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A Generalized Index of Fractionalization^{*}

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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to contribute to the economic literature on ethnic and cultural diversity by proposing a new index that is informationally richer and more flexible than the commonly used 'ethno-linguistic fractionalization' (ELF) index. We characterize a measure of diversity among individuals that takes as a primitive the individuals, as opposed to ethnic groups, and uses information on the extent of similarity among them. Compared to existing indices, our measure does not require that individuals are preassigned to exogenously determined categories or groups. We show that our generalized index is a natural extension of ELF and is also simple to compute. We also provide an empirical illustration of how our index can be operationalized and what difference it makes as compared to the standard ELF index. This application pertains to the pattern of fractionalization in the United States.

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1 Introduction

The role of ethnic and cultural diversity has received increasing attention by economists in recent years. Numerous contributions have analyzed the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and socioeconomic outcomes, including public good provision, growth, corruption and social capital. The transmission of cultural traits and the 'formation' of heterogeneity have also been studied theoretically and empirically.¹ The growing interest in these topics is likely attributable to the upward trend in migration flows and the fact that many societies are becoming increasingly heterogeneous from a cultural point of view.

Yet the economics literature does not seem to have advanced very far in the measurement of ethnic and cultural diversity. This contrasts with the breadth of the literature on the measurement of income inequality, the traditional notion of heterogeneity employed by economists. While we can rely on a variety of indices of economic inequality, and these indices have been axiomatically characterized from a theoretical point of view, the economic literature on the measurement of 'categorical' heterogeneity is much less developed. Virtually every empirical contribution on the topic uses the so-called index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (*ELF*), which is a decreasing transformation of the Herfindahl concentration index built from population shares. The *ELF* index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall population belong to different (pre-defined) ethnic groups. While *ELF* has the advantage of being simple to compute and easy to interpret, its economic underpinnings seem inadequate.²

The implicit contention in economic models is often that different ethnic groups may

¹Among the first group of studies, ethnic diversity has been shown to be associated with lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine, 1997), more corruption (Mauro, 1995), lower contributions to local public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999), lower participation in groups and associations (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) and a higher propensity to form jurisdictions to sort into homogeneous groups (Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby, 2004). For a review of contributions on the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). For the formation and transmission of cultural traits see, among others, Bisin and Verdier (2000), Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004), and Giuliano (2007).

²To our knowledge, the only paper that attemps to provide a theoretical background for the use of ELF is the one by Vigdor (2002). He proposes a behavioral interpretation of ELF in a model where individuals display differential altruism. He assumes that an individual's willingness to spend on local public goods depends partly on the benefits that other members of the community derive from the good, and that the weights of this 'altruistic' component vary depending on how many members of the community share the same ethnicity of that individual. Notice that our goal here is to provide a characterization, rather than a behavioral interpretation, of a new index of fractionalization.

have different preferences, and this would generate conflicts of interest in economic decisions. It is hard to believe that population shares would be enough to capture the extent of divergence in preferences among society's members. Presumably, people of different culture or ethnicity will feel differently about each other depending on how similar they are in other dimensions. A second channel through which ethnic or cultural diversity may affect economic performance is the existence of possible skill complementarities among different types. But again, it is unlikely that simple population shares will capture the nature and extent of skill complementarities among groups.

If the rationale for including ethnic diversity effects in economic models lies in preferences or technological features, then measuring fractionalization purely as a function of population shares seems a severe limitation. Similarity between individuals should play a role. This similarity could depend, for example, on language spoken, age, educational background, employment status, just to mention a few attributes. If preferences might be induced by these other characteristics, then considering similarities between individuals will give a better understanding of the potential conflict in economic decisions. Providing a measure of 'fractionalization' that accounts for the degree of similarity among agents seems therefore an important task.

The goal of this paper is to characterize a *generalized fractionalization index* (GELF) that takes as primitive the individuals and uses information on their similarities to measure fractionalization. We propose to use as a building block a 'similarity matrix' containing pairwise similarity values $\{s_{ij}\}$ among any two individuals i and j in society. An entry equal to 1 in the matrix represents perfect similarity among individuals, an entry equal to 0 complete dissimilarity. We then rely on four axioms to characterize GELF. The first axiom is a normalization one, and requires that in a society with maximal similarity our diversity index takes value zero and in a society with maximal dissimilarity it takes a positive value. The second axiom, anonymity, requires that individuals are treated impartially, i.e. that our diversity measure is invariant with respect to permutations. The third axiom, additivity, imposes a separability property on our index. The fourth and last axiom, replication invariance, requires the index to be invariant with respect to 'replicas' of the population. We prove that a diversity measure satisfies these four axioms if and only if it is a decreasing function of the sum of similarity values in the matrix, scaled by the square of the population size. We denote this generalized index as GELF and show that it is a natural extension of ELF. More generally, depending on the metric used to measure similarity among individuals and on the level of aggregation of the information (i.e., similarity among individuals or among groups), our index nests a number of indices used in the literature. In the limit case where the information is purely categorical (e.g., similarity is 0 or 1) our measure reduces to *ELF*. In richer information settings where measuring the 'distance' among individuals is feasible and meaningful, our index conveys a broader measure of 'diversity'. The flexibility of our formulation and its suitability to being applied in very different informational environments are an advantage of the measure we propose. Another advantage is that our index does not require that individuals are pre-assigned to exogenously determined categories or groups. Our theoretical framework (e.g. the similarity matrix) can actually be used to determine an endogenous partition of society into groups. Relevant groups may be constituted by clusters of individuals who have perfect (or very high) similarity among themselves, and share the same (or very close) similarity values vis-a-vis the rest of society.

We also provide an empirical illustration of how GELF can be operationalized and what difference it makes as compared to the standard ELF index. This application pertains to the pattern of fractionalization in the United States. Using individual level data from the 1990 Census, we compute the two indices for all US states. We find that the ranking of several states changes significantly when we use GELF rather than ELF. For example, in 1990 Hawaii was the first most diverse state in terms of ethnic diversity (ELF) and California was the fifth. When we compute GELF embedding information on similarity in income, education and employment, as well as ethnicity, Hawaii moves to the 42nd place and California to the 30th. This is because economic opportunities in these states are relatively more equal across races than they are in other states. The District of Columbia, on the other hand, is the 2nd most fractionalized on the basis of ELF and becomes the 1st most fractionalized -by a wide margin- when we use GELF. Finally, we compute 'grouped' versions of the GELF index and show how each variable contributes to the pattern of similarity among races.

Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it naturally relates to the economics literature on ethnic diversity and its economic effects (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, for a survey). While the bulk of this literature does not focus on the specific issue of measurement, a few contributions do. As the majority of applications have used language as a proxy for ethnicity, some authors have criticized the use of ELFon the grounds that linguistic diversity may not correspond to ethnic diversity. Among these, Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) have proposed a classification into groups that combines information on language with information on skin color. These authors propose three measures of fractionalization: one purely linguistic, one related to religion, and one that broadly defines 'ethnicity' by combining language and skin color. Note that this approach differs from ours because it defines ethnic (or linguistic, or religious) categories on the basis of certain criteria and then applies the ELF formula to the resulting number of groups.

Other authors, in particular Fearon (2003), have criticized standard applications of ELF on the grounds that they would fail to account for the salience of ethnic distinctions in different contexts. For example, the same two ethnic groups may be allies in one country and opponents in another, and using simply their shares in the population would fail to capture this. We share Fearon's concerns on this point, and indeed we hope that our index can be a first step towards incorporating issues of salience in the measurement of fractionalization, albeit in a simplistic way. In particular, if one thinks that differences in income, or education, or any other measurable characteristic may be the reason why ethnicity matters only in certain contexts, our *GELF* index already 'weighs' ethnic categories by their salience.

Turning to the notion of 'distance' among ethnic groups, relatively little has been done. Using a heuristic approach, Laitin (2000) and Fearon (2003) rely on measures of distance between languages to assess how different linguistic groups are across countries. In particular, in his 2003 contribution Fearon proposes a measure of 'cultural fractionalization' that adapts Greenberg's (1956) formula by weighting population shares with a resemblance factor that depends on the number of shared classifications between any two languages. This measure intuitively captures the expected cultural distance between two people drawn at random from the population. As we show below, this measure can be derived as a special case of our *GELF* index. Caselli and Coleman (2002) stress the importance of ethnic distance in a theoretical model and propose to measure it using surveys of anthropologists. Finally, a few recent contributions underline the correlation between 'genetic' distance and pairwise income differences, trust and trade flows (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2006, and Giuliano, Spilimbergo and Tonon, 2006).

