

Supplementary File for

“The Efficacy of Ethnic Stacking: Military Defection during Uprisings in Africa”

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September 2018

This appendix offers supplementary information for “The Efficacy of Ethnic Stacking” in a few areas. It provides additional information about the coding of the major dependent and independent variables in the study; analyzes various explanations for the surprising lack of difference in the incidence of mass defection between cases of no stacking and cases of complete stacking; repeats the article’s major analyses in a regression framework in order to add a few control variables; and provides the complete dataset for the article.

Coding notes

This section describes coding procedures for our key dependent and independent variables for “The Efficacy of Ethnic Stacking.” In later sections of this appendix, in which we outline some additional results, we include further coding notes for some additional variables.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is NAVCO 1.1’s binary measure of defection, which takes a value of 1 if there are “large-scale, systematic breakdowns on the execution of orders from the target regime” (Chenoweth 2011, 34). We modified this variable somewhat. NAVCO 2.0 provided an update in

addition to furnishing codings for each year of the uprising. There were discrepancies such that some cases were coded 0 in NAVCO 1.1 but 1 in each year in NAVCO 2.0. We assume that these discrepancies are due to new information gathered in NAVCO 2.0 and code any case with defection = 1 in each year of NAVCO 2.0 as 1. We systematically reviewed NAVCO's coding of defection in light of past work on each case. Consequently, we changed the coding for two cases (Mozambique 1979, and Djibouti 1991). In these cases, NAVCO 1.1 appears to have coded defection rebels toward the government, and not vice-versa (Chenoweth 2011, 91, 94), and we could not find evidence otherwise for mass defection from the regime to the rebels.

Independent variable: ethnic stacking

We base our coding of ethnic stacking policies on Kristin Harkness' (2016) data, which she gathered for the immediate post-independence period. Harkness codes whether the first post-independence government adopted an ethnic stacking policy in the armed forces and, if so, whether it favoured a group that was already dominant or not. We code a case as "no ethnic stacking" if the regime did not pursue policies to favor an ethnic group, whatever the composition of the officer corps. We further code cases as "complete ethnic stacking" if, in Harkness' scheme, the government pursued an ethnic stacking policy, and if it favoured a group or groups already in the majority in the officer corps. Finally, we code them as "incomplete ethnic stacking" if the regime favors a group but this group is in a minority in the officer corps.

For any uprising in the first year after independence, we simply used Harkness' coding of ethnic stacking in the first post-independence government. However, we reviewed all of Harkness' codes, changed one of them that did not fully match our findings, and added another

for which Harkness did not have a coding.¹ We then extend Harkness' data forward in time, based on a reading of secondary material about each case. For any given case, we gathered secondary resources that contained information on the composition of the military of a given country at the time of the large-scale mobilization we are studying. For instance, we relied on the work of seven different specialists to code the Beninese case in 1989 (Allen 1988; Banégas 2003; Decalo 1997, 1976; Dickovick 2008; Heilbrunn 1994; Martin 1986; Ronen 1987). There were numerous areas of agreement among the authors, like for instance the presence of a Bariba-dominated Presidential Guard, pointing to a strategy of ethnic stacking by President Mathieu Kérékou's regime. In many of our cases, codings were not straightforward, as there are either not clear numbers or disagreements among the different. In these cases, we coded per the strength of the different author's evidence. For example, we coded Kenya in 1989 as incomplete ethnic stacking, despite claims that President Daniel arap Moi created an army of Kalenjin in Kenya (Decalo 1998, 245), as N'Diaye (2002, 628) and Stubbs (2015, 77) had stronger evidence that Kalenjin only represented a third of the officers.

Explaining the Lack of an Upside to Complete Ethnic Stacking

The results in the main paper suggest that while incomplete ethnic stacking is associated with a higher incidence of mass defection (the downside risk of stacking), it is *not* the case that complete stacking is associated with a *lower* rate than no stacking at all. This seems to undermine ethnic stacking theory, as we note in the paper. The paper ultimately finds that recent coup history may explain the anomalous finding. But here, we pursue a few lines of inquiry in order to address other possibilities.

¹ We changed the ethnic stacking coding for the first studied uprising in Nigeria from inclusive to ethnic as the quota policies assured that a majority of officers would come from the Northern tribes. Harkness had no coding for the ethnic recruitment policy in Zaïre/DRC. Our evidence for this case pointed to inclusiveness in 1960. See Barron 2013, 113–14; Horowitz 2000, 456–505.

