The Politics of Burden-Sharing
Three Essays on NATO, Canada, and Fair-Share

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Résumé

La présente thèse analyse les premiers débats liés au partage de fardeau au sein de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) durant ses années formatives. En privilégiant une approche qualitative, la thèse vise à démontrer que la racine normative du problème du partage de fardeau otanien est d’ordre politique. À l’inverse des approches systémiques, rationalistes et hypothético-déductives dominantes dans le domaine, cette thèse adresse les dimensions politique, éthique et pratique du partage de fardeau au niveau des élites nationales. Cette étude conceptuelle axée sur la méthode et orientée vers les politiques entreprend comme stratégie de recherche une interprétation qualitative dont le fondement est à la fois politique, normatif et historique. L’analyse contextuelle exhaustive des matériaux d’archives reconstruit la manière dont les acteurs ont eux-mêmes compris et cadré le problème du partage de fardeau au sein de l’OTAN dans leurs discours à la fois publics et privés. Aussi, cette étude mobilise les usages de l’éthique normative en tant qu’outils analytiques afin de saisir les différentes stratégies de contributions nationales, et d’interpréter le problème du partage de fardeau à l’aune du concept de justice distributive. The Politics of Burden-Sharing consiste en trois différents articles reliés entre eux par le thème du partage de fardeau dans l’OTAN. Alors qu’elle se concentre sur le rôle des élites politiques, bureaucratiques et militaires sous le gouvernement de St-Laurent (1948-1957) au Canada, la thèse relie ce débat à la situation suivant le sommet de l’OTAN de 2014 afin d’enrichir les récentes polémiques d’équité au sein de l’Alliance.

Mots-clés : Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique-Nord; partage de fardeau; méthodologie qualitative-interprétative; éthique normative; justice distributive; Canada; Guerre froide
Abstract

This dissertation analyses the original burden-sharing debates in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during its formative years. In calling for a qualitative approach to studying NATO burden-sharing, this dissertation demonstrates that the NATO burden-sharing problem was normatively rooted in politics. In contrast to the dominant systemic, rationalist, and hypothetical-deductive studies, this dissertation explores the political, ethical, and practical dimension of burden-sharing at the level of national leaders. This conceptual, method-driven, and policy-oriented dissertation uses interpretation as its research strategy and develops a qualitative approach with a political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry. The in-depth and context-sensitive analysis of archival materials reconstructs how the practitioners themselves made sense of, and discursively framed, the NATO burden-sharing problem in both their public and private discourse. Furthermore, this doctoral research employs the traditions of normative ethics as analytical tools to better grasp national contribution strategies and to interpret the burden-sharing problem through the lenses of distributive justice. *The Politics of Burden-Sharing* consists of three separate articles connected through the common theme of NATO burden-sharing. While focusing primarily on the Canadian political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders under the St. Laurent Premiership (1948-1957), the dissertation links these traditional burden-sharing debates with the contemporary post-2014 NATO discussions to draw some lessons learned for a fairer burden-sharing within the Alliance.

Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization; burden-sharing; interpretive-qualitative methodology; normative ethics; distributive justice; Canada; Cold War
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<td>ATOP</td>
<td>Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Air Training Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common/European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
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<td>DCER</td>
<td>Documents on Canadian External Relations</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
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<td>DEW</td>
<td>Distant Early Warning</td>
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<td>DFEC</td>
<td>Defence Financial and Economic Committee</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FEB</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Board</td>
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<td>FNC</td>
<td>Framework Nations’ Concept</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada</td>
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<td>LSL</td>
<td>Louis St-Laurent Fonds</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Mutual Aid Programme</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NAT</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPP</td>
<td>NATO Defence Planning Process</td>
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<td>NSIP</td>
<td>NATO Security Investment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Privy Council Office Fonds</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWG</td>
<td>Paris Working Group; Permanent Working Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SAACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSEA</td>
<td>Secretary of State for External Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Temporary Council Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSEA</td>
<td>Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs</td>
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<td>WLMK</td>
<td>William Lyon Mackenzie King Fonds</td>
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Introduction

This dissertation entitled *The Politics of Burden-Sharing: Three Essays on NATO, Canada, and Fair-Share* analyses the burden-sharing dynamics in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from the perspective of its practitioners. Through interpretation and the conceptual apparatus of normative ethics, this dissertation looks at how national political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders in Canada, and to a lesser extent in other major NATO countries, made sense of burden-sharing during NATO’s formative years in the early Cold-War period. Based on the historical evidence retrieved from the Canadian national archives, this dissertation argues that the burden-sharing problem in NATO was normatively rooted in politics.

The driving force behind this doctoral research is the dissatisfaction with the existing burden-sharing literature. Given the dominance of systemic, rationalist, and hypothetical-deductive studies in the burden-sharing scholarship, including statistical metrics used to measure burden-sharing inequalities and determine free riders in the Alliance, this dissertation makes the case for a qualitative approach to studying the burden-sharing phenomenon in NATO. The existing literature on burden-sharing has understudied the complex environment of burden-sharing negotiations, the process of agreeing on sharing arrangements, and especially the problem of fairness.

Positioned at the intersection between International Relations (IR), Normative Ethics, and History, this dissertation goes beyond the narrow cost-benefit explanations and technical understanding of burden-sharing. Reflecting on the recent interpretive and ethical turns in social sciences, this conceptual, method-driven, and policy-oriented doctoral research develops a political, normative, and historical approach to NATO burden-sharing based on interpretive-qualitative methodology. As this dissertation is interested in the *politics*, not the economics, of military alliances, its immediate research goal is to move from the field of abstract theory to the field of practice and policy.

In the form of three articles, this dissertation reconstructs the political, ethical, and practical dimensions of burden-sharing in both the private and public discourse of national leaders. Its qualitative approach dives deep into the sense-making processes and the arguments that practitioners chose to justify their contribution strategies (article one and two), and how they tried to arrive at fair but practicable sharing arrangements in NATO (article three). To
systemise the analysis of archival documents, it uses a set of basic interpretive methods (category, metaphor, and argument analysis) and a modified theory-as-thought method.

This interpretive research does a major conceptual work when it comes to burden-sharing key components: alliance purpose, burden, national contribution, and sharing principles. Furthermore, by drawing the links between normative ethics and the burden-sharing problem in terms of contribution strategies and fairness, this dissertation places terms such as distributive justice, codes of ethical action, and the different valuation of the collective good delivered by NATO into its very centre, in addition to the traditional private-public benefit considerations.

Ultimately, this doctoral work aims to improve our understanding of burden-sharing in NATO. The niche of this dissertation resides in its focus on burden-sharing as a political issue, in contrast to prevailing explanations based on economics. In looking at NATO burden-sharing in terms of a dynamic, non-technical process, in which allies contest their respective positions on what it means to share the burden, this dissertation adds a normative layer on the collective action problem and brings a missing element into the existing scholarship on burden-sharing.

The qualitative-interpretive analysis approaching burden-sharing as a process, not an outcome, shows that coordinated defence planning of capabilities set up the whole framework for burden-sharing and the comparison of contributions. Against the static technical nature of burden-sharing speaks also the fact that member countries largely contested the one-dimensional quantitative metrics. Burden-sharing neither does mean mechanical cost-benefit calculations resulting in automatic free riding behaviour. The normative layer that this dissertation adds on this collective action further clarifies that the notion of a good burden-sharer has different meanings while intentional free riding is not morally acceptable behaviour. Lastly, in linking traditional burden-sharing debates with the current discussions at NATO, this dissertation outlines several lessons learned for a more effective, capability-based, and fair intra-alliance cooperation.

**Statement of the problem**

NATO is a political-military alliance created in 1949 to guarantee the freedom and security of its members. In committing national resources to the defence of other members against an external aggressor in view to protect peace, rule of law, liberal values and democratic institutions, NATO countries have assured security in the Euro-Atlantic area through the
mechanism of collective defence. This makes NATO the most successful military alliance in the modern history of international relations (Thies 2009, p. 17). Burden-sharing is one of the constitutive features of the Alliance, as outlined in Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty in terms of self-help and mutual aid. Why has it been such a long-lasting problem for NATO allies?

Burden-sharing is essentially a collective action that entails the problem of “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” (Cimbala and Forster 2005, p. 164). Although the question of sharing the costs of collective defence was put on the Alliance table as early as in the summer of 1949, even today NATO does not have a common budget of collective defence. While allies financially contribute to NATO common budgets and investment programme on an agreed cost-sharing formula, the majority of national contributions is made indirectly on a voluntary basis, following the principle of costs lie where they fall. The latter concerns both force generation for NATO-led ad hoc operations and contributions to NATO standing forces. Only relatively recently, NATO allies have publicly adopted a rule of thumb to commit at least two per cent of their GDP on defence spending, which was reinforced at the highest political level during the NATO summits in 2014 and 2016. Yet in general, these vague sharing arrangements continue to feed lively political and academic debates and to fuel tensions among allies.

This dissertation puts forward that burden-sharing in NATO is above all a political issue. In political science, politics can be understood in at least four different ways: (1) activities of the state’s institutions (institutional definition), (2) the pursuit of own selfish advantage (politics as a struggle for power), (3) the process of interest accommodation (pluralist conception), and (4) a self-regulating system fulfilling necessary tasks (functionalist definition). Focusing on policy decision-makers, this dissertation views politics in line with Weber’s and Laswell’s conceptualisations of politics as a struggle for power and control and as an issue of distribution.

For Weber, politics represents “striving for a share of power or for influence on the distribution of power, whether it be between states or between groups of people contained within a single state” (1994, p. 311). This means the focus on competitive acquisition and distribution of power, not on the goal of providing common public goods. In contrast, Laswell (1936) views politics as a distributive issue in terms of the access to material and non-material goods. Importantly, he distinguishes politics from economics, law, or ethics. Even though they overlap, politics is not determined by them.
In the context of political struggles and distribution, decisions that are political in nature give the sovereign actor the power to decide according to his interpretation and his will. Political decisions are different from administrative or technical issues, as the latter do not determine the goals and winners. Especially on the international level, the issue of distribution goes into the essence of politics: power-sharing and conflicting value systems (Hoffmann 1981, p. 141).

Despite the numerous definitions, *politics* is an abstract concept. More importantly, issues are not political per se, they become political. The question therefore more accurately stands as why has burden-sharing become a political issue? What or who has politicised it? Indeed, burden-sharing generates a visible divide in the transatlantic community: it concerns collective good, the problem of distribution, and politicians discuss it publicly. In addition, national political leaders who decide on how much the country spends on defence must weigh this decision against other national priorities (education, health care, etc.). In contrast, for example NATO standardisation and interoperability has rarely been considered as a political issue. Although it requires multinational consultations and collective decisions on resources and procedures, it is usually viewed as a technical (and boring) topic.

This dissertation aims to study burden-sharing as a process in order to explore how it has become a political issue by reconstructing the meanings conveyed in it by national leaders. The politics of NATO burden-sharing therefore involves normative arguments, symbolic language, and rhetoric that practitioners use in their domestic discussions and struggles, as well as during negotiations with representatives from other allied nations. Since NATO does not have explicit rules for burden-sharing apart from very general guidelines, national governments are often confronted with decisions that require ethical judgment on how much and in what form to contribute, in addition to why contribute at all. Put in the words of General Eisenhower, who addressed the allies in the North Atlantic Council on 16 January 1951 to talk about the common efforts, first and foremost “it was up to each to do everything in its power to build up its forces, on the principle of ‘let your conscience be your guide’”.

Over time, these burden-sharing debates have usually reflected the unequal distribution of costs between the United States (US), bearing a lion’s share of the NATO burden, and the

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1 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2, 16th Panel meeting, 18 and 19 January 1951.
European allies, accused of free riding. Sixty years after Eisenhower’s speech, the US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned that NATO reached a point of a two-tier alliance (producers vs. consumers of security), due to the alarming burden-sharing gap caused by the disproportionately shared costs between the US and the European allies (in Garamone 2011).

Why is it relevant to examine meanings to better understand burden-sharing? Take the most recent point of contention that concerns the defence spending pledge. Depending on the country’s standpoint, it could mean (i) a goal to actually spend the two per cent of the GDP on defence, (ii) the reversal of cutting defence budget, or (iii) an eventual move towards this target in the longer term. Interpretive research that includes the study of internal private material can show how politics appears in documents adopted under the rule of consensus, whose language is often very general and even vague. As national leaders have the liberty to discursively frame and interpret their commitments, The Politics of Burden-Sharing tries to uncover those meanings vested by practitioners themselves.

In general, debates on burden-sharing in NATO refer to the notion of fairness where the distribution of costs and responsibilities is guided by the principles of reasonable challenge and the relative wealth of countries. These abstract categories necessitate subjective judgment on deciding about an appropriate contribution. In justifying their (political) willingness to contribute, national practitioners infuse their burden-sharing discourse with normative language and often challenge this constructed concept.

Furthermore, the comparison of qualitatively different contributions (money vs equipment vs troops) in terms of their impact on countries’ economies and Alliance’s capabilities is open to contestations as well. The measurement criteria – how to count allies’ contributions to identify free riders – then further epitomise the burden-sharing politics in NATO. Burden-sharing debates in NATO have been largely the result of “the inherent difficulties in quantifying and comparing defence contributions between nations” (Duke 1993, p. 3). Recently, the burden-sharing discussions have extremely narrowed to a simple input numerical indicator, obliterating NATO’s capability problem. This shift in focus primarily to defence expenditures has left certain European allies questioning the relevance and adequateness of this type of measure (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2017, p. 1). This is dangerous, since at times when the burden-sharing problem becomes more intense, it can inhibit allied cooperation and damage alliance cohesion. The framing of the burden-sharing problem is
also important, as it could range from the realm of defence and security policy (collective
defence, prevention of war, promotion of peace) to domestic public policy (budgetary allocation
of public expenditures).

Given numerous conceptual ambiguities pertaining to the politically loaded burden-sharing debates, this dissertation makes the case for a qualitative approach to burden-sharing and proposes an interpretive research strategy that blends interpretive methods with normative ethics. Through interpretation with a political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry, it attempts to demonstrate that NATO burden-sharing was normatively rooted in politics.

**Scope of the inquiry**

This dissertation reconstructs the political, ethical, and practical dimension of NATO burden-sharing when the problem first appeared in the Alliance in the early 1950s. From 1949 to 1952-53, NATO allies intensively discussed, examined, pondered, and also abandoned several different types of sharing arrangements, while they were setting up the whole organisational civilian structure and integrated military command. Already back then, burden-sharing proved to be a painful exercise marked by lengthy negotiations.

Organised into three separate articles, this dissertation aims to answer the following set of questions. The principal question stands for the general research objective of this dissertation, that is, *how does domestic politics shape burden-sharing dynamics in NATO?* The three articles then address the following sub-questions:

I. How did Canadian officials make sense of the original burden-sharing debate?
II. How did ethical arguments discursively shape Canadian contribution strategies?
III. How did NATO leaders frame the problem of, and the solution to, burden-sharing in the 1950s?

On the one hand, this dissertation explores how Canadian leaders discursively framed the burden-sharing problem and how they justified their national contribution strategies. On the other hand, it looks at how NATO allies talked about the appropriate sharing metrics for their collective burden. In delving into the practitioners’ discourse on burden-sharing, the overall findings of this dissertation indicate that far from being a technicality, burden-sharing is a politically complex and dynamic problem animated by various, at times contradictory, ethical
concerns. When the problem emerged in NATO for the first time, Canada together with other allies struggled to devise fair burden-sharing rules that would translate into effective sharing and allow for maximising the overall utility of national contributions. In sum, the interpretive analysis of historical evidence suggests that NATO burden-sharing was normatively rooted in politics.

The sequence of three articles progressively studies different components and dimensions of burden-sharing: (1) burden and political dimension; (2) contribution strategies and ethical dimension; and (3) sharing arrangements and practical dimension. This section outlines the findings in accordance with their respective focus points.

The main goal of the first article is to clarify NATO burden-sharing conceptually. Opening with the observation that burden-sharing is an ambiguous concept that does not float in a political vacuum, it attempts to analyse the burden-sharing problem through the interpretation of its main components: alliance purpose, burden, contribution, and sharing. The article reconstructs the parameters of Canadian burden-sharing discourse in order to explore how these practitioners themselves made sense of burden-sharing when the problem was discussed in NATO for the first time (1948-1952). It recovers the context-sensitive meanings through the analysis of categories, metaphors, and arguments in their public and private discourse.

This first article argues that, according to Canadian political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders, should any contribution be fair, it had to be based on the recognition that NATO’s burden was not only military, but also economic and moral. This understanding of burden consequently influenced the type of national resources Canada decided to commit to the Alliance and the overall extent of its participation in the Alliance’s internal cooperation processes with respect to the collective efforts to share NATO’s burden.

The second article further examines Canadian contribution strategies in the context of the NATO burden-sharing dynamics during the liberal government of Louis St Laurent (1948-1957). Its value-added stems from using normative ethics to reconstruct the ethical dimension of burden-sharing in the Canadian discourse. To interpret the ethics of burden-sharing, it employs a grid of four ethics (ethics of obligations, ethics of prudence, utilitarian ethics, and communitarian ethics), developed by blending an IR theory-as-thought method with the three traditions of normative ethics. The article explores on ethical grounds how Canadian leaders
framed contribution strategies in their private and public discourse about NATO burden-sharing.

This second article argues that the NATO burden-sharing dynamics can be characterised by the tensions between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution. While free riding was not an acceptable behaviour, the historical evidence reveals incoherence between the predominantly consequentialist discourse of Canadian authorities with respect to Canada’s contributions to NATO, and their discourse on allied sharing in NATO, shaped by obligations and communitarian ethics. The presence of these different ethics resulted in a split discourse on NATO burden-sharing in Canada. This split discourse implies that the same set of actors (Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and senior military) in the same institutional setting (the Government and its committees) employed a burden-sharing discourse that was shaped by multiple ethics, depending on whether they talked about the cost distribution in NATO or discussing specific Canadian contributions.

The third article addresses the evolution of the first burden-sharing debates in NATO in terms of sharing arrangements. Particularly, this article explores burden-sharing on a broader normative and conceptual level and treats it as a contributory system similar to taxation. The analysis of the original burden-sharing debates focuses on what kind of distributive justice and corresponding sharing arrangements NATO allies agreed on for their collective action problem of burden-sharing in the early Cold War. It attempts to interpret the problem of burden-sharing in terms of fairness from the point of view of various leaders from major NATO countries.

This third article then links the findings to the current burden-sharing debates centred on the two-percent defence spending pledge. The article argues that although being simple, the defence spending indicator that currently dominates NATO burden-sharing debates is neither fair nor effective. The consulted archival documents show that a simple numerical narrative does not capture the core of the problem, since burden-sharing is a dynamic and complex process that needs more than accounting numbers. This article demonstrates that NATO allies conceived their burden-sharing in terms of ability-to-pay principles, similar to a progressive tax model. Given the contentious issue of interstate distributive justice, NATO burden-sharing requires fair but practicable sharing arrangements: not a one-size-fits-all formula, but the defence planning process became the defining feature of NATO burden-sharing. This prompted NATO allies to prioritise optimal, rather than fair, sharing. This article further refreshes NATO’s organisational memory and points towards institutional solutions to its collective action problem.
Importance of this doctoral research

This doctoral research on NATO burden-sharing is important for two reasons. First, this dissertation answers the call for a more qualitative and interpretive approach to burden-sharing in analysing the political, ethical, and practical dimension of NATO burden-sharing. Second, given the continuing disputes between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean on the substance of the burden-sharing gap, this doctoral research is policy-relevant since it draws analogies between the past and the present burden-sharing discussions to formulate certain lessons learned from the original burden-sharing debates for NATO’s current efforts of improving its defence and deterrence posture.

Where it fits in the literature

The burden-sharing scholarship, as a specific sub-group of the alliance management literature, consists of studies in alliance theory, Security Studies, and collective action and public goods theories. In general, the studies on burden-sharing have been using almost exclusively hypothetical-deductive and systemic models, pursuing inquiries based on a positivist research agenda (Thielemann 2003). Explanations of contribution strategies are often unsatisfactory due to their focus on either the role of great powers and alliance security dilemma, or an excessive emphasis on domestic institutional constraints (Oma 2012). The dominance of the economics of alliances, an approach to burden-sharing based on the public goods theories that conceives burden-sharing in terms of static (and statistical) outcomes, results in neglecting the politics of sharing and normative structures of the problem. Only very recently, non-rationalist scholars have developed some norm-based, practice and strategic culture approaches to burden-sharing.

Indeed, in the past decade, several scholars have recognised that a more qualitative research programme is necessary “to take public goods theory examinations of NATO one step further” (Ringsmose 2016, p. 219). Given the contested nature of the burden-sharing problem, the burden-sharing literature would benefit from a qualitative and conceptual work (Foucault and Mérand 2012, p. 424). On top of that, NATO has not been “the subject of much normative theorising” (Webber 2016, p. 11). This is unfortunate, since interpretive and sociological approaches would account for “the intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values” that shape states’ burden-sharing behaviour (Zyla 2016, p. 5).
The present dissertation challenges the existing mainstream burden-sharing scholarship, as it incorporates both interpretive and ethical turns in social sciences (Vilmer and Chung 2013; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). In developing an interpretive research strategy with a political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry, this dissertation avoids the oversimplification of free riding and the exploitation hypothesis. Its qualitative approach to NATO burden-sharing unpacks the prevalent assumptions, according to which states are rational, unitary, and functionally alike. What is more, the politics of burden-sharing is able to embrace disparate theoretical perspectives on why countries back their political commitments by devoting national sources to collective defence in the peacetime. The most common explanations include power dynamics between the US and NATO junior allies, savings due to cost-sharing and other material advantages, or adherence to the community of shared norms, values and traditions. Examining the politics of burden-sharing in the discourse of national leaders can grasp power struggles, positive cost-benefit calculations, and the sense of belonging to the community into one complex picture of NATO burden-sharing dynamics.

Furthermore, when it comes to the normative portion of this dissertation’s research strategy, Webber observed that the IR studies on NATO which do include some moral preoccupations usually refer to specific aspects of allied operations (e.g., humanitarian intervention) in terms of applied ethics, rather than “NATO’s broader place in global order” (2016, p. 11). More importantly, despite the fact that burden-sharing debates about fairness in costs distribution represent a textbook case of distributive justice, the research on this kind of ethical dilemma in alliances has been “entirely missing from the burden-sharing literature” (Zyla 2016, p. 13). In exploring the ethical dimension of burden-sharing through the traditions of normative ethics and the distributive justice concept, this dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the burden-sharing literature.

Finally, this dissertation underlines the importance of studying alliances in general. Although theorising about alliances dates back more than two thousand years to the Peloponnesian Wars (Calder 2009), the recent increase in the use of ad hoc coalitions and the end of bipolarity have strengthen the voices in “the ‘end of alliances’ debate and the related question of the ‘end of alliance theories’” (Oest 2007, p. 7). In attempting to clarify conceptually NATO burden-sharing, the findings of this doctoral research about one of the central aspects of alliance cooperation can contribute to the improvement of intra-alliance relations and enhance
its effectiveness in pursuing common objectives. In addition, this dissertation could add a new research agenda on the ethics of burden-sharing to the alliance theory literature.

**Burden-sharing in NATO: past and present**

This dissertation conducts a research on burden-sharing that is policy-relevant in two ways. First, it conceptually clarifies burden-sharing. The questions *who pays for what, how much, and why* are recurrent issues and inherent to every collective action process. Misunderstandings and tensions about how to share a common burden, and by which means, can become a serious obstacle to effective multilateral cooperation and hinder discussions on the strategic purpose of alliances.

In recovering the meanings in the practitioners’ public and private discourse, and in interpreting them through the lenses of normative ethics, this dissertation gives content to the key burden-sharing categories. It differentiates between alliance’s purpose and burden, together with the long-term objectives of military cooperation and their near to mid-term implementation. In terms of contributions, it sheds light on which types of national resources are right to count, as well as on how to count them. Especially the interpretation of fairness helps identify the points of tensions, and diagnose and anticipate misunderstandings in NATO. Furthermore, the interpretive analysis can better explain the lack of collective agreement on the explicitly institutionalised sharing rules in NATO, which would in turn clarify both the allies’ obligation to pay and the form of their participation in this collective defence enterprise.

Second, the dissertation links the original burden-sharing debates with the current burden-sharing disputes in NATO centred on the defence spending pledge. Back in the 1950s, NATO allies discussed and then abandoned the idea of having a formula to determine their contributions to collective defence. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies made a commitment toward spending two per cent of their GDP on defence and endorsed a complimentary goal of spending twenty per cent of this on research, development, and armaments. This pledge, however, has posed a significant challenge to NATO countries in terms of credibility and cohesion, with many of them contesting its fairness and relevance, especially on grounds of NATO’s capability problem.

Furthermore, after the Cold War, during which NATO defended the Allied territory against the Soviet threat, the security environment changed dramatically and NATO had to adapt
to new threats. For the first time, it conducted combat operations and deployed troops in out-of-area missions. However, in 2014, the security situation changed again dramatically. After Russia violated the Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by force and annexed Crimea, NATO countries returned to the Alliance’s original purpose: collective defence of the allied territory. It is in this context that NATO has to relearn how to talk about sharing.

In revisiting the origins of the burden-sharing problem in NATO and the principles of collective defence (self-help and mutual aid), this dissertation outlines some lessons learned from NATO’s early years for a more capability-driven and strategy-oriented burden-sharing to improve Alliance’s current defence posture. Through applying various models of distributive justice, it shows that burden-sharing requires more than statistical targets. Drawing on NATO’s early history, this dissertation demonstrates that the defence planning process is where burden-sharing gets done in NATO. In addition, this research responds to the demands for clarifying the role of “NATO’s defence planning processes and the institutionalisation of distinct burden-sharing indicators” (Ringsmose 2016, p. 219). In short, the understanding of fair-share and its practical implementation constitutes a starting point for improved cooperation in NATO.

To conclude, this dissertation contributes to the existing scholarship by improving our understanding of burden-sharing thanks to its political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry. In a nutshell, this research addresses the politics of burden-sharing in terms of sense-making processes at the national level of political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders through the lenses of ethical traditions and distributive justice during the genesis of the burden-sharing problem in NATO.

**Research strategy**

To pursue this political, normative, and historical inquiry of NATO burden-sharing, this dissertation needs an interpretive research strategy. This doctoral research is based on qualitative-interpretive methodology, recently developed in the works by Dvora Yanow (1995, 2000, 2006, 2012). Using the techniques of abduction and grounded theory, the main objective of this type of research is to recover meanings, categorise ideas, and reconstruct argument architectures in practitioners’ debates on a given policy problem.

The political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry is best suited for the qualitative exploration of burden-sharing in NATO, as it is principally meant to go beyond the collective
action theory and systemic accounts of burden-sharing. It makes it possible to conduct an in-depth analysis of the alliance’s internal dynamics, to reconstruct the evolution of burden-sharing debates in both national milieu and NATO, and to document the sense-making of the volatile and ambiguous term of burden-sharing at the level of national leaders in their private and public discourse.

Moreover, in contrast to the mainstream positivist research on allied contributions and burden-sharing in NATO, this dissertation uses the IR theoretical concepts and the traditions of normative ethics to read and systemise practitioners’ sense-making and arguments. Yet, it does not construct hypotheses and causal relations in terms of dependent-independent variables. In short, based on specific ontological and epistemological assumptions, this dissertation develops a qualitative approach to burden-sharing that uses IR theory and normative ethics as analytical tools. It follows a five-step interpretive research strategy in order to analyse the archival documents, which constitute its primary source of data forming the national discourse on burden-sharing.

This interpretive research strategy serves to reconstruct political, ethical, and practical dimension of burden-sharing. It studies how burden-sharing dynamics reflected particular conceptualisations of the NATO burden, how different ethics shaped national contribution strategies, and which principles of distributive justice led NATO allies to decide on how fair burden-sharing should look like in NATO.

**Methods and archival data**

This dissertation employs multiple interpretive methods to explore how national leaders made sense of their fair share and what burden they continued to carry with their fellow allies. Overall, three basic interpretive text-oriented methods (category, metaphor, and argument analysis) and two methods “with an ethical twist” serve to interpret the burden-sharing dynamics from the practitioners’ perspective. This dissertation uses these methods to explore how the national leaders discursively framed the burden-sharing problem in NATO. For this reason, this dissertation has also adapted a theory-as-thought method, originally developed by Hayes and James (2014), through incorporating normative ethics into its analytical apparatus. Lastly, this dissertation uses the concept of distributive justice to interpret burden-sharing debates, in addition to employing the basic interpretive method of category analysis.
To reconstruct the political, ethical, and practical dimension of burden-sharing, a vast amount of archival material was retrieved from Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa and, to a lesser extent, from NATO online archives for this doctoral research. Privileging primary sources enabled this dissertation to look at how these in media res actors talked about national contribution strategies and sharing arrangements in the Alliance.

The other North-American ally: a country-specific perspective on burden-sharing

The major part of this dissertation analyses the NATO burden-sharing dynamics from the Canadian perspective. In doing so, it challenges the dichotomous US—Europe vision present in most of the burden-sharing studies of this period. There are only a few works on NATO burden-sharing that use Canada, or small and medium powers, as their central cases studies. Usually, burden-sharing is understood as a transatlantic bargain between the US and Western European states (Sloan 2016). If, according to one famous but unfortunate simplification, Americans are from Mars while Europeans are from Venus (Kagan 2004), where would Canada fit in here with respect to NATO burden-sharing dynamics?

Overall, the IR literature has studied NATO’s formative years (and the question of burden-sharing in this period) from the US or great power perspective. However, at its beginnings, NATO was not an American Alliance (Haglund 2000). Oftentimes, it has been forgotten in this literature that Canada played a major role in the creation of the Alliance and development of its organisational structures. The Canadian case has many insights to offer, beyond the historians’ well-documented studies of this period. This being said, this dissertation does not dress a comprehensive historical account of Canada, but the first pilot episode of the burden-sharing saga in NATO.

Canada’s involvement in the creation of NATO meant a U-turn in its foreign and defence policy. Canada joined its first peacetime alliance, and while ranking fourth on the international great power scale, it chose the path of a middle power with no great power ambitions. This did not stop it from launching a mutual aid programme to its Western European allies, the only one next to the US military assistance. Finally yet importantly, Canada faced a peculiar security dilemma. Given its southern superpower neighbour, it had to balance its security concerns on the two continents.
Consequently, the ways in which Canada’s middle power position and interests within the Alliance were reflected in the burden-sharing dynamics calls for a systematic examination. It is also believed that the Canadian perspective on burden-sharing in the chosen period would be less biased than the US or European one. Additionally, this dissertation looks at the burden-sharing problem from a variety of Canadian actors, especially from the departments of external affairs, national defence, and finance, diplomatic representatives abroad, and senior military leaders, which further adds to a rich and comprehensive account of the burden-sharing problem that this dissertation aims to provide.

Overall, this dissertation picked Canada to demonstrate the politics of burden-sharing through illustrating how national authorities conceived burden-sharing, divergences in perceptions within one government, and how they reacted to the intra-alliance pressures to contribute from fellow allies.

**Dissertation outline**

The burden-sharing phenomenon in NATO entails two principal considerations: factors that explain states’ burden-sharing behaviour, and indicators that measure national contributions and determine their equitable distribution. For this reason, the first chapter of this dissertation, after placing NATO in a wider alliance theory literature, conceptually explores the burden-sharing problem in the scholarly literature and presents discussions about burden-sharing measurements that have characterised the political aspect of the problem.

The second chapter then dresses the current state of the burden-sharing studies on allies’ contribution strategies. It outlines theoretical approaches to states’ burden-sharing behaviour based on self-interest, economic logic, both international and domestic institutional incentives, norms, culture, or their combination. These first two chapters serve to demonstrate the niche of the present dissertation: qualitative approach to NATO burden-sharing with a political, normative, and historical focus of analysis. The following methodological chapter introduces in more details interpretation as a research strategy and briefly describes its research methods.

The main part of this dissertation consists of three separated articles, which each treats the NATO burden-sharing problem in the 1950s from a different analytical angle. While the first article focuses on the conceptual clarification of burden-sharing through the sense-making processes of Canadian leaders, the second article analyses Canadian contribution strategies and
the burden-sharing problem along the ethical lines. The third article interprets the NATO burden-sharing problem specifically through the lenses of distributive justice.

The dissertation concludes with the discussion of its findings, their theoretical and policy implications, and identifies the limitations of this doctoral interpretive research. The last paragraphs provide some suggestions for the future research on alliances.

References


Chapter 1 Conceptualising NATO Burden-Sharing

The Politics of Burden-Sharing analyses a phenomenon that has become one of the defining features of cooperation dynamics among the allies in NATO. Does the problem involve only money? Filling out statistical reports? Compromising national interests? Acting on responsibility or obligation? The burden-sharing problem in an alliance such as NATO seems to be too complex for a mere technical problem or mechanical cost-benefit calculations.

The first chapter of this doctoral dissertation provides a conceptual exploration of the burden-sharing problem. In particular, it looks at how NATO burden-sharing has been defined and measured in the scholarly literature in order to outline practical and politically-loaded problems of sharing. First, the chapter describes NATO as a specific type of alliance in the alliance theory literature. Second, it defines the concept of burden-sharing and identifies its problematic spots in NATO since 1949. The chapter then moves on to examine general tendencies in NATO burden-sharing measurements in the scholarly literature. It reviews various burden-sharing models and indicators of what scholars believe constitutes NATO burden-sharing in view to identify free-riders and the burden-sharing gap. The chapter concludes on how those measurements have been particularly prone to generate contentious debates among NATO member states on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Alliance theory and NATO

International alliances are one of the central objects of study in International Relations. They represent the principal tools in the international conflict-cooperation dynamics and a central means of foreign policy. Alliance theory as a subfield of IR, which focuses on these specific instances of cooperation, overlaps with Security Studies and Cooperation and Conflict Studies, and builds upon insights from organisation theory, public goods theory, political party coalition theory and comparative politics, integration and community-building theory, and signalling and commitment theories (Oest 2007, pp. 24-5).

This rich research field has analysed alliances at various stages of their life cycle: alliance formation, management, cohesion, endurance, enlargement, and termination under both peacetime and wartime conditions. The problem of NATO burden-sharing concerns the topic of
alliance management, which means that this dissertation focuses on what happens after states have formed an alliance, and on the parameters of intra-alliance cooperation.

**Defining alliances**

Generally speaking, the alliance cooperation “takes place between two or more sovereign states” (Oest 2007, p. 12). The alliance literature further defines alliances in terms of the level of commitment. For instance, the Correlates of War (COW) project identifies defence pacts, non-aggression/neutrality treaties, and ententes (Sprecher and Krause 2006, p. 363). Another research group, the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project, differentiates between defence, offense, non-aggression, neutrality, and consultation pacts (Leeds et al. 2002, p. 364). Alliances therefore differ in terms of commitment, character and object of cooperation (Oest 2007, pp. 11-12, 15).

In addition, there are many broad and narrow alliance definitions, which vary depending on the emphasis put on the formality of agreement. As to the narrow definitions of alliances, Snyder describes alliances as “the formal subset of a broader and more basic phenomenon, than that of alignment” (Snyder 1990, p. 105). Another simple one says “an alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” (Holsti et al. 1973, p. 4). Leeds specifies that this cooperation is military, among independent states, and that national security issues involve “facing potential or realised military conflict” (2005, p. 4). Yet, Wolfers defines an alliance in broader terms as “a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states” (1968, p. 268). Similarly, Walt sees alliances and alignments as “formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” (1987, p. 12).

Adding more complexity, the COW project defines alliances as “formal, written, mostly voluntary, agreements, treaties, or conventions among states pledging to coordinate their behaviour and policies in the contingency of military conflict” (Sprecher and Krause 2006, p. 363). Similarly, the ATOP project describes alliances as “written agreements signed by official representatives of at least two independent states that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict” (Leeds et al. 2002, p. 238).
Furthermore, von Hlatky refines the category of defensive pacts. By adding the qualification of *special alliances*, she points to more far-reaching and institutionalised security commitments where allied states share intelligence and seek military interoperability, and therefore pursue a more intrusive goal in terms of defence force structures than regular defence alliances (2013, p. 49). The difference is especially visible between pre-1945 and post-1945 alliances due to, among others, technological developments.

**NATO in the alliance literature**

NATO is one of those special defensive alliances. In the midst of the early Cold War, twelve countries created NATO as an alliance based on a collective defence clause that connected the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that each NATO member has the obligation to defend its fellow allies in case of an armed attack.

The Treaty nevertheless contains political, economic, and social aspects, unique for a military alliance (Article II, III, and IV). The Treaty Preamble specifies the purpose of the Alliance: the allied countries cooperate “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law ... [and] to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” (NATO 1949). Overall, NATO defines itself as a political-military alliance, especially after the release of the Harmel Report in 1967.

Although only one of the fourteen Treaty Articles mentions a formal institutional body (Article IX – the Council), the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 forced NATO countries to intensify institutionalisation of their Alliance. The concrete measures included the creation of integrated military command, adoption of alliance-wide defence plans, coordinated conduct of military build-ups, creation of the office of the Secretary General, and establishment of permanent international staff (see Box 1). The Alliance’s permanent structures and the objective of collective defence solidified during this rigid bipolar era.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has experienced a remarkable transformation. In the context of new international environment, it has made a passage from collective defence to a more broadly defined agenda of collective security. NATO’s interventions in the Balkan conflicts and its several enlargements have demonstrated that NATO is as much a collective defence organisation of shared values as it is an alliance defending shared interests (Goldgeier
Thus, formally, NATO is a special alliance. Practically, NATO is an organisation with multiple tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security, as specified in the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept.

**Box 1  NATO: Organisation and Structures**

**NATO: Organisation and structures**

NATO’s current 29 member countries are represented by permanent national delegations, headed by an ambassador or a permanent representative, at NATO’s political headquarters in Brussels. On the military side, NATO member countries’ Chiefs of Staff are represented on a permanent basis by senior officers, acting as Military Representatives and each supported by a national staff. NATO is further characterised by its complex civilian and military structures.

**Civilian structure**

**North Atlantic Council**

Each member country has a seat at the Council – the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body – that meets at least once a week or whenever deemed necessary at different levels and formats. The highest-level meetings are summits of Heads of State and Government approximately every two years. The Council is responsible for giving political guidance to the military authorities and for providing them with the authorisation to use means they require to defend the NATO area. Discussions and decisions in the Council cover all aspects of the Alliance’s activities. Only the **Nuclear Planning Group** has the same authority as the North Atlantic Council with regard to nuclear policy issues.

**Committees**

NATO has developed a network of committees and ad hoc working groups to deal with subjects ranging from political and operational to technical issues. They bring together officials, advisers, and subject-matter experts from national delegations to exchange information, consult, and make decisions. Membership of committees and working groups is open to all member countries.

**Secretary General**

NATO’s highest international civil servant is responsible for facilitating consultations and decision-making and for overseeing the implementation of decisions made at the Council meetings that he or the Deputy Secretary General chairs. The Secretary General directs the International Staff.

**International Staff**

The International Staff is organised into eight Divisions plus the Private Office of the Secretary General, the Offices of Resources, Financial Control, Security, and Legal Affairs. It provides advice and support to the national delegations in the Council and its committees.

**Military structure**

**Military Committee**

The Military Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of all NATO member countries. It is responsible for advising the Council on military matters and for tasking or providing guidance to subordinate military authorities. The Military Committee meets in a permanent session at the level of military representatives. NATO military authorities work on defence and operational plans for multinational forces, composed by troops from NATO member countries, and determine requirements for the forces under their command control.
International Military Staff

International Military Staff is the Military Committee’s executive body, composed of military personnel seconded from national military establishments and to a smaller extent supporting civilian personnel. Its role is to provide the best policy advice to the Military Committee. It is headed by the Director General.

Integrated Military Command Structure

NATO’s command structure is composed of the two NATO Strategic Commands, Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation, and a number of subordinated commands.

Decision-making

In NATO, all decisions are made by consensus, which is preceded by discussion and consultation among member countries. There is no voting as decisions are meant to express the collective will of all sovereign allies. This principle has been applied at every level of the Council and the committee structure since 1949.* Most of the time, decisions are reached through a silent procedure (unless a country breaks the silence, documents are adopted). The importance of consultation between Allies is further highlighted in the NATO motto *Animus in Consulendo liber* (“In discussion a free mind” or “l’esprit libre dans la consultation”).

*The only exception from the rule of consensus is the defence planning process when the examination procedure on capability packages and the consultation on the capability report can end in a “consensus minus one” situation. This means that a single country cannot veto its own capability target package.


Given the degree of institutional density developed over almost seventy years of its existence, NATO has distinguished itself by properties not only of an international organisation, but also of security community. Especially social and constructivist scholars argue that NATO, a political-military alliance created in 1949, has become something very different from virtually all pre-1939 and many contemporary alliances. Particularly, it is a security community with established practices and a common identity of liberal democracies (e.g., Risse-Kapen 1996, Adler and Barnett 1998). In fact, NATO was one of the case studies in the original Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities. This contradicts realist scholars, who generally claim that alliances are temporary marriages of conveniences, where “today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy” (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 33). Although tensions and disagreements among democracies in NATO are nothing exceptional, “they do not fear each other” (Thies 2009, p. 20). NATO has developed multiple “hidden strengths” that have made it possible to endure for
several decades, while other alliances usually break apart once the reason for their creation ceased to exist.

At first glance, NATO has been an elephant in the alliance theory literature. On the one hand, it is one of the most studied alliances in the IR field. On the other hand, Hyde-Price and Webber (2016) observe that the NATO scholarship has paid little attention to theory due to its mostly descriptive, empirical, and policy-prescriptive focus concentrating on the Alliance’s post-Cold War development. However, their recent comprehensive collection of studies defies the perception that NATO is a “theory-free zone”.

Overall, the trends in the contemporary NATO literature show that the mainstream IR theories spend most energy on explaining NATO’s formation, purpose, and its resilience after the end of the Cold War (e.g., Yost 1998, Rynning 2005, Barany and Rauchhaus 2011), enlargement and transformation (e.g., Goldgeier 1999, Hodge 2002), its functioning as a bureaucratic organisation (Mayer 2011), or cooperation within a wider security governance network, especially NATO-EU relations and non-Article V operations (e.g., Ojanen 2006, Yost 2010, Michta and Hilde 2014). They show a particular interest in NATO’s struggles with competing strategic visions for the post-2014 adaptation and with “how NATO defines itself in a world it can no longer […] comprehend” (Webber 2016, p. 10).

On the whole, the scholarly literature on NATO in general lacks a more critical theoretical perspective, with an exception of a small number of scholars that focus on norms and practices (Webber 2016, p. 11). The dissertation’s next chapter will show that this imbalance is present also in the alliance management literature on burden-sharing, as it further underlines the dominance of positivist studies on NATO.

**NATO burden-sharing: outlining the object of study**

NATO has never had a common “collective defence fund”. Nevertheless, NATO countries have developed two sets of rules that guide their cooperation efforts in NATO. First, direct contributions finance the expenditures of NATO’s set of organisations and personnel, its integrated military structures, and collectively-owned equipment or installations (NATO command structure, alliance-wide air defence, command and control and communications systems) through common or joint funding arrangements in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income. Taken together, member states pool within
the NATO framework only a very small percentage of each member’s overall defence budget. These explicit sharing rules have been limited to the distribution of financial commitments to NATO civilian and military budgets, investment programmes, or NATO-managed trust funds, and constitute a relatively minor part of NATO costs.

Second, indirect national (or operational) contributions concern the participation of member countries in NATO-led operations. Once the Alliance decides to launch a non-Article V operation, allies are requested to provide troops and equipment under the NATO command through the force generation procedure to form multinational forces (in contrast to the relatively automatic deployment of national forces under NATO command in an Article-V operation). In addition to these ad hoc contributions, NATO also has a number of standing forces through which allies contribute to collective defence on a daily basis. These include for instance standing maritime group fleets, integrated air defence system, or air policing missions to patrol the airspace in Albania, the Baltic States, and Slovenia (NATO 2017). Traditionally, a so-called principle costs lie where they fall applies to this largest part of contributions to NATO: they are voluntary (unless Article V is activated), vary in form and scale, and the provision of national forces is discretionary and decided on a case-by-case basis.

Much less visible part of burden-sharing in NATO concerns defence planning that runs in the background of virtually all NATO activities. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) coordinates national defence planning activities in view to harmonise them with NATO’s priorities (see Box 2). The purpose of this information-demanding process is to assure that NATO has at its disposal the right tools to conduct tasks and operations to achieve its agreed level of ambition and strategic objectives. With a certain degree of exaggeration, it is possible to assert that neither the Soviet/Russian threat, nor shared transatlantic values, but the alliance-wide defence planning process is the glue that holds NATO together.