Second, the paper relates to the literature on ethnic polarization. In her original contribution, Reynal-Querol (2002) adapts the measure of polarization developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) to the case of categorical variables, such as ethnicity or religion, and proposes an index of ethnic polarization, RQ, which captures how far the distribution of ethnic groups is from the bipolar case. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the RQ index is a more powerful predictor of the incidence of civil wars than ELF. The authors also show that RQ is highly correlated with ELF at low levels, uncorrelated at intermediate levels and negatively correlated at high levels. In a recent contribution (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2007), the same authors analyze the theoretical properties of RQ and show that the explanatory power of RQ for the incidence of wars is greater the higher the intensity of the conflict. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber (2005) focus on ethno-linguistic conflict that arises between a dominant central group and peripheral minority groups. To this aim the authors propose an index of peripheral ethno-linguistic diversity, PD, which can capture both the notion of diversity and of polarization. The relationship between RQ, PD and GELF is discussed in Section 3.

Third, the paper is related to the theoretical economics literature on the measurement of diversity. For example, Weitzman (1992) suggests an index that is primarily intended to measure biodiversity. Moreover, the measurement of diversity has become an increasingly important issue in the recent literature on the ranking of opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice, where opportunity sets are interpreted as sets of options available to a decision maker. Examples for such studies include Weitzman (1998), Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Nehring and Puppe (2002) and Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (2003). A fundamental difference between the above-mentioned contributions and the approach followed in this paper is the informational basis employed which results in a very different set of axioms that are suitable for a measure of diversity. Both Weitzman's (1992) seminal paper and the literature on incorporating notions of diversity in the context of measuring freedom of choice proceed by constructing a ranking of sets of objects, interpreted as sets of species in the case of biodiversity and as sets of available options in the context of freedom of choice. On the other hand, we operate in an informationally richer environment: not only whether a group is present may influence the measure of fractionalization, but also the relative population shares of these groups along with the pairwise similarities among them. We are interested in capturing a different aspect of diversity than Nehring and Puppe (2002), namely the instrumental—as opposed to intrinsic—value of diversity, where the number of individuals plays a key role.

Finally, ELF is also used in the literature on network formation as a measure of heterogeneity in the underlying population, where distances in characteristics translate into distances in connections in the network (see, for example, Moody, 2001).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notion of a similarity matrix, we present the formula of our diversity index, and we provide some examples to show how it compares with the ELF index and how our framework can be used to derive an endogenous partition of society into groups. Section 3 contains our main theoretical result, namely, the axiomatic characterization of GELF. The relationship between GELF and alternative measures that appear in the literature is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides an empirical illustration and Section 6 concludes with a summary of our results and possible extensions.

2 Similarity and fractionalization: notation and examples

In this section we first of all introduce the notion of a similarity matrix, which is the building block of our index. We then present our proposed diversity measure, GELF, and show that the commonly employed ELF is a special case of our index. Finally, we briefly illustrate how our framework can be used to partition the population into groups.

Similarity

While the existing literature on the measurement of fractionalization relies on exogenous partitions of the population into groups, our starting point is a society composed of individuals. We believe that a measure of fractionalization of a society should take as primitive the individual and consider attributes such as ethnicity like any other personal characteristic in determining the similarity among individuals. In our informal discussion, we shall occasionally refer to ethnic groups in order to be in line with the literature to which we aim at contributing. Similarly, the empirical application will also make use of ethnic categories for comparison purposes with standard indices. However, the characterization result we provide in this paper is very general and we do not need to impose any predefined partition of the population into groups.

Our reasoning proceeds as follows. Imagine a society composed of individuals with personal characteristics, whatever they might be. Any two individuals may be perfectly identical according to the characteristics under consideration, completely dissimilar or similar to different degrees. For simplicity, we normalize the similarity values to be in the interval [0, 1], assign the value one to perfect similarity and a value of zero to maximum dissimilarity. If the society is composed of n individuals, the comparison process will generate n^2 similarity values. These values are collected in a matrix that we call the similarity matrix. Each row i of this matrix contains the similarity values of individual i with respect to all members of society. Naturally, all entries on the main diagonal of such a matrix—the entries representing the similarity of each individual to itself—are equal to one. Furthermore, a similarity matrix is symmetric: the similarity between individuals i and j is equal to that between j and i. We discuss below the possibility of a non-symmetric similarity matrix.

Let \mathbb{N} denote the set of positive integers and \mathbb{R} the set of all real numbers. The set of all non-negative real numbers is \mathbb{R}_+ and the set of positive real numbers is \mathbb{R}_{++} . For $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, \mathbb{R}^n is Euclidean *n*-space and Δ^n is the *n*-dimensional unit simplex. Furthermore, $\mathbf{0}^n$ is the vector consisting of *n* zeroes.

DEFINITION 1. A similarity matrix of dimension $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ is an $n \times n$ matrix $S = (s_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1,\dots,n\}}$ such that:

- (a) $s_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ for all $i, j \in \{1, \dots, n\};$
- (b) $s_{ii} = 1$ for all $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$;
- (c) $[s_{ij} = 1 \Rightarrow s_{ik} = s_{kj}]$ for all $i, j, k \in \{1, \dots, n\}$.

The three restrictions on the elements of a similarity matrix have very intuitive interpretations. (a) is consistent with a normalization requiring that complete dissimilarity is assigned a value of zero and full similarity is represented by one. Clearly, this requires that each individual has a similarity value of one when assessing the similarity to itself, as stipulated in (b). Condition (c) requires that if two individuals are fully similar, it is not possible to distinguish between them as far as their similarity to others is concerned. Because i = j is possible in (c), the conjunction of (b) and (c) implies that a similarity matrix is symmetric. Finally, (c) implies that full similarity is transitive in the sense that, if $s_{ij} = s_{ji} = s_{jk} = s_{kj} = 1$, then $s_{ik} = s_{ki} = 1$ for all $i, j, k \in \{1, ..., n\}$. Our characterization result remains valid if restriction (c) is dropped —that is, our index can be characterized on a larger domain where the notion of similarity is not necessarily symmetric, as may be the case if the similarity values are obtained from people's subjective views on the degree to which they differ from others. We state our main result with restriction (c) to emphasize that we do not need non-symmetric similarity matrices and, thus, our characterization is not dependent on an artificially large domain. See the Appendix for details.

Measuring diversity: GELF and ELF

Let S^n be the set of all *n*-dimensional similarity matrices, where $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and $S = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}} S^n$., A diversity measure is a function $D: S \to \mathbb{R}_+$. The specific measure we propose in this paper is what we call the generalized fractionalization (GELF) index G. It is defined as

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij}$$
(1)

for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in S^n$ (or any positive multiple; clearly, multiplying the index value by $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ leaves all diversity comparisons unchanged). *GELF* is the expected dissimilarity between two individuals drawn at random.

As an example, suppose a three-dimensional similarity matrix is given by

$$S = \left(\begin{array}{rrrr} 1 & 1/2 & 1/4 \\ 1/2 & 1 & 0 \\ 1/4 & 0 & 1 \end{array}\right).$$

The corresponding value of G is given by

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{9} \left[1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{2} + 1 + 0 + \frac{1}{4} + 0 + 1 \right] = \frac{1}{2}.$$

It is easy to show that G(S) is indeed a generalization of the commonly-employed ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. The application of ELF is restricted to an environment where the only information available is the vector $p = (p_1, \ldots, p_K) \in \Delta^K$ of population shares for $K \in \mathbb{N}$ predefined groups. No partial similarity values are taken into consideration—individuals are either fully similar or completely dissimilar, that is, s_{ij} can assume the values one and zero only. Letting $\Delta = \bigcup_{K \in \mathbb{N}} \Delta^K$, the ELF index $E: \Delta \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is defined by letting

$$E(p) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_k^2$$

for all $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and for all $p \in \Delta^{K}$. Thus, ELF is one minus the well-known Herfindahl index of concentration.

In our setting, the *ELF* environment can be described by a subset $S_{01} = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}} S_{01}^n$ of our class of similarity matrices where, for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, for all $S \in S_{01}^n$ and for all $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $s_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$. By properties (b) and (c), it follows that, within this subclass of matrices, the population $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ can be partitioned into $K \in \mathbb{N}$ non-empty and disjoint subgroups N_1, \ldots, N_K with the property that, for all $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$,

$$s_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if there exists } k \in \{1, \dots, K\} \text{ such that } i, j \in N_k; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Letting $n_k \in \mathbb{N}$ denote the cardinality of N_k for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$, it follows that $\sum_{k=1}^{K} n_k = n$ and $p_k = n_k/n$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$. For $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and $S \in \mathcal{S}_{01}^n$, we obtain

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} n_k^2 = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_k^2 = E(p).$$

For example, suppose that

$$S = \left(\begin{array}{rrr} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right),$$

that is, we are analyzing a society composed of three individuals. Two of them (individuals 1 and 2) are fully similar: the similarity values s_{12} and s_{21} are equal to one and, furthermore, they have the same degree of similarity —zero— with respect to the remaining member of society (individual 3). Because individual 3 is not completely similar to anyone else, it forms a group on its own. The corresponding value of G is given by

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{9} \left[1 + 1 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 \right] = \frac{4}{9}.$$

Because $S \in S_{01}^3$, we can alternatively calculate this diversity value using *ELF*. We have $K = 2, N_1 = \{1, 2\}, N_2 = \{3\}, p_1 = 2/3 \text{ and } p_2 = 1/3$. Thus,

$$E(p) = 1 - \left[\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^2\right] = \frac{4}{9} = G(S).$$

Partitioning society into groups

Our framework allows us to obtain population subgroups endogenously from similarity matrices even if similarity values can assume values other than zero and one. A plausible method of doing so is the following. Any two individuals i and j belong to the same group if the similarity between i and j is equal to one and, moreover, the similarities of i with respect to all other individuals k are the same as those of j. Using this process, a group partition emerges naturally from the similarity matrix without having to impose it in advance. This method has several advantages: i) it releases the researcher of the choice of the one characteristic that determines fractionalization in the society of interest; ii) it makes it possible to consider simultaneously multiple characteristics; iii) it allows group formation across characteristics; iv) it considers the intensity of similarities between groups.

