enterprises. Women walking to morning markets or who shopped in the area were especially targeted. Large, street-front windows

⁸⁴The regional office in Nancy had its own reading room that operated under authority of the PAO/Strasbourg. There was also a film annex in Toulouse under PAO/Bordeaux supervision.

displayed attractive pictures, exhibits and advertisements. If the rented facilities did not include windows, the U. S. government had them installed so that materials could be easily observed from the street.

(a.ii) **Interior Design**

Regional information centers were comfortably furnished so that the impression conveyed to the visitor was one of relaxed welcome and invitation. Facilities were usually first-floor rentals in order to avoid the necessity for visitors to go up a flight of stairs. Comfortable armchairs were placed around a large, sunny room. Several small tables placed around these chairs held a well-stocked supply of U. S. newspapers, magazines and journals that readers were encouraged to take away with them.⁸⁵

In the center of the room was an information and reception desk staffed by American and French employees whose duty it was to provide help and information for visitors. A guest book asked visitors to write comments about the reading room and leave their names and addresses. This provided a convenient follow-up procedure; a mail program sent forms to library visitors to ascertain that requested information was received, that students were equipped with application forms for U. S. study and that the visit had been successful.

Thus, what appeared to be a relaxed environment, was actually controlled through organized programs designed to monitor visitor information that the staff could later employ to capitalize on public requests for U. S. information.

⁸⁵Visitors were also encouraged to order U. S. maps and brochures for individual use and for large groups that included school classrooms and public lecture audiences.

(b) Regional Center Libraries

Every French regional information center had a library staffed by a U. S. reference librarian assisted by French employees who worked there as clerks. The library was also a pleasant, bright room with the most recent books and publications from the U. S.

Particularly attractive and stocked with printed materials, was the children's library. A main attraction was a special story-telling hour, held several times a week, during which a librarian read fairytales to youngsters and selected stories to older children. This activity was followed by question and answer periods designed to inform French youngsters about life in the U. S. and the type of schools that American children attended. French youth were especially encouraged to borrow books and to peruse U. S. maps and American history books that portrayed popular U. S. heroes.

Information centers in larger French towns⁸⁶ had an auditorium that was used for regular movie screenings and special presentations several times a week. A U.S. projectionist made a continuous circuit of regional operations in order to make frequent screenings available. He traveled in a mobile unit that reached isolated centers so that French viewers in far-away rural areas could see U.S. films and presentations that they would have otherwise missed.

The French regional information centers, therefore, were warm, welcoming environments where intellectual curiosity could be satisfied with U. S. books and information about U. S. lifestyle. There was also certainty of a friendly, sympathetic welcome for impromptu visitors. In these cases, the reception desk answered questions, and

⁸⁶Strasbourg, Lille, Lyons and Marseilles.

provided pamphlets and printed information without charge. Visitors were encouraged to spend time in the reading room; if necessary, the reference librarian would be summoned to give pertinent information and to answer inquiries about the U. S. It was not unusual for the PAO, or his deputy to participate in these informal meetings.

(c) Regional Language Courses

English language courses for the adult French population were designed and taught by regional personnel who often volunteered their services. Evening courses⁸⁷ were held so that they could attract the maximum-working population. Classes were followed by coffee and light refreshments at the conclusion of the evening. Courses were free of charge; textbooks were supplied by the regional office.

Although they appeared informal and relaxed, regional centers were actually well-planned resource areas that recorded the number of visitors, requests and service needs everyday. By doing so, they accomplished a two-fold purpose: they showed a warm, hospitable U.S. government eager to meet the French public and to publicize its foreign policy objectives through the use of printed materials and audio-visual equipment. Furthermore, they reflected U. S. diplomacy by attempting to reach the people without benefit of bureaucracy. In reality, however, they provided the nucleus for the U. S. information program by creating a particular type of “family” and home atmosphere within these regional French centers that made the U. S. better understood and known in rural France. Moreover, they provided a sanctuary for many work-worn people trapped in the restrictive living conditions of post-World War II France.

⁸⁷ Evening courses took place during prime-time hours, two or three times a week.

(d) Regional Program Format

Before cultural activities took place, they were well-publicized for several days by advertisements, newspaper ads and, whenever possible, on the radio. The type of publicity given a scheduled event depended upon the population group that officials wished to attract.

Information activities opened with speeches of welcome from embassy officials and a brief explanation of the subject matter. Brevity and punctuality were crucial, so as not to lose audience momentum before the activity began. Ideal program length was between forty-five minutes to one hour. During the question and answer period that followed, a program official fielded audience questions. If the audience were unresponsive, the participating official was always well-enough informed about the subject matter to present a short speech concerning its merits in relation to U. S. lifestyle. Remarks emphasized self-determination; explaining that the individual, having received the information, was now free to make to decide about the validity of what he had seen. After the program, officials mingled with the crowd over coffee in order to ascertain the general feeling toward the activity. Free brochures were handed out to everyone who attended.

Reaction was carefully analyzed by embassy personnel who determined the extent of activity success and whether or not it merited repetition. Reports explaining embassy position vis-à-vis the activity were prepared for regional centers and for Washington.

XII. Regional PAOs**(a) The PAO Position**

Following the inauguration of the Campaign of Truth in 1950, the Truman Administration made a concerted effort to reach out to ordinary people in remote areas of

France. It justified program expansion into the French provinces by claiming that it was necessary, “to get as much as possible produced at the post so that it will be responsive to the local need.”⁸⁸ PAO job positions were created to meet this demand.

Regional PAOs were “public relations men,”⁸⁹ or, what one would call “spin doctors” today. Their job was to package and “sell” the public affairs program in the French provinces. They provided the human link between U. S./France Country Paper information objectives and the cultural resources that the U. S. government sent to France to carry out identified information policy goals.

As the “troops in the field,”⁹⁰ the PAOs were the men who actually did the day-to-day U. S. campaign work with the French population. Their jobs were to develop, through personal contacts and “networking,” a regional lifeline of sources that, once put into place, would create goodwill for the U. S.; effectively smoothing the way for public acceptance of U. S. foreign policy objectives. These modern-day “missionaries” crusaded on a platform of public information and politicized culture. Preaching U. S. gospel of superior lifestyle achieved through free enterprise, their objective was to convert the French public to U. S.-brand democracy.

⁸⁸ “Revised Priorities for USIS Country Programs.” Record Group 59. Department of State. Records Relating to Informational Activities 1938 to 1953. Box 113. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁹From 1950 to 1954 all regional PAOs were male.

⁹⁰Phrase used by Edward Barrett, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 8 March 1951. *Hearings. House. Appropriations 1952* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 1020.

PAO regional “missions” were guided by the necessity of providing a convincing “soft sell” to the French. PAOs could not be overt; instead, initiative had to focus on making local opinion-forming groups *conscious*, through *unconscious* means, that U. S. lifestyle was superior to that offered to France by communism. Doing so, meant devising new, unusual strategies that would encourage public perception of a kind, beneficent U. S.-government that really cared about the individual. At the same time it would fire public imagination with images of a dynamic, young country that was fighting to maintain its democratic way of life. This involved creativity, patience, effort, and detective work; the PAO had to be, consistently, one step ahead of the life of his community. Moreover, he was both opportunist and actor; ready and willing to make use of situations while making it appear publicly that he was not.

This “split personality” within the PAO role paralleled U. S. foreign policy objectives in France; his job was to make the U. S. *appear* in a certain way, that, in reality, it was not. In effect, this made the PAO job a political campaign in which the candidate is forced into backwoods areas, in order to meet the people and build his support at grass roots level. As is the case on the political trail, the work that the PAO did often involved nebulous “grey areas,” among population groups that were difficult to define. To be successful, no part of the community could be left out; so the PAO made field trips an integral part of his work. He went deep into his territory to discover its political orientation, problems and ambiance in order to ascertain how French attitudes could be best brought to accept U. S. foreign policy objectives. On these trips his goal was to build contacts with mayors and prefects, teachers, social and religious leaders and officers of Franco-American societies.

(b) PAO Characteristics

To do the job a particular personality was required. Requisite characteristics focused on energetic, extroverted, personable candidates already experienced in public relations work. Moreover, the incumbent had to possess the courage of his convictions; he had to believe what he preached. Other traits included resiliency and determination; someone who would not give up when the U. S. was criticized, but would tenaciously fight on to defend his country's actions. Regional PAOs took on the persona of the U. S.; by personalizing the country, they became the living symbol of U. S. lifestyle for many French people who had no other contact with Americans.

We are putting a heavier load on our overseas staff and Congress willing that process will continue for some time. If the work overseas is not good, what we do here at home cannot be effective. The IIA has a mission. That mission has been defined by Congress. That mission cannot be carried out here at home. It can be carried out only overseas. We need "missionaries" for our overseas staff; men and women who have, or at least are capable of having, a sense of mission, who have knowledge of their own country, have faith in it and are willing and competent to represent it and uphold it abroad and not merely apologize for its weaknesses when their country is criticized. Our overseas offices all fly the American flag and each American information officer should carry the spirit of that flag with him every day. That is what I mean when I say that we need to have "missionaries" to carry out our "missions."⁹¹

⁹¹Wilson H. Compton, Administrator, USIS Program, "U.S. Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda," 1 December 1947. Compton resigned in 1952, citing poor health as his reason but lingering suspicion in the U.S. press and in government circles pointed to differences of opinion with the Department of State over application of policy and budget. Record Group 59. Department of State. General and Classified Subject Files of the Department of State Decimal File 1947 to 1949. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(c) PAO Selection

Officially, PAOs were chosen from the ranks of U. S. Foreign Service applicants. Candidates had to possess knowledge of the area they were assigned to and be familiar with the type of public relations work that they were expected to carry out.

Contradictory evidence, however, suggests that regional PAO selection may have been through more informal criteria. U. S. policy in France was decided by a small inner circle of confidants who had previous service and personal contacts with the U. S. diplomatic corps. This information supports the earlier analysis in this study about hiring procedures in the USIS/Paris office.

Some PAOs were the sons of missionaries,⁹² selected because they were experienced travelers who spoke French. France, in particular, was a country where few Americans had been before the war, and the French language was not well known in the U. S. Regional PAOs had to be familiar with French culture and civilization, as well as possess a competent knowledge of the language. Therefore, a candidate who had a university education with a degree in the liberal arts was excellent candidate material.

Regional PAOs had to be willing to live in the region where they served; to be a “public person” and to make personal and family sacrifices. These were difficult adjustments for many Americans working abroad; therefore, career diplomats with previous experience in French-speaking countries were sought after by the Department of State. Moreover, many candidates were Americans who had come to maturity believing strongly

⁹²Oral testimony by the late Franklin W. Roudybush, former PAO/Strasbourg. Roudybush was interviewed by the author in Sauveterre de Rouergue on 12 August 1996.

in the U. S. democratic ideal. Part of the appeal was that the PAO post nurtured this quality; thus, giving the opportunity for successful candidates to advance the U. S. cause.

While some candidates were patriotic and idealistic, others were more practical; service in France offered a pleasant sojourn abroad for a few years with job security and little interference from the outside world.

(d) PAO Training

PAO training was officially the responsibility of the Foreign Service Institute in the Department of State, but other training operations included arrangements with private and government institutions that cooperated with the Department of State on a “voluntary”⁹³ basis.

In France, however, regional PAOs received a practical orientation from their immediate predecessors. Of the regional PAOs who remained in their positions from 1948 until the 1953 change of Administration, none were given official training before assuming their posts. Moreover, in 1953, departing PAOs were asked by USIA officials to provide “orientation” for their successors. Therefore, official Washington testimony⁹⁴ that field personnel received specialized training prior to starting the job is unreliable.

⁹³Within government departments and agencies, there was ongoing training for newly-appointed candidates. Candidates could be sent to diverse departments that had training courses deemed appropriate for the PAO position. The Department of State also had informal relationships with private and non-governmental facilities for training without cost. In return, candidates from these agencies were sent to the Department of State for training when necessary.

⁹⁴Oral testimony by William C. Colligan, Director, OEX, to Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 6 February 1952. *Hearings. Appropriations. House. 1953.* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office 1952), 220.

(e) PAO Authority

Regional PAO positions were under jurisdiction of the Department of State but, from 1950 to 1953, they encountered little interference from either Washington or the U. S. Embassy. Individual PAOs determined *what* they had to do to carry out U. S. political and economic aims in their areas; moreover, they decided *how* they would do so. This strategy is evident from the justification and semi-annual evaluation reports that they submitted.⁹⁵

(f) Concrete Examples of PAO Work

In the early 1950s, the U. S. government commissioned research studies that convinced it that the French liked and wanted the same things as Americans: close family ties, religion, better-quality living standard and secure job income. The results of these studies determined that U. S. foreign policy objectives could be effective if it demonstrated that France and the U. S. had similar goals. Therefore, cultural activities and entertainments were brought to the regions where U. S. films, book programs, concerts, entertainments and special programs became part of regular operations.

Carrying out the PAO job description necessitated finding ways to subtly place U. S. lifestyle within the French collective and individual consciousness. In Strasbourg, for example, the PAO developed new outlets by distributing USIS literature to hospitals and

⁹⁵ "Provincial Reports." Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C. Regional PAOs submitted monthly and semi-annual justification and evaluation reports to the CPAO in which they commented on the success and/or failure of cultural activities and entertainments. Statistics were presented in order to justify their commentary.

French drugstores where people normally waited to get prescriptions filled.⁹⁶ He also approached a local café owner whose establishment catered to a labor clientele. After their conversation, the proprietor agreed to set aside one night per week as a Franco-American evening during which USIS films would be screened on his premises.

In Marseilles, the PAO took the initiative of distributing U. S. brochures to the offices of fifty doctors in the Cannes area.⁹⁷

L'Est Républicain, published in Nancy, was the largest and most important newspaper in eastern France with a combined circulation of four hundred and fifty thousand readers a day.⁹⁸ Editorial policy had consistently refused to accept any British or U. S. information sources. At a banquet in Strasbourg⁹⁹ in honor of Winston Churchill, the PAO managed to convince management to change this policy and to place USIS information and photos in the newspaper.

From 1950 on, Bordeaux achieved special prominence because many of the U. S. troops stationed in France as part of NATO forces destined for service in Korea, were billeted in the area. USIS/Bordeaux strategy was directed at integrating U. S. soldiers into local society. The U. S. government believed that if it could do so, it would make gain

⁹⁶Memorandum from Franklin W. Roudybush, PAO/Strasbourg, August 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁷Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C..

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Held in Nancy, August 1950.

sympathy and understanding, making the U. S. better understood.

Popular French thinking was widely against¹⁰⁰ the presence of the U. S. military. Local population resented the fact that U. S. troops had quality housing and food while many Frenchmen were suffering economic hardship. Furthermore, the widespread neutralism and defeatist attitude were responsible for the belief that it was only a matter of time until another war broke out and France was devastated. The presence of U. S. military did nothing to dispel this; on the contrary, it seemed to harden people to the fact that war was imminent.

The *American Folklore Program*¹⁰¹ was a special cultural program produced by USIS/Bordeaux in order to bring U. S. troops into the French consciousness. *Letter From An American Schoolboy*, was a documentary film that was presented. The music selection was carefully chosen to reflect U. S. “music of the people.” In this case it included several songs that were known as “hill-billy” music from the Kentucky mountains region; it was played by a band of U. S. soldiers from a nearby military base¹⁰² while a U. S. Air Force Band from the Base at La Rochelle performed jazz.

¹⁰⁰U. S. Embassy correspondence indicated that the French disliked the U. S. military because individual soldiers who were often drunk and made scenes in public places. There were a few cases of car accidents in regional areas caused by military personnel who were inebriated. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰¹Organized especially for French students in Bordeaux, 22 January 1953.

¹⁰²U. S. depot at Captieux Ordonance near Bordeaux.

The PAO/Bordeaux¹⁰³ gave a short speech about U.S. goodwill before presenting the guest speaker who explained the origins of U. S. folk and jazz music. This was followed by a talk on American youth before a French audience of almost 900 students.¹⁰⁴ At the program's conclusion, brochures about the U. S. were distributed to the audience at the main exit.

This program had been carefully prepared to ensure its success. A few days before, the PAO telephoned the local Inspecteur de l'Académie, who happened to be the first Smith-Mundt Leadership grantee from Bordeaux. His presence was particularly desirable because he encouraged teachers in state schools to bring their students to USIS programs. Since returning from his stay in the U. S., he had consistently supported the U. S. cause; therefore, he could be relied upon. Other PAO calls had guaranteed the presence of the local press and free radio publicity for the activity.

Another example of PAO efforts to gain acceptance for U. S. forces occurred during the *France-American Manifestation Program*.¹⁰⁵ The U. S. Air Force Band performed in an outdoor concert where it played music by French composers and a French-speaking American acted as Master of Ceremonies.

¹⁰³Theodore Arthur, PAO/Bordeaux, had been transferred from Strasbourg where he was Deputy PAO.

¹⁰⁴Students who were invited to the *American Folklore Program* by the regional PAO. John H. Madonne, U.S. Consul-General, Bordeaux, "Foreign Service Despatch 3 June 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal Files 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁵The *Franco-American Manifestation Program* was held in September 1953. Although this name appears strange, it is the title of the activity and is referred to in this way in all correspondence.

This event was jointly organized by USIS/Bordeaux, the commanding officer of the U. S. Air Force Base and the local Comité Français as a fund raiser for the restoration of Versailles. It attracted an audience of more than 27,000 spectators;¹⁰⁶ one of the largest public gatherings ever assembled in Bordeaux.

The PAO played a major role in preparations by assuming responsibility for technical arrangements and acting as co-host with the military commander at a reception in USIS/Bordeaux headquarters following the performance. Careful planning and organization resulted in successful outcome of this activity. High audience attendance was attributed to advance publicity in local newspapers arranged by the PAO and public interest in the Versailles Project. Through his numerous contacts, the PAO was able to arrange for the program to be taped and and rebroadcast over Bordeaux radio, gaining an additional audience estimated at approximately 3,000 people in southwest France.¹⁰⁷

Other examples of USIS/Bordeaux efforts included the *Franco-American Independence Day Program* on 4 July 1953¹⁰⁸ presented jointly by USIS/Bordeaux and the local chapter of France-États-Unis.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ "France-American Manifestation: U.S. Air Force Band," 14 September 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2687. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid. Held in a Bordeaux city park, this activity attracted 5,000 spectators.

¹⁰⁹A privately-funded organization that worked toward improved Franco-American relations and had prominent French and American members on its mailing list.

An example of PAO effort in Lyons is found in the American Opera Company presentation of the Italian composer Menotti's opera, *The Consul*.¹¹⁰

Once permission was granted by the Department of State, the Lyons PAO began a concerted campaign to gain the approval and cooperation of the Director of the Lyons opera house and civic authorities so that local support from the Lyons music community would be forthcoming.

Using tape recordings, the PAO gave French critics a foretaste of the opera over a local radio station. He arranged a special reception for the U.S. company when it arrived by train in Lyons; including civic dignitaries and the Lyons press in the official welcoming party. Accordingly, excellent press reviews appeared in the newspapers the following morning. The publicity also allowed opportunity for the interested public to purchase tickets for the event.

The next evening, the PAO arranged a conference about the musical work at the Lyons opera house that was attended by the Dean of Music at Université de Lyon and a large delegation of the music faculty. The following day the PAO held a reception at the USIS/Lyons library where he presented the U. S. entertainers to the Lyons authorities and to the city press corps.

All these public relations activities culminated in the début of the opera held under the patronage of the U. S. Consul and the Mayor of Lyons. Positive performance reviews were recorded in the morning press. Newspapers called the opera, "the lyric event of the

¹¹⁰Presented in Lyons, 2 March 1953.

season.”¹¹¹ As a result the company gave three more full-house performances before moving on to Paris. Press clippings included some twenty-one articles in local papers from 5 February 1952 to 6 March 1952 with a total reader circulation of 526,000 readers.¹¹² The reports were also carried by newspapers in St. Étienne ¹¹³ where papers ran an article on the success of American opera in Lyons.

(g) PAOs and Administration

Some regional PAOs were more interested in administration as evidenced by their frequent reports to Paris. USIS/France regional files abound with statistics providing “evidence of effectiveness” of regional PAO roles. These reports underline the importance of PAOs in maintaining French support for U. S. foreign policy objectives.

Yet, report validity remains uncertain because PAOs who wrote these had a vested interest in demonstrating consistently high numbers of local attendance at USIS Programs. Admittedly, the numbers of press clippings and photos in French regional newspapers for the same time period show increases. For example, in July 1952, speeches and appearances by the Lyons PAO appeared in French newspapers in five different Départements with an estimated circulation of 963,000 readers.¹¹⁴ Yet, skepticism over the accuracy of figures

¹¹¹This quote is from a report by Horatio Moors, U. S. Consul/Lyons, to the Department of State, 12 March 1953. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³A large industrial center about fifty miles away.

¹¹⁴“U.S. Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda,” 1 December 1947. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954.

remains as cultivating good relations with newspaper editors and journalists was a PAO priority.

Other PAOs, however, preferred to put their efforts into human contacts; they wrote justification reports when necessary; but, otherwise had limited interaction with Paris and Washington. There was consensus that their roles must not become “automatic dispensing machines for the distribution of ‘canned’ materials from Washington and Paris.”¹¹⁵ All agreed, however, that PAO strength lay in establishing personal contacts with community groups.

Aside from writing regional evaluation reports, the only other required PAO administrative function was attendance at the semi-annual PAO Conference in Paris. Speakers from other embassy departments and the Department of State presented updated information on U. S. foreign policy objectives. Time slots were left open for individual PAO appointments with supervisory personnel for discussion of practical operations. Other than conference timetables, there is no evidence that PAOs actually participated in these meetings. In the conferences held from 1950 to 1953, only one reference supports the value of individual meetings between PAOs and supervisors.¹¹⁶

Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁵Memorandum from William Koren, Jr., CPAO, U.S. Embassy, Paris, “Staffing Pattern for USIS/France,” 2 September 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁶Theodore Arthur. PAO/Lyons wrote to CPAO William Koren, Jr. in 1954 to express his satisfaction at the opportunity for personal discussion with embassy supervisors. Arthur, who was new to the position, was the only PAO attending the semi-annual conference in Paris to do so. Letter from Theodore Arthur, PAO/Lyons, 18 August 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and

This suggests that lax application of USIS/France regional policy allowed PAO autonomy and continued decentralization from Paris and Washington, resulting in conflict among the authority levels. Furthermore, two opposing views on the regional PAO role underline this conflict. Managerial outlook¹¹⁷ regarded the PAO as a “robot-like” machine that was created by the Department of State. In effect, it “packaged” the PAOs for mass distribution using Washington-produced general materials. After transfer of the program to USIA in 1953, this outlook was superseded by a new perspective that stressed public relations work from regional outlets almost exclusively in terms of political objectives.

The consensus¹¹⁸ of regional PAO opinion, as expressed in the semi-annual conferences, was that their task could neither be carried out in terms of political objectives nor on a mass-produced scale. They felt that goals would be best obtained indirectly by appearing to be non-political and through skills of personalized diplomacy generated by films, lectures, concerts and entertainment programs that could be utilized to change French public opinion.

Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁷William Koren Jr., CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris referred to complaints from regional PAOs voiced at the semi-annual PAO Conference in Spring 1954. The consensus of opinion among PAOs was that they must avoid becoming Department of State “products” if their roles were to be carried out successfully. William Koren Jr., CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “Report on PAO Conference,” 16 June 1953 in *ibid*.

¹¹⁸*Ibid*. PAO consensus about the personal nature of their roles was voiced in the semi-annual PAO Conferences held in Paris. Their recommendations were known to Washington managers through their representatives who attended these conferences and from memoranda submitted to the Department of State.

While regional PAOs felt that they had sufficient authority and necessary leeway to accomplish their goals, they sought responsibility for preparing U. S. information objectives for France. In particular, they wanted increased authority in defining priority groups and in selecting materials used to reach these groups.

(h) PAO Budget Restrictions

The 1951 USIS merger with MSDAP resulted in regional programs undertaking greater impetus to stimulate support for U.S. foreign policy objectives. Investigation of USIS by the U. S. Senate Appropriations Hearings resulted in orders that regional funds be regulated. Regional PAOs, although aware of these instructions, encountered few budget restrictions. While Washington presumed regulations were adhered to, there is no documented evidence that they were enforced.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, budget was never a matter for discussion and consideration at the PAO semi-annual conferences from 1950 to 1953.

(i) PAO Operational Difficulties

By 1951, the presence in France of numerous external administrative officers caused “operational problems”¹²⁰ for regional PAOs. Information officers from the Office of the Special Representative for Europe and ECA often clashed with PAOs over questions of

¹¹⁹Oral testimony from Franklin Roudybush confirmed this statement. He recalled that he was never asked to fill out any forms or account for finances. He signed a monthly statement of his expenses that was sent to the Paris Embassy where it was processed. Furthermore, his only financial obligation to visiting artists was to take the entertainer to dinner following the performance. The bill was charged to the USIS/Strasbourg account. This is corroborated by former PAO/Lyons, Philip Chadbourne in a letter to the author, written in October 1995, in which he stated that he did not have to account for finances.

¹²⁰Phrase used by William Koren, Jr., “Report on PAO Conference,” 16 June 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C. Koren was referring to PAOs from the ECA Program.

responsibility. PAO resentment may have been motivated by presence of outside personnel whom they perceived as threats to their authority.

ECA personnel were regarded as interference by regional PAOs, who suspected that ongoing discussions in Paris and Washington debating¹²¹ the necessity for two parallel programs would have detrimental consequences for their positions. They failed to respond positively to the ECA decision to bring in Information Officers in 1953,¹²² leaving themselves open to charges of policy violations from management.

Unsuitable audio-visual materials prepared by technicians at the Audio-Visual Unit in Washington, who were unfamiliar with sophisticated French tastes and attitudes, provided the justification for regional PAO demands that they oversee preparation of materials for use in regional programs. They requested a mandate for maximum use of local facilities for test production, and displays and exhibits requiring editing to suit local needs. While agreeing that Washington should retain overall guidance, PAOs felt that the diversified population groups throughout France merited local production of materials under their authority.

(j) PAOs and Organizational Changes

Under USIA authority, the program became more restrictive after the 1953 takeover. Desiring tighter control of regional operations in France, USIA officials initiated a series of unpopular reductions in regional services that culminated in job losses and budget

¹²¹SMOF: PSB Files 014.31 Aliens to 040 ECA. Box 2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹²²William Koren Jr., CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Report on PAO Conference," 16 June 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

restrictions. In 1954, USIA gradually reduced USIS/France posts from fifty-eight to thirty-eight positions.¹²³ This created uncertainty and bitterness among regional PAOs¹²⁴ who, unsure of their future, resented the new bureaucratic administration.

Policy change led to conflict among Washington, Paris and the PAOs. Trying not to alienate the PAOs, embassy officials vacillated in implementing USIA directives. Although they initially recommended that Washington retain regional PAO positions, they were ambiguous¹²⁵ in their support. This led to tri-level conflict that became a question of managerial intent versus staff procedure.

¹²³William Koren, Jr. CPAO, U.S. Embassy, Paris, 2 September 1953, "Staffing Pattern for USIS/France." Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁴There were initially six regional PAO positions in Strasbourg, Lille, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Algiers. A seventh post was added in 1955 when a regional information center opened in Tours. PAO fears that their jobs would be either restricted or eliminated were motivated by rumors over budget cuts after the USIS/MSDAP union in 1951. Part of the reason for PAO apprehension was the presence of PAOs in the ECA Program. Regional PAOs feared that they might be declared redundant and their jobs given to the ECA personnel. This may have been a factor in the major personnel exodus that preceded the USIA takeover in 1953. However, PAO posts were not part of the cuts implemented by USIA in 1954.

¹²⁵Correspondence between the U. S. Embassy in Paris and Washington indicates that staffing requirements for fiscal year 1954 were discussed on the telephone prior to an official memo confirming that USIS/France posts were reduced from fifty-eight to thirty-eight positions. What is implied in this reference attached to the official memorandum, is that the embassy wished to retain the posts so that officials could move personnel to positions they deemed important. Therefore, they may have wanted to either close or minimize some regional operations that were not functioning to capacity. William Koren Jr., CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Staffing Pattern for USIS/France," 2 September 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

USIA policy emphasized increased administration and less personal contact with local French population. This challenged the PAOs' roles, forcing them into an office environment, spending more time on paper work and less time in the field. A constant stream of official visitors from Washington came to view field operations first hand, making regional PAOs less available to the public.

(k) Assessment of PAO Influence

Assessment of PAO influence upon U. S. foreign policy is difficult to evaluate because of the nature of their roles. In many instances the PAOs' work involved trying to change "grey areas" of French opinion. In reality, PAOs often spent hours attempting to convince individuals of the validity of U. S. foreign policy.

Moreover, the early 1950s economic boom in France raised French morale and diminished neutralism and previous French *défaitisme*. This growing, positive psychological climate, reinforced through regular cultural entertainments and activities, made PAOs popular¹²⁶ with local population while providing practical examples of the benefits of the U. S. free enterprise system. At the same time there was a sharp decline in PCF prestige.

PAOs throughout France have been encouraged to make field trips and spend as much time as they can 'on the road'-seeing people, talking with people, finding out what they think, what they want. These personal contacts have paid off in terms of greater local initiative in forwarding USIS information aims and in organization of ceremonies, film showings, programs by local

¹²⁶According to correspondence provided by regional PAOs to the U. S. Embassy in Paris and subsequently sent to Washington to justify retaining PAO positions. "Provincial Reports." Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

groups.¹²⁷

Regional PAOs took advantage of this situation to convince the French of U. S. goodwill while demonstrating respect for French traditions and civilization. Because their approach was subtle,¹²⁸ PAOs were able to focus on important French population groups¹²⁹ without attracting undue criticisms of propagandizing. This technique flattered the French while creating a favorable milieu for U.S. foreign policy. The result was, that during this period the regional PAOs became the real spirit of the U.S. for many French people. Therefore, it was in the unmeasurable domain of personal influence that real PAO impact occurred. It was this hidden sphere of influence that was the backbone of French sympathy for the U. S.

¹²⁷ Charles K. Moffly, ACPAO, "Field Trip in Calvados," p. 2. 9 February 1953. No. 1666 in *ibid*.

¹²⁸ French reaction to U. S. cultural policy is discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. There was no hint in the U. S. archives of objection to the presence of the PAOs in French regions. However, it is unlikely that this type of evidence, if every received, would have been left in the U. S. Embassy papers or submitted to Washington. In general, the regional PAOs appeared to have established satisfactory relationships with French officials. The latter had little power over PAO activities because of regulations from the Ministry of the Interior instructing them not to interfere with U. S. activities. Archives de la Police, Paris. "Relations avec les Autorités Étrangères." Circulaire No. 491. 8 October 1948.

¹²⁹ For example, the 1953 Field Trip to Calvados by John L. Brown, Director, Area Section, USIS/Paris with the Strasbourg regional PAO focused on meeting "leading personalities" that included the Mayor of Caen, the Rector of the University of Caen, the principals of the town's high schools, the Conseiller général of the département and Pierre Moisy, Editor-in Chief of the newspaper *La Liberté de Normandie* that had just printed a favorable series of articles about his experiences on a recent visit to the U. S. "Field Trip in Calvados," p. 1. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Conclusion

USIS/Paris administration reflected the organization of its parent agency in Washington. Its regional services demonstrated the same set-up at the provincial level. Although the three levels were structured in similar fashion, *how* the USIS/France Program was executed was considerably different from the way that Washington officials perceived it. Evidence given in this chapter demonstrates that distance-forced delegation of authority permitted USIS/Paris to operate in a relaxed manner. In turn, it did not get involved in regional operations.

The reason *why* this lax application of policy endured from 1948 to 1953 is because of the size of the U. S. mission. USIS/France operations were kept at large enough ratio so that personnel could pass on directives to subordinates without becoming directly involved. Furthermore, distance between Paris and the provinces allowed regional PAOs to run their operations independently.

However, less formal application of policy, reflected in the unobtrusive nature of U.S. cultural activities in France, became its real success. U. S. cultural policy, while applied differently from what Washington directed, worked because of personal initiative undertaken by program personnel.

Chapter Three

Concrete Examples of U. S. Cultural Policy in France

I. USIS/France Activities from 1948 to 1952

With the establishment of the USIE Act by Congress in 1948, information and education became an established part of U. S.-government conduct of foreign policy. However, Congress actually supported only two aspects of cultural activities overseas, U. S. libraries and the Exchange of Persons Program. It remained suspicious and generally opposed to federal funds being used to subsidize U. S. art, literature, music, dance, and theater. In order to get funds for cultural activities abroad, the Department of State had to evaluate them as “educational exchanges” and present special budget requests justifying their effectiveness to the execution of foreign relations as “an instrument of foreign policy.”¹

This attitude resulted in the general classification of cultural and information activities into a single framework for policy and program planning purposes, a move that made projects uniform in the eyes of policy specialists and later became a major source of conflict between staff and line management. Failure of policy makers to enunciate a distinction between the two activity types led to lack of confidence in the program and a much more independent attitude on the part of USIS personnel concerning selection and execution of activities. This reaction was confirmed by congressional cutbacks and curtailment of program funds that left fewer staff carrying out additional duties² that

¹Memorandum from William R. Tyler, July 1949, to the U. S. Advisory Commission. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946-1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²See Chapter Two for explanation of USIS/France employee characteristics.

frequently had little, if anything, to do with cultural content. For example, U. S. Embassy Cultural Attachés found themselves working in jobs that were not concerned with cultural affairs.

Moreover, Washington perspective was strongly influenced by the emerging Cold War situation. Policy makers tended to see USIS/France information and cultural activities as one entity dedicated to the eradication of communism in France. Management's lack of distinction between activity types left USIS/France officials with no choice but to use general audio-visual materials for different target audience groups, a policy that made program staff feel that their efforts at distinguishing diverse interests among selected French priority groups were irrelevant. Resources continued to be produced in the U. S. capital, where audio-visual unit technicians had very limited understanding of the French situation. Requests for local production of materials in France went unheeded, allowing this issue to become a chronic sore point among authority levels throughout the second Truman Administration.

II. U. S. Centralization of Information Components

(a) Rationale for Centralization

Washington political outlook was responsible for the U. S. trend toward centralization of all information components that began in 1945. Before the 1948 congressional legislation, cultural activities were carried out through varied information elements that worked to strengthen Franco-American relations and develop sympathy and understanding for the U. S. in France. However, after the establishment of the official USIS/France Program, policy makers began to advocate the elimination of all independent

activities.

Primary among these were the many private agencies in Paris that supported closer interaction between French and American people, some of which had been in operation for decades. While the U. S. built liaisons with some of these institutions³ ostensibly to promote better understanding between France and the U. S., others became increasingly problematic because they did not come under the broad umbrella of U. S. cultural policy jurisdiction.

(b) Background of Franco-American Organizations

Post-World War II Franco-American organizations were the reincarnation of earlier structures that reorganized after the war in order to eliminate suspicion of the presence of collaborators on the membership list and pro-Nazi activities during the Occupation.

French agencies that had been associated with the Free French Forces during World War II were reconstituted.⁴ In some cases, financially-independent French and U. S. citizens worked for the continuation of these agencies that they believed provided a forum for intellectual opinion. Such was the circumstance of the organization known as Le Rayonnement Français:

³Included were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the following French institutions: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Institut National des Techniques de la Documentation, l'École Bibliothèque de l'Institut Catholique and the French Library Association.

⁴For example, the agency France Forever, an American organization that operated in France and the U. S. and Le Rayonnement Français both received new charters after the end of World War II.

Le Rayonnement Français a été formé à Paris durant l'Occupation. Officiellement constitué dès la Libération sous le le nom de Rayonnement Français a pour objet le rayonnement à travers le monde de l'esprit français sous toutes ses formes en même temps que l'entretien et le resserrement des relations de tout nature, mais surtout intellectuelles, existant entre la France et les nations amies.⁵

(c) The Association France-États-Unis

One agency that enjoyed the support of both the French and U. S. governments was the Association France-États-Unis,⁶ reconstituted after World War II.⁷

In 1945, the Association-France-États-Unis established a liaison with the U. S. Embassy that later became an official connection through the office of the CPAO. In 1946, its first branch was opened in the Lyons area. Other outlets followed in cities throughout France, and, in 1951, after discussions with the embassy about how best to centralize its diverse requests for USIS/France activities, it expanded further, acting as an assisting organization to USIS/France regional operations.

⁵AE, France. Relations Culturelles. Oeuvres Diverses 1945 to 1947. États-Unis 1945 to 1946. Vol. 214.

⁶Founded in 1945, this agency was under the patronage of the U. S. Ambassador. In 1956 André Maurois became its president. He was succeeded by Henri Claudel. Vice-President was Mme. Georges Bidault. In 1954 there were 53,000 members. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Note from Philippe Benoist, Direction d'Amérique, 9 October 1956.

⁷Reconstituted by charter on 8 November 1945, the Association France-États-Unis had complied with the French government's request for a complete membership list that satisfied Boullé, Directeur-Général des Relations Culturelles, that it was not involved in enemy activities during World War II. Its president was Robert Geoffroy. AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Oeuvres Diverses. États-Unis. Vol. 173.

France-États-Unis became a type of junior partner in U. S. information activities in France, often assuming joint coordination of USIS programs. In particular, it kept in contact with French academics and students who were interested in traveling to the U. S. to study⁸ as a sort of parallel operation to the Exchange of Persons Program. Other work carried out under its auspices included operation of mobile film units in remote areas. For example, one such unit operated in the Bordeaux region. Staffed with Paris-based technicians, it followed a regular route throughout the Bordeaux countryside, bringing USIS/France films to the inhabitants.

In certain cases, France-États-Unis co-sponsored special information activities with USIS/France, an interaction that had political and financial benefits for U. S. objectives. One example took place in Roanne⁹ where the PAO gave a lecture on U. S. policy in Korea, followed by three film documentaries shown at a working man's club that was attended by 200 people.¹⁰ USIS/Lyons officials declared themselves very pleased with this activity

⁸France-États-Unis centers in French cities were regional sites of the American Library. Each branch had a trained French librarian.

⁹Held 19 September 1950. This activity was the result of an experiment in Saint-Étienne two weeks earlier. Roanne, a city in the Loire département, was a textile and metallurgical center with approximately 80,000 inhabitants. The U. S. government considered it a Communist stronghold because of an earlier PCF demonstration held there to protest against a shipment of arms to Indo-China. Horatio Mooers, U.S. Consul/Lyons, "Public Affairs Officer's Lecture at Roanne (Loire) on American Policy in Korea," p. 1. 25 September 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰Held 10 November 1950. Films were *The United Nations Aids Korea*, *Music in America* and *Freedom of the Press*. Commentary about audience reception indicated that the first two "made the best impression." Horatio Mooers, U.S. Consul/Lyons, "USIE Lecture and Film Showing at Montbéliard," 20 November 1950 in *ibid.*

activity because it had been held without interruption, despite the fact that the PCF had denounced the program in advance. Although the Communist member of the National Assembly¹¹ from the Loire area was speaking nearby at the same time, the USIS audience included a delegation of textile workers and the Police Commissioner who was responsible for the arrest of eighteen Communist demonstrators at the earlier protest. This interest was interpreted by USIS officials as an indication that there was potential for development of information activities in the area.

A similar program took place in Montbéliard. It was developed after preliminary contacts indicated that USIS activities were well-received and liked by the inhabitants, a fact that made Montbéliard a type of bellweather riding for USIS activities. In particular, contacts with local press resulted in positive commentary. This was important to officials whose experience had taught them that public lectures and films followed by “good press” was one of the most effective means of conveying the USIS message in countries that enjoyed freedom of speech.¹²

Montbéliard was an area that was chosen for intensification of USIS activities by officials after the announcement of the Campaign of Truth in order to ascertain reactions of people who had what they considered special characteristics.

It had always enjoyed good relations with the U. S. One of the few bastions of Protestantism, an unusual factor in Catholic France, USIS felt that it provided advantages because of its capacity for identity with Protestants in the U. S. Its inhabitants were dour,

¹¹Marius Patinaud who gave a talk at the Bourse du Travail.

¹²Ibid.

hardworking and industrious. In short, they resembled White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant working-class population in the northeastern U. S. Furthermore, large numbers of inhabitants had emigrated to the U. S. Therefore, family and friends who remained in France were likely to receive information positively because of their personal connections and their inherited knowledge about Americans.

The program used was an “impromptu”¹³ talk on the structure of U. S. society. This was followed by three film documentaries that attracted 200 people.¹⁴ What made the activity particularly successful in USIS officials’ opinion, was the positive French press reaction the next morning. Three Saint-Étienne papers that printed Roanne editions¹⁵ contained favorable reviews.

Thus, France-États-Unis was used by USIS/France in order to present special programs in areas where officials wanted to test local reaction to U. S. lifestyle. Using the agency in this way allowed the USIS program to take a lesser role in proceedings, thus avoiding suspicion of propagandizing. Therefore, while actually controlling the programs that were presented under joint auspices of USIS and France-États-Unis, officials could make effective use of local chapters in order to try to attract maximum audiences.

¹³Ibid. This is the language used by Mooers to describe the event. However, given the usual controlled format under which lectures operated, it is unlikely that this was the case. He may have wanted the U. S. Embassy and Washington to think that it was impromptu in order to justify funds and requests for future activities.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵*L'Espoir*, *La Tribune*, and *La Dépêche*. However, *L'Espoir* and *La Dépêche* had a common edition for Roanne. Therefore, only two reviews were actually printed. No local press reaction was found for the Montébeliard activity.

Furthermore, program expenses were partially subsidized by France-États-Unis, making its sponsorship even more attractive to USIS officials.

The French government also reacted positively toward the continued existence of France-États-Unis. It had plans¹⁶ to use this agency analogously in the U. S. in order to promote goodwill for France through the French information services located in New York City.

(d) The Case of France-Amérique

The Association France-Amérique¹⁷ was a different case. Another private French agency, it was liquidated by the French government because of its wartime activities. In 1945, the Marquis de Crequi-Montfort,¹⁸ was asked to provide the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a membership list, but he failed to comply with the Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles¹⁹ request, furnishing instead a verbal list of present-day members whose wartime activities were involved with the Resistance.

¹⁶AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Oeuvres Diverses. États-Unis. vol. 173.

¹⁷Ibid. The Association France-Amérique, reconstituted January 1946, was dedicated to five major projects that involved placement of French youth in different sectors of activity in American enterprises: industry, farming or business; sending young women to America to live with families as Au Pair Girls to promote French culture in the U. S.; creation of tourist camps in agreement with the Commissariat au Tourisme; organization of exhibits and the adoption of the war-devastated village of Maillé. Sponsors included Mrs. William Astor.

¹⁸The Marquis de Crequi-Montfort was Head of the Comité exécutif of France Amérique.

¹⁹Henceforth referred to by its acronym DGRC.

On 5 March 1945, the DGRC formally refused a France-Amérique request for financial aid.²⁰ It denied the subsidy on grounds that the organization required restructuring to avoid suspicion that it was still “pétainiste et anti-gaulliste.”²¹ However, this excuse provided the basis for DGRC refusal for subsidization that allowed liquidation of the agency to proceed. Closure of this organization accomplished two objectives: it avoided a confrontation between the French government and the U. S. while ostensibly demonstrating that France agreed with U. S. policy that organizations suspected of fascist orientation should be banned.

Moreover, a DGRC subsidy to France-Amérique would undoubtedly have opened the way for a flood of similar requests by other agencies. French finances would not have permitted these requests, but the French government also feared that official support would contradict to U. S. policy.²² It wished to avoid, moreover, renewed charges from the French press of U. S. cultural imperialism in France. For these reasons it was opportune for the DGRC to sacrifice the agency to the greater interest of maintaining relations with the U.S.

²⁰AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Oeuvres Diverses. États-Unis. Vol. 173.

²¹Ibid. This information came to light when the Minister of Public Health consulted the DGRC after the Marquis de Créqui-Montford asked Mme Pleven, wife of René Pleven, to preside over a committee of women who supported its work. Upon learning of the wartime affiliation of some of its members, subsidization was refused.

²²See Chapter Six for discussion of French government reactions to U. S. Cultural Policy in France.

(e) U. S. Rationale for Eliminating Private Agencies

Analysis of U. S. policy indicates that it sought elimination of opposition to its information policy from private organizations because it could then more easily control overall policy in France and restrict aspects of U. S. cultural involvement that it did not approve of. In particular, this move would enable curtailment of activities of private U. S. artists to France that the government did not consider of high enough caliber, or, did not want in France because of their political preferences. In light of the growing Cold War, this political factor supports the concerted U. S. attempt to eradicate French and American agencies that were not under government aegis.

Moreover, U.S. centralization of American information components within the USIS/France Program, confirmed its refusal to interact with non-governmental agencies. That this was official policy is evident from the documented statements of William Tyler²³ as recorded in his conversations with Pastor Marcel J. Brun.²⁴

(f) Status of France Forever

France Forever was a private agency that had headquarters in France with chapters operating in the U. S. Its membership was made up of French and U. S. citizens who, by virtue of either being born or living in the U. S., were thought to understand the complex

²³In 1946 Tyler was Director of the Office of Information and Cultural Relations for Western Europe in the Department of State.

²⁴Pastor Marcel J. Brun was the Protestant leader in France. On France Forever official letterhead stationery he is identified as Honorary Executive Vice-president of that organization.

question of Franco-American relations better than anyone else.²⁵ It was dedicated to the pursuit of peace between the two countries and promoted business, press and publication interests.

Pastor Marcel J. Brun's objective was to forge a reinvigorated position for France Forever by establishing French cultural offices and press activities into a sort of "Maison Centrale"²⁶ that would permit increased public contact between the two countries. His plan for France Forever envisaged that it play a leading role in the Exchange of Persons Program and information activities:

La solution que j'envisage après en avoir discuté longuement avec de nos amis français et américains est la création d'une sorte de maison centrale française qui pourrait être l'admirable local où s'est installé le Bureau des Relations Culturelles. Je rappelle à ce sujet que c'était un des projets de M. Rockefeller lorsqu'il a créé les différentes maisons internationales dont une abrite le consulat de France. On pourrait y abriter également le Service d'information et France Forever, et dans ce cas le travail de coordination serait extrêmement facilité.²⁷

France Forever published a document called *France USA* that printed articles written by prominent French and U. S. businessmen. This journal possessed both the finances and the editorial influence necessary to influence public opinion, making it suspicious in the eyes

²⁵For example, France's ambassador to Washington, Henri Bonnet, accepted the organization's invitation to be President of France Forever in 1945. His candidacy for this position was advanced not only because he was ambassador, but because of his long experience in the U. S.

²⁶AE, France. Relations Culturelles. Oeuvres Diverses 1945 to 1947. États-Unis. vol. 214. Pastor Marcel J. Brun, "Compte rendu d'une entrevue avec M. William Tyler," p. 1. 9 August 1946.

²⁷Ibid., 3.

of the U. S. Tyler told Brun:

Nous savons qu'il y a eu en France un grand mouvement d'intérêt pour les choses américaines dès la Libération. Mais nous avons le sentiment que *France USA* qui a eu les moyens de se lancer à grand frais et par une propagande tapageuse a pu nous faire beaucoup de tort en drainant la curiosité du public vers ses conceptions particulières, ce qui a beaucoup déçu les esprits. Nous sommes naturellement anxieux d'apporter notre aide à un mouvement comme le vôtre dont les membres fondateurs ont fait leur preuve ici et qui jouissent de la confiance du gouvernement français et du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.²⁸

He reiterated the U. S. position in the following statement:

Je peux affirmer avec force qu'il est en mesure de démentir que le gouvernement donne à une attitude semblable un appui quelconque. Si un journal français publié ici.. croit obtenir les bonne graces du gouvernement américain eu adoptant une attitude politique qui soit, en opposition avec l'attitude générale du gouvernement français je vous autorise à dire de ma part qu'il se trompe absolument..²⁹

Whereas Brun's plan failed,³⁰ a second French source confirms that the French government was well aware of U. S. intentions toward centralization and had been adequately warned of its consequences:

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid. Tyler's answer, recorded by Brun, was diplomatic and cordial without accepting any of Brun's suggestions. He replied that France Forever was a spontaneous movement demonstrating goodwill between France and the U. S. that worked "disinterestedly" for Free France and presently for Franco-American relations. It is interesting that there is no record of this conversation in the U. S. archives.

D'une façon générale, j'ai trouvé l'O.I.C. très soucieux d'établir son contrôle sur toutes les formes de l'activité culturelle américaine à l'étranger; et très susceptible à l'égard d'initiatives prises directement par telle université ou telle fondation américaines. Nous assistons certainement à un effort de grande envergure pour centraliser l'action culturelle des États-Unis. La conséquence de cette attitude est que le Département d'État se montre très favorable à une centralisation analogue de notre propre action culturelle. On m'a signalé avec beaucoup de mauvaise humeur des initiatives privées telles que celle du "Comité Allié d'Aide à la Résistance" ou celle du groupement "France-U.S.A." Un projet de loterie qui serait dû à cette dernière organisation et dont les prix seraient autant de bourses pour les États-Unis a été évoqué non sans ironie. M. Tyler notamment m'a informé de son désir de ne connaître aucun projet français qui n'ait pas l'agrément de la Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles et qui ne serait pas réalisé directement sous son autorité. Il y a là, une tendance dont nous devons, me semble-t-il, savoir profiter.³¹

Therefore, U. S. plans to eliminate private agencies in France may be seen as part of wider U. S. cultural policy to ascertain U. S. cultural dominance. Furthermore, the French government, while not outwardly cooperating with the U. S., did not interfere with plans to eliminate private agencies. Its sideline role was part of its own greater foreign policy strategy that contained the government's grand design³² for post-World War II France. In effect, U. S. centralization of Franco-American affairs in France put unwanted agencies out of business without opposition, in much the same way that small businesses in the U. S. and France were forced to give way to larger corporations in the post-World War II era.

³¹AE, France. *Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 271.* Claude Levi-Strauss, Conseiller Culturel, "Organisation et préoccupations actuelles des Services Culturels du Département d'État," p. 16. No. 1471. 13 March 1946.

³²See Chapter Six for discussion of French government reaction to U. S. cultural policy.

III. U. S. Cultural Policy and the Use of Information Activities

(a) Information Activity Strategy

In 1948, USIS/France began a concentrated endeavor to disseminate data about the U. S. through information activities and an educational exchange program that employed press, radio, motion picture, exchange of persons and libraries in order to promote French approval of U. S. foreign policy.

Formulation of program policy involved a conscious attempt to make propaganda-type activities appear as information. Information activities planned by careful design were supposed to *inform* rather than *convince*. Presenting information in a calm, rational fashion, policy makers believed, would allow conviction to grow out of reason. Ration formed an integral part of this strategy, because officials wanted French audiences to leave USIS activities believing that they could make an informed decision based on the data that they had received.

By creating a public scenario that supported openness in political thinking, U. S. policy makers insinuated that U. S. lifestyle was the only one that offered freedom of choice and individual liberties. Verbalizing this, per se, was unnecessary because program materials focused on graphic evidence that accompanied subject documentaries.

However, information activities were planned programs about subjects that proved more *necessary* rather than *popular* nature with French audiences. French people came to these activities not because they wanted information about U. S. lifestyle, but because they provided advanced technical and industrial subjects information necessary for their work. At the time, U. S. technology was far advanced than it was in France.

Policy makers capitalized on this situation by using simple psychological ploys. Offering programs about new technology and up-to the minute scientific data, they placed subject matter in controlled formats³³ that were heavily combined with basic U. S. political axioms about freedom of choice and decision-making. For example, a Labor group³⁴ audience might be shown a film about car-factory workers in the U. S. and their active participation in political events. Scenes of workers³⁵ openly discussing political candidates and their platforms during coffee breaks and lunch hours were included. Political discourse between workers and managers demonstrated U. S.-style freedom of opinion for all Americans. In this way, ordinary U. S. citizens were shown to be actively involved in the political life of their country. This approach was considered important by Washington policy makers who thought that the French were too remote from their government.

Another example took place in 1951, when a lecture series³⁶ was organized for students of the École des Hautes Études Commerciales. Four films that demonstrated political and economic themes were shown to a group that was known to be well-read and

³³See Chapter Two for explanation of USIS/France activities.

³⁴See Chapter One for discussion of target audience groups in France.

³⁵Through USIS/France film documentaries, the U. S. government endeavored to tell French workers how management and labor groups in the U. S. cooperated so that all workers could benefit from increased productivity. The film *With These Hands* was produced by a private film company in the U. S. that was contracted by the Department of State in order to demonstrate this labor/management theme.

³⁶Held in the U. S. Embassy theater in January 1951. The films in this series were: *Trade Between the U. S. and France*, *American Labor Organization*, *Productivity and Technical Assistance* and *Advertising and Sales Promotion*. Anita C. Lauve, Assistant Cultural Attaché, U. S. Embassy Paris, 16 January 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2390. NARA, Washington, D. C.

interested in up-to date U. S. advances in business. This program was judged successful when the student audience requested a second series. Their reaction³⁷ was received enthusiastically by USIS/France officials who justified continuation of the program to the Department of State by claiming that the U. S. message of liberal enterprise had been accepted by the audience. While this made the USIS/Paris office appear to clearly understand the types of activities that succeeded with French audiences, it is more likely that it was new techniques emphasizing innovative themes of management and staff interaction that motivated the students.

Underlying strategy stressed that direct, factual presentation of information delivered in objective fashion was the commonly inherited tradition of France and the U. S. It permitted freedom of choice by placing the onus on the individual to determine whether or not he believed in U. S. lifestyle. In this way, policy makers called to mind not only the historical Franco-American friendship, but also the more recent Liberation celebrations.

³⁷Assistant Cultural Attaché Darthea Speyer wrote that both lecture series were “an outstanding success.” She maintained that the only complaint from the student audience was that limited seating in the embassy theater did not allow more of their fellow students to attend. She included two written comments from student spectators. One, written in English, thanks Speyer for the lecture series stating, “Thanks to the help of your Service we had four interesting lectures; the most outstanding ones were the second on American Labor and the fourth on Advertising and Sales Promotion.” This comment invites suspicion that Speyer may have exaggerated the success of the program. It confirms the idea that student reactions were oriented toward learning about new trends in the U. S. economy. Memorandum from Darthea Speyer, to the Department of State, “Series of Lectures in Embassy Theater for the École des Hautes Études Commerciales,” 16 January 1951. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Other factors utilized included political-type activities that demonstrated confidence in the French democratic tradition and in the heritage of intellectual liberty. U. S. policy makers felt confident in doing so because information from Intelligence Reports³⁸ stated unequivocally that French leaders were intent upon preserving the fabric of the historical Franco-American friendship:

These men all seem most sincere in wanting France and the United States to like each other. In their own way, they are very proud of the old ties between France and America and want to maintain them for the future.³⁹

Instituting individual decision-making upon the basis of reasoned judgement gave U. S. policy makers the means to reiterate freedom of choice as basic to U. S. lifestyle. It allowed practical application of presentation of information based on knowledge and understanding as the key to informed opinion. In this way, French audiences appeared to participate in U. S. practices by exerting freedom of choice at the conclusion of each activity.

Moreover, there were no overt attempts to force public display of pro-U. S. policy. An open, direct approach in public forums deflected criticism of propagandizing, while effectively using information activities to further U. S. political and foreign policy objectives that stood in direct opposition to those of the Communist-dominated countries. Thus, U. S. Country Plan objectives for France appeared publicly to practice freedom of choice, they actually placed U. S.-style democracy into direct opposition with what U. S.-policy makers

³⁸Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF. Intelligence File. O.S.I. Reports 1950. Box 257. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³⁹Memorandum to Secretary of State, 16 September 1950. No. 1397, in *ibid.*

deemed alien lifestyles:

Our efforts to promote and secure the cause of freedom in the world have one strict limitation. We will not - indeed we cannot - impose ideas on other nations. Democracy cannot be forced on people. It has to grow out of conviction and experience. It has to be voluntarily tried and accepted. Other ways of life can be imposed by force and terror. Democracy cannot live by force and terror. Tyranny feeds on ignorance. Democracy and freedom thrive on knowledge and understanding.⁴⁰

Although officials favored this type of activity, the desired reaction from French audiences was not always as enthusiastic as officials hoped for. French workers,⁴¹ tired after a long day on the job, were not overly responsive to U. S. activities that demanded concentration and decision-making as part of the program. Furthermore, many French people remained suspicious. In their view, the U. S., despite attempts not to appear condescending, was really doing so by expecting⁴² French audiences to react as model

⁴⁰Department of State Bulletin, *The Campaign of Truth*, p. 71. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Correspondence File. File Folder: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs 1952. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴¹How to generate interest and bring out maximum French spectators to USIS/France Programs was a major part of information program strategy. Organizers were aware of French lack of initiative if it were left to the individual to decide whether or not he would frequent events. Therefore, while adhering to a "non-obtrusive" approach, they made it easier for the individual to attend through attention to practical details including advertising, transportation and no entrance charges. As well, French lack of enthusiasm for USIS/France programs was a factor in changing the format from information to entertainment activities.

⁴²USIS/France internal correspondence between regional officials and the central Paris office as well as internal embassy memoranda consistently emphasized that the French were extremely sensitive to condescension. Officials advocated careful preparation of activities that were deliberately designed to present evidence of U. S. progress through advanced technology. The economic and political messages were subtly inserted in these activities so that the audience would react positively to the overall process of liberal economic enterprise within U. S. lifestyle.

students.

Whereas U.S. archival documentation demonstrates that these events were well-attended,⁴³ suspicion about French reaction is raised because of the consistently positive tone of the remarks about popular reception of information activities. Investigation of why the French population attended these activities points to curiosity,⁴⁴ or desire for information about new technology that was applicable to their own work, as motivating factors. Therefore, the question of whether or not French audiences came out freely to these information activities is unproven. Recorded statistics⁴⁵ of large numbers of French visitors to USIS/France presentations were, of course, made by program officials.

⁴³In particular, provincial justification and effectiveness reports, where the numbers are continually high over long periods of time. In the rare cases where they are slightly lower, attendance figures are explained as “not unusual” because of summer or Christmas-holiday periods.

⁴⁴For example, 250 people in Paris attended a talk by Professor F. D. Patterson, President of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama entitled “Negro Education in the U. S. A.” on 13 December 1950. USIS/France staff who mingled with the audience after the program noted that audience reaction was largely curiosity about U. S. segregation policies. Reaction motivated USIS/France personnel to emphasize the importance of impromptu talks about the structure of U. S. society as an introduction to film screenings. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁵See Table 10 for examples of audience attendance. Other statistics demonstrating the number of French spectators at USIS/France events are presented in Chapter Four as well as in footnotes throughout this study.

(b) Examples of USIS/France activities from 1948 to 1950

(b.i) Franco-American Memorials

USIS/France information activities from 1948 to 1950 were oriented around dedication of U. S. memorials in France and ceremonies to honor U.S. war dead as well as public lectures, documentaries and filmstrips.

Dedications of public buildings and plaques in French cities, renaming of streets, wreath-laying ceremonies and memorial ceremonies played a major role in Franco-American diplomacy during the early post-World War II period. In effect, these occasions were used by both governments in order to publicly reaffirm the historical friendship of France and the U. S.

Behind the scenes there was considerable activity as each government debated the protocol level of delegations to these different ceremonies. The French government was advised by the Direction Générale d'Amérique while the U. S. Embassy reacted to Department of State directives. In most cases, each side waited for the other to see what level of diplomacy the activity was accorded. For example, for the annual memorial ceremony at La Fayette's grave, the Direction d'Amérique withheld its recommendation as to whether the French president should go personally, or send his representative, until it learned who composed the U. S. delegation.

In 1949, the USIS/Bordeaux office reported on the laying of the cornerstone of the École Maternelle de Royan. This occasion was considered especially significant by USIS officials because U. S. citizens had contributed the sum of five million francs toward the

building of this school through the intermediary of the American Aid to France Committee.⁴⁶ The ceremony included introduction of the Bordeaux PAO⁴⁷ by the Mayor of Royan, a speech in French by the PAO as well as discourses by representatives of the Préfecture and the Ministry of Education.

Franco-American memorials included the dedication of the Hôpital Memorial France-États-Unis de Saint-Lô⁴⁸ that was begun in 1948 with funds collected from U. S. aid to France. The cornerstone was laid by U. S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery in the presence of the French Minister of Health. In a ceremony honoring Franco-American friendship, the flame at the tomb of the unknown soldier⁴⁹ was rekindled.

Franco-American commemorations included the inauguration of the Kelly⁵⁰ memorial in 1952. Organized by the American Legion in Paris, it took place under the dome in Les Invalides. Rationale for French and American government interest and high-level

⁴⁶ "U.S. Embassy Representation at Royan Ceremony." Report from the American Consulate, USIS/Bordeaux, 13 December 1949. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1944 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁷ Arthur Jennings, later PAO/Lille.