**Box 2 NATO Defence Planning Process**

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the primary means to identify NATO’s present and future capability requirements and to facilitate their timely and coherent development by member countries. It focuses on 14 planning domains: air and missile defence, aviation, armaments, civil emergency planning, C3, cyber defence, force planning, intelligence, logistics, medical support, nuclear deterrence, resources, science and technology, and standardisation and interoperability. Various review documents resulting from the process are submitted to defence ministers to inform their political debate and facilitate decision-making. The NDPP is managed by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee.*
The NDPP consists of five steps in a four-year cycle:

**Step 1 – Establish political guidance**

It outlines NATO’s level of ambition (number, scale, and nature of operations) both in qualitative and quantitative terms based on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, other high-level political directions, intelligence, and previous lessons learned. It is reviewed every four years and approved by defence ministers.

**Step 2 – Determine Minimum Capability Requirements**

This step concerns putting together a list of required current and future capabilities determined by NATO military strategic commands every four years.

**Step 3 – Apportion requirements and set capability targets**

The agreed minimum capability requirements are divided among member countries and NATO entities, that is individual, collective, and multinational targets (apportioning multinational targets at this step is limited to already existing multinational projects within the Smart Defence initiative, Framework Nations Concept, and binational cooperation), in line with the principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge. After national governments give their initial view on individual targets, these Capability Target Packages are refined through a joint consultation between the national authority and the NATO staff to be then submitted to a series of multilateral examinations. The agreed packages are adopted by defence ministers.

**Step 4 – Facilitate Implementation**

This is a continuous process conducted in parallel with other steps. The NATO staff assists member countries in implementing their capability targets and in facilitating multinational capability delivery, such as Capability Area Facilitators who design and maintain capability implementation roadmaps. However, a decision to join a multinational initiative or the agreement of cost sharing remains a national sovereign decision.

**Step 5 – Review results**

This step, conducted every two years, assesses the ability of the Alliance’s forces and capabilities to meet the Political Guidance from the Step 1. It concludes with a NATO Capability Report, a comprehensive summary of the individual and collective progress on capability development, and a Suitability and Risk Assessment, produced by the Military Committee. These are based on the information collected from member countries through the Defence Planning Capability Survey on individual national plans and policies undertaken to address assigned capability targets.

* Previously the Defence Review Committee, which was established in 1966 to replace the Annual Review Committee. At the beginning of the 1950s, NATO bodies involved in the consultation and planning process related to burden-sharing included the Defence Committee (defence ministers), the Military Production and Supply Board, and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee (finance ministers). The latter was transformed into the Financial and Economic Board (senior officials) in April 1951 and then into the Temporary Council Committee in September 1951. At the Summit in Lisbon in 1952, NATO underwent major reorganisation of the civilian agencies, separate ministerial bodies of the Council were abolished, and the defence planning process was vested into one Annual Review Committee.

Burden-sharing is essentially a collective action problem in which members of a group unite to fulfil a common purpose. According to the collective action theory, to share a burden means to distribute “costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” (Cimbala and Forster 2010, p. 1). Alliances then “help to direct the military, technological, economic, and sociocultural capabilities and attributes of a particular state to the purposes of a larger collective body” (Gardner 2002, p. 25). More dynamic definitions approach burden-sharing through “coalition diplomacy” (Gordon 1956) and describe it as “negotiations on how the costs of common endeavours are shared between states” (Chalmers 2000, p. xi). Sociological approaches conceive burden-sharing as practices (e.g., Mérand and Rayroux 2016).

The burden stands for a common good, a product of collective action, with varying degree of publicness. The characteristics of NATO’s burden pose three general challenges for its assessment. The first one is the intangibility of NATO’s product, be it greater security, peace, or stability. The second concerns the multiple means to achieve it: collective defence of the allied territory against an aggressor, deterrence measures, crisis management, or various stability projection measures. The third challenge involves the scope and form of national contributions (financial, material, or human). Although NATO has developed a common definition of defence expenditures, members have the liberty to determine what to include in their national defence budgets and which expenditures account for NATO purposes. Many countries earmark great parts of national defence budgets for own ambitions that are not necessarily aligned with NATO’s priorities.

At first glance, it seems that NATO’s burden has been divided disproportionately throughout its existence between the United States (US), Canada, and the allies in Europe. The US, the dominant power in the international system and one of the NATO founding states, has regularly complained about the unsatisfactory contributions of European members to the Alliance, mostly by pointing to the level of their defence spending. The Alliance’s long-lasting problem of burden-sharing has been exacerbated since the end of the Cold War, with the US progressively paying a share greater than half of NATO’s overall spending: United States defence spending was about 68 per cent of the NATO total in 2017, in contrast to 56 per cent in 1980 (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2017). However, controversies over the size of allies’ individual contributions and the distribution of burden within the Alliance in general are more complex than the today’s debate about the level of defence spending. While the US narrows
NATO burden-sharing to military expenditures, European leaders have a broader understanding of security and consider non-military expenditures to be part of NATO burden-sharing as well.

The post-Second World War transatlantic bargain between the US and European states – with NATO as its backbone – has guaranteed security in Europe for many decades (Sloan 2016). From the long-term perspective, the NATO burden-sharing problem has resulted from this bargain that balanced US commitment against European contributions (Cooper and Zycher 1989, p. 2, italics in original). However, Tonelson (2000) reminds that burden-sharing has been basically a history of broken promises. Despite the vitality of Europe’s improved security and stability over time, the US never gave the Europeans sufficient incentives to strengthen their defences. In contrast, according to Hillison, the defining feature of NATO burden-sharing is “the ability and willingness to collectively share burdens and risks”, albeit in an unequal manner (2009, p. 355).

Nuclear-sharing represents an important sub-set of burden-sharing in NATO (another example includes the cyber defence pledge). Overall, the American commitment to European allies in the form of nuclear deterrence assurances has been part of the framework for burden-sharing arrangements in the Alliance (e.g., Goldstein 1995, Yost 2011, von Hlatky 2014). Some NATO non-nuclear states in turn contribute to nuclear sharing by hosting nuclear weapons or providing dual-capable aircraft, and participate in strategic decision-making on NATO’s nuclear policy (Major 2018).

In a similar vein, NATO burden-sharing can be viewed as a de facto division of labour that evolves with how NATO approaches security environment. Given the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept establishing three roles for NATO (collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security), Hallams (2013) calls for a new bargain fit for the 21st century that would include a flexible but more systematic transatlantic division of labour, especially niche capabilities.

The ambiguity and fogginess around the meaning of burden-sharing in NATO is reflected also in the efforts to re-label the term itself. In the context of peace dividends and reductions in force levels after the Cold War, burden-sharing became a burden-shedding debate, characterised no so much by “actual threats or needs”, as by “maximis[ation of] savings” (Duke 1993, p. xvi). Another fashionable term, burden-shifting, captures burden-sharing dynamics in the context of budgetary austerity, when one government tries to transfer own defence payments
on to the taxpayers in another member state (Thies 2003). For others, burden-sharing has been replaced by responsibility-sharing, which does not count contributions solely in terms of material costs (Cimbala and Forster 2010, p. 206). With the NATO Afghanistan campaign, the burden-sharing debate has turned into risk-sharing and the problem of national caveats (Ringsmose 2010). Finally, in a larger international security context, the variety of contributions could mean sharing of international duties or inter-institutional burden-sharing, to account for allies’ multiple membership in other security organisations and missions, such as the EU.

On the NATO side, the Alliance has defined burden-sharing as “an equitable division of roles, risks and responsibilities within the Alliance” that follows the principles of fair-sharing and reasonable challenge (NATO 2006, p. 52). The out-of-area non-Article V operations pushed the Alliance to redefine the parameters of its internal burden-sharing review process. Concretely, in 2011 NATO started to use a burden-sharing metrics to compare different national efforts on an annual basis. This metrics reflects the so-called three Cs – cash, capabilities, and contributions (Stoltenberg 2017); in other words, defence spending, development of military capabilities, and contributions in the form of troops and equipment to operations.

Furthermore, with allies’ defence budgets under pressure, NATO adapted to the period of austerity by embracing the Smart Defence initiative at the 2012 Chicago Summit. This meant greater coordination of national efforts through pooling and sharing of allies’ capabilities and smart spending, especially in the form of cost-effective multinational capability development.

Finally, since 2016 the current debate has tended to associate burden-sharing solely with the defence spending (investment) pledge that says allies should spend at least two per cent of their GDP on defence, out of which at least twenty per cent must go into capability acquisition, research, and development. This purely monetary input measure has been contested on various grounds (see Chapter Six for more details). The next sections further develop on how scholars approached this problem of measuring allies’ contributions and burden-sharing in NATO.

**Burden-sharing measurement: finding free riders and fair-shares**

Apart from explaining states’ burden-sharing behaviour and incentives to free-ride, scholars have been occupied with a two-fold objective that concerns more practical aspects of this problem. First, they try to find the kind of indicators or parameters that would best grasp sharing among allies and countries’ ability to contribute to the common defence effort. Second,
Researchers compare how individual allies fare against the chosen yardstick scheme in order to produce rankings of countries. This more descriptive part of the burden-sharing literature has nevertheless highly political consequences for the debate, since the choice of indicators influences how free riders and burden-sharing gaps are identified and quantified, and establishes the basis against which scholars determine what an equitable sharing should look like.

Contentious points with respect to burden-sharing metrics could be divided into three groups: a variety of indicators, comparison baselines, and definitions of free riders. First, the burden-sharing studies can use either qualitative or quantitative measurements to count collective defence efforts. Those indicators can range from military and civilian to broader economic and social ones. With respect to the economic evaluation of burden-sharing, there are two traditional competing economic perspectives: input vs output measures (Hartley and Sandler 1999, p. 668). Input measures concern absolute or relative defence spending with indicators such percentage of GDP or per capita of GDP allocated to defence. Output side focuses on armed forces, civilian personnel, and materiel committed to NATO’s primary objectives, and can include indicators such as force effectiveness and military capabilities (military), or economic and development aid, and peacekeeping troops (civilian). Alternatively, instead of focusing purely on the costs or benefits, scholars can set burden-sharing parameters on risks or responsibilities (usually more difficult to operationalise).

The second point concerns the appropriate basis for comparing individual shares, which can include several variations of absolute and relative spending numbers, their changes over a certain period of time, or reflect qualitative differences among allies. Third, a free rider can be understood as a country that does not contribute at all, its contributions are considered of little use, or it contributes below NATO’s average/median, all according to a chosen indicator (Hartley and Sandler 1999, p. 671).

Researchers usually construct practical measurement of burden-sharing through the lenses of private-public goods divide. They conceive NATO’s product as a collective good with a certain degree of publicness, to which states contribute individually and voluntarily. Yet, given the lack of consensus on the “right” criteria for determining contributions and individual shares, as there is no single standardised measure of burden-sharing, the type of indicators has depended mostly upon the character of international environment and understanding of security. This section contrasts two historical periods: the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.
The Cold War period

During the Cold War, burden-sharing measurements included both input and output side, and in general applied military and quantitative military indicators, such as input defence spending figures both in absolute and relative terms, and output expenditures such as armed forces, equipment and other materiel committed to NATO’s primary objectives (see for example Kravis and Davenport 1963, Oneal 1990). These quantitative military indicators accounted for “fiscal, material, human and political burdens” of building and maintaining the NATO Forces (Adams and Munz 1988, p. 1). Some researchers have pointed to the Cold-War double bias in terms of the overwhelming focus on the military domain measured by defence spending indicators (Cooper and Zycher 1989, Coonen 2006).

As NATO’s strategy evolved, the frontiers between the public and the private became less identifiable. Already in the second half of the Cold War, the researchers started to use a joint product model, introduced by Sandler in 1977, in order to account for the varying degree of excludability and to include measurements of private benefits. Over time, researchers have developed joint product models that combined both quantitative and qualitative elements, including various civilian measures. These models thus measure allied efforts in terms of defence spending and armed forces personnel on the one hand, and contributions to UN humanitarian operations, economic/development aid, or contributions to other international organisations on the other hand (see Sandler and Hartley 1999, 2001, 2014). These researches usually set the distribution of relative benefits and burdens on individual shares of NATO’s overall defence spending, based on ally’s GDP and population (Sandler and Forbes 1980).

Other common measures include conscripted forces (Khanna and Sandler 1997), peacekeeping expenditures and foreign aid (Sandler and Murdoch 2000, and Khanna et al. 1998), and refined spending measure that differentiate between operations and maintenance spending (Becker 2017). In terms of private benefits, measures such as geographical area, country size, openness (trade to GDP proportion), or protection of exposed borders are another examples of excludable benefits (Sandler and Forbes 1980, debunked by Solomon 2004).

In short, the joint product model allows researchers to determine the level of exclusion and publicness of the good produced by a collective body. Sandler and Shimizu (2014) summarise and extend Sandler’s lengthy research on alliance economics into three types of
burden-sharing measures: within-ally (GNP indicator), between-ally (individual burdens vs benefits), and finally, a broad-based security measure.\(^1\) Another example of the joint product model’s applicability can be found in the study on the European Union, where these models account for assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence policies, together with the asymmetry of the cost-benefit distribution and aggregation technologies in each policy domain (Dorussen et al. 2009).

**After the Cold War**

In addition to mixed civilian-military indicators, the burden-sharing studies produced in the post-Cold War period focused on more nuanced qualitative and output measures to reflect on NATO’s non-Article V operations. Overall, the recent development in measuring allied contributions is characterised by two major shifts: from purely military to more multidimensional focus and from cost to risk and responsibility sharing.

Already in 1983, Golden looked at different burden-sharing dimensions within the military domain. Pointing to the simplistic traditional financial paradigm, he argued that burden sharing measures needed to combine both conventional and nuclear defence dimensions and go beyond the defence spending indicator in order to account for different patterns in allied contributions (1983, pp. 187-92). For instance, the increase in defence spending as percentage of GDP, the most widely used measurement, did not necessarily improve capabilities (rather, they were improved through coordination) and failed to account for the qualitative aspects of contributions (the output side) such as force modernisation, standardisation, and interoperability (Golden 1983, pp. 187-88).

In a similar vein, Zycher reminded that researchers needed to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of burden-sharing “in the context of multinational provision of a group

\(^1\) Their goal is to determine the presence of free riding in NATO. Although they found evidence for the exploitation of the rich by the poor, the exact starting point of this exploitation differed depending on the type of quantitative test: a Spearman rank correlation test indicated the year 2010, a Wilcoxon test 2002, and finally the broad-based security expenditure burden said that the exploitation had begun in 2004.
of goods, only one of which is defence services” (1990, p. iii). Taking into consideration multiple alliance outputs, he examined three alliance goods: military services, security and economic assistance, and defence and science technology research. He asserted that anything narrower would fail to account for specialisation among allies and efficiency of the Alliance as a whole.

Looking beyond the military dimension, Boyer in 1989 formulated a new economic theory of alliances that included multiple alliance public goods (economic, political, and military) and used the theory of comparative advantage for analysing security burden-sharing among Western countries. For Boyer, “to assess alliance burden-sharing only on a military dimension fails to account for the essential interplay of political, economic, and military concerns for the costs and benefits these non-military concerns entail” (1989, p. 703). Steinberg (1987) made a similar argument about multidimensional benefits provided by NATO. Due to their specialisation, the occurrence of allies’ free riding depended on the type of contribution. Taking this idea further, Krahmann suggested that burden-sharing should depict a functional and geographical division of labour among the state and non-state actors (2005, p. 541). From the game theory point of view, Morrow (1991) put forward that smaller members in asymmetric alliances could compensate their free riding with providing symbolic contributions, usually of non-military or non-operational character, such as renting their military bases, or increasing foreign aid.

At the turn of the millennium, Chalmers (2001) emphasised the complexity of 21st century security environment and designed a multi-dimensional burden-sharing regime to include economic, environmental, and societal aspects. Similarly, Cimbala and Forster (2010) broadened the traditional scope of burden-sharing and examined simultaneously political, economic, and military burdens in view to address the Alliance’s shift from collective defence to collective security. They pointed to the problems related to checkbook diplomacy

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2 Each output consisted of several components differing in terms of publicness and excludability. For example, Zycher measured military services with following ones: general deterrence (pure public), defence in specific areas, development of defence industry, foreign policy leverage, domestic political support, and foreign military sales (private).
(contributing financially rather than deploying troops) and suggested studying NATO burden-sharing in terms of the dynamic risk distribution, the allocation of defence resources, and the assumption of responsibility for global order (Cimbala and Forster 2010, pp. 24, 195).\(^3\) Furthermore, due to comparative advantage, the form of contribution depended on the mission in the question and therefore certain kinds of contributions were more popular in some contexts than in others (Cimbala and Forster 2010, p. 12).

As to the second shift in studying burden-sharing, especially with the operation in Afghanistan, burden-sharing became measured in blood. The debates refocused to risk-sharing and the output side, with indicators such as dangerous/safe geographical areas, fatalities/casualties, or national caveats (Ringsmose 2010, Naumann \textit{et al.} 2007, Sperling and Webber 2009). Other non-material measures included control or power-sharing and expertise. For instance, Cameron put forward that “the NATO burden sharing arrangement continues to be a limited sharing of control, complemented by a deliberate sharing of risk and costs” (2008, pp. 6, 20). Burden-sharing among the EU members in the context of the refugee crisis incorporated the dimensions of costs and responsibility sharing as well (see for example Thielemann \textit{et al.} 2010).

Overall, wartime burden-sharing should account for compellence, assurance, and prevention in order to assess the degree of free-riding. In studying allied contributions in Afghanistan, Siegel (2009) found that free riding behaviour varies in time and within European allies, though in general, he observed less free riding in terms of compellence strategies.

The NATO operation in Libya (2011) further revealed a demand for a more sustainable burden-sharing arrangement with European allies who were stepping up their efforts (Hallams and Schreer 2012, Valasek 2011). However, some argued that this “risk-taking” debate was only a “new form of the old burden-sharing debate” (Schmitt 2015, p. 8). The problem rather lied in the “contrast between the ‘doers’ and the ‘watchers’ within NATO”, as only a few allies were ready or willing to conduct high-profile interventions (Ibid.).

\(^3\) These dimensions are detailed as: (1) the implications of non-involvement and failed intervention, (2) the hidden burdens emerging only after the operation has been undertaken, and (3) the impact of the increasing violence against peacekeeping and peace enforcement units.
Alongside with the changed focus of burden-sharing assessments, researchers have enriched burden-sharing measurements by developing a further variety of new military and non-military measures. Among the models that combine both qualitative and quantitative output measures is a relative force share index (Zyla 2015, 2016). Instead of comparing absolute allied force contributions, this index allows for comparisons in relation to the national force strength (Zyla 2015, p. 117). Notably, Zyla’s analysis of burden-sharing based on the relative force share index includes NATO’s institutional tools of providing consultation and expertise to partner countries and future members, soft military measures, and hard civilian indicators. Other studies disaggregate defence expenditures (overall share of GDP) into the categories of personnel, modernisation and R&D, equipment investment, or infrastructure. This detailed analysis can reflect the allocation choices within allies’ national budgets and differentiate resources supporting shared interests from domestic political goals (Becker and Malesky 2014, p. 5).

In contrast, some researchers still pay attention to purely quantitative input measures. For instance, in revising the original theory of free riding (see the next Chapter, p. 46), Plumper and Neumayer (2014) proposed to analyse burden-sharing efforts through a relative increase in defence spending percentage as GDP (the growth in spending over time). They demonstrated that the extent of free-riding was not a function of country size.

Lastly, when talking about burden-sharing or contribution strategies in the transatlantic area, one can take into account a wider institutional context. Although security and stability in this region is the main purpose of NATO, European states are members of multiple regional/international organisations. For instance, transfers within the EU (the richer states help the poorer ones through the established inter-EU programmes), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations’ programmes (peacekeeping, environmental protection), the Council of Europe, or bilateral foreign and development aid contribute to the Western security as well (Foucault and Mérand 2012, p. 436).
Conclusion

This literature review on burden-sharing measurements in NATO suggests that the burden-sharing methodology is plagued particularly with the problematic application of quantitative solutions to what is largely a qualitative problem. This criticism can be broken into four major sub-points.

First, public benefits are in general difficult to measure (how can you quantify security?). It is therefore hard to imagine a “fair share burden-sharing standard based on benefit distribution” (Adams and Munz 1988, p. 11). Furthermore, since all qualitative measures need some quantification at the end of the day, the choice of those proxies can eschew the overall burden-sharing picture. The case in a point is the sensitivity analysis of benefit measures. Solomon (2004) found that removing the exposed border proxy from the relative benefit measure had a significant impact on the robustness of the joint product model study. Most importantly, “political burdens involve factors that are inherently unquantifiable” (Duke 1993, p. 115).

Second, there are problems with the comparability of contributions, either in terms of political or economic costs, such as blood vs. iron, human casualty vs. loss of equipment, conscript vs. volunteer armies, well vs. poor trained troops, etc. Additionally, although they are difficult to distinguish, some defence resources are not destined to Alliance’s shared interests, but to ally’s private ambitions at home and abroad, for example the case of NATO former colonial powers.

Third, some researchers criticise the over-reliance on defence spending figures, which remain the most used and universal measure of burden-sharing, and on the input side of burden-sharing in general. Even though they provide a general picture of a state’s relative sharing position, they say little about the structure of this spending. Defence spending as a measure of relative shares in ratio to the percentage of national GDP can be highly misleading, as it does not show, for instance, how many, or how efficiently, states purchase and modernise equipment and improve their capabilities. From the analytical point of view, readily available resources and capabilities, rather than spending, are more relevant given the varying levels of military productivity in each state. The military output as a measure of spending effectiveness seems to be a more accurate measure of contributions (Cooper and Zycher 1989, p. vi).
Fourth, many studies focus exclusively on the transatlantic burden-sharing, i.e. comparing the US to Europe at large. In general, the debates on burden-sharing in NATO have been conducted basically between two camps of scholars: one group tries to prove that the European allies are contributing enough, while the other tries to point out that the US contributes too much and “Europe” is free-riding. Given its super-power status and incomparable power projection capabilities, the US has many engagements beyond the NATO area (Duke 1993, p. 115). In general, any comparison with the US will always dwarf the contributions of the rest of the allies. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to dichotomous United States-Europe analyses. For instance, Matlary and Petersson (2013) who examined the military ability and political willingness to use force for political purposes of NATO’s European members and their free riding behaviour within Europe, or Hillison (2009) who analysed burden-sharing efforts of the new NATO members.

Overall, the attempts to count, measure, and compare individual shares of NATO’s burden have been so far unsatisfactory. Applying one common template for comparing defence contributions creates a situation where the only thing upon which scholars are able to agree is the impossibility to establish a set of quantitative criteria for assessing burden-sharing performance. Consequently, quantifications of an expected burden-sharing gap very often ends in some statistical jugglery with comparison criteria and the multiplication of variables in the burden-sharing equation.

This is problematic. Statistical measurements create different rankings of states and, as a consequence, particular burden-sharing realities. The choice of indicators determines which contributions are taken into account and influences our perceptions about which states are free riding or are bearing an unfairly high burden. In addition, a selective use of data and burden-sharing indicators usually favours particular “national interest groups and [can be] ‘unfavourable’ to other member states” (Hartley and Sandler 1999, p. 670).

What is more, these static and numerical abstractions tend to mistake the trees for the forest (Cooper and Zycher 1989, p. 9). The real-life burden-sharing assessment of “who pays for what, how much, and why” tends to be highly politicised, concerns normative and symbolic value of fairness, and permeates especially into the public debates among NATO allies. These debates over burden-sharing measurements epitomise the politics of burden-sharing. The case in point is the transatlantic divide over the nature of indicators. In general, the divisive burden-
sharing debates between the US and the European countries illustrates very well the input-output biases. The US has often stressed quantitative input measures (defence spending as a percentage of GDP) to determine contributions to collective defence, while the European allies have preferred less quantifiable measures and have inclined to the output “man-to-man or tank-to-tank” comparison (Duke 1993, p. 107). Moreover, they tend to operate with a broader definition of security, affecting their assessment of efforts related to NATO burden-sharing:

“[...] America’s love of hard statistics makes it difficult to explain that sharing the burdens of defence involves more than money. [...] Even European toleration of noise pollution caused by thousands of low-level jet fighters flying over the countryside was, in its own way, a sharing of the defence burden that could not be measured in dollars and cents. [...] The United States fails to appreciate what Western Europe does to contribute to the economic growth in the third world [...] because development assistance is not popular in the United States.”

This excerpt, among many others, illustrates the ontological divide between the American and the European perspective on burden-sharing measurements. Accordingly, arguments based on a broader security context can mobilise quite different indicators. It may not come as a surprise to find in the scholarly literature statements such as “the Europeans have been militarily underdeveloped while the United States has been militarily overextended” (Calleo 1987, p. 217). More importantly, Cooper and Zycher (1989), inquiring about the reasons why European states spend less on defence in comparison with the US, put forward that burden-sharing has been problematic particularly due to the “differences in interests and perceptions about the goals, means, costs, and benefits of activities undertaken by NATO collectively” (1989, p. v).

The interpretation of equity and fairness are therefore key to understanding NATO burden-sharing. As Zycher noted earlier, these “differences [in values] affect the equity of any given allocation of burdens and responsibilities” (1990, pp. vii, 23). On the other hand, more often than not, national leaders in these debates over appropriate burden-sharing indicators attempt to spin fair burden-sharing parameters into one’s advantage. For instance, in 1987 the

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US Congress complained that the US share in NATO was disproportionately high and proposed to withdraw US forces from the European continent, whereas the Defense Department argued for several years that the non-US NATO allies as a group had been bearing roughly their fair share of the NATO defence burden. Since the perceptions of fair-share can differ within the same country, interpretation at the level of national elites appears to be a fruitful path for the research on NATO burden-sharing.

Finally, an equal burden-sharing does not equate with an effective one (Becker 2012). If priority is given to achieving peace and security, rather than equal sharing, the unequal distribution of costs and benefits might be necessary (Cimbala and Forster 2017, p. 115). Not only unequal burden-sharing, but also an unhealthy obsession about equitable sharing can endanger the whole cooperative enterprise in the Alliance and damage its cohesion.

References


Chapter 2  Review of the Burden-Sharing Literature

This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review in order to situate this dissertation in the IR field. Falling under the alliance management theory, the burden-sharing scholarship represents the confluence between alliance theory, Security Studies, and collective action and public goods theories. It formulates middle range theories to explain why and how states commit national resources to the defence of other allies. Unlike alliance formation, the burden-sharing literature does not analyse the initial means of overcoming the collective action problem within the international system, but opens the alliance up and looks at its internal dynamics.

The main goal of this chapter is to identify theoretical and methodological gaps in the existing literature on burden-sharing. This literature review demonstrates the long-time dominance of rationalist, hypothetical-deductive, economic, and structural approaches to NATO burden-sharing on the one hand, and the recently growing burden-sharing studies that address political and normative aspects of the allied cooperation on the other hand. This critique in turn serves to justify the interpretive research strategy chosen in this dissertation.

This second chapter organises the relevant studies around the different approaches to the burden-sharing problem. Roughly, the following sets of factors usually explain what can drive states’ decisions to contribute: the pursuit of self-interest in terms of power, security from a threat, and other relative gains (realism); utility, cost reduction, and shared interests (institutionalism, public goods theories); domestic politics and institutions (liberalism, comparative politics), norm-driven behaviour and culture (constructivism), or in a combination of several of these factors (integrated, or integrative, models).

This chapter first presents the scientific studies that have marked the research on burden-sharing behaviour. In order to make a call for a more qualitative-interpretive research on burden-sharing, this chapter makes an overview of more “conventional thinking on burden-sharing” (Zyla 2016a, p. 6), which includes public goods and collective action theories and the rationalist portion of IR and Security Studies on alliance management. It continues with adding studies focused on domestic factors, followed by social and constructivist approaches. The chapter then establishes several critical remarks and concludes by underlining the importance of this dissertation’s political, normative, and historical approach to NATO burden-sharing.
Economic theory of alliances

The economic theory of alliances is one of the dominant and oldest approaches to the burden-sharing problem. It is characterised by a particular application of the collective action and public goods theories to alliance cooperation. The economics of alliances sees NATO as a cost-sharing arrangement – “a provider of public goods set up by rational states with overlapping strategic interests” (Ringsmose 2016, p. 202).

Introduced by Olson and Zeckhauser in 1966, the economic theory of alliances defines alliance burden as a good in terms of a public/private dichotomy. Looking at publicness and exclusion of costs, these theories have distinguished between public and private good, defining the former as non-excludable “[...] upon production of which, it becomes impossible or prohibitively expensive to exclude anyone from its consumption and the consumption by one does not detract from others ability to consume it” (Cimbala and Forster 2010, Chapter 1, note 5). According to public goods theories, states’ motivations to contribute, together with variations in states’ military expenditures, correlate with the degree of excludability and rivalry of what NATO produces. Furthermore, NATO’s goods have can range from pure and impure public goods, club goods, and private good as NATO’s strategy evolved over time from defence, deterrence, to crisis management, and the parameters of collective action problems changed. Overall, there are three generations of public goods scholars who have addressed NATO burden-sharing: (1) the general application of Mancur Olson’s collective action problem; (2) Todd Sandler’s joint product model; and (3) the dynamics between club goods and NATO’s out-of-area operations.

First Generation

The first generation applied Olson’s general collective action theory to alliance management. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) put forward two core hypotheses. First, a pure public good hypothesis says that as the alliance produces a pure public good, benefits in the form of collective defence are non-excludable and non-rival among allies. Consequently, the exploitation (or free rider) hypothesis predicts a disproportionate cost distribution within an alliance, where “large, wealthy allies will shoulder the defence burden for smaller, poorer allies”; smaller partners’ free-riding means that they will enjoy alliance public benefits without
making adequate contributions or bearing any costs of proving that public good (Sandler and Hartley 1999, pp. 29-31). To determine free riding, one had to compare country’s economic size in terms of GDP and defence burden in terms of the ratio of military expenditures to GDP. Based on these assumptions, Oneal (1990) hypothesised that NATO is a uniquely privileged group due to its great reliance on the US.

The pure public good hypothesis held until 1968 (Oneal and Elrod 1989, Sandler and Hartley 2001). The observed decline in free-riding in the next decade led theorists to claim first that the declining association between economic size and defence burden was due to the weakening US hegemonic power; the pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal; and the increased cooperation among European countries (Oneal 1990). They also argued that if those national security interests were excluded from the empirical test, exploitation of the rich by the poor would still occur in NATO (Oneal and Elrod 1989).

Murdoch and Sandler (1991) disproved these explanations about the declining hegemon affecting allied military expenditures by another empirical test. More importantly, they suggested that alliance military cooperation produced several types of goods in terms of different degrees of publicness, and therefore earlier studies deformed and simplified burden-sharing. Others argued that early NATO military cooperation was a specific case of collective action that yielded no replicable results.

The first generation continued to reaffirm the relevance of Olson’s theory of collective action based on the pure public goods. For instance, Oneal and Diehl (1994) demonstrated a strong relationship between relative economic size and defence burdens throughout the Cold War era by controlling for non-military elements and private benefits. Their results showed that the US had borne a much larger defence burden than other allies. Nevertheless, they confirmed the general theoretical value of the joint product model, the central approach of the second generation since the late 1960s.

**Second Generation**

When the practical application of collective action theory based on the pure public goods theorising started to appear limited, a new generation of scholars tried to explain new burden-sharing outcomes, that is, the decrease in free-riding, through a joint product model. Essentially, conceiving the alliance output as a pure public good was deemed as too simplifying.
The second generation of theorists argues that the distribution and nature of benefits, not the economic size, determine allies’ relative burdens. They put forward that the combination of defence and deterrence provides a range of products with varying degree of publicness. First, collective defence produces many private benefits, which implies consumption rivalry and exclusion, and therefore less free-riding. In contrast, as deterrence is closer to being a pure public good, more free-riding is expected to occur. When NATO’s strategy shifted from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response, which reintroduced conventional defence, the Alliance’s product became an impure public good due to an increasing “rivalry in consumption, multiple outputs, benefit exclusion, and private benefits” (Sandler and Forbes 1980, p. 427).

The joint product model of alliances highlights that impure public good and country-specific private benefits are positive externalities of the collective action. Therefore, NATO burden is shared, and free riding is present, in accordance with a mixture of benefits (Conybeare 1994). It follows that increases in excludable benefits produce more incentives to contribute and more equal and efficient burden-sharing (Sandler and Hartley 2001). The level of free-riding declines, because the degree of non-rivalness and non-exclusiveness decreases. Put simply, “the higher the ratio of excludable benefits, the less free-riding” (Ringsmose 2016, p. 206).

In addition, since the general economic theory alliances underperformed in the case of the pre-1945 alliances, Thies (1987) refined its scope of conditions in terms of private benefits. He added three more assumptions: the degree of substitutability of alliance members’ armed forces, the difference between deterrent and defensive alliances, and the choice of strategy (Thies 1987, p. 328). Free riding, understood as suboptimality and disproportionality, was then encouraged in cases of a greater degree of substitutability and where allies pursued a deterrent strategy. When the public good impurities and the private benefits of military spending became more pronounced, “the willingness of all allies, regardless of size or wealth, to allocate resources to military spending should increase”, and disproportionality in burden-sharing should decline (Thies 1987, p. 305).

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1 Additionally, the public goods theories and joint product model have been applied to other international problems that require states to take some collective action, for instance, climate change (Horstmann and Scholz 2011), redistribution and protection of refugees (Betts 2003), or border security management (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012).
In an important case study on NATO burden-sharing, Lepgold (1998) elaborated on the claim that the nature of goods provided by military cooperation played an important role for state’s incentives. While traditional security goods provided by NATO (deterrence) were excludable outside of the Alliance and non-rival within the Alliance, NATO’s new missions (humanitarian and peacekeeping) produced either pure public or impure (non-excludable but rival) goods. In these situations, “only highly valued private, selective incentives” were likely to motivate effective multilateral operations (Lepgold 1998, p. 79).

**Third Generation**

The post-Cold War era shifted NATO’s focus from collective defence to collective security, which resulted in a new Alliance activism outside the NATO territory. NATO’s out-of-area operations have produced non-excludable public goods, which would normally encouraged a free-riding behaviour. The third generation of public goods scholars emerged out of the puzzlement that despite the pure public character of the good produced by crisis management operations, NATO allies have been able to deploy a substantial number of troops for the Afghanistan operation.²

This generation, too, challenged the original Olson and Zeckhauser’s claim that security provided by NATO is a pure public good. They suggest that NATO produces a club good (Ivanov 2011), since “the larger member states can arm-twist their smaller partners (by threatening not to guarantee their security) into investing more in defence and security than they would otherwise have done” (Ringsmose, 2016, p. 206). This line of reasoning – that deterrence is in fact excludable but non-rival – can be seen already in 1970, when Russett suggested that “the non-excludability is not necessarily met, because of a nation’s will or ability to regulate the credibility of deterrence” (1970, p. 94). In other words, the US could “manipulate the credibility of providing nuclear protection extended to its allies” (Ringsmose, 2016, p. 202).

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² In contrast, Hillison claims that the combination of input (scarce national resources) and output (deployed troops that become unavailable elsewhere) rivalry exacerbates the collective action problem (2009, p. 32).
The third generation of public good theorists offer a novel explanation for how NATO allies have refrained from free-riding in those new missions. They point to an important linkage between traditional and excludable benefits provided by collective territorial defence and the new more purely public products resulting from NATO’s out-of-area operations. Ringsmose, the leading author of this generation, argues that “as long as NATO is producing the traditional club goods (in the form of collective defence) – and is led by a member state favouring global engagement – the alliance is likely to continue to be able to provide forces for out-of-area operations” (2010, p. 321). This means that smaller states would contribute to missions outside of NATO territory to buy protection from the US (Ibid., p. 202).

**Realism**

Dominating the alliance theory literature, realist school theories have provided explanations for a full spectrum of alliance life cycle, especially formation, cohesion, and dissolution of alliances. According to realism, states create alliances because they pursue goals that cannot achieve on their own (Thies 2009, p. 25). Similarly, collective protection against a common enemy may be considered one of their main goals of alliances as the creation of a military alliance is very often facilitated by the perception of a common threat “which cannot be met with one’s own resources” (Rothstein 1968, p. 52). Furthermore, shared interests play a crucial role in the alliance birth, since “alliances are formed primarily against something, and only secondarily for something” (Holsti et al. 1973, p. 17). Ideology and common identities are not central factors but for alliance cohesion and effectiveness (Liska 1968). Also, alliances dissolve for different reasons during wartime then peacetime (Leeds and Savun 2007, Weisiger 2016).

In a realist burden-sharing analysis, alliances, like institutions in general, are not independent variables. Security cooperation is a function of cost-benefit calculations in terms of geopolitical interests and prestige, where relative gains play a major role. States will not maintain alliances if the costs of doing so exceed the benefits (Morrow 1993). Alliances are a means of accumulating power and capability multipliers: independent states join voluntary defensive alliances such as NATO, because this collective commitment amplifies the ability of each country to provide for its own security. Alliances are subject to the calculations of its powerful members, where the dominant powers dictate the conditions of cooperation (Posen 2006). Nevertheless, small powers can exercise disproportionate influence, as their weakness
may be actually a source of advantage in intra-alliance bargaining (Holsti et al. 1973, p. 15). Alliances can also act as enablers of autonomy and be instrumental for smaller members in gaining leverage over the larger ones (von Hlatky 2013).

**Balancing power and threat**

The realist burden-sharing research can explain ally’s behaviour through its principal theoretical variations, which are central to alliance formation as well: balance of power and balance of threat, and, to a lesser extent, hegemonic stability theory. First, according to the hegemonic stability theory, the most powerful state in the system is the guarantor of stability and protector of other states – it creates international order. Consequently, the hegemon bears a greater share of the burden in the system providing international public goods, which he established, though he also receives the greatest benefits (Kindleberger 1973, Gilpin 1987).

Second, given the balancing mechanism proper to international anarchy, states form and participate in alliances depending on their relative position in the system based on the structural distribution of power (Waltz 2010 [1979], Mearsheimer 2001, Hyde-Price 2006). For instance, offensive neorealism sees NATO as a US tool for offshore balancing and stresses that “there always was among the European allies an underlying fear and distrust of US power” (Layne 2000, p. 76). In contrast, traditional realists’ balance of power suggests that while the European countries do not perceive the US as a threat, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a form of soft-balancing against the American unipolarity (Pape 2005), instead of hard-balancing (Posen 2006). In contrast, the CSDP may not qualify as either balancing or bandwagoning since it does not have enough capabilities to do so. In addition to its “strategic schizophrenia” and “muscular dystrophy”, the EU does not have one coherent policy, since different EU states usually pursue one of those strategies (Ringsmose 2013).

Third, states form, participate in, and maintain alliances based on the level and direction of threat, which further determines their behaviour (Walt 1987, 1997). For instance, European states can either balance against the US (Posen 2006) or bandwagon with them (Cladi and Locatelli 2013). How does the threat perception play out in the burden-sharing problem? The willingness of states to assume the collective burden is directly proportional to their perception of threat; this perception, however, is never equal among the allies (Cimbala and Forster 2010, pp. 27, 207). It follows that states’ perception of threat is one of the principal causes of
disproportionate burden-sharing among NATO allies. For instance, Lanoszka found that free riding in NATO could be a result of diverging threat perceptions or “the implementation of a grand bargain with the US” based on the extended deterrence during the Cold War, rather than “opportunistic exploitation” (2015, p. 145).

In contrast, the unequal transatlantic burden-sharing between the European allies and the US might be due to disagreement about best means to deal with these threats. It is often argued that Americans tend to rely on military force and unilateral action, whereas Europeans prefer the use of soft power and multilateral approaches. Fettweis argues that European states have embarked on a strategy of restraint “not due to the stability provided by U.S. hegemony but a conscious response to declining threat” (2011, p. 316). Other studies observe that whether states contribute vary in accordance to their political and military utility (Schmitt 2017a).

Classical realism suggests that states continue to cooperate within the NATO framework because of their national interest in the status quo and perceived alliance’s utility. Put plainly, NATO survived even if the external threat disappeared. After being largely a territorial defence alliance, NATO serves as a coalition facilitator, where “power is negotiated, not imposed”, and as a tool in managing world affairs thanks to the alignment of allies’ interests (Rynning 2005). However, Gates and Terasawa (2003) argue that the homogeneity of interests within the Alliance would lead the smaller members to free ride. In contrast, by building the link between contributions and interests, Noetzel and Schreer (2009) argue that the increasing divergence of interests and disagreements over NATO’s general purpose may lead to the creation of a multi-tiered alliance.

More importantly, Snyder’s concept of “alliance security dilemma” (1984, 1997) represents a crucial realist spin-off for the alliance management theory. Snyder conceptualises the double threat of abandonment and entrapment that determines allies’ behaviour from inside the alliance. Burden-sharing is then a result of intra-alliance bargaining. It can lead to alliance dependence where smaller allies pursue policies only driven by the stronger states. In addition, the impact of entrapment and abandonment differs under different system of polarity, which can (politically) intensified alliance security dilemma (Sperling 2004). Alliance security dilemma is useful for explaining smaller allies’ decisions to contribute. For instance, through the alliance dependence thesis, Matlary and Petersson (2013) look at the US pressures, geopolitics, and prestige to explore the European allies’ resulting support for the US policies.
Neoclassical realist models

Furthermore, neoclassical realist models have offered many plausible and often multi-causal explanations of states’ burden-sharing behaviour. In general, the value-added of neoclassical realism in studying NATO and alliance management lies in its ability to combine systemic and material factors (their influence is prioritised) with normative/ideational and government-level ones in a single study (e.g., Ratti 2006, Schweller 2006, Dyson 2013).

Ashraf (2011) uses a neo-classical realist model of coalition burden-sharing in order to show how systemic incentives and constraints are mitigated through domestic political and culture-induced processes. He shows how the interaction of multiple factors produce unique burden-sharing state behaviours in the case of the war in Afghanistan 2001. These variables are alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action (systemic variables); and domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability (domestic level variables).

Von Hlatky (2013) demonstrates how systemic constraints are channelled through state-level variables (the level of government cohesion/autonomy, public opinion, and weak/strong military capabilities) in order to explain asymmetric military cooperation. Looking at domestic-level constraints and the bilateral-relationship with the US, she identifies three contribution strategies pursued by secondary states in military alliance with the US: leveraging, hedging, or compensating. As democracies are constrained by domestic structures, they have unpredictable behaviour: although alliance relationship with the superpower serves as the primary incentives for the secondary states to contribute, they nevertheless try to influence the terms of their participation (von Hlatky 2013, p. 147). In other words, alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while the domestic variables play a role regarding its implementation – domestic constraints on how governments commit national resources.

Davidson (2011) offers a multiple-case analysis of contemporary coalition warfare and transatlantic burden-sharing. In explaining countries’ decision to contribute, he argues that neoclassical realist factors (alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics) have more explanatory power that constructivist ones (identity and norms).
Neoclassical realism also analyses financial burden-sharing in the EU’s Athena review mechanism (Nováky 2016), whose imbalance has been caused by the interplay of two factors: varying influence among EU member states and the diverging preferences of their Foreign Policy Executives. These factors caused that the Athena review has remained in the hands of a small group of member states that had diverging utility expectations and ideological preferences.

**Rational choice institutionalism**

The institutionalist literature on alliances has been mostly preoccupied with how alliances mitigate the collective action problem, their endurance, enlargement processes, and common goods provided by security governance in general. Based on individualism, cost-benefit calculations, and unitary conception of states, rational choice institutionalism attempts to explain why states manage to cooperate under the conditions of international anarchy and decide to maintain cooperative institutions long after they establish them. A specific subset of this literature – the realist institutionalism – looks at the components of institutional arrangements within alliances to examine their effect on cohesion and effectiveness. The particularities of alliance internal functioning and bureaucracy have been covered by organisational approaches.

States create institutions especially “because of their anticipated effects on patterns of behaviour” (Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 46). In elaborating on transaction costs, information sharing, and compliance, neo-institutionalism provides a richer explanation than does the collective action theory. This is also why neoliberal institutionalism sees alliances as “security management institutions” (Wallander 2000, p. 705). Especially for the smaller or secondary states, it is beneficial to participate in alliances as they can enhance their role and leverage their influence (Haftendorn et al. 1999).