Formally, we define a partition of $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ into $K \in \mathbb{N}$ non-empty and disjoint subgroups N_1, \ldots, N_K . By properties (b) and (c), these subgroups are such that, for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$, for all $i, j \in N_k$ and for all $h \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $s_{ij} = s_{ji} = 1$ and $s_{ih} = s_{hi} =$ $s_{hj} = s_{jh}$. Thus, for all $k, \ell \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$, we can unambiguously define $\overline{s}_{k\ell} = s_{ij}$ for some $i \in N_k$ and some $j \in N_\ell$. Again using $n_k \in \mathbb{N}$ to denote the cardinality of N_k for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$, it follows that $\sum_{k=1}^{K} n_k = n$ and $p_k = n_k/n$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$. For $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$, we obtain

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} n_k n_\ell \overline{s}_{k\ell} = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{\ell=1}^{K} p_k p_\ell \overline{s}_{k\ell}.$$
 (2)

Clearly, the ELF index E is obtained for the case where all off-diagonal entries of S are equal to zero.

To provide a numerical illustration of this case, let

$$S = \left(\begin{array}{rrrr} 1 & 1 & 1/2 \\ 1 & 1 & 1/2 \\ 1/2 & 1/2 & 1 \end{array}\right),$$

that is, we consider another society of three individuals. Again, two of them (individuals 1 and 2) are fully similar: the similarity values s_{12} and s_{21} are equal to one and, furthermore, they have the same degree of similarity with respect to the remaining member of society (individual 3). This time, however, the similarity between the members of the first group and the remaining individual is equal to 1/2 rather than zero. Individual 3 is not completely similar to anyone, thus is in a group by itself. The corresponding index value is

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{9} \left[1 + 1 + \frac{1}{2} + 1 + 1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + 1 \right] = \frac{2}{9}.$$

According to the method outlined above, we can alternatively partition the population $\{1, 2, 3\}$ into two groups $N_1 = \{1, 2\}$ and $N_2 = \{3\}$. The population shares of these groups are $p_1 = 2/3$ and $p_2 = 1/3$. We obtain the intergroup similarity values $\overline{s}_{11} = \overline{s}_{22} = s_{11} = s_{22} = s_{12} = s_{21} = 1$ and $\overline{s}_{12} = \overline{s}_{21} = s_{i3} = s_{3i} = 1/2$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$ which, using (2), leads to the index value

$$G(S) = 1 - \left[\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^2 + \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \right] = \frac{2}{9}.$$

3 A characterization of *GELF*

We now turn to a characterization of GELF. Our characterization relies on four axioms, which we proceed to illustrate in order. We then state and prove the main theorem containing the formula of our diversity index.

Axiom 1: Normalization

Let I^n denote the $n \times n$ identity matrix and $\mathbf{1}^n$ denote the $n \times n$ matrix all of whose entries are equal to one. Clearly, both of these matrices are in S^n , and they represent extreme cases within this class. I^n can be thought of as having maximal diversity: any two individuals are completely dissimilar and, therefore, each individual is in a group by itself. $\mathbf{1}^n$, on the other hand, represents maximal concentration (and, thus, minimal diversity) because there is but a single group in the population all members of which are fully similar. Our first axiom is a straightforward normalization property. It requires that the value of D at $\mathbf{1}^n$ is equal to zero and the value of D at I^n is positive for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$.

Given that the matrix $\mathbf{1}^n$ is associated with minimal diversity, it is a very plausible restriction to require that D assumes its minimal value for these matrices. Note that this minimal value is the same across population sizes. This is plausible because, no matter what the population size n might be, there is but a single group of perfectly similar individuals and, thus, there is no diversity at all.

In contrast, it would be much less natural to require that the value of D at I^n be identical for all population sizes n. It is quite plausible to argue that having more distinct groups each of which consists of a single individual leads to more diversity than a situation where there are fewer groups containing one individual each. Our first axiom can thus be formalized as follows.

NORMALIZATION. For all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$,

$$D(\mathbf{1}^n) = 0$$
 and $D(I^n) > 0.$

Axiom 2: Anonymity

Our second axiom is very uncontroversial as well. It requires that individuals are treated impartially, paying no attention to their identities. For $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, let Π^n be the set of permutations of $\{1, \ldots, n\}$, that is, the set of bijections $\pi \colon \{1, \ldots, n\} \to \{1, \ldots, n\}$. For $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, $S \in S^n$ and $\pi \in \Pi^n$, S_π is obtained from S by permuting the rows and columns of S according to π . Anonymity requires that D is invariant with respect to permutations.

ANONYMITY. For all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, for all $S \in S^n$ and for all $\pi \in \Pi^n$,

$$D(S_{\pi}) = D(S).$$

Axiom 3: Additivity

Many social index numbers have an additive structure. Additivity entails a separability property: the contribution of any variable to the overall index value can be examined in isolation, without having to know the values of the other variables. Thus, additivity properties are often linked to independence conditions of various forms. The additivity property we use is standard except that we have to respect the restrictions imposed by the definition of S^n . In particular, we cannot simply add two similarity matrices S and Tof dimension n because, according to ordinary matrix addition, all entries on the diagonal of the sum S + T will be equal to two rather than one and, therefore, S + T is not an element of S^n . For that reason, we define the following operation \oplus on the sets S^n by letting, for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S, T \in S^n, S \oplus T = (s_{ij} \oplus t_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1,...,n\}}$ with

$$s_{ij} \oplus t_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i = j; \\ s_{ij} + t_{ij} & \text{if } i \neq j. \end{cases}$$

The standard additivity axiom has to be modified in another respect. Because the diagonal is unchanged when moving from S and T to $S \oplus T$, it would be questionable to require the value of D at $S \oplus T$ to be given by the sum of D(S) and D(T) because, in doing so, we would double-count the diagonal elements in S and in T. Therefore, this sum has to be corrected by the value of D at I^n , and we obtain the following axiom.

ADDITIVITY. For all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S, T \in S^n$ such that $(S \oplus T) \in S^n$,

$$D(S \oplus T) = D(S) + D(T) - D(I^n).$$

Axiom 4: Replication invariance

With the partial exception of the normalization condition (which implies that our diversity measure assumes the same value for the matrix $\mathbf{1}^n$ for all population sizes n), the first three axioms apply to diversity comparisons involving fixed population sizes only. Our last axiom imposes restrictions on comparisons across population sizes. We consider specific replications and require the index to be invariant with respect to these replications. The scope of the axiom is limited to what we consider clear-cut cases and, therefore, represents a rather mild variable-population requirement. In particular, consider the *n*-dimensional identity matrix I^n . As argued before, this matrix represents an extreme degree of diversity: each individual is in a group by itself and shares no similarities with anyone else. Now consider a population of size *nm* where there are *m* copies of each individual $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ such that, within any group of *m* copies, all similarity values are

equal to one and all other similarity values are equal to zero. Thus, this particular replication has the effect that, instead of n groups of size one that do not have any similarity to other groups, now we have n groups each of which consists of m identical individuals and, again, all other similarity values are equal to zero. As before, the population is divided into n homogeneous groups of equal size. Adopting a relative notion of diversity, it would seem natural to require that diversity has not changed as a consequence of this replication. To provide a precise formulation of the resulting axiom, we use the following notation. For $n, m \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, we define the matrix $R_m^n = (r_{ij})_{i,j \in \{1,...,nm\}} \in S^{nm}$ by

$$r_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \exists h \in \{1, \dots, n\} \text{ such that } i, j \in \{(h-1)m+1, \dots, hm\}; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Now we can define our replication invariance axiom.

REPLICATION INVARIANCE. For all $n, m \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$,

$$D(R_m^n) = D(I^n)$$

These four axioms characterize GELF, as we state in the following theorem.

Theorem 1 A diversity measure $D: S \to \mathbb{R}_+$ satisfies normalization, anonymity, additivity and replication invariance if and only if D is a positive multiple of

$$G(S) = 1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij}$$

for all $n \in N \setminus \{1\}$ and all $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$.

