

Université de Montréal

**On Critical Junctures and Legacies: An Analysis of the Evolution of
Brazil's African Affairs (1985-2015)**

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the evolution of Brazil's African policy and Brazil-African relations, lending particular emphasis to those changes brought by President Lula da Silva since his accession to power in 2003. The scope of the work covers the period from the mid-1980s through 2015, extending into President Dilma Rousseff's administration. It follows the theoretical framework proposed by David Collier and Ruth Collier (1991) on critical junctures, including some adaptations to the context of the present research. The study is divided into four main chapters, starting with the literature review, followed by an analysis of Brazil's African engagement between 1985 and 2002. Immediately after, the two remaining chapters, respectively, focus on the hypothesized critical juncture and the legacy of Brazil's new African policy. The work closes by drawing conclusions and stating its contribution to the broader study of Brazil's foreign policy, including the applicability of underexplored theoretical models in the field, such as the critical junctures framework.

KEY WORDS: Brazil's African policy; critical juncture; legacy; Brazilian engagement; President Lula da Silva

RESUMO

O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a evolução da política africana do Brasil e as relações Brasil-África, dando ênfase especial às mudanças trazidas pelo Presidente Lula da Silva desde sua ascensão ao poder em 2003. O escopo do trabalho cobre o período desde os meados dos anos 1980 até 2015, estendendo-se até a administração da Presidente Dilma Rousseff. O arcabouço teórico escolhido é aquele proposto por David Collier and Ruth Collier (1991) que focaliza conjunturas críticas, incluindo algumas adaptações para o contexto da presente pesquisa. O estudo é dividido em quatro capítulos principais, iniciando pela revisão de literatura, seguida de uma análise do comprometimento africano do Brasil entre 1985 e 2002. Logo a seguir, os dois capítulos restantes focalizam, respectivamente, a conjuntura crítica hipotetizada e o legado da nova política africana do Brasil. O trabalho finaliza apresentando conclusões e afirmando sua contribuição para o estudo mais abrangente da política exterior do Brasil, incluindo-se a aplicabilidade de modelos teóricos pouco explorados na área, tais como a perspectiva das conjunturas críticas.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Política africana do Brasil; conjuntura crítica; legado; engajamento brasileiro; Presidente Lula da Silva

RÉSUMÉ

Le but de ce mémoire est d'analyser l'évolution de la politique africaine du Brésil et des relations Brésil-Afrique, en mettant l'accent sur les changements apportés par le président Lula da Silva depuis son arrivé au pouvoir en 2003. La portée du travail couvre la période allant du milieu des années 1980 jusqu'en 2015, alors se prolongeant dans l'administration de Dilma Rousseff. Il suit le cadre théorique proposé par David Collier et Ruth Collier (1991) relatif aux conjonctures critiques, incluant quelques adaptations pour le contexte de cette recherche. L'étude est divisée en quatre chapitres, en partant d'une revue de littérature, suivie par une analyse de l'engagement brésilien en Afrique entre 1985 et 2002. Les deux derniers chapitres se concentrent, respectivement, sur la conjoncture critique hypothétique et sur l'héritage de la nouvelle politique africaine du Brésil. Le travail termine par tirer des conclusions ainsi que par souligner des contributions pour l'étude de la politique étrangère du Brésil, y compris sur l'applicabilité des modèles théoriques peu utilisés dans le domaine, tels que celui des conjonctures critiques.

MOTS CLÉS : politique africaine du Brésil; conjoncture critique; héritage; l'engagement du Brésil; Le président Lula da Silva

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABC	—	Brazilian Cooperation Agency (<i>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação</i>)
AEB	—	Brazilian Space Agency (<i>Agência Espacial Brasileira</i>)
ALCSA	—	South American Free Trade Zone (<i>Área de Livre Comércio da América do Sul</i>)
APEX	—	Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (<i>Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos</i>)
ASA	—	Africa-South America Summit (<i>Cúpula América do Sul–África</i>)
ASACOF	—	South America–Africa Cooperation Forum (<i>Fórum de Cooperação América do Sul–África</i>)
ASPA	—	South America–Arab Countries Summit (<i>Cúpula América do Sul–Países Árabes</i>)
AU	—	African Union
BEFIEX	—	Commission for the Concession of Tax Incentives to Special Export Programs (<i>Comissão para Concessão de Benefícios Fiscais a Programas Especiais de Exportação</i>)
BNDES	—	Brazilian Social and Economic National Development Bank (<i>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social</i>)
CACEX	—	Foreign Trade Portfolio of the Bank of Brasil (<i>Carteira de Comércio Exterior do Banco do Brasil</i>)
CASA	—	South American Community of Nations (<i>Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações</i>)
COBRADI	—	Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (<i>Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional</i>)
CPLP	—	Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (<i>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</i>)
DAF I	—	African Division I (<i>Divisão da África I</i>)
DAF II	—	African Division II (<i>Divisão da África II</i>)
DAF III	—	African Division III (<i>Divisão da África III</i>)
EMBRAPA	—	Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (<i>Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária</i>)
FIOCRUZ	—	Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (<i>Fundação Oswaldo Cruz</i>)

G-20	—	Group of 20
IBSA	—	India-Brazil-South Africa Forum
IBSA Fund	—	India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger or India, Brazil, and South Africa Fund
IILP	—	International Institute of the Portuguese Language (<i>Instituto Internacional da Língua Portuguesa</i>)
IPEA	—	Institute of Applied Economic Research (<i>Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada</i>)
MDIC	—	Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (<i>Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior</i>)
MERCOSUL	—	Southern Common Market (<i>Mercado Comum do Sul</i>)
MPLA	—	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i>)
MRE	—	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<i>Ministério das Relações Exteriores</i>)
OTAS	—	Organization of the South Atlantic Treaty
OUA	—	Organization of African Unity
PALOP	—	Portuguese-speaking African countries (<i>Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa</i>)
PEI	—	Independent Foreign Policy (<i>Política Externa Independente</i>)
PL	—	Liberal Party (<i>Partido Liberal</i>)
PSDB	—	Brazilian Social Democratic Party (<i>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</i>)
PT	—	Worker's Party (<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>)
SEPPIR	—	Special Secretariat for Racial Equality Promotion Policies (<i>Secretaria de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial</i>)
SWAPO	—	South West Africa People's Organization
UNDP	—	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	—	United Nations General Assembly
UNILAB	—	University for the International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony (<i>Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira</i>)
UNSC	—	United Nations Security Council

WB	—	World Bank
WTO	—	World Trade Organization
ZOPACAS	—	Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (<i>Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul</i>)

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INTRODUCTION

In early November 2010, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva embarked on his last trip to Africa as the leader of the Brazilian State. On that occasion, he visited the site of ongoing technical cooperation projects and announced other financing measures to benefit the export of Brazilian goods to Mozambique (Uchoa 2010). Throughout his two terms in office (2003-10), presidential visits to African countries had become a recurrent affair and had proved an effective mechanism to foster Brazil's ties with its African counterparts. In fact, this final undertaking came not long after the president's visit to other African nations in July 2010. In this effort, he was unmatched by previous administrations.

Under President Lula da Silva, trade between Brazil and Africa grew considerably while the government implemented a series of incentives to further promote economic exchange. Also during his presidency, Brazil opened 19 embassies on African soil, not only reinstating diplomatic representations closed during previous governments, but also establishing new ones. In 2011, Brazil counted 37 embassies in Africa, the fifth largest presence across the continent, only behind the United States, China, France and Russia (Fellet 2011). Not every aspect of the evolution of Brazil's African affairs is nonetheless quantifiable. For instance, the revitalization of existing multilateral forums and the establishment of other new and diversified initiatives are another dimension of this same process to bring Brazil closer to Africa. Already in 2006, for example, following an initial understanding between Nigeria and Brazil, the I Africa-South America Summit (*Cúpula América do Sul-África*) (ASA) was held in Abuja, Nigeria. Subsequent summits took place in 2009 and 2013, the latter during President Dilma Rousseff's administration (2011-). It was also under President Lula da Silva that Brazil became a prominent international

development actor, with Africa as a central destination of its technical cooperation projects (Stolte 2015).

Whereas Brazil and Africa have long been connected through the experience of Portuguese colonialism and slavery in Brazil, the onset of a Brazilian foreign policy towards the African continent dates to the beginning of the 1960s, in the wake of Africa's independence. What has come to be known as Brazil's African policy has nonetheless been loosely defined by government officials and scholars alike, as shown in the following chapters. In broad terms, a country's foreign policy can be understood as “(...) l'instrument par lequel l'État tente de façonner son environnement politique international” (Charillon 2002, 13) in an effort that builds on the perceptions, ideas and interests of decision-makers in the face of both international and domestic determinants (Pineiro 2004). Whereas the concept has come to encompass a larger scope of actors on the international scene, in the context of the present study, our focus is on the interactions between the Brazilian State and its African counterpart, emphasizing the different features and meanings attributed to Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa over time.

As studies have shown, the first years after the policy's emergence in the 1960s were marred by uncertainties and oscillations as Brazil hesitated in the face of its Portuguese connections and its ties with South Africa during the *apartheid* regime. It was only during the following decade that those challenges were overcome as the pressing economic needs of Brazil's military regime pushed for the establishment of a broader relationship with Africa (Saraiva 1996).

In the 1980s, growing economic difficulties and the crisis of the state put a halt to Brazil's expansion in Africa, amidst internal struggles over foreign policy orientations. As such, the José Sarney administration (1985-90), which marked the transition from military to civilian rule, announced the start of a period of distance and selectivity in Brazil's African

affairs. As a general trend, the successive administrations that followed since President José Sarney have shown a lesser interest over the African continent as they pursued other foreign policy avenues. In the instances where an interest has been shown, the selectivity in the choice of partners has been more than evident. Starting in the late 1980s and extending to President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's terms in office (1995-2002), Brazil's attention to Africa focused mostly on South Africa and the Portuguese-speaking countries, and to a lesser extent, Nigeria (Saraiva 1996; Sennes 2003; Ribeiro 2007; 2008; Machado 2013).

Seen from this perspective, the scope and scale of Brazil's current engagement in Africa is all the more impressive since it contrasts with the previous pattern of Brazil's African affairs. Not only so, but the fast pace with which concrete actions could be observed should also be noted. These developments led to a number of initial questions. How encompassing have these developments been? What motivated the Brazilian government to pursue closer ties with Africa? What of the stability of these developments? Do they enunciate the start of a long lasting trend or are indeed ephemeral? Upon further reflection on the matter, the focus of this study has been narrowed to address the following question: How has Brazil managed to increase its presence across Africa and modified the profile of its relationship with the continent?

Our working hypothesis is the following: **the new profile of Brazil's engagement with Africa is the result of a critical juncture that affected Brazil's African policy between 2003 and 2006.** During this time, President Lula da Silva and key foreign policy decision-makers – in particular Foreign Minister Celso Amorim – presided over two substantive changes in Brazil's African policy: (i) revision of Africa's role and value in the context of Brazil's strategic calculations and international aspirations; (ii) transformation of the symbolic elements that had long characterized Brazil's approach to Africa from the

ongoing culturalist discourse towards an emphasis on the recognition of a historic and moral debt.

The theoretical framework used in this study builds on the work of David Collier and Ruth Collier (1991) on critical junctures, albeit with some adaptations to the context of the present research. As an analytical tool, the framework allows for the study of non-incremental processes of change that take place in well defined and limited periods of time. Critical junctures, as discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, are understood as “a period of significant change” that disrupts previous patterns and establishes new ones, a so-called legacy (Collier and Collier 1991, 29; Spektor 2002).

The main objective of the present study is thus to provide an analysis of the evolution of Brazil’s African policy and Brazil-Africa relations in recent times, with particular emphasis to changes introduced since the Lula da Silva’s accession to power in 2003. That being said, the scope of the work extends from the mid-1980s through 2015, thus extending into the administration of President Dilma Rousseff. The adoption of this broader scope is justified in order to better evaluate the existence of similarities among successive administrations, to assess hypothesized changes and to analyse the continuity or lack of continuity of newly established patterns.

By focusing on the case of Brazil and Africa, this study seeks to make an in-depth and detailed contribution to the analysis of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. Furthermore, even if there have been a greater number of studies on the subject of Brazil’s African affairs in recent years, research on the matter remains largely incipient as many topics remain to be discussed. Thus, the present study also seeks to address, even if partially, this existing knowledge gap.

The analysis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one starts with a literature review which addresses two points: (i) an overview of Brazil’s relationship with Africa from the

early 1960s through the first half of the 1980s, highlighting the many hesitations and concrete actions during this first phase; (ii) a debate over the progresses, strengths and weaknesses of previous studies on Brazil's African affairs which are pertinent to the present study. It then discusses the critical junctures framework (Collier and Collier 1991) and presents both the hypothesis and methodology.

The second chapter focuses on Brazil's African engagement between 1985 and 2002. It analyses the evolution of the dynamics of distance and selectivity under the four different presidents at the time (José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso). Pursuant to the theoretical model, it establishes the antecedent conditions and the triggers to the changes seen during Lula da Silva's administration. The third chapter discusses the hypothesized critical juncture. It looks at precisely how Africa regained its strategic value to Brazilian foreign policy while also addressing the modification to the symbolic elements of Brazilian discourse towards Africa. The final chapter focuses on the legacy of Brazil's new African policy. It analyses the measurable dimensions of Brazil's ties with Africa (number of partners, trade, etc.), as well as the impacts to the qualitative nature of the country's relationship with Africa. Particular emphasis is given to the institutionalization of ties and Brazil's footprint as an emerging development actor in Africa. The chapter extends into the Rousseff years in order to probe into the duration and stability of the legacy.

CHAPTER 1

ON THE EVOLUTION OF BRAZIL'S AFRICAN AFFAIRS: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK¹

The present chapter introduces the reader to the beginnings and early evolution of Brazil's African policy and, accordingly, Brazil-Africa relations. The first part of the literature review explores the many hesitations and oscillations that shaped Brazil's incremental approach towards Africa from the 1960s onwards (Lechini 2008). It focuses on the underlying culturalist discourse that came to shape said interactions by promoting Brazil as Africa's natural partner. It shows how political and economic relations came to gradually prosper throughout most of the 1970s and the first half of the subsequent decade.

Even so, whereas the solution of contentious matters would lead one to expect an increase – or at the very least the maintenance – of Brazilian engagement in Africa, the late 1980s witness the progressive decline of Brazil's presence in that continent and the early stages of selectivity, a tendency that would be accentuated in the following decade. Given this somewhat grim outlook for Brazil and Africa interactions, how then does one account for Brazil's sudden renewed interest in Africa at the beginning of the 21st century and the rapid expansion of ties that followed? The second half of the literature review explores some tentative answers to this question and highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies. The final sections of the chapter present the theoretical framework – that of critical junctures, as well as the working hypothesis and the methodology used throughout this study.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, direct quotes originally in Portuguese have been translated into English by the author. Quotes originally in French have not been altered.

1. Literature review

1.1. *An African policy for Brazil: from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s*

After centuries of interactions resulting mostly from the slave trade, the 19th century brought with it the decline in exchanges between Brazil and Africa following the former's independence, European colonialism in Africa and the prohibition of slave trade. It was only after World War II that the African continent would become a subject of interest to Brazilian authorities (Saraiva 1996; Visentini 2013). One would not, however, talk of an African policy at this time given that debates centered mostly on Brazil's relations with colonial Portugal² and South Africa, with little to no consequence to Africa's struggle for independence (Saraiva 1996; 2010; Santos 2011). As a matter of fact, Brazil's ties with both these countries would come to shape the debate over Brazil's African affairs in the years to come.

The first concrete efforts to engage with the newly independent Africa came under the "Independent Foreign Policy" (*Política Externa Independente*) (PEI). Introduced by President Jânio Quadros in 1961, and continued under his successor, João Goulart (1962-4), the policy was seen as a means for the country to advance its economic development, diversify its foreign relations, and become more active in the international scene (Visentini 1999; Leite 2011). It advocated for the end of colonialism in Africa, as well as for the economic emancipation of African peoples as announced by President Quadros in early 1961 through a congressional message, as well as on the president's article on *Foreign Affairs* (Quadros 1961; Saraiva 1996)³ Pursuant to José Flávio Saraiva (1996), the congressional

² Close ties between both countries were formalized on a friendship and consultation treaty (*Tratado de Amizade e Consulta*) in 1953. According to Cláudio dos Santos (2011), the calls to establish a Luso-Brazilian community turned Brazil into an ally of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

³ Brazil also admitted to egoistic reasoning in its approach to Africa, as noted by President Jânio Quadros himself: "This is our policy, not merely in the interests of Africa, nor for the sake of platonic solidarity, but because it is in keeping with Brazilian national interests. These to a certain extent are still influenced by the most disguised forms of colonialist pressure, but call for a rapprochement with Africa" (Quadros 1961). Original in English.

message marks the start of Brazil's policy towards Africa. Institutional reforms also took place, with the establishment of a specific Africa division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministério de Relações Exteriores*) (MRE)⁴. Accordingly, diplomatic representations were created, with embassies in the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Rhodesia, and Zaire; consulates were opened in Angola and Mozambique (Quadros 1961; Saraiva 1996; Leite 2011). Even so, the effects of this early policy were rather limited in the midst of the political instability that characterized the early 1960s in Brazil, as well as the country's ongoing ties with Apartheid South Africa (which represented close to 50% of Brazil's trade with Africa) and the influence of the Portuguese lobby in Brazilian politics (Saraiva 1996; Visentini and Pereira 2008).

Under General Castello Branco's government (1964-7), the first of five military administrations, interactions with South Africa and Portugal were fostered, in alignment with the administration's keen intent on countering the spread of communism in the South Atlantic region. This was seen as part of the broader determinants of President Branco's foreign policy which focused on declaring Brazil's allegiance to the Western world and capitalism. Within this scenario, interactions with Black Africa became secondary and the result of efforts by a group of dedicated diplomats within *Itamaraty* – the 1965 trade mission - being the most important development at the time (Forrest 1982; Saraiva 1996; Visentini 2004).

In 1967, under President Marshal Costa e Silva (1967-9) globalization and multilateralization would once again become central aspects of Brazil's foreign policy, following the interlude of Castello Branco's administration⁵ (Visentini 2004). With regard

⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also commonly referred to as *Itamaraty*. Both denominations will be used in this study.

