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Parties and Nationalism: Assessing the Influence of Parties on Support for Regional Nationalism in Spain

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Résumé en français

Dans cette thèse, je cherche à déterminer si les partis politiques influencent l'appui au nationalisme régional dans quatre régions espagnoles: le Pays basque, la Catalogne, la Communauté valencienne et la Galice. Je souligne d'abord l'importance de l'influence de l'information concernant les positions des partis sur les opinions des citoyens. Les partis influencent les opinions des citoyens même sans qu'ils présentent des arguments persuasifs ou d'autre informations. La littérature suggère actuellement que cette influence passe par le biais du raisonnement motivé partisan.

Cependant, il n'est pas clair si les partis influencent les opinions dans le contexte du nationalisme, parce que l'influence des partis semble impliquer l'ajustement des préférences aux identités partisanes, alors que le nationalisme implique une identité concurrente, avec une collectivité que les citoyens peuvent considérer une nation. Il y a aussi une ambiguïté substantielle par rapport au parti (ou aux partis) qui influence les citoyens. Il n'est pas clair si les partis que les citoyens aiment influencent leurs opinions, si ce sont les partis qu'ils n'aiment pas qui les influencent ou si ce sont les deux en même temps. Je propose que l'exposition aux positions des partis que les citoyens n'aiment pas est nécessaire pour que les partis influencent leurs opinions.

Ensuite, J'analyse des données observationnelles et expérimentales pour déterminer si des citoyens de quatre régions espagnoles où le nationalisme est présent adaptent leurs préférences nationalistes aux positions exprimées par les partis. Dans le chapitre 4, je me concentre sur la mesure des positions des partis à l'aide de l'analyse automatisée des discours législatifs. Dans le chapitre 5, je considère si, quand un parti change sa position,

ses partisans changent leurs opinions dans le même sens et si les citoyens qui n'aiment pas ce parti changent leurs opinions dans le sens contraire. Nous verrons que les résultats suggèrent que les partis nationalistes influencent leurs partisans au Pays Basque et en Catalogne. En Galice et dans la Communauté valencienne, les partis nationaux semblent jouer un rôle plus important.

Dans le chapitre 6, à l'aide de données expérimentales, je démontre que, quand les citoyens sont exposés à la position du parti qu'ils aiment le plus et à celle d'un parti qu'ils n'aiment pas, ils adaptent leurs opinions pour les rendre cohérentes avec celle du parti qu'ils aiment le plus. Les partis que les citoyens aiment n'influencent pas elles seules les préférences des citoyens.

Je conclus que les partis influencent les opinions des citoyens au sujet du nationalisme. Cependant, cette influence dépend de la présence des positions des partis que les citoyens n'aiment pas. Les partis ne peuvent donc pas tout simplement influencer leurs propres partisans en exprimant les positions qu'ils veulent qu'ils adoptent.

Mots clés: Partis politiques, Opinion publique, Influence des partis, Nationalisme, Espagne, Pays Basque, Catalogne, Communauté valencienne, Galice.

Abstract

In this dissertation, I consider whether parties influence support for regional nationalism in four regions of Spain: the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, and Galicia. I argue that the fundamental way parties influence citizens' opinions is by offering party cues. Citizens adapt their opinions to party cues even in the absence of persuasive arguments or other information. The current literature suggests that such influence takes place via partisan motivated reasoning.

However, it is not clear whether parties influence people in the context of nationalism, since party influence seems to involve adjusting preferences to people's partisan identities, while nationalism involves a competing identity, with a collectivity people may consider a nation. There is also substantial ambiguity about whether citizens are influenced by parties they like, by parties they dislike or whether they are influenced by both at the same time. I propose that exposing citizens to the positions of parties citizens dislike is key to party influence.

I then analyze both observational and experimental data to determine whether citizens of the four Spanish regions where nationalism is present adapt their nationalist preferences to the positions expressed by parties. In chapter 4, I focus on the measurement of party positions using automated text analysis of legislative speeches. In chapter 5, I consider whether people who like a party move in the same direction as that party when it changes its nationalist positions and whether those who feel distant from a party move in the opposite direction when it shifts its positions. We will see that the results suggest that na-

tionalist parties influence their partisans in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Statewide parties seem to play a stronger role in Galicia and the Valencian Community.

In chapter 6, using experimental data, I show that, people who did not already know the position of their most liked party, when exposed to that position as well as to the position of a party they dislike, adapt their opinions to make them more consistent with the position of their most liked party. The positions of parties citizens like are not enough to induce them to change their opinions.

I conclude that parties influence the opinions of citizens on nationalism. However, this influence depends on the presence of the positions of parties citizens do not like. Parties cannot simply influence their own partisans by adopting the positions they would like them to adopt.

Key words: Political parties, Public opinion, Party cues, Nationalism, Spain, Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencian Community, Galicia.

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List of Abbreviations

AP: Alianza Popular (People's Alliance)

BNG: Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc)

CDC: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia)

CEO: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (Centre for the Study of Opinion)

CIS: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Centre for Sociological Studies)

CiU: Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union)

C's: Ciutadans-Partit de la Ciutadania (Citizens-Party of Citizenship)

CUP: Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy)

EA: Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)

EB: Ezker Batua (United Left)

EB-B: Ezker Batua-Berdeak (United Left-Greens)

EE: Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Left)

EH: Euskal Herritarok (Basque Citizens)

ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left)

ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom)

EUPV: Esquerra Unida del País Valencià (United Left of the Valencian Country)

HB: Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity)

ICPS: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (Institute of Political and Social Sciences)

ICV: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (Initiative for Catalonia Greens)

IU: Izquierda Unida (United Left)

PCE: Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party)

PNV: Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party)

PP: Partido Popular (People's Party)

PSdeG: Partido dos Socialistas de Galicia (Socialists' Party of Galicia)

PSC: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialists' Party of Catalonia)

PSE: Partido Socialista de Euskadi (Basque Socialist Party)

PSE-EE: Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Socialist Party-Basque Left)

PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party)

PSG: Partido Socialista Galego (Galician Socialist Party)

PSP: Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party)

PSPV: Partit Socialista del Pais Valencia (Socialist Party of the Valencian Country)

PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia)

RI: Reagrupament Independentista (Independence Rally)

SI: Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (Catalan Solidarity for Independence)

UCD: Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre)

UDC: Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (Democratic Union of Catalonia)

UPG: Unión do Pobo Galego (Union of the Galician People)

UV: Unió Valenciana (Valencian Union)

UVR: Unión Valencianista Regional (Valencianist Regional Union)

To Oma (11.21.1925-02.10.2016)

Acknowledgments

The question I am asked most frequently about my research is: why Spain? My answer usual involves recounting the story of my first trip to Barcelona in February 2008, when I was intrigued not only by the beautiful architecture of the city and by the weather, which was extremely warm for February by Canadian standards, but also by the election signs I encountered. I happened to be there during the 2008 Spanish general election campaign. I have always been fascinated by elections. When I saw signs proposing that Catalonia become its own state, I knew I had to research the topic.

When I started my Ph.D. in the fall of 2010, I was determined to write a dissertation on regional nationalism in Spain. However, I was not clear on exactly what I wanted to research. I knew I was interested in elite influence on nationalism, which many of the people I had encountered in Spain talked about, but my dissertation lacked focus. It took six years for me to figure out exactly what I wanted to do. I must first and foremost thank André Blais for his patience. André endured six years of me talking about researching elite influence on nationalism without having a clear idea where my dissertation was going. He watched me pursue countless other projects and methods training, which may in part have been ways of avoiding my dissertation. I am fully responsible for the time it took me to finish it.

I am also grateful to Ignacio Lago, my co-supervisor at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. He invited me twice to his department even before I knew where my dissertation was going. His guidance on conducting research in Spain was tremendously useful. I also

really appreciate the criticisms he had of my work. It was by being told that my work was not good enough that I made it better. This past spring, Nacho was particularly helpful, when he provided advice on running experiments in Spain. I must point out that I ran a survey experiment in Galician without knowing a word of the language. I never would have been able to do that without him.

My lack of direction finally came to an end in May 2015 when I met Gabe Lenz, who gave a talk at the Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship. He suggested that I read his book *Follow the Leader?*, which he promptly shipped to me. Gabe's work made me realize how common the type of elite influence I had heard so much about in Spain is in advanced democracies. I am profoundly indebted to Gabe for having given me the ideas that reshaped my dissertation. I also owe him considerable thanks for his subsequent advice on conducting experiments.

Another person who played an important role in the recent evolution of my research is Sven-Oliver Proksch. When I found transcriptions of 1000s of debates in parliaments in Spain, I was very fortunate to meet Oli, who introduced me to the world of text analysis. Much of my work would not have taken the path it took if I had not met him.

I must also thank Xavier Coller, whose work on Valencia has inspired much of what I have written on that region. He was also extremely welcoming when we met in his office in Seville in 2013. His knowledge of nationalism in Spain is tremendously impressive. I benefited enormously from the advice he gave me then and through follow-up emails.

I also have to acknowledge María José Hierro, Jordi Muñoz, and Jeff Miley, from whom I have learned immensely about nationalism in Catalonia. They also provided me with very useful advice on my research.

I have to acknowledge the people I have met at the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies (now Research Chair in Electoral Studies) at the Université de Montréal over the past six years. I had great colleagues with whom I engaged in fruitful discussions about my research and who provided me with invaluable feedback at the weekly chair seminars.

Chapter 1

Introduction

On September 27th, 2015, 48% of Catalans voted for parties that had committed to make Catalonia an independent state in an election those parties had presented as a plebiscitary vote on Catalan independence. This unprecedented show of support for separation from Spain followed more than five years of strong mobilization in favour of Catalan independence and decades of support for decentralization and the promotion of the Catalan language and culture, all of which had strong popular backing. Such strong regional nationalism is not unique to Catalonia. In the Basque Country, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has been fighting for increased power for the region as well as for the promotion of the regional culture for over a century. Moreover, for decades, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (generally known as ETA) used terrorism to fight for independence. Although ETA put an end to violence in 2011, the PNV and other parties have won election after election with strong nationalist platforms.

Regional nationalism has appeared in other regions of Spain as well, although it has been considerably weaker there. In the Valencian Community, the *Compromís* coalition, which includes nationalist parties, joined the regional government formed in June 2015. The Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) has been receiving at least 10 percent of the votes in regional elections in Galicia since the early 1990s (Generalitat valenciana, 2016).

Nationalism in each of these regions has had varied trajectories. In recent years, Catalan nationalism was transformed from a moderate movement seeking greater self-government within Spain to one focused on creating an independent state. Basque nationalism, on the other hand, while composed of various groups pursuing different goals, has generally moderated in recent years. Support for independence has notably dropped there since the mid 2000s.

Nationalism, whether regional or statewide, is not unique to Spain. It is present all over the world. Numerous authors have attempted to explain it, accounting for its origins and evolution. In recent years, there has been a consensus that nationalism does not naturally emerge from objective differences. Economic and political factors have been proposed as its causes (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983).

One key explanation that has been proposed is that political elites cause nationalism. A common argument in the literature on nationalism in Spain and on nationalism more broadly is that political elites mobilize support for nationalism (e.g. Brass, 1985; Fernández-Albertos and Lago, 2015; Hierro, 2012; Miley, 2006; Torcal and Mota, 2014). However, to my knowledge, no study has shown how elites actually induce support for nationalism among citizens. Research on nationalism thus lacks a theory of how elites influence support for it. I argue that the considerable body of research on elite influence on public opinion in political science in recent decades provides such a theory.

1.1 What is Nationalism?

Before pursuing the debate about the role of elite influence on public attitudes towards nationalism, it is important to provide a definition of nationalism. As Gellner (1983) defines it, nationalism is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1). This definition implies that nationalists pursue two goals: modifying the territorial organization of the state and seeking to extend

the identity and culture (especially the language) of the nation to all residents of a political unit, which can be an independent state or a self-governing region within a larger state. In chapters 4 and 5, I call these the state-building and nation-building dimensions of nationalism, respectively.

Regional nationalists pursue the first goal by seeking a sovereign political unit for the nation, either by demanding increased autonomy or independence. They pursue the second goal by trying to assimilate residents of the region into the regional culture. Statewide nationalism pursues the first goal by asserting its sovereignty vis-à-vis other nations and supranational organizations and the second by seeking to exclude outsiders from its territory and/or assimilating those who do not fully share the national culture. A nationalist movement is one that is motivated to apply the principle of congruence between institutions and the population (Gellner, 1983, 1).

Regional nationalism is the pursuit of this principle by a population inhabiting a region within a larger state. My definition of regional nationalism is not as restrictive as that of Meadwell (1991), who only considers nationalist movements those that prefer independence to the status quo. His restrictive definition of nationalism excludes movements that seek greater autonomy for the region and policies designed to promote the regional culture and identity, but not secession, even if they adopt radical positions towards those ends. I thus consider as nationalist any political movement that aims to either transform political institutions to make them more congruent with the regional identity or to change the culture and/or identity of the inhabitants of the region to make them more consistent with the regional institutions that exist. Consistent with this definition, beginning in chapter 3, I consider whether citizens support either increased autonomy or the possibility of independence in Galicia and the Valencian Community in which nationalism is relatively weak. in the Basque Country and Catalonia, I focus on support for independence, because that option has much stronger support in those regions.

Nationalism is present all over the world. However, the type of nationalism that is

present varies across regions. In some regions, regional nationalism is much stronger than state-level nationalism.[1] In other regions, state-level nationalism is much more prevalent.

So far, I have defined nationalism without defining the word nation. Nation is synonymous with "national group" in Gellner's definition of nationalism. It is the group with which institutions should be congruent. I propose Benedict Anderson's definition of nation. He defines a nation as "an imagined political community", which is "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign". A nation is imagined, because most of its members will never meet or even hear of most other members. It is limited in that any nation must exclude some human beings who are not part of it. Its sovereignty implies that, by possessing a state, or at least self-governing institutions, a nation can be said to be free. A nation is a community, because it implies some form of fraternity among members (Anderson, 2006, 6-7). In other words, a nation is a limited group of human beings who aspire to govern themselves.

1.2   Regional Nationalism in Spain

Spain is a fascinating context for the study of regional nationalism. It is composed of at least six regions with languages that are distinct from the national language, Spanish (also known as Castilian).[2] These regions are the Balearic Islands, Catalonia, the Valencian Community[3], the Basque Country, Navarre, and Galicia. In all of these, regional languages exist. In the first three, some variant of Catalan is spoken by a considerable proportion of the population.[4] In the Basque Country and Navarre, significant minorities speak

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[1]Note that in this dissertation, I will frequently use the term national to refer to the level of the state. This does not in any way imply that I consider the state to correspond any more with a nation. I simply use the word national in the conventional way.

[2]There are a few other languages spoken by small minorities.

[3]Valencian Community is the official name of the region. In this dissertation, I will often refer to it simply as Valencia.

[4]I consider the languages spoken in each of these regions variants of Catalan, since that is what academic experts call them. Politicians in the Balearic Islands and Valencia have often asserted that their local tongues are in fact distinct languages, in spite of the scientific evidence to the contrary (e.g. Wheeler,

Basque. In Galicia, a majority of the population has Galician, a language that is related to Portuguese, as its mother tongue.

However, the political manifestation of that distinctiveness varies. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, regional nationalism has been strong. People there have been strongly supportive of greater autonomy and in many cases even independence. In Galicia, support for the territorial and cultural aspects of nationalism has been considerably weaker. In the other three regions, regional nationalism has been the exception rather than the rule. In the Balearic Islands, Navarre and the Valencian Community, state-level (i.e. Spanish) nationalism has been predominant.

All Spanish regions lived under a very centralized dictatorship under Franco from 1939 to 1975. Following the transition to democracy that came after the death of Franco, government authority was decentralized to all regions of Spain (and to a few regions that were created at that time). The Spanish case thus allows us to investigate the conditions under which decentralization leads to regional nationalist movements that potentially threaten a long-standing state.

In this dissertation, I focus on four of these regions with distinct cultures : the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. There are two major reasons for selecting these regions. Most fundamentally, they illustrate the two possible outcomes with respect to the success of nationalism. While the Basque Country and Catalonia have nationalist movements that have received widespread public support for sometimes radical changes, Galicia and Valencia have much weaker movements. I thus partly focus on these because they allow me to assess whether parties are the cause of strong or weak nationalism. They also allow me to determine whether parties influence nationalist opinions in two very different types of regions.

2006).

Figure 1.1: Four Regions of Spain

A second key reason for focusing on these four regions is that excellent survey data are available in all of them. The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) has been surveying the national population since the late 1960s. Most significantly, abundant data are available at the regional level since regional self-governing institutions were created in the early 1980s. A particularly large amount of data exists in the two strongly nationalistic regions. In Catalonia, in addition to the CIS, the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO) and the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) have also been surveying residents there on a regular basis. In the Basque Country, the Euskobarómetro has been asking similarly relevant questions since the 1980s.[5] I thus have data from a large number of surveys, for most of which I have individual-level data, on which to base this dissertation. Such data allow me to analyze support for nationalism over time and, most importantly for my purposes, by party. Unfortunately, as we will see, these data are more abundant in some regions than in others.

Data on elites are also available. Of particular interest, records of all debates in the

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[5]Unfortunately, the Euskobarómetro does not share individual-level data. I thus rely on it only for observing aggregate movement.

four regional parliaments going back to the early 1980s can be downloaded from their websites. Chapter 4 uses transcriptions of these speeches to measure party positions at various points in time. In chapter 5, I relate these to measures of public support for nationalism.

1.3 Political Science Has the Answer

We saw above that many scholars of nationalism have argued that political elites influence support for nationalism, but that they have yet to provide a compelling account of how such influence takes place. I argue that the literature on elite influence that has accumulated in recent decades can provide an account for elite influence on nationalism.

There are two major lines of research that suggest ways parties may influence support for nationalism. The first focuses on how citizens respond to the content of political communications. The second emphasizes the sources of messages. On the one hand, there is an extensive literature on framing effects, which involve emphasizing the dimension (or dimensions) of an issue that are favourable to a particular position (for an overview of framing research, see Chong and Druckman, 2007). For example, a secessionist party may focus on the economic implications of independence if citizens' beliefs about the economic consequences of that change would be positive rather than on the linguistic implications if citizens' are less sanguine about those. Parties may also successfully persuade citizens to change their opinions by offering arguments to support or oppose a position. Zaller (1992) argued that parties present considerations, reasons for supporting or opposing a position, in their communications, which citizens may internalize, depending on how compatible they are with their predispositions and how high their political awareness is. If the balance of considerations switches from one side of an issue to the other, citizens may change the opinions they express.