NATO as an international political-military organisation facilitates defence and security cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area, decreases uncertainty, and it may even change states’ preferences and incentives through decision-making rules and procedures. In casting more light on the shadow of the future (Keohane 1984), NATO helps states achieve common benefits. Institutional perspective are particularly strong in explaining persistence of institutions over time and in the wake of strategic shocks. NATO survived the end of the Cold War due to its institutional assets and provision of information on states’ intentions and compliance, providing rules for negotiations. Most importantly, the costs of maintaining NATO were lower than
creating a new security management institution (Wallander, 2000, p. 709). Put shortly, “the more enduring the alliance, the more likely it is that partners will want to invest in upgrading the alliance rather than terminating it” (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012, p. 68).

Neo-institutionalism provides a cost-benefit explanation of states’ burden-sharing behaviour, seated in an institutionalised framework. It puts forward that alliances provide states with opportunities to establish or enhance their reputation and demonstrate credibility of commitment, in addition to the collective benefits. For example, participation in out-of-area missions has become an unwritten obligation for new Alliance states and prospective members (Cimbala and Forster 2017). Although the collective action theory identifies rational incentives to free ride, neo-institutionalism shows that free-riding may weaken state’s credibility, and this non-compliance with institutional rules and terms of cooperation can result in reputation costs (Keohane 1984, pp. 105–106; Keohane 1998). The pursuit of good reputation further enhances the participation in an alliance, since states may not seek immediate or relative gains (Lipson 1991). In addition, due to possible issue linkages within the wider security institutional architecture, the US has been able to tolerate the unequal distribution of costs in NATO since it values more its “commitment to European order and transatlantic cohesion” (Pohl 2016, p. 130). On the other hand, institutionalised cooperation is not a panacea for collective action problems. For instance, Chun (2013) shows that NATO enlargement has increased the diversity of interest in alliance, which in turn created more tensions in its burden-sharing institutional architecture.

**Organisational approaches**

Although being a political-military alliance by definition, NATO has become a densely institutionalised organisation. For this reason, organisational approaches expect NATO to behave as an international bureaucracy with developed norms, procedures, and functions. They address alliance management and maintenance by exploring standard operating procedures and institutionalised behaviour and interests of the international staff. For instance, in analysing NATO as a set of institutions and a complex administration of security governance, Mayer (2014) elaborates on internationalisation processes of allies’ policies and decision-making.

This specific focus has led organisational studies on NATO to argue that while its high level of institutionalisation would slow NATO’s response to changes in threats, the organisational interests could ease Alliance’s transition to an environment without direct
external threat. Additionally, in the context of domestic pressures to lower national contributions to alliance, NATO would self-preserve by redefining either its functions or threats to make burden-sharing less costly (McCalla 1996).

This literature is also useful in studying the level of integration between NATO’s doctrine and its structures. Deni’s studies of alliance management through the evolution of military doctrines and structures show how an integrated institutionalised military alliance resists changes and endures, and can provide useful insights into burden-sharing (2004, 2007). For instance, he examines the suboptimal outcomes of force generation processes in NATO. Due to interactions between military planning and (domestic) political bargaining, strong institutional motivations keep the military requirement high and result in “mutually acceptable capability shortfalls” (Deni 2014, pp. 188-190). Tuschhoff further specifies that “member states accepted, on average, about 70 per cent of NATO’s force goals and actually implemented about 50 per cent” (2014, p. 197).

Organisational approaches also explain burden-sharing behaviour in terms of standard operating procedures. As a mechanism that facilitates collective action by generating incentives to comply with common goals, the alliance-level planning procedure makes it more difficult for allies to avoid contributing national resources or eschew their participation in NATO missions (Tuschhoff 2014, p. 206).

**Realist Institutionalism**

Another specific category of institutional theory in studying alliances is realist institutionalism. This institutionalist perspective defines alliances as “more than mere means of accumulating power” in face of an external threat (Krebs 1999, p. 334), though their principal focus is not on how they help states overcome the structural constraints of anarchy and establish peace and stability (as neo-institutionalism does). States can create alliances in order to manage relations among themselves, the so-called alliance power management (Schroeder 1976).

In other words, realist institutionalism sees alliances as a basis for the exercise of power, as institutions of war (Weitsman 2013, p. 2). They can be a way for rival powers to ally. This approach is interested in how and under which conditions a membership in an alliance can heighten the tensions and “spur competitive dynamics” (Krebs 1999, p. 356), and how institutional arrangements affect alliance’s effectiveness and cohesion. It also examines the
dependency of smaller allies on the larger states and their interest in maintaining alliance stability.

Although this alliance theory literature usually studies the effects of intra-alliance tensions on alliance cohesion, it might explain how alliances’ institutional factors can influence burden-sharing. Using the realist-institutional analytical framework and building on the realist balance of threat theory, Weitsman has produced the most significant contemporary work on alliance cohesion. In explaining the effectiveness (or lack of thereof) of alliances, Weitsman theorised that different levels and sources of threat could result in different alliance behaviour. She identified four strategies: hedge, tether, balance, or bandwagon (Weitsman 2004, pp. 4, 20). Alliance cohesion can therefore be influenced by decision-making structure, size, internal capability and alliance security dilemma, UN sanction, and mission legitimacy (Weitsman 2013, pp. 45-6). In addition, she also noticed that peacetime alliances serve different functions than those at war, and thus the interaction of cohesion-relevant factors might differ considerably (Weitsman 2013, p. 29). These factors may play an important role in the burden-sharing dynamics as well.

**Domestic approaches and liberal two-level games**

In contrast to structural institutional approaches, the use of domestic factors in the burden-sharing literature, and alliance management studies in general, has expanded especially after the Cold War, when the main external adversary disappeared and the threat perception among the allies was no longer homogenous (Matlary and Petersson 2013).

Domestic level explanations mostly reflect on the fact that NATO is an alliance among democracies, where shared liberal values (or liberal ideology) form the basis for security cooperation (Risse-Kappen 1995). They focus on national decision-makers and highlights the role of domestic institutions and processes in explaining countries’ diverging preferences and cross-national variations with respect to the means and ends of foreign policy (Pohl 2013).

This liberal theoretical perspective does not conceive states as unitary actors with fixed preferences. With preferences determined by domestic political processes and bargaining, states’ decisions and their behaviour result from an interplay between state and society on the one hand, and the domestic and international levels, known as the two-level game (Moravcsik 1997) on the other hand. For instance, Lipson (2003) showed that the bargaining position of
democratic states is more constrained when they face decisions concerning the use of force, given their domestic political procedures and dynamics (e.g., constitutional rules, independent officials, public commitments). Domestic institutions can make democratic leaders “less likely to demonstrate solidarity in some situations” (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004, p. 775). Furthermore, domestic political dynamics, such as the logic of political party and electoral systems, show that governments tend to make commitment to defence alliances “if potential successors have different preferences regarding the alliance, if the government believes that it will lose power soon, and if the costs of pre-commitment are not too high” (Mattes 2012, p. 153).

Studies inspired by comparative politics further elaborate on how domestic institutional constraints affect alliance burden-sharing. For instance, theories of domestic institutions (collective vs. individual decision-making institutional models) can explain specific behavioural patterns of states in alliance’s military interventions. Findings in Auerswald and Saideman’s study on the allied burden-sharing behaviour in Afghanistan indicate that coalition and minority governments tend to place more restrictions upon troop deployment due to intra-coalition bargaining, while presidential and single-party governments reflect more the decisions of the leader and tend to follow the alliance’s guidance (2014, pp. 14-15). For example, coalition governments usually send troops exercising a number of caveats from the alliance’s general rules of engagements.

Domestic variables are useful in explaining variations in defence expenditures. Captured already in Russett’s study, the distribution of defence expenditures is “fixed less by inexorable laws of economic than by the nation’s political system and the values of its people” (1970, p. 157). Public policy analysts for example look at the role of interest groups in the military-industrial complex to explore priority shifts in the national budget and the classic “guns vs. butter” trade-off between domestic welfare spending and defence spending (Hartley and Sandler 1999, p. 669). Other studies explain “guns vs butter” outcomes through political parties’ ideology and partisan control of government. Breunig (2006) finds that the left tends to contribute more to welfare programmes, while the right gives more to defence. Particularly, he argues that NATO members “make defence-spending choices for non-defence related reasons”, either due to fiscal pressures or they move “resources away from operational and capabilities-focused investments into personnel” (Breunig 2016, p. 1). Similarly, Becker (2017) puts forward that domestic fiscal policy variables influence burden-sharing outcomes to a significant extent.
Another domestic variables concern consensus of political parties and public opinion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Kreps argues that states defy public unpopularity and continue to send troops only because of the cross-party consensus – this elite consensus can neutralise the impact of unfavourable public opinion (2010, pp. 191-92). Her study of the continuous engagement in Afghanistan shows that NATO brings the credible promise of future benefits for states who cooperate, and that public opinion is relevant as explanatory factor only when there is a strong opposition party ready to use the issue for its election campaign. By contrast, De Graaf et al. (2015) analyse how national leaders develop and employ strategic narratives to win and sustain the support of domestic audiences for the war in Afghanistan.

Finally, a two-level game model identifies the situations when either domestic support can facilitate multilateral agreements or small domestic win-set translates into a strong bargaining advantage that could slow down the agreement. For instance, Auerswald (2004), inspired by Robert Putnam’s two-level game analogy, develops an integrated decision-making model to analyse alliance behaviour in the Kosovo conflict that helps to determine how much influence domestic and international politics have on national political decisions.

Similarly, Thies observes that member states of the democratic alliance try to obtain the most security at the lowest cost and to this end they develop various two-level bargaining strategies by which they aim to shift the defence burden from their taxpayers to those in another member states (2003, p. 9). Elaborating on the fact that US budgetary choices have been crucial for NATO credibility, Cameron suggests that NATO burden-sharing debates have been less about equitable division of labour and more about the US Administration balancing (American) domestic pressures and perceptions in the Congress (2008, p. 44).

**Constructivism and norm-driven burden-sharing behaviour**

In contrast to the above-mentioned studies that explain burden-sharing inequalities in terms of balance of power or threat, institutional incentives, and collective action, the constructivist and sociological literature studies NATO by looking at norms, identities, and practices. These scholars conceive burden-sharing as a norm-driven behaviour, where NATO represents either an institution that can make an independent impact on states’ action, or a security community of states with shared norms and values.
Sociological institutionalism

In general, sociological institutionalism analyses how ideas, knowledge, mutual social construction of meaning, and inter-subjective logic of appropriateness in particular institutional settings influence states’ behaviour and create peer-pressure (Risse 2000, Barnett and Finnemore 2004). For instance, states can internalise norms of the international organisation through socialisation mechanisms (Checkel 2005). Gheciu (2005) examined socialisation practices in two aspiring NATO states to show that NATO could shape state’s identity and successfully promote liberal-democratic norms as a means of projecting stability and security in the region. Schimmelfennig (2016) uses sociological institutionalism to explain NATO adaptation (or “flexibilisation”) as its agenda changed to out-of-area missions and enlargements.

Burden-sharing is explained through relational dynamics among allies and alliance structures as well. Two important studies on burden-sharing stand out in the sociological institutional literature. First, Thielemann (2003) develops a norm-based approach to burden-sharing to analyse the European Union’s refugee problem. He elaborates on the rationalist-sociological divide in institutionalism to outline an analytical model that separates motivations from patterns of burden-sharing. His model contrasts two patterns of behaviour: the prevalent cost-benefit with the norm-based logic of social action, in other words logic of expected consequences vs. logic of appropriateness. The former is employed usually by the public goods literature, where benefit maximisation motivates states to share, and free riding of smaller states characterised the pattern of burden-sharing behaviour. As to the latter, typical for more sociological approaches, states’ motivations to share range from norm of fairness, unity, and solidarity that forbids free-riding, and obligation to others. This second burden-sharing pattern then reflects states’ efforts to safeguard and preserve the norm of equitable sharing.

The second study by Hillison (2009) combines both rational choice and constructivism to how NATO’s enlargement affected alliance burden-sharing. He finds that NATO enlargement did not increase free riding, which contradicts the predictions of both collective action theory (smaller states free ride) and sociological institutionalism (new states are not fully socialised yet). In accordance with the joint product model, his findings indicate that larger NATO members shared a greater part of the burden. However, the new members demonstrated greater willingness to bear burdens than older members did, despite their limited capabilities
(Hillison 2009, p. 8). In distinguishing between limited national resources and the lack of political will, Hillison explains that the new members aimed to establish their reputation of reliable partners through their demonstration of greater willingness to share the burden. This normative aspect of burden-sharing was stronger than the rational incentive to free ride.

**Norms and identities**

Several studies provide explanations of the burden-sharing behaviour in reference to particular norms, or identities. As to norms, Kitchen explains NATO’s out-of-area operations through the evolution of a social norm that has defined NATO allies’ responsibilities to each other and has shaped their interpretation of treaty obligations (2010, p. 105). In another example, rooted in the liberal IR tradition while enriched by constructivist insights, Zyla argues that second-tier powers like Canada eschewed free-riding due to the norm of external responsibility (2015, p. 10). Finally, Long (2006) argues that the decline in Atlanticism can explain the NATO burden-sharing problem. In looking at Atlanticism as a norm of solidarity, he shows that the central difficulty with NATO burden-sharing has lied in the fact that the US wanted burden-sharing without power-sharing, whereas Europe sought more responsibility-sharing while free-riding (Long 2006, p. 24).

Alternatively, NATO can be seen as the manifestation of Atlanticism, a common Atlantic identity, which in turn strengthens allies’ self-identification with NATO’s values and culture (Croci 2008). Identity-based explanations in general can clarify states’ decisions to intervene in an armed conflict (Ringmar 2007). As to NATO burden-sharing, Flockhart (2016) claims that burden-sharing reinforces NATO’s identities, since it has been part of the narrative about the Alliance founded on shared values, risks, and burdens. Additionally, she elaborates on NATO’s multiple identities (corporate and collective) and the practice of “constructive ambiguity” to explain NATO’s endurance (Flockhart 2016, pp. 145-46, 156).

**Strategic culture**

In contrast to rationalist theories, strategic culture approaches conceive alliance burden-sharing as a dynamic process in evolution, rather than as a static outcome in terms of cost distribution (Zyla 2016a, p. 14). Widely applied on country-specific case studies, the concept of strategic culture informs about the appropriateness regarding the use of force and presents both
limitations and resource for governments (e.g., Rasmussen 2005, Massie 2010, Biehl et al. 2013, Trudgen 2016, Skak 2016). Higher levels of defence spending usually relate to a strategic culture based on a more muscular vision of international security. For example, in contrast to the German strategic culture, the Canadian or the Dutch strategic culture attributes an important role to the military cooperation with the US (Mérand and Foucault 2010).

Moreover, international organisations can have a strategic culture too. For instance, Peters (2011) explores the strategic cultures of the EU and the United Nations. Further on the EU strategic culture, Norheim-Martinsen (2011) finds that strategic culture of the EU means a comprehensive approach to security and a unique European asset, though the CSDP has not yet a robust strategic culture. Interestingly, the classical realist study on the EU identifies a strategic culture of restraint (Rynning 2011). Writing on the strategic culture of the European allies, Zyla (2011) conceptualises NATO’s strategic culture as a subculture of the EU’s strategic culture in contrasting collective defence with collective security.

When it comes to the NATO context in particular, Becker and Malesky (2014) argue that the more states articulate their national security strategy in the Atlanticist terms, in contrast to the Europeanist ones, the more likely they are to allocate resources to military operations. In other words, the more Atlanticist strategic culture an ally has, the more it will invest in operational burden-sharing. However, as Becker (2012) argued earlier, variations in strategic culture do not necessarily cause variations in defence expenditures. Adding to this, paradoxically, a coherent alliance-wide strategic culture might in fact result in more free-riding.

It is also worth mentioning here the study by Cooper and Zycher (1989), who outline two different conceptual approaches to burden-sharing in NATO (even though they do not use the term “strategic culture”). First, a fundamentalist approach concentrates upon the allocation of fair shares and equality of financial costs and views free-riding mainly as the major reason for lower defence shares in Europe. This approach stresses fairness of burden-sharing regardless of efficiency. Second, an Atlanticist approach emphasises alliance unity and mechanisms designed to yield effective military force structures for NATO as a whole. This approach is driven by practical problems, not numerical expenditure goals, and thus legitimises the reasons for some degree of free riding in Europe (Cooper and Zycher 1989, pp. v, 6-10).
Burden-sharing as practice

For a great portion of constructivist literature, NATO represents a pluralist security community. The concept has its origins in Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities, a concept which was later elaborated by Adler and Barnett (1998). The existence of such a community is characterised by the peaceful resolution of disputes and the absence of the threat of conflict. With NATO seen as a security community, the shared common identity contributes to alliance longevity.

The recent constructivist burden-sharing scholarship builds on security communities of practices. This approach can show, among others, that security communities share dependable expectations and collective responsibility to live up to the community’s normative standards of self-restraint (Adler 2008). These practices then characterise inter-alliance cooperation dynamics and alliance management in both diplomatic and operational settings (e.g., Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, Pouliot 2016, Schmitt 2017b). For instance, to develop Thies’ study (2003) on disagreements between democratic allies, Hofmann and Yeo argue that the procedural norm of political contestation and internalisation of the substantive norm of security consensus provide many insights into the existing “tolerance for disagreement” (over resources and troops) and ad hoc coalitions (2015, p. 387).

This latest practice trend in the security studies literature defines the burden-sharing problem as a set of practices, as a social activity “informed by deep-seated normative beliefs, that is directed toward a specific set of social purposes at the national and international level” (Zyla 2013, p. 296). NATO therefore represents a security community of practices, out of which is a particular way of sharing the collective burden.

With the practice perspective applied in the EU context, burden sharing emerges as an anchoring practice. Although the allies “all agree on the need to practise burden sharing, they often share antagonistic views of what it implies”; burden sharing then serves as a common point of reference, though in reality the allies share the burden in different ways (Mérand and

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3 However, one of the first analysis of burden-sharing in terms of a social practice is Oppenheimer’s reassessment of the collective goods theory (1979). He argues that free riding of small nations and economically suboptimal burden-sharing might in fact be a socially acceptable outcome.
Rayroux 2016, pp. 444-45). In the same vein, the policy of burden-shifting – asymmetrical sharing of burdens and responsibilities among the allies – requires a common framework (Thies 2003). Another example concerns the case study of Canadian burden-sharing practice in NATO Afghanistan operation. In his study, Zyla (2013) provides a norm-based explanation of why and how Canada shared the collective burden.

**Integrated analytical models**

Many scholars observed that states under the same international system behave differently. Against the prevalent systemic realist and strategic culture analyses of states’ burden-sharing behaviour, several integrated models have been constructed in the last three decades, combining insights from multiple theories and using variables from different levels of analysis.

To study NATO’s involvement in the Persian Gulf, Kupchan attempted to analyse intra-alliance cooperation through three theories: balance-of-power theory, collective action theory, and pluralist theory. He found several determinants of intra-alliance behaviour (external threat, alliance security dilemma, collective action, and domestic politics variables), generated from both systemic and domestic models of international politics.

By isolating political and economic components of alliance management and analysing them separately, Kupchan in his work on intra-alliance cohesion identified different dynamics that drove alliance cooperation and discord (1988, p. 318). The nature of the issue being discussed therefore determined the factors that influenced the national decision-making with regard to alliance management: either intra-alliance bargaining or domestic political, economic, and demographic constraints. He showed that a systemic model of alliance security dilemma best explained political outcomes, while domestic variables played a greater role in explaining economic outcomes. In short, political elites were influenced more by intra-alliance bargaining, coercion, and threat perceptions (the US using the threat of conditional abandonment) in producing political cooperation in NATO. In contrast, the level of defence expenditures and contributions were more influenced by domestic factors, since they were more likely to affect national electorate. On the whole, “the outcome reached by the alliance was the product of coercive bargaining operating in the presence of very rigid domestic spending constraints” (Kupchan 1988, p. 346).
In a similar vein, Bennett et al. (1994) tested two internal and three external hypotheses. In combining collective action, balance of threat, and alliance dependence with state autonomy and domestic politics and bureaucratic politics, they explained alliance behaviour through the interactions between systemic and state-level variables, which “shape states’ alliance contributions in a way that no commonly used hypothesis predicts” (Bennett et al. 1994, p. 73). They believed that only the integrated model could capture those unique burden-sharing outcomes as these models allowed the domestic autonomy and bureaucratic politics hypotheses to play larger part in the explanations of alliance behaviour. Pointing to the weakness of collective action theory, Bennett et al. argued above all that the probability of a state to free ride was higher when the state is either independent of allies in a security coalition or the domestic pressures (factors in terms of state autonomy, societal preferences and bureaucratic politics) against contributions are strong (1994, p. 74). They claimed that domestic variables are especially useful to study alliance behaviour with respect to the mix of military, economic, and diplomatic contributions.

Inspired by the decision making model developed by Bennett et al. (1994), Baltrusaitis (2008) constructed his own integrated model to explain foreign policy decisions regarding burden-sharing. He tried to identify the conditions under which states contribute to military coalitions. Departing from systemic and economic approaches that in general fail to explain the actual outcome of decision-making (e.g., as a result of side-payments, bargaining, or alliance dependence), he incorporated state-societal measures (state execute-legislative relationship) to account for the type of states’ contributions. He found that states with significant executive power in the military affairs are less limited in approving troop deployment than states with higher parliamentary freedom who are ready to accept only lesser military costs.

Another study that transcended theoretical boundaries is Cameron’s analysis (2008) of burden-sharing debates. He applied a multi-theoretical interpretive framework of power and control sharing (realism), cost-sharing (liberalism), and risk-sharing (domestic politics). Lastly, Hyde-Price (2013) in his study of the EU’s security and defence policy went beyond liberal-realist divide, as his analytical framework combined structural relationality and strategic-relational approach with discursive-materialist analysis of power, institutions, and ideas. Looking at both system and domestic level allowed him to understand agent-structure dynamics of transatlantic security relations.
Critical summary

Having provided an overview of the relevant scholarly studies on NATO burden-sharing, this chapter identifies several shortcomings with regard to the existing explanations of states’ burden-sharing behaviour in NATO. Most importantly, in narrowing the burden-sharing problem into the economics of alliances, cost-benefit calculations, and systemic incentives, the existing literature on burden-sharing in NATO has not put enough emphasis on the politics of burden-sharing and its normative structures.

Overall, the NATO burden-sharing scholarship has adopted primarily a rationalist approach to inquiry based on a positivist research agenda (Chalmers 2000, Thielemann 2003). In other words, what the majority of burden-sharing studies has in common is their hypothetical-deductive approach and the system level of analysis. Additionally, these rationalist-deductive studies concentrate mostly on great powers (Oma 2012). In general, ideational factors remain underdeveloped in comparison to “material threats or institutional features” in the literature on alliance management (Hofmann and Yeo 2015, pp. 380-81). Equally important for this dissertation, scholars has pointed out that NATO has not been “the subject of much normative theorising” (Webber 2016, p. 11).

This section regroups the theoretical and methodological shortcomings in the existing literature on burden-sharing into eight points. First, burden-sharing as an economic concept merging collective action and public good theories has limited utility for understanding NATO burden-sharing. Looking at NATO burden-sharing as a zero-sum game, they focus on explaining disproportionate burden-sharing in terms of unidimensional static outcomes and often without contextualisation (Zyla 2016a, pp. 10, 12). In addition, traditional economic models of alliances argue that rational calculations of small and middle powers lead them to free ride, which is not always the case. Due to the determinism of economic logic, they are not equipped to explain actual contributions of smaller states. Furthermore, economic hypotheses fail to explain specific cases of sharing such as operational burden-sharing (Becker 2017).

Second, the alliance security dilemma and dependence explanations often explain European contributions as either based on the fear of abandonment, or as bandwagoning on the US. Yet, these realist hypotheses come to their limits when the specific liberal-democratic nature of NATO is taken into consideration: NATO does not operate because of fear and distrust.
However, realists provide useful insights into various contribution incentives, such as prestige and reputation.

Third, institutional approaches are very useful in explaining the persistence of alliances. However, when it comes to burden-sharing, “they cannot account for the ways in which power disparities, regional variation, or differentiated threat perceptions are translated into successful alliance management” (Hofmann and Yeo 2015, p. 381). Realist institutionalism is an important exception, though it focuses mostly on alliance cohesion.

Fourth, for the constructivist literature in general, the bridging between material and non-material variables seems problematic. For instance, how to measure and rank competing ideas and norms, and compare them with material indicators? One way to overcome this setback is to argue that cultural approaches are “analytically prior to considering burden-sharing as a static outcome” (Zyla 2016a, p. 14). However, strategic culture approaches fail to account for internal differences (states are conceived as unitary actors) and for variations in outcomes among countries with the same normative background and political regime. They implicitly admit that change in a nation’s strategic culture is a difficult long-term process and thus they fail to explain strategic behaviour of states in abnormal situations or differences in contributions among several missions. In general, they are more “descriptive than analytical” (Zyla 2016a, p. 14). On the other hand, Becker and Malesky (2014) claim that a strategic culture approach can explain resource allocation decisions within allies’ budgets.

Fifth, the mainstream burden-sharing literature lacks more in-depth studies on allies other than great powers. The middle and small powers remain under-theorised or they are highly dependent on their relationship with the major power(s). When taken together, explanations of middle and small powers’ free-riding behaviour either rely on the role of great powers or put too much emphasis on domestic constraints.

Sixth, domestic approaches show that NATO burden-sharing might be less about equitable division of labour and more about balancing domestic pressures and perceptions, usually demonstrated through domestic institutional models. However, variables on the level of political elites ultimately need to play a larger part in the research on contribution strategies and alliance burden-sharing in general.

Seventh, systemic approaches struggle to explain decisions on the type of contributions. However, they can be strong in explaining political leaders’ incentives to contribute (Oma
These theories generally concentrate on managing alliance security dilemmas and decreasing cost and insecurity in explaining states’ decisions to contribute. Recent studies using domestic constraints have addressed the long-term absence of research on the form of contributions. The integrated models, mostly within a neoclassical realist framework, try to remedy these limitations by developing an interesting two-phased sequel. Strategic considerations and power politics in the intra-alliance bargaining account for states’ decisions to contribute, whereas domestic constraints (e.g., party politics, public opinion, tensions in the government, accountability and legitimacy, configuration of legislative and executive, collective decision-making, etc.) influence the form and level of contributions. The unique burden-sharing behaviour therefore requires separate explanations of decisions to contribute and its implementation.

Eight, a comprehensive account of burden-sharing and incentives to contribute to military alliances requires analytical tools from more than one IR theory. Since systemic theories alone say little about the variety of possible military, economic and diplomatic contributions to the common burden, one would need different IR theories to explain each specific sphere of burden-sharing. For instance, Cameron’s study (2008) combined power and influence (realism), cost and risk (liberalism), and responsibility (constructivism).

**Conclusion on a qualitative approach to NATO burden-sharing**

This dissertation answers the recent calls for more qualitative and conceptual research on burden-sharing. It joins the front of several scholars who have observed that qualitative (Foucault and Mérand 2012; Ringsmose 2016), normative (Webber 2016), and interpretive (Zyla 2016a) studies on NATO burden-sharing are still under-developed. Particularly, more interpretive research is needed to conceptualise burden-sharing as a dynamic process or social behaviour. This is one of the points in the ontological schism between the old traditional collective action/ systemic literature and the new interpretative literature on NATO burden sharing (Zyla 2016a). In a less radical fashion, Ringsmose believes that qualitative research could further improve collective action and public goods theorising on burden-sharing (2016, p. 219). Similarly, Becker points to the “significant gaps between the public choice defence economics literature and the security studies literature” in terms of insufficient interaction between quantitative and qualitative data (2017, p. 131).
This dissertation tries to remedy the gaps in the existing burden-sharing literature by developing an interpretive research strategy distinguished by its political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry. This qualitative approach to burden-sharing goes beyond cost-benefit assumptions in order to normatively frame the burden-sharing problem. Overall, this dissertation follows the path that Flockhart describes as a “move from the abstract ‘world of theory’ to the pragmatic ‘world of policy’” (2016, p. 157).

The dissertation’s qualitative-interpretive approach to the burden-sharing problem does not pretend to be superior to the mainstream theories of NATO burden sharing. However, it recognises that the existing theories are not suitable for addressing especially the political aspects of burden-sharing. The present doctoral research therefore unpacks the rational deductive approach to defy the determinist assumptions that states are unified actors who make decisions in isolation purely because of cost-benefit calculations and the pursuit of relative gains.\(^4\) This interpretive research therefore aims to provide further insights into the burden-sharing conundrum, in addition to the divergent public goods, realist, institutional, liberal, and constructivist explanations.

The value-added of this dissertation flows from the three-pronged conceptual clarification of burden-sharing key terms – burden, contribution strategies, and sharing arrangements – through the analysis of sense-making processes in the discourse of national elites. This dissertation considers it important to explore the perspective of practitioners themselves, given that burden-sharing is a contested political concept and a powerful “rhetorical weapon” (Foucault and Mérand 2012, p. 424). Even realists would say that an “accurate determination of national interest is important in deciding whether a burden is perceived to be fair or unfair” (Layne 2000, p. 68).

The quest for a more accurate picture of burden-sharing from the practitioners’ perspective gains even more significance when one takes into consideration that “the burden-sharing debate has in many senses been a substitute for the discussion of strategic issues within NATO” that were “too delicate to address directly” (Duke 1993, p. xv, 2). Disagreements on

\(^4\) Similarly, in making a sweeping criticism of rationalist/positivist theories, Zyla claims that “the ontological and epistemological assumptions of rationalist theories of NATO burden sharing are overly reductionist, parsimonious, simplified, and static” (2016a, p. 12).
burden-sharing among and within the allied countries then mirror differences and struggles about the purpose and strategic priorities of the Alliance. For instance, these “disputes are symptoms of deeper disagreements on economic policy and military strategy” (Golden 1983, p. 50, 189).

Burden-sharing is difficult to understand in isolation from NATO’s purpose. As Golden clearly puts it, “without a consensus on how broad alliance objectives should be translated into specific actions, evaluation of national contributions is impossible” (1983, p. 25; similar conclusions in Mattelaer 2016). Consequently, inputs of the collective endeavour cannot be dissociated from its outputs. As Zycher reminds us, “we will not be able to estimate burdens with greater confidence unless we have a clearer idea of precisely what those [alliance] outputs are” (1990, p. 23).

The political, normative, and historical focus of this dissertation’s interpretive inquiry aims to deep dive into the original burden-sharing debates in NATO during the early Cold War. This dissertation will show that, far from being a mere technicality, burden-sharing has been above all an inherently political problem from the very beginning, constantly complicated by allies’ different understanding of equity. And, as the previous chapter showed, the discussions on measurement and indicators have further epitomised the political character of burden-sharing in NATO.

When it comes to the normative portion of the research strategy, it has been recognised that IR theories examine only NATO’s specific activities such as humanitarian interventions (Webber 2016, p. 11). In combining IR theories with the traditions of normative ethics, this dissertation will elaborate on ethical incentives to contribute and will add further insights into the evolution of burden-sharing arrangements. In doing so, it will clarify the political dynamics of fairness and examine an unequal burden-sharing in NATO, the outcome predicted by the economics of alliances. This will provide a more nuanced understanding of burden-sharing shaped around the concept of distributive justice, which is still missing in the NATO literature.

The next chapter will show in more details why interpretation is a valuable strategy for the exploration of burden-sharing, and with the focus on sense-making, for shedding more light into the conceptual vagueness that has surrounded burden-sharing in NATO.
References


Chapter 3 Interpretive Research Strategy

The research strategy of *The Politics of Burden-Sharing* is premised on a specific set of ontological and epistemological considerations. This chapter presents the particularities of the political, normative, and historical approach to burden-sharing that forms the core of this dissertation, and outlines its qualitative-interpretive methodological parameters.

In calling for a qualitative approach to studying NATO burden-sharing, the dissertation’s immediate research goal is to move from the field of abstract theory to the field of practice and policy. In order to explore practitioners’ discourse and analyse how they made sense of as an ambiguous concept as burden-sharing, this dissertation uses interpretation as its main research strategy. It aims to clarify what burden, individual contribution, and fair share meant in the context-specific national discourse of political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders during the first burden-sharing debates in NATO. Moreover, through the traditions of normative ethics as particular analytical tools, together with the concept of distributive justice, the dissertation attempts to interpret NATO burden-sharing within the national actors’ discourse along the ethical lines.

This chapter first elaborates on the triple focus of qualitative inquiry: the political, normative, and historical. The next section explains why the research strategy of this dissertation is interpretation and describes its interpretive-qualitative methodology. The chapter also provides important precisions with regard to the role of normative ethics and justifies its function in this doctoral research. It introduces a five-step interpretive research strategy and its methods. The last part of this methodological chapter provides more details on why this dissertation studies the burden-sharing problem during NATO’s early years and from the Canadian perspective, and presents archival materials as its primary sources.

A qualitative approach to NATO burden-sharing

The present doctoral research on NATO burden-sharing is situated at the intersection between IR, Normative Ethics, and History. The three essays that constitute this dissertation are connected through the following central research question: *how does domestic politics shape burden-sharing dynamics in NATO?* To this end, the dissertation reconstructs the political,
The ethical, and practical dimension of NATO burden-sharing. Its three articles provide respective answers to the following sub-questions:

1. How did Canadian officials make sense of the original burden-sharing debate?
2. How did ethical arguments discursively shape Canadian contribution strategies?
3. How did NATO leaders frame the problem of, and the solution to, burden-sharing in the 1950s?

The main research objective is to understand and conceptualise burden-sharing in NATO from the perspective of the national leaders in Canada, and, in the third article, the leaders from major NATO member countries. This three-essay sequence therefore analyses the key burden-sharing components: purpose and burden (what type of contribution to what kind of burden – article one), contribution strategies (why contribute – article two), and sharing arrangements (how much to contribute – article three).

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the burden-sharing literature is characterised by the dominance of hypothetical-deductive type of studies, while more qualitative and normative research has been largely under-developed. In contrast, this doctoral research is qualitative and incorporates interpretive and ethical turns in social sciences, the elite-level of analysis, and pluralistic and multidisciplinary theorising.

This being said, the doctoral research does not aim to determine why states’ contributions to NATO vary. This qualitative research does not attempt to develop new burden-sharing indicators in order to objectively measure states’ individual contributions. Nevertheless, the value of qualitative analysis resides in its goal to refine our knowledge about burden-sharing dynamics. Instead of counting deployed troops, constructing statistical tables on defence spending, structuring military expenditures, or comparing exposure risks and the shape of national caveats, this dissertation attempts to understand how practitioners themselves made sense of burden-sharing and which sharing arrangements they considered fair and practicable.

*The Politics of Burden-Sharing* focuses on ways in which national officials talked about NATO’s burden and a fair share, and what kind of arguments they used to justify their commitments to NATO. The political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry is best suited for the purpose of studying NATO burden-sharing. It helps unpack the assumption of collective action theory according to which states are rational, unitary, and share the same preferences and
perceptions of the purpose and functioning of the Alliance. This tri-folded approach is enabled by the following methodological choices:

- Interpretive-qualitative methodology and the elite-level of analysis (politics)
- Interpretive text-oriented methods blended with normative ethics’ conceptual apparatus (ethics)
- Archival material as the principal source of data (history)

First and foremost, the interpretive research in this dissertation has a political focus of inquiry. The problem of burden-sharing has been one of the most controversial and discussed issues in NATO, fuelled by the voluntary character of state’s contributions and divergent understandings of what a fair-share should look like. Since burden-sharing is generally framed as a collective action problem, it then follows that NATO members face a rather challenging problem of a fair cost distribution with respect to the common good they collectively produce. Overall, burden-sharing is an abstract concept open to many subjective interpretations, which can influence the modalities of its practical implementation. This is, among others, heightened by the fact that NATO is a multinational alliance whose members make decisions by consensus. This necessarily implies general and vague language in adopted official documents. Inquiring about the reasons why European states spend less on defence in comparison with the US, Cooper and Zycher claim that NATO’s burden-sharing problem lies in the “differences in interests and perceptions about the goals, means, costs, and benefits of activities undertaken by NATO collectively” (Cooper and Zycher 1989, p. v). Put plainly, had burden-sharing been a mere technicality, allies would not have kept returning to it in their high-level discussions.

Although NATO is an alliance concerned with military affairs, political elites (i.e. civilians, not military) from member countries have decision-making power that is based on legal equality of all allies. Not floating in a political vacuum, different understandings of the terms alliance burden or fair share are prone to generate internal differences among and within the groups of domestic decision and policy makers. For instance, the divisions within one national government could develop along the line of different ministries (defence vs. foreign affairs vs. finance), or the understanding of burden-sharing may differ depending on actors’ position in the political system and value spectre (right vs left, conservatives vs liberals,
opposition vs government/coalition). Above all, national authorities have to balance their
decision to spend money on defence against other national priorities (education, health care).

On the alliance-wide level, burden-sharing disputes reflect the different criteria the allies
chose when they talk about national contributions. It is the politics what produces the
disagreements over burden-sharing: how politicians talk about burden and what kind of
measures they use when selling their (domestic) agendas and policies. As put in Duke’s words,
“whether they are fair or even meaningful comparisons seems to be very much of secondary
importance” (1993, p. 109). The political approach of this dissertation therefore tries to
understand how those disparate interpretations play out in NATO burden-sharing dynamics.

Second, this approach is also normative. It aligns with the ethical turn in IR, which claims
that “the distinction between facts and values and the axiological neutrality is only a façade”
(Vilmer and Chung 2013, pp. 19, 58). Considering the fact that the allies formed the Alliance
on the declared premises of solidarity, mutual aid, and shared values, in addition to collective
defence against a common external aggressor, this research on the burden-sharing problem
includes two principal ethical concerns: how national elites justified and rationalised their
commitment to the Alliance, and the parameters of an equitable burden-sharing.

In incorporating the traditions of normative ethics that define abstract principles of
ethical behaviour together with concepts from three major IR theories, this research attempts to
go beyond a cost-benefit analysis of states’ contribution strategies. It is based on the
presumption that politicians think and act according to their worldviews, distinguishing right
from wrong. The normative dimension of burden-sharing is also closely tied to the ethical
concept of distributive justice, which is defined as “the proper distribution of the benefits and
burdens of social cooperation, particularly the distribution of economic resources” (Hoffmann
1981, p. 141). The dimensions of equity and fairness are therefore essential to our understanding
of burden-sharing (Cooper and Zycher 1989, p. vi) in terms of how ethical concerns framed
discussions on sharing arrangements, since “differences [in values] affect the equity of any given
allocation of burdens and responsibilities” (Zycher 1990, p. vii, 23).

The value-added of this type of analysis is that it can “inform policy analysis [at the level
of ideas, as] it provides a way of thinking about normative policy issues that allow policy
advisors and policy makers to frame complicated issues in meaningful ways” (Boadway 2012,
p. 3). In general, the concept of justice is almost devoid of content and provides only some
formal principles. When it comes to the substantive question of what relevant characteristics are to be counted, “different social groups tend to want different lists” (Barry and Rae 1975, p. 384). What further complicates the debates about burden-sharing efforts is that equality does not equal justice; unjust distribution is not the same as unequal distribution and inequality of outcome does not imply injustice (Graham 2008, p. 171).

The IR theory and normative ethics used in this research have an ontological and epistemological function that is different from the mainstream positivist research on burden-sharing. They inform the research strategy per se, but they do not serve to generate research design in terms of dependent-independent variables. In other words, this dissertation uses the theoretical concepts and ethical traditions to better read practitioners’ arguments, not to construct hypotheses.

Third and last, the approach is historical since this dissertation explores the genesis of the burden-sharing problem in NATO during its formative years in the early Cold War. This context-sensitive analysis attempts to provide some answers as to why there had been no explicit numerical rule for indirect contributions in NATO and which measures the allies consider important to include in view to improve their collective action problem. Importantly, as this research focuses on the evolution of how the burden sharing problem was framed in the early debates, it conceives it as a process to underline the dynamic character of burden-sharing.

Furthermore, the traditional burden-sharing debates may offer some valuable insights for the current discussions on NATO burden-sharing. These have arguably been out of balance. With the agreement on the defence spending pledge and the arrival of the new American administration, NATO burden-sharing has become a boiling topic again as the debates have focused predominantly on the input monetary side, pointing to the great inequality in defence spending among allies. In contrast, NATO at the same time has recently shifted its attention and put greater emphasis on its original objective of territorial collective defence on the European continent after two decades of out-of-area operations. The historical perspective of this dissertation represents a way of zooming out from the contemporary interpretations of the “hot” burden-sharing problem. Taking a step back, there might be important lessons learned in the debates when NATO allies launched the military build-up of the Alliance defence posture for the first time.
Interpretation as a research strategy

The research strategy of this dissertation on burden-sharing that glues together its political, ethical, and historical focus of inquiry is interpretation. In designing the qualitative-interpretive methodological toolbox, this dissertation has found inspiration principally in the work by Dvora Yanow (1995, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2012), one of the main advocates of the recent interpretive turn in the social sciences. Yet, the qualitative-interpretive methodology dates back to interpretive theory developed by Geertz (1973) and the Chicago School of the 1940s.

For a positivist mind-set, the word *interpretation* is usually employed when a researcher uses “qualitative data to interpret quantitative findings” (Tarrow 2010, p. 109; italics added by the author). So, “[w]hat’s ‘interpretive’ about interpretive methods?” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xi). Interpretation has a particular function when talking about methodology and ways of doing social science – interpretation is “the method of investigation” (Yanow 1995, p. 111). Interpretive methodology disagrees with “a social scientific practice derived from a model of human behaviour abstracted from the physical and/or natural sciences” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xii). Yanow and Schwartz-Shea identify a division among quantitative, positivist-qualitative, and traditional qualitative methods, with the latter labelled interpretive and based on “ontological and epistemological presuppositions of the Continental interpretive philosophies of phenomenology and hermeneutics and their American counterparts of symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and pragmatism” (2006, p. xviii).

Although both qualitative and interpretive researchers work with word-based data, interpretivists focus on experience-near perspective (Geertz 1983). In other words, thanks to its constructivist ontology and interpretive epistemology, interpretative research is located in the middle between positivism and post-positivism due “the presupposition that social reality is multifold, that its interpretation is shaped by one’s experience with that reality, and that experiences are lived in the context of intersubjective meaning making” (Yanow 2006, p. 23).1

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1 Della Porta and Keating describe four approaches in social sciences: positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist, and humanistic (2008, p. 32). According to this typology, interpretive research uses methodology with a relative focus on meanings and context and methods seeking meaning (textual...
The result is interpretive knowledge where meanings are never treated independently of the contexts of people doing and saying the things that created those meanings.

Interpretation concerns problems of meanings created, conveyed, and interpreted in specific situations and focuses on analytically disclosing those meaning-making practices (Yanow 2006, p. 23). In general, studies conducting interpretive research focus on “the importance of intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values” (Zyla 2016, p. 5). In this kind of research, concepts are embedded in the context and are not universal constructs (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xvii). Interpretive researchers try to “grasp meaning and action together as parts of a complex, situated whole” and are “skeptical of the act of conceptually isolating factors” (Adcock 2006, pp. 60-61).

When it comes to conducting a policy analysis, scholars usually engage in cost-benefit analyses in order to produce an objective assessment of a policy programme. In contrast, scholars using interpretive research ask different questions such as “what does this programme mean, for whom does it have meaning, would it mean different things to different people”; they think about values not as costs and benefits but as a set of meanings (Yanow 2000, p. ix). Instead of generating objective facts and discovering causalities, the ultimate purpose of this kind of research is “to articulate well-founded interpretations of policymaking” (Glynos et. al 2009, p. 23; see also Ginger 2006). Furthermore, by using interpretation, a policy analyst, instead of producing simple description, maps the architecture of actors’ different worldviews and, moving into normative considerations, it ultimately attempts to provide advice to the involved policy makers and inform them on whether the policy is likely to achieve the desired outcomes (is it the right policy to address the specific problem?). Studies that use interpretive research analyse for instance local government processes in Australia (Colebatch, 1999), technology transfer policy in Germany (Hofmann. 1995), meaning of immigration in Congressional committee hearings (Chock 1995), or the issue of wilderness designation and public lands (Ginger 2006).