⁴⁸ Saint-Lô had been entirely destroyed by bombs during the Normandy landings, 6 June 1944.

⁴⁹ Held 4 July 1952. This ceremony was sponsored by the American Legion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs presence demonstrated the high level of protocol that the French government assigned to it.

⁵⁰ Staff Sergeant Kelly was the first American soldier to reach Paris at the Liberation. He was wounded on the bridge at St. Cloud and was returned to his hometown, Attoona, Pennsylvania where he subsequently died from his wounds.

delegations⁵¹ to this ceremony focused on the public interest and sympathy that it generated.

(b.ii) Technological and Scientific Films

Screenings of USIS/France films were preceded by local advertising in regional newspapers and by posters placed in prominent places in cities, towns and villages by regional staff. Information centers featured information about forthcoming films in their reading rooms with copies prominently displayed in street-front windows. As well, Regional PAOs telephoned municipal officials in advance and university rectors and school principals were also informed. Teachers who were former grantees on the Exchange of Persons program were invited to bring their students if the film shown were targeted toward youth. In isolated areas, USIS/France staff distributed bulletins in town squares on weekly market days.

To ensure that public attendance was not affected by lack of transportation, regional information centers provided buses free of charge to and from distant communities for important screenings. This was done in reaction to staff concerns⁵² that farmers and laborers who lived and worked in remote areas would not travel long distances to rented halls, theaters and information centers if they had no means of getting there.

⁵¹For example, high profile of this event was demonstrated by the presence of foreign minister Robert Schuman who spoke at the ceremony.

⁵²Discussion about transportation took place at USIS/France staff meetings. It was left to the PAO to arrange for buses at his discretion. Cost was undertaken by USIS/Paris.

Films⁵³ used with French audiences at USIS programs tended to be documentaries and filmstrips that illustrated U. S. technology in scientific fields and presented data and information about advances in medicine, dentistry, architecture and engineering. Thus, *RX House of Squibb*⁵⁴ was a film that was considered highly useful to show French audiences because it demonstrated U. S. efficiency in manufacturing pharmaceutical products. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce requested two specialized film documentaries⁵⁵ on cortisone and ACTH for a lecture series⁵⁶ given by the Medical Association of Northern France.

Other examples in 1949 categorized under the heading, "Special Events," in Marseilles, included a series of animated short films for use in orphanages and monthly showings of dental films. In Strasbourg, three documentaries that treated different phases of motor transportation were viewed by three hundred truck drivers in the area.⁵⁷ In Paris,

⁵³While these documentaries and filmstrips suited information activity format, it is noteworthy that U. S. feature-length films at that time were encountering difficulties with new French regulations in dubbing text. American film makers protested, calling these edicts a "flagrant violation of the Blum-Byrnes Agreement." However, an early U. S. film, *The Lost Weekend* was released in France in 1947. Its' popularity made USIS/France officials aware of the potential for using American films to spread the U. S. message in France. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 19. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁴In January 1950 there were fifty-eight screenings of this film throughout France. Audience attendance was documented at 9885 spectators. William R. Tyler, "Report of Motion Picture," 30 January 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁵Made by Dr. C. Hench of the Mayo Clinic, Boston, Massachusetts.

⁵⁶Held in March 1950.

⁵⁷Titles were, *Trailer 201*, *Panorama*, and *Film Magazine No. 3*. All were produced by the Audio-Visual Unit in the Department of State.

six films⁵⁸ concerning medico-social problems relating to children were organized by the USIS/Paris Film Unit, the French Ministry of Labor (Social Security Branch) and the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale.

A survey⁵⁹ of the Cinema Section of the Ministère de l'Agriculture indicated that private film companies in the Paris region had agricultural films available for use in France. To capitalize on this, the Department of State sent photographers to France in order to prepare footage for documentary films about food production there.⁶⁰

In Cannes, twenty-four agricultural films were screened in 1950 for ECA information chiefs and delegates from the Ministère de l'Agriculture and the Confédération Générale de l'Agriculture in a two-day marathon.⁶¹ Seventy people attended, who were asked to select the best subjects for translation into French. Films were then distributed through USIS/France and other outlets arranged by ECA.

⁵⁸Eighty people attended the screenings of these films. William R. Tyler, "Report of Motion Picture," 30 January 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁹Carried out by Ben H. Thibodeaux, Agriculture Attaché, U. S. Embassy, Paris, in 1947. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 19. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹"USIS Staff Meeting," p. 1. 6 January 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Reports of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(b.iii) Agricultural Films

Agricultural films included titles such as *Guardian of the Forest*, a documentary that demonstrated the importance of forest lands in the life of the American nation. It highlighted the theme of pioneers who farmed in the wilderness. *Harvest for Tomorrow* was an agricultural film that portrayed an American landscape that appeared very similar to that of rural France. Most of the audience were French youth who were disappointed in it. They expected the U. S. countryside to be far more rugged, an impression that, perhaps, was the result of films about American cowboys and the wild west.

Sensing the audience disappointment, the regional officer in charge quickly explained that if the U. S. countryside were similar to that of rural France, it was thanks to the energy of the American founding fathers and pioneers whose energy transformed into “mother bountiful.”⁶²

Other agricultural titles included *Hay is How You Make It*, *Realm of the Honeybee*, *The New California* and *Irrigation Farming*. The U. S. Embassy retained control of all prints required.

(b.iv) Political Films

Often, USIS/France programs were information activities that demonstrated citizen involvement in political life. This was a deliberate move on the part of the U. S. Embassy, where the political division had been moving toward the integration of political reporting and public information.

⁶²Ibid.

One Tuesday in November, was a brief, factual documentary that focused upon a small town in middle America and its citizens' involvement in the 1948 U. S.-presidential election. The script emphasized the responsibility of each citizen to participate in the election by casting his vote. Thus, this film highlighted favorite USIS themes of the role of the individual and his direct participation in and contribution to U. S. lifestyle.

The Holtville Story was a production that highlighted U. S. values of neighborliness, religion and honesty. Its objective was to demonstrate the benefits of living in a society where the individual could count on community help in times of personal stress. Using these themes, the story developed around the aftermath of a serious fire in a school storage plant. Completely destroyed, the townspeople rebuilt the depot together.

USIS/Paris office officials who viewed this film thought that it would have some potential with rural and agricultural workers who might react positively to the portrayal of life in a small town. Upon their recommendations, it was edited to highlight the reactions of the citizens concerned after the fire, thus, demonstrating how Americans worked together for the common good. Translated into French and cut to a forty-minute narrative, this film was released for use in the French countryside.

Two-Way Street was a political documentary that the USIS/Paris film unit rejected for use in France because of fears that French audiences would object to its strong emphasis on Anglo-Saxon civilization. This film also depicted Asian and Arab people as being the same as French people.⁶³ In addition to the cultural problems with this interpretation,

⁶³Memorandum from Philip Chadbourn, PAO/Lyons, to U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Evaluation of Two-Way Street," 14 February 1951. Chadbourn felt that this film was not suitable for use in the Lyons area because the public was too disposed to see USIS as a

officials feared that it would be the catalyst for racist outbursts and that it would also present opportunity for renewed French press accusations of a mass U.S. assault on French culture.

Other political films focused on popular U. S. heroes and prominent politicians who were personified as working for peace and harmonious relations with the international community. *President Truman's Speech to the United Nations*⁶⁴ and *Secretary Acheson Reports on New Communist Threat to World Peace*,⁶⁵ were two filmstrips in demand by USIS film staff.

*The Roosevelt Story*⁶⁶ provides a good example of this type of film. Chronicling the life of the World War II President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, it consisted of newsreel footage depicting the "historic"⁶⁷ years of his Administration. It was particularly considered particularly acceptable for use with French audiences because of Roosevelt's lingering popularity in France as the leader of the allied forces during World War II and public nostalgia for the wartime U. S. president. Another reason for its appeal was that it gave credit to other French wartime leaders including General de Gaulle, General Leclerc and several French Resistance leaders. Moreover, its overall theme was peace, a concept that the

propaganda machine. It was likely, he wrote, to confirm the impression "with its global picture of the cultural exchange program and its strong emphasis and diffusion [sic] of a knowledge of English." Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁴Produced by Twentieth-Century Fox for distribution in France.

⁶⁵Produced by Metro-Goldwyn Mayer for distribution in France.

⁶⁶Produced by United Artists. This film was screened on the anniversary of Roosevelt's birthday, 30 January 1950.

⁶⁷Vocabulary used in the film narrative.

French equated with Roosevelt's presence on the international scene.

Advance publicity⁶⁸ arranged for this film included Roosevelt's photo on the front page of Lyons' principal daily newspaper⁶⁹ and a commemorative editorial based on USIS material furnished to the paper by the USIS/Lyons regional office. Screening of the film took place at a well-known theater in downtown Lyons without admission charges under the joint sponsorship of USIS/Lyons with local chapters of Franco-American agencies.⁷⁰

Table 10. Sample of Attendance at USIS/Paris Activities, November/ December 1949⁷¹

	Nov 49	Dec 49	Increases (+) Nov/Dec 49
No. of Programs	1,383	1,507	+124
Program Audience	193,740	232,398	+39,658
No. of Films	3,720	4,607	+887
Film Audience	583,814	700,914	+117,100

⁶⁸Memo from Horatio Mooers, U. S. Consul/Lyons, 7 January 1950. It refers to the advance preparations underway for commemoration of Roosevelt's centenary on 30 January 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁹*Le Progrès*, leading daily newspaper in Lyons.

⁷⁰This event was held under the joint sponsorship of USIS/Lyons, Association France-États-Unis and the Comité de l'Indépendance Day France-Amérique. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷¹Figures in Table 10 are from monthly OEX/OII-USIS/Paris statistics for November to December 1949. They are commensurate with reports that indicated increased demand for documentary films and that nine out of eighteen Centres Cinéma Éducateur reported additional programs and attendance over the previous month, November 1949. Figures in Table 10 demonstrated a large increase in numbers of programs and films as well as in attendance between November and December 1949 that probably resulted from the Christmas holiday season. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D.C.

(c)The Shift in Emphasis in 1950

The original objectives of the USIS Program were officially stated in terms of “winning friends abroad,”⁷² a phrase that the introduction of the 1950 Campaign of Truth changed to “influencing people abroad.”⁷³ The basis for this shift in emphasis was U. S.-government concern over the intensification of the Cold War and the confrontation in Korea between Chinese and U. S. troops in 1950. President Truman’s statement was, therefore, emphasized in favor of a U. S. propaganda offensive⁷⁴ that was deemed necessary to fight the ideological war for “the battle of mens’ minds.”⁷⁵ U. S. policy in Korea made dissemination of information overseas an insufficient means by which to further U. S. foreign policy objectives. Instead, a carefully planned and executed entertainment program was substituted.

This shift in emphasis provided Washington policy-makers with the opportunity to work out new practices in order to persuade the U. S. press and public of its validity. To do so it reworked its definition of truth. Truth became a concept that could not be left at simple presentation of facts and reporting of information. It had to represent the *interpretation* of ideas. In this way the U. S. could explain its intentions and foreign policy as a counter-

⁷² “Information Policy Guidelines,” p. 1. Record Group 59. Department of State. Miscellaneous Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs, 1944 to 1962. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴See Chapter One for explanation of this phrase.

⁷⁵Department of State publication, *The Campaign of Truth*, pp. 71-74. (Washington, D. C.,: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951). Papers of Harry S. Truman. Official File. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

objective to the “big lie”⁷⁶ that Washington believed was expounded by the USSR.

Presenting the truth as we understand it means a great deal more than the mere reporting, willy-nilly, of facts. Truth is not only the presentation but also the interpretation of facts and ideas. Although the presentation of facts and ideas often reflects the truth, the presentation of facts and ideas without interpretation can also create false impressions. In accordance with this reasoning, the foreign information program not only presents facts and ideas, but also supplements this presentation with an interpretation of their significance in the present world scene. It is this presentation of facts and ideas in perspective which creates the reactions that further the foreign policy objectives of the United States.⁷⁷

Thus, in 1950, the evolving international situation provided the background for the U. S. to redirect its efforts toward achievement of foreign policy objectives. Taking the psychological initiative, it reoriented its agenda toward culturally-politicized entertainment programs that focused on what it considered to be the “urgent need for combating Soviet-inspired anti-American propaganda.”⁷⁸ This move was not merely an expansion of information operations, but one that carefully appraised target groups, media and objectives through more flexible programming that was designed to meet whatever emergencies might arise from the new political situation.

⁷⁶ “Broadcasts to France in the Cold War and the Korean War Periods (Spring 1950 and Winter 1951). A Content Analysis Conducted by The Research Center for Human Relations. North York University, 6 July 1951.” Papers of Charles Hulten. VOA 1950 to 1951. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷⁷Ibid., 2.

⁷⁸Department of State Bulletin, *The Campaign of Truth*, p. 7. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951). Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

The supplement granted by Congress, in 1950,⁷⁹ to the annual budget allocated to the USIS Program supported this initiative. It provided for improved publication and press facilities, increased numbers of motion pictures, expanded libraries and a greater volume of information materials of all kinds, tailored to meet the needs of specific French audiences.

(d) Effect of the Korean War, June 1950

In 1950, USIS and the Mutual Security and Defense Agency Program⁸⁰ were joined together to advance the concept of collective security and Western European defense efforts. Official U. S. policy was that integration of the USIS Program with the MSDAP was necessary to keep information activities under constant review and surveillance so that they focused as sharply as possible upon attainment of U. S. objectives.

However, it was financially expedient for the U. S. to combine the USIS with the military program so that one budget would pay for dissemination of information materials. As well, centralization of information policy was expanded to include its financial component. Therefore, USIS/France personnel suspicion that the ECA Information Program would take precedence over USIS appears to be justified. Whereas it was amalgamated into the larger program, ECA remained independent.

⁷⁹Congress voted an additional \$79 million to provide for the intensification of U. S. information overseas after declaration of the Campaign of Truth in 1950.

⁸⁰Henceforth known by its acronym MSDAP.

In France, union with the military agency determined new objectives for information activities. Greater emphasis began to be placed on the concept of common interests. For example, information policy focused on the threat posed to the West by Communist ideology, lessening the emphasis on the purely national orientation of information.

The intensified political situation was responsible for renewed Department of State questions about the reliability of the French as allies. For policy planners, the often-changing French political scene acted as an indicator that French democracy was unstable. Privately however, the U.S. knew from its Intelligence Reports ⁸¹ that the possibility of a Communist takeover in France after 1947 was remote.

Yet, negative U. S. press reports about the French political situation demanded that public fears be calmed. Therefore, the U. S. government called upon, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce,⁸² one of its strongest voices on France, to speak out about the situation.

Bruce declared that French foreign policy remained remarkably constant despite frequent changes of government. By pointing out that there had been only two foreign ministers⁸³ within the past seven years, he tried to demonstrate that the French situation was stable; yet, he sparked public interest about the strength of the PCF when he stated:

⁸¹"France." SR-30. 17 March 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF: Intelligence File Situation Reports 25 to Situation Reports 53 to 61. Box 261. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁸²Department of State Release for the Press. No. 226. 25 March 1952. Statement by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce to the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸³Georges Bidault and Robert Schuman.

Naturally, we have recently been deeply concerned over political developments in France. The interplay, the reaction between politics and economics is closely linked. There is an equal apprehension over the large, although reduced, Communist vote that expressed itself in the last general election. As to communism in France, it no longer constitutes the threat that it once did to the integrity of the Atlantic Community.⁸⁴

His statement helped the government in two ways: it quieted the outcry in the U. S. press and on Capital Hill over questions of French reliability, while it reminded the U. S. that communism was still a force to be reckoned with in France, thus justifying the need for U. S. presence there.

(e) Expansion of the USIS/France Program

Increased MSDAP and NATO responsibilities resulted in rapid development of information activities in France that could not be met by distant Washington. This led to a call for local French initiative in information activities to deflect French public criticism about the dissemination of information materials under U. S.-government sponsorship.⁸⁵

Rationale for this move came from U. S. Embassy speculation that the Department of State believed was confirmed through U. S. Intelligence Information.⁸⁶ Increasingly, it appeared that subversive Communist propaganda in France aimed at influencing French

⁸⁴Statement by David K. E. Bruce, former U. S. Ambassador to France, 25 March 1952 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1953. *House Hearings. Senate.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office 1952).

⁸⁵ Memo from William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, to Department of State, "Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending 31 May 1950." No. 379. 16 August 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁶Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF. Intelligence File. O.S.I. Reports 1950. Box 257. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

popular opinion to believe that aggressive U. S. foreign policy tactics would precipitate France into a new war.

The perceived intensified Communist offensive in 1951 resulted in U. S. belief that dissemination of information materials and even the Marshall Plan were not sufficient to meet the challenge of the heightened political situation.⁸⁷

It is not enough to turn only to the day-to-day materials and distribution of documentary films, press materials and exhibits that compose the ordinary USIS/France information activities.⁸⁸

Therefore, U. S. policy-makers seized the opportune political situation in order to change the orientation of the USIS Program from that of information to entertainments. The art of persuasion was now reincarnated into the art of recreation. Culturally politicized entertainments were about to bring U. S.-liberal democracy to the French through art, song, dance and literature.

(f) William Tyler's Plan for France

William Tyler submitted a plan for development of USIS/France information objectives in 1950. His strategy concerned centralization of U. S. information components. Although this scheme appears to echo earlier centralization efforts, it deals more with bringing together major services in U. S. information programs.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid., 2.

Tyler, as CPAO in the U. S. Embassy, had actually been campaigning for reform in the USIS/France Program since its beginnings in 1948. As chief program officer, he was well placed to know about program strengths and deficiencies. He received all of the provincial justification and evaluation reports, a fact that made him privy to concerns about selection of suitable audio-visual materials for different priority groups. Furthermore, as liaison to a large number of Franco-American committees and to government envoys from Washington, Tyler was in a unique position to comment on the effectiveness of the program.

Yet, his position remains unclear. Archival evidence suggests that he had a distinctive plan for policy reform, but upon analysis it is found to be rooted in ideas that were already in effect. Moreover, he had a reputation within the program of delegating authority to subordinates, but his scheme called for greater discipline and administration. His plan deserves examination because of the insight that it provides into conflict between staff and line management.

Tyler wanted to unify separate U. S. information components into a central force that would permit single direction of U. S. information activities, His choice was influenced, he admitted, by his interaction with the French government, where, "Each impulse must be transmitted separately to a number of uncoordinated elements within the French Administration and social structure."⁸⁹ He likened the situation to the five fingers of one hand, each one of which required a separate act of will in order to make it move.

⁸⁹Ibid., 3.

Furthermore, he stated, maintaining separate aspects of U. S. information components in France were not only more expensive, but were less effective, because of separate administrations. However close coordination between separate establishments in similar fields might be, Tyler wrote, it could not equal the advantages of one force in policy direction and administrative supervision. Projected benefits were closer guidance over the USIS/France program with substantial financial savings.

These were recommendations that would be well-received by Washington policy planners who were always conscious of the possibility of U. S. embarrassment overseas if policy direction were not properly coordinated. Furthermore, criticism directed at the program in the U. S. usually was focused on high financial costs.

Yet, Tyler's recommendations would not be popular with USIS personnel in France where there was ongoing concern about keeping jobs. In effect, his recommendations became the basis for job reductions when the Administration changed in 1953. Thus, his plan is controversial because it put the USIS/France Program into jeopardy by suggesting that the government could save tax dollars if it would simplify the organization. Moreover, it gives rise to the suspicion that Tyler may have known that changes were coming and attempted to jump on the managerial bandwagon before they actually occurred in the USIS/France Program.

On a pedagogical level, Tyler's memorandum focused on his earlier ideas that the U. S. should distance itself from a program where everything is self-contained and organically divided from the conduct of foreign affairs:

Informational activities should not be thought of as a kind of independent tank fighting part of the battle by itself as a self-contained unit, but rather as the specialized application of techniques to the cause of furthering the conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.⁹⁰

Given that the international political situation had changed radically in five years, U. S. orientation toward an information program that consisted of media directed according to previously established criteria and whose work was evaluated on a statistical basis held semi-annually was largely passé. Furthermore Tyler wanted to get away from a standardized program to a more individual⁹¹ conduct of information activities as necessitated by need:

What we should be engaged in is the application of specialized techniques to the conduct of our foreign relations for the purpose of furthering the attainment of our foreign policy objectives.⁹²

For Tyler, the difficulties of dealing with the French were compounded by the heavy emphasis on administration by Washington. Stating that the program had become overburdened by bureaucracy, he targeted the Department of State habit of using standard resource materials, “so that we are rapidly reaching the lowest common denominator of psychological effectiveness.”⁹³

⁹⁰William R. Tyler to Department of State, 13 June 1949, “Notes on the USIS,” p. 1. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹¹Memorandum from William R. Tyler to Arthur Stevens, Department of State, 13 April 1950 in *ibid.*

⁹²*Ibid.*, 3.

⁹³*Ibid.*

Tyler believed that these materials were not suitable for use in France where a customized approach was necessary for program success. However, he claimed that too much bureaucracy was responsible for the cyclical damage that was occurring to the USIS/France operation. Explaining it in context, he stated that the more the U. S. allocated for mass production of materials in the U. S., the more staff that was required in the field for distribution purposes and for reporting on their effectiveness. Concluding that this led to an ineffective program, he said that division of information activities from those of cultural entertainments was not just desirable, but imperative.

Therefore, Tyler explained, cultural entertainments should become part of a semi-autonomous agency financed by congressional appropriations, but run by private groups in close and continuous consultation with the Department of State. He recommended that substantial funds be made available for local production of information activities. This move would permit implementation of a real information program, rather than the formula to which USIS was now reduced.

The exception to this, however, was France, where, Tyler admitted, “ I can go as far as to say that information activities in France which matter most are carried out independently of the official USIS and of the information policy planning in Washington.”⁹⁴ With this statement Tyler admitted that the USIS/France Program was acting independently of official policy.

⁹⁴Ibid.

While targeting the advantages of program unification, Tyler's plan indirectly attacked the less well-known ECA public affairs program operating in Western Europe. Directly linked to the Marshall Plan, it maintained its own personnel, independent financial resources and PAO officers. Original ECA goals supported the Marshall Plan, but, as Recovery was achieved in France new themes of promoting European productivity and output were undertaken along with "creating psychological climates favorable to the success of the ECA Program."⁹⁵

Thus, Tyler's plan was paradoxical in its recommendations. In effect, he had nothing new to offer Washington and much to lose in his relations with USIS personnel. While his suggestions for reform may have satisfied Washington, they harmed the USIS/France Program in the long run by recommending the type of managerial measures that personnel was strongly against. His strategy was eventually accepted in 1952 when a Department of State directive stated:

There should exist a single overseas information program of the U.S. government. The development of this national program and the overall coordination in carrying it out should be responsibilities of the Secretary of State. The national overseas information program must be developed within the framework of the national policies and plans of the Psychological Strategy Board. The national program, to be fully adequate must aim at (1) promoting abroad an understanding of America and U.S. programs and policies (2) combating international communism and (3) eliminating psychological barriers to the attainment of U.S. overseas objectives.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ "Report on Study of Overseas Information Programs of the State Department and the Economic Cooperation Administration," p. 3. 1 October 1951. SMOF: PSB Files 014.31 Aliens to 040 ECA. Box 2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁹⁶ Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2483. NARA, Washington, D. C.

It is interesting to note that by the time this directive came into effect in 1952, Tyler had left the CPAO position. In his wake came strict measures for the USIE/France Program undertaken by the USIA in 1953. The incoming administration was preceded by a large number of USIS/France personnel transfers, resignations and releases. Tyler, whose aim was to reform the program, was responsible for the new stringent measures that became operational in 1953. While he escaped from the new administration that he, in effect, created, some long-term USIS/France employees⁹⁷ bitterly resented his actions.

IV. Influence of Political Events on USIS/France Policy

(a) French Government Action Against the PCF

The Pinay⁹⁸ program emphasized national well-being, an approach that the U.S. felt reiterated its own Country Plan Objectives for 1952.⁹⁹ Furthermore, and more important to U. S. strategy in France, Pinay's government created a favorable impression with the U. S. by reacting sharply to PCF actions that the U.S. considered hostile and violent. U. S.

⁹⁷After 1948 all Department of State employees were bound by the Loyalty Oath that they took upon entering government service. It remains binding even after personnel have left their government positions. Therefore, it is often difficult to get information about interpersonal relations in USIS/France. This author spoke to several former employees who, while professing interest in the questions posed, were reticent in their answers about the management of the organization. The impression that there was bitterness among the employees about the 1953 reorganization is confirmed by archival evidence that discusses conflict between managers over termination of jobs for certain individuals. Memorandum from William Koren Jr., ACPAO, 19 September 1954. Record Group 306. General and Classified Records of the USIA, 1946 to 1955. Box 14. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁸The first government of Antoine Pinay came to power in 1952.

⁹⁹Eighth psychological objective of U. S/France Country Plan 1952: "Encourage Sense of Self-Reliance and Initiative in France." Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

impressions of renewed Communist agitation and propaganda was thought to be an attempt to create confusion and disorder coinciding with the signing of the European Defense Community¹⁰⁰ treaties.

U. S. suspicions were further aroused when USIS/France offices at Bordeaux and Lille were raided.¹⁰¹ These sporadic occurrences culminated in the demonstrations surrounding the arrival of General Ridgeway in France on 27 May 1952. The mass demonstration against Ridgeway held at the Place de la République in Paris was banned by the French government. Along with the seizure of the Communist newspaper, *L'Humanité*,¹⁰² searching of PCF headquarters and announcement of intended government legislation against the leaders of the protest and 162 participants,¹⁰³ the ban was very well received by the U.S. Embassy that reported it to Washington as the “final setback to Communist strength and prestige.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰Henceforth referred to by its acronym EDC.

¹⁰¹Damage was minimal and both offices were open for business as usual the morning after the attack. Other incidents included raids on a U. S. military depot at Bordeaux and the destruction of an MSA labor exhibit at Oyonnax.

¹⁰²André Stil, editor of *L'Humanité*, and Jacques Duclos, leader of the PCF, were arrested.

¹⁰³“Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period December 1, 1951 to May 31, 1952,” p. 2. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.* 3.

(b) The Paix et Liberté Movement

In 1950, Jean-Paul David¹⁰⁵ approached the U. S. Embassy with a plan to set up an organization¹⁰⁶ whose sole purpose was to fight the PCF, a Party that he considered to be the agent of Soviet communism in France.

In order to combat what he regarded as the diffusion of Communist propaganda in France, David organized a parallel propaganda organization. He arranged with the French Ministry of Information to broadcast a three-minute daily program over Radio Diffusion Française called *The News of the Day* that he selected to expose and confuse Communist information and activities. In addition, there were two other longer, weekly programs that targeted “the sinister designs and anti-patriotic activities of the Communist Party”¹⁰⁷ for French-listening audiences. In addition, David believed strongly in “the art of ridicule.”¹⁰⁸ He attempted to use leaflets and other publications in order to portray the numerous Marshals of the Soviet Union as “The General Staff of the Partisans of Peace.”

David studied information methods used by the PCF as well as their political activity. Further examination led to a special study of the means employed to fight communism by other French political parties:

¹⁰⁵Jean-Paul David had been a member of the National Assembly since 1946. He was re-elected in 1951.

¹⁰⁶Policy Planning Records 954. General Records of the Department of State. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁷ “Paix et Liberté,” p.1. Memorandum from William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy to Department of State, 9 October 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

He arrived at the conclusion that the struggle against communism must be waged by entirely different methods in order to obtain worthwhile results. He decided that the fight against communism had to be conducted on a non-partisan level and by using the same tactics that the Communists used to further their ends.¹⁰⁹

David, a zealous anti-Communist, organized the Paix et Liberté campaign in Paris in which he made use of posters, pamphlets, weekly bulletins and radio broadcasts. All of this media was designed to expose and place before the public what he claimed was objective information that would deflate Communist propaganda and expose its lies.

As part of this media campaign the Movement devised a special poster that portrayed a balance sheet showing the 1917 Russian Revolution alongside a statistical analysis of lives lost during that political upheaval. Other posters placed in public squares in French cities, towns and villages included a roster of names of Lenin's companions and co-workers with explanations of their fate.

Paix et Liberté was funded by the French government¹¹⁰ and included a small staff. However, David was dissatisfied with what he considered a relatively small amount of money in comparison to what he estimated¹¹¹ the Communists were spending on their

¹⁰⁹Cited in AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 327.* Extract from the Senate *Record*, 1952, pp. 213-215, quoting Homer Ferguson, Republican Senator from Michigan.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.* The sum was 800,000 French francs per month.

¹¹¹David estimated that the Communists were spending more than three hundred million francs on their information program in France. William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris to Department of State, "Paix et Liberté," p. 2. 9 October 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C. It is noteworthy that the U. S. archives contain mention of the amount of money given to David's organization by the French government, whereas the French archives mention that

Information Program in France. He repeated this information to William Tyler and Helen Kirkpatrick.¹¹² Therefore, it is possible that he was hoping for financial help from the U.S. Embassy.

The U. S. government, acting upon instructions from the Department of State, found David useful to U. S. policy. From his unsolicited arrival at the embassy, David provided a welcome example of the new U. S. Country Plan objectives that desired to place the onus of information activities on Frenchmen in order to deflect from overt U. S. involvement and criticism of interference in French domestic affairs. When the elections in the Fall of 1951 resulted in a decline of PCF favor, the Embassy declared that David's work was responsible for Communist candidates losing 500,000 votes.¹¹³

However, it is questionable whether David's organization had any real effect on the status of the PCF at the time. U. S. Intelligence Reports acknowledged that whereas the PCF was "still dangerous,"¹¹⁴ it had probably reached the zenith of its power in 1947. Its present-

he was given a sum, but they do not specify the amount. Furthermore, there is no mention of David's remarks about the Communist Information Program in France in the French archives. This information is found in the U. S. files.

¹¹²Helen Kirkpatrick was the Director of Information, ECA Special Mission to France. She accompanied William Tyler on a visit to Jean-Paul David at the Paix et Liberté offices in Paris on 5 October 1950.

¹¹³According to U. S. Embassy correspondence, PCF membership declined thirty percent as a result of the David campaign while circulation of *L'Humanité* diminished from 500,000 to 16,000 readers daily. Furthermore, it noted that for the first time in thirty-four years no parade was organized by the PCF to honor the October Revolution. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D.C.

¹¹⁴"France, SR-30," p. 2. 17 March 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF: Intelligence File Situation Reports 25 - Situation Reports 53-61. File Folder: Situation Reports 30-31. Box 261. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

day danger was, the Report stated, due to its influence over Labor. Yet, by 1951, the PCF had lost much of its image of wartime Resistance and post-war concern with poverty in France. The economic boom beginning around 1950 added to its diminishment. This evidence appears far more credible than U. S. claims that David was responsible for the decline of communism in France. Far more likely is the fact that the U. S. Embassy encouraged David in his campaign because his motives fit in so well with U. S. foreign policy objectives and U. S. political attitudes at the time.

The French government named Siriex, an official in the Prime Minister's office, as the personal liaison officer for Paix et Liberté. When Tyler and Kirkpatrick visited him following their interview with David, he proved unhelpful, in their opinion. Upon being asked to act as liaison between Paix et Liberté and the Embassy, he bluntly told the pair that they could approach David themselves, although he did agree to be involved in informal discussions about the subject.

The attitude of the Prime Minister's Liaison Officer prompted the following comment from William Tyler:

Paix et Liberté, which has only been going for a very few weeks, is already the target of a good deal of sniping from quarters which should be supporting such an effort and giving it all assistance possible. The reasons for this sniping are partly political and partly due to the natural reactions of the French character.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ William R. Tyler to Department of State, "Paix et Liberté," p. 3. 9 October 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2483. NARA, Washington, D. C.

David's initiative occurred at a time when the U. S. was locked in a battle with the PCF for control of Labor. Evidence for this statement is provided by the press and media attention allotted to Irving Brown, President of the American Federation of Labor,¹¹⁶ and George Meany, President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations,¹¹⁷ who supplied moral and financial backing to the anti-Communist movement that broke the Communist-led General Strikes of 1947.

Brown, sent to Europe as a trouble shooter for the Department of State, helped form the Mediterranean Port Committee that wrested control of French, Greek and Italian ports from the Communists. In particular, he was actively involved in the fight for the Communist-dominated Marseilles docks where the Russians had ordered that U. S. arms be prevented from unloading at French ports. Brown planned to use the French Communist example for an international anti-Communist campaign.

Investigation of the roles of Brown and Meany in France demonstrates U. S. concern with the PCF was over its influence with French workers. U. S. approval of Jean-Paul David and his role as the leader of the Paix et Liberté Movement are recognized in this context as propaganda demonstrating concern of Frenchmen over the U. S.-perceived threat of Communism. They also became a way for the government of showing a hostile U. S. press that U. S. support of France, through its information campaign, was succeeding in turning Frenchmen toward U. S. lifestyle.

¹¹⁶Henceforth referred to by its acronym AFL.

¹¹⁷Henceforth referred to by its acronym CIO.

(c) The American College in Paris

In May 1949, Leon L. Mathias¹¹⁸ called at the U. S. Embassy to discuss his plans for the opening of an American College in Paris. He told embassy officials that his intention was to open a school in Paris that would be staffed by English-speaking U. S. and French professors in order to offer courses to American students in France who were not gaining full benefits from their experience because their lectures were in French.¹¹⁹

During this initial visit, Mathias stated that he was not seeking embassy backing but requested that the embassy not make his task impossible to carry out. He asked that the embassy take a position of “neutrality”¹²⁰ on his project. Leslie S. Brady responded that, as an American citizen in France, Mathias’ endeavor was regarded as a private enterprise. Officially, the embassy would not support it, because he had no university¹²¹ backing in the U. S., he was still free to pursue his plans privately.

¹¹⁸ Mathias was a naturalized U. S. citizen, born in Germany who claimed to be a professor of political science and sociology. However, this author was unable to confirm his professional qualifications.

¹¹⁹Memorandum from U. S. Embassy, Paris to Department of State, 2 June 1950. No. 2660. It cited an article entitled, “American College in Paris May Open Doors Next Year,” in an “unnamed U. S. newspaper” sent to the embassy by a Parisian who received it from a family member serving in the U. S. Armed Forces in Augusta, Georgia. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁰Memorandum from Leslie S. Brady, Cultural Affairs Officer, U. S. Embassy, Paris to Department of State, “Leon L. Mathias,” p.1. 2 March 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²¹Ibid. According to Brady, Mathias was very reluctant to reveal the name of the university he claimed was supporting his venture. Only when pressed on the point did he state that he hoped to gain the support of the University of Vermont.

During a series of meetings with the embassy, Mathias discredited himself by claiming that it was turning down his venture because he was a recently-naturalized U. S. citizen. When Mathias left for a trip to the U. S. to solicit academic support for his project, the Embassy recommended to the Department of State that his movements be carefully monitored while he was in the U. S. and that any institutions solicited by him should be warned of his activities.

The Mathias project provides further evidence of U. S. attempts to thwart private efforts to establish non-government information and educational activities in France. The project was never carried out. Embassy checks on his credentials revealed no proof that Mathias had professional qualifications or the contacts¹²² in the educational and intellectual world that he claimed. Therefore it was easy for the embassy to make him appear suspect.

(d) *The American Festival in Paris Proposal*

In late 1950 a group of private American citizens in France and the U. S. launched a fund-raising campaign¹²³ for a series of artistic presentations to be presented as *The American Festival in Paris*. The target date was 1954. Its objectives were to improve Franco-American relations through bringing U. S. cultural groups to France in order to make the U. S. better understood and known.

¹²²Ibid. The U. S. Embassy was concerned by the fact that Mathias claimed to have backing from a committee of French scholars that included André Maurois and André Siegfried as well as Suzanne Crimberg, the Dean for Europe of the Association of Women Jurists and Paul Giacobbi, the former Minister of Education.

¹²³The *American Festival in Paris* was a non-profit organization. The objective of the fund-raising campaign was \$100,000 that would be used as initial working capital in order to pay artists and meet expenses. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Initial embassy reaction was supportive of this project, although cautious because of high financial cost.¹²⁴ However, in February 1950, the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs rejected it on the grounds that there was not enough time to arrange such a large undertaking and that the Department had severe doubts about whether the organizers could ultimately raise the money to meet costs “respectably.”¹²⁵ In keeping within the stated policy for U. S. entertainments in France, he remarked on

...what seemed to me to be the importance of handling the whole festival with good taste, without seeming to be just flamboyant and extravagant Americans.¹²⁶

Yet, further investigation reveals that doubts harbored by Department of State concerned not only financial support for this project and the entertainments involved, they were also directed toward the political orientation of at least one of the organizers.

Misgivings centered around the figure of U. S. citizen, Viola Ilma, who lived and worked in Paris as a free-lance journalist. Ilma wrote a gossip column in the USIS press called, *Ilma's Grapevine*. The U. S. Embassy considered her to be politically left-wing and, therefore, a dangerous security risk. It reported that she was involved in suspicious private

¹²⁴Memo from William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy to Department of State, “Paix et Liberté,” p. 3. 16 January 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2483. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁵Memo from Edward Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, to Howland H. Sargeant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1 February 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*

activities in France.¹²⁷ In 1950, her column was suppressed by the USIS press and the Embassy attempted, unsuccessfully, to get an affidavit from her attesting to her previous activities.¹²⁸

Moreover, Ilma was *persona non grata* at the U. S. Embassy for other reasons. Some months before becoming involved with the projected *American Festival in Paris*, she wrote a letter to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, requesting the help of the former First Lady in getting a job in the U. S. Foreign Service. Mrs. Roosevelt, who appears to have known of Ilma,¹²⁹ wrote to Edward N. Barrett, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, stating that as she did not have a high opinion of Ilma, she would not recommend her for the position.

¹²⁷Memorandum from U. S. Embassy, Paris to the Department of State, 25 February 1955. No 3596. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 2390. NARA, Washington, D. C. Text refers to Ilma's past associations.

¹²⁸*Ibid.* Memorandum refers to previous Department of State instruction about Viola Ilma dated 5 November 1954. She disappeared from Paris late that year. Department of State directives to the embassy to rescind her passport and force her to appear were not carried out because the embassy could not get in touch with her. Registered letters sent to her last known address in Paris went unanswered. This author was not able to find any further mention of her in either the U. S. or the French archives after that date. Inquiries about Ilma made to former U. S. diplomats in France only revealed that they knew who she was.

¹²⁹A handwritten letter from Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to Edward N. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs exists. Mrs. Roosevelt admitted that her only personal contacts with Ilma were through correspondence. She confirmed that Ilma had written to her on several occasions in relation to finding a job with an international organization. However, she criticized her for the scandalous nature of her Paris newspaper column. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

When the embassy learned of Mrs. Roosevelt's involvement, the Cultural Affairs Officer¹³⁰ contacted the Department of State recommending that the planned *American Festival in Paris* not be given official government support. The embassy, subsequently, wrote to the organizers stating their reservations about financing, time constraints and quality performance. Ultimately, the project was abandoned. However, no mention of Ilma was made as the embassy advised the Department of State that "she seems to have contacts in high places and any case against her must be handled delicately or there is apt to be a lot of public fuss."¹³¹

Examination of this episode¹³² reveals that the Embassy and the Department of State worked closely together in order to ensure that U. S. cultural policy followed established strategies for cultural presentations in France. It also gives further evidence of the inner circle at work in the execution of Franco-American affairs that decided how policy was to be carried out, rather than adhering to Washington directives.

¹³⁰Leslie S. Brady.

¹³¹Memorandum from U.S. Embassy, Paris to the Department of State, 25 February 1955. No. 3596. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1955. Box 2390. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹³²Ilma's name appears frequently in embassy correspondence during this period whenever there is doubt about the activities of U. S. citizens. She was disliked by embassy personnel because of her suspected support for left-wing political groups and because she was active in private groups that supported better interpersonal relations between the U. S. and France. Embassy personnel considered her too ambitious and suspected that the real reasons behind her frequent appearances at embassy events were to try to get information about U. S. policy.

(e) The Dewarin Campaign

The French archives¹³³ contain some commentary about French reaction¹³⁴ to U. S. policy seen through the eyes of individual French citizens. Worthy of examination is the surprising attempt by a French industrialist, Bernard Dewarin, who wished to save France from disaster by creating, in his words, a “U. S. of the World.”¹³⁵

The philosophy at the heart of this campaign was that the only way the world could save itself would be for the U. S. to serve as the nucleus of a world government. Therefore, Dewarin wanted his native France, “in a spirit of generosity and intelligence”¹³⁶ to show other democratic countries the way to salvation by offering to become the forty-ninth¹³⁷ state of the U. S.

Dewarin instituted a letter-writing campaign in which he sent 23,000 letters¹³⁸ to his fellow Frenchmen that asked whether or not French patriotism would be disturbed if France, the following day, decided to become the forth-ninth U. S. state. This question was also sent

¹³³AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Information Radio/TV. Vol. 511. “France-the Forty-Ninth State?”* p. 20.

¹³⁴There is also one reference to Dewarin’s letter-writing campaign in the U. S. archives. See Chapter Seven for discussion.

¹³⁵AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Information Radio/TV. Vol. 511. “France-the Forty-Ninth State?”* p. 20.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷At the time of Dewarin’s initiative in 1951, there were forty-eight states in the U. S. constitution.

¹³⁸AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Information Radio/TV. Vol. 511. “France-the Forty-Ninth State?”* p. 20.

to members of the National Assembly, higher French government officials, the mayors of 20,000 French towns, editors of French newspapers and to 1,000 selected persons and newspapers in the U. S.¹³⁹

Reaction varied from extreme criticism of the plan to comments about Dewarin's sanity. The majority of public opinion tended to be pragmatic, telling Dewarin that his project would not solve the ills of the country:

Making France the forth-ninth state will not shorten the six thousand kilometers which separate us from the U. S. and will not multiply [sic] also the three hundred kilometers which bind us only too closely to the front lines of the Soviet armies.¹⁴⁰

Others disagreed, finding the plan innovative and far-seeing. A French industrialist wrote:

At last a Frenchman has the courage and the opportunity to be a realistic Jules Verne politically and economically on a world scale. I'm yours to command if action follows.¹⁴¹

Examples included a selection of opinion from mayors of French towns. These ran the gamut from enthusiasm to strong disapproval: "Obviously we will make one world or we will make war and I want to see France shout it loudly."¹⁴² Or, "As a socialist of long standing I can only subscribe to your ideal and support your initiative."¹⁴³ However, one

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. Unsigned letter written in English. The correspondent states that she is a social worker.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 21. Unsigned letter written in English.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid.

group of mayors protested over the details of the plan and signed their letter, "An association of mayors devoted to France and to the republic and not sold to America."¹⁴⁴

French newspaper editorials also varied in their reaction. While some supported it, calling the goal imaginative and based on good will, others stated flatly that such an unpatriotic and unrealistic idea bordered on lunacy.

Correspondence demonstrates the diversity of public opinion that U. S. activity could create in France. One of the reasons for even limited public approval of the scheme was the sense of helplessness and overriding pessimism that engulfed many people during the post-Liberation period. Yet, it demonstrated that French individualism was still strong. Few French people favored the idea or even considered it viable,¹⁴⁵ however, those who did felt confident to express their opinions about it.

(f) The American Library in Paris

The American Library¹⁴⁶ was a Paris institution that traced its origins back to the 1920s. During the war, diplomatic efforts by library staff and French-citizen volunteers were responsible for it remaining open.

¹⁴⁴Ibid. These quotations appear in their original English format. It seems strange that Frenchmen would write in English to another Frenchman. As well, the quotations appear to be stylistically too Anglo-Saxon to be those of foreigners. This arouses suspicion about the sources and whether or not these quotations are authentic.

¹⁴⁵See Chapter Seven for further discussion of French reaction to this project.

¹⁴⁶The American Library in Paris was a private institution, not to be confused with the USIS/Paris Library mentioned in Chapter Two that later became the Centre de Documentation Benjamin Franklin in the U. S. Embassy.

The founder of the library was Henri Jégu who, in an effort to secure books for the institution, undertook a tour of the U.S. in 1952. He was received by French diplomatic officers in different cities across the U. S. who later refused to recommend his candidacy for the Légion d'Honneur to the DGRC on grounds that his motivation was self-interest and that he sought personal publicity in the U. S. Furthermore, correspondence indicated that he was unpopular with the Americans who met him.

Jégu was succeeded by Dr. Ian Forbes Fraser who toured the U. S on behalf of the American Library in 1954. In a speech before the Carnegie Foundation given on 3 March 1954, he insisted that his organization was the only “centre de propagande”¹⁴⁷ in France at the time, following the closing of the Carnegie Foundation and the Institute of International Education.

Fraser toured the U. S. several times, emphasizing similar values held by French and American people in order to demonstrate the common historical ties of the two countries. An enthusiastic defender of France, he was well-received in the U. S., where he won positive approval from the U. S. press for his institution in Paris.

After the end of World War II, the American Library complemented, rather than duplicated, the service of the USIS Documentation Center. A private, non-profit organization, it received no government subsidization and was dependent upon reader

¹⁴⁷ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol 512. No. 86. “Conférences du Dr. Ian Forbes Fraser.” Mémoire de Jean Lagarde, Consul Général/ New York to Bonnet, French Ambassador. 4 March 1954.

subscriptions and gift donations.¹⁴⁸ Beginning in 1948, the Library expanded into five provincial cities.¹⁴⁹ Subscriber numbers were high:

Table 11. The American Library 1948 to 1951¹⁵⁰

City	Date Established	No. Members	No. Books
Paris (main)	1920	1960	80,000
Paris (Left Bank)	1948	582	3,000
Roubaix	1951	900	1650
Toulouse	1951	684	1900
Rennes	1951	721	1600
Montpellier	1951	599	1550
Grenoble	1952	491	1800

Ninety-nine percent¹⁵¹ of the books in the American Library collection were in English, while the only French publications were French classics. Of the English-language collection, fifty percent was devoted to English literature.¹⁵² In the five provincial branches, fifty percent of the books were translated from French into English.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸Figures given for subscribers to the American Library in Paris indicate 91,784 members in 1946. Figures for 1950 figures showed membership increased to 139,152 members. December 1952 records stated that there were 2,856 members, of whom “about forty percent” were French. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. vol. 518. “The American Library in Paris, 1920 to 1951,” p. 13.

¹⁴⁹Roubaix, Toulouse, Rennes, Montpellier and Grenoble.

¹⁵⁰ AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 518. “The American Library in Paris,” pp. 79-81.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*

¹⁵²*Ibid.*

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

(g) The Rathvon Project, 1951.

In 1951, Peter Rathvon, a former Hollywood producer,¹⁵⁴ was hired by the Department of State as a consultant to investigate the possibility of assisting French production of feature-length technical films and documentaries.¹⁵⁵ The intended project is interesting because it casts light on how policy planners aimed to extend U. S. Cultural policy into the French film industry¹⁵⁶ to further U. S. objectives in France.

After discussion with USIS/France officials, Rathvon expressed interest in sending a French production team to the U. S. to shoot footage for a documentary film there for subsequent distribution in France. He suggested that the theme be “discovery of the U. S” by an eminent Frenchman, but no candidate was named.

William Tyler cautioned Rathvon about the necessity for making all necessary arrangements for the proposed visit of the French technicians and for making the team think that they were in the U. S. to pursue independent filming opportunities. Yet, the opposite was what he had in mind, for Tyler then went on to suggest the use of a U. S. labor theme by French producers that could eventually be distributed in France under the auspices of non-Communist labor groups. Rathvon replied only that the Department of State had the means to produce this type of film.

¹⁵⁴Rathvon was a producer at RKO Film Studios in Hollywood.

¹⁵⁵ “Notes of USIS-ECA/F Joint Meeting,” 15 February 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵⁶See Chapter Six for in-depth discussion.

Tyler discussed the possible use of anti-Communist information utilizing recently-released details about conditions in Soviet forced-labor camps. His interest in this theme dovetailed well with U. S. political objectives and the new, reinforced U. S. campaign oriented toward using psychological strategies to overcome communism in Western Europe.

The Department of State signed a contract with Peter Rathvon and the Rathvon Project went through various evolutions over the next two years. A Rathvon Committee was established that generated a lot of discussion by USIS/Paris staff.¹⁵⁷ However, the project was never completed. Rathvon himself appears to have lost interest. Possible reasons were the influence of Senator Joseph McCarthy upon the Hollywood-entertainment community and the changing U. S. international perspective. The Committee was disbanded entirely in 1953 when the Eisenhower Administration took office.

VI. Concrete Examples of USIS/France Entertainments 1950 to 1953

(a) The Art and Exhibits Category

Art and Exhibits came under jurisdiction of the Cultural Relations Services in the USIS/France Program.¹⁵⁸ Under the direction of the embassy Cultural Attaché, several Assistant Cultural Attachés were responsible for selecting, organizing and presenting entertainment programs. Although restricted by budget, every possible effort was made in

¹⁵⁷This subject is often referred to in USIS staff meetings and in correspondence between personnel. Comments made indicated that there were differences of opinion about the project. There appears to be conflict between management and staff about how to present it to French technicians and the French film unions. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵⁸See Table 1, p. 84.

this unit to show American art at USIS/Paris headquarters and to help U. S. artists or exhibits in Paris. Assistant Cultural Attachés were required to keep abreast of all this information, a sort of “on site” inventory and network of everything that was happening vis-à-vis U. S. art in France.

Cooperation was such between outside individuals and organizations that this unit was said to have an art program with specific plans for developing contacts between the French and the U. S. milieux. Some of the contacts that this unit had in Paris included the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, La Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, the American Library in Paris, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Sorbonne. Within this unit, a particular effort was made to counter stereotype French opinion that Americans were materialistic, backward in artistic endeavor and achievement, and not interested in spiritual matters.

One Assistant Cultural Attaché worked with an Exhibits Officer in order to promote as many exhibits and displays as possible at USIS/Paris headquarters. Programs were wide-ranging and included art exhibits from the U. S. held in Paris museums as well as in the USIS/Paris offices. Assistant Cultural Attachés were expected to set up visits for the public to view U. S. art on exhibition in Paris as well as arrange special programs for students. They contacted French art experts in French museums and arranged for French art to be loaned to museums in the U. S. This demanded tact and skill as the French art community tended to take a dim view of allowing French art treasures to leave France.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹For example, U. S. requests in 1952 to send Michelangelo's *Mona Lisa* from the Louvre to the Metropolitan Museum in New York City as a gesture of French goodwill toward the U. S. were refused, even though it was recommended by Ambassador Bonnet.

The Art and Exhibits unit was dedicated to bringing the finest U. S. artistic endeavor to France in order to present visually, graphically and artistically the works of renowned U. S. artists. Therefore, the Assistant Cultural Attachés responsible for these programs kept in close contact with U. S. and French sources so that an interchange of cultural presentations could be easily facilitated between the two countries. Included were U. S. exhibits sent to France from American museums and private collections including the Metropolitan Museum and Museum of Modern Art in New York, the Cochrane Art Gallery in Washington, D. C., the Boston Public Library and the Houston Museum of Art in Houston, Texas.

Cultural Attachés in this unit forged links with major French museums, including the Louvre, so that exhibits could be sent to the U. S. As well, they were responsible for arranging liaisons with the Centre International d'Echanges Pédagogiques Audio-Visuels.¹⁶⁰

Other unit responsibilities included arranging field trips for the Cultural Affairs Officer to visit provincial centers where he participated in memorials and celebrations. For example, visits were organized to Strasbourg and Nancy¹⁶¹ in order to tour the area universities. Their purpose was to explain the Fulbright Program to the Deans and Presidents.

Assistant Cultural Attachés had responsibility for coordinating the events of the large U. S. Cultural festivals that were held in Paris between 1950 and 1955. These events were developed in conjunction with Washington.

¹⁶⁰This agency was the counterpart of the Franco-American Audio-Visual Distribution Center (FADC) in New York City. The objective of both these organizations was to make France and the U.S. better known and understood. The FADC experience was limited to the classroom in the U. S. The Centre International d'Échanges Pédagogiques Audio-visuels (CIEPAV) operated in France.

¹⁶¹Week of 6 Jan 1950.

Table 12. Art Category. Sample of Exhibits 1948 to 1952, Paris¹⁶²

Exhibit	Date	Place
U. S. and French Artists' Engravings	20 Oct-10 Nov 1948	U. S. Embassy
Grandma Moses in Paris	11 Dec 1950	Paris
Graphic Arts Book Festival	4 March 1950	Paris
Leseur Exhibit	June 1950	Paris
Dance in America	Oct 1950	Musée d'Art Moderne, Paris
Window Display	Dec 1950	American Express, Paris
American Artists	9-31 Dec 1950	Salon de l'Art, Paris
Film and American Art	15 Feb 1951	Paris
54 Contemporary American Prints	3 April 1951	Paris
68 Contemporary American Prints	12 Oct-14 Nov 1951	Paris
Fishing in the U. S.	Aug 1951	Paris
U. S. Seen By Its Advertising Agents	Aug 1951	Paris
American Music	Aug 1951	Paris
Exhibits Program, France	Nov-Dec 1951	Paris
Frank Lloyd Wright Exhibit	Apr 1952	Paris
École Nationale des Beaux Arts Exhibit	Apr 1952	Paris
Photos of American Architecture	31 May - 25 June 1952	Paris
American Art	25 Jul-5 Aug 1952	Paris
Three Arts Exhibit	Aug 1952	Paris
Twelve Contemporary U. S. Artists	24 Apr-8 June 1953	Paris
American Advertising Techniques	1 June 1953	Paris
H. B. Stowe Centenary Exhibit	24 June-10 Jul 1953	Paris
NATO Exhibit	16 September 1953	Paris
International Festival of Dramatic Art	15 June-14 July 1954	Paris

¹⁶²Information for Table 12 is from Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(b) The Music Unit

One Assistant Cultural Attaché in this unit worked full time on presentation of American music to French audiences and to administering a collection of U. S. recordings and musical scores on loan to French organizations.

During the winter months, the music unit sponsored concerts of American music or concerts by American artists. There were an average of two such programs per month.¹⁶³ As well a number of independent U. S. concert performers in Paris offered their services to this unit.

In 1952, there were four concerts held in a seven-month period,¹⁶⁴ including one that honored the presence in Paris of the U. S. delegation to the annual UNESCO Conference.

Table 13. Sample of Music Events, 1950 to 1955¹⁶⁵

Event	Date	Place
Lamoureux Orchestra/Gershwin Program	4 July 50	Palais Chaillot, Paris
U. S. concert artists	Dec 50	USIS/Paris
Music Students, Fondation des États-Unis	16 May 50	Embassy Theater, Paris
Menotti Opera, <i>The Consul</i>	3 May 51	Théâtre Champs-des Élysées, Paris
Serge Koussevitzky	7 May 51	Théâtre des Champs-des Élysées, Paris

¹⁶³Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid. The Music Unit was part of the Cultural Relations Services in the USIS/Paris Office. An Assistant Cultural Attaché devoted his full time to the presentation of American music to French audiences. During the winter months in the period from 1950 to 1952, there was an average of two programs per month.

Serge Koussevitzky	7 May 51	Théâtre des Champs-des Élysées, Paris
American Composers	28 June 51	U. S. Embassy Theater
Perpignan Festival	7-28 Jul 51	Perpignan
Nikolai Sokoloff/Orchestre Radio Symphonique de Paris	4 Feb 52	Paris
American music recordings from USIS/Paris Library	Mar 52	Paris
French Musicians Concert of American Composers	Mar 52	U. S. Embassy Theater
Smith College Chamber Singers	3-5 Aug 52	Marseilles
Dorothy Maynor, Soprano	24 Apr 52	U. S. Embassy Theater
American Opera	Mar 52	Lyons
Negro Spirituals Concert	Apr-May 52	Bordeaux
Foreign Composers	Summer 52	Paris
Holiday on Ice	Sept 52	Paris
U. S. Air Force Band	10 Sept 52	Bordeaux
Naval Cadets Choir	Dec 52	Fontainebleau
Colgate Glee Club	Dec 52	Théâtre de la Cité Universitaire, Paris
Cecilia Society chorus	23 Apr-7 May 53	Paris, Versailles, Lille, Strasbourg
American Folklore	27 Jan 53	Bordeaux
U. S. Artists, Mr/Mrs. Glazer	16 Feb 53	Clermont-Ferrand
Patricia Neway, Soprano	Feb 53	Opéra Comique, Paris
Long-Jacques Thibault, Pianist	June 53	Paris
Temple University Choir	3-5 Jul 53	Paris

(c) *The Salute to France, 1955*

(c.i) **Rationale for Presentation**

The *Salute to France*, held in Paris in the Spring of 1955, was the occasion for a major presentation of U. S. artistic endeavor in France. Discussions for its organization,

Department of State. In Paris, the CPAO, Leslie S. Brady, had discussions with William Clark, the Assistant Director for Europe USIA, who advised the Department of State to invite the Curator¹⁶⁶ of the Metropolitan Museum of Art to serve as Advisor. The Festival was publicized as an opportunity for French people to discover America:

En ses premières semaines de printemps, le public français va pouvoir, à son tour, découvrir l'Amérique. Dans le cadre d'une série de manifestations culturelles présentées sous le titre générique "Salut à la France," cinquante ans d'art américain se dérouleront sous ses yeux. Et ce sera sans doute, même pour les membres les plus éclairés de ce public, une véritable révélation.¹⁶⁷

In 1953, General Eisenhower was elected president of the U. S., bringing a Republican administration into power. In France, public feeling was apprehensive; even though Eisenhower was personally respected because of his role as Supreme Commander of the wartime allied forces, the change to a Republican government was greeted cautiously.

Eisenhower chose John Foster Dulles as his first Secretary of State. Dulles had experience in France; in particular, he was familiar with the USIS Program, having been a special advisor to President Truman, investigating whether or not the program should be maintained. Dulles was in favor of a hard line policy overseas. His report to Truman laid out

¹⁶⁶Clark advised Department of State to invite T. Rousseau, Curator of the Metropolitan Museum. Response from John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State agreed with his recommendation, demonstrating the high profile that this Festival was accorded by the U.S. government. Memorandum from John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, to U. S. Embassy, Paris, 21 January 1955. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 19. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁷*Informations et Documents*, 15 avril 1955. Numéro Spécial. "Salute à la France," (Paris: Les Services d'Information des États-Unis), 3. Centre de Documentation Benjamin Franklin, Paris.

the following recommendations:

Another reason for Communist Party strength...is that they have become the Parties of protest against somewhat feeble governments of the center. This suggests that one of the action items should be diplomatic efforts to persuade the government and other political leaders to adopt an all-out modern, progressive economic and social program designed to appeal to the working classes...We must not rely solely on government action. We must encourage action by individual groups of patriotic citizens by the press and other media of public opinion.¹⁶⁸

Dulles recommended cutting the information program and advised Eisenhower that a special committee should be established in order to ascertain the need for keeping it. Eisenhower complied by asking C.W. Jackson to evaluate the role of USIS. After an in-depth investigation, the Jackson Committee recommended the program be maintained as the official U. S. information organ overseas, but that cutbacks and reform be implemented.

The Eisenhower Administration was overshadowed during its first term in office by the Rosenberg Affair. Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were tried and convicted on charges of selling nuclear secrets to the Russians and executed in 1954, provoking worldwide criticism. Eisenhower, in a position to veto the execution, refused to do so.

In France, public outcry at what many French people believed to be an act of murder by the U.S. was greeted by critical press reports. Thousands of telegrams from French leaders in the academic and intellectual fields calling for clemency for the Rosenbergs were

¹⁶⁸Report by John Foster Dulles, cited in, "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France," pp. 8-9. Papers of Harry S. Truman. SMOF. PSB Files. Box 5. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Much of the text of Dulles' Report is missing, having been blanked out. Requests made by this author under the Freedom of Information Act to view the original text have not, at this date, been granted as the Report is still classified.

received at the White House and the U. S. Embassy in Paris, while ordinary French citizens wrote letters demanding Eisenhower's intercession into the matter.

For the first time, Eisenhower's personal popularity in France was threatened.¹⁶⁹ He was caricatured in the French press as a murderer. A particularly graphic cartoon¹⁷⁰ portrayed a smiling Eisenhower with miniature electric chairs attached to his teeth to demonstrate his role in the execution of the Rosenberg couple.

Following the Rosenbergs' execution, there was a strong reaction from the French intellectual elite. It was led by Jean-Paul Sartre who published an open letter in the French press urging that his followers turn away from U. S. foreign policy objectives. Sartre, who had previously been pro-U. S. and a guest lecturer at U. S. universities, was outspoken in his criticism of the U. S. government and of American society for not doing enough to stop the execution. For the remainder of his life, Sartre remained opposed to U. S.-style government. His reaction was the signal for a rise in anti-Americanism in France that was led by a violent press campaign and supported by large numbers of students, professors and leaders in the French professional sectors.