⁵ To Paulo Visentini (2004), the multilateralization and globalization of Brazil's foreign policy showed a willingness to decrease dependence on the United States by pursuing new avenues and spheres of international

to Brazil's African Affairs, Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto presided over an institutional reform that placed the African Division under the newly-created Under-Secretariat for Africa and the Middle East, as opposed to the Under-secretariat for Eastern Europe, as had been previously the case. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia also dates from this period. These actions took place as Brazil adopted a Third World rhetoric in the international scene under the minister's "Prosperity Diplomacy" (*Diplomacia da Prosperidade*). This approach was, nonetheless, marred by contradictions. On the one hand, Brazil did not cease its support of Colonial Portugal; on the other hand, efforts to increase commercial exchanges with South Africa were also pursued (Saraiva 1996; Visentini 2004; Pinheiro 2007).

These contradictions and oscillations would continue to shape Brazil's African policy during most of General Emílio Médici's government (1969-74), though the country's dubious position became harder to sustain in the face of internal and external pressure, as well as demands for economic growth (Forrest 1982; Pinheiro 2007). As the Brazilian economy experienced high growth rates in the early 1970s – a period known as the "economic miracle" (*milagre econômico*) – there was a growing need to secure markets for the country's manufactured goods, as well as reliable oil supply (at that time, nearly 80% of Brazil's oil need came from imports) (Selcher 1976; Saraiva 1996; Visentini 2004; Pinheiro 2007). In this scenario, two projects were under dispute within the administration: that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Gibson Barboza, whose priority was to abandon support for Portugal's claims, and that of the Finance Minister Delfim Netto, to whom the partnership with the Portuguese would be the best way to ensure access to African markets⁶ (Selcher 1976; Visentini 2004; Pinheiro 2007). In 1972, Brazil's position would come under scrutiny

action. Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy had constituted the first concrete expression of multilateralization, even if not entirely successful.

⁶ Delfim Netto also advocated on behalf of trade with South Africa (Visentini 2004).

as African officials criticized the country during Minister Gibson Barboza's visit to Gabon, Cameroun, Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, Dahomé, Ivory Coast, Togo and Ghana. That being said, the trip also had an important symbolic meaning as "(...) one of the first concrete efforts by Brazilian diplomacy towards the countries in Atlantic Africa" (Visentini 2004, 180). Finally, the 1973 oil crisis would add pressure to Brazil's stance as the possibility of negative impact on the economy and of a boycott from oil-producing nations – Nigeria, in particular – were assessed (Forrest 1982; Pinheiro 2007).

A definitive change in position would come the following year, a shift that was made clear to the world not least in Brazil's opening address at the 29th United Nations General Assembly by the new Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, where he called for an end to colonialism in Angola and Mozambique (Silveira 1974; Saraiva 1996). Perhaps the most symbolic event of the time was the decision by General Ernesto Geisel's administration to recognize both Angola's independence and its Marxist government under the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*) (MPLA) (Saraiva 1996).

Pursuant to José Flávio Saraiva (1996), Brazil's African policy at the time relied heavily on the opportunity of economic gains arising from a growing relationship with the African continent⁷. In fact, Brazil's economic strategy in Africa during the 1970s benefitted from a series of export incentives, such as those provided by the Commission for the Concession of Tax Incentives and Special Export Programs (*Comissão para Concessão de Incentivos Fiscais e Programas Especiais de Exportação*) (BEFIEEX) (1972). Credit lines were established; *Banco do Brasil*, for its part, opened branches in countries such as the

⁷ Elaborating on the evolution of Brazil's African affairs since the early 1960s, José Flávio Saraiva (1996, 134) argues that the 1970s portrayed Africa as an important market to Brazil's aspirations. The African continent was also seen as a player – albeit a background one – in Brazil's search for international autonomy; an evolution since the solidarity that had inspired President Jânio Quadros in the preceding decade.

Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Trading companies were amidst the instruments adopted to foster economic ties and promote oil imports. For instance, under *Interbras* (1976), a subsidiary of the state-owned oil company *Petrobras*, a series of Brazilian products were being sold in Africa (Uriarte 1983; Baumann 1990; Saraiva 1996; Santana 2003). The adoption of these instruments was accompanied by what José Flávio Saraiva (1996, 148) calls the geographical reorientation of trade. According to the author, Brazil's focus shifted from South Africa – at one point responsible for 50% of all exchanges – to Black Africa, in particular Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, Congo, and Gabon (Saraiva 1996).


The early 1980s witness Brazil's continuous efforts to enhance ties with Africa. Under General João Batista Figueiredo (1979-1985), the last of military presidents, Brazilian discourse would engage with such topics as requests for Namibia's independence, a solution to Zimbabwe's crisis and condemnation of Apartheid. In 1980 and 1983, Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro went on a tour in Southern and Western Africa, issuing joint *communiqués* condemning South Africa's incursions into neighboring countries. The year 1983 would also mark the first visit by a Brazilian president to the African continent, namely Cape Vert, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Nigeria (Saraiva 1996, Visentini 2004). According to José Flávio Saraiva,

The trip encompassed, therefore, two values. The material, objective, translated into the reciprocal recognition of Brazil's trade strategy towards the continent. The second, symbolic, goes back to the idea of an Atlantic identity that united, with the political gesture of the visit from a first South American president, the two "adjacent" regions (Saraiva 1996, 191).

As a matter of fact, trade between Brazil and Africa, which had grown already by the late 1970s, continued to rise, and that despite the first indications of economic crisis with the onset of the foreign debt crisis in 1982. Following the second oil crisis (1979) and the increase in international interest rates, Brazil's growth strategy – which relied heavily on

international loans – was compromised. Under the new and uncertain economic scenario, the Brazilian government sought to develop new instruments to foster economic exchange. The adoption of countertrade⁸, for example, would be important in dealings with Nigeria – Brazil’s largest economic partner on the continent – and Angola – where Brazilian firms were involved in the Capanda hydropower plant project (Sennes 2003; Santana 2003, Saraiva 1996). Hence, starting in the late 1960s, trade flows began an upward trend until the mid-1980s, even if oscillations were experienced during this time. As such, if in 1969 Brazilian exports to Africa were close to 25.8 million USD, they would surpass the 1 billion USD mark in 1980. As for imports, they would show greater variation throughout the period. Even so, in the early 1980s they would be over 1 billion USD in all but one year (1983) (Lechini 2006).

Graph 1. The evolution of Brazilian trade with Africa (1961-1984)



Source: prepared by the author with data from Lechini (2006).

⁸ By allowing goods to be paid with other goods where currency is scarce, countertrade stimulated the trade of Brazilian services and goods against oil with African countries (Santana 2003; Lechini 2006).

Another issue that mobilized the Figueiredo administration, and that of his successor José Sarney (1985-90), was Brazil's response to South Africa's renewed proposal to establish a military alliance in the South Atlantic. The proposed Organization of the South Atlantic Treaty (OTAS) was backed both by the United States and Argentina, and first proposed during the 1960s, albeit in more modest terms (Hurrell 1983; Saraiva 1996; Visentini 2004)⁹. In 1982, Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro asserted that

Brazil, as well as the developing nations in Africa, is interested in maintaining the South Atlantic away from the arms race and the confrontation between the superpowers. The South Atlantic, until this day, has been an ocean one could consider "without arms". It is in our interest to keep our ocean in this state, essentially dedicated to the peaceful activities of commercial, economic, cultural and human exchanges. And this, I believe, is also the African interest (Guerreiro 1982, 50 *apud* Saraiva 1996, 208).

This international political conundrum would only be solved during his successor's term in office. It was only then that the submission and approval by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (*Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul – ZOPACAS*) put an end to competing initiatives in the region (Saraiva 1996).

Since the early 1960s and with few interruptions and alterations, Brazil's African approach would build on the symbolic idea of a natural partnership between Brazilians and Africans given the historic ties that connected both regions. Already in 1961, President Jânio Quadros stated the following:

I believe that it is precisely in Africa that Brazil can render the best service to the concepts of Western life and political methods. Our country should become the link, the bridge, between Africa and the West, since we are so intimately bound to both peoples. In so far as we can give the nations of the Black continent an example of complete absence of racial prejudice, together with successful proof of progress without undermining the principles of

⁹Andrew Hurrell (1983) analyses the proposals and their evolution in greater detail in "The politics of South Atlantic security: a survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization".

freedom, we shall be decisively contributing to the effective integration of an entire continent in a system to which we are attached by our philosophy and historic tradition (Quadros 1961, 24)¹⁰.

This culturalist discourse, as termed by José Flávio Saraiva (1993; 1996; 2012), was built around the ideas of racial equality and racial democracy that were recurrent themes in Brazilian society¹¹. According to José Flávio Saraiva (1996), this would translate into the promotion of a so-called natural affinity between Brazil and Africa, as well as the idea of a continued human interaction throughout time between Brazil and the African continent.

The common history that was said to unite Brazil and Africa was nonetheless marred by paradoxes. On the one hand, knowledge of independent Africa remained limited; on the other, African contribution to Brazil's social formation was seen through folklore with little room for discussion over the consequences of slavery. After the interlude of the first military administration, where geopolitics and relations with Portugal were at the center of the discourse, the early 1970s already show the refinement of the ideas of racial equality and cultural affinity. If critiques were noticeable at the time, they did not, however, undermine the strength of this culturalist approach (Saraiva 1993; 1996).

1.2. Brazil and Africa from 1985 through 2015: state of knowledge

Brazil's African affairs have long remained an underexplored subject among scholars of the country's foreign policy and international relations. This is particularly true of the late 1980s and the 1990s. Even so, with regard to the latter part of the 1980s, authors tend to agree that the period presents challenges to Brazilian African policy, even if they may

¹⁰ Original in English.

¹¹ According to Anthony Marx (1998, 167-8), racial democracy builds on an idea of Brazil as an inclusive society characterized by the absence of racial discrimination. It finds its source on reinterpretations of slavery to frame in the context of a "paternalistic tolerance". Africa was remembered through its contributions to Brazilian culture without reference to its connections to the harms brought by slavery. The term became widely known through the work of Gilberto Freyre and it was intrinsically linked to Brazilian nationalism.

disagree on the importance of Africa in general to Brazil's international aspirations. As such, whereas José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (1996) states that the Sarney government followed the determinants of Brazil's African affairs as established in the 1970s, Cláudio Ribeiro (2007; 2008) points to a lack of priority accorded to Africa as other regions came to be of greater interest. Gladys Lechini (2006; 2008), in her turn, speaks of the first signs of selectivity in African partnerships.

Greater consensus can, nonetheless, be found in studies of Brazil's African affairs between the 1990s and early 2000s with authors generally referring to a distancing and selectivity in Brazil's engagement in the continent (Saraiva 1996; Lechini 2006; Ribeiro 2007). In his seminal analysis on the matter, José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (1996) stresses that

(...) two controversial movements characterize African policy in the 1990s. First, the visible decline in exchanges, already clear in the second half of the 1980s, and accelerated in the present decade. Brazil's relations with Africa, when compared to the integrationist surge in the Plata region of America and movements, still uncertain, of the country's international insertion in the 1990s, marked this downward tendency. The downward trend, however, does not mean the end of contacts. On the contrary, the policy persists, but in a selective manner, with specific and well-defined priorities on the continent. The great African policy of the 1970s and part of the 1980s gives way to an approach limited to a few countries, regions and themes. The second movement is gradual deconstruction of the imaginary argument that had facilitated Brazil's commercial contacts with Africa in recent decades. The culturalist discourse brandished by Brazilian diplomats and businessmen in Africa, illusory backbone in the affirmation of Brazilian Africanity, shows its limits in the 1990s (Saraiva 1996, 217).

Lula da Silva's accession to power in 2003 has spurred greater interest within the academic community as Brazil expanded its footprint across the continent (e.g. White 2010; Saraiva 2012; Visentini 2013; Santander 2014). Lyal White (2010), for instance, offers a typology of Brazilian engagement in Africa during Lula da Silva's terms in office that is divided into three categories: economic exchanges, political-diplomatic interactions and development cooperation. Paulo Visentini (2013) presents a detailed portrait of Brazil's

relations with Africa until the first two years of Dilma Rousseff's administration (2011-2), while also analysing interactions by regions across Africa.

Others have proposed a more longitudinal approach to the study of the evolution of Brazil-Africa relations. Even if Africa is not the main focus of their analysis, Elaine Vilella and Pedro Neiva (2011) use content analysis to compare over a thousand of Cardoso and Lula da Silva's speeches. As a result, they find that, while references to Africa do not reach 10% of the former declarations, they reach near 20% of those during the latter's terms. Cláudio Ribeiro (2007), on the other hand, seeks to identify variations in Brazil's interactions with Africa between Sarney and Lula da Silva's first term in office. Although the use of interviews with Brazilian authorities proves rich in details, the author's analysis at times lacks rigor in terminology and the systematic use of its theoretical framework. Interest over Dilma Rousseff's ties with Africa have, up to now, received less attention. Even so, the aforementioned study by Paulo Visentini (2013) and that of Guilherme de Oliveira (2014) bring a somewhat detailed portrait of developments during Rousseff's administration.

Despite the valuable contributions made by these and other authors, discussion on the processes that have led to the alteration of Brazil's profile and footprint in Africa have remained limited, thus posing a challenge to the systematization of the existing knowledge. For instance, Christina Stolte (2015, 92) has stated that "(...) Brazil's rediscovery of Africa was unexpected and sudden (...)", as well as an immediate action sought by then President Lula da Silva. Even so, Stolte's (2015) central concern has been on the connection between Brazil's pursuit of international status and its implications to the country's presence in Africa. What is more, authors diverge on what should be considered as the "founding moment" of Brazil's new African approach. José Flávio Saraiva (2010) argues that the administration inaugurated in 2003 brought innovations and a more permanent basis to Brazil's African policy. He states that,

(...) there was evidence of a new political will which aimed the inversion of the picture of oscillation and inconsistency of the 1990's. But the initiatives did not bring immediate results so that Brazil's good will towards Africa was acknowledged once Africans were already used to gestures based on advancements followed by several drawbacks from the part of Brazil (...). The fact is that the revival of Brazil's African policy by the beginning of the 21st century has been held in a new background. Firstly, there is a coordinated strategy based on national interests and its protagonists, including entrepreneurs in charge of the expansion of Brazilian capitalism and diplomatic agents. Undoubtedly, a political fact that can be considered a landmark to the rebirth of this policy was the Brazil-Africa Forum: Politics, Cooperation and Commerce (...), which provided a strategic closure to the decision process (Saraiva 2010, 178-9).

Paulo Visentini (2013) alludes to the emergence of a multidimensional policy under Lula da Silva, stressing that

This change in Brazilian foreign policy is thus justified, on the one hand, by the government's greater understanding of the importance of African support to increase Brazil's projection in the international scene, within its global insertion strategy, fulfilling its aspiration as a middle power. On the other hand, the new African policy is also justified by African Renaissance, given that Africa has its status acknowledged in the international scene, in great part due to the increase in the commodities exported by the continent and the growth of Chinese investment in the region (Visentini 2013, 95).

Sebastian Santander (2014) also points to the effect the rise in power of the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) and Brazilian aspirations had on Brazil's African affairs. According to him,

L'accession au pouvoir du parti travailliste brésilien en 2003 va avoir pour effet de relancer les relations afro-brésiliennes, inaugurant un nouvel « âge d'or ». L'administration Lula est animée par la ferme conviction que la concrétisation des vieilles aspirations brésiliennes d'un monde multipolaire passe, notamment, par la multiplication et la consolidation des relations et partenariats politiques et économiques avec pays du Sud. C'est dans ce cadre doctrinal qu'il faut resituer la volonté de Brasília de se doter d'une nouvelle politique africaine et de donner au continent noir une place de choix dans son agenda extérieur, vision qui est formulée dans l'accord gouvernemental présenté en janvier 2003 devant le Congrès brésilien (Santander 2014, 101-2).

Though these writings offer insights into the determinants of Brazil's renewed approach towards Africa, they do not present any systematic or in depth analysis on the

subject. Issues such as the timing of change and its intensity are at most superficially discussed. For instance, while some authors of Brazilian foreign policy suggest that the country adopted a more critical stance towards the international order towards the end of Cardoso's administration, there have been no systematic evaluations of the impacts of this claim over Brazil's African affairs¹². Given all that, the present study remains pertinent in its objectives.

2. Theoretical framework: critical junctures and legacies

The analysis of the dynamics of change has long mobilized political scientists. Among the established theoretical frameworks to evaluate change, that of the critical junctures can offer valuable inputs. Building on the pioneering work of Polanyi (1944) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the approach has been used in several subfields ranging from comparative politics to International Relations (Collier and Collier 1999; Cappocia and Kelemen 2007). The idea of path dependence is central to the study of critical junctures, linking the different perspectives adopted by proponents of the model, such as Collier and Collier (1991), Mahoney (2001), and Pierson (2004). Cappocia and Kelemen (2007, 341), through an institutionalist standpoint, allude to a similar perspective when they introduce critical junctures as part of a “dual model of institutional development”, one where “(...) relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction (...) are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux – referred to as critical junctures (...)”. In a later contribution, Giovanni Capoccia (2015, 147) further insists on this “dual model of institutional development.

¹² Reis da Silva (2008) is one of the authors that provide a broad analysis Cardoso's foreign policy. His writings describe the increase in Brazil's criticism of the international system (*globalização assimétrica*) towards the end of the president's second term.

As it is the case with most concepts in Political Science, different definitions can be found for critical junctures. Collier and Collier (1991, 29) argue that “A critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies”. James Mahoney (2001, 113) states that critical junctures constitute “(...) choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives” leading to a situation where the chosen course of action makes it “(...) progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available”. To Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kelemen (2007, 358), they are “(...) relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest”. Similarly, Capoccia (2015, 148) introduces critical junctures “(...) as moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development (...)”.

As shown above, several scholars have sought to advance the study of critical junctures in recent decades. Among those, the work of Collier and Collier (1991) has been portrayed as a “landmark study” and central to the advancement of the critical junctures framework (Thelen 1999, 389; Capoccia 2015). To Kathleen Thelen (1999), for example, Collier and Collier (1991) address the important issue of how legacies endure over time through mechanisms of reproduction (discussed below), thus addressing what she deems as a gap in the literature on critical junctures. Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), while praising Collier and Collier’s emphasis on the study of the critical junctures themselves, identify what they perceive as weaknesses in their work and in the literature in general. For example, they

argue that “(...) critical junctures are too often equated with moments of change” (Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348)¹³.