As to interpretivist philosophical grounding, objective and subjective are ontologically linked; reality is “somewhat” knowable, but not as separate from human subjectivity; and the lack of the epistemological divide between scholar and its object results in understanding subjective knowledge and producing contextual knowledge (Ibid., p. 23).
Yanow presented an overview on how to employ interpretive analysis: “understanding [...] meanings is not simple: it requires deliberate efforts of interpretation. Policy interpretations ask not only what a policy means, but also how a policy means. Interpreters often discover that for both questions, the answer is plural: a policy means more than one thing, and those meanings are conveyed in more than one way” (1995, p. 111; italics in original). Scholars using an interpretive analysis call attention to the “metaphoric character of policy discourse” and to ambiguities due to not only political reasons, but human language itself as “it accommodates multiple meanings” (Ibid., p. 115). Data interpretation is a construction of meaning: “meaning is not something that just exists; every reader must interpret it” (McNabb 2010, p. 317).

Interpretive research serves to explore how people make sense of ambiguous situations and concepts and how the parties of the debate frame issues by assessing structure and content of stories and arguments (Yanow 2000, pp. 5, 11; Ginger 2006, p. 332). These frames, by which political actors make sense of problems, are often built through language and, as such, they shape perceptions and understandings (Yanow 2000, p. 12).

Why is interpretive analysis useful for studying burden-sharing in NATO? The overall policy context of burden-sharing in NATO involved high levels of ambiguity and polarisation arising from multiple and conflicting interpretations of what the burden is and how to best carry it, uncertainty (incomplete information in the public), and complexity (competing evaluation criteria and comparison methods). The case in point is the two-percent benchmark. National leaders can understand it in three different ways: as an indicator of the level of spending in the near to distant future, a desirable level of present spending, or simply a signal to stop cutting defence budget.

Furthermore, in burden-sharing discussions, the actors link technical information to policy recommendations that can change the framing of the problem. It is necessary to look at which ideas their discourse conveys and how they turn technical language into rhetorical devices, such as analogies and metaphors. It follows that even technical documents require interpretation as they hide normative positions that relate technical information to policy through politics (Ginger 2006). Normative assumptions are related to burden-sharing in politically important ways. This kind of analysis enables the researcher to make clear the differences that lie at the core of political debates on burden-sharing and how these differences
are reflected in the contribution strategies of allies, as “politicians can talk past each other because of the failure to acknowledge value differences directly” (Ginger 2006, p. 346).

An interpretive research strategy uses abduction to produce findings, and a technique known as grounded theory to construct categories from the ground (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Without imposing a priori established abstract concepts, the analysis is developed, re-established and refined simultaneously with the research. This technique is particularly widespread in situations where the researcher is highly dependent on the empirical material. The researcher develops provisional categorisations, then compares new data with the existing basis in order to see whether these provisional categories fit and, if necessary, reformulates the categories so that they are empirically valid. Thus, the abstract categories emerge from empirical research through this constant comparative technique (Milliken 1999, p. 234).

This dissertation explores the practitioners’ sense-making of the burden-sharing problem through their private and public discourse. The distinction between discourse and interpretation is not straightforward. For some, discourse analysis is a method within the interpretive research programme. For others, interpretive methods are part of the discourse analysis. Undoubtedly, there are various schools of discourse analysis and each defines discourse in its own terms, depending on theoretical and epistemological bases of respective discourse analysis.²

There is even a lively debate on the term *discourse* itself. Apart from a standard understanding of discourse as “natural language, speech, and writing”, discourse can mean “almost anything that acts as a carrier of signification, including social and political practices, to discourse as an ontological horizon” (Glynos *et. al* 2009, p. 5). What these discursive approaches have in common is their concern with questions of meaning and its construction and apprehension by subjects (Glynos *et. al* 2009, p. 6).

This dissertation does not consider discourse as a particular method, but as an analytical *playground* that consists of a certain number of textual corpuses. To be more specific, discourse in this doctoral research represents “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations” (Hajer 1997, p. 44), which together create “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, p. 1). When it comes to its

² For a more comprehensive explanation of these epistemological positions, see Bhattacharya (2008).
functions, the definition of discourse is further refined as a “grid of intelligibility”, according to which discourses “make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, […] while excluding other possible modes of identity and action” (Milliken 1999, p. 229).

The most common criticism directed to discourse and interpretive research programmes in general concerns the lack of objectivity and methodological rigour or systematicity, given its “procedural idiosyncrasies” and the proximity of researcher to the observed phenomena (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 4). However, findings in an interpretive study are not “little more than ‘opinion’” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xiv). “Interpreting words or acts or objects in a scientific fashion may be an act of creating meaning, but it is not an act of imagination ex nihilo” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 385). In other words, “interpretive does not mean ‘impressionistic’” (Yanow 2000, p. ix).

The best answer to these critics can be found in Pouliot’s work on practice of security communities, in which he introduces his subjective-with-an-o methodology. This particular research methodology is based on the passage from subjective to objective by recovering meanings, putting them in context, and setting them in motion via a non-linear three-step research process based on a methodology that is inductive, interpretive, and historical (Pouliot 2010, pp. 57-91). Similarly, to remedy these obstacles, this dissertation uses a five-step interpretive research strategy based on abduction, concepts of normative ethics’ traditions in the form of an interpretive grid, and archival material.

**Five-step interpretive research strategy**

This section outlines the analytical procedure of how this doctoral work arrived at its findings. The dissertation follows the five-step interpretive research strategy that has been inspired by Yanow (2000, pp. 20-23). The first two steps are conducted simultaneously as the researcher needs to identify both the artifacts (the significant carriers of meaning for a given policy issue) and the interpretive communities (different groups of political actors) relevant to policy issue. These first steps concern the data-collection phase of the research.

In this type of research, collection of data is not “straightforward, matter-of-fact observation”, since data must be generated as they are not considered as “things given, but things made sense of, interpreted” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. xix). Furthermore, accessing/generating data and analysing them are usually interlinked processes. For instance,
the objective of the fieldwork in the archives is to collect the body of evidence, which had already been influenced by research decisions and later shaped by the gradual reading of the material.

During the third step, the researcher identifies discourses: how interpretive communities talk and act with respect to the policy issue. Put differently, the objective here is to identify the various meanings carried by specific artifacts. The fourth step reveals the points of conflict between and/or among groups through applying different research methods. Their conceptual sources can include instrumental, cognitive, and ethical elements. For instance, making arguments based on national or community interests, “thinking in metaphors, invoking labels, using implicit theories”, and justifying action on the grounds of fairness create cognitive maps of actors through which the research can assess “how different practices entail different discourses” (Yanow 1995, p. 121). The researcher’s major intervention begins in the fifth step. The researcher shows how these conceptual differences reflect different ways of thinking by different political actors. The researcher also points to the implications of these different interpretations for policy formulations and actions and, if applicable, to a possible bridge-building reformulation of the issue.

The discussion on the first and second step is presented in this chapter’s section on data and primary resources. As the fifth step of the interpretive research strategy concerns the interpretation of findings, it could be find in the last chapter on conclusions and implications. Overall, the interpretive research strategy generates historically and conceptually rich accounts that emerge from thick descriptions. In order to recover the contextualised meanings and significations from both the national private and public discourse on burden-sharing, hidden in archival documents, this dissertation employs a variety of interpretive methods.

**Methods**

This section presents a brief overview of interpretive text-oriented methods that this dissertation uses for the third and fourth analytical steps of the interpretive research strategy. The ultimate purpose of this interpretive research strategy is to let national practitioners speak about their contributions and the burden-sharing problem in NATO. To do so, each of the three articles uses a specific set of methods. Further detailed description of each method is provided in the respective essays.
At a very basic level, interpretation applies analytical, or close, reading to generate and analyse data. In general, the interpretive analysis in this dissertation uses word-based, meaning-focused methods. The analysis focuses on the documents as a whole, not just on the sentence-level grammar or the flow of paragraphs. It assesses the outline and overall structure of the burden-sharing story, with a particular interest in word choices in the written material. Furthermore, to understand how government and national authorities made sense of burden-sharing, it pays attention to (i) who produced a document, how, and why; (ii) the intended audiences, (iii) the structure and normative positions of arguments that linked the technical information to burden-sharing (structure, content, and arguments).

The first article applies three text-oriented methods of category, metaphor, and argument analysis to retrieve meanings from the Canadian national discourse on NATO burden-sharing. These three interpretive methods are especially useful in situations when the actors have to make sense of ambiguous concepts such as NATO’s burden or responsibilities, as some allies contribute to Western security and others are more globally-oriented, and as some allies refer only to the GDP indicator, whereas others focus more on the quality of contribution or non-military efforts.

These methods are essential for the purpose of conceptual clarification. The first article of this dissertation is particularly interested in the meaning and subsequent difference between NATO’s purpose and burden through category and metaphor analysis. Once their meaning(s) is (are) established, further interpretive exploration of Canadian discourse in this essay uses the argument analysis to clarify the reasons why Canada decided to contribute to NATO. Concretely, it looks at the arguments that practitioners themselves mobilised, prioritised, and reiterated in their discourse to justify Canada’s contributions to NATO in accordance with their understanding of burden.

The third article uses a category analysis that specifically concentrates on practitioners’ sense-making of distributive justice, one of the central concept of normative ethics, during the original burden-sharing debates among the NATO allies. Its take on the burden-sharing problem is particular, because it employs the distributive justice concept together with the insights from the philosophy of taxation. It uses three basic models of distributive justice (benefit principle, equal sacrifice, and egalitarian models) as developed in Murphy and Nagel (2002), and looks at the balance between simplicity, fairness, and effectiveness, the three characteristics proper to
every tax model. This category analysis therefore attempts to establish which type of distributive justice, if any, the allies agreed on to guide their sharing arrangements right after NATO was established.

In short, this dissertation uses these three basic interpretive methods to clarify conceptually the purpose and the burden of NATO, to improve our understanding about how national elites framed the problem of, and the solution to, the burden-sharing problem through the lenses of the distributive justice concept. In short, they facilitate the analysis of what it takes to be a good burden-sharer in the NATO context.

Lastly, the second article uses a complex form of an argument analysis that builds on Hayes and James’s theory-as-thought method to explore the ethical dimension of burden-sharing behaviour. This adapted IR theory-as-thought method applies an interpretive grid, or a codebook, of four ethics: ethics of obligations, ethics of prudence, utilitarian ethics, and communitarian ethics. They result from the combination of three IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) with three families or traditions of normative ethics (deontology, consequentialism, and relational ethics). These four ethical ideal-types inform on abstract principles of ethical behaviour and help establish which ethics shaped the Canadian discourse on burden-sharing.

This grid, despite being simplistic, as it ignores complexities within and between various ethical and IR schools, systemises what national actors themselves put forward as being a “right thing to do” in terms of contributing to the Alliance and its burden-sharing. The combination of IR theory with normative ethics in the analysis facilitates the grasp of ethical elements in the burden-sharing discourse of national elites. Ultimately, it serves to interpret the national discourse on burden-sharing along the ethical lines. This argument analysis “with an ethical twist” improves our understanding of how the issues of contributing and sharing were framed in ethical terms. Its ontological and epistemological assumptions are exposed in more details in the next section of this chapter.

**The role of normative ethics in this dissertation**

The exploration of ethical elements in the burden-sharing discourse rests on two important assumptions. First, there is no ethically neutral action or “ethic-free zone” (Booth 2011, p. 475). Even in politics, no action is void of ethical considerations since decision-makers, bound by
legitimacy concerns, act in accordance with some conception of a right course of action, and thus “every politics has an ethics” (Burke et al. 2014, p. 9, Vilmer 2015, pp. 177-8).

Second, IR is a domain of moral choice. Every IR theory has a normative dimension, and these IR “moral codes” are not different from those that exist in domestic politics or on the individual level (Hoffmann 1988, p. 29). However, IR as a domain of moral choice also implies “the uniqueness of the international”, which lies in its “ethical pluralism” (Hurrell 2002, p. 137). This means that many competing moral systems create different criteria of ethical action and value ranking.

In order to dig deeper into the normative dimension of burden-sharing, this dissertation develops an interpretive method that blends IR theory with normative ethics on a conceptual level. It is a modified version of the argument analysis that builds on a theory-as-thought method originally developed by Hayes and James (2014). This section provides some details on the field of normative ethics including its ethical traditions, and the role of normative research in the IR. It further justifies the inclusion of normative ethics in the present research on burden-sharing in NATO.

Normative ethics

The field of ethics is categorised into four branches: meta-ethics, normative ethics, descriptive ethics, and applied ethics. Meta-ethics is interested in the meaning of “right” action, metaphysics of moral facts, and the nature of moral statements. Descriptive ethics, also known as comparative ethics, studies people’s beliefs about morality, values, and distinguishes right from wrong actions. In contrast, normative ethics is prescriptive in nature, since it studies ethical action (how people ought to act) by evaluating the criteria for the rightness and wrongness of action, motives, and ends of this action. Descriptive ethics is complementary to normative ethics, as its empirical investigation can inform normative ethics theories about new ethical concepts or improve philosophical arguments. Finally, applied ethics is concerned with moral permissibility of concrete actions and practices. While normative ethics addresses theoretical problems, applied ethics has a practical vocation, since it studies ways of how we can translate ethical knowledge into reality. It thus attempts to use philosophical methods to identify the morally correct course of action in various fields of human life, for example bioethics or environmental ethics.
The classical theories of normative ethics are divided in three grand families: deontology, consequentialism, and the virtue ethics\(^3\) (Sandel 2010). Contemporary normative ethics also includes a fourth branch of relational ethics, which is linked to more reflexive schools of thought (Bauman 1993, Burke 2007). According to deontological approaches, defining right action and placing constraints on this action depends on the interpretation of duties (or rules), obligations, and authority. The authority can be divine, but most deontological approaches emphasise the centrality of reason (Kantianism) or agreement (contractarianism).

Consequentialist approaches emphasise the results of actions as the benchmark of morality, rather than duties or intentions. Utilitarianism has become the most well-known consequentialist theory, where just or right actions are only those that can contribute to the maximisation of utility for the greatest number of persons.

Finally, relational ethics emphasises the interdependence of all humans, rather than taking a moral individual separately as the basis of ethical theory. In proposing an alternative to deontology and consequentialism, relational ethics concentrates on responsibilities to and for other and shifts away from the question “how one ought to act” towards “how one should respond” or “how we should exist in responsibility to and for others” (e.g., Austin 2008, Frosh 2011; Burke \textit{et al.} 2014, p. 11).

\textbf{IR theory and ethics}

The IR approach to ethical thinking is rather particular. The long domination of realism, which has traditionally been hostile to ethical questions in politics in its pursuit of a value-free science, has led the modern IR field to neglect the significance of studying ethics in the international arena. This has changed in the 1980s with the emergence of critical IR theories. In short, despite the long tradition of ethical reflection, ethical theorising about international politics remained weak, or of secondary interest at best, until one decade ago.

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\(^3\) Virtue approaches are mostly associated with the ancient Greek thought, which gave priority to moral character, personal qualities, and human flourishing in judging moral behaviour, rather than to rules or consequences. However, this dissertation does not use this ethical tradition due to its limited applicability and under-resourced information in the IR field.
The interest in historical traditions of normative IR theory (e.g., Brown 1992, Nardin and Mapel 1992, later Copp 2006) and the pioneering critical ethical thinkers (Linklater 1998; Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Shapcott 2001, 2010) have put ethical questions back on IR research agenda. The contemporary attention to ethics in IR is manifested by several high-quality handbooks and IR ethics dictionaries, such as Hayden (2009), Reus-Smit and Snidal (2010), Bell (2010), or Moellendorf and Widdows (2015).

Today, some scholars claim that the field of international ethics has become a branch of applied ethics (Nardin 2008), or that it is a sub-field of international normative theory (Hurrell 2002). Other academics advance that the IR domain does not have one coherent ethical theory. Some recent voices would like to regroup several ethical traditions (particularly the critical one) under one roof as “global ethics” (e.g., Gasper 2006, Frost 2009, Hutchings 2010, Eskelinen 2011, Dower 2014).

Undoubtedly, the central preoccupations of IR ethical thinking concern the long-lasting dilemma of a force-order-justice nexus. The IR realm is also characterised by several on-going major debates that address this nexus: the communitarian (e.g., Taylor 1989, Frost 1996, Walzer 1977, or Sandel 2010) vs. cosmopolitan (Hurrell 2013) divide that undermines the “traditional” separation of domestic and international, including the efforts to reconcile it (Shapcott 2001); the problem of global justice (Hurrell 2013) the opposition between global moral egalitarianism vs. global distributive egalitarianism (Gilabert 2015) and even responsibilitarianism or sufficientarianism (Blake 2015); domestic vs. international justice, such as the “thin vs. thick” debate about distributive justice (Walzer 1994).

Overall, the research on the international normative theory is rather strong in applied ethics. Ethicists studying international affairs and IR scholars elaborating on ethical questions have provided important normative insights in various IR-specific issue areas. For instance, ethics of (critical) security studies (Burke et al. 2014, Burke 2015; Nyman and Burke 2016, Hynek and Chandler 2013); just war tradition (Walzer 1977, Elshtain 2007); humanitarian intervention (Bellamy 2004; Wheeler 2001; Doyle 2011); cyber warfare (Dipert 2010; Barrett 2013); foreign policy (Irwin 2001; MacDonald et al. 2007; Blake 2015); strategic studies (Vilmer 2015), international law (Hurd 2014); or sovereignty and justice (Brown 1997, 2002). Interestingly, and most importantly for this dissertation, the studies that include NATO address ethical concerns mostly in relation to the general problems of security studies, such as the
responsibility to protect concept. This being said, normative theorising on burden-sharing in NATO is almost absent (Webber 2016, p. 11).

In contrast to the studies that use applied ethics in the IR field, this interpretive research strategy is interested in how normative ethics – the three families that define different abstract principles of behaviour introduced at the beginning of this section – relates to the IR theory in a general and abstract manner. Rather than using IR applied ethics, the principal goal of this research strategy is to link general traditions of ethical thinking to IR theories in order to develop an interpretive method of argument analysis with an ethical twist.

Generally speaking, the normative dimension of theories means asking the so-called second order questions. However, the major IR theories are usually only implicit about their ethical judgments, and their moral positions are more or less assumed. Yet, the central premises of each IR theory do inform about a desirable action of individual and state. These preoccupations have not emerged from nowhere (Nardin 2008, p. 595). In order to make the general IR ethical thinking more transparent, one has to look at their intellectual traditions, which overlap with the disciplines of political thought and moral philosophy.

The main reason for using theories of normative ethics in this research is a very simple one: to generate a richer, coherent, and more systematic account of the ethical dimension in the practitioners’ private and public discourse on burden-sharing in NATO. Furthermore, the general distinction between rule-oriented and consequence-oriented ethical traditions in the IR realm is not quite practical, since there is no clear-cut distinction in a sense “one ethical tradition – one IR theory” (Mapel and Nardin 1992). For example, the liberal IR theory includes both rule-oriented and consequence-oriented traditions, while various consequence-oriented traditions are present in almost all major IR theories. This research strategy therefore systemises ethical thinking of three IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) along the lines of three normative ethics traditions (deontology consequentialism, and relational ethics). Hence the combination of both IR theories and normative ethics.

And finally, the decision to employ normative ethics also stems from a recent call by scholars for a greater dialogue between descriptive and normative ethics. On the one hand, a better use of normative ethics can lead to more precise descriptions of moral attitudes in traditions and social activities since “normative ethicists have a superior vantage point from which to understand and delineate the contents of moral attitudes” (Sandberg 2015, p. 177). On
the other, descriptive ethics’ empirical investigation of moral practices can put normative ethics into perspective, generate new concepts and give credibility to existing ones. The ethical elements specific to each of three IR theories are discussed in more details in the second essay of this dissertation.

**NATO burden-sharing from the Canadian perspective**

This interpretive research of the burden-sharing origins in NATO reconstructs the first burden-sharing debates in NATO mostly from the point of view of a particular country, which is neither a hegemon, nor a European state. Canada’s involvement in the creation of NATO, its defence policy, and its role in the subsequent development of military cooperation within the Alliance, is very interesting to study for at least five reasons.

First, Canada was not only one of the founding nations of NATO, but also one of the three countries that participated in the very first secret negotiations on the possibility of creating a peacetime military alliance in this region. As historians analyse Canada’s foreign policy in reference to the Atlantic Triangle, the so-called *ABC countries* (e.g., Brebner 1948, Haglund 2000), it would be interesting to see how those relations played out in the context of NATO burden-sharing.

Second, according to material indicators of power in terms of military assets (such as the size of armed forces), economy, and geographical size, Canada was the fourth most powerful state in the international system in the aftermath of the Second World War (Létourneau 1992, p. 53). Yet, it chose the path of becoming a middle power (Chapnick 1999). This choice could have influenced also the terms and extent of Canada’s participation in the NATO structures and the type of Canadian contributions.

Third, Canada borders with a superpower. This means that it faces constant security dilemma and threat of over-dependence, while at the same time it can enjoy the benefits provided by its much stronger southern neighbour, act on its responsibility to defend the both continents, or continue to build a security community along the world’s longest demilitarised border. These various concerns have affected its involvement in NATO as well.

Fourth, Canada was the only country apart from the US that launched and maintained an official governmental programme of mutual military aid, specifically open for all European allies. This could have created important dynamics in its contribution strategies to NATO. Other
traditional European middle powers either chose neutrality and did not join NATO or were trying to reconstruct national economies after the Second World War.

Fifth, more often than not, this other North American ally gets a silent treatment in the burden-sharing literature. This is not surprising since burden-sharing for many represents a transatlantic problem between the US and the European allies. When it comes to early NATO itself, its history has usually been told from the American or European (great power) perspective. It must be noted, however, that the number of IR studies that have included Canada in their multi-case, cross-country comparisons on the post-Cold War cooperation in NATO have increased in the recent years.

It is important to mention that this dissertation does not try to provide a comprehensive account of Canada in the 1950s, as it is neither a case study of this country’s history nor its foreign policy. Several significant works studied Canada’s raise on the international scene during and in the aftermath of the Second World War. They especially analysed the origins of middle power diplomacy and internationalism in Canadian foreign policy within the United Nations system (e.g., Gelber 1946, Holmes 1979, Halloran 1990, Hilliker and Barry 1995, Chapnick 2000). In general, this middlepowerhood became the basis of Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s justification for Canada’s involvement in international organisations to affirm Canadian influence in the international community during the mid-1940s (Chapnick 1999, p. 75). Interestingly, Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong first put forward that “the middle powers could be understood hierarchically as those states which were a part of the North American Treaty Organization, but were not great powers” (Chapnick 1999 p. 78).

Overall, there are little detailed analyses of early NATO burden-sharing from the Canadian perspective in the political science/IR field. In general, the early Cold War period of the Canadian policy towards NATO has been treated extensively in the works of Canadian historians and in memoirs of former Canadian politicians and diplomats. This dissertation, to guide the research in the archives and correctly contextualise the retrieved material, regularly consulted the historical writings by Pearson (1966), Reid (1977, 1992), Eayrs (1980), Holmes (1979, 1982), Hillmer (1999), Bothwell (2011), the collections of Canadian political leaders’ public speeches compiled by MacKay (1971) and Blanchette (2000), and the excellent overview of NATO’s first years by NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay (1955).
Political scientists studying Canada and NATO in this period have been interested especially in the questions of why and how Canada participated in the creation of the Alliance, the concept of the Atlantic community, and power relations on the North American continent, for instance Létourneau (1992), Létourneau et al. (1994), Roussel (1998, 2008), Haglund and Rousssel (2004), Trudgen (2012). There are also several studies that deal with parts of Canadian burden-sharing efforts, such as the deployment of Canadian troops to Europe (Maloney 1997), the link between NATO and NORAD (Lajeunesse 2007), or the legacy of Article II (Morrison 1992). This dissertation further develops on Canada’s pursuit of middlepowerhood in NATO structures, where middle power is understood as a tool of foreign policy and influence, in its reconstruction of the burden-sharing dynamics in NATO. For instance, topics such as the conception of the programme of military assistance to European allies.

In short, the study of the Canadian burden-sharing behaviour and the discourse of its national political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders who helped build NATO can add some new insights into how NATO members approached their collective action problem at the very beginnings of the Alliance and into ways in which their cooperation started to take shape.

Primary sources

This dissertation conducts an in-depth analysis at the level of national political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders during the Premiership of Louis St-Laurent and his foreign affairs minister Lester B. Pearson (1948-1957). Given that its main goal is to explore how these elites made sense of burden-sharing, this dissertation needs to reconstruct the Canadian discourse on burden-sharing as recorded in the official historical documents of the Government. The principal source of archival data is Library and Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa and, to a lesser extent, NATO online archives. In addition, many secondary resources, such as detailed historical studies on Canada and NATO, helped further contextualise burden-sharing debates in the 1950s.

During a one-month fieldwork, almost twenty thousands of pages were collected in the Canadian archives for the purpose of this research. The data-collection phase consisted especially of tracing arguments in the national decision-making processes that had preceded Canada’s contributions and discussions on the events that shaped NATO in its formative years. The main actors came from the departments of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, trade and commerce, together with Chiefs of Staff, Canadian diplomats, High Commissioners, and
national representatives from all over NATO countries. The following collections were consulted in LAC (see Annex A for the full detailed list of the collected material):

- MG26-J4 William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds (Memoranda and Notes series)
- MG26L Louis St. Laurent fonds
- RG 2 Privy Council Office fonds
- RG 19 Department of Finance fonds
- RG 20 Department of Trade and Commerce fonds
- RG 24 Department of National Defence fonds
- RG 25 Department of External Affairs fonds

The strength of archival research comes with the access to primary sources, which are crucial “to produce fine-grained decision-making analyses that mitigate the biases of hindsight and uncritical dependence on existing scholarly works” (Darnton 2018, p. 84). The primary sources for this research consist of both private and public documents retrieved from the archives. The public documents include public speeches and statements made by the members of the Canadian Government, ministerial books, press communiqués, final policy documents, white papers, parliamentary hearings, (annual) reports from specialised committees, departments and agencies, and, if applicable, transcriptions of interviews in the media.

The more important and interesting corpus of private documents consists of diplomatic correspondence (recorded mail, telegrams, and private letters) either between the Canadian Government and NATO staff or among the Canadian diplomats, unofficial drafts of governmental reports, minutes of meetings in the Canadian specialised committees, Government memoranda, and private reports of governmental or parliamentary commissions and agencies.

Finally, the third essay of this dissertation presents the views of other NATO allies, as they were reported by the Canadian representatives and recorded in the Government’s documents in the National Archives. These actors from other countries include the national representatives at the NATO Headquarters, and usually included defence and foreign ministers from the US, the UK, and France.
Summary

In conclusion, to pursue a political, normative, and historical inquiry about the NATO burden-sharing problem, this dissertation needs an interpretive research strategy that links them in a coherent way. The research strategy of interpretation follows five steps, uses several qualitative-interpretive methods, and further employs traditions of normative ethics to give the analysis the “ethical twist” necessary to explore the normative dimension of NATO burden-sharing.

In this qualitative-interpretive research, discourse represents a place where political problems are framed and solutions to them defined, conceptualised, and legitimised. It is also a place where the struggles over the meanings of words, categories, conceptual boundaries, connections and disconnections are fought. For example, how national leaders present their contributions, what kind of measure they refer to when they talk about burden-sharing, their political arguments and justifications, or how they present their fair shares. In other words, this dissertation interprets NATO burden-sharing from the point of view of national elites.

This dissertation does not aim to measure burden-sharing gaps, but to approach burden-sharing through the concept of distributive justice (the notion of fairness), offer normative answers for why states commit national resources to defend others, and characterise burden-sharing dynamics along the ethical lines. This dissertation conducts a qualitative-interpretive research of burden-sharing dynamics that is based on the historical evidence of what was actually said (and recorded) in the Canadian Government’s private and public archived documents.

Lastly, this interpretive research strategy can clarify not only why states contribute to military alliances, but also the normative roots of the burden-sharing problem. The political, normative, and historical approach is apt to reveal how burden-sharing dynamics connect the motives to contribute with the different understanding of burden and fair share. For instance, the interpretive-qualitative research can demonstrate the reasons for the absence of a common funding mechanism for NATO’s operations or an institutionalised cost-sharing formula for allies’ indirect contributions in general. Briefly, to give the Politics of Burden-Sharing a concrete shape, this dissertation explores NATO burden-sharing as a process from a qualitative angle at the level of domestic practitioners.
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Chapter 4 The Canadian Politics of Fair-Share: The First Burden-Sharing Debates about NATO (Essay #1)

Abstract

After the long domination of economic and collective action theories, the literature on the political aspects of Allied burden-sharing is growing. This article analyses the politics of fair-share in NATO from the perspective of Canadian officials during the first burden-sharing debates in 1949-1952. I focus on sense-making and, through an interpretive methodology, I reconstruct the Canadian discourse on fair-share. This article shows that for Canada sharing NATO’s burden was not only a matter of technicality or realist considerations; in order to make NATO burden-sharing work, the allies needed to balance three dimensions of collective defence burden: military, economic, and moral.

Keywords: Canada; NATO; burden-sharing; collective defence; interpretive methodology

Introduction

Since allies are expected to contribute on a voluntary basis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have a common ‘budget of collective defence’. This situation has led to lively political and academic debates about burden-sharing. This debate divides two camps of scholars: one claims that Europe is contributing enough and the other argues that the United States (US) contributes too much and Europe is free-riding. Both camps brandish statistical figures and quantitative models to support their argument. By contrast, this article focuses on the other, often overlooked North American ally. The case of Canada illustrates

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2 Only in 2006 NATO allies adopted a guideline to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. The much smaller NATO infrastructure budget, which is based on an agreed cost-sharing mechanism, is not covered in this paper.
vividly the political and even at times moral dimension of burden sharing. To analyse what I call the *politics of fair-share* from the perspective of Canadian political, bureaucratic and military officials, I go back in time to the moment when the burden-sharing problem in NATO first emerged to explore how it became an issue in the first place.

Specifically, the article addresses an episode of the Allied burden-sharing from the early NATO just before the *NATO Annual Review* was institutionalised in 1952. Although a considerable amount of literature deals with NATO’s founding years independently of economic and collective action theories, political scientists usually focus on the US Cold War policy and on European great powers. Conversely, even though there is a significant number of studies produced by Canadian diplomatic historians, political scientists pay more attention to burden-sharing debates during the Pearson and Trudeau governments, which occurred later in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, the question of sharing the costs of collective defence was put on the table in NATO for the first time in the summer of 1949.

How did Canadian officials make sense of this ‘original’ burden-sharing debate? Playing a leading role in the creation and development of NATO, Canada found itself isolated

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early on. While Canadian officials frequently used terms such as ‘fair contribution’, ‘fair-share,’ or ‘just part’ (quoted in English), Canada was the only country with an explicit dislike of NATO’s statistical exercises, which were precisely supposed to determine the equitable distribution of the common defence burden. The views formulated under the St. Laurent liberal government in 1949-1952 were echoed in debates about defence spending guidelines at the NATO summit in September 2014, during which the Canadian conservative Prime Minister Harper expressed his dissatisfaction with measuring contributions against one indicator – defence spending expressed as a percentage of the GDP.

Studies on burden-sharing and military alliances are based almost exclusively on hypothetical-deductive models and systemic theories. In narrowing the problem to the economics of alliances, the existing literature on Allied burden-sharing does not put much emphasis on the politics of sharing. Yet, as I will demonstrate, burden-sharing is not a mere technicality but is instead filled with interpretive gaps generated by the ambiguity of the concepts of burden and fairness. To do so, I conduct an interpretive and historical analysis, in which the principal elements of burden-sharing – purpose, burden, contributions, and comparison – are put together like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle to create a portrait of Canadian officials’ understanding of burden-sharing. And I argue that, in the view of these officials, Atlantic allies needed to recognise all three elements of NATO’s defence burden – military, economic and moral – in order to make burden-sharing work. The allies therefore had to tailor their contributions in a way that would not only correspond to their realist concerns and cost-benefit calculations, but also to the notion of fairness.

After presenting shortcomings of the economic and structural literature and outlining the interpretive methodological approach of the present article, I first look at how Canada’s decision to co-found NATO can inform us about the Alliance’s purpose. In the second part I distil the categories, metaphors, and arguments Canadian officials used to characterise NATO. The third analytical section reconstructs the ambiguous concept of burden and, through the mapping of Canadian officials’ arguments, it explores how they made sense of burden-sharing. The article concludes on the politics of burden-sharing from a transatlantic perspective today.

Interpreting Burden-Sharing

The question of burden-sharing is as old as collective action. The dominant approach to the burden-sharing problem is collective action theory, introduced by Olson and Zeckhauser in
1966, which defines the burden as a *good* in terms of a public/private dichotomy.⁵ When it comes to sharing, mainstream economic reasoning suggests that large states should bear a disproportionately higher share of the burden while smaller nations will act as self-interested actors and tend to retain security assurances without bearing (hardly) any costs.⁶ The current main explanation of why free-riding does not always occur is based on the alliance security dilemma, according to which states’ contributions to alliances stem from their fear of being abandoned or entrapped by their more powerful ally. The smaller allies facing this strategic choice can also decide to contribute in order to pursue symbolic and reputational gains.⁷

When it comes to the task of assessing and comparing individual states’ contributions, the most commonly used yardstick is defence spending, expressed as a percentage of country’s GDP. Post-Cold War economic theories have addressed the changing and less identifiable frontiers between the public and the private by combining quantitative and qualitative elements.⁸ Yet, still today there is not a general set of indicators to quantify a potential burden-sharing gap and the analysis very often ends in some statistical jugglery with comparison criteria and the multiplication of variables in the burden-sharing equation. The ambiguity of burden-sharing can also be illustrated by the conceptual vagueness as scholars use different

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labels to describe the dynamics of sharing. They go from burden-sharing to ‘burden-shedding’, ‘burden-shifting’, or ‘responsibility-sharing’.9

While studies of the burden-sharing problem have long been dominated by hypothetical-deductive economic and structural approaches, there is also a growing literature that addresses the political aspects of allied burden-sharing either on domestic level or by combining several levels of analysis. Back in 1994, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger argued that the probability of free riding on the part of a state was higher when the state was either independent of allies in a security coalition or if domestic pressures (the configuration of factors relating to state autonomy, societal preferences and bureaucratic politics) against contributions were strong. Ten years later Auerswald and Saideman analysed domestic political institutions and decision-making to explain the burden-sharing behaviour of allies in Afghanistan. They argued that coalition and minority governments tend to place more restrictions upon troop deployment due to domestic intra-coalition bargaining. By combining two analytical levels, von Hlatky used an integrated model to show how systemic constraints are channelled through state-level variables (including governmental politics). She identified three contribution strategies (leveraging, hedging, or compensating) pursued by secondary states in military alliance with the US. Lanoszka explored the politics behind free riding in a sense that ‘what looks like free riding could be the result of low threat assessments’ or the ‘implementation of a grand bargain with the US’ with regards to nuclear weapons during the Cold War, rather than ‘opportunistic exploitation’.10


In a recent book, Zyla studies patterns of national state preferences for sharing NATO burden(s). Building on Wolfers’ hypothesis of ‘external responsibility’, he argues that second-tier powers like Canada also felt this external responsibility and eschewed free-riding.\(^\text{11}\) By contrast, one of the implications of Cooper and Zycher’s study on the ‘transatlantic bargain’ over NATO is to suggest that the roots of the burden-sharing problem are found in ‘differences in interests and perceptions about the goals, means, costs, and benefits of activities undertaken by NATO collectively’.\(^\text{12}\)

My research builds on the insights of this emerging politically oriented literature on alliances and burden-sharing and so goes beyond realist concerns about the security dilemma and collective action theory’s economic calculations. Instead of applying abstract theoretical concepts, I unpack the assumption of classic collective action theory, according to which states are rational, unitary, and share the same preferences and perception of the purpose and functioning of the Alliance, in order to look at Canadian officials’ reading of the burden-sharing problem.

Understanding the politics of burden-sharing is premised on a complex set of epistemological considerations, which need to be briefly explained. The present article focuses on the processes of sense-making and context-specific knowledge through an interpretive and historical methodology. This kind of approach generates historically and conceptually rich accounts that are based on thick descriptions. It dates back to Geertz’s interpretive theory and the Chicago School of the 1940s.\(^\text{13}\) My objective here is to dig out the contextualised meanings and significations from the Canadian officials’ private and public discourse through the analysis

\(^{11}\) Benjamin Zyla, *Sharing the Burden? NATO and its Second-Tier Powers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 10. In addition, Zyla uses a large number of multidimensional and cross level military and civilian indicators, though he admits that Canada’s non-military contributions have not always been easily quantifiable.


of archival documents. I break down the burden-sharing problem into several mutually constitutive elements in order to explore what the act of contributing to an alliance, the term burden, and the principles of sharing meant in a concrete time and space. In so doing, the article combines the functional and operational aspects of the burden-sharing problem. The former designates what NATO actually meant for Canadian officials and how they projected their country’s role in the Atlantic Alliance (the purpose of NATO). The latter refers to the intra-alliance context and the implementation of those general objectives by some collective action (the burden and its sharing in NATO). This conceptual differentiation between purpose and burden allows me, among other things, to avoid the oversimplification of free riding accusations and the exploitation hypothesis.

I employ three interpretive text-oriented methods to analyse private and public archival documents from Canadian officials. First, category analysis allows me to reconstruct the logic of naming and to decipher the meanings that ‘actors have vested in the categories, rather than the meanings they hold for the researcher’. This analytical approach is useful in situations where actors have to make sense of ambiguous concepts, for example how officials interpret NATO’s purpose, burden, or statistical comparisons. In addition, by focusing on the sameness and differences within and among categories, category analysis helps point to the ‘unspoken’, that is, which characteristics are left out of categories in question. Second, metaphor analysis clarifies meanings and reinforces the categories by pointing to the local knowledge of those who introduced the metaphoric language. Put differently, the meaning of the metaphor can be decoded through its frame of reference; the implied comparison in a given metaphor can be understood only when grounded in the context. For example, the metaphor of the Iron Curtain refers to the deeply divided bipolar world only when used in the context of international relations.

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15 Ibid., 41-43.
Table I. NATO in categories, metaphors, and arguments of Canadian officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Defensive alliance (military deterrence) Instrument of peace (more than a mere military alliance) (Expression of) Atlantic community</td>
<td>Green lands New departure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burden</td>
<td>Military Economic Moral (Soviet direct and indirect aggression)</td>
<td>“No one wishes to compare blood with iron”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td>(improvement of) National defence capabilities Non-operational (raw materials, equipment, training) Deployment of Canadian soldiers (Korea, West Germany)</td>
<td>Insurance premium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third analytical technique – argument analysis – looks at the arguments which Canadian officials reiterated in their discourse on burden-sharing in NATO. Put differently, this method enables me to look at how Canadian officials justified the contributions made by their country to NATO. The aim is to understand how the burden-sharing issue was framed by parties of the debate. The resulting ‘argumentative architecture’ shows how the categories, recovered
by the first method, were structured in their discourse, which further clarifies the sense-making process of what fair-share in NATO was.\textsuperscript{16}

To illustrate this methodology, the article’s main findings are summarised in Table 1 along with the respective methods used to obtain such results. Instead of generating objective facts and testing theoretical hypotheses, the ultimate purpose of this interpretive analysis is to retrieve meanings through categories, metaphors and arguments that emerged directly from the studied texts. With the help of these interpretive methods I let Canadian officials speak about their contributions and the burden-sharing problem in NATO. The primary sources consist of both public speeches and statements made by the members of Government and private memoranda and diplomatic telegrams found in Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa. The majority of these documents refer to private Cabinet debates between 1949 and 1952. The public documents are listed in the Annex B and are referenced in the text by a parenthesised number. The private documents are specified in the endnotes. Due to space limitation I cite only some of the private and public material, though the most representative quotations were chosen.

**Why NATO?**

‘[I]t was the threat to the peace that brought NATO into being.’
Pearson, 4 April 1952 (70)

With the end of the Second World War Canada experienced a generational transition and ideological change.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to the triumvirate of Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson and Hume Wrong, Escott Reid at the Department of External Affairs (DEA), A.D.P. Heeney (Clerk of the Privy Council and later the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), A.F.W. Plumptre at the Department of Finance, and Dana Wilgress (Head of the Canadian Delegation to NATO, and later High Commissioner in London) all contributed to the growing sense of ‘Canadianism’.\textsuperscript{18} The appointment of St. Laurent as the first independent Secretary of State for


\textsuperscript{17} Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 391.

External Affairs (SSEA) in September 1946, who two years later formed his own liberal government, marked a departure from the politics of ‘no commitments’, cautiously pursued by long-serving liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Thanks to this new generation of mandarins and political leaders, Canadian foreign policy shifted towards liberal internationalism and sought to be recognised as a middle power by the international community.

Soviet activities in the post-war context created anxieties on the west side of the Iron Curtain. How could Canada address Uncle Joe’s aggressiveness? After leading the formation of a collective defence system in Western Europe, British Prime Minister Attlee proposed to Canada and the US, in a telegram from 11 March 1948, to establish together a regional security organisation under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. No more than two weeks later, informal tripartite talks between the United Kingdom (UK), the US, and Canada began in Washington; they lasted over 12 months from 22 March 1948 to 15 March 1949. The five Brussels Pact members joined the discussions in June 1948, and Norway, Italy, Denmark and Iceland came aboard in March 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, less than 14 months after the fall of Czechoslovakia.

Canada faced a double security dilemma: first, it needed to create a balancing coalition against the Soviet menace and second, it had to counter the invasive influence of the US on the North American continent. Since the creation of the former was already in motion, the major concern of Canada narrowed into the focus on its southern neighbour. In the efforts of diluting this ‘US factor’ in the multilateral setting, the Canadian delegation pushed for a strong American pledge in the form of a congressional approval, bringing an element of mutual assistance and reciprocity into the alliance. Any unilateral American declaration of military aid would according to the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Reid sound like charity to Europe and would only emphasise the dependence and the satellite character of

19 Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, 139.
21 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Department of External Affairs Fonds (DEA)/5803/283(s) – Wrong to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA), Washington, 7 April 1948.
Western Europe. At the same time, any alliance without American power and resources would not live long. Therefore, most of the concessions Ottawa made during the NAT negotiations resulted from the urgent need to get this treaty passed in the US Congress. It is interesting to notice that while Canadian officials had serious misgivings with regard to Washington in private communications, in public St. Laurent presented Canada’s relation with the US as more than a mere ‘empirical neighbourliness’ (1). Ottawa officially considered the Canada-US friendship an important asset for the Atlantic Alliance. By comparing it with the relations between Moscow and its satellites, the US-Canadian relationship was meant to be a proof that friendship between asymmetric powers could exist.

The NAT answered Canada’s basic needs at that time: deter the Soviets; keep an eye on the Americans; promote cooperation, consultation and reciprocity between the free democratic Western European and North American states, connect Canada institutionally with Europe, and enhance the Canadian status of a middle power and independent North American nation. The Washington Treaty also solved another Canadian geopolitical dilemma since, on the one hand, it reconciled the dual orientation of Canadian foreign policy by preserving the Atlantic triangle of US—UK—Canada or le ménage à trois in the Alliance; and, on the other, it maintained Canada’s special relationships with its two ‘mother countries’ – the UK and France. The Canadian Parliament approved the Treaty on 28 March 1949 with only two opposing votes from the Bloc Populaire. Canada was the first of its allies to ratify the NAT which came into force on 24 August 1949.

NATO in Categories and Metaphors

This section builds further on the functional aspect of NATO according to Canadian officials, since the understanding of NATO’s burden flows from the interpretation of its purpose. The following analysis attempts to explore how Canadian officials understood the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance in their discourse by looking at the expressions and metaphors directly associated with NATO. I explore the relations between the categories of alliance, community,
and international collective security system based on sameness and what elements are excluded/included from/in the respective categories.

NATO for Canada’s officials meant in the first place a purely defensive alliance against a military threat (58). The notion of war makes all the difference for NATO was created ‘not for the purpose of waging war, but for the purpose of preventing war’ (8) due to strong reminiscence of the Second World War tragedy. The Soviet threat to international peace fed the tangible fear of a looming war in Ottawa. Officials believed that had the Alliance existed in the 1930s, the world would not have had to witness another world war.26 The only aggressive element of NATO according to Pearson was located in its intellectual force since Atlantic nations could challenge communism with ‘the International of the free scholars’ (13). The creation of the Alliance was meant to make the cost of an attack high enough to ‘deter any act of aggression’ (9) and at the same time to ‘reduce fear and tension in the face of threats and provocation’ (63).