¹⁶⁹AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. Questions Atomiques*. Vol. 447. "l'Affaire Rosenberg." Two reports from the Procureur de la République to the Procureur Général, 10 August 1953 and 22 August 1953 detail, "affiches offensantes pour le Président Eisenhower, Chef d'État Étranger." An inquest was held, but no suspects were ever apprehended.

¹⁷⁰Ibid. This cartoon was printed in the Communist newspaper, *L'Humanité*, 9 June 1953.

The U. S. Embassy feared that the reaction from the French elite would create a surge in the popularity of the PCF. In order to try to counter this reaction, it recommended to Washington that a major cultural event be planned to demonstrate that the U. S. were a civilized people, capable of intellectual pursuits and possessing a strong cultural community. This was the background to the organization of the *Salute to France* that took place in Paris in the Spring of 1955. Its conception was embedded in a previous five-year program that was planned by the public affairs department as early as 1953:

The work of modern artists is to be exhibited in many parts of the world under an International Art Exchange Program. The five-year program is to be financed by a six hundred and twenty-five thousand dollar grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The first of three exhibits to be held this year will be at the Museum of Modern Art, Paris on 24 April. The American Exhibit at Paris show will consist of twelve modern American painters and sculptors.¹⁷¹

(c.ii) **Financing the *Salute to France***

The cost of presenting an American Festival in Paris was undertaken by the Department of State in conjunction with a special initiative organized by U. S. Ambassador James Dillon. Dillon organized a campaign calling for “patriotic” private citizens in the U. S. to donate funds for this endeavor. However, the people who actually contributed substantial sums were personal friends of the Ambassador and other wealthy Americans who were solicited by sources close to the Department of State.

¹⁷¹ “Wireless Bulletin, International Information Administrators,” p. 13. 7 April 1953. No. 82. Papers of Charles Hulten. State Department Information Program (1952 to 1954). Box 14. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

The reaction from U. S. citizens after publicity in the U. S. press about the project was less than hoped-for. It motivated adverse comment from then Acting Secretary of State Murphy who criticized comments made by Arthur Luce Klein¹⁷² about Department of State financial arrangements. Murphy wrote to the U. S. Embassy in Paris, stating that he had hoped for “some public-spirited desire to help our country gain enhanced prestige and respect in Europe.”¹⁷³

In early 1955, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, wrote to President Eisenhower in order to facilitate a request from then U. S. Ambassador, James Dillon,¹⁷⁴ asking that he receive several important supporters of cultural activities that would be part of the *Salute to Paris* cultural festival scheduled to be held in Paris in the Spring. Highlights of planned entertainments included two major art exhibits,¹⁷⁵ the popular U. S. Broadway musical,

¹⁷²Klein was a former grantee on the Smith-Mundt Leadership Program. He was asked by the U. S. Embassy to accept an assignment on the *Salute to France* project. Unwilling to leave his present position in the Department of State, he complained to U. S. Embassy officials that he would be forced to take a financial loss if he did so. Internal embassy correspondence indicated that officials felt that Klein was both ungrateful and unpatriotic. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 19. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁷³Ibid. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Murphy, 14 January 1955. No. A-759. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2391. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁷⁴Dillon, who was appointed U. S. Ambassador to France by President Eisenhower in 1954, organized the financial campaign that supported the *Salute to France*. It was paid for by private citizens who were solicited by Dillon.

¹⁷⁵ An exhibit called, “50 Ans d’Art aux États-Unis,” on loan from the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City was held at the Musée National d’Art Moderne from 2 April to 15 May 1955 and “De David à Toulouse-Lautrec,” a selection of paintings from private collections in the U.S., was held at the Musée de l’Orangerie from 20 April to 3 July

Oklahoma, and performances by the Philadelphia Orchestra conducted by Eugene Normandy. Dance was represented by the New York City Ballet, directed by George Balanchine. Judith Anderson performed in *Medea*, while Helen Hayes and Mary Martin starred in Thornton Wilder's play, *The Skin of Our Teeth*.

President Eisenhower met William Burden, President of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City and the committee responsible for the American Art Exhibit that would be part of the festival. Dulles, acting on Dillon's request, wanted Eisenhower to receive Robert Dowling¹⁷⁶ who was responsible for raising funds to finance the Festival. Eisenhower granted the request and saw Dowling with two members of his committee in order to demonstrate the high level of U. S. interest in the affair.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, the Department of State allotted what it referred to as "seed money" for this project.¹⁷⁸

In the case of the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, costs were underwritten by The President's Fund. The orchestra was granted a maximum of \$66,000 in expenses for its appearance at the *Salute to France*. However, the Department of State, cautious about

1955.

¹⁷⁶Dowling was Vice-Chairman of the Committee for the Performing Art Phase of the American Cultural Festival in Paris.

¹⁷⁷\$100,000 donated by *The President's Emergency Fund*, made it necessary for Eisenhower to become personally involved with the beneficiary of this public expenditure. Therefore, financial involvement and his personal presence indicated the importance that the U. S. attached to the cultural festival in Paris.

¹⁷⁸ John Foster Dulles, "American Cultural Festival in Paris (1955)." Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 5. NARA, Washington, D. C.

criticism over finances and anxious to avoid charges of favoritism toward certain cultural organizations, asked the Embassy not to release this information because, “The effect of the orchestra’s appearances could be lessened if it were known that the U.S. government was partially underwriting its performances.”¹⁷⁹ Dulles may have been particularly concerned about this because the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra was also performing in France at the invitation of the French government and going on to give performances in other Western European cities. These other activities, however, were only publicized as concerts,¹⁸⁰ whereas the appearance at the *Salute to France* was an official one, on behalf of the U. S.

The *Salute to France* marked the beginning of a series of mega-cultural presentations by the U. S. government in France. U. S. attempts to play a dominant role in French cultural life were demonstrated by the American Festival in Paris in 1955 that was followed by two other large events, the La Fayette Bicentennial in 1956 and the Wilson Centenary in 1957.¹⁸¹

Conclusion

Through a concentrated effort to eliminate opposition to its wider foreign policy objectives in France, the U. S. used its cultural policy to centralize all components disseminating information about the U. S. This strategy allowed it to develop a framework for deeper involvement in French life. While the overall policy objective was the eradication

¹⁷⁹ Confidential memorandum from John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, 24 January 1955. CA 4932 in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ See Chapter Six for discussion of these events and reaction by the French government.

for deeper involvement in French life. While the overall policy objective was the eradication of communism and the predominance of U. S. influence, information programs and later cultural entertainments were developed as media operations to attract French people toward U. S. economic and political goals.

Cultural politicization became a stronger trend in USIS/France presentations after 1950 when there was a steady increase in entertainments to counter what the U. S. stated was a mounting threat to liberal society. Expansion of influence was carried out systematically through cultural policy supported by organized programs in cities, towns and villages that aimed at inserting as many U. S. images and messages as possible into local lifestyle in order to make the U. S. appear desirable as the most advanced and progressive society in the world.

Chapter Four

Policy, Program Planning and Finances

Examination of USIS/France finances demonstrates that policy, program planning and funding were successfully linked to U. S. foreign policy objectives by Department of State strategists in order to justify allocation of public monies for execution of U. S. Cultural Policy in France. Such a strategy was necessary because of congressional opposition to designating funds for increased information activities overseas.

I. Funds Legislated by Congress

(a) Background to Congressional Budget Allocations for the USIS Program

USIS/France annual budget allocations reflected the overall fluctuations of funds assigned to the USIS Program overseas. In the immediate post-World War II period preceding the congressional legislation that authorized the 1948 USIE Act, the information program encountered a difficult reception from Congress, its principal beneficiary.

The Department of State budget estimate for the Information and Education Program in fiscal year 1947 was \$25 million.¹ Of this amount, only \$19 million was approved by the Bureau of the Budget. The House of Representatives Appropriations Committee ordered further cuts, leaving a balance of \$10 million; a move that then Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, William Benton, stated was so drastic, that it would virtually force elimination of all Voice of America² broadcasts.

¹George M. Elsey Papers. Harry S. Truman Administration Subject File. Foreign Relations, Truman Doctrine. Western European Defense. Box 65. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²Henceforth referred to by its acronym VOA. Of the \$19 million allocated by the Bureau of the Budget, \$8,600.00 was designated for the VOA. George M. Elsey Papers. Harry S. Truman Administration Subject File. Foreign Relations, Truman Doctrine. Western

Although the 1947 Appropriations Bill³ passed in the House of Representatives, the USIS Program remained unpopular with the Seventy-Ninth Congress. The House Appropriations Committee eliminated the Department of State budget request of \$31,381,220⁴ for the program for fiscal year 1948 on grounds that it lacked legislative authority. This occurred despite strong protests by Secretary of State George C. Marshall whose testimony emphasized the importance of the information program to U. S. foreign policy.

The U. S. Senate recommended an allocation of \$13 million and added an additional \$470,000 when it came to a vote,⁵ resulting in severe program restrictions⁶ for fiscal year 1948.

European Defense. Box 65. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³H. R. 4982. The Bill then went to the Senate where the original figure of \$19 million was restored. Although some Republican members attempted to block the Bill, the House concurred on 20 July 1947. There was no legal basis for appropriating money at that time and the budget allocation was carried out by presidential directive. *The Congressional Record*, 29 July 1946, p. 10354.

⁴“Reports of Appropriation Committees Conducting Hearings on H. R. 3311 (Regular Bill),” pp. 6 to 7. 5 May 1947. Report No. 336. Papers of George M. Elsey. Harry S. Truman Administrative Subject File. Foreign Relations. Truman Doctrine. Western European Defense. Box 65. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁵Both Houses agreed upon the final sum of which \$683,250 was allocated to the VOA. George M. Elsey Papers. Harry S. Truman Administration Subject File. Foreign Relations, Truman Doctrine. Western European Defense. Box 65. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁶See Chapter Two for discussion of program restrictions in 1947 fiscal year.

While debate on the Department of State budget for the 1948 fiscal year continued, Representative Karl E. Mundt⁷ succeeded in getting the House of Representatives to pass his Bill⁸ to approve the information program on a permanent basis.

Thus, difficulties in obtaining public funds from Congress in the pre-USIE Act period were sufficient reason for the Truman Administration to make greater efforts to obtain legislation for its proposed USIS Program.

(b) Fund Allocations and U. S. Foreign Policy Priorities

Annual budget allocations to the USIS Program reflected U. S.-government priorities in international affairs. Public funds were determined on the basis of political expediency for the U. S.

Post-World War II formulation of U. S. foreign policy created the political pattern that would dominate the Cold War period. When the OIE⁹ was developed in the winter of 1946, the U. S. had not yet been affected by what it would later refer to as, “the concerted campaign of anti-American propoganda fomented since then by the Soviet Union and by Communist Parties in other countries.”¹⁰ Consequently, initial information policy strategy

⁷Mundt, who was serving in the House of Representatives at the time, later became the Republican Senator from South Dakota. The Smith-Mundt Bill, officially known as P. L. 584 authorized the USIE Act. See Chapter One for discussion.

⁸Later P. L. 584.

⁹See Chapter One for explanation of this office.

¹⁰ “U.S. Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda,” p. 2. 1 December 1947. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France. (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1944 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

did not include counteraction against what the U.S. government later publicly referred to as an anti-U. S. campaign directed by the Soviet Union. During the two-year period before Congress authorized an official information program overseas, U. S. information policy was enacted on the following premises:

The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the U. S. and is employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine all non-Communist elements in foreign countries which are capable of opposing Soviet aspirations. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the U. S. and the effectiveness of its national policy, but is designed to weaken and divide foreign opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet aspirations is no longer attainable by political, economic or military means.¹¹

Despite U. S. Intelligence Reports from 1947 on, that the Soviet Union by itself posed no threat to the U. S., the government was aware of the possibility that Western European nations might align with the Communist bloc. It feared that the scheme would provide Russia with the means to launch a territorial war.

U. S. attention turned to France where it was concerned that PCF popularity might be able to redirect French government policy toward the Soviet Union and turn France away from the Atlantic Alliance. U. S. Intelligence claims that the Soviet Union was the sponsor of a Communist Information Program in France, where large amounts of money were committed to an anti-U.S. campaign, alarmed the Truman Administration. Evidence¹² suggests that the U. S. did not fear loss of democracy in France as much as it did the removal

¹¹Ibid., 2.

¹²“France.” SR-30. 17 March 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF: Intelligence File Situation Reports 25 to Situation Reports 53 to 61. Box 261. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

of French Atlantic and Mediterranean seaports and bases from which ships and planes could take off and refuel on their way to military attacks in South East Asia and Indo-China.

In policy making sessions, U. S. strategists pointed to the success of the Marshall Plan in France, a factor that they argued negated the possibility of a PCF victory. Belief in prosperity through achievement of liberal economic enterprise became the basis for U. S. government confidence that France would remain Western oriented. Gradual improvement in French living standard and growth of the French economy, made further PCF-led strikes appear remote to officials who tended to use these arguments to dismiss the likelihood of revolution in France. President Truman formulated the thinking of many government officials when he stated, "In the long run, economic aid is much more important than military aid."¹³

However, policy makers were inclined to misunderstand the post-World War II popularity of the French Communists,¹⁴ focusing only on the U. S. overall objective of ridding France of the Communist element so that U.S. hegemony could be maintained. While the U. S. considered Communist influence in France in decline after 1948, it feared

¹³Comment by President Truman made to Robert E. G. Harris, Professor of Journalism at University of Southern California in October 1953. Papers of Harry S. Truman. Post-Presidential Files (PPF). Memoirs File. Box 645. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹⁴In the 1946 French national elections, the PCF polled approximately twenty-eight percent of the popular vote and obtained twenty-five percent of the seats in the National Assembly. Until spring 1947, the PCF participated in the government, holding cabinet positions that included Ministers of National Defense, Armaments, Industrial Production, Labor, Health, War, Veteran's Affairs, Aviation and Reconstruction. Papers of Harry S. Truman. PSF: Intelligence File. Situation Reports 25 to Situation Reports 53 to 61. Box 261. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

the Party's potential as a Fifth Column would minimize French resistance to any Soviet westward expansion.¹⁵ As well, its possible effect on organizing public opinion against the U.S. constituted a threat.

Ideological warfare began to be taken seriously by 1950. In particular, the PSB advised the Truman Administration of the risks involved in this kind of conflict. Heeding its warnings, the government reacted to PCF popularity by seeking better means to lessen Party approval. Hence, the importance of the USIS/France Program and its media-oriented events that strategists considered the U. S. best hope in an ideological battle.

The 1949 Berlin Blockade and the growing rift between the superpowers made the successful outcome of ideological warfare crucial in U. S. policy makers' perception. At home, a successful government campaign had brought advertising and big business into what was publicly portrayed as a patriotic crusade against the USSR. The U. S. press had capitulated in the domestic debate over the government information program. What remained was to ensure necessary program funds from Congress, so that intensified U. S. foreign policy objectives could be executed.

(c) The Appropriations Hearings

Annual congressional appropriations, or the justification of public funds for government programs, became an integral part of the USIS Program in 1949, its first full year of operations. The Secretary of State testified before the Subcommittee of the

¹⁵ "The Communist Position in France," 10 January 1952. PSB D-14/b. SMOF: PSB Files. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri.

Committee on Appropriations¹⁶ in order to personally justify the Department of State budget estimates. His initial appearance before the House Subcommittee resulted from frequent public statements by members of Congress¹⁷ that the U. S. did not have a foreign policy; or, that. policy lacked continuity and was not adequately exposed to public view. Thereafter, successive Appropriation Hearings became the forum for the Secretary of State to present a general statement about the condition of international affairs and U. S. foreign policy objectives.

Requests for congressionally-legislated funds were not only justified by the Secretary of State. President Truman wrote to Senator Patrick McCarran,¹⁸ stating that he wished to either eliminate, or revise, the Senate amendment to the State, Justice and Commerce Appropriations Bill¹⁹ that would have reduced the information activities of the three agencies by twenty-five percent. Truman's letter denounced this projected

¹⁶There were two of these committees: one in the House of Representatives and a second one in the Senate. The procedure was for the House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations to hear all the justification evidence from witnesses relating to the annual budget requests from the Department of State and the Information Program. Then the House of Representatives passed on its recommended budget to the Senate where that Committee held its own Hearings and made recommendations on budget appropriations. As well, the Bureau of the Budget studied the initial request for budget allocations before it went to the House and Senate committees.

¹⁷Memorandum to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, from the Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 April 1947. Record Group 59. Department of State. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs. Bureau of Public Affairs. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁸Senator Patrick McCarran was the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations in 1951.

¹⁹H. R. Bill 4740.

amendment, as “particularly harmful”²⁰ to information program objectives.

In the early 1950s, U. S. political and economic influence was targeted at Europe. During his testimony before the 1950 fiscal year House Subcommittee on Appropriations, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, noted that there would be “heavy emphasis on overseas information activities”²¹ in Europe in 1950. Other officials, followed his lead in enunciating U. S.-area priorities:

Europe was given in the plans for the foreign service part of this program thirty -seven percent of the total foreign request. That was the result....of very careful consideration of what priority should be given in the distribution of these funds and in relation to United States foreign policy what areas should be given first priority. The feeling of the Department, both political officers and the information officers in OIE, was that Europe, in view of the present United States foreign commitments, should be given first priority.²²

²⁰Harry S. Truman in letter to Senator Patrick McCarran, 24 September 1951. Papers of Harry S. Truman. WHCF (White House Central File): Official File. 20-U Miscellaneous to 20-Z, U. S. International Information Administration. Box 169. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²¹ General Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 21 February 1949. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1950* (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 715.

²²Statement by William T. Stone, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *Hearings. House. Appropriations 1949*. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 573.

U. S. focus on Europe was determined by conviction that the European continent remained the heart of the Western world's security system and that, by 1951, U. S. Western European allies held most of the world industrial power,²³ exclusive of the U. S. This fact figured prominently in U. S. negotiations with France over Franco-German control of the industrial Ruhr area on the French border with Germany.²⁴

Despite prioritizing of Western Europe by U. S. policy, distribution of public monies for U. S. information activities demonstrates that the U. S. was heavily committed to the American Republics, with only a modest increase in other parts of the world during the 1948 to 1950 fiscal year periods. Table 14 illustrates the breakdown of U. S. funds assigned to USIS Program Area Activities.

²³ "Program in the European Area." *Hearings. Senate. Appropriations 1956.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 931.

²⁴In 1952, the Schuman Plan that formulated a settlement between France and Germany over industrial resources was well received by the U.S. government.

Table 14. Allocated Funds for USIS Area Activities for Fiscal Years 1949 to 1950²⁵

USIS Area Program	1949 (adjusted)	1950	Increase (+)
Europe	\$3,444,500	\$ 4,786,430	+ \$ 1,341,840
Near East and Africa	\$1,636,370	\$ 3,408,388	+ \$ 1,772,018
Far East	\$1,303,548	\$ 2,332,673	+ \$ 1,029,125
American Republics ²⁶	\$ 5,878,911	\$ 5,903,766	+\$ 24,855
Total	\$12,263,419	\$16,431,257	+\$4,167,838

However, as U. S. priorities evolved during the later 1950s, and foreign policy focus shifted from Europe to the Near East, Africa and the Far East, public monies allocated to USIS Programs followed suit. Growing U. S. inclination toward Asia and Africa, is evidenced by the annual increases in appropriated money for these areas. Legislated funds for Western European information programs, originally larger than those attributed to other areas, began to decline annually, while funds assigned to other locations increased.

²⁵Information in Table 14 is from *Hearings. Appropriations. House 1950*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 712. Note that whereas the American Republics received the largest appropriation for the 1950 fiscal year, Europe was allotted the greatest increase in funds between 1949 and 1950.

²⁶Also included in the estimate for 1950 are funds for the program previously financed from the appropriation entitled, "Cooperation with the American Republics" that was consolidated with the information program by P. L. 402. Statement by George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 21 February 1949. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1950*. (Washington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 714.

Table 15. Allocated Funds for USIS-Area Activities in Fiscal Years 1954 to 1956²⁷

Area Description	1954	1955	1956
American Republics	\$ 918,986	\$1,592,714	\$2,383,300
Europe	\$10,528 395	\$9,585,510	\$9,002,818
Far East	\$ 3,003,161	\$3,028,203	\$4,729,571
Near East, South Asia, Africa	\$ 2,953,821	\$2,509,031	\$3,762,176

Although Europe received the largest amount of appropriated money in 1955, its funds were decreased in 1956, demonstrating U. S. growing interest in third world countries and former colonies. Policy change is confirmed by U. S./ France Country Paper objectives from 1956 to 1958 that move from previous concentration on elimination of communism, to new problems of French neutralism, German rearmament, atomic energy and European union.

II. The Effect of the Combined USIS/MSDAP

(a) U. S. Government Rationale for Program Unification

In 1951, the Department of State merged the USIS and MSDAP²⁸ into a single information program that remained under Department of State control, leaving no doubt about Washington's intention to keep the program centralized:

²⁷Information in Table 15 is from *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 300.

²⁸The Mutual Security Act, 1951, (henceforth referred to by its acronym MSA), invested responsibility in the Director of Mutual Security, who, on behalf of the President, directed the combined military, economic and technical assistance programs under one law. The USIS Program was included within this law. "First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program," p. 44. 31 December 1951. Files of C. S. Murphy. Presidential Speech File. 28 February to 5 May 1952. Box 14. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

There should exist a single overseas information program of the U. S. government. The development of this national program and the overall coordination in carrying it out should be responsibilities of the Secretary of State. (The national overseas information program must be developed within the framework of the national policies and plans of the Psychological Strategy Board). The national program, to be fully adequate must aim at (I) Promoting abroad an understanding of America and U. S. programs and policies; (ii) Combating international communism and (iii) Eliminating psychological barriers to the attainment of U. S. overseas objectives.²⁹

In a definite move away from decentralization, policy statements declared that the “world-wide program and budget to further the MSDAP should be developed in Washington by the Department of State and MSA for presentation as separate, but coordinated programs, to the Director of Mutual Security.”³⁰ Furthermore, “Because all components of the program represent major elements in U. S. foreign policy, there is continuing close consultation and coordination with the Department of State.”³¹

Examination of Department of State documentation culminating in program unification, indicates that policy makers’ decisions were oriented toward savings achieved through financing the program from one budget.³² However, investigation of the debate over appropriations undermines this view.

²⁹ “Recommendations, p. 2” 30 December 1951. SMOF: PSB Files. Box 2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ “First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program,” p. 45. 31 December 1951. C. W. Murphy Files. Presidential Speech File. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³² MSA replaced the ECA in the new organization.

The 1951 House Hearings on Appropriations were dominated by witness testimony about the dangers posed against U. S. liberal-style democracy by the USSR. In the previous fiscal year, Congress appropriated a total of \$41.5 million for the overall USIS Program in an about-turn from previous information program budget cuts. Additional appropriations indicate its willingness to send U. S. tax dollars overseas to aid information efforts, if it were convinced that U. S. political and economic objectives were threatened.

Moreover, study of U. S. political strategy during this period, confirms that government policy was oriented toward presenting a forceful image of the U. S. overseas. Unification of the USIS Program with the military arm of U. S. government³³ was another step toward its consolidation. This approach demonstrated U. S. physical might to foreign people under guise of protection against what the U. S. publicly referred to as an attempted expansion of Communist power into Western Europe. Thus, physical presence of U. S. forces achieved psychological goals of ideological warfare by demonstrating, rather than using, physical force.

The decision to combine the USIS Program with MSDAP, was controversial among U. S. policy makers. Some objected, maintaining that it would never arouse the same enthusiasm among Western Europeans as the Marshall Plan had, and, that it would increase suspicion of the U. S. abroad as an imperialist and warmonger.

³³The integrated USIS/MSA Program joined the the Department of Defense to the Department of State information program.

In France, billeting of U. S. soldiers on French soil and the large French NATO force³⁴ sent to Korea not only increased public speculation that World War III was imminent, but presented USIS/France personnel with a major public relations problem resulting from tension between U. S. troops and the French population.³⁵ France, one of the U. S. allies already committed to this program, had undertaken a heavy burden of increased taxes, diversion of materials and goods, and manpower absorption into military service during the War in Korea. Policy planners warned government officials that, unless steps were initiated to change U. S. image, further anti-American demonstrations would result.

Strategists' reaction was to diminish the program's military image while still stressing the comprehensive information effort. This meant presenting a more positive program, whose operational requirements fit into USIS commitments, placing public perception on personnel and resources, rather than on defense. Congress, convinced for the moment of necessity for a refurbished image, appropriated funds to the program with the counterpart equivalent sum of \$20 million³⁶ for fiscal year 1952.

³⁴France had the largest commitment of all NATO members. The French government increased compulsory French military service from one year to eighteen months in order to fulfill its obligations.

³⁵"Report on Conference of Provincial PAOs," 9-12 July 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³⁶SMOF: PSB Files. 350 File#1. Department of State. USIE Program 27 July 1951 to 350.05. Discussion with E. Kirkpatrick. 31 January 1952. Box 29. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

(b) Effect of the Combined Program on Information Activities

The program featured a basic design whereby each country mission functioned as a team under direction of the mission Chief. USIS/MSA directives amalgamated information activities into a single agency at country-mission and regional levels. Despite impracticalities in terms of time and the political situation,³⁷ policy planners recommended changes in missions' organizational structure that concentrated on an integrated approach to information program activities.

Collective responsibility to the agencies supporting the program was emphasized by issuing the mission Chief's salary from the combined budgets of the departments³⁸ involved. Managerial personnel were directed to regard their individual finances, staff, and programs as a common pool, serving the greater U. S. interest.³⁹ Policy statements were prepared that consolidated aims, methods, and target groups to promote the appearance of a substantial U. S. *offensive*, rather than a *defensive* information program. This approach was undertaken by government strategists in an effort to satisfy critics at home who complained⁴⁰

³⁷“Political impracticalities” referred to the presidential election in November 1952. Testimony by William C. Johnstone, Director, OEX, 6 February 1952, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1953. Department of State. IIA.* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1952), 183-184.

³⁸ “Agreement of Joint MSA-USIE Field Operations and Planning in Western Europe.” *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1953. State. IIA.* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 183.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 184.

⁴⁰General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, in a statement to the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 23 March 1948. *Hearings. Senate 1949.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948).

that policy overseas was not meeting the challenge of the publicized Soviet offensive.

(c) Attitude of USIS/France Officials

From USIS/France viewpoint, program unification was a positive move because it expanded the scope of USIS/France information activities. Local-media production, long recommended by regional PAOs and supported by the Embassy, was finally realized. Government officials announced that Washington was too remote from the situation to provide the necessary support media within reasonable time limits. Yet, this rationale is suspect, given the fact that the Department of State had not previously found distance a problem. More likely, strategists assessed local media production as less expensive than continuing to import Washington-produced resources.

Moreover, USIS/France, reflecting the broader program approach, began to distance itself from activities supporting national themes; for example, instead of focusing on activities that highlighted liberal democracy in France, it emphasized the superiority of U. S. lifestyle in international context. Information activities in France, therefore, became part of the greater U. S. effort toward centralization of information activities through promotion of common USIS themes.

Ever conscious of program cost, the CPAO⁴¹ asked Washington whether a unified information program would mean one appropriation, rather than several garnered from different agencies. Program cost-effectiveness would best be served, he stated, by supporting a single appropriation request, thus minimizing personnel resources and preparation time

⁴¹William R. Tyler, CPAO, U.S. Embassy, Paris. "Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period Ending 31 May 1950." Paris Despatch, No. 379. 16 August 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D.C.

used for justification statements preparation.

(d) Shift of emphasis in Policy Directives

USIS appropriations were influenced by the government's presentation of the political situation, making politics and finances mutually dependent. Using the Cold War situation to achieve U. S. political and economic aims, budget allocations were assigned accordingly. For example, the 1950 Campaign of Truth escalated U. S. information efforts overseas and marked the beginning of a "hard core" propaganda campaign whose intention was aimed at creating the impression among foreign people that U. S. lifestyle was threatened.

Policy planners in Washington took advantage of media attention⁴² about a Communist threat to U. S. lifestyle. Targeting language, they began to use vocabulary items that spoke of "freedom versus slavery" in official directives and press releases. Memoranda contained references to "Commies"⁴³ and "Reds," while other examples included alluding

⁴²The Bureau of Public Affairs asked leading U. S. newspapers and magazines to participate in a media-awareness program called the "Hate America" campaign. It was supposed to inform Americans of deliberate U. S. S. R. propaganda actions against the U. S. At Department of State request, CBS television aired a documentary on the Charles Collingwood-Dorothy Doan show that presented six posters of Russian MIGs shooting down U. S. planes. *The New York Times* and *The Saturday Evening Post* printed articles that discussed a propaganda effort against the U. S. Record Group 59. Department of State. Miscellaneous Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs 1938 to 1955. Box 38.

⁴³Evidence that this level of language was also being used in the U. S. Embassy in Paris exists in a memorandum from Ambassador James Dunn in which he addresses the removal of books by author Howard Fast and requests guidance about books by other authors. Ambassador James Dunn, U. S. Embassy, Paris to the Department of State, "Commies, Fellow Travelers." No. 10813. 27 February 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

to Russia as “the bully.”⁴⁴

As well, USIS information objectives were rewritten to meet new demands generated by the international situation. The increasingly anti-Communist atmosphere, emanating from the Department of State and spearheaded by the U. S. press, was reflected in U. S. Embassy, Paris requests for additional funds to launch a more aggressive information campaign, rather than continue what some elected officials publicly termed a lame duck program. Thus, the *offensive* versus *defensive* debate over information program policy became a question of finances.

This debate culminated in June 1950 with President Truman’s request to Congress for a Supplemental Appropriation Bill granting an additional \$5.5 million for the Department of State to run the Campaign of Truth. His justification was that extra funds were necessary for the information program to function effectively in the crucial “battle for men’s minds.”⁴⁵ This supplement, subsequently enacted by Congress, was in addition to the \$36 million already allotted for the information program, bringing the 1950 fiscal year appropriation total to \$41.5 million.

⁴⁴Statement by Charles A. Coolidge, Deputy Director of International Security Affairs on CBS television, 12 August 1951. Papers of Harry S. Truman. Official File. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁵See Chapter One for discussion of this phrase.

III. The 1952 Reorganization of the USIS Program

(a) Program Structure and Public Funding

The 1952 program reorganization resulted from the Benton-Wiley Resolution⁴⁶ that demanded a full-scale congressional investigation into USIS activities. Program jurisdiction, previously delegated to the Bureau of Public Affairs by its parent, the Department of State, was assigned to the IIA,⁴⁷ a semi-autonomous agency.⁴⁸ While the Department of State still retained overall responsibility, program planning, policy and execution were placed under the authority of an IIA Administrator.

The IIA mission statement linked itself with the Bureau of Public Affairs through the role of the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs,⁴⁹ who became a liaison between it and the Department of State. His function was to provide updated information to the IIA Administrator, so that information objectives would reflect current U. S. foreign policy goals.

Outwardly, USIS policy under the IIA, appeared to support greater decentralization by prioritizing staff roles over those of line management.

We are planning in the new organization to put principal emphasis on the field program. We should have more of our radio programming done

⁴⁶Officially Senate Resolution Seventy-Four. SMOF: PSB Files. Box 2. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁷See Chapter One for explanation.

⁴⁸Established by the Department of State 30 June 1952 upon recommendation of the U. S. Advisory Commission on Information.

⁴⁹The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs participated in policy sessions with Department of State strategists and the Secretary of Defense.

overseas or near the principal target areas. As soon as these necessary field staffs are completed, it should be possible, thereafter, to devote our additional funds almost entirely to more publications, more books, more radio programs, more motion pictures and more exchange of persons....Also, the necessary extent of the U. S. government's activities in information services overseas, will, of course, depend largely on the extent of private information services overseas. If and as private enterprise will do more, public enterprise will do less.⁵⁰

However, IIA statements suggest an attempt to dovetail policy, program structure and funding within the context of U. S. diplomacy and foreign policy objectives. France, in particular, fits into this pattern because of U. S. Embassy support for "indirect" techniques in dissemination of information.

Analysis reveals differences between *intent* and *reality*, emanating from the fact that program operations and policy remained within Department of State purview, thus preventing any attempted decentralization or a move toward private enterprise. More important, policy planners refused to move the USIS Program out of Department of State jurisdiction because of its close relationship to foreign policy.

Therefore, public statements emphasizing decentralization, were more likely crafted to convince Congress of program effectiveness and Department attempts to lower appropriation requests through private enterprise involvement, thus ensuring stable appropriations for the immediate fiscal year than otherwise might have resulted.

⁵⁰Testimony by Wilson H. Compton, Director, IIA before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *Hearings. House. Appropriations, Part 2, IIA, 1953.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 11.

(b) **Influence of Wilson H. Compton**

Wilson H. Compton, the first IIA Administrator, appeared before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations during the debate on budget allocations for fiscal-year 1953. His general statement justified an increase in the USIS Program appropriation because of the need to contain what he referred to as “the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union.”⁵¹

Compton’s testimony highlighted the excessive amounts of money that he claimed the Soviets were putting into a Western European information program that was designed to discredit the U.S. and its foreign policy: “The best available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union is now spending annually on propaganda the equivalent of \$1,400,000.”⁵²

This statement⁵³ demonstrates the underlying problem in information program policy. Throughout the period under study, the U. S. government justifies its requests for additional information program appropriations in order to react *offensively* rather than *defensively* to Russian information and cultural initiative. Intensified foreign policy objectives follow public declarations of hostile Communist actions that became the justification for increased public funds for the information program in Western Europe. During Compton’s 1952 appearance before the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, he was asked to defend U. S. financial support of France. Questions focused around controversy over

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 10. Note that this was a huge amount of money by 1953 standards.

⁵³Evidence for these statistics quoted by Compton and used by other U. S. officials in the USIS Program could not be verified. They are readily quoted in U. S. archives, but there is no source for the amount given. Furthermore, there is no evidence for this statement in the French archives.

sending millions of U. S. tax dollars to France, where U. S. aid did not seem to be appreciated, and, where, “all the propaganda in the world would not change the minds of people there.”⁵⁴

Compton’s reply hints at U. S. policy direction. The U. S., he stated, ought to take away money from those countries where it did not seem to be appreciated and focus more on South East Asia and the Middle East.⁵⁵ Yet, justifying the expenditure because of the historic friendship between the two countries, he explained that, “We ought to put more money where our friends are.”⁵⁶ He then continued, “We can hope to win the propaganda war only if we seize the initiative.”⁵⁷

Compton, a government emissary, tried to present a logical rationale for U. S. expenditure in France. U. S. actions demonstrate that its interest in France was pragmatic; because the French were useful to U. S. political and economic objectives, government strategy justified continued aid.

U. S. policy in France can, therefore, be more clearly delineated. Using the theme of the historic Franco-American friendship and the necessity to preserve liberalism in the face

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵In this statement there is a hint that U. S. policy was beginning to turn away from Europe to focus on the Far East and the Middle East.

⁵⁶Wilson H. Compton, Director, IIA, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *Senate. Hearings. Appropriations 1953*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 1060-1061.

⁵⁷Ibid.

of threats from an alien ideology, the U. S. made a concerted effort to keep France part of the Western Alliance. In effect, this strategy provided a smokescreen for greater U. S. economic and political objectiveness. Consequently, the Truman Administration understood that it must present a unique case to Congress in order to keep USIS/France appropriations high, so that work already developed through the information program would continue to advance U. S. economic policy. New markets achieved through increased trade and productivity⁵⁸ were goals that USIS/France could focus upon in information objectives aimed at selected target groups. Given the status of the Cold War by 1950, demonstrating a perceived threat to U. S. lifestyle from the Soviet Union appeared to Department of State policy makers to provide a suitable means by which to do so.

(c) Government Strategy in Hearings Appropriations

Department of State strategy for obtaining congressional funds for the information program relied on testimony from government officials whose prepared statements justified the need for increased resources.

In response to queries from the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, witnesses presented statistics to justify expenditures for USIS Program components. Officials from the Department of State, the IIA and the Bureau of Public Affairs, were accompanied by subordinate officers who answered more specific questions about USIS functions. In this

⁵⁸Evidence of U. S. interest in increased trade and productivity is witnessed by the attention to the ECA program and its productivity missions that the Department of State favored during the early 1950s. Its preoccupation with ECA is particularly interesting to this study because of the negative reactions that USIS/France personnel had toward it. In particular, the regional PAOs feared that Washington policy planners' intentions were to increase the ECA program at the expense of USIS/France and that ECA PAOs would make their positions superfluous.

way, Washington policy planners participated directly in the Hearings.

Hearings began in the House of Representatives whose members comprised the committee. On occasion, random government officials were called to testify or were permitted to give statements and ask questions.⁵⁹

Upon completion of the House Hearings, a vote was taken on the requested appropriation figure for the individual fiscal year. Results were sent to the Senate where another subcommittee met to hear witnesses justify budget requests before that House voted on the appropriation request.

IV. The 1953 Program Reorganization

(a) The Jackson Committee Recommendations

Early in his first Administration, President Eisenhower appointed W. H. Jackson⁶⁰ to form a committee that would investigate⁶¹ the IIA Program. Reporting back to the President, the Jackson Committee⁶² advocated structural and policy changes.

⁵⁹For example, Senator J. William Fulbright testified in support of the program before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations during debate over budget for the 1951 fiscal year. "Statement of J. William Fulbright, A U. S. Senator from the State of Arkansas," 20 April 1950. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1951*. (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 1064-1068.

⁶⁰William H. Jackson, appointed by Eisenhower as Head of the *President's Committee on International Information Activities*. The first meeting of this committee took place on 20 January 1953.

⁶¹Renewed press criticism over continuation of public funds to support an official information program overseas that appeared to many Americans not to be worth the tax dollars necessary for its operation, resulted in calls for an investigation. Eisenhower had committed himself to such an inquiry during his campaign for the presidency.

⁶²The Jackson Committee members included Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes and Sigurd Larmon. More

First, in a move away from the previous Administration's interest in psychological warfare, it advised Eisenhower to suppress the PSB. To replace it, the Committee recommended establishment of an Operations Coordinating Board⁶³ that, while remaining part of the NSC, reported directly to the President. Its chief function was coordination of detailed operational plans to execute national security policies. This, the committee stated, would ensure similar co-ordination in U.S. missions overseas under the direction of the individual mission chief.⁶⁴

OCB makeup consisted of the Under-Secretary of State as Chairman, with the Deputy Secretaries of MSDAP, the Director of the CIA and a Special Assistant to the President comprising the committee. A Chief Executive Officer appointed by the President was given his own staff.

This move consolidated the USIS Program into a centralized service that would, the Jackson Committee stated, allow determination of basic information themes within all components of U. S. information abroad, while eliminating program duplication and non-

than 250 witnesses were interviewed, including representatives from government departments and agencies. Also included were consultations with members of Congress and, in particular, with the Senate Subcommittee for U. S. Overseas Information Programs (Hickenlooper Committee). *New York Times*, 9 July 1953. Howland H. Sargeant Papers. General File. Clippings and Personal Papers 1953 to 1954. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁶³Henceforth known in this document by its acronym, OCB. Establishment of this Board actually began in March 1953 with the appointment of Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs, development of the National Security Council (henceforth known in this document as NSC) Planning Board and the initiation of other procedures to strengthen NSC operations.

⁶⁴Ibid. White House Statement on the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 9 July 1953. *New York Times*, 9 July 1953.

coordinated elements.

While advocating continuation of country teams in U.S. missions, the Committee favored a more decentralized format by restricting Washington's role to policy guidance, leaving field officers in charge of program policy within their own specific situations. Focusing on earlier program objectives of presenting "a true and fair picture"⁶⁵ of the U. S., the Committee attempted to publicly distance itself from charges of propaganda by recommending that books criticizing the U. S. be permitted in U. S. libraries overseas.⁶⁶ A return to original program aims that stressed factual information based upon knowledge, was justified:

The efforts of all media - radio, press and publications, motion pictures, exchange of persons and libraries, and information centers - should be directed to this end: to show the identity of our goals with those of other peoples. These goals and desires which we hold in common must be explained in ways that will cause others to join with us in achieving them.

In carrying out this purpose, American broadcasts and printed materials should concentrate on objective, factual news reporting with particular selection and treatment of news designed to present a full exposition of U.S. actions and policies, especially as they affect the particular country addressed. The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a propagandist note should be avoided. The information services should not, however be precluded from making forceful and factual refutations of false Soviet accusations.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Phrase used to portray original information program aims in 1948.

⁶⁶This contradicted previous information policy that had not permitted books that criticized the U.S. in its' libraries overseas. The Department of State circulated names of authors whose books were to be immediately removed because they were suspected of left wing sympathies and/or criticized U. S. foreign policy objectives.

⁶⁷"White House Statement on the "Report of the *President's Committee on International Information Activities*," *The New York Times*, 9 July 1953.

Other committee recommendations concerned use of language, defining “Cold War ” and “psychological warfare” as unfortunate terminologies that did not accurately describe U.S. attempts toward establishment of world peace and international freedom.⁶⁸

(b) Creation of the USIA

Acting on the Jackson Committee recommendations, President Eisenhower signed an Executive Order⁶⁹ creating the USIA as a separate agency responsible to the OCB, that reported directly to the President. His directive placed the USIS Program under USIA authority for program planning and execution, removing it from any responsibility to IIA and Bureau of Public Affairs authority.

However, although the Jackson Committee recommended some initiatives toward decentralization and allowed USIA internal discretion over budget, it left program responsibility in the Department of State, signifying government intention to keep the USIS program centralized

(c) USIS/France Reaction to the 1953 Reorganization

Under USIA, the U. S. Embassy in Paris undertook a four-month intensive study of USIS/France⁷⁰ in conjunction with House Subcommittee recommendations for surveillance on information activities to ensure sharp focus on attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

⁶⁸Ibid. New terminology included phrases such as “solidarity of freedom-loving men and women everywhere.”

⁶⁹A Presidential Executive Order created the USIA, an independent government agency brought into being by Reorganization Plan No. 8. August 1953.

⁷⁰The official Program name reverted to USIS.

The U. S. Ambassador, James C. Dunn, concurred with reducing a number of U. S. periodicals and bulletins in USIS/France libraries.⁷¹ His justification was that curtailment of selected materials would minimize ineffective or low-priority activities, allowing an increase in selective services oriented toward USIS/France particular objectives. To do so, Dunn supported changes that encouraged greater emphasis on individual programs at lower cost. Included were film distribution through local French channels, and increased development of the Exchange of Persons Program, with special attention to persons influential in molding public opinion.

Reductions included subsidies previously granted to the American Library in Paris and to France États-Unis, the French agency partially subsidized by the U. S. government. The annual supplement to this organization of \$1, 800, 000⁷² for publication of its periodical *Rapports France États-Unis* was suspended.

Dunn also endorsed “downsizing,” that is, discontinuing individual units that could be successfully incorporated into the overall program Information Unit. Included were the individual Labor and MSDAP information units,⁷³ several cultural units and Area Services. Productivity Unit activities were placed under French auspices.

⁷¹U. S. Ambassador James C. Dunn, “Revised Program of USIS/France,” 2 June 1953. Policy Planning Files 954. General Records of the Department of State. NARA, Washington, D.C.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³As directed by the Department of State in Embassy Despatch 1823, “Revised Program of U. S. Information Services in France,” 2 March 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. (France) Embassy. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(d) Reactions of Private Enterprise

Private enterprise in the USIS Program was authorized by the USIE Act of 1948. Successive USIS and Department of State officials emphasized the potential for extending private-enterprise facilities. In his testimony before the House Subcommittee Hearings in 1952, Dr. Wilson H. Compton declared his intentions for the private sector:

The work already undertaken toward expanding private cooperation is encouraging. It will be my intention as Administrator to explore diligently all these possibilities and to mobilize private cooperation to the greatest practicable extent. In the long run, it should add much to the effectiveness of this program. In general, I think we should be 'picking the wits' of the best talent in America. Talent which the government cannot buy is often available without cost as a patriotic service.⁷⁴

However, involvement of private enterprise to enhance U. S. prestige overseas, quickly became problematic. The feeling that Congress had not fully accepted the value of cultural exchanges and export of U. S. cultural achievements, created a widespread sense of inferiority among those in the cultural field.

Congressional obstinacy in fund allocations had a detrimental effect upon the willingness of private enterprise to encourage the cultural program in France. While many agencies and individuals remained supportive, they hesitated to become too involved because of apprehension that association with government-sponsored cultural activities, might reflect negatively upon their future independence.

⁷⁴Testimony by Wilson H. Compton, Administrator, IIA, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 5 February 1952. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1953* (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 8.

Fear of government encroachment notwithstanding, lack of funds was the primary concern governing private-enterprise reluctance to support cultural activities overseas. The problem of government versus private enterprise became, for many in the U. S. cultural field, a question of *how* to impress Congress, so that non-governmental overseas cultural activities could be “adequately financed and efficiently conducted.”⁷⁵

V. USIS/France Fiscal Year Estimates

Budget estimates began in the provinces where semi-annual evaluation reports were the vehicle for recommending cultural presentations. Funds for events, resources and media that were controlled by the Embassy, were assigned on basis of information objective priorities and the presence of prioritized target groups in regional areas.

Program assessments were based on audience attendance at functions. As attendance figures were the mode of determining which programs would be continued, it was in the interests of regional PAOs to quote high-spectator turnout for events.

Budget estimates passed through a vertical line of managerial authority, culminating in a composite report written by the CPAO that was sent to the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget, where it was evaluated in context of the Department of State budget request. Estimates were submitted to the Subcommittee on Appropriations before Hearings began to enable members to familiarize themselves with details.

⁷⁵William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “Some Notes on the Principal Obstacles to Conducting a Cultural Program in Foreign Countries,” p. 2. July 1949. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

By 1958, cuts in appropriated funds impacted upon individual USIS/France program components. In particular, the USIS/France Film Program was placed on a standby basis because of reduced funds.⁷⁶ Conflict between Paris, where officials felt that money for the Film Program was unjustified because the intellectual level of U. S. films did not attract the sophisticated French, and the provinces, where PAOs reported that U. S. films were enormously popular, left the program in limbo. Solutions offered by visiting USIA officials urged Washington to obtain, either free, or at minimum charge, documentaries from U. S. educational institutions that could be used with taped-recorded French commentary.

VI. USIS/France Program Cost

(a) Staffing

Appropriations for increased USIS/France staffing positions were justified as necessary by U. S. Embassy officials and Washington administrators because of what they deemed the “special” situation in France, that demanded building personal contacts and cordial relationships between program officials and influential French public opinion molders. Table 16 demonstrates the breakdown of the USIS/France staffing pattern during the Truman Administration.

⁷⁶ \$40,000 was budgeted for the USIS/France Film Program in fiscal year 1958 with no new prints planned. “The U. S. Information Service in France: An Evaluation,” p. 45. 3 February 1958. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

Table 16. Staffing Situation, USIS/Paris Office, 1948 to 1953⁷⁷

Year	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerks	Fr. Clerks	U. S. Staff	French Staff	Total Staff
1948	2	6	23	8	23	31
1949	6	12	23	18	23	41
1950	24	16	23	40	23	63
1951	29	24	149	53	149	202
1952 ⁷⁸	38	12	149	50	149	199
1953	38	12	198	50	198	248

Following the 1948 fiscal year restrictions, appropriations were granted in 1949 to open six regional information centers, a move that made information objectives in France a national effort, and confirmed the program's personal nature. Appropriations for increased staffing were permitted in fiscal years 1950 and 1951, for successful implementation of the ideological war defined by the Campaign of Truth.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Statistics provided for USIS/France personnel for fiscal year 1953 are from an information paper prepared for Senator J. William Fulbright's visit to Paris in December 1952. Memorandum from Charles K. Moffly, ACPAO, U.S. Embassy, Paris to Wilson Compton, Administrator, IIA, 12 December 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷⁸Statistics provided by the U. S. Embassy vary from those given in House Hearings before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations for 1952. House figures establish employee numbers as 182 French nationals and sixty-five U. S. citizens, totaling 247 on staff. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1952*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 1017.

⁷⁹*House. Hearings. Appropriations 1951*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government printing Office, 1951), 1014-1015.

Table 17. USIS/France Regional Staffing Pattern, 1951 to 1953⁸⁰

Post	Authorized Positions 1951			Authorized Positions 1952			Authorized positions 1953		
	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerks	Fr. Clerks	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerks	Fr. Clerks	U. S. Officers	U. S. Clerks	Fr. Clerks
Algiers ⁸¹	1	2	5	2	2	12	2	2	12
Bordeaux	2	1	11	2	2	12	2	2	18
Lille	1	2	7	1	2	5	1	2	5
Lyons	1	2	6	2	2	6	2	2	12
Marseilles	1	2	6	1	2	6	2	2	16
Strasbourg	1	2	9	1	2	10	1	2	16
Total	7	11	44	9	12	51	10	12	79

Fiscal year 1952 continued the personnel increase under the combined USIS/MSDAP operation, while planning for fiscal year 1953, completed by the Department of State under the Truman Administration, decreased staffing by one position, leaving the other positions constant.

However, figures contradict each other in the 1951 and 1953 fiscal year summaries. In 1951, the total number of employees is given⁸² as 189 persons. This figure contradicts a U. S. Embassy submission⁸³ to Washington, that specifies 241 employees on the payroll.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Algiers was separate as to appropriations and was only under U. S. Embassy administrative jurisdiction.

⁸²“USIS-Country Plan 1952.” August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸³“Foreign Service Inspection Report,” p. 28. December 1951 in *ibid*.

Significantly, cost difference between the two figures⁸⁴ is \$312,000.⁸⁵

Therefore, if appropriated monies were granted for 241 employees while there were only 189 employed in the USIS/France Program, the embassy had a surplus of \$312,000 in fiscal year 1953. As well, information compiled in Table 18, below, gives another set of figures for USIS/France staffing from 1954 to 1958. It shows that there was a steady increase in staff positions every year despite reports that positions were cut back severely from 1954 on.

Table 18. USIS/France Regional Staffing, 1954 to 1958⁸⁶

Year	Regional Posts	U. S. Staff	French Staff	Total Staff
1954	6	41	174	221
1955 ⁸⁷	7	52	174	233
1956	6	52	218	276
1957	7	52	225	284
1958	7	52	225	284

⁸⁴Based on the following mathematical calculation (241-189=52), there is a difference of fifty-two positions.

⁸⁵Calculated by using the "average" salary figure of \$6000 as determined in witness testimony before the House Subcommittee Appropriation Hearings for 1953. ($6000 \times 52 = \$321,776$).

⁸⁶Information in Table 18 is from "Foreign Service Inspection Report," p. 28. December 1951. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁷One additional regional post opened at Tours in 1955.

Erratic accounting appears to emanate from the U. S. Embassy. Analysis of possible motives for not reporting accurate employee statistics indicates that it might have been possible to do so during the Truman Administration, considering the lack of supervision by Washington and the infrequent visits of Department of State officials.

The incoming Republican Administration in 1953 enacted broad policy changes that were unpopular in the embassy and with regional officials. Increased administrative duties that detracted from field work created poor morale among personnel, resulting in a major personnel exodus in 1954. Major cuts in the 1954 fiscal year resulted in reduction of USIS/France positions from fifty-eight to thirty-eight.⁸⁸ Many employees who had been with the USIS/France Program since its 1948 inception, requested transfers to other government posts, or left when their jobs were terminated. For example, the 1954 elimination of the Area Services Unit led to the dissemination of staff to other positions, while some long-term

⁸⁸ "USIA Reduction-in-Force Instructions," 28 August 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

employees were refused transfers.⁸⁹ Job reductions and the transfer of one regional PAO⁹⁰ to a supervisory position in the USIS/Paris office generated further dislike of USIA management.

Situations such as those outlined above may have provided the catalyst for USIS officials to try to protect their interests by not reporting accurate funds and position numbers. Given that the USIS/France operation was highly personal in nature and that many employees had devoted years to building up the program in France, hiding funds in order to preserve positions may have been looked upon as doing one's best to preserve an important U. S. installation, rather than considering these actions deceptive, or a covert operation.

Furthermore, the CPAO indicated⁹¹ that once the initial elimination of posts had been accomplished in support of Washington directives, the embassy would have flexibility in placement of personnel. This demonstrates that suppression of posts "on paper" may not

⁸⁹For example, John L. Brown, Director, Area Services was among personnel whose positions were abolished. Brown, recognized for his participation in the program rather than in administration, was denied his requested transfer to other USIS operations. His job termination generated considerable in-house correspondence from USIS/Paris managers, some of whom attempted to intervene on his behalf. From the correspondence and a personal interview with Brown in Washington, D. C. in January 1996, it seemed that he was sacrificed by higher-up embassy officials in order to meet USIA demands for job reductions. There was ill-feeling among embassy officials, and forty years later, Brown was still unwilling to discuss the matter. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁰Philip Chadbourn, former PAO, USIS/Lyons. In a letter to the author dated 1 November 1994, he claimed that USIA was "so fed up" with the way USIS/Paris functioned that it put him in charge of revised operations.

⁹¹ "USIA Reduction-in-Force Instructions." 28 August 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

have accurately reflected the in-house USIS/France situation. If embassy officials wished to keep additional personnel, it was in their interest to report fewer numbers while maintaining the additional staff with the extra appropriated funds from Congress.

Table 19. Total USIS Appropriations During the Truman Administration⁹²

Year	Amount	Supplement	Total
1950	\$ 36,000,000	\$ 5,500,000	\$ 41,500,000
1951	\$ 41,288,000	n/a	\$ 41,288,000
1952	\$ 41,288,000	\$97,500,000	\$139,788,000 ⁹³
1953	\$133,272,914 ⁹⁴	n/a	\$133,288,000

Examination of total appropriation figures for the USIS Program confirms that allotment of appropriated monies paralleled intensified effort toward U. S. foreign policy objectives. The inauguration of the Campaign of Truth in 1950 and President Truman's call for an ideological battle against the Russians resulted in a supplemental appropriation exceeding \$5 million.

While the amount did not increase in 1951, it remained constant in the first year of the combined USIS/MSDAP operation. As one of the principal reasons for the unification of the two programs was to save public money, the lack of government officials' interest in publicly stating lower appropriations for fiscal year 1952 appears contradictory to policy.

⁹²Information in Table 19 is from official appropriation figures provided for 1950 to 1953. *House. Hearings 1954* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office 1954), 581-583.

⁹³*House. Hearings. Appropriations 1952* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 15.

⁹⁴"Summary of Requirements, Fiscal Year 1953." *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1953*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 4.

Instead, the appropriation was augmented significantly to meet what the Truman Administration designated as the challenge posed by what it perceived were Communist attempts at world domination. Interestingly, the appropriation declined slightly in 1953, the year that the Truman Administration left office.

(b) Diverse Statistics

Determination of accurate cost of operational expenses for the period under study is contravened by different statistics reported for given years. For example, figures quoted by the U. S. Embassy in 1953 were later contradicted by witness⁹⁵ testimony before the House Appropriations Committee for the 1956 fiscal year. Whereas U. S. Embassy figures (Table 22) quote the cost for the USIS/France Program in 1953 at \$3,984,000, U. S. Embassy records state it as \$1,212,396 (Table 20), a difference of \$2,771,604.⁹⁶ This demonstrates a notable discrepancy between reported amounts while leaving unaccounted-for funds amounting to \$1.3 million.

⁹⁵Testimony by William L. Clark, Director, USIA, European Area, before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 26 February 1957. He contradicted the amount of money stated in Table 22 for fiscal year 1953. This may have been a deliberated move by USIA in order to blame excessive costs on the former Truman Administration. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 94.

⁹⁶The ratio is \$1.3 million more than the amount requested in 1953.

Table 20. USIS/France Operational Expenses from 1949 to 1958⁹⁷

1949	\$ 326,500	1954	\$ 1,993,857
1950	\$ 500,500	1955	\$ 1,819,200
1951	\$ 650,900	1956	\$ 2,603,500
1952	\$ 687,410	1957 ⁹⁸	\$ 2,131,632
1953	\$1,212,396	1958 ⁹⁹	\$ 1,542,000

Total: \$12,226,495

Operational expenses¹⁰⁰ for the USIS/France Program during the Truman Administration increased from \$80,000 during the first full year of program operations in 1949, to \$628,730 in fiscal year 1952¹⁰¹ amounting to an overall increase since the

⁹⁷Figures in Table 20 are from Morrill Cody, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Despatch on USIS/France," 15 February 1957. USIA Library, Washington, D. C., and from *House Hearings. Appropriations 1958* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1957,) 308.

⁹⁸Note the discrepancies between appropriated monies designated for fiscal year 1957. USIA requested an increase in appropriation from \$2,131,632 (as of 30 June 1957) to \$2, 692, 304 (1 July 1957). These figures contradict those provided by U. S. Embassy, Paris CPAO, Morrill Cody, who stated that the 1957 fiscal year appropriation for operational planning was \$1,500,000. Accepting his figure would constitute a difference of \$631,632 in fiscal year operational planning [\$2,131,632 - \$1,500,000]; subtracting the increase of 1 July 1957: \$2, 692, 304 - \$1, 542,000 leaves a difference of \$1,150,304.

⁹⁹Figure provided by Morrill Cody, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, breaks down the total \$1,542,000 allocated to the U. S. mission for fiscal year 1957 in the following manner: \$555,000 (salaries); \$97,000 (maintenance including rent); \$725,000 (program execution divided between press activities, the Benjamin Franklin Library and the Rue Dragon Cultural Center in Paris). "Despatch on USIS/France," 3 February 1957, Appendix H. p. 107. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁰Operational costs include salaries, living expenses, quarters and representation allowances.

¹⁰¹Statistics for 1949 are from the Charles Hulten Papers. State Department Information Program (1946 to 1948). Box 9. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Operational costs stated for fiscal year 1952 are from "Country Plan USIS -

beginning of the program of \$548,730.

For fiscal year 1953, the final year of Truman Administration planning, approximately \$100,000 of the figure in Table 20 represents fixed charges against general operating expenses for items including travel, communications, equipment, maintenance, rent, utilities and procurement of local supplies. After these deductions, money available for programming amounts to approximately \$86,000¹⁰² from the USIS budget.

Part of the expenditure was paid for in counterpart funds; in 1953 this figure had a franc equivalent of \$4,260,000.¹⁰³ Of the balance of funds remaining, \$1,960,000 in counterpart was used exclusively for projects developed by the USIS/MSDAP Productivity Center for traveling exhibits and subsidies to French organizations promoting productivity and other objectives of the USIS/MSDAP combined operation.¹⁰⁴

France,” p. 19. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D.C. Before the Truman Administration went out of office in January 1953, USIS/France fiscal 1953 operational costs were estimated at \$1,212,396. This figure is from the IIA Prospectus for 1953, “Summary of Positions and Total Operating Expenses by Geographic Area and Country (Exclusive of Media Support Services),” 624. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Records of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰² “Description and Assessment of U. S. Information Services in France,” p. 5. 1 October 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D.C.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

(c) Program Cost in Salaries¹⁰⁵

Using 1953, the mid-point of the period under examination as an example, salary budget, declared for 290 employees in the USIS/France Program, was \$322,830.¹⁰⁶ However, figures presented in Tables 16, 17 and 18, documenting USIS/Paris and USIS/Regional Staffing, attest to 348 employees, a difference of fifty-eight salaried positions. As well, the House Subcommittee on Appropriations 1956 fiscal year record states that at the end of the Truman Administration there were 395 Americans and a “large number of locals” on the USIS/MSDAP staff.¹⁰⁷ Official calculations,¹⁰⁸ upon which appropriated monies were based for the 1953 fiscal year indicate a lower figure determined by the following statistics:

¹⁰⁵Analysis is based upon figures available for 1953 salaries, the mid-point of the period under study.

¹⁰⁶Figures include 227 Americans and sixty-three French local employees. “Country Plan - France,” p. 19. August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰⁷Letter from U. S. Ambassador Douglas Dillon, 11 March 1955. It was introduced into the official House record during debate over the USIS/France Program. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 1052.

¹⁰⁸“Program for France.” *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 248.

Table 21. Salary Analysis for Fiscal Year 1953¹⁰⁹

	Base Salaries	Total
U. S. Ambassador¹¹⁰	\$ 263,000	\$263,000
CPAO¹¹¹	\$ 78,000	\$ 78,000
U. S. Officers¹¹²	\$ 8,163 (x 24)	\$195,912
Regional PAOs¹¹³	\$ 11,130 (x 6)	\$ 66,780
Secretaries¹¹⁴	\$ 3,531 (x 208)	\$ 734,448

Total: \$1,338,140

Based on the above calculation, the figure given by the U. S. Embassy of \$322,839 is inaccurate and actual salary cost was \$1,183,043, a difference of \$860,204 more than the U. S. Embassy indicated for salaried positions in fiscal year 1953.

