Sitting on Our Hands: Comparing Canada’s Intervention Policy in Libya and Syria

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Mémoire présenté en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maîtrise en Science Politique

Août 2017

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Sitting on Our Hands: Comparing Canada’s Intervention Policy in Libya and Syria

I. Résumé/Abstract

Dans le sillage du Printemps Arabe, le Canada a réagi différemment aux crises en Libye et en Syrie. En Libye, il participe à une coalition de l’OTAN qui contribue à renverser le régime de Gaddafi. En Syrie, il adopte une politique d’endiguement. Mon mémoire analyse les raisons qui ont motivé les différentes politiques d’intervention du Canada en Libye et en Syrie en 2011. J’affirme que le Canada a participé à l’intervention militaire en Libye parce que ses intérêts nationaux étaient menacés par le conflit, qu’il n’était pas le sujet de pressions domestiques contre l’intervention, et qu’il ressentait une responsabilité envers l’OTAN. Je soutiens aussi que d’autres facteurs – soit l’isolation géographique et politique de la Libye, la faiblesse de ses forces militaires, et la confiance de l’Occident envers l’opposition libérale qui s’est rapidement organisée – ont facilité la décision d’intervenir parce que le Canada jugeait que l’intervention comportait peu de risques. En revanche, je maintiens que le Canada n’avait ni opportunité ni incitatif pour intervenir en Syrie. Dû en partie à la complexité de la crise, une impasse à l’OTAN et au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU a empêché la création d’une coalition multilatérale. Je soutiens que, même si le Canada avait eu l’opportunité d’intervenir, il aurait été improbable qu’il l’ait fait, parce qu’il n’avait aucun intérêt économique en Syrie, et que le gouvernement Canadien n’a pas ressenti de pressions domestiques en faveur d’une intervention. Je conclus en proposant des pistes de recherche liée aux contraintes sous lesquelles les puissances moyennes opèrent dans le système international.

In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, Canada responded differently to the crises in Libya and Syria. In Libya, Canada participated in a NATO-led coalition which eventually helped topple the Gaddafi regime. In Syria, Canada “sat on its hands” and adopted a policy of containment. My thesis addresses the reasons behind Canada’s different intervention policies in Libya and in Syria in 2011. I argue that Canada participated in a military intervention in Libya because its national interests were threatened by the conflict, it experienced no domestic pressure against the intervention, and it felt a responsibility towards NATO to intervene. I also argue that other factors – Libya’s political and geographic isolation, the weakness of its military, and the West’s trust in the liberal opposition which organized quickly – may have facilitated Canada’s decision to intervene because it judged the intervention in Libya to be low-risk. In contrast, I argue that Canada did not intervene in Syria because it lacked an opportunity and an incentive to do so. Paralysis at the UN Security Council and NATO hindered the creation of a multilateral military intervention in Syria, due to concerns about the complexity of the crisis. Provided with the opportunity to intervene however, it is unlikely that Canada would have done so because it had no economic interests in Syria, nor did it experience domestic pressure to intervene. I conclude by suggesting further avenues of research regarding the constraints experienced by middle powers in the international system.
## II. List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CETA</td>
<td>Canada-European Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>CFDS</td>
<td>Canada First Defence Strategy</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTW</td>
<td>Diversionary Theory of War</td>
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<td>FPE</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Executive</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamist Fighting Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGA</td>
<td>Ministry of Global Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>Neoclassical Realism</td>
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<td>NCR (Iran)</td>
<td>National Council of Resistance of Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OOD</td>
<td>Operation Odyssey Dawn</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>Operation Unified Protector</td>
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<td>PIJ</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Syrian National Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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III. Introduction

In early 2011, protests broke out throughout the Arab world. Though there were regional differences in the way the conflicts evolved, their genesis was caused by the same grievances; corrupt regimes, nepotism, and injustice.\(^1\) Citizens demanded respect for their human rights and for a democratic political system.\(^2\) While some countries, such as Djibouti\(^3\) and Saudi Arabia\(^4\), experienced minor protests that were quickly quashed, other countries, such as Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, experienced important protests which evolved into civil conflicts.\(^5\)


\(^2\) Ibid.


Despite being faced with conflicts which seemed similar, Canada’s reaction varied from one case to another. Two countries emerge as worthy of comparison due to their apparent similarities and to the difference in Canada’s reaction: Libya and Syria. In Libya, Canada responded quickly to the crisis and held an active role in the NATO coalition which helped topple the Gaddafi regime in 2011.\(^6\) In Syria, however, Canada’s government “sat on its hands” and refused to intervene; in 2011, Ottawa’s policy was to avoid deep engagement and commitment.\(^7\)

I seek to understand why Canada intervened in Libya, and refrained from intervening in Syria in the wake of the civil conflicts. Understanding the conditions under which Canada will conduct a military intervention is important because it informs us about the foreign policy priorities of the Canadian government and the constraints under which it operates as a middle power in the international system. Moreover, the case studies chosen are particularly informative for the study of military intervention, because two conflicts warranted very different reactions from the Canadian government, despite their seemingly similar dynamics and the fact that they occurred simultaneously.

In order to answer my research question, I use a neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy. Adapted to Canadian foreign policy, this approach will allow me to study both internal


and external factors which contribute to a state’s decision to conduct a military intervention in a foreign state.

Though I use Canada’s involvement in Libya and Syria as case studies, I expect the findings of the research to provide insights applicable to the decisions of middle powers to conduct military interventions.

IV. Literature Review

Military interventions in foreign states are risky ventures. The decision by a state to intervene militarily in a foreign state is an important one, as state leaders must mobilize both sufficient resources and society’s support for the mission. And while all states operate under domestic constraints, in comparison to major powers, middle powers are especially constrained by their limited military resources and relative power in the international system.8 Thus military intervention is an especially important decision for a middle power. The following is an overview of theories of military intervention that purport to explain why, how, and when military interventions occur.

1. Why Interventions Occur

Regarding why interventions occur, offensive and defensive realist theories argue that systemic pressures cause states to intervene militarily, while the theory of humanitarian intervention argues that some states feel compelled to intervene to protect human security abroad. Diversionary War Theory argues that states will conduct military interventions in an effort to distract the public from domestic issues, whereas Prospect Theory posits that decisions regarding military intervention (and foreign policy more generally) are subject to the individual leader’s assessment of risk.

i. Offensive and Defensive Realism

Offensive realism claims that states in the international system are perpetually revisionist. They are in constant competition to become hegemonic powers because there is no other way to guarantee their survival in a self-help system. Therefore, they are likely to go on the offensive regardless of their share of relative power or whether they feel directly threatened. In order to guarantee their survival in an anarchical international environment, states may therefore conduct military interventions preemptively.

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Defensive realist theory claims that states will only use their military power to intervene in other states occur under certain conditions. Examples of these conditions are an increased level of threat in the international environment; sudden changes in relative power; opportunities to exploit resources in a foreign state; a state developing offensive weapons; and multipolarity.

An illustrative example of the applicability of offensive and defensive realist theories is captured by the behavior of Germany, France, and the UK in 1936. As per offensive realist theory, Germany displayed behavior typical of a revisionist power by remilitarizing the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. French and UK intelligence were aware of Germany’s expansionist desires. Defensive realist theory would suggest that France and the UK would have responded to this aggressive intention, but Germany met no resistance from France or the UK until 1939, when it invaded Poland. Multiple authors have

13 Shore, “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine”, 5.
tried to explain why France and the UK did not act as defensive realism would expect. They argue that France and the UK underestimated Germany’s expansive desires; had they correctly assessed Germany’s intentions, they would have acted sooner, possibly preventing Germany’s invasion of Poland.\(^{14}\)

ii. **Humanitarian Intervention**

A normative explanation of military intervention posits that this decision is compelled by threats to human security.\(^{15}\) According to this theory, some states will use military intervention to protect the citizens of other countries when their governments either will not

\(^{14}\) Germany went on to invade Poland in 1939, at which point France and the UK declared war on Germany. For a summary of key events in WWII, see: Wells, Anne Sharp. *Historical Dictionary of World War II*. 1st Edition edition. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 1999. For scholars who claim that a pre-emptive threat may have deterred Germany, see: Shore, Zach. “Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 1 (January 1, 1999): 5–18; Neville, Peter. “A Prophet Scorned? Ralph Wigram, the Foreign Office and the German Threat, 1933-36.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 47. Ripsman and Levy have argued that France predicted that Germany was rising quickly, but were waiting for British support, which never occurred. They argue that Britain believed that “German ascendancy was only temporary” and that it could eventually neutralize the threat; Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. “The Preventive War That Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s.” *Security Studies* 16, no. 1 (March 2007): 32–67.

\(^{15}\) These theories belong to the constructivist school of thought, which challenges the realist conception of what matters in military intervention. Constructivists argue that those material forces – which realists claim provide structure and hierarchy in the international environment – are only as important as we make them. In other words, it is ideas that shape the direction of the interaction between states; a revisionist state will create a self-help system, whereas a Lockean state will create Lockean liberal structures. States are independent agents, structures are created by ideas, and these structures put pressure on the agents to act a certain way. Over decades of interactions between states, norms and rules are created and perpetuated. This “path dependent” approach to foreign policy decisions expects states to make foreign policy decisions in response to incentives (as predicted by the rationalist model) but that these decisions are also influenced by internalized norms and rules in international relations that guide states’ actions. The constructivist school of thought thus suggests that the motives behind a military intervention are guided by a state’s internalization of norms and ideas. See: Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*. 1st edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Finnemore, Martha. *National Interests in International Society*. 1st edition. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996; Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. 1st edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Bull, Hedley, Andrew Hurrell, and Stanley Hoffman. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th edition. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012; Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. 1 edition. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
or cannot protect them. Humanitarian intervention is an expression of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a norm of international law whereby the international community is responsible for preventing “war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide within a state’s borders.” The March 1999 NATO intervention against Serb forces in Kosovo is often cited as an example of humanitarian intervention. However, there is no consensus regarding the extent to which the R2P norm actually matters when a state evaluates whether or not it will conduct a military intervention. While constructivist scholars argue that R2P necessarily factors into a state’s assessment of whether it should intervene in a foreign state, most realist scholars argue that R2P has no decisive impact on a state’s decision to intervene militarily.


It is also important to note that military interventions are subject to less scrutiny when they are sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council.\textsuperscript{21} For middle powers, approval by a multilateral organization is necessary because they generally do not have the military power to intervene alone. However, even major powers with the power to intervene alone will seek approval; for instance, the United States will often seek approval by the United Nations Security Council before conducting a military intervention.\textsuperscript{22} Although strong states \textit{can} often intervene in a foreign state without the approval of a multilateral organization, they risk facing significant criticism for doing so. For instance, the US continues to be criticized for its decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003 without UN approval.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{iii. War as a Diversion}

The most prominent theory at the domestic level of analysis which purports to explain military intervention is the Diversionary Theory of War (DTW). DTW argues that, in an


effort to create a distraction, leaders will start wars when faced with domestic political or economic issues.\(^{24}\) Adventurous foreign policies will be especially commonplace when the leader faces the possibility of re-election, and when foreign policy decisions made by the leader can impact their possible re-election.\(^{25}\) The driver behind adopting an aggressive or interventionist foreign policy is to both distract the electorate from issues at home, but also to create a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, whereby support for the leader is bolstered.\(^{26}\) An example of Diversionary Theory is Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. Argentinian president Leopoldo Galtieri sought to re-establish support for his government after a period of sharp economic decline which pitted him against an opposition composed of union representatives, students, business leaders, the Church, intellectuals, and human rights activists.\(^{27}\) Galtieri thus decided to invade the Falkland Islands in an effort to recapture the contested territory from the British and divert public opinion away from the trouble at home.\(^{28}\)


\(^{25}\) Alastair, “Diversionary Foreign Policy,” 150.

\(^{26}\) Tir and Jasinski, “Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War,” 645.

\(^{27}\) Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” 449.