While acknowledging the contributions of the authors mentioned above, as well as that of other political scientists, Collier and Collier’s (1991) work is the one that provides the most accurate and clear analytical tools to support the proposed analysis in the present study. That being said, one can also emphasize the clarity of the concepts and categories employed by the authors. For starters, the idea that change can be discontinuous without being necessarily revolutionary is a central point in the framework purported by the authors. Beyond that, they present clearly defined categories that allow for a more systematic understanding of the evolution of political matters. Aside critical junctures, their model is composed of the following elements:

- Antecedent conditions: the starting point of the analysis, the antecedent conditions “(...) represent the “base line” against which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed” (Collier and Collier 1991, 30), therefore allowing for the comparison between the previous scenario and the legacy supposedly brought about by the juncture itself.
- Cleavage or crisis: these are either a precise moment (crisis) or an existing dynamic “(...) that emerges out of the antecedent conditions and in turn triggers the critical juncture” (Collier and Collier 1991, 30)

¹³ Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) argue that change need not be present for a critical juncture to be defined as such. In fact, they argue that “Tempting as it may be to equate critical junctures and change, this view is not commensurable with the emphasis on structural fluidity and heightened contingency that are the defining traits of critical junctures. Contingency implies that wide-ranging change is possible and even likely but also that re-equilibration is not excluded. If an institution enters a critical juncture, in which several options are possible, the outcome may involve the restoration of the pre-critical juncture status quo (...) If change was possible and plausible, considered, and ultimately rejected in a situation of high uncertainty, then there is no reason to discard these cases as “non-critical” junctures” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 352). Accordingly, the authors introduce what they term *near misses* to the analysis of critical junctures.

- Legacy: “The sequence of political events, relationships, and dynamics of change hypothesized to be the outcome of a critical juncture” (Collier and Collier 1991, 785). The production, reproduction and stability of the main characteristics of the legacy depend on a series of mechanisms that seek to ensure its consolidation and longevity. Finally, it should be noted that every legacy will necessarily end at a certain point in time.
- Rival explanations: in particular, those that emanate from constant causes, that is, “(...) attributes of the system that may contribute to the presumed stability of the legacy, but that are not the product of the critical juncture” (Collier and Collier 1991, 37).

Figure 1. Critical junctures: analytical framework



Source: Collier and Collier 1991, 30.

The duration of a critical juncture varies according to the circumstances of each case, ranging from “(...) relatively quick transitions (...) to an extended period that might correspond to one or more presidential administrations, a long "policy period", or a

prolonged "regime period"" (Collier and Collier 1991, 32). The legacy must also be determined on a case by case basis, as the critical juncture in question may only have an impact on the specific result under study by the researcher (Collier and Collier 1991; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Finally, Collier and Collier's framework also provides for the possibility that some of the elements of the legacy are directly related the antecedent conditions, as shown in the figure above.

The critical junctures framework has been used in the analysis of the emergence of integration between Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s by Matias Spektor (2002). The author, nonetheless, proposes a few adjustments to the model, which are also followed in the present study. First, he argues that the hypothesized changes did not transform the political and social landscape in Argentina nor in Brazil, contrary to the outcome of Collier and Collier's (1991) comparative historical analysis. Beyond that, Spektor gives greater emphasis to the role of agents as proponents of change, as opposed to using a structural approach.

3. Hypothesis

The previous discussion has in turn led to the following hypothesis: **the new profile of Brazil's engagement with Africa is the result of a critical juncture that affected Brazil's African policy between 2003 and 2006.** During this time, President Lula da Silva and key foreign policy decision-makers – in particular Foreign Minister Celso Amorim – presided over two substantive changes in Brazil's African policy: (i) revision of Africa's role and value in the context of Brazil's strategic calculations and international aspirations; (ii) transformation of the symbolic elements that had long characterized Brazil's approach to Africa, from the ongoing culturalist discourse towards an emphasis on the recognition of a historic and moral debt, as is suggested by José Flávio Saraiva (2012). The hypothesis under analysis here establishes that these two changes must occur simultaneously and be

consistently pursued in order to characterize the significant change proposed by the theoretical framework.

In accordance with the critical juncture framework, this hypothesis has a few implications, namely: (i) that before 2003, no systematic and sustained efforts had been made to change the distancing and selectivity that characterized Brazil's African affairs from the mid-1980's through 2002; (ii) that the group that came to power in 2003 is at the origin of the legacy originating from the critical juncture; (iii) that the legacy extends beyond its initial implementation through the adoption of mechanisms to ensure its reproduction.

It is hypothesized that the critical juncture lasted for almost the entirety of President Lula da Silva's first mandate (2003-6). More than a specific event or "founding moment", one speaks here of a series of processes and concerted actions by foreign policy decision-makers who had to face the opposition and critique of some political parties, the media and private actors – a point raised by Christina Stolte (2015). In this sense, the 2006 elections would allow for the consolidation of changes, opening the way for the production and reproduction of the legacy in its main features at least until 2015.

That being said, it is important to emphasize that the periodization of the critical juncture has been determined to make the analysis more intelligible in a dynamic that is analogous to an ideal-type, with some characteristics of the legacy emerging throughout Lula da Silva's first term in office¹⁴. Finally, the present study examines only the dynamics pertaining to the realm of Brazil's African affairs. As such, comparisons and conclusions related to other domains of Brazilian foreign affairs remain outside the scope of this research.

¹⁴ This also seems to apply to the analysis of the Brazilian case by Collier and Collier (1991). A careful reading shows the overlap between the end of the critical juncture and the period known as the "aftermath". In taking into account the notion of ideal-types, the present study follows a similar orientation adopted by Spektor (2002).

4. Methodology

The present study is of a qualitative nature. It relies mostly on the textual analysis of speeches, statements, *communiqués*, messages, interviews and memoirs of the key players involved in Brazil's African affairs since the mid-1980s. The speeches, *communiqués*, messages and statements originated from official government pages and publications, such as the Library of the Presidency (*Biblioteca da Presidência da República*) and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The selection of the material relied on two criteria: (i) declarations made during bilateral and multilateral visits between Brazil and Africa, as well as in main international forums and regional initiatives involving both sides; (ii) the use of the following keywords and expressions on general and foreign policy documents by relevant actors: "Africa" (*África*), "African" (*africano/africana*), "race" (*raça*), "racial" (*racial*); "debt" (*dívida*), "Community" (*Comunidade*), "Portuguese language" (*língua portuguesa*), "Atlantic" (*Atlântico*), as well as specific mentions to African nations. The writings of experts in the field, as well as official reports and media articles are used to complement the analysis.

Special attention is given to the actions and strategies of President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, held as central actors for our hypothesis. If the literature on Brazilian foreign policy already admits the influence of other actors in its conception and implementation, it remains a fact that *Itamaraty* remains a key institution in the matter. Beyond that, even if its autonomy has always been subjected to varying degrees of presidential acquiescence, some authors postulate that presidential diplomacy has nonetheless become more influential since the mid-1990s (Danese 1999; Lima 2000; Cason and Power 2009; Milani and Pinheiro 2013), thus justifying the analysis of the President's role in Brazil's African affairs.

Finally, the present study follows Collier and Collier (1991) and Spektor (2002) in acknowledging that the analysis offers a partial explanation of the phenomenon at hand. In that sense, the logic of the argument remains that of probability, meaning that the legacy was not inevitable. Furthermore, following Spektor (2002), it must be noted that the systematic use of the theoretical framework seeks to make the analysis more consistent and coherent. That being said, if any inconsistencies between the framework and the data are made evident, the latter shall have precedence.

CHAPTER 2

BETWEEN DISTANCE AND SELECTIVITY: BRAZIL AND AFRICA FROM 1985 TO 2002

By the end of the 1980s, Brazil's engagement towards Africa had lost the momentum it had experienced in the previous years. As the economic and debt crises imposed internal and external difficulties to Brazil's international stance, interactions came to rely more sharply on political and cultural exchanges. It was indeed during this period in time that initiatives such as ensuring the non-nuclear status of the South Atlantic Ocean and the promotion of the Portuguese language were developed. As we shall see in this chapter, in the latter part of the decade, Brazilian partnerships in Africa became more selective, a trend that would continue all the way through the following decade. Even more so, selectivity would come to be coupled with a growing distancing as Africa lost its strategic value to Brazilian foreign policy (Saraiva 1996; Ribeiro 2008).

As neoliberalism made its way into Brazilian foreign policy in the 1990s, priorities shifted with Brazil according greater importance to regional integration, interactions with developed nations, and seeking to conform to international regimes. In this context, there seemed to be little room to prioritize African Affairs, despite reassurances that Africa remained a foundational stone of Brazil's historic and cultural fabric. Even if variations can be found from one administration to another, notably the brief spur in interactions during Itamar Franco's interlude (1992-4), there seemed to be little in government action to indicate a willingness to reverse the continuing loss of momentum in the country's African affairs. José Saraiva (1996), for instance, attempts to summarize the choices behind Brazil's interactions with Africa in the early 1990s. According to him, four axes could be identified: (i) South Africa; (ii) Angola; (ii) the South Atlantic, through the South Atlantic Peace and

Cooperation Zone; (iv) the Community of Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP) and its African members. These stand as good starting points, though they need to be further developed and qualified to include developments through the entirety of the period here under analysis and the results of newer research.

The present chapter thus explores in greater detail the period extending from 1985 through 2002 in regard to Brazil's African policy and presence in that continent. It sets the antecedent conditions to the argument made in this paper. It seeks to do so by focusing on three main issues. First, it analyses the evolution of Brazilian African policy during this period in time, concentrating on actions, partnerships and motivations as put forward by government officials. Second, it explores the alternative suggestion that alterations in Brazil's foreign policy at the end of Cardoso's second term pointed to a shift in momentum in African affairs. Finally, it explores the foreign policy crisis and the electoral process that laid open the possibility of deeper change in Brazil's African policy in the upcoming years.

1. The end of consensus and the first signs of retreat: The José Sarney years (1985-1990)

Across several documents, it is possible to note that the Brazilian government still sought to highlight Africa as an important scenario for Brazil's international insertion (Sarney 1986a), even as difficulties in the development of those ties were already apparent. On the Message to Congress in 1986, an annual document pointing out achievements and future plans across several domains of government action, one can already find some of the prominent topics of Brazil's African policy during the José Sarney administration (1985-90).

Relations with African countries, which suffer with the aggravation of economic problems, continue to intensify. Innovative alternatives so as not to interrupt trade, technical cooperation and cultural flows are being studied. On the other hand, the Brazilian policy of condemning the racist matter in the South African Republic, object of a presidential decree, determined the adoption of sanctions against that country (Presidência 1986, 85).

Even if President José Sarney reaffirmed the continent's priority to Brazilian foreign policy, it is possible to note the beginning of Brazil's economic withdrawal from positions in Africa, while political and cultural interactions became more prominent (Ribeiro 2008). Not only so, the end of the decade witnesses the start of selectivity in partnerships as shifts in priority domains and themes bring certain partners to the forefront of Brazilian interest.

Democratic transition in Brazil¹ coincided with the worsening of economic conditions as the effects of the debt crisis came to be felt both internally and on the country's ability to effectively pursue its foreign policy goals. The final years of the "lost decade" would be characterized by economic crisis, rampant inflation, and the failure of a series of economic stabilization plans adopted by the government. Internationally, developments such as the end of the Cold War, the breakdown in Third World unity and the toughening of negotiations with developed countries and international financial institutions – the latter pushing for economic liberalization – would all impose further hardship on the maintenance of Brazil's foreign policy strategies. These developments are particularly important here because they help explain the decline of Brazil-Africa trade levels as early as 1986 (Sennes 2003; Ribeiro 2008; Prado and Shiguenoli 2010).

According to Ricardo Sennes (2003), the aforementioned developments would directly impact Brazil's foreign partnerships starting in the late 1980s and extending into the beginning of the following decade. Faced with the need to increase trade surplus to ensure

¹ President José Sarney was appointed to power after indirect elections marking the transition from military rule. Initially vice-president in a coalition with Tancredo Neves, he came to replace the latter after he passed away.

debt repayment, Brazil's strategy to diversify its partners by focusing on a crisis-stricken developing world became harder to sustain, prompting an increase in relations with developed countries. On a similar note, Brazil's economic crisis made it harder to continue fostering the financial mechanisms at the backbone of the country's insertion in Africa (Sennes 2003; Santana 2003; Ribeiro 2008). Influenced by efforts made by previous administrations, Brazilian trade with Africa rose in 1985 only to be followed by a sharp decline the following year. From over 3.7 billion USD in 1985, numbers dropped to 1.6 in 1986. The decline is noticeable in both imports, which go from just over 1.7 billion USD to around 691 million USD, and exports, which stay below the 1 billion USD mark after reaching just above 2 billion USD in the previous year² (Ribeiro 2008).

Even as trade with Africa lost momentum, the Sarney government sought to deepen some of the diplomatic initiatives pursued by his predecessor. As such, one of the main themes mobilizing Brazilian interest in Africa was the condemnation of *apartheid*, a recurrent topic in speeches made by President Sarney during exchanges with African officials and on important international stages, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Sarney 1985; 1987). In his first speech there as Head of State in 1985, he stated that

In Brazil, racial discrimination is not only illegitimate – it is illegal, a crime provided for in criminal law. As such, we find the recrudescence of racial conflict dictated by racial intolerance, or the persistence of colonial configurations, appalling. I solemnly reiterate our total condemnation of apartheid and our unconditional support to the immediate emancipation of Namibia, under the auspices of the United Nations (...) As my country's President, I have renewed a few weeks ago the prohibition to export oil and oil products, guns and ammunition, licenses and patents to South Africa, while I also suspended cultural, artistic, and sport exchange activities with the Pretoria government (Sarney 1985, 269).

² A graph presenting the evolution of trade between Brazil and Africa between 1985 and 2015 can be found in Annex A.

A newly-democratic Brazil thus sought to deepen its critique of the South African regime (Lechini 2006). Criticism of Pretoria would also extend to repeated calls for the independence of Namibia and a halt to all South African incursions in neighboring countries, such as Angola. Those were coupled with important visits from key figures from political movements in both Namibia and South Africa. In March 1987, it was Sam Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) that visited Brazil; he was followed by Anglican bishop Desmond Tutu later that year (Sarney 198; Saraiva 1996). Despite all this, Brazil chose not to sever diplomatic ties with South Africa as, Gladys Lechini (2006) contends, *Itamaraty* saw it as a way to better grasp developments inside that country, even if some may argue that economic considerations played a considerable stake.

The evolution of affairs in the South Atlantic region would gain considerable attention from the administration. Brazil's denials to the constitution of OTAS, previously discussed, would be translated into a concrete project for the establishment of the South Atlantic Cooperation Zone. The initial project, authored by Brazilian diplomat Antonio Celso Sousa e Silva, attributed greater responsibility to Brazil in ensuring the absence of nuclear weapons in the region. The final version of the project was introduced to the United Nations in 1985 and approved in October of the following year by Resolution 41/11 (Saraiva 1996; Ribeiro 2008)³. The first meeting of member countries took place in 1988, in the city of Rio de Janeiro. According to José Flavio Saraiva (1996), the establishment of what he terms as a *Pax atlantica* was the greatest success of Brazil's African policy in the 1980s.

The shared heritage of the Portuguese language would also be explored as an asset in Brazil's interactions with Africa – and, one must add, with Portugal. President Sarney visited Cape Verde in 1986; in 1989, he would embark on a journey to Angola. In it, he

³ The United States were the only country to vote against the project; France, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, Japan, Portugal and the Netherlands, abstained (Saraiva 1996).

would follow Foreign Minister Roberto de Abreu Sodré, who had already been to Angola in 1986 (Lechini 2006). In 1989, an important step would be taken with the establishment of the International Portuguese Language Institute (IILP) during a meeting with Heads of State from Portuguese Speaking Countries and Portugal, held as the first step to the constitution of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) (Santos 2001). On that occasion, President Sarney would claim that

With the creation of the International Portuguese Language Institute, we will open, to our societies, the doors to a future of shared achievements. In our diversity, we will find the factions that will unite us and render us capable of projecting our culture, the Portuguese language culture, to the prominent place it deserves to occupy in the universe of the great contemporary civilizations (Sarney 1989, 514-5).

These political and cultural developments do not undermine the fact that Brazil's African policy faced considerable challenges at the time. If those were most evident on economic ties, they were not limited to them. For instance, one notes a decline of the relative number of Brazilian diplomats on Africa soil from just over 10% in 1984 to near 8% between 1987 and 1988. Even more so, despite the author's optimism, José Flávio Saraiva (1996) mentions the breakdown of consensus over Brazil's African matters during the 1980s with the debt crisis. Brazil's focus thus shifts to a smaller number of countries and themes, particularly Southern Africa and Lusophone Africa by building on cultural connections⁴. At that time, the country's foreign interests were increasingly on regional integration, thus the development with Argentina, and on enlarging its presence on developed markets (Sennes 2003).

Finally, a note must be made regarding the symbolic elements of Brazil's African policy at the time. As shown in the previous chapter, the culturalist discourse had been a

⁴ Nigeria is also one of Brazil's priorities in the continent given the importance of its oil-based trade with Brazil (Machado 2013).

central element of Brazil's approach to its African partners. It is not different during President Sarney's administration, and that despite the distancing and selectivity in partnerships. This discourse is particularly evident in the government's condemnation of *apartheid* in South Africa as a justification for Brazil's chosen course of action, as shown by the quote below.

This peace is threatened by the conflicts that upset the lives of Southern African countries, by the unacceptable delay to Namibia's independence and by the intolerable persistence of *apartheid*, the injustice of which always manifests itself, in a shocking manner, in the bloody conflicts that characterize everyday South Africa. Brazil is proud to be a racial democracy (Sarney 1986b, 243).

2. The Collor de Mello administration (1990-2): deepening distance and selectivity

Under Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-2), the pursuit of modernization became key. Brazil should strive to modernize itself under a neoliberal approach that sought liberalization and the withdrawal of the state from its central role in Brazilian development. This neoliberal perspective had clear implications to Brazil's foreign policy, not least in the reorientation of its main external priorities. In all fairness, the influence of neo-liberal thinking was already felt during José Sarney's government, despite never amounting to be the dominant perspective at the time (Lafer 1993; Saraiva 1996; Casarões 2011). President Collor de Mello would rely on exponents of this line of thought within and outside of *Itamaraty*, by appointing outsiders Francisco Rezek (1990-2) and Celso Lafer (1992) as Foreign Ministers.