¹⁰⁹Information in Table 21 is from the IIA Prospectus for 1953, "Summary of Positions and Total Operating Expenses by Geographic Area and Country (Exclusive of Media Support Services), 624. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁰This figure appears exorbitant by 1953 standards, but it is the base salary figure given for U. S. Ambassadors. It does not include supplemental funds allotted for travel, food and entertaining. Lodging was provided free of charge in Embassy premises. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1953* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 2.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Salary figure from Charles K. Moffly, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Prospectus for France 1954 to 1955," III-5. 9 July 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Reports of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

(d) Strategies for Obtaining Appropriations

U. S. government strategies for obtaining money for the USIS Program were focused around the implied danger to the U. S. and liberal democracy by the presence of communism. However, examination of evidence surrounding this approach indicates that the USIS/France Program provided a smokescreen for wider U. S. concerns. The cost of maintaining U. S. cultural policy in France through the information program was justified by the larger U. S. objective of overcoming the ideological war that it said was waged by the USSR to discredit its policies. It allowed the U. S. to pursue its domination of Western Europe through widening its economic and political spheres.

The Truman Administration justified increased appropriations for the information program by its public campaign identifying an ominous Communist threat. Expounding on the same theme, the Eisenhower Administration embellished accounts of Communist cultural activities. Using France as an example, it presented evidence at House Appropriation Hearings that alluded to large amounts of money in a Communist information program that left the USIS/France program lagging behind.

However, the cultural offensive launched under the Eisenhower Administration was not novel. It began in 1954 in order to meet what it announced was a Communist propaganda initiative in “many areas of the world.”¹¹⁵ France was determined a “key

¹¹⁵Letter from Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles to John J. Rooney, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 7 March 1955. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 246.

country,”¹¹⁶ where internal dissent among French political parties was complicated by the use of cultural programs to achieve PCF interests:

The past year has witnessed an impressive increase in the Communist “cultural” drive to beguile France and ensnare her into the Soviet spider web with sugar-coated appeals for coexistence and “peace.” All this, and the fact that France is only a year away from its next national election, makes the need for a well-planned, intelligently executed USIS Program in France more pressing than ever.¹¹⁷

Witness testimony before the 1956 House Subcommittee on Appropriations accentuated Communist financial commitment: The USSR spent “as much as \$150 million per year in France.”¹¹⁸ This accounted for USIA increased appropriations requests. They were necessary in order for the U. S. to maintain its influence in France against what it said was the Communist attempt to infiltrate Western Europe with its economic and political ideology.

¹¹⁶ “Statement by William L. Clark, Assistant Director for Europe, USIA, entitled “Program for France,” before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 3 March 1955. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 246-247.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 247.

¹¹⁸Testimony by Theodore C. Streibert, Director, USIA, 3 March 1955, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 940.

Reference was made to The President's Emergency Fund for International Affairs,¹¹⁹ an account used to stimulate the presentation of U. S. cultural and industrial achievements overseas by private firms. However, he related U. S. concern with cultural policy in France to finances by noting that this money would be used "to offset worldwide Communist propaganda charges that the U. S. lacked culture and that its industrial production was war-oriented."¹²⁰ Furthermore, Communist "cultural offensive" was conspicuous in France, where the comparative absence of U. S. cultural groups was striking in contrast.

Challenged by House Subcommittee Chairman, John Rooney, Streibert denied that the USIS/France Program exceeded that of the supposed-Communist program, "by billions of dollars."¹²¹ Rooney asked whether USIA figures were accurate, noting that

You always neglect to mention that a full comparison [with the USSR cultural Program] would have to include all the private press, magazine, radio and television expenditures made each year throughout the U. S. That would exceed the Soviet totals by billions of dollars.¹²²

¹¹⁹Approved by Congress, 26 August 1954 for sum of \$5 million that would remain available until funds were exhausted. Statement of Theodore C. Streibert, Director, USIA, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1956, 13 June 1955. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 280.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, 277.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 272-278.

¹²²Comment by House Subcommittee on Appropriations Chairman, John L. Rooney in response to statement by Theodore C. Streibert, Director, USIA, before the House Subcommittee on 3 March 1955. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 59.

Witnesses testified before the House that increased appropriations to the program were imperative in order to turn USIS/France into an offensive rather than let it remain a defensive program. In this way, it not only justified the operation, but made increased government financial support appear vital to U. S. foreign policy objectives. Thus, the Eisenhower Administration continued the same initiative that the previous Administration had begun.

Analysis of this strategy reveals that warnings of an increased USSR “cultural initiative” in Western Europe, with particular attention to France in 1954, provided justification for the House Subcommittee on Appropriations to increase USIS/France regional staffing significantly from fiscal year 1955 to 1956 by forty-four positions. Cost for the additions was covered by an extra appropriation of \$734,300¹²³ for fiscal year 1956.

Examination of U. S. cultural policy strategy indicated that USIA officials closely followed Communist participation at International Trade Fairs and Cultural Exchanges in Western Europe, events that the U. S. did not attend.¹²⁴ By 1955, officials were aware that

¹²³An increase of \$784,300 in fiscal year 1956 provided for expanded USIS/France Program. As well, forty-four additional local positions were legislated to support a significant buildup in cultural activities using mass-approach technique in selected areas directed at specific target groups. Increase in funds and personnel was to counter U. S.-perceived cultural increase by the Russians in Western Europe. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1955), 930.

¹²⁴Traditionally the U. S. did not attend Trade Fairs because it had the largest volume of trade in the world and its liberal enterprise system did not participate in industrial displays that demonstrated the dependence of the people on the government. Rationale for the U. S. entry into Trade Fairs and Exhibits was officially to tell the story of free enterprise and to provide effective international trade promotion. However, the U. S. recognized increased Communist participation at these Fairs as a “threat,” by the USSR, hence, the reason for U. S. participation. Statement of Harold C. McClellan, Assistant Secretary of International Affairs, Department of Commerce, to the House Subcommittee of the Committee on

the Communist countries were exhibiting at fairs in Western Europe and that their attendance there was steadily increasing. A Bill¹²⁵ was drafted in Congress to legitimate joint U. S. government and industry participation at Trade Fairs. It was followed by a Cultural Presentations Program¹²⁶ that permitted consultation with Field Posts in program planning. Included in the Department of State Appropriation request for USIS/France cultural presentations for the 1958 fiscal year was the amount of \$3,100,000,¹²⁷ representing an increase of \$795,000 over the 1957 allocation. Thus, USIA moved to intensify U. S. commitment to cultural policy when it became aware of the potential for publicizing Communist activities in cultural exchanges and Trade Fairs. U. S. participation¹²⁸ at Trade Fairs was justified by the following statement:

It is essential that maximum psychological benefit be derived from participation in trade fairs and the presentation of cultural attractions to overseas audiences. Full exploitation of these events by USIA representatives, through the channels of press, radio, films and through personal contacts has increased substantially, at small cost, the effectiveness

Government Printing Office, 1955), 17.

¹²⁵Ibid. Congress passed the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act in 1956.

¹²⁶This Act came into effect in August 1957.

¹²⁷The amount of \$795,000 over the 1957 fiscal year appropriation represents the actual increase over available funds by virtue of \$674, 256 that was recovered from a previous obligation. Two-thirds of this increase was also to allow for a substantial number of cultural presentations in Eastern Europe. "President's Special International Program." *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1957* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 306-308.

¹²⁸From 16-25 April 1956. The U. S. sent a Trade Information Team and maintained a consultation booth that was enlarged and used as the central exhibit motif. This type of booth was always featured at Trade Fairs.

of the total program, both by enlarging the size of the audience and by strengthening the impression created.¹²⁹

The USIA Director's attempts to convince the House that U. S. presence at Trade Fairs was justified, focused on what he termed was a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to slur the U. S. and attack liberal enterprise through claims that U. S. non-participation presented an insult to the host countries. He interpreted Communist reaction to U. S. absence as being that the U. S. was too occupied with war production to participate.¹³⁰ This became the basis for his statement to the House Subcommittee on Appropriations that "a vastly-increased cultural offensive"¹³¹ by the USSR had the effect of discrediting the U. S. while it emphasized Communist devotion to the peaceful arts. Russian ballet troupes, musicians, artists and athletes were sent out in great numbers to show the world the cultural achievements of Communist society,¹³² while the U. S. lagged far behind.

Thus, by striking a mode of comparison with the Russians, in which he depicted the U. S. as the loser in cultural competition, Streibert convinced the House to increase the Appropriation for cultural presentations.

In 1955, witnesses appearing before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations testified that there was increased Communist emphasis on an exchange program between

¹²⁹Statement by Theodore C. Streibert, 13 June 1955 before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 280.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 277.

¹³¹*Ibid.*

¹³²*Ibid.*

the Soviet Union and Western European nations. According to U. S. sources, the Russians had permitted more than one thousand delegations to the USSR in 1954.¹³³ Washington officials used this data to justify increased fiscal year 1956 budget requests for the Fulbright Educational Exchange Program.

Other witnesses testified that USSR exchanges increased sixty percent from 1950 to 1953,¹³⁴ while the 1954 program nearly doubled that of the previous year. Sixty-one percent of these exchanges were reputed to have been concentrated in Western Europe;¹³⁵ hence, the rationale for augmenting U. S. appropriations to that area. As well, U. S. Embassy warnings about declining U. S. popularity in France, while that of Russia¹³⁶ rose, provided the government with sought-after justification for requesting increased appropriations for fiscal year 1957.

¹³³Statement by Russell L. Riley, Director, International Educational Exchange Service, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 15 February 1955. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 304.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, 303.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶Hugh J. Perry, "The Pre-NATO Poll," 9 December 1957. USIA Library, Washington, D. C. Perry was a USIS Research Officer.

Table 22. USIS/France Direct Mission Expenses¹³⁷

	1953	1954	1955	1956
Total Funds	\$3,984,000	\$1,993,837	\$1, 819, 200	\$2,603,500
Direct Media Support				
1. Radio/TV		\$ 5,992	\$ 9,150	\$ 73,100
2. Press		\$ 32,520	\$ 25,800	\$ 35,800
3. Motion Pictures		\$ 366,999	\$ 77,349	\$ 77,349
4. Information Centers		\$ 66,400	\$ 57,300	\$ 57,300
Subtotal		\$ 471,911	\$ 169,599	\$ 243,549
Reimbursement ¹³⁸		\$ 304,060	\$ 334,600	\$ 370,400
Total Direct Country Costs		\$ 2,769,808	\$ 2,323,399	\$ 3,217,249

Table 23. USIS/France Program Cost Analysis 1955 to 1956¹³⁹

Programs	1955	1956	Difference in Cost
Radio/TV Materials ¹⁴⁰	\$ 62,204	\$168,975	+\$106,771
Motion Pictures ¹⁴¹	\$ 640,661	\$ 762,390	+\$121,729

¹³⁷Information in Table 22 is from *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 933. Direct mission expenses were funds that were controlled by U. S. Missions overseas for their operations. Within this general funding, there were designated amounts for individual programs. (See Table 23).

¹³⁸Reimbursement to the Department of State was for administrative support.

¹³⁹Information from Table 23 is gathered from several sources. See following notes for clarification.

¹⁴⁰Radio program expenses provided for continuing program in fiscal year 1956 at established cost (\$35,000) with increases for the following: two ten-minute weekly shows for forty weeks on time purchased from Radio Luxembourg (\$40,000); European-unity series broadcast under local auspices (\$58,000). William L. Clark, Assistant Director for Europe, USIA, "Program for France." *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 249.

¹⁴¹Ibid. Including four local productions (\$20,000); one production (\$10,000); additional newsreel coverage (\$3000) and contract increase for French film organization, Mondial Films (\$7,000) for increased film distribution.

Information Centers ¹⁴²	\$ 428,000	\$ 782,000	+\$354,000
Program Direction	\$ 203,105	\$ 212,305 ¹⁴³	+\$ 9,200
Press	\$ 25,800	\$ 35,800	+\$10,000
Program Expenses ¹⁴⁴	\$ 186,630	\$ 467,537	+\$280,907
Personal Services	\$ 241,907	\$ 314,781	+\$ 72,874

In 1958, operational costs were augmented to \$1,554,000.¹⁴⁵ The 1958 figure, however, was substantially lower than the \$2,603,500¹⁴⁶ spent by the U.S. Mission in 1956. The exorbitant cost of operations for that year reflects intensified U. S. foreign policy

¹⁴²The increase for information centers in 1955 covered the opening of the new installation at Tours.

¹⁴³Program Direction increase in fiscal year 1956 was justified in order to provide for \$6,500 for operations allowances offset by a decrease in representation allowances of \$3100 and an increase of \$5800 for program direction expenses for increased travel of the CPAO and regional PAO officer. Note that whether this amount that included the regional PAO was for the six provincial officers or one person in Paris is not defined. However, it remains suspect because the position of Regional Affairs Officer in the USIS/France office was abolished in the 1954 fiscal year job cutbacks.

¹⁴⁴Amounts given include the following components' breakdown: Seven additional exhibits shown in the provincial centers for total of \$52,500; an additional \$57,500 for showing the atomic-energy exhibit for a total of \$110,000 for exhibits; a \$6000.00 increase for book translation; increased support for subsidies including France-États-Unis (\$20,000) and the American Library provincial branches (\$25,000); U. S. sponsorship of concerts (\$7,000) and an additional seminar for teachers, (\$6,000); an increased Lecture Program for 100 additional lectures (\$45, 000); an increase (\$19,179) for additional library supplied, posters and programs. William L. Clark, Assistant Director for Europe, USIA, "Program for France," *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 250.

¹⁴⁵Figure given by Morrill Cody, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, 3 February 1957, "Despatch on USIS/France," p. 6. Appendix H. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

¹⁴⁶*House. Hearings. Appropriations 1956.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 308.

efforts as a result of the Suez crisis. That the U. S. government had lost faith in the USIS Program in Western Europe and France in particular, is reflected in the following statement:

I find that our Information Agency planners are using the Suez crisis as an excuse for increasing the information efforts in countries such as France and Britain. On the contrary, this crisis points out the fact that our information program must have been such an abysmal failure since it has obviously produced no increase in respect or understanding for America and its policies in these two countries.¹⁴⁷

VII. The Exchange of Persons Program

In France, the Exchange of Persons Program was dedicated to building closer contacts between French and American people through educational exchanges. Legislated in 1946 as P. L. 402, the program began on a limited scale and did not achieve sizeable proportions until 1950. It received increased amounts appropriated by Congress as its objectives became more politically oriented during the Cold War. Both the Truman and the Eisenhower Administrations continued to use it to pursue foreign policy objectives.

(a) Foreign Currencies

In 1948, P. L. 584 authorized the use of foreign currencies in order to finance the Exchange of Persons Program between the U. S. government and participating countries. Foreign currency, or local currency credits, were funds that were accumulated from the sale of surplus property and war equipment overseas.

¹⁴⁷Statement by Senator Ellender before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1958*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Printing Office, 1957), 306-308.

At the end of World War II in Europe, millions of dollars worth of U. S. military equipment lay idle in warehouses. Included were heavy armaments, and food and clothing stocks that Washington officials thought could be useful in rebuilding the war-devastated countries where supplies were located.

The Fulbright Bill¹⁴⁸ was, therefore, originally introduced into the House of Representatives, as a means of “beating swords into ploughshares,”¹⁴⁹ that is, recycling unused military supplies into practical commodities for overseas use. Senator Fulbright suggested that this material not be sold for dollars, but for foreign currency and credits of the individual country involved. Part of the funds would then be set aside, through special agreements with participating countries for educational exchange purposes.

Fulbright’s public statements emphasized mutual benefits assured to the U. S. and the foreign country involved from discharging the incurred debt by non-monetary payment.

We sell our war surpluses to the governments of these countries - not for dollars, but for their own foreign currencies and credits. Part of these funds would be set aside, through special agreements, for educational exchange purposes. In that way, both the U. S. And these countries could profit mutually. The debt would be paid, but it would be paid in terms of things money cannot buy.. goodwill and better international understanding.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸Unofficial name for P. L. 584 in recognition of Senator J. William Fulbright who introduced the Bill in Congress and guided it through the two Houses.

¹⁴⁹Phrase used in “Report on the Operations of the Department of State (Under P. L. 584): A Report by the Secretary of State on the Operations of the Department of State During Calendar Year 1955.” (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 2. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵⁰P. L. 402 contained these statements by Senator J. William Fulbright. Cited in *ibid.*, 1.

The Fulbright Act imposed controls on foreign currency expenditures by declaring a maximum \$1 million dollars¹⁵¹ could be spent annually in an individual country with a \$20 million ceiling permitted per country.

Currencies for the Fulbright Program were bought with certificates. Only dollars were appropriated, not foreign currencies. In 1950, the dollar equivalent of funds spent on the Fulbright Program was approximately \$7 million.¹⁵² The estimated annual program cost was \$6,615,000.¹⁵³

(b) Counterpart Funds

Counterpart funds, separate from foreign currency funds, were directly related to the Marshall Plan. For example, if the U. S. government sold goods to the French government, the latter then sold it to its citizens. The money acquired would be put aside as counterpart funds.¹⁵⁴ This arrangement applied only to items sent out of the U.S. and sold to citizens or

¹⁵¹Figures on Tables below are sometimes more than \$1 million. This is generally because in the fiscal year specified, there were costs for accumulation of real property, equipment and furniture in France.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴Statements that amounts could then be drawn upon by the U. S. for certain purposes in order to meet its own expenses in France contradict the more commonly-held belief that Counterpart Funds, once sold to the French government, became its property. The French government repaid this money to the U. S. However, explanations provided by USIA officials to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations claimed that counterpart could be used by the U. S. for its expenses in France. This may have been the result of misunderstanding by the officials who were called upon to explain the situation.

corporations that participated in the Marshall Plan.¹⁵⁵

By law, the Secretary of State was permitted to allocate counterpart funds without a formal appropriation by Congress. From 1948 to 1952, the USIS/France Program used counterpart funds to meet eighty percent of its expenses. However, by 1952, these funds were running out; subsequently, they were turned into commodity¹⁵⁶ funds in the mid-1950s.

Table 24. Exchange of Persons Program Cost¹⁵⁷

Year	Available Funds	Expenditures		Unspent Funds 31 December
		Administrative	Program	
1949	\$ 229,800	\$ 28,101	\$191,580	\$ 10,117
1950	\$ 1,010,117	\$103,709	\$836,402	\$ 30,201
1951	\$ 1,070,006	\$ 72,208	\$814,292	\$ 183,505
1952	\$ 1,183,506	\$ 68,616	\$730,271	\$ 384,617
1953	\$ 1,386,434	\$ 58,650	\$873,254	\$ 513,179
1954	\$ 1,513,180	\$ 66,685	\$762,445	\$ 684,048
1955 ¹⁵⁸	\$ 1,684,049	\$ 68,766	\$820,114	\$ 153,316

¹⁵⁵Bernard W. Poirier, "Interview With Governor Averell W. Harriman," 10 January 1950. Oral History Collection. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹⁵⁶Commodity funds replaced counterpart funds after 1953. They were sold to foreign governments in U. S. dollars. However, these funds came from the integrated budget of MSA and USIS rather than being paid for directly from the previous Department of State budget.

¹⁵⁷Funds converted to approximate U. S. dollars.

¹⁵⁸Total expenditures for Exchange of Persons Program for France from 1949 to 31 December 1955 stated as \$5,449,013. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1955* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 416. Author's figure for same dates is \$4,587,360.

Table 25. Breakdown of Grant Awards¹⁵⁹

Year	U. S. Citizens	French	Total Grants ¹⁶⁰
1949	275	132	407
1950	323	230	553
1951	284	287	571
1952	275	283	558
1953	290	304	594
1954	310	305	615
1955 ¹⁶¹	324	321	645
1956 ¹⁶²	330	332	662
1957	335	321	656
1958	331	319	650

VIII. Shared Budget Projects

Prior to the unification of the USIS and MSA programs in 1951, certain budgets were shared by the ECA and USIS. Financing was usually achieved through use of counterpart

¹⁵⁹ Statistics are from individual editions (1949 to 1958) of the "Report on the Operations of the Department of State." (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office).

¹⁶⁰Note that amount for each grantee from France was \$3000. Therefore \$3000 x 3298 (total number of grantees from 1949 to 1955) = \$9,894,000 expenditure for grants.

¹⁶¹Grant numbers for fiscal year 1955 are from "Report on the Operations of the Department of State," 1955. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 29. Numbers contradict with U. S.-citizen grant numbers for the same year documented by the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. U. S. grants recorded indicate 275 instead of 310 as documented in Table 25, constituting a difference of thirty-five grants. (\$3000 per grant x 35 = \$105,000 cost difference between the two figures).

¹⁶²Numbers for the 1957 fiscal year are from Morrill Cody, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "The Exchange Program," p. 1. Appendix E. 15 February 1957. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

funds. USIE/France participated in several joint projects with ECA to support diverse activities in program components. In 1951, these included transferral of five million French francs from the ECA budget¹⁶³ to pay for a joint USIS/ECA project for dubbing certain USIS documentaries into French. Documentation attests to a second project of the same nature in fiscal year 1952.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to make available for USIS use, an amount not to exceed \$15,212,000 in ECA counterpart funds.

The USIS/ECA/France Information Planning Board held its first meeting in Paris in late 1950.¹⁶⁵

(a) Joint Film Project

In order to hire movie-houses in French provincial cities during off-peak hours, 3,012,000ff¹⁶⁶ that were divided equally among the six¹⁶⁷ regional information centers and the Paris/USIS office on a basis of one film showing per week, at ten thousand francs per

¹⁶³A. E. Manell, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Memorandum to OII-IMP State," 7 April 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2391. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵The Board was convened under the chairmanship of U. S. Embassy CPAO, William R. Tyler, 3 October 1950. Its purpose was to produce a policy to unite USIS and ECA planning in consolidating staff, resources and funds of the two agencies.

¹⁶⁶Figures provided at first meeting of the USIS/ECA/France Information Program Planning Board, 3 October 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁷ The opening of an additional information center at Tours in 1955, brought the total to seven: Paris, Strasbourg, Lille, Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles, Tours.

theater in each of the centers.

(b) Joint Press and Publication Project

Ten million francs were allotted for purchase of existing translations of three hundred books comprising standard U. S. works with “justifiable reference to issues of concern to ECA.”¹⁶⁸ Individual sets of books were delivered to each USIS information center library and to each of the seventeen university libraries in France. Moreover, the Bibliothèque Nationale offered the U. S. Embassy increased distribution of U. S. books through French libraries and bookmobiles at a cost of eighteen million counterpart francs in order to purchase necessary shelving and equipment.

Table 26. Funds for Joint USIS/ECA/France Projects, 1951¹⁶⁹

Project	Cost (in French Francs)
Film Hall Rentals	3,012,000
Library Books	10,000,000
U. S. School Maps	8,500,000
France-États-Unis Centers	57,000,000
Traveling Libraries	24,065,000

Total: \$102, 127,000

Budget-sharing activities in France included a proposed publication program in 1950. Policy for this project was discussed at a USIS/ECA/France meeting where it was determined that it would be possible to produce and translate pamphlets for distribution in

¹⁶⁸ “Minutes of the USIS/ECA/France Meeting,” 10 October 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁹ “USIS/ECA/France Meeting,” 3 October 1950 in *ibid.*

France using shared ECA/USIS funds. Included were the *Monthly Labor Review*¹⁷⁰ and a Department of State publication called, *Our Foreign Policy* that was included in a special issue of *Document de la Quinzaine*¹⁷¹ and as a supplement to *Rapports*.¹⁷²

IX. Non-Governmental Financial Support

(a) Academic Institutions

Individuals, colleges, universities, hospitals, private industry and other organizations contributed financial assistance to foreign grantees studying under the Exchange of Persons Program. In 1950, eighty¹⁷³ local and national organizations participated, while U. S. colleges and universities provided full, or partial maintenance for approximately three-quarters of the foreign nationals who were studying in the U. S., as well as endowing more

¹⁷⁰The July 1951 issue of this magazine, published under the auspices of ECA/France included an article entitled, "Fifty-Years Progress of American Labor" that the USIS/ECA/France Program Planning Board was considering for circulation in USIS libraries. "USIS/ECA/France Meeting," 9 November 1950 in *ibid*.

¹⁷¹Bi-monthly bulletin printed in French by USIS Press in France. It was eight to sixteen pages in length. Each issue was devoted to one broad question of U. S. foreign policy, or a factual survey of a part of U. S. life. Whenever, possible, official U. S.-government reports and documents were used as its source. In 1951, 15,000 copies per issue were printed. The mailing list included distribution to one dozen other U. S. Missions in French-speaking areas and 1,800 copies that were sent to Brussels. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁷²Monthly publication printed in French by USIS Press in France. The U. S. Embassy claimed that it had 1,300,000 subscribers. "Country Plan - USIS France," p. 12. August 1952. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. Washington, D. C.

¹⁷³"Report on the Operations of the Department of State (Under P. L. 584). Message from the President of the U. S. Transmitting a Report by the Secretary of State on the Operations of the Department of State," 19 March 1951. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 1.

By 1953, non-government financing increased to more than \$7 million.¹⁷⁴ In addition to financial support, U. S. and foreign groups provided diverse services in the U. S. and France. These included orientation for French students at U. S. colleges and in community life as well as hospitality with American families.

(b) Special Projects

To increase program effectiveness in 1953, a series of ongoing special projects were developed in countries participating in the Educational Exchange Program. These included American Studies Conferences that was open to the general public. In France, the American Studies Project was established to meet increasing interest in U. S. History and literature. A special group project in American Civilization was arranged for teachers from France in U. S. universities. American Studies¹⁷⁵ were also offered at French universities.

As well, on recommendation of the U. S. Embassy in Paris, the Department of State approved the sum of \$3,000¹⁷⁶ to assist in partially financing the U. S. visit of twenty-six students and two professors from the National School of Horticulture in Versailles. Table

¹⁷⁴ “The Fulbright Exchange Program: A Message from the President of the U. S. Transmitting a Report from the Secretary of State on the Operations of the Department of State,” 7 April 1954. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954).

¹⁷⁵ The Nice Seminar on Contemporary American Civilization for Returned Teachers of English reported positive evaluations from its thirty-three participants. Comments from the group encouraged the USIS/France Paris office to stress the on-going need for educational exchanges of this sort to Washington. A statement to this effect was added to the justification statement presented in the proposed budget allocations for fiscal year 1959.

¹⁷⁶ Breakdown specified for use of money was \$2,000 from one Smith-Mundt Leadership Grant and \$1000 from the Special Projects Division. Memorandum A590 from the U. S. Embassy, Paris to the Department of State, 29 April 1958. Record Group 59. Department of State 1955 to 1959. Central Decimal File. Box 4586. NARA, Washington, D. C.

27 demonstrates examples of additional monies that the U. S. placed in special educational projects in France in the 1957 fiscal year:

Table 27. U. S. Financial Support for Special Educational Project, 1956¹⁷⁷

Event	Amount
Teacher Seminar	\$ 6,000
Student Assembly for Returned Grantees	\$13,000
Increased Lecture Program ¹⁷⁸	\$45,000

Total: \$64,000

(c) Joint Projects

Joint projects between the U. S. and France were sponsored by large U. S. corporations, institutions and individuals. The John Hay Whitney Foundation sponsored a Foreign Lecturer Program with the Department of State that allowed foreign academics to lecture at lesser-known U. S. colleges and institutions. In 1950, the Ford Foundation contributed \$500,000 to the program, prompting incredulity on the part of the French diplomatic community in Washington at the amount of money that Ford was willing to spend on an educational exchange program.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷*House. Hearings. Appropriations 1957.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 248.

¹⁷⁸Amount included one hundred additional lectures at an average cost of \$450 for hall rentals and speakers.

¹⁷⁹AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis.* Vol. 250. Memorandum from Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. 15 March 1950.

Conclusion

Examination of statistics for the USIS/France Program during the period under review supports evidence that a U. S. cultural policy existed in France. It is proved by the financial commitment of Congress. Significantly, funds were allocated on basis of the need to serve U. S. foreign policy objectives that aimed at elimination of Communist propaganda during the Cold War.

USIS/France officials justified the amount of money spent on each program in order to portray their program as an integral part of operations. Reports from the U. S. Embassy formed the backbone of Department of State requests for additional appropriations from Congress. Embassy recommendations were confirmed at the Department of State level, where administrators, without personal knowledge of the situation, relied upon program statistics to rationalize their demands for increased annual funding.

Analysis of USIS/France statistics demonstrated that the figures used as evidence for presentation at different authority levels were not always accurate and did not always reflect actual numbers. Rationale for these discrepancies indicated the desire of USIS/France managers to keep the program functioning as they believed best under the guise of its being an important part of U. S. foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, distance and decentralization between Paris and Washington permitted program officials a wide range of authority in portraying to Congress how funds were used. As a result, the total cost of the program remains unclear.

Chapter Five

Special Problems: U. S. Cultural Policy in France and French Youth

I. U. S. Policy Objectives and Prioritized Groups

From 1950 on, USIS/France prioritized groups of French population whose support it deemed essential to successful execution of U. S. foreign policy. This tactic, executed through U. S. cultural policy, reflected wider information program policy defined by the Department of State for use in countries where there were USIS operations. In France, it quickly focused on youth as the most important group to address.

USIS/France breakdown of the French population into targets for intensified cultural activities was a deliberate campaign to marginalize the influence of organized groups before they gained further momentum. These associations represented a challenge to U. S. authority because of their size, makeup and political affiliation. To refute their influence, a “psychological offensive,”¹ that substantiated the objectives of the Campaign of Truth, justified accelerated emphasis in cultural activities for designated social groups.

The outcome of the present contest for the minds of men will depend in large measure upon our ability to identify those population elements whose attitudes and opinions will be decisive in shaping the course of world events and enriching them with materials which will be most influential in furthering U. S. foreign policy.²

¹Wording used in memo from CPAO, William R. Tyler, 16 October 1950. Contents contained statement of activities for the USIS/France Mission that were based on U. S./France Country Paper objectives for 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2391. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²*House. Hearings. Appropriations 1952.* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 1062.

Expansion of USIS/France regional operations to reduce the possibility of hostile group activities continued U. S.-government efforts to consolidate its influence across France through its cultural policy.

Significantly, the Department of State assessed minorities within local population in all Priority Three countries that it judged “presently capable of turning larger population elements against us.”³ In France, the U. S. Embassy determined youth, labor and intellectuals as priority groups whose suspected affinities aroused doubt about their political loyalties. During the Campaign of Truth, it moved to reach these elements through combining general USIS policy directives with specific objectives identified in the U. S./France Country Papers.

Policy planning operations included development of channels of communication called “priority media” that were assigned to each priority group. A general program index related priority media to target groups in different priority zones. Table 28 demonstrates the number of times that the most important media were assigned to priority groups in the overall Priority Three country category. Table 29 confirms that the same media were employed in France to achieve information objectives for French youth.

³Ibid.

Table 28. Media Priorities According to Priority Three Country Criteria⁴

Medium	No. of Times Media Assigned in Priority Three Countries
1. Unspecified Press/Publications	74
2. Film	59
3. Libraries	54
4. Exchange Programs/Grants	48

Table 29. Youth Media Assignments in France, January 1951⁵

Target groups	No. Media Assignments	Film	Press/Publications	Libraries	Exchanges
Youth	201	60	49	48	44

In 1952, U. S. apprehension about primary target group activities in France became the basis of embassy recommendations for Field Program increment. Local operations were the focus of the information program in the 1952 reorganization that created the IIA.

The Field Programs organization⁶ has been frequently referred to as “the art” of the IIA Program. That point should be kept in mind. What we do here or anywhere in this program is of little consequence, unless elsewhere, somewhere, somehow, sometime, it shows up in an impact on the populations of the “target” communities. It is at this point that IIA needs should seek, and should try to deserve, the confidence and cooperation of the

⁴Ibid., 12.

⁵Dr. E. Stern, “Media Impact Study II,” *Foreign Opinion and Market Research* (Spring 1951): New York and The Hague. Record Group 306. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to Box 23. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶The 1952 chart of the reorganized USIS program included a position of Deputy Administrator for Management. Its first occupant was Arthur Kimball, formerly with the Department of German Affairs. There was also a Deputy Administrator for Field Programs that was initially occupied by William O. Johnstone, Jr. Wilson H. Compton, “The International Information Administration 1951 to 1954,” p. 1. 19 March 1952. Papers of Howland H. Sargeant. Box 5. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

responsible Regional Bureaus.⁷

Placement of additional field personnel allowed the USIS/France network the benefit of first-hand information about regional partisanship through contacts with influential local personalities. This created a type of “watchdog” enterprise, where unorthodox ventures to accomplish information tasks were not opposed by the embassy or by the Department of State, provided that they did not embarrass USIS/France, or indicate U. S. involvement in clandestine activities. In effect, during the Campaign of Truth regional personnel had tacit approval and authority to carry out individual projects that were sometimes surreptitious.

In Strasbourg, for example, when the PAO learned through his personal contacts⁸ that the PCF had scheduled a meeting with local unions, he had no hesitancy in infiltrating it. Unable to attend in person because he would have been immediately recognized, he sent a female accomplice to the restaurant where the meeting was held. Unnoticed, she sat quietly in a corner eating dinner while listening to the proceedings. The next day the PAO was able to place stories in regional newspapers that refuted data about U. S. aims presented at the meeting, using information from his source. Moreover, this gave him the opportunity to “one-up” the PCF while promoting the U. S. point of view.

⁷Ibid., 5.

⁸This took place in 1950. It was related to the author by the late Franklin W. Roudybush, PAO/Strasbourg from 1948 to 1953, during an interview in Sauveterre de Rouergue, 17 August 1995.

This type of involvement in community affairs was exactly what USIS officials had in mind when they created the need for increased field personnel. Contact work was the defining point of provincial operations that required an intimate knowledge of the different elements within the French population.

Prioritized target groups in France were divided into primary and secondary categories. While youth, labor and intellectuals occupied the first division, subordinate groups included rural agricultural workers, members of the Armed Forces, clergy and housewives. Reviewed annually, the ranking of individual targets within primary and secondary groups was subject to change in the U. S./France Country Papers, depending on how embassy personnel viewed their activities.

For example, emphasis on labor might exceed that assigned to youth during a particular year in terms of the amount of funding and activities that USIS/France allocated to it, but its priority could be reduced the following year if the embassy downgraded its influence. Examination of the 1951 U. S./France Country Paper⁹ identified youth as the most important of the top three priority groups.¹⁰ However, 1952 U. S./France Country Paper¹¹

⁹ "Country Paper for France," pp. 1-2. 19 January 1951. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office, 1946 to 1955. Box 8. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰Ibid. The others were labor, intellectuals and professionals. Within these categories labor included white-collar employees, artisans, personal service workers and manual laborers. Intellectuals and professionals included statesmen, members of parliament, teachers, journalists, writers, publishers, scientists, technicians and artists.

¹¹ "Country Plan. USIS - France," p. 18. August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

objectives determined labor¹² as the principal target group in the primary category, followed by opinion leaders and policy makers,¹³ educators,¹⁴ students¹⁵ and the Armed Forces.¹⁶

Youth, labor, and intellectuals were also general target groups throughout the USIS Program in Western Europe because of policy planners' overall assessment of their potential influence. More significantly, U. S. interest in French youth, was predicated on the wide-ranging elements that comprised this group:

young adults, youth workers, youth leaders, grade and secondary school students, students in normal schools, universities, district and mission schools; army conscripts between the ages twenty to twenty-two years old.¹⁷

This broad definition disclosed the difficulties that USIS/France experienced with isolating French youth as a target group; its membership overlapped with so many French population elements that its boundaries were almost indefinable. Furthermore, there were between eighty and one hundred National Front organizations working through local chapters that

Files of the USIA 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²Especially workers in key industries and communications.

¹³Part of the intellectual and elite Group.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Part of the youth group.

¹⁶Armed Forces personnel were usually placed in the secondary target group. However, the 1951 unification of USIS with MSA necessitated a more prominent position. In particular, junior and non-commissioned officers were targeted in order to ensure their support.

¹⁷*Targets and Media Study: A Preliminary Analysis of the Country Papers.* Prepared for the International Evaluation Staff. Department of State. August 1952. Record Group 306. Records of the USIA. Box 23. NARA, Washington, D. C.

were made up of diverse population including youth, children, artists, and agricultural workers.¹⁸

Youth inclusion in diverse population groups was the result of large numbers of French young people approaching the age of majority that permitted them to vote, and to be eligible for military service. Substantial numbers confirmed U. S. policy planners' opinions that French youth constituted a dangerous group. First, it suspected youth of pro-Left-wing political orientation. Moreover, the possibility of a youth insurrection from within the French Armed Forces was an ominous threat that made officials wary about the extent of support that they could rely upon from the military.

U. S. uncertainty about French youth forced the Department of State into a compromising position that contradicted its public policy statements. While official speeches¹⁹ contained oft-repeated platitudes that equated the future of the free world with youth backing, government sources actually maintained a skeptical attitude toward youth in general and French youth in particular, because of its doubts about that group's allegiance.

Examples of these reservations underscored the text of the preamble in the U. S./France Country Papers. The introduction to these papers justified the need to build strong relationships with French youth through training "receptive minds," that would, the

¹⁸ "Country Plan USIS - France," p. 9. August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁹Public statements by President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State Howland H. Sargeant all emphasized the importance of youth in building the future of the free world.

narrative predicted, pay future dividends for the U. S. when present-day youth group members achieved influential leadership roles.

Youth groups are naturally of paramount importance. Their receptive minds have not as yet been vitiated by dialectics and by reaching the young, we reach the general public and elite of tomorrow.²⁰

Therefore, despite officials' qualms about youth, the Department of State was committed to keeping youth sympathetic to U. S. objectives. Confirmation of this attitude is demonstrated through policy planners' analysis of target group breakdown in Western European USIS operations. Youth became a priority target in seventy out of one hundred countries where there were USIS programs overseas.²¹ Government officials, who formed a subcomponent of the intellectual elite, and labor, were also specified as target groups in over one-half of these countries.

For example, of the twenty Priority Three countries categorized by the Department of State in 1952, eighteen selected youth as a target; fourteen chose government officials and ten selected labor.²² These choices demonstrate misgivings toward selected groups by the Department of State that were supported in memoranda to U. S. Missions directing that personnel keep organized groups and their activities under close surveillance.

²⁰ "Country Paper for France," p. 2. 9 January 1951. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²¹ *Targets and Media: A Preliminary Analysis of the Country Papers*, p. 5. August 1952. Prepared for International Evaluation Staff of the International Information Administration. Record Group 306. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 23. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²² *Ibid.*

However, embassy insistence that the USIS/France Program must publicly appear to be a personalized endeavor, rather than part of general policy with standardized media activities, resulted in separation of media priorities for use in France from those in other USIS operations. Embassy recommendations were consistently against developing general program activities according to pre-set media concepts for use with established targets. Instead, it suggested a more spontaneous approach that involved media adapted to specific situations. In effect, the embassy wished to avoid increasing public suspicions that USIS/France operations were part of a pre-packaged cultural policy.

Publicly,²³ USIS/France officials argued that the French were too sophisticated for a stereotype approach to cultural activities; therefore, operational requirements demanded specialized projects in order to reach target group objectives. U. S. Embassy officials, conscious of the French tradition of individualism, were experienced enough with French lifestyle to realize that customized planning for individual groups would be a more beneficial tool with which to motivate group sentiment toward U. S.-style democracy.

²³That is, during testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations and in correspondence with the Department of State.

II. Composition of the French Youth Group

(a) Background of French Youth Population

The French birth rate, once the highest in Europe,²⁴ suffered serious setbacks during the second half of the nineteenth century and World War I. In particular, the latter conflict severely weakened the French population by its catastrophic death rate. Total deficit resulting from population loss in World War I amounted to 1.5 million dead and six million injured. Not alone among Western European nations that suffered similar misfortune, France, nevertheless, was one of the few states that did not possess large reserves of children and young people to replace the generation that died in the war.

With the return to France of Alsace-Lorraine in 1918, and the resulting large influx of immigrants, French population increased slightly during the inter-war period. Despite this, the French still maintained the oldest-average age²⁵ in the world in 1946 and the highest proportion of people over sixty-five years of age.²⁶

²⁴ The France of Napoléon I was exceeded in European population only by Tsarist Russia. "French Youth Today - Its Attitudes and Opinions," p. 1. IS-58-55. 14 October 1955. Record Group 59. Department of State. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Exchange Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - France 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²⁵Ibid. The average age was thirty-five years.

²⁶11.3% was figure quoted in *ibid.*

However, the decade following the end of World War II witnessed a dramatic reversal in demography, with an increase²⁷ in the French birth rate paralleled by a decrease in deaths. With the French birth rate again one of the highest in Western Europe, France, for the first time in half a century, had a population pyramid with a solid youth foundation.

The regeneration of French youth had important consequences for political and economic changes in societal patterns. In the years preceding the outbreak of World War II, there was little incentive for investors to risk capital in productive enterprises in a French labor market that had few young people coming of age. Limited expansion meant restricted growth and potential, with minimal opportunities for new ideas to take hold in a political, economic and social climate dominated by older attitudes more relevant to the previous century than to the modern age.

The post-war increase in French youth, however, significantly altered this situation. A youth group that was influential in size and opinion now populated the French labor market, university campuses and the Armed Forces. However, the French job market following the end of the war could not meet the demand presented by this group. Furthermore, youth was vocal in its protests about lack of opportunity in France that it equated with a strained and lackluster economy. Premier Faure recognized this factor when he spoke of the “vital obligation of the nation to implement a creative program of economic

²⁷The birth rate increase actually began under the Vichy Regime during World War II, possibly because of the conservative natalist bent of that regime.

expansion”²⁸ that would adequately challenge the intellectual and physical energies that were revitalizing the old France. More significantly, the re-emergence of French youth resulted in renewed political and social challenges because of Cold War politics.

(b) French Youth Political Orientation

Post World War II French youth was defined by its political acumen. Unlike their parents, this generation was far more politically conscious and factional. Recent world events made them acutely aware of their political and national identities. Moreover, those approaching maturity in the immediate aftermath of World War II were in a unique situation, having experienced the Occupation, the Liberation period and the political and economic crises that dominated the Recovery period.

French youth political consciousness was part of burgeoning international youth interest in world affairs, that forced government officials in Western Europe and in North America to take notice. Youth awareness paralleled the rapid post-World War II development of electronic communications, a fact that allowed international interaction between youth groups. French diplomatic officials recorded individual experiences with U. S. youth that confirmed the growing youth involvement in international affairs:

²⁸Speech by Premier Faure, 12 August 1955 at the inaugural meeting of the “High Committee on the Youth of France and its Overseas Territories.” Cited in “French Youth Today - Its Attitudes and Opinions,” p. 2. 14 October 1955. Record Group 59. General and Classified Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International and Educational Exchange Program. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Il ne fait point de doutes [sic] qu'aujourd'hui, plus encore qu'il y a quatre ans, ces jeunes portent un intérêt particulier, à tout ce qui est européen, et sont, beaucoup mieux avertis, des problèmes de l'Europe que ne l'étaient leurs parents.²⁹

At a conference held at Harvard College, students asked questions about academic theses by French personalities that included Pierre Emanuel and François Mauriac. French Embassy correspondence recorded the U. S. youth trend:

Ils sont de plus en plus inclinés à condamner le système américain de la substitution à peu après dans tous les domaines du quantitatif au qualitatif, de la tyrannie du groupe de l'idolâtrie de la machine. Ils se rendent compte...que cette civilisation ne peut que conduire à une graduelle déshumanisation.³⁰

Similarly, USIS/France officials concentrated their attention on French youth through a series of lectures designed to present U. S. foreign policy objectives to French university students. Surviving correspondence speaks of warm receptions for program officials, claiming, for example, that a visiting USIS/France official was enthusiastically welcomed by students at Université Toulouse where: "Boys and girls not only clapped, but enthusiastically stamped their feet when I finished."³¹ Other youth activities included a slide

²⁹AE, France. Memorandum from Albert Chambon, French Consul/Boston, to Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador, B Amérique 1944 à 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 269. "l'Inquiétude de la jeunesse universitaire américaine," p. 2. AC/MM No. 98. 22 avril 1950.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Letter from Lawrence. S. Morris, Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy, Paris, to A. E. Manell, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, "Lecture At French University," 14 April 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

presentation on the University of California that illustrated a talk before six hundred spectators at the Société de Conférences de Monaco.³² This same material was used again in the USIS/Strasbourg library when the PAO spoke about U. S. universities to a student audience there.

Post-World War II domestic events engulfed French youth, many of whom were embittered about what they considered the subordination of France by the Allied powers. French lack of status on the international scene, the stagnant economy and the uncertain future of French lifestyle, were among the criticisms that youth voiced. It censured government bureaucracy that it believed prevented France from taking a more dynamic and energetic role in the new world. In effect, what the youth group collectively rejected was an outmoded regime whose leadership appeared ill-equipped to meet the challenge of modernization.

(c) French Youth and Neutralism

Politically, French youth tended to sympathize with left-wing political parties, while generally disregarding the post-World War II public trend in France toward neutralism. However, USIS/France officials misunderstood their attitude, often mistakenly advising Washington that French youth group activities indicated a pro-neutralist stance. U. S. suspicions were corroborated by French youth leaders,³³ whose statements advocating an

³²Held in December 1949. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³³Remy Montague and Jean Josselin, leaders of the French Council of Youth Movements (Conseil Français des Mouvements de la Jeunesse) that was the French affiliate to the Free World Assembly of Youth. IRI Intelligency Summary, "French Youth Today - It's Attitudes and Opinions," p. 8. 14 October 1955. Record Group 59. General Records of

international grouping of non-Communist countries appeared to support neutralism. While working for progress in fields of mutual interest, they opposed formation of any outwardly anti-Communist bloc that would tend to accentuate differences between the Eastern and the Western alliances.

Failure of group leaders to outrightly condemn communism reinforced Department of State sentiment that French youth expressed solidarity with young Communist organizations. When the leader³⁴ of the Students' Association at Université Nancy told the PAO that the students wanted to participate in a ceremony³⁵ of unity with their comrades at the University of Prague, USIS/Strasbourg hurriedly distributed U. S. literature³⁶ to the students to try to dissuade them from doing so. Student action of this sort served to increase U. S. conviction that French youth was pro-Communist. Furthermore, policy planners tended to stereotype organized groups' into two factions: those who were pro-U. S. and those who were against it. Government attitude was that any groups that were against the U. S. were, therefore, pro-Communist. Groups whose political orientation was not clearly defined appeared more dangerous than those with known goals. In fact, government officials held

the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Educational Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - France 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³⁴Roger Kruger, President de l'Association générale des étudiants Université Nancy.

³⁵Held on 25 February 1952.

³⁶Literature was Department of State publication, "Our Foreign Policy." Memorandum from G. D. Andrews, U. S. Consul at Strasbourg, 12 February 1952. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2385. NARA, Washington, D. C.

greater doubts about what they perceived as evidence of disloyalty from groups that were not openly aligned with either superpower, than from those that declared their allegiance. French youth failure to commit itself was, in U. S. eyes, an admittance of pro-Communist sympathies.

The Youth Activities Officer in the USIS/Paris office³⁷ confused the situation further by trying to affiliate the French youth stand with traditional neutrality. Stating that the group had a “great desire to avoid war,”³⁸ he misconstrued its anti-war outlook, considering it the same as Swiss neutrality.

Washington officials, however, assumed that French youth *neutralism* was *nationalism*. Reports from the U. S. Embassy and the frenetic attitude generated by the Campaign of Truth became the basis for U. S. belief that the group was militant and biased against U. S. foreign policy. To policy planners, the French youth position on neutralism appeared to escalate the differences between the U. S. and other countries. Statements such as the following spurred U. S. belief that youth was indeed problematic:

³⁷O. Rudolph Aggrey, “Current French Youth Activities,” 25 April 1955. Aggrey, USIS/Paris Youth Officer, carried out a ten-month study of French youth. Cited in IRI Intelligency Summary, “French Youth Today - Its’ Attitudes and Opinions,” p. i. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Educational Exchange Program. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 8.

I don't intend to question the great qualities of the American people but the American stubbornness and their blind belief in their infallibility have led them to commit great errors in matters of diplomacy and politics in general. Up to what point has not their 'anti-colonialism' encouraged the Tunisians, Moroccans and the Algerians. The worst weakness would be to let them obtain our agreement to a policy which we think baneful. In other words, in respecting the liability of the Alliance, we should keep the independence and freedom to act in our own best interests on certain essential points.³⁹

Evidence suggests that planners' nervous speculation about implications of French youth political preferences reflected their increasing anxiety about suspected youth support of local Communist Parties in Western European nations. They relied upon information about key groups from USIS installations that was not always correct or complete. In France, embassy evaluation did not consider that French youth was rebelling against the strict codes of tradition that governed French behavior. Instead, Embassy sentiment was that the group was waiting to declare its position until France had achieved economic and military independence. It believed that youth hoped to see French influence restored in world councils.⁴⁰

Failure of the embassy to be sympathetic to these youth concerns and its apparent willingness to castigate the group for its suspected political orientation became the basis of specially-commissioned polls and research reports⁴¹ to guide U. S. policy direction.

³⁹ French writer Delebeque in *Aspects de la France*, 10 June 1955. Cited in *ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴¹ USIS/France Polls during the Truman Administration included private polls and analyses that were contracted by the Department of State. The Eisenhower Administration placed more influence on evaluation and research. Included were Barometer Polls and Research Reports. There were analyses of library studies and reports on Intellectual and Elite

(d) USIS/France Polls and Youth Support

USIS/France polls measured public support of different political elements in France. In particular, they assessed PCF membership, voter profiles and voting patterns. Sensitive data obtained from surveys that informed embassy officials of trends in support, were not necessarily made public; however, results were submitted as evidence to sustain arguments justifying public funding for specialized operations. Thus, statistics measuring PCF affiliation and percentages of voter support may have been used by USIS/France to its own advantage.

Diverse polls commissioned by USIS/France were carried out by French interviewers who were contracted by the USIS/Paris office. During the Eisenhower Administration, special research projects limited interviewing to a single French city where there was a U.S. information center. For example, a 1957 study targeted the city of Tours because of its diverse population.

Two-person teams equipped with tape recorders questioned selected population groups. Deeper examination of certain respondents, chosen on basis of information obtained from initial sessions, followed. Interviewers' questions focused on broad issues that included North Africa, NATO, and European Union as well as foreign cultural influence in France. Emphasis was on the U. S. role, with special attention to PCF influence and its relation to international communism.

Poll results alarmed officials by suggesting that neutralism among French youth was more widespread than originally thought. Officials admitted that criteria, while not scientific, presented solid indication of group sentiment because of wide contacts with leaders and rank-and-file members of youth organizations throughout France.⁴² Moreover, statistics demonstrated stronger youth support for neutralism than that evidenced among older population groups. A pre-Geneva Summit USIS Four-Nation Poll on the position of France in an East-West conflict concluded the following:

Table 30. Results of Pre-Geneva Summit USIS Poll in France⁴³

Age Groups	Neither Side	Pro-West Side
21-29 years	66.6%	13%
30 to 64 years	+50%	18%
over 65 years	50%	23%

(e) French Youth and U. S. Installations in France

French youth rejected the older generation's pessimism about chances for peace, reacting instead, with enthusiasm, to the future. In effect, re-emergence of positive attitude that accompanied a surge of nationalism and renewed French pride paralleled growth of the French economy. It also influenced the group's growing dislike of U. S. foreign policy.

⁴² "French Youth Today - Its Activities and Opinions," p.i. 14 October 1955. IS-58-55. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Educational and Exchange Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - France 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁴³ Ibid., 10.

Criticism toward the U. S. was stimulated by youth visions for a reinvigorated France, that they hoped would emerge independent and in control of its own destiny. Their general disdain for U. S. foreign policy focused on what many believed were attempts to inundate France with U. S. economic, political and cultural influence. Group opinion of U. S. motives was further confirmed by the War in Korea and the subsequent billeting of U. S. military forces on French soil.

NATO was unpopular with French youth, who tended to regard the notion of collective security as further demonstration of U. S. efforts at subjugation. Increasingly, the youth group resented the involvement of French soldiers in a distant conflict that many young people felt not only had nothing to do with France but was also immoral. To create the necessary manpower that the French government had to send to serve in NATO forces in Korea, conscription was increased from twelve to eighteen months, forcing enlistment of able-bodied males from twenty to twenty-two years of age in the French Armed Forces. This provided the French military with 300,000 young Frenchmen who were called up annually, maintaining the number of French soldiers between the described ages at approximately 600,000 men.⁴⁴

Dislike of the U. S. was further augmented by growing conviction among French youth that the Americans, despite lofty public statements, were not making concrete efforts to promote peace. This perception led to some French intellectual and political youth group

⁴⁴Testimony by William T. Stone, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State, before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 1949. *House. Hearings. Appropriations 1949*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948) 573.

sentiment that they had a moral responsibility to try to restrain rampant U. S. imperialism.

U. S.-policy planners carefully observed French youth trends. Support for neutralism in France, although doubled by 1955, was paralleled by a drop in NATO⁴⁵ support. USIS/France officials attributed this inclination to the influence of French youth.

A Barometer Poll completed in May shed some light on French attitudes toward U. S. Forces in France. Only fifty-nine percent of the French public was aware of the presence of U. S. Forces on French soil. Of these, twenty-eight percent disapproved, fourteen percent approved, and seventeen percent expressed no opinion. This was a two-to one ratio of disapproval among those French people who were aware of and had opinions about U. S. Forces in this country. The ratio was four-to one (thirty-five percent to nine percent) among youths in the twenty-one to twenty-nine age bracket, and almost five-to one in the strongly Communist Paris region. On the other hand, among professional and university-educated people, the ratio was about two-to one in favor of U. S. Forces in France.⁴⁶

U. S. decline in popularity was accompanied by lack of public sentiment for closer Franco-American relations, leading Washington to believe that differences between the two countries were basically irreconcilable. Furthermore, the increase in neutralism that had risen to majority status,⁴⁷ provided U. S. Embassy rationale for the parallel 1957 increase in

⁴⁵Less than one person in five in France approved NATO as the best method to assure security. Whereas NATO appeared to have been better-known than before, there was a greater lack of confidence in the organization. Memorandum from Hugh J. Perry, "The Pre-NATO Poll," 9 December 1957 to Morrill Cody, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, France. Cited in Cody's "Report on USIS/France 1957," p. 47. Appendix A. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁶ "Country Report for France," 2 August 1956. Record Group 59. Department of State. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Exchange Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - France 1957. Box 23. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁷Ibid., 48. Figures given hypothetically in case of war between the U. S. and Russia. They indicated that six to one Frenchmen favored Neutralism.

anti-Americanism. The tendency to equate French youth with both facts became dominant in U. S. opinion as public dislike of the U. S. mounted.

(f) French Youth and Organized Activities

In 1955, USIS/France estimated that not more than ten percent of French youth belonged to organized groups.⁴⁸ However, this did not prevent officials from ascertaining that the French youth group was one of the most effectively organized youth movements in Western Europe.

Though French youth organizations include but a small percentage of French youth, they are effectively organized and have gained important advantages especially for students.⁴⁹

Opportunities for French students included diverse forms of social security benefits available from the French government, as well as government agencies for finding lodging, obtaining reasonably-priced food and benefiting from state reductions applied to intellectual and recreational pursuits. As well, there were student discounts in state-run museums and other government facilities. Numerous religious, political, occupational, recreational and cultural groups in France followed suit in developing programs for French youth.

⁴⁸OIR Report #6552, "Non-Communist Student and Youth Movements in France, 1955. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁹"French Youth Today - Its Attitudes and Opinions," p. iii. 14 October 1955. IS-58-55. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Education and Information Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - 1957. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

By the mid-1950s, membership in youth sections of most French political parties indicated very low levels.⁵⁰ USIS/France officials attributed this to youth apathy and pessimism that was also pervading the rest of the country: "Political apathy and indifference is exemplified by the difficult time political groups have had in recruiting and holding members."⁵¹ However, its feeling that the group was indifferent to French lifestyle was contradicted by the General Secretary of the Paris Student Federation:

The conditions under which youth must live, the outmoded structure of our institutions, our obsolete educational system and the decay of our political institutions, are the cause of strong disgust among French youth and that this disgust expresses itself not in romantic revolt, but in a great lassitude and in a desire to leave the country.⁵²

Other evidence points to French youth's growing involvement in religion. For example, the Catholic Association for French Youth claimed over half a million young Frenchmen as members in 1955. Furthermore, a poll⁵³ indicated that thirteen percent of all French youth were prepared to die for their faith, if exceptional circumstances warranted it.

⁵⁰U. S. figures of French youth political involvement in 1955 included 10,000 members in French socialist organizations. The Gaullist Rally of French Youth that previously claimed 30,000 members indicated only a few thousand in 1955. Cited in IRI Intelligence Summary, "French Youth Today - Its Attitudes and Opinions," p. 4. IS-58-55. 14 October 1955 in *ibid*.

⁵¹Letter from J. Auberger, General-Secretary, Paris Student Federation to *Paris-Press* cited in *ibid*.

⁵²*Ibid*.

⁵³A poll carried out by the magazine *Réalitiés*. Cited in "French Youth Today - Attitudes and Opinions," p. 10. IS-58-55. 14 October 1955 in *ibid*.

USIS/France thought that youth disenchantment with the French domestic scene was responsible for its interest in the political Left. Research singled out poor leadership and deficient management of government affairs as factors that French youth considered responsible for hindering the emergence of an independent, restructured France that would recapture its former international prestige. Its hopes, according to USIS/France, appeared to focus on a young, dynamic leader to provide the necessary leadership: "The young Frenchman wants real leadership badly and sometimes talks as if he would settle for a strong man."⁵⁴ Informal surveys⁵⁵ conducted by French newspapers demonstrated the same trend was growing among young French people.

More than any others youth are suffering from the helplessness of the political system which gave to France twenty premiers in the course of ten years, which means that twenty times the ministerial crisis has been also a moral and political crisis. They don't believe anymore in the government, but in the "strongman" who will be able to put everything in working order..The word "strongman" is ambiguous..Some young Frenchmen mention Mr. Mendès France's name.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Stanley Karnow, "France: The Younger Generation," *Time Magazine*, 30 May 1955.

⁵⁵Including one by *Paris-Presse* in May 1955. The paper polled one hundred young people about their attitude toward the article by Stanley Karnow (in *ibid*). More than sixty of those questioned agreed that a dynamic young leader was needed in France.

⁵⁶Poll conducted by the French newspaper *Paris-Presse* in a referendum on the article in *ibid*.

USIS/France thought that Pierre Mendès France was the preferred French youth candidate. Results of two polls,⁵⁷ conducted before and immediately after his government's downfall, indicated that the youngest age group sampled appeared more concerned about his ouster than either of the other two age groups polled.

Respondents questioned while Mendès France was still in office, demonstrated that those in the youngest age group indicated greater satisfaction with his government than did the middle-aged group. The oldest group, however, contradicted results by indicating stronger levels of satisfaction with Mendès France than did the youngest group.

Table 31. Results of Institute of Public Opinion Poll, January 1955⁵⁸

Age Groups	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Indifferent	No Opinion
20-34 years	56%	13%	26%	5%
35-49 years	51%	16%	27%	6%
50-64 years	55%	10%	30%	5%

While the youngest group appeared unhappier about the loss of Mendès France's leadership than either of the other two groups, analysis of percentages demonstrates that the proportion of those polled who indicated "unhappy," versus those who were "happy," in the youngest age group was about six to one. While, in the second group, the proportion was less than three to one, in the oldest age group, the difference was approximately four and a half

⁵⁷Poll conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion in February 1955. Question was "Were you unhappy or indifferent at the fall of the Mendès France government?"

⁵⁸Poll taken in January 1955 while the Mendès France government was still in office. Question was, "Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or indifferent to Mendès France as Premier?"

to one.

Table 32. Results of Institute of Public Opinion Poll, February 1955⁵⁹

Age Groups	Happy	Unhappy	Indifferent	No Opinion
20-34 years	10%	59%	29%	2%
35-49 years	18%	48%	32%	2%
50-64 years	12%	55%	29%	4%

USIS/France opinion, therefore, identified Mendès France as a role model for French youth. Any talk of a “strongman” was narrowly interpreted by U. S. officials who invariably saw political orientation as either pro-liberal democracy or against it. Hence, their growing fears about the political direction of a government headed by Mendès France, with the support of French youth. Seen in the general context of U. S. worries about French government ambiguity in international politics, the youth group reflected, for many Washington planners, an increasingly dangerous entity.