\(^{28}\) Ibid, 443.
iv. Prospect Theory

An important individual level-theory\(^{29}\) is *Prospect Theory*. In the larger context of foreign policy-making, this theory posits that decisions are based on judgements made about the state of the world and that these judgements are distorted under conditions of risk.\(^{30}\) In other words, leaders who are risk-averse are more likely to base their decisions on potential costs rather than gains. A good illustration is provided by McDermott’s study of the reactions of President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew

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\(^{29}\) The individual level of analysis holds that foreign policy decisions are not entirely rational calculations, because the leaders who make foreign policy decisions are fallible human beings. Foreign policy decisions made by leaders can be affected by the leader’s cognitive processes, which encompass emotions, psychology, beliefs, and personality. Foreign policy decisions can be affected by simple factors such as fatigue during a crisis, or a decision-maker’s personal experience with a particular state or society; these factors can create biases. Although these biases are most often subconscious, they will affect a decision-maker’s ability to make an entirely objective and rational calculation. Regarding military intervention, the individual level of analysis argues that due to certain cognitive biases, the exact same situation can be evaluated quite differently by individual decision-makers, and this is why there is often disagreement about the course of action to take when facing a crisis. This is a micro-level theory which focuses on individual decision-makers and how their cognitive biases and risk aversion will impact the decision to conduct a military intervention. For works regarding leader behavior and foreign policy, see: Hermann, Margaret G. “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders.” *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (1980): 7–46; Axelrod, Robert, ed. *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015; Rivera, Joseph De. *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*. 1St Edition edition. Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1965; Holsti, Ole R. “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.” *Journal of International Affairs* 21, no. 1 (1967): 16–39; Bonham, G. Matthew, Michael J. Shapiro, and George J. Nozicka. “A Cognitive Process Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” *Simulation & Games* 7, no. 2. Accessed April 21, 2017; Bonham, G. Matthew. “Cognitive Mapping as a Technique for Supporting International Negotiation.” *Theory and Decision* 34, no. 3 (May 1, 1993): 255–73; McDermott, Rose. *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001; Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–91.

Brzezinski during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980.\textsuperscript{31} Carter was hesitant to intervene military because of his declining popularity, the failure of attempts at diplomatic resolution, and pressure emanating from Congress and the American public.\textsuperscript{32} Vance assessed that inaction would eventually lead to a peaceful resolution and felt that intervention would lead to potential loss of American lives, which he deemed unacceptable.\textsuperscript{33} Brzezinski, for his part, believed inaction would worsen the situation and damage the prestige of the United States.\textsuperscript{34}

2. How and When Interventions Occur

Theorists have also given thought to the constraints that shape how interventions occur. Of note are geopolitical theories which claim that a foreign state’s geography can impact the strategy a state will adopt when intervening, though the advent of modern war technology has alleviated these constraints. Finally, theorists also address the role of public opinion which can stall a military intervention as the elite must convince the public of the intervention’s \textit{raison d’être} or, alternatively, exert pressure on elites to intervene, particularly in the case of humanitarian intervention in foreign states.

i. \textbf{Geography and Military Intervention}

Though geography used to play an important role in military intervention by making the intervention costly, the advent of modern war technology has alleviated this constraint.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item[31] In 1980, 53 Americans were held hostage in Iran for over six months. This occurred in the context of the Islamic Revolution of 1979; militant Iranian students took hold of the US embassy and captured 53 Americans. See McDermott, \textit{Risk-Taking in International Politics}, 45.
    \item[32] Ibid, 47.
    \item[33] Ibid, 60.
    \item[34] In the end, Brzezinski’s opinion swayed Carter and the US went ahead with the rescue mission, which failed and caused the death of eight American soldiers. \textit{Ibid}, 63 and 74.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Previously, some state-level factors, such as topography and climate, could make military intervention both costly and ineffective, impacting a state’s decision on how best to conduct an effective intervention. Indeed, a country’s military capability was greatly constrained by the ease of access to the state (whether it is landlocked or coastal), by the area of the state (whether it is large or small); and by its topography (whether it is flat or mountainous). A cautionary tale regarding climate is that of the Russian Winter, in reference to extreme weather conditions in Russia which caused operations by the Swedish, French, and Germans to fail in 1707, 1812, and 1941, respectively.

With the increasing reliance on the use of airstrikes both by manned and unmanned aerial vehicles however, geographical constraints on intervention have decreased. For instance, some suggest that the success of air-power technology used in Afghanistan demonstrated the emergence of a new model of warfare based on precision weapons.

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37 Ibid.
destroying enemies at a distance and that this model would eventually eradicate the need to have soldiers on the ground.\textsuperscript{40}

ii. Public Opinion

Finally, theorists also consider the constraint that public opinion can place on military interventions; public opinion can either facilitate or complicate as well as impact the timing of a military intervention, especially in democratic states.\textsuperscript{41}

Some theorists argue that public opinion can constrain the use of force because in democracies, leaders are accountable to their electorate; a failed policy can impact the


leader’s credibility and even impact their chances at re-election. This will not necessarily impact the decision to conduct a military intervention, but it may impact its timing. Leaders may therefore introduce policy regarding the use of force at times when public attentiveness is not focused on the crisis. For instance, concerns over public opinion shaped the Bush and Clinton administration’s response to the crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s. Indeed, Matthew A. Baum argues that Bush introduced ground troops in Somalia and that Clinton decided to de-escalate the crisis at times when public attentiveness to the crisis in Somalia was low.

On the flip side, public opinion can pressure decision-makers in favor of intervention. For instance, vocal diasporas contributed greatly to bringing publicity to the

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42 Domestic audience costs theory argues that public opinion acts as a constraint on the use of force; leaders suffer domestic political costs if they threaten an enemy with force and do not follow through because the public views this as a sign of incompetence. This theory further argues that though public opinion does tie the leader’s hands to follow through with their threats, it also causes leaders to credibly communicate its resolve to its adversaries, who realize the leader has increased their domestic costs. This may cause adversaries to back down, thus nulling the need for the leader to actually use force without having to pay those domestic costs. See: Fearon, James D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92; GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA, and ALASTAIR SMITH. “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 1, 2002): 175–200. For a study on how support for intervention depends on whether the electorate is politically informed or not, see: Sirin, Cigdem V. “Examining the Effects of Political Information and Intervention Stages on Public Support for Military Interventions: A Panel Experiment.” Acta Politica 46, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 261–93.


44 Ibid.

crisis in Darfur, which began in 2003 leading to the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping force in July 2007.46

I consider that all of the above explanations which purport to explain why, how, and when interventions occur hold merit, and in the interest of capturing all factors which have led Canada to either participate in a military intervention or refrain from doing so, I use a theory of military intervention which captures both motives and constraints as well as international and domestic factors.

V. Analytical Framework

1. Neoclassical Realist Theory of Intervention

The theory I use for my analysis is the neoclassical realist (NCR) approach to foreign policy. I use NCR for two main reasons. First, this theory allows me to consider pressures internal and external to the state which produce a decision to either conduct a military intervention or refrain from doing so. Second, this theory discusses why a state may intervene militarily, which is the crux of my research question. This theory provides the broad analytical framework within which I will conduct my research; I therefore adapt this theory to Canadian foreign policy by considering pressures internal and external to Canada which have traditionally guided its foreign policy.

Neoclassical realism suggests an approach which considers both pressures from the international system, and the internal dynamics of states. According to the NCR theory on military intervention, the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) first considers their perception of the national interest; if intervention is deemed to be in the national interest, it will occur, but will be subject to domestic constraints and incentives.\footnote{Dueck, Colin. “Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions.” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 139.} According to this theory, domestic constraints matter in that they will not have a decisive impact on whether an intervention will occur or not, but they \textit{can} affect the intervention’s timing, implementation, and public representation.\footnote{Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Lobell, Steven E, Ripsman, Norrin M., and Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 25-26.} 

NCR theory states that the decision to conduct a military intervention is based on a threat to the national interest.\footnote{Dueck, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest,” 146.} NCR theory shares some chief assumptions with structural realist (neorealist) theory, namely that the international system is anarchic and that states seek to protect their security from external threats. The FPE uses military intervention as a tool to protect their security, which is their chief national interest.\footnote{Ibid.} NCR theory concedes that the FPE’s conception of the national interest is subjective and “may be misguided,”\footnote{Ibid.} but is genuine in that the FPE believes it is acting in the state’s best interest. NCR theory thus posits that developments abroad can represent a threat to national interests, and this is when a military intervention becomes a viable tool to protect the state.
NCR theory departs from structural realism in that it concedes that domestic pressures have a measurable role to play in the decision to conduct a military intervention.

Domestic actors can apply pressure which may impact the timing, implementation, or public representation of a military intervention. These domestic groups can be interest groups, or lobby groups. Domestic groups are motivated by different reasons; for instance, while some groups may seek to change social policy, others (such as corporate lobbyists) may be primarily driven by economic interests. The groups which matter most are, first, those which can actually provide a significant amount of electoral clout; these are large groups who are able to influence their members, and who hold members in strategic voting regions.\textsuperscript{52} For instance, corporate lobby groups in Quebec or Ontario may be more successful in influencing their Members of Parliament (MP) than corporate lobby groups with MPs in provinces less represented in the Canadian Parliament.

The international circumstances also affect to what extent these groups will be able to influence foreign policy. The ideal environment for the maximization of influence by domestic actors is, predictably, during “stable periods when the state faces a low-threat international environment”.\textsuperscript{53} This is intuitively convincing, because in a low-threat international environment, the FPE can make more concessions to its domestic actors, thus appeasing groups and increasing approval for foreign policies, with significantly less risk. In a high-threat international environment, it would naturally follow that domestic actors will be

\textsuperscript{52} Ripsman, Norrin M. “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups.” In \textit{Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 181.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid}, 186.
less successful at influencing the FPE. In any event, the main way in which domestic actors can actually influence the FPE is its voting power. This means that timing is very important, because domestic interest groups will be much more effective if a government is close to an election and, thus, vulnerable. Domestic actors will have a much stronger impact if the FPE is uncertain about the direction policy should take. A high degree of certainty within the FPE leaves very little wiggle-room for domestic groups to influence policy. Influence by domestic groups does not happen solely near election time, however. Apart from attempting to influence their MPs, corporate lobbying groups may use their money and political connections to influence policy.

NCR theory thus posits that military interventions are tools used by states in response to an external threat to their perception of the national interest. Four points must be adapted to Canadian foreign policy so I may conduct my analysis. First, I must define Canada’s national interest; second, I must determine which threats traditionally undermine Canada’s interests; finally, I must demonstrate how domestic pressure is manifested in the Canadian democratic system. NCR theory provides the framework within which I will conduct my analysis, and adapting this theory to Canadian foreign policy will allow me to evaluate why Canada decided to conduct a military intervention in one foreign state, and not in another.

54 Ibid, 187-188.
55 Ibid, 188.
2. Canada’s National Interests

In its last International Policy Statement in 2005, Canada identified two key interests which continue to be relevant to the study of military intervention: maintaining international stability and promoting economic prosperity.57 These interests did not change with the arrival of Harper’s Conservative Party to power in 2006. Indeed, documents issued by the Harper government, such as the Economic Action Plan58 and the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), reiterated the importance of these two objectives.59

Threats to Canada are those which target these national interests. In the post 9/11 international environment, international stability could potentially be threatened by transnational actors (such as terrorist groups) and revisionist actors (including Russia and Iran). Threats to economic prosperity include large scale disruptions in international finances and trade, such as the 2008 economic crisis.

i. International Stability

According to the IPS, Canada’s interest in maintaining international stability can be threatened by failed, fragile, and revisionist states, terrorism and organized crime, and the

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proliferation of WMDs. Under the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the threat of ‘Islamicism’ was also identified as another factor of potential instability.

Since Canada is a middle power, it has opted to work collaboratively with others to maintain international stability. Canada’s first partner in this realm is the US. Since the mid-1980s, Canada has not owned weapons of mass destruction and is currently protected by the US’ “nuclear umbrella”. Short of nuclear threats, for which it relies on the US’s “nuclear umbrella”, Canada contributes to protection against threats to North America through participation in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a pact which places “under joint command the air forces of Canada and the United States”. Canada also helps protect border security, particularly since the terrorist attacks which targeted New York and Washington D.C. in September 2001. As will be described further in the analysis,

60 Ibid, 9.
62 The US is one of five recognized nuclear weapons states, owning over 10,000 warheads, of which 50% are operational or active. See “Canada vs United States: Military Facts and Stats.” Accessed June 1, 2017. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/compar.../Military.
Canada remains engaged with the US in the war against Islamic extremism and this continues to shape Canadian foreign policy.