In projecting the ‘positive and constructive consequences’ (11) of the Treaty, the dual purpose of NATO crystallised very quickly in Ottawa. NATO’s positive objective consisted in the promotion of democracy, stability, and consultation, which was assured by implanting Article 2 and 4 in the Treaty. They were meant to give NATO a purpose beyond the imminent Soviet threat and to avoid the risk of the Atlantic coalition diminishing into a ‘by-product of a cold war’ (69). Canadian officials insisted throughout the studied period that the North Atlantic Pact should aspire to be more than ‘a mere military alliance’ (48), more than only ‘defensive’, ‘negative’ and ‘against something’ (20). Canadian officials very often characterised NATO as the ‘instrument of peace’ destined to ‘remove the economic and political causes of war and increase security of the North Atlantic nations’ (11). NATO was supposed to be a positive move forward, as Pearson put it in a metaphor, ‘from dark ages of war, from wasteland to green lands’ (48).

Article 2 brought NATO commitments closer to the UN since NATO was regarded as a tool for building the system of collective security in a particular region. NATO was not designed to undercut or side-track the UN. St. Laurent made it clear that NATO was created ‘to fill the security gap in the North Atlantic area’ (31) precisely because of the inability of the UN to provide for collective security. Ergo, until the UN could function more effectively, NATO

26 LAC, Louis St Laurent Fonds (LSL)/224/E4-26 – Reid to Pickersgill, 28 October 1948.
was believed to be ‘the most effective agency’ (57) for ‘the defence of the free world and the preservation of international peace’ (53).

In private Cabinet discussions two other reasons pressed for Article 2. First, according to Reid, Canada had a direct interest in creating unity among Atlantic nations due to the vulnerability of Canadian economy.\(^{27}\) Although the Second World War helped Ottawa boost the economy, post-war loans to Britain soon drained its economic power.\(^{28}\) In addition, in the late 1940s Canada struggled with its negative balance of payment vis-à-vis the US. The Canadian Government saw in NATO an opportunity to diversify its exports and liberalise trade relations between Western Europe, the UK and Canada. Even Mackenzie King put special emphasis on achieving some bilateral arrangements for free trade between Canada and the US.\(^{29}\) Ottawa positioned itself as a pacificator since it wanted the treaty to preserve trade flows within the transatlantic triangle, which was hoped to eliminate economic nationalism between great powers.\(^{30}\) The second private reason was a domestic one. Since membership in NATO was about to constitute a revolution in Canadian foreign policy, the full acceptance of the Treaty by the whole Canadian population – including the Province of Québec as the loudest opponent calling for neutrality – would increase the Treaty’s political value for the Government.\(^{31}\)

The categories alliance and community caused confusion to some extent due to the vagueness and imprecision of the latter. Heeney explained very clearly that ‘NATO is not the North Atlantic community, neither is the North Atlantic community NATO’ since ‘there is nothing in our Treaty to suggest that NATO is the only means by which we are to build our community’ (58). Nevertheless, Pearson pointed to the strong cohesive qualities of NATO since this association of North Atlantic countries was ‘a natural one’ geographically and socially (9). Several other members of the Cabinet expanded on this idea. Although for Taylor, from the Department of Finance, a community in the North Atlantic area had ‘existed for a very long time’, he admitted that the precise articulations were induced by an external threat which made

\(^{27}\) LAC, DEA/5796/264-C(s) – Memorandum by Acting USSEA, Ottawa, 24 September 1948.


\(^{29}\) LAC, DEA/5804/288(s) – SSEA to Ambassador in United States, Ottawa, 31 March 1948.

\(^{30}\) Holmes, Life with Uncle, 7.

\(^{31}\) LAC, LSL/224/E4-26 – Reid to Robertson, Ottawa, 11 November 1948; LAC, DEA/5803/283(s) – Ambassador in United States to SSEA, Washington, 21 February 1949.
the Atlantic nations aware of their common heritage and interest (54). Since a common fear is ‘only an ephemeral bond of unity’ (64), St. Laurent kept stressing that NATO was ‘far more than an old-fashioned military alliance’ (10). Still, as Reid observed in a private memorandum, the Government took advantage of this common Atlantic identity since it considered NATO ‘a great power alliance against the Soviet Union which has been given the cover of an agreement between countries in a certain geographical area’.32

Taken together, the categories of alliance, community and collective security, reinforced by metaphors such as ‘green lands’, framed the discourse of Canadian officials and pointed to NATO’s double purpose: the prevention of war and the promotion of peace. These two broad purposes can be split into more specific and momentous goals of resisting the Soviet aggression and building the Atlantic community. As seen in the private documents, the objective of community building was a result of the strategic mobilisation of the Atlantic identity and the community by Canadian officials.33 They valued NATO as ‘the most important international instrument for the defence of the free world and the preservation of international peace’ (53), which became ‘the cornerstone in the structure of general collective security’ (17).

**NATO’s Burden and its Share**

Having established the purpose of NATO, this part focuses on the operational aspect of NATO’s purpose: burden-sharing. After identifying the category of burden from the perspective of Canadian officials, I reconstruct the argumentative structure of burden-sharing by looking at how officials justified Canada’s contributions to NATO along three dimensions of the defence burden. The objective here is to shed more light on the equitable distribution of the costs, the meaning attributed to statistics, and ultimately the Canadian politics of fair-share.

The notion of burden refers to how to implement the alliance’s objective. As seen in the two sections above, Canadian officials hoped NATO would not only prevent war but also create such conditions for life in the North Atlantic area which would represent more than the mere absence of war. When it comes to the implementation of these objectives, the interpretation of

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32 LAC, DEA/4484/50030-40 – Deputy USSEA to USSEA, Ottawa, 22 July 1949.

the Soviet aggression was instrumental for understanding NATO’s burden in Canada. Pearson warned repeatedly that the Russian Communist aggression was ‘more than military’ (51) and thus Canada needed NATO to increase the security of the free world in the face of both military and ideological aggression. As St. Laurent pointed out, ‘security is a commodity produced […] possibly more by economic well-being as by military preparedness’ (11).

This more complex understanding of NATO’s purpose therefore implied that its burden had to be conceived in broader terms as well. The burden Canadian officials talked about was not only military. Pearson urged to develop ‘our defence – military, economic and moral’ (64). NATO’s burden consisted of building the overwhelming preponderance of forces which had to be economic and moral as well as military, so that NATO would be able to resist any direct and indirect aggression. For the DEA, non-military defence consisted in ‘showing that democracy can contribute more to the dignity and well-being of the citizens than communism can ever hope to do’ (13). Consequently, the Government put equal emphasis on military expenditures and on economic and social contributions. Pearson stressed the importance of both the short-term and long-term goals: on the one hand, Atlantic nations had to strengthen their military deterrent effect vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and on the other hand they had to promote economic and social stability and prosperity of Atlantic nations, protect their democratic institutions and values and maintained the unity of the alliance in the long-term. NATO’s defence burden from the Canadian perspective thus consisted of three closely intertwined dimensions – military, economic, and moral. In the next section each of them is treated separately only for the analytical purpose of this article.

**Military Burden**

During the negotiations of the Treaty no specific military requirements were discussed in the Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff Committee considered only improvements to the Canadian military strength for national defence purposes if war should break out. The DEA bureaucracy supposed that NATO members would optimise or even narrow defence costs by pooling their resources. The defence military burden had a clear end-point: to make NATO strong enough to be able to deter and defend itself against the Soviet Union. Yet, the Government had never contemplated sending soldiers away from Canada’ territory since their withdrawal from Europe in 1946. Until

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34 LAC, DEA/5796/264-C(s) – Memorandum by USSEA, Ottawa, 24 September 1948; LAC, DEA/4484/50030-40/3 – Memorandum to Cabinet by Pearson, 4 October 1948.
mid-September 1950 the Cabinet continued to believe that the most effective contribution Canada was able to make were donations of services and transfers of equipment and ammunition to soldiers already stationed in Europe, rather than making a military commitment itself.35

Several Canadian politicians used the metaphor of an ‘insurance premium’ to describe contributions to the Atlantic alliance. It points to a logic of protection of well-being against future losses – pay less now, get greater security later. When St. Laurent announced to Canadian citizens the creation of NATO, he made this very same pledge: ‘When I ask you to support a North Atlantic Treaty, I am simply asking you to pay an insurance premium’ (8). Later during the Korean War, the increase of Canadian defence expenditures was justified again as ‘the increased premium to ensure peace’ (35). This premium insurance would cost Canada $5 billion in the military programme for 1951-1953.

The Korean situation accelerated the Canadian defence programme. In October 1950 the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff Committee admitted that stationing more troops in Western Europe was the only effective deterrent – Canadian soldiers in Canadian bases could no longer serve the same purpose. Two months later the Cabinet Defence Committee contemplated moving some soldiers from Korea to Europe.36 The pressure from the US, and the creation of the NATO Integrated Force under the Supreme Commander, ‘facilitated’ Ottawa’s decision to deploy troops to the old continent.37 On 5 February 1951 Defence Minister Claxton announced in the House of Commons the Cabinet’s plan to send the 27th Infantry Brigade to West Germany as Canada’s contribution to NATO’s Integrated Force (not the Occupation Force!) since ‘equipment without men is even less useful than men without equipment’ and thus ‘participation by the Canadian army will show more emphatically than any amount of equipment’ (35).

35 LAC, LSL/224/E4-26 – Reid to SSEA, 26 October 1948; LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 – St. Laurent in the House of Commons, 13 September 1950.
36 LAC, Department of National Defence Fonds (DND)/20707/2-2-30/2 – Drury and Foulkes, 13th Panel meeting, 2 and 3 October 1950; LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 – Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 29 December 1950.
37 At one point Eisenhower told the NATO allies to contribute on the principle of ‘let your conscience be your guide’. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – 17th Panel meeting, 15 and 19 February 1951; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – SSEA to Wilgress, 17 March 1951.
According to Canadian officials, contributions should be commensurable with a state’s standing and responsibilities. Canada’s foreign policy relied on the functional principle. Although the great importance was attached to Article 9, the equal representation of all members in the North Atlantic Council, according to Pearson ‘the equality appropriate to status need not, and in many circumstances should not, extend to function’ (53). In other words, the situation where the US bore a significantly higher share of the burden than its allies was merely a de facto acceptation of international responsibilities which matched the American power and resources. Or, as Pearson said, it was ‘a penalty of leadership to feel overburdened’ (56). St. Laurent explicitly acknowledged that Canada was not part of the ‘Big Four’ since there was only the ‘Big Three’: US, UK, and France.38 In short, Canada was presented as a middle power with no great power aspirations since it would have meant a considerable increase in its contributions to the Alliance. At the same time, Canada’s defence expenditures ranked the highest after the Big Three, or even third in 1951-1952, when Canada’s spending rate was higher than any other country in the Commonwealth except the UK and higher than any NATO member except the US.39

**Economic Burden**

Since NATO was conceived by Canadian officials as more than a mere military alliance, a large part of Canadian contributions was non-operational. Ottawa preferred to concentrate on the ‘economic and social measures’ of collective defence. Canada’s Mutual Aid Programme (MAP) consisted of transfers of military equipment from the Canadian stocks to Western Europe free of charge. Similarly, the MAP’s major component, the Air Training Programme (ATP) was offered to train aircrew from NATO countries for free. Canada transferred equipment of the amount of two divisions to six NATO countries, and by the time it was terminated in 1958, ATP trained almost 80 per cent of the operational forces under the Supreme

39 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 – 21st Panel meeting, 6 June 1951.
In practice Canadian officials tended to merge Article 2 (economic and social cooperation) with 3 (self-help and mutual aid) of the Washington Treaty.\textsuperscript{41}

In the summer of 1949 Cabinet started to consider the implementation of Article 3. At first, the Government wanted to wait with the public announcement of its contributions until NATO agencies had mapped deficiencies in national defences of all allies. Publicly and privately, Canadian officials maintained that it would be ‘premature to predict the appropriate form and scale of our assistance’ until the collective military goals and deficiencies ‘are worked out and problems of co-ordination investigated’ (17) by the respective NATO committees.\textsuperscript{42} However, in November 1949 the Cabinet Defence Committee realised that an early announcement of MAP could bring Canada some political benefits than the wait-and-see strategy.\textsuperscript{43} Consequently, an interdepartmental Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions (Panel) was formed in Ottawa at the beginning of 1950 to discuss the implications of Canada’s commitments to NATO.\textsuperscript{44} Although ATP became operational in March 1950, the first transfers of equipment started only in autumn 1950 after the Government got the Defence Appropriation Act passed in the House of Commons in September 1950, giving the Defence Department $300m for MAP. The procurement of both equipment and ATP was allocated by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40}Michael M.L. Rafter, ‘The NATO Aircrew Training Program in Canada: An example of Canadian Defence Policy within Alliances’ (Unpublished paper, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 2008), 35.
\item \textsuperscript{41}During treaty negotiations, Pearson wanted Article 3 to deal with both direct and indirect aggression. Unfortunately, Canada’s proposal to use the word ‘aggression’ instead of ‘armed attack’ did not pass. This little episode shows to what extent the goals of collective military defence and the national economic strength were interconnected in Government’s interpretation.
\item \textsuperscript{42}LAC, DEA/4484/50030-40/3 – Memorandum for USSEA, 26 May 1950. On 5 October 1949 the Military Production and Supply Board was tasked to implement the objectives of Article 3. In April 1950 a Medium Term Defence Plan was approved by the Defence Committee as a first approximation of the 1954 NATO force.
\item \textsuperscript{43}LAC, DEA/4501/50030-L-40/1 – Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, Ottawa, 23 November 1949.
\item \textsuperscript{44}The Panel provided machinery for interdepartmental consultation on economic questions arising from Canada’s commitments to NATO and related to its defence programme. Panel meetings were attended by representatives from Ministries of National Defence, Trade and Commerce, External Affairs and Finance. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Defence Research Board, and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada were usually present as well.
\end{itemize}
the Standing Group on the advice of several NATO agencies and approved by the Supreme Commander. Although the Canadian Government always kept the right of final decision, it used a multilateral allocation procedure known as ‘shopping list’, unlike the Americans whose military programme was distributed on a bilateral basis.

Ottawa considered its MAP to be the most effective means of meeting its defence commitments and the main contribution to the equitable distribution of the economic defence burden. At the same time, it launched MAP to promote Canada’s reputation as a net contributor to NATO and never forget to emphasise its position as the only country that did not receive any aid from the US. These reputational concerns also led Ottawa to refuse a priori all proposals of reciprocal mutual aid.45

Privately, MAP was supposed to ‘appease’ NATO allies and postpone their demands for Canada’s military presence in Western Europe. Canada could contribute to NATO’s defence capabilities without the need to deploy expensive military forces. Furthermore, MAP and ATP brought economic benefits enhancing Canadian industrial production, which was a positive side-effect for unemployment at home. In addition, the Government believed that Canadian contributions were crucial for creating peer pressure on the US since its active implication in the Alliance was essential.46

Curiously, most of those $300 million were actually spent on the purchase of US-type equipment for… Canadian forces. This re-equipment was financed with the money publicly presented as the Canadian mutual aid to its fellow allies. In reality, MAP was a major programme of conversion of the whole Canadian army from British to the American type equipment, for both practical and political reasons. In 1952-1953 actual military production started to increase, but only under the condition that military items fitted in the Canadian defence production programme – were ‘typically Canadian’ with minimal US dollar content – and met needs in Europe.47

45 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 – 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
46 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – Wilgress and Foulkes, 12th meeting of the Panel, 9 August 1950; LAC, DEA/4543/50030-AL-40/2 – Pearson, 11 January 1952; LAC, LSL/224/E4-26 – Reid to SSEA, 26 October 1948.
47 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – 13th Panel meeting, 2 and 3 October 1950; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – 18th Panel meeting, 6 April 1951. Only some 9% of the programme up to the end of 1951-52 were devoted to mutual aid from production; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 – Memorandum for Cabinet Defence Committee, 23 June 1951.
As to the implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty, Pearson and Wilgress constantly pressed for closer economic cooperation in the NATO Council. However, apart from minor and mostly cultural projects on public awareness among Atlantic nations, there was no significant progress in economic and social co-operation measures, which made this Canadian sub-crusade for Article 2 disappointing at best. At the same time, the Canadian Government did not want ‘some grandiose’ (52) structure for non-military cooperation in NATO or to duplicate already existing machineries. When Canada and the US became observers to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in May 1950, most of NATO-wide economic matters was transferred to this Paris-based economic organisation. Finally, Wilgress together with Pearson admitted in 1953 that even though NATO should direct attention to the problems of lifting economic barriers and promoting the collective approach to economic development, ‘action to bring about a collective approach must be left to other agencies because it has to be on a broader basis than that of NATO’ (67). Questions about economic cooperation entered the burden-sharing debate merely in connection with Canadian calls for improving conditions of inter-allied military procurement.

Moral Burden

‘I do not suggest that in these discussions anyone would be so naive as to propose that the members of the alliance should each devote exactly the same proportion of their national income to defence purposes. This would be as absurd as proposing that the citizens of Nova Scotia should contribute the same proportion of their total income to the federal budget of Canada as the citizens of Ontario, in which the per capita income is much higher.’

The third dimension of the defence burden is linked to the preservation of allies’ unity and solidarity vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. This unity was imperilled according to Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and the military due to burden-sharing exercises in NATO, which were meant to establish principles for the equitable distribution of the defence burden among allies.

48 The idea of an Atlantic economic community under a NATO framework died when the allies had the NATO headquarters moved from London to Paris. The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 was a final nail in the coffin of economic integration on a NATO basis. For details see John Milloy, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948 – 1957: Community or Alliance? (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

49 LAC, LSL/224/E4-26 – Reid to SSEA, 26 October 1948.
Even though the burden-sharing problem was put on the NATO table in autumn 1949, already in October 1948 Reid outlined the Canadian vision of an alliance ‘based upon the principles of pooling of resources, of risks and of control over policy’. Reid also specified that Canada’s most effective contributions would be a result of a political decision by the Cabinet, which should be based on recommendations received from NATO committees, instead of relying solely on the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{‘Each of them is a representative of one of the three branches of our armed forces and each of them would find it difficult to discuss with an open mind the possibility of his branch’ (Ibid.).} Similarly, Heeney argued that the nature and extent of Canadian contribution would be determined by the Canadian Government.\footnote{LAC, DEA/4483/50030-40/1 – Heeney to SSEA, 1 April 1949.}

In the summer of 1949 the US suggested a study of ‘equality of sacrifice’ under North Atlantic defence, which according to the Canadian representative to NATO would only ‘rise to difficulties of a practical as well as psychological character’.\footnote{LAC, DEA/4483/50030-40/1 – Ignatieff to SSEA, Washington, 25 August 1949.} The Cabinet considered an economic machinery of this kind to be useful only as the European counterpart to the US agency administrating the American military aid programme (of which Canada was not a recipient). The first official disagreements between allies occurred during discussions on the terms of reference for the Permanent Working Staff (PWS) established in November 1949 under the Defence Financial and Economic Committee (DFEC). The US proposed terms which would assess and estimate the fiscal resources for defence purposes of all NATO states. Moreover, the PWS was supposed to propose a formula and design criteria to indicate individual burdens in relation to each country’s budgetary and economic capacity.\footnote{LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 – High Commissioner in UK to SSEA, London, December 8, 1949.}

There was a general dislike of statistics in Ottawa. Statistical comparison of allied defence spending presented in the US Congress caused outrage in Ottawa in December 1949 since Canada came off poorly. Problems with such comparisons lied in currency conversions, a lack of a uniform set of items counted as defence spending, cross-country differences in fiscal years and accounting practices, or the importance of the ratio between territory and population in Canada. Although Canada compared favourably with other NATO countries on the basis of per capita defence expenditure, there was a unanimous opposition towards statistical exercises across all Government departments, in Cabinet, and in the military. Indeed, Wilgress in DFEC stated that any attempt to develop formulae and criteria for comparing defence burdens were
impracticable because of ‘the widely different national circumstances of the various North Atlantic countries’. Similarly, Air Vice-Marshall Campbell and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Foulkes voiced their objections on very similar grounds with regards to the NATO Military Committee’s study on how to close the gap in NATO forces with respect to the Medium Term Defence Plan. They claimed that contributions could not be determined by a formula based on only one component of national defence (in this case manpower), and emphasised that the common effort should aim to build a deterrent force, rather than to estimate what Canada could do in a total war.⁵⁴

The formula approach was politically objectionable since it would establish some measure of allies’ relative capacity to share the financial burden in the future. Pearson considered it ‘academic and impracticable’ and necessarily producing time-wasting discussions on ‘hypothetical ways of sharing a presumably large, but yet unspecified, defence burden’. This search for one-size-fit-all formula was regarded by Ottawa both publicly and privately as arbitrary, unrealistic, mischievous, invidious, unfair, and misleading. The Minister of Defence Production Howe pointed out that ‘there are elements in the defensive strength of any country that cannot be reckoned in the simple arithmetic of government expenditures’ (41). The general reluctance of Canadian officials towards statistical comparison stemmed from the perceived danger of equating incomparable contributions; as put by Pearson, ‘no one wishes to make the comparison [...] between blood and iron’ (24).

Since only the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada raised objections of principle, on 29 March 1950 the PWS was officially tasked with four projects, including the development of a formula designed to indicate the financial and economic burdens of defence in relation to the capacity of NATO countries.⁵⁵ Eventually, the formula was never found due to members’ divergent views and the PWS was able to finish only the first two projects. The comparisons feared by Canada were made only between one year and another and not so much between one country and another.⁵⁶

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⁵⁴ Canada was placed 10th according to the percentage of defence spending, just ahead of Luxembourg and Iceland. LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-10/1 – Defence Liaison, 23 January 1950; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/1 – FEC(50)M-2a, 29 March 1950; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – 16th Panel meeting, 18 and 19 January 1951.

⁵⁵ LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/1 – NATO FEC STAFF (50) D-17/1a, 18 July 1950.

⁵⁶ LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 – High Commissioner in UK to SSEA, London, 18 March 1950.
The problem of the equitable distribution of burden re-emerged in full force at the beginning of the autumn 1950, when the allies were about to determine terms of reference for the Paris Working Group under Council Deputies, whose main objective was to study methods of ensuring an equitable distribution of the defence burden with regards to the NATO Medium Term Defence Plan. Although this step would weaken the dominance of American economists, since the group was to be made up of experts from the OEEC, Canada judged this burden-sharing exercise once again to be too intrusive. Pearson regarded two principal proposals – the American ‘Nitze plan’ and the British ‘sharing the wealth’ – idealistic from the statistical and philosophical point of view, respectively. However, Canada found itself in a position of ‘splendid isolation’ since all NATO members were ready to proceed with the American proposal.

There was a major clash between the US Delegation, who was thinking in terms of formula and capacity to pay, and the Canadian Delegation, preferring intentions and needs. Canadian representatives suggested undertaking a more practical approach. This Canadian proposal illustrated their frustration with the way the NATO bureaucracy was evolving. Ottawa wanted to break the circle of theoretical studies and ‘get down to practical business’. In particular, the Secretary to the Cabinet and Chairman of the Panel Robertson outlined three aspects of the burden-sharing problem that would have more practical impact than studying terms of equitable burden-sharing: a long-term policy of standardisation; production and procurement policies; and the implementation of the concept of balanced collective forces to lessen the real cost of effective re-armament.

The confusion between technical and political questions was the main DEA objection to this new study. Tasks of drawing defence estimates, evaluating their impact on national economies and effectiveness of measures seemed all satisfactory to Canada. However, the extended economic analysis, such as studying the ability of each country to devote resources to defence and commenting on the practicability of different mechanisms for transferring burdens among allies, was called ‘nonsense’ by the Minister of Finance Abbott. The DEA concluded that ‘the obstacle to increased defence expenditures in all countries concerned is not economic ability but political willingness and ability’. Pearson did not think that ‘fundamental political matters could be evaluated or decided by dispassionate statistical processes’ since national

57 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 – Plumptre to SSEA, 10 November 1950.
58 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/1 – 9th Panel Meeting, 7 June 1950.
contributions must ‘be guided not only by estimated overseas requirements, but also by
domestic needs and undertakings’. 59

On 22 November the Cabinet approved Canada’s participation in the burden-sharing
study in Paris. The Canadian delegation did not succeed in gaining support for its cause, because
European allies found themselves in a completely different situation than Canada. They were
all dependent on bilateral US military aid, while Canada was the only ally who refused to
become a recipient country of this American programme. Obviously, Canada’s own mutual aid
programme, when looking at its volume, was only of a symbolic value compared to the 60-
times bigger American one. 60 Moreover, some of the European governments had already had
some experience past experience with finding a cost-sharing formula in the Brussels Pact.

The interdepartmental Panel in Ottawa concluded that the advantages of participation
were greater than the disadvantages of abstention, despite the continuing disapproval of the
Finance Minister. Wilgress in London feared that Canada’s negative attitude would only be
misunderstood and Canada would end up embarrassed. Pearson explained to the Cabinet that
this burden-sharing exercise might be useful for exchanging information and for future political
negotiations on defence plans in NATO. Above all, the DEA feared that Canada’s absence
would set a ‘dangerous precedent’ in NATO, which ‘could lead to a complete breakdown of
the work and cohesion of the whole organisation’ since decision-making had already become a
tradition. In the end, the Canadian Government did not consider itself to be obligated
by any
formula or reports. Although the DEA felt ‘morally bound already to give some sort of aid, the
amount will remain a political decision here, whatever Paris or the Deputies may produce’. 61

59 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 – Memorandum to USSEA, 10 November 1950 and Plumptre to SSEA,
17 November 1950; LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 – SSEA to Canadian Delegation to UN Assembly,
New York; 15 November 1950.

60 Canada earmarked $324 million for MAP in 1952-53 versus the American $21 billion for the mutual

61 Canada could have been suspected of playing the game only as long as it did not cost too much. LAC,
DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 – SSEA to High Commissioner in United Kingdom; Ottawa, 29 January
1950; LAC, Privy Council Office Fonds (PCO)/204/U-40-4(p) – SSEA to Cabinet, Ottawa, 21
November 1950; LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 – Memorandum by Heeney, 25 November 1950
and Memorandum by Plumptre, 13 November 1950.
The Canadian Delegation voiced similar disagreements with statistical exercises again at least twice during the period under study. In the spring of 1951 the Financial and Defence Board replaced the previous working groups. The Canadian representative expressed his relief with respect to the interim report on equitable distribution of defence burden, when the attempt to make inter-country comparisons on the basis of the progressive income tax principle was abandoned and country comparisons were made mainly on ‘simple and easily-made arithmetical calculations’. In September 1951 the NATO Council created a Temporary Council Committee to report on and reconcile a NATO defence plan with the realistic political-economic capabilities of allies. After presenting its final report in February 1952, a cross examination of national capabilities by the International Staff became institutionalised in NATO as Annual Reviews, which ran until the mid-1960s. No official distributive formula was ever created in NATO on a basis of statistical yardstick. Ottawa publicly appreciated annual reports, though Pearson called them ‘inquisitorial’ examinations (53).

During the following years Canada refocused its contributions on the North American continent where a joint US-Canada project of radar lines (later known as NORAD) was under consideration in the 1950s. Although this project was presented as part of the transatlantic defence efforts, it was not paid from NATO’s infrastructure budget and was never officially integrated into NATO military structure under a multinational command. Canadian financial and personnel participation on the construction and management of these radar lines was meant to minimise ‘the appearance of American control over Canadian soil’ (especially the McGill Fence and the Distant Early Warning Line). Later during Pearson’s own Cabinet in the 1960s, Canadian military expenditures decreased mainly due to the launch of Canada-wide social programmes and the unification project of Canadian Armed Forces. Although St. Laurent sent one Canadian brigade to Korea, Pearson refused to deploy Canadian troops to Viet Nam since, contrary to the Korean War, the American war in Viet Nam did not happen under UN auspices. In addition, Pearson continued to believe that NATO should concentrate its defence efforts in the transatlantic area. However,

62 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/1 – Canadian representative in Paris to SSEA, 4 September 1951.
he did find a way to contribute to the common defence cause. In order to lessen the burden of the US and other great powers fighting elsewhere, Canada increased its defence production to address US needs in Viet Nam. And even though Pearson was officially critical of this war, he made sure that Canada supplied once again non-operational contributions in form of military equipment.

The Canadian Politics of Fair-Share

This article has looked at how Canadian political, bureaucratic and military officials made sense of early burden-sharing debates in NATO. To this end, I used the interpretive methods of category, metaphor, and argument to reconstruct the Canadian discourse on fair-share. The analysis combined the functional and operational aspects of the fair-share problem. Employing these analytical tools, the article has thus focused on making sense out of NATO’s purpose, the polysemic concept of burden, and meanings attached to statistics and equitable distribution according to Canadian officials.

The interpretive analysis reveals that the Canadian approach to burden-sharing was based on recognising and maintaining a balance of three elements of collective defence. When broken into details, a fair contribution was seen as a contribution which (i) was adequate to the country’s standing in the international system; (ii) did not jeopardise the economy; and (iii) addressed both the national needs and those of NATO, which were identified in NATO agencies. Consequently, a fair burden-sharer was a country that fulfilled these collectively decided commitments. This finding refutes the commonly accepted fact that only the end of the Cold War brought an end to the exclusivity of the military dimension in the burden-sharing debates. At least at the beginning of the Cold War Canadian officials were thinking about NATO’s burden in wider than military terms.

Ottawa compromised on its principles of fair-share and participated in numerous burden-sharing exercises in order to bear the moral burden of NATO that consisted in protecting allies against the indirect Soviet aggression. Nevertheless, Canadian political, bureaucratic, and military officials maintained their opposition towards the construction of statistical criteria, which would fix national contribution for the NATO Integrated Force in the future. This is not

65 Holmes, Life with Uncle, 100.
to say that they tried to find a ‘cheapest way out’ or to avoid making their ‘fair contribution’. Canadian officials were against the ‘automatisation’ of contributions and of a procedure in which NATO allies wanted to determine the ‘fair’ distribution of collective defence burden.

Canadian officials objected to the quest for some kind of a distributive mechanism, because its implementation would harm, in their view, Atlantic unity and solidarity, since any one-size-fit-all formula would be always unfair to somebody. In addition, their dislike for statistics came from concerns about Canada’s reputation and sovereign discretionary power over national resources. According to Ottawa, to contribute should be neither bureaucratic nor military, but primarily a political decision. The only formula Canadian officials were searching for was ‘a satisfactory formula for lasting peace’ (67).

This case study has shown that the burden-sharing problem is neither situated in vacuum, nor is it a question of a mere technicality. The strategic decision to contribute and share the burden has to square economic calculations and the realist security dilemma with the context-dependent notion of fairness. As seen in the analysis, comparisons and burden-sharing studies can have several political, reputational, domestic, and economic consequences. The abstract concept of fairness is prone to subjective interpretations and normative divergences, which in turn opens the door for the politics of fair-share. National governments naturally try to shape criteria to present a country as a good burden-sharer who carries its fair load. It is not surprising that the issue of fair-share is being used as a powerful ‘rhetorical weapon’.

Indeed, NATO members never agreed on a distributive mechanism. When turning to the present two-percent spending pledge in NATO, allies might look at what countries actually do with the money and compare words with deeds. Canadian officials in the early 1950s believed that burden-sharing should be about something more than devising a formula. The Canadian Government, both then and now, would not increase military spending to achieve some arbitrary target, especially when expressed in such a simplifying way as defence spending. Instead of talking in percentages, NATO should base its approach on precisely articulated defence needs.

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Chapter 5  The Ethics of Burden-Sharing: When Canada Talks About Fairness, but Actually Counts Benefits (Essay #2)

Abstract

This paper aims to rethink the problem of NATO burden-sharing along ethical lines. It argues that the ethics of burden-sharing reveals the tensions between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution. Inspired by Jarrod Hayes and Patrick James’ theory-as-thought method and using the traditions of normative ethics, this interpretive research looks at how the issues of sharing and contributing were discursively framed during NATO’s first decade. Focusing on one of the largest founding members, Canada, the paper finds incoherence between the predominantly consequentialist discourse of Canadian authorities with respect to Canada’s contributions, and their discourse on allied sharing in NATO, shaped by obligations and communitarian ethics. Consequently, the presence of different ethical logics points to a split discourse on NATO burden-sharing in Canada. The paper sheds light on the normative roots of the burden-sharing problem and demonstrates the relevance of theoretical pluralism for the burden-sharing scholarship and foreign policy analysis.

Keywords: burden-sharing, NATO, intra-alliance cooperation, normative ethics, interpretive methodology, Canada

Introduction

Ethics and morality are not necessarily the first thing that come to mind regarding military cooperation. In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), allies follow the principle of costs lie where they fall, which invites each of them to exercise ethical judgments as to whether to contribute, the choice of the right form of contribution, and how much they should contribute relative to the efforts made by fellow allies. This rather vague arrangement

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1 This chapter in its current form has not been submitted to a peer-review journal yet.
about the division of costs incurred by the common burden of collective defence has fuelled NATO’s most protracted collective action problem, commonly known under the expression burden-sharing.

In contrast to deductive rationalist approaches that dominate the past and contemporary burden-sharing scholarship, I build on the interpretive and ethical turns in social sciences (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, Vilmer and Chung 2013). Positioned at the crossroads between politics, history, and ethics and armed with interpretive-qualitative methodology, this paper reconstructs the ethical dimension of the Canadian burden-sharing discourse during the liberal government of Louis St. Laurent (1948-1957). To shift the attention towards the ethical elements of the burden-sharing dynamics in NATO, this paper uses interpretation as its research strategy and analytical tools that blend International Relations (IR) theory with normative ethics on a conceptual level.

This paper argues that the ethics of burden-sharing reflects a tension between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution. The findings indicate that the simultaneous presence of different ethics resulted into a split discourse on NATO burden-sharing in Canada. Consequentialist ethics shaping the Canadian discourse in case of specific contributions proved incoherent with the discourse of Canadian authorities on allied sharing in NATO, informed by the ethics of obligations and communitarian ethics. This paper comes to the conclusion that, rather than the pursuit of a free-riding strategy or even simply calculating one’s own benefits, the split discourse – in which several ethical logics shape the way national authorities approach the issues of contributing and sharing – has turned burden-sharing into a long-lasting problem in NATO.

The Canadian perspective on burden-sharing is particularly compelling in this period of NATO’s formative years. Canada’s involvement in the creation of NATO – its first peacetime alliance – meant a U-turn in Canadian foreign and defence policy. While ranking fourth on the international great power scale in the aftermath of the Second World War (Létourneau 1992, p. 53), it chose the path of becoming a middle power (Chapnick 1999). This did not stop it from launching a free mutual aid programme to its Western European allies, the only one next to the US military assistance. Finally yet importantly, Canada faced a peculiar security dilemma. Given its superpower southern neighbour, Ottawa had to balance its security and economic concerns on two continents. This turbulent period formed a liberal-realist generation of Canadian statesmen (Haglund and Roussel 2004, pp. 57-60). In short, these multiple crucial policy choices, together with the availability of detailed historical records, make the in-depth
interpretive analysis of Canadian contribution strategies particularly rich on contrasting a range of possible ethical considerations related to NATO burden-sharing.

In order to understand the ethics of burden-sharing in NATO, the paper first situates and presents the methodological framework to explain how the insights of normative ethics can inform an interpretive research strategy on allied contributions and sharing. Adapting the theory-as-thought method originally developed by Hayes and James (2014), the paper then develops an interpretive codebook of four ethics, constructed as a synthesis of three IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) with three grand families of ethical theory (deontological, consequentialist, and relational). The second part sifts through ethical elements in the Canadian discourse on allied sharing, as recorded in the archival documents of the Canadian Government in Library and Archives Canada (LAC), and analyses specific discursive instances when Canadian authorities discussed concrete contributions to NATO. Part three contrasts and compares ethical patterns of this Canadian discourse on burden-sharing. The paper concludes on the implications for the future research on military cooperation and makes the case for pluralist theorising in the IR and foreign policy analysis.

**Burden-sharing scholarship: more theorising, less understanding**

The problem of allied contributions in NATO – why members decide to contribute to military alliances – has been studied from several theoretical angles within the alliance management literature. Arguably, the burden-sharing scholarship remains dominated by studies based on alliance security dilemma (e.g., von Hlatky 2013), economics of alliances based on public goods theories (e.g., Sandler and Shimizu 2014), or domestic and alliance-level institutional structures (e.g., Weitsman 2013, Auerswald and Saideman 2014). Overall, they provide narrow and mostly static accounts of burden-sharing (Zyla 2016, p. 12).

Yet, in the past decade, several scholars have recognised that a more diverse research on burden-sharing is necessary. For instance, Ringsmose believes that a qualitative approach could “take public goods theory examinations of NATO one step further” (2016, p. 219). Becker (2017) calls for an enhanced dialogue between qualitative and quantitative studies on burden-sharing measurements. Given the contested nature of burden-sharing, this literature would also benefit from further conceptual work on this politically loaded problem (Foucault and Mérand 2012, p. 424). Equally important, Webber observes that NATO has not been “the subject of much normative theorising” (2016, p. 11).
Interpretive and sociological approaches are particularly apt to study “intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values” in states’ burden-sharing behaviour (Zyla 2016, p. 5). To mention the most significant examples, Zyla (2015) studies a burden-sharing norm of external responsibility, Kitchen (2010) explains states’ participation in NATO’s out of area operations with a norm of responsibility, Mérand and Rayroux (2016) conceptualise burden-sharing as an anchoring practice, while Flockhart sees behind the burden-sharing problem a practice of “constructive ambiguity” (2016, p. 156). Lastly, in his study of the EU approach to the refugee problem, Thielemann (2003) develops an especially illuminating analytical model for studying the burden-sharing problem that contrasts norm-based and cost-benefit logic of burden-sharing behaviour, and distinguishes between motivations and patterns.

This paper analyses the burden-sharing problem from an ontological and epistemological perspective that contrasts with the dominant positivist research on allied contributions and burden-sharing. In interpreting Canadian contribution strategies, I regard burden-sharing as a process, rather than an outcome, and propose an alternative use of scientific theories to analyse the “why contribute” problem. Instead of factoring in various systemic and domestic variables, I look at how the traditions of normative ethics, blended in IR theory, shaped the discourse of national actors in media res of burden-sharing at the beginnings of NATO: Canadian elected officials, bureaucrats and senior military staff under the liberal government of Louis St. Laurent (1948-1957). I do not look for objective reasons why a state should contribute to alliances; rather, I explore what national actors themselves put forward as being a “right thing to do” in terms of military cooperation. Representing a specific case of NATO burden-sharing, this paper should not be looked upon to provide a comprehensive study in Canada’s history.²

² For a historical account of Canada in this period see for example works by John Holmes, James Eayrs, or Norman Hillmer.
Ethics enters interpretive research strategy

“The ethics is not a choice to do good when the overwhelming temptation – or the easier option – is to do evil; it is, rather, a competing set of perspectives about what it is to do good, and about what that good might be.”
Burke et al. 2014, pp. 8-9

The present historical and interpretive analysis explores ethical elements of the burden-sharing problem. It rests on two important premises with respect to ethics. First, there is no ethically neutral action or “ethic-free zone” (Booth 2011, p. 475). Even in politics no action is void of ethical considerations since decision-makers, bound by legitimacy concerns, act according to some conception of a right course of action (Burke et al. 2014, p. 9; Vilmer 2015, pp. 177-8). Second, IR is a domain of moral choice. Every IR theory has a normative dimension, and these IR “moral codes” are not different from those that exist in domestic politics or on the individual level (Hoffmann 1988, p. 29).

To reconstruct the normative dimension of the burden-sharing problem, this paper uses a theory-as-thought method, originally introduced by Hayes and James (2014). Based on the assumption that IR theories represent different modes of thinking about the world, the theory-as-thought method puts forward the idea that policy-makers think and make sense of world affairs in terms of theoretical logics (Hayes and James 2014, p. 401). Theory-as-thought conceives IR theories as socially constructed systems of meanings and relations in narratives and discourses. These modes of thinking are intersubjective structures enabling actors to understand the world. The method’s central analytical tools are discursive markers and inductive extraction that indicate the presence of particular theoretical logic (Ibid., pp. 406, 427). They roughly correspond to key concepts of the chosen theories. Since discursive markers are integral part of the studied texts, rather than abstract terms externally imposed by the researcher, tracing theoretical logics in actors’ discourse requires a certain degree of analytical flexibility.

Given this paper’s objective to analyse Canadian contribution strategies through the lens of ethics, the theory-as-thought method is here accordingly adapted by narrowing the range of discursive markers. I rely on the conceptual apparatus drawn from the traditions of normative
ethics, and further clarified through the three IR theories. The resulting four ethical ideal-types create together a single interpretive grid (see Table One). This codebook of four ethic does not pretend to embrace the complexities within and between various ethical and IR schools, as it represents only one of possible ways of simplifying the centuries of moral philosophy. Its role is to systemise ethical elements in the Canadian burden-sharing debates.

Table II. Interpretive grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR theory/ Ethical tradition</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule-oriented (Deontology)</td>
<td>Ethics of obligations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence-oriented (Consequentialism)</td>
<td>Ethics of prudence</td>
<td>Utilitarian ethics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Communitarian ethics</td>
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Having outlined the interpretive research strategy, this paper approaches the burden-sharing problem differently from the positivist studies. Instead of using the precepts of existing

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3 The contemporary ethicists divide normative ethics into four grand traditions: deontology, consequentialism, the virtue ethics, and the relational ethics (Sandel 2010; Burke et al. 2014, p. 11). Virtue approaches give priority to moral character and personal qualities in judging moral behaviour. However, they are almost never represented in any IR work. Making the case for this ethics in the IR realm is neither the objective nor within the scope of this paper. For a notable exception, see Gaskarth (2011).

4 The decision to include normative ethics as an analytical tool stems from a recent call for more dialogue between descriptive and normative ethics (Sandberg 2015). On the one hand, greater understanding of normative ethics can lead to more accurate descriptions of moral attitudes in social activities. On the other hand, empirical investigation can put normative ethics into perspective, generate new concepts and give credibility to existing ones.
applied ethics developed within the IR research agenda, this paper reconstructs the ethics of burden-sharing through identifying the broad traditions of normative ethics in practitioners’ discourse. The combination with the logics of IR theories further facilitates the grasp of ethical elements in the burden-sharing discourse of Canadian authorities, and improves our understanding of how the issues of contributing and sharing were framed in normative terms.

The adapted theory-as-thought method first establishes which ethics shaped the Canadian discourse on the issue of allied sharing in NATO, and second, how Canadian authorities talked about Canada sharing in with respect to discursive instances of concrete contributions to NATO. The paper then compares the patterns of ethical logics framing both issues of sharing and contributing as part of the Canadian discourse on burden-sharing. The following paragraphs are dedicated to a brief overview of central prescriptions for action and justice of the four ethics, which constitute together the interpretive grid and serve as a basis for discursive markers.

**Ethics of Obligations**

According to deontology, or the rule-oriented ethical tradition, the right action depends on, and is constrained by, the interpretation of duties (rules, obligations) and authority (Smith 1992, p. 215). The authority can be divine, but most deontological approaches emphasise the centrality of reason (Kantianism) or agreement (contractarianism). According to the Kantian tradition, an actor is motivated by duty rather than by achieving interests, and his moral motives overrule consequences. Contractarians, another branch of deontological ethics, stipulate that only in basing international reciprocity and social relations on the concept of social contract can international cooperation become a matter of moral duty, not charity (Sandel 2014, p. 142). Regardless of empirical facts or probability, the a priori defined moral duty justifies actions, not vice-versa (Donaldson 1992, pp. 136, 142), when an overriding moral duty is to make (perpetual) peace possible (Smith 1992, p. 209).

The liberal IR tradition, characterised by individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism, embraces both deontological and consequentialist ethical thought (Williams 2009, p. 29). Although the motivations behind these two ethics are different, when it comes to practical ends, they often converge; in order to phase out negative impacts of international

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5 For more details see IR ethics handbooks edited by Hayden (2009), Reus-Smit and Snidal (2010), Bell (2010), or Moellendorf and Widdows (2015).
anarchy, states themselves should agree to limit their sovereignty and create international organisations and law, and maintain international commerce.

According to the ethics of obligations, states should provide contributions through their rationalisation of the North Atlantic Treaty constitution. This should result in free riding being considered an unethical action and in moral egalitarianism, aiming at universal (political) equality of actors. As to the sharing, the Kantian tradition offers only procedural prescriptions for justice in terms of impartial application of international law. In the Rawlsian “justice as fairness” tradition, burden-sharing should be procedural and distributive at the same time, where inequalities in sharing are not necessarily problematic insofar as they benefit to the least advantaged.