Muñoz and Tormos (2015) have considered the influence of persuasive content on sup-

port for Catalan independence. They found weak evidence that the content of messages persuades citizens to support or oppose independence. This finding points to a key limitation to framing and arguments as avenues for parties to influence citizens' opinions, which suggest that the second way parties may influence preferences is more consequential. As numerous scholars have argued and many have shown, rather than blindly following arguments or frames, citizens consider the sources of political messages (e.g. Druckman, 2001; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010; Zaller, 1992). Thus, source effects might actually override the influence of frames, arguments or any other information contained in political communications. Party cue effects, when citizens adopt a position because of information about parties' positions on an issue, are thus the most fundamental way parties can influence people's attitudes. Moreover, according to Broockman and Butler (2015), such "position adoption" effects have greater implications for the functioning of democracy than persuasion, because, if citizens adopt positions merely because their preferred elites support them, politicians may not feel constrained to represent citizens' preferences.

Given the importance of party cue effects in general, I focus on them in this dissertation. I argue that they are an important way in which parties influence support for nationalism.

There are two main reasons why party positions have been said to influence citizens' opinions (e.g. Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). On the one hand, citizens may be making up for their lack of attentiveness to politics by using party positions to help them figure out their positions on political issues. Downs (1957) argued that most citizens are incapable of making expert decisions in all areas of public policy. They consequently seek help from experts in those areas who share their goals and who have good judgment. Lupia (1994) makes a similar argument about citizens relying on their knowledge of the positions taken by experts to formulate their own opinions when they lack "encyclopedic knowledge". They do not adopt the positions of any elites though. People seek guidance from elites they consider knowledgeable and trustworthy (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998, 9). Parties are key

political actors towards which citizens have strong attitudes. Citizens may thus rely on parties to help them develop opinions on issues on which they have little knowledge.

On the other hand, the influence of party cues may result from one's feelings of attachment to parties. Instead of serving as a shortcut, partisanship may actually be a claim of support by parties. The authors of *The American Voter* argued that party identification is a "perceptual screen" (133) and described the political party as "an opinion forming agency of great importance" (Campbell et al., 1960, 128, cited in Slothuus, 2015, 3). People may adopt a party's position, because they want to have the opinion of their group and/or not have the position of the opposing group. Leeper and Slothuus (2014) argue that citizens, when faced with information about party positions, engage in motivated reasoning, that is reasoning aimed at striving towards a particular goal, defending one's partisanship rather than arriving at an accurate conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006).

In recent years, studies on party influence have stressed the latter explanation (e.g. Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Petersen et al., 2013). However, as I will show in chapter 2, American studies offer incomplete guidance on how to study party cue effects in multiparty systems in Europe and elsewhere. American studies typically show participants cues from both parties there and assess reactions among those who identify with each party (e.g. Cohen, 2003; Kam, 2005).

However, there has been considerable skepticism among scholars of European politics about the applicability of the notion of party identification across the Atlantic (especially, Thomassen, 1976). I suggest that we should keep in mind the limitations to the conceptualization of partisanship as an identification and instead think of partisanship as a set of attitudes when studying European politics, as proposed by Rosema (2006). He has suggested that parties can be seen as groups to which voters may belong or as organizations towards which they have positive or negative attitudes. He proposes studying attitudes towards parties rather than party identification in the European context. Given the doubts

about the relevance of party identification in Europe, I support Rosema's suggestion to use attitudes towards parties as a measure of partisanship in European multi-party systems.[6]

For parties to most strongly influence public opinion, party cues must appeal to the strongest attitudes citizens have. Such attitudes are their feelings towards parties they strongly like and parties they strongly dislike. I thus propose that party cue effects are most powerful in multi-party systems when citizens are exposed to the positions of two parties, one they like a lot and one they dislike a lot. When citizens are exposed to contrasting positions from two such parties towards which they have opposing attitudes, their prior attitudes should lead them most strongly to adjust their opinions in the direction of their preferred party. Their positive attitudes towards their preferred party and their negative attitudes towards their disliked party should make them favourable to the position expressed by the former and unfavourable to the position of the latter. They should thus make their opinions more consistent with the position of the party they like. Such contrasting positions between parties towards which people have opposing feelings should be common in the real world. Thus, I argue that, studies on party cue effects in multi-party systems should consider reactions to such opposing cues not only because they are more likely to lead to evidence of party following effects but also because they are closer to the reality of political conflict of real-world politics.

In *Follow the Leader*, Lenz (2012) provides compelling evidence that party cue effects occur in a large variety of contexts. In example after example, he finds no evidence that citizens choose politicians on the basis of pre-existing policy views. Lenz finds that citizens fail to change their party preferences to reflect their policy preferences when they learn parties' positions, when those positions become salient or when they change their policy opinions. What he finds is evidence that citizens adjust their policy preferences to make them consistent with those of the politicians they already like for other reasons. The

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[6]This is not to say that no one identifies with a party in Europe. I am merely arguing that such identification is not the only manifestation of partisanship there. Most citizens in non-presidential systems have attitudes towards multiple parties, as Blais, Guntermann and Bodet (2016) show.

evidence presented by Lenz suggests that democracy does not work the way most people expect it to. Citizens do not choose parties to reflect their policy preferences, but rather they choose parties for other reasons and then adopt those parties' policy positions.

More recently, Tesler (2015) has shown that citizens do sometimes adjust their attitudes towards parties to reflect their preferences. When citizens have strongly-crystallized attitudes and elites adopt clear positions on those issues, citizens will adjust their evaluations of elites to reflect their crystallized attitudes. It does, therefore, appear that citizens are not always influenced by elites. Even Lenz (2012) concedes that, on some issues, notably race and social issues, the public's attitudes may be strong enough to influence their party choices and thus they can lead elites (213). Thus, it is not entirely clear that parties influence opinions on nationalism.

I suggest that parties do influence the public's support for nationalist positions. When partisanship is activated through exposure to the position of a disliked party, people move their opinions in the direction of their preferred party in spite of competing identities.

I show that, in the aggregate, opinions follow changes in party positions. When a party moves in one direction, citizens who feel close to it often move in the same direction. Those who feel distant from it often move in the opposite direction. We will also see that, when people learn the contrasting positions of the party they like the most and of the party they dislike the most, they move their opinions in the direction of the former. When they only are exposed to the position of their most liked party, they do not move in that direction. This suggests that the ability of parties to influence opinions is limited. Parties can only influence their partisans if another party takes a contrasting position and many citizens have opposing feelings about the two parties.

1.4 Why We Should Care About Elite Influence on Nationalism

Not only is the role of elites in the success of nationalism an interesting theoretical debate, it also has implications for the survival of diverse states. This is particularly true if all parties have to do to influence people's opinions is to state their opinions. As we will see in chapter 2, there has been a considerable debate about whether decentralization promotes or hinders regional nationalism (e.g. Brancati, 2009; Lublin, 2014). A lot has also been written about the normative justification of decentralization and arrangements like asymmetric federalism as means of giving regionally-based groups increased autonomy within existing states (e.g. Gagnon, 2009). If regional elites promote nationalism, decentralization may simply give them more power, thus allowing them to mobilize the population against the current state and ultimately threaten its survival. Moreover, the normative justification for decentralization is considerably weaker if nationalism is caused by elites. If that is the case, decentralization does not serve to recognize pre-existing nationalist sentiment. It instead may place elites in a position to more strongly influence citizens' opinions.

More fundamentally, if elites strongly influence the opinions citizens express on policy issues, this calls into question the democratic ideal (Lenz, 2012). Most of the time in democracy, citizens do not themselves directly make decisions on political issues. Instead, they elect representatives who make decisions for them. The hope is that citizens exert an indirect influence through choosing representatives who reflect their own policy preferences. In recent years, a number of studies have shown that elites generally do respond to citizens' preferences (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). Other studies have shown that representation is biased though, with richer citizens being strongly influential, while poorer individuals have less of an impact on government policy (e.g. Bartels, 2010; Gilens, 2012)

However, if citizens' positions are strongly influenced by the positions adopted by their preferred parties, such debates about representation and responsiveness become less important, since the views citizens express are to a large extent influenced by parties' positions.

My explanation for elite influence, however, suggests that it is not as pervasive as much of the work on party following would suggest. Motivated reasoning does not necessarily imply that citizens will always seek to defend their partisanship when faced with new information. They have other attitudes that may be salient. I argue that partisan attitudes only become salient when opposing parties adopt contrasting positions. Consequently, citizens' opinions are not only a reflection of what their preferred party says about an issue. It is more accurate to assert that they are influenced by debate between parties.

Political conflict is inevitable in a democracy. Thus, if conflict leads to party influence on opinion, party influence should be pervasive. A single party cannot simply manipulate public opinion though. Thus, in debates about decentralization, rather than fearing giving power to regional elites who may cause the breakdown of existing states, observers of nationalism who care about preserving the territorial status quo should care about the creation of situations of polarization between pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist parties.

1.5   Organization of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, I take advantage of a variety of different methodological approaches to assess the role played by political elites in public opinion formation with respect to nationalism. I use conventional surveys, innovative text analysis methods, and experiments. Each of these has its limitations with respect to establishing causality. However, used together, they provide strong evidence of the relationship between elites and masses in the context of nationalism.

In the second chapter, I review the relevant literature on nationalism, on public opinion

formation, and on the relationship between elites and masses. I argue that parties can influence opinions, on nationalism and on other issues, if they make partisan attitudes salient, that is when opposing parties take contrasting positions on an issue.

In the third chapter, I provide some general historical background on regional nationalism in Spain and I introduce each of the four regions. I particularly focus on how some parties have come to support nationalism, while others have ended up opposing it. I suggest ways in which parties may have influenced support for nationalist territorial options over time.

In the fourth chapter, I measure party positions in legislative debates at various points in time. I produce these using Wordfish. The chapter deals with four issues involved in using Wordfish to measure nationalist positions using speeches: dominance of the political dimensions of interest, "bag of words", the stability of word meaning, and the presence of more than one language. I validate the measures I produce using citizens' perceptions of party positions in surveys. I show that, when the positions I measured using text analysis show that parties changed their positions, citizens also perceived a change.

Chapter 5 assesses whether aggregate changes in citizens' opinions after changes in parties' positions are consistent with party cue effects. It seeks to determine whether, when parties move, their partisans move their opinions in the same direction and whether citizens who dislike them move in the opposite direction, as would be expected by partisan motivated reasoning. We will see that there is considerable evidence that citizens in the regions with strong nationalism, the Basque Country and Catalonia, respond to changes in positions by regional nationalist parties. In regions where nationalism is less salient, Galicia and the Valencian Community, citizens react more to changes by parties at the national level.

While these findings suggest that partisans' opinions often change in ways that are consistent with party following in the aggregate, they do not show how party cue effects occur at the individual level. As we will see, the measures of party positions I produce

are relative measures, thus making it difficult to determine which parties move and thus lead to changes in party positions. Consequently, it is not possible to know with these analyses whether people are reacting to their preferred party or to their least preferred party. Moreover, it is still possible that they are changing due to other developments. The aggregate analyses in chapter 5 should thus be seen as demonstrating that changes in relative party positions precede changes in opinions that are consistent with party cue effects.

To deal with the limitations of these observational analyses, I conducted three experiments, a laboratory experiment in Catalonia, and two on-line survey experiments, one in Galicia and one throughout Spain. These studies show that, when they learn the position of their preferred party, people adjust their opinions in its direction if they are exposed to cues from this party as well from the party they dislike the most among those with the opposite position. When they are exposed to a single cue from their favourite party, people do not adjust their opinions and even increase their perceived distance from that party.

I conclude that parties do influence nationalism, but that this influence does not occur via manipulation by any particular elite. Parties influence opinions when opposing parties take contrasting positions. Therefore, rather than worrying about empowering a nationalist elite in the process of decentralization, observers of politics in regions like the four I consider here should be concerned about politics becoming polarized between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties.

Chapter 2

Party Influence on Nationalism: The Importance of Partisan Attitudes

This chapter considers the various ways that elites may influence public support for nationalism. It focuses on two majors avenues of elite influence. On the one hand, elites can change people's preferences through the content of their messages. They can influence citizens by framing issues in ways that are favourable to their positions or they can offer persuasive arguments. On the other hand, parties have been found to influence citizens' opinions merely by expressing positions. As we will see, the latter means of influence is fundamental, because citizens adopt the positions of their preferred parties regardless of whether they offer persuasive content.

I then show that similar arguments about elite influence are central to the literature on nationalism. However, rarely do authors consider the importance of the source of an elite message on nationalism and thus do not explain why people listen to a particular nationalist elite. I thus assert that the literature on nationalism would benefit by considering the influence of partisanship.

In the following section, I point out that American studies on party cue effects are poor guides on how to study such effects in multi-party contexts like in Spain. American studies

typically show participants cues from both parties there and assess reactions among those who identify with each party. However, there is considerable doubt among scholars of Europe about the applicability of the concept of party identification in European multi-party systems. Moreover, it is not clear whether participants in studies in the US are responding to the cue from the party with which they identify or to the position of the other party or, possibly, to both party cues. We will see that studies in multi-party systems have found smaller effects of party cues. I argue that these studies probably underestimate the influence of parties because they do not conceptualize partisanship in the most appropriate way for party influence in such systems. I argue that, when we conceptualize partisanship as a set of attitudes towards various parties and consider the importance of prior attitudes as determinants of how people respond to new information, it becomes clear that, in multi-party systems, people should most strongly react to the contrasting positions of liked and disliked parties. I then outline the expectations, at both the aggregate and individual levels, I derive from this discussion of when to expect party cue effects.

Finally, this chapter concludes with a consideration of the implications of party influence on nationalism. If support for nationalism depends on the positions adopted by opposing parties, it suggests that, as many argue, nationalism is endogenous to politics. However, far from extreme claims of manipulation by parties, a single party cannot intentionally impose its positions on citizens. Thus, in debates over decentralization, rather than being concerned about providing power to regional elites, what observers of nationalist conflict should worry about are situations of confrontation between opposing parties.

2.1 Avenues of Influence

Scholars have long discussed elite influence on opinions. Studies have pointed to, on the one hand, effects that depend on the content of elite messages, framing and persuasion

effects, and, on the other hand, to those that depend on the sources of messages, cue effects. We will see that it is essential to consider which elites issue a message (or messages) in any consideration of its influence.

2.1.1 Frames

Two major types of framing effects exist in the literature. An equivalency framing effect is when people express different opinions in response to distinct but logically equivalent language. A classic example is the 'Asian disease' experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in which people select different programs for dealing with the outbreak of a disease depending on whether they focus on lives saved or deaths. An emphasis framing effect, on the other hand, involves an elite that focuses on a subset of considerations that are related to an issue and thus induces people to use these when forming an opinion. The difference between the two is that the latter type of frames are not logically equivalent (Druckman, 2001, 226-229).

Emphasis frames may influence opinions on nationalism. People may have positive or negative attitudes towards various dimensions (or considerations) of an object. A person's attitude towards a political proposal is a combination of their positive and negative evaluation of its different dimensions. For example, attitudes towards Catalan independence likely depend on a number of considerations, for example, the standard of living people would have in an independent state and the future of the Catalan language. If a person is optimistic about how well off she is going to be in an independent state but is pessimistic about the effects of separation on the vitality of the regional language, she may favour independence if she focuses on the economy but oppose it if she focuses on language. The weight a person places on different dimensions in deciding on an issue is their "frame in thought". Politicians frequently seek to change these frames by emphasizing certain considerations by diffusing a "frame in communication" (Chong and Druckman,

2007, 105-106). A Framing effect is the influence of the "frames in communications" used by elites on citizens' "frames in thought" and, in turn, on their attitudes (109).

For a consideration to affect an attitude, Chong and Druckman (2007) propose that three conditions must be met. First, the consideration must be available, meaning that it is stored in memory. Second, it has to be accessible. In other words, it must be easily retrievable from long-term memory. Third, it has to be considered applicable or important for the issue. Framing effects occur by making considerations available, accessible or applicable (110-111).

Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) have taken the notion of framing to the extreme by arguing that political elites carefully study public opinion and identify the language that is most likely to lead citizens to endorse their proposals and then use such "crafted talk" to elicit support for their preferred policies (27). However, studies suggest that there are real limits on the extent to which frames can influence people. Druckman (2004) and Sniderman and Theriault (2004) showed that people are less influenced when they receive competing frames, as is typically the case in a competitive political environment. Competing considerations clarify citizens' choice, thus allowing them to make decisions that better reflect their general attitudes. While in an artificial situation, citizens are strongly influenced by frames, in more realistic situations, elite messages actually help them make better decisions and develop opinions that are closest to their broader preferences (Sniderman and Levendusky, 2007).

There is a more fundamental limitation to the ability of elites to use frames to influence people's opinions. A number of studies have shown that a frame's source matters in determining how influential it is (e.g. Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lupia, 2002; Slothuus and De Vreese, 2010). As Slothuus and De Vreese (2010) assert, we should not ignore the sources of frames in the real world: political parties. They find that people are more likely to follow frames when they come from their preferred party and on issues on which there is a conflict between parties. They

argue that citizens, when faced with party cues, engage in motivated reasoning. In other words, they are driven by their predispositions to come to a conclusion in a particular direction (632). They argue that motivated reasoning should be most strongly engaged on issues on which parties conflict (633). Consequently, while people can be influenced by frames that emphasize particular considerations, they consider the parties that use particular frames when responding to them.

Before moving on to the next way elites can influence opinions, I should point out that there is another means of elite influence that is related to framing effects: priming. Iyengar and Kinder (1987), in a series of experiments, demonstrate such priming effects. When people are exposed to news stories on a particular topic, they show that they are more likely to use that issue to evaluate political leaders, notably the American president. By changing the importance of considerations, priming is similar to framing (Chong and Druckman, 2007, 115). The key difference is that framing is about the considerations behind opinions on policy, while priming is about considerations underlying evaluations of political elites. As with framing effects, Miller and Krosnick (2000) found that priming depends on the source of the message. Only people who trust the media consider an issue to be more important in response to media coverage and give it more weight in their evaluations of the US President. I do not consider priming in any more detail given that my goal is to assess the influence elites have on opinions.

2.1.2 Persuasive Messages

In addition to (or instead of) influencing citizens by emphasizing the dimension (or dimensions) they use when considering an issue, elites may also persuade people to change their beliefs on a particular dimension underlying an issue (Nelson and Oxley, 1999). For example, pro-independence parties in Catalonia may be able to increase support for secession by persuading people that the state of the economy would improve in an independent

Catalonia.