Canada is militarily dependant on the US, because its smaller-scale economy causes its military budget to be much smaller than that of its neighbor to the south. Whereas the US’s military budget is worth over 682 US$ BN, Canada’s is 32 times smaller, standing at 21 US$ BN.\(^{65}\) The US military is larger and much more powerful than the Canadian Armed Forces. Indeed, the US’s armed forces personnel is 24 times the size of Canada’s; its battle tanks 37 times more numerous than Canada’s; and its combat aircrafts 33 times as numerous as Canada’s.\(^{66}\)

Canada also collaborates with other partners to ensure international stability. Its largest security commitments are with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), comprised of 27 other members.\(^{67}\) The NATO military alliance helps maintain international stability, a chief interest of all its members, by facilitating the creation of multilateral coalitions in response to international crises.\(^{68}\) Canada has honored its commitments by participating actively in NATO-led coalitions, most notably in Afghanistan and during the Kosovo crisis.\(^{69}\)

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\(^{67}\) NATO Members: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. See NATO. “Member Countries.” NATO. Accessed March 20, 2017. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm).


Threats to international stability are manifested, first, by terrorist groups. Terrorist groups became high on Canada’s foreign policy agenda after 9/11. Global Affairs Canada describes counter-terrorism as “the first priority of the Government of Canada”. Post 9/11, like many other Western democracies, Canadian interests became focused on security in an unpredictable international environment plagued by violent transnational actors. While Canadian military resources do not allow the country to adopt especially interventionist policies, the government sought to reorganize the Department of National Defence to make it more relevant to the post-Cold War environment. The goal was to transform the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) into “a very new, strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically decisive joint force”. Stated objectives were the protection of Canadians and of the bilateral relationship with the US, and the contribution to multilateral security and stability initiatives abroad. Canada’s largest counter-terrorism effort has been its contribution to the Operation Apollo, the name given to US-led military operations in Afghanistan which included counter-terrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda. Apart from actually engaging in

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73 Ibid.
counter-terrorism operations abroad, Canada engages in information-sharing with other states, through the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),\(^\text{75}\) and the Egmont Group.\(^\text{76}\)

International stability is also threatened by revisionist actors, most notably Russia and Iran. Revisionist actors seek to expand their influence and power beyond their borders. Unpredictable and potentially aggressive in their methods, they threaten international stability. Canada remains concerned with Russia due to its presence in the arctic and its annexation of Ukraine. Regarding Arctic sovereignty, long-standing territorial disputes have caused Canadian-Russian relations to sour. From 2009 to 2014, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) made contact with Russian long-range bombers hovering close to Canadian airspace over 50 times.\(^\text{77}\) Canada has also taken a strong stance against Russian annexation of Ukraine, the first such blatant violation of a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Sanctions were imposed on any individuals or entities who were judged to have violated the “sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine.”\(^\text{78}\) The CAF also launched operation UNIFIER, the military deployment of 200 CAF members to Ukraine to assist Ukrainian armed forces with military training.\(^\text{79}\)

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\(^{75}\) Rudner, Martin. “Challenge and Response: Canada’s Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 11, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 29.

\(^{76}\) The Egmont Group “provides a platform for the secure exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF).” per “About - The Egmont Group.” Accessed August 6, 2017. [https://www.egmontgroup.org/en/content/about](https://www.egmontgroup.org/en/content/about).


Canada’s concerns regarding Iran derive from the Islamic Republic’s sponsoring of terrorist groups and its nuclear programs. Iran, which is also strongly hostile towards Israel, and actively trains and finances groups which are opposed to the Hebrew state, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ). These groups are all recognized by the Canadian government as terrorist groups. Canada is also concerned with Iran’s nuclear ambitions; in 2002, Iranian opposition groups forming the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR-Iran) alleged that Iran had been developing nuclear weapons, in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While the Iranian government always insisted that it was developing nuclear capabilities for domestic use, this would trigger a crisis between Iran and the international community. It would take until 2015 for a nuclear arms deal to be signed between Iran and “the P5+1”, which include the US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany. Canada remained suspicious of Iran, however; Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird expressed his “deep skepticism” about the deal, notably

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due to the revisionist stance of Iranian leaders towards Israel.© Canada maintained its sanctions against Iran, only making slight modifications in response to UNSC Resolution 2231.© On January 5, 2012, Stephen Harper explicitly stated that Iran is the “world’s most serious threat to international peace.”©

More generally, Canada estimates that Iran undermines international stability notably because it engages in proxy wars by arming terrorist groups opposed to Israel (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), and by supporting regimes hostile to the West, such as the Syrian regime.©

ii. Economic Prosperity

Canada’s second national interest is economic prosperity. Threats to economic prosperity emanate from fluctuating international markets and the interruption of a relationship with an important economic partner. Canada collaborates with other states to

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mitigate these concerns. The US and Mexico are its most important economic partners 88, with the Asian continent in second place, importing 13% of Canadian exports. 89

In an effort to promote economic prosperity, Canada seeks to maintain healthy economic ties with the US. As a part of the G8 and G20, Canada is one of the big economic players in the international system, but one that remains heavily reliant on the US. It therefore in Canada’s interest to prioritize the bilateral relationship with the US in an increasingly globalized world. 90 Canada and the US are not equally dependent on each other; approximately 75% of Canadian exports go to the US 91 while only 16% of US exports go to Canada. 92 The Canadian economy is thus particularly sensitive to changes in US policy. An illustrative example is the softwood lumber dispute, which began in 1982. US lobby groups, composed of private owners of softwood lumber lots, successfully argued that the extent of federal and provincial subsidies on timber are unfair, and should be subject to a duty tariff. 93 This effectively reduced trade in softwood lumber between the two countries and took a very

serious toll on the industry in Canada. As an illustration, between 2004 and 2009, over 9,000 jobs were lost in British Columbia.94

Canada also has a vested interest in building and maintaining strong economic ties with other players in the international system. It is therefore important for Canada to participate in international commerce and strengthen Canada’s overseas networks.95 In an effort to diversify its economic partnerships, Canada announced the Canada-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue in 2013; this established a strategic partnership with Gulf countries to “promote mutual economic prosperity”, and it currently engages in trade with these countries.96 Canada also signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2015 along with 12 other nations to create a free-trade zone among its signatories; the countries in its scope represent approximately 40% of the world’s economic output.97 In 2016, Canada also signed

97 These countries are Australia, Brunei Darussalem, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and the United States. See: “What Is TPP? Understanding the New Pacific Trade Deal.” The Globe
the landmark Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).\textsuperscript{98}

In order to prosper in global markets, Canada also relies on the stability of the international financial system. Canada collaborates with other economic players in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other commercial agreements, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).\textsuperscript{99}

3. The Foreign Policy Executive in Canada

The neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy discusses the importance of the Foreign Policy Executive in foreign policy decision-making. In Canada, the FPE is defined as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the cabinets of relevant Ministers. The relevant ministers include the Ministry of Global Affairs (MGA) and the Department of National Defence (DND). The MGA is responsible for designing both long-term strategy and specific policy in response to challenges faced by Canada.\textsuperscript{100} Other responsibilities of the MGA include managing Canada’s international relations with other countries (as they pertain to diplomacy, economy, trade, and negotiations), and carrying out programs to expand Canada’s trade

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
relations, and to contribute to international development in developing countries.  

The DND is responsible for “all matters relating to national defence”, including the management and direction of the Canadian Forces.

4. Domestic Pressures in Canada

A range of actors in Canada exert pressure on the government regarding its foreign policy; these include individual citizens, firms, and various associations of civil society.

Individual citizens exert pressure by their voting behavior, and by direct contact with their Members of Parliament (MPs); the MPs can then bring issues to Parliament and engage in debate. The role of an MP in Canada is indeed to be attuned to the needs of his/her constituency.

Firms and civil society associations may exert pressure through lobbying. These groups may have ethnic interests which shape their opinion on Canadian foreign policy. Some vocal diasporas may engage in ethnic lobbying for or against humanitarian intervention in their home countries. For instance, in an attempt to influence the Canadian government, the Serbian-Canadian community gathered “in large numbers” to oppose Canada’s contribution to

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105 Ibid, 98.
the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. English-Canadians and French-Canadians have also been known to adopt foreign policy preferences based on their ethnicity; whereas the English-Canadians held a more isolationist worldview, the French-Canadian community has traditionally supported Canada’s role in international peacekeeping operations.

Some groups have material or economic interests; these actors may lobby the Canadian government to influence foreign policy as it pertains to business and economics. For instance, the Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada has been known to lobby the Canadian government on matters of free trade agreements.

Other groups may have altruistic interests, and attempt to influence the government’s stance on issues of human rights abroad. For instance, in response to the killings of pro-democracy protestors by the Chinese government in 1989, Canadians organized massive protests, most notably in Toronto, Halifax, and Vancouver.

The NCR theory of military intervention thus provides the framework within which I will present my empirical evidence. I consider pressures external to Canada which have provoked the decision to either conduct a military intervention in Libya or refrain from doing so.

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so in Syria. Next, I evaluate whether there were domestic pressures regarding the Libyan intervention which may have affected the timing, implementation, or representation of the intervention. I evaluate domestic pressures for Syria as well, to determine whether the intervention was possibly delayed due to domestic pressure.

VI. Methodology

I use the comparative method to conduct my research with the use of case studies. The comparative method serves to highlight similarities and contrasts in seemingly similar cases. I seek to compare two similar phenomena which produced two different outcomes. At the origin of the revolutions in the Arab world, Canada reacted differently to similar crises. Though there were regional differences in the way the conflicts evolved, their genesis was caused by the same grievances; corrupt regimes, nepotism, high unemployment, and lack of accountability by government. Moreover, modern communications technology and social media played a big role in allowing for masses of individuals to gather rather quickly. My case selection was prompted by the identification of two cases that seemed worthy of comparison because they presented several similarities yet prompted completely different responses from the Canadian government. In early 2011, Canada participated in a multilateral NATO operation in Libya which culminated in the toppling of the regime and the death of President Gaddafi. Canada’s reaction in Libya was quick. In Syria, however, Canada stalled

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for months, only imposing travel and economic sanctions in May 2011 against members of the Syrian government.116

My methodology is qualitative. My research includes both primary and secondary sources. My primary sources include Parliamentary debate transcripts, official government statements, public interviews, and eyewitness testimony from international organizations such as Amnesty International. My secondary sources include journal articles, books, newspaper articles, and publications by international organizations and think-tanks. Limited tertiary sources are also used in the form of textbooks. With these sources, I will submit both the Libya and Syria cases to a rigorous and identical qualitative analysis. This qualitative analysis is based on the analytical framework of my research, and will seek to describe the external and internal factors which led to decisions to intervene or to refrain from intervening.

VII. Case Studies

1. Anatomy of the Crises

In this section, I describe the crises in Libya and Syria within the broader context of the Arab Spring. I also provide details surrounding Canada’s response to the crises.

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i. The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, in the weeks leading up to 2011. On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in a flammable liquid and set himself on fire. The suicide was a protest against a government which had long neglected to care for its people. A merchant who sold produce out of a small cart, whose daily wages amounted to 7 USD, Bouazizi was struggling to support his extended family. He committed suicide following the confiscation of his produce by a city official who claimed he did not hold a vendor’s license. His words to the city official during the scuffle are extremely telling. “Why are you targeting me?” he asked. “If I paid you bribes, you wouldn’t target me”. Bouazizi was referring to the rampant corruption that had developed under the authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1983-2011).

Bouazizi eventually perished in an area hospital, but his suicide set in motion a chain of events which is commonly known as the Arab Spring. Protests erupted all over Tunisia and eventually turned into a full-fledged revolution as citizens expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the state of the country. Unemployment was soaring, especially among the youths.