Proof. That any positive multiple of G satisfies the axioms is straightforward to verify. Conversely, suppose D is a diversity measure satisfying normalization, anonymity, additivity and replication invariance. Let $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, and define the set $\mathcal{X}^n \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n(n-1)/2}$ by

$$\mathcal{X}^{n} = \{ x = (x_{ij})_{\substack{i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}\\j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}}} \mid \exists S \in \mathcal{S}^{n} \text{ such that } s_{ij} = x_{ij} \text{ for all } i \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$$
and for all $j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}\}.$

Define the function $F^n \colon \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ by letting, for all $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$,

$$F^{n}(x) = D(S) - D(I^{n})$$
(3)

where $S \in S^n$ is such that $s_{ij} = x_{ij}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ and for all $j \in \{i+1, \ldots, n\}$. This function is well-defined because S^n contains symmetric matrices with ones on the main diagonal only. Because D is bounded below by zero, it follows that F^n is bounded below by $-D(I^n)$. Furthermore, the additivity of D implies that F^n satisfies Cauchy's basic functional equation

$$F^{n}(x+y) = F^{n}(x) + F^{n}(y)$$
(4)

for all $x, y \in \mathcal{X}^n$ such that $(x + y) \in \mathcal{X}^n$; see Aczél (1966, Section 2.1). We have to address a slight complexity in solving this equation because the domain \mathcal{X}^n of F^n is not a Cartesian product, which is why we provide a few further details rather than invoking the corresponding standard result immediately.

Fix $i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ and $j \in \{i+1, \ldots, n\}$, and define the function $f_{ij}^n \colon [0, 1] \to \mathbb{R}$ by

$$f_{ij}^n(x_{ij}) = F^n(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)/2-1})$$

for all $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$, where the vector $(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)/2-1})$ is such that the component corresponding to ij is given by x_{ij} and all other entries (if any) are equal to zero. Note that this vector is indeed an element of \mathcal{X}^n and, therefore, f_{ij}^n is well-defined. The function f_{ij}^n is bounded below because F^n is and, as an immediate consequence of (4), it satisfies the Cauchy equation

$$f_{ij}^n(x_{ij} + y_{ij}) = f_{ij}^n(x_{ij}) + f_{ij}^n(y_{ij})$$
(5)

for all $x_{ij}, y_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ such that $(x_{ij} + y_{ij}) \in [0, 1]$. Because the domain of f_{ij}^n is an interval containing the origin and f_{ij}^n is bounded below, the only solutions to (5) are linear functions; see Aczél (1966, Section 2.1). Thus, there exists $c_{ij}^n \in \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$F^{n}(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)/2-1}) = f^{n}_{ij}(x_{ij}) = c^{n}_{ij}x_{ij}$$
(6)

for all $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$.

Let $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$. By additivity, the definition of F^n and (6),

$$F^{n}\left((s_{ij})_{\substack{i\in\{1,\dots,n-1\}\\j\in\{i+1,\dots,n\}}}\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} F^{n}(s_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)/2-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} f^{n}_{ij}(s_{ij}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} c^{n}_{ij}s_{ij}$$

and, defining $d^n = D(I^n)$ and substituting into (3), we obtain

$$D(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} c_{ij}^{n} s_{ij} + d^{n}.$$
(7)

Now fix $i, k \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$, $j \in \{i+1, \ldots, n\}$ and $\ell \in \{k+1, \ldots, n\}$, and let $S \in S^n$ be such that $s_{ij} = s_{ji} = 1$ and all other off-diagonal entries of S are equal to zero. Let

the bijection $\pi \in \Pi^n$ be such that $\pi(i) = k$, $\pi(j) = \ell$, $\pi(k) = i$, $\pi(\ell) = j$ and $\pi(h) = h$ for all $h \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \setminus \{i, j, k, \ell\}$. By (7), we obtain

$$D(S) = c_{ij}^{n} + d^{n}$$
 and $D(S_{\pi}) = c_{k\ell}^{n} + d^{n}$,

and anonymity implies $c_{ij}^n = c_{k\ell}^n$. Therefore, there exists $c^n \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $c_{ij}^n = c^n$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ and for all $j \in \{i+1, \ldots, n\}$, and substituting into (7) yields

$$D(S) = c^{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{n} s_{ij} + d^{n}$$

for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$.

Normalization requires

$$D(\mathbf{1}^{n}) = c^{n} \frac{n(n-1)}{2} + d^{n} = 0$$

and, therefore, $d^n = -c^n n(n-1)/2$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$. Using normalization again, we obtain

$$D(I^n) = -c^n \frac{n(n-1)}{2} > 0$$

which implies $c^n < 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$. Thus,

$$D(S) = c^n \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^n s_{ij} - c^n \frac{n(n-1)}{2}$$
(8)

for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$.

Let n be an even integer greater than or equal to four. By replication invariance and (8),

$$D(R_{n/2}^2) = c^n \frac{n}{2} \left(\frac{n}{2} - 1\right) - c^n \frac{n(n-1)}{2} = -c^2 = D(I^2).$$

Solving, we obtain

$$c^n = 4\frac{c^2}{n^2}.$$
(9)

Now let n be an odd integer greater than or equal to three. Thus, q = 2n is even, and the above argument implies

$$c^q = 4\frac{c^2}{q^2} = \frac{c^2}{n^2}.$$
 (10)

Furthermore, replication invariance requires

$$D(R_2^n) = D(R_2^{q/2}) = c^q \frac{q}{2} - c^q \frac{q(q-1)}{2} = -c^n \frac{n(n-1)}{2} = D(I^n).$$

Solving for c^n and using the equality q = 2n, it follows that $c^n = 4c^q$ and, combined with (10), we obtain (9) for all odd $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ as well.

Substituting into (8), simplifying and defining $\alpha = -2c^2 > 0$, it follows that, for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in S^n$,

$$D(S) = 4\frac{c^2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{\substack{j=i+1 \ j\neq i}}^n s_{ij} - 2\frac{c^2}{n^2}n(n-1)$$

$$= 2\frac{c^2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\substack{j=1 \ j\neq i}}^n s_{ij} - 2c^2 + 2\frac{c^2}{n}$$

$$= -2c^2 \left[1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\substack{j=1 \ j\neq i}}^n s_{ij} - \frac{1}{n}\right]$$

$$= -2c^2 \left[1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\substack{j=1 \ j\neq i}}^n s_{ij}\right]$$

$$= \alpha G(S). \blacksquare$$

4 Alternative and related approaches

In this section we discuss the differences between GELF and related indices proposed in various literatures. We start briefly with the linguistics and statistical literature and compare GELF with Greenberg's (1956) index and with the quadratic entropy index (QE). We then proceed with the economics literature, focusing on the indices of ethnic polarization (RQ) and peripheral diversity (PD).

What is known in the economics literature as ELF is, in the statistical literature, the Gini-Simpson index, introduced first by Gini (1912) and then by Simpson (1949) as a measure of diversity of the multinomial distribution. The same index has been proposed by the linguist Greenberg (1956) termed as the 'A index'. In his 1956 article, Greenberg suggested a way to measure the degree of resemblance among K languages. Indicating by $r_{kl} \geq 0$ the resemblance between language k and l, the proposed B index is:

$$B = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} p_k p_l r_{kl}.$$

This is the index used by Fearon (2003) in his empirical contribution on cultural fractionalization. In an independent contribution, Rao (1982) suggested exactly the same generalization of ELF, the quadratic entropy index (QE), in order to take into account different distance values, $d_{kl} \geq 0$, of different pairs of categories, k and l. As opposed to Greenberg (1956), Rao (1984) and Rao and Nayak (1985) provide various axiomatizations of the measure. QE is an index that, rewritten in the settings of our paper, considers distances other than zero-one between individuals belonging to different groups, that is

$$QE = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} p_k p_l d_{kl}.$$

Recall the definition of \overline{s}_{kl} in Section 2 and the formula for GELF (2). Letting $d_{kl} = 1 - \overline{s}_{kl}$, we immediately see that GELF is QE, and hence B, when the population is partitioned ex-ante into groups on the basis of a characteristic.

The inspection of the indices B and QE gives further insights into the relationship between GELF and ELF. As we said above, GELF is the expected dissimilarity between two individuals drawn at random from the population. ELF is the likelihood that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different (exogenous) categories. Rewriting ELF as $E(p) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_k p_k$, we see that ELF can be interpreted as one minus a weighted sum of population shares p_k , where the weights are these shares themselves. GELF, on the other hand, is its natural generalization: it can be written as one minus a weighted sum of the population shares. However, the weight assigned to p_k is now not merely p_k itself but a considerably more refined expression that takes account of the similarities of the group members to the individuals in other groups. In calculating GELF, each individual counts in two capacities. Through its membership in its *own* group, an individual contributes to the population share of the group. In addition, there is a secondary contribution via the similarities to individuals of *other* groups.

It should be noted that, when the distance values are differences in income, QE is twice the well-known absolute Gini coefficient. The latter, when normalized by mean income, is one among the most popular indices of income inequality.