Probably the most influential work on persuasion in political science is *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* by Zaller (1992). He argues that responses to survey questions are "opinion statements" rather than real opinions (51). Citizens formulate such statements on the basis of the considerations, which are reasons that induce an individual to give an opinion on one side of an issue rather the other, they have "at the top of their head" when they answer a survey (1, 40).

Zaller proposes the RAS (Receive-Accept-Sample) model to explain how citizens come to formulate opinion statements. People receive messages from political elites. They accept them as considerations if they are consistent with their predispositions. When they express opinions, they sample from the considerations they have internalized. People's attitudes, or, as he sees them, their long-term response probabilities, can change over time, as elites diffuse new messages if they accept them. While the reception of elite messages increases with political awareness, acceptance of such messages declines with awareness. Thus, the relationship between political awareness and opinion change tends to be non-monotonic. People who pay a moderate level of attention to politics are most strongly influenced by elite messages.

Readers should notice that there are actually two types of information voters receive from elites in Zaller's model. He argues that people receive persuasive messages, arguments for taking a point of view, and cueing messages, which contain information about the ideological or partisan implications of a persuasive message (Zaller, 1992, 41-42). Consequently, it is far from clear whether what changes expressed opinions are the persuasive messages elites send out or whether it is simply the positions parties express. As we will see in the next section, numerous studies show that party cues are sufficient to induce opinion change.

As with frames, citizens do not blindly change their opinions in response to messages from all parties. Citizens, in Zaller's model, only selectively consider elite messages. They

accept them based on how compatible they are with their predispositions, which he sees as "stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication the person receives". Partisanship is one important type of pre-disposition (22-23). Consequently, persuasive messages do not necessarily influence the opinions citizens express.

2.1.3 Cues

We have seen that partisanship is fundamental to both framing and persuasion effects. Many other studies have found that party cues, information about parties' positions, are sufficient to induce changes in the opinions people express (Bullock, 2011; Cohen, 2003; Kam, 2005; Slothuus, 2015).

According to Broockman and Butler (2015), such "position adoption" effects have greater implications for the functioning of democracy than persuasion, because, if citizens adopt positions merely because their preferred elites support them, politicians may not feel constrained to represent citizens' preferences. Unlike persuasion, when citizens follow party cues, they do not even require that politicians justify their positions or appeal to citizens' values. Broockman and Butler found that US legislators influence their constituents' views even in the absence of persuasive arguments. Moreover, consistent with the literatures on framing and persuasion effects, when such information is provided, partisanship still matters. Bullock (2011) found that, even when experimental participants received large amounts of policy information, they relied on cues. Since they can influence opinions even in the absence of arguments or frames and because they matter even when persuasive content is present, party cues are fundamental to party influence on opinions.

It should not be surprising that citizens tend to adopt parties' positions. Major studies in social psychology have found that humans tend to obey authority (see especially, Milgram, 1974, cited in Broockman and Butler (2015)) and to adopt the attitudes of their

peers (Asch, 1952). Obedience to authority may account for the influence of party cues if citizens are deferring to elite judgment. Conformity may explain it if people adopt party positions in order to share the opinions of people like them. These possibilities correspond to the major approaches to explaining party influence.

There are two main reasons why parties have been said to influence citizens' opinions (e.g. Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). On the one hand, citizens may be making up for a lack of attentiveness to politics by using party positions to help them figure out their positions on political issues. Downs (1957) argued that most citizens are incapable of making expert decisions in all areas of public policy. They consequently seek help from experts in those areas who share their goals and who have good judgment. Lupia (1994) makes a similar argument about citizens relying on their knowledge of the positions taken by elites to formulate their own opinions when they lack "encyclopedic knowledge". They do not adopt the positions of any elites though. People seek guidance from elites they consider knowledgeable and trustworthy (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998, 9). Parties are key political actors towards which citizens have strong attitudes. Citizens may thus rely on parties to help them develop opinions on issues about which they have little knowledge.

This perspective is related to dual-process theories from psychology, which suggest that citizens engage in heuristic or peripheral processing of information, on the one hand, or systematic or central route processing, on the other (Chen and Chaiken, 1999; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). If following party cues involves heuristic processing, we should find that citizens with less political information are more susceptible to party influence, since they substitute party cues for careful consideration of the policy. Evidence consistent with this perspective includes Kam (2005) and Rahn (1993).

On the other hand, the influence of party cues may result from one's feelings of attachment to parties. Instead of serving as a shortcut, partisanship may actually be a claim of support by parties. The authors of *The American Voter* argued that party identification is a "perceptual screen" (133) and described the political party as "an opinion forming

agency of great importance" (Campbell et al., 1960, 128, cited in Slothuus 2015, 3). People may adopt a party's position, because they want to share the opinion of their group and/or not express the position of the opposing group. Leeper and Slothuus (2014) argue that citizens, when faced with information about party positions, engage in motivated reasoning, that is reasoning aimed at striving towards a particular goal, defending one's partisanship rather than arriving at an accurate conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006).

These two perspectives on partisan influence imply different goals on the part of citizens. In the heuristic approach, parties influence citizens' views, because citizens pursue accuracy goals. In other words, citizens use an informational shortcut to express the opinions that most accurately reflect their values, interests or the state of the world. In the motivated reasoning approach, citizens pursue directional goals, that is, to reach a particular conclusion that is consistent with their partisanship (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014, 134-135).

While there are some findings that support the heuristic approach (e.g. Kam, 2005), the weight of the evidence seems to support the second perspective. In his analysis of survey data, Zaller (1992) found that more aware citizens reacted more to political messages from their own party. If citizens followed elites to make up for a lack of sophistication, we would expect less informed citizens to be most affected by party positions. Moreover, Petersen et al. (2013) show that, when people are exposed to party cues that are inconsistent with a party's broader ideology, the higher their sympathy for their party, the longer it takes them to express opinions that are consistent with that cue. Since, in the heuristic approach, party cues should decrease the effort involved in stating an opinion, this finding suggests that party cues are claims for support by a group and not a heuristic. Being exposed to party positions can make answering survey questions more difficult, due to the need to reconcile predispositions relevant to an issue and the position taken by the party or parties one likes, and possibly positions taken by other parties. Similarly, Petersen, Giessing and Nielsen (2015) assessed the physiological reactions to party cues and found

that only people who experience strong physiological reactions to parties are influenced by their positions. This suggests that parties influence citizens, because they seek to defend attachments that are grounded in affect (8). Finally, Slothuus (2015) finds greater effects of non-pretreated party cues among people with higher political awareness, suggesting that cues are not substituting for a lack of knowledge among citizens with low political awareness. Since the motivated reasoning approach has received considerable attention as well as empirical support in recent years, I focus on it in the rest of my dissertation.

2.2   Partisanship and Policy Preferences

Ever since *The American Voter*, scholars of political behaviour have been keenly aware of the influence parties can have on citizens' attitudes. Its authors argued that political parties serve as groups "towards which individuals may develop an identification, positive or negative, of some degree of intensity". People use parties as either positive or negative reference groups (Campbell et al., 1960, 121-122). They also described the political party as "an opinion-forming agency of great importance". Consistent with the evidence we have seen on the importance of party positions, Campbell et al. (1960) argued that parties do not have to defend their positions but merely influence citizens by providing cues (128). Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002), similarly, argue that identification with a party serves as a fundamental social identity that influences many of people's attitudes. Further evidence to back up the notion of partisanship as a fundamental political attitude comes from Converse (1964), who found that, while people's opinions varied over time, their party identification is largely stable (240).

Note that there has been a considerable debate about the relevance of party identification in Europe. While it has been very influential in the US context (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996), in Europe, scholars have doubted its relevance (e.g. Kaase, 1976; Thomassen, 1976). Rosema (2006)

has defended its importance in Europe but argued that it should be conceptualized in a different way in systems with multiple parties. He advocates the use of party evaluations instead of the measure of identification used in American research. I follow this practice in the experiments I designed. I also use a measure of closeness in my analyses of observational survey data in chapter 5. While not identical to the common American notion of party identification, both approaches are related to the notion of references groups from *The American Voter*. What matters is not which single party one identifies with but the feelings people have to the multiple parties in existence.

As discussed above, Leeper and Slothuus (2014) focus on motivated reasoning as an explanation for citizens' tendency to follow party positions. In other words, citizens adopt party positions, because when they encounter new information, people are driven by particular goals (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Leeper and Slothuus point to the notion in *The American Voter* of a "perceptual screen" that influences the way people see the political world (Campbell et al., 1960, 137). Citizens evaluate evidence that is more consistent with their prior attitudes more positively than opposing arguments. They also spend considerable effort showing that arguments that go against their prior attitudes are wrong. Moreover, they look for information that is congruent with their prior attitudes (Taber and Lodge, 2006, 756). Motivated reasoning is thus difficult, since people who are faced with party cues that contradict their predispositions must come up with a rationalization for supporting their preferred party's stance (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014, 136).

Readers should note that there is no reason why citizens would necessarily engage in "partisan motivated reasoning" (e.g. Leeper and Slothuus, 2014, 134). Rather than seeking to defend their party attitudes, they may very well defend their prior attitudes on some issue. We will see below, that I only expect such reasoning to reliably occur in certain circumstances.

The view of partisanship as a causal force has been challenged by two literatures. The

first challenge comes from revisionists who have notably argued that partisanship is a "running tally" of citizens' evaluations of parties' past performance (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1981). Bartels (2002) countered these claims that partisanship merely reflects citizens' more specific attitudes by showing that partisanship in fact influences not only political attitudes but also perceptions of the real world.

The view of people's attitudes towards one or more parties as an exogenous force also goes against a whole tradition of research on "issue voting", that is, the notion that citizens support parties on the basis of their policy platforms (Lenz, 2012, 1). This perspective started with Downs (1957), who argued that citizens vote for the party they believe will give them the greatest utility (38-39). Building on Downs' framework, subsequent work has developed the notion of spatial voting, the idea that citizens vote for the party that is closest to them in what is normally a unidimensional space (Enelow and Hinich, 1984). The notion of spatial voting has been much amended (Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005; Lachat, 2015; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). However, the essential idea is always that citizens have policy preferences on the basis of which they develop their preferences for one or more parties.

All these perspectives share the assumption that policy preferences are largely exogenous to party preferences. They also assume that these preferences are what is driving party preferences. The general view of citizens' selecting parties on the basis of policy preferences, what Achen and Bartels (2016) call the "populist ideal of democracy" of democracy (2), has been strongly challenged, however.

Lenz (2009, 2012) finds strong evidence that citizens are more likely to adopt the position of their preferred party or candidate than to change their evaluation of them to reflect pre-existing preferences. He considers a number of cases in which issues become salient, in which people change their policy opinions over time or in which people learn politician's positions. Using panel data, he finds no evidence that people adjust their attitudes towards parties or candidates to reflect prior policy preferences. However, he

does find a large amount of evidence that they move their opinions in the direction of the position of their preferred party or candidate. Lenz finds evidence that citizens follow parties not only on specific policies but also on what scholars like Zaller have considered predispositions (Lenz, 2012, 207). He argues that studies that purport to show that people vote on the basis of policy preferences are based on findings that suffer from observational equivalence. In other words, they show that there is an association between policy positions and vote choice, but these studies cannot show that people are selecting parties on the basis of their policy preferences rather than the other way around. He argues that his analyses using panel data allow him to show that party or candidate preferences precede policy preferences (3-10).

Other studies provide evidence that party choice depends on non-policy considerations. Achen and Bartels (2016), for example, show that election results are influenced by events like shark attacks that should not have political relevance. Healy, Malhotra and Mo (2010), furthermore, show that basketball and football game outcomes influence election results. Zaller (2012) provides a similar argument about the limited importance of policy preferences in developing party preferences. He suggests that voters support candidates for various reasons. He points to the three categories of non-ideological voters Converse (1964) suggested compose the electorate. These are those who vote on the basis of attitudes towards groups, "nature of the times" voters, and "issue publics". Zaller suggests that, while people vote for parties for various reasons, they then adapt to their party by adopting the parties' positions as their own (Zaller, 2012, 573). In short, while party preferences seem to influence policy preferences, at least for many citizens, other factors seem to influence party preferences.

Even if citizens do develop preferences for parties on the basis of policy preferences, it is still likely that they are influenced by party cues. This is true under two views of parties. It is most obviously true if one accepts the view of parties as coalitions of policy demanding activists proposed Bawn et al. (2012). As Zaller (2012) asserts, people

may support a party because of one of its policy positions and then adopt its position on another issue (573-575). Similarly, Miley (2014) argues that parties engage in "policy packaging". If citizens like a party because it has a policy position they like, they may not be too concerned if its nationalist positions are inconsistent with theirs. He argues that the high level of support working-class Catalans have given to the regional Catalan Socialists' Party (PSC, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya) is due to its social-democratic positions and not to its nationalist positions. It has expressed relatively pro-nationalist positions because much of the party's elite has such positions. He contrasts the PSC with the Basque Socialist Party (PSE, Partido Socialista de Euskadi), whose leadership is much less favourable towards nationalism. While he merely argues that this make it more difficult for anti-nationalist views to be expressed in Catalonia, logically, it also implies that the PSC may have pulled its supporters in a nationalist direction, while the PSE may have pulled its supporters away from nationalism.

Even if one accepts the classic view promoted by Downs (1957) of parties as coalitions of office seekers (24-25), parties may still influence citizens' opinions particularly in a country like Spain where regional nationalism is very prominent. If a party seeks to win votes by adopting pro-nationalist positions in one region, they are limited in their ability to adopt a different stance in regions where that position is unnecessary to win votes. Their partisans may become more sympathetic towards such positions and their anti-partisans may become more opposed to them. Consequently, parties may influence the opinions of citizens in regions where nationalism is less salient due to the positions they adopt in regions where it is salient.

2.3 Do Parties Always Influence Opinions?

While the above discussion on party cue effects suggests that party influence is pervasive, there are two major limits to the ability of parties to shape preferences. First, governments

and parties have been found to actually represent citizens opinions. Second, on some issues, preferences are so strong that parties do not influence them.

Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) find that the policies adopted by the United States Presidency, Congress, and Supreme Court are responsive to what they call the "public mood", citizens' aggregate preferences for more or less government spending. Furthermore, they find support for the "thermostatic model" proposed by Wlezien (1995, 2004) involving politicians doing more of what citizens want and, in turn, citizens desiring less of something when the government gives them more of it. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) also find support for this model. In particular, in their study of public opinion and public policies in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, they find that governments in the three countries tend to respond to popular preferences and that citizens generally respond to government actions according to the thermostatic pattern. They explicitly test the argument about elite manipulation proposed by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) and find no evidence that elites induce citizens to share their preferences. Similarly, Hobolt and Klemmemsen (2005) and Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) find evidence that governments are responsive to citizens' policy priorities. In short, these studies show that governments are responsive to citizens' preferences and, to the extent that they influence citizens, they do so in a negative way. When governments spend more in an area, people want less of it.

There is similar evidence of representation of attitudes towards nationalism. In their analysis of the issues raised by the Bloc Québécois, the Quebec sovereigntist party active at the federal level, in the Canadian House of Commons, Young and Bélanger (2008) find that its focus on issues related to Quebec independence follows public support for that option, rather than the party mobilizing such sentiment. One caveat to keep in mind with their study is that it discusses a party active at the national level and not in a regional parliament. It may still be that political elites at the regional level mobilize popular sentiment. However, this possibility must be demonstrated rather than assumed. There is

even some evidence supporting the public responsiveness component of the thermostatic model. A study by Richez and Bodet (2012) on support for sovereignty in Quebec shows that such sentiment decreases when the separatist Parti Québécois is in power, because its sovereigntist discourse scares off ambivalent Quebecers. Conversely, support for that option increases when the Quebec Liberal Party is in power, because it is seen as insufficiently nationalistic. There thus is evidence that party elites represent citizens' nationalist views and that citizens react to greater elite nationalism by become less not more nationalistic.

Beyond responsiveness to government spending preferences, in a follow-up to *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Zaller (2012) points to another way elites may be representing the public's preferences that is not evident in survey data. He suggests that elites frequently represent what Key (1961) called "latent opinion" rather than the "opinion statements" (Zaller, 1992, 1) respondents give to political surveys (Zaller, 2003, 2012). Latent opinions are opinions citizens are likely to have at some later point in time under different conditions. The examples he provides relate notably to the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. Democratic leaders supported these wars not because of a personal preference for them, but rather because they feared how public opinion would react if they failed to support them and were criticized by Republicans for not doing so (Zaller, 2012, 585-589). The notion of latent opinion is very relevant to the study of nationalism, because similar to support for foreign wars, it involves a sense of defending a particular group. If elites are seen as failing to defend the group, voters may punish them. Thus, elites will be sure to defend the group when it is threatened from the outside. Representation of latent opinion may occur when there is some external threat to the region and there is a more extreme nationalist party threatening a more moderate party. Given that it is impossible to observe latent opinion, it would be difficult to test this possibility.

There is also evidence that some opinions are less influenced by party positions. A recent study by Tesler (2015), using panel data similar to that used by Lenz, shows that people's preferences sometimes do influence their party and candidate preferences. He

makes a fundamental distinction between crystallized opinions which tend to influence party or candidate preferences and less crystallized opinions, which tend to be changed in response to cues. He shows that, in the United States, attitudes towards Catholics influenced presidential vote choice in the 1960 election campaign when Kennedy ran, attitudes towards gays and lesbians influenced candidate choice in 2004 when Bush opposed moves to allow gay marriage and again when Obama came out in favour of gay marriage in 2012. Finally, religiosity influenced vote choice in the 1980s and 1990s as the Democrats and Republicans expressed opposing views on moral issues (810-817). In contrast, Tesler found that elite views influenced citizens' positions with respect to public health insurance, since this policy view was less crystallized than the attitudes that were primed in the other cases (817-819).

Lenz (2012) himself suggests that opinions on other issues on which attitudes are stronger, like race and social issues, may influence party preferences (106). It has long been clear that people have more stable opinions on some issues than others. While Converse (1964) found low stability on many issues, Converse and Markus (1979) found that opinions on other issues like abortion were considerably more stable.

The focus on the crystallization of preferences is not new. Zaller (1992) argued that elites can more strongly influence opinion statements on issues that are novel than on issues that are more familiar to people, since, in the former case, they have fewer considerations to reject elite messages. More recently, he has claimed that some attitudes, like racism, fear of communism, and rejection of taxes, are quite stable in the American context (Zaller, 2012, 571).