(g) U. S. Perception of French Youth Attitudes Toward Communism

A 1950 French Gallup Poll⁶⁰ indicated that almost forty percent of French voters who preferred the PCF to any other national political Party, were between eighteen and thirty-four years of age. Wide-ranging U. S. press coverage of this fact alarmed Department of State officials who were already concerned about anti-French sentiment at home. Further evidence of French youth alignment with the Communists might, it feared, result in defeat of Truman-Acheson foreign policy objectives.

⁵⁹Tbid.

⁶⁰Results of a French Gallup Poll conducted in France, released 15 December 1950.

U. S. Intelligence sources, moreover, indicated that the youth group was the focus of Soviet propaganda in France. This information led to categorization of French youth as a primary group in the U. S./France Papers from 1950 to 1953. During this period, information objectives for youth exceeded those for all other priority groups except for organized labor.

However, investigation of the French youth group's motives demonstrates that it was generally anti-Communist, but tolerant in its attitude toward the PCF. Perceived lack of government interest in large-scale poverty supported its opinion that implementation of policies based on social justice were necessary to eliminate poverty and misery. This created consternation in Washington, where talk of social justice was equated with left-wing political parties. Therefore, increased speculation about French youth political loyalties justified greater emphasis on the group by the USIS/France Program.

III. The USIS/France Education Program

(a) Objectives

Prior to the Campaign of Truth, USIS/France interest in education, manifested through the Educational Exchange Program legislated in 1946, focused on university students, research scholars and academic faculty who were awarded grants for study in the U. S. and France. After 1950, however, the information program became closely involved with the French education system, using a special agenda that targeted school children and their teachers in the state-controlled primary and secondary schools.

Making children the center of a USIS/France Education Program was justifiable from U. S. point of view because information objectives highlighted youth as the means to cooperation and understanding in the future. However, USIS/France involvement with younger French students provided the opportunity to monitor classroom activities and to counter possible anti-American attitudes that children might be exposed to at home. More importantly, while it offered the means for inculcating U. S.-style attitudes in impressionable minds, it also gave officials the opportunity to interact with French teachers. Therefore, while school children appeared to be the targets of the France/USIS Education Program, it is more likely French teachers who were the real interest of U. S. officials.

Using the excuse that increased Soviet propaganda activities in France oriented toward French youth necessitated intensified U. S. educational activities, the embassy undertook special programs to encourage French teachers to support U. S. objectives. U. S. resource materials and pedagogical aids were disseminated without charge making publications and films readily available for classroom use. "Gifts" from U. S. educational institutions, publishers and the U. S. government were made to French schools through the Educational Exchange Materials Program organized by the the USIS/France Education Unit.⁶¹ Thus, attention to curriculum and classroom activities were part of a larger plan to curtail what the U. S. Embassy reported were alien political attitudes by French teachers.

⁶¹Ibid. Part of the Cultural Relations section of USIS/Paris, the Education Unit was separate from the Exchange of Persons Program. Its function was to supply information in all phases of the U. S. Education Program in France except the Exchange Program.

USIS/France interest in French primary and secondary school curriculum was accentuated by U. S. Intelligence suspicion that the PCF had infiltrated the teaching profession, where, it claimed, approximately twenty percent of teachers⁶² employed in French secondary schools were Party members. Moreover, these reports hinted that teachers were PCF agents.

Of the intellectual group teachers and professors, of course, constitute a particularly important element in the forming of attitudes. The amount of Party membership among secondary school teachers, and the evidence of the Party's more subtle success among leaders in higher education point at areas where work must be done to restore intellectual integrity.⁶³

Acknowledging French teachers' advantageous position from which to influence young French students against the U. S., officials also feared anti-American attitudes would be nurtured through curriculum materials and inculcation of pro-Left wing political attitudes.

USIS/France suspicions about teachers' political alliances were escalated because they were not authorized to personally visit individual classrooms. Therefore, they were unable to know first hand either what information teachers gave to their students, or, how it was received. Program officials, therefore, attempted to protect U. S. interests in the school system, while appearing to offer attractive opportunities for teachers to learn more about the U. S.

⁶²U.S./France Country Paper, 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶³ "Country Plan USIS - France," p. 17. August 1952 in *ibid.* Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the Department of State. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

The Education Unit persuaded the French Ministry of Education⁶⁴ to place American “Assistants” in French schools in order to “help” French teachers become familiar with the U. S. Assistants, by 1957, were present in secondary and normal schools⁶⁵ where they had charge of curriculum materials and were responsible for ordering resources about the U. S. for classroom use. Furthermore, they reported to regional PAOs about classroom activities, teacher attitudes toward the U. S. and possibilities for increasing student awareness about Americans and their country. As well, considerable evidence exists that the information program had a specific agenda, operating under cover of providing information and assistance, that was really part of a national campaign to disseminate U. S. cultural policy through priority media, and to keep USIS/France authorities informed about the school situation.

(b) Americana Days

Americana Days were originally conceived by the Education Unit to interpret the U. S. to French teachers of English. Publicly, these events were supposed to aid French teachers who knew little about U. S. education. More realistically, they were information activities that offered officials the opportunity to make contacts with French teachers and

⁶⁴ U. S. “Assistants” or, in present-day vocabulary, “Documentalists” were placed in French schools by the French government. However, they were paid by the Department of State and monitored by the U. S. Embassy. Their language of work was English. “Education,” p. 21. USIE/France Semi-Annual Report, June 1951 in *ibid*.

⁶⁵*Ibid*. No numbers of “Assistants” working in French schools are given. However, there is reference to the “special effort” by USIS/France to give them documentation to assist teachers in their English language courses and to help them in their explanations to students about the U. S. As well Assistants were available to interested teachers and student groups for educational field trips and to help organize “some phase of their own educational program.”

to evaluate their reactions to U. S. objectives. Consequently, Americana days were held as frequently as possible in USIS/Paris headquarters⁶⁶ and in regional information centers.

A second type of Americana Day presented a forum to demonstrate U. S. lifestyle to French youth. Themes included celebration of U. S. public holidays and commemoration of Allied war victories. After the War in Korea, preferred subjects for these events were integration of U. S. military forces billeted locally and improved troop/civilian relations. Depending upon the region where the events were held, special days might take on an agricultural or labor theme in order to stimulate regional youth interest in similarities between the U. S. and France.

Promotion of the event usually involved high-level regional profile with attendance of the PAO and local officials, including the town mayor and the chief of police. Area journalists, present at the invitation of the PAO, guaranteed local press coverage.

Examples of Americana Days included the Franco-Americana Day at the Lille International Fair⁶⁷ that featured exhibits on U. S. industry in rural farming. An Americana Day held there⁶⁸ in 1956 reflected USIS/Lille concern over poor civilian relations with U. S. troops in the area by highlighting U. S. Air Force Band performances to generate

⁶⁶Special Americana Programs in and around Paris were also made available to interested French teachers and their students. Examples included field trips to U. S. monuments and American sites, presence of students at ceremonials on U. S. public holidays and visits to U. S. art displays. When American officials visited Paris, groups of school children were invited to hear them speak. Christmas parties with special activities for students were always included in regional and Paris program activities.

⁶⁷Held at Lille, 13 June 1950.

⁶⁸Held at Lille, 20 May 1956.

enthusiasm for their presence. Similarly, an Americana Day⁶⁹ for French teachers of English organized by USIS/Bordeaux also attempted to promote better relations between civilians and military troops.

U. S. Independence Day celebrations in Lyons⁷⁰ featured an Americana Day with political themes that focused on U. S.-style democracy. A flag-raising ceremony on the public square in front of the U. S./Lyons Consulate, was followed by an automobile procession to the two Lyons war memorials where wreaths were laid by U. S. Embassy personnel and Lyons municipal officials. Following the ceremony, there was a free-of-charge screening of the film *They Died With Their Boots On*.⁷¹ Activities specifically oriented toward younger children included a puppet show attended by 600 youngsters.⁷²

The 1952 fourth of July observance in Lyons was an extended two-day celebration that was directed toward increasing public acceptance of U. S. military commitments overseas. Ceremonies began with a statement on the situation in Korea read by the Mayor of Lyons. The movie *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* was shown to Lyons youth.⁷³

⁶⁹Held at Bordeaux, 24 November 1952.

⁷⁰Held in Lyons, 4 July 1952.

⁷¹This was an English-language film produced by the Motion Picture Unit of the Department of State. Surviving correspondence states that 600 people attended the film screening in a downtown Lyons movie theater. Memorandum from C. H. Hall, U. S. Consul/Lyons, 28 July 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Made by the RKO Company for the Department of State. Policy Planning 954. General Records of the Department of State. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Similar celebrations in Bordeaux marked U. S. Independence Day with special Americana programs to earn goodwill for U. S. troops stationed in the area. Other Americana Days included the Franco-American Manifestation at Perigueux.⁷⁴

A program of special youth activities for secondary school students at Bordeaux was planned to attract a youthful audience who were students in the upper three grades of the city's private and public schools. Program agenda included a talk by a lycée teacher,⁷⁵ followed by the screening of a documentary film entitled *Letter from an American Schoolboy*.

The above examples indicate the double nature of the Americana Programs organized by USIS/France. They served to interest younger French youth through a variety of activities and to influence their teachers by providing U. S. educational resources. Thinly disguised as entertainments using American Fair format, these functions had political themes with orchestrated activities that reflected U. S. foreign policy objectives. At their conclusion, events and participants' reactions were evaluated by USIS/France staff who, on the basis of press reports and personal contacts, decided whether or not repeat performances of particular events were justified. A follow-up program ascertained whether materials exhibited at Americana Days were used in classrooms and to what extent teachers were

⁷⁴Held at Perigueux 20 March 1953. It is referred to in the archival correspondence by this name.

⁷⁵Alcide Le Reller who had participated in the 1952 summer session at Northwestern University for Secondary School Teachers of English. Memoranda from John H. Madonne, American Consul/Bordeaux, "Americana Program for Secondary School Students," p. 1. 3 June 1953. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

informed about U. S. lifestyle from their visits. This information was used to plan future Americana Day activities.

(c) Franco-American Youth Cultural Exchanges

USIS/France officials seized the opportunity to gain publicity for the information program through goodwill exchanges. A popular mode for doing so was exchanges between schoolchildren. Precedence for this type of activity was found in the example of the statue of La Fayette⁷⁶ that was originally subscribed by U. S. school children as a gift to the children of France.

An example was the exchange of Liberty Bells between Independence, Missouri⁷⁷ and Annecy-Haute Savoie. Joint ceremonies took place in each city with the individual Mayors present to dedicate the two Liberty Bells and to explain their significance to French and American school children brought to the sites for the occasion.

Intensified U. S. attention to these exchanges created other youth programs. For example, the U. S. Interim Program to Develop Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy included a Round Table Discussion on U. S. primary and secondary education.⁷⁸ As well, there was

⁷⁶Originally situated in the Cour Napoléon of the Louvre, the statue was moved to a new site in the gardens of the Champs Élysées, across from the U. S. Embassy when the Louvre Pyramid was built. Removal of the statue was the subject of long diplomatic exchanges between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Embassy.

⁷⁷Exchange took place on 8 February 1951. Independence, Missouri was the home town of President Truman. The Liberty Bell that was exchanged with Annecy-Haute Savoie today stands before the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence.

⁷⁸Held in November 1958.

greater participation of returned grantees.⁷⁹ A “Junior Legionnaire’s Club”⁸⁰ was also planned. Table 33 gives an indication of the diverse variety of USIS/France activities that focused on youth from 1950 to 1956.

⁷⁹Michel Cojot, former grantee, spoke at an informal get-together for forty French teenagers equally divided between French Lycées and students from the American Community School in Paris.

⁸⁰Letter to Mr. H. Saltzman, President, Frantel Limited, from John W. Jones, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, 15 April 1954. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Table 33. USIS/France Activities Prioritizing Youth 1950 to 1956⁸¹

6 January 1950	Regional French Universities Tour
6 January 1950	Lecture, École du Lac, Le Vesinet
2 June 1950	Université Alsace Lecture ⁸²
July-August 1950	MIT Foreign Students' Project
October 1950	Child Art/Home Economics Competitions
January 1951	Regional School Program
November 1951	Children's Book Exhibit ⁸³
1-24 December 1951	USIS/France pavilion at the Salon de l'Enfance ⁸⁴
June 1952	Children's International Summer Village ⁸⁵

⁸¹Information in Table 33 is a composite of youth activities gathered from data in the U. S. archives. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA office 1946 to 1954. Boxes 3, 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C. Post-1955 reference is from "American Participation in Lille International Student Cultural Festival," p. 1. USIS/Paris Despatch #175. 21 April 1956. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Bureau of Public Affairs. International Educational Exchange Service. European Country Files 1951 to 1956. Fulbright - France 1957.Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸²The Lecturer was the Director of USIS/France Regional Services.

⁸³A joint effort of the Library and Exhibits Units of the Cultural Relations Section, USIS/Paris.

⁸⁴The USIS/France pavilion consisted of a marionette show with cowboy puppets, maps of France and the U. S., twenty-four photos of American children, fifteen paintings by American school children and fifteen special photographs demonstrating children helped by public welfare in the U. S. Memorandum from D. Speyer and P. Child, "The Exhibits Program in France," 29 November 1951. Despatch No. 1446. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁵This was a private project held at the Camp de Sainte-Colombe, Côte d'Azur. USIS/France arranged receptions at the Hotel de Ville through the Marseilles PAO. It also arranged for photographs and interviews with children that were broadcast over Radio Marseilles. Memorandum from David K. C. Bruce, Acting Secretary of State, 23 June 1952. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2384. NARA, Washington, D. C.

18 March 1953	NATO Information. Project III
June 1953	International Concert for Violin/Piano
16 September 1953	NATO Exhibit
15-25 April 1955	International Student Cultural Festival ⁸⁶
August 1955	Youth Specialist Project ⁸⁷
Summer 1955	Camping Specialist Project ⁸⁸ /Grenoble Project ⁸⁹
9-15 April 1956	Lille International Cultural Festival ⁹⁰

⁸⁶A special project of the Cultural Relations Section arranged the participation of three U. S. student artists in the Third International Student Cultural Festival at Université Montpellier. The participation of two John Hay Whitney Fellows marked the first participation of U. S. students in the Festival's three-year history. Memorandum from O. R. Aggrey, Youth Activities Officer, USIS/Paris, "Participation of American Student Artists in International Student Cultural Festival," p. 1. Despatch No. 175. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁷A USIS/France Project with the Conseil Français de Mouvements de la Jeunesse. The latter was a co-ordinating body for twenty-two French youth movements. "Semi-Annual Report on the International Exchange Program," p. 3. 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955. Record Group 59. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. France: Fulbright #2. Box 2. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁸⁸Ibid. Four candidates for this project were selected by Fédération française des Maisons de Jeunesse et de la Culture and by the Office du Tourisme universitaire. Serge Ricque of the Maison des Jeunes and Monique Priou who was a member of Jeunesses Musicales de France were chosen.

⁸⁹The 1955 Grenoble Project was a study trip to the U. S. arranged for fifteen French graduates of the School of Electrochemistry and Electrometallurgy of Université Grenoble. Upon their return, all participants served in the French Armed Forces, a point that was not overlooked by USIS/France, whose officers considered that they would have ample opportunity to share their U. S. experiences with their military and civilian colleagues. "Educational Exchange: Semi-Annual Report on the International Educational Exchange Program 1 July 1955 to 31 December 1955," p. 4. 2 May 1956. Despatch No. 2114. Record Group 59. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. France: Fulbright # 2. Box 2. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁰Organized by the Union nationale des étudiants de France, USIS/France assistance was requested by that group and the Association générale des étudiants de Lille after the U.

Cultural exchanges between young French and American artists,⁹¹ had high Department of State public profile as demonstrations of goodwill between the two countries, but their intention was to serve as examples of U. S. cultural interest and expertise. Determined to thwart what the U. S. Embassy declared were PCF attempts to portray the U. S. as a decadent country without culture, USIS/France used these exchanges to demonstrate the opposite. Because of Department of State restrictions on official patronage for U. S. artists performing in France, the embassy often called upon returned grantees and U. S. music students living in Paris to perform. By doing so, they avoided financial expense necessary in sending official entertainments to France. Despite the saving, performers still had to undergo an embassy security check, albeit not one at Department of State level.

For example, the Music Unit of the Cultural Relations section, offered young artists publicity and the opportunity for recognition by French music critics in return for their professional services.

S. National Students Association announced that it would not send a student representative from the U. S. The 1956 International Festival at Lille was distinguished for the U. S. by the size of delegations from Communist countries. Whereas the U. S. sent only eight participants, the USSR had eleven with forty-four from Czechoslovakia and forty-nine from East Germany. "American Participation in Lille International Student Cultural Festival," p. 1. USIS/Paris Despatch #175, 21 April 1956. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box . NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹¹This was a private enterprise venture; no funds were supplied from the Department of State. Memorandum from the National Music League to William C. Johnstone, Director, OEX. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2396. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Table 34. Music Programs by Young U. S. Artists in France⁹²

Date	Artist	Entertainment
June 50	Purdue University Glee Club	U. S. Embassy Concert ⁹³
June 50	Students, Fondation des États-Unis	U. S. Embassy Concert
26 Jan 51	Pasdeloup Orchestra	Referendum Concert, Paris ⁹⁴
28 June 1951	American students performance	U. S. delegates to UNESCO Concert, Paris
April- May 1952	U. S. Army Choral Group	Negro Spirituals Concerts ⁹⁵
Jan 53	Smith College Singers	Concert / Radio Diffusion Française
16 Feb 53	Patricia Neway, soprano	Performances at the Opéra Comique
March 53	Frank Glazer/Ruth Gevalt	Piano/Vocal concerts in regional France
June 53	Natalie Ryshna, pianist	International Competition for Violin/Piano
3 July 53	Temple University Choir	Concert broadcast over VOA
18- 20 March 55	American music students	Radio Montpellier/ Radio Marseilles concert

⁹²Information from Table 34 is a composite of data from Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Boxes 3, 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹³The Purdue University Glee Club was in Paris en route to represent the U. S. at the Llangollen International Musical Eisteddfod in Wales.

⁹⁴Under sponsorship of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was an event at which works of foreign composers were played before an audience and jury who voted on which one of the compositions in the concert repertoire should be played at a public concert and later included in programs of the major symphony orchestras in Paris. American musical compositions were submitted by the U. S. Embassy. *Symphony No. 1* was chosen to represent the U. S. at the concert. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁵Under sponsorship of Les Jeunesses Musicales. The first of two concerts in Bordeaux was presented in Bordeaux's Grand Théâtre, before 1000 spectators. A similar concert for youth took place in Poitiers where the sponsoring Jeunesses Musicales gave a reception and dance for the choir. Memorandum from Frederick B. Lyon, American Consul/Bordeaux, "Concerts of Negro Spirituals," pp. 1-2. 4 June 1952. Despatch No. 224 in *ibid.*

(d) Programs for Secondary School Teachers

USIS/France officials used contact trips⁹⁶ within the French countryside to develop relationships with French teachers and school principals. Field trips by regional PAOs maintained these connections and were responsible for publicizing materials available from U. S. information centers for use in classrooms, as well as for inviting school personnel to participate in local USIS activities. They also publicized the Exchange of Persons Program among teachers and students and the numerous courses in English and in American Studies⁹⁷ that were initiated in French universities during the Eisenhower Administration.

Thirty-four teachers attended the Convention for French Teachers of English held in Lyons over a three-day period in 1948. The agenda included lectures, songs, English conversation, documentary films and exhibit materials.

⁹⁶For example, a three-day field trip to the Calvados by John L. Brown, Director of Regional Area Services, USIS/Paris in 1951. Brown, accompanied by the regional PAO, visited several primary and secondary schools where he met French teachers and principals. Record Group 84. Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁷“Educational Exchange: 1959 Country Program Proposal,” p. 3. 17 June 1957. No. 2357. Including the Nice and Pau Summer Seminars, and the Summer Course in American Literature and Civilization. English courses for teachers included Teaching English Language and American Civilization in French Schools and Universities. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 2388. NARA, Washington, D. C.

An expanded meeting took place the following year⁹⁸ with pre-planned USIS/France activities that demonstrated program objectives for teachers. The second convention differed from its predecessor in that officials, benefiting from their experience with the group in the previous year, planned activities that they thought would hold specific interest for teachers. Secondly, by 1949, teachers were given higher profile by USIS/France because of their suspected political affiliation with the PCF.

The Cultural Officer had suggested⁹⁹ the idea for a teachers convention to the Rector of Université de Lyon. Shared responsibilities between USIS/France and the university allocated convention activities to embassy officials, while the university was responsible for finding lodging and lecture halls for participants and events. Thus, what was supposed to be a “joint” project in reality divided administration and curriculum agenda, leaving USIS/France in charge of programming while the university was relegated to an administrative role. In this way, USIS/France could control teacher activities, while making it appear that it maintained an effective relationship with the Lyons academic community. In particular, USIS/Lyons officials acted as leaders along with an American exchange

⁹⁸Fifty-nine teachers representing forty-eight public and private French schools in eight départements of southeastern France attended this convention. Memorandum from U. S. Consulate/Lyons, “Teachers’ Convention At Lyons, 20-23 September 1949,” 13 October 1949. A-127. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁹ Terminology used by Philip S. Dur, PAO/Lyons, “Teachers Convention in Lyons, 20-23 September 1949, p. 1” in *ibid.*

teacher¹⁰⁰ who participated in the activities. Evidence that officials thought that the agenda would succeed in impressing the teachers with the value of U. S. education is demonstrated by the following statement:

The above-mentioned members of USIS took part in conducting conversation classes and generally in leading the conversation. They provided the American element in the gathering and were the positive pole in the electrolytic process of depositing a layer of American ideas on the French academic mind.¹⁰¹

This statement is particularly relevant because it provides evidence of U. S. attitude that the superiority of U. S. culture would be easily assimilated by French academics. It demonstrates, therefore, that these same officials did not understand the French groups that they considered priorities for U. S. information work. This type of misconception is apparent in the literature, indicating that there was not only a wide cultural gulf between USIS/France personnel and French population, but that program personnel assumed that U. S. culture was more desirable than any other.

¹⁰⁰Robert Sheets, a returned grantee. He led the singing at the Convention while Darthea Speyer, Acting PAO and Philip Dur, PAO, were in charge of the conversation classes. Other participants from the USIS/Paris office included Anita C. Lauve, Leslie S. Brady and Wilfred Allard, Cultural Officers. The high profile given to this convention is evident from the number of USIS/Paris Cultural Officers who participated in the event.

¹⁰¹Memorandum from Philip S. Dur, PAO/Lyons, "Teachers' Convention At Lyons, 20-23 September 1949." p. 1. 13 October 1949. A-127. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Programs and media activities focused on lectures about U. S. lifestyle. For example, an English lecture, "The Development of International Consciousness in America,"¹⁰² was followed talks entitled, "Return From A Visit to the U. S."¹⁰³ and "Extra-Curricular Activities in American Education."¹⁰⁴ Evening lectures in French were presented by visiting U. S. academics¹⁰⁵ whose topics were, respectively, "Le professeur français dans une université américaine" and "Les relations franco-américaines." Other activities for teachers included a visit to the USIS/Lyons library where there was an *Exhibition of Scientific Books and Classroom Material*¹⁰⁶ on display. Teachers were also shown the film *Abe Lincoln in Illinois* that was preceded by a talk about Lincoln by the PAO. At the end of the evening, pamphlets¹⁰⁷ were distributed to all the teachers who attended the film.

¹⁰²Given by Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment for the Arts.

¹⁰³Given by Leslie S. Brady, Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy, Paris.

¹⁰⁴Given by Philip S. Dur, PAO/Lyons.

¹⁰⁵Professor Germaine Brée of Bryn Mawr College and Professor Gilbert Chinard of Princeton.

¹⁰⁶Sponsored by USIS/Lyons, this exhibit was planned to run concurrently with the Lyons Teachers Convention.

¹⁰⁷Pamphlets were copies of Professor Gilbert Chinard's wartime publication, "L'Amérique d'Abraham Lincoln et la France." USIS/Lyons claimed that twelve hundred people attended the film and took home the pamphlet. Memorandum from Philip Dur, PAO /Lyons, "Teachers' Convention At Lyons, 20-23 September 1949," p. 2. 26 September 1949. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(e) USIS/France Film Program for French Youth

In conjunction with Campaign of Truth efforts to consolidate effective media priorities for target groups, the USIS/France Motion Picture Unit promoted film as the most direct media to reach French youth. It favored documentary film strips with themes supporting improved troop-civilian relations. The Inter-Allied Committee¹⁰⁸ liaised between governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to provide appropriate film documentaries for screening to local population where U. S. troops were billeted.

The Motion Picture Unit organized a film exchange service with the French Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Health. An arrangement with the U. S. Special Representative in Europe, relayed imminent news information to the four major French newsreel companies with footage of events that had Franco-American themes.¹⁰⁹

Film documentaries demonstrated the close relationship between secondary and university education in the U. S. and the military. Life in the army was made to appear attractive, stressing that young American recruits combined academia with military instruction. Recruit camp was portrayed as a popular, necessary activity, where young men cultivated academic subjects, but whose devotion to their country was paramount. Thus, patriotism was linked to the U. S. army concept of information and education through cultural media.

¹⁰⁸Ibid. Formerly the Franco-American Troop Relations Committee. Its name was changed in 1951 to reflect the unification of USIS and MSA. It consisted of USIS/France officials and selected French officials who were charged by the U. S. government with developing appropriate activities for improvement of U. S. Troop and civilian relationships.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

After 1950, showings of U. S. military documentaries were intensified in the attempt to influence the vision of young people. Film selection priority focused on education themes through films supplied to the French educational system. These films were used¹¹⁰ in schools, universities and community situations to convey the U. S. message of freedom.

The advantage of films, as a medium to convey this message, lay in its potential; it could be used, "both in and out of schools, and in the homes because of their [youth] coming position of leadership in French life as they mature."¹¹¹ Therefore, USIS/France officials strove to convince the Department of State of their importance within the program.

Educational films and documentaries are widely used in schools, youth organizations, and in connection with military training. French public schools alone own about two thousand sixteen millimeter projectors, a number which is expected to be substantially increased under funds recently made available. In this field USIS films have found warm welcome through the Cinémas Educateurs operating under the Ministry of Education.¹¹²

¹¹⁰See Appendix 1 for examples. Exact numbers are not given. However, USIS/France correspondence consistently refers to the need for new films because the film inventory for university and French schools was exhausted. USIS/France officials complained to Washington about the lack of new films and the poor quality of those that were still available. Robert P. Speer, USIA, "The U. S. Information Program in France: An Evaluation," 45. 3 February 1958. The USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

¹¹¹ "Report on International Motion Picture Division," p. 4. 9 November 1950. Department of State Information Programs. VOA 1946-1948. Charles Hulten Papers. Box 15. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹¹² "Country Plan USIS-France," p. 16. August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the Department of State. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

(f) Use of French Educational Facilities

USIS/France film operations during the early 1950s relied on mobile units and the Cinéma Éducateurs¹¹³ that distributed U. S. documentary films throughout the state-controlled school system. As well, the Musée Pédagogique¹¹⁴ was a repository for USIS documentary films bought by the French government for use in French public schools.

However, there is evidence that the U. S. Embassy used these institutions as clearing houses from which U. S. cultural media was distributed to schools across the country. The Motion Picture Unit took it for granted that French schools welcomed¹¹⁵ U. S. films, viewing French education facilities as a popular mechanism for disseminating U. S. educational materials.

A series of available training films focused on similarities of teaching methods in France and the U. S. Films on U. S. teaching methodology that did not demonstrate radical differences between approaches in the two countries were emphasized. Moreover, films for use with French teachers depicted cultural emphasis in U. S. curriculum; instruction and

¹¹³Cinéma Éducateurs were seventeen centers associated with the French Ministry of Education. They were used by USIS/France for film distribution. USIS/France loaned the films to the Cinéma Éducateurs for distribution. In return, each center was equipped with qualified personnel and facilities for projecting and keeping films in good repair.

¹¹⁴The Musée Pédagogique made all films available to the French public school system without charge through the Cinémas Éducateurs. However, it had only partial control over the latter and could not tell that organization what films to purchase or circulate. Memorandum from A. E. Manell, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Films for the French School System," p. 1. 26 May 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁵"Report on International Motion Picture Division," p. 5. Charles Hulten Papers. VOA 1946 to 1948. Box 15. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

development of individual student talent in music, drama, journalism, forensics and other cultural subjects were highlighted.

The Musée Pédagogique obtained a selection of films made by the U. S. Office of Education¹¹⁶ with the intention of preparing same theme French versions. Using the excuse that it had to verify that there was no duplication in Department of State productions, the embassy stipulated that all proposed scripts must be submitted by the Musée Pédagogique to the Motion Picture Unit prior to recording. Comments by the Unit that it was ready to “assist in reviewing scripts prior to screenings,”¹¹⁷ were a diplomatic way of effecting U. S. policy directives. Furthermore, the Embassy expressed satisfaction with this arrangement, stating that it found the Musée Pédagogique, “cooperative.”¹¹⁸ Therefore, from U. S. viewpoint, French officials did not object to U. S. interference in the French educational system.

Archival correspondence indicates that USIS/France found it easier to exert control over the Musée Pédagogique than over the Cinéma Éducateurs. This was most likely because the former was dependent upon the information program for documentaries that

¹¹⁶The U. S. Embassy in Paris received information that the Musée Pédagogique intended to obtain certain training films made by the U. S. Office of Education and other U. S. agencies in order to prepare French dubbed versions. Memorandum from A. E. Manell, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, p. 1, 25 June 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁷U. S. Embassy, Paris Memorandum to Department of State, 26 May 1952. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2383. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, 2.

were provided without charge. The embassy Film Officer, however, reported difficulties in dealing with the Centre Cinématographique and its censorship board. Poor interpersonal relationships between that organization and the embassy caused negative feeling. Program officials considered their French counterparts uncooperative in granting commercial licences¹¹⁹ to U. S. political films. As well, they thought that adverse French attitudes about French dubbing on films produced in the U. S. were a result of multiple protests emanating from French film unions.

Centre Cinématographique criticism about U. S. films focused on their cultural deficiencies rather than on U. S. influence in French curriculum. The lack of concrete government intervention into U. S. activities in French education adds further support to the idea that it turned a blind eye to U. S. cultural influence in France in order to pursue its overall policy objectives of French economic Recovery.

(g) Concrete Examples of Films for French Youth

(g.i) Political Films

Following the merger of USIE and MSA in 1951, U. S. films distributed for use in French educational institutions adapted more militant themes with a dominant political point exemplified through documentaries that explained U. S. foreign policy and upheld U. S. lifestyle.

¹¹⁹ William R. Tyler, "Distribution of Newsreel-Type Films," 25 November 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

PCF statements objecting to regular shipments of USIS films free of charge to local schools called for a boycott because films demonstrated U. S. “decadence.” Coincidental with this public appeal was the rifling of a USIS/France film shipment to a local school in Gien. One documentary was found missing and a PCF-member railroad employee, who was on duty when the attack took place, was later arrested for theft. The U. S. Embassy claimed that the PCF orchestrated the robbery in an attempt to draw attention to what the embassy said was an “anti-Hollywood” press campaign.¹²⁰

Political films for youth included *The Impressionable Years* and *Flight to New York*, documentaries that highlighted civic responsibility, leadership, and development of recreational and social values demonstrating the role of the individual citizen in a liberal democracy. Commercial releases of some Department of State productions were political-interest films including *The Path to Peace*, *Presidential Election* and *Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thirty-Fourth President of the U. S.*¹²¹

Directives presented by film personnel at the House Subcommittee Hearings on Appropriations in 1951 for selection of film documentaries emphasized increased use of military documentaries in French. Because USIS/France indicated that the highest youth interest in the U. S. was in education, a variety of films were supplied for the educational

¹²⁰USIS/France claimed that *L'Humanité* had stepped up its ongoing anti-Hollywood Campaign by extending it to USIS documentaries. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²¹These three films were sent to France through a joint initiative by USIS and the Motion Picture Association of America.

system in France. These were used in community group situations, schools and universities. What the U. S. referred to as its “message of freedom”¹²² aimed directly at the target audience to demonstrate U. S. lifestyle, often using current news topics in order to illustrate it. A new project initiated by Mondial Films in 1952 with USIS/MSA assistance consisted of a series of ten-minute newsreels that featured local interest events interspersed with themes of productivity, military preparedness and U. S. aid.

(g.ii) Sports Films

Sports films promoted U. S. athletic events and games that were popular with French youth groups in France. They provided a well-liked theme through which USIS/France officials could advocate U. S. lifestyle, by focusing on the issue of fair sportsmanship and non-discrimination¹²³ in sports events. Sports films adapted well to additional documentaries that dealt with related subjects including the Boy Scouts of America, camping, travel and youth activities. For these reasons, the Motion Picture Unit recommended acquisition of additional sports films in French, “even at the sacrifice of other

¹²²Wording used in witness testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, 1951. *Senate. Hearings. Appropriations 1951*. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 715.

¹²³Correspondence between the U. S. Embassy and the Department of State indicates that Sports Films were sought after by USIS/France officials who particularly liked the themes of fair sportsmanship and non-discrimination between team members. By highlighting this aspect of U. S. sports they could deflect embarrassing questions about segregation and racism in the U. S. from French audiences. *Informations et Documents* often published articles that emphasized how children played baseball together in the street and how this favorite American past time prepared them for getting along with their fellow citizens in future life. *Informations et Documents*. Numéro 50: La jeunesse américaine. May 1956. (Paris: USIS Press 1956), 61-62.

subjects.”¹²⁴

For example, films about baseball identified this game with the common man, stressing that it was the national pastime of Americans. Associations of patriotism and civil liberties with sports films were used to emphasize that every good American felt pride in national baseball teams and that every citizen was free to support the team of his choice. USIS/France officials advocated more sports films and recommended that the quota on these films be increased because they reflected an essential part of American life. Films were produced in conjunction with directives¹²⁵ that specified sports selected should be those that did not require expensive equipment or facilities.

USIS/Paris received a steady demand for films about baseball, boxing track and field events, soccer, canoeing, swimming and diving competitions. These activities were promoted as basic to U.S. youth lifestyle.

Le sport, aux yeux de tout jeune américain, est à la fois un bon de santé, un plaisir, parfois un moyen de gagner sa vie si l'on a des dons, et en quelque sorte une éthique nationale.¹²⁶

¹²⁴Memorandum from William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “Acquisition of Additional Sports Films,” 22 November 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁵ “Report on International Motion Picture Division, 9 November 1950.” Department of State. Papers of Charles Hulten. VOA 1946 to 1948. Box 15. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹²⁶ “Activités sportives,” *Informations et Documents*. Numéro Spécial: La jeunesse américaine. May 1956. (Paris: USIS, 1956), 61.

As many well-known youth organizations in the U. S. also existed in France, officials hoped that sports emphasis would promote closer ties between the youth of the two countries.

Table 35. Sample of USIS/France Films for Youth, from 1949 to 1955¹²⁷

Date	Film Title	Audience
1949	Chimp the Aviator	school children
1950	Flight to New York ¹²⁸	school students and youth
1950	New York State College of Home Economics	students, Home Economics teachers
1950	The Home We Love	children and general public
1950	Christmas in the U. S.	children and general public
1950	Cartoons	children and general public
1950	Sports Films	school children, youth groups
1952	The Impressionable Years ¹²⁹	children and general public
1955	The Fulbright Program ¹³⁰	students, teachers, academics and researchers

¹²⁷Information in Table 35 is a composite of data gathered from Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Boxes 3, 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁸Produced by Trans World Airlines, this film was a twelve-minute color documentary that described life in New York City. It was only recommended for young audiences because of what the U. S. Embassy described as “the rather bombastic nature of the running commentary.”Memorandum from William R. Tyler, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “Assistance Given TWA in Distribution of TWA Films.” Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹²⁹USIS/Paris opinion was that this film would help development of library services for children in France. Memorandum from A. E. Manell, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “Motion Picture - The Impressionable Years,” 25 June 1952 in *ibid.*

¹³⁰This documentary was released to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Fulbright Program. It was oriented at students and educators in order to draw additional attention to student exchanges.

Table 36. USIS/France Regional Film Program, 1950¹³¹

Date	Place	Screenings	Audience
1950	Algiers	7	850 students
1950	Bordeaux	37	1395 school children
1950	Lille	90	2423 children and students
1950	Strasbourg	120	8640 school children/ youth organizations
1950	Marseilles	36	2701 school children/ youths
1950	Lyons	42	852 school children/ students

USIS/France enthusiasm for the Film Program gradually declined. Local inhabitants had seen all the available films, projection equipment and mobile units became obsolete and Washington did not appropriate the necessary funds to renew operations.¹³² Moreover, U. S. priority in film media moved away from what it termed “large non-priority groups such as primary-school children”¹³³ to more significant viewers that included greater numbers of labor, agricultural and professional groups in concurrence with changing U. S./France Country Papers group priorities. The French distributor, Mondial, was persuaded by USIS/France officials to abandon seventy percent of its traditional primary school film

¹³¹Information in Table 36 is from “Film Showings,” 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. France (Embassy). General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. (France) Embassy. Box 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹³²Budget cuts in the amount of money appropriated for USIS resulted in restrictions in the film program. USIS/France officials attempted to convince Washington that film program operations could be effectively improved by only small amounts of money. However, by 1957, the film program was at a standstill. Morrill Cody, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, “The Exchange Program,” p. 6. Appendix 6. 15 February 1957. USIA Library, Washington, D. C.

¹³³“Comments on USIS Semi-Annual Report 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955,” p. 2. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs International Educational Exchange Service. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

showings¹³⁴ in order to concentrate on more significant target groups.

IV. USIS/France Press and Publications Program for French Youth

Intensified press and publication activities aligned to the Campaign of Truth included the establishment of exhibits in primary schools and lycées. English language materials ordered from the U. S. for use in French schools included *Short Readings in American History and Selections from American Literature*.¹³⁵ As well, a poster campaign informed youngsters about life in the U. S. Themes exemplifying family life, religious and educational training explained how traditional values must be kept secure from negative influences. Using graphics, rather than text to explain, these posters were illustrated by Department of State artists to appeal to children through use of color, simple design and attractive characterization. Other themes included explanation of how atomic energy would be used for peaceful purposes and how organizations such as the U. N., UNESCO and the European Commission on Atomic Energy¹³⁶ were working toward these objectives.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Only fifty copies of each of these texts were ordered because of the mass distribution of locally-produced French editions by USIS press.

¹³⁶Henceforth known by its acronym, EUROCOM.

A 1951 issue of *L'Humanité*¹³⁷ stated that USIS/France and ECA publications were reaching large enough French audiences to evoke a general warning to the PCF about their effect. It also claimed that they attracted widespread attention of French youth.¹³⁸ This showed the results of intensified USIS/France press activity following inauguration of the Campaign of Truth.

However, as U. S. foreign policy objectives gradually turned away from Western Europe to renewed military conflicts in Asia and Africa that required increased use of NATO troops, USIS/France relied on more diverse strategies to reach French youth. Cultural activities that encompassed themes of politics, leisure activities and military involvement, became more commonly used in France to depict role models for French young people. The following statement provides an example of this type of material disseminated to French youth.

La vie américaine comporte pour les Français trois mystères: les différences existant entre le Parti républicain et le Parti démocrate, les règles du baseball et l'organisation du service militaire.¹³⁹

Carefully crafted to reflect U. S. foreign policy objectives, it linked freedom of choice to politics, sports and duty to one's country. Under cover of explaining U. S.-youth pastimes, it disseminated the U. S. message of liberal democracy by focusing once again

¹³⁷*L'Humanité*, 18 January 1951. Cited in "Evidence of Effectiveness of U.S. Information Program in France," 25 January 1951. Record Group 59. Department of State. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office, 1944-1955. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D.C.

¹³⁸Ibid. Article referred to was entitled, "In Our Schoolyards."

¹³⁹ "Soldats-étudiants," *Informations et Documents*. Numéro spéciale: La jeunesse américaine. May 1956. (Paris: USIS, 1956), 53.

on individualism, a concept that the U. S. Embassy thought would attract French youth because of its historical importance in both countries.

From 1952 to 1954, students¹⁴⁰ comprised the largest single group of library readers¹⁴¹ in U.S. regional centers. Research studies by USIS/Lille indicated that students comprised forty-six percent of total population attendance,¹⁴² while another study indicated that the proportion of students using the library was exactly one-third¹⁴³ of the total borrowers. These studies formed the nucleus for reorientation of the Book Program¹⁴⁴ to focus on reaching youth through specialized publications. Table 37 demonstrates quantities of U. S. books and materials reprinted for use in French educational institutions.

¹⁴⁰Note that “students” and “youth” are often used interchangeably in USIS/France documentation.

¹⁴¹ “U. S. Semi-Annual Evaluation Report for Period 1 December 1952 to 31 May 1953,” p. 5. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid. Analysis done at USIS/Paris office in February 1953.

¹⁴⁴ “Comments on USIS Semi-Annual Report 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955,” p. 6. Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. International Educational Exchange Service. Box 3. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Table 37. U. S. Publications Distributed to French Educational Institutions¹⁴⁵

Publication	Quantities
Bantam Pocket Books	34,000 copies
New World Library Books	27,200 copies
Pocket Webster Dictionary	27,200 copies
Our America	27,700 copies
Five-color U. S. Wall Map	100, 000 copies
Narrative Cartoons	5,000 copies

As part of the Campaign of Truth offensive in 1950, U. S. book publishing companies donated¹⁴⁶ inexpensive reprints¹⁴⁷ of American classics and contemporary writings in English for distribution to municipal and school libraries, work camps, student hostels and U. S. information centers. For example, 6,750 copies¹⁴⁸ of this type of publication were part of a joint donation by Bantam Books, Pocket Books and the New American Library to educational centers in the French provinces. Table 38 demonstrates some of the U. S. gifts to French educational institutions.

¹⁴⁵Information in Table 37 is from *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶USIS/France correspondence refers to “donations.” However, the Department of State actively solicited the help of U. S. businesses and firms after 1950 under the guise of patriotism in order to help fight the ideological war against the Communists. (See Chapter One of this document for discussion of Department of State advertising campaign). Therefore, while these publications were officially “donations,” the companies involved received information from the Department of State asking for materials. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁴⁷The U. S. Embassy reported 115,000 copies of these reprints distributed to educational centers in France in 1951. “Book and Publications Unit,” p. 17. USIS/France Semi-Annual Report, December 1951 in *ibid.*

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*

Table 38. U. S. Gifts to French Educational Institutions and Universities¹⁴⁹

December 1949	USIS/France gift ¹⁵⁰	Université d' Aix-en Provence
6 January 1950	USIS/France Book loan	Lycée Compiègne
10 March 1950	Book ¹⁵¹	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
June 1950	Books ¹⁵²	Prizes in secondary schools
16 Feb 1951	Law Books ¹⁵³	Université de Lyon
16 July 1952	Bibliothèque Erskine ¹⁵⁴	Université de Dijon
June 1952	USIS/France Book prize ¹⁵⁵	French secondary student
17 February 53	USIS/France Book gift	Bourg-en-Bresse Library
15 April 1955	Library Exchange ¹⁵⁶	France

¹⁴⁹Information in Table 38 is a composite of information gathered from Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Boxes 3, 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵⁰Three hundred books on U. S. law.

¹⁵¹*Nationality Rooms of the University of Pittsburgh*. Presented to Jean Marx, Technical Advisor to the Cultural Relations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in honor of the French Room Project at the University of Pittsburgh. The book was presented to André Martin, of the Bibliothèque Nationale, for circulation there. Memorandum from Leslie S. Brady, Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Presentation of Book, *Nationality Room of the university of Pittsburgh*, 27 March 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵²*Ibid. This is America*. One thousand copies were awarded upon completion of the French school year.

¹⁵³Gift of the Louisiana Heritage Foundation.

¹⁵⁴A special collection of American Literature endowed by Mrs. John Erskine in memory of her husband, author John Erskine.

¹⁵⁵The prize was *This Is America* awarded annually to a French secondary school student.

¹⁵⁶Exchange of libraries on Atomic Energy between the U. S. and France.

USIS/France library books for youth contained themes oriented toward the fight against persecution practiced by non-liberal powers. Oppression was a favorite choice; yet, U. S. political interests could overrule program strategies. In 1956, the U. S. Embassy rejected presentation of *The Diary of Anne Frank* in the scheduled Paris Drama Festival because of its fears that negative political implications for U. S. foreign policy might result from its appearance.

After reading diary Anne Frank and discussions with persons who have seen it, I have reversed my earlier preliminary view and feel it should not be presented Paris drama festival because it might be exploited by Leftist elements as an insult to Germans.¹⁵⁷

Another example of USIS/France intimate attention to political objectives, rather than to public statements, was its efforts to avoid giving the impression that it was critical of youth. One clear indication of this was embassy reaction to a nationally televised French interview with American writer Pamela Moore that also occurred in 1956. Moore, a nineteen-year old U. S. citizen living in France, was the author of a recently-released novel entitled *Chocolates for Breakfast*. Interviewed about her work,¹⁵⁸ her statements about U. S. lifestyle were regarded as negative and inflammatory by the embassy.

¹⁵⁷Telegram from U. S. Ambassador Douglas Dillon to Secretary of State, 6 March 1956. No. 4036. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 5799. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵⁸The author was interviewed by French television as part of a campaign arranged for her by the French publisher, Julliard, in order to publicize the recently released French edition of her novel. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 5799. NARA, Washington, D. C.

During the interview, Miss Moore made invidious comparisons between American and French youth. The Americans were decadent with serious drinking and promiscuity, none of which, in her opinion, exist in France.¹⁵⁹

Despite their adverse reaction, embassy criticism of Moore was kept private in France for several reasons. First, the embassy did not wish to give support to Leftist political charges that it did not permit criticisms about the U. S. by Americans living abroad. In particular, it did not want to be portrayed in the French press and on the new medium, television, as intolerant of freedom of speech. Nor did it wish to incur the wrath of French youth by seeming insensitive to a young person's opinions.

For these reasons, condemnation of Moore was kept low key. Even privately, in correspondence with USIA, the embassy took care not to over react to the young author's comments. Instead, it blamed the French television¹⁶⁰ host for his blunt statements, claiming that Moore was easily manipulated: "She was more naïve than nefarious, young and opinionated."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹Memorandum from Heath Bowman, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Report of T. V. Interview With American author," 20 May 1956. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 5277. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁰French talk show host, Pierre Desgroupes.

¹⁶¹Memorandum from Heath Bowman, ACPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris, "Report of T. V. Interview With American author," 20 May 1956. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box 5277. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Conclusion

U. S. priority of the French youth group is significant because of the scope of the USIS/France program toward it. Although the intellectual elite and labor were officially given highest priority in the U. S. Country Papers in different years during the period under study, the extent of the program for French youth indicates that this group remained its highest priority. Underlining this is the fact that U. S. cultural policy penetrated the French school system, ostensibly to influence young children with specially-prepared pedagogical aids, but more likely in an effort to reduce suspected teacher affiliation with the PCF and promote good feeling toward the U. S.

U. S. involvement in the French school system demonstrates the length to which the U. S. extended its influence without being challenged either by the French government or by public criticism of interfering in French domestic affairs. It sends a clear message of U. S. intention to consolidate its influence across France through U. S. cultural policy.

Furthermore, U. S. prioritization of French youth reveals the cultural gulf between program officials, youth and teachers. USIS/France officials did not understand the groups that they were so concerned with. Nor did they comprehend the complex nature of the situation in France that was responsible for organized groups' attitudes. Moreover, program directors' desire to serve their own interests and keep Washington from interfering in program affairs appears to have clouded their point of view.

Chapter Six

French Government Reactions to U. S. Cultural Policy in France

French government reaction to U. S. cultural policy in France was an integral part of French foreign policy toward the U. S. Its orientation was marked by severe tension in its relations with the Department of State. It was executed through a planned procedure that prioritized keeping U. S. aid coming to France. To do so, it mobilized its forces on two fronts: in the U. S. the French Embassy was responsible for developing strategies to achieve French government objectives; in France, French leaders gave preeminence to the economic situation, putting Recovery ahead of fears that U. S. cultural policy would destroy traditional French lifestyle.

I. French Government Negotiations with the U. S.

U. S. officials attributed responsibility for strained relations between France and the Department of State to French leaders' failure to adapt to the new post-World War II order. However, they underestimated government view of the French domestic crisis as well as French leaders' political and diplomatic ability. The French government was far more sophisticated and politically astute than U. S. officials tended to believe. Its determination to meet U. S. foreign policy objectives directly, with a policy of its own that would not succumb to pressure exerted through cultural policy, were the reasons that motivated French strategy.

The unabashed joy of the Liberation temporarily masked French realization of the post-war devastation. In the excitement of the public celebrations that continued for several weeks, the population failed to immediately grasp the enormity of what had happened. Consequently, when reality began to take hold, many people found it almost impossible to

comprehend the totality of the loss. French status as an international power disappeared, the former empire was in disarray and domestic chaos was universal.

Traumatized by the situation, the population soon withdrew from its earlier enthusiasm into deep pessimism. For the coalition government, trying to create order amidst the turmoil, the situation was far worse than any of the men who returned with General de Gaulle from exile in London imagined.

After de Gaulle's 1946 departure, successive governments continued to assign priority to the economic sector because of the immense physical damage to the French countryside, towns and cities, as well as the harm inflicted on the French mentality. Lack of housing, uncertain food supply and unemployment were compounded by coal and petrol shortages for which the government, without funds, had few solutions.

Government objectives to restart the economy were stymied by the worsening domestic economic and political situation. Limited available resources created desperate living conditions that were accentuated by acute food shortages necessitating continued strict rationing. Farm land was unusable without heavy machinery, fertilizer and potash necessary to revitalize burned fields and crops. Rampant inflation, caused by instability of the franc, forced poverty and misery.

The increasing evidence of political impotence reinforced the mood of public pessimism and lowered the level of confidence. Rumors circulated in Washington¹ that either another war, or, a Soviet invasion, would soon assault France. American journalists

¹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. États-Unis. Vol. 214. Memorandum from Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador, to Georges Bidault, Président du Conseil. 19 December 1947.

reported incidents² in France that attributed fear of a Soviet invasion as rationale for a certain “fickleness”³ on the part of French industrialists who were reluctant to make any investment moves that might later be construed by USSR occupiers as anti-Communist. U. S. reporters also submitted newspaper articles that focused on the inability of the French government to control the internal French situation, mentioning, in particular, the increasing anti-Americanism and questioning the reliability of France as an ally. The French government, aware of the “défaitisme” pervading society, could not provide the moral economic, or political direction to contradict these statements.

French leadership reacted to reports⁴ that anti-American sentiment among the French working and middle classes was responsible for political neutrality. To counter this, it needed a common theme that would unite the population through promoting French nationalism rather than neutrality. It turned to support of European unity as a “balance” between East/West antagonism that would make France a nation, “non-divisée contre elle-même.”⁵

²AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511.* Victor Riesel, “Moola-Laden American Tourists Making Frenchmen See Red.” *The Los Angeles Daily News*, 20 July 1953. Riesel was held in high esteem by the French government because of his pro-France articles. He later became chevalier de la Légion d’honneur.

³Ibid. Terminology used by Victor Reisel in his article.

⁴Ibid.

⁵AE, France. *Secrétariat Général 1946 to 1965. Vol 51. Note.* “Position de la France dans la Guerre froide.” 21 April 1950.

Negative public reaction, coupled with the magnitude of problems calling for solutions, resulted in a succession of governments that remained in office for only short periods. The Ramadier, Schuman and Queuille cabinets suffered quick defeats over a period of thirty months. These events were interpreted as signs of French political instability by U. S. Embassy officials, claims that French diplomats in Washington dismissed as evidence of American misunderstanding of the situation.

French government attention was occupied, not only by the domestic crisis, but by the implications of the international political situation. Domestically, PCF popularity during the early post-war period increased in part because of Party assistance for the needy. Soup kitchens and facilities for the homeless earned positive French press reports, contrary to others that criticized the lack of government measures during the domestic crisis. It attracted the attention of the U. S. Embassy where PCF approval ratings demonstrated evidence of augmented Communist support in France.

Worried that France might be further eclipsed by escalating Cold War politics, the French Embassy in Washington warned its government that PCF popular support spelled danger for Franco-American relations. Department of State concern with containment of communism made it likely that the U. S. would react if its sources indicated that there was possibility of a Communist takeover. This opinion was corroborated by French policy planners in the Direction Générale d'Amérique who reported that French neutralism alarmed Department of State officials who tended to divide the world into two diametrically opposed camps.

Le monde se trouve divisé en deux camps d'importance et de force sensiblement égale, et ne laissant place à aucune force intermédiaire ou neutre. Entre ces deux camps, il y a - à vues humaines - peu de chances d'accommodement. L'un d'entre eux, animé par un puissant mouvement totalitaire, tend par son orientation essentielle, à la domination universelle; l'autre dont les principes demeurent pluralistes, prend également conscience de sa vocation civilisatrice s'étendant à l'ensemble du monde.⁶

PCF support prompted French government speculation that it would provide the excuse for increased USIS/France efforts, ostensibly to demonstrate U. S. concerns about the Cold War, but more likely to assure U. S. security through cultural activities designed to resist what the Americans thought was an augmented Communist propaganda program.

Le camp totalitaire, en effet, a supprimé chez lui toutes libertés; il s'appuie sur des masses rigidement encadrées; il dispose, de plus, dans les pays libres, de forts contingents qui lui obéissent ouvertement et s'emploient à briser toute résistance aux entreprises de l'Union Soviétique. Le camp occidental ne peut utiliser les mêmes moyens. Son action au premier stade est moins d'exercer une propagande sur les pays soumis à l'URSS que d'assurer par tous les moyens sa stabilité et sa force de résistance.⁷

However, the French leadership's assessment of the situation recognized the value of U. S. presence in France, because it presented a warning not only to the PCF and other organized left-wing groups,⁸ but to the Soviet Union, at the same time maintaining French security while demonstrating U. S. confidence in France. For example, action by the Pinay government against left-wing protesters, when the leaders of the Communist Party were

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸This view was corroborated by U. S. journalist Constantine Brown. AE, France. B Amérique 1944 à 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 43. "This Changing World," p. 1. *The Evening Star*. 20 October 1949.

arrested in 1951,⁹ was supported by U. S. presence.

Yet, French neutralism presented a serious risk evidenced by the fact that USIS cultural policy placed more emphasis on internal affairs of politically undefined countries than it did toward others that were considered part of the “enemy” camp.¹⁰ French government opinion¹¹ was that as long as there was a balance of power between East and West, U. S. support of France was assured. However, the alliance of China¹² with the Eastern bloc shattered this viewpoint. Whereas French leadership had relied on the U. S. as the dominant world power, the expanded¹³ Soviet bloc increased its apprehensions about future French security.

Jusqu'à 1949 la balance des forces semblait en faveur des États-Unis. La rupture de l'équilibre s'est produite par le passage de la Chine dans le camp totalitaire et par la perte du monopole atomique américain. Depuis le début de 1950 ce renversement est un fait accompli; l'Union Soviétique commence à en tirer les conséquences; l'opinion américaine commence à saisir à portée-peut-être fatale-du phénomène.¹⁴

⁹Discussed in Chapter Four.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1965. Vol. 51. “Position de la France dans la guerre froide.” Note. 21 April 1950.

¹²In 1949.

¹³The Chinese/USSR alliance in 1949 increased manpower potential and seriously alarmed the French. AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1965. Vol. 51. “Position de la France dans la guerre froide.” Note. 21 April 1950.

¹⁴Ibid.

Furthermore, the government suspected that U. S. foreign policy direction would move away from Europe, to Africa and Asia in order to protect American interests there through opposing Communist advances in the former French and British empires.

L'entrée de la Chine dans le camp russe a pour première conséquence interne de ramener la politique soviétique dans la voie jadis indiquée par Lénine: détacher des nations occidentales; les populations coloniales ou semi-autonomes, de façon à étouffer le capitalisme, privé de sa base essentielle d'exploitation.¹⁵

Signs of U. S. withdrawal created consternation within French government circles. French leadership feared that a Communist takeover in Western Europe would result in a physical confrontation between the two super powers and the eventual elimination of U. S. economic markets, leaving France weak and defenseless: "La problème pour la France est qu'elle risque d'être écrasée dans ce double mouvement."¹⁶ Therefore, development of a policy that would keep U. S. aid coming to France, so that the country could recoup its independence through a quick and effective economic recovery was imperative.

II. French Policy and U. S. Conditions for Economic Aid

(a) French Awareness of U. S. Conditions

U. S. financial support offered to France was contingent upon conditions stipulated by the Department of State. Provided that France would pledge its complete allegiance to U. S.-dominated political organisms¹⁷ and to foreign policy objectives that supported them,

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷The U. N., NATO, the EDC and European Union.

the government would advance unlimited economic and moral aid to rebuild the country. However, until the U. S. had assurances of unequivocal French support, it would not commit itself.

U. S. monopoly was accomplished first through a complex series of negotiations¹⁸ that assured its influence in France economically and politically. Following establishment of the USIE Act in 1948, its interests¹⁹ were secured by centralization of information program components. With the change of emphasis from information to propaganda in the Campaign of Truth, increased numbers of cultural entertainments were used to intensify U. S. image and lifestyle. More significantly, ideological warfare demanded endorsement of objectives that included an unwritten policy of non-interference²⁰ in the USIS/France Program, allowing expansion of U. S. cultural policy to continue unimpeded.

¹⁸The Interim Loan, Lend-Lease and the Marshall Plan were the three major U. S. financial loans to France. The U. S. Education Commission in France negotiated the Fulbright Agreement between the U. S. and French governments.

¹⁹Centralization of all U. S. information components, including the Franco-American agencies, is described in Chapter Three. As well, the U. S. negotiated with the French government so that U. S. citizens and property owners in France were able to obtain war damages for their property destroyed in World War II.

²⁰Bulletins issued by the Minister of the Interior reminded mayors, prefects and municipal officials that it was strictly forbidden to correspond directly with representatives of foreign governments. In this way, the French government ensured that local USIS/France operations would not be disturbed by French authorities. Thus, French government acquiescence to USIS/France functions was assured. Archives de la Police, Paris. Circulaire No. 491. "Relations avec les Autorités Étrangères," 8 October 1948.

Consequently, there were understated requisites that accompanied U. S. conditions for aid. Non-intervention toward expanding U. S. cultural policy was the hidden²¹ constraint that bound the French government. Not only was its adherence to U. S. political objectives mandatory, but its acquiescence to an elaborate U. S. presence in France was also expected.

The French did not assent unconsciously. Decision to accept U. S. aid was based on French analysis of the situation, namely that foreign help that only the U. S. was in a position to offer was imperative.

Secondly, the French leadership was overwhelmed by political and moral issues surrounding French security. It viewed U. S. presence in France as a double edged sword because, while acting as a deterrent to possible Soviet attack, as well as to political force exhibited by the PCF and its supporters, it was also the catalyst for outbursts of anti-American feeling in the French press. The French government, therefore, was in a “no-win” situation. If it refused the U. S. conditions, France was destitute; if it accepted, it became subservient to the U. S.

Morally, the French leadership realized that its refusal to accept U. S. conditions surrounding economic aid would be tantamount to consigning its citizens to disaster. Unemployment and bread lines became common in 1947 when the French economy could not support the multitudes who were out of work. The disastrous strikes of that year were a reaction to the deteriorating economic situation.

²¹That is, in addition to repayment of the principal monies borrowed and accrued interest.

Thus, French compliance with U. S. demands appeared unavoidable. Yet, the steps taken by the French government demonstrated a comprehensive view of the situation. French politicians were realists who understood that, far from being humanitarian gestures as it was portrayed in the U. S. press, financial aid was a component of foreign policy to better American interests overseas.

The French government knew from USIS/France policy direction that the U. S. intended to centralize its influence through uniting all its information components. Moreover, it did not doubt that the U. S. intended to intrude on French domestic lifestyle through its cultural policy executed by the information program. Evidence for this is that French leadership considered USIS particularly harmful to the French cause in the former African colonies, where French government sources claimed that it was supporting rebellion: “USIS est particulièrement néfaste aux intérêts français. Elle soutient systématiquement l’oeuvre séparatiste, au moyens d’informations tendancieuses.”²²

Given this situation, it resolved to place its long-range goals of future French independence and its determination that France not become a U. S. satellite as primary factors in its reaction toward U. S. cultural policy in France. From the French perspective, *not* to act would be immoral because U. S. cultural imperialism would mean the end of French lifestyle and French independence, while inflicting further suffering on the population. Accordingly, it developed a strategy that it believed would allow France to maneuver within U. S. policy confinement.