121 Ibid.
There was no political freedom and Ben Ali’s government was regularly accused of arresting
and mistreating political opponents.\textsuperscript{123} Indeed, the government’s response to protestors in
2011 contributed to transforming demonstrations into a revolution; government forces
cracked down on peaceful dissidents arbitrarily detaining them and locking them up on fake
or overblown charges.\textsuperscript{124} As Ben Ali was ousted from power, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain,
and Syria began in turn to experience pro-democracy protests.\textsuperscript{125}

\textbf{ii. The Libyan Uprising and Canada’s Involvement}

After demonstrations began in Libya, the country’s descent into a civil conflict was quick. In what follows, I provide a brief overview of the political and socioeconomic
grievances which culminated in the Libyan uprisings. I then follow up with a description of
key events in the uprisings, and conclude this section with a discussion of the NATO response
and Canada’s contribution to the NATO effort.

Though socioeconomic grievances played a role in the Libyan uprisings, the most
important grievances in Libya were political. Indeed, Gaddafi’s government suppressed
political dissent and was unaccountable to the public. By the time the uprisings began,
Gaddafi had ruled the country with an iron fist for forty years,\textsuperscript{126} using fear as a tool to
suppress opposition or challenges to his government. A military commander, Gaddafi overthrew the government of King Idris and established the Jamahiriya in 1969. The stated purpose of the new Libyan state was to establish a “state of the masses,” a type of direct democracy; in reality, however, citizens could not challenge the regime. Multiple attempts to do so were suppressed notably in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a militant group, the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), was formed and managed to grow undetected by Gaddafi’s forces with the objective to overthrow the Libyan leader and establish Islamic rule. When Gaddafi’s forces discovered the LIFG and other smaller militant groups, they eradicated them by arresting “anyone suspected of having the slightest sympathy with the cause”. As a show of force and a warning to Libyans, the revolutionary committees, which were mandated by Qaddafi to destroy any opposition to the Jamahiriya, killed suspected Islamists and paraded their bodies in the streets.

The Libyan government was also unaccountable to the public. This was due to nepotism and cronyism in both formal (such as the military and security organizations) and

127 Takeyh, Ray. “Qadhafi’s Libya and the Prospect of Islamic Succession.” Middle East Policy 7, no. 2 (February 1, 2000): 154.
128 The real power lay with “the security services, the bureaucratic administration, and most especially with Qaddafi himself (together with his family and inner circle)”. See Brynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring, 27.
130 There were other militant groups with the goal of overthrowing Gaddafi. These were the radical Islamic Martyrs’ Movement, and the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. See Pargeter, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi, 168.
131 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
informal (i.e. organizations that were never defined in the constitution) state structures. Indeed, Gaddafì put relatives of his in charge of the Libyan military while military personnel was selected from members of tribes close to Gaddafì.\textsuperscript{134} Three informal structures were also headed by members of Gaddafì’s inner circle: the Free Unionist Officers’ Movement, the Forum of Companions of Gaddafì, and the People’s Social Leadership Committees.\textsuperscript{135} These organizations were instrumental in ensuring regime control by ruling over the districts, filling important civilian posts, and maintaining “social stability within the Jamahiriya by controlling both family and tribal members”.\textsuperscript{136}

While there were many political grievances vis-à-vis the regime, socioeconomic grievances were mitigated by Libya’s oil wealth which allowed the country to achieve the highest Human Development Index rating and GDP per capita of any country in Africa.\textsuperscript{137} Nevertheless, by 2010, the Corruptions Perceptions Index gave Libya a 14 on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents a highly corrupt regime and 100 reflects full transparency and accountability.\textsuperscript{138} In 2011, Libya had no political parties, independent media, or trade unions, and despite the country’s successful economic standing vis-à-vis other African countries, unemployment was high, especially among youth.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{134}The Intelligence Bureau of the Leader, which coordinated the activities of all the other security organizations, was headed by Ahmad Ramadan al-Asabiyya, a “close confidant” of Gaddafì. See Vandewalle, Dirk. \textit{A History of Modern Libya}. 2nd edition. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 148.

\textsuperscript{135}Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 148-149.

\textsuperscript{136}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{139}Gelvin, \textit{The Arab Uprisings}, 71; Brynen et al., \textit{Beyond the Arab Spring}, 28; Huliaras, Asteris. “Qadhafi’s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.” \textit{African Affairs} 100, no. 398 (2001): 19.
It is in this context that protest movements broke out in Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, in January 2011. Gaddafi’s government responded to protests with an excessive amount of force. On February 17th, the “Day of Rage”, a peaceful demonstration was organized near a police station in Tripoli to protest the treatment of demonstrators, most notably the arrest of lawyer and human rights militant Fathi Terbil. Demonstrators called for Gaddafi to step down and they demanded that the government free political prisoners who had been arbitrarily detained. Government forces responded with an inordinate amount of force, shooting into the crowd with tanks and helicopters, and executing militants who refused to obey orders. Throughout the month of February, violent confrontations continued. Gaddafi’s forces weakened as military units defected; this helped arm the opposition. Rebel forces gained control of some western cities, including Benghazi, whereas Tripoli and the surrounding areas remained under government control. Clashes concentrated in the coastal regions, as government and rebels battled for control of the oil exporting ports.

On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 condemning the Libyan government’s response to protestors, imposing an arms embargo, and enforcing a

145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
freeze on the assets of members of the Libyan government.\footnote{147} Two weeks later, on 17 March 2011, the UNSC issued a second resolution (1973) which called for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, imposed a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on members of the Libyan government.\footnote{148} 

In response to UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, \textit{Operation Odyssey Dawn} (OOD) began on 19 March 2011.\footnote{149} OOD was a ‘coalition of the willing’, led by the United States but included members from Italy, France, Canada and the United-Kingdom.\footnote{150} The operation’s mandate was to impose the arms embargo and no-fly zone, and to protect civilians from Gaddafi’s forces. Practically speaking, the Operation lent assistance to the opposition in their fight against Gaddafi’s forces. OOD conducted surveillance operations in the Mediterranean with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS)\footnote{151}, provided humanitarian assistance, and prevented Gaddafi’s forces from advancing on rebel-held territory.\footnote{152} On March 31st,

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{150} There were disagreements among NATO members regarding the best way to deal with Gaddafi, which they all agreed was a “major problem”. Italy held business interests in the state but was cautious when the violence began in February 2011, saying it wished to adopt a “prudent” stance. The US, France, and UK were hawkish from the start; France and the UK were the "most adamant backers" of the UNSC Resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya, and the US led Operation Odyssey Dawn. See “Italy and Silvio Berlusconi Face Libya Dilemma.” \textit{BBC News}, March 1, 2011, sec. Europe. \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12612405}; Erlanger, Steven. “Action on Libya, Driven by France and Britain, Shows Rare European Resolve.” \textit{The New York Times}, March 18, 2011. \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19europe.html}; James et al., “Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, 25; “Press Briefing by NATO spokesperson,” \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}, March 31, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2016. URL: \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-4618E83B-9204E6B0/natolive/opinions_71897.htm}.
\item \footnote{152} James et al., “Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn,” 24.
\end{itemize}

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command and control of the operation, now called *Operation Unified Protector* (OUP), was transferred to NATO on March 31st; the mandate, however, remained unchanged. On October 31st, OUP had concluded; the opposition was in control of the entire state after opposition forces successfully attacked Gaddafi’s strongholds in Tripoli and Sirte.

Canada’s involvement in Libya began on February 24, 2011, when the Government of Canada requested that a CC-177 Globemaster strategic airlifter based in Germany remain on stand-by for a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), the goal of which would be to evacuate Canadian citizens from Libya. The next day, Operation MOBILE began; the operation’s initial mandate was to evacuate both Canadians and other foreign nationals from Libya. In response to the passing of UNSC Resolution 1970, Parliament amended the Special Economic Measures Act of Canada (S.C. 1992, c. 17) that same day to include the *Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on Libya*. This triggered the implementation of Canadian sanctions on Libya, which included an arms embargo and asset freeze. However, the Canadian government took sanctions one step further. Because UNSCR 1970 had declared an asset freeze only on Gaddafi and specific members of his

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family, Canada added “Libya” as a designated entity impacted by the asset freeze in order to impose these measures on the Libyan government itself, plus its institutions and agencies. Two days after the issuing of UNSC Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, Operation MOBILE became a combat mission, joining the US-led *Operation Odyssey Dawn*, the mandate of which was enforcement of the no-fly zone mentioned in UNSCR 1973. On March 22nd, 2011, Operation MOBILE merged with *Operation Unified Protector* which formally began operations on March 31st, 2011. Canadian Lieutenant-General Charlie Bouchard led the OUP NATO coalition which eventually toppled Gaddafi’s regime. Canada deployed a total of seven CF-18 fighter jets, two refueling airplanes, four transports

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(two tactical, two heavy), and two maritime patrol aircraft.\textsuperscript{164} Prime Minister Harper described Canada’s contribution as “punching above its weight” militarily.\textsuperscript{165}

iii. The Syrian Uprising and Canada’s Involvement

The Syrian uprising began two months after the Libyan uprising, and response by the international community was delayed in comparison to the response to the Libyan crisis. I provide a brief history of the grievances which culminated in the Syrian uprisings. I then follow-up with a description of key events in the uprisings and Canada’s subsequent involvement.

When the uprisings began in Damascus, the capital of Syria, the Al-Assad family had been at the helm of the country since Hafiz al-Assad, the father of the current Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, came to power in 1970.\textsuperscript{166} Before rising to power, Hafiz al-Assad was a member of the Ba’ath party, a political party founded on ideals of Arab nationalism and socialism, and pan-Arabism.\textsuperscript{167} In intra-party coup occurred in 1966, causing al-Assad to now occupy a senior position in the Ba’ath party as defense minister and commander of the air


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force.\textsuperscript{168} In 1970, al-Assad assumed the top political position and stabilized a regime which had experienced an average of almost one coup per year since 1949.\textsuperscript{169} Stability came at a price, however, as there was little room for political dissent; al-Assad developed a police state apparatus, the goal of which was to shut down any opposition to his regime.\textsuperscript{170} Through the use of police, military forces, and security services (\textit{mukhabarat}), al-Assad created omnipresent fear of the regime. The security apparatus especially was “pervasive and omnipotent”, discouraging opposition; where a country like Canada will have approximately 200 police officers for every 100,000 citizens, the ratio of \textit{mukhabarat} officers in Syria was approximately 1 officer for every 240 citizens.\textsuperscript{171} Syrians had reason to be afraid of opposing the regime; in 1982, an insurrection supported by the Muslim Brotherhood provoked an aggressive response by al-Assad, who sent a paramilitary force into Hama, killing an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 civilians.\textsuperscript{172}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{168} Lesch, \textit{Syria: The Rise and Fall of the House of Al-Assad}, 3.
\end{flushleft}
Power was transferred to Bashar al-Assad in 2000, when Hafiz al-Assad died.\textsuperscript{173} Syrians were optimistic when Bashar took over as President; he claimed he desired to modernize Syria, not necessarily turning it into a Western-style democracy, but into a democracy “specific to Syria”.\textsuperscript{174} For a brief period between 2000 and 2001 known as the Damascus Spring, there were vocal demands by a group of Syrian intellectuals for political, legal, and economic reforms which included the implementation of a multiparty democracy.\textsuperscript{175} While the regime seemed initially willing to make some concessions, it would quickly change its course, closing political forums that had until then been tolerated and imprisoning prominent members of the Damascus Spring movement.\textsuperscript{176} A few years later, in 2005, opposition groups tried to engage the regime on the issue of reforms and drafted the Damascus Declaration, demanding a multiparty democracy in Syria; al-Assad responded by imprisoning the leading signatories of the Declaration.\textsuperscript{177} By 2010, Human Rights Watch reported that “authorities [in Syria] continued to broadly violate the civil and political rights of citizens, arresting political and human rights activists, censoring websites, detaining bloggers, and imposing travel bans.”\textsuperscript{178}

Economically, Hafiz al-Assad had left behind a socialist economy that was threatened by globalization, with a large public sector, inefficient state-owned enterprises, and poor

\textsuperscript{173} Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Al-Assad, 1.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Ibid}, 5.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{178} Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Al-Assad, 11.
private sector business initiatives and entrepreneurship due to strict regulations. In an interview with international newspaper *Asharq al-Awsat* in February 2001, Bashar Al-Assad stated that his first priority would be to “see Syria more prosperous”. Bashar made some attempts at liberalizing the economy; notably, private banks were established in 2004, loan interest rates were cut, and the stock exchange was established in 2009. The economic liberalization, however, mostly benefited al-Assad and his inner circle, as Syrians continued to face economic hardships. Another important economic issue facing Syria was its heavy reliance on its agricultural production, which plummeted since droughts began in 2006. From 2006 to 2011, devastating droughts severely impacted the agricultural sector, causing crop failures and livestock devastation. At least 1 million farmers could no longer pursue their livelihood, and were forced to seek other employment or simply abandon their lands.