There is further experimental and observational evidence for the importance of crystallization. Bechtel et al. (2015) show that, on a highly salient and contested issue, immigration in Switzerland, elites have no influence. They find no effect of either an issue frame, a party cue or a combination of a party cue and an issue frame on immigration policy preferences in a telephone survey experiment. In fact, they find some evidence for a

reinforcement effect. In other words, participants who were exposed to a cue and a frame that was contrary to their party identification reinforced the consistency between their attitude and the position of the party with which they identified.

In another study, Carsey and Layman (2006) found that the importance individuals ascribe to an issue is a key moderating variable of the extent to which they adjust their opinions to bring them into line with their partisanship or the reverse. They studied opinion and partisanship change in the US in the 1990s using panel data and found that people who knew party positions and considered an issue important adjusted their partisanship. Those who knew party positions but did not consider the issue important adopted the position of their party.

2.4 Elite Influence in the Study of Nationalism

Given these limitations to party influence, readers may doubt whether they actually do influence opinions on nationalism. Nonetheless, the literature on nationalism ascribes a prominent role to elites. This is true of both classic studies on the origins of nationalism and of more recent empirical studies that seek to account for changes in popular support for nationalism over time.

Elites play a particularly important role in theories of nationalism that fall under the general category of modernism (Smith, 2001). Gellner (1964, 1983) and Hechter (1975) argued that, when a group is systematically disadvantaged in the process of economic development, its leaders organize members of the group and thus create a new nation. (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012) argued that elites invent traditions in order to control the masses. In another classic study, Brass (1979) argued that Muslim elites created Pakistan by mobilizing the Muslim population of northwest India. Finally, Hroch (1985) argued that nationalism appears in three phases. In the first phase, intellectuals create the idea of the nation on the basis of pre-existing cultural traditions. In the second, political activists

seek to mobilize the population. In the third, nationalism becomes a mass movement. Thus, elite action precedes popular support for nationalism in this view. More recently, Brubaker (2002) argued that people's tendency to act as members of groups is variable and dependent on elite actions.

These classic arguments deal mostly with history and thus have not been tested empirically. What they lack is an explanation of why people listen to these nationalist elites. Do they successfully appeal to pre-existing cultures, symbols and memories as ethno-symbolists would suggest (e.g. Smith, 1999) or do people support them for other reasons?

In recent years, a number of studies have been published on regional nationalism in Spain using empirical analyses to demonstrate that elites influence nationalism there. In her dissertation on national identification in Catalonia, Hierro (2012) finds that identities are more polarized when conflict between the central government and statewide parties, on the one hand, and the Catalan government and parties, on the other, is more present in a regional newspaper and concludes that individuals adjust their identities in reaction to elite conflict. She finds that Catalans whose families are native to the region feel more strongly Catalan when confrontation is high, while the children of immigrants from the rest of Spain feel less Catalan when conflict is prevalent (158). This is perhaps the closest argument to the one I propose in this dissertation. However, it is not clear whether people are reacting to political elites or simply to the media. Thus, I would argue that it does not clearly connect elite discourse with mass support for nationalism.

Torcal and Mota (2014) adopt a different approach to argue that elites influence public opinion. They show that nationalist party identifications are associated with more radical opinions on state territorial organization and suggest that the former influence the latter. Their work does not tell us, however, whether citizens adopt nationalist views because they identify with parties asserting such views or because they select parties that adopt the positions they already have. Nevertheless, it does extend the literature on party cue

effects to nationalism. There is a similar study on support for independence in Quebec. Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart (2004) argue that in a context of uncertainty surrounding the costs and benefits of a political option, like sovereignty in Quebec, citizens rely on their feelings towards parties and their leaders in order to help them make a decision. While they do show that these attitudes are associated with opinions on Quebec secession, their analysis is entirely based on observational data, making the direction of causality unclear.

In probably the most sophisticated empirical analysis of elite influence on nationalism, Fernández-Albertos and Lago (2015) argue that nationalist elites use nationalist sentiment to gain power. They show that, in six Spanish regions, identification with the region increases when regional parties are in situations in which, the authors argue, they have an interest in mobilizing nationalism.

They argue that regional parties are more likely to mobilize nationalist sentiment when they are in government but below a threshold of electoral strength. According to Fernández-Albertos and Lago (2015), mobilizing nationalist sentiment is a useful strategy when a regional party is weak because it moves citizens closer to them and moves them away from statewide parties. However, it is only an appropriate strategy when regional parties are relatively weak. When they reach a threshold of about 35 to 40 percent support, mobilizing nationalist sentiment can be a risky strategy, because it may split apart the coalition supporting the regional party (288). They expect a curvilinear relationship between regional electoral success and nationalist mobilization. As a regional party's support increases, they are more likely to be in government, but, once they reach a certain level of support, they reduce their level of nationalist mobilization in order to avoid scaring away less nationalist voters. The authors also argue that having a competing regional nationalist party decreases the costs of nationalist mobilization, because they do not have to mobilize nationalism alone, and increases the benefits, because the other party might steal their nationalist appeal (293). Findings are consistent with their expectations. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the electoral strength of the main regional

party and the strength of regional identity. They also find that the higher the ratio of the number of seats of the second regional party to the the number of seats of the first, the stronger regional identity is, suggesting that nationalist mobilization is greater when there is a strong competing nationalist party.

Their findings are quite clear. However, they do not explain the strategies parties actually use to mobilize nationalist sentiment when they have an interest in doing so. Do they seek to persuade voters to be more nationalistic? Do they simply adopt more nationalistic positions when it is in their interest to do so? Do they adopt nationalist frames? Above all, the authors do not explain why citizens would follow the parties in whatever strategy they use to mobilize nationalism.

In this dissertation, I argue that one way elites influence nationalism is by simply adopting positions. As we have seen, the existence of party cue effects has been widely documented. We also saw that nationalism may become bundled with other political positions and thus people may adopt a party's nationalist position if they agree with another one of its positions. Furthermore, even if many people vote for parties on the basis of their nationalist positions and parties seek to appeal to voters on this basis, statewide parties may influence people's opinions. If they adopt a pro-nationalist or anti-nationalist position in a region where nationalism is salient, this may have implications for nationalist opinions in regions where nationalism is less predominant. I thus expect that, while regional nationalist parties influence nationalist opinions in regions where nationalism is strong (Basque Country and Catalonia), statewide parties are more influential in regions where it is weak (Galicia and the Valencian Community).

2.5 When Do Parties Influence Opinions?

The current literature on party cue effects in the American context provides weak guidance on when to expect parties to influence opinions in a multi-party system like Spain. Classic

examples of such experimental studies from the US context present the positions of both major parties there, the Democrats and the Republicans and assess reactions to these positions among partisans of each party (e.g. Bullock, 2011; Cohen, 2003; Kam, 2005).

The unfortunate effect of these designs is that there is considerable uncertainty about what is driving changes in citizens' opinions. Do people react to party cues from the party with which they identify? Alternatively, do they respond to cues from the other party? Given the binary nature of the American party system, it is hard to disentangle these two possible effects.

Studies on party cue effects in multi-party systems have generally presented one cue at a time (e.g. Merolla, Stephenson and Zechmeister, 2008; Slothuus, 2015). While this approach allows these scholars to clearly assess whether citizens are responding to one party in particular, it misses a major aspect of politics: conflict between parties. The traditional approaches to studying the effects of party cues in multi-party democracies thus may understate the effect of party cues. The fact that studies in non-US multi-party systems have generally found weaker effects of cues (Brader and Tucker, 2012; Brader, Tucker and Duell, 2013; Merolla, Stephenson and Zechmeister, 2007, 2008) suggests that party cues from a single party may not be enough to influence opinions.

While the obvious conclusion seems to be that party cue effects are weaker outside the US (Bullock, 2011), to my knowledge, no published work has considered the fact that the attitudinal implications of presenting the position of one party are weaker than those of presenting contrasting cues from opposing parties.

The implications of presenting a single cue are particularly significant given that the American notion of party identification does not appear to be as relevant in multi-party systems as in the bipartisan US. Early studies suggested that less than half of citizens had a party identification in Europe and that what identifications did exist changed more frequently than vote choice (e.g. Kaase, 1976; Thomassen, 1976). More recent research from the Netherlands suggests that party identification is still much less common there

than in the US and that it is less stable than the vote (Thomassen and Rosema, 2009). As Gunther and Montero (2009) point out, party identification is particularly uncommon in Spain (176). In the survey experiment I conducted on a representative sample in Galicia, only a third of respondents there said they identified with a party. Thus, if party identification is necessary for people to be influenced by party cues, only a minority of citizens in a country like Spain are potentially open to party influence.[1] Furthermore, since studies in other multi-party systems in Europe have found that party identification is unstable, it is doubtful that it constitutes as strong a prior attitude as it does in the US.

We saw above that Rosema (2006) argued that partisanship in Europe should be seen as a set of attitudes towards multiple parties rather than an identification with a single party. Blais, Guntermann and Bodet (2016) show that citizens in a large number of multi-party democracies have distinct evaluations of various parties. Thus, such attitudes do exist and may play a role in party influence on opinions.

The conception of partisanship as a series of attitudes towards parties, while going against decades of studies on party identification, is actually consistent with the conceptualization of parties offered in *The American Voter*. Campbell et al. (1960) asserted that parties constitute reference groups that citizens use to orient themselves in the political world. They explicitly state that people's party identification may be either positive or negative and of varying degrees of intensity (121).

There are reasons to think that negative attitudes towards parties are important. Soroka (2014) has shown that such attitudes strongly condition political behaviour. Moreover, Medeiros and Noël (2014) show that negative party identifications constitute an important influence on voting behaviour. In addition, Merrill, Grofman and Adams (2001)

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[1]Note that this limitation is very different from the limitation of experimental studies on party cue effects due to pre-treatment. As we will see in chapter 6, in the context of an experiment, only a minority of citizens respond to party cues, because most people already know the parties' positions. However, they should still be influenced by party positions in the real world.

provide evidence for contrast effects, that citizens exaggerate the perceived distance between themselves and parties they dislike.

More importantly, some recent American studies have shown that people's opinions are influenced by cues from their out-party (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014; Nicholson, 2012).[2] Goren, Federico and Kittilson (2009) shows that the parties Americans dislike influence their political values. Relatedly, Berinsky (2009) argues that party cues do not have to come from a preferred party to influence public opinion. He suggests that citizens use visible elites as reference points to figure out their positions. Not only do they support the position of their preferred party but they may also adopt the opposite position of a party or leader they dislike. He argues that such a negative party cue effect can explain the pattern of polarization that appeared in the US during the Iraq War. Even though the Democrats did not clearly oppose the war, Bush and the Republicans clearly supported it. Consequently, Democrats, who also disliked Republicans, opposed the war because the party they disliked took a strong stance in favour of it (110).

I am aware of one study outside the US context that shows that negative cues influence opinions. Aaroe (2012), in experiments in Denmark, shows that citizens there contrast their opinions with the positions expressed by a leader of a party they do not support.

We also saw that there is considerable evidence that motivated reasoning accounts for party cue effects. A key component of motivated reasoning is the influence prior attitudes have on the processing of new information. Existing attitudes should make people evaluate supporting information more positively and opposing information more negatively (Lodge and Taber, 2013, 152). Thus, for party cues to have a strong and reliable effect in a multi-party system, I propose that strong partisan attitudes must be evoked. They may influence citizens who identify with a party. However, given that most citizens in these systems do not seem to identify with a party and that partisan identification does not appear to be

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[2]Readers should note that Nicholson (2012) found greater effects of cues from out-party leaders than of cues from the parties themselves. This may be a particularity of the US presidential context.

as meaningful as in the US, I argue that partisan attitudes are a more fruitful source of prior attitudes for partisan motivated reasoning to occur.

The strongest prior attitudes should be evoked when people are exposed to the position of the party they rate highest as well as to that of a party they strongly dislike. People should thus be positively disposed towards the former's positions and negatively disposed towards the latter's. Even if people do not identify with a party, they should be induced to take sides in a political debate if they have attitudes that are relatively favourable to one side over the other. I thus expect that citizens only reliably adjust their opinions in the direction of the position of their preferred party when they are exposed to both the position of their preferred party and that of a disliked party. In such a situation, even though citizens do not feel particularly positive about the party they like most, they still like it more than the other party and thus their relative preference for one over the other may influence their reception of information about party positions.

A single cue from one's most liked party has weaker attitudinal applications. People who feel so positively about a party that they identify with it may be influenced by a single cue from it. However, most citizens in Spain do not identify with a party and we saw that there are doubts about whether the identifications that do exist really influence people.

A number of studies have shown that conflict strongly influences people's political opinions. Price (1989) shows that people are more likely to have opinions that reflect a group identity if they are exposed to news reports of their group's position in addition to that of an antagonistic group. Layman and Carsey (2002) show that, as politics in the US has become polarized over a greater range of issues, partisans who are aware of party polarization have moved their positions in the direction of the party with which they identify. A number of studies have shown that polarization between parties increases cue-taking behaviour. Levendusky (2009) argues that polarization, when parties offer more distinct and more internally homogeneous positions, makes it easier for people to follow

cues (13-15). In an experiment, he finds stronger party following in a high polarization condition than in a moderate polarization condition (Levendusky, 2010). Slothuus and De Vreese (2010) found that the partisan source of a frame matters more on an issue of intense controversy than on a consensus issue. Moreover, Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus (2013) found that, when polarization is high, party cues overwhelm the influence of arguments on citizens' opinions. On the other hand, when polarization is low, party cues have less influence.

In sum, there is considerable evidence that conflict between parties leads to party influence. I thus focus on conflict between parties that should influence citizens' opinions: parties towards which they have positive attitudes and those towards which they have negative attitudes.

In this section, I have argued that, given that partisan identification is weaker in Europe than in the US, scholars there should focus on a broader set of partisan attitudes when considering how citizens in multi-party political systems react to party cues. Cues from a single preferred party have weaker attitudinal implications than cues from both a strongly liked party and a very disliked party.

2.6   Hypotheses

In this dissertation, I test seven hypotheses. Chapter 5 considers aggregate reactions to changes in party positions. It tests two simple implications of party cue effects. If citizens follow parties, their partisans and anti-partisans (people who dislike them) should react when parties change their positions. The former should move in the same direction as a party and the latter should move against it. People who do not fit into these categories should not change their preferences in response to a change in a party's position.

Note that in these aggregate-level hypotheses, I describe as partisans people who feel close to a party and as anti-partisans those who feel distant from them. I describe people

who are neutral towards them as neither close to nor distant from them. I adopt this language due to the nature of the survey data on partisanship that I use in chapter 5. My first two hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1 *When a party changes its position, people who feel close to it move in the same direction as it more than people who do not.*

Hypothesis 2 *When a party changes its position, people who feel distant from it move in the opposite direction from it more than people who do not.*

Chapter 6, which is focused on the analysis of experimental data, assesses individual-level hypotheses about how people react when they learn party positions by receiving party cues. In experiments on party cue effects, as we will see, a clear limitation to assessing people's reactions to information about party positions is that many people already know parties' positions. We should not expect such pre-treated participants to react to information about party positions (Slothuus, 2015). My fundamental individual-level expectations are thus that:

Hypothesis 3 *People who lack knowledge of party positions move in the direction of their most liked party in the presence of party cues.*

Hypothesis 4 *People who have knowledge of party positions do not move in the direction of their most liked party in the presence of party cues.*

Existing research has found that citizens tend not to significantly change their evaluations of elites when they are exposed to positions with which they disagree (Broockman and Butler, 2015). Lenz (2012), similarly, found that, on a range of issues in various contexts, citizens do not change their attitudes towards candidates or parties on the basis of their policy preferences, but they do change their opinions. This evidence is consistent with the notion of partisanship being a powerful and enduring force (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). My fifth hypothesis is thus that:

Hypothesis 5 *When exposed to positions of the party they like the most which they do not share, citizens do not significantly change their evaluations of that party.*

As I argued above, the attitudinal implications of a cue from a liked party are weaker in Europe than they are in the US. I thus only expect strong party cue effects in the presence of conflict between a liked party and a disliked party.

Hypothesis 6 *Party cue effects only occur when people are exposed to the position of their most liked party and that of a disliked party with a contrasting position.*

If party following involves motivated reasoning, it should be stronger among the more politically aware, because they are more motivated and have more resources to counter-argue information that goes against an existing attitude (e.g. Slothuus, 2015). I thus expect that:

Hypothesis 7 *Among non-pretreated individuals, people with high political knowledge move in the direction of their most liked party more than people with low knowledge when shown party cues.*

2.7   Why Party influence on Nationalism Matters

In recent years, there has been a considerable literature on the influence of institutional reform on support for nationalism. Authors have been particularly concerned about the effects of decentralization on the success of regional parties and on nationalist sentiment. Some of these studies have posited a direct role of self-governing regional institutions. According to these authors, decentralized institutions influence people's identification with the existing state and their preferences for the place of their region in it (e.g. Martínez-Herrera, 2002).

Brancati (2006, 2009) and Fernández-Albertos and Lago (2015) have argued that, rather than having a direct influence on popular support for nationalism, the effect of

institutions is moderated by regional parties. Brancati argues that decentralization only leads to a secessionist threat to the existing state if regional parties are strong. She argues that regional parties foment ethnic conflict and secession by strengthening regional identities, adopting laws that advantage their group at the expense of others, and mobilizing ethnic conflict and support for secession (Brancati, 2006, 658-660). As we have seen, Fernández-Albertos and Lago argue that institutions can increase people's identification with their region if parties adopt regional nationalism as a political strategy. Brancati (2008, 2009) argues that decentralization increases the strength of regional parties. Lublin (2012, 2014), on the other hand, shows that it does not. Regional party success following decentralization, he finds, depends on their strength prior to institutional reform. Regardless of whether decentralization increases the success of regional parties, these studies all express concern that parties will make people more favourable to secession.

My argument about party influence on nationalism depending on the contrast between the positions of two opposing parties, while acknowledging that parties do influence nationalism, suggests that a single party or coalition of parties cannot make people more nationalist on their own. In order for people to be influenced by party positions, at least one other party that many supporters of a regional nationalist party dislike has to adopt a contrasting position on nationalist issues. Consequently, rather than worrying about institutions empowering a regional nationalist elite, we should be concerned about polarization become too strong.

Chapter 3

Parties and Nationalism in Four Spanish Regions

Spain, like many other European countries, is a country of considerable diversity. After the death of Franco in 1975 and the adoption of a democratic constitution in 1978, Spain was transformed from a strongly centralized state to the State of the Autonomies (*Estado de las Autonomías*), which has provided extensive autonomy to Spanish regions. As a result of this process of decentralization, 17 autonomous communities were created. While some of these, like the Community of Madrid, were artificial creations, others were created to provide autonomy to regions with distinct identities and cultures. The Basque Country, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, and Galicia are examples of such distinct regions.