²²AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1965. Vol. 51. “Position de la France dans la Guerre froide.” Note. 21 April 1950.

(b) French Objectives

The French government's aim was to develop the means make France *necessary* to the U. S. Its conjecture was that the U. S. would not abandon France if it believed that its policy objectives required French support. Therefore, French policy aimed at convincing U. S. leaders and diplomats that France was not only a responsible and trustworthy ally, but that it possessed something that the U. S. wanted. Evaluation of the situation convinced French authorities that France had little left to offer except culture.

Secondary French objectives were to maintain U. S. aid as a means to secure French position as the U. S. primary ally in Europe and recapture its former international prestige. By complying with Department of State conditions, the French government thought that it assured material aid for France that it believed would eventually make possible the return of its former power.

What remained was to formulate a strategy that would make France indispensable so that the U. S. were obligated. Hence, French policy attempted to make French and U. S. support mutually dependent. The government gambled that avoidance of becoming supplicants at the hands of the Americans hung upon its presentation of an element important to U. S. foreign policy. Moreover, it sensed that relations with the U. S. had to be cemented quickly because of French sentiment²³ that U. S. Isolationism might become more widespread.

²³AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol. 214. Memorandum from Bonnet to Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 August 1952.

French government officials feared that the election of a Republican government under Senator Howard Taft,²⁴ would not only mean U. S. withdrawal from Europe, but termination of American funds, a catastrophe for French domestic policy. Contrary to General Eisenhower,²⁵ who spoke publicly of his conviction that U. S. security was linked to that of the Western world, Taft²⁶ was strongly anti-U. S. involvement overseas, making the French wary of his popularity during an election year.

French government discussions focused on U. S. foreign policy objectives and the Franco-American accord. The French Embassy in Washington reported that the Department of State was consumed with the containment of communism in Western Europe.²⁷ Similarly, its close watch on U. S. foreign policy determined culture to be the factor that was most beneficial to the French primary objective of creating a necessary U. S. presence in France.

J'ai eu récemment l'occasion...de montrer que l'administration américaine assignait à la "culture" un rôle croissant dans la politique extérieure des États-Unis...Jamais l'accent n'avait été mis à ce point sur le caractère politique du programme américain d'échanges culturels.²⁸

²⁴Taft was running for Republican candidate for U. S. president in 1952. His platform advocated cutting aid to countries overseas.

²⁵Eisenhower was the other Republican Party candidate for presidential nomination in 1952.

²⁶Taft was the leader of the Republican "New Isolationist Movement."

²⁷AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol. 214. Memorandum from Bonnet to Schuman, 25 August 1952.

²⁸AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 517. Memorandum from Bonnet to Schuman, "Politique américaine d'échanges culturels," 23 May 1952.

Therefore, embassy analysis defined two diverse sectors, defense and culture, as areas where the French might be able to persuade the U. S. of French importance as an ally. The significance of these sectors was confirmed by French officials²⁹ in New York who worked in the French Information Services. Their contacts with special U. S. government envoy John Foster Dulles,³⁰ indicated that he recommended fighting what the U. S. government termed “Communist propaganda” with a combined civilian and military organization.³¹

Convinced that loss of the use of French ports, airfields and military bases would present the U. S. with a weakened security position in Western Europe,³² the French government was confident that the U. S. wanted to keep France in the Atlantic Alliance.

Par sa position géographique en Europe, et par la disposition de ses territoires d’Outre Mer, la France constitue aujourd’hui l’objectif essentiel de la “guerre froide.” Attaquée directement en Indochine, elle est usée intérieurement par le parti communiste³³

²⁹French Press and Information Services were based in New York City where a small staff was responsible for disseminating information about France. French consular and visa services were housed with this operation.

³⁰In 1948 John Foster Dulles, a corporate lawyer, was Special Advisor to President Truman. His recommendation was achieved in 1951 with the union of USIS and MSA.

³¹Yvonne Dumarie, Attaché d’Information adjoint, “Lettre à Direction d’Amérique.” 7 June 1948. B AM 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 53. AE, France.

³²This is corroborated by U. S. Intelligence Reports. “The Current Situation in France,” p. 3. ORE 85-49. 14 November 1949. Papers of Harry S. Truman. President’s Secretary’s Files. Intelligence File. Box 257. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³³AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1955. “Position de la France dans la Guerre froide.” Note. 21 April 1950. Vol. 51.

Next, government estimation³⁴ of the popularity of French culture in the U. S. demonstrated it to be a valuable weapon because of its presumed popularity in the U. S. and because of the increasing involvement of the Soviet Union in cultural competitions and events in Western Europe.

C'est principalement dans la domaine de culture que nous avons un effort à faire dans ce sens. Il semble en effet que nous avons eu trop tendance jusqu'à présent, spécialement à New York, à concentrer notre action sur des manifestations dont je ne nie pas l'intérêt intellectuel ou artistique mais qui dans l'ensemble attirent davantage des visiteurs français ou européens qu'un public américain.³⁵

III. The French Government Response: France and Culture

The traditional French guardianship over culture became a matter of paramount concern in intellectual and academic groups, where debates centered on whether or not the French would have to sacrifice cultural independence to the Americans. For centuries France had been the seat of European culture and civilization. Now, its moral and cultural authority was challenged by a much younger nation in the new world that it regarded as a cultural neophyte. Moreover, these groups discussed the possibility of U. S. aid being withdrawn if U. S. demands of total support from France were not met, or, if the French government were unable to halt the growing post-war anti-Americanism.

³⁴AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 517. Memorandum from Bonnet to Schuman, 23 May 1952, "Politique américaine d'échanges culturels."

³⁵AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol. 518. Memorandum from Schuman to Bonnet, "Politique américaine d'échanges culturels," p. 6. 4 April 1952.

The French population, suffering under the lifestyle inculcated to an impoverished France, turned to its cultural heritage. Unlike the U. S., where industrialization and technology targeted the future, France kept close ties with its past. Many Frenchmen experienced difficulty accepting that French influence worldwide was severely damaged by the Second World War.

French susceptibilities were easily frustrated by Americans whom the majority of Frenchmen thought of as materialistic and culturally ignorant, bound to a society where the dollar took precedence over spiritual and artistic life. Unlike the American situation, culture in France was taken very seriously. For most Frenchmen, the fact that France was no longer the leader in cultural affairs and that culture was relegated to a much lower priority than it had been before the war was difficult to bear.

The French government, concerned over anti-French sentiment expressed in the U. S. press and knowledgeable about the emphasis that USIS/France was assigning to culture, believed that French culture could be effectively used to refurbish French image in the U. S. U. S. freedom of the press was much played up by USIS/France, giving high profile to its influence on public opinion that it claimed was a force on elected government officials. French leaders, therefore, reacted to this opportunity to persuade American popular attitudes toward France through development of a two-tiered strategy: promotion of French culture in the U. S. would impress ordinary Americans who would consolidate their appreciation and interest by pressuring government officials to continue French aid. Accordingly, it set

out to use its art collections, films, plays, displays and luxury items to this end.³⁶

Thus, French government reaction to U. S. cultural policy was not to sacrifice France to Department of State goals, but to try to redirect U. S. policy toward France, so that the French objective of economic recovery could be achieved. Realistically, it realized that solution to the multi-faceted problems facing France lay in the future. French domestic policy, once the immediate urgency had been met, would rebuild the country and restructure French society. American funds would provide the means to do so. Modernization³⁷, therefore, became government strategy through which it worked toward eventual re-emergence of France as an independent nation restored to its pre-war leadership position in Western Europe.

As well, the French government concluded that not only would it be futile to attempt to keep U. S. cultural influence out of France, but it would also contradict French long-range policy objectives. Instead, government thinking focused on the accrued benefits from using

³⁶Sources for this statement are found in the French archival correspondence, Included are AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Box 214. No. 1950. Bonnet to Bidault, "Réorganisation des services de Presse et d'Information aux États-Unis." 17 November 1946. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Memorandum from Schuman to Bonnet, 4 April 1952. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Pineau 1956 to 1958. Vol. 31. Note pour le Ministre. "De la création d'une Direction Général des Affaires culturelles et techniques." 26 July 1956.

³⁷This viewpoint is consistent with those expressed by French scholars Bossuat and Margairaz. In *La France, l'Aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944 à 1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992), Bossuat argued that U. S. restructuring of Europe made modernization the key factor in French policy. In *L'État, les finances et l'économie: Histoire d'une conversion 1932 à 1952* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France. Ministère des Éditions, 1992) Margairaz maintained that France was a reluctant participant in U. S. aid. While it wished to avoid prolonged dependence, modernization necessitated it.

French culture as its own diplomatic weapon to demonstrate to the U. S. that, in spite of the great materialistic, moral and spiritual damages that France suffered during World War II, it still maintained its preeminent position in present-day intellectual affairs, as it had done in the past.

Thus, French government reaction to U. S. cultural policy in France was essentially *acceptance* through necessity, rather than *approval*. French premier, René Pleven, explained the situation succinctly: “We will ask for aid without blushing.”³⁸ In return, French policy confirmed its support of the U. N., NATO and EDC. It established a program of atomic energy as a means for France to try to regain its pre-World War II position.³⁹ By committing France to a program of atomic energy, the French government hoped that it would be able to provide the resources to replace the loss of empire and the French colonies.⁴⁰ The Schuman Plan⁴¹ established a High Commission to exercise sovereign power over Western Europe coal and steel-producing countries.

Within French policy there was, moreover, a concerted effort by the government to maintain satisfactory Franco-American relations by not publicly criticizing U. S. policy or appearing to doubt its good intentions. One example of this strategy occurred when General

³⁸English translation of remarks made by Premier René Pleven in Strasbourg. *The Washington Post*, 3 September 1950. Papers of George M. Elsey. Box 65. Harry S. Truman Library, Washington, D. C.

³⁹AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman 1948 à 1953. Vol. 12.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Presented by the French government in 1950.

Eisenhower, who was personally very popular in France because of his wartime role as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, issued a statement⁴² that there was a growing trend toward moral decay and disintegration in France.

French Embassy reaction was to downplay⁴³ Eisenhower's remarks, calling them a "mistake" and trying to explain the incident to the French government by pointing out that the Department of State had called in Senator Henry Cabot Lodge⁴⁴ to dispel the damage that these remarks might have created. Cabot Lodge claimed that the press reaction distorted Eisenhower's remarks and that this was due to press bias fueled by the upcoming presidential elections.

Evidence also points to the fact that French Ambassador, Henri Bonnet was trying to impress his government with the necessity for creating a better French image in the U. S. to counter anti-French sentiment. For example, a 1952 student protest in Brookline, Massachusetts,⁴⁵ criticized the French press for its negative attitudes toward U. S. foreign policy and its general anti-American stance. Bonnet explained that French hesitancy at

⁴²Eisenhower statement during U. S. presidential campaign, June 1952. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 327. Memorandum from Bonnet to Schuman, 17 June 1952.

⁴³Bonnet's tendency to try to "smooth things over" and make light of incidents is evident in the archival correspondence. He appeared to do so on his own initiative, rather than under instructions from his government.

⁴⁴Bonnet wrote that Cabot Lodge explained Eisenhower's remarks in terms of his "friendship and deep appreciation for France." AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 327. Bonnet, Communiqué No. 40488/91. 17 June 1952.

⁴⁵AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 511. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, 24 June 1952.

supporting the other nations of Western Europe would be viewed negatively by the Department of State that was already suspicious of what it regarded as French ambivalence⁴⁶ toward the Western world.

In effect, government leaders determined their decision to accept U. S. aid and cultural policy upon a commitment to French citizens to rebuild the country. Government strategy accepted French dependency upon U. S. aid as a temporary means to an end that would make possible eventual prosperity and French aspirations of a return to its traditional leadership position in international affairs.

IV. The French Government and French Security: The German Question

French government fears that the U. S. might abandon Europe were part of the greater question of French security: “La sécurité de la France n’apparaît pas en danger tant que les États-Unis resteront en Europe, maintenant ainsi l’équilibre avec les Soviets.”⁴⁷ U. S. withdrawal would leave France vulnerable to a militarily-restored Germany and the possibility of Russian invasion.

Le seul danger pour la France est que les États-Unis se retirent d’Europe, ce qui ferait automatiquement tomber les organismes centraux sous l’influence soviétique ou, en tout cas, ce qui permettrait aux dirigeants allemands de ces organismes de faire un jeu de bascule entre les Soviets et le bloc des Nations occidentales.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷ AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1965. Vol 3. Commandant en Chef français en Allemagne, “La Politique américaine en Allemagne,” p. 4. 16 December 1945.

⁴⁸Ibid., 2.

A weak and divided Germany presented no threat to France. However, French realization that the U. S. intended to reconstruct the German state and make Germany its closest Western European ally alarmed French politicians.

French leadership wanted to convince the Department of State that it would rebuild in the common interests of a prosperous economy that would guarantee U. S.-style democracy, while a united Germany would be disposed to further military aggression. The French government believed that it could prove the value of French civilization⁴⁹ by demonstrating that it was French culture that kept France sane during the long years of World War II. This was the reason, it explained, that there had been no civil war in France or a revolution, despite the post-war devastation.

The U. S., however, believed that France was trying to dismember Germany economically in order to keep it divided. It blamed France for the failure of the deadlock in Berlin and cast the French in the role of aggressors.

The necessity of breaking the present deadlock in the control council at Berlin is so important that use of the full force and prestige of American diplomatic power to that end is fully warranted. Repeated attempts have been made to set up common policies so that the German railways, the German postal service and other essential facilities could be operated as integral national systems. All of these attempts have failed due almost entirely to the rigid opposition of the French. As a result of the French attitude, Germany is not being treated as an economic unit. Instead, what is happening amounts, to speak plainly, to the economic dismemberment of Germany. This is a reversal of basic objectives and, I believe, a certain step toward future international friction. If France is really bent on the dismemberment of Germany, as her acts indicate, she should be made to acknowledge that policy before the world and not permitted to hide behind the opposite

⁴⁹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol. 1. Henri Claudel, *Mémoire*. 20 November 1948.

pronouncements of the Potsdam declaration.⁵⁰

Foreign Minister Georges Bidault cited French Recovery as an urgent priority that the French population had to be able to address without threat from the former enemy: “...sans être troublé par l’inquiétude démoralisante que constituerait pour lui le redressement rapide et menaçant de l’ennemi d’hier.”⁵¹ It was vital that French security be guaranteed by the U. S. France, he stated, so that it would never again be menaced by German aggression.

The French also wanted control of the Ruhr area industrial resources.⁵² French administration of the coal and steel industries would make France independent of Germany. French refusal to accept German development of this area became the basis for U. S. complaints about difficulties in dealing with the French. In 1952, French prestige was heightened in U. S. eyes when the Schuman Plan, an effective and imaginative presentation for joint administration of the Ruhr coal and steel resources, was well received by the U. S.

⁵⁰ AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1945 to 1965. Vol. 3. “Byron Price Report,” p. 2. Extrait du Radio Bulletin No. 282 du département d’État américain. 28 November 1945.

⁵¹ AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Bidault. No. 32. Memoranda of conversation between Georges Bidault, Président du Conseil, and Général George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 6 March 1947.

⁵² In his work *La France, l’Aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944 à 1952*, Bossuat underlined French desire for control of mineral resources in the industrial Ruhr area as primary to policy. He concluded that the French were the losers in this situation.

V. French Government Suspicions of a Conspiracy Against France

French insistence that France be included among the Allied victors of World War II had been reluctantly accepted by the U. S. and Britain. The French suspected an Anglo-American plot against its presence, and, when American policy appeared to support the British, French suspicions escalated. Government sentiment was based on sources that identified U. S. and British attempts to isolate France: “La mauvaise camaraderie des pays anglo-saxons sont la cause de toutes les difficultés actuelles.”⁵³

Privately, rumors circulated in government and leadership circles in Paris that French diplomatic efforts toward improving relations with the Department of State were being undermined⁵⁴ by the British, who were attempting to consolidate their privileged position with the U. S.

However, a “gang war” against France was more likely orchestrated by the Department of State than by London, in order to call press attention to what it regarded as French sensitivity. U. S. Embassy officials referred to the French as “flighty” and “emotional,” stressing that they were hypersensitive and jealous, liable to react badly to any relationship that the American government had with its other allies. In this way, it created an image of French “pique” that Department of State policy planners found useful to demonstrate how French leadership was trying to prevent successful execution of U. S. policy toward Germany.

⁵³AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol 1. Claudel, *Mémoire*. 20 November 1948.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Yet, there is considerable evidence that French perception was correct that it was being relegated to a subordinate position by the U. S.

Ils soupçonnent Washington et Londres de s'entendre derrière leur dos. Ils se plaignent de l'anti-colonialisme américain. Le sentiment de frustration éprouvé par la France en ce qui concerne l'Afrique du Nord et l'Europe a conduit récemment M. Guy Mollet à souhaiter que les États-Unis adoptent une attitude plus positive à l'égard de l'Union soviétique.⁵⁵

Evidence of Anglo-American strained relations goes back to 1940, to recognition of the Vichy regime and subsequent tension with the Free French. Examination of archival documentation confirms the importance of General de Gaulle's 1944 visit to Washington. That occasion manifested sharp disagreements between the U. S. and French leaders that were, subsequently, patched up by government officials on both sides. Washington diplomats referred vaguely to "personality differences" between Roosevelt and de Gaulle, but those in Roosevelt's inner circle attested to the bitterness that both men exhibited toward each other. Rumors of a poor relationship were later contradicted by comments that relations between the two men had been "positive in general"⁵⁶ and that Roosevelt held the wartime French Free Forces in high regard. Nevertheless, both French and U. S. diplomats

⁵⁵AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 356. D. H. Callender, *The New York Times*, pp. 1-2. 8 September 1956. This article is written in English. In the overseas edition of this newspaper sold in France, it was translated by the newspaper's translation services.

⁵⁶Professor T. A. Wilson, University of Kansas, Interview with Henri Bonnet, 29 June 1970. Oral History Interview Collection. Interview #422. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

were hard pressed to support a positive relationship.⁵⁷

Roosevelt's dislike of de Gaulle had repercussions for France in Washington long after his death. President Truman, unfamiliar with foreign policy and the personalities involved, readily accepted what he was told by his advisors, many of whom were former Roosevelt aides. He was tight-lipped about his relationship with de Gaulle, stating that they got along "well enough."⁵⁸ Publicly, Truman echoed the lines of official Franco-American policy. Replying to a letter from de Gaulle that thanked the U. S. government for his warm reception in Washington in 1945, Truman wrote formally that he trusted "the U. S. and the sister Republic of France would ever work in the closest harmony in promoting the welfare of our two peoples and of the world."⁵⁹

VI. The Position of Ambassador Henri Bonnet

(a) Bonnet's Background

Bonnet's relatively long tenure⁶⁰ as French ambassador made him indispensable to achievement of French foreign policy objectives in the U. S. An astute choice for Chief of the French delegation because of his experience and familiarity with American lifestyle, he forged an important link between the French and U. S. governments.

⁵⁷Ibid. Bonnet mentioned FDR's wartime State of the Union Message that highlighted the role of France during the war and its importance on the world scene.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Truman's reply to de Gaulle's letter is dated 28 August 1945. Harry S. Truman Papers. OF. Miscellaneous 1945. Box 770. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁶⁰From 1945 to 1954.

For many Americans who admired French culture and civilization, Bonnet represented the quintessential Frenchman. Fluently bilingual, his excellent public speaking ability, personality and charm made him a popular guest at diplomatic functions where he had ample opportunity to meet government leaders, educators and the U. S. intellectual and social elite. As well, his wartime teaching career as a faculty member at University of Chicago, permitted him diverse contacts with U. S. academia. Bonnet, therefore, was in an excellent position from which to assess U. S. attitudes toward France and recommend appropriate action to his government.

Adroitly, he concluded that increased Department of State interest in culture was an outcome of ideological warfare that demanded additional means other than arms and materialism. Bonnet's assessment foresaw two concrete factors as evidence of this policy: the large amounts⁶¹ of money designated for cultural activities and the opinion that there would be no territorial confrontation with the USSR.⁶²

Pour le première fois dans l'histoire des États-Unis, une institution privée offrait un demi-milliard de dollars pour le bien commun de l'éducation et de la santé américaines. Un record venait de tomber. Le pays, qui a le culte de la performance et qui place l'esprit civique en tête de toutes les vertus, a éprouvé une certaine fierté à la pensée que le système de la libre entreprise

⁶¹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. No. 4701. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to the U. S., to Antoine Pinay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "La Fondation Ford distribue à des universités, des écoles et des hospitaux américains, 500 millions en dollars." 22 December 1955.

⁶²AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Bidault 1944 to 1948. Vol. 32. No. 387. Memorandum from Direction d'Amérique to Cabinet du Ministre, "l'Évolution recente de l'opinion américaine et l'échange de notes américain-soviétique," p. 2. 25 May 1948.

pouvait inspirer de tels exploits.⁶³

(b) Bonnet's Objectives

Bonnet's correspondence⁶⁴ indicated his close attention to and concern with negative U. S. press reports about France. His opinion was that U. S. press positive reaction toward France was imperative for achievement of French objectives. Therefore, he proposed to change negative press and resulting popular attitudes through establishment of an effective, centralized⁶⁵ French Information Service that would disseminate positive information providing reassurance of French support for U. S. foreign policy. In effect, his suggested reorganization of press services in the U. S. was an integrated French Cultural Program.

Bonnet's decision to reform French Press and Information Services resulted from his familiarity with U. S. government policy. A pragmatist, he understood that Department of State policy planners assigned high public profile to the parallel relationship of press reaction and the strength of popular support. Disturbed by the anti-French⁶⁶ press campaign

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴In particular, his correspondence with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Consuls General in the U. S.

⁶⁵Bonnet's decision was based on information that he received from the French Consuls General in U. S. cities who complained that there was no effective means to refute press commentary that attacked France. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. No. 98. Memorandum from Raoul Bertrand, Consul General/Los Angeles to Bonnet, "Campagne de presse anti-française." 5 August 1953.

⁶⁶Bonnet personally perused major U. S. newspapers daily while the Consuls General sent clippings and news items relating to France to the French Embassy. Conservative newspapers such as *The Houston Chronicle* owned by the Scripps-Howard chain were scrutinized for commentary relating to U. S. aid to France. It had a circulation of 186, 000 subscribers and was known for printing "sensational" items. The French Consul/Houston contacted the Editor-in Chief, whom he said was willing to listen to French concerns, but

that aimed at terminating U. S aid to France, he began to develop a strategy within the context of general French policy objectives that would swing the tide of press support behind France, rather than rally against it.

Bonnet believed that French Information Services had to demonstrate two main concerns. First, it had to develop damage-control techniques⁶⁷ in order to effectively deal with criticism from U. S. journalists in France and returning American tourists who complained to the press that increasing anti-Americanism in France showed that the latter did not merit U. S. public aid.⁶⁸

Next, the French information services had to create the correct atmosphere in the U. S. that could change ingrained American attitudes toward the French. Sensibly, Bonnet grasped that while French image was conditioned by negative U. S. press coverage, creating a positive attitude lay in eliminating the basis for derogatory reports. Accordingly, he identified diverse misunderstandings caused by differences between American and French mentalities. The primary problem was how to address U. S. charges of French political

was not free to publish everything he wanted to because of pressure from other, more conservative newspaper editors. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis.* Vol. 512. Memorandum from Consul General/Houston to Bonnet, "Presses de Houston," p. 1. 25 October 1953.

⁶⁷Evidence confirmed that Bonnet and the French Consuls General considered making a visa mandatory for American citizens staying in France for less than three months. This would have been a "damage control" technique, making it more difficult for U. S. journalists who reported negative comments about the French situation to return to France. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963.* Memorandum from Bonnet to Schuman, "Campagne de presse anti-française." 5 August 1953. *États-Unis.* Vol. 511.

⁶⁸AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963.* Vol. 518. Jean Daridan, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Chargé d'Affaires, to Robert Schuman, "Memorandum," p. 21. 18 July 1952.

“instability,”⁶⁹ that the press claimed made France an unreliable ally.

Bonnet’s analysis in his reports to the French government, stressed differences between the French and U. S. systems of government as the underlying reasons for this. Politically, American lifestyle sought security in a stable four-year government. When an Administration left office, its policies were officially⁷⁰ retracted and many of its top civil servants who were known supporters left with the outgoing government.⁷¹ The French parliamentary system however, allowed elected governments to fall in quick succession, but its foreign policy remained constant.⁷² Therefore, what the press referred to as unstable government, was, in French perception, continuity.

Quant à notre politique étrangère, n’a-t-elle pas fait preuve d’une remarquable continuité? Depuis Clemenceau jusqu’à Sarraut, nous n’avons cessé de dénoncer la politique insensée qu’ont suivie l’Amérique et l’Angleterre à l’égard de l’Allemagne.⁷³

⁶⁹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Memorandum from Daridan to Schuman, No. 3383. “Étude sur les données fondamentales de l’Information française aux États-Unis.” 18 July 1952.

⁷⁰This is a debatable view as policies that were officially retired at the end of the Truman Administration were resurrected by the following Eisenhower government under new names. For example, the USIS Program was revamped in 1953, but essentially retained the same policy objectives.

⁷¹In the case of USIS/France, there was a large exodus of employees from the U. S. Embassy and from the regional outlets when the Truman Administration left office.

⁷²Bonnet emphasized that, although French governments changed frequently, the elected officials remained. For example, there were only four Ministers of Foreign Affairs within a four-year period.

⁷³AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol. 1 Henri Claudel, *Mémoire*. 20 November 1948.

Bonnet asserted that using culture would have beneficial effects in three areas. It would meet stated French strategy for interacting with U. S. officials as experts, rather than subordinates, putting France on a new footing with the American rulers. It would provide the opportunity to inform French allies that France was still the traditional guardian of culture and civilization. Lastly, it would offer a popular medium to the American people through presentation of French art, theater, literature and dance, allowing the re-emergence of French dignity and pride that would unite the French population. This, Bonnet hoped, would result in a change of attitude in the U. S. press about France that would influence congressional representatives to keep U. S. aid going to France. If all of these goals could be accomplished, the French government's overall aim to regain its independence would be achieved.

Noting that USIS/France strategy linked culture with image, Bonnet conceived a scheme to change French image in American perception. He felt confident that this could be successfully done, because there was considerable demand in the U. S. for information about France. The French Embassy received an average of one hundred letters⁷⁴ daily in late 1949. Citing these as evidence of U. S. popular regard for France, he believed that if French overriding⁷⁵ interests could be effectively disseminated, public sentiment would turn toward France.

⁷⁴AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman. Vol. 93. Telegram from Bonnet to Bidault, "Service d'Information de l'Ambassade," p. 3.

⁷⁵By "overriding interests" he meant information pertaining to French Recovery and reconstruction, Germany, and French membership in the European Union.

En raison de la place que tient la France dans les relations internationales il y a un grand nombre de questions particulières qui sont pour nous d'un intérêt capital et sur lesquelles il est essentiel que nous puissions faire connaître à l'opinion américaine le point de vue français. Le progrès de reconstruction, l'action de la France au sein de l'OECE, ses efforts pour organiser l'Europe le développement économique des territoires de l'Union française, les réalisations de notre politique en Afrique du Nord, ne sont que quelques exemples. Il en est bien d'autres.⁷⁶

Bonnet's goal, therefore, was to create a popular information machine that would develop the correct ambiance to keep U. S. public opinion favorable toward France. "Les activités sont plus que jamais nécessaires pour maintenir aux États-Unis un climat favorable à la poursuite de la politique française."⁷⁷ This was consistent with French government policy objectives to make France better known through demonstrating that its cultural expertise continued unimpeded in the post-war era.⁷⁸

(c) **Bonnet's Rationale**

Concluding that the press was the best vehicle⁷⁹ for this endeavor, Bonnet recommended a reorganization of French press and information services. Choice of press and information as a popular mode reflected Bonnet's concerns that culture echo U. S. "people to people" democratic approach to reach the man in the street. Quoting the U. S.

⁷⁶AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman 1948 to 1953. Vol. 93. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman. 10 November 1949.

⁷⁷Ibid. No. 5473. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, p. 3.

⁷⁸Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Jacques Constant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "De la Propagande américaine en France." 15 January 1952.

⁷⁹Bonnet's correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is filled with references to the importance of the U. S. press as a mold of U. S. public opinion.

Ambassador in France, he stated that French objective in the U. S. should be to “parler à l’homme de la rue.”⁸⁰

Bonnet believed that positive popular reaction toward France, through dissemination of French culture, and emphasis on U. S.-style democracy as being in the forefront of Western European political ideologies, would alleviate U. S. fears that France might turn to communism. This would have the advantage of negating neutralism, while increased French international prestige in the U. S. would make other nations aware that France was still a political force.

Bonnet planned to execute his plan through public relations, rather than by continuing outmoded propaganda techniques. In this, he followed U. S. policy planners design for the USIS/France Program. For example, Bonnet clearly understood the phrase, “Sell America” that the Advertising Council of America suggested as a means to solicit big business and U. S. corporations to invest in France. While he knew that the French would be shocked at the idea, as well as the use of this phrase, his opinion was that it provided the most direct way to bring the French cause to the American people. Convincing the French government to “Sell France” in the U. S., therefore, was a necessary element to accomplish French foreign policy objectives.

⁸⁰AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 511. Memorandum from Lagarde to Bonnet, 4 February 1953. It quoted Douglas Dillon, the new U. S. Ambassador to France who replaced James Dunn. Dillon was emphasizing that U. S. diplomacy would continue to focus on direct relations with the French people.

In essence, Bonnet's plan depended upon convincing his government of the importance of U. S. public opinion and press influence so negative U. S. press reports such as this one might be avoided:

M. Constantine Brown⁸¹ est revenu à la charge dans un éditorial publié le 27 mars par l'Evening Star, sous le titre, "Les Nerfs de la France." l'auteur y présente la France comme 'une prima dona mûrissante, qui a perdu le plus clair de sa voix, mais a encore un reste de tempérament et de prestige et reçoit du public des applaudissements respectueux mais sans enthousiasme.'⁸²

Bonnet's wish to turn press criticism to French advantage was actually an objective that he had in common with the Department of State,⁸³ although his motives were different from those of the government agency. Department of State mandate under the Truman Administration focused on continuing U. S. aid as a means to keeping France in the Atlantic Alliance despite public sentiment and congressional opposition. Bonnet, however, was in favor of keeping U. S. aid in France so that eventual French independence could make France free of U. S. interference.⁸⁴

⁸¹Brown was a U. S. journalist stationed in France who the French government considered anti-French and a major contributor to the U. S. anti-France press campaign.

⁸²AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États- Unis. Vol. 43. Jean Daridan, Minstre Plenipotentiaire, to Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Article par M. Constantine Brown, *The Evening Star* " p. 2. 20 October 1949.

⁸³See Chapter One for analysis of U. S. government rationale for keeping France in the Atlantic Alliance.

⁸⁴AE, France. Henri Bonnet. Papier d'Agents 271. Vol. 2. "La Situation économique et financière de janvier 1954. La France au seuil de l'année 1954." pp. 1-2.

Bonnet realized the interest that French culture generated in the U. S. through his personal experience of the enthusiastic approval of U. S. audiences at French exhibits and intellectual exchanges. He also knew that Americans frequented art museums throughout the country and that visiting exhibits were popular weekend outings. If France could export culture to the U. S. the way the Americans were doing in France, he could foresee a change of attitude in regard to the French. Therefore, it was in French interests to restructure⁸⁵ the French Information Service in the U. S. in order to effectively use media services to build French prestige.

Il s'agit en fait de mettre en oeuvre aux États-Unis une propagande autour de tout ce qui se rattache au nom ou à l'idée de la France. Le problème est de créer aux États-Unis un climat favorable à la France; d'y rendre l'opinion publique consciente de l'existence de la France; de faire connaître le point de vue des Français, leur vie politique, leurs réalisations techniques, culturelles et artistiques, leur contribution au progrès général. Le programme de reconstruction de notre pays comporte une aide importante provenant des États-Unis. Cette aide sera obtenue plus aisément et dans un sens plus large, si l'opinion américaine est informée des progrès de la reconstruction française et tenue au courant de l'efficacité avec laquelle est mise à profit la contribution des États-Unis à cette reconstruction.⁸⁶

(d) **Bonnet's Strategy**

Bonnet's dilemma was how to explain the importance of U. S. public opinion to French government officials. Whereas most of the French diplomatic corps stationed in different U. S. cities understood the differences between U. S. and French mentalities,

⁸⁵AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Box 517. No. 2479. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, 27 March 1952.

⁸⁶AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 à 1947. États-Unis. Vol. 214. No. 1950. Bonnet to Schuman, "Reorganisation des services de presse et d'information aux États-Unis." 17 November 1946.

the DGRC often did not. Many of its personnel were not only anti-American, but hostile to foreign lifestyle. Provincialism was particularly evident in Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff during the early post-World War II period. Most employees did not understand English; nor did they comprehend that U. S. visitors were different from other Anglo-Saxons. Often, they mistakenly equated Americans with British tourists in France during the pre-war era.

Seeking a way to explain these differences, Bonnet focused on U. S. public attention to the news media and citizen interest in government. By highlighting the popularity and influence of U. S. news reporters and journalists, he emphasized the importance of their roles⁸⁷ in U. S. society. For example, instead of focusing on the opinion presented by journalists, he targeted the estimated public reaction according to the author's reputation. Therefore, when an article written by Joseph and Steward Alsop in *The Saturday Evening Post*, assessed the possibility of Soviet invasion of Western Europe through France or Italy, Bonnet underlined the high regard in which these two authors⁸⁸ were held and the large circulation⁸⁹ that the magazine enjoyed before concluding that these two factors would certainly influence U. S. policy toward France.

⁸⁷Most likely a deliberate strategy by Bonnet who knew that French journalists were usually intellectuals. He probably wanted French officials to think that U. S. reporters and authors were regarded similarly in the U. S., making their support appear vital to French policy objectives in the U. S. Consequently, the government would be more attuned to providing necessary funds for reorganization of French Press and Information Services.

⁸⁸The Alsop brothers were popular U. S. journalists who wrote for U. S. magazines and major newspapers.

⁸⁹*The Saturday Evening Post* had a circulation of almost ten million subscribers at that time. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. États-Unis. Vol. 178. Bonnet to Bidault, "Si l'URSS s'emparait de l'Europe," p. 2. 19 December 1947.

Il ne faut pas oublier que les directeurs de journaux américains sont des personnages considérables qui n'acceptent guère d'avoir de contacts qu'avec l'Ambassadeur, nos Consuls généraux ou des personnalités françaises à qui un long séjour aux États-Unis vaut une position personnelle dans ce pays.⁹⁰

Bonnet attempted to interest the French government in the importance of providing U. S. journalists stationed in France with information to make them more aware of the French situation so that they could convey a fairer image of France to the U. S. public. He believed that this could best be accomplished through establishing personal contacts between French government officials and the U. S. press corps⁹¹ rather than through creating extra positions. The same recommendation applied to French press officials resident in the U. S. In response to a suggestion from Georges Bidault that increasing the number of French Press Attachés would improve French image in the U. S., Bonnet wrote:

Il est vain de penser qu'en multipliant les postes d'attachés de presse aux États-Unis, notre section sur l'opinion américaine en deviendra plus efficace.⁹²

What Bidault failed to realize was what Bonnet already understood, namely that the French image in the U. S. could not be so easily transformed. Bonnet understood that the solution was not to increase the number of press personnel. Instead, he favored the U. S. technique of developing liaisons between journalists and influential people in leadership

⁹⁰AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Vol. 214. Memorandum from Bonnet to Bidault, "Réorganisation des services de presse et d'Information aux États- Unis," p. 3. 17 September 1946.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

positions.

Bonnet wanted U. S. journalists to be “fed”⁹³ information by French diplomats in the same way that PAOs provided information to French editors. This, he felt, would afford reporters a less unsympathetic interpretation of French attitudes that they would transmit to the public, making popular opinion more disposed to view France favorably. Therefore, he was anxious to increase publication of French bulletins and periodicals that were becoming less familiar on the U. S. literary scene because of cuts imposed on French publications.

For example, in 1949, the French government published reports of the French political situation twice daily.⁹⁴ By 1951, these were reduced to monthly publications because of personnel reduction: “Ces bulletins étaient au début de 1949 bi-hebdomadaires. Ils ne paraissent plus aujourd’hui qu’une fois par mois, faute de personnel suffisant pour les rédiger.”⁹⁵

Psychologically, Bonnet’s strategy was designed to support his plan to French leaders by demonstrating possibilities for achievement of French objectives that they could relate to. For example, government leaders were accustomed to dealing with French intellectuals and public figures who wrote for the French press. Whereas they often read articles by the intellectual elite, they did not solicit their reactions in the same manner as the Department of State did in the U. S. Bonnet, however, thought that by indicating the

⁹³AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman 1948 to 1953. Vol. 93. Bonnet used the word, “alimenter.” Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, pp. 4-5. 10 November 1949.

⁹⁴Ibid. These reports were published in a magazine called *New From France*.

⁹⁵Ibid.

presence of U. S. intellectuals in the press, he could focus French government interest upon his plan.

(e) Support for Bonnet's Plan

Bonnet's focus on the press as an appropriate vehicle to address the problem of French image in the U. S. was echoed by French intellectuals in the government who supported his recommendations.

Henri Claudel stressed that the French must not underestimate the importance of the press⁹⁶ and the role of journalists in the U. S. Writers and reporters not only influenced ordinary American citizens through their opinions, but public approval, influenced by the press, pressured lawmakers to support or reject government change.

Beginning with the question, "Quels sont à votre avis, les thèmes essentiels que l'information française doit utiliser dans son action aux États-Unis?"⁹⁷ Claudel traced the long history of Franco-American relations to demonstrate that France must champion the U. S. in Western Europe. To do so, he believed that the French must "tuer l'idéologie communiste"⁹⁸ by reverting to traditional French culture, upon which rested the glory of France.

⁹⁶Henri Claudel was Administrateur-adjoint in the DGRC. AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol. 1. Henri Claudel, *Mémoire*. 20 November 1948.

⁹⁷Ibid., 1.

⁹⁸Ibid., 8.

Claudel's argument demonstrated the difference between what he formulated as an "occupation symbolique," versus an "occupational territoriale." He equated the former with U. S. economic domination, pointing out that U. S. propaganda in France was designed to further U. S. markets and trade. Concluding that the only way to prevent France from being overrun by U. S. cultural imperialism was to support U. S. foreign policy objectives through French point of view, he advocated that an independent organization⁹⁹ be established that would be composed of members chosen from French writers, journalists and artists and film makers.¹⁰⁰ This group would not necessarily reject U. S. cultural policy in France, but would accept or modify those ideas that it agreed with. This, he believed, would provide the best possible French response to the U. S. cultural offensive because it would satisfy French tastes, tendencies and opinions, while advancing the U. S. cause.

A more practical idea that demonstrated greater credibility for Bonnet's plan came from Claude Levi-Strauss¹⁰¹ who emphasized that culture was the only exportable product left to France in the post-war era, the sole means by which France could become prominent in public perception while her other products were absent from the foreign market. Culture,

⁹⁹Ibid. 26. That is, a Comité Franco-Américain that would operate independently of the ECA, the U. S. public affairs program that Claudel thought was responsible for U. S. cultural imperialism in France.

¹⁰⁰Ibid. Claudel proposed calling his committee the "Office de Propagande par le Film pour le rapprochement franco-américain."

¹⁰¹French writer and academic. Claude Levi-Strauss was the Head of the Centre des Hautes Études Franco-Américaines in New York City in 1945.

therefore, was France's form of "institutional advertising."¹⁰² As well, his analysis of the importance of culture and its role in France, confirmed French government policy objectives for dealing with the U. S.

A far more important long-term motive is the need for re-establishing France's prestige abroad, so badly damaged during the past years. With military reputation gone, economic status in jeopardy, diplomatic position in serious question, France has fastened upon cultural relations as a means of boosting her stock.¹⁰³

The idea received an unexpected boost from an American source when the French Embassy received a letter from special U. S. emissary, Charles Ball¹⁰⁴ who suggested possible ways of correcting unfavorable opinions in the U. S. about France. Ball's reaction suggests that his intervention was sanctioned by U. S. policy planners who had a vested interest in keeping U. S. financial aid in France during the Campaign of Truth. Moreover, they may have done so because of their personal contacts with Bonnet and their conviction that he would not have objected as he understood the mutual benefit for U. S. and French goals.

¹⁰²AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. États-Unis. An undated and unsigned article written in English entitled, *French Culture for Export*. "Rapport américains DGRC et Attaché Culturel New York."

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Charles Ball, Public Relations Specialist in the Truman Administration. Ball wrote to the French Embassy in Washington on the subject of defending French interests in the U. S. Jean Daridan was Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Chargé d'Affaires, that is, diplomat at large, possessing full authority from his government to carry out specified duties. A public relations specialist in the French Embassy, he was assigned the task of preparing a special report to answer Ball's memorandum. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol. 511. No. 3303/IP. Memorandum from Daridan to Schuman, 18 July 1952.

Ball, a trouble shooter for the Truman Administration in Europe, would have been unlikely to approach the French Embassy on his own initiative. Protocol demanded that he intervene through the Department of State. His interest reflects the Truman Administration's desire to keep France allied to the West, casting Bonnet and the Americans in the same position and trying to convince the French government of the validity of their efforts.

(f) Results of the Bonnet Plan

Bonnet's request was denied by the French government because of inadequate funds. His argument that annual French budget allocation for information services in fiscal year 1949¹⁰⁵ was lower than that of its counterpart British Information Service, was disregarded, despite the fact that the French were sensitive¹⁰⁶ to British activities. Moreover, his recommendation that a request for funding from the Head¹⁰⁷ of French Information Services in the U. S. be honored so that French information facilities could modernize, in order to

¹⁰⁵Bonnet stated that the French Information Services budget in the U. S. was \$168, 524 for fiscal year 1949 while the British allocated \$2 million for its Information Service in the U. S. AE, France. Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman. Vol. 93. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, No. 5473. "Service de l'Ambassade d'Information," p. 7. 10 November 1949.

¹⁰⁶Official figures provided by the U. S. Attorney General in 1945 claimed that the British spent six times more on propaganda in the U. S. than France did. AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. Vol. 53. Telegram No. 3984/3985, "Propagande politique des États-Unis à l'étranger." 14 June 1945.

¹⁰⁷Michel Dumont, Head of French Information Services, New York City, wanted to hire a public relations expert who would increase information services as the U. S. had done in its information program.

meet the demand for information, also went unheeded.¹⁰⁸

However, archival evidence indicates that another reason was also involved in the negative French government decision. The French were anxious during the early Marshall Plan period to avoid accusations in the French press of “political” maneuvering in artistic presentations.

Un caractère politique (qui) aurait pu favoriser des polémiques et qui d’ailleurs se serait mal accordé avec nos attributions nous avons insisté principalement sur les aspects artistiques, littéraires ou techniques de phénomènes complexes qui ont constitué cette Révolution.¹⁰⁹

Bonnet’s disappointment in government rejection of his plan was countered by his knowledge that cuts in present French information service facilities in the U. S. were necessitated by lack of funds.

Offrey¹¹⁰ a passé ce matin nous annoncer que nos services étaient ‘guillotines’ et que sur les crédits des Services de Botrot quarante millions seulement passaient aux Relations Culturelles pour diffusion de l’Information et trente millions à la Direction de Politique (Service Offrey)¹¹¹ pour être affectés au fonctionnement de cinq postes, (dont New York) qui

¹⁰⁸Most likely the French government did not have the supplementary funds requested by Dumont for this operation. AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman, 1948 to 1953. Vol. 93. No. 5473. Telegram from Bonnet to Schuman, “Service d’Information de l’Ambassade,” pp. 7-8. 10 November 1949.

¹⁰⁹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1953. Échanges Culturels. Série II. États-Unis. Vol. 124. René Messières, Conseiller Culturel to Minister of Foreign Affairs. P/148. 13 April 1948.

¹¹⁰Offrey was in charge of the Direction de Politique in the French Information Services in New York.

¹¹¹Dumairie seems to suggest that Offrey was trying to make sure that his own authority and staff remained constant while other components of the French Service were terminated. Her remarks allude to in-fighting within the ranks of the French Service and between the French Embassy and the DGRC.

seraient les seuls maintenus.¹¹²

His scheme, while accepted in principle by the French government as a suitable design to fight anti-French feeling in the U. S., was rejected on grounds of lack of available funds to support such a large project. While it agreed that it was necessary to carry on its own “propagande”¹¹³ in the U. S. to keep French Recovery on target, the French government had its hands tied by its inability to pay for it.

For three years Bonnet persisted, but his attempts to get the French to accept his ideas were ignored. So desperate was the French economic situation that the government was forced to cancel or postpone all official cultural projects in the U. S, even those from which it stood to benefit. For example, Louis Jouvet¹¹⁴ was invited to the U. S. by the American National Academy and Theater to present a series of lectures and to perform four plays from his Company’s repertoire. Jouvet’s request for French government subsidization stated that funding was necessary to support a series of theatrical drama that his company wished to present in the U. S. It would, he stated, enhance French image.¹¹⁵

¹¹²AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. États-Unis. Vol. 215. Memorandum from Dumarie to Louis Joxe, Directeur Général d’Amérique. 4 November 1947.

¹¹³AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Vocabulary used by Robert Schuman in his memorandum to Bonnet, 4 April 1952.

¹¹⁴Renowned French actor and producer who had his own theater company. Jouvet’s invitation to the U. S. was in 1950.

¹¹⁵AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1953. États-Unis. Vol. 214. Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre from the Directeur Général des Échanges Culturels. Échanges Critiques. No. 2701/RC2a.

However, the French government, acting upon a recommendation from the Direction Générale¹¹⁶ deemed it incompatible with budget directives. While agreeing that the trip meant valuable prestige for France, it suggested that it be shortened and that additional budget cuts be implemented. The Cabinet, however, rejected the idea and canceled the activity.

Thus, Bonnet's recommendation that reorganization of French Press and Information Services in the U. S. would enhance French foreign policy objectives remained in operational limbo until 1952, when Robert Schuman finally approved¹¹⁷ it, calling the idea long overdue¹¹⁸ and citing its value for French goals:

..l'utilité d'intensifier notre action d'information dans le pays de votre résidence, particulièrement à un moment où la défense des intérêts français en Afrique et en Asie, qui se confond avec celle de la civilisation atlantique, ne semble pas être toujours exactement appréciée par les milieux politiques et le public américain.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série II. Échanges Culturelles. États-Unis. Vol. 125. "L'American National Theater and Academy." Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre. No 2711/RC2a. 27 March 1950.

¹¹⁷AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Schuman to Bonnet, 4 April 1952.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 1.

VII. The Daridan Plan

(a) U. S. Stereotype Images About France

Ball's confidential memo was subsequently forwarded to Jean Daridan who prepared a detailed report for the French government that defined "l'image de la France"¹²⁰ in American perception and explained the sources of present-day American attitudes toward France.

Daridan's Report traced the poor French image in the U. S. to themes about French lifestyle portrayed in novels of the 1920s, written by American authors who had gone to France seeking French ambiance and culture. Daridan explained these as stereotypical images of "la France anti-industrielle."¹²¹ They were supported by superficial opinions that, he explained, neglected the reasons for and the sources of these attitudes.

For example, The French were portrayed as shirkers whose lifestyle revolved around leisure. It was difficult to rid the Americans of their image of "fun-loving" Paris where cafés and nightclubs were often the subjects of magazine and press articles. Because of this portrayal of French life, It was difficult to persuade Americans that the French ever paid taxes or had any social conscience. More significantly, there was a growing trend of opinion in the U. S. that believed French workers were Communists and revolutionaries.¹²² The source of these images, Daridan stressed, came from a small group of American individuals

¹²⁰AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Memorandum from Jean Daridan to Robert Schuman, "Rapport sur l'orientation et le Progrès du Programme d'Information," p. 1. 20 April 1952.

¹²¹Ibid., 8.

¹²²Ibid., 12.

who were in a position to influence the majority.

L'Opinion publique aux États-Unis est actuellement formulée par les efforts d'un petit nombre d'individus actifs et organisés qui sont effectivement en mesure d'utiliser certains moyens d'information.¹²³

Daridan identified the theater, films and universities as principal areas where French image was developed in the U. S. public mind. Theater and films were responsible for portraying Frenchmen as emotional and "légèrement ridicule,"¹²⁴ or "frivole,"¹²⁵ a term that he equated with feminine rather than masculine characteristics.

Anti-French attitudes, Daridan stated, were related to the symbolic government caricature known as "Uncle Sam," a masculine image associated with patriotic gestures. Contrary to this, French society was identified with the feminine image, Marianne, a mythological creature dating from the French Revolution.¹²⁶ It appeared on official French documentation as well as on French currency and the government Seal.

Daridan attributed impressions of the French as volatile, frivolous and morally lax to the Marianne myth. He believed that Anglo-Saxon puritan mentality equated this image to the French preoccupation with artistry, fashion and luxury. Protestantism, therefore, was

¹²³Ibid., 9.

¹²⁴Ibid., 10.

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶The Marianne effigy of a young girl was chosen by French revolutionaries as a symbol of the new republic in 1793. Rationale for using a feminine rather than a masculine image was to demonstrate the change in French morality. Marianne was supposed to represent virtue and goodness, whereas the previous masculine image of the King was deliberately destroyed in order to emphasize its association with corruption and immorality.

the factor behind the supercilious attitude that Americans had toward the French. Moreover, Daridan identified the anti-colonial attitude in the U. S. as a “by-product” of Protestant missions. The strongest opponents of French colonial policy were U. S. Protestant dailies.¹²⁷ He pointed out that these papers were quick to call the French lax and immoral because of the identification of France with Paris nightlife and American tourist haunts.

Les États-Unis sont un pays protestant et ... le clergé protestant se méfie de la France catholique. (Paris, centre du péché et de la décadence). Cet état d'esprit a des effets sur l'idée que les Américains se font de la valeur de la France comme alliée (pas de force sans cohésion sociale et moralité).¹²⁸

Moreover, U. S. press attacks condemned the French as lazy and immoral, while stereotyping France as a weak, feminine type of society where real labor never took place. Hence, the U. S. image of France as a non-industrialized country where business could not be carried out and solid labor to rebuild the country would never succeed because the population was effeminate and superficial.¹²⁹

Daridan pointed to the fact that these stereotype images of French people included myths that were supported by erroneous facts distorted by the news media. He identified social groups in France who were castigated by the U. S. press that did not understand their characteristics or their background. In particular, French intellectuals were depicted as “fringe members” of society who complicated issues with abstract ideas, while neglecting

¹²⁷Included in his assessment were U. S. newspapers, *The Christian Herald* and *The Christian Century*.

¹²⁸AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. No. 3308. Memorandum from Jean Daridan to Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, p. 11.

¹²⁹Ibid. 3.

the real problems of French life: “L’intellectuel qui est à l’écart de la vie française, se complait dans les abstractions et néglige les problèmes concrets.”¹³⁰ In these reports, the French peasant often represented the solid virtues of French lifestyle that included family, hard labor, savings and stability. The French worker, however, was more often depicted as an artisan hostile to modern techniques and industrialism; he was targeted by the U. S. press as a PCF member whose radical ideas wanted to destroy liberalism.¹³¹

(b) Daridan’s Strategy for Changing U. S. Attitudes

Daridan thought that U. S. public opinion was formulated by a small, but influential group of Americans who were well-organized and were effectively in a position to use certain information. He identified teachers in primary and secondary schools as having a principal role in molding the opinions of young Americans. These educators, he emphasized, lived largely in their own world. They were, moreover, influenced by reports and articles that they read in the press and magazines. Teachers of French, in particular, were in a position to change their students’ attitudes toward France. While most of them were very attached to France, they often had the tendency to emphasize characteristics that made France appear to be a relic rather than a progressive nation.

*Mais ils ont une influence parfois dangereuse en ce sens qu’ils ont tendance à mettre l’accent sur les qualités qui font apparaître la France plus comme un monument historique que comme une nation vigoureuse et moderne et comme la nation de la sensibilité et de l’intellect par opposition avec une Amérique industrialisée et agressive.*¹³²

¹³⁰Ibid., 8.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid., 10.

Daridan thought that French image could be effectively improved in the U. S. by strategically using French magazines and press information¹³³ that would be printed in France for distribution in the U. S. This material would consist of special publications for different groups.¹³⁴ It aimed at U. S. intellectuals and the elite for whom Daridan wanted to have luxury¹³⁵ books printed that would explain French lifestyle through glossy pictures. He recommended a large-scale government program that would include a Comité Américain that would be established to take charge of distributing information about France. He wanted this committee to be composed of well-known U. S. personalities who would have influence with the American public.

(c) Assessment of the Daridan Plan

Daridan's Plan differed from that proposed by Bonnet. Whereas Bonnet advocated the strength of U. S. public opinion as a force in government, Daridan thought that he could inform the U. S. public about the "real" French situation by manipulating influential groups.¹³⁶ His ideas equated image with culture, a concept previously initiated in the

¹³³Daridan's plan was never acted upon by the French government. It was rejected because of the cost involved.

¹³⁴Daridan, therefore, recommended an approach similar to that of USIS/France for reaching different groups

¹³⁵Daridan appears to have thought that he could attract the rich and famous by reviving the former French deluxe editions that were popular in the U. S. before World War II. He planned to send free copies to them at their home addresses.

¹³⁶There was, therefore, a fundamental difference in the way that Bonnet and Daridan understood the American system. Bonnet recognized the force of public opinion upon government policy, while Daridan thought that small, exclusive groups were influential in government circles and in forming public impressions.

USIS/France Program and favored by Bonnet for achievement of French objectives in the U. S. While Daridan's plan was not original, it supported Bonnet's calls for reform and emphasized the need for modernization of French Press and Information Services in the U. S.

Daridan's recommendations demonstrate the conflicting ideas between his strategy and that of Bonnet. Bonnet attempted to get the French government to accept that U. S. lifestyle attributes "power" to the people. Daridan's estimation was that U. S. public opinion was determined by the few rather than the majority.

However, the necessary element needed to change U. S. attitudes toward France was *perception*. If the U. S. press could be made to perceive that French policy supported U. S. objectives and that the French exhibited goodwill toward Americans, then public opinion would change toward France. Of the two plans, Bonnet's was more realistic than the one proposed by Daridan. The latter understood the reasons for public dislike of the French, but he failed to realize that intellectuals and the elite in the U. S. did not have the same influence as did their counterparts in France.

VIII. French Cultural Policy Toward U. S. Universities

Confirmation of French fears that U. S. policy was moving away from France toward Germany found an ally in former President Truman who stated that pro-German sentiment in the U. S. was attempting to change the balance of power in Europe.

There's a class of people in this country who want to put the Germans in charge in Europe, and I don't want to see that done. We have to balance the thing.¹³⁷

For the French, however, augmented U. S. interest in Germany appeared to be facilitated by public support in the Midwest and northeast areas of the U. S. where there were large populations of German descent and where the German Protestant Anglo-Saxon work ethic predominated. Politically, minorities of German origin favored a return to U. S. Isolationism.

Le Middle-West est la région des États-Unis où nous avons le plus à nous défendre contre un opinion publique qui, lorsqu'elle ne nous est pas hostile est pour le moins indifférente. Deux raisons expliquent cette attitude: d'une part le Middle-West centre de "l'Américanisme" à outrance, a été jusqu'ici et reste la région des États-Unis où le grand public continue à subir l'influence d'une presse puissante, qui reste foncièrement isolationniste et qui retarde une évolution dont il est possible malgré tout d'enregistrer quelques symptômes encourageants.¹³⁸

Therefore, when there were demonstrated actions of dislike for France in the state of Kansas, bastion of the American Middle West, the Embassy counseled members of the French community,¹³⁹ "de ne pas porter des emblèmes français à cause du grand nombre de

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. Vol 215. No. 1460. Memorandum from French Consul-General/ Chicago, to Bidault, Foreign Minister. 27 November 1946.

¹³⁹The French Consul/Chicago stressed the importance of French community groups in the Middle West to support the French language and French causes because of pro-German sentiment in the region. AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. Vol. 123. No. 150. Memorandum from J. J. Viala, Consul General/Chicago to Bonnet. 14 June 1947. AE, France.

personnes d'origine allemande."¹⁴⁰ By the following year, however, there was a given improvement in attitude toward the French. Diplomatic officials attributed this to French gratitude to the U. S. over the Marshall Plan.¹⁴¹

Searching for ways to counteract German influence that it believed was politically oriented against France, the French government targeted the large German academic lobby in the prestigious northeastern universities. There, a significant number of German scholars occupied faculty positions in Ivy League institutions. Evidence¹⁴² of their pro-German sentiment indicated to the French that university classrooms might become a vehicle for increased U. S. support of Germany. French opinion was substantiated by the fact that the U. S. was readily using its academics to further its information policy overseas. As evidence of this, it pointed to the fact that high-ranking U. S. officials often chose to make major policy announcements from universities.

French officials visiting U. S. universities noted the pro-Germany trend among academics and warned the French government that an active campaign against France was being waged by pro-German faculty.

J'ai pu constater personnellement combien est grand le nombre de professeurs d'origine allemande, notamment à l'université de Chicago. Leur influence sur les étudiants américains n'est pas toujours favorable à la France, mais d'autres professeurs de nationalité ou d'origine française

¹⁴⁰AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 121. No. 29. Memorandum from Alexandre de Manziarly, Consul General/Los Angeles to Bonnet. 4 April 1950. De Manziarly was referring to an incident that took place in 1948.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 à 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol 1. Claudel, *Mémoire*, 20 November 1948

s'efforcent de donner à l'influence de notre pays la place à laquelle elle a droit dans l'enseignement donné aux États-Unis.¹⁴³

In an attempt to counter these attacks,¹⁴⁴ the Direction d'Amérique drew up guidelines for lectures and presentations by French diplomats and visiting officials for presentations in U. S. universities, schools and colleges.

Consuls in the U. S. regions were directed to prioritize invitations from universities and to develop contacts with academics. Personnel were to portray the pro-German academic lobby as tangible evidence that the U. S. had been victimized by pro-German propaganda between the world wars.¹⁴⁵ It recalled that these academics traditionally claimed that Germany was not only not responsible for World War I, but that she was "asphyxiée"¹⁴⁶ in its diminished borders.

French government interest in student and faculty exchanges with the U. S. dated back to 1945¹⁴⁷ when the Direction Générale d'Amérique expressed an interest in continuing previously established annual French exchanges with Mount Holyoke University¹⁴⁸ because

¹⁴³AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Échanges Culturels. Série II. États-Unis. Vol.124. Memorandum from Jean Maunoury, l'Architecte en Chef du Département d'Eure et Loire, to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 10 February 1949.

¹⁴⁴AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Telegram from Schuman to Bonnet. 4 April 1952.

¹⁴⁵AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol. 1. Claudel, *Mémoire*, 20 November 1948.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. Vol. 178. Telegram from Ministère des Affaires Étrangères to Consul de France, New York City, 26 January 1945.

¹⁴⁸AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1947. Box 173.

they provided an opportunity to disseminate information about France to U. S. intellectuals and academics.

Universities were especially favored by the French government because of the open forum that they provided for informing students and faculty about French lifestyle and updating them on the French domestic situation. Robert Schuman¹⁴⁹ considered this sector so important to the French cause in the U. S. that he wanted to keep a special section autonomous in the reorganized French cultural services to deal with grants for teachers and students. His rationale was that no confusion should exist in the U. S. intellectual milieu between the French services charged with university relations and the services offered by U. S. Foundations.

Je désire toutefois que la section de l'enseignement et des bourses des services culturels conserve une certaine autonomie et, qu'aucune confusion ne puisse s'établir dans les milieux intellectuels américains entre des services chargés des relations avec les universités et les grandes Fondations et ceux qui, du fait de leur objet, doivent mener une action politique susceptible de revêtir un caractère de propagande. Il convient donc de maintenir à la tête de cette section un membre de l'enseignement supérieur et de l'installer dans les locaux distincts de ceux affectés aux activités de presse.¹⁵⁰

Schuman planned to use U. S. academia to maximum French advantage by placing a well-known French intellectual at the head of French cultural and intellectual services. This appointee would be a French scholar who was a member of a recognized graduate studies program. He would divide his time equally among local French installations in U.

¹⁴⁹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol. 518. Telegram from Schuman to Bonnet. 4 April 1952.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 4.

S. cities where there were educational activities that were covered by the U. S. press.¹⁵¹ His presence would provide the French program with an experienced spokesperson to deal with students' and scholars' problems in the U. S.¹⁵² He felt that this strategy would assure positive dissemination of French information to important U. S. faculty members and student bodies.