180 Ibid, 70.
A large rural exodus ensued, and unemployment was rampant.\(^{186}\) In urban areas, the drought and over-population caused water scarcity, most notably in Daraa.\(^{187}\)

In 2010, the World Bank ranked Syria 143\(^{rd}\) out of 183 countries regarding “the ease of doing business”; that same year, Transparency International gave Syria a corruption score of 2.5/10, where 10 represents “very clean”.\(^{188}\) Damascus had little incentive in actually improving the economy; as mentioned, profits of corruption benefited the government and its inner circle.\(^{189}\) The result of Syria’s poor economic performance and backwards economy is very low foreign and domestic investment and economic interest in the state.\(^{190}\)

Above these socioeconomic grievances, political grievances persisted throughout Bashar’s reign. The \textit{mukhabarat} remained omnipresent, arbitrarily detaining and even torturing citizens.\(^{191}\) In an attempt to strengthen his regime, Bashar al-Assad appointed members of his family and a group of young officers from his Alawite community to

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\(^{186}\) Abboud, “How Syria Fell to Pieces”, 342; Lesch, \textit{The Fall of the House of Al-Assad}, 63. The rural exodus was worsened by the fact that urban areas were already flooded by Iraqi refugees; see Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg, “Did We See It Coming?”, 32.


\(^{191}\) Lesch, \textit{Syria: The Fall of the House of Al-Assad}, 56.
positions of power. It is in the context of these economic and political grievances that the uprisings began in 2011.

The Syrian uprising began on March 15th, when a demonstration was held in Damascus to protest the arrest of ten schoolchildren in Daraa who had borrowed the “Down with the regime” slogan from the Egyptian revolution and written it on a wall. Between March 18th and 20th, police officers in Daraa caused the death of five people and injured one while they fired into crowds. On March 27, 2011, Al-Assad deployed the Army. A large-scale military operation was conducted in April 2011 for 11 days in Daraa, killing 115 residents. In May, the city of Banyas was the subject of another large-scale military operation, which forced over 3,000 residents to flee. In July 2011, the city of Hama saw the largest anti-government protests which had occurred so far; al-Assad’s forces conducted another military operation, killing 200 residents. The regime’s consistent use of excessive force against protestors triggered the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on July 29, 2011; this was a group of Sunni-sponsored army defectors and exiled opposition members.

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192 Bashir’s brother, Maher Al-Assad, was appointed head of the presidential guard, while his brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, was appointed deputy chief of staff. See Gelvin, James L. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012: 110.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 This group eventually evolved into a “loose collection of volunteer, multi-ethnic army brigades, largely composed of Sunni personnel”. See: Heydarian, Richard Javad. How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The
Throughout the conflict, al-Assad, who had a vested interest in defaming the opposition, perpetuated the narrative that the opposition was led by extremists.\(^{200}\) By November 2011, *Human Rights Watch* reported the arbitrary detention of thousands of protestors, and a death toll of 3,500.\(^{201}\) These killings occurred during protests, sit-ins, and funeral processions.\(^{202}\) Throughout the crisis, victims were often denied medical assistance (some even taken out of hospitals mid-surgery), and activists and journalists were arbitrarily detained.\(^{203}\)

In response to the government’s use of force against its people, Canada adopted a containment policy but refrained from intervening; this was also EU and US’s strategy. Canada did impose sanctions on the regime on May 24, 2011, which included “asset freezes and travel bans on key regime figures, banning specific imports and exports, and suspending all bilateral cooperation agreements and initiatives.”\(^{204}\) Between 2011 and 2012, the EU had also imposed sanctions on al-Assad’s regime, with the stated objectives of increasing pressure on the regime to end repression, withdrawing troops from occupied cities, and implementing

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\(^{202}\) Ibid.

\(^{203}\) Ibid.

democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{205} The US also adopted sanctions; between April and August 2011, the U.S. Government issued Executive Orders 13572, 13573, and 13582 with the stated goals of depriving “the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians” and to “allow for a democratic transition”.\textsuperscript{206}

Canada’s tone, like that of the EU and US, became more threatening over the course of the crisis. In June 2011, Foreign Minister John Baird released a statement calling for Al-Assad to “reform or step down”\textsuperscript{207}, but by August 2011, Harper joined the US and EU – who, by that point, had also refrained from intervening – in requesting Al-Assad’s resignation.\textsuperscript{208} In September 2012, Canada listed Syria as a state supporter of terrorism, and added more sanctions which affected 129 individuals and 44 entities.\textsuperscript{209}

In 2014, Harper clearly stated that Canada would not join any effort to topple Al-Assad’s regime, even if the US was keen on doing so; Harper stated that Canada would limit


its involvement in Syria to the fight against ISIL. In September 2014, an American-led intervention began in Syria; its purpose was limited to eliminating the ISIL threat. By October 7, 2014, Canada had already made limited contributions to the anti-ISIL effort in Iraq, delivering military supplies to forces, and deploying members of the Canadian Forces to Iraq to advise security forces. On October 7, 2014, Harper announced that Canada would join the American-led coalition in Iraq, eventually deploying “six CF-18 Hornet fighter-bombers, a CC-150 Polaris aerial tanker, and two Auroras for surveillance and reconnaissance missions”. In March 2015, the military mission was expanded to Syria and 30 officers were deployed to coalition headquarters. Some EU members had also joined the coalition, notably Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK. Though many NATO members were

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213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

already part of the American-led coalition to defeat ISIL, NATO formally joined the coalition on May 25, 2017.216

iv. Canada’s reaction to the Libyan and Syrian uprisings in comparative perspective

In the wake of the Arab Spring, Syria and Libya experienced pro-democracy protests. While Libya’s uprising began in January 2011, Syria experienced its first demonstrations in March. The uprisings were similar in that they erupted as a response to nepotism, unemployment, and a lack of accountability by government. In both states, government forces responded with an inordinate amount of force and caused the death of thousands of protestors and opposition members. However, Canada’s response to the crises was different: while Canada intervened almost immediately in Libya and participated actively in the coalition which toppled Gaddafi’s regime, it “sat on its hands” in Syria and avoided a military intervention. Per NCR theory, the decision to conduct a military intervention is driven primarily by a threat to the intervening state’s national interests. However, the timing, implementation, and public representation of the intervention could be affected by domestic pressures.

My research demonstrates that Canada intervened in Libya because its national interests were at stake, and it faced no domestic pressure against the intervention. I also suggest that a third factor which motivated Canada to conduct a military intervention in Libya was the low-risk nature of the mission. In contrast, I argue that Canada did not conduct a

military intervention in Syria because its national interests were not at stake, and Canada faced no strong domestic pressure to act. Further, I suggest that contrarily to the intervention in Libya, involvement in the Syrian conflict was very high-risk.

2. Explaining Canada’s Intervention in Libya

Military intervention will generally occur when the FPE determines that national interests are at stake. In the case of Canada, and as discussed above, these interests include international stability and security, and economic prosperity. Furthermore, though domestic pressure may shape the timing and logistics of a military intervention, it will not have a decisive impact on the decision to intervene or not.

I make four separate arguments regarding Canada’s reasons for intervening in Libya. I first argue that Canada’s decision to intervene was primarily motivated by a threat to international stability, a threat which the NATO coalition could help mitigate. I also argue that as a middle power, Canada felt a responsibility towards NATO and the United Nations to participate in the coalition. I further argue that threats to Canada’s economic interests in Libya facilitated its decision to intervene. Finally, I argue that the Canadian government faced no domestic pressure against the intervention.

i. The Threat to International Stability

Before the uprising, Libya did not constitute a threat to international stability. Indeed, Gaddafi’s relationship with the West had actually improved in the twenty-first century. However, Gaddafi’s treatment of his own population during the 2011 uprisings constituted what the UNSCR 1973 called “crimes against humanity”; as per chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, this constituted a threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{217} Thus, this posed a threat to Canada’s interest in maintaining a stable international environment, a threat which the NATO coalition could lessen or eradicate.

Historic tensions developed between Gaddafi and the West, but improved in the twenty-first century. Tensions had developed due to Libya’s involvement the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist attack, and its possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

In 1988, a bomb exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on a Pan American World Airways flight \textit{en route} to London; two hundred and fifty-nine passengers were killed, and among them were three Canadians, along with English, French, American, and Scottish citizens.\textsuperscript{218} As of 1990, two Libyan citizens were suspected of participating in the bombing.\textsuperscript{219} The United States, France, and the UK demanded that Gaddafi hand over the two suspects, but Gaddafi’s government refused, mocking the evidence and calling it “less than a laughable piece of fingernail”.\textsuperscript{220} In response to Gaddafi’s refusal to hand over the suspects, the UNSC imposed an air and arms embargo and hindered Libya’s ability to import certain oil equipment from abroad.\textsuperscript{221}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} Pargeter, \textit{Libya}, 153.
\end{itemize}
The West was also concerned with Libya’s attempt to produce unconventional weapons and WMDs, despite Libya having ratified and signed the NPT in 1975.\textsuperscript{222} In 1997, the CIA confirmed that Libya’s attempts to acquire chemical weapons had stalled, but that the North African state continued to attempt the acquisition of missile and nuclear technology.\textsuperscript{223} In 2001, concern grew after the Russian-Libyan nuclear program was renewed; the CIA warned this could lead to weapons-related research.\textsuperscript{224} This was confirmed in 2004, when Gaddafi admitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that in the late 90s and early 2000s, Libya had acquired centrifuges, and built enrichment cascades (used to produce enriched uranium).\textsuperscript{225}

In the twenty-first century, Gaddafi took steps towards improving Libya’s relationship with the West. Since the September 11 attacks in the United-States, the US, Libya, and Britain had maintained low-key trilateral talks which had culminated in Libya’s announcement in 2003 that it apologized for its involvement in the terrorist attack and would try the Lockerbie suspects, and that it was giving up its WMDs.\textsuperscript{226} It is unclear what provoked Libya’s attempts at improving relations with the West. Libya may have been deterred by the US’s invasion of Iraq, proving the US’s willingness to intervene in states which it suspected of developing


\textsuperscript{224} Ibid, 181.

\textsuperscript{225} Hochman, “Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for US Policy.”: 65.

WMDs.\textsuperscript{227} It is also possible that Gaddafi, seeing potential revenue from Libya’s oil riches, sought to reverse economic sanctions imposed on Libya after the Lockerbie incident.\textsuperscript{228}

Though relations improved marginally in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, ambivalence towards Gaddafi persisted in Canada. A faux-pas by Gaddafi in August 2009 caused further disdain in the Canadian government; one of the bombers involved in the Lockerbie incident, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, was released from prison in Scotland on compassionate grounds and received a hero’s welcome in Libya.\textsuperscript{229} One month later, Gaddafi was meant to visit Newfoundland on his way back to Libya from New York; the Prime Minister’s office said he could expect a “chilly reception” and that Minister Cannon would be meeting with the leader to express his “strong disapproval” over the hero’s welcome received by al-Megrahi.\textsuperscript{230} In 2010, MP Jim Abbott described Libya as a country “that you don’t exactly have warm fuzzies about or send Christmas cards to”.\textsuperscript{231} At the very least, the Canadian government’s concerns about Libya were somewhat eased after Gaddafi stopped sanctioning terrorist groups. During discussions on February 16, 2011 (incidentally, the day before protests in Libya began) about sanctions in Iran, NDP MP Jim Maloway drew a parallel with Libya and stated that Gaddafi suffered from

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
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sanctions until he “came forward and renounced terrorism and promised not to be involved in any more state-sponsored terrorism activities.”