These regions not only have distinct identities but also have their own languages. They are parts of a larger pattern of linguistic diversity in Spain. Three major non-Spanish languages are spoken on the territory of the Spanish state: Basque (also known as Euskera), Catalan, and Galician. There are also several smaller languages that are spoken elsewhere, like Bable in Asturias.

Basque is spoken in the three provinces of the autonomous community called the Basque Country as well as in parts of Navarre. Variants of Catalan are spoken in Cat-

alonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and in some bordering areas of other regions such as the Franja (the strip) in Aragon. In the Valencian Community, the variety of Catalan spoken there is officially an independent language called Valencian. However, the scientific consensus is that Valencian is a variant of Catalan (e.g. Coller, 2002). In the Balearic Islands, other varieties of Catalan are spoken.

In all regions with distinct identities, nationalist movements have arisen. These movements have had considerable success in the Basque Country, and Catalonia, while, in the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Navarre, and Galicia, they have received significantly less support.

In this dissertation, I focus on the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Valencian Community (also known as Valencia), and Galicia. These are all regions with distinct languages and which have a single identity that is distinct from Spanish which is present in much of the region. Each of the Balearic Islands has its own distinct identity and history. In Navarre, Basque is spoken and the Basque identity and language are only present in a small portion of the autonomous community. Since producing a single nationalist identity for the totality of each of these regions would be extremely problematic, I do not include them in my selection of cases.

In this chapter, I explain how movements promoting regional identities and/or the statewide identity emerged and evolved in general and then in each region. I particularly show how they became connected to political parties. I then suggest how parties may influence nationalist opinions. I do not claim here to show that parties influence or have influenced nationalism. The purpose of this chapter is simply to provide the context for the analyses I present in the empirical chapters that follow.

I present the regions in a logical order. The Basque Country and Catalonia are both regions where nationalism has been prominent. The Valencian Community and Galicia are regions where it has been much less important. I start with the two regions where nationalism has been very salient and end with the two regions where nationalism has

been less present. The Valencian Community follows Catalonia, because they have related cultures and because there is a political movement which asserts that both are part of a larger political entity, often referred to as the Catalan Countries (*Països Catalans*). However, the political movement making that claim, like nationalism in Galicia, has been considerably less successful in attracting support. The first section of this chapter provides general context on nationalism in Spain. The following four sections then present each of the regions.

3.1   Some General Historical Context

Spain was formed from the combination of a number of pre-existing territories. For much of their history, Catalonia, Valencia, and the territories of the Basque Country, among others, have had considerable autonomy. Entities corresponding roughly to modern Galicia did exist in the Middle Ages. However, Galicia did not retain its autonomy as it became absorbed into larger kingdoms.

The territories that would eventually join up to create Spain were founded during the *Reconquista* of Spain from the Moors by Christians during the Middle Ages. The Crown of Aragon consisted of territories in the east of what later became Spain, including the Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon itself. The Crown of Castile consisted of territories in the rest of the country, including the Basque provinces and Galicia. The crowns of Aragon and Castile were eventually joined when King Ferdinand II of Aragon married Queen Isabella I of Castile in 1469, creating modern Spain. In spite of the union of Aragon and Castile, they, as well as many of their constituent units, maintained considerably autonomy in a state that has been likened to a confederation (Lecours, 2007, 26).

The autonomy that many of these territories enjoyed was eventually eroded. In the 17th century, Spanish monarchs, seeking to finance their participation in wars and the

expansion of their empire, sought to raise more taxes and to recruit soldiers (Lecours, 2007, 35). These attempts to collect taxes and to draft troops from regions that had previously been exempt from such obligations provoked resistance in a number of these, particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

Centralization became more systematic in the 18th century, following the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), which opposed two candidates to the Spanish throne: Philip, Duke of Anjou and grandson of King Louis XIV of France, and Archduke Charles, of the House of Habsburg. The accession to the Spanish throne of a Bourbon threatened other European monarchs, which feared their domination of Europe. In response, an alliance of European states backed an alternative candidate to the throne. This rival candidate was also supported by the leaders of the territories that made up the Crown of Aragon, including Catalonia and Valencia. When Philip V won the war, he centralized Spain according to the French model. This was done via the New Foundation Decrees (*Decretos de Nueva Planta*), which between 1707 and 1716 took away the autonomy the territories of Aragon had possessed for centuries.

In the 19th century, there were further attempts to centralize Spain. Rather than being merely done for practical reasons, centralization in the 19th century was carried out in order to attempt to modernize the state in accordance to the new model that had taken shape in France after the Revolution. These provoked reactions from traditionalist leaders, seeking to protect the old regime, and, particularly, the remaining autonomy that persisted, notably in the Basque Country. Later in that century, following economic development in the Basque Country and Catalonia, nationalism was born there. In Galicia and Valencia, there were reactions to centralization, but they were considerably weaker.

In the 20th century, two dictatorships imposed a centralist Spanish state. Between 1923 and 1930, General Primo de Rivera led a dictatorship that, while initially favourable to regional distinctiveness, ultimately imposed centralization. However, following it, Spanish regions had a new opportunity for real autonomy. In 1931, the Second Spanish Repub-

lic (1931-1939) was founded. The Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia each obtained statutes of autonomy, which would have granted them considerable autonomy within Republican Spain. However, the Civil War (1936-1939) and the subsequent dictatorship (1939-1975), which was committed to a centralized Spain, put an end to this autonomy. It did, nevertheless, set a precedent for the democratic period that followed the dictatorship.

When Franco died in 1975, Spain began a transition to democracy, which involved a radical change from the centralized dictatorship to a decentralized state, notably with a new constitution that was adopted in 1978. The statutes of autonomy adopted during the Second Republic made a major difference to the path to autonomy followed by these regions. The constitution established a fast route to autonomy for the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, which had obtained statutes of autonomy in the 1930s and a slow route, which was followed by most other regions, including Valencia (e.g. McRoberts, 2001, 54).

The major statewide parties adopted contrasting positions in the debate on decentralization. Left-wing parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE, Partido Comunista de España), as well as the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD, Unión de Centro Democrático), which formed the first democratically elected government following the death of Franco, supported decentralization. The People's Alliance (AP, Alianza Popular), which later became the People's Party (PP, Partido Popular) did not support such a radical transformation of Spain and many of its deputies voted against the new constitution.

The statewide parties did change their positions over time when they replaced their leaders and as the political contexts evolved, notably their majority statuses in the Congress of Deputies, the lower house of the national legislature, and other political circumstances. Regional nationalist parties also changed their positions, notably when their support was needed by the statewide parties at the national level or when they needed the support of regional branches of the statewide parties at the regional level.

While generally favourable to decentralization, the PSOE and UCD presented a bill to slow it down in 1981. The UCD largely disappeared after 1982 when the PSOE won a majority government at the national level. However, the Socialist Party would live on and later negotiate increased decentralization with nationalist parties. Between 1993 and 1996, the PSOE governed with a minority in parliament, and agreed to decentralize powers in exchange for the support from Basque and Catalan nationalist parties.

Between 1996 and 2000, the PP found itself in a similar situation. Its leader, José María Aznar, who is well known for his support for a centralized and homogeneous Spain, was forced to accept increased decentralization. In April 28th, 1996, he and then Catalan premier Jordi Pujol, from Convergence and Union (CiU, Convergència i Unió) signed an agreement in the Majestic Hotel in Barcelona. Pujol agreed to have his deputies in the national legislature vote to make Aznar prime minister. In exchange, the national PP government agreed to decentralize more powers and to support the CiU government in Catalonia. Aznar also got the support of the Basque Nationalist Party and of the Canary Coalition.

However, when the PP won a majority government in 2000, Aznar adopted a hard line with regional nationalists, particularly those from the Basque Country. When José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero became prime minister of Spain in 2004, the party was much more open to regional nationalism. Later, both major national parties converged in their opposition to a right to self-determination for both the Basque Country and Catalonia in the late 2000s and early 2010s. With both major national parties opposing the right of Catalonia to organize a referendum, far-left Podemos (We Can), created in 2014, has sought to appeal to regional nationalists by supporting a right for regions to organize a referendum on their future in Spain. In chapter 5, I will consider these changes in a more systematic way and assess their influence on public opinion.

3.2 The Basque Country

The present-day Basque Country is composed of three provinces in Spain, Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa (Álava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya in Spanish). Many nationalists would include the autonomous community of Nafarroa (Navarra in Spanish) as well as three territories in France, Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea, and Zuberoa (Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule in French). These territories never formed a whole. Only in the 20th century did three of them, Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, come together to form the modern Basque Country after the emergence of Basque nationalism.

The political statuses of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa changed repeatedly during the Middle Ages as they alternated periods of autonomy and control by either the Kingdom of Navarre or the Kingdom of Asturias. Eventually, the Basque provinces were taken over by Castile in the late 14th century. Until the late 19th century, they, along with Navarre, had special provisions for self-government, called *fueros*. These were privileges they were granted by monarchs as rewards for service against Muslims. Each of them had an assembly and was allowed to opt out of decisions by the monarch, most notably about taxation (Lecours, 2007, 33). Unlike Catalonia and Valencia, the Basque provinces (and Navarre) did not lose their autonomy when Philip V came to the throne, because they had not supported the Habsburg candidate.

In spite of the persistence of the autonomy of the Basque provinces, the Basque economic elite was not particularly favourable towards it. When the Basque territories became part of Castile, the king established urban centres for non-Basques, while Basque speakers continued to dominate the countryside. Over the following centuries, the Basque elite became strongly connected to the Spanish Crown, notably because they benefited considerably from the Spanish Empire. They were closely involved in the national economy and politics (Lecours, 2007, 34-35). These urban elites, consequently, have always been supportive of the Spanish government (e.g. Shafir, 1995, 94).

While the urban centres of what would become the Basque Country were heavily Spanish-speaking, the Basque language was spoken by peasants (Shafir, 1995, 97). The regional language and identity were thus associated with backwardness. Given the lack of interest of urban elites in the regional culture, unlike in the other regions, no cultural revival or modernization occurred in the late 19th century. Moreover, three developments in the 19th century combined to reduce the presence of the Basque language even more: urbanization expanded the environments where the Basque language was least present, industrialization strengthened the pro-Spanish economic elite, and migration brought Castilian-speaking workers from other parts of Spain (Tejerina, 1992, 315). As Shafir (1995) asserts, Euskera was the "Achilles heel of Basque national revival" (97).

In the 19th century, liberal Spanish governments, seeking to modernize the state on the French model, on several occasions, tried to abolish the *fueros*. These efforts to create a unified liberal Spain were opposed by traditionalists who wanted to restore the previous political structure that had existed before the French occupation during the Napoleonic Wars (1807–1814 in Spain). Three civil wars were fought during that century between the Carlists, who defended traditional self-governing institutions as well as other traditions. As part of the struggle to defend the *fueros*, a type of cultural and political proto-nationalism was formed, leading to the development of a sense of solidarity among many Basques who lived in the different Basque territories (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 4). After the first Carlist War (1833-1839), a law was adopted reaffirming the Basque fueros. However, in 1876, these privileges were abolished and were replaced by another form of fiscal autonomy, the *concierto económico* (Economic agreement) in 1878, whereby the governments of the Basque provinces collect taxes, of which they transfer a portion (the *cupo*) to the central government. Following this period, the traditionalist movement defending the *fueros* slowly died out. However, it left a legacy of a collective memory of Basque independence which was then used by nationalists (6). A notable development occurred in 1895 when Sabino de Arana Goiri founded the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party),

which is still the major nationalist party in the Basque Country.

Basque nationalism was founded by a pre-industrial elite, which was harmed by the industrialization of the region that occurred in the 19th century as well as by the increasing centralization of the state (e.g. Conversi, 1997, 55-56). Arana himself came from a *jauntxo* (rural notable) family. His father was a deputy in the *Juntas Generales* (legislature) of the Vizcaya province and owned rural property in addition to a preindustrial shipbuilding business (Shafir, 1995, 96).

Basque nationalism was heavily influenced by another development that was related to the economic transformations the Basque Country underwent at this time: the arrival of a large number of migrants from the rest of Spain. They were called *maketos* and made it clear to Basques how different they were from people from the rest of Spain (Lecours, 2007, 53). In its origins, Basque nationalism adopted a conception of the nation according to which belonging to the nation was not a voluntary matter but rather depended on possessing various identity markers, a race, a language, a common history, and a religion, Catholicism (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 10-13). A major motivation behind the creation of Basque nationalism was the fear that, as a result of industrialization and the resulting migration of people from the rest of Spain, the Basque race was in danger of extinction (Shafir, 1995, 98).

Sabino Arana created the major symbols of of Basque nationalism, the name of the region, *Euskadi* (the Basque Country), the flag, and the anthem, among others. An important idea that was born at this time is that the seven provinces where Basque culture is present together form a whole, Euskadi (Lecours, 2007, 53).

Later on, a liberal and more pragmatic group, composed of industrialists from Bilbao, led by Ramón de la Sota, joined the Basque Nationalist Party. As a result of their joining the party, the PNV came to be composed of two groups: radicals who tended to come from the lower and middle classes and moderates from the upper classes (29). The sector led by de la Sota preferred autonomy to independence and focused on the Basque language

rather than racial differences (Lecours, 2007, 56). Partly as a result of the incorporation of these two very different groups, Pablo and Mees (2005) have compared the history of the Basque Nationalist Party to a pendulum, alternating between radical separatism and a more moderate pursuit of autonomy.

With the exception of the de la Sota group, Basque economic elites generally did not support nationalism, because industrialization there involved large industry, which was controlled, along with banks and mines, by a small number of urban owners, who spoke Spanish and were strongly integrated into Spain (Shafir, 1995, 94). As we have already seen, the Basque elite had long been strongly connected both economically and politically to the rest of Spain. This became even more true in the 19th century, when the Basque provinces industrialized with a focus on heavy industry producing capital goods, which they sold either to the state or to industry elsewhere (Díez Medrano, 1995). Heavy industry also required capital, leading to the development of large financial institutions in the Basque Country, which became involved in economic activities throughout Spain (51-52). The economic elite of the region thus became even closer to the rest of Spain.

In the early 20th century, the PNV experienced its first electoral success, electing deputies in the provincial assemblies of each of the Basque provinces of Spain. However, a split quickly emerged between moderates and radicals. The radicals ended up taking control of the PNV and the moderates created a new party, the Basque Nationalist Communion (CNV, *Comunión Nacionalista Vasco*) in 1921. They came together again, however, in 1930, when faced with repression by the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The first left-wing nationalism in the Basque Country appeared in the same year, when Basque Nationalist Action (ANV, Acción Nacionalista Vasca), was created by nationalists who did not support the reunited party, because they considered it too conservative. The party never became a significant political force in the region though (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 116).

The PNV was ambivalent with respect to the Republican regime created after the

first dictatorship due to the incompatibility between the nationalists' conservatism and the left-wing orientation of the Republicans. Nevertheless, during the Second Republic (1931-1939), the PNV was able to secure autonomy for the Basque provinces. After a very long process, it obtained a statute of autonomy in 1936 and, from October 1936 to March 1937, a regional government led by the PNV was in place. Moreover, for the first time, three Basque provinces formed a united political entity. However, the control of the Basque government over the region was short-lived due to the beginning of the Civil War in 1936. Perhaps due to the autonomy they gained under the Republic, the Basque Nationalist Party, in spite of its conservatism, supported the Republican side in the Civil War. Because the rebels opposed Basque autonomy while the Republicans supported it, the Spanish Civil War was widely perceived in the region as being between Spain and the Basque Country. Probably the most widely remembered episode of the conflict in the Basque Country was the bombing of Guernica, a Basque town where there is a famous oak tree next to which the assembly of Bizkaia province used to meet, on April 26th, 1937 by German and Italian warplanes, which were allied to Franco (Lecours, 2007, 70-71).

The Franco dictatorship came down considerably harder on Bizkaia and Guipúzcoa than on Araba or Navarre, because, while the first two provinces backed the Republicans, the second two supported Franco. As a reward for their support, Araba and Navarre were allowed to keep their economic concerts, while Biskaia and Guipúzcoa lost them (Lecours, 2007, 70).

During the dictatorship, Basque nationalism divided between the traditional conservative movement associated with the PNV and a new far-left sector. Following the beginning of the Cold War, it became clear that the Allies who had defeated Hitler had decided that Franco would be useful in the struggle against the Soviets. Many Basques were disappointed with the PNV's moderate strategy which appeared ineffective in opposing the centralizing dictatorship. Consequently, in 1952, a group of young nationalists got together and founded a clandestine group they called Ekin (To do), which was committed

to the independence of all seven Basque territories. This new more radical nationalism decidedly broke with the racist and Catholic orientation of traditional Basque nationalism. In the late 1950s, following a conflict with the PNV, members of Ekin founded Basque Country and Freedom (ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which aimed to create an independent Basque socialist state that would include the Basque territories both of France and of Spain. It was willing to use violence to accomplish its objectives. In the 1960s, it began committing terrorist acts (76).

ETA was influenced by the action-repression-action theory of Basque writer Federico Krutwig. Its strategy was to carry out violent acts in order to provoke repression of the masses by the authorities, thus eliciting popular support. In spite of the large number of deaths attributed to ETA during the dictatorship, the repression by Franco's regime brought ETA considerable sympathy from part of the Basque population (81).

ETA did experience a number of splits, however. One major division concerned the group's objectives. Some of its members focused on promoting Basque culture. Others aimed at fomenting a revolution that would lead to independence. Another group was more decidedly Marxist (77-78). A further split was between the ETA-PM (political-military) group, which was committed to engaging in politics in addition to violence and the ETA-M (military) group, which focused exclusively on violence as a means of reaching the goal of independence. In 1981, ETA-PM's members gave up violence and most of its members joined Basque Left (EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra), which would later merge with the Basque Socialist Party (PSE, Partido Socialista de Euskadi) in 1993 (80-85).

During the transition to democracy, the Basque Country obtained a statute of autonomy, giving it significant powers. It was also granted an economic concert with the Spanish state in 1981, creating a fiscal system similar to that established by the 1878 agreement. The elected governments of each of the three provinces (the *diputaciones forales*) collect taxes which they then transfer to the Spanish and Basque governments (Gillespie, 2000, 119). The Basque Country internally thus has a quasi-federal organization (Pablo and

Mees, 2005, 401).