Schuman directed that French intellectuals visiting U. S. universities should be particularly convincing when speaking where faculty members were suspected of trying to influence students against France.¹⁵³ French diplomatic initiative supported government strategy as the following text demonstrates.

C'est à l'université où je traitais des principes de la politique étrangère française que j'ai trouvé au sujet de l'Afrique du Nord le plus de contradicteurs. Parmi, en effet, les membres de l'Institut des Sciences Politiques dont j'étais l'hôte, j'ai pu constater qu'un certain nombre de jeunes gens continuaient à être persuadés que l'indépendance complète des pays d'Afrique du Nord pouvait demeurer une sorte de panacée pour résoudre les difficultés auxquelles les pays libres ont à faire face dans cette région du monde.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, French officials were competitive guest lecturers, often sharing university invitations with visiting diplomats. French regional operations attempted to keep track of where British visitors spoke and what they told their academic audience because of

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²This part of Schuman's plan was never carried out and no one was named to this position.

¹⁵³Ibid., 6.

¹⁵⁴AE, France.Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Memorandum from Jean Vyau de Lagarde, Consul-General/San Francisco to Bonnet, 18 December 1952.

French perception that Anglo-Saxon points of view would reflect badly on the French cause.

Si l'on tient compte...que mon collègue britannique...a été invité à faire des conférences par l'université de Tulane..et que mon très actif collègue italien a été également invité...l'on ne peut douter de l'intérêt que du point de vue politique présentent ces contacts universitaires qui me permettent d'exposer sous le couvert de l'expansion culturelle, la position de la France sur certains problèmes d'actualité internationale..¹⁵⁵

IX. The French Program for Influential U. S. Visitors to France

(a) French Policy

The Direction Générale d'Amérique recommended that the French government establish cultural ties with well-known U. S. personalities visiting France by receiving them in private audiences at the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères and the Élysée.

In explaining its rationale for these meetings, it emphasized that the psychological benefits that accrued from liaisons with U. S. citizens who were active in public life would enhance French foreign policy objectives in the U. S. Receiving important visitors in opulent surroundings that reflected French history and culture would demonstrate French goodwill and support of U. S. policy. This theme was endorsed by the French Embassy in Washington, where the ambassador and his staff often met with Americans who were leaving for France. Similarly, the embassy held numerous receptions until lack of funds¹⁵⁶ forced severe

¹⁵⁵AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. No. 146/RC. Memorandum from Lionel Vasse, Consul-General/New Orleans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 June 1949.

¹⁵⁶AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Bidault 1944 to 1948. Vol. 39. A Memorandum from Relations Culturelles covering the period 1 July to 30 December 1947 stated lack of finances necessitated serious cutbacks in government receptions honoring foreign visitors. The memo suggested that inter-departmental receptions be held

program cutbacks.

Le Cabinet du Ministre estime qu'il convient de ne pas laisser s'accréditer l'opinion que le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères est à même d'accueillir sans discrimination les participants des nombreux congrès ou manifestations artistiques, littéraires, économiques, voire sportif tenant leurs assises en France.¹⁵⁷

(b) Examples of Visitors Received

In keeping with French government policy of receiving influential U. S. personalities, whose activities related to French interests, the French Consul in New York welcomed American author John Steinbeck¹⁵⁸ before his departure for France in 1947.

Étant donné la personnalité de Steinbeck et d'autre part, la série d'articles très favorables que la revue *Life* vient consacrer à la France, je n'ai pas manqué de recevoir M. Steinbeck avant son départ et de lui accorder toutes les facilités possibles.¹⁵⁹

Steinbeck, considered an important contact by the French Embassy for future U. S./France intellectual exchanges, merited a recommendation to the French government that he be received at the Élysée in Paris.

for several visiting dignitaries rather than having individual functions.

¹⁵⁷Ibid. AE, France. Note pour le DGRC. PH/BB. No. 360 CM. 11 July 1947.

¹⁵⁸Steinbeck, author of numerous articles on France and many books published internationally, had just completed a series of favorable articles about France in *Life* magazine, a weekly publication with one of the largest circulations in the U. S. and also published in Paris. Steinbeck, who was pro-French, was going to France to take up a position at the Université de Dijon.

¹⁵⁹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. États-Unis. Vol. 178. No. 611. Memorandum from Ludovic Chancel, Consul General/New York to Bidault, "Voyage en France de M. Steinbeck." 11 July 1947.

Victor Riesel¹⁶⁰ requested an audience with the Président du Conseil that was granted upon recommendation of the Direction Générale d'Amérique.

Riesel s'est, en effet, du fait de la campagne qu'il a menée récemment contre les malversations qui s'étaient produites dans les syndicats américains, acquis une incontestable autorité aux États-Unis. Il a vu cette autorité encore renforcée à la suite d'un attentat dont il a été victime en représailles de cette campagne.¹⁶¹

Other U. S. visitors whom the French Embassy recommended that its government host in Paris included a group of U. S. mayors who were in France to attend the Thirteenth International Congress of Municipal Authorities.¹⁶² The French Embassy was careful to explain¹⁶³ to Paris that, while in England, the mayors were received by the London County Council and the Lord Mayor of London. Therefore, French government authorities should accord them similar courtesy in order to avoid possible press comments in the U. S. that the French did not provide the same level of protocol to Americans in elected positions as the British did.

¹⁶⁰Riesel was an American journalist who the French Embassy considered very sympathetic to France. He was made Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur.

¹⁶¹ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. No. 63/AM. "M. Victor Riesel." Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre from the Direction Général d'Amérique. 22 August 1957.

¹⁶²Held in Paris 12 to 18 June 1957. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Vol 518. Letter from Ambassador Hervé Alphand to Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Voyages des maires américains en France." 10 May 1957.

¹⁶³Ibid.

U. S. government officials were given preferential treatment by the French, depending upon their ability to influence Franco-American relations. Senator William J. Fulbright was warmly received at the Élysée¹⁶⁴ because of his patronage of the Exchange Program and his support for France in the U. S. Senate. When Senator Mike Mansfield¹⁶⁵ visited France in 1956, the Direction d'Amérique recommended¹⁶⁶ that he be received by the Cabinet during his brief stay in Paris and that he be given the opportunity to talk with members of the Interministerial Suez Committee.

However, the planned visit of U. S. aviator Charles Lindbergh¹⁶⁷ in May 1957 was far more controversial. Lindbergh was invited under the auspices of the U. S. film company, Warner Brothers, to attend the world premier of a specially-produced film¹⁶⁸ to honor his flight between New York and Paris. Responding to a letter received from Air France¹⁶⁹ that

¹⁶⁴Fulbright was on a fact-finding mission in 1949 with other members of Congress.

¹⁶⁵Mansfield was a member of the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. He had been authorized by President Eisenhower to intervene in U. S. petrol supplies to Suez in case of cessation of traffic or a bloc.

¹⁶⁶AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 332. Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre. 21 September 1956.

¹⁶⁷Lindbergh's visit was part of a project planned by Air France to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of his solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean. He was a controversial visitor because of his public statements on the eve of World War II that were generally reported in the U. S. press to be pro-Hitler. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Note pour le Cabinet from the Directeur Général Politique. "Commemoration du voyage Lindbergh." 10 August 1956.

¹⁶⁸Title of the film was *The Spirit of St. Louis*.

¹⁶⁹The Air France representative in North America wrote to French Ambassador Couve de Murville asking if the French government would receive Lindbergh in Paris. Given the nature of Lindbergh's reported political orientation, the ambassador passed the request

was forwarded to Paris from the French Embassy in Washington, the Direction Politique advised the government that it saw no obstacles to Lindbergh's personal presence in Paris, but left the decision to the Cabinet as to whether or not an official ¹⁷⁰French welcome would be extended. French policy planners feared that official acknowledgment of Lindbergh might result in protests from left-wing political groups.

Occasionally, French municipal authorities,¹⁷¹ who had contacts with U. S. businessmen, requested that the government provide an official welcome for individuals. The level of protocol involved was dependent upon his importance to French business interests. For example, when Harold Hodgkinson¹⁷² visited Paris, he was described as "sans doute l'un des hommes d'affaires américain les plus favorables au développement des échanges commerciaux avec la France."¹⁷³

on to the Direction Politique. The latter, unwilling to respond because of possible political recriminations from Lindbergh's presence, sent the request to the French Cabinet.

¹⁷⁰Lindbergh was received by officials in Paris, but his visit was not accorded high protocol.

¹⁷¹Note that French municipal officials had to conform to regulations from the Ministry of the Interior and request courtesy for visitors rather than accord it themselves. This was in keeping with government directives that local French officials not get involved with foreign activities.

¹⁷²Hodgkinson was the Director of Filene's Department Store in Boston, Massachusetts and a Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur.

¹⁷³AE, France. États-Unis. Vol. 518. Amérique 1952 to 1963. Letter from Pierre Ruais, Président du Conseil Municipale, Hôtel de Ville, Paris, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15 April 1957.

French officials in the U. S. also used honors bestowed on important French citizens in the U. S. to promote French policy objectives. When Albert Schweitzer¹⁷⁴ was honored by the University of Chicago,¹⁷⁵ the ambassador saw the opportunity for using Schweitzer's fame to promote French policy in North Africa. He reported the benefits of this visit in the following manner.

Notre compatriote a certainement réussi à influencer certains secteurs de l'opinion publique américaine en ce qui concerne notre oeuvre africaine. Il a dans un entrevue au New York Times¹⁷⁶ exprimé sa grande admiration pour l'administration française en Afrique: 'étant donné les difficultés, a-t-il dit, elle a fait du bon travail.'¹⁷⁷

The French Embassy took careful note of statements by U. S. Senators and Congressmen that concerned France, so that both favorable and derogatory comments could be analyzed in order to develop French strategy for future use. Thus, remarks made by Senator Wiley,¹⁷⁸ referring to La Fayette and the French explorers of the Great Lakes region

¹⁷⁴Schweitzer was invited to the U. S. in 1949 on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of the death of the German poet, Goethe. Despite the fact that his presence was to honor German culture, the French government turned the occasion into a major press and information event by highlighting the fact that Schweitzer was a French citizen.

¹⁷⁵An honorary Doctor of Law degree was bestowed on Schweitzer by University of Chicago. The faculty of this university was known to be largely pro-German in sentiment and it promoted German studies and Anglo-Saxon civilization.

¹⁷⁶Published in *The New York Times*, 17 July 1949.

¹⁷⁷AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1948 to 1955. Série I. Cabinet du Directeur. Affaires Générales. Vol. 1. Letter from Bonnet to Schuman, 21 July 1949.

¹⁷⁸Wiley was speaking to students at Marquette University. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 518. No.1567. Memorandum from Alphand to Pineau, "Remarques du Sénateur Wiley sur la France." 13 June 1957.

as “heroes,” were especially welcomed because of rising anti-French sentiment¹⁷⁹ in the U. S.

Le Sénateur Wiley estime qu’il convient particulièrement de rappeler notre dette à l’égard de la France...à l’heure où nos amis de ce pays qui a donné au monde le slogan, ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité,’ sont harcelés chez eux et à l’extérieur.¹⁸⁰

Conclusion

French reaction to U. S. cultural policy in France was a component of French foreign policy. It aimed at restoring French independence through reconstruction of the French economy. Government strategy assumed that low-key reaction to U. S. cultural policy in France would facilitate French economic recovery by keeping U. S. financial aid available. Furthermore, it bargained on its own culture as a valuable tool to change negative American opinion toward France.

The French approach failed because government leaders underestimated the extent of U. S. cultural policy and the anti-French reaction in the U. S. Whereas government leaders thought that French culture would provide a viable means of increasing support, poor French image was responsible for growing anti-French sentiment that was paralleled by heightened tension between the French and the U. S. as the Cold War intensified. Moreover, lack of funds did not permit French foreign policy to use French culture in the U. S. as French diplomatic officials recommended.

¹⁷⁹A new wave of anti-French feeling began in the U. S. press following French government policy in the Suez Crisis in 1957.

¹⁸⁰AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518. No. 1567. Memorandum from Alphand to Pineau, “Rémarques du Sénateur Wiley sur la France.” 13 June 1957.

Chapter Seven

French Public Reaction to U. S. Cultural Policy in France

I. Anti-Americanism in France

U. S. archival documents consistently¹ debated the causes and intensity of anti-Americanism in France. Officials blamed certain organized French groups, especially French youth, for inciting anti-American sentiment. Combined with what the Department of State stressed were PCF efforts to discredit the U. S.,² these groups were the focal point of USIS/France Program objectives.³ When the growing Communist trend toward mass use of culture⁴ prompted a shift in orientation toward the general French population, program initiatives began mobilizing popular support.

¹During the period under review, U. S. archives concerning the state of Franco-American relations have a dominant theme of anti-Americanism. Although U. S. strategists contended that it abated during certain periods, it remained a factor throughout. After 1950, the U. S. carried out regular surveys and polls in France to try to determine the nature of anti-Americanism and its rise or fall in public opinion. It established the Office of Intelligence and Research in order to do so. Polls became more frequent when the USIS Program came under USIA authority in 1953.

²Charles A. Micaud, "Organization and Leadership of the French Communist Party." Center of International Studies, Princeton, New Jersey. 15 January 1952. SMOF: PSB Files 080 The Washington Seminar to 091 France. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

³Information policy objectives in the U. S. /France Country Papers from 1950 to 1954 targeted French youth more than other organized groups. See Chapter Five for discussion.

⁴AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Pineau. Vol 32. Note pour le Ministre. "Échanges culturels avec les pays de l'Est," pp. 1-2. 10 February 1956.

French correspondence referred to “l’image américaine”⁵ and the effect that it had upon Franco-American relations. Popular reaction to U. S. cultural policy, however, was problematic for the French government because of its complex nature. French foreign policy objectives made it necessary to ignore much evidence of unpopular reaction to U. S. cultural expansion into French domestic life. Public attitudes were determined through French press commentary as well as from reports by the French Embassy and its U. S. network that provided background impressions of French visitors that the French press published when the parties involved returned to France.

Less publicized, but perhaps more significant French response emanated from individuals who had no particular group affiliation. Their reaction to U. S. cultural policy was frequently critical, or, at best, blasé. Many French people believed that France had been *the* most important nation in the history of Europe. This was taken to be the opinion of de Gaulle.⁶ France, he affirmed, would recover its previous prestige with the return of effective

⁵This phrase was frequently used in French Embassy correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in internal memoranda between the embassy and French Consuls General in U. S. regional cities. Jean Daridan, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, used the expression to argue that misunderstanding by American officials of French mentality was responsible for poor Franco-American relations. (See Chapter Six). AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Jean Daridan, No. 3303. “Études sur les données fondamentales de l’information française aux États-Unis.” 18 July 1952.

⁶American journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer attributed this view to de Gaulle. He interviewed the French leader in 1954 when de Gaulle was in retirement. Mowrer wrote that de Gaulle told him that French apathy and disillusionment were a result of the devastating losses suffered by France as a result of World War II. According to Mowrer, when he contradicted the statement by saying that perhaps the General meant that France was *one* of the greatest nations, De Gaulle replied, “The leading nation.” Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “France Needs A New Revolution,” p. 21. *Collier’s Magazine*, 22 January 1954. Records of the Democratic National Committee. Harry S. Truman Library. Independence, Missouri.

leadership.⁷

However, French popular attitudes toward U. S. cultural events in France were often determined through less concrete fashion because of the *lack* of formal comments by ordinary people. Impressions about the U. S. were garnered from daily contacts through personal interactions with Americans.

U. S. talent with respect to culture, however, suffered from poor image. Paris audiences preferred to spend their limited leisure time and money on sophisticated entertainments better-suited to French tastes. “Banal enough to drive one to distraction,”⁸ complained one French listener, referring to a U. S. radio program about Manhattan. Another reaction pointed to differences in style between U. S. and French broadcasts, “It’s [program about information gained through interviews] not instructive enough and has no usefulness either as information or entertainment. It’s just nothing.”⁹

When the Chicago Ballet appeared at the Champs-Élysée Theater in the spring of 1950, audience booing at the end of the performance precipitated devastating reviews in morning papers. Critics panned the performance describing “offensive taste and artistry”¹⁰

⁷Ibid. Mowrer reported his conversation with de Gaulle in which the French leader implied that he was referring to his eventual return to power.

⁸Listening to *Ici New York* and other Foreign Broadcasts in France,” p. 18. Papers of Charles Hulten. VOA 1951. Box 17. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁹Ibid., 18.

¹⁰Telegram from the U. S. Embassy to the Department of State. 10 May 1950. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

and the “violently unfavorable reaction of the invited audience.”¹¹

Publicly, U. S. Embassy officials blamed negative French reception on PCF influence, but privately it warned the Department of State against sending the American Ballet Theater¹² to Paris in case of a recurrence.¹³ As a result, plans to present the Martha Graham Dance Company in Paris¹⁴ were scrutinized by policy planners in order to insure that the program would be tailored to French tastes. The USIS/Paris office was directed to promote the event in all the French newspapers so that the Paris performance would be sold out.

When a letter criticized U. S. entertainments in France, calling them the “industrialization of culture,”¹⁵ the Bureau of Public Affairs directed that all final decisions about official performances would be authorized by Washington. It ordered that a distinction be made between U. S. troupes that possessed the expert professional level

¹¹Ibid. The audience for this event was by invitation from the U. S. Embassy.

¹²Ibid. Telegram from the U. S. Embassy to the Department of State. No. 2895. 15 June 1950.

¹³Ibid. Telegram text suggested that everything possible be done to warn other USIS posts where the Chicago Ballet Company was scheduled to appear of the negative audience reaction.

¹⁴The Martha Graham Ballet Company scheduled performance in 1950 was canceled because of U. S. Embassy fear that the disastrous appearance by the Chicago Ballet Company had endangered it. The Martha Graham Company performed at the *Salute to France* in 1954.

¹⁵Individual letters were answered by Department of State clerks who attempted to explain U. S. use of culture in France as a means for improving relations between the two countries and of promoting world peace. The phrase “industrialization of culture” came from a letter written in English by a French woman complaining about the low level of a cultural performance that she had attended.

necessary for Paris performances and other groups designated for provincial performances where audiences were thought to be less discriminating.

The initial performance of the Smith College Chamber Singers in Paris in 1950 and again in 1953 in Paris was judged inadequate¹⁶ in comparison with those of French student groups. As the group was “non-professional,”¹⁷ French music critics were not invited to attend its performances, making its value to USIS/Paris objectives negligible.

Interestingly enough, regional PAO reports¹⁸ stressed strong audience enthusiasm for the group’s performances, allowing speculation that PAOs manipulated popular reaction to their own advantage. The Smith College group gave a series of concerts that were reviewed by the local PAO who included press coverage in his Embassy report. Part of his commentary follows: “It is difficult to be anything less than rhapsodic in appraising the success of the Smith College concerts at Menton and Nîmes.”¹⁹ Another read, “Perhaps the most eloquent commentary on the success of the Nîmes concert was the fact that the audience was reluctant to “release” the Smith singers.”²⁰

¹⁶Memorandum from Lawrence S. Morris, Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy to Department of State. 13 January 1953. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Thomas J. Jennings, PAO/Marseilles, “Report on Concerts of Smith College Chamber Singers in Southern France,” p. 1. 11 August 1952. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Reports of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁹Ibid., 2.

²⁰Ibid.

Two significant facts emerge from this: If the PAOs were writing positive reports that were inaccurate portrayals of performances, or of audience reaction to them, their opinions were still corroborated by the U. S. Embassy CPAO who prepared a composite semi-annual report justifying the USIS/France program to Washington where it was used to substantiate requests for program funding. This demonstrates that U. S. impressions of French popular reaction may have been unreliable. Although the PAOs often included complimentary letters from French spectators in their reports, there is no possibility of verifying their authenticity. Very few letters from ordinary French citizens that criticize American performances exist in American archives. Nor was popular French reaction to U. S. cultural policy recorded in the French archives.

U. S. performances, however, were reviewed in French newspapers, permitting another venue of perspective about audience reaction. Yet, French press commentary was not without its limitations. Anti-American sentiment on the part of journalists sometimes prevented a non-biased review of cultural entertainments. Furthermore, PAO efforts to ensure “good press” through personal contacts with local editors and reporters frequently prevented French critics’ impressions from being accurately conveyed to the public.

Some journalists, however, resisted the pressure placed on them by regional PAOs. For example, the Director-General of *l’Est Républicain*²¹ adamantly refused copy from British and American information services for one year before capitulating to PAO tactics.

²¹Léon Chadé, Director of *l’Est Républicain*. He is mentioned in Chapter Two, but his reactions are given deeper analysis here.

I am extremely obliged for the diligent way in which you have complied with my requests for photographs to illustrate our reports on America. I most heartily thank you. It will be a great pleasure to have lunch together the next time you are in Nancy.²²

However, his recorded appreciation is contradicted by a prior statement in the same memorandum that gives evidence of a deal between USIS/Strasbourg and his newspaper.

Mr. Chadé made certain requests and said his newspaper chain would like to cooperate more closely with the consulate. The consulate received the following letter from Mr. Chadé, indicative of his new attitude.²³

Explanation of Chadé's change of opinion may lie in the larger context of French political circumstances and the chain of events immediately preceding his reversal of policy. His conversation with the PAO took place in September 1950, less than three months after the declaration of the Campaign of Truth. Its implementation was accompanied by directives to USIS officials to intensify U. S. economic and political activity. In France, the government was concerned with the question of security because of the emergence of the new German state. Whereas it had previously relied on the U. S. as its mainstay against a possible German aggressor, its confidence in American protection was shaken by the shift in the balance of power²⁴ that resulted following the 1949 alliance between China and the USSR.

²²Letter from Chadé 11 September 1950. Cited in memorandum from George D. Andrews, U. S. Consul/Strasbourg to the Department of State, "USIE - Features and Photographs." 14 September 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²³Ibid.

²⁴See Chapter Six for discussion.

L'Est Républicain printed special editions²⁵ throughout eastern France. The advent of a possible Communist takeover²⁶ or aggression by the new German state may have forced Chadé's hand. His presence at a banquet for Churchill held in September 1950 demonstrates that he was favorable to the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, his acquiescence to the PAO's request that he print positive information about the U. S. was made with "some requests"²⁷ and not offered freely. Cooperation with USIS/Strasbourg requests to publicize constructive impressions about U. S. politicized events in the region would have been to his advantage because of the protection that it offered, as well as the opportunity for his paper to enjoy U. S. support.. Therefore, Chadé's commitment appears to have been a strategic move that was mutually beneficial to USIS and himself.

Other examples of positive press reaction to U. S. cultural policy are found in the length of stories that were printed in French newspapers from USIS/France information submitted to editors by regional PAOs. Table 39 demonstrates a sample number of stories published locally concerning USIS/France cultural events.

²⁵Special editions were published in Metz, Thionville, Lunéville, Longway, Joeuf, Belfort, Vesoul, Bar-le-Duc, Verdun, Épinal, Saint-Dié, Remirement, Chaumont and Saint-Dizier.

²⁶USIS/France control of the press in Eastern France was desirable because of officials' concern with PCF support in the region and suspected Communist affiliation with local unions.

²⁷George D. Andrews, U. S. Consul/Strasbourg to the Department of State, "USIE - Features and Photographs." 14 September 1950. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 11. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Table 39. Sample of Regional French Press Publication of USIS/France Material 1950 to 1952²⁸

Date	Place	Paper	Circulation	Details
18 Sept 1950	St-Étienne	<i>Le Patriote</i> ²⁹	-----	two columns
21 Sept 1950	Roanne	<i>Espoir de St-Étienne</i>	-----	three columns
18 Jan 1951	Lille	<i>Nord Matin</i>	193, 000 ³⁰	three columns/photo
18 Jan 1951	Lille	<i>Croix du Nord</i>	60, 000	two columns
18 Jan 1951	Lille	<i>Voix du Nord</i>	250, 000 ³¹	three columns/photo
4 July 1951	Marseilles	<i>Le Provençal</i>	100, 000 ³²	
30 Nov 1951	Strasbourg	<i>Nouvel Alsacien</i>	40, 000	
12 Dec 1951	Marseilles	<i>La Gazette Provençale</i>	30, 000	
5 Feb 1952	Lyons	<i>Le Progrès</i>		three columns/photo
12 Aug 1952	Lyons	11 newspapers	963, 000 ³³	-----

²⁸Table 39 information is from the Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. Box 27. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri and Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²⁹*Le Patriote* was a Communist newspaper that occasionally printed some positive references to U. S. cultural performances. A memorandum refers to a *Le Patriote* reporter who approached the PAO/Marseilles following a concert and reportedly stated, "I want you to know I can only speak favorably of the concert in my review." Memorandum from C. H. Hall, U. S. Consul/Marseilles to the Department of State, "Report on Concerts on Smith College Chamber Singers in Southern France," p. 2. 11 August 1952. Despatch No. 20. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³⁰Statistics are approximate.

³¹*Voix du Nord* also printed a USIS/France story on 26 Dec 1951.

³²*Le Provençal* was a socialist newspaper. The favorable article was written by USIS/Marseilles staff and placed in the newspaper at the PAO's request.

³³*Ibid.* Total circulation from the eleven newspapers concerned.

The Department of State, searching for an answer to poor U. S. image in France, blamed deteriorating relations with the French on what it claimed was “the well-known French inferiority complex.”³⁴ Its’ assessment was that denial of the changed circumstances of France was the root of this problem. Government attitudes that anti-Americanism was a result of a national inferiority complex was simplistic. It may have emanated from its own feelings of cultural inadequacy³⁵ in comparison to France, leaving Department of State planners to search for appropriate ways of defending U. S. lifestyle.

U. S. opinions about France, however, evolved from its ivory tower position as new world rulers. American perspective possessed a type of “tunnel vision” that foresaw danger to U. S. interests overseas when the general population did not enthusiastically accept U. S. attitudes. During the escalation of the Cold War, American policy planners found the French guilty of anti-Americanism once their enthusiasm for the U. S. waned after the Liberation. Department of State memoranda pointed to the difficult French temperament,³⁶ but failed to take into account that the French population was accustomed to a particular

³⁴ “France as a Problem for U. S. Foreign Policy,” p. 4. Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954. Record Group 59. General and Classified Records of the Department of State. Box 87. NARA Washington, D. C.

³⁵ Statements by U. S. officials that it would find it difficult to compete with European artistry, particularly French culture, are abundant in the archival literature. During the period immediately preceding the Campaign of Truth, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Edward Barrett replied to several memoranda concerning lack of U. S. cultural expertise in comparison to European artists. He stressed that the U. S. must always send its very best talent because of the Soviet cultural offensive into Western Europe. Record Group 59. Department of State. Decimal File. 1950 to 1954. Box 2386. NARA, Washington, D. C.

³⁶Ibid., 8.

lifestyle, that, despite some³⁷ similarities to U. S. society, remained French at heart and foreign to U. S. understanding.

II. French Popular Reaction and Culture

Culture played a leading role in French public and private life. There were wide discrepancies between politicized cultural events that USIS/France used with target groups to pursue foreign policy objectives and French involvement in cultural life. While the U. S. government actively solicited help from its intellectuals and academics under guise of patriotic duty, in order to support foreign policy, the French government did not do so³⁸ because it was not necessary. French popular opinion reacted to the lead provided by French intellectuals who, as an integral part of public life, commanded a strong following in the press among the urban middle and upper classes.

Moreover, in Paris and other large cities people regularly participated in cultural events. Many people took culture so seriously that relegation of artistry to secondary position below industrialization and capitalism was considered to be evidence of immorality.

³⁷Close-knit family, community and religious ties.

³⁸AE, France. Secrétariat Général 1946 to 1965. Vol. 51. "Position de la France dans la Guerre froide." 21 April 1950.

French attitudes raise the possibility that popular reaction toward U. S. cultural policy may have been less anti-American in nature than it was anti-foreigner.³⁹ While the ordinary Frenchman may not have disliked individual Americans whom he met personally, the history of pre-war interpersonal relations with foreigners, as well as the very clear differences between himself and those Americans he encountered, made him suspicious and wary.⁴⁰

L'amitié n'est pas toujours inspirée par la ressemblance. Les "communautés" les plus solides et les plus fécondes sont celles qui, dictées par la raison, sont consolidées par l'expérience et soutenues par l'intérêt, quand elles ne sont pas imposées par la nécessité. Les relations de la France et des États-Unis sont la meilleure illustration de cette vérité. Il est difficile de trouver deux tempéraments plus différents pour ne pas dire plus opposés que celui du Français moyen et celui de l'Américain moyen: le premier nourri d'une longue hérédité catholique et le second de ces principes "puritains" qui, encore aujourd'hui, forment le fond de la mentalité yankee."⁴¹

USIS/France explanations that its policy was to help the French help themselves⁴² were resented by proud Frenchmen, not only because of their respect for French cultural heritage, but because of the uniqueness of French lifestyle and tradition accustomed to its

³⁹In his interview with de Gaulle, Mowrer attributed the following statement to the French leader, "The French people," he [de Gaulle] said, "Are not anti-American. They are anti-foreigner." He then went on to explain that this was a result of French dislike at playing a secondary role in world affairs after having been the leading nation for centuries. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "France Needs A New Revolution," p. 21. *Collier's*, 22 January 1954. Records of the Democratic National Committee. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁰Comments from U. S. tourists and from French citizens made informally to U. S. journalists, as well as correspondence in U. S. and French archives demonstrate this.

⁴¹AE, France. Relations Culturelles 1945 to 1949. États-Unis. Vol. 214. Henri Claudel, *Mémoire*, p. 1. 20 November 1948.

⁴²This was stated in all U. S./France Country Papers from 1950 to 1953.

own pace of change. Workers often balked at using new methods, preferring to perform familiar tasks as they had always done. In France, one year's work resulted in a hundred units of production,⁴³ an extremely low rate that left France far behind its British and U. S. counterparts. In effect, Frenchmen were deeply attached to their own, unique way of life that identified culture with French ideas of freedom and self-expression.

I think that France and Frenchmen will remain true to their way of life. And that way of life does not call for vodka. It does not call for knuckling under to Russian domination. Neither, however, does it call for whiskey and American domination. It calls for what the Frenchman considers to be in keeping with French tradition of culture and freedom.⁴⁴

Statements such as "France is the Sick Man of Europe"⁴⁵ attempted to explain French reaction to the shift in power from its former European center to North America. In the new order, Europe played a much less significant role in resolution of international affairs than it had done in the past. Consequently, all of the tradition, refinement and cultural expertise of the French seemed endangered, as if it would be lost forever in the face of U. S. power. Translated into practical reality for Frenchmen, rapid implementation of technical and industrial progress arrived without the consolation of time for the population to adapt to new lifestyle. Since modernization could only be accomplished with U. S. technological

⁴³Figures given for France were compared with 180 units in Great Britain and 310 in the U. S. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "France Needs A New Revolution," p. 20. *Collier's Magazine*, 22 January 1954. Records of the Democratic National Committee. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁴AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 43. Article by Louis A. Fontaine in *The Worcester Telegram*, 28 July 1950.

⁴⁵English translation of remarks by Deputy Premier Paul Reynaud. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "France Needs a New Revolution," p. 19. *Collier's* 22 January 1954. Records of the Democratic National Committee. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

help, the most advanced in the world, Frenchmen were all the more conscious of the conflict between their cultural and industrial identities. This was emphasized by widespread French belief that while France was dependent upon American economic aid, the U. S. had nothing to offer France in the way of cultural achievement. A French listener to the VOA wrote the following after hearing a program about U. S. progress on heart disease.

They [the Americans] appear to be pointing out a superiority they enjoy over others - a superiority they don't really have. I believe that their superiority, if they have one - which I don't believe [sic]- is due only to their money. It's the money which permits them to have superior methods to ours. ⁴⁶

Much of what U. S. officials concluded was French hostility toward Americans may be defined as human curiosity about apparent U. S. insensitivities. As Americans were not well known in France, their presence during the post-Liberation domestic crisis aroused considerable interest. Foreigners with leisure and money to enjoy themselves during a time of extreme hardships presented an image of selfish, egotistical Americans.

The PCF took advantage of this situation by decrying the presence of "rich Americans"⁴⁷ whose self-indulgence was an insult to hardworking Frenchmen. In this way, PCF propaganda combined with philosophical interpretations⁴⁸ of American lifestyle by

⁴⁶ Letter written in English. "An Evaluation of Audience Testing in Western Europe," pp. 15 to 16. No. A-94. 15 March 1951. Papers of Charles Hulten. VOA 1951. Box 17. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁴⁷Memorandum from Romain Gary, Consul General/Los Angeles accompanying copy of article in *The Los Angeles Daily New*. A. E. France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 520. Victor Riesel, "Moola-Laden American Tourists Making Frenchmen See Red." 20 July 1953.

⁴⁸André Siegfried and François Mauriac were among French intellectuals who visited the U. S. and reported negative opinions in the French press upon their return. Mauriac wrote

French intellectuals to keep anti-Americanism at high levels.

French inquisitiveness peaked with frustration in 1947 when organized strikes made unemployment and lack of basic living necessities a facet of everyday life. While some Frenchmen saw the opportunity for self-profit by raising prices and demanding exorbitant amounts for basic services, others became indifferent to Americans, or simply ignored them. Despite this, French impressions, gleaned from the post-war influx of U. S. films, comics, Coca-Cola,⁴⁹ chewing gum and other examples of U. S. lifestyle, were of a distant country where, it appeared, anyone could get rich quickly. French Communists used examples of U. S. cultural expansion to claim that American firms⁵⁰ were taking over traditional French lifestyle and threatening the civilized French way of life.⁵¹

Many Americans who traveled to France after the war were disappointed by their personal experiences with the French. Acutely conscious of the U. S. role in the Liberation and the welcome accorded to American servicemen, U. S. tourists could not understand

an article in *Le Figaro* in January 1945 in which he expressed the opinion that industrialization was society's main evil. He predicted that the race for power between Russia and the U. S. would result in the eventual victory of mass over individualism. AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 43. Cited in Harold Callender, "Explaining France's View of Us," p. 63. *The New York Times*, 12 March 1950.

⁴⁹In 1950 the "American menace" as Coca-Cola was known in France, led a majority of Assemblée Nationale members move to adopt a prohibitive measure against the beverage. AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 43.

⁵⁰This was particularly evident to French film makers involved in negotiations with American film companies who wanted to secure a monopoly for U. S.-made films in France. Archives Nationales, (henceforth known as AN) France. F/42/13. "Protocol des Accords Intervenues," pp. 2-3. 21 March 1945.

⁵¹Ibid.

their own cold reception. Their perspective was often clouded by pride in the new role that the U. S. had seized for itself overseas, allowing many Americans to view France through rose-colored glasses. Expecting value for dollars, they believed that they could buy “creature comforts” to create American lifestyle abroad. Certain that the U. S. would be respected as heroes and conquerors, they disregarded the grim realities that marked the changes in French life.

I have known three Americans in my life. The first was in August 1944. Everything he had in his arms he gave to me. The second was in January 1945. Everything he had in his arms he sold to me. The third time - that was yesterday - everything I had in my arms he took away from me.⁵²

Aside from personal interaction, popular opinion was determined through what the French read in newspapers and magazines, heard at union meetings and learned about through books and films. A VOA program questioned listeners about their attitudes toward “on the spot” interviews with random passersby. French reaction was that it would be “all right” if the questions were not dull and the responses were not inarticulate.⁵³

U. S. discussion of active Soviet propaganda program in France that it claimed deliberately attempted to castigate the U. S. intensified during the Campaign of Truth. In effect, the Department of State found it convenient to allude to a Soviet Program in order to promote the need for U. S. aid in France at home while creating the framework for

⁵² English translation of an article from the Paris press entitled, “What Paris is Laughing At.” *The New York Times*, 10 February 1946. Papers of Charles W. Thayer. Box 11. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁵³ “An Evaluation of Audience Testing in Western Europe,” pp. 19-20. Papers of Charles Hulten. VOA 1951. No. A-95. 15 March 1951. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

ideological warfare that its renewed policies demanded. It could then justify increased demands for congressional funds while continuing to expand U. S. influence. Consequently, culturally politicized events became much more prominent because of the nature of Cold War politics. Images of U. S. power were accomplished by its military presence, while parallel cultural displays of a refined and artistic America had to be especially created for use in France.

III. Reaction from French Intellectuals

(a) The Debate

French intellectuals eloquently and tirelessly expressed their misgivings against U. S. foreign policy. A debate began in the final days of fighting before the Liberation over reaction⁵⁴ to U. S. lifestyle. Accusations that the Americans had been mistaken in creating mass consumerism were met by different opinions from French intellectuals. Some⁵⁵ rejected U. S. lifestyle through philosophical arguments that an industrialized society was detrimental because it could only result in the loss of individualism.

⁵⁴During the closing days of the French Occupation, as the Americans neared Paris, one-page tabloids found the space to print articles with the theme that the U. S. had grievously erred in creating a consumer society. This is noteworthy because within these reports can be detected the underlying awareness of the challenge posed by U. S. lifestyle.

⁵⁵André Siegfried, renowned French teacher of political science who was an expert on the U. S., contended that Western civilization characterized by the Greek critical spirit and the Christian concept of the individual had deteriorated as a result of the mechanization that followed industrialization. He predicted that this would eventually result in a war between the two superpowers, the USSR and the U. S. François Mauriac expressed the opinion that both powers threatened France, but, it was intellectual neutrality that carried political influence. Louis Terrenoire wrote that French intellectuals were certainly not entirely in agreement with the U. S., and that Frenchmen intended to preserve their tradition of individualism and free rights, rather than sacrifice them to the capitalist system.

American conceptions have certain aspects that disturb us: An excessive confidence in mass production, a scale of values giving too great importance to quantity, a tendency to excess in organization and a too great leaning toward conformity.⁵⁶

Despite misgivings about U. S. lifestyle, not all French intellectuals were against U. S. policy. François Mauriac wrote approvingly of President Truman's 1950 message that launched the Campaign of Truth by stating that he admired the simple words of the American leader as well as his courage in standing up to the Communists. He stated: "I admire the fact that the Chief of one of the two strongest empires of the world should say to the other, 'You shall go no farther' without raising his voice."⁵⁷ Furthermore, Mauriac saw in Truman's words, the possibility that France might "awaken" from its political neutrality. French arousal might be able to persuade Europe to follow her lead. "Our apathy has sometimes seemed that of an old goat hypnotized by a python. Will the old goat move at last?"⁵⁸

⁵⁶Letter from André Siegfried to an (unnamed) friend dated January 1945. Cited in Harold Callender, "Explaining France's Views of Us," *The New York Times*, p. 34. 12 March 1950.

⁵⁷François Mauriac, "The Awakening," *Le Figaro*. 22 July 1950. Translated into English. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. PSF. Box 4. The Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

A meeting⁵⁹ of French and Italian intellectuals, delegates drafted a manifesto denouncing the prominence of defense budgets in the Western allied countries and pledged to promote “numerous and broader meetings of intellectuals working jointly for more concrete cultural exchanges between nations as a testimony of our desire for peace.”⁶⁰ Calling for greater interest in cultural exchanges, it explained that they represented the road to peace, “essential for the work of intellectuals, for the progress of learning, for the improvement of moral conscience and the happiness of peoples.”⁶¹

Pierre Abraham,⁶² who gave the keynote address, stressed that it was necessary for intellectuals to reclaim responsibility for cultural exchanges that was originally designated to UNESCO “which has until now been sabotaged by official organizations.”⁶³ His assertion

⁵⁹This meeting was sponsored by the Regional Movement of Intellectuals for the Defense of Peace and the Provence-Liguria Committee. “Franco-Italian Meeting of Intellectuals at Nice 1-2 September 1951.” Policy Planning 954. General Records of the Department of State. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹English translation of manifesto published by the organizing committee of the Franco-Italian Meeting of Intellectuals. Published in *Lettres françaises*, 9 August 1951. Cited in memorandum from the U. S. Embassy, Paris to the Department of State, “Franco-Italian Meeting of Intellectuals at Nice, 1-2 September 1951,” p. 1. Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶²Abraham was a journalist who wrote a weekly column for *Lettres françaises*, a left-wing political magazine.

⁶³English translation of Abraham’s weekly column in *Lettres françaises*, 6 September 1951. Cited in memorandum from the U. S. Embassy to the Department of State, “Franco-Italian Meeting of Intellectuals at Nice, 1-2 September 1951.” Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 11. NARA, Washington D. C.

defined French intellectual opposition to U. S. rearmament and alignment of cultural policy with defense⁶⁴ that emerged with the Campaign of Truth.

Other French intellectuals warned of the coming danger in a world where France could easily be the pawn in the Cold War.

It is the intellectuals, and amongst them the best informed de omni re scibili et quibusdam aliis, who have caressed the idea of a neutral France and a neutral Europe in the world of Stalin, devourer of small nations, while they know that in the case of a brusque attack the French troops would be pushed around in Berlin at the same time as the Anglo-Saxon armies.⁶⁵

Mauriac was not appealing for political neutrality, but for a rather abstract type of intellectual neutrality that appealed to French political convictions. Others followed his lead and questioned the wisdom of taking the path toward U. S. capitalism.

Are we entirely in accord with the United States? Certainly not. France and with her Free Europe intend to preserve their peculiar values and to assure for individual rights a different prospect from that of the capitalist system. Between the capitalism of the Western Trusts and the state capitalism of the East we withhold our trust.⁶⁶

More direct opinions were candid in declaring that U. S. economic domination of French lifestyle was so deep that it might be more efficient if France simply accepted that Americanization was inevitable.

⁶⁴Evidenced by unification of USIS and MSA.

⁶⁵François Mauriac, "The Awakening," *Le Figaro*, 22 July 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. PSF. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁶⁶AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. Vol. 43. Louis Terrenoire, cited in Harold Callender, "Explaining France's Views of Us," p. 64. *The New York Times*, 12 March 1950.

The American influence is very much in evidence, but it does not exist. It has changed the externals of our life but not our life itself. It (America) sends us a lot of money but has not changed our way of spending it. It imposes its mannequins on us, but it is we who make the dresses. It teaches us how to sell our books but not how to write them. It buys paintings but we paint them....France would be better off if her businessmen, her industry, her agriculture, her laboratories, her hotels, were Americanized.⁶⁷

(b) The Role of *Le Figaro*

Le Figaro was the French newspaper where academic and intellectual opinion most often surfaced. The oldest⁶⁸ and best-known of Paris newspapers, it closed during the Occupation but resumed publication after the Liberation.⁶⁹ The long litigation between its major share holder⁷⁰ who favored a “U. S.-first policy” and its Managing Director⁷¹ who insisted on a “France-first policy,” was carefully followed by Department of State officials who were alarmed by press comments that *Le Figaro* was “further left than right-wing

⁶⁷Philippe Labro, 1954 to 1956 French Fulbright grantee at Washington and Lee Universities co-authored an article with Woldemar Lestienne in *Arts* entitled, “Sommes-Nous Américanisés?” *Arts* was a weekly review of arts and letters in France that had a circulation of approximately 35,000 subscribers that the U. S. Embassy categorized as “middle to high-brow readers.” Record Group 59. Department of State. General and Classified Files 1955 to 1959. Box 2388. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁶⁸*Le Figaro* was first published in 1826.

⁶⁹A protracted legal battle between Yvonne Cotnareanu, former wife of French perfume magnate René Coty, and *Le Figaro* Managing Director, Pierre Brisson, resulted in Brisson taking control of the paper.

⁷⁰Until 1950 Contneauru owned ninety-seven percent of *Le Figaro* stock. “Fools and Opposition,” *Time Magazine*, 5 June 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. PSF. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

papers, and further right than left-wing papers.”⁷² Policy planners opinion was that *Le Figaro* was politically radical.⁷³ Therefore they were surprised⁷⁴ when the newspaper printed a lengthy editorial that criticized the PCF as “the camouflaged fifth column of Moscow.”⁷⁵ Retribution for this was an organized demonstration that burned 1,500 copies of *Le Figaro* outside its offices where windows and doors were barricaded against attackers.⁷⁶

U. S. policy planners disliked *Le Figaro* because of its association with French intellectuals who published their works and ideas in the paper. U. S. officials blamed the

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Archival evidence indicates that the U. S. Embassy was scrutinizing the French press and reporting on its attitudes. Newspapers were defined as pro and against U. S. liberalism. Therefore, *L'Humanité*, the organ of Communist expression in France was carefully watched in order to follow PCF objectives. When *Le Monde*, previously the French government mouthpiece, began to exhibit an anti-American trend in 1946, the U. S. showed interest in purchasing it. An attempt to do so was launched in early 1947 by a USIS/France agent who was given authority to buy the paper with U. S. dollars deposited in a French bank. He claimed that he arrived at a designated meeting with *Le Monde* executives too late to buy the paper because it had already been sold. Although he stated that the buyers were Soviet agents, this information has yet to be proven. Hubert Beuve Maury, owner of *Le Monde* at the time alluded to a potential sale in his autobiography, but failed to make a definite statement about the matter. Information is from the late Franklin W. Roudybush, former PAO/Strasbourg, interviewed by the author in Sauveterre de Rouergue, 12 August 1996.

⁷⁴In Spring 1950. Coincidentally, this attack came as the Campaign of Truth began. Department of State officials designated Communists as enemies without discriminating French Communists from the larger Soviet Communist group. “Fools and Opposition,” *Time Magazine* 5 June 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. PSF. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷⁵English translation of original *Le Figaro* editorial cited in *ibid*.

⁷⁶*Le Figaro* editorials stated that the riot was a reaction by the PCF to the paper’s publication of the memoirs of Nazi Storm Trooper Otto Skorzeny who led the paratroop raid to release Italian dictator Bruno Mussolini.

intellectual elite for creating the atmosphere that bred anti-Americanism in France. Moreover, attempts to place the U. S. and the USSR as equally responsible for the plight toward which humanity was headed was enough evidence for them to condemn French intellectuals as dangerous to U. S. objectives. "It is not that which separates the USSR from the U. S. which should frighten us, but rather what they have in common."⁷⁷

One of the reasons for targeting French intellectuals as hostile⁷⁸ to U. S. interests was that there was so little known about them in the U. S. Aside from some intellectual and academics known to U. S. Intelligence and the Paris embassy, they were otherwise unfamiliar names. A memorandum in the U. S. archives sent to then FBI⁷⁹ Director J. Edgar Hoover summarized the role and influence of Jean-Paul Sartre in France. Hoover wrote a comment in the margin, "Who is this Sartre, anyway?"⁸⁰

⁷⁷English translation of quotation from French writer François Mauriac. "The Awakening," cited in *Time Magazine*, 15 June 1950. It appeared in *Le Figaro*, 22 July 1950. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. PSF. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁷⁸Not all French intellectuals were considered unsympathetic to U. S. interests. Raymond Aron, for example, was cultivated by the U. S. Embassy because of his pro-Western attitudes. USIS/France often submitted his articles to magazines such as *Réalités* and *Arts USA*.

⁷⁹Correspondence in the U. S. archives indicates that the FBI received reports from U. S. Intelligence in France that summarized the positions and influence of leading French intellectuals. These reports included biographies and assessments of whether or not they were pro-U. S. foreign policy.

⁸⁰Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Box 4. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Sartre and fellow intellectuals Simone de Beauvoir and Pierre Emmanuel had visited the U. S. at the invitation of the U. S. government following the end of World War II. Sartre professed that he was impressed and remained sympathetic to the U. S. until 1953 when his repulsion at the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg⁸¹ became the catalyst for his advice to his followers that the future lay with the East rather than the West. His reactions paralleled the renewed outburst of anti-American demonstrations that included attacks against President Eisenhower⁸² at a time when France was caught in the propaganda⁸³ battle between the East and the West.

⁸¹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 447. June 1953. Sartre viewed the Rosenbergs' execution as the result of McCarthyism. His frustration with the refusal of President Eisenhower to grant clemency was followed by his open letter in *Le Figaro* condemning the U. S. government and Eisenhower in particular for their murder.

⁸²Ibid. Two reports from the Procureur de la République to the Procureur Général on 10 and 22 August 1953 detail "Affiches offensantes pour le Président Eisenhower, Chef d'État Étranger." An official inquiry into the matter was held, but those responsible were never found. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 447.

⁸³Ibid. Articles in this file claim that the PCF was using the Rosenberg Affair to inflame anti-Americanism.

IV. Reactions of the “Man in the Street.”

(a) Poll Results

In general, the ordinary Frenchman did not volunteer⁸⁴ his opinion easily about the presence of the U. S. in France or about its cultural policy. USIS/France archival documentation records comments *about* French reaction to the information events and cultural media that were attended by large numbers of French-area residents. However, in the majority of cases, these are the *presumed* or *desired* reactions of French spectators, often used by USIS/France officials to their own advantage.

French reaction was frequently elicited by surveys, polls or by special projects conducted by French men and women who were hired by private organizations.⁸⁵ A 1953 poll⁸⁶ showed surprising results when statistics determined that two-thirds of the population questioned⁸⁷ responded that they liked Americans, but not necessarily American policy.

⁸⁴From the French archives it would appear that ordinary French men and women did not have the time or the interest to write letters. The U. S. archives contain some letters from French citizens about their reactions to U. S. influence in France. These are mostly letters of gratitude to President Truman and to private organizations that sponsored goodwill missions such as “The Freedom Train.” There is more French popular response recorded in magazine articles by U. S. journalists who translated these for use in U. S. publications. They are less credible because of the second-hand nature of the comments and the fact that the translation may not be in context.

⁸⁵A feature of U. S. polls was that they were almost always carried out by French pollsters who were carefully trained in U. S. polling methods.

⁸⁶Poll conducted by *Réalités Magazine* in August 1953. Cited in Doris Fleeson, “Weaknesses Evident in France,” *The Washington Star*, 11 September 1953. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF. President’s Secretary’s Files. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁸⁷*Ibid.* In the *Réalités* poll, 5,000 French people were questioned. The sample indicated that two-thirds of this number liked Americans.

Moreover, sixty-one percent⁸⁸ agreed that additional contact between French people and Americans was desirable.

Table 40. Sample of French Popular Opinion About Americans⁸⁹

Questions	Positive Responses
Are Americans only interested in money?	32%
Are all Americans wealthy?	34%
Do all Americans hate communism?	34%
Should Frenchmen Be Grateful for U. S. aid?	32%

Table 41. Sample of French Popular Opinion About American Lifestyle⁹⁰

Items Questioned	Negative Responses
American jazz	54%
American films	43%
Chewing Gum	70%
Coca-Cola	61%
American Cigarettes	36%

⁸⁸Results of poll conducted by *Réalités Magazine* August 1953. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 520.* Cited in Paul Sampson, "The French Are A Funny Race." *The Washington Post*, 30 August 1953.

⁸⁹Results of poll conducted by *Réalités Magazine* in August 1953. Cited in "American Seen by Frenchmen," *The Louisville Times*, 28 August 1953. Harry S. Truman Papers. OF. President's Secretary's Files. Box 4. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

(b) French Popular Reaction and the Dewarin Project

The Dewarin Project⁹¹ posed specific questions to determine French sentiment about France becoming the forty-ninth U. S. state. In responding to Dewarin's questions, an "ordinary"⁹² Frenchman wrote:

I will soon be sixty-four years old. I have known the first world war and its suffering. I have been raised in the patriotic principles of the epochs [sic] and, obviously, I must reflect before answering your first question: Well, for the love of peace I'll go along. I make the sacrifice of hitching myself to the wagon of the U. S. without, for all that, renouncing my native land, with her glories, her sorrows, her errors.⁹³

A letter⁹⁴ from Dewarin called for a French initiative for world reorganization⁹⁵. France, it stated,⁹⁶ would be the starting point of a "U. S. of the world"⁹⁷ by becoming the forty-ninth U. S. state. One newspaper editor stated outright: "No, Mr. Cottonspinner,

⁹¹Dewarin's project is introduced in Chapter Three. It is given deeper analysis here.

⁹²The respondent did not state his occupation in the questionnaire.

⁹³Ibid., 22.

⁹⁴Bernard Dewarin, "Bold Constructive Plan." Letter from Dewarin to President Truman. Papers of Harry S. Truman. OF 203. Box 770. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁹⁵Ibid., 22.

⁹⁶Ibid. A small, handwritten note in the margin of this letter from Secretary of State Dean Acheson reads, "Harry, what do you think of this? Probably a fine idea, but I doubt the world is ready for it."

⁹⁷Ibid. Actual phrase used in the letter.

France will *not*⁹⁸ be the forty-ninth state of the U. S. A.⁹⁹ More detailed analysis came from a third editor:

.....He [Dewarin] must be thinking that from the day when we will be Americans, and not only Americanized, it will be the others who will make war for us [sic] ...What person would be big enough for this ‘separatism’¹⁰⁰ if, by making a mistake in flags, he had written 22,500 letters asking that France hitch its wagon to the Soviet star?¹⁰¹

What is most surprising about this project is that it received any support. Yet, the type of response that it engendered is indicative of French sentiment. Only a small number¹⁰² of people answered Dewarin’s questionnaire. Judging from letters received and the correspondents’ occupations, it appears that those in favor of the plan were older

⁹⁸Italics are used in the original quotation.

⁹⁹AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Freedom and Union Magazine of the Democratic World*, July to August 1952. No. 7. Vol. 7. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Union Incorporated, 1952), 22.

¹⁰⁰The use of the word “separatism” is curious. It is not clear what the writer intended by this vocabulary. Given that Dewarin claimed these letters were written in English, the ambiguity of this vocabulary might be attributed to language inaccuracies. As well, the fact that publicity for Dewarin’s campaign and examples of letters that he supposedly received, were printed in the American Legion publication, *Freedom and Union Magazine of the Democratic World*, gives rise to speculation that the Legion may have been promoting Dewarin’s endeavor under guise of democracy being superior to communism.

¹⁰¹AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Freedom and Union Magazine of the Democratic World. July to August 1952. No. 7. Vol. 7. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Union Incorporated, 1952), 22.*

¹⁰²Analysis of support would be almost impossible to determine scientifically because of missing evidence. If Dewarin really sent out 22,500 letters as he claimed, only a small number of replies exist. However, the project was given enough attention by the French and U. S. governments to merit comment in both archives.

older citizens. Considering that French political neutrality and “*défaitisme*” were widespread among the middle-aged and elderly,¹⁰³ it can be assumed that the idea reflected the group’s political attitudes.

V. Concrete Examples of French Popular Reaction

Increased numbers of French visitors went to the U. S. under either government or private auspices that were designed to give impressions about America to the French. For example, a young French couple¹⁰⁴ was sent to the U. S. to provide information about American lifestyle and to tell French readers about Americans. Twenty-one members of the French Parliament¹⁰⁵ visited the U. S. at the invitation of the Department of State for a seventeen-day “goodwill” tour during which they met with government officials and private citizens across the country.

However, a series of Department of Immigration investigations surrounding visiting French celebrities became the focus of French press reports and negative popular reaction. Georges Delamarre,¹⁰⁶ who had gone to the U. S. to attend a meeting of the Franco-American Union Committee was detained at La Guardia Airport by U. S. immigration authorities who questioned him about an affiliation with the French Communist Party. Charging him with

¹⁰³See Chapter Five for statistical evidence on this subject.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.* Pierre and Renée Gossette were French writers who were sent to the U. S. by the French government in 1953 to give French readers a “picture” of the U. S. Their comments were favorable.

¹⁰⁵This visit took place in September 1956. There were fourteen members from the National Assembly and seven members of the Council of the Republic (Senators). *AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 332.*

¹⁰⁶Delamarre was an executive member of the CGT.

being a Communist, officials refused to grant him entry until the F. B. I. had investigated his background. Inquiries by the French Consul in New York drew the response that the committee that Delamarre was supposed to meet with in New York was suspected of “Communist sympathies.”¹⁰⁷ Confirmation from the French Embassy that Delamarre had never been a member of the PCF¹⁰⁸ followed, but he was not permitted to enter the U. S. until a long interrogation about his political activities was completed.¹⁰⁹ He remained unruffled by the incident, stating that, “si nous avions agi en France avant la guerre avec une telle rigidité, nous aurions peut-être évité l’oeuvre néfaste de la cinquième colonne.”¹¹⁰

In 1948, Madame Joliot-Curie¹¹¹ was detained at Ellis Island by Department of Immigration despite the fact that she held an authorized visitor’s visa.¹¹² Authorities questioned her about her political orientation and her reasons for trying to enter the U. S.

¹⁰⁷AE, France. B Amérique 1944 to 1952. États-Unis. Vol. 299. No. 1870. Memorandum from Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador, to Georges Bideault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Résidents et voyageurs français sans ressources.” 25 September 1947.

¹⁰⁸Ibid. This information was confirmed through the Secretary General of the CGT.

¹⁰⁹Ibid. This aspect of the situation particularly annoyed Union membership because the consul had been informed by U. S. officials that Delamarre’s detention was only temporary, pending a security check about his status.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 4.

¹¹¹Daughter of the famed scientists, Joliot-Curie was a winner of the Nobel Prize for Science.

¹¹²Joliot-Curie held an authorized tourist visa obtained at the U. S. Consulate/ Paris. AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Pineau. Vol. 32. No. 1537. Telegram from the Cabinet du Ministre. 19 March 1948.

Although she was permitted entry twenty-four hours later upon receipt of a telegram¹¹³ from the French government, her detention aroused hostility in French Labor circles.

Convaincu que de telles atteintes à la liberté ne peuvent qu'altérer, entre États, les bonnes relations si nécessaires au maintien et à la consolidation de la paix dans le monde, le Conseil Syndical associe sa protestation à celle des démocrates et savants contre ces agissements et la possibilité du retour de semblables mesures qui caractérisent la 'démocratie Occidentale.' Les travailleurs des Entreprises de Genevilliers, informés par la presse, de l'arrestation à New York de Mme Joliot-Curie, gloire de la science française et internationale, considèrent cet acte comme une mesure arbitraire qui n'est pas faite pour améliorer nos relations avec l'Amérique.¹¹⁴

In 1949, Pierre Emmanuel was appointed to a position at Wellesley College as a faculty member in the French department. Shortly before leaving he wrote an article in an American academic journal.

I am convinced that you [the U. S.] are a powerful though adolescent nation, whose vitality may lead you to the best as well as to the worst...Historically, you were pushed too soon on the foreground of the world scene; it is a tragic responsibility which you deserve in some ways, not in all..I am prepared to acknowledge that leadership, with due restrictions coming from my deep contact with another superiority: the European one..During the Resistance Movement I worked closely with Communists..I believed there was something to be done with them after the war. We tried: we went as far as we could; we failed. Seen from Washington, it seems perhaps, a mistake to have tried; seen from here it is a tragedy to have failed and to measure what

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid. Letter from the Fédération nationale des Travailleurs des Chemins de Fer de France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1948. Other letters of protest followed from the Syndicat des Metaux du XIIème, Le Front National de la Seine (20 March 1948), Le Centre Intersyndical (19 March 1948), Le Fédération Nationale Ouvrière des Cuirs et Peaux (19 March 1948), Le Confédération Générale du Travail and the Union de la Jeunesse Républicaine de France (20 March 1948).

communism is becoming even among old friends.¹¹⁵

Emmanuel was refused a visa and forced to return to France. *Le Monde* reacted to this incident by lashing out at the U. S. and criticizing its almost paranoid fear of communism.

Four French scientists who were attending a conference¹¹⁶ in New Hampshire were arrested¹¹⁷ by immigration officials and ordered to leave the U. S. immediately because their visas had expired.¹¹⁸ Fearing the reaction of the French scientific community,¹¹⁹ the French Embassy requested support from the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology.¹²⁰ Their combined efforts managed to get the deportation order reversed and obtain visa extensions so that the scientists could remain in the U. S. until the end of the

¹¹⁵ AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Pineau. Vol. 32. Letter from Pierre Emmanuel, *The Harvard Crimson*, p. 1, No. 88. Vol. CXXIII. 18 December 1949.

¹¹⁶National Center of Scientific Research Conference held in July, 1955.

¹¹⁷AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 520. No. 3781/83. Telegram from Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 July 1955.

¹¹⁸Expiration of visas was the official reason given for the attempted expulsion of the French scientists. However, there were other incidents in which French visitors to the U. S. from France were harassed by Department of Immigration authorities. Air France passengers en route to Mexico were detained in the U. S. by immigration authorities for questioning about their political activities and confidence in the future of France. Reports that they were subjected to surveillance in Mexico by agents employed by the U. S. resulted in a surge of negative press reports in France. Questions about the incident by député Jacques Soustelle in the National Assembly failed to elicit any concrete replies from the French government. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 327.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.* Telegram referred to “l’effet déplorable qui pourrait produire dans le milieu scientifiques français” if the scientists were deported.

¹²⁰Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the official sponsor of this conference.

conference.