In economics, the index of ethnic polarization RQ (see Reynal-Querol, 2002, and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) shares a structure similar to that of ELF and of GELF. It is defined by

$$RQ(p) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left(\frac{1/2 - p_k}{1/2}\right)^2 p_k$$

for all $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and for all $p \in \Delta^K$. As is the case for *ELF*, *RQ* employs a weighted sum of population shares. The weights employed in *RQ* capture the deviation of each group

from the maximum polarization share 1/2 as a proportion of 1/2. Analogously to ELF, underlying the formula of RQ is the implicit assumption that any two groups are either completely similar or completely dissimilar and, thus, the weights depend on population shares only.

The index of peripheral diversity PD (see Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber, 2005) is a specification of the original Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index. It is derived from the alienation-identification framework proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994), applied to distances between languages spoken rather than to income distances as in Esteban and Ray (1994). Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber (2005) distinguish between the effective alienation felt by the dominant group and that of the minorities. In particular, expressed in the setting of our paper, the index is defined by

$$PD(p) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left[p_k^{1+\alpha} \left(1 - \overline{s}_{0k} \right) + p_k p_0^{1+\alpha} \left(1 - \overline{s}_{0k} \right) \right]$$

for all $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and for all $p \in \Delta^K$, where $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ is a parameter indicating the importance given to the identification component, 0 is the dominant group and the other K are minority groups. When $\alpha < 0$, PD is an index of peripheral diversity; when $\alpha > 0$, PDis an index of peripheral polarization. The structure of this index is different from that of those previously discussed. As is the case for GELF, it does incorporate a notion of dissimilarity between groups, given by the complement to one of the similarity value. On the other hand, as opposed to the previous indices, the identification component plays a crucial role enhancing (when $\alpha > 0$) or diminishing (when $\alpha < 0$) the alienation produced by distances between groups. An additional difference to the other indices discussed in this section is the distinction between the dominant groups and the minorities.

5 An empirical illustration

In this section we provide an application of GELF to the pattern of diversity in the United States. Our goal is to compare the extent of diversity across states taking into account different dimensions of similarity among individuals, in particular: racial identity, household income, education and employment status.

5.1 Methodology

The data set used is the 5 percent IPUMS from the 1990 Census. We use individual level information on all household heads in the sample and record the following characteristics:

(a) Race. Each individual is attributed to one of five racial groups, that is, (i) White;
(ii) Black; (iii) American Indian, Eskimo or Aleutian; (iv) Asian or Pacific Islander; and
(v) Other.³

- (b) **Income.** Total household income.
- (c) **Education**. The years of education of the individual.

(d) **Employment.** Each individual is attributed to one of four categories, namely, (i) Civilian employed or armed forces, at work; (ii) Civilian employed or armed forces, with a job but not at work; (iii) Unemployed; and (iv) Not in labor force.

Drawing on the above information, we construct GELF in several ways. The first, and more general, is an implementation of formula (1) that takes into account all four dimensions at the same time without imposing an exogenous partition into groups. The second and third approaches rely on an ex ante partition of the population and implement the 'grouped' version of GELF, expression (2).

Similarity of individuals

To implement our index (1), we start from the variables (a) to (d) and apply principal component analysis.⁴ In this way, we extract for each individual *i* a synthetic measure x_i , the first principal component, that we employ to compute pairwise distances among all individuals living in the same state, i.e., $|x_i - x_j|$. To generate similarity values s_{ij} that are bounded between 0 and 1, we normalize this distance by the difference between the maximum and the minimum value of the x_i 's in the entire US sample, and we subtract the resulting value from 1. Once we have the full set of similarity values $\{s_{ij}\}_{i,j\in\{1,...,n\}}$ computation of (1) is straightforward.

Our second set of results is obtained by assuming that individuals can be aggregated into exogenously defined groups —specifically, the five racial groups described under (a) and measuring the similarity among these groups along the remaining dimensions. The choice of race as the exogenously given category is purely instrumental to comparing our results to the widely used ELF index that relies exclusively on racial shares Obviously, depending on the specific application, the grouping could be done on the cleavage that is

³The last category includes any other race except the four mentioned. The 1990 Census does not identify Hispanic as a separate racial category. However, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), who construct ELF from the same five categories, report that the category Hispanic (obtained from a different source) has a correlation of more than 0.9 with the category Other in the Census data.

⁴We have experimented with the standard principal component method as well as with an application that employs polychoric correlation matrix to take into account the fact that some of our variables are categorical. The estimates reported below rely on the latter method; results obtained using the standard method are available from the authors.

most relevant for the phenomenon under study. The idea underlying this second set of results is to propose a way to compute *GELF* that is less data intensive and to see whether the qualitative pattern of results differs from that obtained using the full similarity matrix. This second set of results, in turn, is obtained under two alternative methods. The first requires the availability of the entire distribution of individual characteristics, and can be used when individual survey data is available. The second relies only on aggregate data on *mean* characteristics by group. In what follows we briefly describe the two methods.

Similarity of distributions

Once the population is exogenously partitioned into racial groups, we can assess the 'distance' among these groups by comparing the distributions of individual characteristics such as income, education, employment. Consider for example income. We first estimate non-parametrically the distributions of household income by race of the head of the household, $\hat{f}^i(y)$. The estimation method applied in the paper is derived from a generalization of the kernel density estimator to take into account the sample weights attached to each observation in each group, namely, from the *adaptive* or *variable* kernel. After estimating the densities of household income by race, we measure the overlap among them, implying that two racial groups whose income distributions perfectly overlap are considered perfectly similar. The measure of overlap of distributions applied is the Kolmogorov measure of variation distance:

$$Kov_{ij} = \frac{1}{2} \int \left| \widehat{f^i}(y) - \widehat{f^j}(y) \right| dy.$$

 Kov_{ij} is a measure of the lack of overlap between groups *i* and *j*. It ranges between 0 and 1, taking value zero if $\hat{f}^i(y) = \hat{f}^j(y)$ for all $y \in \mathbb{R}$ and one if $\hat{f}^i(y)$ and $\hat{f}^j(y)$ do not overlap at all.⁵ The resulting measure of similarity between any two groups *i* and *j*, that we employ to implement formula (2) for grouped *GELF*, is

$$\overline{s}_{ij} = 1 - Kov_{ij}.$$

This method is also applied on the distribution of the synthetic measure x_i obtained for each individual in each group by principal component analysis. In this case we estimate $\hat{f}^i(x)$, the distribution of the synthetic measure by race, compute the Kolmogorov measure of variation distance and the measure of similarity as described above.

⁵The distance is sensitive to changes in the distributions only when both take positive values, being insensitive to changes whenever one of them is zero. It will not change if the distributions move apart, provided that there is no overlap between them or that the overlapping part remains unchanged.

Similarity of means

As an alternative to the distance among distributions, we compute a crude measure of similarity based on the *expected value* of the distribution of the characteristic analyzed. This is to illustrate the performance of *GELF* in case of grouped data or poor availability of information in the data set.

We can measure similarity with respect to continuous or to categorical variables. For continuous variables, such as household income or education, we indicate by λ^i the sample mean of the distribution for group *i*, by λ_{Max} the maximum mean value among all groups in all states, and by λ_{Min} the minimum. Then we can compute s_{ij} for each state as

$$\overline{s}_{ij} = 1 - \left| \frac{\lambda^i - \lambda^j}{\lambda_{Max} - \lambda_{Min}} \right|. \tag{11}$$

Note that expression (11) is bounded between zero and one by construction.

For categorical variables like employment, we create a dummy variable that assumes the value one if the household head is employed, and zero if he is unemployed or not in the labor force.⁶ Indicating by δ^i the sample means of this variable for group *i* (i.e., the share of the population assuming value one), similarity between any two groups *i* and *j* is

$$s_{ij} = 1 - \left|\delta^i - \delta^j\right|$$

Again, sample weights are used in the computations for these variables.

5.2 Results

We discuss our results starting with computations based on the *GELF* formula (1), which relies on the original similarity matrix without pre-assigning individuals to groups. We refer to this index as '*GELF*' with no further specifications. We then turn to approaches that pre-assign individuals to racial groups. In this case the distance among groups is computed on the basis of characteristics other than race (e.g., income) and we refer to the indices as '*GroupedGELF* income', etc.

[Insert Figure 1]

The main result of our empirical analysis is summarized in figure 1. On the horizontal axis we plot values of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) for all states in the US

⁶We have also experimented with a different definition where one corresponds to households whose head is employed or not in the labor force, and zero to unemployed. The results were not significantly affected and are available from the authors.

in 1990. The vertical axis reports the corresponding value of GELF. While the two are positively correlated, their relationship is far from linear: the correlation coefficient is only .59. In particular, states like Hawaii, California and Nevada are much more heterogeneous if one only looks at racial shares than if all dimensions are considered jointly. This is because in these states the distribution of income, education and employment is relatively more similar among races than in other states. At the opposite end we have states like Alaska, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and in general New England, where diversity measured in terms of racial shares is relatively low, but different races differ in the distribution of the remaining characteristics to such an extent that they are actually 'more diverse' when the full similarity GELF is employed.