At the time of the transition to democracy, the PNV had an unclear position on the new Spanish constitution and on the statute of autonomy that was approved for the region (Lecours, 2007, 4). While the party was not clearly in favour of independence, it disliked the fact that the constitution did not include a right to self-determination. Its leaders called on voters to abstain in the referendum on the constitution in 1978. The other nationalist parties at this time, Popular Unity (HB, Herri Batasuna) and the Basque Left (EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra), urged their supporters to vote no, also because the constitution did not recognize Basques' right to decide their future (88-89). In the referendum on the statute of autonomy for the region, held the following year, the Statute of Guernica, Basque nationalist parties were somewhat more favourable. EE and the PNV backed the yes side, while HB called for abstention (90).

In spite of the fact that the PNV represented the more conservative branch of Basque nationalism, which was never particularly favourable towards the Republican side, Franco associated it with the left, thus linking left-wing ideology and nationalism, as exemplified by the expression "rojos separatistas" (Lecours, 2007, 70). As a result, nationalism in the Basque Country, like in Catalonia, is clearly associated with the left (Dinas, 2012).

Explicitly left-wing nationalism has also found expression in the Basque party system. In addition to EE, ETA's left-wing nationalism lives on. It was initially taken up by Popular Unity (HB, Herri Batasuna), which from 1978 to 2000 claimed to represent the *Abertzale* (patriotic) left, the left-wing nationalism that is associated with ETA. Several other parties, notably Basque Citizens (EH, Euskal Herritarok), Unity (Batasuna), and, most recently, the EH Bildu coalition have sought to represent the views of the patriotic left.

Another nationalist party appeared a few years after the Basque Country became an autonomous community. In 1986, the PNV split and a more clearly separatist party was created. A sector of the PNV that was close to Carlos Garaikoetxea, who had been

president of the Basque Country from 1980 to 1985, left the party. Garaikoetxea and his supporters wanted to centralize powers in the Basque Country, while other leaders of the PNV wanted to keep the traditional organization of the region. The new party was called Basque Solidarity (EA, Eusko Alkartasuna) and is more clearly supportive of Basque independence and is to the left of the PNV (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 420).-

Even though the PNV has been ambivalent with respect to the future of the Basque Country in Spain, it, like most other parties in the region, has generally rejected political violence. All mainstream parties in the region (all except HB) got together in 1988 and signed the Ajuria Enea Pact (Pact for the Normalization and Pacification of the Basque Country), whose stated aim was to eradicate the terrorism of ETA (428).

In spite of its merger with a party that came out of ETA, the Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE, Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra) has generally been associated with "constitutionalist" (i.e. anti-nationalist) positions) The PSE's generally anti-nationalist stance has been frequently discussed in comparison to the Catalan Socialist Party, which, as we will see, has generally been more favourable to nationalism. Miley (2014), for example, argues that the PSE has allowed the voices of left-wing Basques who do not share nationalist views to be represented in the political system, unlike those of Catalans with similar positions.

PNV-led governments were relatively moderate in the early years of Basque autonomy. Many of them included the PSE, which likely moderated the governments' nationalism. In 1993, the PNV deputies in Madrid voted to make Felipe González of the PSOE prime minister of Spain and, in 1996, they voted in favour of Aznar, allowing him to form the first PP government at the national level.

However, while Basque politics had previously been seen as primarily opposing democrats and terrorists, in the late 1990s, it became strongly polarized between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 439). In 1998, the PNV, along with EA, United Left (IU-EB, Izquierda Unida-Ezker Batua or just EB in Basque, often EB-B, Ezker Batua-

Berdeak, Greens), HB, and other nationalist groups signed the Lizarra Pact (also called Estella Pact), by which they sought to negotiate an end to violence with ETA. The PNV, along with the *Abertzale* left, made calls for a ceasefire in the Basque Country but also for a right to self-determination for the region (Gillespie, 2000, 113). ETA then declared an end to violence. In exchange, it expected democratic nationalist parties to declare that the end of the Basque autonomous institutions and the transition to a sovereign Basque state, including Navarre and the French Basque territories (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 444). Furthermore, in 1999, the PNV formed a coalition government with EA with the support of Euskal Herritarok (EH, Basque Citizens), which represented the radical patriotic left, instead of its former partner, the Basque Socialists. In exchange for EH's support, the government adopted more radical nationalist positions, including more intensive policies to promote the Basque language and hosting the *Udalbiltza* (Assembly of Basque Municipalities), which brought together elected municipal officers from the seven Basque provinces to discuss nationalist issues. The PNV appeared to be giving into the pressure it faced from the extreme nationalism of the *Abertzale* left. According to Pablo and Mees (2005), the PNV saw an opportunity to end Basque terrorism at this time and believed that, by ending violence, it could consolidate its political power, which was increasingly threatened by the radical left nationalists (441).

The United Left of the Basque Country (EB) gradually associated itself with Basque nationalism. In 1994, it entered the Basque Parliament for the first time. It signed the Lizarra Pact, being the only non-nationalist party to support it (Pablo and Mees, 2005, 443). Following this period, it joined coalition governments with EA and the PNV in 2001 and 2005, thus clearly moving in a nationalist direction.

On the other end of the nationalist divide, the People's Party (PP, *Partido Popular*), which was founded in 1989, came to play an increasingly prominent anti-nationalist role in Basque politics. In the 1990s, its popular support progressively increased in the region, leading to more polarization between the two anti-nationalist parties, the PP and the

PSE, on the one hand, and the nationalist parties on the other (Lecours, 2007, 101). The PP, along with the PNV's previous coalition partner, the PSE, strongly opposed the government's increased nationalism (Gillespie, 2000, 118).

Eventually, however, the Lizarra Pact fell apart. In January 2000, ETA returned to terrorism, which EH did not condemn. EA and the PNV became less interested in maintaining their collaboration with the EH, since they believed they had lost support because of it (Gillespie, 2000, 120). In 2000, EH left the Basque legislature. While this may have reduced polarization in Basque politics, developments in the rest of Spain increased divisions in the Basque Country.

In the early 2000s, conflict heated up between the Basque government, made up of EA, EB, and the PNV, and the Spanish government, which was a majority PP government from 2000 to 2004. In 2001, the Basque government presented the Ibarretexe Plan, named after the then PNV premier. It was a plan to reform the statute of autonomy of the region in order to move towards a relationship of co-sovereignty with Spain. All statewide parties voted against it in the national Congress of Deputies. At the same time, the PP took a really hard line against Basque nationalism, notably by getting the courts to shut down Batasuna, a new *Abertzale* party that had appeared in 2001, in 2003, and then by closing the daily newspaper Egunkaria the same year, both for alleged links to ETA. The PP also made it illegal to hold referenda that could threaten the territorial integrity of Spain (Lecours, 2007, 107).

Tensions eventually calmed down. Following the election of a PSOE government in 2004, under Zapatero, which was open to dialogue with the Basque government, relations between the Basque and Spanish governments improved considerably (Lecours, 2007). The hard-line anti-nationalist Aznar was also replaced by the more moderate Mariano Rajoy as leader of the PP.

The PSOE government took a hard line against the Ibarretxe Plan. The Socialists joined the PP, IU, and some regional parties in voting against it in the Spanish Congress

of Deputies in 2005. In 2008, when the Basque government tried to hold a referendum on Basque self-determination, the PSOE government in Madrid got the Constitutional Court to declare it unconstitutional. Tensions did not last long though. After the failure of Ibarretxe's plans for self-determination, the PNV, under leader Iñigo Urkullu, retreated from the secessionist positions it had adopted under Ibarretxe. In its 2012 election manifesto, it devoted three times as much space to the economy as to nationalism (Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Pérez, 2013, 499).

Following the failure of the Ibarretxe Plan, the Basque Nationalist Party lost control of the regional government for the first time since the creation of an autonomous Basque region. In the 2009 regional election, even though the PNV won the most votes and seats, the PSE and the PP together managed to form a coalition government, led by the Socialists. The PSE-PP government lasted until 2012. During the non-nationalist coalition's time in office, political violence came to an end in the region following ETA's announcement of a permanent end to violence in October 2011.

However, radical nationalist positions continue to have a major presence in Basque politics. In 2012, the Constitutional Court legalized *Sortu* (To be born), which had succeeded Batasuna as the party of the *Abertzale* left. It has since run in elections in the Basque Country as part of the coalition *Euskal Herria Bildu* (EH Bildu, Reunite the Land of the Basque Language), defending independence for the region. The EH Bildu coalition, which includes EA, has thus constituted a force advocating separatism in the region. Unlike the PNV, it devoted more space to nationalism than to the economy in its 2012 election manifesto (Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Pérez, 2013, 499). It became the second largest party, after the PNV, in the Basque Parliament in 2012 (Generalitat valenciana, 2016).

Nevertheless, Due to the PNV's newfound moderation as well as the appearance of Podemos in 2014, which is open to self-determination but not necessarily independence, the divide around nationalism in the Basque Country has become much less clear than it was previously. Podemos won the most seats and votes in the 2016 national election in

the Basque Country (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). It thus is a strong challenger to the established Basque nationalist parties.

Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of support for independence in the Basque Country as measured by the Euskobarómetro (2016), a survey run by a team at the University of the Basque Country. We can see that support for independence rose in the late 1980s. It then dropped in the late 1990s. It increased again in the first half of the 2000s and has been in decline since then (76-81). I will consider in a systematic way in chapter 5 whether some of these changes in support for nationalism follow shifts in the positions of the Basque parties.[1]

Figure 3.1: Support for Independence of the Basque Country

Source: Euskobarómetro

Figure 3.2 shows preferences for different models for the organization of the Spanish

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[1]Note that here I present data from the Euskobarómetro but, in chapter 5, I use data from the CIS, because the Euskobarómetro, in spite of providing a long time series of public opinion, does not share individual-level data. The Euskobarómetro question asked respondents for their preferred state organization for the Basque Country and included four options: centralization, autonomy, federalism, and independence.

state over time. They come from the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). I use these in chapter 5 when I consider how partisans and anti-partisans respond to changes in party positions. I use these data there, because the CIS makes individual-level data available. The territorial preferences question asked by the CIS in the Basque Country is "I am now going to present to you some alternative forms for the territorial organization of Spain. Tell me, please, with which of these you agree the most". The options are a centralized state with no autonomous regional governments, a state with autonomous communities like in the present, a state in which the autonomous communities have more autonomy than in the present, and a state that recognizes the possibility that autonomous communities can become independent states. The pattern is less clear than it is with the Euskobarómetro. However, we can see that support for self-determination (the possibility of autonomous communities becoming independent states) was highest in the late 1990s and again in 2005. There is also a clear increase over time in the proportion of Basques who prefer the status quo.

Figure 3.2: Preferences for the Territorial Organization of Spain in the Basque Country over Time

In short, politics in the Basque Country has involved swings between periods of high polarization between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties. Public opinion has experienced similar movements over time. In recent years, Basques have become increasingly opposed for Independence. If parties are influencing mass nationalism, when nationalist and anti-nationalist parties become more distant from each other, support for nationalist positions should go up among partisans of nationalist parties and down among partisans of non-nationalist parties. Conversely, when they get closer to each other, support for nationalism should decrease among nationalist party supporters, while those who prefer statewide parties should become less opposed to nationalism.

3.3   Catalonia

The present-day autonomous community of Catalonia is a highly-developed region composed of four provinces, Barcelona, Girona (Gerona in Spanish), Lleida (Lérida in Spanish), and Tarragona. Unlike the Basque provinces, these territories have formed a unified territorial entity since the Middle Ages.

In Catalonia, the Moors were chased away around 800 when the Carolingian Empire created the Hispanic March as a buffer zone against the Muslims. The region was made up of a number of counties, several of which were eventually united under the Count of Barcelona. This territory became known as the Principality of Catalonia, which then merged with Aragon through a dynastic union to form a decentralized political unit in 1137.

In the Middle Ages, Catalonia, as part of the Crown of Aragon, conquered a large part of the Western Mediterranean. By the fifteenth century, in addition to ruling Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands, the counts of Barcelona, who were also the kings of Aragon, ruled Naples, Sicily, Malta, and Sardinia. In 1469, however, with the marriage of Ferdinand II of Aragon to Isabella I of Castile, Aragon, along with its constituent territories like Catalonia was absorbed into the state that became Spain. In spite of this union, Spain was a decentralized state, with considerable political autonomy for Aragon, and for Catalonia within Aragon, including an autonomous parliament and a distinct legal system.

Catalonia lost its autonomy, however, following the War of Spanish Succession (1701-13) in which Catalans sided with the House of Austria. The Bourbons won and Philip V became king of Spain. By one of his *Nueva Planta* (New Foundation) decrees, the new king abolished Catalan institutions in 1716 and declared Castilian the only language that could be used in court and in other state institutions.

In spite of losing its institutions after 1716, during the eighteenth century, Catalonia's

capital, Barcelona, began a period of impressive growth and became what Jacobson (2009) called the "most industrialized city in Spain and on the Mediterranean" (10). This was above all the consequence of the improved productivity of agriculture in the region as well as the emergence of the cotton industry. In the early 1830s, steam power arrived, leading to the takeoff of mechanized industry. The economy of Barcelona also benefited tremendously from trade with the Spanish colonies in the Americas after Charles III ended the monopoly on commerce Cadiz previously had in 1778 (Jacobson, 2009, p. 10-11).

As in the Basque Country, with economic development came migration from the rest of Spain. Migration became massive in the 1880s, with people from less-developed rural areas seeking opportunities in the burgeoning industrial centres of Catalonia. The earliest migrants were from other Catalan-speaking regions, notably Valencia, but many of them were from Spanish-speaking areas. Another large group arrived in the 1920s from Murcia, in the south of Spain, as well as from Andalusia and from Castile. They kept on coming in the following decades. The largest group of migrants arrived during the Franco dictatorship. Between 1950 and 1975, about 1,400,000 came, especially from Andalusia (Termes, 1984).

A focus on Catalan identity appeared as part of the cultural renaissance (*Renaixensa*) that took place in the 19th century. Romantics began to use the regional language for poetry and theatre, even though, for centuries, it had not been considered fit for literature (Jacobson, 2009, p. 24). One of the most celebrated innovations of this movement was the re-enactment of the Floral Games (*Jocs Florals*), a poetic competition, in 1859. Regional identity was still not nationalist at the time time though.

This cultural movement became political in the 1880s. Some participants in the cultural revival movement began to argue that Catalan political institutions should be restored. Many claimed that Aragon had accepted union with Spain only conditionally on the preservation of the Catalan Parliament. The abolition of Catalan institutions in 1716 was, therefore, seen by such activists as illegitimate (Jacobson, 2009, p. 25). In 1881,

Valentí Almirall founded the Catalan Centre, which, in 1885, published the "Memorial de Greuges" (Memorial of Grievances), with objections to the proposed codification of the Spanish Civil Code as well as to free trade with Great Britain. Free trade was expected to benefit the largely agricultural rest of Spain, while harming Catalan industry, which could not compete with more developed industries in other countries. Catalan jurists were strongly involved in this Catalanist, proto-nationalist movement since they associated Catalan legal traditions with economic success. They particularly valued the rule allowing first-borns the right to inherit all property, thus avoiding the division of land over time into small properties (204-205).

A notable event in this transformation of the movement into nationalism was the creation in 1986 of the Catalanist Student Centre (CEC, Centre Escolar Catalanista). The CEC was the first Catalanist organization that pursued political goals. It is best known for its involvement in the 1889 protests against article 15 of the revised Spanish Civil Code. The protest movement, led by a large part of the Catalan legal profession, marked the beginning of Catalan nationalism. Catalan lawyers were intent on preserving their legal traditions, which they associated with progress, while they associated Spanish traditions with backwardness (Jacobson, 2002, 2009). Also in 1886, some activists created the *Lliga de Catalunya* (Catalan League), a conservative regionalist party. Leaders of the movement transitioned from using the word nation to describe Spain to using it for Catalonia (Marfany, 1996). In 1892, the Catalanist Union (Unió Catalanista), which had been created in 1891 and which the CEC joined, issued the Bases of Manreas (Bases de Manresa), a proposal for a regional constitution.

Nationalism appealed to a limited number of people until the end of the 19th century. The movement took off following the 1898 loss by Spain of Cuba and the Philippines. As Marfany (1996) asserts, the crisis caused by Spain's loss made Catalans begin to consider the country decadent and, therefore, only a state for Catalans, while their nation was Catalonia (42-43). Around this time, Catalan nationalist organizations spread all over

Catalonia (37-38).

Unlike in the Basque Country, where nationalism took off among Basques who were harmed by industrialization, Catalan nationalism was founded by Catalans who were relatively well-off. According to Díez Medrano (1995), this reflects diverging patterns of economic development in the two regions. While both regions industrialized in the 19th century, before most of the rest of Spain, their economies were dependent on very different types of industries. While the Basque Country specialized in capital goods production, Catalonia, specialized in consumer-goods production. Díez Medrano argues that the capital goods production that arose in the Basque Country led to the concentration of the economy in the hands of a small number of people who were close to the Spanish government. The focus on consumer goods in Catalonia made its elite more autonomous vis-à-vis the capital (14). Given that the economy developed autonomously from the Spanish state in Catalonia, Catalans who benefited from industrialization supported nationalism when they felt the state had failed to serve Catalan interests.

Due to its association with economic development, the first analyses of Catalan nationalism, published during the Franco dictatorship, presented the movement as a "bourgeois epiphenomenon". This was notably the case of authors like Pierre Villar, a French Marxist historian who traced the emergence of Catalan nationalism to the frustration of the Catalan bourgeoisie with the backwardness of the Spanish state, and Jordi Solé Tura, who saw it as resulting from the inability of Catalan economic elites to effect a "bourgeois revolution". Other historians, such as Fèlix Cucurull and Josep Termes, however, later began to trace the roots of Catalanism to the popular classes and to argue that the bourgeoisie was a late joiner of the movement. These authors and others focused on early assertions of Catalan identity, like the Reapers' Revolt of 1640 and other anti-centralist protest movements in the first half of the 19th century to suggest the movement had a popular base (Balcells, 1996, p. 23). More recently Fontana Lázaro (2014) has asserted the historical roots of Catalan identity, which he traces back to around the year 1000.