Three were the main foreign policy goals pursued by Brazil at the time: "1) update the country's international agenda (...), 2) build a positive agenda with the United States and 3) dismantle Brazil's Third World profile" (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995, 6). Topics such as the environment, nuclear energy, and human rights, which had been major contention points to the country in previous decades, became major items on the agenda. The Rio-92 Conference

on the Environment was a result of those efforts (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995). Under Celso Lafer, efforts at a better understanding with the United States would fall under Brazil's "operational partnerships", which included Europe and Japan in the hall of important economic developed partners. The member countries of the Common Market of the South (*Mercado Comum do Sul* – MERCOSUL) – which was established in 1991 – and Latin America were also key, for they were seen as "(...) our circumstance, our life, our destiny" (Lafer 1993, 279). Other than that, a few countries, such as China, were thought of as "niche opportunities" (Lafer 1993).

A look at Brazil's stated priorities at the time shows that Africa was not among them. Even if President Collor de Mello and his foreign ministers would call for the intensification of ties in official speeches (Collor 1990b), no concrete efforts were made to reverse the downward trend seen since the previous government. If anything, distance between Brazil and Africa grew and selectivity was reinforced. This is corroborated in interviews conducted by researcher Cláudio Ribeiro (2009), where the President admits that relations had to be somewhat put on stand by as Brazil struggled to adapt to a changing world.

As Brazil still struggled with the ongoing economic crisis, Africa was seen as unable to give a meaningful contribution to the country's needs, especially as it had its own economic and political difficulties at the turn of the decade (Ribeiro 2009). Despite a slight recovery in absolute numbers in Brazilian exports to Africa (over 1 billion USD in 1990 and 1991), Africa's share did not go beyond 3.27% during those two years; imports also went up in absolute numbers, particularly in 1991 (close to 840 million USD), but still remained under 4%. Nigeria, still one of Brazil's main economic partners due to its oil trade, seemed to account for the bulk of variation – Brazilian imports from that country went from just over 61 million USD (1990) to 248.7 million USD the following year. In both years, Angola and

Algeria, both oil exporting countries, also stood out as Brazil's main import sources (Lechini 2006).

Selectivity in economic affairs was accompanied by similar developments in political and diplomatic interactions. During his two years in office, it was the evolution of affairs in Southern Africa and in Portuguese-Speaking countries (PALOP) that continued to mobilize some of Brazil's interest. In his speech at the opening session of the UNGA in 1990, for example, Namibia's independence and the liberation of Nelson Mandela were both quoted. Namibia's accession to the ZOPACAS was a much hailed event at the second meeting of the heads of state, which took place in Nigeria in 1990; in 1991, Nelson Mandela himself would make a visit to Brazil. With regards to Lusophone Africa, the President's inaugural speech singled out the Portuguese language community as a priority within that continent (Collor 1990a; 1990b; Saraiva 1996; Ribeiro 2008). Consistent with these, President Collor de Mello visited Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia in September 1991.

These characteristics were still accompanied by elements of the culturalist discourse, as when Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek would express that "The practice of *apartheid* goes against human conscience and dignity and it represents the antithesis of Brazilian society, which is proud of its multiracial formation as an element of stability and social harmony". (Rezek, 1990, 70); or when the president stated that "Africa will always be present in each Brazilian, in our culture, in our customs, in our multiracial society and in our option for peace and cooperation amongst nations" (Mello 1991, 121).

Collor de Mello's administration would be interrupted by the onset of an institutional crisis that led to his removal in October 1992 amidst impeachment proceedings and his subsequent resignation later that year. He was replaced by vice-president Itamar Franco who stayed in power until December 1994.

3. Restoring *momentum* while consolidating selectivity: the short-lived Itamar Franco years (1992-4)

As the dust from the institutional crisis settled, Brazil sought to strengthen its efforts on foreign policy which had fallen behind internal demands. First with Fernando Henrique Cardoso as foreign minister (10/1992 – 05/1993), and subsequently, Ambassador Celso Amorim (08/1993 – 12/1994), neoliberal inclinations were toned down and competed more openly with a more nationalist approach under Itamar Franco. The MERCOSUL project was continued, but its sense modified to fit a more strategic insertion for Brazil in a globalized world, as opposed to the instrumental character for liberalization seen in the previous administration. It was also during Itamar's government that the idea of a South American Free Trade Zone (ALCSA) emerged as the United States put forward its own ideas for economic relations on the hemisphere. Emphasis was placed on multilateral fora, particularly in pushing for the reform of the United Nations and in enhancing Brazil's presence through participation in peacekeeping missions. Internally, efforts at economic stabilization continued, culminating in the success of the *Plano Real*⁵ (Hirst e Pinheiro 1995; Sennes 2003; Canani 2004; Reis da Silva 2008).

It was during Itamar Franco's short mandate that Brazil sought to regain some momentum in its African affairs, most notably through negotiations to establish the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). As proponent of the project back in 1989, former Minister of Culture José Aparecido da Silva was named Brazilian ambassador to Portugal and tasked with gathering support from the Portuguese and Lusophone African countries to the proposition (Saraiva 2001). Speaking about the project and its role within Brazil's place in Africa in early 1993, then Foreign Minister Cardoso claimed that

⁵Fernando Henrique Cardoso left his position as foreign minister to become finance minister in May 1993. He is responsible for *Plano Real*, an economic plan that stabilized Brazil's economy (Reis da Silva 2008).

(...) it is natural that the PALOP be reserved a privileged space in the attention we devote to Africa. For this reason, we seek to add a new political action instrument destined to institutionally pave and consolidate towards Portuguese-speaking African countries. There lies the meaning of the creation of a Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (...) The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries is not moved by sentimentality. Its establishment corresponds to a trend in the current international perspective, with the end of bipolarity, that opened way for new initiatives to bring together countries with affinities, sometimes derived from economic interest, other times based on political or cultural values (Cardoso 1993b, 219).

Efforts towards the establishment of the CPLP involved visits to prospective African partners by José Aparecido da Silva, as well as high-level meetings. The decision to officially establish the community was made in early 1994, when the foreign ministers, together in Brasilia, decided to create a permanent committee tasked with taking the appropriate measures to launch the project. Nonetheless, its effective implementation would be delayed until July 1996⁶. Whereas the integrative potential of the Portuguese language is clearly at the basis of the CPLP, two other dimensions are also evident – and would later become official in the Constitutive Act of the community. The first of these dimensions is that of technical cooperation; the second, of a political nature, was, at that moment, geared towards aiding in the ongoing civil war struggle in Angola and also to contribute to and salute the efforts at pacification in Mozambique (Santos 2001; Saraiva 2001).

Under President Itamar Franco, Brazilian foreign policy also sought to articulate its connections to Lusophone Africa with Brazil's participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. On the innovations and achievements of Franco's administration, then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim would comment:

But it was also the first time that Brazil participated with troops, in a peacekeeping operation, it was in Mozambique. And the decision to participate in Angola was also made in Itamar Franco's government. Later, its implementation came only in...I do not remember the date

⁶ The two scheduled meetings in 1994 did not take place since President Itamar Franco was unable to attend the first, and his Angolan counterpart missed the second one. Internal disputes in Brazil would subsequently interfere with implementation (Saraiva 2001), as will be briefly discussed in the next section.

anymore. But, then, these are also points that I find important. Let us say, still within this spirit of modulating our foreign policy so as not to seem that it was totally linked – to not seem and not be totally linked – to developed countries, I would say these initiatives in South America are important (Amorim 2003b, 13).

Whilst there was a clear vision of not limiting Brazil's partnerships to the developed world, this did not translate into the reversion of selectivity and distancing from the African continent. In fact, the African continent as a whole was not among Brazil's international priorities, even if official discourse sought to highlight its somewhat perennial place in Brazilian foreign policy (Amorim 1994a; 1994b). Back in 1992, when enquired on the matter of priorities of Brazilian foreign policy, Foreign Minister Cardoso had replied they would be in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and above all, Asia (Cardoso 1992 *apud* Saraiva 1996).

Beyond the PALOP, Brazil focused its attention on a prospective relationship with South Africa as that country experienced regime change. This included welcoming South Africa into the ZOPACAS. Following *Itamaraty's* efforts, the third meeting of member countries relaunched the initiative. The representatives that attended the meeting adopted three specific declarations focused on protecting the marine environment and ensuring its sustainability in economic activities; renewing the commitment to keep the region free of nuclear weapons; and fostering economic ties between member-countries (MRE 1994). On that occasion, President Itamar Franco would assert that

The Brasilia meeting marks the extension of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic to all the countries on the Latin American and African borders of the South Atlantic. The nations from South American and 21 African countries, from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Verde and Senegal, constitute this community of States that is revitalized with the end of institutional racial discrimination and the strengthening of democracy (Franco 1994, 190).

Despite these developments, there seems to be little in the way of a broader strategy to engage with the African continent. Regarding economic affairs, even if Brazilian imports rose from 551 million USD in 1992, to over 1.2 billion USD the following year, this represented 4.6% of Brazil's imports for that same year. This share would drop to 3.24% in 1994, even if in absolute numbers the decline is not so pronounced (1.07 billion USD). Brazil's exports remained above the 1 billion USD mark, oscillating between 2.88% and 3.1% in 1993 and 1994, respectively (Lechini 2006). Brazil's diplomatic presence in Africa reinforces this trend. Whereas in the previous decade the country had 34 diplomats stationed on African soil, in 1993, this number was reduced to 24. The decline is also visible in relative numbers. Between 1983 and 1993, the total number of Brazilian diplomats rose from 362 to 418. Comparatively, the numbers of diplomats rose from 44 to 52 in North America, from 134 to 161 in Europe, and from 68 to 77 in South America in that same period (Saraiva 1996)⁷.

Similar to previous administrations, Itamar Franco's government still relied on culturalist elements to justify Brazil's appeal to Africa. In the context of the CPLP project, this discourse relates directly to an Afro-Luso-Brazilian cultural identity. In broader terms, it continues to evoke the cultural and ethnic ties that bring both borders of the Atlantic together (Cardoso, 1993a; 1993b).

4. The continuity of distance and selectivity: the Fernando Henrique Cardoso years (1995-2002)

During President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government, Brazil pursued its accession to international regimes and favored multilateral organizations in the hopes of

⁷ Brazil's African policy would become a matter of controversy in early 1993, following declarations by the Foreign Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Lechini 2006).

contributing to a cooperative international environment conducive to its foreign interests. In 1998, the country would adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example; Brazil's favoring of the World Trade Organization (WTO) also fits with that logic. MERCOSUL, and later South America more generally, was at the center of Brazilian foreign policy, with the country actively pursuing free trade deals between the bloc and other groupings and countries, including South Africa. Improving relations with developed countries was also one of the main features of Cardoso's foreign policy, in particular with the United States and Europe (Vigevani, Cepaluni and Cintra 2003; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Reis da Silva 2008). As Brazil explored possibilities in these domains and expanded its ties in Asia, "(...) Africa's relative position loses appeal" (Pimentel 2000, 8).

Similar to the previous presidents and their foreign ministers, the Cardoso administration evokes Brazil's long-lasting ties to the African continent, while at the same time acknowledging the challenges in this relationship. In an article for the newspaper *Correio Braziliense* in May 1996, Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia stated that

Since the beginning of Fernando Henrique's government, *Itamaraty* has been updating its relations with Africa (...) which translates the idea that Africa must be a creative priority to us (...) Our commitment to Brazil-Africa relations is strong. Africa is an unreplaceable goal to Brazilian diplomacy (...) We are staffing our diplomatic missions in Africa more appropriately, restructuring the portrait of cumulative embassies to render them more efficient and establishing diplomatic relations with seven Africa countries with which we still did not have relations or exchanged missions (...) We are cooperating with African countries within our possibilities – which honestly differ greatly to those that prevailed in the 70s and early 80s, when there were objective conditions to offer subsidized credits to several African countries. Today, there is another state of affairs in Brazil and Africa. It is necessary to work with this reality (Lampreia 1996, 296-8).

The limitations of Brazil's African policy are evident in the closing of diplomatic missions across the continent, justified by budgetary restrictions. This was the case in Zambia, Togo, Cameroon, Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Ethiopia (Ribeiro 2007). While Africa did not, as one notes, disappear from the outline of Brazilian

foreign policy, mentions of it make evident the selectivity in partnerships. On the first Message to the Congress in 1995, the chapter on foreign policy speaks of enhancing ties with traditional economic partners in Africa, to which South Africa is now added; the consolidation of the Community of Portuguese Speaking is also noted. Foreign Minister Lampreia confirms this trend on a later interview on the subject when he asserts that

There is no doubt that our policy with regards to the Africa continent was one of complete openness and receptivity because Brazil has ethnic, cultural affinities with Africa. This is evident. From an operational point of view, we centered this relationship in a few countries, since we did not have the capability to turn this into cultural actions, into considerably vast technical cooperation actions including budgetary matters. As such, we prioritized countries with a particular potential: Angola, with which we have very old historic relations and that was in the process of a very difficult civil war (...) We also had important acting in Mozambique and other Portuguese-Speaking countries. South Africa was the main bet in my phase (Lampreia 2006 *apud* Ribeiro 2007, 138-9).

Foreign Minister Lampreia visited South Africa twice as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The first visit, in 1995, was meant as a preparation for Cardoso's trip the following year. Aside from the 1996 visit, President Cardoso traveled to South Africa again in 2000. During that same time, both President Mandela, and his successor Thabo Mbeki would visit Brazil (Lechini 2006). Brazilian interest over South Africa had both commercial and political implications. In fact, the signing of a framework agreement between MERCOSUL and the South African government in 2000 – a first step towards envisaged free trade – was one of the main themes of the relationship at the time. Politically, one of the high points of the Brazil-South Africa relationship during Cardoso's government would be the alliance between both countries and India to challenge pharmaceutical patents over the production of HIV/Aids drugs (Vigevani, Cepaluni and Cintra 2003; Oliveira 2005; Lechini 2006).

On the 17th of July 1996, in Lisbon, the heads of state and government from Portugal, Brazil, and the PALOP gathered to formally establish the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. Between the beginning of Cardoso's first term in office and the said

date, two other high-level meetings were held in preparation for the CPLP in Lisbon and Maputo, respectively. Preparations on Brazil's side were the subject of minor internal controversy over statements by then Brazilian ambassador to Portugal, Itamar Franco, over the situation in East Timor and his desire to assign José Aparecido da Silva as the first Executive Secretary of the organization. In the end, alphabetical criteria would be followed (Santos 2001).

Pursuant to its Statute, the CPLP has three goals:

a) political-diplomatic dialogue among its members in matters of international relations, namely to strengthen its presence in international fora; b) cooperation, particularly in the economic, social, cultural, legal and technical-scientific fields; c) the materialization for projects that promote and diffuse of the Portuguese Language (CPLP 2001, 173-4)⁸

The CPLP would prove instrumental in appeasing political tensions in Guinea-Bissau in 1998. Several would be the meetings among governmental representatives, both over specific themes and the broader scope of the organization. In 2000, pursuant to the rotation, Brazil nominated Dulce Pereira, a long time racial and gender equality activist to the Executive Secretariat; she would stay on the post until 2002⁹.

The Community's achievements would nonetheless coexist with practical difficulties such as the ongoing civil conflict in Angola, the somewhat divergent expectations of its members, or even the meager availability of resources to fund projects within the community. Whereas African members wished to expand technical cooperation and political dialogue, the Portuguese emphasized the promotion of the Portuguese language (Saraiva 2001). On the other hand, according to José Flávio Saraiva (2001), Brazil had, for the most part, lost its ambition to use the CPLP as a means of ensuring his presence in Africa under President Cardoso.

⁸ The wording of the objectives was later amended, but it keeps with the basic idea expressed her.

⁹ In 2002, an independent East Timor joined the CPLP.

The evolution of technical cooperation under the CPLP banner illustrates the achievements and challenges to consolidate a Community approach to the issue. Though one of the CPLP's pillars, the implementation of projects would suffer from the initial lack of financial resources. For instance, it was only in 1999 that the creation of the CPLP's Special Fund would be agreed upon (Abreu, Gala and Fernandes 2001). Carlos Puente (2010) argues that Brazil was at first resistant to acquiesce to the fund, but started its contributions the following year¹⁰. On the other hand, Brazil would independently approve two special allocations for projects under the CPLP. The first amount, of 3.1 million USD, was allocated in 1997-8; the second, of R\$ 2.5 million, was approved in 2000 (Puente 2010).

In what regards Brazilian trade with Africa at the time, absolute numbers grew from close to 2.67 billion USD in 1995 to more than 5.3 billion in 2001 (a slight decrease was registered in 2002, when exchanges were just above the 5 billion USD). This scenario contrasts nonetheless with Africa's share of Brazilian exports, which did not go over 3.91% between 1995 and 2002. Imports would nonetheless peak at 5.99% in 2001; its lowest share registered in 1995 at 2.36% (MDIC 2011) (See Annex A).

The "liberal optimism" (Reis da Silva 2008) that had been at the base of Brazilian foreign policy under President Cardoso would come under challenge during his second term in office. Amidst the 1999 financial crisis that hit *Plano Real*, the increase in American unilateralism at the turn of the century, as well as Brazilian defeats within multilateral institutions such as the WTO, the Cardoso administration would move towards the idea of an "asymmetric globalization", i.e., towards an increasingly critical international discourse (Reis da Silva 2008).

¹⁰ Carlos Puente and Abreu, Gala and Fernandes present different values for this contribution, of 200 thousand USD and 300 thousand USD, respectively (Abreu, Gala and Fernandes 2001; Puente 2010).

Were there any spillovers onto Brazil's African policy? During Cardoso's second term, one notes that the Brazilian government does indeed allude to the idea of asymmetrical globalization in its interactions with Africa (Cardoso 2001). Nonetheless, there is little to no indication that this speech was accompanied by a move to regain lost space or even enlarge Brazil's footprint across the African continent as a way to compensate for the perceived negative dynamics in the international system. This is apparent on the number and destination of visits between Brazil and Africa, which remained concentrated on the PALOP and Southern Africa (Lechini 2006). Even the alliance with South Africa – and India – over pharmaceutical patents at the end of his administration does not go beyond the usual pattern of selectivity, nor does it lead at that point to the institutionalization of partnerships with so-called emerging nations.