[Insert Table 1]

Table 1 provides the counterpart to the graphical analysis, as it reports the full set of states listed in decreasing order of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the corresponding values of ELF, GELF and the difference in ranks between ELF and GELF for each state. We prefer to rely on a comparison of ranks because the absolute values of the two indices are not comparable. In particular, in the last column of table 1 we report the difference ELFrank - GELFrank, so that negative values indicate that a given state is less fractionalized according to GELF than according to ELF, while positive values indicate the opposite. The magnitude of the difference gives a rough approximation of how big a difference it makes for a particular state to use one index over the other, in terms of relative rankings.

We next turn to an investigation of what happens when race is isolated to define relevant subgroups and distance is computed on the remaining components. In particular, we implement formula (2) with the slight modification that individuals are *exogenously* grouped into five categories—in this case racial groups—and distances among groups are measured as the difference in a synthetic measure of income, education and employment.⁷ The results are displayed in table 2.

[Insert Table 2]

States in table 2 are listed in decreasing order of GELF, and two additional indices (with the corresponding ranks) are reported. The first index, which we denote

⁷As before, this synthetic index is the first principal component extracted from our income, education and employment variables, where we use a polychoric correlation matrix to take into account the fact that employment is a categorical variable.

as $GroupedGELF_d$, employs the Kolmogorov distance among distributions of the synthetic index to compute similarity values that are the used in formula (2). The second index, denoted as GroupedGELF, is simpler in that only the *average* value of the synthetic index for each racial group is used when computing distances (differences). While the use of means or of the entire distribution yield very similar results, the comparison with *GELF* suggests that for some states the exogenous definition of racial categories does make a difference: these are the same states for which the difference between ELFand GELF in figure 1 was more pronounced. In this sense, and not surprisingly, the GroupedGELF index calculated according to (2) is more similar to ELF than the GELFindex (1) calculated on the full similarity matrix.

[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2]

Finally, in table 3 we try to disentangle the contribution of each individual dimension to overall diversity by implementing a version of (2) where distance among racial groups is measured solely in terms of differences in average income (*GroupedGELF income*), differences in average years of education (*GroupedGELF* edu), or difference in the share of people employed (GroupedGELF_empl). For each index, we report the value and the rank, and states are still listed in decreasing order of the full similarity *GELF*. The results are quite informative and are more easily visualized through figure 2. Panel A of the figure plots the original values of *ELF* on the horizontal axis against *GroupedGELF* income on the vertical one. The two measures are closely correlated with two extreme outliers: Hawaii is much less fractionalized when we use *GroupedGELF* income than when we use ELF, while the opposite occurs for the District of Columbia. The intuition is similar to that provided when commenting on figure 1, i.e., in states like Hawaii or California average income levels are relatively more similar among races than they are in DC or in Connecticut, for example. A similar picture is offered in Panel B with respect to years of education. Interestingly, however, when we look at employment levels (Panel C) the relationship between the two indices becomes hump-shaped. The maximum value of diversity according to *GroupedGELF* empl corresponds to *intermediate* levels of ethnic fractionalization; on the other hand, very low or very high levels of *ELF* translate into middle range values of diversity when both race and similarity in employment status are taken into account. A possible interpretation of this result is that sizeable differences in employment status (e.g., high unemployment levels for minorities) may be politically difficult to sustain in states where a relatively high fraction of the population is non-white. On the other hand, the same does not hold for income, as if income differences were more

easily acceptable compared to the universal right of access to employment.

While only suggestive and illustrative, the above analysis highlights some of the potential benefits that may derive from the use of fractionalization indices that do not simply rely on population shares, but also try to incorporate information on other dimensions along which individuals may differ.

6 Concluding remarks

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation and an empirical illustration of a new measure of ethnic diversity. Unlike the most commonly used ELF index, our generalized version GELF makes use of a broader informational base. Instead of limiting the relevant variables to the population shares of predefined groups, we start out with a notion of similarity among individuals and calculate our index value accordingly. It is possible to derive a partition into groups endogenously, and the standard ELF index emerges as a special case when no partial similarity is allowed. The results of our empirical application suggest that accounting for the extent of similarity among individuals in observable dimensions other than race may indeed alter the picture of 'ethnic diversity' in the United States. In places like New England or Washington DC racial fractionalization is magnified when similarity in income, education or employment is taken into account; in places like California the opposite occurs.

Before concluding, we would like to stress an important methodological point. While in this paper we characterize GELF on the basis of similarities among individuals, our approach is silent on how these similarities should be defined. In particular, our approach is fully compatible with a setting in which the notion of continuous distance does not apply (i.e., individuals are either fully similar or fully dissimilar, in which case our primitives s_{ij} will take values 0 or 1), as well as with a setting in which it is meaningful to think of similarity among individuals in a continuous way. In addition, our index allows to incorporate a multidimensional concept of similarity, as opposed to a single dimension. We view this flexibility as an advantage of our approach, and one that makes our index applicable in many different settings. Our choice in the empirical illustration was guided by the attempt to compare our results with well known patterns in the economics literature on ethnic fractionalization in the US. We chose as dimensions of similarity ethnicity, household income, education and employment status since we believe that these are important aspects of the US economy that could influence the behavior of individuals. However, the choice of variables to be employed in the measurement of similarity could include very different aspects and should be guided by the specific application that one has in mind.

Finally, the application of our index is not limited to studies involving ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The generalized index that we propose may be applied to various areas in economics, including for example industrial organization. *GELF* is an index of diversity, and the difference between one and the index value can be interpreted as an index of concentration. Embedding information on similarity among firms in a concentration index may yield different results than the traditional Herfindahl index, which is purely based on market shares.

Appendix

In this appendix, we illustrate that our characterization result is unchanged if the set of similarity matrices S^n consists of all $n \times n$ matrices S satisfying conditions (a) and (b) of section 2, but not necessarily (c). This is achieved by some straightforward modifications of the definition used in the proof of Theorem 1.

That any positive multiple of G satisfies the axioms on the larger domain as well is, again, straightforward to verify. Conversely, suppose D is a diversity measure defined on the larger domain satisfying normalization, anonymity, additivity and replication invariance. Let $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$, and define the set $\mathcal{X}^n \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n(n-1)/2}$ by

$$\mathcal{X}^n = \{ x = (x_{ij})_{\substack{i \in \{1,\dots,n\}\\j \in \{1,\dots,n\} \setminus \{i\}}} \mid \exists S \in \mathcal{S}^n \text{ such that } s_{ij} = x_{ij} \text{ for all } i \in \{1,\dots,n\} \\ \text{ and for all } j \in \{1,\dots,n\} \setminus \{i\} \}.$$

Define the function $F^n \colon \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ by letting, for all $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$,

$$F^{n}(x) = D(S) - D(I^{n})$$
 (12)

where $S \in S^n$ is such that $s_{ij} = x_{ij}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \setminus \{i\}$. Because D is bounded below by zero, it follows that F^n is bounded below by $-D(I^n)$. Furthermore, the additivity of D implies that F^n satisfies Cauchy's basic functional equation

$$F^{n}(x+y) = F^{n}(x) + F^{n}(y)$$
(13)

for all $x, y \in \mathcal{X}^n$ such that $(x+y) \in \mathcal{X}^n$; see Aczél (1966, Section 2.1).

Fix $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \setminus \{i\}$, and define the function $f_{ij}^n \colon [0, 1] \to \mathbb{R}$ by

$$f_{ij}^n(x_{ij}) = F^n(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)-1})$$

for all $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$, where the vector $(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)-1})$ is such that the component corresponding to ij is given by x_{ij} and all other entries (if any) are equal to zero. The function f_{ij}^n is bounded below because F^n is and, as an immediate consequence of (13), it satisfies the Cauchy equation

$$f_{ij}^n(x_{ij} + y_{ij}) = f_{ij}^n(x_{ij}) + f_{ij}^n(y_{ij})$$
(14)

for all $x_{ij}, y_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ such that $(x_{ij} + y_{ij}) \in [0, 1]$. Because the domain of f_{ij}^n is an interval containing the origin and f_{ij}^n is bounded below, the only solutions to (14) are linear functions; see Aczél (1966, Section 2.1). Thus, there exists $c_{ij}^n \in \mathbb{R}$ such that

$$F^{n}(x_{ij}; \mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)-1}) = f^{n}_{ij}(x_{ij}) = c^{n}_{ij}x_{ij}$$
(15)

for all $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$.