In spite of slight improvements in Libya’s image abroad, its image was again tarnished when mobilizations against the government began in 2011. When the protest movements broke out in February 2011, Libya responded with an inordinate amount of force. Amnesty International reported that the protestors were unarmed, and that Gaddafi’s forces had gunned them down; between February 16 and 21, 1,500 were injured and 170 killed in Benghazi and al-Bayda. As of February 2011, the INGO reported that Gaddafi’s forces had initially launched indiscriminate rockets and bombs in neighbourhoods uninvolved in the fighting. These indiscriminate attacks took place in late February, in the northwestern and northeastern parts of the state, blocking access to the ports, preventing access to humanitarian aid. Gaddafi’s forces also engaged in execution-style killings of opposition forces, and used anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, and other mines. By end of February, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, reported that thousands had died. All over the country – in Benghazi, al-Bayda, and Misratah – soldiers continued to shoot at unarmed protestors.

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234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
also saw Gaddafi’s forces using Grad rockets, cluster munitions, tanks, and heavy military vehicles and equipment, and launching indiscriminate assaults.\(^{239}\)

The international response made it clear that what was happening in Libya was considered a threat to international peace and security. UNSCR 1970, adopted on February 26, 2011, called for the dispatch of an international commission to investigate violations of international human rights law, and explicitly mentioned the Council’s responsibility “for the maintenance of international peace”.\(^{240}\) UNSCR 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011, it explicitly mentioned acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.\(^{241}\) Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes measures to be taken to “maintain or restore international peace and security”.\(^{242}\)

Though there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the crisis in Libya was considered a direct threat to Canada, it was considered a threat to international peace and security by the UN and NATO, two organizations with which Canada’s foreign policy has historically been tightly associated. When Harper released the *Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)*, there was explicit mention of Canada’s commitment to international peace and security.\(^{243}\) The United Nations judged that the crisis in Libya threatened international


security; per Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, referenced in both UNSCR 1970 and 1973, crimes against humanity threaten international peace and stability. For NATO, these crimes against humanity were the chief motivator behind their military intervention, as the mission’s stated purpose was “protecting civilians and civilian populated areas from attack or the threat of attack.” Because international stability is a chief Canadian national interest, and because both the UN and NATO considered the crisis to present a threat to international stability, this would undoubtedly have weighed in Canada’s assessment of the threat posed by the crisis in Libya.

ii. **Canada As a Middle Power**

Canada’s position as a middle power means it cannot afford to take unilateral military action, preferring instead to participate in multilateral efforts. As a middle power, Canada’s international behavior is defined by two main tendencies: the support of multilateral engagements, and the tendency to avoid a strong position in international disputes. Due to its vested interest in international stability, Canada’s strategy as a middle power is to lend assistance to those multilateral organizations which promote stability in the international system. I argue that Canada’s strategy as a middle power on the international scene contributed to Canada’s decision to participate in the NATO effort.

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248 David, Charles-Philippe, and Stéphane Roussel. “‘Middle Power Blues’: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War.” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 28, no. 1–2 (June 1, 1998): 135; Murray,
As a middle power, Canada cannot afford to conduct unilateral military interventions; as a result, it collaborates with multilateral organizations to do so. Its financial contributions to defence spending have not been very high, but Canada has nonetheless maintained an active role in NATO-led operations. Post-Cold War, Canada lagged behind other middle powers regarding its financial contribution to defence spending; where countries such as Belgium and Denmark contributed on average 1.6 and 1.7 percent of their GDP on defence (respectively), Canada contributed 1.4 percent.\footnote{Zyla, Benjamin. “NATO and Post-Cold War Burden-Sharing NATO at 60.” \textit{International Journal} 64 (2008): 341.} In 2011, Canada spent 1.5\% of its GDP on defence.\footnote{Robinson, Bill. “Canadian Military Spending 2010-2011.” \textit{Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Foreign Policy Series}, March 2011: 4.} Canada has been unable to reach NATO’s target of 2\% annual spend on GDP, but has held an active role since in the organization nonetheless. Since 1992, over 40,000 Canadian military personnel served in NATO and UN-led operations in the Balkans to bring stability to the region.\footnote{Today, eight military personnel remain committed to peace-support operations in the Balkans under a NATO-led operation for defence reform. See Government of Canada, National Defence. “National Defence | Canadian Armed Forces | Backgrounder | Canadian Forces Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” May 10, 2007. \url{http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-forces-operations-in-bosnia-herzegovina/hnps1u07}; “Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - SFOR - Homepage.” Accessed August 18, 2017. \url{http://www.nato.int/sfor/}.} In 1999, Canada participated in the NATO-led mission by deploying 500 military personnel and crew members for air and naval operations in Italy and the Adriatic Sea, and 1,300 soldiers for peacekeeping operations on the ground in Yugoslavia.\footnote{CBC News. “CBC News In Depth: Canada’s Military,” October 30, 2003. \url{http://www.cbc.ca/news2/background/cdnmilitary/kosovo.html}.} Between 2003 and 2014, Canada’s Operation Athena lent assistance to the UN-mandated,
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 253 Of the 50,000 soldiers deployed for ISAF, Canada stood as the fifth largest contributor out of over forty countries, behind the US, UK, Germany, and France. 254

Despite its military engagement in NATO operations, the Harper government was not as committed to its role in the United Nations. Indeed, Canada’s role as an active member in the UN peacekeeping operations declined under Harper. Until 1989, Canada had participated in every UN mission since 1947. 255 Though its contributions began to plummet slowly as it moved into the 21st century, the year following Harper’s election (2007) marked a sharp decline in Canada’s rank among contributors to UN peacekeeping, where it dropped from 31st to 61st. 256 Harper lent Canada’s participation mostly to multilateral forums that had the potential of advancing Canada’s interest, and the United Nations, was not one of his main priorities. 257 In fact, when Harper spoke at the American Council for National Policy in 1997, he described Canada’s pride in being praised by UN bodies as distressing to “conservatives like myself.” 258

If the Canadian government’s commitment to the UN and UN peacekeeping waivered under the Harper government, its commitment to NATO was crystal clear, as Canada readily backed the mission in Libya. When talks opened on March 21, 2011 in the House (culminating in the House unanimously backing Canada’s mission in Libya), Defence Minister Peter MacKay stated that "We are compelled to intervene, both [as] a moral duty and by duty [to] NATO and the United Nations."  

iii. The Threat to Economic Prosperity

Economic prosperity is one of Canada’s major interests, and the situation in Libya at the wake of the revolts threatened this interest directly. In 2011, Canada held significant oil interests in Libya, and felt its economic interests threatened by the instability in the state. I argue that protection of its business interests in Libya facilitated its decision to intervene. Libya is an oil-rich country whose history has been shaped by this resource. Libya is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the stated goal of which is to “coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets.” It holds Africa’s largest oil reserves, and in

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2010, it was ranked 18th in the world for its daily oil production, behind Angola, Algeria, and Norway, but surpassing Kazakhstan and Qatar.\textsuperscript{261}

Canada holds substantial oil interests in Libya. In 2008, Petro-Canada (now Suncor, post-merger) signed a multi-billion dollar, thirty-year deal with the Libyan government.\textsuperscript{262} As of December 2011 (two months before the uprisings began), it was estimated that Suncor’s investments in Libya surpassed $900 million.\textsuperscript{263} Many other Canadian companies operate in Libya, and their projects are worth billions.\textsuperscript{264} Of note is SNC-Lavalin, which has consistently bid on projects in Libya since 2008; by February 2011, SNC-Lavin held over $1.2 billion worth of contracts in Libya.\textsuperscript{265} In response to the


\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{264} CBC News, “Canadian Companies in Libya,” CBC News, February 28, 2011, \url{http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-companies-in-libya-1.1058943}. Other Canadian companies with interests in Libya include Pure Technologies, Sonde Resources, and Caradan Chemicals; these companies provide both services and products related to Libyan oil fields. Suncor draws approximately 50,000 barrels of oil daily; Pure Technologies was mandated with the Great Man-Made River Project in Libya; Sonde Resources were mandated to develop potential oil fields off the coast of Libya and Tunisia, working with Joint Oil, a company owned by Libya and Syria, to develop 768,000 gross undeveloped acres of potential oilfields; “Suncor Back to Work in Libya,” The Canadian Press. January 31, 2012. \url{http://www.castanet.net/news/Canada/70425/Suncor-back-to-work-in-Libya}; Caradan Chemicals make oil and gas products available within the Libyan industry. See Caradan International Chemicals, “Our Locations: Libya, Tropoli,” Accessed November 10, 2016. URL: \url{http://www.caradaninternational.com/index-4.html}.

\textsuperscript{265} SNC Lavalin’s projects in Libya include building a new international terminal, runway, and Apron for the Benina International Airport in Benghazi, a contract worth $500 million won in September 2008; installation of pumps and pipelines for the Great Man-Made River Project, a contract worth $450 million won in October 2010; building the Guryan detention center in Tripoli, a contract worth $275 million and scheduled to be completed by
civil conflict in Libya, Suncor suspended operations due to this force majeure in 2011. For the last three quarters of 2011, Suncor reported a $1.2 billion write-down on its Libyan assets due to the civil conflict halting operations; Libyan operations represent approximately 6% of Suncor’s total production.

Debates in Parliament suggested that Canadian MPs were aware of these interests and favored protecting them. Before the UNSC issued Resolution 1973 authorizing intervention in Libya, the Liberal MP for Scarborough-Agincourt requested an emergency debate on March 10 to discuss the situation in Libya; this request was motivated by concerns that the situation in Libya was beginning to have tangible repercussions on Canada, causing rising gas prices. A few months after the intervention began, on June 14, 2011, Liberal MP Mark Eyking confirmed that the intervention in Libya was (and continued to be) beneficial for Canada, openly stating that “There will be a benefit for our companies as we get the oil industry back and get everything to work well in that area.”

By January 31, 2012, stability had returned to the region and Suncor resumed its operations in Libya.270

iv. Domestic Pressure

Not only were Canada’s interests directly threatened, but the government faced no domestic pressure against the intervention. Parliamentary debates demonstrated cross-party support for the mission.

On March 19th, 2011, in response to UNSCR 1970, Operation MOBILE had become a combat mission to enforce the no-fly zone with OOD, thus marking the beginning of Canadian combat operations in Libya.271 On March 21st, 2011, the House of Commons voted unanimously in favor of Canada’s participation in the UN-mandated mission in Libya; though Canada had already been actively involved in the enforcement of the no-fly zone, this decision would extend Canada’s mission to protect civilians “under threat of attack”.272 Although Parliament was in support of the mission, the motion required that another vote be held in three months if the mission were to be extended.273


Conservative motion to extend the mission for 3½ months passed by a vote of 294-1, with only Green Party leader Elizabeth May voting against.\(^{274}\)

\[v. \quad \text{Other considerations}\]

In the course of my research, I have identified other considerations which help explain Canada’s intervention policy in Libya. These explanations fall outside the purview of my analytical framework which is focused on national interests and domestic pressure. I consider these explanations to be important nonetheless. I suggest that Canada’s decision to intervene in Libya was facilitated by considerations that the intervention would be low-risk, due to Libyan geopolitics, Libya’s weak military, and its organized, liberal-leaning opposition.

As demonstrated in my analysis, Canada’s interests (namely, international security and economic prosperity) were at stake in Libya, and the international community had given its green-light for intervention in the state. I argue that other considerations existed to facilitate the intervention, namely Libya’s isolation from its regional environment, the weakness of its military, and the liberal image that its opposition, which had organized quickly, was able to project.