This is also the case with the symbolic elements of Brazil's African policy, where changes in discourse are not accompanied by a political willingness to expand nor alter Brazil's footprint in Africa. At the start of Cardoso's administration, culturalist elements are present in the repeated remarks about cultural and historic connections between Brazil and the African continent (Cardoso, 1995). As of the president's second term, nonetheless, other features are added to these considerations, notably the acknowledgment that racial inequalities persist within the country. Such a move is consistent with the internal racial equality policies implemented early on by that government. On one occasion, the president would mention that

Let us not forget that, by strengthening its relations with Africa, Brazil reconciles with itself, with the invaluable African dimension of its formation. We rely on the inspiration and support from the Community to overcome once and for all a past of intolerance and injustice with Afro-Brazilian groups. The redemption of this debt, through the greater participation of the black population in the country's economic and social development, is a priority within my government (Cardoso 2000, 91).

5. Opening the way for change: Brazilian foreign policy and the 2002 presidential election

At the end of President Cardoso's government, difficulties faced both by Brazil's foreign policy and economic crisis would be capitalized by opposition candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during his campaign. Brazilians wanted change and Lula da Silva proved more successful at conveying that message than government candidate José Serra, and that from the early stages on the presidential election (PT 2002b; Figueiredo and Coutinho 2003).

In early 2001, President Cardoso would replace foreign minister Lampreia with Celso Lafer, in what André Reis da Silva (2008) considers as an attempt to mediate the crisis in Brazilian foreign policy at the turn of the century. During that time, *Itamaraty* would be faced with internal and external criticism, as influential diplomats publicly voiced their disagreement with particular projects, such as Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, who opposed the United States' proposal to establish a free-trade area in the Americas. The ministry's decision to remove him from his post at the time was met with harsh words from a *Folha de São Paulo* editorial, that claimed the move was an attempt by the government to remove non-liberal influences from within the ministry. Internally, the effects of the economic crisis were still present (Reis da Silva 2008).

Criticism of Cardoso's foreign policy would also come from the opposition. In June 2002, in the wake of the presidential campaign, opposition candidate Lula da Silva stated that, if elected, he would be fiercer in international negotiations (Dianni 2002). Lula da Silva's program (PT 2002b), under which he campaigned, would claim the Cardoso administration lacked a coherent and strong industrial policy that would favor exports and increase competitiveness; the country's ongoing struggles with inequality were also a contention point. Brazil thus needed a foreign policy that could provide an alternative model for development, while ensuring the country's sovereign insertion on the international sphere

and as a means to overcome external vulnerability. If regional integration was key, partnerships with regional powers were also explicitly singled out as a means to democratize international institutions and international affairs, which include ties with South Africa. Beyond that, both South Africa and the PALOP would be central in establishing a « (...) new policy towards that continent (...) » (PT 2002b, 7-8), though no specific measures are detailed in the document.

Traditionally, the Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT), under which Lula da Silva had run in three previous elections, espoused left-wing positions that extended to its visions on foreign policy. In 1989, the first direct presidential elections after democratic transition, PT's alliance with other left-wing parties called for an anti-imperialist foreign policy, for the ceasing of all payments related to Brazil's foreign debt, for the severing of diplomatic ties with South Africa, among other things (PT 1989a; Almeida 2003). In the following two elections, the anti-imperialist discourse would be toned down in favor of calls for the transformation of international institutions and world affairs in order to end the North's hegemonic control of political and economic decisions. Among other things, this would involve strengthening ties with the South. With regards to Africa, this meant a will to develop stronger partnerships with the continent, in particular with South Africa and the PALOP (PT 1994; 1998; Almeida 2003).

The multiple campaign programs over the years also included Brazil's African affairs in chapters on racism and racial equality. For instance, the 1989 program ties together the critique of racial democracy and the condemnation of *apartheid*; in 1994, a commitment was made to reassess Brazil's African policy in order to render it compatible with the fact that half of the country's population descended from that continent. On a similar note, the "Brazil Without Racism" (*Brasil sem Racismo*), a chapter of Lula da Silva's 2002 governmental program, called for new economic ties with the continent, moving beyond cultural and ethnic

connections, again emphasizing South Africa, but also within the context to increase cultural and economic ties with the developing world. (PT1989b; 1994; 2002a). In 2002, in the context of an alliance with centrist Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal* – PL), PT's propositions were in general more moderate, though still more assertive than those of governmental candidate José Serra – and that even if the latter does mention Africa in his program, with a particular emphasis on the PALOP and South Africa. On October 27th, Lula da Silva would win the presidential election with over 60% of the vote (PSDB 2002; Petista 2002; Almeida 2003).

Not long after the election, Ambassador Celso Amorim, who had occupied the highest post in *Itamaraty* during President Itamar Franco's government, would be officially announced as Brazil's new foreign minister. This marked the return of the autonomists to the highest ranks within *Itamaraty*, as opposed to the pragmatic-institutionalists that had conducted the ministry under President Cardoso. In opposition to pragmatic-institutionalists, autonomists favor a stronger stance on the international scene in order to render it more suitable to the needs of developing nations (Gomes Saraiva 2010). His initial thoughts revolved around the idea of a foreign policy. On an interview on the 18th of December 2002, he argued that Brazilian foreign policy would be built around the ideas of social change present on the president-elect's program. Africa is mentioned on occasion, reinforcing the roles of the PALOP and South Africa. Furthermore, as Celso Amorim would later recall, the mention to Africa in the president's inaugural speech was a specific inclusion by members of the new administration, an addition to the ideas the soon-to-be foreign minister had prepared for that occasion (Amorim 2002; 2011).

6. Conclusion

As economic conditions worsened in the mid to late-1980s, and the maintenance of foreign initiatives became harder to sustain, consensus over the extent of Brazil's presence in Africa started to erode. As such, the strong rhetoric of the condemnation of *apartheid*, for example, would contrast with Brazil's economic withdrawal from the continent, as the Portuguese language began to be increasingly used as a means to reach out to Lusophone Africa. As the following decade unfolded, Brazil's relative withdrawal from Africa would be accompanied by the ongoing development and consolidation of selectivity, as the reality of limited resources and other foreign policy priorities contributed to concentrate Brazil's interactions in the Southern part of the continent as well as with Portuguese-Speaking nations, the latter officially regrouped under the CPLP as of 1996. Regional integration with the MERCOSUL project deemed an at least partial replacement of the strategic value Africa had held in previous years, and relations with developed nations were at the core of Brazil's international insertion (Saraiva 1996). Such were the antecedent conditions of to Brazil's current African affairs.

Brazil's frustrated expectations on the international system at the turn of the century did not impact greatly on the country's stance towards Africa. Nor did a change in the nature of Brazil's culturalist speech, which now acknowledged the existence of racial inequalities within the country. In that interim, a cleavage, that is, the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva under a historically left-wing party, would instill the possibility of a foreign policy that relied more heavily on relations with the South, consistent with PT's programs over the years.

CHAPTER 3

WHEN STRATEGIC VALUES MEET SYMBOLIC CHANGE: A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN BRAZIL'S AFRICAN POLICY (2003-6)

With the start of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's administration (2003-10), Brazilian foreign policy would come to display a much more emphatic stance in the international scene. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be under the command of Ambassador Celso Amorim, who had served in the same position under President Itamar Franco. He was seconded by Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães as secretary-general, who had been a harsh critic of Cardoso's foreign policy. Finally, party member Marco Aurelio Garcia, joined the team as the president's Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs, while the president himself came to rely on presidential diplomacy as a strategy to push for Brazilian interests abroad (Visentini 2005; Cason and Power 2009).

From early on, it was noticeable that the new government's interpretation of the international scene and the opportunities it offered for a country such as Brazil differed from that of Cardoso's two terms in office (Leite 2011). Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007) argue that, under Lula da Silva, Brazilian foreign policy operated under the paradigm of "autonomy through diversification" as opposed to the "autonomy through participation" of his predecessor. In concrete terms, autonomy through participation meant that Brazil's engagement with international regimes would be a means to foster its interests from within, while also expressing a preference for ties with the developed world. Autonomy through diversification, for its part, is a strategy that seeks to challenge the international status quo and Brazil's position within it by establishing closer ties with emerging and other developing nations, without

undermining Brazil's engagement with developed countries. In this, as we have seen, President Lula da Silva's foreign policy distinguished itself from that of his predecessor, even if the latter had pursued a few courses of action with emerging nations. Brazilian emphasis on South-South cooperation came with an innovative dimension of solidarity which included the internationalization of the national social policy agenda, of which the greatest example was the president's national and international campaign against poverty and hunger (Lima and Hirst 2006; Puente 2010; Faria and Paradis 2013).

The present chapter thus explores the changes brought to Brazil's African policy with the start of President Lula da Silva's administration and extends into the 2006 presidential election that accorded him a second term in office. As will be shown, under the diversification strategy, African nations quickly became one of Brazil's key interests abroad. More important, nonetheless, was the new strategic role accorded to Africa by the incoming administration. This shift in Brazil's position also comprised the symbolic elements that had long informed Brazil's African affairs, in a dynamic reminiscent of a critical juncture. Critical junctures, as previously mentioned, are instances of non-incremental change that upset previously existing patterns in a given social context and that directly lead to a legacy, i.e. the establishment of a new and different pattern (Collier and Collier 1991; Spektor 2002). The chapter then moves on to explore some of the early effects of Brazil's new approach to Africa, even if this strategy had been devised to achieve long term results (Amorim 2005e). In the last section, it looks at the criticism and support towards the policy that were present throughout the period and how the lack of consensus became an issue during the 2006 election.

1. A renewed interest and a new approach: remodeling Brazil's African policy

Similar to other administrations, Lula da Silva did not fail to mention Africa in his inaugural speech, neither did Foreign Minister Amorim upon taking office (Silva 2003d; Amorim 2003b). The difference, however, was that, from the early days, the new government took action to indicate its declared will to reengage and expand ties with the African continent. As early as January 2003, President Lula da Silva held a meeting with the group of African ambassadors stationed in Brazil, where he expressed to them the government's will to strengthen Brazil's engagement in Africa (Nguele 2004). Not long after that, the *Brazil-Africa Forum on Politics, Cooperation and Trade* took place in the Brazilian city of Fortaleza, an event aimed at the analysis of difficulties and prospective opportunities in interactions between Brazil and the African continent (Coelho and Saraiva 2004). Institutional changes within *Itamaraty* also sought to reflect the government's emphasis on Africa as early as June 2003. The Africa and Middle East Department was divided into two. The new Department of Africa would house three divisions: (i) African Division I (*Divisão da África I* - DAF I) was responsible for the majority of nations bordering the Atlantic; (ii) African Division II (*Divisão da África II* - DAF II), which housed the PALOP and Southern Africa; (iii) African Division III (*Divisão da África III* - DAF III), comprising Northern and Central Africa (Castro and Castro 2009; Rizzi *et al* 2011).

Africa soon became a subject of articles and interviews given by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. In an article published by the minister in *Folha de São Paulo* in late May 2003 upon returning from a trip to seven African nations, he spoke of "(...) Brazil's commitment to a renewed political, economic, social, commercial, and cultural agenda (...)" in the face of the many promising opportunities the continent seemed to offer (Amorim 2003d, A3). A few days

later, he would claim his belief that Brazil's rediscovery of Africa would be more intense than ever before (Amorim 2003a).

Public speech would, nonetheless, go beyond the claim of greater proximity, enunciating a new approach to Brazil's African affairs, one that accorded Africa greater strategic value as Brazil came to rely greatly on alliances with the Global South to foster its national interests. In this scenario, Africa was presented as the second step to increase Brazil's ties with the developing world, only behind integration within South America, as President Lula da Silva would reiterate on several occasions (2003h; 2004b; 2004e). This decision can be apprehended within the context of Brazil's international insertion strategy since the beginning of Lula da Silva's administration. "Autonomy through diversification" (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007) saw Brazil pursue increasing ties with the developing world as a means to enhance its decision-making power over influential international matters. Far from implying a relative distancing from developed countries, this strategy sought to expand the realm of the country's actions by probing into new and diversified partnerships (Visentini 2005; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007)²⁵.

Changes in Brazil's culturalist discourse added another dimension to this new African policy. The president's first trip to Africa, in November 2003²⁶, is illustrative of the ongoing changes to Brazil's African policy. Even if he was still visiting somewhat traditional partners –

²⁵ In a later article, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim elaborated on the significance that South-South Cooperation had acquired since Lula da Siva's coming to power. According to him, "At the crossroads of all the main guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy is the effort to establish closer relations with other developing countries. South-South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the same time, it helps expand Brazil's participation in world affairs. Cooperation among equals in matters of trade, investment, science and technology and other fields reinforces our stature and strengthens our position in trade, finance and climate negotiations. Last but not least, building coalitions with developing countries is also a way of engaging in the reform of global governance in order to make international institutions fairer and more democratic" (Amorim 2010, 231). Original in English.

²⁶ In December 2003, President Lula da Silva visited both Libya and Egypt in the context of a broader trip to Arab nations.

namely Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa – which were chosen for their opportunities and historic connections to Brazil, the trip was presented as a first step towards Brazilian engagement with Africa as well as a response to long-standing demands from academics and afro-descendants in Brazil. More importantly, however, were the changes to the symbolic elements characteristic of the evolution of Brazil-Africa relations. While Africa's cultural contribution to Brazil remained praised and acknowledged, government discourse was now building its African approach on the country's long lasting moral and historic debt, one which created a political and moral obligation towards African nations and its descendants in Brazilian territory (Silva 2003e; MRE 2003b).

Although more or less present since the beginning of President Lula da Silva's term in office (Amorim 2003d), it was really during his first visit that the new discourse became more structured and clear in meaning and implications. Upon arriving in São Tomé, for example, the president highlighted the role of slave trade in forging ties between Brazil and Africa, while also pointing to the cultural connections between both sides (Silva 2003i). A few days later, already in Angola, President Lula da Silva declared that

Our history with Africa is more than a diplomatic relationship. It is a debt I think Brazil, none of us individually, but that Brazil has with the African continent. Since it was from this part of the world that free men departed, turned into slaves from the moment they departed, to help us be what we are today, to help us build a beautiful racial mix and to have a wonderful people, like we have. And I think that Brazil kept a debt to repay, and we have to pay, over these coming years, maintaining the closest relationship, particularly with Portuguese-speaking countries (Silva 2003e, 3-4).

This discourse singled out the instances of racial inequality that remained in Brazilian society, pointing to the initiatives taken by the government to address them. Among these, one

finds the establishment of the Special Secretariat for Racial Equality Promotion Policies (*Secretaria de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial* – SEPPIR) (Silva 2003b).

Beyond that, and of greater importance to the scope of the present work, the new discourse would engage with the new humanistic dimension of Brazilian foreign policy, where solidarity to other less developed countries became a key aspect of Brazil's foreign engagement as well as being hailed as an innovation brought by the Lula da Silva's government (2003b; 2003c; Puente 2010; Faria and Paradis 2013). While in Mozambique, for instance, the president declared that

Brazil has a historic debt and, consequently, needs to contribute decisively towards the repayment of this debt. And the repayment of this debt relates to the good relations Brazil has to have, above all with Portuguese-speaking countries (...) The most appropriate way to repay the sacrifice Africans made is to establish the most perfect policy of harmony with Africa. This is a bit of what we came to do here. We came to say to President Chissano that we, Brazilians, and the Brazilian government, want to dedicate part of our time, part of our technological knowledge; we want to dedicate our industrial knowledge, our agricultural knowledge to contribute to the development of this part of planet Earth (Silva 2003h, 2).

Carlos Puente (2010) argues that the humanist dimension would find its greater expression in Brazil's national and international fight against poverty and hunger, with concrete measures being taken towards the advancement of the cause. In 2004, accompanied by France, Spain and Chile, Lula da Silva launched the "Global Action against Poverty and Hunger". Even more so, Brazil showed a pronounced interest in expanding its technical cooperation with Africa, even if the new agreements during the first two years remained somewhat limited to traditional partners (Amorim 2004b; 2010; Mendonça Júnior 2015). Brazil's strong stance in the defense and development of a social agenda at the international level cannot be fully understood without reference to the government's national development strategy with its

emphasis on social policies. One thinks notably of the “Zero Hunger Initiative” (*Fome Zero*) and the “Family Grant” (*Bolsa Família*), a program that offers conditional cash transfers with the broad goal of alleviating poverty (Visentini 2005; Faria and Paradis 2013; Stolte 2015)²⁷.

Brazil’s moral obligation to Africa was paired with a strategic imperative that comprised both political and economic motivations. Trade and investment, played a role on the government’s willingness to engage with Africa as public statements called for the increase in trade and the seizing of investment opportunities. The president also prompted Brazilian businessmen to accompany him on his visits to the African continent – and that even if it can be argued that it was not the main determinant of Brazil’s renewed impetus towards the continent (Amorim 2003d; Stolte 2015). Brazil’s engagement was, however, to be understood as extending beyond immediate interests and gains. As the country looked to relations with the Global South as a strategy to enhance its own standing within the international system, and even to modify some of its key elements, Africa stood out as a fruitful scenario for partnerships in the context of an African renaissance (MRE 2003b; Amorim 2003d). While in Gabon, during his second official visit to Africa, President Lula da Silva stated that

The deepening of our ties with Africa, besides being a moral duty, is a strategic necessity. The world economic order presents difficulties and challenges that can only be overcome through the solidary support of developing countries. When we articulate our positions, our ability to influence international decisions is immense (Silva 2004f, 3).

The strategic value accorded to Africa would be even clearer with regards to South Africa, which Brazil identified as one of the key emerging countries in the international scene.

²⁷ For a discussion on the origins and evolution of these social initiatives in Brazil, refer to Hall, Anthony. 2006. “From *Fome Zero* to *Bolsa Família*: social policies and poverty alleviation under Lula”.

As early as 2003, both the economic prospects and results of a political alliance placed South Africa as one of Brazil's prospective strategic partners. South Africa, along with countries such as China, Russia and India, was among the nations seen as central to the establishment of South-South partnerships with the capacity to alter the international economic order (Silva 2003g; 2004c). In fact, a trilateral partnership comprising Brazil, South Africa and India would be the first test of Brazil's broader diversification strategy and new African policy, as shall be seen in subsequent sections.

Brazil's African policy became better defined and more coherent as Lula da Silva's term progressed, as did the government's vision of its long term implications and interests. In an article reviewing the first two years of Lula da Silva's foreign policy, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim referred to Africa under the following terms:

We have been seeking to pay special attention to our relations with Africa. It is an old aspiration of Brazil, but that no other government took ahead with such determination. In this endeavor, we have our historic connections, our status as a country with a large afro-descendant population and, also, the government's internal efforts to promote racial equality. Africa is a continent of great poverty, but it is not stagnant. In my several trips to the African continent, I notice there are dynamism and a willingness to find indigenous solutions to African problems. President Lula made, in these two years, two trips to Africa. In a first stage, he was in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia; on the second trip he visited São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde and Gabon, accompanied, in both opportunities, of a numerous delegation of ministers, businessmen and congressmen. They were not trips to obtain short term results, even if, from an economic point of view, Africa represents an important market (...) (Amorim 2005f, 9).