Let $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$. By additivity, the definition of F^n and (15),

$$F^{n}\left(\left(s_{ij}\right)_{\substack{i\in\{1,\dots,n\}\\j\in\{1,\dots,n\}\setminus\{i\}}}\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^{n}F^{n}(s_{ij};\mathbf{0}^{n(n-1)-1}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^{n}f^{n}_{ij}(s_{ij}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^{n}c^{n}_{ij}s_{ij}$$

and, defining $d^n = D(I^n)$ and substituting into (12), we obtain

$$D(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^{n} c_{ij}^{n} s_{ij} + d^{n}.$$
 (16)

Now fix $i, k \in \{1, ..., n\}, j \in \{1, ..., n\} \setminus \{i\}$ and $\ell \in \{1, ..., n\} \setminus \{k\}$, and let $S \in S^n$ be such that $s_{ij} = 1$ and all other off-diagonal entries of S are equal to zero. Let the bijection $\pi \in \Pi^n$ be such that $\pi(i) = k, \pi(j) = \ell, \pi(k) = i, \pi(\ell) = j$ and $\pi(h) = h$ for all $h \in \{1, ..., n\} \setminus \{i, j, k, \ell\}$. By (16), we obtain

$$D(S) = c_{ij}^n + d^n \quad \text{and} \quad D(S_\pi) = c_{k\ell}^n + d^n,$$

and anonymity implies $c_{ij}^n = c_{k\ell}^n$. Therefore, there exists $c^n \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $c_{ij}^n = c^n$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\} \setminus \{i\}$, and substituting into (16) yields

$$D(S) = c^n \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^n s_{ij} + d^n$$

for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$.

Normalization requires

$$D(\mathbf{1}^{n}) = c^{n}n(n-1) + d^{n} = 0$$

and, therefore, $d^n = -c^n n(n-1)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$. Using normalization again, we obtain

$$D(I^n) = -c^n n(n-1) > 0$$

which implies $c^n < 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$. Thus,

$$D(S) = c^n \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\substack{j=1\\j \neq i}}^n s_{ij} - c^n n(n-1)$$
(17)

for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in \mathcal{S}^n$.

Let n be an even integer greater than or equal to four. By replication invariance and (17),

$$D(R_{n/2}^2) = c^n n\left(\frac{n}{2} - 1\right) - c^n n(n-1) = -c^2 = D(I^2).$$

Solving, we obtain

$$c^{n} = 2\frac{c^{2}}{n^{2}}.$$
 (18)

Now let n be an odd integer greater than or equal to three. Thus, q = 2n is even, and the above argument implies

$$c^q = 2\frac{c^2}{q^2} = \frac{c^2}{2n^2}.$$
(19)

Furthermore, replication invariance requires

$$D(R_2^n) = D(R_2^{q/2}) = c^q q - c^q q(q-1) = -c^n n(n-1) = D(I^n).$$

Solving for c^n and using the equality q = 2n, it follows that $c^n = 4c^q$ and, combined with (19), we obtain (18) for all odd $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ as well.

Substituting into (17), simplifying and defining $\alpha = -2c^2 > 0$, it follows that, for all $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{1\}$ and for all $S \in S^n$,

$$D(S) = 2\frac{c^2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{\substack{j=1\\j\neq i}}^n s_{ij} - c^n n(n-1)$$

= $2\frac{c^2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n s_{ij} - 2\frac{c^2}{n^2}n - 2\frac{c^2}{n^2}n(n-1)$
= $-2c^2 \left[1 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n s_{ij}\right]$
= $\alpha G(S). \blacksquare$

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Figure 1: *GELF* and *ELF* in the US.







Figure 2: GroupedGELF (income, education, employment) and ELF in the US.











01-1-					Difference	
State	ELF	ELF rank	GELF	GELF rank	(ELF rank-GELF ran	
HI	0.5245	1	0.0668	42	-41	
DC	0.5032	2	0.0767	1	1	
MS	0.4344	3	0.0737	3	0	
LA	0.4165	4	0.0731	4	0	
CA	0.4042	5	0.0681	30	-25	
MD	0.3975	6	0.0709	12	-6	
SC	0.3940	7	0.0722	6	1	
GA	0.3885	8	0.0716	9	-1	
NY	0.3644	9	0.0690	23	-14	
AL	0.3577	10	0.0717	7	3	
ΤX	0.3534	11	0.0697	21	-10	
NC	0.3425	12	0.0703	15	-3	
NM	0.3332	13	0.0698	19	-6	
VA	0.3259	14	0.0717	8	6	
AK	0.3225	15	0.0738	2	13	
IL	0.3069	16	0.0688	24	-8	
NJ	0.3005	17	0.0703	14	3	
DE	0.2904	18	0.0697	20	-2	
OK	0.2640	19	0.0696	22	-3	
MI	0.2591	20	0.0686	26	-6	
TN	0.2566	21	0.0701	16	5	
AR	0.2546	22	0.0688	25	-3	
AZ	0.2540	22		34	-5 -11	
			0.0679			
FL	0.2324	24	0.0677	35	-11	
NV	0.2248	25	0.0639	51	-26	
ОН	0.2037	26	0.0686	27	-1	
CT	0.1967	27	0.0700	17	10	
МО	0.1958	28	0.0698	18	10	
PA	0.1821	29	0.0683	29	0	
CO	0.1815	30	0.0680	33	-3	
WA	0.1637	31	0.0684	28	3	
IN	0.1574	32	0.0669	41	-9	
MA	0.1535	33	0.0710	11	22	
KS	0.1501	34	0.0669	40	-6	
KY	0.1354	35	0.0728	5	30	
RI	0.1290	36	0.0712	10	26	
WI	0.1145	37	0.0671	39	-2	
OR	0.1054	38	0.0673	38	0	
UT	0.1033	39	0.0664	45	-6	
MT	0.1027	40	0.0665	44	-4	
SD	0.1015	41	0.0660	47	-6	
NE	0.0980	42	0.0659	49	-7	
WY	0.0856	43	0.0661	46	-3	
ID	0.0797	44	0.0657	50	-6	
MN	0.0788	45	0.0681	32	13	
ND	0.0718	46	0.0659	48	-2	
WV	0.0674	47	0.0708	13	34	
IA	0.0503	48	0.0666	43	5	
NH	0.0303	40 49	0.0675	37	12	
VT	0.0321	49 50	0.0677	36	12	
ME	0.0240	50 51	0.0681	30	20	

Table 1: *GELF* and *ELF* in the US.

State	GELF	GELF rank	GroupedGELF_d	GroupedGELF_d rank	GroupedGELF	GroupedGELF rank
HI	0.0668	42	0.0917	6	0.0588	13
DC	0.0767	1	0.2306	1	0.1864	1
MS	0.0737	3	0.1161	2	0.1061	2
LA	0.0731	4	0.1070	3	0.0951	3
CA	0.0681	30	0.0793	9	0.0586	14
MD	0.0709	12	0.0675	14	0.0564	16
SC	0.0722	6	0.0974	4	0.0879	4
GA	0.0716	9	0.0850	7	0.0758	6
NY	0.0690	23	0.0701	12	0.0617	10
AL	0.0717	7	0.0810	8	0.0727	7
ΤX	0.0697	21	0.0783	10	0.0646	8
NC	0.0703	15	0.0701	13	0.0613	12
NM	0.0698	19	0.0656	17	0.0614	11
VA	0.0717	8	0.0752	11	0.0637	9
AK	0.0738	2	0.0966	5	0.0875	5
IL	0.0688	24	0.0664	15	0.0576	15
NJ	0.0703	14	0.0661	16	0.0541	18
DE	0.0697	20	0.0545	19	0.0510	20
ОК	0.0696	22	0.0365	26	0.0303	26
MI	0.0686	26	0.0558	18	0.0516	19
TN	0.0701	16	0.0432	24	0.0356	25
AR	0.0688	25	0.0543	20	0.0475	21
AZ	0.0679	34	0.0440	23	0.0558	17
FL	0.0677	35	0.0448	22	0.0388	23
NV	0.0639	51	0.0363	27	0.0285	29
OH	0.0686	27	0.0392	25	0.0364	24
СТ	0.0700	17	0.0481	21	0.0407	22
МО	0.0698	18	0.0291	31	0.0252	31
PA	0.0683	29	0.0324	29	0.0294	27
СО	0.0680	33	0.0348	28	0.0293	28
WA	0.0684	28	0.0257	35	0.0184	37
IN	0.0669	41	0.0284	32	0.0241	32
MA	0.0710	11	0.0310	30	0.0256	30
KS	0.0669	40	0.0261	34	0.0216	33
KY	0.0728	5	0.0202	41	0.0146	42
RI	0.0712	10	0.0247	36	0.0197	36
WI	0.0671	39	0.0272	33	0.0213	34
OR	0.0673	38	0.0168	44	0.0125	45
UT	0.0664	45	0.0222	39	0.0180	39
MT	0.0665	44	0.0222	38	0.0184	38
SD	0.0660	47	0.0243	37	0.0201	35
NE	0.0659	49	0.0182	43	0.0148	41
WY	0.0661	46	0.0189	42	0.0157	40
ID	0.0657	50	0.0214	40	0.0145	43
MN	0.0681	32	0.0157	46	0.0114	46
ND	0.0659	48	0.0164	45	0.0128	44
WV	0.0708	13	0.0123	47	0.0097	47
IA	0.0666	43	0.0085	48	0.0058	48
NH	0.0675	37	0.0052	49	0.0040	49
VT	0.0677	36	0.0044	50	0.0020	51
ME	0.0681	31	0.0043	51	0.0030	50

Table 2: GELF and GroupedGelf (Kolmogorov and Average) in the US.