**Utilitarian Ethics**

Consequentialist ethical approaches emphasise the results of actions, rather than duties or intentions, as the benchmark of morality. Utilitarianism is the most wide-spread consequentialist theory. It stands on two basic premises. First, in contrast to a Kantian duty, happiness (well-being, welfare, common good or benefit) is considered the only intrinsically good thing. Second, consequences is the only relevant factor in deciding whether any action or practice is right or wrong. Utilitarian ethics implies that the principle of (collective) utility – the greatest happiness for the greatest number – should guide states’ contributions to NATO. Both Benthamite and Mill’s versions of utilitarianism, even if they propose more substantive conception of ethical action, remain too vague when it comes to international burden-sharing. If following its central axiom, burden-sharing is just when it maximises the common good (collective defence). However, it is only implicit about the assumption that these benefits should not be concentrated in a small number of states but spread evenly across the members of the group. Utilitarianism is therefore often supplemented by other principles such as equality (Ellis 1992, p. 168).

**Ethics of Prudence**

A quite standard realist denial of the morality in IR is connected with the realist core principles of action being determined by conflictual anarchic international system and/or by human nature, the radical separation of domestic and international realms, and the primacy of self-interest over any moral principle. Put shortly, this radical position advances that there is no room left for ethics in international politics. Yet, although most IR realists do not overtly acknowledge any ethical concerns, the moderate variant of realism can be best understood as “a cautionary ethic
of political prudence” (Donnelly 2005, p. 150), where moralism is seen as a distortion and an impediment to effective foreign policy.

The ethics of prudence is a variant of Weber’s ethics of responsibility, where prudence is a function of statesperson’s responsibility for his or her own population/country and is characterised by the dilemma of dirty hands (Warner 1991). Ethical action is thus guided by the imperative of national interest, whose defence has an important normative value for realists (Forde 1992, p. 79). National contributions to alliances should therefore have positive consequences for country’s security. States above all contribute in order to increase national gains from military cooperation. However, even moderate realists are pessimistic about the possibility of international justice. The absence of coercion makes justice either unavailable in the IR sphere, or it is only limited and contingent on the interests of the most powerful (Brown 1997, p. 276). The ethics of prudence implies that great powers instrumentalise allied sharing to their own advantage and power projection.

Communitarian Ethics

In addition to classical families of normative ethics, contemporary ethicists have added relational ethics (e.g., Burke 2007, Shapcott 2010). Addressing problems of power and vulnerability, relational ethics emphasises interdependence of all humans, rather than taking a moral individual separately as a basis of ethical theorising. Relational ethical approaches claim to propose an alternative to deontology and consequentialism by centring on responsibilities to and for those with whom actors choose to enter into relation (Altman and Wellman 2009, p. 131; Burke et al. 2014, p. 11). The constructivist IR school focuses on the role of norms and identities in respect with actors’ behaviour. It puts emphasis on intersubjective realities and operates with social facts. In spite of having an inherently normative research agenda, constructivism has found it problematic to advance some prescriptions for what should count as an ethical action. Nevertheless, there are two recent developments of constructivist ethical thought: the ethics of humility and communitarian ethics. Since it is not clear whether the ethics of humility is a distinctive ethics at all (Hoffmann 2009, Price 2008), I use the second conception and place it within the family of relational ethics.

Popularised especially in the works by Emmanuel Adler on the communitarian turn in IR normative and analytical theory, communitarian ethics introduces a concept of “communities of practice” and describes social mechanisms that could facilitate the emergence of “normatively better” communities. Often presented in opposition to cosmopolitanism,
communitarianism is certainly not a novel ethical theory. What its many versions have in common is that they highlight the moral significance of communities, where “the common good or community interest […] is greater than individual goods and interests” (Morrice 2000, p. 237). Although constructivist communitarian ethics does not elaborate on the hierarchy of interests or goods, it considers “community and individual interests as ontologically complementary” (Adler 2005, p. 13). The constructivist version of communitarianism stresses the important role of the social construction of knowledge in the development of collective normative understandings as a source of moral action and justice (Adler 2005, pp. 3, 11, 27). It is particularly useful for clarifying where communities and commitments, solidarity and we-feeling, to these communities came from. However, these constructivist communities are not limited to national sovereign borders. Communitarian ethics therefore calls for shared moral expectations and cultural understanding, which may in turn provide some substance to relational ethics’ premises of responsibility to and for the others. According to this ethics, states’ contributions to alliances are reflections of responsibility to their like-minded allies and allied sharing becomes an expression of the Atlantic community building.

**Canada contributes to NATO (1948-1957)**

No specific military commitments were discussed in the Canadian Cabinet prior to signing the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. However, over the summer of 1949 the Government started to contemplate how Canada could materialise its political pledge. The Chiefs of Staff Committee cautiously considered improvements to Canada’s military strength for national defence purposes, if war should break out. Ottawa mandarins first supposed that NATO members would optimise or even decrease defence costs by pooling their resources. With the adoption of the NATO Balanced Collective (later Integrated) Forces concept in the midst of the Korean War, Canada’s defence programme started to develop in relation to the total capabilities

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6 Since security communities, or communities of cooperative-security practices, depend on shared moral expectations of self-restraint, Adler indirectly suggests that spreading the norms of self-restraint could constitute the much sought constructivist prescription for ethical action (Adler 2008, Adler and Greve 2009). Adler’s approach contrasts with liberal constructivists, who build on the Kantian tradition and focus on liberal democratic security communities, see Williams (2001).

7 LAC, LSL/224/E4-26 Reid to Pearson, 26 October 1948.
of the entire group of NATO nations. During this early Cold War period, Canada became one of the leading contributors to the Alliance.

The strategic narrative on NATO in the early 1950’s was uncontested at the elite level. The Government helped create the Atlantic alliance with a clear objective: build collective defence to deter potential aggressors (avoid war), and strengthen the Atlantic community (reinforce peace). The attitudes towards NATO were generally positive across the political spectrum, agreeing on its importance for both Canada’s and international security, and on the perception of the Soviet threat. No disputes arose over the basic policy of Canadian involvement in NATO during St. Laurent’s premiership (Byers 1967, pp. 4, 18).

This paper is not, however, interested in general long-term objectives with respect to the Alliance. I focus on what came next once NATO’s military strategy of collective territorial defence and deterrence was established. The analysis of Canadian burden-sharing discourse aims to clarify why Ottawa contributed to NATO by looking at ethical elements behind concrete defence measures. The empirical section first explores the discourse of Canadian authorities on allied sharing in NATO. Then it looks at the specific instances in the discourse related to Canada’s contributions: provision of military equipment and services to the European allies; deployment of Canadian aerial and ground troops to Western Europe; and continental defence of North America. I do not evaluate the actual impact of contributions on the overall NATO defence. Rather, I explore the “good reasons” which national authorities evoked in their private and public discussions to help them rationalise Canada’s participation at NATO.

**Allied sharing in NATO: distributing costs of collective defence**

This section looks at in how Canadian authorities framed the issue of sharing with the fellow allies. It is important to note that they neither publicly nor privately tried to evade their commitments to NATO. At times the Canadian Government attempted to delay or compensate one type of contribution with another, like providing military equipment instead of deploying troops. Yet, they never questioned their obligation to share the NATO burden. Free riding on other allies – deliberately avoiding or diminishing one’s share of the common burden – was not considered acceptable behaviour in Ottawa.

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8 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Defence Liaison Memo, 30 August 1950.
9 Among others, Roussel (1998) already demonstrated the Kantian liberal-constructivist logic behind the Canadian activism in the creation of NATO.
Three ethics shaped this basic but central point to approaching the burden-sharing problem is in the Canadian discourse. First, from the utilitarian viewpoint, the cost-benefit calculation favours sharing due to a more efficient utilisation of national resources for the common cause, which otherwise could not be attained. In several of his public speeches, the foreign secretary Pearson explicitly ruled out free riding because “peace could not be achieved by leaving the job of securing it to others”.10 Second, in accordance with the ethics of obligations and the communitarian ethics, the international danger “demands a unity of sacrifice by all free nations in the common cause of peace”.11 Pearson publicly urged the NATO countries less-exposed to the risks of war to actively demonstrate solidarity with those who would have to make the “ramparts of sacrifices” to resist the ground attack.12 Similarly, his Under-Secretary Heeney observed that “no national government was willing to shift to other shoulders, even if it could, the responsibility for its own security”.13 The necessity to share in terms of relational ethics was unequivocal: “the Atlantic Community” could not persist “without some form of burden-sharing”.14

NATO eventually launched a series of burden-sharing studies at the beginning of the 1950s, which were supposed to determine an equitable distribution of defence costs among the allies. Proposals took various forms, such as statistical formulas or arrangements for transfers of equipment. The studies resulted in the institutionalisation of the NATO Annual Review in 1952. In this multilateral procedure, the allies exchanged information on their military capabilities and defence programmes, and identified the ways to improve NATO’s overall strength, without resorting to some rigid distributive mechanism.

Canadian authorities conceived the sharing problem in terms of fairness. Instead of determining allies’ shares in relation to the benefits received, they framed the equitable distribution of costs in NATO in terms of country’s idiosyncratic characteristics and by drawing an analogy with domestic distributive justice among Canadian provinces. The Canadian discourse on allied sharing was therefore dominated by the ethics of obligations and further shaped by the communitarian ethics.

13 Heeney, 19 March 1951. Speeches & Statements, 51/11.
In the House of Commons, in June 1950, Minister of National Defence Claxton defined Canada’s “fair contribution towards collective security” in accordance to Canadian resources, needs, capacities and responsibilities.15 The Canadian officials alluded to principles of proportionality especially in speeches to the American public. For the Department of External Affairs (DEA) it was perfectly normal for the US to pay more than anyone else in the Alliance: “The Americans should not complain if they have to pay the price of empire, nor should they expect us [the Canadians] to pay that price with them”.16 At the same time, the Minister of Trade and Commerce tried to dismiss any doubt that Canada was not doing enough despite the unequal – but fair – cost distribution: “We do not expect the United States to carry our burdens, even though it has twelve times the population and eighteen times the productive strength. […] We expect to carry a fair share of the sacrifices and costs of collective defence. On a per capita basis we shall probably carry more than many of our allies”.17 In other words, national contributions should reflect not only the overall size of national income, but most importantly the national income per capita, required for a decent living standard.

On contrary, in the case of NATO common budgets, the only departure from the NATO principle of “let the costs lie where they fall”,18 the Canadian Government acknowledged that the US had already borne a substantial contribution to European defence strength.19 Consequently, the Secretary to the Cabinet Robertson, seconded by the Deputy Minister of National Defence, thought that Canada should agree to a formula modified in the US favour, since “the US were paying such a high proportion of the real cost of rearming the alliance”.20 Ottawa accepted to pay more than pure national income proportion, since this scheme would be fairer to the US.

When turning to the European allies, Heeney acknowledged that in addition to these principles of proportionality, there was also the obligation to help less well-off allies. The DEA’s Economic Division recognised that relatively richer North American members had the

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15 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Claxton speech, 26 June 1950.
16 LAC, MG26L/235 Memo for the Prime Minister, 9 February 1949.
17 Howe, 27 February 1951. Speeches & Statements, 51/7.
18 LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2 Department of Finance to Deutsch, 5 February 1951.
20 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
ability and capacity to assist the European allies struggling with economic problems, and, again, the unequal contributions to NATO defence could be justified “in order that the common burden may be shared more equitably”.  

Another way to incorporate fairness into their burden-sharing discourse was the analogy with contributions of Canadian provinces to the federal budget, where proportionality reflected their per capita income. Well before the whole Alliance embarked on painful burden-sharing exercises, Acting Under-Secretary Reid sketched out a proposal for an equitable distribution of defence efforts based on “principles of pooling of resources, of risks and of control over policy”. He thought that the percentage of defence spending should be linked to the aggregate national incomes of all NATO members and this amount to be then allocated according to the strength of their respective national income. Although other members in the DEA were sceptical, for Reid the problem resembled to that of “measuring the comparative burdens of national expenditures, which persons of different income groups within a country bear”.

The Canadian authorities searched for the criteria which would have made the cost-sharing in NATO more equitable. Their fairness discourse on allied sharing lacked the utilitarian element of expenditures-benefits correspondence. Contrary to the predictions of most economist and realist studies on burden-sharing, Canada, and the allies in general, had been actively attempting to arrive at some form of distributive justice instead of dodging their shares of NATO defence burden. In contrast to this discourse on sharing, shaped by the ethics of obligations and communitarian ethics, the ethical logic in the Canadian debates on specific contributions refocused on consequences.

**Mutual aid programme**

By the end of 1949, the Canadian Government decided to launch a form of contribution that Canada “can reasonably be expected to contribute in the most effective way” to the mutual benefit to both Canada and the allies in Europe. By September 1950 it started providing own facilities to train aircrew from NATO members, and transferring them some of its military

21 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 Plumptre to Pearson and Cabinet, 17 November 1950.
22 LAC, MG26L/224/E4-26 Reid to Pearson, 26 October 1948.
23 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Reid to Heeney, 5 September 1950.
Together as a Mutual Aid Programme (MAP), these contributions of services and equipment, free of charge, were meant not only to rehearse the Canadian reputation as an “arsenal of democracy”, but also to yield numerous benefits to both Canada and NATO.

First, spending public funds on military production was supposed to help the Canadian economy and maintain a high level of employment. The Canadian High Commissioner in London Wilgress explained that the MAP funds, in addition to meet European deficiencies, should “enable us to cut the coat of our aid to suit the cloth of our economy”.

Second, from the military viewpoint, the MAP should serve the dual purpose of developing and maintaining the productive capacity, especially in the aviation industry, to meet the needs of the Canadian Forces, and of furnishing strategically important equipment to NATO allies. This was the “useful ‘pump priming’ function”, as described by Secretary to Cabinet Robertson, where “a modest element of self-interest was permissible”. Although Canada had no legal means to control the destiny of military material once it left the Canadian territory, it reserved a “moral right” to know how the transferred equipment was put in use. Especially for the military authorities it was important that, regardless of the country destination, the MAP should strengthen overall NATO defence.

Third, the MAP was to generate positive political consequences. Although the Government was able to make a contribution at a relatively small cost (some $300 million annually) which was highly-valued by the allies, Canadian authorities used the MAP to avoid sending troops overseas and later to compensate for its small manpower contribution to NATO Forces in Europe. Canadian offers were tabled in NATO agencies who then recommended the allocations based on allied strategic needs. Some Canadian officials, however, later complained that Canada was not getting enough credit for its efforts. As reported by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff General Foulkes, due to this multilateral allocation procedure, it was the NATO Standing Group, not Canada, that enjoyed more visibility, and the recipient countries were

26 During the Second World War, Canada used only 30% of its war production for itself. LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 Memo by Department of Trade and Commerce, 27 February 1950.
27 LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 Wilgress to Pearson, 12 December 1949.
28 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 16th Panel meeting, 18-19 January 1951.
29 LAC, DND/20708/CSC 2-2-30/4 34th Panel meeting, 15 June 1954.
sometimes not aware of the equipment’s origin. Ottawa desired more publicity so that Canada could make proper political gains from its contribution.  

Given the prospect of political gains, all equipment and services under the MAP were free of charge to European allies, except for transportation costs. Ottawa refused any reciprocal mutual aid. Wilgress explained that if Canada were to seek counter benefits, the MAP “would have to be substantially larger in order to get the same political results”. Deputy Minister of National Defence Drury explicitly ruled out making profit on any country, as he did not consider it politically advantageous for Canada. The only actor who consistently opposed free Canadian aid was the Bank of Canada, and to a lesser extent, the Department of Defence Production, which wanted the Government to put more emphasis on the sale of equipment, instead of having the military assistance put a direct burden on the Canadian economy. Several public speeches eventually started to frame the issue with a new slogan “trade not aid” in order to encourage economic activity on the both sides of the Atlantic.

The last benefit of the programme, as identified by the Canadian authorities, concerned the Canadian military procurement in the US. This introduces a prudential element into a largely utilitarian discourse with respect to the MAP. Ottawa used its mutual aid to strike a deal with the US on the reciprocal military procurement between these two countries. It convinced the US that Canada’s inability to start its MAP for European partners was because much of the equipment, which the Government intended to produce in Canada, included an important US dollar content. At that time, Canada faced a challenging balance of payment problem with respect to the American dollar and the Buy American Act, which barred military purchases for the US forces in Canada.

Given the ongoing Canadian conversion programme of equipment from the British to the American type, General Foulkes was, as usual, more straightforward in that “if the US authorities were interested in encouraging the Canadian Armed Forces to standardise on

31 LAC, DND/20708/CSC 2-2-30/4 36th Panel meeting, 19 November 1954.
32 LAC, DEA/4501/50030-L-40 Ritchie to Defence Liaison Division, 25 February 1950.
33 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 Memo, 6 April 1951.
American equipment, they would have to make it possible for us to buy the equipment”.

Prime Minister St. Laurent was more moderate as he presented the deal with the US as beneficial to NATO in general, since it implied more efficient utilisation of the allied resources for producing defence equipment. Having revived the spirit of the 1941 *Hyde Park Declaration*, the US Government agreed to reciprocal military purchases in Canada in May 1950.

The Canadian discourse with respect to its mutual aid contribution to NATO was shaped largely by utilitarian ethics, while tainted with the ethics of prudence as the Canadian Government used the MAP to improve its bargaining position with the US in the matter of military procurement. Overall, exchanges between the government’s departments (Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Trade and Commerce/Defence Production) suggest that the consequentialist logic played the central role in how Ottawa should bring about and execute the MAP, converging political, economic, and military benefits.

**Canadian forces in Europe**

Although Canada withdrew its soldiers from Europe in 1947, it sent them back four years later as its contribution to the NATO Integrated Forces. Throughout the initial period of NATO’s military build-up, the Canadian Government firmly held the line that the provision of equipment to Europe would be its most effective contribution to the collective defence strength. Yet, in October 1951 Parliament approved sending to Europe one brigade group and an air division of 11 fighter squadrons. The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade landed in Western Germany on 23 December 1951 (Maloney 1997, p. 21). Which ethics shaped the Canadian discourse on the redeployment of armed forces overseas?

Troop deployment to Europe was a great nuisance to the Canadian Government. The Minister of Defence acknowledged that although “participation by the Canadian army will show more emphatically than any amount of equipment […] that we stand together with our allies”, at the same time he added that “material considerations alone might suggest that there might be greater military value in spending the same amount on equipment for forces already

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35 LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 1st Meeting of Mutual Aid Working Group, 12 July 1950. However, Ottawa kept the funds for the replacement programme for its own forces separated from the reciprocal procurement with the US.

36 LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 Defence Liaison to Reid, 26 July 1950.

37 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/2 Memo for Pearson, 19 March 1952.
on the spot rather than on Canadian ground forces”.\(^{38}\) The financial factor did not play a minor role – the Canadian defence policy at that time did not contain plans for maintaining an expeditionary force of ground troops. External Affairs’ Head of Economic Division Plumptre confirmed that keeping “any considerable force in Europe would be in a military sense expensive and wasteful of men and resources”, though he noted the pressure of public opinion at home and in the US on Canada to increase its forces in being.\(^{39}\) Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, explained to the US Secretary of State Acheson that the Canadian deployment would “be unwise and unprofitable”.\(^{40}\) As it turned out, Canadian forces stationed in Europe was indeed the most expensive item on the national defence budget.

Ottawa definitely leant towards the deployment option when General Foulkes together with the Deputy Minister of National Defence concluded “the stationing more troops in Western Europe was the only effective deterrent and that forces in Canada would not serve the same purpose”.\(^{41}\) In December 1950, Pearson and Claxton in their memorandum advised the Cabinet “there is no alternative to defending North America in Europe”.\(^{42}\) Doubts, however, never disappeared. General Foulkes reminded the Government of the limited military value of the Canadian brigade in Europe, because Germany had been contributing to the Integrated Force since 1952 and, more importantly, “this [Canadian] brigade and its dependent costs does not in any way increase the military position of NATO”.\(^{43}\)

The Canadian authorities believed that this contribution would have only narrow military utility. Nevertheless, utilitarian cost-benefit calculations shaping their discourse identified some benefits. Considering the US pressures and allies’ expectations of future Canadian contribution, by deploying forces to Europe the Canadian officials hoped to enhance Canada’s reputation of a responsible and committed ally.\(^{44}\) For example, they let the NATO

\(^{38}\) Claxton’s speech in the House of Commons, 5 February 1951.

\(^{39}\) LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Plumptre to Prime Minister, 22 September 1950.

\(^{40}\) LAC, DEA/4524/50030-S-40/1 Canadian Ambassador in Washington to SSEA, 8-9 September 1950.

\(^{41}\) LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2 13\(^{th}\) Panel meeting, 2-3 October 1950.

\(^{42}\) LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2 Claxton and Pearson to the Cabinet, 28 December 1950.

\(^{43}\) LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 Memo by General Foulkes, 23 November 1955.

\(^{44}\) Some Canadian officials argued that the manpower contribution could have an impact on restoring the European morale, which was certainly important if NATO wanted its military strategy to
Supreme Commander choose the location of the deployed troops instead of deciding unilaterally\textsuperscript{45} and the Government paid for this brigade forces stationed in Germany.\textsuperscript{46} Yet, it remains puzzling why the Government helped its allies in a way which the Canadian elites themselves did not consider at all as the best means to maximise the NATO strength.

Public speeches made by Canadian officials suggest an ethics different from utilitarianism, or consequentialism in general. Here the Canadian discourse was shaped by the communitarian ethics and ethics of obligations as well, since they framed the question of troop deployment as “necessary for the protection of the Atlantic community”, and as contributing to “a better understanding between our two [Canadian and German] peoples”.\textsuperscript{47} This discourse did not expect Canada’s contribution to maximise anything, but rather pointed to the appreciation of the value of the Atlantic community and interdependence between Europe and North America. This communitarian posture put Canada in relation with the European nations to whom the Government felt responsibility for their common destiny, as it was “the solemn obligations which bind us [Canadians] to our friends there [in Europe]”.\textsuperscript{48} This discourse on “solemn obligations” and responsibility to “friends” was absent in the case of the Canadian mutual aid. In a similar vein, one memo that attracted attention in Ottawa in 1954 proposed to include some European units in the North American continental defence under a new NATO command structure in Canada (to be called SACNAM). It meant to decrease the sense of European dependence and inferiority to the US while making NATO “more of an affair between equal partners”. According to this memo, Canada would sacrifice part of its sovereignty to improve ties between the NATO allies.\textsuperscript{49}

In short, although forces in Western Europe did not represent Canada’s major strategic military contribution, Ottawa made this commitment despite the heavy burden it would place succeed. However, this limited military utility of Canada’s manpower contribution could not outweigh the heavy cost of the deployment.

\textsuperscript{45} There was no consensus in the Military Staff Committee on this issue.

\textsuperscript{46} LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 Memo for the Cabinet Defence Committee, (n.d.) April 1951. Though Canadian forces in Europe used facilities of other NATO countries through the pooling of infrastructure. LAC, DND/20708/CSC 2-2-30/4 Pearson to the head of Post, Bonn, (n.d.) May 1956.

\textsuperscript{47} St. Laurent, 10 February 1954. \textit{Speeches \& Statements}, 54/8.

\textsuperscript{48} Heeney, 19 March 1954. \textit{Speeches \& Statements}, 54/20.

\textsuperscript{49} LAC, DEA/4903/50115-P-40/3 Memo by Southam, 30 April 1954. This project was never realised.
on the national budget. The Government’s decision reflected on the one hand the utilitarian ethics in terms of non-material political gains, but on the other hand, the communitarian ethics combined with the ethics of obligations played an important role in how the Canadian authorities further framed the issue in terms of its great symbolic value. This communitarian discourse will be more evident in a parallel discussion on the continental North American air defence. The heavy expenditures earmarked for the construction and operation of radar lines forced the Canadian Government to decrease its MAP, but not the amount of Canadian troops in Europe.

**North American continental air defence**

In the first half of the 1950’s, Washington came up with ambitious projects of radar chains to improve the continental air defence of North America on the Canadian territory. Although the Canadian Government knew very well that the radars did not qualify as NATO common projects, it equalled this early warning system with the Canadian contribution to European defence for two reasons. First, since the radar chains increased the strength of North American defence, that is a part of the NATO area, they contributed to overall NATO strength. Second, the Government emphasised the sharing and pooling element, which was central in the NATO military build-up and which had always been encouraged in Canada. Over time, there were three lines of radar stations built on the Canadian territory, with Canada involved in each of them quite differently. The ethics shaping the discourse on Canadian participation in this continental radar system could be characterised as prudential utilitarianism. Although sovereignty and country’s reputation were of Ottawa’s overriding concerns, financial feasibility and military efficiency informed the Canadian discourse to a significant extent.

As to the first radar chain, the Pinetree Line, approved by the Canadian Cabinet in February 1951, the two Governments quickly arrived at a cost sharing formula, according to which the US shared two thirds and Canada one third of all costs. The question of economic impact on the Canadian defence budget was not pronounced in this case. The Cabinet Defence

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50 Extract from Cabinet conclusions, 22 January 1953. DCER volume 19, p. 1052.
51 Wrong to Under-Secretary, 26 July 1951. DCER, volume 17, p. 1271-72.
Committee however made sure that the US Administration presented the project as a joint enterprise and measure of self-defence, not an American mutual aid to Canada.\textsuperscript{53}

The conjoint negotiations of the next two chains, the McGill Fence (or the Mid-Canada Line) and the DEW Line, were far from being as smooth as the first one. Especially the issue of Canadian sovereignty re-emerged when the DEA’s Defence Liaison Division complained about Canada not being consulted sufficiently ahead on the development of US plans for radars in the Canadian Arctic.\textsuperscript{54} MacKay noted that the Defence Department, together with the Department of Finance, were more busy “assuming their responsibilities for operations abroad […] rather than protecting such intangibles as sovereignty or autonomy at home”.\textsuperscript{55} Wilgress concurred that judgments made by the Canadian Government “were governed largely by financial considerations”.\textsuperscript{56} The Canadian Government approved in principle the construction and operation of the McGill Fence as a Canada-funded project in November 1953. After long deliberations, in November 1954 the Cabinet Defence Committee agreed to the DEW Line construction as a joint project, with Canada’s responsibility confined to the operation and maintenance.

The Mid-Canada Line is usually presented as a Canadian tactic to preserve its reputation at home and to dilute criticism of the US taking control over Canada (Lajeunesse 2007, p. 56). However, several Canadian officials simply doubted both financial feasibility and military efficiency of the DEW Line project. Especially the Canadian military were persuaded that the McGill Fence was more reasonable than the DEW Line. The Acting Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that from a strictly technical point of view, the DEW Line would be of little value without sea wings, which the US had undertaken at its expense, whereas the Mid-Canada Line was less challenging to build and would be immediately able to provide a warning earlier than the Pinetree Line.\textsuperscript{57} Since feasibility of the DEW Line was too contingent on US action and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[53] Reid to Pearson, 20 July 1951. DCER, volume 17, p. 1269. Claxton even suggested than Canada should build this line on its own. Although Pearson was sympathetic, Reid and Wrong disapproved.
\item[54] Memo by MacKay, 22 November 1952. DCER, volume 18, p. 1118.
\item[55] LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/2 MacKay to Under-Secretary, 9 July 1952.
\item[56] LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/2 Wilgress to Pearson, 15 July 1952.
\item[57] Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 25 June 1954. DCER, volume 20, p. 997.
\end{footnotes}
Canadian authorities did not know how authentic the US estimates of construction costs were, Ottawa avoided specifying its contribution to this “crash programme”.58

Private discussions in Ottawa suggest that the financial aspect turned out to be decisive.59 Not forgetting the dilemma of dividing its resources between continental defence and its commitments to Western Europe, in October 1953 Claxton suggested Canada should use a “cost avoidance strategy” (Jockel 1987, p. 83). Coupled with the doubts regarding the military feasibility of the DEW Line, Ottawa decided to fully pay for the Mid-Canada Line even though it knew this would affect Canada’s room for manoeuvre in the DEW Line project. This lower cost option would keep Canada’s “self-respect without having to put out too great an expenditure of materials, manpower, and money” and in such a way that the Canadian economy would get the maximum benefit from this contribution.60 Although Canada did not participate but in a final phase of the DEW Line development, it was crucially important for Ottawa to signal joint responsibility for the DEW Line and to present it publicly as one element of a larger continental defence project.61

In sum, prudential utilitarianism shaped Canadian discourse in the case of radar lines. The Government’s decision to assume the costs of the Mid-Canada Line was predominantly made on utilitarian grounds of financial and military efficiency and in accordance with its cost-minimising preferences, while the DEW Line project was informed by the prudential considerations with regards the country’s reputation.

Canadian officials played the NATO card to do some political damage control regarding the perceived loss of sovereignty. Eventually, the role of ethics of prudence in the Canadian discourse diminished since Ottawa preferred allowing more US troops to Canada than reducing Canadian forces in Europe. Even though Foulkes proposed to cut down the Canadian air force

58 Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 12 November 1954. DCER, volume 20, p. 1043.
59 The central point of disagreement was the decision to approval in principle the DEW Line and favouring one of the two lines in terms of costs. DEA officials had expressed to Pearson, Foulkes, and Bryce (Department of Finance) their misgivings that Canada’s freedom on determining the extent of participation in the DEW Line would be limited if Canada was to construct the Mid-Canada Line alone.
60 Defence Minister to Prime Minister, 21 October 1953. DCER, volume 19, p. 1092.

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in Europe, Pearson made sure they did not decrease. Rather, Ottawa chose to reduce its MAP by two-thirds in November 1955, so that the value of Canadian presence in Europe would not shrink.

**Split Discourse: Incoherent or Incompatible Ethics?**

Having looked at the ethical elements in the Canadian discourse on NATO burden-sharing, the interpretive analysis of how Canadian authorities discursively framed the issues of sharing and contributing makes two principal observations (see Table Two). The first relates to the co-occurrence of several ethics in the Canadian burden-sharing discourse. The second sheds light on how the ethical discourse differed in relation to the topic discussed.

Two broad tendencies characterise the presence of ethics in the Canadian discourse. On the one hand, the co-occurrence of the ethics of utility and the ethics of prudence, as in the case of the mutual aid programme or the construction of the radar lines, points to a practical convergence into the consequentialist type of ethics. On the other hand, the evidence points to the combined presence of the ethics of obligations and communitarian ethics. The ethics of obligations provided rules for Canada’s principled action, as stemming from the Treaty, and communitarian ethics further shaped Canadian officials’ discourse in terms of relational responsibility to the allies. The case in point is the obligation to share the burden of the Atlantic community and the overseas deployment of the Canadian forces to protect it.

**Table III. Co-occurrence in the ethics of burden-sharing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethics / Topic</th>
<th>Ethics of prudence</th>
<th>Utilitarian ethics</th>
<th>Ethics of obligations</th>
<th>Communitarian ethics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual aid programme</td>
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<td>×</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian troops in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar lines in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied sharing</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 LAC, DEA/4886/50115-J-40/5 NATO Delegation to Under-Secretary, 15 December 1953.
63 LAC, DND/20709/2-2-34/1 Draft of Statement on Canadian mutual aid, 3 December 1954.
As to the different ethics shaping the Canadian discourse in relation to the topic, this is where the normative contours of the burden-sharing problem start to emerge. Canadian authorities framed the issue of contributing to NATO by employing largely consequential types of ethics: prudence and utilitarianism. The communitarian posture was significantly present only in the case of troop deployment to Western Europe. In contrast, the issue of allied sharing was shaped in the Canadian discourse by both deontological and relational ethics, appealing to rules, obligations, and responsibility.

On the whole, Canadian authorities had a pretty clear idea about how Canada’s share in NATO should look like. Their discourse on allied sharing had a deontological background. These principles for equitably dividing the costs of collective defence according to some notion of fairness were supposed to go beyond utility-seeking, otherwise characteristic for the ethics shaping the Canadian discourse in the case of specific contributions to NATO.

The problem with this split discourse is that utilitarian rationality does not create a mindset prone for anything but benefit-maximising behaviour. According to its plain prescriptions, a utilitarian discourse on allied sharing would base the cost distribution upon the benefits received from this collective action. Alternatively, a utilitarian could also justify individual shares in accordance with strategic utility, for example in a sense that ‘the alliance is as strong as its weakest member’. However, this kind of utilitarian discourse was absent from the way Canadian authorities talked about the issue of dividing collective defence efforts. Instead of utility, Canadian authorities framed sharing in terms of fairness. Due to the limits of utilitarianism, the ethical logic behind contributions could not generate additional criteria should fairness require them.

**Conclusion**

How can an ethical perspective contribute to our understanding of NATO burden-sharing? At the very least, the available evidence suggests that there are normative roots to the burden-sharing problem. According to the historical interpretive analysis of Canadian archival documents, the ethics of burden-sharing in NATO can be characterised as a tension between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution.

This split discourse means that the same set of actors (Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and military) in the same institutional setting (the Government and its committees) employed a burden-sharing discourse which was shaped by multiple ethics, depending on whether they talked about the cost distribution in NATO or discussing specific Canadian contributions.
Although utilitarian ethics shaped how concretely Canada was going to share in, the very issue of sharing was framed in terms of equitable cost distribution. The utilitarian ethics under these circumstances could not make burden sharing discourse more intelligible, since it generally operates within a logic based on efficiency, not fairness.

In light of these findings, this paper suggests several theoretical and empirical implications with respect to the burden-sharing dynamics in NATO, interdisciplinary theoretical pluralism, and applied ethics. Following the renewed academic interest in studying ethical questions in IR and in overcoming theoretical boundaries, the interpretive grid used in this paper combined three IR theories with three traditions of normative ethics. It puts forward the claim that none of these theories alone could properly seize how Canadian leaders approached NATO burden-sharing. While liberal and constructivist ethics informed the Canadian discourse on sharing of defence cost (fairness of distribution), the liberal utilitarian ethics, occasionally together with realist prudence, shaped the discourse on what Canada should actually spend money on (utility of contribution). The simultaneous presence of all three IR theories in the Canadian discourse can then be depicted by the terms of cautiousness and sovereignty concerns (realism), principled action and benefits from cooperation (liberalism), and responsibility to and for the community of Atlantic nations (constructivism). This awareness of theoretically divergent concepts on the level of interpretation made it possible to embrace the complexity of military cooperation in NATO and to identify the split discourse as the possible normative root of the burden-sharing problem.

The interpretive analysis further points to the relevance of using normative ethics to address the burden-sharing problem. In contrast to most realist and economic theories of alliances, the paper found that free-riding in an alliance voluntarily created by like-minded sovereign states is not considered acceptable behaviour. Canada did not contribute to purely seek private benefits or strengthen only its own defence. The contributions were meant to enhance the collective enterprise, to produce benefits for itself and the allies at the same time. Moreover, the Canadian discourse reflected some notion of justice and responsibility for the others. Despite the sovereignty concerns about the control over the national budget, the realist ethics of prudence did not prevent Canadian authorities from framing the issue of sharing in terms of fairness. Returning to Thielemann’s analytical model, NATO burden-sharing poses many challenges because it combines norm-based (deontological and relational) motives with cost-benefit (consequential) patterns of states’ behaviour. Further research on how ethical
considerations help actors choose the right contribution strategy over other – should improve our conceptual understanding of military cooperation.

The St. Laurent Government represents a rather hard case for NATO burden-sharing. Despite the absence of parliamentary opposition against the policy of Canada’s active participation in NATO, even this pro-NATO government developed a split discourse shaped by incoherent ethical logics. Furthermore, internal differences emerged between the Departments driven by the ethics of prudence and utilitarian ethics (Finances, Trance and Commerce, and Defence) on the one hand, and the actors using a discourse more centred around obligations and communitarian arguments (Department of External Affairs and Prime Minister’s Office) on the other hand. The 2016 announcement of “responsible conviction”64 to guide Canadian foreign policy confirms to some extent that international politics is just too complex to follow one simple code of ethical conduct.

In sum, this interpretive research with an ethical twist provides further insights into the relational burden-sharing dynamics beyond the quantitative realms of public goods theory. In adding a normative layer to the collective action problem in NATO, this study suggests that there is one ethics proper to sharing and other ethics to contributions. In short, individual action that pursues practical gains, rather than fairness, can undermine the desirable fair distribution of costs. To overcome this ethical impasse, NATO committees in discussing allied burden-sharing efforts might have to put emphasis on more tangible benefits of contributing, not only obligations to share the common burden equitably. This would create more compelling incentives for allies to commit their national resources for the defence of others and produce greater burden-sharing in NATO.

References


Abstract

This paper calls for a qualitative turn in discussing NATO burden-sharing. The paper takes issue with the numerical burden-sharing narrative in NATO and identifies its two main problems. Despite being simple, the 2% defence spending pledge lacks other basic attributes of any contributory system: fairness and effectiveness. Drawing from concepts of distributive justice, the paper analyses NATO’s first burden-sharing debates and demonstrates that due to their qualitatively different capabilities, the allies agreed on an egalitarian ability-to-pay distributive justice. Furthermore, it shows that the allies refrained from implementing fairness in terms of a one-size-fits-all formula, since this simple numerical approach could not produce fair and effective burden-sharing at the same time. Rather, they developed a dynamic framework for optimal sharing. These formative burden-sharing debates provide valuable lessons learned for the current build-up of NATO’s posture: less focused on formal sharing, more concerned with strategic outputs.

Keywords: NATO; burden sharing; fairness; distributive justice; intra-alliance cooperation, Trump

Introduction

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO has put collective defence back on top of its agenda. With the post-Cold War security order in Europe eroding, the question of defence spending has gained a prominent place in public debates on burden-sharing in the Alliance. At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, the allies committed to spend 2% of their Gross Domestic

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1 This chapter is the original version of the article published as “One measure cannot trump it all: lessons from NATO’s early burden-sharing debates” in *European Security*, online advanced publication (First published date: 4 August 2017).
Product (GDP) on defence. Although this guideline has existed in NATO for more than a decade, in Wales the allies made this defence spending pledge at the highest political level for the first time, and reaffirmed it during the Warsaw Summit two years later. Although there has been an increase in defence spending in real terms since 2014 (NATO 2017a), only a handful of countries can (and did) fulfil it. Given that this guideline has been contested on several grounds ever since its introduction in 2006, the way in which the current burden-sharing debate is framed could be harmful for NATO’s cohesion (Kreps 2010, p. 191).

This paper calls for a qualitative turn in discussing burden-sharing. Debates centred on the 2% pledge have created a purely numerical burden-sharing narrative that puts too much emphasis on simplicity, and neglects normative and practical aspects of sharing. To develop this argument, I offer a historical perspective on burden-sharing and analyse the problem – the distribution of collective defence costs – as a contributory system similar to taxation. A sound tax policy has to strike the right balance between three basic attributes: simplicity, fairness, and effectiveness (Murphy and Nagel 2002, pp. 12, 46-47). The 2% figure, I argue, cannot render burden-sharing fair and effective at the same time.

In analysing NATO’s first burden-sharing debates in the early 1950s, the paper shows that the allies once considered but then abandoned a similar idea of having the sharing arrangements determined by a simple statistical number. More importantly, the allies struggled with how to translate the agreed egalitarian fairness into effectiveness. After they had concluded four rounds of burden-sharing studies, the predecessor of the today’s NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), rather than a numerical formula, became the focal point and practical expression of allied burden-sharing.

This paper aims to contribute to the policy-relevant debate on NATO burden-sharing. Its historical focus stresses normative arguments and sharing arrangements put forward by practitioners in terms of distributive justice and taxation. In the context of the current allied

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2 In addition, the allies pledged to spend at least 20% of their defence budgets on procurement and modernisation of equipment. North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, 5 September 2014.

3 The allies made a similar high-level financial commitment in 1978 (expired in 1987), when NATO leaders agreed on “an annual increase in defence expenditure in the region of 3% in real terms”. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 30-31 May 1978.

4 Archival data collected for this analysis contain allied documents discussed in the North Atlantic Council, as well as reports on these private debates retrieved from the Canadian national archives.
efforts to boost defence and deterrence on the European continent, the allies may usefully revisit NATO’s historical origins in order to “relearn” how to discuss their burden-sharing (Mattelaer 2016, p. 26). The lessons from NATO’s early approach to burden-sharing in the 1950s can provide more capability-driven and strategy-oriented guidance than the past two decades of force generation practice for NATO’s particular out-of-area operations.

**Problematic percentages**

Member-states contribute to the Alliance in two ways (NATO, 2017b). First, allies make direct contributions to NATO military and civilian budgets, as well as NATO investment projects. These contributions follow the principle of common funding, consisting of an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income. Second, the largest contributions are indirect and made on a voluntary basis in accordance with the “costs lie where they fall” principle (except when Article 5 is invoked). The 2% guideline concerns the latter type of contributions.

The current political climate illustrates that “Europeans underestimate the political significance of 2%, while Americans overestimate the political significance of 2%” (Techau 2015). The 2% pledge has been making news headlines especially since the 2016 US presidential election. Narrowing NATO’s burden-sharing problem into an unkept promise of financial sharing, Donald Trump seems to associate NATO’s core purpose of collective defence solely with the level of allies’ defence spending. Yet, according to the German defence minister, the US President does not realise that “NATO does not have a debt account” (Noack 2017). Although he is certainly not the first US president to point out that European allies free ride on American capabilities, his transactional approach to the allies has been criticised for undermining NATO’s credibility.

Strictly speaking, the 2% pledge addresses the problem of declining investments in the defence sector. While defence spending decreased in the Western world between 2004 and 2013, the trend in all other regions, including Russia, China and Saudi Arabia, points to an increase, even doubling, of military expenditures over the same period (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2014). The 2% pledge represents a political symbol that is intelligible to the public (Lindley-French 2015). Yet, observers offer at least four reasons why the 2% pledge may be wrong-headed.

First, the 2% pledge is a politically constructed benchmark, which provides the US Administration with a political tool for naming and shaming on the one hand, and for securing more defence funds in Congress on the other (Ringsmose 2010, p. 325). While it indicates the
ally’s political will to contribute to common defence efforts and channels the intra-alliance peer-pressure, achieving the 2% threshold is in many cases unrealistic; for many member states this pledge would mean doubling their current defence spending.\(^5\) Interestingly, it was supposed to be an easily achievable, or “soft”, target. When in 2006 NATO defence ministers approved the 2% guideline in view to reverse the decline in defence expenditures of NATO countries, they took the median defence spending of the Alliance for 1991–2003, meaning that half of the allies already met this standard (Rynning 2015).

Second, in its current form, NATO conducts its burden-sharing in a “strategic void” (Mattelaer 2016, pp. 26, 31), disconnecting the debate from the geographical and historical context. The 2% pledge alone cannot respond to NATO’s urgent need to strengthen its defence and deterrence posture. Neither can it inform smart defence projects, which emphasise pooling and sharing of capabilities, or “smart spending” (Becker 2012, Sokolsky and Adams 2017). The examples of Greece and Turkey further illustrate the wrong inferences that can be derived from the 2% guideline. Nobody can conclude that because of their higher level of defence spending, they are better and more responsible NATO burden-sharers than Denmark.

Third, this one-size-fits-all approach yields different practical results, depending on the actual size of nation’s GDP; the Estonian 2% is less central to collective defence than 2% of the French GDP. More importantly, as the 2% pledge depicts only the input side, it does not indicate the actual improvement of collective defence or qualitative differences between allies’ shares, e.g. effectiveness of spending, risk sharing, superiorly trained and equipped forces, etc. Thus, one could argue that it neither measures nor quantifies the real burden-sharing in NATO. Marking the “triumph of simplicity over complexity” (Techau 2015), the 2% pledge detracts NATO from its real capability problem.

Finally, many NATO leaders have expressed their frustration with this indicator and denounced it as unfair. On the one hand, the governments might use the 2% pledge as a supportive argument with an international force in the domestic politics to boost national defence budgets (Deni 2014, p. 189, Rudžite-Stejskala 2014). On the other hand, European allies prefer to develop concrete capabilities without money waste, rather than blindly increasing their defence spending (Sauer 2015). For many of them, the defence spending

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\(^5\) The recent increase in European defence spending has largely been due to the Russian threat, not the pledge itself (Marrone et al. 2016, p. 4).
narrative is not sufficient, as “no amount of defence spending constitutes a panacea for maintaining Alliance cohesion” (Mattelaer 2016, p. 31).

The problem is that although NATO defines defence expenditures, it does it in very broad terms and without instructing states on how to compute their national defence budget numbers (NATO 2017c, p. 14). This allows states to pick those metrics that make them look better. In addition, there have been voices calling for broader burden-sharing measures to account for non-military means in preserving security. For instance, the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang Ischinger recently suggested a 3% spending target that would include military, development aid, and humanitarian expenditures (The Economist 2017).