As international events unfolded, it became clear that Africa was of strategic importance for Brazil. On one subject in particular, that of UN reform, Brazilian speeches and joint *communiqués* would refer to a shared interest to promote the better representation of developing nations within the organization, with notable emphasis on the UN Security Council (UNSC), and that even as Africa consolidated its united position on the matter. This is true both with

regards to smaller African countries, as well as bigger players, like Nigeria. Brazil not only thanked the support and sympathy it received from Africa, but vowed to lend its support to Africa's claims. UNSC reform, by including developing countries as permanent members would allow for an increase in both Brazil and Africa's stance in international decision-making (Silva 2005h; 2005j; MRE 2005a). A similar logic applied to trade negotiations within the WTO, where the Doha Round witnessed the establishment of the G-20 (Group of 20), a group led primarily by Brazil, India and South Africa, but also comprised of other African nations²⁸, which sought to effectively integrate trade liberalization and development (Silva 2005b; Visentini 2013; Mattos and Leães 2015).

Africa's importance to Brazil was not, however, limited to specific claims. In fact, public statement reinforced the broader role Africa was to play in Brazil's foreign policy as a scenario for the country's international presence and as a partner in international demands. For instance, while visiting Senegal and Ghana in 2005, President Lula da Silva spoke of uniting developing countries in order to promote their own economic interests, reasserting the claim to engage in a "(...) new economic and commercial geography of the world" (Silva 2005k, 3-4); or even calling for unity in order to influence the international decision-making process (Silva 2005e; 2005i; 2006d). During his official visit to Nigeria, in 2005, the president stressed that

I, now, along with President Obasanjo and, certainly, dozens of other leaders from developing countries, have to make a decision: do we want to continue being poor or do we want to take a step ahead? If the 19th century was that of Europa, if the 20th century was that of the United States, why can't the 21st century be ours? It depends only on us believing it and discovering, in our interactions, those sectors in which we can help each other and make the Atlantic Ocean not an obstacle, but a way to assist our relationship (Silva 2005a, 2).

²⁸ Aside from South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Egypt are part of the G-20 (Visentini 2013).

Public declarations were matched with calls for effective action, and that on the part of both Brazil and African nations. For instance, if Brazil had already expressed its desire to formally constitute a strategic partnership with South Africa, the same intentions would be extended to Nigeria not long after. Furthermore, it was Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo who, during President Lula da Silva's visit to his country in 2005, suggested the establishment of a more formal arrangement between Brazil and Africa. The idea was to bring together both Africa and South America, after consultations were undertaken within the scope of the African Union (AU) and the newly established South American Community of Nations (*Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações – CASA*). The Declaration on the CASA-African Union Summit expressed South American support for the initiative, paving the way for its implementation, which would be accomplished in late 2006 (MRE 2005a; 2005b; 2006c; Machado 2013).

The solidarity dimension of Brazil's African policy was also reinforced. Brazil could contribute to African development in many fields through technical, scientific, cultural and educational cooperation. According to Brazilian statements, the country could build on its knowledge in order to contribute in such fields as the fight against HIV/Aids, the production of biofuels, and, once more, through concerted efforts in the fight against hunger and poverty (Silva 2005c; 2005d; 2006a; 2006d). As Brazilian discourse accentuated its humanistic characteristics, the government also seemed to be laying the foundations for effective action by engaging with new prospective partners in the realm of technical cooperation and planning the expansion and reformulation of its initiatives.

In the first two years of Lula da Silva's administration, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency had faced legal issues that undermined its ability to engage in technical cooperation

activities²⁹. These difficulties were at least partially overcome with the arrival of new staff members and arrangements to ensure the funding of planned international activities (Puente 2010).

Furthermore, the year 2005 marked the establishment of a new frontier in Brazil's potential African partnerships as technical cooperation agreements moved beyond traditional partners to encompass new ones, including Gambia, Benin, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan. Consistent with Brazil's focus on Africa, as well as the fight against hunger and the promotion of biofuels, the Brazilian government also announced the establishment of an office of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (*Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária* – EMBRAPA) in Ghana (Silva 2006e; Mendonça Júnior 2015).

The solidarity dimension continued to be coupled with the moral and historic debt discourse. In fact, that discourse gained increased symbolic significance when President Lula da Silva formally asked for Africa's forgiveness during a visit to Senegal in April 2005. While in the historic Goree Island, in a speech that mixed Africa's cultural influences over Brazil with the recognition of the nefarious effects of slavery, the president stated that

You know, President, that when we decided to turn Africa into a priority continent of our political action, amongst the things that we had in mind and that defined our strategy in international politics, was not only to do business, it was, above all, a strategy of a political leader who is aware of the historic debt that we have with the African continent (...) I believe that when we made the decision to retell the African story of our slaves in elementary school in Brazil, the goal was to make our children learn that this was not a paradise of slaves, this was a paradise of free men (...) I think that, if we take into account the historic value of the passage of black people through Brazil, condemning all that we have to condemn, the result for Brazil was the extraordinary creativity of the Brazilian people and a miscegenation that created an extraordinarily beautiful people (...) And this intensification of my government, of my country, with Africa, is because we believe that the XXI century could be the great century of those who

²⁹ Starting in 2002 and up until 2005, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which holds the responsibility for Brazil's technical cooperation, faced « institutional challenges ». Among other issues, the methods applied by the agency came under scrutiny by the Brazilian legal system, undermining its ability to advance projects at the time (Puente 2010).

were oppressed in the 20th century (...) I want to say, President Wade, to the people of Senegal and to the people of Africa, that I do not hold any responsibility for what happened in the 18th century, in the 16th, 17th century, but that I think it is a good policy to ask the people of Senegal and the people of Africa for forgiveness for what we did to black people (Silva 2005g, 1-3).

The speech was not without national and international repercussion, as the press reported the emotional tone it held over those present at the time. It would also be recalled by Foreign Minister Amorim on other occasions (Brazil's 2005; Cabral 2005; Scolese 2005; Amorim 2005c). The proposed retributions for Brazil's moral and historic debt could very well take the form of cooperation, as stated in the president's official statements (Silva 2005b).

While the Brazilian government sought to reinforce its new approach to its African affairs, it also strove to increase the number of prospective partners across the African continent and to indicate Brazil's commitment to its new position. In order to do so, it used not only the technical cooperation agreements mentioned above, but it also invested in institutional reforms³⁰ and presidential diplomacy. President Lula da Silva would visit Africa on a number of opportunities during these first few years, travelling to visit both traditional and new partners, especially since 2005 (Table 1). These mechanisms would be continually used to secure Brazil's positions in Africa in the following years.

³⁰ Brazil pursued efforts to increase the total number of diplomats to enter *Itamaraty* and to establish incentives for their transfer to locations in Africa, for example (Amorim 2005a).

Table 1. Presidential visits to Africa (2003-6)

Year	Country
2003	São Tomé and Príncipe Angola Mozambique Namibia South Africa
2004	São Tomé and Príncipe Gabon Cape Verde
2005	Cameroon Nigeria Ghana Guinea-Bissau Senegal
2006	Algeria Benin Botswana South Africa Nigeria

Source: Presidência da República 2003;2004;2005;2006

2. Rehearsing institutionalization: The India-Brazil-South Africa Forum (IBSA) and the Summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA)

One development in particular anticipated the effects of Brazil's new African approach. It was the establishment of a pioneer initiative which sought to bring together three great developing countries that came to be known as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum – or simply IBSA³¹. According to Minister Celso Amorim, the initial proposition was made by South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Zuma, in the beginning of 2003, soon after Amorim's inauguration in office. Originally thought of to encompass a greater number of nations, it was agreed by both representatives that a smaller, more aligned group of countries constituted a better option. The third member would be India, once the invitation was accepted

³¹ The IBSA Forum has also been referred to as G-3.

by its government (Amorim 2011). Soon thereafter, more precisely in June 2003, the foreign ministers of the three countries convened in Brasilia to officially found the initiative through the adoption of the Brasilia Declaration. The latter not only established the group, but enumerated some of their shared concerns in the international arena, such as the reform of the United Nations and protectionism in trade (MRE 2003c).

The new initiative was announced during the president's first speech at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in late September 2003 (2003a). A few days later, while speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, President Lula da Silva claimed that

Beyond the traditional relations with our partners from the developed world, we have announced a strengthening of our ties with great developing countries, such as South Africa, China, India, Mexico and Russia, among others. The establishment of a group with India, South Africa and Brazil, reinforced in the meeting I had yesterday with the heads-of-state from these two countries, is a historic event and opens great possibilities in the bilateral and multilateral spheres (Silva 2003f).

The meeting the president refers to occurred on the sidelines of the UNGA and led to a joint *communiqué* in which the three countries took a clearer stance on some of the issues shaping the international agenda at the time, such as the reform of the United Nations and of the international trade architecture; furthermore, the fight against poverty and hunger was also a concern (MRE 2003a).

Speaking at an opening lecture in March 2004, Foreign Minister Amorim pointed to the group's innovative character in the international scene.

We created the G-3, a group that brings together the three great democracies of the developing world: Brazil, South Africa and India. And we are creating it not just as something, say, distant, abstract, rhetorical. We are creating the G-3 in a very concrete way (...) Newspapers criticize a lot, stating that we have a habit of saying that things are unprecedented, but I really think this fact is unprecedented, since in my forty years in a diplomatic career, I do not remember noticing a Joint Trilateral Commission of developing countries – Brazil, India, and South Africa – discussing projects in the fields of health, science and technology, defense, in the field of

commercial analysis. It is a new geography that is created. Of course, without prejudice to our traditional partners, which will continue to be our main partners for a long time. (Amorim 2004a,77-8).

The fight against poverty and hunger soon became a central banner for the members of the forum. In this sense, the establishment of the group was soon followed by the creation of the IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (also known as India, Brazil, and South Africa Fund) (IBSA Fund), which received the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As the first initiative to comprise only developing countries, the fund was promoted within the scope of solidarity, where the three countries were deemed capable of helping those mostly in need. Already in 2004, the fund envisaged the launch of cooperation projects in poorer countries, starting with Guinea-Bissau in the field of agricultural development (Silva 2004d; 2004a; Amorim 2005b; 2005e).

The institutionalization of the IBSA initiative was also key in the developments that led to the G-20 within the World Trade Organization (WTO), with India, Brazil and South Africa playing important roles in agricultural negotiations. Moreover, even after the loss of momentum over UN reform, the group continued its calls for changes to be brought to the organization, as shown during the First IBSA Summit, held in September 2006. Placing the IBSA initiative as one of the exponents of Brazil's emphasis in enhancing ties with the Global South³², without prejudice to the country's engagement with developed nations, President Lula da Silva also claimed the forum had clear trilateral goals in fostering economic and transport connections amongst its members, for example (Silva 2006b; Mattos e Leães 2015).

³² It was common for Brazilian leaders to refer to the IBSA initiative in similar terms to the ones that follow: "For their singular and unique characteristics of bringing together three major developing countries, from three different continents, IBSA symbolizes in a very special way this orientation of Brazilian diplomacy, of a more active search for partnerships with countries from the South". (Silva 2006b,5).

The Summit of South American-Arab Countries could in some ways be viewed in the same logic as the IBSA Forum, albeit with lesser intensity. The initiative, originally an idea put forward by President Lula da Silva, comprises the African countries which are also members of the Arab League. During the opening of the first meeting, held in Brasilia, in May 2005, the Brazilian president spoke of the democratization of international decision-making bodies while also calling for a new economic geography. Beyond that, other opportunities such as increases in trade also constituted subjects of interest to the Brazilian government as it prepared for the summit (Amorim 2005d; Silva 2005f).

3. The absence of consensus and the 2006 presidential election: challenges to Brazil's African policy

Upon discussing the duration of critical junctures, Collier and Collier (1991) argue that those can be rather rapid modifications or extend over a longer period of time. This is important to the argument at hand since the Brazilian government had to overcome criticism and the challenge of an election in order to consolidate its policy and open way to the development of the legacy.

Brazil's African policy, in particular, and its emphasis on the Global South were not a consensus among political parties and the media. From early on, the government faced criticism from some of the greatest newspapers in the country, while others sought to defend the international stance adopted by Lula da Silva's administration. Eliane Cantanhêde (2003), for example, praised Brazil's renewed willingness to engage with Africa, noting both commercial and humanitarian aspects and the expectation of moving beyond words and signed agreements. Other editorials, however, were critical of Brazil's diversification strategy with the developing

world, which they viewed as rather ideological. *O Estado de São Paulo*, in particular, characteristically right-winged, argued that there was a huge gap between President Lula da Silva's dreams in Africa and reality, going as far as characterizing the ordeal as fiction. On another occasion, the same newspaper argued that the President was wasting resources in comparison with the possibilities of gains with this African strategy, even if there was a moral justification for the policy; the paper even spoke of an obsession with the developing world (Fantasias 2003; Terceira 2004; Casaroes 2012). On an editorial commenting on President Lula da Silva's 2005 visit to Africa, *Folha de São Paulo* (Frustração 2005) criticizes the government's alleged lack of preparation prior to trade negotiations with Nigeria. This is coupled, nonetheless, with a recognition of the symbolic value of the visit given the historic debt Brazil held with the continent.

The Brazilian government would respond to the open criticism in the media by highlighting not only the symbolic elements of its policy, but also the expectations that relations would continue to increase, including economic ties with the African continent. This was the case when Foreign Minister Celso Amorim compared reactions to the President's visit to Asia with that of Africa, claiming that the extent of Brazil's afro-descendant population should be reason enough to justify closer ties (Amorim 2005a; 2005e). On a later occasion, the minister not only reiterated Brazil's debt to Africa and the continent's commercial and strategic importance to national interests, but argued "It is important to have a relationship with these countries. We cannot make foreign policy thinking only of the next years or the next two years. It is necessary to think of Brazil in the next 10 or 20 years" (Amorim 2006, 30). The president himself also addressed the criticism contending that Brazil's relations with Africa had to be built

also on gratitude and solidarity, as opposed to a solely mechanical logic of economic interest (Silva 2006c).

Later on, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, would sum up the criticism and the government's position towards it in a recollection from his years on the position. According to him, the administration's greatest battle was against what he called "public opinion makers" who had a different vision of Brazil's African strategy than that of the government, which saw several opportunities in Africa:

(...) the Africa that was opening up for Brazil in the 21st century was a fertile and obvious field for the exploration of affinities and partnerships. This was President Lula's vision, and this was the sense attributed to the trips we undertook together or separately, starting with my tour, in May 2003, across seven African countries. This perception was far from consensual. Two years after this first trip, incomprehension and anti-African activism were felt in a special way in Lula's visit to a few West African countries in the first semester of 2005. Something similar had occurred in the trip he took, at the end of 2003, to Arab nations, among which two nations, Egypt and Libya, in the African continent. It is curious that this "aversion" or "prevention" was not demonstrated with the same intensity when it came to Portuguese-speaking countries, which seem to enjoy a certain indulgence, probably due to sentimental and cultural ties that even our most conservative elites could not deny. During the 2005 trip, which included some countries with less than perfect democratic credentials (...) media harassment reached its peak (...) What some dismissed as "Third Worldism" constituted, in fact, the projection of our interests (accompanied by a strong sense of solidarity) in the face of a continent filled with opportunities (...) Only some time after Lula's trip in 2005, when Chinese President Hu Jintao spent over ten days visiting a good number of countries the attitude of the press started to change. It went from questioning to demand: "Would we not be losing ground to China?" (Amorim 2011, 95-7).

The lack of consensus over Brazil's Africa policy would impact the 2006 presidential race which would ultimately oppose the Worker's Party and the PSDB on a second round of voting. Amidst the proposals put forward by opposition candidate, Geraldo Alckmin, one finds the strengthening of ties with Africa, with emphasis on Portuguese-speaking nations and even a mention to trade with developing countries. Despite that, the propositions were cast within a more general critique of what the PSDB saw as an ideological foreign policy under President

Lula da Silva. Furthermore, these proposals were clarified upon later statements and showed a clear intention to favor ties with developed countries, as opposed to developing ones. With Africa in particular, Alckmin's agenda envisaged the closing of diplomatic representations which were thought of as a purely political move, eventually leading to a re-evaluation of their economic significance (Leo 2006b; PSDB 2006).

Lula da Silva's re-election bid continued to push the diversification agenda under the banner of a sovereign international insertion, asserting that, amongst other things, the government "(...) will strengthen South-South relations, with particular emphasis to its relations with the African continent (...)" all the while pursuing stronger relations with the developed world (PT 2006, 14). If the electoral process opened the possibility of a reversion of Brazil's African policy, Lula da Silva's re-election led the way to the continued expansion of Brazil's presence across the continent and the establishment, as well as the consolidation of a new profile in Brazil-Africa relations.

4. Conclusion

Keeping in mind the concept of critical junctures, the present chapter has shown that Brazil significantly modified its African policy. Between 2003 and 2006, the Brazilian government developed and consolidated a new approach to its African affairs. During that period, Africa re-acquired significant strategic value to Brazilian foreign policy and was effectively made a foreign policy priority beyond government speech, following two fundamental aspects. On the one hand, it became a central component of South-South cooperation, as Brazil opted to enhance ties with developing countries as a way to project itself onto the international arena. South-South cooperation, Brazilian authorities believed, would

provide the country with better means not only to position itself, but to bring about change in the international order, rendering it more suitable to the country's aspirations. This was evident not only with regards to traditional and emerging partners, but also in connection with smaller ones. Brazil's pursuit of "autonomy through diversification" (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007) thus provided the broader context of the country's renewed interest in Africa.

On the other hand, South-South cooperation also entailed a solidarity component through which Brazil sought to portray itself as a developing country that nonetheless was able to aid Africa in its own development path. As such, as Lula da Silva's administration implemented and broadened the scope of a series of social programs aimed at reducing poverty and hunger nationally, it also integrated such issues in its foreign agenda. This was most evident in the fight against hunger, the internal wing of which found correspondence in foreign policy discourse and the promotion of technical cooperation through the intended sharing of successful experiences. The IBSA Fund is but one example of that, and one that comes rather early.