Both geographically and politically, Libya was isolated from key players, meaning Canada and its allies had no reason to fear backlash by an ally or conflict spillover. Libya is

sandwiched between two states – Egypt and Tunisia – which were undergoing revolutions at the same time, and who as a result were also weak; conflict spillover was thus not a concern.\textsuperscript{275} Moreover, Libya did not have ties to any important allies. Gaddafi had alienated himself from the Arab League after years-long disagreements about the Arab League’s difficulty in presenting a unified front against Israel and the West.\textsuperscript{276} Gaddafi’s relations with African countries were also unstable, due to Gaddafi’s meddling in their internal affairs. For instance, Libya intervened in Chad in 1980; and in 1985, Gaddafi encouraged Muslims in Zaire to engage in a war against the regime.\textsuperscript{277} Relations with African countries improved slightly at the dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, when Libya encouraged the creation of bilateral and multilateral organizations aimed at unifying the states in the African continent.\textsuperscript{278} However, African states were divided between those who were ambivalent towards Gaddafi’s regime and those who were accepting of it. Proof of this dichotomy were obvious when the crisis broke out in Libya in 2011; the African Union adopted a hands-off approach, split between supporters of Gaddafi and his opponents.\textsuperscript{279} Libya did not have any important allies in the Arab World, nor on the African continent.

Further, the weakness of Libya’s military suggested the intervention in Libya would be low-risk. Part of the issue with Libya’s military was not its limited material capability, but its loyalty; only some 20\% of the military was estimated to be loyal to Gaddafi, and the chain

\textsuperscript{276} Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya. 2nd edition}, 194.
\textsuperscript{277} \textit{Ibid}., 195.
\textsuperscript{278} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Ibid}, 198.
of command was weak.\textsuperscript{280} Indeed, as of February 2011, members of the military began to defect to the opposition or simply abandon their posts.\textsuperscript{281}

The decision to intervene in Libya was also facilitated by the Libyan opposition, which had organized quickly. Libyan society had traditionally espoused a rather moderate vision of Islam,\textsuperscript{282} and out of this ideology emerged the National Transitional Council (NTC). When the opposition to the regime established the NTC in Bayda on February 24, 2011, they made it quite easy for western states, who now knew clearly with whom they could discuss. This group also allowed western states to get a good idea of who would likely take over power in a post-Gaddafi Libya. The NTC included technocrats who had defected from the regime and professionals.\textsuperscript{283} Notably, the appointed head of the NTC was Mustafa Abdeljalil, who was Gaddafi’s justice secretary; Ali Issawi, who became responsible for foreign affairs at the NTC and used to be the economy minister; and Mahmoud Jibril, who used to be at the head of


\textsuperscript{281} Pargeter, \textit{Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi}, 223.

\textsuperscript{282} Libyan identity generally religious. Religion is a large component of the Libyan civil war, and in fact helped shaped international response to the crisis. Throughout history, Libyan leaders have attempted to inject their own interpretation of Islam into the Libyan population. Gaddafi’s Islamic ideology was rather moderate, described as heterodox and idiosyncratic, pushing for such ideas as “personal \textit{ijtihad} (legal reasoning), questioning the authority of the \textit{hadith}, and the individual interpretation of the Quran”. The role of identity in the Libyan civil war is pivotal, as groups identified themselves based on their interpretation of Islam. These identities were often contradictory, but all claimed to be legitimate. It is unfathomable for Libya to build a secular democracy. Islam was and is part of the fabric of life in Libya, built into daily habits, social customs, culture, and policy. Libyans, however, do not view extremist Islamic groups as a positive force. Indeed, Muslim identity in Libya is something of a catch-22, where being labelled a secularist is wholly undesirable, and being labelled an Islamic is equally as disagreeable. Per Pack, \textit{The 2011 Libyan uprisings}, 57; “The Libyan Rorschach.” \textit{Foreign Policy}. Accessed April 6, 2017. \url{https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/12/the-libyan-rorschach/}.

\textsuperscript{283} Pargeter, \textit{Libya: The Rise and Fall of Gaddafi}, 231.
Gaddafi’s National Planning Council, and who became head of crisis management in the NTC. Members of the NTC were overwhelmingly liberal, and a great deal of them were previously members of Gaddafi’s government who had been part of a non-corrupt, progressive and reformist current. The NTC appeared non-threatening to the West. Not only were they liberals who spoke English, but they published a manifesto on March 29, 2011, *A Vision of a Democratic Libya*, which expressed their desire to implement a modern liberal democracy. The NTC’s manifesto might as well have been written by any western state, close as it was to western political and social values. The document called for the “supremacy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Declarations,” requiring that the new democratic Libya be ruled by “the free will of the people, without exclusion or suppression of any voice.” The manifesto also called for freedom of expression, through any form, including “media, peaceful protests, demonstrations and sit-ins and other means of communication, in accordance with the constitution and its laws in a way that protests public security and social peace.” Indeed, this trust in the budding organization prompted western states to officially recognize the NTC as the legitimate governing body of the Libyan opposition. By November 30, 2011, 102 UN member states officially recognized the NTC.

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These member states included France, Canada, the United-States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Iceland. The NTC publicly advocated for a state based on “moderate Islam”. Indeed, standing before some 10,000 supporters in the Martyrs’ Square, Abdeljalil stated that Libya was a Muslim nation, “with a moderate Islam, and we will maintain that”. Abdeljalil warned against any extremist ideology that would attempt to hijack the movement; his statement was met with applause and celebration, the Libyan people clearly agreeing with his message.

I have argued that the decision to intervene in Libya was fourfold. First, the situation in Libya threatened international security, a chief Canadian national interest; the NATO-led coalition had the potential of eradicating or mitigating this threat. Second, Canada felt compelled to intervene by a duty to NATO; as a middle power, Canada is bound by its commitments to multilateral institutions. Third, Canada’s economic interests in Libya

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296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
facilitated its decision to intervene. Finally, Canada faced no domestic pressure against the intervention.

3. Explaining Canada’s Decision Not to Intervene in Syria

I argue that Canada did not intervene in Syria because it did not have an opportunity nor an incentive to do so. There was no opportunity to intervene because paralysis at NATO and the UNSC hindered the creation of a multilateral military coalition, and as a middle power, Canada cannot intervene alone.\(^{298}\) Had the opportunity for intervention presented itself however, it is unlikely that Canada would have intervened because it had no incentive to do so; its economic interests were not threatened, and it did not experience significant domestic pressure urging intervention.

i. No Opportunity to Intervene

I argue that Canada did not have an opportunity to intervene, because NATO refused to conduct a military intervention and the UN Security Council was deadlocked. As a middle power, Canada would not have intervened alone.

NATO’s refusal to conduct a military intervention was due to the conflict’s inherent complexity. This complexity arose from concerns that, due to Iran’s involvement in the crisis

in support of al-Assad and to a lack of trust in the Syrian opposition, a military intervention in Syria would not be successful.

NATO explicitly cited that the complexity of the crisis caused it to rule out intervention in Syria. On October 31, 2011, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that “NATO has no intention (to intervene) whatsoever. I can completely rule that out.”299 In February 2012, Rasmussen expanded on his statements, claiming that “Syria is ethnically, politically, religiously much more complicated than Libya. This is the reason why the right way forward is different.”300 The Secretary-General also stated that even if the mission was UN-mandated, it did not change the fact that it had little chances of success.301 Indeed, the complexity of the crisis in Syria was mainly due to Iran’s involvement in the crisis, and to the fragmented Syrian opposition.

a. **Iran, Syria, and the West**

Hostility towards Iran was somewhat alleviated in 2015, when Tehran signed the nuclear arms deal. However, I am interested in NATO’s assessment of the situation in the early years of the Syrian crisis; therefore, a description of Iran’s relationship with the West pre-nuclear arms deal is crucial to my analysis.

Iran’s involvement was disconcerting to many members of the West (including the EU, US, and Canada), which had long considered the country a threat to international peace.

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and security. Hostility towards Iran was notably due to Iran’s sponsoring of terrorist groups, its human rights record, and its nuclear ambitions.

Iran’s sponsoring of terrorist groups has caused many Western countries to consider Iran as a threat to international security. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas are part of the “Axis of Resistance”, an alliance which shares regional anti-West and anti-Israeli objectives.302 The partnership between Syria and Iran was borne out of Syrian isolation in the Middle East following three pivotal events: the death of Hafiz Al-Assad, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the US’s “War on Terror” which targeted several Arab countries.303 In 2006, Iran and Syria concretized this relationship by signing the Iranian-Syrian Supreme Defense Commission, the goal of which was to “provide a foundation for long-term military cooperation between the two countries to protect them from common threats, primarily the United States and Israel.”304 Further, Syria’s geographical position bordering Israel is practical for Iran, a “champion of anti-Israel activism.”305 Both Syria and Iran sponsor Hamas and Hezbollah; these are recognized terrorist groups by many Western powers, including the

303 Ibid, 949.
305 Ibid. 226.
European Union, Canada, and the US. Iran and Syria are also listed as state sponsors of terrorism in Canada, and the United-States.

Iran’s abysmal human rights record also contributed many Western countries criticizing Tehran. Iran had been known to arbitrarily detain and torture citizens, restrict freedom of expression, restrict demonstrations, intimidate human rights activists, and kill protesters without cause.

The West was also critical of Iran due to its nuclear ambitions, though the nuclear arms deal of 2015 helped mitigate some of these concerns. Iran was long believed to be developing nuclear weapons; between 2005 and 2007, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a US intelligence review, and the German intelligence service all claimed Iran would be able to produce a nuclear weapon by 2015. Concerns about Iran acquiring nuclear power culminated in the Iranian arms deal,

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308 Iran was listed in 1984, whereas Syria was listed in 1979. See: “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” US Department of State. Accessed August 18, 2017. [https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm](https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm).


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signed in 2015, which would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Part of the nuclear deal was to lift some international sanctions against Iran, though the US and Canada kept Iran on their list of states sponsoring terrorism.

Before 2015, concerns over Iran’s threats to international peace and security prompted the US, Canada, and EU to impose sanctions on Iran. Above the sanctions imposed on Iran, Canada and Germany in particular have been vocally critical of Iran. In 2009, Obama warned that Iran cannot “take its rightful place in the community of nations […] through terror or arms.” In 2014, the Government of Canada labelled Iran “the most significant threat to

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global peace and security in the world today”.

That same year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called Iran a threat “not just to Israel, but also to European countries.”

Tehran provided significant support to Al-Assad from the outset of the conflict, and had geopolitical reasons for doing so, as Tehran could not risk the rise of a Sunni-led regime backed by Gulf states to replace Al-Assad. As of April 2011, Iran was providing al-Assad’s forces with “weapons, surveillance equipment, and training,” as well as monitoring equipment to maintain surveillance on cell phones, social media, and e-mail accounts. In 2012, Iran increased its support by helping create the National Defence Forces (NDF), a paramilitary organisation of 100,000 soldiers mandated to help al-Assad’s forces. Iran also supplied al-Assad with light arms, rocket launchers, rockets, Kalashnikov rifles, and drones to conduct strikes. Iran’s role in the crisis was well known; on June 16, 2011, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister stated that Iran was “assisting the al-Assad regime’s crackdown on the vulnerable people of Syria”.


321 Ibid.

b. The Fragmented Syrian Opposition

Some Western countries were also reticent to back the Syrian opposition, which was fragmented and included radical Islamist groups.