VI. Popular Reaction and the Relocation of the Statue of Lafayette

(a) Rationale for Relocation of the Statue

In 1954, the Comité des Beaux-Arts¹²¹ announced its intention to remove the statue of Lafayette from the Cour Napoléon¹²² in the Louvre courtyard to a new location in order to permit reconstruction so that Louvre audiences could be accommodated there for summer *Son et Lumière* productions. This intention produced French and U. S. public protest,¹²³ but the Louvre directors refused to reconsider their decision that was directed toward increasing tourist revenue for the Beaux-Arts ministry. The resulting controversy over the statue's relocation preoccupied French and American diplomats for more than three years. It

¹²¹André Cornu, Secrétaire d'État aux Beaux Arts. He wanted to produce *Son et Lumière* spectacles at the Château de Vincennes, the Basilica of Saint-Denis and in the Louvre courtyard. The statues of Gambetta and La Fayette interfered with the anticipated productions as space was needed for the stage and for the large audience attendance anticipated.

¹²²American school children raised \$50,000 and commissioned the statue. Their contribution was to honor the French hero of the American Revolutionary War and to repay French school children's gesture in erecting the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor. The statue was dedicated on 4 July 1900 after the U. S. Embassy requested that it be placed in the Louvre courtyard. Its former site is presently occupied by the Louvre Pyramid erected in the 1990s. A copy of the statue occupies a site in Washington Square, facing the White House.

¹²³Correspondence, memoranda and copies of French and U. S. newspaper clippings found in AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vols.184, 525, 527, passim.

motivated questions in the Assemblée Nationale,¹²⁴ a public debate in the French press¹²⁵ and requests from French mayors who maneuvered to have the statue resituated in their municipalities. More significantly, it became the underlying factor in popular response to U. S. cultural policy in France because of French attempts to answer U. S. propaganda organized around the public celebrations of the two hundredth anniversary of Lafayette's birth.¹²⁶

The Beaux-Arts plans to relocate the statue placed the government in a difficult position. Not only had it originally been a gift¹²⁷ from American school children to the children of France, but its original dedication in the Louvre courtyard had been accompanied by pledges that it would remain there in perpetuity. Moreover, transferal of the statue forced the French government to seek¹²⁸ U. S. Embassy approval of its new site because of its past

¹²⁴By Joseph Denais, Député, 8 March 1955. AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Couve de Murville. Vol. 129. Note pour le Direction d'Amérique. Q. E. No. 15. 1948.

¹²⁵Particularly in *Le Figaro*. In addition to its ongoing coverage of the controversy surrounding the transferal of the statue, it printed Thierry Maulnier's "Lettre aux américains," in January 1956. The USIS Press organ *Informations et Documents* replied to Maulnier's letter in its "Numéro Spécial: Lafayette," *Informations et Documents* (Paris: Presses USIS), 16 January 1957.

¹²⁶Marquis Marie-Joseph de La Fayette was born on 6 September 1757 at Chavaniac-Lafayette, France.

¹²⁷AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol 184. "La Fayette ira-t-il Place des États-Unis?" *Le Figaro*, 13 January 1955.

¹²⁸In addition to the fact that the statue had been subscribed by American school children, there was a precedent in the Direction des Relations Culturelles of consulting the U. S. Embassy about sites and streets that were associated with Americans. When the French government decided to name a street after an American benefactor named Spanel, it asked if the U. S. Embassy had any objections. The same protocol applied when the French

history.

J'ai été à plusieurs reprises appelé à intervenir auprès des autorités américaines, dont le consentement était rendu nécessaire par les conditions dans lesquelles la statue a été autrefois donné à la France.¹²⁹

Publicly, choice of a new site for the statue appeared to be a compromise¹³⁰ between the Direction d'Amérique and the U. S. Embassy, but in reality behind the scenes acrimony marked the diplomatic relations between the two governments. So protracted were the negotiations that the statue became a regular incident of humor in the French press as discussions about diverse sites continued.

The Paris Municipal Council initially suggested placing the statue in the Place de la Concorde, facing the U. S. Embassy: "Place de la Concorde et l'avenue Gabriel, face aux bâtiments de l'Ambassade des États-Unis et près de l'Hôtel Crillon."¹³¹ The Direction d'Amérique favored this idea because the site satisfied U. S. requests for a prominent

government invested Americans with the Légion d'honneur. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 533.

¹²⁹ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 184. Memorandum from the DGRC to the Direction du Budget. No. 44/AM. "Déplacement de la statue de La Fayette," p. 1. 20 December 1957.

¹³⁰The French archives contain correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Embassy over a three-year period. The tone of the internal Direction d'Amérique memoranda often reflects frustration. Among themselves, French officials were exasperated at having to consult U. S. Embassy authorities over the relocation of a French monument.

¹³¹The Hôtel Crillon was the site where the first *Traité d'Amitié de Commerce et d'Alliance* between France and the U. S. was signed on 6 February 1778. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 525. Letter from the Paris Municipal Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 November 1953.

location in central Paris, close to its embassy. However, plans to relocate the monument to this locale were abandoned when the foundation of the square was found insufficient to support the weight of the forty-foot statue.

Other French suggestions followed, including potential sites in the Champs-Élysées' gardens, and the square facing the Hôtel de Ville. The latter position was vetoed by Municipal Council authorities who hesitated to place the statue there out of concern that it might make the site open territory for a series of other unwanted monuments later on.

(b) French Press Reaction

An article in the French press¹³² recommended situating the statue in the Place Royale. It was declared unsuitable because the monument's size would make it appear ungainly in proportion to the surrounding buildings that were officially classified as historic sites.¹³³ Consequently, the Direction Générale d'Amérique wrote¹³⁴ to the U. S. Embassy arguing that an open space on the Avenue d'Iéna,¹³⁵ facing the U. S. Embassy compound was the best location in central Paris.

¹³²AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 525. *Combat*, 22 January 1954.

¹³³AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 184. Memorandum from the Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale to the Direction Générale d'Amérique. 23 June 1955.

¹³⁴AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 516. Letter from the Direction d'Amérique to the U. S. Embassy. 10 November 1954.

¹³⁵The statue of La Fayette still stands in the same location today.

U. S. opposition to this plan was spearheaded by M. E. Batier¹³⁶ who insisted that the statue be retained in its original position.¹³⁷ Subsequent U. S. Embassy consultation with the Department of State presented two options: to convince Louvre management to leave the statue where it was, or, to transfer it to an appropriate site in front of the U. S. Embassy.¹³⁸

An article in *Le Figaro*¹³⁹ intensified the controversy by declaring that the site on the avenue d'Iéna, opposite the Place des États-Unis¹⁴⁰, proposed by the Direction d'Amérique, had been agreed to by the U.S. Embassy. This choice was also sanctioned by the Municipal Council that declared it the best solution because monuments to other American heroes¹⁴¹ were already in place there.

However, the newspaper blamed the stalemate in negotiations on the internal agencies of the Direction d'Amérique. It hinted that the agency had deliberately disregarded

¹³⁶Secretary of the American Committee for the La Fayette Bicentennial.

¹³⁷AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. *The New York Herald Tribune*, p. 17. 1 June 1954.

¹³⁸AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 184. Barrett McGurn, "Plan to Move Statue of La Fayette Stirs Row." *The New York Herald Tribune* (Paris Edition), 1 June 1954.

¹³⁹ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Maurice Tilber, "De la Cour du Louvre, qu'il faut dégager La Fayette; ira-t-il placé des États-Unis?" *Le Figaro*, 13 June 1955.

¹⁴⁰A square in Paris situated between the Avenue d'Iéna and the Rue Galilée in the eighth arrondissement.

¹⁴¹Ibid. A monument dedicated to La Fayette and George Washington and another honoring Rochambeau.

the letter from the U. S. Embassy agreeing to the avenue d'Iéna site.

Les services du ministère des Affaires étrangères ont, par une lettre du 10 novembre, restée sans réponse jusqu'à ce jour, proposé à l'ambassade des U. S. le choix du terre-plein qui, avenue d'Iéna, fait face à la place des États-Unis. Le conseil municipal avait auparavant approuvé cette proposition.¹⁴²

Among the letters responding to the *Le Figaro* article was one from Henry Jay Kahn to the Direction d'Amérique¹⁴³ that objected to the "campagne"¹⁴⁴ organized by the French government to keep the issue of the monument in the front pages of the French press.

A reply¹⁴⁵ from the Direction d'Amérique did not deny Kahn's claim. Instead, it placed blame for the media coverage upon the former Director of American Affairs and the U. S. Embassy official responsible. Stressing that *how* the *Le Figaro* reporter learned about the problems associated with relocating the La Fayette statue was unimportant, the letter stated that the only significant factor was the French position. It did not, the letter indicated, wish to "dénoncer unilatéralement l'accord conclu en 1898 au sujet de l'emplacement de la statue."¹⁴⁶ Warned by the French Embassy in Washington about American public nostalgia

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Letter from Henry Jay Kahn, president of the Comité Français du Souvenir de La Fayette, to the Direction d'Amérique, 15 January 1955.

¹⁴⁴Ibid. Vocabulary used by Kahn. His letter refers to earlier correspondence between the French government and the U. S. Embassy in November 1954. Although the text of the letter is unclear, he appears to accuse the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of "leaking" information to Tilber. "Nous avons été fait surpris d'apprendre que ce journaliste avait pu obtenir connaissance de votre lettre du 10 November dernier."

¹⁴⁵Ibid. Letter from Direction d'Amérique to Kahn, 17 January 1955.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

surrounding the statue,¹⁴⁷ the agency was unwilling to promote additional opportunity for increased anti-French sentiment in the U. S. press.

Des entretiens échangés à ce sujet avec les services de l'Ambassade des États-Unis, il ressort que les autorités américains souhaiteraient si le projet de déplacement devait être mis à exécution, que le gouvernement français fût guidé, dans le choix du nouvel emplacement par le sentiment que les États-Unis attachent à cette statue, symbole de l'amitié franco-américaine, élevée grâce aux souscriptions des enfants des écoles des États-Unis un intérêt particulier.¹⁴⁸

However, subsequent intervention by the Prefect of the Seine¹⁴⁹ indicated that the avenue d'Iéna site was inappropriate because placement of the statue would necessitate removal of some of the symmetrically-aligned trees flanking the avenue des Champs-Élysées. This prompted the following statement, "The U. S. came to France's help twice in twenty-five years. Surely that's worth more than a few trees!"¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the statue was eventually removed to that location in 1958.

¹⁴⁷In fact, both the U. S. and the French used the opportunity to invoke La Fayette's name as a symbol of the historic friendship between the two countries. Numerous examples exist including speeches from French officials to the American Club in Paris, (16 February 1954), speeches by French Ambassadors Bonnet and Alphand from 1954 to 1956 and the commemorative stamp issued by the French in honor of the two hundredth anniversary celebration. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527.

¹⁴⁸AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. No. 575. Letter from Direction d'Amérique to the Mayor of Versailles, 30 June 1954.

¹⁴⁹The official responsible for all Paris monuments.

¹⁵⁰AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Statement by M. E. Batier, *The New York Herald Tribune* (Paris Edition). 1 June 1954.

Other officials, anxious for the honor¹⁵¹ of having the statue located in their municipalities negotiated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Le monument a été offert à la France par le Gouvernement américain et il me paraissait que la solution ne dépendait que de vous, l'accord avec l'Ambassade n'étant recherché que par courtoisie et celle-ci n'ayant pas fait d'objection au déplacement de la statue pour Versailles, si tel était le désir du Gouvernement Français exprimé par votre intermédiaire.¹⁵²

Response from the Direction Générale d'Amérique, however, was negative. After discussions with the U. S. Embassy, it declared, that this "symbole de l'amitié franco-américaine, élevée grâce aux souscriptions des enfants des écoles des États-Unis,"¹⁵³ must be accorded a site in downtown¹⁵⁴ Paris so that annual U. S. public ceremonies honoring the anniversary of La Fayette's birth¹⁵⁵ could take place in the best possible conditions. Therefore, although the U. S. Embassy had not actually stated it,¹⁵⁶ transferal of the

¹⁵¹Motivation appears to have been the tourist trade that would result from the monument's presence more than from the honor of housing the statue.

¹⁵²AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Letter from the Mayor of Versailles, to the Direction Générale d'Amérique, "Transfert de la Statue de Général La Fayette." 18 June 1954.

¹⁵³No. 575. Letter from the Direction d'Amérique to the Mayor of Versailles, p. 2. 30 June 1954 in *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.* The correspondence indicates that the U. S. Embassy insisted that the statue be relocated in a high-priority area in central Paris.

¹⁵⁵There was an annual parade on the anniversary of La Fayette's birth that was used to demonstrate U. S.-troop presence in France. The anniversary of his death was marked by an annual ceremony at his gravesite in Picpus Cemetery, Paris, where wreaths were laid by the U. S. Ambassador and French dignitaries who were invited to attend the service.

¹⁵⁶This may have been the case, but informally the French understood that the Americans insisted upon a prominent location.

monument to a site outside Paris was out of the question.¹⁵⁷ Subsequently, the statue was removed to the avenue d'Iéna in 1958.¹⁵⁸

Payment for the statue's relocation was left unresolved. Although the Direction Générale Politique requested that the Secretary of State for Budget designate eighteen million francs¹⁵⁹ for the statue's transferal, letters¹⁶⁰ between the offices involved failed to authorize payment for transportation costs. Original plans called for Vice-President Nixon¹⁶¹ to visit France on the actual anniversary of La Fayette's death and to be present at the rededication of the statue. However, Nixon's trip was at first postponed, then canceled. His aborted visit may have prompted the Budget Officer's decision to place the issue of the statue's transferal on a lower protocol level and refuse to deal with the monetary aspect

¹⁵⁷This statement provides yet another example of the idea presented in Chapter Six, that the U. S. government made unstated demands that were honored by the French.

¹⁵⁸A memorandum from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of National Education confirms that official agreement to the site had been received from the U. S. Embassy. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 516. No. 3970. "Transfert de la statue de La Fayette." 13 July 1955.

¹⁵⁹In the 1958 fiscal budget. Direction Général Politique to the Minister of National Education. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 184. "Déplacement de la Statue de La Fayette," p. 1. No 99/AM. 20 December 1957.

¹⁶⁰Correspondence between the offices of the Director of the Budget and the Director of American Affairs contains a multitude of letters between October 1954 and June 1957 concerning payment. Failure of the Budget Office to remit the money caused the civil servant charged with organizing the affair to remind it that removal of the statue to the Avenue d'Iéna, close to other historical personalities involved in Franco-American past relationships, was an important point for future links between the two countries.

¹⁶¹During the Eisenhower Administration.

until absolutely necessary.¹⁶²

(c) The Public Celebration in France

As part of the La Fayette celebration, 1957 was declared “l’Année La Fayette,” an initiative of the Comité France America. President Eisenhower accepted the Committee’s invitation to serve as Honorary President of the National La Fayette Bicentennial Committee¹⁶³ in the U. S. while French president René Coty held the same position in France.

The French National Bicentennial Committee sent letters¹⁶⁴ to mayors of forty-two U. S. towns that included reference to La Fayette in their names, inviting them to travel to French towns similarly identified to commemorate the La Fayette anniversary.¹⁶⁵

Responding mayors were guests¹⁶⁶ of the committee for three days in the Auvergne region, birthplace of La Fayette. Eleven affirmative replies were received and the mayors’

¹⁶²The bill was finally paid in 1958.

¹⁶³Statement by Eisenhower to Comité France America accepting the position as Honorary President of the National La Fayette Bicentennial Committee. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 184.

¹⁶⁴Sent out in December 1956.

¹⁶⁵These invitations were from the French National Committee of the La Fayette Bicentennial. Subsequently, mayors of eleven other French towns believed to be named for La Fayette were invited, as well as representatives of the Sons of the American Revolution, Daughters of the American Revolution and the Society of the Cincinnati. Memorandum from Morrill Cody, CPAO, U. S. Embassy, Paris to Department of State. No. 2283. 5 June 1957. Record Group 59. Department of State. Central Decimal File 1955 to 1959. Box. 4190 NARA, Washington, D. C.

¹⁶⁶All expenses including return air fare for each mayor were paid by the committee.

visit was followed by a program to “twin”¹⁶⁷ French cities with their U. S. counterparts that French mayors were subsequently invited to visit.

A program in France organized by the French National Committee awarded prizes to students participating in conferences using the theme of La Fayette’s mission to the U. S. during the 1775 War of Independence. Similarly, an agenda for merchants and the business community highlighted the anniversary. Table 42 demonstrates some of these activities.

¹⁶⁷Included were Montpellier/Louisville, Kentucky, Arles/York, Pennsylvania and Royan/Atlantic City.

Table 42. French Response to La Fayette Celebration in Paris¹⁶⁸

Date	Activity
January 1957	Students' Conference/Cité Universitaire
February 1957	Art and Essay Contests in French Schools ¹⁶⁹
May 1957	Anniversary Ceremonies of La Fayette's Death ¹⁷⁰
June 1957	La Fayette exhibits ¹⁷¹
June 1957	Shop window displays in central Paris ¹⁷²
June 1957	La Fayette Week in Paris ¹⁷³

Not to be outdone by the Paris spectacles and the resulting tourist income, regional French communities planned similar cultural homage to La Fayette's memory. A series of

¹⁶⁸Information in Table 42 is from AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 516. "Comité National Français pour la Célébration du Bicentenaire de la Naissance de La Fayette," p. 2.

¹⁶⁹Ibid. Contest organized by the Comité Français Souvenir de La Fayette with an annual prize of fifty thousand francs awarded to a student at the École des Beaux-Arts for the best portrait of La Fayette.

¹⁷⁰Ibid. Traditional annual ceremonies by the French community at La Fayette's statue, but augmented for the anniversary celebration. Included were the presenting of arms under command of the Governor of Paris with participation of a battalion of the Garde Républicaine and U. S. troops. This was followed by a reception at the old Hôtel des Noailles (present-day Albany and St. James Hotel on the Rue Rivoli) in the salon where La Fayette was married and later lived. There was also a religious service at the Église de l'Assomption, rue Cambon, where La Fayette's State Funeral Mass was celebrated.

¹⁷¹On 3 June 1957 La Fayette Exhibits were opened at the Musée de l'Armée and at the Hôtel Soubise under sponsorship of the Archives Nationales, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Musée de l'Armée.

¹⁷²From 3 June to 4 July 1957 shop-window displays were exhibited on the rue La Fayette, the Faubourg St. Honoré, the Avenue Franklin Roosevelt and the Champs Élysées. Participating stores included the Galeries La Fayette.

¹⁷³28 June to 4 July 1957.

tours¹⁷⁴ included stops in the Auvergne at sites associated with La Fayette's childhood¹⁷⁵ and visits to the Haute Loire area.¹⁷⁶

VII. Reaction to the Woodrow Wilson Centenary

Plans to honor the centenary of former President Woodrow Wilson's birth with a public celebration were a response to a resolution from Congress¹⁷⁷ followed by a proclamation from President Eisenhower

urging interested individuals and organizations both private and governmental, to participate in appropriate ceremonies during 1956 designed to honor and commemorate his life, his ideals and his concern for the freedom of people throughout the world.¹⁷⁸

The French Embassy in Washington reported that the U. S. government would observe this occasion with ceremonies in many U. S. cities, but principally at U. S.

¹⁷⁴La Fayette Tours conducted by the French Commission of Tourism and American Express. Included was a week-end at Deauville.

¹⁷⁵Including a visit to his birthplace, the Chateau du Chavaniac that was privately owned. The La Fayette National Committee attempted to buy it, but its offer was rejected by the owner (whose name was Namm). He suggested that the Committee erect a monument in the area instead. AE, France. *Amérique* 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527.

¹⁷⁶Including visits to Clermont-Ferrand where a military camp was reconstructed to resemble the one at Yorktown where La Fayette led a French battalion to victory during the U. S. War of Independence. There was a celebration at Le Puy with a Comédie Française production and a *Son et Lumière* featuring the Garde Républicaine. AE, France. *Amérique* 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 516.

¹⁷⁷Resolution passed by Congress in April 1956 followed by a proclamation from President Eisenhower calling upon the American people to render homage to Wilson's memory for his contributions to humanity.

¹⁷⁸Eisenhower Proclamation, April 1956. AE, France. *Amérique* 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527.

universities.¹⁷⁹ Its reaction was initially unenthusiastic, but Wilson's special role in France and the possibility of using French ceremonial to strength the Franco-American alliance, underlined embassy recommendation for a French celebration. British intention¹⁸⁰ to commemorate the occasion provided additional impetus: "Comme vous le verrez nous ne sommes pas très chauds, mais nous ne voulons pas risquer d'être les derniers et surtout de faire moins que les Britanniques."¹⁸¹

Other events influenced the French decision. A U. S. presidential election campaign was scheduled for November 1956. The French Embassy thought that the Eisenhower Administration would likely be returned to power. As Wilson had been a democrat, this played into French favor because a more moderate celebration could be held if the democrats were not in office. "Si les Républicains gardent le pouvoir, la célébration de Wilson à Paris ne leur causera qu'une satisfaction modérée. Les Démocrates y seraient plus sensibles."¹⁸²

However, the main problem for the French government was to estimate the popular reaction to a public celebration honoring Woodrow Wilson's memory. It feared that forty

¹⁷⁹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Memorandum from the Direction Générale d'Amérique to Gontram de Juniac, Ministre Conseiller de l'Ambassade de France en Grande Bretagne, "Fêtes Commemoratives en l'honneur du Président Woodrow Wilson." 15 July 1956.

¹⁸⁰Ibid. Public celebrations were also planned in Holland and Switzerland.

¹⁸¹AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Letter from the Direction Générale Amérique to Jacques Vimont, Conseiller de l'Ambassade. 17 July 1956.

¹⁸²AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 516. Letter from J. Vimont, Embassy Counselor, to Roger Monmayou, Direction d'Amérique. 28 August 1956.

years later, the French still resented his role in the 1919 Peace Conference and that present-day U. S. foreign policy in Indo-China, Algeria and the Middle East was unpopular enough for the occasion to become the focus of anti-American demonstrations. Also, French sources¹⁸³ close to the Department of State reported that the U. S. intended to use the occasion to extend its foreign policy through cultural endeavors associated with Wilson. Lengthy discussions ensued, but the first¹⁸⁴ of several memoranda from the U. S. Embassy made a final decision necessary.

It requested information on whether the French intended to participate in a Wilson commemoration and if Paris, or, perhaps Versailles, would be willing to dedicate a plaque in his memory at a site associated with the former U. S. President.¹⁸⁵ A second memorandum¹⁸⁶ conveyed an offer from the Commonwealth of Virginia to place a plaque to Wilson in a prominent locale.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³Ibid., 2. Président Paul-Boncour was alerted about U. S. intentions by an American friend who was a member of the bipartisan committee established by Congress to organize the U. S. celebration of Wilson's centenary.

¹⁸⁴Memorandum from W. E. Weld, Jr. Cultural Officer, U. S. Embassy Paris, to the Préfet de la Seine, 8 October 1956 in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Memorandum in English from the U. S. Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 1956 in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁷Ibid. The U. S. Embassy suggested that the plaque be placed on the Palais de Chaillot, at the beginning of Avenue Président Wilson, noting that previous correspondence between the City of Paris and itself indicated that municipal authorities were agreeable to the site.

However, response¹⁸⁸ was that a more appropriate site would be the facade of the Hôtel Crillon where Wilson lived during the 1917 Versailles Treaty and the Society of Nations negotiations. Furthermore, the French government intended to raise this plaque to Wilson, leaving the Virginia Committee to place its own memorial on the Palais de Chaillot. A French tribute was planned that included a ceremony at the Sorbonne.¹⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the Direction d'Amérique hesitated¹⁹⁰ about spending French public funds on the anniversary not only because it was unsure of public response, but also because of the problem of raising the necessary amount to pay for the plaque. French sources reported that Congress had only allocated a moderate sum of money for the Wilson anniversary in the U. S.¹⁹¹ This prompted the French decision "que la France se devait de célébrer cet anniversaire d'une façon modeste sans doute mais digne."¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸From the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of National Education, "Plaque commémorative du Président Wilson," pp. 1 to 2. PB/S. 20 December 1956 in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁹Choice of the Sorbonne was motivated by fact that it had bestowed an honorary doctorate upon Wilson. Part of the ceremony included speeches by Paul-Boncour, U. S. Ambassador Houghton and a member of the French government, as well as a film about Wilson that was obtained from the U. S. Embassy.

¹⁹⁰French government reluctance was also conditioned by the serious Algerian situation.

¹⁹¹The amount was \$100,000. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 527. Memorandum from Direction d'Amérique to de Juniac, "Fêtes commémoratives en l'honneur du Président Wilson," p. 1. 17 July 1956.*

¹⁹²*Ibid.*

The Sorbonne¹⁹³ seemed a logical choice because the university had bestowed an honorary Doctor of Laws degree upon Wilson during his lifetime. French strategy, therefore, emphasized his role as an academic rather than his political career, thus minimizing adverse public reaction to French celebration of Wilson's memory, while still satisfying the U. S. Embassy. Holding the ceremony at the prestigious Sorbonne would, hopefully, reduce anti-French sentiment in U. S. universities.

Dedication of the plaque was coordinated with the anniversary of the end of World War I¹⁹⁴ in an attempt to encourage French veterans to attend, thus adding respectability to the ceremony. A memorial service was held at La Fayette's grave in Picpus Cemetery, followed by the unveiling of the Crillon Hotel plaque.

VIII. French Reaction to U. S. Film Production in France

During 1945, the French film industry, left destitute at the end of World War II, produced only sixty-four films.¹⁹⁵ French film makers doubted that production would ever equal its pre-war numbers because of the extreme shortage of available funds. The explanation for the post-war crisis was attributed to the influx of foreign films flooding the French market that the industry was powerless to control. "La crise du cinéma est due à l'envahissement du marché par les films étrangers."¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³In the Ampithéâtre Richelieu.

¹⁹⁴The date of the formal armistice, 11 November.

¹⁹⁵The total of sixty-four films contrasted strongly with the 120 produced in 1939. AN, France. Note d'Information, 29 January 1946. *Cinéma - Études du Cinéma Français*. Vol. 3.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*

Film workers realized U. S. intention to assert its dominance in the industry through its cultural policy: Their correspondence referred to “la pression croissante exercée par les Américains qui désirent reprendre leur activité en France.”¹⁹⁷ Reaction from film workers was that since dissemination of U. S. propaganda films had already begun, if a similar French organ existed, the Americans would certainly use it. “Il est certain que si un pareil organisme existait en France, les Américains n’hésiteraient pas à lui confier leur propaganda.”¹⁹⁸

Furthermore, U. S. attempts to monopolize the industry through removal to Hollywood of France’s best actors was well-publicized.

Les Américains craignirent de perdre la suprématie qu’ils avaient obtenue sur la marché français et les firmes Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer et Warner Brothers prirent sous contrat nos meilleurs artistes qu’ils envoyèrent à Hollywood. Ce ne se fit pas sans provoquer quelques remous notamment pour l’engagement de Charles Boyer et d’André Burgere.¹⁹⁹

Charles Boyer²⁰⁰ and André Burgere were under contract to French film companies, but the Hayes Group²⁰¹ assumed financial responsibility when they broke their contracts to accept Hollywood movie offers, leaving their incomplete French productions stranded. French

¹⁹⁷ F. Héliard, “Plan de Réorganisation d’activité.”AN, France. F/42/131. Note pour M. Calvet au sujet du monopole des Actualités. 24 March 1945.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰Boyer later became the liaison between the French and the American film industries.

²⁰¹U. S. film interests were centered in the Hayes Group.

producers and distributors reacted by supporting a one-year union boycott of films featuring the two actors.²⁰²

Furthermore, Hollywood films were criticized by the film unions²⁰³ as decadent examples of a consumer-oriented society. They were stereotyped as materialistic, non-cultural and generally discriminatory against minorities because of the traditional servant or criminal roles assigned to members of these groups.

(a) The Constant Thesis

Jacques Constant²⁰⁴ collaborated for five months with an American film maker sent to France to produce a propaganda film. His 1952 report²⁰⁵ to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined U. S. film production and its consequences for the French film industry.

Constant related U. S. interest to Cold War politics. He believed that U. S. film makers' objective was to remove what American policy planners thought was the Communist monopoly in the industry through elimination of the militant French film union. However, U. S. efforts in film production struck Constant as amateur since he believed that destruction of an ideology demanded complete understanding of the country where it was doctrine. Therefore, U. S. film success was dependent upon facilities that American film producers lacked: familiarity with language, customs, culture and moral attitudes.

²⁰² AN, France. F/42/131. "Firmes américaines en France," pp. 48 to 49.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Jacques Constant was a French film producer.

²⁰⁵ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 511. Jacques Constant, "De la Propagande américain en France."

J'ajouterais, pour ma part et en mon nom personnel, que durant mes cinq mois de collaboration à la propagande américaine par le film en France, je n'ai jamais rencontré un Américain connaissant notre histoire comprenant notre civilisation ou, même, ce qui paraît invraisemblable, parlant parfaitement notre langue.²⁰⁶

Constant's analysis revealed that U. S. plans made no provision for trying to make the type of film that would interest French spectators. He was astonished that American directors worked alone, without benefit of French advisors to explain audience preferences. He concluded that this limited U. S. film production to an American operation that possessed only limited appeal for French spectators because the films produced portrayed U. S. rather than French attitudes. Film effectiveness, he reiterated, depended upon a French approach²⁰⁷ to subject matter so that audiences could relate to them.

Despite the fact that the French economic crisis forced closure of most film studios leaving hundreds of film workers unemployed, U. S.-produced films refused to employ French writers, directors, technicians or actors. Constant related the Department of State "Americans only" hiring policy to the fact that the majority of French film workers held left-wing political attitudes.

He argued that policy planners' strategy was counter-productive because hiring unemployed French workers would have been less expensive than bringing U. S. resources to France, while simultaneously creating good will among those affected by the French film situation. The irony, Constant stressed, was that widespread poverty and misery caused by

²⁰⁶Ibid., 10.

²⁰⁷Ibid., 9.

French film worker lay-off, provided a convenient excuse for PCF claims that the U. S. government was responsible for decimating the film industry. It would also, he affirmed, leave a weakened France open to possible invasion: “La menace d’une nouvelle invasion qui risque de nous abattre et de nous terrasser plus tragiquement encore si nous ne prévoyons pas [sic].”²⁰⁸

To oppose this, Constant urged creation of an organism to develop U. S. propaganda films that would demonstrate the spirit of the special Franco-American relationship. Believing that ECA²⁰⁹ was the controlling force behind present policy in the U. S. Film Program in France, he wanted the new organization to be independent and to consist of French and U. S. committee members chosen from the ranks of the film industry.

À la tête de cet organisme, un comité groupant des personnalités de l’industrie cinématographique, des écrivains, des journalistes et des artistes, connus pour leurs sentiments démocratiques, rechercherait les sujets de films susceptibles de servir notre propagande et étudierait toutes les suggestions favorables à celles-ci.²¹⁰

Constant’s report reacts angrily to U. S. domination of the French film industry; yet, he ignores the issue that the U. S. did not have to even attempt to make films that would appeal to French audiences. Their presence in France was solely to eliminate the Communist influence, while the USIS/France program imported mostly²¹¹ Department of State films that

²⁰⁸Ibid., 25.

²⁰⁹Ibid., 15.

²¹⁰Ibid.

²¹¹Some U. S. films were produced for distribution in France, but these were limited. The USIS Film Unit in Washington, an agency of the Department of State, was responsible for supplying the overseas information program with audio-visual materials. The type of

were produced for designated target groups.

If Constant worked effectively with U. S.-film production, he undoubtedly realized that U. S. producers' mission was *not* to employ French film workers or to support a private agency that would make U. S. films under authority of French and American advisors. In fact, Constant's report appears to attempt to reverse²¹² what he perceived as the danger of a Communist invasion through requesting U. S. help to rebuild French films.

This report was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet the government failed to react to it. This further demonstrates that French long-range foreign policy objectives demanded that the government ignore U. S. cultural expansion into French domestic policy. In effect, the government watched the deterioration of the French film industry from the sidelines.

(b) Popular Themes and Public Reaction

Patriotism was a popular theme that invoked memories of historic events that U. S. producers hoped would produce favorable French audience' reactions. In particular, World War II was featured because it could be easily recalled in French collective memory. Within the general context of the fight for liberation from oppression, popular heroes were a favorite sub-theme. Documentaries of General Eisenhower portrayed him as a conquering hero, whose war record glorified him as the defender of liberalism.

films used were mostly documentaries. See Chapter Two for discussion.

²¹²Ibid., 6-9. Constant makes reference to an "opération symbolique" that he denotes as separate from a territorial invasion. He explains the symbolic invasion as Communist occupation within the minds of individuals. His definition, therefore, parallels U. S. attitudes demonstrated during the Campaign of Truth in what it referred to as the "Battle for mens' minds." (Discussed in Chapter One).

However, this type of theme failed with French audiences for the precise reasons outlined by Constant. U. S. producers misunderstood the respect accorded to French heroes in public life where homage to leaders who included Clemenceau, Foch and Guynemer was a regular feature. Films that focused on American role models often antagonized, rather than inspired French audiences. U. S. insensitivity about public reaction to the French war record heightened anti-Americanism.

(c) Reaction from War Veterans

Among organized groups French veterans were given considerable recognition because of their service to France. The French heritage of a glorious military tradition was still vivid in popular imagination: “Une seule richesse lui reste; sa gloire, et l’étendue des blessures qu’elle a reçues en luttant à l’avant-garde des peuples libres.”²¹³ Veteran support, therefore, was sought after by many organizations, while their presence at state memorials²¹⁴ was an important part of French public image. Therefore, complaints from veterans that criticized films casting their military roles in a negative light were accorded high profile.

²¹³Ibid.

²¹⁴The significance of this group was known to the U. S. Embassy. Public memorials always included invitations to French veterans. The liaison between the veterans and the embassy was the American Legion in Paris.

Such was the case when veterans²¹⁵ protested distribution of the film *Hôtel des Invalides*,²¹⁶ because they felt that it accorded superficial treatment to French patriotism. In addition to the disrespect for French lives lost in two wars, criticism focused on the potential that the film held for negating the French military operation in Indo-China. Public support for the veterans' opposition to the film was so strong that it forced an open letter from the Foreign Minister²¹⁷ to the Minister of Defense. It argued that respected veterans living at Les Invalides could not be summarily dismissed²¹⁸ by a film that superficially acknowledged French patriotism without presenting the heroic role and tradition of the French military. Furthermore, it stated that *Hôtel des Invalides* was essentially made for tourists and negated the real importance of French veterans in French lifestyle.

Escadrille La Fayette,²¹⁹ documented the story of American pilots in the Free French Air Force before the U. S. entered World War II. Its' portrayal of patriotic American youths, rather than young French fighters, as heroes of the French fight against oppression, generated negative French popular response because the subject matter appeared to treat the

²¹⁵Members of the Fédération Nationale des Plus Grands Invalides de Guerre. AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet R. Schuman 1948 to 1953. Vol. 107. CAB/D.R. No. 2837. Letter from the Ministre des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de la Guerre to Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 May 1952.

²¹⁶A 1952 television production directed by Georges Joffre.

²¹⁷Robert Schuman.

²¹⁸AE, France. Archives du Cabinet du Ministre. Cabinet Schuman 1948 to 1953. Vol. 107. Letter from the Foreign Minister to the Minister of Defense, 19 June 1952.

²¹⁹Produced in France but distributed in the U. S. by Warner Brothers.

French as immoral. Protests to Warner Brothers and to the Department of State resulted.²²⁰

Ce film dont le titre évoqué l'amour pour la France et l'esprit de sacrifice de ces jeunes Américains qui, sans attendre l'entrée en guerre des États-Unis, s'engagèrent dans l'aviation française pour combattre à nos côté n'est en réalité qu'un film du plus mauvais style Hollywood, dans lequel tous les Français sont des grotesques et toutes les Françaises sont femmes de mauvaise vie.

The film that evoked the greatest reaction was *Paths of Glory*²²¹ that presented the story of World War I mutinies. It was considered particularly scandalous because of its association with American actor and producer Kirk Douglas and his French-born wife.²²²

Au moment de l'offensive Nivelles au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale il décrit l'Armée française sous un jour qu'on ne saurait accepter et qui est particulièrement scandaleux venant de la part d'un soi-disant ami de la France, marié à une femme soi-disant française, ayant de très nombreux amis dans le milieu cinématographique de notre pays.²²³

Negative French reaction forced the French Embassy in Washington to make a formal complaint to the Department of State, as well as to film managers and distributors. Once again, U. S. insensitivity to French reaction was held responsible.

²²⁰ Although there was no formal apology from Warner Brothers or from the U. S. government, Eric Johnson, the film unit officer delegated to deal with this matter, offered his personal regrets to the French Ambassador. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 335. No. 649. Memorandum from Alphand to Pineau, *Escadrille La Fayette*. 14 March 1958.

²²¹ Released in France by United Artists in 1958.

²²² Douglas's wife was head of the American Committee of the Cannes Film Festival. As a result of the negative response toward this movie and her involvement in it, she was not offered her previous position on the Committee in 1958, nor was she invited to attend the Festival.

²²³ AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 335. Romain Gary, Consul-Général/Los Angeles, "Film insultant pour l'Armée française," 8 January 1958.

On doit avoir le tact d'utiliser pour sa démonstration soit un exemple choisi dans sa propre histoire nationale, soit dans une période de l'histoire suffisamment reculée pour ne risquer de heurter aucun patriotisme.²²⁴

In an unprecedented move, the French government banned the movie in France²²⁵ because of its fear that popular reaction to its anti-militarism would result in renewed hostility toward French military participation in Indo-China.

Conclusion

Attempts to hold on to French culture and keep France French during a period of domestic crisis emphasized latent anti-Americanism that was intensified by the growing U. S. cultural monopoly and the highly visible presence of Americans.

While French intellectuals understood cultural differences and warned the population about the inherent dangers of collective lifestyle over that of individualism, they failed to convince French people that U. S. cultural expansion had to be stopped. In effect, France remained French through the inaction of ordinary French people who refused to change their longstanding habits. Despite their approval of French intellectuals' commanding position in French public life, the influence of this group was not enough to significantly bring about change in popular attitudes. The French remained drawn toward French culture and traditions, rather than willingly adapt to North American standards, because as individuals they wanted to retain their cultural heritage.

²²⁴Ibid.

²²⁵It also attempted to have it banned in all French-speaking countries. Related in *ibid.*

French reactions to U. S. cultural policy, therefore, were personal. They emanated from different groups as well as from ordinary people at all levels of society. More significantly, popular response to U. S. cultural policy in France, did not represent the opinions of French society overall. Whereas there is no concrete evidence that a *majority* of Frenchman felt aversion to U. S. cultural policy, the influence of French intellectuals combined with French apprehension about the economic, and political situation, as well as rapid social change, probably convinced Frenchmen that French lifestyle was preferable to that offered by the U. S.

General Conclusion

Policy studies rest on the premise that the organization, operations, division of managerial and staff functions and financial commitment of a particular program constitute a deliberate procedure applied toward a particular course of action and aimed at determined objectives. The original supposition of this work, that there was a U. S. *cultural policy* rather than simply *cultural influence* in France is confirmed by the investigation in the preceding chapters. The conclusion that follows examines the extent of this policy, its successes and failures and its significance.

I. Cultural Policy Within Foreign Policy

The 1948 Smith-Mundt Act legislated a *propaganda* rather than an *information* program to improve U. S. image overseas. Its appearance on government agenda complemented other U. S.-supported organisms already in place that comprised a grand plan for a “Pax Americana.” It consolidated U. S. economic and political operations in France by presenting a separate medium through which information and education activities could target diverse groups of French society.

Situating cultural policy as a legitimate operation of the U. S. government overseas is determined by assessing its place in foreign affairs. The following facts are evidence that culture was assigned serious enough consideration by the Department of State to constitute its use as a bona fide policy.

The USIS program is dominated by its officials’ requests for decentralization. Despite repeated attempts to remove it from the Department of State, it remained there. Several reorganizations placed the program in what were referred to as semi-independent agencies, yet officials never succeeded in convincing policy planners that greater efficiency

would be accomplished if it were autonomous.

The reason for this is that the Department of State is the seat of U. S. foreign policy. Its' adamant refusal to adhere to demands for program independence represents the key to understanding the role of the information program in foreign affairs. By keeping it within jurisdiction of the Department of State, its importance as an instrument of foreign policy was guaranteed. Consequently, cultural policy must be recognized as a component of foreign policy and a concrete activity of the U. S. government overseas.

Confirmation is found in the analysis of information program objectives. These were determined by policy makers to reflect larger U. S. foreign policy goals. Strategy conceived in Washington formulated a procedure for evaluating the amount of support that the U. S. could expect from its allies. These criteria allowed USIS/France officials to develop information objectives that targeted individual groups whose activities appeared to threaten U. S. goals. What resulted were "mini"foreign policy objectives that made information and foreign policy parallel. Hence, cultural policy that was based on applied criteria governing USIS/France objectives, was a tangible foreign policy operation.

Program strategy publicly stressed the USIS role as a type of modern-day knight, sworn to protect liberal principles from non-democratic foes. A carefully orchestrated scheme by Washington personified the U. S. as the heroic standard bearer in the fight between good versus evil. U. S. cultural policy became the established mechanism by which this type of ideological warfare would be waged.

This plan was justified by the post-World War II international situation. U. S. policy statements that communism threatened world peace and security echoed President Truman's original phrase, "the battle for men's minds," that fully endorsed the notion of an intrepid fight that assumed greater proportions than those of territorial warfare. Through the sheer size and force of its armies, the U. S. could win physical battles, but whether it could prevail in a great psychological fight was less certain.

To encourage the fight against communism, culture was publicly used as the new weapon in the U. S. arsenal because it could be portrayed as an effective means of promoting U. S.-style democracy while bringing people closer together around American lifestyle, thus achieving U. S. foreign policy objectives. However, analysis demonstrates that public statements about use of culture to improve interpersonal relations was far removed from reality. Hence, there was a contradiction between what the U. S. said its objectives were and what actually took place.

II. The Nature of U. S. Cultural Policy in France

Strategies for effective execution of U. S. cultural policy in France were dominated by the universal objective of the eradication of communism. Although U. S. documentation consistently refers to "containment," archival evidence demonstrates that policy really aimed at elimination of communism. This objective became primary with the escalation of Cold War politics and was the basis for Department of State centralization of information and educational activities.

The Department of State consolidated its operations in France because of its perceived need to remove competition from semi-independent American agencies that could provide obstacles to USIS/France policy objectives. Privately, policy makers identified a need for increased operations across France so that the U. S. message could be more effectively disseminated. In reality, provision of a national network created an umbrella operation that was used to expand U. S. influence by establishing a central organization that controlled all information activities. It also ensured the presence of a “watchdog” function that monitored French opinion and reaction to U. S. foreign policy.

The USIS/France Program operated on two levels. Publicly, it organized cultural events and entertainments that were designed to provide maximum interest and attract large-scale audiences. On a less open format, it worked inside French institutions so that it could infiltrate French national life to discover smaller pockets of Communist support. The public role provided respectability for USIS/France operations, while keeping the more sensitive mission secret.

Moreover, its public operation provided the front needed to shield its deliberate control over the materials that it provided to French educational institutions. This was done by the presence of U. S. “cultural counselors” who were placed in French institutions ostensibly to deal with dissemination of U. S. materials, but who provided a liaison between the U. S. Embassy and the inner workings of French opinion. Thus, U. S. application of cultural policy was a high-level political operation that used a “Big Brother” approach to remind the French that U. S. interests in France were omnipresent. As well, the particular emphasis on personal contacts developed a grapevine that allowed the U. S. Embassy to

usually be forewarned about hostile reactions to the U. S., that permitted it to act in order to prevent damage to greater U. S. objectives.

III. The Evolution of U. S. Cultural Policy in France

Cultural policy evolved with its counterpart foreign policy in relation to Cold War politics. Three major cultural evolutions are distinguished. The 1950 shift from information strategy to politicized cultural entertainments reflected sharpened U. S. goals determined by the Campaign of Truth. The U. S. campaign in Korea, followed by unification of the information program with the defense program turned cultural emphasis toward integrating U. S. troops in France. Finally, the wars in Indo-China and Algeria, the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis motivated a more internationalized approach in cultural policy by using programs that targeted what Department of State policy makers referred to as the common fight against oppression.

Furthermore, as French colonial policy evolved during the 1950s, the French government became suspicious that the U. S. was using cultural policy in Algeria to encourage rebellion against France. Regional operations in Algeria were independent of those in metropolitan France and only depended upon the Paris Embassy for administration. Therefore, USIS/France operations could be used to foster rebellion in North Africa without fear of negative public reaction in Paris and other large French cities. Evidence of this misuse of cultural policy exists in the fact that USIS/France operations continued without interruption, thus presenting the ideal front for politicized operations in Algeria.

The U. S. knew from its embassy and its Intelligence Reports that the French were too sophisticated and too attached to French lifestyle to readily accept that of the U. S. This information formed the basis for creating a reason why U. S. cultural policy was necessary in France. American popular response demanded an explanation. Accordingly, policy planners created a strategy that stressed what it portrayed as a cultural initiative waged by Russian Communists in Western Europe.

Declaring that Soviet policy was detrimental to U. S. objectives, the Department of State issued memoranda that called for a counter-offensive necessary to fight a Soviet cultural program. Information provided to the U. S. press and to other government agencies claimed that the Soviets were placing large amounts of money in book and film programs. Within a short time congressional officials reacted by demanding to know why the U. S. government had not done more to protect U. S. image overseas. In effect, this outcry guaranteed support for U. S. cultural policy. Public reaction was then satisfied and the expenditure appeared justified.

IV. The Significance of U. S. Cultural Policy in France

U. S. cultural policy in France was only a limited success if its primary objectives are viewed from a French perspective, rather than from that of the U. S. From archival evidence presented, the policy cannot be considered responsible for the diminution of Communist popularity in France.

Proof of this is demonstrated by the course of events that took place in France during the Recovery period. By 1949, the French economy was growing, an occurrence that satisfied the French economic sector. As a result, popular support for the PCF and its greater

organization, international communism, fell. Few businessmen and industrialists felt that there was any longer danger of a Communist takeover in France, while the previous fear of another world war appeared unjustified. Economic optimism helped to destroy French political indifference and defeatism. Therefore, popularity for communism that was widespread during the post-Liberation period diminished significantly on its own.

Organized groups that were politically inclined toward Socialist and Communist ideologies were, by the beginning of the new decade, older and by then members of the French labor force, many of whom had family responsibilities. Necessity to earn a living that would allow them to enjoy quality lifestyle lessened their attraction for the political Left. Thus, communism in France lost its impetus in the regrowth of the French economy and natural changes in French societal patterns. Consequently, the first objective of U. S. cultural policy did not succeed on its own merits, although USIS/France officials consistently stated it was responsible was reducing the Communist threat.

Nor did U. S. cultural policy effectively alter French popular response to U. S. lifestyle. French individualism, attachment to the French way of life, family ties and a burgeoning sense of nationalism and pride in the success of economic reconstruction after 1950 were factors that reduced popular interest in U. S. culture and effectively restrained its influence. Conclusively, U. S. cultural policy failed to convince the majority of French people that American lifestyle offered them a better or a more qualitative opportunity.

The fact that U. S. cultural policy was not able to attract more positive French response is also related to the re-emergence of national pride in French cultural heritage and its unique civilization. Many French people rejected U. S. lifestyle as alien and not

acceptable in France. For them, it not only seemed a degradation of their standards and values, but an indication that they were not comfortable in a North American lifestyle. While U. S. information activities may have provided them with some measure of appreciation for the U. S., it did not create a change in their attitudes. Many remained suspicious of U. S. motives, while for others, the question of “Americanization” was irrelevant.

While many French spectators, particularly those in the French regions, attended USIS/France cultural events, this does not constitute an indication of favorable reaction to U. S. lifestyle. Often, public attendance was motivated by going to a social event, or out of curiosity, possibly because the scheduled program held an interest for French workers. USIS/France strategies to bring out locals to these events were effective, yet, their claims that they were resounding successes must be treated as exaggerations or, attempts to keep their regional operation intact.

From the evidence presented, it may be concluded that French people attended USIS/France functions, although perhaps not in the excessive numbers indicated in USIS/France statistical reports. Few, however, intended to trade in French lifestyle for that of the U. S. because they had seen U. S. films or had visited information centers. Most people realized that what were billed as popular entertainments were thinly-veiled propaganda programs.

Therefore, U. S. cultural policy did not effectively change French lifestyle. As well, it cannot be stated that it significantly altered French attitudes toward Americans whose presence in France was often the occasion for hostility and resentment. Anti-Americanism was nurtured by reactions from organized groups that felt betrayed by U. S. policy.

Unpopularity was increased by an openly hostile press that reacted to impressions of U. S. imperialism. However, U. S. cultural policy, while it did create some positive impressions about the U. S. and about its expertise in technology in particular, failed to eliminate anti-Americanism as a factor in the French press as well as in public outlook.

More significantly for this study, it may be concluded that U. S. cultural policy did not have a radical effect on keeping the French within the Allied Alliance. Once economic recovery was underway, the tradition of French individualism reasserted itself. Most Frenchmen supported a democratic republic, but did not endorse suppression of political parties. Therefore, French public disagreement over U. S.-style democracy was widespread. It was often regarded as too politically right wing to succeed in France. The anti-Communist movement in the U. S. culminating in McCarthyism created a negative atmosphere, making most Frenchmen skeptical that the U. S. was really the liberal country that it claimed to be. Once again, the French tradition of individual rights made French lifestyle more appealing than that of the U. S. where government appeared to many to intrude upon personal choice.

U. S. cultural policy in France did, however, provide the impetus for French foreign policy in the U. S. Yet, this policy failed because French politicians did not realize that present-day international politics prevented any hope of a return to the former French position in international affairs.

Officials responsible for USIS/France operations never formally acknowledged that the U. S. had a cultural policy in effect in France. Instead, Department of State policy planners argued that use of culture in France was successful because it reduced PCF attempts

to discredit the U. S. However, USIS/France officials insistence that large numbers of French spectators at U. S. cultural events demonstrated French approval of U. S. lifestyle was naive and presumptuous. Use of statistics that were largely unsubstantiated by the Embassy as justification for continuation of public funding provides an example of self-serving behavior and hints of suspicion that officials were merely trying to maintain operations that were at best inappropriate.

In conclusion, U. S. cultural policy in France contributed two significant factors in application of U. S. foreign policy in France. It created a centralized operation that allowed U. S. cultural influence to continue unimpeded, while it integrated U. S. influence within important media operations that the U. S. considered imperative to the eventual destruction of communism. It existed, therefore, as an extension of what foreign policy objectives could not readily accomplish in France because of adverse public reaction and a seemingly indifferent response to U. S. goals from successive French governments.

It is also apparent that cultural policy was far more important to U. S. objectives in France than the Department of State ever admitted to publicly. Its network transcended cultural affairs to include economic and political objectives that were the subjects of greater U. S. interest.

It is noteworthy that annual statements by successive occupants of the Secretary of State position never mentioned a U. S. cultural policy, while they consistently emphasized the use of culture to promote U. S. foreign policy objectives. While cultural production was made to serve political purposes, it was never recognized as part of a strategy. Non-clarification of this issue appears to have been a deliberate attempt not to call attention to

an actual cultural policy. Operating in France would have precluded such public statements on grounds that the French would object to such an intrusion, while also ridiculing the U. S. attempt to use cultural policy to promote adaptation of U. S. lifestyle. Instead, officials testifying at congressional inquiries attempted to justify the amounts of public money spent by claiming that the information program in France succeeded in improving French support for U. S.-style democracy over that of communism through dissemination of U. S. culture.

However, cultural policy significance lies not in its success, but in lessons learned from its failure. Refusal of the French people to accept U. S. lifestyle provided proof that foreign nations could not be bought in consumer-like fashion. Moreover, it demonstrated that U. S. cultural policy was in reality U. S. foreign policy and that French people were not deceived by a superficial display of U. S. movies, literature and art.

It also demonstrated that the U. S., through implementation of its cultural policy in France, was easily able to access French internal institutions without hindrance from the government or acute public response. While it is surprising that the French government, despite its reservations that have been discussed earlier in this work, did not protest U. S. involvement in internal affairs, it is more striking that French popular response was not more evident.

The lack of popular voice supports the idea that the French were so sure of their own cultural expertise that they felt that they had little to fear from the U. S. Secondly, French officials, who witnessed U. S. efforts, may have been directed by their superiors not to interfere. However, the fact that teachers and educators did not react publicly to U. S. presence is more difficult to understand. Their lack of protest may lie in the fact that

publicizing the matter would have meant the end of U. S. resources that French institutions could not afford to buy. They may have feared pressure from the U. S. Embassy that could have resulted in job loss or social stigma. Whatever the case, French archival documents contain no reference to complaints from personnel.

The situation in France presented an ironic situation. Whereas U. S. cultural policy attempted to make France dependent upon U. S. lifestyle, the French emerged culturally, if not economically, independent from this particular era of Franco-American relations. While this statement appears deniable by a walk in the present-day streets of Paris where fast-food style restaurants, American fashions and public billboards illustrating U. S. movies and publications are abundant, these remain superficial indications of the presence of U. S. culture. In fact, beneath the thin surface of attempts at Americanization, France remains French and American culture is still foreign, no more a serious option for Frenchmen today than it was in 1958. U. S. cultural policy in France, while it was not successful by itself in transforming French attitudes and impressions about the U. S. and its people, created a lasting impression.

Appendix 1

Tables Demonstrating Examples of USIS/France Films and Film Programs for French Youth from 1950 to 1954

Tables 43 to 46 demonstrate the type of films that the USIS/France Program showed to youth and the numbers of young spectators that officials claimed viewed these films.

Table 43. USIS/France Films for French Youth, March 1950¹

City	Place	Film Titles
Paris	École Alsacienne	The California Junior Orchestra The Bolivar Mission The Window Cleaner Cherbourg, Gateway to France Johnny Jones Freedom to Learn Popular Science
Lille	École Supérieure de Commerce	This Is My Railroad King's Other Life
Algiers		The Third Man A Child Went Forth The Little Tramp
Poitiers		Fighting Lady Memphis Belle
Tarbes		The Battle of Britain
Strasbourg		The Marshall Plan

¹Information in Table 43 is a composite of information from Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Clasified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Boxes 3, 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

Table 44. USIS/Bordeaux and USIS/Strasbourg Youth Film Programs, 1951²

Place	Audience	No. Films
Bordeaux	650 school children	18
Bordeaux	490 Youth Organization	14
Strasbourg	40 Youth Organization	15
Strasbourg	212 Educational Institute	3
Strasbourg	70 secondary students	9
Strasbourg	1000 secondary students	26
Strasbourg	482 Youth Organization	21

Table 45. USIS/Strasbourg Regional Film Program January to March 1954³

Date	Place	No. Films	No. Screenings	Audience
January 1954	Strasbourg	125	8	10,935
February 1954	Strasbourg	91	28	4,132
March 1954	Strasbourg	98	34	2,565

Table 46. USIS/Lyons/Lille Film Program 1953 to 1954⁴

Date	Place	No. Films	No. Screenings	Audience
1953	Lyons	65	5	10,954
1954	Lyons	71	7	12,316
1954	Lille	115	23	36,295

²Ibid.

³Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1955. Box 13. NARA, Washington, D. C.

⁴Ibid.

Appendix 2

Tables Demonstrating Examples of French Government Recognition of American Achievement

Tables 46, 47 and 48 demonstrate examples of French government recognition toward U. S. achievement between 1945 and 1957.

Table 46. French Government Honors to the U. S.¹

Date	Activity
1945	Portrait of Benjamin Franklin ²
1951	Stamp honoring Nicolas Appert ³
3 Feb 1955	International Rotary Chicago 50th anniversary stamp
7 Aug 1957	Commemorative La Fayette Plaque ⁴

¹Information in Table 46 is a composite of data from the following: Record Group 84. Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (France) Embassy. General and Classified Subject Files of the USIA Office 1946 to 1954. Boxes 4, 11, 32 and 36. NARA, Washington, D. C.

²Official gift from General de Gaulle to President Truman on the occasion of his visit to the White House. Painted by eighteenth-century French artist Joseph Siffrede Duplessis, the portrait hangs in the home of the U. S. President today.

³Appert was the founder of conservation of food through use of heat. In 1951 the National Association of U. S. Canners was celebrating the two hundredth anniversary of Appert's birth. In the U. S. there was a lot of official recognition of this event, a fact that was not lost on French diplomats who urged Paris to issue the commemorative stamp as a gesture to U. S. Labor.

⁴Plaque struck with La Fayette's effigy recalling General Eisenhower's role in the Second World War was sent to Eisenhower as a gift.

Table 47. Public Memorials to the U. S. in France⁵

Date	Memorial
12 Apr 1952	FDR Monument, Paris. ⁶
8 Dec 1952	Street named for General Shearly ⁷
23 Jan 1953	Sevran square named for George Eastman ⁸
12 Feb 1953	Omaha Beach Monument to U. S. dead
15 April 1953	Roads in Calvados named for General Eisenhower
2 Nov 1953	Square, St. Man-le-Grant named for General Patton
13 Jan 1954	Saint-Lô street named for U. S. Major ⁹
11 May 1956	Wilson Plaque, ¹⁰ Crillon Hotel Facade, Paris
May 1957	Rededication of La Fayette Statue ¹¹

⁵Information in Table 47 is from AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vols. 525, 526.

⁶Erected by the Comité Français. The dedication ceremony was not given the highest priority by the French government. Premier Robert Schuman did not attend, but sent Christian de Nicolay, an Embassy Councilor, as his personal representative. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 525.

⁷General Shearly died in combat after the Liberation. The municipal council of Mousson (Merthe et Moselles) wanted to honor him by naming a street after him. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963*. Box 525. Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Homage Public," 8 December 1952.

⁸Eastman was the founder of the Kodak society that had several establishments in Sevran.

⁹Major T. P. Howie was Commander of the U. S. battalion that liberated Saint-Lô in 1944. Howie died during the Liberation.

¹⁰Final cost of this plaque, paid for by the French government, was 102,000FF. AE, France. *Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis*. Vol. 526.

¹¹The removal of La Fayette's statue from the Cour Napoléon in the Louvre to its present position in the Champs Élysée gardens generated a great deal of controversy between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Embassy. In 1954, the French government began to search for a permanent resting place for the statue that would be acceptable to the U. S. government. Its final choice, opposite the U. S. Embassy complex in downtown Paris,

Table 48. Legion of Honor Awards to U. S. Citizens by the French Government¹²

Date	American Recipient	French Award
Jun 47	Arthur Hally Compton ¹³ Harry Sparkes ¹⁴ James Finch ¹⁵ Gilbert Wilkes ¹⁶ Anton Lebecki ¹⁷	Officier de la Légion d'honneur Officier de la Légion d'honneur Officier d'Instruction Publique Officier d'Académie Officier d'Académie
1951	Abraham Litton ¹⁸	Croix de Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur/Citoyen d'honneur
Feb 52	Mme Cittadini-Warren ¹⁹	Croix de Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur/Citoyenne d'honneur
Oct 52	M. Robinson ²⁰	Citoyen d'honneur

was a compromise.

¹²Information in Table 48 is from AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 525.

¹³Hally Compton was Rector of the University of St. Louis, a member of the U. S. National Academy of Science and a Nobel Prize recipient.

¹⁴Sparkes was the President of the Sparks-Witherington Company in Jackson, Michigan.

¹⁵Finch was Dean of Engineering at Columbia University.

¹⁶Professor of Science, Johns Hopkins University.

¹⁷Lebecki was an Engineer in Los Angeles.

¹⁸Litton, an industrialist, was honored by the French government in 1951 and 1953 for his contribution to the Commune d'Isigny sur-Mer (Calvados).

¹⁹She was honored for her contribution to laboratory research in France and for her gift of cortisone to the Aix-en-Provence hospital.

²⁰Robinson was Mayor of San Francisco and official representative of the Association of U. S. Mayors.

Apr 53	Walt Disney ²¹	Officier de la Légion d'honneur
Aug 53	Frank Samuel ²²	Citoyen d'honneur
Sept 53	Raymond Loewy ²³	Citoyen d'honneur

²¹Disney was honored at the Cannes Film Festival for his contribution to the film industry in France. Two Disney productions, *Waterbirds* and *Peter Pan* had been favorably received at Cannes. AE, France. Amérique 1952 to 1963. États-Unis. Vol. 518.

²²Honor recommended by the Ministry of the Interior for candidate's contribution to the Commune de Roquefort (Aveyron).

²³Honor bestowed on Loewy, an industrialist, for his contributions to Rochefort-en-Trelines.

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