Out-group presence in the officer corps

One possibility is that this is an artifact of our coding scheme. Since ethnic stacking is coded as complete if the favoured group is in a numerical majority in the officer corps, there is still some possibility that disfavoured groups retain a considerable presence in the officer corps, and are provoked into defecting by the stacking policy in place. In other words, some “complete” ethnic stacking cases could look a lot like “incomplete” cases, only less so. We therefore dug deeper into cases of dominant ethnic stacking, examining whether disfavoured groups still had a substantial presence in the officer corps. Where figures could be found, we used a benchmark of 25% as a minimum. Otherwise, we relied on qualitative accounts suggesting that disfavoured officers were still substantially present.

Table A1. Frequency of mass defection by ethnic stacking and out-group presence in the officer corps

Did mass defection occur during the uprising?	Complete ethnic stacking			
	(1) No ethnic stacking	(2) Little out-group presence	(3) Substantial out- group presence	(4) Incomplete ethnic stacking
Yes	3 (23%)	2 (15%)	5 (28%)	7 (54%)
No	10 (77%)	11 (85%)	13 (72%)	6 (46%)
Total	13 (100%)	13 (100%)	18 (100%)	13 (100%)

Chi-square: 5.198, n.s.

Statistical significance, t-tests:

(1) vs. (2): n.s.

(1) vs. (3): n.s.

(2) vs. (3): n.s.

(1) vs. (4): $p < .1$

(2) vs. (4): $p < .05$

(3) vs. (4): $p < .1$

We find (in table A1) that in armies in which disfavoured groups were more thoroughly excluded, mass defection was less frequent than where they did, and less frequent also than where ethnic stacking was not employed at all. This hints at advantages to ethnic stacking—if it goes far enough. However, the number of cases is obviously small, and neither difference is statistically significant. We still cannot conclude that ethnic stacking, even if *extremely* extensive, has an upside for regimes seeking to prevent defection in the face of uprisings.

Table A2. Frequency of mass defection by ethnic stacking and out-group presence in the rank and file

Did mass defection occur during the uprising?	Complete ethnic stacking in officer corps			
	No ethnic stacking	Rank and file are majority favoured groups	Rank and file are majority disfavoured groups	Incomplete ethnic stacking in officer corps
Yes	3 (23%)	6 (26%)	1 (12.5%)	7 (54%)
No	10 (77%)	17 (74%)	7 (87.5%)	6 (46%)
Total	13 (100%)	23 (100%)	8 (100%)	13 (100%)

Chi-square: 5.168, n.s.
 Statistical significance, t-tests: (1) vs. (2): n.s. (1) vs. (4): $p < .1$
 (1) vs. (3): n.s. (2) vs. (4): $p < .1$
 (2) vs. (3): n.s. (3) vs. (4): $p < .05$

Out-group Presence in the Rank and File

In a similar vein, it may be that, by focusing on the officer corps alone, the paper’s coding scheme misses important variation in the rank and file. While the officer corps may be dominated by the leader’s favoured group, the rank and file might not be (for example, in Syria, in which Sunnis are numerically preponderant in the rank and file even if Alawis dominate the officer corps). We therefore coded a variable indicating whether or not the rank and file was composed, in the majority, of members of groups the leader favoured. Then, in parallel with Table A1, we focus on the cases of complete ethnic stacking in the officer corps, to find out if their surprisingly high incidence of mass defection had to do with the presence of out-group members in the rank and file. We find no evidence that this was the case. Indeed, armies experienced mass defection if anything *more* often when both the rank and file and the officer corps were matched to the leader’s preferred groups (though the difference is not statistically significant, since there are not many cases). Again, this is anomalous for a direct reading of ethnic stacking theory.

Personalist regimes

Is the seeming lack of an upside for complete ethnic stacking spurious on a selection effect? After all, ethnic stacking theory does view ethnic stacking as a response to disloyalty. It could well be that the lack of a gap emerges because the countries that have the luxury of *not* pursuing ethnic stacking are those that do not have much of a loyalty problem to begin with. In Table A3, we break the result down by personalist regimes vs. all others, since personalist regimes are often argued to pursue coup-proofing strategies more than others (Brooks 1998; Quinlivan 1999; Roessler 2011; Svobik 2012), and since Dahl (2015) finds these regimes—and coup-proofing—to be positively related to defection. We use Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) classification of regime types.