DC 1 0.2436 1 0.1426 AK 2 0.0936 10 0.0825 8 0.2261 MS 3 0.1181 2 0.1048 2 0.1748 LA 4 0.1181 3 0.0836 6 0.1960 KY 5 0.0249 36 0.0063 46 0.1943 AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 15 0.132 MD 12 0.10285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.04285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 14 0.0328 4 0.0339 49 0.0631 NU 14 0.0935 11 0.0568 15 0.2140 NC 15	State	GELF rank	GroupedGELF_income	rank	GroupedGELF_edu	rank	GroupedGELF_em	npl rank
MS 3 0.1181 2 0.1048 2 0.1748 LA 4 0.1181 3 0.0836 6 0.1960 KY 5 0.0249 36 0.0063 46 0.1199 SC 6 0.1054 5 0.0905 4 0.1943 AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.039 49 0.0631 NL 14 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2041	DC	1	0.2880	1	0.2436	1	0.1426	29
MS 3 0.1181 2 0.1048 2 0.1748 LA 4 0.1181 3 0.0836 6 0.1960 KY 5 0.0249 36 0.0063 46 0.1199 SC 6 0.1054 5 0.0905 4 0.1943 AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.039 49 0.0631 NL 14 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2041	AK	2	0.0936	10	0.0825	8	0.2261	5
KY 5 0.0249 36 0.0063 46 0.1169 SC 6 0.1054 5 0.0905 4 0.1943 AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0566 18 0.2061 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0575 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.1744 37 0.1575	MS		0.1181	2	0.1048		0.1748	23
SC 6 0.1054 5 0.0905 4 0.1943 AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0675 12 0.2101 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0285 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NU 14 0.0936 11 0.0556 18 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2001 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575	LA			3	0.0836	6	0.1960	16
AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NL 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300			0.0249	36	0.0063	46	0.1169	34
AL 7 0.0937 9 0.0618 14 0.2023 VA 8 0.0938 8 0.0675 12 0.2100 GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300	SC		0.1054	5	0.0905			17
GA 9 0.1161 4 0.0690 11 0.2021 RI 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0566 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0330 7 0.2346 0.0213 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 <				9		14		11
R/ 10 0.0285 33 0.0190 35 0.1151 MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0627 13 0.0668 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0235 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 23 0.0171 13 0.2349 <	VA	8	0.0938	8	0.0675	12	0.2100	9
MA 11 0.0401 25 0.0259 26 0.1332 MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0681 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NU 14 0.0936 11 0.0568 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0668 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.6625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 <	GA	9	0.1161	4	0.0690	11	0.2021	12
MD 12 0.1028 6 0.0581 16 0.2117 WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0733 19 0.2004 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 <	RI	10	0.0285	33	0.0190	35	0.1151	36
WV 13 0.0135 44 0.0039 49 0.0631 NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0586 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 <	MA	11	0.0401	25	0.0259	26	0.1332	32
NJ 14 0.0936 11 0.0596 15 0.2140 NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 <	MD	12	0.1028	6	0.0581	16	0.2117	8
NC 15 0.0827 13 0.0568 18 0.2081 TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2166 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 MI 26 0.0629 18 0.0356 23 0.1917 </td <td>WV</td> <td>13</td> <td>0.0135</td> <td>44</td> <td>0.0039</td> <td>49</td> <td>0.0631</td> <td>47</td>	WV	13	0.0135	44	0.0039	49	0.0631	47
TN 16 0.0555 22 0.0236 29 0.1845 CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 MI 26 0.0629 18 0.0257 27 0.1617 WA 28 0.0230 37 0.0209 34 0.1411 <	NJ	14	0.0936	11	0.0596	15	0.2140	7
CT 17 0.0709 17 0.0435 21 0.1615 MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 7X 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.05676 17 0.2156 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 MI 26 0.629 18 0.0356 23 0.1917 OH 27 0.0475 24 0.0257 27 0.1617 WA 28 0.0230 37 0.0229 30 0.1499 <	NC	15	0.0827	13	0.0568	18	0.2081	10
MO 18 0.0353 30 0.0174 37 0.1575 NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2044 7X 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 MI 26 0.0629 18 0.0356 23 0.1917 OH 27 0.0475 24 0.0257 27 0.1617 WA 28 0.0230 37 0.0229 30 0.1419 CA 30 0.0779 14 0.0851 5 0.2522 </td <td>ΤN</td> <td>16</td> <td>0.0555</td> <td>22</td> <td>0.0236</td> <td>29</td> <td>0.1845</td> <td>20</td>	ΤN	16	0.0555	22	0.0236	29	0.1845	20
NM 19 0.0625 19 0.0751 9 0.2300 DE 20 0.0735 16 0.0533 19 0.2004 TX 21 0.0840 12 0.0830 7 0.2346 OK 22 0.0396 26 0.0254 28 0.2013 NY 23 0.0967 7 0.0674 13 0.2349 IL 24 0.0778 15 0.0576 17 0.2156 AR 25 0.0564 20 0.0389 22 0.1849 MI 26 0.0629 18 0.0356 23 0.1917 OH 27 0.0475 24 0.0257 27 0.1617 WA 28 0.0230 37 0.0209 34 0.1411 PA 29 0.0396 27 0.0229 30 0.1499 CA 30 0.0779 14 0.0851 5 0.2522 </td <td>СТ</td> <td>17</td> <td>0.0709</td> <td>17</td> <td>0.0435</td> <td>21</td> <td>0.1615</td> <td>25</td>	СТ	17	0.0709	17	0.0435	21	0.1615	25
DE200.0735160.0533190.2004TX210.0840120.083070.2346OK220.0396260.0254280.2013NY230.096770.0674130.2349IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.20933	МО	18	0.0353	30	0.0174	37	0.1575	26
TX210.0840120.083070.2346OK220.0396260.0254280.2013NY230.096770.0674130.2349IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	NM	19	0.0625	19	0.0751	9		4
OK220.0396260.0254280.2013NY230.096770.0674130.2349IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0257270.1617OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0667450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	DE	20	0.0735	16	0.0533	19	0.2004	14
NY230.096770.0674130.2349IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304				12				3
NY230.096770.0674130.2349IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	OK	22		26		28		13
IL240.0778150.0576170.2156AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	NY				0.0674			2
AR250.0564200.0389220.1849MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304				15				6
MI260.0629180.0356230.1917OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0031500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304								19
OH270.0475240.0257270.1617WA280.0230370.0209340.1411PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304								18
PA290.0396270.0229300.1499CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	ОН		0.0475	24	0.0257		0.1617	24
CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0265340.0209330.1304								30
CA300.0779140.085150.2522ME310.0028510.0025510.0233MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0265340.0209330.1304	PA	29	0.0396	27	0.0229	30	0.1499	28
MN320.0169400.0067450.0737CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	CA	30	0.0779	14	0.0851	5	0.2522	1
CO330.0361290.0330250.1531AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	ME	31	0.0028	51	0.0025	51	0.0233	51
AZ340.0556210.0733100.1965FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	MN	32	0.0169	40	0.0067	45	0.0737	45
FL350.0552230.0480200.1790VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	СО	33	0.0361	29	0.0330	25	0.1531	27
VT360.0031500.0034500.0235NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	AZ	34	0.0556	21	0.0733	10	0.1965	15
NH370.0047490.0051480.0313OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	FL	35	0.0552	23	0.0480	20	0.1790	22
OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	VT	36	0.0031	50	0.0034	50	0.0235	50
OR380.0129460.0156390.0963WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	NH	37	0.0047	49	0.0051	48		49
WI390.0264350.0153400.1033KS400.0265340.0209330.1304	OR	38	0.0129		0.0156		0.0963	38
KS 40 0.0265 34 0.0209 33 0.1304			0.0264				0.1033	37
	KS	40	0.0265		0.0209			33
	IN	41	0.0304	32	0.0178	36	0.1337	31
HI 42 0.0325 31 0.0940 3 0.1166		42	0.0325		0.0940		0.1166	35
<i>IA</i> 43 0.0054 48 0.0056 47 0.0482								48
MT 44 0.0175 39 0.0131 41 0.0935								40
UT 45 0.0168 41 0.0211 32 0.0945								39
WY 46 0.0150 43 0.0171 38 0.0796								43
SD 47 0.0188 38 0.0084 43 0.0922								41
ND 48 0.0131 45 0.0073 44 0.0674								46
NE 49 0.0162 42 0.0119 42 0.0899								42
<i>ID</i> 50 0.0117 47 0.0224 31 0.0745								44
	NV	51	0.0394	28	0.0330	24	0.1811	21

Table 3: GELF and GroupedGelf (income, education, employment) in the US.