The strategic component was tied with changes in discourse. Even if the cultural contribution of Africans to the constitution of Brazil remained in government speech, the « historic and moral debt » elements proved more persuasive and sought to single out the harm done to Africa under many centuries of slave trade. It also spoke to the empowerment of the large Black population in Brazilian society through measures to fight racial discrimination and promote the social advancement of Blacks. An element present since the beginning of Lula da Silva's term, it reaches its greatest symbolic impact with the forgiveness speech made by the president during a 2005 visit to Senegal.

Throughout the period, changes in Brazil's African policy were not only significant, but occurred rapidly and from the very beginning, against the background of low interest and

selectivity that had characterized the previous administrations. They were indeed “unexpected and sudden”, as suggested by Christina Stolte (2015, 92). The new approach did undergo its share of challenges and uncertainties posed both by the media and opposition leaders. In this context, the 2006 presidential election and Lula da Silva’s ensuing victory paved the way to the development and consolidation of a new legacy in African affairs.

CHAPTER 4

BRAZIL'S LEGACY IN AFRICA: 2006-2015

As has been shown in the previous chapter, Lula da Silva's re-election conferred legitimacy to Brazil's African policy, a policy that had been contested since the beginning of his administration by exponents of mainstream media and opposition parties. Under this new found legitimacy, the Brazilian government sought to establish and consolidate its legacy over Brazil-Africa relations. From the end of his first term in office and throughout his second term (2007-10), President Lula da Silva's administration worked to establish a new footprint for Brazil's presence in Africa, in accordance with the new strategic value held by the continent and the logic of solidarity that accompanied the much repeated debt discourse. Presidential diplomacy remained central to signal Brazil's impulse to strengthen ties with Africa, extending those intentions far beyond traditional partners.

The present chapter thus elaborates on the legacy of Brazil's new approach to Africa, that is, "The sequence of political events, relationships, and dynamics of change hypothesized to be the outcome of a critical juncture" (Collier and Collier 1991, 785). It argues that the legacy, a direct result of the critical juncture that characterized the better part of Lula da Silva's first term in office, differs from the background of selectivity and distance seen during the antecedent conditions. As such, not only the scope of interactions between Brazil and Africa has greatly diverged, but Brazil's recent presence in Africa would innovate, culminating in the establishment of a new pattern to the country's insertion across the African continent. Amongst the features that are indicative of the innovative character of Brazil's profile in Africa, three are of particular interest here: (i) the broad institutionalization of ties through the constitution and

revitalization of multilateral fora; (ii) the establishment of strategic partnerships with African nations; (iii) Brazil's status in Africa as an international development partner.

The legacy of Brazil's new African policy would not, however, be limited to the Lula da Silva era, as its main features are still present in the government of his successor, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-). On broad terms, there is a general understanding within the academic literature that President Rousseff has followed in the main orientations of Lula da Silva's foreign policy, albeit with different intensity at times (Cornetet 2014; Oliveira 2015). Joao Marcelo Cornetet (2014), for example, argues that the new administration maintained the strategy of "autonomy through diversification" that had prevailed under Lula da Silva's government, albeit with a less assertive tone.

1. Building a legacy: establishing Brazil's new profile in Africa (2006-10)

Soon after his re-election, President Lula da Silva embarked on yet another trip to Africa. Amongst the items on the agenda, there was the inaugural meeting of the Africa-South America Summit, in Abuja, Nigeria. Throughout his second term in office, the presidential visits to Africa continued, expanding to encompass other non-traditional partners of Brazil in Africa, such as Kenya and Zambia, for example (Table 2). Beyond that, the administration continued to rely on the signing of technical cooperation agreements with a broad number of African nations.

Table 2. Presidential visits to Africa (2007-2010)

Year	Country
2007	Burkina Faso Republic of Congo South Africa Angola
2008	Ghana Mozambique
2009	Libya
2010	Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Kenya Tanzania Zambia South Africa Mozambique

Source: Presidência (2007;2008;2009;2010)

Even if some concrete outcomes are already evident during his first term in office, it is in the aftermath of Lula da Silva's re-election that they become better structured and extensive. The legacy of Brazil's new African policy will have a quantitative component to it, particularly in the expansion of effective partners and economic exchanges. Even so, it is in the establishment of a new profile to the country's presence across the continent that the innovative outcomes are more strongly felt. For analytical purposes, the sub-sections that follow will be divided into economic relations, diplomatic affairs and development cooperation, in keeping with a proposition made by Lyal White (2010) that renders the evolution in each category more intelligible to the reader. This is done with the explicit acknowledgement that the three dimensions operate simultaneously throughout the period. Accordingly, both the measurable dimensions, as well as the qualitative ones will be highlighted in each of these same categories.


1.1. Brazil's economic presence in Africa

Economic ties had been a central concern of Brazil's approach to Africa since the start of Lula da Silva's administration, as shown by their frequent mentions in governmental speeches and the afore mentioned inclusion of Brazilian businessmen on official visits (Amorim 2003d; Stolte 2015). Even if Foreign Minister Amorim (2015) later claimed that economic ties were not the central concern at the time, the Brazilian government sought to conceive and implement a series of instruments and programs to foster trade and investment.

The Brazilian Development Bank (*Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social* – BNDES) proved an asset in fostering trade and the internationalization of Brazilian companies. For instance, Brazilian companies present in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa have been accorded loans to aid in their expansion abroad, an initiative that started in 2007. In 2009, the total amount granted reached 766 million USD. Brazil's economic strategy strengthened the position of big national firms in the construction, mining and oil sectors such as Odebrecht, Vale and Petrobras, but it has not been limited to them. Furthermore, though Brazilian investment in Africa has been concentrated on a small number of countries – namely Mozambique, Angola, Libya and South Africa – by the end of the president's second term in office, Brazilian firms were present in 22 African countries. (Villas-Bôas 2011; Stolte 2015).

Brazilian trade with Africa had been growing steadily since the first year of Lula da Silva's presidency, and it continued to do so for the most (?)part of his two terms in power. As such, if in 2002, Brazil's trade with Africa was just above 5 billion USD, in the year 2007, exchanges almost reached the 20 billion USD mark. With the exception of the year 2009, trade numbers would surpass the 20 billion USD in both 2008 and 2010 (Graph 2). Africa's share of Brazil's total trade also grew, even if oscillations are noted throughout the period.

Graph 2. Brazil-Africa Trade (2003-2010) (USD) (F.O.B)



Source: prepared by the author with data from MDIC 2016

Whereas in 2002, Brazilian exports to Africa corresponded to 3.91% of the country's total exports – the highest share since José Sarney's government – they would reach the 5.68% mark in 2008 whilst maintaining an average of 4.93% between 2003 and 2010 – or even 5.18% from 2007 through 2010. With regards to Brazil's imports from Africa, they would surpass 9% in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008 from a previous peak of 5.99% in 2001. Even in 2009, when trade numbers declined, Brazilian exports and imports were of 5.68% and 6.63%, respectively (MDIC 2016). Underlying Brazil's trade expansion with Africa are the businesses and the government's interests in continuing to foster the export of manufactured goods. The establishment of an office of the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (*Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos* – APEX) in Angola, in 2010, shows the above mentioned efforts (Stolte 2015).

1.2. Institutionalizing Brazilian presence in Africa: multilateral fora and strategic partnerships

One of the outcomes of Brazil's new African policy was the expansion of the country's embassies on African territory. More than the figure itself, the increase in the number of diplomatic representations attests to Brazil's growing presence even on small African countries which had been of lower importance to Brazil's foreign interests in the recent past. This is the case for countries such as Burkina Faso, Liberia and Malawi³³, for example (Stolte 2015).

African countries responded accordingly to Brazil's greater emphasis to its African affairs. As such, they have not only increased the number of their own representations in Brasilia, but have also sought to further engage with Brazil through participations in high-level meetings. President Lula da Silva's attendance at the African Union Summit in Libya, in 2009, is but one example. In the following year, the president participated in the I Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, in Cape Verde (Méio 2012; Visentini 2013).

Brazil's bilateral relations with Africa have also been the subject of strategic partnerships during the president second term in office, thus building on a possibility already envisaged during the development of Brazil's African policy. Strategic partnerships have been defined in Brazilian experience as "(...) priority and mutually compensating political and economic relations, which are built on a heritage of universally configured bilateral relations"; as such, the establishment of a privileged pattern of diplomatic relations with those countries seen as most able to provide meaningful inputs to Brazilian national development (Lessa 1998, 31). Dating back to the 1970s, when the military regime saw in Germany and Japan the chance to

³³ Even though the authorization for the Malawian embassy dates to 2010, its physical implementation occurred in 2011, the first year of Dilma Rouseff's presidency.

enhance its access to capital and technology, Brazil's strategic partnerships have since been extended, encompassing, among other things, the possibilities brought by regionalism as of the late 1980s – hence the partnership with Argentina. Under President Lula da Silva, Brazil's strategic partnerships have come to address a broader host of issues while also trying to account for convergent views on international matters (Lessa 2010; Vaz 2014). It is in this context that Angola and South Africa, important partners even before Lula da Silva's administration, have been added to the spectrum of Brazil's strategic partners.

The institutionalization of Angola's strategic partnership with Brazil occurred at the end of June 2010, during a visit by President José Eduardo dos Santos. The preamble to the joint *communiqué* establishing the partnership builds on the major themes incorporated by Brazil's African policy when it states that:

Aware that to face the challenges and explore the opportunities of the new international scene, it is necessary to expand and diversify the fields of cooperation to other domains based on principles and institutional mechanisms that reflect the new situations of Angola and Brazil in the international context; considering that Brazil and Angola advocate for a fairer, democratic and transparent international order, supported by a strengthened multilateral system, for the consolidation of a multipolar world (...); considering the priority they attribute to South-South cooperation in the context of international cooperation (MRE 2010a, 1-2).

The rather large scope of the strategic partnership addresses, amongst other topics, the fields of sustainable development, exchange of scientific and technological knowledge, investments and defense. It also makes specific references to some of the topics that ranked high on Brazil's diplomatic agenda with Africa, such as the ZOPACAS and the reform of the United Nations. The search for a greater influence on the part of developing nations over the international trade and financial systems are also noteworthy. On economic affairs, beyond cooperation on more traditional fields of oil, mining, and public works, one notes specific

concerns with the financing of trade and a specific mention on food security. Finally, the document established greater commitments on technical, educational, as well as scientific and technological cooperation. Beyond that, provisions are made to stimulate cooperation between Brazil-Angola and third parties (MRE 2010a).

South Africa, for its turn, had already been singled out not only as an important partner within Africa, but also as one of the emerging nations deemed key players on the international scene. In July 2010, the Brazil-South Africa strategic partnership was agreed upon by both countries. The document envisaged greater cooperation in fields such as science and technology, as well as defense (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014).

In parallel with bilateral developments, Brazil has pursued the growing institutionalization of multilateral ties with the establishment and revitalization of several initiatives. The First Africa-South America Summit is one instance where Brazil's African policy considerably contributed to the ideas shaping its implementation still in 2006. As discussed in the previous chapter, the initial proposition for the initiative came from Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo during President Lula da Silva's visit to that country in April 2005. The project, as it was formally conceived, implicated both the African Union and CASA, its first official meeting being held not long after in Abuja, Nigeria (MRE 2005a; MRE 2005b).

In the days preceding the summit, *Itamaraty* highlighted the converging views of the member countries "(...) with emphasis on international trade, peace and security, the environment, energy, human rights, the fight against hunger and poverty and the reform of multilateral organizations" adding that one of the main goals of the meeting was to "(...) intensify partnerships between the two regions, in order to establish a sustainable dynamic of South-South cooperation (...)" (MRE 2006, 377). The Abuja Declaration, one of the documents

issued at the end of the Summit, called for further cooperation in negotiations within the WTO, as well as in the reform of the United Nations in order to render it more democratic and to ensure decision-making procedures. Other specific mentions refer to cooperation in tropical agriculture and biofuels and topics on democracy and human rights, peace and security, trade and development, hunger and poverty, among others. The Declaration also established a follow-up committee tasked with ensuring the oversight of implemented actions; the Summit, it was agreed, would meet on a regular basis³⁴ (ASA 2006). Following the I Summit, eight different working groups were established, ranging in themes from environment and agriculture to social topics and sports. Each group is headed by one South American and one African country. Other events include a meeting of the ministers of trade from ASA member countries in 2008, in Morocco. The II ASA Summit took place in Venezuela, in September 2009 (MRE 2009).

Another important development was the IBSA Forum. Even if the forum represents an early example of institutionalization, there were doubts about the longevity of the initiative given, among other issues, the broad scope of the forum's agenda (Oliveira 2005). Since then, not only has the initiative been strengthened, but its contribution to international development was awarded two times during Lula da Silva's presidency. Its addition to the legacy of Brazil's African policy is thus merited.

Following the I IBSA Summit in 2006, three other similar meetings were held between 2007 and 2010. On those occasions, the members took explicit positions on several specific issues on the international scene, such as the political crisis in Zimbabwe, while also expressing their shared positions on key issues such as the WTO and UN reform. The fight against poverty

³⁴ Initially planned for every two years, the ASA Summits would henceforth be held on a three-year basis, rotating between Africa and South America.

and hunger, and the role of the IBSA Fund are also mentioned (IBSA 2008; 2010; MRE 2007)³⁵ In 2006, the UNDP awarded the IBSA Fund the South-South Partnership for a South-South Alliance. A few years later, the fund received yet another award from the NGO Millennium Development Goals Awards Committee. As of 2010, the portfolio of technical cooperation projects by the IBSA Fund included other African partners than Guinea-Bissau in its ongoing and completed activities, such as Burundi and Cape Verde (IBSA Fund 2011; MRE 2016c).

A similar reasoning can be applied to the ASPA initiative, which had itself been the subject of questioning and criticism at the time of its first meeting. The II ASPA Summit was held in 2009, in Qatar. It was on this occasion that the initiative's institutional design was further established. Similar to the ASA initiative, ministerial meetings took place in between the two summits in a broad range of fields. Beyond that, the ASPA Library has functioned in São Paulo, where it has hosted, since 2010, the South American Arab Culture Festival. A research institute on South America was also opened in Morocco (MRE 2016b).

The Brazilian government also worked to strengthen and revitalize the CPLP and the ZOPACAS. The 2008 Summit, held in Lisbon, focused on strengthening the use of the Portuguese language, as well as its expansion beyond the CPLP countries. The summit also addressed prominent issues on the international scene, such as the reform of the United Nations and the contributions of member countries to situations of political instability, like the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The following summit, which took place in Luanda, in July 2010, expressed similar concerns in the international scene. The CPLP also announced its support to Brazil's

³⁵ On a newspaper article published in *O Globo*, President Lula da Silva reinforced the underlying ideas that had shaped the constitution of the IBSA Forum. At one point, he states that « We have agreed that the starting point must be a close association between three important economies from Africa, Latin America and Asia. Together, we are giving a more robust voice to the South in addressing the main themes of the international agenda » (Silva 2007, 605).

candidacy to Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which the country would eventually win in 2010. Furthermore, the 2010 meeting determined the beginning of negotiations towards the inclusion of Equatorial Guinea as a member of the organization (MRE 2008a; MRE 2008b; 2010b). Also in 2008, the Brazilian government undertook efforts to establish the University for the International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusofonia (*Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira* – UNILAB), which started its activities in May 2011, in the Brazilian province of Ceará (Visentini 2013; Oliveira 2014).

Finally, ZOPACAS held its sixth ministerial meeting in 2007, in Luanda, Angola. This encounter, called by the Angolan government, constituted an effort to revitalize the forum after almost ten years since the Buenos Aires Ministerial Meeting of 1998. The Luanda Declaration and the Luanda Action plan were both adopted on that occasion. The Luanda Action Plan attested to ZOPACAS' renewed importance to Brazil's defense and security strategy in the South Atlantic would become more apparent in the following years as concerns with oil reserves and the presence of foreign actors pushed Brazil to increase its standing in the region (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014).

1.3. Brazil as an emerging development actor in Africa

The most significant innovation in Brazil's legacy was its emergence as a development actor across the African continent, notably through technical cooperation³⁶ - which is seen as

³⁶ Brazilian cooperation for international development (*Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional* - COBRADI) has only recently been defined. According to Ipea (2011, 17), it consists of « The total funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the capacities of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socioeconomic conditions ». It

the « brand image » of Brazilian cooperation (Cabral 2011, 12). As shown in the previous chapter, Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa was framed under the logic of solidarity. This idea was reinforced by Foreign Minister Amorim on a publication detailing the evolution of Brazil's engagement in the field. The links between Brazil's own national development strategies and its contribution to Africa are also apparent. According to the minister,

The solidarity motivating the relationship of Brazil and other developing countries is the cornerstone of our cooperation activities with Africa (...) Several challenges faced by African countries are not unknown to Brazil, a country where inequality is still substantial. Contributing to the development of Africa through the sharing of the solution we found to our very own problems is the chief purpose of our technical cooperation (ABC 2010, 5).

The logic of solidarity was also linked to key issues in Brazil's foreign policy, not least through the fight against hunger and poverty. According to Stolte (2015), Africa has been at the center of Brazil's global fight against poverty and hunger. Consistent with this, in 2010, Brazil hosted the « Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, the Fight Against Hunger and Rural Development », the direct result of which has been the implementation of the “More Food Program” on African territory. The global fight against tropical diseases and HIV/Aids, as well as energy security – including the promotion of biofuels – have also played important roles in Brazil's technical cooperation in Africa (Stolte 2015).

While it is undeniable that Brazil has already been engaged in technical cooperation in Africa in the past, particularly during Cardoso's administration, under President Lula da Silva both the number of partners and initiatives, as well as the country's approach have been

encompasses the following categories: (i) technical cooperation; (ii) scientific and technological cooperation; (iii) educational cooperation; (iv) humanitarian assistance; (v) peacekeeping operations; (vi) contributions to international organizations (Ipea 2011; 2014). The categories of technical cooperation were previously combined in Ipea (2011); peacekeeping operations appear only as of Ipea (2014).

modified. Brazil's planned geographical expansion started in 2005 when new agreements were signed with non-traditional partners, which indicated Brazil's willingness to engage in projects and activities with those countries. During the president Lula da Silva's second term in office, these agreements continued to act as important mechanisms to Brazil's engagement in technical cooperation. By the end of the president's administration, there were 35 countries with established technical cooperation agreements with Africa, an increase of 318% in comparison with the 11 countries in a similar situation during Cardoso's terms in office (Mendonça Júnior 2015). Furthermore, the budget for the execution of projects in Africa was also increased as of 2006. With the exception of 2007, when one notes a reduction, it grew considerably until the end of the president Lula da Silva's administration. The PALOP continued to account for the bulk of expenditures on projects in Africa, but Brazilian action was not limited to them. The number of projects and initiatives being executed on a given year also grew, from 16 in 2002 to a high of 235 in 2010 (ABC 2010; ABC 2016a).