Table A3. Frequency of mass defection by ethnic stacking and personalist regimes

		(1)	(2)	(3)
		No ethnic stacking	Complete ethnic stacking	Incomplete ethnic stacking
Non-personalist regime	Mass defection	1 (12.5%)	4 (20%)	3 (33%)
	No mass defection	7 (87.5%)	16 (80%)	6 (67%)
	Total	8 (100%)	20 (100%)	9 (100%)
Chi-square: 1.152, n.s.				
Statistical significance, t-tests: all n.s.				
Personalist regime	Mass defection	2 (40%)	3 (30%)	4 (100%)
	No mass defection	3 (60%)	7 (70%)	0 (0%)
	Total	5 (100%)	10 (100%)	4 (100%)
Chi-square: 5.763, $p < .1$.				
Statistical significance, t-tests:		(1) vs. (2): n.s.		
		(1) vs. (3): $p < .05$		
		(2) vs. (3): $p < .01$		

There is a second reason to investigate varieties of authoritarian rule here. It could be that the result in Table 2 in the main paper, in which successful ethnic stacking is associated with low defection rates *only* in regimes without a recent history of coups, is again spurious on regime

types. The concern here would be that certain regimes (personalist dictatorships above all) would be both prone to coups and to mass defection, with ethnic stacking simply making little difference.

Personalist regimes seem to have higher defection rates on average, as Dahl finds. But within the set personalist regimes there is little obvious difference among those employing successful ethnic stacking and those not. (The N is further reduced by the listwise deletion of Djibouti from the dataset, since this case does not appear in the Geddes et al data.) Nor is the relationship between successful ethnic stacking and defection conditional on personalist vs. non-personalist regimes, the way it is for coup history. Repeating the analysis and focusing only on the relatively institutionalized alternatives of democracy and single-party rule as a contrast set to personalist rule shows no differences. On the basis of these data, it does not appear that selection effects about personalist regimes are driving the null result. It also seems clear that the link between coup history, ethnic stacking, and defection is not just a reflection institutional orders, like personalist regimes, that are especially prone both to coups and to mass defection.

Violent and nonviolent rebellions

Ethnic stacking might have clearer effects in the case of violent movements rather than nonviolent ones. If nonviolent rebellions are generally able to induce loyalty shifts through moral and social appeals to soldiers (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), these appeals might cut across identity lines. In contrast, violent uprisings may be particularly likely to activate identity-based loyalties. Or, alternatively, we might expect the reverse—that violent uprisings have mechanisms (like winning battles and inflicting casualties) to force loyalty shifts that nonviolent ones do not have (see, e.g., Albrecht and Koehler 2017), so that stacking might matter less in this context.

We test this possibility by breaking the result down by the primary tactics used by the opposition; results are in table A4. The context of nonviolent vs. violent rebellion seems to make no difference to the effectiveness of ethnic stacking; the results are similar across the two settings. Moreover, it appears as though complete ethnic stacking is less effective than not stacking in the face of violent uprising from below; the difference between the two is statistically significant.

Table A4. Frequency of mass defection by violent and nonviolent uprisings

		(1)	(2)	(3)
		No ethnic stacking	Complete ethnic stacking	Incomplete ethnic stacking
Primarily nonviolent uprising	Mass defection	3 (43%)	2 (33%)	2 (50%)
	No mass defection	4 (57%)	4 (67%)	2 (50%)
	Total	7 (100%)	6 (100%)	4 (100%)
Chi-square: 1.152, n.s. Statistical significance, t-tests: all n.s.				
Primarily violent uprising	Mass defection	0 (0%)	5 (20%)	5 (56%)
	No mass defection	6 (100%)	20 (80%)	4 (44%)
	Total	6 (100%)	25 (100%)	4 (100%)
Chi-square: 5.763, $p < .1$. Statistical significance, t-tests: (1) vs. (2): n.s. (1) vs. (3): $p < .05$ (2) vs. (3): $p < .05$				

Indeed, an interesting finding emerges for regimes that do not employ ethnic stacking: there, nonviolent uprisings are especially likely to provoke mass defection while violent ones are especially unlikely to do so. It may be that here, in unstacked armed forces, there are fewer social barriers between demonstrators and the military, and thus that nonviolent tactics can have a greater effect in appealing to a shift in loyalty. But there are few cases.