Other work suggests that Catalan nationalism's creation was more strongly associated with the middle class. Marfany's analysis of people who participated in Catalan nationalist assemblies at the turn of the 20th century shows that they tended to be in middle-class professions, especially lawyers, but also other professionals like doctors and people who identified as "traders" (Marfany, 1996, 47-52). Both bourgeois and working class individuals were underrepresented among Catalan nationalists. On the basis of the available evidence, Marfany suggests that early Catalan nationalists were generally young Catalans from the upper-middle class, but that there was a tendency for the movement to spread to people with lower socio-economic statuses (79, 83). He argues that the middle-class origins of its activists explain the moderation of Catalan nationalism at this time, especially its rejection of separatism (97).

The first major electoral success of Catalan nationalism came in 1907 when Catalan nationalist parties, most prominently the Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist League), joined forces with pro-Catalan Republican parties and with some other parties under the banner Catalan Solidarity (Solidaritat Catalana). They won 67% of votes in the region and 41 of the 44 Catalan seats in the Congress of deputies (Balcells, 1996, 58). Catalan nationalism finally secured a degree of self-government for the region in 1914 when the *Mancomunitat* (Commonwealth) of Catalonia was created, which unified the four provinces of Catalonia into one unit (67-68). During the Second Republic (1931-1939), after the adoption of a Catalan Statute of Autonomy in a referendum in 1931, Catalonia gained even more autonomy. Catalan self-government, however, was suspended in 1935 and abolished in 1938 as a result of the outbreak of the Civil War (94-124).

The political expression of Catalan nationalism was initially limited to the conservative Lliga regionalista. The right-wing dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s, however, then mobilized left-wing nationalism. Public opinion was radicalizing at this time and many Catalans considered the conservative Lliga too moderate (McRoberts, 2001, 32). Eventually, a successful nationalist party of the left was created in 1931, when Esquerra

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Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, Catalan Republican Left) was created from the merger of the Partit Republicà Català (Catalan Republican Party) and Estat Català (Catalan State). ERC became the dominant nationalist force during the First Republic. It, along with much of the Catalan leadership, however, was forced into exile during the Civil War and the ERC president of Catalonia was executed in 1940.

When Franco came to power, his dictatorship repressed the Catalan identity and language. Among some of the measures adopted by his regime were the banning of use of the Catalan language in public as well as the Catalan flag and anthem. Regional nationalism became associated with the left not only because the centralist dictatorship was on the right but also because some Catalan economic elites, many of whom had been active in the conservative Lliga Regionalista, fearing revolutionary anarchism, supported the dictatorship (McRoberts, 2001, 41). Perhaps the most famous example of a Catalan nationalist who ended up supporting the centralizing dictatorship was Francesc Cambó, founder and leader of the Lliga Regionalista (De Riquer i Permanyer, 1996). At the time of the Civil War and the beginning of the dictatorship, the abandoning of Catalan nationalism by many conservative leaders thus left it a left-wing movement.

However, during the dictatorship, centre-right nationalism became a major force again. Some sectors of the Church, especially the Abbey of Montserrat, opposed Franco and had sympathies for Catalan nationalism. The most prominent leader of this Catholic nationalism was Jordi Pujol, who was jailed for opposing the dictatorship. In 1974, he and his entourage created Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya), a centre-right nationalist party. CDC ran in elections in alliance with Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya), a moderately nationalist Christian Democratic party that was founded in 1931, under the name Convergence and Union (CiU, Convergència i Unió) from 1979 to 2015.

On the left, Catalan Republican Left, which had been the major nationalist force in the 1930s all but disappeared following the Civil War. However, other left-wing political

movements adopted moderate forms of nationalism during this period. The major left-wing party during the dictatorship, the communist Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC, Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya), which had been founded in 1936 and whose base included many nationalists, adopted elements of nationalism in order to form a "historic bloc" that could end the regime (Miley, 2014, 314).

Socialists played a marginal role in the opposition to the dictatorship, but, during the transition to democracy, a strong socialist party was founded in the region under the leadership of pro-nationalist elites (Miley, 2014, 314). Given that the PSOE had weaker roots in the region, two Catalan socialist parties, the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congrés (Socialist Party of Catalonia-Congress) and the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament (Socialist Party of Catalonia-Regrouping) joined forces with the Catalan federation of the PSOE to form the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), which has always been associated with the Spanish Socialist Party in spite of its formal independence. Leaders with nationalist sympathies played a major role in the foundation of the PSC. Consequently, the party has always advocated a moderate form of nationalism.

These parties have been particularly supportive of nationalist policies on the nation-building dimension. When Catalan language policy was being discussed in the early 1980s, the left-wing parties supported more intensive policies of Catalan language promotion than the nationalist parties themselves (Argelaguet i Argemí, 1999). Nationalism thus has had a strong presence on the left in Catalonia. Miley (2014) argues that the support for nationalism by the Catalan left, by preventing the expression of views critical of nationalism, has allowed nationalism to become hegemonic in the region (314-315). In the early years of Catalan autonomy, there was, therefore, little nationalist conflict within Catalonia: all major parties supported moderate nationalism.

Following Franco's death and the beginning of the transition to democracy, CiU won the first election to the Parliament of Catalonia in 1980. It governed the region under

Jordi Pujol's leadership uninterrupted for 23 years. For most of its existence, CiU had moderately nationalist positions. It called for "Yes" votes in both the 1978 referendum on the constitution and the 1979 referendum on Catalonia's new statute of autonomy (Santamaría, 2011, 293-298). The other nationalist party that has played a major role in Catalan politics, ERC, was also relatively moderate at this time. While it opposed the 1978 constitution, it supported the 1979 statute of autonomy.[2] It also supported the first CiU government (from 1980 to 1984) and its leader became a minister in the second (from 1984 to 1988).[3] In 1989, it radicalized its nationalism when it came to explicitly support Catalan independence. Nevertheless, until recently, it was open to seeking reforms within the Spanish state to increase the autonomy of Catalonia (McRoberts, 2001, 86-87).

In the 1990s, the PP became an important player in Catalan politics. In the 1995 election, it more than doubled its share of votes and seats under anti-nationalist leader Aleix Vidal-Quadras by taking a strong stance against Catalan language policies. He notably compared the Catalan school system to apartheid. The PP ended up winning 17 seats with 13% of the vote (Santamaría, 1999, 62-63). While this may have led to intense polarization of Catalan politics for the rest of the 1990s, national politics got in the way. In 1996, as we saw above, the anti-nationalist PP leader Aznar signed an agreement by which CiU would support a PP minority government in the Congress of Deputies in exchange for further decentralization. After the agreement was signed, the PP put aside its criticisms of Catalan nationalism and recognized Catalan distinctiveness (Díaz Esculies, 2008, 45-46). Pujol also got Aznar to replace Vidal-Quadras as leader of the Catalan PP by the more moderate Alberto Fernández Díaz (Voltas, 1996, 236). In 1999, CiU benefited from the agreement when its minority regional government got support from the PP. Tension between the major nationalist and anti-nationalist parties was thus relatively low at this

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[2] *La Vanguardia.* 1979. "Actos para hoy y mañana." October 21.

[3] Pi, Jaume. 2012. "CiU y ERC se reencuentran 32 años después." *La Vanguardia* December 20. URL: `http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20121220/54358147237/ciu-erc-se-reencuentran-32-anos-despues.html` (accessed on August 15, 2016)

time.

In the first half of the 2000s, divisions between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties were further reduced. In 2003, CiU won more seats than the second place PSC. The Socialists, however, won slightly more votes. More significantly, they were able to put together a left-wing tripartite coalition government with ERC, Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV, Inciativa per Catalunya Verds), the successor party of the PSUC. The coalition lasted from 2003 to 2006 and it was repeated from 2006 to 2010. The first tripartite government proposed a new statute of autonomy for the region, which was approved by the Catalan Parliament, with some amendments, by the Spanish Congress of Deputies, and by the Catalan population in a referendum. The proposal of a new statute involved a move in the nationalist direction by the Socialists, both nationally and regionally. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who became leader of the PSOE in 2000, declared during the 2003 regional election campaign that he would support a reform of the Catalan statute of autonomy that came out of the Catalan Parliament.[4] The Catalan socialists became associated with a demand for reform that included recognizing Catalonia as a nation. It also constituted a move in the nationalist direction for ICV, which clearly was less nationalist than the separatist ERC. For ERC, pursuing statute reform involved temporary putting aside its goal of independence.

The PP in Catalonia kept up the moderate positions it had adopted following the 1996 Majestic Pact in spite of the fact that the national party won a majority government in 2000. Josep Piqué, who became its leader in 2003, sought to make the party more friendly towards Catalan nationalism (See, for example Culla, 2009). Consequently, the first half of the 2000s was a period of relative moderation by Catalan nationalist parties and those that opposed them.

In the second half of the 2000s, Catalan politics became increasingly polarized around

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[4]Rusiñol, Pere. 2003. "Zapatero promete apoyar la reforma del Estatuto que salga del Parlamento." *El País.* November 14. URL: http://elpais.com/diario/2003/11/14/espana/1068764421_850215.html (accessed on August 15, 2016)

nationalism. In 2006, a new party, the Citizens-Party of Citizenship (C's, Ciutadans-Partit de la Ciutadania), bringing together Catalans who were opposed to nationalism in the region, was founded. It won three seats in the regional parliament in the election held that year (for some background on this election, see Lago, Montero and Torcal, 2007). The following year, Piqué resigned from the leadership of the PP. While the Catalan PP was returning to its previous anti-nationalist ways, the national PP had continued to oppose regional nationalism, in spite of the change in leadership from Aznar to Rajoy in 2004. It strongly opposed the new Catalan statute, which was approved in 2006, and challenged it before the Constitutional Court immediately following its approval. As Muñoz and Guinjoan (2013) assert, "the decision to impugn the new law kept the issue of Catalan autonomy at the top of the political agenda, and the positions both at the secessionist and unitarist ends of the spectrum radicalized" (49). They argue that this created a "favorable structure of political opportunities from which the Catalan pro-independence movement could benefit" (49-50).

At the same time, Catalan nationalists were becoming increasingly mobilized in favour of independence. In September 2009, an unofficial referendum on Catalan independence was held in the town of Arenys de Munt. Following this example, about half of Catalan municipalities held similar consultations, organized either by the municipal governments or by private organizations. Overwhelming majorities voted "Yes" in most of these (although turnout was only about 18.2% (Muñoz and Guinjoan, 2013, 52)).

A number of new parties supporting secession emerged at this time. The most important were Independence Rally (RI, Reagrupament Independentista), formed by dissidents from ERC who thought that party had become too moderate, and Catalan Solidarity for Independence (SI, Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència), formed by another group of pro-independence activists. The Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular), a far-left pro-independence party that had been around since the 1980s, also became successful at this time. While RI has never won seats in the Catalan Parliament,

SI won four seats in the 2010 regional election, and the CUP won 3 seats in 2012 and 10 seats in 2015 (Generalitat valenciana, 2016).

The two main nationalist parties, ERC and CDC, have also become more clearly supportive of independence. After CiU won the 2010 regional election and returned to power in Catalonia, it became increasingly favourable towards that option. Following the end of the tripartite government, ERC was free from the more moderate parties with which it had governed. CDC and ERC together sought a way to hold a vote on Catalan independence, in spite of the national government's refusal to consider one. On November 9th, 2014, the Catalan government, under CiU, with the support of ERC and other parties supporting the right of Catalonia to hold a referendum, organized a participatory process on the political future of Catalonia. Like previous attempts to hold a vote on independence, the central government tried to stop it by appealing to the Constitutional Court, which suspended it. The vote took place anyways and 80.8% of voters opted for Catalonia to become an independent state. Although it is difficult to know the exact turnout, since two categories of Catalans who are not normally on the list of registered voters were allowed to participate: those aged 16 and 17 and foreigners who are residents in Catalonia, an estimate puts it at around 37% (GESOP, 2014). In June 2015, the Constitutional Court declared the participatory process unconstitutional. On September 27th of that year, a second vote was held on independence, this time in the context of a regional election. CDC and ERC joined forces to present a pro-independence coalition, Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes), in what they considered a "plebiscitary election", which was, in their view, the only option left after repeated attempts to hold a vote were rejected by the central government (Junts pel sí, 2015, 29). They ran on a program to take steps towards independence, without prior negotiations with the Spanish government (3). Junts pel Sí, along with the CUP, which had refused to join the pre-electoral coalition, won a majority of seats in the regional parliament (72 of 135). However, they received a minority of votes (48%) (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). They have since made taken small steps towards

independence.

At the same time as Catalan nationalist parties were increasingly pushing for independence, at the national level, not only had the PP taken a hard line against Catalan nationalism but so had the PSOE. After having opposed the Basque government's plan to organize a referendum in 2008, the Socialist government in Madrid also strongly opposed the unofficial votes held in Catalonia in 2009 (Muñoz and Guinjoan, 2013, 50). Thus, in the late 2000s, while nationalists were strongly mobilized in favour of independence, the two main statewide parties as well as the Catalan PP and Ciutadans were strongly opposed to it. Catalans at this time were, consequently, exposed to a political environment that was strongly polarized between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties.

After the emergence of independence as a serious option in the region in the early 2010s, CDC gradually came to support it. CDC's change of position on this issue led to a conflict with its former coalition partner, UDC, which opposes secession. As a result, in 2015, CiU fell apart. Recently, CDC, has sought to re-brand itself, adopting the name Catalan Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Català). The UDC has become a minor force in Catalan politics.

Another recent development has been the emergence of Podemos (We Can). After its creation in 2014 as a statewide far-left party, it has been very successful in Catalonia. The regional coalition representing it, En Comú Podem (Together We Can) came in first place in Catalonia in the national elections held in 2015 and 2016. The party strongly supports holding a referendum on Catalonia's political future. However, it does not explicitly support secession (En Comú Podem, 2016, 73).

Around the time that parties have polarized over the future of Catalonia, support for Catalan independence has skyrocketed. Figure 5.1 shows how support for the four options for the relationship between Catalonia and Spain has evolved over time since 1995. The four options are: a region of a (centralized) Spain, an autonomous community (the status quo), a state in a federal Spain, and an independent state. The data are from

the Centre for the Study of Opinion (CEO, Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió) since 2005, which is when they started running regular surveys, and from the Institute of Political and Social Sciences (ICPS, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials) before then. We can see that the most obvious change in preferences is the impressive increase in preferences for secession beginning in the late 2000s and especially after 2010. This change has been at the expense of both preferences for the status quo as well as those for federalism. This surge may have resulted from the increased polarization between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties. Support for independence has then dropped somewhat since 2014. This may be due to the divisions that have appeared in the main nationalist party in Catalonia and/or the appearance of Podemos.[5]

Figure 3.3: Preferences for the Territorial Organization of Spain in Catalonia over Time

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
[5]We can also see that the ICPS estimates higher support for the status quo and lower support for federalism than the CEO does. This may be due to biases in the samples used by CEO identified by Muñoz and Tormos (2015, 325, footnote 6).

3.4   The Valencian Community

The Valencian Community shares much of its culture and history with Catalonia. However, politically, it has taken a very different path. While nationalism has had a major presence over the past century in Catalonia, in Valencia, it has been much more limited.

Coller (2002) considers Valencia a "deviant case", which, in spite of possessing a distinct culture and language, has never had a strong nationalist movement (4). As a prominent scholar of Valencia, he has provided an influential explanation for the weakness of Valencian nationalism, which is the basis for much of the material presented in this section. His argument is that the history of the region led elites there to adopt a pro-Spanish orientation for several centuries. When some Valencian elites adopted positions that were more favourable to nationalism during the Franco dictatorship, this led to conflict between these elites and those who were more supportive of Spain, preventing a unified movement promoting Valencia's identity (Coller, 2002, 2006).

Rather than focusing on why Valencia is different from other regions in Spain, especially Catalonia, I stress the influence parties may have had on nationalist opinions in the region. I suggest that, since competing conceptions of Valencian identity have been promoted by the major statewide parties, these may have influenced the opinions of Valencians who support or who oppose them.

Before continuing, it is important to comment on the name of the region. Officially, the present-day region is called the Valencian Community (Comunidad Valenciana in Spanish, Comunitat Valenciana in Valencian). It is often called Valencia (València in the regional language) for short, although Valencia is also the name of the region's capital and of one of the three provinces of which it is composed (the other two are Castelló de la Plana and Alacant). The region is also frequently referred to as the Valencian Country (País Valencià, in Valencian) by proponents of the regional nationalist view of Valencia and sometimes as the Valencian Kingdom (Reino de Valencia) by those who subscribe to the

pro-Spanish view of Valencian identity.

The Kingdom of Valencia was created in 1238 by King James I of Aragon. Following his conquest of Valencia from the Moors, he and his successors encouraged Christians to settle in the newly conquered territory. Colonizers mostly came from Aragon and Catalonia. They brought their languages with them. The region was thus divided into two linguistic zones. The areas where the Aragonese predominantly settled became Castilian-speaking, while those where Catalans arrived became Catalan-speaking. The Spanish-speaking area is in the interior, while the Catalan-speaking zone is on the coast. This division still exists today and was recognized by the major Valencian language law, the 1983 Bill of Use and Teaching of Valencian (Llei d'Ús i Ensenyament del Valencià) (Coller, 2002, 10-11).

From its creation, there is evidence that Valencian elites have mostly been supportive of Spain and of its language. This is partly because the kings of Aragon and then of Spain have rewarded their supporters for their loyalty. Following his conquest of Valencia, James I rewarded the Christian crusaders who participated in the conquest with land and money (10). When the Moors were expelled in 1609, the region experienced a major economic decline, because Muslims had been a source of agricultural workers. In response, Valencian nobles, sought to marry their offspring to Castilian nobles in order to maintain their positions. This led to their participation in the court of the king of Spain. They also petitioned the king to provide them with financial assistance and protection against their creditors. Nobles in the region thus became dependent on and cooperative with the king. The monarchs gave nobles and commoners titles, special privileges, and military assistance in exchange for their support. Valencia thus became strongly integrated into Spain (16-23).

Valencia also became firmly integrated into the Spanish economy, exporting mostly agricultural products to the rest of Spain and to its colonies. Since it was useful for commerce, Valencian economic elites increasingly used Spanish (23-24). For centuries, the Valencian upper classes and those who aspire to join them have tended to speak Spanish.

The Valencian language is mostly used by peasants, workers and people in rural areas. It is often associated with backwardness. Valencians, on the other hand, associate Spanish with economic success (Ros i García, 1984, as cited in Coller 2002, 13). Like Catalonia, Valencia lost its political autonomy when Philip V adopted a New Foundation Decree in 1707, which furthered Valencia's integration into a centralized Spanish state (Coller, 2002, 27-28).