The transformation of Brazil's status into that of an international donor in Africa went beyond the quantifiable aspects mentioned above. For instance, the Brazilian government fostered the greater implication of national institutions with expertise in agricultural development and health through the opening of offices in Africa. Embrapa's office in Ghana, for example, already became operational in December 2006, not long after its announcement. In 2008, it was the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (*Fundação Oswaldo Cruz* – Fiocruz) who opened its first ever international representation in Mozambique (ABC [2007]; Fiocruz 2008).

As of 2008, Brazil started to favor a model of structuring projects in Africa in opposition to initiatives that focus on a more specific nature, often single-topic projects. In contrast with the limited gains attainable from single-topic initiatives, structuring project focus on the

sustainable development of institutional and individual capabilities while also enhancing the prospects of cooperation with third parties (Ipea 2011)³⁷. As shown in the table below, these projects have not been limited to Lusophone countries.

Table 3. Brazilian structuring projects in Africa

Project name	Features
Technological strengthening and dissemination of good agricultural practices for cotton in Togo and C4 countries (2008-)	The project, implemented by EMBRAPA, seeks to increase the competitiveness of cotton producing countries in Africa. Its first phase, developed in the C-4 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad) ended in 2013. Phase Two, which covers Togo, began in 2014.
Support to the Senegalese Sicke-Cell Disease Program (2009-2012)	Implemented by the Brazilian Ministry of Health in cooperation with its Senegalese counterpart, the project sought to aid in the training of Senegalese health professionals. The activities involved neonatal care, quality control and diagnosis.
Program for the Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSavana) (2009-)	The trilateral cooperation initiative with Japan and Mozambique was agreed upon in September 2009. Deemed ambitious, it seeks to develop the agricultural potential of the Savanna region of Mozambique. Its implementation began in 2011.

Source: prepared by the author with data from WB/Ipea 2011; ABC 2010; Chichava *et al.* 2013; EMBRAPA 2016

Finally, Brazilian technical cooperation during Lula da Silva’s second term in office has explored in greater depth the possibilities of triangular or trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation is developed both with international organizations, as well as developing and developed countries, and has been key in the planning and execution of structuring projects in Africa. The ProSavana project, for example, was conceived and implemented in partnership with Japan (Abreu 2013; Chichava *et al.* 2013). During Lula da Silva’s second term in office,

³⁷ One of the first tests on the use of structuring projects occurred in Angola, with the establishment of a vocational training center in the year 2000. The success of the initiative inspired its later use by the ABC (Abreu 2013).

agreements towards the development of specific projects in Africa with developed countries have been established with Canada, France, Italy, Norway, Japan, Germany and the United States (ABC 2016b).

2. Continuity and evolution: The Dilma Rousseff years (2011-5)

During Rousseff's years in office (2011-5), there were clear differences in the president's personal engagement in foreign policy and in Brazil's strong and affirmative presence on the international scene. Even so, the main orientations guiding Brazil's international insertion that had been developed under President Lula da Silva continued to be followed under the new administration. Dilma Rousseff's foreign policy thus combined restraint and continuity (Cornetet 2014). During her five years in office, the *Itamaraty* was headed by three different ambassadors, namely Antonio Patriota (2011-3), Luiz Alberto Machado (2013-4) and Mauro Vieira (2015-6).

Even if the president travelled less than her predecessor, she still visited Africa on different occasions. On the first trip, in 2011, she visited South Africa, Mozambique and Angola; in 2013, the president stopped in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia. In Equatorial Guinea, she attended the III ASA Summit; in Ethiopia, the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union. She also attended Nelson Mandela's funeral in 2013 (Presidência 2011; 2013). Through it all, the main characteristics of Brazil's new profile in Africa have been continued under President Rousseff (Presidencia 2011;2013).


Brazil's economic strategy continued to rely on the BNDES to ensure the expansion of trade with Africa. In 2013, the bank opened its first office in the African continent. The office, located in Johannesburg, South Africa, seeks to act as bridge between Brazil and Africa by

increasing knowledge of the business environment and by strengthening interactions with both local and regional institutions (BNDES 2013). Also in 2013, the Brazilian government announced an “African agenda” aimed at improving both trade and investment, as well as development cooperation. With regards to the economic sphere, actions include the development of better financing conditions and efforts at establishing new trade and investment deals in Africa. Other initiatives involve debt forgiveness and renegotiations with a range of African nations. This decision was announced by the President during her visit to Equatorial Guinea in May 2013³⁸ (Rossi 2013).

During Dilma Rousseff’s first term in office, trade between Brazil and Africa continued to grow. From over 20.5 billion USD in 2010, it increased above the 27.6 billion USD mark. In 2013, it would be at a record high of 28.5 billion USD. In 2015, nonetheless, trade between Brazil and Africa closed the year below 17 billion USD after a considerable decline in Brazilian imports. Africa’s share of Brazil’s total exports neared 4,5% throughout the five-year period; with regards to Brazilian imports, Africa’s share was of 6.68% between 2011 and 2015 (MDIC 2016).

³⁸ The “African agenda” also included a plan to increase funding for development cooperation and an idea to restructure the ABC. No sources could be found that indicate any concrete advances on the matter.

Graph 3. Brazil-Africa trade (2003-2015) (USD) (F.O.B)



Source: prepared by the author with data from MDIC 2016.

Following the *communiqué* establishing their strategic partnership, Angola and Brazil have actively pursued the further strengthening of their relationship. In 2012, the High Level Bilateral Commission held its first meeting in Brasilia where the advancement of bilateral projects was agreed upon (Cruz 2012). A prospective strategic partnership with Nigeria was also envisaged when, in 2013, both countries issued a joint declaration after the I Session of the Brazil-Nigeria Strategic Dialogue Mechanism (MRE 2013a).

President Dilma Rousseff followed in her predecessor's efforts to consolidate Brazil's multilateral ties with Africa. Already in 2011, the foreign ministers of ASA member countries met in 2011 for a ministerial meeting under the ASACOF, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The *joint communiqué* issued at the event of the event made recommendations to further the institutional development of the initiative (MRE 2011 268). The III ASA Summit was also held

in Malabo, in February 2013. Its final declaration addressed, among other things, pressing concerns with political instability in Africa, as well as the international developments on climate change. It also praised the revitalization of the ZOPACAS and reasserted its stance on the reform of the UNSC in order to render it more efficient and to better represent developing nations (MRE 2013b). In 2015, Brazil hosted a seminar to discuss possible institutional changes to the initiative (MRE 2016a).

The III ASPA Summit took place in Peru, in 2012. The Lima Declaration addressed issues such as climate change and development cooperation. With regards to its African members in particular, the document denotes specific concerns with the political situation in Somalia and the Darfur region, for example. Other topics include the initiative to establish an ASPA Library in Algeria. The following summit was held in Saudi Arabia in late 2015. One of the interesting development regarding the initiative are the business forums that happen in parallel to the main meeting, such as the 2012 that brought together close to 450 businessmen (MRE 2012; 2016b).

In 2011, President Dilma Rousseff attended the V IBSA Summit, in South Africa. Similar to previous events, the governments of Brazil, India and South Africa reasserted their calls for the reform of the United Nations, all the while highlight the need to better account for developing countries in international decision-making. Beyond that, the declaration covered a host of issues, from human rights to the situation in Guinea-Bissau. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the initiatives developed under the IBSA Fund (IBSA 2011). Amidst the projects that are being developed under the IBSA Forum to the benefit of its own members, one finds the negotiations to create a joint microsatellite. Even if the idea was introduced by Brazil back in 2008, its negotiations have extended into Rousseff's presidency. In 2012, IBSA's role in

international development was once again acknowledge with by the “South-South and Triangular Cooperation Champions Award” (AEB 2012; MRE 2016c).

Other developments include the further revitalization of ZOPACAS through its IV Ministerial Meeting held in Uruguay in 2013, in which defense ministers were also present. On that occasion, the countries present adopted the Montevideo Declaration, which included references to UN reform and the greater participation of developing countries on the international financial system (MRE 2013c). The importance of the zone in recent years must be understood in the context of Brazil’s African approach and the strategic importance of the South Atlantic, where the opportunities for the exploration of minerals, but also latent and explicit security threats are evident. In fact, Africa has been termed part of Brazil’s strategic surroundings under its National Defense Policy and National Defense Strategy³⁹. Beyond the ZOPACAS, Brazil’s technical cooperation with Africa on security and defense have been important in recent years, with projects being developed since 2011 with countries like Nigeria, Senegal, Benin and Cape Verde (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014).

Between 2011 and 2014, Brazil disbursements to technical cooperation in Africa have decreased in comparison to the last two years of Lula da Silva’s administration. This reduction, which has been seen across the spectrum of ABC’s activities has not gone unnoticed by the media and even specialists in the field⁴⁰. That being said, a closer look at the evolution of Brazil’s projects and disbursements in Africa underlines the considerable difference between the current scenario and the early years of the preceding decade. As such, while Brazil counted

³⁹ Between 2011 and 2014, Celso Amorim acted as Brazil’s defense minister, hence the close connections between the country’s foreign and defense policies at the time.

⁴⁰See Fingeremann (2015).

16 initiatives in 2002, these amounted to 161 in 2014 (the highest number was reached in 2010, with 253 projects and activities) (ABC 2016a).

The decrease in disbursements has not, however, undermined Brazil's profile in Africa. Trilateral cooperation continued to be pursued, with Great Britain been added to the host or developed partners in triangular cooperation schemes in Africa (ABC 2016b). Structuring projects have also seen further developments. Among them, the implementation and conclusion of the « Technical Support to Nutrition and Food Security Programs », a collaborative undertaking by Brazil, the United States and Mozambique must be noted. The project was active between 2012 and 2015; its activities encompassed the training of locals and the testing of American and Brazilian vegetable varieties in order to ensure their suitable to the local climate. The Cotton-4 initiative, for example, has entered a new phase as of 2014 to include Togo. The first phase, as seen above, was implemented in Mali, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. The installation of infrastructure to the development of cotton in Mali is one of the results of the project (EMBRAPA 2016; Evento 2016).

3. Conclusion

The development of a new approach to the country's African affairs had a fundamental impact over the evolution of Brazil's ties with Africa. These are not only evident in quantitative aspects – such as the evolution of trade –, but also in the establishment of a new profile that has seen the emergence of Brazil as an international development actor across the continent, as well as the creation and the revitalization forums geared towards cooperation and coordination of international policies.

In all this, Brazil's presence in Africa has come to differ markedly from the previous period of selectivity and distancing that had characterized Brazil-Africa relations from the onset of the New Republic through the end of President Cardoso's second term in office. Through the extensive use of such mechanisms as presidential visits and the signing of agreements in various domains, Brazil has enlarged its footprint in Africa, a move that has been accompanied by the expansion of diplomatic representations, particularly under Lula da Silva. Even with the preferred partners from the years of selectivity, the relationship has attained new levels with the extension of strategic partnerships to both Angola and South Africa, and the perspective of a similar development with Nigeria.

Perhaps the most noteworthy development occurred in the field of development cooperation, notably on technical cooperation. Even if financial commitments have been scaled back under Dilma Rousseff, Brazil has continued to push its agenda through structural projects and trilateral cooperation agreements, a recognition of Brazil's role and contribution on the matter. Under the IBSA Fund, other initiatives had continued to be pursued in Africa as well. Developments on multilateral arrangements also attest to the stability of the legacy even after the departure of its main proponents.

CONCLUSION

This study sought to analyse the evolution of Brazil's African affairs since the 1980s and up until 2015. It focused, in particular, on the changes brought to the country's African policy following the onset of Lula da Silva's administration in 2003 and on the impacts of these transformations over Brazil's presence and footprint in Africa. The theoretical framework adopted throughout the analysis was that of critical junctures, as developed and applied by Collier and Collier (1991). Critical junctures, as per the authors' definition are "(...) periods of significant change" which in turn produce a legacy thus altering previous patterns in a given political context (Collier and Collier 1991, 29; Spektor 2002). Upon extensive review of available sources, the present study has found that the changes introduced to Brazil's African policy during Lula da Silva's first term in office can indeed be deemed significant since their legacy has established itself as a new pattern to Brazil's relationship with Africa, as well as expanded Brazilian presence across African territory.

Starting in the mid-1980s, distance and selectivity became the defining characteristics of Brazil's ties with Africa. As the country experienced growing economic difficulties to keep pace with the efforts developed in the previous decade, Brazil began to withdraw from the African continent as to find alternatives in its interactions with developed nations and through the pursuit of regional integration. Not only so, Brazilian partnerships in Africa became more selective. The administrations that followed until 2002 would consolidate both tendencies. Even President Itamar Franco, under which the project for the constitution of the CPLP advanced considerably, would not represent a reversal of this trend. Aside from the PALOP, Brazil focused its attention mostly on South Africa and the ZOPACAS. Towards the end of the period, a foreign policy

crisis and the proceedings leading to the 2002 presidential election would open the way for the changes later seen in Brazil's African policy. Arising from the antecedent conditions experimented between 1985 and 2002, this constituted a dynamic analogous to a cleavage.

The fact that profound changes would be brought to Brazil's African policy under President Lula da Silva was evident from the early days of his administration. Through meetings with African ambassadors in Brazil and interviews, the government announced its intentions to bring Brazil closer to Africa. These significant changes were twofold, occurred concomitantly and are intrinsically connected. On the one hand, Africa retrieved its strategic value to Brazil's international insertion. As Brazil pursued a more active presence on the international scene, the African continent was seen as an important partner in an international agenda that sought to enhance the decision-making power and the influence of developing countries. Solidarity was also key in this transformation, as Brazil sought to project an image of a developing nation that was nonetheless able to help others in their own search for development. Africa appeared in official discourse as a crucial scenario for Brazilian action on the matter.

On the other hand, Brazil's emerging African approach encompassed the transformation of the culturalist discourse that had from early on been a part of Brazil's African affairs. It was not that African contribution to Brazilian culture had been eliminated from official discourse, but the government made explicit efforts to acknowledge the harsh conditions imposed by centuries of slavery. The « historic and moral debt » discourse would engage with national public policies to ensure Black empowerment in Brazil, as well as with the solidarity dimension of Brazil's new African policy. As such, recognition of Brazilian debt to Africa would call for stronger measures directed at exerting solidarity. Once the challenge to Brazil's African policy

was overcome with Lula da Silva's victory at the 2006 presidential elections, a legacy could be established.

As a direct result of the changes during Lula da Silva's first term in office, one notes a marked increase in Brazilian presence in Africa and the development of a new *modus operandi* in the countries relationship with its African counterpart. A series of initiatives attest to this new state of affairs. For instance, there has been a growing institutionalization of Brazil's ties with Africa as of the end of President Lula da Silva's second term in office. Bilateral relations with key African partners have attained the status of strategic partnerships, unlike historical trends. Multilateral fora have also been revitalized or established. The ASA Summit, for example, has institutionalized a mechanism with the collection of African nations, a feature that was absent in previous times. Brazil has also arisen as a development actor in Africa pushed by its logic of solidarity and historic and moral debt. Moreover, the number of partners in technical cooperation and Brazil's diplomatic presence have increased. This legacy has not been limited to Lula da Silva's administration. His successor has followed in the main characteristics mentioned above, even if financial constraints and the personal inclinations of decision-makers are noticeable. The ZOPACAS, for example, has been accorded greater importance in the face of opportunities and possible challenges in the South Atlantic Ocean.

In this scenario, the three implications to the hypothesis presented in the first chapter have been met. First, as the analysis in Chapter Two has shown, there had been no consistent or sustained efforts to effect change to the selectivity and distance that characterized Brazil's African affairs between the mid-1980s and 2002. Accordingly, it was established that it was Lula da Silva's administration that, upon taking office in 2003, made efforts to markedly alter Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa, thus conducting the critical juncture. As Chapter Two

has also demonstrated, even the modifications to Brazil's speech acknowledging the racial inequality were not accompanied by measures to alter existing patterns. Finally, it has been established that the legacy of such a policy has extended beyond its initial development, enduring in its main features throughout the years of Dilma Rousseff's administration.

By engaging in an in-depth and detailed analysis of the contemporary evolution of Brazil's African affairs, the present study has contributed to the expansion of the knowledge on the matter. At the very least, it has allowed for the thorough investigations of official documents pertaining to the issue at hand, while also addressing some contentious points in the literature. Beyond that, a contribution has been given to the broader study of Brazil's foreign policy, including the applicability of underexplored theoretical models in the field, such as the critical junctures framework.

Final considerations over the future of the legacy seem in order given the recent political shifts in Brazil with the onset of impeachment procedures against President Dilma Rousseff in 2016⁴¹. Collier and Collier (1991) addressed the issue of the duration of any given legacy. They argued that every legacy will eventually come to an end at a certain point in time, but that its longevity relates to the stability of its core elements. As such, whereas some legacies prove stable over long periods of time, in others "(...) the "self-destruction" (...) may be predictable from the critical juncture, though the length of time before this occurs may vary greatly and is influenced by other factors as well" (Collier and Collier 1991, 34).

The interim government, led by Vice-President Michel Temer, has placed Senator José Serra as the head of *Itamaraty*. With regards to Africa, there is uncertainty as to the directions

⁴¹ Until the closing of the present study, there was yet to be a final decision on Dilma Rousseff's impeachment procedures. The considerations made here take into account this state of facts.

that will be followed from here on. For instance, one of the first measures taken by the new minister was to order a study on the effectiveness of the great number of Brazilian embassies in Africa, though there is no answer yet as to their maintenance in the future. At the same time, Foreign Minister José Serra has sought to indicate that Africa would continue to be a priority to Brazilian foreign policy, a move signaled by his visit to Cape Verde (Mello and Nublat 2016; Oliveira 2016). In this scenario, the possible outcomes to Brazil's ongoing legacy in Africa remain to be seen.

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
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ANNEX A

BRAZIL-AFRICA TRADE (1985-2015)



Source: prepared by the author with data from Ribeiro 2008; MDIC 2011;2016