The Argument

This paper explores normative and practical aspects of NATO burden-sharing through various models of distributive justice. While comparing burden-sharing to domestic taxation models is not a novel idea (Schelling 1955, Kravis and Davenport 1963, Hartley and Todd Sandler 1999, Horstmann and Scholz 2011), I examine the conceptual evolution of the NATO burden-sharing problem at its early stages. The objective of the paper is not to explain the causes of burden-sharing gap or inequalities among the allies, but to understand how the Alliance historically defined and tried to arrive at an equitable but practicable distribution of the collective defence burden. At the end of the day, burden-sharing is one of the Alliance’s constitutive elements, materialised in Article 3 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, and one of the sources of its cohesion and solidarity.

First, the paper contests the fairness of the 2% indicator on grounds of distributive justice. NATO’s early burden-sharing debates show that the allies preferred progressive, rather than flat, tax models due to their qualitatively different capabilities. In analysing NATO’s early burden-sharing debates, I put forward the argument that today’s NATO needs more substantive equity standards for its burden-sharing. In contrast, the current defence spending target does not take into account differences among countries’ abilities to pay. Furthermore, while this paper corroborates that “the absence of a supranational taxation authority” poses problems to burden-sharing arrangements (Ringsmose 2010, p. 324), it refines the claim that discussions on distributive justice are driven by “conflicting ideas of fairness” (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 3). Originally, the allies did agree on an egalitarian type of fairness for their burden-sharing.
Second, the rigid format of the 2% pledge fails to deliver on effectiveness. Focusing exclusively on uniform defence spending input figures amounts to sweeping the burden-sharing problem under the carpet. Its excessive simplicity creates vagueness, and thus eschews the capability gap problem of the Alliance. This pledge pushes the allies towards formal and procedural burden-sharing rules, which could backfire (Shapiro 2017). This paper shows that in the past, the allies struggled with how to translate fairness into effectiveness. Once they abandoned a formula approach to fairness, they started to frame their debates to prioritise optimal sharing, which focused on capabilities and capacities for an effective collective defence. Consequently, effective burden-sharing has to be connected more explicitly with defence planning guidelines, capability sharing, and common/joint funding of multinational projects. In other words, it has to put more focus on strategic outputs, not just on the burden to be shared.

To develop this argument, the paper first provides an overview of burden-sharing measurements in the scholarly literature. Then it elaborates in more details on the taxation models and the concept of distributive justice in connection to burden-sharing. The third part explores various contributory models proposed during the meetings of NATO committees in the early 1950s and the practical difficulties regarding the implementation of fair burden-sharing. The paper concludes with the implications for post-2014 allied burden-sharing.

**Burden-sharing: designing a tax system**

Apart from explaining states’ burden-sharing behaviour and their incentives to contribute or free ride, International Relations (IR) scholars focus on two objectives. First, they identify which descriptive indicators would better grasp burden-sharing efforts and countries’ ability to contribute. Second, they compare how individual allies fare against the chosen yardstick scheme in order to produce a ranking of countries. This is an important exercise since the choice of indicators influences how researchers identify free-riders and define equitable sharing.6

Economists and rational-choice theorists typically construct indicators of burden-sharing through the lenses of private—public goods divide. NATO’s product, be it greater defence, deterrence, or security, is a collective good with a certain degree of publicness, where contributions are made individually and voluntarily by its members. During the Cold War, these

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6 Free riders are usually countries that contribute below NATO’s average, according to a chosen indicator (Hartley and Sandler 1999, p. 671).
indicators included both sides: financial input and capability output. In general, scholars applied quantitative military indicators, such as input defence spending figures in both absolute and relative terms, and output expenditures such as armed forces, equipment, and other materiel committed to NATO’s primary objectives (Thies 1987, Oneal 1990). Later studies in the second half of the Cold War started to use a joint-product model in order to account for the varying degree of excludability as NATO’s strategy evolved (Sandler 1977). These models included both military and civilian indicators, such as defence spending and armed forces personnel on the one hand, and contributions to UN humanitarian operations, development aid, and contributions to other international organisations on the other hand (Sandler and Shimizu 2014).

After the Cold War, scholars added less quantifiable, mixed civilian—military indicators. Emphasising the complexity of 21st century security environment, Chalmers (2001) designed a multi-dimensional burden-sharing regime to bring together economic, environmental, and societal goods. Similarly, Cimbala and Forster (2010) broadened the traditional scope of NATO burden-sharing and examined simultaneously political, economic, and military burdens by looking at three dimensions of costs and risks. More recent studies focused on nuanced qualitative output measures, reflecting NATO’s non-Article 5 operations. Especially with the mission in Afghanistan, the debate shifted to risk sharing and indicators such as dangerous vs safe geographical areas, fatalities and casualties, or national caveats (Siegel 2009, Ringsmose 2010, Sperling and Webber 2009). Another model that combines both qualitative and quantitative measures is the relative force share index (Zyla 2016). Purely quantitative input studies for instance measure burden-sharing efforts through relative growth in defence spending over time (Plümper and Neumayer 2014).

This paper explores burden-sharing on a broader normative and conceptual level and treats it as a contributory system similar to taxation. Instead of finding specific indicators to compare and rank countries’ contributions, abilities, and efforts, the paper discuss the compromise between the attributes of fairness and practical effectiveness.

The normative dimension of burden-sharing is closely tied to an ethical concept of distributive justice, which could be defined as “the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, particularly the distribution of economic resources” (Hoffmann 1981, p. 141). Justice in taxation addresses the moral dilemma of “the fair-sharing out of tax burdens among individuals” (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 15). Depending on the political and societal context, each tax model tries to balance the following basic characteristics: simplicity,
fairness, and effectiveness. Apart from being fair, the tax system must be effective in promoting the desirable goals of distributive justice.

When distributive justice is situated into the tax policy context (pre-tax income vs tax burden), we are left with three basic models that are relevant to burden-sharing in NATO: the benefit principle, equal sacrifice, and egalitarian models. The latter are two versions of the ability-to-pay principle. Murphy and Nagel (2002, pp. 16-31) define the three models as follows.

First, the benefit principle is based on the desirable direct or indirect correspondence between benefits and costs. Members’ contributions should thus be in proportion to the size of benefits they receive individually from the public services. Both private and public benefits are taken into consideration. Second, the model of equal sacrifice develops on the idea that the market produces a just pre-tax situation. Consequently, the tax scheme should mirror the existing welfare distribution. Third, in the egalitarian model members contribute according to their ability to pay based on the principle of equal proportional, or increasing, sacrifice. This tax policy model serves as a means of redistribution away from the market, since the pre-tax situation of wealth distribution has “no independent moral significance”.

Based on these three basic models, burden-sharing arrangements can vary rather significantly. First, they could concern only the benefit side, for example in terms of each ally’s share of NATO’s GDP and population, justified as “what would be saved” (Solomon 2004, p. 252). Alternatively, and to a clear disadvantage of larger countries, contributions could be calculated per square kilometre, arguing that the protection of allied territory is the main benefit of collective defence.

Second, the equal sacrifice model often uses the same measures (GDP as indicator of wealth) and can yield the same results as the benefit model, albeit with different justifications (national wealth indicating one’s ability to pay, not benefit gained). In this case of allied burden-sharing, individual contributions would be purely proportional to GDP to preserve the existing distribution of wealth as some sort of a flat tax scheme, such as the current 2% pledge.

7 The second version of the equal sacrifice model says each member should endure the same real (not monetary) loss of welfare. In this interpretation, the actual tax scheme depends on how the marginal utility of income diminishes. Yet, it is difficult to operationalise since it requires speculations to quantify the amount of individual adequate sacrifice and equivalent utility loss.
Third, the egalitarian burden-sharing model would calculate allies’ contributions by taking into account their qualitatively different abilities to pay, or the existing intra-alliance inequalities. One can think about varying living standards or productive capacity across allied countries. It would follow that, based on an agreed scale, the richer countries should contribute proportionally more than the poorer members, implicitly favouring some progressive tax schemes.

This paper looks at the evolution of these sharing principles in the early Cold War NATO. The analysis focuses on what kind of distributive justice and a corresponding contributory system the NATO allies agreed on for their burden-sharing.\(^8\)

**Burden-sharing in a historical perspective**

Shortly after NATO came into being in August 1949, the allies started to debate the ways of dividing the costs of collective defence, focused on the European continent, and financing the common civilian and military structure of the Alliance.

This was the time of the European post-war recovery and the origins of the two-pronged transatlantic bargain (Sloan 2016). With the help of mutual aid programmes, launched by the US and to a lesser extent Canada, the Western European countries began to reconstruct their economies and rebuild democratic institutions. Equally important, the US guaranteed the defence of Europe from the Soviet Union and European allies in turn agreed to improve their self-help. This is also why the initial burden-sharing arrangements concerned especially national economic costs of the collective defence burden in NATO.

The term *burden-sharing* meant specifically the allocation of costs in terms of personnel and equipment. The allies discussed cost-sharing formulas guiding money contributions to NATO common budgets and facilities in parallel to their physical contributions. This practice points to a cautious approach. Since devising rules for common funding marked a departure

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\(^8\) It is important to note the difference between domestic and international distributive justice. Political theory, as Brown (1997, p. 208) explains, tends to conceive the latter in procedural and formal, not social or distributive terms. The international sphere is concerned with whether the formal rules are followed and applied impartially, rather than with social or economic justice, especially due to barriers of the state-dominated international system (Hoffmann 1981, p. 143). For the purpose of this paper, NATO is a regionally limited group of nations with shared values, yet without a supranational authority, whose cooperation is based on solidarity and mutual aid.
from NATO’s general principle of *letting the costs lie where they fall*, the allies did not want financial arrangements be a precedent for sharing other expenditures.9

The next section presents an overview of proposals discussed in the North Atlantic Council and various NATO committees. While the allies determined contributions to common budgets and infrastructure in a form of a distribution formula, in the case of physical commitments the allies gradually abandoned the formula approach and opted for a more dynamic, qualitative, and annually updated defence-planning process.

**Common budgets and infrastructure**

Until 1951, NATO did not need an international budget. London and Washington largely paid the running costs of the organisation and national governments contributed personnel at their own expense. After setting up the NATO integrated command, the allies discussed the possibility of establishing a common budget to support both civilian and military structures, together with common infrastructure projects. The term *infrastructure* was defined as “static buildings and permanent installations required to support military forces” (NATO Infrastructure Committee 2001, p. 19), or as the Canadian foreign minister put it, “in plain English terms infrastructure means collective facilities”.10

The allies agreed on the principle of common financing for NATO commands and installations regardless of their location, since they were in NATO’s common interest and thus the responsibility of all NATO members.11 The first SACEUR General Eisenhower hoped that the allies would not condition their contributions by “inevitably artificial evaluation of their own interest in any particular phase of the NATO operation”. Similarly, the British Representative found “it was politically important” that all NATO countries contribute and

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9 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2 Defence Liaison Division to USSEA, 14 February 1951.

10 Lester B. Pearson in the House of Commons, 21 March 1952. LAC, Statements and Speeches, 52 (15).

11 Especially the French, American, and British emphasised the common responsibility. Only Luxembourg and Iceland were in a peculiar position, since the former had no naval forces and its contribution to SACLANT was unclear, and the latter had no armed forces or military budget at all. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 18th Panel meeting, 6 April 1951.
share the operating and capital costs of commands, since all countries were “in the same boat”.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, the allies expected that every nation would benefit from projects through a system of international bidding for infrastructure contracts.\textsuperscript{13}

American and British proposals dominated the discussions. In the case of NATO common budgets, the allies agreed that a national income basis was the best rule of thumb. In searching for their common position on cost sharing, the allies were largely inspired by the United Nations, where contributions were based on national incomes with appropriate adjustments such as caps and ceilings.\textsuperscript{14} On the one hand, the British delegation came with the basic criterion of capacity to pay, which included the UN-like discount for countries with low national income per capita.\textsuperscript{15} On the other hand, the American delegation suggested a grouping formula, where the three biggest allies (the US, the UK, and France) would pay 22.5\% and the other countries would pay according to their national income\textsuperscript{16} The French delegation agreed with this scheme. In the North Atlantic Council (NAC) there were “strong political reasons” for agreeing with the grouping formula, since “the US were paying such a high proportion of the real cost of rearming the Alliance, to the benefit of all, that other countries might go some distance towards meeting US wishes”\textsuperscript{17} NATO used this grouping formula until 1955 (Ek 2012, p. 5).

While the running costs of NATO were not large ($2.5m for the civilian and $3m for the military budget), already in 1951 infrastructure programmes demanded investments totalling $400m.\textsuperscript{18} Due to the amount of money involved and immediate urgency, the allies decided to deal with them separately from financing NATO common budgets. Each

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{12} Both citations in LAC, PCO/204/U-40-4-(p) High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 5 April 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{13} LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/3 Memo to Panel by the Department of Finance, 24 November 1955.
\item\textsuperscript{14} LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 17th Panel meeting, 15 and 19 February 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{15} LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/1 IB-D(51)6 British representative to NATO Deputies, 23 February 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{16} LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 16 February 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{17} There was also an alternative Canadian proposal (which never became an official position) that compared national contributions to club dues, or universal membership fees, which did not require adjustment to an individual’s ability to pay. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
\item\textsuperscript{18} LAC, DEA/4485/50030-40/4 “NATO Roundup no. 1”, 12 May 1951.
\end{itemize}
infrastructure programme (or *slice*) had its own cost-sharing design, usually resulting from a combination of various principles.

Again, as in the case of common budgets, two discussion papers structured the debate on infrastructure. First, the Americans proposed sharing on a user basis, according to which the land and local utilities should be contributed for free by the country in which the installations were located. Other construction and operating costs should be covered by the countries that used those facilities. Small European countries did not favour this proposal, since virtually all common facilities were to be located on the European soil. The second model, proposed by the British and supported by the French, suggested that individual shares of each project should be examined according to three criteria: degree of common use, costs vs benefits to the host country (e.g. provision of land and utilities vs gains in labour), and capacity of individual countries to contribute to the total cost.¹⁹

It turned out that the user principle could discourage deploying national forces under the NATO banner, as it implied the greater the individual contribution to the integrated force, the higher the relative financial commitment for infrastructure. The allies therefore agreed on a modified version of the British proposal, which calculated contributions according to a degree of common use and country’s capacity to contribute to total cost.²⁰ Especially European allies, later joined by Canada as well, supported this compromise solution in order to, among others, preserve the concept of integrated forces.

Overall, financial contributions to both the common budgets and infrastructure programmes largely corresponded to allies’ capacity relative to their national income. However, it was not a pure ability-to-pay system. In the case of NATO budgets, the allies agreed on an important exception – discount for the richest countries. The grouping formula was supposed to correct the allies’ differing economic strengths, so that no ally would pay an excessively large portion of costs. Although the three biggest countries paid almost 70 per cent of the NATO budgets, the proportion of contribution to income was still lower than for the other allies. In the case of infrastructure, in addition to the ability-to-pay model, they allies ensured fairness of individual shares by factoring in the common use and the host nation’s cost-benefit ratio.

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¹⁹ LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 11 May 1951.

²⁰ The difference between the UK compromise and the US proposal resided in their treatment of land: the US wanted host countries to contribute necessary land (and force the European allies to increase their defence efforts), whereas the UK included land as one of the shared costs.
Burden-sharing in the 1950s

Negotiations to determine sharing arrangements for NATO’s administrative, capital, and operational costs smoothly arrived at specific cost-sharing formulas. More heated debates unfolded when the allies set out to develop a practical form of sharing in terms of physical commitments. The allies realised that burden-sharing was not about a promise to make available a certain amount of force in the case of war, but about making instant contributions to create a strong deterrent to prevent one.\(^2\) The allies wanted burden-sharing to be a practical expression of Article 3 of the Treaty – the principles of self-help and mutual aid.

There were four big burden-sharing exercises in NATO from 1949 to 1952. Proposals to develop a sharing system, which would ensure a fair distribution of defence costs, stretched from various forms of statistical formulas to inter-allied transfers of equipment, or even wealth-sharing. Reports of these committees and expert groups demonstrate how the allies gradually abandoned the quest for a simple one-size-fits-all solution. After concluding these studies, some allies even suggested that the very term burden-sharing should cease to be part of the NATO terminology.\(^2\) It never did, but this view shows how traumatising their experience with finding the right criteria was.

Indicators

The very first task for the allies, before outlining the desirable share, was to agree on how to measure individual contributions. Because differing national budgetary practices and the absence of a common fiscal year base posed problems of comparability, the allies developed a standardised NATO definition of what should count as expenditures on defence. This was also the most practical outcome of the first burden-sharing study. The allies defined defence expenditures in a broad rather than narrow sense, so that any effort, whether in the real terms of personnel, armaments, material, or expressed in terms of finance, would be a contribution to the attainment of a common end. Put simply, all direct expenses for national armed forces, except of payments to war veterans, war damage, and the use of military personnel for other

\(^2\) LAC, DND/20707/2-30-2 16th Panel meeting, 18-19 January 1951.

\(^2\) LAC, DEA/4789/5096-40/5 Edmonds to Davis, 13 January 1953.
than military purposes, were on the list as defence spending.\textsuperscript{23}

The next step was to determine the relative share for the purpose of inter-allied comparisons. Three criteria that appeared in the debates were (a) percentage of national income, (b) percentage of national budget, and (c) per capita defence expenditure (population criterion).\textsuperscript{24} However, national income measures tend to favour aggregated numbers and, as pointed by the Canadian delegation, burden-sharing studies should not assume that “each unit of any country’s national income is equally usable for defence purposes”.\textsuperscript{25} Some alternative ideas from the Canadian camp included adjusting defence expenditures according to per square mile of territory.\textsuperscript{26} Since national income was the only information readily available on all member states with respect to their productivity, the allies agreed on comparing defence expenditures as a percentage of national income (productivity effort) and as per capita defence expenditures (the magnitude of productive effort).\textsuperscript{27}

**Allies set out to study burden-sharing**

The first study under the Defence Financial and Economic Committee (DFEC) was supposed to collect data on countries’ defence expenditures, verify their resources available for military production, examine their financial capacities for transfers of equipment and materials, and develop a formula for measuring defence costs.\textsuperscript{28}

The US delegation put forward a concept of equal sacrifice, based on the ability to pay in proportion to national income. In a nutshell, a study of “equality of sacrifice” suggested assessing allies’ fiscal capacity to compare their performance in bearing the cost of defence and

\textsuperscript{23} They included also mixed civilian-military purposes in so far as the military element could be identified, such as expenditures on airfields, meteorological services, aids to navigation, joint procurement services, and R&D. LAC, DND/21143/CSC1311/1/1 “Supplementary Directives and Questionnaire to NATO Member countries for purposes of consideration of equitable distribution of defence burdens”, 16 December 1950.

\textsuperscript{24} LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Defence Liaison, 23 January 1950.

\textsuperscript{25} LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Couillard to Wilgress, 17 March 1951.

\textsuperscript{26} LAC, MG26L/224/E4-26 Claxton to Prime Minister, 7 January 1950.

\textsuperscript{27} LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 Defence Research Board, 17 December 1949.

\textsuperscript{28} LAC, DEA/50030-K-40/4498/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 8 December 1949.
to establish some measure of their relative capacity to share the defence burden in the future.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, the US wanted this NATO burden-sharing exercise to design a general formula to determine individual shares of NATO collective burden in relation to the allies’ capacity to pay.\textsuperscript{30} The British delegation was more moderate. The British suggested that the study should focus on developing financial and economic guidelines for future defence programmes.\textsuperscript{31} Although the DFEC soon dropped the idea of equal sacrifice, the US strongly favoured an implicit reference to this concept.\textsuperscript{32} The US was convinced that NATO nations should agree on some formula for sharing the defence costs (despite knowing that the Brussels Treaty pact failed to do so after one year of intense discussions).

Other allies wanted to include special factors such as the level of economic development, population, geographic structure, and location.\textsuperscript{33} For instance, Norway disagreed with equal sacrifice and stressed that the allies could not make such far-reaching decisions affecting countries’ economies based only on figures and formulas. To demonstrate its point, the Norwegian delegation came up with a detailed description of practical problems that would be associated with the formula approach, if living conditions in each allied country were to be taken into account, i.e. the criterion of “minimum income necessary for covering the necessary needs of the individuals”.\textsuperscript{34} The Canadian delegation suggested that burden-sharing should rather help eliminate barriers obstructing deliveries of military equipment in Europe, and improve integration and standardisation of armed forces.\textsuperscript{35}

Unsurprisingly, the allies were not able to agree on one simple formula. The DFEC in its report stated that although most of countries saw some worth in measuring the defence burden in relation to the countries’ capacity to bear them, some allies started to “doubt the practicability and its ultimate value, because of the wide range and complexity of the factors involved”.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{29} LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 7 January 1950.
\textsuperscript{30} LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 8 December 1949.
\textsuperscript{31} LAC, DEA/4498/50030-K-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 22 December 1949.
\textsuperscript{32} LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 Memorandum by Defence Liaison Division, 18 October 1949.
\textsuperscript{33} LAC, DEA/4486/50030-A-40/1 NATO FEC STAFF (50) D-17/1a, 18 July 1950.
\textsuperscript{34} LAC, DEA/4491/50030-C-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 18 March 1950.
\textsuperscript{35} LAC, DEA/4498/50030-K-40/1 11th Panel meeting, 7 July 1950.
\textsuperscript{36} LAC, DEA/4486/50030-A-40/1 North Atlantic Council Deputies, D-D/1, July 22, 1950.
At the Paris Working Group (PWG), established in the fall of 1950, the US conceded “it was quite impossible to establish some simply quantitative measurement to determine the extent of the contribution” and that some qualitative modifications were needed.\textsuperscript{37} The US representative ruled out the formula approach as the way to achieve equity: “It simply establishes the frame of reference within which multilateral agreement on the form and amount of compensatory transfers is to be sought”.\textsuperscript{38}

Once again, the PWG studied how the allies could arrive at an equitable distribution of defence burden, by examining the economic impact of their defence programmes. Particularly, it dealt with the necessity for establishing an order of priorities under which the allies should fill the capability gap, which emerged with the approval of the NATO Medium Term Defence Plan.\textsuperscript{39} It gathered the information about the impact of allied total military programmes on their economies and their relative abilities to carry the burden of expanded NATO defence requirements.\textsuperscript{40}

However, this study was plagued by semantic problems: the US used “a share-the-burden operation”, while for others it was “pooling of resources” (France) or even “sharing the wealth” (the UK).\textsuperscript{41} As aptly summarised in the memo for the Canadian foreign affairs department, burden-sharing transfers in NATO could be interpreted in three different ways: (a) a principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need”; (b) bearing one another's burdens; or (c) sharing the wealth.\textsuperscript{42}

The study that dominated this discussion, the US-proposed “Nitze plan”, implied extensive statistical analysis, according to which the PWG study should: (i) assess each country’s capacity to maximise their contribution to the common military effort; (ii) determine a country’s capacity to share with respect to different compensatory devices for securing a more equitable distribution of the economic burden of defence. However, the US eventually called this second burden-sharing study an “Operation Mousetrap”. It seemed that the Americans

\textsuperscript{37} LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 Canadian Ambassador in Washington to SSEA, 25 November 1950.
\textsuperscript{38} LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 24 November 1950.
\textsuperscript{39} LAC, DEA/4499/50030-K-40/2, Canadian Delegation to North Atlantic Council Meeting to SSEA, 21 September 1950.
\textsuperscript{40} LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 7 November 1950.
\textsuperscript{41} LAC, DEA/4788/50069-40/1 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 23 November 23 1950.
\textsuperscript{42} LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/2 SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 4 November 1950.
became the first victims of their own study, as their goal of encouraging self-help in defence preparedness among their European NATO partners – the equal sacrifice motive – backfired: the discussions quickly shifted towards justifying more American aid to the European allies, rather than “serving as a means of increasing the net effort of all participants”.  

Regardless of the arrangement, it became clear that the limits on burden-sharing were political, not economic. As the PWG reached an impasse, in March 1951 the US delegation proposed to establish a Financial and Economic Board (FEB), absorbing the functions of both previous entities (DFEC and PWG). This third round of burden-sharing exercises went going even further into the political field than the previous study, presumably a result of the British and American leadership in the FEB. The new committee was authorised to propose the amount and nature of specific compensatory action and to make recommendations for the best use of national resources in support of the common defence effort.

Burden-sharing “was raising its ugly head” again. The US delegation set the tone with its proposal based on the principle of progressive taxation, which looked a lot like the formula approach. In combining several criteria, the US delegation outlined a specific sharing formula. Their recipe was to take 6% of GNP, add 0.625% for each $100.00 of national income per capita, and apply the resulting percentage against the GNP. According to this formula, in 1951 the US share would be 17.3% ($55.9 billions), the Canadian share, 13.2% ($2.6 billions), and the UK share, 9.75% ($4.4 billions).

The per capita and progressive taxation approach raised a number of controversial questions. On which basis should the allies choose from a variety of progressive principles and which exceptions to apply? Should they take into account the average per capita income or the actual distribution of income within each country? The per capita approach, unlike the percentage of national income, would require the conversion of national income into real resources, and therefore numerous deductions for the basic minimum (e.g. with respect to the

43 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 Wrong to Heeney, 21 November 1950.
44 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 12 April 1951; SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 16 April 1951; and SSEA to High Commissioner in London, 20 June 1951.
45 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/3 Griffin to Plumptre, 19 April 1951.
46 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 3 March 1951.
47 LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/1 Plumptre to USSEA, 6 March 1951.
cost of fuel, insulation, clothing in countries with a cold climate, or large and sparsely populated countries) caused never ending discussions. As the Canadian delegation noted, “there is no justice in levying a higher proportion from a higher money incomes, if the national cost of living is also higher than elsewhere”.⁴⁸ In other words, the progressive taxation model based on per capita defence spending required a qualitative take on fair-share comparisons.⁴⁹

However, by the time the interim report came out in September 1951, the FEB realised it could not derive an equitable distribution from the mechanical application of statistical formula. Especially after NATO adopted the concept of balanced collective forces, “no automatic formula can be applied to all governments alike and that a degree of specialisation is not only acceptable but should be encouraged”.⁵⁰ The Board further refused to “establish absolute standards for assessing the maximum defence effort of which the Atlantic community is capable” and limited its study to analysing the implications of defence programmes against “the political and military risks”. Overall, the FEB stated “the best known and fundamental general measure of relative economic strengths is provided by per capita national incomes or products”.⁵¹

To sum up, the FEB disregarded its two central tasks. First, the FEB’s report did not make any recommendations for inter-allied transfers of resources from have to have-not countries. Second, the attempt to make inter-country comparisons based on the progressive income tax principle disappeared completely – allies were left to form judgements according to “simple and easily made arithmetical calculations of the obvious type”.⁵²

⁴⁸ LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Couillard to Wilgress, 17 March 1951.

⁴⁹ This particular debate seems to echo today’s purchasing power parity measures, which allow for comparing living conditions and examining per-capita welfare. For more details see the research project Penn World Table, which looks at real GDP per capita as a measure of relative living standards across countries (Feenstra et al. 2015). I thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this reference.

⁵⁰ LAC, DEA/4485/50030-40/4 “NATO Roundup no. 1”, 12 May 1951.


⁵² LAC, DND/21143/CSC 1311:1/2 Canadian representative to OEEC, Paris to SSEA, 4 September 1951.
Board largely served to coordinate the discussion of economic and financial questions in NATO.

Having refused a statistical formula approach, the FEB nevertheless came to a Solomonic solution. Without specifying concrete numbers, it affirmed “meeting the common needs of the Atlantic community is analogous to the domestic sharing of the burden of government and common services” in accordance with the internal distribution of GNP. It followed that “countries whose general economic strength is greatest, might in equity be expected to assume not only a greater amount of defence burden absolutely, but also to devote a greater proportion of their national production to defence”.

The Temporary Council Committee (TCC) conducted the fourth round of studies from September 1951 to February 1952. Given the increasing complexity of the burden-sharing problem, the allies definitively abandoned the idea of progressive income tax principle as a formal basis for sharing. Instead, the allies tasked TCC to draft a report on “the need to build up and equip forces at the lowest possible cost and with a minimum of waste”. The analysis focused on the reconciliation of the requirements of external security, i.e. a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, with the realistic political-economic capabilities of member countries. In other words, the TCC report put the emphasis on finding the most efficient and effective possible use of existing resources, such as the allocation of contributions in personnel, production and finances, among the member countries. Its ultimate goal was to develop a “balanced and time-phased programme” which would be “militarily effective and politically and economically feasible”.

The TCC asked each ally to fill a series of questionnaires, which served as a basis for its analysis. The TCC report also took into account the contribution of West Germany for the

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54 Although, the main reason for the TCC exercise appeared to be the need of the 12 ministers to negotiate an agreed report. LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 Draft Commentary on Economic and General Aspects of the TCC Report and the Canadian Annex (Memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee), 2 January 1952.

first time (even though this country was not a member of NATO yet). The TCC also served as an allocation mechanism of priorities once it identified the deficiencies in resources.

Since the basic planning procedure would require annual re-application, they decided to make a study similar (but simplified) to the TCC exercise an integral part of NATO’s life. The allies design the *Annual Review* as a thorough critical examination of national economic and political capabilities and national defence programmes by an international body. It was supposed to show that each NATO country was doing its share militarily and economically.56

These Annual Reviews examined the costs and the supply standards of the defence build-up among the NATO countries in view of the overall defence needs of the transatlantic community.57 Each Review included country chapters, which served as a narrative component to basic statistical comparisons to amplify the tabulated information.58 This multilateral approach aimed at increasing national contributions through peer pressure, given that each NATO country was “eyeing all the others”, where “good examples and bad examples count”.59

NATO Annual Reviews ran until 1966. After France left the Alliance’s military structures, a new Defence Review Committee inherited the Annual Reviews’ agenda. Today, these tasks are performed by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee. It turned out that the Annual Review process developed a more flexible and qualitative approach to burden-sharing, which entirely focused on the collective defence planning. The then-Secretary General of NATO Lord Ismay (1955) highlighted another result of burden-sharing exercises: despite the absence of an explicit distributive justice formula, the allies recognised that burden-sharing “takes place in NATO by the daily practice” (Ismay 1955, chapter 12).

However, these Annual Reviews did not automatically harmonise national defence plans with NATO requirements. Their main objective was “to develop target figures for the build-up of military forces which were accepted by the national authorities” (Megens 2011, pp. 168-169). Yet, the process helped to focus minds on the collective needs of the Alliance, and to induce “a frame of mind not rooted exclusively in narrowly conceived national interests”

56 LAC, PCO/227/P-10-M 30th Panel meeting, 18 June 1952.
57 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 “The Organization of NATO–TCC and Related Suggestions”, 2 January 1952.
58 LAC, DEA/4903/50115-P-40/2 Extract from Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, 9 October 1952.
Although the resulting annual reports were non-binding recommendations and decisions on the amount and nature of contributions rested with the national governments, the process of collective consultations facilitated informed political decision of the governments. In addition, as complicated a bureaucratic process as the Annual Review was, the allies appreciated that it made them keep each other updated on their defence efforts. Although this routine favoured practical political bargaining over rigorous applying of statistical formulas, it greatly enhanced the processes of “mutual examination and consultation” (Gordon 1956, p. 539).

**Discussion: quantitative fairness, qualitative effectiveness?**

This paper showed how the framework of the burden-sharing debates evolved during NATO’s early history and how it balanced fairness and effectiveness of this contributory system. Progressively, NATO allies developed a shared understanding of a just distribution of their contributions in terms of the egalitarian ability-to-pay principle. However, when the allies fell short of finding desirable fair-share arrangements and refrained from one simple numerical formula, their attention shifted towards effectiveness of defence cooperation and strategic objectives, and prioritised optimal over fair-sharing.

Overall, the NATO allies, in order to accommodate both fairness and effectiveness into their burden-sharing arrangements, developed the Annual Review procedure. To put it in the language of public goods theory, institutionalisation of this multilateral planning process meant to ease the collective action problem in NATO (Ringsmose 2016, p. 219). In view of NATO’s renewed focus on territorial defence and the high profile of the 2% pledge, it is important to summarise the underlying principles of fair-sharing and their practical implementation, as agreed by the NATO nations when they built the Alliance’s initial defence posture.

**Fair burden-sharing**

We have seen that early burden-sharing debates in NATO evolved along the precepts of the ability-to-pay model, confirming the assumption of the previous studies on burden-sharing. Concepts derived from distributive justice theory can bring further insights.

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60 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/1 High Commissioner in London to SSEA, 4 November 1950.
The allies argued that sharing the burden needed to reflect qualitative differences between nations. In other words, they recognised that the sharing arrangements should take into account the inequalities of the “pre-tax” situation among the nations. First, contributions to NATO common budgets were proportional to their national income with the exception of the most well-off members who got a discount. Similarly, fairness in sharing of the infrastructure costs included a combination of benefit and ability-to-pay criteria.

The historical evidence showed that the NATO allies explicitly preferred a progressive proportional system for their physical contributions. Yet, the appropriate basis for determining one’s ability to pay and adequate shares was subject to lengthy discussions. The allies put emphasis on the differences in their demography, geography, structure of national economy, or societal needs. For them, expected national contributions reflected not only the overall size of national income, but most importantly the national income per capita required for a decent living standard. The allies discarded the equality of sacrifice tax model, because they could not figure out what exactly it meant and how they should operationalise it. This also meant that they eventually refrained from a simple proportional (flat tax) scheme.

As to the benefit model, neither of the two possible interpretations appeared during the burden-sharing debates. First, according to the allies, benefits received from their military cooperation were unquantifiable in the NATO collective defence context, and thus could not serve as a basis for the equitable sharing. The allies understood collective defence as a non-excludable good, where country’s individual benefits were “nebulous”.61 As all countries were making efforts, “it bec[a]me impossible to say which country benefits most when one country ‘gives’ arms or the use of defence facilities to the troops of another”.62 Second, the benefit model could also determine contributions in accordance with indirect benefits. As NATO provides greater security and leaves states’ prosperity undisrupted by war, it allows the nations to prosper economically. The Gross National Income (economic benefit) should therefore determine individual contributions (defence cost). Although in reality the allies did choose the national income indicator for common funding, they did not use this particular line of justification in determining their respective shares.

61 LAC, DND/20707/2-2-30/3 19th Panel meeting, 10 April 1951.
Generally, the allies perceived individual benefits as diffused and unclear,\textsuperscript{63} and did not try to base their burden-sharing on the distribution of benefits, which is what the joint product model does in alliance economic theory. Furthermore, when IR scholars try to measure the burden-sharing gap, they usually incorporate non-military contributions into their analyses. However, the NATO collective defence imaginary did not include foreign aid or contributions to missions of other organisations. For instance, they excluded contributions to the Colombo plan (the development aid programme to south-Asian countries) from NATO burden-sharing efforts.

**Effective burden-sharing**

We also saw that NATO allies were unable to agree on a quantitative solution to this qualitative problem: to design the progressive tax scheme in a formula format and apply it on inter-state collective defence cooperation. This should not come as a surprise since NATO is by definition an intergovernmental entity. Without a supranational authority powerful enough to impose one comprehensive cost-distribution mechanism on its members, devising any tax scheme is like “requiring the unanimous consent of the taxpayers for every detail of a national income tax law” (Gordon 1956, p. 537).\textsuperscript{64} As the agreed concept of fairness similar to the progressive ability-to-pay model differed operationally, the allies chose to give priority to the other aspect of burden-sharing – effectiveness – and reframed their sharing from fair to optimal.

The allies developed the following general burden-sharing guidelines. First, they regarded preserving the economic well-being of the Atlantic community as inseparable from the Alliance’s military strength. No ally should be asked to “carry a burden of defence expenditures beyond its resources”.\textsuperscript{65} The allies aimed to achieve maximum security at minimum expense. Second, the most prosperous nations should contribute a higher proportion of national income to defence. The extensive studies helped the allies realise that comparing costly contributions in absolute terms was of little practical value, though at the same time they

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} The only exception was infrastructure. The user principle and benefits to the host country indeed made part of the calculations. However, most of the time it was difficult to “[distinguish] between a project that contributes to the international welfare and one that redounds to the benefit of a particular country” (Kravis and Davenport 1963, p. 313).
\item \textsuperscript{64} This is also why in many countries national referenda and plebiscites on tax policy are abolished.
\item \textsuperscript{65} LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/3 Drury to Leger, 27 April 1955.
\end{itemize}
cautioned that comparisons based on national income figures failed to allow for different sizes of GNP per head. Third, they agreed that “no precise quantitative formula existed which could translate these various factors into an appropriate level of defence expenditures”.

Instead, they developed a comprehensive burden-sharing framework centred on defence planning, where the NATO international staff together with national delegations conducted broad qualitative assessments of countries’ abilities to share NATO’s burden.

Instead of focusing exclusively on individual ability to pay – country doing all that it can do – the allies gradually refocused burden-sharing on doing all that a country needs to do.

This meant paying more attention to strategic requirements, practical tackling with capability gaps, standardisation, and specialisation with an objective to build NATO integrated forces in accordance with the NATO Medium Term Defence Plan. Decisions as to who-should-make-what were an essential part of burden-sharing.

The output of the daily burden-sharing was more important than comparing annual defence “budget balance sheets” (Baron 2017). However, this “can do” vs “needs to do” approach to burden-sharing, or “how much is enough” debate, creates room for another pile of problems. Stronger NATO members usually make different assessments of what optimal NATO Forces should look like than do their smaller counterparts. At the same time, military planners often overshoot defence requirements due to the norm of “mutually acceptable shortfalls”, a paradox resulting from political bargaining among and within the allies (Deni 2014, pp. 188-190).

The last observation concerns the different cost-distribution arrangements, depending on the type of contribution. In general, the allies kept minor financial commitments towards NATO separated from their physical contributions to the collective defence. They were able to agree on explicit financial cost-sharing rules only in the case of NATO infrastructure and budgets. As the term burden-sharing in the early NATO history meant only the allocation of physical contributions, not financial commitments, burden-sharing among the allies aimed at qualitatively different ends than the common financing of NATO organisation per se.

This difference in sharing arrangements has been, with some modifications, preserved until today. The allies make direct contributions (common funding) according to an agreed cost-sharing formula based on GNI, while their indirect national contributions consist of ad hoc

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66 LAC, DEA/4789/50096-40/5 “Some Economic Aspects of NATO”, 1 January 1953.
67 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-10/1 George Drew, Speech from the Throne, 1 September 1950.
68 LAC, DEA/4788/50096-40/2 Plumptre to USSEA, 20 January 1951.
volunteered equipment and troops without an explicit distribution mechanism. Infrastructure (collective facilities) is funded under the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and represents a “cost effective solution to fill a recognised gap in the military capabilities” (NATO ACT 2017). The NDPP is today’s equivalent to the Annual Review process. In cases of both NSIP and common budgets, NATO applies the contribution ceiling only in the US case, which contributes 22% and thus proportionately less than the NATO allies in Europe (NATO 2017b).

**Implications for NATO post-2014 burden-sharing**

The experience of the 1950s suggests that NATO burden-sharing is a dynamic process that needs constant revisions and adjustments. This paper showed how the allies struggled with translating fairness into effectiveness, and the pragmatic result thereof in terms of optimal sharing to increase their collective capacity. Overall, a sound NATO burden-sharing system is neither based on equal sacrifice principle, as the allies refused a flat tax model, nor has the form of one numerical formula. Consequently, if the 2% defence-spending pledge was put in the 1950s’ context, it would not be considered either fair or effective.

Furthermore, greater defence spending is not how the real burden-sharing gets done, as burden-sharing does not concern principally financial commitments. Limiting burden-sharing debates to one arbitrary number or confining it solely to input measures is dangerous, since the conversion of spending figures into effective capabilities is not straightforward. In short, economic growth is not the primary driver for the increase of defence spending, and putting more money into defence does not guarantee improvement of NATO’s capability problem (Golden 1983, p. 188; Major 2015). Moreover, if NATO continues to determine its burden-sharing problem by levels of national defence spending, it will run the risk of aggravating the intra-alliance divisions and obfuscating the necessary debate on its strategic purpose.

Based on the historical evidence of the initial burden-sharing discussions and the resulting Annual Review process, how could the NATO allies now reframe their current post-2014 burden-sharing debates? The paper revealed that the alliance-wide defence planning process became a synonym for burden-sharing; it is ultimately about resource planning,

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69 In addition, even if a government earmarks a certain amount of defence money for a given fiscal year, it does not necessarily mean this money will actually be spent on defence, for example due to occasional inter-departmental transfers.
equipment sharing, and building personnel the Alliance needs to defend the allied territory. Consequently, the qualitative turn in discussing sharing arrangements should make the debates on NATO burden-sharing more capability-driven and strategy-oriented. The changed shape of burden-sharing discussions should also reflect on the strategic objectives of NATO’s ongoing long-term military and command transformation.⁷⁰

For that reason, alternative focus-points in the burden-sharing debate should be linked explicitly to the NDPP, where the actual burden-sharing happens. Based on political guidance and military requirements (NATO’s Level of Ambition), it identifies capabilities that NATO will need in the mid-term future, which are subsequently apportioned among the allies. The basic rule in NATO says that no member should provide more than 50% of any required capability and the principles of fair burden sharing and reasonable challenge based on allies’ GDP should determine the size of individual capability packages.

The 2% indicator is part of four-year NDPP cycles. Although the amount of defence spending has gained the most public and media attention, it is only 1 of 11 NDPP indicators. The 2006 Comprehensive Political Guideline, adopted at the same time as the 2% pledge, established a rule of thumb for deployable and sustainable forces in accordance with defined usability targets, or a double utilisation principle.⁷¹ However, the allies have kept these national factsheets mostly secret. Since they are classified, their political value is limited. Yet, over the past years, the allies have adopted several framework documents that outline the desirable characteristics of NATO Forces. These initiatives focus on strategic outputs and improvements through continual cooperation, rather than spending figures.⁷²

Bringing insights of the distributive justice back to today’s NATO burden-sharing, the three models discussed in this paper could offer some ways ahead for the NDPP, though it is

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⁷⁰ The NATO ACT’s publicly distributed document *Framework for Future Alliance Operations* directly informs the NDPP and makes recommendations for the future NATO Forces.

⁷¹ The so-called 40/8 ratio; revised to 50/10 in 2009 (Ringsmose 2016, pp. 208-209).

⁷² The 2012 Chicago Summit introduced the Connected Forces Initiative, which recognised interconnectedness and interoperability as a primary goal for NATO Forces in 2020. More recently at the 2014 Wales Summit, the allies developed the NATO Readiness Action Plan, together with a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Force integration units. Lastly, the 2016 Warsaw summit introduced a concept of Enhanced Forward Presence to assure greater readiness and responsiveness of NATO Forces.
clear that, in reality, one pure model is hard to implement. They could play out in the NDPP as follows.

First, allies’ ability to pay is usually determined in terms of their relative wealth as a share of NATO’s combined GDP. This general framework for determining the size of capability targets, as it concerns the appropriate amount of defence expenditures, could be based more explicitly on progressive proportional principles. Alternatively, rather than using a crude GDP measure, a more sophisticated indicator of country’s relative wealth would account for population, relative standards of living, or domestic productive capacity. This new metric defining allies’ ability to pay in either of those two ways could provide a “fairer” numerical framing for the political burden-sharing battlefield. In addition, in taking into account inter-allied differences and their respective domestic constraints, a more sensitive measure should be able to accommodate future challenges in terms of financial crises (budgetary austerity) and a long-term demographic change (aging societies) within NATO nations.73

Second, even though there is no clear direct correspondence between individual costs and public benefits, the benefit principle could be factored in the NDPP without creating nebulous arrangements. In designing individual capability packages, a greater functional and/or geographical division of labour in accordance with national priorities and interests could clarify allies’ private benefits. Moreover, this (private) benefit principle could encourage multinational projects, which brings this paper to its last point.

NATO burden-sharing debates can no longer neglect multinational procurement. Instead of talking about burden-sharing between the US and Europe at large, the allies need to scale burden-sharing down to smaller but tangible instances of joint/common investment programmes and capabilities development projects, such as smart defence, the Framework Nations’ Concept (FNC), or in terms of bi-national cooperation under the NATO flag. For instance, to facilitate the quantification of fairness and qualitatively increase effectiveness, specific FNC roadmaps could result in more structured multinational cooperation (Ruiz-Palmer 2016) and ultimately improve intra-European burden-sharing through coordinating and developing “coherent capability-clusters” (Saxi 2017, p. 180). The burden-sharing process

73 Further research into the capability approach, justice, and inequality in the public policy domain might prove useful for the study of burden-sharing in NATO. See Nussbaum (2011) or Hausman et al. (2016).
would thus combine a more pragmatic, bottom-up approach to capability development with the top-down element only to assure their coherent and coordinated acquisition (Chalmers 2015).