In contrast to the Libyan opposition, which was rather uniform and organized, the Syrian opposition was scattered and composed of groups with varying ideologies. Indeed, the West did not have the luxury of recognizing a sole governing authority of the Syrian people, as they had with the Libyan NTC. The Syrian opposition was both complex and included radical Islamist groups. At first, demonstrations seemed to make common demands: they requested political change, including system reform and, eventually, the downfall of the regime as a whole. This semblance of a united front did not last. Despite the overwhelming majority of rebels identifying as Sunni Muslims, the Syrian opposition was and continues to be extremely fractionalized. The fractionalization of the Syrian opposition sent inconsistent messages to the population of Syria and to foreign powers. Attempts were made throughout the war to unify the opposition front. In September 2011, an umbrella organization called the Syrian National Council (SNC) was founded, which included members of the Muslim Brotherhood, liberals, Salafists and Kurds. The SNC did not succeed in unifying the opposition. This was due to three main issues. First, the Muslim Brotherhood held about 25%
of the council’s seats, and some critics argued this gave them far too much decision-making power over the SNC’s policies; there were concerns over Islamist domination of the council.\textsuperscript{327} Second, Kurdish members of the council believed their desire for political decentralization went unheeded, accusing the SNC of bending to pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey.\textsuperscript{328} Eventually, the Kurdish faction of the SNC broke off from the council to form their own committee. Lastly, disagreement arose regarding the appropriate response to the regime’s increasing use of violence.\textsuperscript{329} This disagreement seemed to be resolved in March 2012, when the SNC announced that it was creating a bureau to facilitate coordination between the SNC and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in order to distribute arms sourced by foreign powers; this, however, did not lead to a more effective relationship.\textsuperscript{330} Some other opposition factions (such as the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change) did not agree with the SNC’s more aggressive strategy towards the regime.\textsuperscript{331} The SNC did not succeed in unifying the opposition, which remained fragmented, ever-changing, and extremely complex.

Most Western countries, including the EU and US, recognized the Syrian National Council (SNC) as the only representative of the Syrian people, but the SNC did not succeed in unifying the opposition.\textsuperscript{332} The West remained concerned with the existence of radical


\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Ibid.}

Islamist groups in the opposition; Harper was notably concerned with the complexity of the opposition. Standing before the UK Parliament in 2013, Harper described the “grotesque dilemma” in Syria. The dilemma was caused by, on one hand, a desire to halt the violent actions of Al-Assad’s government against the Syrian people and, on the other hand, a reticence to attempt to help an extremist and sectarian opposition.

c. Deadlock at the UN Security Council

The UNSC was deadlocked due to Russian and Chinese vetoes. These vetoes were motivated by, first, Russia and China’s long-standing opposition to violations of territorial sovereignty. These concerns were aggravated following the UN-mandated NATO-led coalition in Libya, which began as a humanitarian intervention and turned into an effort at


regime change. Russia’s vetoes were also motivated by its ties to Syria, which prompted Russia to refuse any resolution which placed strong blame on al-Assad’s government.

The main reason that a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria did not occur is due to Russia and China’s vetoes. On October 4, 2011 and February 4, 2012 (respectively) the Russian Federation and China vetoed two resolutions regarding Syria; these were S/2011/612 and S/2012/77. Defending their position in their rejection of draft resolution S/2011/612, which would have condemned the actions of the Syrian government and called for a Syrian-led peace process, the Russian Federation, supported by China, cited “the logic of respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the principle of non-intervention.” They added a feeling of acute discomfort with the “accusatory bent” towards Damascus. They did not explicitly claim support for the Al-Assad regime, instead shifting the attention towards the actions of the “radical opposition” who they believed no longer hid their extremist bent. The second time the Russian Federation and China vetoed a resolution regarding Syria, they expanded on their reasons.

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340 Ibid.
The Russian Federation cited that its rejection of draft resolution S/2012/77 was notably due to the language used, which seemed to insist on regime change.\textsuperscript{341} A resolution, UNSC 2042, was finally unanimously adopted by the Security Council on April 14, 2011; this resolution authorized the deployment of an advance team to monitor the ceasefire in Syria and requested that al-Assad pull back his military and heavy weapons from population centres.\textsuperscript{342} On July 19, 2012, draft resolution S/2012/538 was vetoed by China and Russia.\textsuperscript{343} This resolution would have subjected al-Assad’s government to article 41 of the UN Charter, which would entail “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.\textsuperscript{344} China stated the resolution blamed only al-Assad in the conflict, and no other party, while Russia claimed that the Security Council members were trying to further their own “geopolitical designs” with their involvement in the conflict.\textsuperscript{345}

Russia and China’s vetoes at the UNSC were partly motivated by their resistance against violations of a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. China and Russia often vote as a

bloc on sovereignty issues at the UNSC. This is mainly due to fears of US expansion in the international system and of Western values gaining a dominant position. Primary concerns by Russia and China at the UNSC are that the Western states will use humanitarian intervention as a pretext to reshape the political landscape of the target states in their interests.

These concerns over sovereignty in Syria were made more acute following the NATO-led coalition in Libya, which had changed scope throughout the operation. What had begun as a mission to protect civilians had turned into one aimed at Gaddafi’s removal. Russia had agreed to UNSC 1973, which called for “all measures necessary” to protect the Libyan people from the government’s use of force. However, the operation changed scope; by June 2011, the mission became geared towards removing Gaddafi, which it successfully did in October 2011. Russia was vocal about its frustration with this change, accusing NATO member states in July 2011 of “expanding” the Libya resolution to include regime change in an effort

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to suit its ends.\textsuperscript{351} In its rejection of draft resolution S/2012/77 (which would have condemned al-Assad’s regime for its human rights violations and required the government to withdraw the military from cities and towns), Russia claimed its veto was motivated by “some influential members of the international community, including some sitting at this table, [which] have undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, encouraging the opposition towards power.”\textsuperscript{352}

Russia was also motivated to use its veto due to its relations with the Syrian government, which are largely based on Russia’s military and economic interests in Syria. Notably, Russia holds the rights to use Tartus, a military port in Syria.\textsuperscript{353} Further, the Kremlin has a vested interest in maintaining ties with Syria, through which it could eventually run pipelines thus compensating for the fact that Russian pipelines currently run through states no longer under Russian control.\textsuperscript{354} Syria’s interest in maintaining this partnership is largely based on the obvious political advantage of having such a powerful ally to back its regime, plus an economic advantage; in 2005, Al-Assad had three-quarters of his arms sales debt to Russia written off.\textsuperscript{355} Despite causing stalemates at the UNSC in defense of al-Assad’s government, Russia did not directly assist al-Assad’s government in responding to opposition


\textsuperscript{354} \textit{Ibid}.

early in the conflict. Russian military involvement in the Syrian crisis began in 2015, when it launched air strikes against ISIL.\(^{356}\) It is believed, however, that Russia also attacks other anti-Assad rebels in an effort to keep al-Assad in power.\(^{357}\)

ii. No Incentive to Intervene

I argue that even if Canada was provided with the opportunity to intervene in Syria, it lacked an incentive to do so. Canada had no economic interests in Syria, and experienced no domestic pressure urging a military intervention.

Canada’s economic prosperity was not threatened in Syria. Imports from Syria and exports to Syria are not exceptionally important.\(^{358}\) Between 2000 and 2011, Syria imported an annual average of $45M worth of Canadian products, ranging from machinery to textile fabrics.\(^{359}\) However, Canada has no important business interests in Syria particularly; certainly, business interests are much weaker than those Canada holds in Libya.\(^{360}\) Although some experts have argued that Syria could be geopolitically attractive as it could allow access to Middle East oil, Canada had not yet capitalized on this opportunity.\(^{361}\)

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The Canadian government experienced no pro-intervention pressure by its electorate or in Parliament. The Syrian diaspora in Canada is small, approximately 0.1% of the total population, and it did not make any vocal pleas with the government to intervene. Further, debates in Parliament would suggest that blame was placed on the United Nations, not the Canadian government, for lack of military action in Syria. Blame was placed on the United Nations for the stalemate, more particularly caused by Russian and China vetoes; on June 14, 2011, Liberal MP Bob Rae expressed frustration with Russia and China, claiming they “do not want an intervention because they do not want the eyes of the world to be focusing on them”. During that same debate, Green Party leader Elizabeth May agreed that Russia and China were causing a stalemate, but she was critical of the government’s mission in Libya; she had been the only MP to vote against an extension of the mission in Libya. Indeed, May blamed the Syria stalemate on the mission in Libya, stating that since it had changed goals towards regime change, Canada had lost support of Russia and China by fear the same would occur in Syria.

Canada did not intervene in Syria because it did not have the opportunity to do so; this was due to paralysis at the UNSC and NATO. For its part, NATO rejected the possibility of a Syrian intervention on the grounds that it was far too complex. This complexity was due, first, to Iran’s involvement in the crisis; to the West, Iran a known disruptor of peace and

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international security, and it backed al-Assad’s regime with intelligence, arms, and military personnel. The complexity of the crisis was also due to the fragmented opposition, which failed at creating a unified front against al-Assad, and included extremist groups. Paralysis at the UNSC was caused by Russia, who vetoed several resolutions regarding Syria. At the UN Security Council, members had difficulty agreeing on the proper way to manage the crisis; Russia’s vetoes were due to its support of al-Assad’s regime, and to its distrust in the West after NATO had changed the scope of the Libya intervention to topple the regime. Even if Canada had been given the opportunity to participate in a military intervention, it was unlikely to do so because it had no economic interests in Syria and did not experience domestic pressure urging an intervention.

VIII. Conclusion

The uprisings in Libya and Syria held some important similarities: they belonged to the wider movement of the Arab Spring, occurred within a similar time frame, and were a response to corrupt regimes and political repression. However, Canada’s response was different in both states: where Canada actively participated in a multilateral coalition which culminated in the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime, it “sat on its hands” in Syria and did not take concrete action either in support of or against the Al-Assad government.

I have argued that Canada’s response in Libya can be explained by four main factors. First, Libya indirectly threatened Canada’s national interest in international stability, and a NATO coalition could help mitigate this threat. Second, Canada’s position as a middle power meant it felt a responsibility towards NATO and the United Nations to participate in the
coalition; indeed, the Minister of Defence qualified Canada’s participation as a “duty” to both organizations.365 I also argued that Canada was also motivated by direct threats to its economic prosperity; Canada held significant oil interests in Libya at the time of the intervention, and these were threatened by the conflict. Last, Canada faced no domestic pressure against the intervention; there was cross-party support for both the mission and its extension three months later. I have also added that due to Libya’s geographic isolation, lack of allies, weak military, and organized opposition, the decision for Canada to intervene was facilitated.

In contrast, I have argued that Canada’s lack of intervention in Syria can be explained by the fact that it had no opportunity nor any incentive to do so. First, paralysis at NATO and the UNSC hindered the creation of a multilateral military coalition in Syria. Paralysis at NATO was caused by the belief that the situation in Syria was too complex and that a military intervention would not succeed. The complexity of the crisis was due to Iran actively and unequivocally backing al-Assad in the crisis, and to the fragmented opposition which included extremist groups. Paralysis at the UNSC was caused by Russia and China’s vetoes on UNSC Resolutions; these vetoes were motivated by Russia and China’s mistrust in the West following the intervention in Libya. The intervention, which had begun as an operation to protect Libyan citizens from violence, turned into one aimed at regime change.

My research asked why Canada intervened in Libya, and not in Syria, despite the seemingly similar dynamics of both conflicts and the fact that they occurred simultaneously. In order to identify the factors which led to Canada’s decisions, I used NCR theory, which claims that states will conduct military interventions in response to threats to their national interests; these interventions will be subjected to domestic pressure which may affect the timing and implementation of these interventions.

Both case studies confirm the main tenets of NCR theory. In Syria, Canada did not intervene; its interests were not threatened and it did not experience domestic pressure urging an intervention. In contrast, the crisis in Libya caused an indirect threat to Canada’s interest in international stability, and a direct threat to Canada’s economic interests. Moreover, there was no domestic pressure against the intervention. However, I have also argued that some other considerations, which fall outside the purview of NCR theory, may have impacted the government’s decision to intervene in Libya. This raises questions about NCR’s ability to comprehensively define the reasons why states intervene. Other considerations may impact a state’s decision to conduct a military intervention, such as the context of the intervention, its level of potential risk, the response by its allies, and the nature of the groups in the conflict.

In the case studies analyzed, it seems that in many ways, Canada’s loyalty and commitment to NATO and its allies weighed more heavily in the decisions to intervene or not. Although its interests were threatened in Libya, Canada could not have intervened alone. In Syria, had Canada’s interests been threatened, a deadlock at NATO meant that Canada would not have been able to consider intervention. Therefore, it is possible that the short-
comings of NCR theory could be due to its lack of applicability to middle powers. This opens up new avenues of research, namely which considerations – outside threats to its national interests and the constraint caused by domestic pressure – exist for middle powers to conduct a military intervention.
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