Ethnic rebellions

It is plausible to suppose that ethnic stacking is particularly important in the face of uprisings from below that make ethnic claims. NAVCO unfortunately does not include data on the ethnic claims of uprisings. However, matching the years each NAVCO campaign began with years with an ethnic rebellion onset according to EPR (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), we could in principle examine this effect for *violent* ethnic rebellions. However, there are only 10 such cases as defined by EPR and only 17 as defined by Fearon and Laitin; in the former, only one case did not employ ethnic stacking, while in the latter only four did. There is thus no solid basis for a quantitative analysis.

Linear probability and logit models

In the paper, and so far in this appendix, we relied on crosstabs to give a straightforward portrait of the incidence of mass defection in different situations, and in line with our limited N of 57. Here, we move to a regression setup in order to be able to analyze different variables simultaneously and to see whether the core results from the paper hold up in a different method of analysis. We include our three-value ethnic stacking variable, along with dummy variables for a coup in the past ten years and for personalist regimes, and Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) dummy variable for violent campaigns, which they expect to induce mass defection less often than nonviolent campaigns. We then include an interaction effect between coup history and ethnic stacking in order to examine whether the contingent relationship we found in the main paper in Table 2 holds up.

Linear probability (i.e. regression in a binary-DV context) and logit models have different strengths and weaknesses here: while the former is biased because it assumes the dependent

variable can go below zero or above one, the latter underestimates standard errors when the N is relatively small, as in our case. Logit, in our context, also experiences problems of “separation”: combinations of right-hand-side variables in which the outcome variable is all zero or all one, and so the model cannot produce estimates (specifically, as we saw in Table 2, there is no mass defection in cases of complete ethnic stacking with no coup attempt in the past 10 years). With these offsetting strengths and weaknesses, we begin by using both estimation methods for a basic model without interactions, and linear probability for a model *with* interactions in order to avoid the separation problem.

Results are in Table A5. First, across all models, the primary result holds: there is no statistically significant difference in the incidence of mass defection between cases of no ethnic stacking and cases of complete ethnic stacking (the baseline category), while countries with incomplete ethnic stacking experience mass defection considerably more frequently than either of the other two conditions. Personalist regimes and coup histories are consistently important predictors of mass defection as well. Models 1 and 2 show little meaningful difference between the linear probability and logit models. The one note of caution is that the coefficient estimate for incomplete ethnic stacking, though large in the logit case, is close to statistically insignificant, and the fact that standard errors are *underestimated* with the small N means that it is important to be somewhat more cautious about this result.

Model 3 adds the interaction between coup history and ethnic stacking. Here, given the way the interaction is set up, the coefficient on the “coup attempt in past 10 years” variable is estimated for cases of complete ethnic stacking. It reproduces, from table 2 in the paper, the especially large effect of recent coup attempts when complete ethnic stacking is in place: coup histories seem, again, to make a very large difference to the operation of complete ethnic

stacking. These linear and logit models therefore suggest that the major results of the paper are robust to the inclusion of some important control variables.

Table A5. Linear and logit models

VARIABLES	(1) Linear prob	(2) Logit	(3) Linear prob	(4) Linear prob
No ethnic stacking	0.018 [0.149]	0.249 [0.944]	0.109 [0.189]	0.102 [0.216]
Incomplete ethnic stacking	0.286** [0.139]	1.636* [0.885]	0.545** [0.225]	0.538* [0.314]
Coup attempt in past 10 years	0.285** [0.116]	1.753** [0.783]	0.428*** [0.154]	0.404** [0.173]
No ethnic stacking X coup attempt in past 10 years			-0.216 [0.299]	-0.294 [0.334]
Incomplete ethnic stacking X coup attempt in past 10 years			-0.436 [0.297]	-0.384 [0.370]
Personalist regime	0.283** [0.118]	1.679** [0.755]	0.317** [0.126]	
Democracy				-0.559* [0.280]
Single-party regime				-0.330* [0.164]
Military regime				-0.355* [0.179]
Monarchy				-0.441 [0.325]
Warlord/foreign-occupied/provisional				0.101 [0.325]
Primarily violent uprising	-0.115 [0.128]	-0.611 [0.785]	-0.148 [0.132]	-0.148 [0.157]
External support for incumbent regime				-0.106 [0.164]
Military expenditures				-0.000 [0.000]
Constant	0.070 [0.158]	-2.548** [1.114]	0.003 [0.165]	0.359* [0.210]
Observations	56	56	56	53
R-squared	0.268		0.302	.387

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Model 4, we add further control variables. In particular, we examine the target regime's resource base for paying the military enough to keep it loyal. We therefore add NAVCO 1.1's dummy variable for whether the incumbent regime received overt external state support, as well as data on military expenditures per soldier, calculated from the Correlates of War Project's National Material Capabilities data, version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). We also expanded the regime variable to compare personalist regimes against their many alternatives. We find no change in the major results. We also find in particular that personalist regimes are more likely to experience mass defection than democracies, single-party regimes, and military regimes, consistent with Dahl's (2015) past work and expectations about the relative institutionalization of these regimes.