To do so more consistently, however, the allies would have to adopt standardised national procurement plans and capability requirements, and synchronise capability planning on the NATO level. This would require them to overcome national political concerns and to introduce into the NDPP “the principle of going multinational first” (Breitenbauch et al. 2013, pp. 6-9). Today, the decision to join these collaborative efforts and the cost-sharing agreements in those projects remains a national prerogative, as the NDPP staff can propose the allocation and assist the implementation of capability targets solely for the allies individually. More effective burden-sharing would require an enhanced role of the NDPP in multinational development of capabilities.

References


Conclusions

*The Politics of Burden-Sharing* addressed one of the central aspects of allied cooperation in NATO – namely, how domestic politics shaped burden-sharing dynamics in the Alliance at the beginning of the Cold War. The main research objective of this dissertation was to improve our understanding of burden-sharing in NATO. To do so, it reconstructed the political, ethical, and practical dimension of burden-sharing from the perspective of its practitioners during NATO’s formative years, with a specific focus on Canada as one of the founding members of the Alliance. Having developed a qualitative approach to studying burden-sharing, this interpretive analysis identified the normative roots of the burden-sharing problem in politics.

In analysing NATO burden-sharing as a political issue, this dissertation was able to embrace the main theoretical explanations of why state contribute to alliances into one complex analysis. This dissertation showed that, far from being a mere technicality, burden-sharing has been above all an inherently political problem and a dynamic process in terms of defence planning negotiations from the very beginning, animated by power struggles and distributive concerns further complicated by allies’ different understanding of equity. The normative layer added on this collective action clarified that the notion of a good burden-sharer had different meanings, while free riding was never considered as morally acceptable behaviour.

These concluding paragraphs provide a summary of the dissertation’s findings. The first section presents a general overview of the results, which is followed by a detailed discussion of findings. The second section outlines both their theoretical and policy implications. It describes in which way these findings add to the body of knowledge on the subject of burden-sharing and wider alliance theory: notably, where and how this dissertation converges and diverges with/from previous research on NATO burden-sharing, and which policy-relevant implications could be derived from its findings. The third section addresses limitations of the interpretive research strategy used in this dissertation. The last paragraphs provide some suggestions for further research on NATO burden-sharing in particular and multinational cooperation in general.

Summary of findings

Situated in the period when the burden-sharing problem “was raising its ugly head” in NATO for the first time, this dissertation analysed the processes of sense-making and context-specific knowledge of national leaders, with a particular emphasis on the St. Laurent Government
(1948-1957) in Canada. It attempted to answer the guiding question of how domestic politics shaped burden-sharing dynamics in NATO. Having reconstructed the political, ethical, and practical dimension of NATO burden-sharing in the practitioners’ private and public discourse through the interpretive analysis of archival materials, this dissertation showed that burden-sharing in NATO has not been a mere technicality, a result of cost-benefit calculations, or facilitated uniquely by the alignment of national/material interests of its members. Throughout its three articles, this dissertation argued that the NATO burden-sharing problem was normatively rooted in politics.

The main findings of this dissertation indicated that NATO allies felt the need to balance military, economic, and moral aspects of NATO’s burden. They further pointed to the burden-sharing tensions between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution, and the problematic implementation of desirable fair shares into practice. Even though the allies agreed on the progressive proportional ability-to-pay type of fairness, the NATO defence planning process at large, not a simple numerical formula, became to occupy the central place of burden-sharing due to practical and domestic political constraints.

The Politics of NATO Burden-Sharing therefore emphasised the “nebulous” nature of the burden-sharing concept, prone to allies’ diverging interpretations. Having approached burden-sharing in terms of fairness, this dissertation attempted first to clarify how NATO allies understood the polysemic concept of burden. The interpretive analysis of discursive structures and normative arguments put forward by the practitioners in Canada, and to a lesser extent by representatives from other major NATO countries, showed how the politically loaded discussions shaped the burden-sharing dynamics. Particularly, the problematic nature of burden-sharing proved salient in two respects: first, the split discourse on contribution strategies in terms of ethical logics; and second, the discussions about sharing arrangements in terms of distributive justice and the choice of indicators measuring individual shares.

Overall, this dissertation refined our conceptual understanding of NATO burden-sharing (the first essay), provided further ideas for “NATO theorising” thanks to the analytical use of concepts taken from the traditions of normative ethics (the second essay), and drew some lessons learned for today’s burden-sharing in NATO through a policy-prescriptive analysis (the third essay). The value-added of this conceptual, method-driven, and policy-oriented doctoral research resides in its qualitative approach to the burden-sharing problem in NATO. Particularly, this dissertation (a) chose a political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry, (b) pursued an analysis at the level of national elites, and (c) developed a pluralistic and
multidisciplinary analytical framework. Having moved away from the category of analysis and the mainstream *economics* of alliances, this dissertation looked at the category of practice through *politics* in exploring the perspectives of political, bureaucratic, and senior military leaders on the problem of NATO burden-sharing. Overall, having followed the five-step interpretive research strategy, this doctoral research analysed the burden-sharing dynamics through a range of interpretive text-oriented methods that blended the traditions of normative ethics with the IR theory. This theoretical pluralism made it possible to embrace the complexity of allied cooperation in NATO.

**Interpretation of findings**

Through a sequence of three separate essays, each having a specific primary focus, this dissertation addressed a series of sub-questions to qualitatively explore (1) burden and political dimension; (2) contribution strategies and ethical dimension; and (3) sharing arrangements and practical dimension. The following paragraphs discuss the findings regrouped according to the political, ethical, and practical aspects of burden-sharing. Nevertheless, these remain interconnected.

**Political dimension**

The political dimension revealed complex argumentative structures in the Canadian discourse on NATO burden-sharing. The detailed interpretive analysis of categories, metaphors, and arguments showed that the Canadian approach to burden-sharing was based on recognising and maintaining a balance between three elements of collective defence: military, economic, and moral. This was closely linked to their understanding of the Alliance’s purpose, which was animated by a double security dilemma with regard to the United States and the Soviet Union. At least at the beginning of the Cold War, Canadian leaders were thinking about NATO’s burden in wider than military terms.

The way in which Canadian authorities made sense of the polysemic concept of burden influenced the modalities of Canada’s participation in NATO burden-sharing. For instance, they preferred to make non-operational contributions of military equipment and services in the form of a mutual aid programme. It aimed at preserving the on-going reconstruction of European allies’ national economies, in addition to improving Canada’s own industrial base and economic conditions. At the same time, they asserted that to contribute to NATO should be neither bureaucratic nor military, but primarily a political decision. Furthermore, Ottawa decided to
participate in NATO burden-sharing studies since its abstention would inflict significant (although less quantifiable) moral costs and damage NATO’s image of unity and solidarity inwards and outwards, making it vulnerable to the Soviet ideological aggression. At the same time, they had some concerns about Canada’s reputation in the Alliance. For these reasons, Canadian authorities compromised on their own principles of fair-share and participated in all NATO burden-sharing exercises. Additionally, the arguments of Canadian authorities framing the burden-sharing problem differed depending on whether the discourse was public or private. As to the former, the burden-sharing problem was oriented towards the Atlantic community, while in case of the latter, the arguments were more often shaped by Canadian national interests.

Significant political considerations also surrounded the discussions on the measurement of individual shares and the overall sharing arrangements. There were important disagreements among allies about which series of indicators should determine the actual contributions and how the statistical tables should be constructed in order to compare various forms of national contributions. This created the problem of incommensurable and incomparable allied efforts (e.g., iron vs. blood), which made the assessment of how well each ally was faring in NATO burden-sharing and whether the latter corresponded to some form of fair-sharing very difficult, if not impossible. The choice of indicator to count national efforts, the “what” and “how”, usually reflected member states’ domestic fiscal policies and varied from country to country, depending on which indicator made them look better.

Furthermore, the interpretive analysis of Canadian archival documents revealed that especially at the very beginning of the burden-sharing discussions in the North Atlantic Council, two opposing discourses shaped the debates among the allies: a practical approach based on needs (Canada) vs. one-size-fits-all formula (the US and the European allies). For the Americans, the simple formula would make its transatlantic bargain with Europeans easier to read, especially during the Congressional sessions with the objective to approve large amounts of military appropriations. The Europeans were concerned above all with the reconstruction of their economies, funded by the Marshall Plan, and their room for negotiating the sharing arrangements in NATO that would differ from the US position was limited.

In contrast, Canada was in a particular position since it was the only ally who did not benefit from the US military or economic aid programmes. In fact, Canada had its own mutual aid programme, through which it offered military equipment and services free of charge to its European allies. Canadian leaders, conducting middle power diplomacy, wanted to preserve Canada’s relative independence from the US in this respect. They cared about getting things
done in NATO, that is building a strong military and moral deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in a way that would be beneficial to its own national armed forces and the Atlantic community in general.

Briefly, on the one hand, the Canadian authorities considered finding some arbitrary formula too harmful for the Alliance since it could never be fair to everybody. They opposed this numerical solution to burden-sharing because it would not take into account the specificities of Canada’s vast territory, sparse population, and severe weather. On the other hand, Canadian officials were against the automatisation of contributions and explicit sharing mechanism that would determine national contributions and the fair distribution of collective defence burden beforehand in the future, especially due to sovereignty issues. These political concerns precluded them from vesting the decision about what and how much contribute to an international body.

Lastly, finding fair terms for burden-sharing in NATO touches upon one of the central ethical concepts – distributive justice. Especially in the IR domain, distributive justice goes to the essence of politics, as it exposes conflicting value systems and can often take form of demands for power-sharing in international institutions (Hoffmann 1981, p. 141). The discussion on the practical dimension of burden-sharing in this section provides further details in this respect.

**Ethical dimension**

As to the ethical dimension, the overall findings indicated that burden-sharing is problematic because of the tensions between utility of contribution and fairness of distribution. This split discourse therefore depicted how Canadian leaders framed the burden-sharing dynamics in NATO. Furthermore, NATO burden-sharing examined against distributive justice models revealed that allies preferred sharing arrangements similar to progressive proportional tax schemes.

To interpret burden-sharing along the ethical lines, this dissertation employed a grid of four ethics (ethics of obligations, ethics of prudence, utilitarian ethics, an communitarian ethics), developed by blending an IR theory-as-thought method (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) with the traditions of normative ethics (deontology, consequentialism, and relational ethics). The split discourse then consisted of two ethical logics that shaped the Canadian discourse. While liberal and constructivist ethics informed the Canadian discourse on sharing of defence cost (fairness of distribution), the liberal utilitarian ethics, occasionally
together with the realist ethics of prudence, shaped the discourse on what Canada should actually spend money on (utility of contribution). To link this finding with Thielemann’s analytical model, burden-sharing in NATO is problematic because it combines norm-based motives of fair burden-sharing (deontological and relational) with cost-benefit patterns of states’ utilitarian contribution strategies (consequential).

This split discourse implied that the same set of actors (Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and senior military) in the same institutional setting (the Government and its committees) employed a burden-sharing discourse which was shaped by multiple ethics. Normative arguments therefore varied with respect to whether Canadian authorities talked about the cost distribution in NATO or they discussed specific Canadian contributions within NATO burden-sharing, such as the mutual aid programme including the air training programme, Canadian troops in West Germany, or, the North American radar lines. In other words, although utilitarian ethics shaped how concretely Canada was going to share in, the very issue of sharing was framed in terms of equitable cost distribution.

There were also certain internal variations in the Canadian discourse that are worth mentioning. First, with respect to the private-public dimension of the Canadian burden-sharing discourse, the private discourse involved more utilitarian-prudential kind of normative arguments, including references to national interests, than the private discourse, which often contained communitarian arguments together with remarks about fairness and responsibility. Second, internal differences emerged between the Departments driven by the ethics of prudence and utilitarian ethics (Finances, Trance and Commerce, and Defence) on the one hand, and those Departments using a discourse more centred around obligations and communitarian arguments (Department of External Affairs and Prime Minister’s Office) on the other hand.

It follows that NATO staff in discussing allied burden-sharing efforts had to put emphasis on more tangible benefits of contributing, not only obligations to share the common burden equitably in terms of abstract percentages. This created more compelling incentives for allies to produce greater burden-sharing in NATO, giving them concrete incentives to contribute (due to prevalent consequential ethical logic). The leaders of NATO countries had a greater chance to convince their domestic constituencies about benefits yielded from committing national resources to the Alliance. The opposite would be more difficult: the utilitarian ethics under these circumstances could not make burden sharing more intelligible, since it generally operates within a logic based on efficiency, not fairness. This point was made more explicit in the analysis of burden-sharing against the various models of distributive justice.
The ethical dimension is especially related to designing the “right” kind of distributive justice model for sharing the collective defence costs among NATO allies. In order to explore burden-sharing on a broader normative and conceptual level, this dissertation approached the burden-sharing problem as a contributory system similar to taxation. It analysed the debates among the major NATO allies and their perspectives on equitable burden-sharing through the lenses of the three basic tax models: the benefit principle, equal sacrifice, and egalitarian models.

Based on the historical evidence of the initial burden-sharing discussions and the resulting Annual Review process, a sound NATO burden-sharing system cannot be not based on the equal sacrifice principle, as the allies refused a flat tax model. Neither does it form a single numerical formula. Due to their qualitatively different capabilities, the allies preferred a proportionally progressive, ability-to-pay, contributory system. Extrapolating these findings into the present, the dissertation contested the fairness of the current dominant NATO burden-sharing indicator, which guides NATO countries to spend at least two per cent of their GDP on defence. In putting forward that burden-sharing in NATO needs to stand on more substantive egalitarian principles, the dissertation argued that the current defence spending target does not take into account differences among countries’ abilities to pay. Furthermore, this doctoral research refined the claim that discussions on especially international distributive justice are driven by “conflicting ideas of fairness” (Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 3). Originally, the allies did agree on an egalitarian type of fairness for their burden-sharing, while refuting a contributory system purely based on benefit principles.

Practical dimension

The practical dimension of burden-sharing concerns the implementation of allied burden-sharing. This dissertation approached this specific part of the problem through making an analogy between NATO burden-sharing and domestic models of taxation, and examining the balance of three basic aspects of every tax model – simplicity, fairness, and efficiency – against the historically first burden-sharing arrangements and NATO burden-sharing today.

The dissertation showed that in the early 1950s, the allies struggled with how to translate sharing principles, which would conform to the agreed ability-to-pay kind of fairness, into an efficient and effective burden-sharing. On the one hand, the allies agreed that burden-sharing had to reflect their differing abilities to contribute, and therefore it could not be dictated by a one-size-fits-all formula. On the other hand, difficulties with implementing the agreed concept
of fairness resulted only in general burden-sharing guidelines, which privileged efficiency and effectiveness. This argument is based on the interpretive analysis of the historically first burden-sharing debates among NATO allies who first considered but then relatively quickly abandoned a simple numerical approach to burden-sharing. The dissertation concluded on the principal burden-sharing benchmark that has been shaping the current debates – the two-percent defence spending pledge – does not represent an effective sharing arrangement, in addition to being unfair.

Reconstructing the practical dimension of NATO burden-sharing in this dissertation presented, among others, the genesis of the today’s NDPP and showed how dynamic the NATO burden-sharing process has been. It revealed that the alliance-wide defence planning process became a synonym for burden-sharing, since the latter concerns above all resource planning, equipment sharing, and building personnel the Alliance needs to defend the allied territory. Like in the case of the Annual Review process in the past, contemporary NATO burden-sharing happens in the NDPP.

The practicalities of burden-sharing influenced the way the allies have measured their contributions. The allies chose GNI/GDP as the basic indicator for comparing shares out of necessity. Although national income measures tend to convey only an aggregated type of data, the allies preferred this measurement since it was the only information readily available on every NATO country. For the purpose of comparison, the allies used defence expenditures as a percentage of national income (productivity effort) and as per capita defence expenditures (the magnitude of productive effort). Furthermore, comparisons required a standardised NATO definition of what should count as expenditures on defence (all direct expenses for national armed forces used for military purposes). In practice, the allies, for instance, argued for not accounting for contributions to other organisations/programmes, e.g. Colombo plan (a development aid programme), into the NATO burden-sharing equation.

Lastly, the dissertation observed a practical separation of sharing arrangements between NATO’s common budgets and allies’ physical contributions. While the allies shared the administrative and infrastructure costs according to explicit sharing formulas based on GNI/GDP, the indirect national contributions (military equipment, personnel, and services) were subject to governments’ discretion, informed by a multilateral consultative planning process within NATO structures.
Theoretical implications

This dissertation offers a set of insights for alliance burden-sharing theory and outlines some implications for the way scholars study burden-sharing in NATO. Dissatisfied with the current state of the burden-sharing scholarship dominated by hypothetical-deductive studies, this dissertation called for a qualitative approach to studying burden-sharing and developed a political, normative, and historical focus of inquiry. Furthermore, one of the main contributions of this doctoral research lies in the combination of several theories and traditions from the fields of IR and normative ethics into one particular study of the burden-sharing origins. With the interpretive research strategy using scientific theories in an unconventional way, this dissertation did not formulate or test hypotheses, but applied the IR theories and traditions of normative ethics to interpret how national practitioners’ framed the problem of burden-sharing in their private and public discourse. The findings of this doctoral research can therefore nuance several existing approaches to burden-sharing in NATO.

First, as to the collective action and public goods theories, this dissertation unpacked their simplifying assumptions, according to which states are rational, unitary, and share the same preferences and perception of the purpose and functioning of the alliance, implicitly criticising reductionism of purely quantitative burden-sharing studies. While some scholars assert that burden-sharing in NATO is above all plagued by free riding and put forward the exploitation hypothesis, the present interpretive research showed that the unequal sharing was considered equitable, or fair, by most of its practitioners. Since the allies conceived fair burden-sharing in terms of proportional progressive tax model, it was expected that larger and richer members should contribute more in both absolute and relative terms.

Furthermore, this dissertation showed that the allies, who in general did not use the language of economists, did not see how they could have determined their contributions to NATO based on the correspondence with their public or private benefits. The allies understood collective defence as a non-excludable good, where country’s individual benefits were diffused and unclear. Although they mostly spoke of contributions as prime insurance, they did not quantify those benefits, and rather preferred to contribute on the ability-to-pay principle that took into account their qualitatively different national resources.

This dissertation also enters into the discussion with the institutional approaches to burden-sharing. The historical focus of this doctoral research reconstructed the early evolution of burden-sharing debates and the development of an institutionalised solution to the collective action problem in NATO. In accommodating both fairness and effectiveness into their burden-
sharing arrangements, the allies developed the Annual Review procedure. This multilateral planning process meant to ease the collective action problem in NATO by introducing transparency, facilitating information exchange, and channelling peer-pressure.

Furthermore, in confluence with organisational approaches, this dissertation refreshed NATO’s organisational memory so that today’s NATO leaders can relearn how to discuss their burden-sharing. Overall, in documenting the institutional evolution of burden-sharing in NATO, these findings can add a normative layer to the collective action theory. The dissertation’s historical focus improved the existing accounts of NATO’s history by providing the details missing in the studies on the first burden-sharing debates in NATO, such as the chronological establishment of Alliance’s several workings groups and committees related to this issue.

Second, when it comes to the realist approaches, including alliance security dilemma and the role of threats, this dissertation puts forward that in the Canadian case, the double security dilemma influenced the choice of its initial contributions to NATO, such as launching a mutual aid programme and sending troops to West Germany. Additionally, it was believed that the country’s international standing should be reflected in the amount of contributions to the Alliance. Furthermore, as an important reminder, although burden-sharing scholarship falls under the alliance management theory, studying the reasons that led to the alliance formation in the first place can offer important insights into what kind of burden is there to be shared.

Third, the interpretive analysis of Canadian normative arguments, guided by ethical concepts that situated the research in-between descriptive and normative ethics, allowed for investigating the role of non-material factors in the burden-sharing dynamics. As to the liberal-constructivist democratic theory and the concept of security community, the idea of the Atlantic community was mobilised through the acknowledgment of an existential threat (the Soviet Union). In recognising the important deterrent effect of the Atlantic community, during the burden-sharing discussions Canadian representatives put emphasis on the requirement that national contributions to NATO should not impair the overall well-being of member countries and their (then) fragile domestic liberal-democratic regime.

Strategic culture approaches could benefit from a more diverse set of domestic actors. As this dissertation showed, national authorities coming from different political, administrative or military milieus within one country can frame the problem in different ways, depending on normative argumentative structures of their discourse. For instance, in the Canadian case, the
split over NATO burden-sharing studies between the Department of Finance and External Affairs proved significant in terms of tailoring Canadian contribution strategies.

As to the role of specific norms in burden-sharing, the findings in this dissertation indicated that on a consensual basis, the allies did not consider free-riding an acceptable behaviour. Furthermore, in interpreting the Canadian burden-sharing discourse, this dissertation observed an interesting twist with regard to fairness as such. Fairness, or justice, in general requires strong institutions to have it established and regulated. On the international scene, the exercise of fairness is vested to states – justice needs a sovereign entity to be implemented and applied, since no one else, apart sovereign actors, has the power to do so. However, while according to several normative ethics theories, obligations should limit state sovereignty and the freedom of action, in this case sovereignty itself prescribes the obligation for states to contribute their fair-shares. This thinking was exemplified when Pearson welcomed the Federal German Republic in NATO as its new member state by connecting “the exercise of the first right of sovereignty” with bearing “a fair share of the common burden of defence in NATO”.¹

In other words, doing one’s fair part of burden-sharing is not a responsibility – once a state joins the alliance, it becomes an obligation. As state’s sovereignty makes it possible to mobilise resources for NATO, it should be an obligation of those sovereign actors to contribute their fair-share, since they are the only ones capable of doing so. This part of the ethics of burden-sharing, the norm of unacceptable free riding and the obligation to contribute residing in the sovereign power of each member state, resembles the term “sovereign obligation”, recently introduced by Haass who defines it as “a government’s obligations to other governments and through them to the citizens of other countries” (2017, p. 227).

Fourth and last, in connection to the domestic approaches to burden-sharing, this dissertation asserts that NATO burden-sharing requires a whole-of-government approach to understand domestic bureaucratic policies and the input from not only foreign and defence policy, but also public and administration theory. In the Canadian case, this was illustrated by the establishment of an inter-governmental panel that dealt with the plethora of burden-sharing debates in NATO and the subsequent Canadian commitments. Meetings of this Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions were attended by representatives from all interested Departments (National Defence, Trade and Commerce, External Affairs and Finance), in addition to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Defence Research

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Board, and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada. This suggests that NATO burden-sharing does not involve only military considerations, but also political, economic, and fiscal ones. The conflicting nature of burden-sharing (and its persistence) to a large extent relates to domestic debates on national spending priorities and defence budget planning. It is therefore necessary to understand how national political, bureaucratic, and military authorities talk about burden-sharing in the context of their domestic policy-making processes.

**Policy implications**

“Burden-sharing should not be about what a country can afford to do but rather what a country can afford not to do.”

Based on the findings of this qualitative-interpretive research, this dissertation arrives at several policy-relevant conclusions. In the context of a recent fundamental reorientation of NATO’s posture from forces deployable at a great distance for the so-called out-of-area operations to a traditional defence of allied territory on the European continent, this dissertation draws some lessons learned from the original burden-sharing discussions for this current post-2014 NATO burden-sharing.

The central challenge for NATO allies lies in defining and implementing some practicable arrangements for sharing of collective defence efforts. This has to be done in a context of an inter-state regional community with no central coercive supranational authority that would enable the conditions for justice. Based on the assumption that burden-sharing discussions should mirror the debate on the Alliance’s strategic purpose, this dissertation proposes more substantial criteria for fair burden-sharing, rather than formal sharing in the form of defence spending percentages.

The proposed qualitative turn in discussing sharing arrangements could make the debates on NATO burden-sharing more capability-driven and strategy-oriented. This refocusing of burden-sharing discussions should also reflect on NATO’s ongoing long-term military and command transformation. As this dissertation points to the central role of the NDPP in the NATO burden-sharing problem, its policy implications therefore relate to burden-sharing as a dynamic process, not a static outcome.

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2 LAC, DEA/4526/50030-T-40/1 George Drew, Parliament of Canada, 1 September 1950. 

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For that reason, alternative focus-points in the burden-sharing debate could be linked explicitly to the NDPP, where the actual burden-sharing happens. The first is to provide a fairer numerical framing of burden-sharing debates, which would determine the size of individual capability targets according to progressive proportional principles. Furthermore, rather than using a crude GDP measure, a more sophisticated indicator of country’s relative wealth, such as PPP measures, would provide a qualitatively sensitive data for comparing allies’ shares. Second, in designing individual capability packages, a greater functional and/or geographical division of labour in accordance with national priorities and interests could clarify allies’ private benefits, which could provide members with more incentives to contribute.

This second point is also connected to the split discourse on burden-sharing in terms of ethical logics. This dissertation showed that even though burden-sharing is a relational concept, allied contribution strategies are by default about consequences. While the deontological ethics drives the design of contributory system and sharing per se, consequentialist ethics drives individual contributions. In order to produce greater burden-sharing in NATO, decision-makers in NATO countries need to see how useful exactly their contributions would be and why they should commit national resources to the defence of other countries. Ultimately, politics and ethics of burden-sharing combined, what benefits would the contribution bring home? Clear tangible benefits would provide politicians with sound arguments that could make it easier for them to sell these expenditures to their own constituencies. The current two-percent numerical burden-sharing narrative is too abstract to convey this message. Plainly earmarking certain percentage to spend on defence is not a particularly compelling method to produce a greater burden-sharing.

Lastly, practitioners need to develop a common understanding of alliance’s burden in order to decide on the right form of contribution. Breaking burden-sharing into smaller multinational collaborative projects could provide those tangible benefits. In addition to cost-saving and taking advantage of the basic benefits coming from the collective action in general, it would strengthen the core pillar of burden-sharing defined in Article III of the Treaty – the mutual help: “[…] the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO 1949). This more effective burden-sharing would require an enhanced role of the NDPP in multinational development of capabilities. Member states would in turn need to overcome their national political/sovereignty concerns.
An analytical approach sensitive to politics could reveal and possibly help to overcome politically problematic aspects of multinational collaborative programmes. This can include the following points. National governments are in general reluctant to agree on a single solution due to sovereignty and autonomy problem. In addition, responsibility diffused in multinational projects renders accountability difficult. More importantly, capabilities developed multinationally multiply political risks, as to be deployed, they require consent from all involved parties. The last point concerns cooperative projects with a leading country, such as NATO’s Framework Nation Concept. Smaller countries participating in this framework could grow dissatisfied since even though their contribution can make real difference, most of the credit usually goes to the leading country.

Research limitations

The primary research objective of this dissertation was to reconstruct political, ethical, and practical dimension of burden-sharing at the level of national leaders during the NATO’s formative years. To do so, it analysed archival material by using several interpretive methods. There is a number of limitations that may influence trustworthiness of findings. These limitations concern the quality, amount and range of data and several interpretation biases, in addition to obstacles common to a qualitative-interpretive type of inquiry and archival research in general.

Problem with interpretive research and its status in social sciences touches upon the legitimacy of interpretive methods, as these “tools of scientific inquiry has been increasingly challenged since the post–World War II behaviourist revolution” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 380). However, despite the resurgence of qualitative research, the precedence has been given to positivist standards and evaluation criteria (Ibid., p. 381). Yet, even the qualitative-positivist research remains considered under-developed vis-à-vis quantitative research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002, p. 482). In general, interpretivists argue that interpretive methodologies generate their own criteria for judging the quality of the truth claims, as evaluation criteria need to come from the epistemic communities generating that research. It has also been acknowledged that interpretive methods will never meet the criteria established for positivist quantitative methods, as they rests on philosophical grounding different from methodological positivism.

Overall, despite the efforts to “[deconstruct] the qualitative-quantitative taxonomy and [raise] the visibility of interpretive methods within social scientific research practices (Yanow,
and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 384), little has been published on how to treat interpretive analysis, standardise research practice, and effectively assess interpretive findings. This lack of sources to elaborate more on interpretive methods and criteria to evaluate interpretive research has not prevent this doctoral dissertation from incorporating several measures, common for positivist qualitative studies, to solidify its qualitative-interpretive research on burden-sharing and remedy some of the limitations stemming from its methodological choices.

Notably, this doctoral research made efforts to triangulate sources of data and methods of analysis and to employ several tools to increase its transparency. In a more positivist language, this dissertation was careful to diminish the degree of bias and to improve internal and external validity of its findings, while staying within the interpretive methodological framework.

Triangulation of methods is one of the ways to assure the validity of research through including several dimensions of the same studied object. Usually, triangulation in positivist research means a combination of qualitative and quantitative data to increase inferential leverage within a single research project (Brady and Collier 2010, p. 104). In contrast, for Gering triangulation means using multiple methods (e.g., qualitative and quantitative, multiple levels of analysis) to address the same research question (2012, p. 427). King et al. talk about the triangulation of diverse data sources as the practice of increasing the amount of information (2010, p. 122). For qualitative researchers, triangulation can represent multiple data sources (persons, times, places), methods of accessing and generating data, researchers, and theories in a single research project (Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 102).

In case of this dissertation, the principal source – primary data found in Library and Archives Canada – were complemented with several documents from NATO online archives and further triangulated with secondary literature, especially historical accounts of Canada in the 1940s and 1950s. For instance, works by Eayrs, Holmes, Ismay, Reid, Roussel, or collections of speeches and documents of Canadian political leaders compiled by MacKay and Blanchette. Due to the challenge of studying a distant historical period, the possibility of other data-generating method was limited (see below).

In order to further increase the internal validity (quality and interpretation of the data), this dissertation employed a number of various interpretive methods and combined concepts and insights from several scientific fields (IR, Normative Ethics, and History) to create a multimethod research strategy. These interpretive methods using different conceptual tools were employed onto the same data set to improve robustness of findings. Although, as Gerring
puts it, “boundaries of a method or research design are not always clear” and that “the distinction between ‘robustness tests’ and ‘multimethod research’ is thus a matter of taste” (2012, p. 382-84). This allowed not only to interpret the categories at heart of the burden-sharing (purpose, burden, contributions, collective action), but make the account richer through studying metaphors and divergent arguments to underline the ambiguity of the burden-sharing problem. The ethical concepts further showed different viewpoints as to why and how contribute.

This dissertation developed a historical focus and privileged a perspective of one single country on the burden-sharing problem in NATO. Positivists would say that these methodological choices have made it difficult to generalise its findings. However, even for qualitative research (and social science in general), it is difficult to “provide reasonable estimates of the uncertainty”; rather, we should talk about degrees of generalizability in terms of concentric circles – “the farther the circle, the less likely but not whole implausible” (Gerring 2012 p. 84-5; italics added by the author).

The first and second articles’ focus on a specific Canadian perspective decreased the extent to which the findings could be applied to other NATO allies. Neither did this dissertation analyse different cases of burden-sharing, for instance comparing NATO burden-sharing to other military alliances like Warsaw Pact. However, generalisation, or identifying general laws, was not the ambition of this research. Yet, if the external validity means how well the findings fit within the external world, the researcher attempted to increase the amount of consulted data, and collected and analysed as much archived documents as possible (almost twenty thousand pages retrieved in Library and Archives Canada). To neutralise the lack of a cross-country comparison, this dissertation conducted an in-depth study of the Canadian whole-of-government approach to the burden-sharing problem that included various actors within one national administration. In addition, the third essay analysed the positions of all major NATO allies in a given studied period.

The historical focus might have limited the ability to draw conclusions for today’s burden-sharing strategies of NATO allies, given for instance the changed international security environment and politics of the post-Cold War period, and the evolution of NATO itself (e.g., new strategic documents, higher number of member states, etc.). However, the research objective of this dissertation was not to compare two periods. Including the discussion on the current burden-sharing situation in NATO does not constitute a full-fledged comparison within a research design. Rather, it is meant as an overture for drawing lessons learned from one period
to another based on similar concerns: the arguments of one ally in reaction to the pressures of other allies to increase its contributions in view to strengthen the collective defence of the transatlantic territory against an external threat.

*Mutatis mutandis*, the burden-sharing problem remains essentially very similar. More member countries and new threats are an important, but not the driving factor as this research is interested in the discourse of national elites in reaction to the pressure of fellow allies to contribute more. Whether the notion of fairness has changed would require detailed research and further investigation into how current political elites in NATO states make sense of burden-sharing and how they privately perceive the defence spending pledge. However, only public political statements are available for this contemporary period.

Interpretive research is more focused on and driven by “contextuality” rather than generalisability, because sense-making is always contextual and open to contingency (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2011, pp. 10-11).³ Yet, although understandings are historically situated, some interpretive researchers tried to “find a ‘sensible middle ground’ between deductive and inductive approaches while simultaneously claiming to provide ‘contextual knowledge’ and to be able to locate ‘macro causes’” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 4). For instance, Adcock (2006) puts forward that a general law can highlight, rather than cover, the particularities of diverse societies.

On the other hand, when it comes to external validity, some interpretivists prefer to talk about transferability, rather than generalizability, that is “the responsibility of the researcher is to provide sufficient ‘thick description’ so that others can assess how plausible it is to transfer findings from that research study to another setting” (Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 109). Similarly, rather than generalisability, this dissertation considered it important to provide paths for transferability of its research strategy in terms of methodological procedures: increased transparency, and data-selection bias.

In contrast to quantitative approaches, Elman *et al.* (2010) observe that most qualitative data generated by social scientists are used only once and that replication remains rare. This has been reiterated especially in the context of lacking “explicit methodological rules [, when] the selection, citation, and presentation of sources remain undisciplined and opaque” and sources are subject to cherry-picking (Moravcsik 2010, p. 26). To address this problem of poor

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³ Interpretive methodology understands causality in the form of constitutive causality that “seeks to explain events in terms of actors’ understandings of their own contexts, rather than in terms of a more mechanistic causality” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2011, p. 52).
methodological standards, Moravcsik proposes a solution in the form of active citation (2010, 2014). Others put forward archiving qualitative data or creating databases for qualitative analysis to promote secondary data analysis, refine qualitative techniques, form epistemic communities and, in the end, increase transparency in research processes (Elman et al. 2010).4

The researcher carefully considered all potential material and paid attention to cite sources accurately. This dissertation adheres to the maxim of transparent qualitative research through the extensive use of traditional citation of primary sources and in-text quotations. This means that the documents were referenced by providing not only the number of the archive collection consulted, but also the number of volume and file and exact title and date of the item. For instance, the reference “LAC, DEA/4486/50030-A-40/2 – SSEA to Canadian High Commissioner, London, 17 May 1950” stands for an item that is located in the Department of External Affairs fonds of the Canadian national archives, in the volume number 4486 and under the file number 50030-A-40, part 2 (see all consulted files in Annex A). Possible improvement to transparency of this doctoral research could include attaching the digital version of photographed archival material and developing an active citation version of the dissertation.

When it comes to the work with primary sources and archival research, Darnton (2018) warns against a structural problem of the data selection process and points to the general lack of guidance on how (and how not) to use archival materials and primary materials in general in political science.5 Yet, it is not clear to what extent political scientists should follow data collection practices of historians, since “completeness is an impossible standard” (Darnton 2018, p. 95).

The archival research in this dissertation aimed to be comprehensive but focused. The work in archives of this doctoral research resembled to that of diplomatic historians, as it relied primarily on national governments’ central records. Although seemingly straightforward, after identifying the relevant collections in the Canadian national archives, there was still quite a variety of documents to sift through, such as official correspondence inside the government, communication with Canadian bureaucrats overseas, published bulletins and speaking notes of

4 In contrast, Snyder sees active citation as “opportunity for an evidentiary showdown” (2014, p. 713). He prefers paying attention to variable bias and carrying out robust crosstabs on inferences to assure the quality of qualitative research.

5 The book by Scott A. Frisch et al. (2012) is an important exception that gives “boots on the ground” advice to both archivists and political scientists on how to better access and use archive resources.
officials’ public speeches. When it comes to the danger of collecting only confirmatory/ one-sided evidence, this is less relevant for a dissertation using interpretation as a research strategy, since the researcher does not have a hypothesis to confirm and its goal is actually to map conflictual meanings and arguments of the studied phenomena.

In addition to data selection bias, McKee and Porter (2012, p. 69) draw attention to the ethical issues related to conducting archival research and the sensitive balance between the right to know and the right to privacy. This dissertation made use only of official national archives and followed the institution’s policies and regulations to properly access and reference the used material. For instance, as many requested governmental documents were restricted (code 32, in contrast to code 90 – open), the researcher had to follow the “Access to Information and Privacy” policy to retrieve them and to get the permission to consult the material.

There are also methodological limitations that the researcher herself could not influence. This dissertation recognises possible biases on three levels of interpretation. First, it relied on how national leaders interpreted what went on in NATO (the trustworthiness of the material retrieved in national archives) and assumed that no crucial documents had been withheld. Given the historical period, this research for instance could not conduct interviews to collect a different type of primary data. Reading the archival material constituted the only means of accessing their assessment of burden-sharing. In addition, since no one is able to see inside people’s head, their true motivations are not knowable. Second, the researcher’s subjective biases and background influence how she interprets the phenomenon documented in the archives, for instance the personal experience and professional training. Third, the readership of this dissertation will make its own interpretation of the results. These triple interpretive biases show that this doctoral research is neither data nor value-neutral.

Suggestions for future research

Finally, this dissertation makes three suggestions for the future research on NATO burden-sharing and allied cooperation. First, scholarly studies on normative aspects of burden-sharing and military cooperation in general could formulate an applied ethics of alliances that would address concerns about standards of ethical action with regard to the fellow allies (state’s ethical conduct within an alliance), principles of a fair distribution of alliance’s burden, and ethical criteria for contribution strategies. For instance, focusing on how ethical considerations help actors choose the right contribution strategy over other should improve our conceptual understanding of an efficient military cooperation.
When it comes to distributive justice on the international inter-state level, this dissertation showed that the allies kept the arrangements for minor financial commitments towards NATO separated from their individual shares of the collective defence burden in terms of physical contributions. Only in the case of infrastructure and budgets, they were able to agree on explicit financial cost-sharing rules. This difference in contribution schemes has been, with some modifications, preserved until today. Direct contributions – or common funding – are made according to an agreed cost-sharing formula based on GNI, while indirect – or national – contributions consist of ad hoc volunteered equipment and troops without an explicit distribution mechanism.

Echoing Walzer’s (1994) discussion on “thick justice”, NATO allies could rely on a shared basic understanding of fairness. However, the “thin justice”, characteristic for the inter-state cooperation, prevented them from adopting explicit sharing arrangements for their physical contributions. Having conceptually explored NATO burden-sharing, this dissertation pointed to a double understanding of this problem. On the one hand, a narrow interpretation conceives burden-sharing as an accounting problem and relates specifically to NATO common funding. On the other hand, NATO burden-sharing is also interpreted in terms of a strategic concern and a security problem. This interpretation puts forward burden-sharing in terms of defence planning commitments and operational contributions that follow a capacity- and geography-based approach. This broader conceptualisation aims to improve military effectiveness of the Alliance with a strategic objective of preserving peace and security in the transatlantic area. In drawing links to Walzer’s thick and thin spheres of justice, it might be interesting to look at allied cooperation in NATO in terms of several qualitatively different spheres of sharing that depend on the type of contribution and practical sharing arrangements. For instance, future research could look at the arguments as to why a common operational fund cannot be a panacea for NATO’s burden-sharing problem. One of the possible research path could learn from the UN experience. Its fund that finances peacekeeping operations illustrates the danger of eventually dividing states between those who pay (financial contributions), and those who patrol/fight (troop contributions).

Future research could also investigate burden-sharing as a dissensual practice. The findings of this dissertation suggest that NATO burden-sharing is a practical illustration of dissensus. due to differing, but not necessarily conflicting, understandings of fairness among NATO allies. Dissensus in a broad sense means “a difference between sense and sense: a difference within the same, a sameness of the opposite” (Rancière 2011, p. 1). Dissensus does
not imply a conflict between groups with opposing interests. Rather, even though NATO allies shared an interest in a concept of fairness alike to the progressive ability-to-pay model, such burden-sharing was difficult to achieve in reality. Put differently, one of the symptoms of dissensus is the problematic move forward. As the agreed concept of fairness differed operationally and consequently, allies chose to privilege effective burden-sharing. One of the enabling condition for dissensus in NATO was the differing understanding of fair share. This dissertation illustrated this in pointing to the allies’ struggles with how to translate the ability-to-pay kind of fairness into efficiency and effectiveness. Alternatively, the politics developed around different progressive scales of a contributory system hindered the implementation of fair-share.

Second, another research path could explore the possibilities of further qualitative-quantitative interplay in studying burden-sharing, as suggested by Ringsmose (2016) or Becker (2017). As this dissertation points to the principles and importance of the alliance-wide defence planning process, further research could focus on how the quantitative methodology used in the NDPP corresponds to the more substantial principles of sharing.

Third, future studies could address more explicitly the nexus between burden-sharing, threat perception differentials, cohesion, and effectiveness. This dissertation showed that burden-sharing includes a moral dimension of burden. Scholars have already acknowledged that burden-sharing relates to alliance’s persistence and solidarity (Weitsman 2004). Some scholars claim that burden-sharing is one of the behavioural aspects of alliance cohesion (Park and Moon 2014). While in the past, it was rather conventional to claim that “unless the external danger creates an equitable division of labour among alliance members, cohesion is likely to suffer” (Holsti et al. 1973, p. 17), other researchers assert that threat perception differentials could create a more authentic division of labour in the Alliance and contribute to a greater burden-sharing (Press-Barnathan 2006). At the same time, more equal burden sharing in terms of defence expenditures does not necessarily indicate a stronger alliance cohesion (Posen 2006).

Overall, a similar threat perception seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the creation of equitable burden-sharing in NATO. While in the 1950s NATO faced a clear existential threat, most of the scholarly studies showed that allied burden-sharing was not equitable during this period. More recent studies suggest that the diverging threat perceptions among allies could positively enhance specialisation in NATO burden-sharing, such as East-South division in the Alliance. As a consequence, is burden-sharing one of the proxies for alliance cohesion? Could endless burden-sharing debates eventually pose a
significant threat to cohesion? Which arrangements of allied burden-sharing can positively contribute to alliance cohesion? This dissertation reiterated the findings from other burden-sharing studies in that different actors tend to have different criteria when they talk about contributing national resources to the Alliance, whether in terms of monetary national defence spending or troops. Finally, if burden-sharing debates can hinder the discussion on strategic purpose and prevent allies from effective cooperation, are these burden-sharing squabbles the actual burden of the Alliance?

Lastly, the interpretive research strategy could be useful for the future research on multinational cooperation. Especially in the context of a multinational organisation based on consensual decision-making practices like NATO, there is a good chance that ambiguity and vagueness, or even dissensus, would surround the discussions among practitioners about the development of a new concept or strategy. Qualitative and interpretive approaches can prove useful in studying these instances of allied cooperation and could prevent potentially negative unintended consequences during their implementation.

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## Annex A

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Annex B


(2) Statement by SSEA L.S. St. Laurent, CHCD, 3 March 1947.

(3) Statement by Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, CHCD, 10 March 1947.


(5) Statement by SSEA, L.S. St. Laurent. CHCD, 28-29 April 1948.


(10) Statement by Prime Minister, L.S. St. Laurent, CHCD, 28 March 1949. S&S 49/12.


(16) Address by Prime Minister of Canada L.S. St. Laurent in Acknowledgement of the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y., 14 October 1949. S&S 49/34.


‘Canada and the Atlantic Community’. Address by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA) A.D.P. Heeney delivered to the Canadian Club of Montreal, 19 March 1951. S&S 51/11.


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‘Canada speeds plans for defence’. Address by Minister of Trade and Commerce C.D. Howe to the Vancouver Board of Trade, 6 October 1950. S&S 50/39.


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‘The Universities and International Understanding in the Free World’. Address by Prime Minister L.S. St. Laurent at a special Convocation at the University of Western Ontario, London, 7 March 1951. S&S 51/10.
(38) ‘Canada and the Atlantic Community’. An address by USSEA A.D.P. Heeney delivered to the Canadian Club of Montreal, 19 March 1951. S&S 51/11.


(45) Statement by Minister of National Defence B. Claxton. CHCD, 18 and 22 October 1951.


(52) Statement by SSEA L.B. Pearson. CHCD, 1 April 1952.


(55) ‘Canada and Western Security’. Address by SSEA L B. Pearson to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs at Quebec City, 8 June 1952. S&S 52/24.