Table A5. Complete dataset

Country	Campaign	First year	Last year	Military recruitment strategy	Majority of officer corps from leader's group	Stacking coding	Substantial out-group presence in officer corps	Majority of rank and file from leader's group	Military coup in last 10 years	Personalist regime	Mass military defection
South Africa	Defiance Campaign	1952	1961	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No
Zaire/DRC	Katanga-led leftists	1960	1965	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	Yes	No
Algeria	former rebel leaders	1962	1963	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	No	No	Yes
Sudan	Anya Nya	1962	1973	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Rwanda	Watusi NFDLM	1963	1964	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No
Kenya	secessionists	1964	1969	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	No	No	No
Chad	Frolinat	1966	1990	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	No	No	No	No
Uganda	Buganda Tribe	1966	1966	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		Yes	No	No	No
Nigeria	Biafrans	1967	1970	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Burundi	Hutu rebellion	1972	2002	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Ethiopia	Eritrean-led rebels	1974	1991	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	No	No	No
Angola	UNITA	1975	2001	Inclusive	Yes	None	No	Yes	No	No	No
Western Sahara	Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO)	1975	1991	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	No	No
Ethiopia	Somali rebels (Ogaden)	1976	1983	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Zaire/DRC	FLNC	1977	1978	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Ethiopia	Tigrean Liberation Front	1978	1991	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Mozambique	Renamo	1979	1992	Inclusive	No	None		No	Yes	No	No
Nigeria	Muslim fundamentalists	1980	1984	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Uganda	National Resistance Army	1980	1988	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Somalia	clan factions; SNM	1982	1997	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Zimbabwe	PF-ZAPU guerillas	1983	1987	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No

Sudan	SPLA-Garang faction	1983	2005	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	Anti-Apartheid	1984	1994	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No
Sudan		1985	1985	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mali		1989	1992	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	Yes	Yes
Mali	Tauregs	1989	1994	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	Yes	No
Benin		1989	1990	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liberia	anti-Doe rebels	1989	1990	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya		1989	1989	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	No	No
Nigeria	Ogoni movement	1990	1995	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Rwanda	Tutsi rebels	1990	1993	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No
Zambia		1990	1991	Inclusive	No	None		No	Yes	No	Yes
Niger		1991	1992	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Sierra Leone	RUF	1991	1996	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Burundi	Tutsi supremacists	1991	1992	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	No	Yes
Djibouti	Afar insurgency	1991	1994	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No		No
Madagascar	Active Voices	1991	1993	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liberia	NPFL & ULIMO pro-democracy movement	1992	1995	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Tanzania		1992	1995	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	No	No
Malawi		1992	1994	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	Yes	Yes
Algeria	Islamic Salvation Front	1992	2006	Inclusive	Yes	None		No	No	No	No
Nigeria		1993	1999	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Zaire/DRC	rebels (People's Revolutionary Party)	1993	1993	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
CAR	multiple factions	1994	1997	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	No	No	Yes
Chad	Rebels	1994	1998	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rwanda	Patriotic Front national patriotic forces	1994	1994	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	No	No
Liberia		1996	1996	Inclusive	Yes	None	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Zaire/DRC	Kabila-ADFL	1996	1997	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Uganda	LRA	1996	2006	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Congo- Brazzaville (ROC)	Denis Sassou Nguemo	1997	1999	Ethnic	No	Complete		No	No	No	No
Senegal		2000	2000	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	No	No
Ghana		2000	2000	Inclusive	No	None		No	No	Yes	No
Zambia		2001	2001	Inclusive	No	None		No	Yes	No	No
Ivory Coast	PMIC pro-democracy	2002	2005	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Madagascar	movement	2002	2003	Ethnic	No	Incomplete		No	Yes	No	No
Liberia	LURD	2003	2003	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Sudan	JEM/SLA	2003	2006	Ethnic	Yes	Complete	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

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