In the 19th century, while nationalism was emerging in neighbouring Catalonia, in Valencia, anti-Catalan attitudes began to take root. This phenomenon has been attributed to the distinctive pattern of economic development in the region. In the 19th century, the Valencian economy was largely focused on the production of oranges and rice for export. Economic elites in the region thus supported free trade instead of the protectionism favoured by economic elites in Catalonia. As we saw, protectionism was one of the demands of early Catalan nationalists, who sought to protect the incipient industry there. Many Valencians believed that the regional economy would severely suffer from protectionism. Anti-Catalan sentiment thus emerged at this time (Coller, 2002, 68; Flor, 2011, 64-68).

In the 19th century, Valencia experienced its own *Renaixença*. Much of the activity surrounding this movement converged in Lo Rat Penat (The Bat), an organization that was founded in 1878 to promote the regional language and culture (Coller, 2003, 62). However, the literary revival movement was considerably weaker than the one that occurred in Catalonia and it did not produce many written texts (12). It was also led by an elite that sought to avoid its politicization, since it was deeply involved in and benefited from the 19th century political system in Spain (59). They thus avoided going too far in their promotion of the regional language and particularly in making radical political claims. They saw the more politicized movement in Catalonia as a threat to Spanish unity (Coller, 2002, 63, Flor, 1999, 45-47).

According to Coller (2006), nationalism did not emerge in Valencia in the late 19th century, because elites in the region were happy to take advantage of the economic and

political opportunities provided by the *turnismo* system at the time. While Basque and especially Catalan elites were underrepresented in Madrid, Valencian elites were among the most involved in Spanish politics at this time. He thus argues that they had no need to create parties that were independent of the two major statewide parties. Coller also argues that Valencians would not have supported nationalist parties at this time as a way of opposing the regime, because opposition to the turnismo system already existed in the region in the form of Blasquism, an anti-clerical Republican movement. That movement was led by famous writer Blasco Ibáñez, who, using his newspaper, *El Pueblo* was a "true opinion maker" (113). Focused on reforming Spain along Republican lines, Blasquism was strongly oriented towards Spanish and not Valencian culture. Blasco's group explicitly rejected nationalism along the lines of what existed in the Basque Country and Catalonia, because they considered those movements too conservative. They particularly disliked their focus on Catholicism. According to Coller, Blasquism reinforced anti-Catalan sentiment in the region (114).

While up to the end of the 19th century, Valencia seems to have been dominated by pro-Spanish and anti-Catalan sentiment. In the early 20th century, an incipient nationalist movement appeared. At this time, the first serious attempts were made to promote the Valencian identity, which Cucó (1999) called "political valencianism". In 1904, a group of dissidents from Lo Rat Penat founded València Nova (New Valencia), seeking to promote the regional identity and to achieve autonomy for Valencia (Cucó, 1999, 66-67). València Nova then held the first Valencian Regional Assembly (Assemblea Regionalista Valenciana), which invited a large number of nationalist activists from Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. The assembly decided to organize a Solidaritat Valenciana (Valencian Solidarity) coalition, similar to Catalan Solidarity. However, it failed when the pro-nationalist Republicans, claiming that they wanted to defend Valencian economic interests, refused to participate (101). In 1918, Valencian activists close to the Catalan Lliga Regionalista created a party, the Valencianist Regional Union (UVR, Unión Valencianista

Regional). It issued a declaration stating that Valencia, given that it has a strong "social personality" ("*personalitat social*"), has a right to a state (133-141). The UVR, like the other pro-nationalist organizations, however, that appeared at this time, failed to appeal to many Valencians. Moreover, the identity they promoted was not much of a challenge to Spanish identity (Coller, 2002, 83-84).

The UVR would eventually disappear. During the Second Republic, Valencia was dominated by two regional parties, the Regional Valencian Right (DRV, *Derecha Regional Valenciana*) and the Party of Republican Autonomist Union (PURA, *Partido de Unión Republicana Autonomista*) that were focused on the national level rather than pursuing autonomy for Valencia. As a result, Valencia, unlike the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, never got a statute of autonomy. This failure meant that Valencia would be a second-class autonomy when the 1978 constitution allowed regions to attain autonomy (87).

During the Franco dictatorship, an opposition developed between the regime's view of a centralized Spain and one in which Valencians had a distinct identity. However, the regime was not as opposed to the Valencian identity as it was to Catalan distinctiveness. Since there was no Valencian movement threatening Spanish unity, Francoism tolerated the regional language and even used the Valencian language and symbols in some of its propaganda during the Civil War. It also took over *Lo Rat Penat* and tolerated the Floral Games (Coller, 2002, 105).

Nevertheless, a regional nationalist reaction did occur. Against the identity promoted by the regime, Valencian writer Joan Fuster developed a perspective according to which Valencians, along with residents of the Balearic Islands and Catalans, formed a larger Catalan nation. He inspired a whole movement which became known as Fusterianism. Fuster's perspective was particularly influential among young university students in the region. It was very influential in opposition parties there, creating an association between the struggle for democracy and the promotion of Valencian identity (Coller, 2006, 116).

Fusterianism espoused the flag of the Crown of Aragon, which was also used in Catalonia.

Fusterianism was later adopted by the Valencian left, particularly the regional branch of the PSOE, the Socialist Party of the Valencian Country (PSPV-PSOE, the Partit Socialista del Pais Valencia-PSOE), which was created in 1978 as a result of the merger of the regional branch of the PSOE, the Valencian branch of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP, Partido Socialista Popular), and a previous party also called the PSPV. The Valencian Socialist Party governed at the regional level from 1983 to 1995 and implemented language policies aimed at promoting Valencian. However, as a branch of a statewide party, it could not purse policies that challenged the territorial status quo. Moreover, according to Coller (2002), the PSPV, while promoting Fusterian principles in its early years at the head of the regional government, has become decreasingly supportive of those ideas over time (160). The language policies it adopted, in particular, were limited to reviving the Valencian language and did not seek to create a nation (182). In 1983, it adopted the relatively moderate Law of Use and Teaching of Valencian (*Llei d'Ús i Ensenyament del Valencià*) (189). The United Left of the Valencian Country (EUPV, Esquerra Unida del País Valencià), the Valencian branch of the United Left, a minor party in the region (Coller, 2002, 426), like the Socialists, has also adopted the Fusterianist name of the region in its own name.

As a response to Fusterianism, other Valencians rejected the notion that Valencia was a part of a broader Catalan nation or that Valencian was a dialect of Catalan. The anti-Fusterian movement, called Blaverism, focused on three symbolic issues: opting for the flag of Valencia instead of the Senyera used in Catalonia, promoting Valencian as a language that is distinct from Catalan, by creating a different grammar and spelling for Valencian, and calling the region the Kingdom of Valencia rather than the Valencian Country (Flor, 2011, 22). The name of this movement comes from their preference for the adoption of the flag of the city of Valencia as the regional flag, which has a blue (*blau*, hence the name) band on its left side (Coller, 2002, 120). Unlike the threat posed to Spanish unity by

Fusterianism's focus on the Catalan Countries as a distinct entity from Spain, Blaverism asserts that Valencia is part of Spain, whose unity it values (125). Blaverism has become prominent in cultural groups in the region, particularly those that organize the *Falles*, a major annual festival for which Valencia is famous (123).

During the transition to democracy, this perspective was espoused by political forces on the centre and the right, particularly, the People's Alliance (AP), which later became the People's Party (PP). It was also espoused by the centrist UCD. Blaverism was also adopted by the regional Valencian Union (UV, Unió Valenciana), which strongly supported Valencian distinctiveness. The AP and its successor party, the PP, were reluctant to accept decentralization. However, over time, they became more favourable towards it (Coller, 2002, 167). The PP's support for Blaverism was reaffirmed after 1995, when it won control of the regional government in coalition with UV, which it progressively absorbed (Coller, 2002, 160). While in government, the PP promoted linguistic secessionism, that is, seeking to distinguish Valencian from Catalan (168).

In addition to the major parties mentioned above, the Commitment Coalition (Coalició Compromis) has been in the Valencian Parliament since 2011. It has brought together small Valencian nationalist, left-wing, and environmental parties. It has had considerable success since then. In the 2015 regional election, it received 18.5% of the vote, becoming the third placed party (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). It then joined a coalition government with the Valencian Socialists. In the national election held that year, it joined a pre-electoral coalition with Podemos called Compromís-Podem-És el moment (Commitment-We Can-It is Time), which won 25.12 % of the vote, thus becoming the second placed party in the region (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). In the June 2016 national election, Compromís-Podemos-EUPV: A la valenciana, the same coalition with the addition of United Left of the Valencian Country again came in second place with 25.37% (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). These coalitions, like Podemos in the rest of Spain, support a right to self-determination. It thus is possible that it has made its followers more nationalist.

However, given the absence of a stable party over time, it is impossible to observe the influence it may have had on public opinion. I thus focus on the parties that have been around for longer.

In sum, in the Valencian Community, two versions of regional identity have been politically influential. On the one hand, Fusterianism has advocated a Valencian identity that is part of a broader Catalan identity, thus challenging the unity of the Spanish nation. This perspective has been adopted by left-wing parties. On the other hand, Blaverism has accentuated Valencian distinctiveness from Catalan culture and identity. It has thus been more compatible with Spanish nationalism than regional nationalism. It has been the vision of Valencia adopted by the centre (the UCD) and the right (the PP). We have seen that there has been some movement in these parties' positions over time.

Since these are all statewide parties which also adopt positions to attract support elsewhere in Spain, we should find that, when they change their positions in the rest of Spain, their partisans adjust their opinions in the same direction as them and their anti-partisans change theirs in the opposite direction.

Figure 3.4 shows preferences for the territorial organization of Spain in Valencia. These are data from the CIS, similar to those I present for the Basque Country. The only difference is that, starting in 2010, a fifth option was added: autonomous communities with less power. I thus distinguish both forms of the question. Data from the four-category question are in dashed lines, while results from the five-category question are in solid lines. We can see that, in the 1990s and early 2000s, support for the status quo increased. Valencians then became more supportive of increased autonomy, and less supportive of centralization and somewhat less of the status quo in the first half of the 2000s. The pattern in the 2010s is not clear.

Figure 3.4: Preferences for the Territorial Organization of Spain in the Valencian Community over Time

3.5 Galicia

Contemporary Galicia is composed of four provinces: A Coruña (La Coruña in Spanish), Lugo, Ourense (Orense in Spanish), and Pontevedra. In Galicia, as in the the Valencian Community, nationalism has been relatively weak (at least compared to the Basque Country and Catalonia). This may seem surprising, since the Galician language is spoken all over the region. Moreover, even before language policies were adopted in the early 1980s, Galician was spoken by a large majority of the population of the region (e.g. Linz, 2008*b*, 80). Furthermore, unlike the Basque Country, Galicia did exist as a unified political entity before the 20th century. It was a Roman province called Gallaecia and then corresponded roughly to the Kingdom of the Suebi. Finally, even after joining Castile, it remained the

Kingdom of Galicia.

However, the linguistic situation in Galicia is actually not as favourable to nationalism as it appears. Galician is so widely spoken in the region due to its relative underdevelopment, the focus of its economy on agriculture, and its low level of immigration. These factors all mean that Spanish has not penetrated the region as much as elsewhere (Linz, 2008*a*, 57-58). The Galician language and identity have thus been associated with poor and uneducated peasants (Linz, 2008*c*, 80). This was particularly true when Galician lost its status as the language of the public administration in the 16th and 17th centuries. It continued to be used by clergy and between landowners and peasants. However, in urban areas, middle and upper classes increasingly used Spanish, particularly when industrialization slowly arrived. In areas with military bases, the regional language fared even worse, due to the arrival of soldiers from the rest of Spain. Galicians who sought to improve their economic status opted to use Castilian instead of Galician (Beswick, 2007, 64-66).

Moreover, in spite of the historic institutions associated with Galicia, it became absorbed by other kingdoms, which eventually came to form Spain, in the Middle Ages. While the Kingdom of Galicia continued to exist as an entity, it lost its autonomy at this time. Consequently, Galicia lacks precedents in self-government and thus the historical memories that could serve as the basis for a discourse of lost autonomy (Máiz and Losada, 2000, 65).

Since Galicia had no autonomy, it had nothing to lose in the 18th and 19th century when the centralizing Spanish state took away the other three regions' autonomy. Nevertheless, attempts to defend the identity of Galicia began in the 19th century. These were nearly all very weak. Between 1840 and 1885, there were struggles to unify Galicia, which had been divided into four provinces in 1833. Young people, especially at the University of Santiago de Compostela were particularly active in this movement. However, like the movements that arose in Valencia in the 19th and 20th century, participants saw Galicia as a part of the Spanish nation, rather than being a nation itself (Beramendi, 1997, 9-13).

As elsewhere in the 19th century, there was a literary renaissance, which in Galicia was called the *Rexurdimento* (Resurgence). The cultural elite of the region sought to turn Galician into a literary language (Beswick, 2007, 65). At this time Eduardo Pondal, wrote a poem that would become the Galicia anthem and Rosalía de Castro, contrasted Castile with its antithesis Galicia (Maiz, 2010, 176-177).

The cultural movement eventually became politicized. In 1886, Manuel Murguía, a historian who played a key role in the Galician literary revival, first asserted that Galicia is a nation (Beramendi, 1997, 24-25). In 1890, a political organization defending Galician regional interests, the Galician Regionalist Association (Asociación Regionalista Gallega) was created by a group led by Murguía. In spite of the prestige its founders, it only ever received weak support from the population. In 1907, some Galician leaders created a Galician Solidarity (Solidaridad Gallega) nationalist coalition, similar to the one that appeared in Catalonia the previous year. However, it was a failure, not electing a single deputy (29).

Nationalism reappeared in 1916, when the Brotherhood of the Language (*Irmandades da Fala*) was founded in Madrid by a group of Galician activists who wanted to defend the regional culture and, secondarily, obtain autonomy for Galicia. Although the Brotherhood never became a political party, it did run in the 1918 Spanish election in coalition with Catalan nationalists. Even though this experience of electoral politics was a failure, its key figures, notably Vicente Risco, played a major role in the development of Galician nationalist discourse (Beramendi, 1997, 35-36).

In 1931, political party, the Galicianist Party (*Partido Galeguista*), was finally created with the objective of obtaining autonomy for the region. It elected deputies to the Congress of Deputies for the first time in 1931 and was very active during the Second Republic. Unlike the nationalist parties that would succeed it, which, as we will see, would be clearly on the left, the Galicianist Party was a coalition of groups with various ideologies. It succeeded in getting a statute of autonomy for the region, which recognized Galician

along with Spanish as co-official languages. Although it was approved in a referendum in June 1936, it never came into force, due to the outbreak of the Civil War. However, it set a precedent. In the 1978 constitution, Galicia was recognized as a historic nationality and thus, unlike Valencia, was able to take the fast route to autonomy (60-61).

Like in the other regions, the regional culture was repressed during the dictatorship. However, the dictatorship did not repress all elements of Galician identity. As in the other regions, Franco found supporters among some regional nationalists. While those who were on the left were persecuted, the regime spared pro-Galician activists who were on the right (Maiz, 2010, 177-178). Nevertheless, Galician nationalist activity was abandoned in the early years of the dictatorship and the Partido Galeguista disappeared (Beramendi, 1997, 65).

As elsewhere, repression led to a reaction. Initially, this reaction consisted mainly of cultural initiatives. However, in the 1960s, with the emergence of what has been called "new Galician nationalism" (67), the reaction became political. Of note are the creation of the social-democratic Galician Socialist Party (PSG, Partido Socialista Galego) in 1963 and the Union of the Galician People (UPG, Unión do Pobo Galego) in 1964. While the former never had much success, the latter was quite influential. It promoted a Galician nationalism that was centred on anti-imperialist Marxism. Under the pressure of the dictatorship and the influence of Marxism-Leninism and decolonization, the UPG saw Galicia as a a colony of the Spanish state. Galician nationalism thus became clearly associated with the left (66-67).

In the 1980s, Galician nationalism was spread out among numerous mostly far-left parties. Over time though, nationalist forces came together in the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego), a coalition of left-wing nationalist parties. Much has been written about this party's political trajectory since the transition to democracy (e.g. Lago and Máiz, 2004; Núñez Seixas, 1997; Quintana Garrido, 2010). The BNG, whose core was UPG, was founded in 1982. In its early years, it took extreme nationalist

and left-wing positions, refusing to accept the region's statute of autonomy and rejecting the existing political institutions. It also adopted the UPG's anti-colonalist discourse (e.g. Lago and Máiz, 2004, 34). In the 1980s, the BNG, with its extreme positions, never received more than 8% of the vote in elections Galicia (Generalitat valenciana, 2016).

By the late 1980s, however, it began to change into a moderate regional nationalist force. Lago and Máiz (2004) and Maiz (2003) argue that the coalition took advantage of the opportunities presented by the creation of Galician autonomous political institutions and the perceived centralism of the Galician Socialists and moderated both its nationalism and its left-wing positions. It also brought together a set of smaller nationalist parties under the charismatic leadership of Xosé Manuel Beiras, who successfully appealed to Galicians who identified less with nationalism. Its great success came in the 1996 Spanish election when it won two seats, its first seats in the Congress of Deputies, and in the 1997 regional election when it won 18 seats, relegating the Socialists to third place for the first time since 1982 (Generalitat valenciana, 2016).

Since the transition to democracy, while nationalism has been clearly associated with the left, parties of the right and centre have hardly been hostile towards it in the region. The major statewide centre-right parties, first the UCD and then the AP (and its successor the PP) have been particularly successful in the region. They have controlled the regional government for most of its history and have adopted a moderate pro-Galician discourse (Lago and Máiz, 2004; Losada, 1999). After the PSOE came to power in Madrid in 1982, the AP (and then the PP), used the Galician identity to rally support in its struggles with the central government when the Socialists were in power (Losada, 1999, 155). Consequently, while nationalism is associated with the left in Galicia, there is no strong divide between nationalist and anti-nationalist parties.

The Socialists' Party of Galicia (PSdeG, Partido dos Socialistas de Galicia) has generally been perceived as subordinate to the PSOE and thus not favourable to Galician interests. Lago and Máiz (2004) suggest that this is one reason why the BNG was able to

succesfully appeal to moderate left-wing voters (30-31). However, it eventually got closer to the BNG in the 2000s and formed a coalition government with it between 2005 and 2009.

If party cue effects are dependent on parties towards which citizens have opposing attitudes adopting competing positions, Galician nationalism has suffered from a major weakness in the democratic period. Both the BNG and the PP have been moderating their nationalist positions since the 1980s. Consequently, there has been no major contrast between the positions of the two, which would clearly show partisans and anti-partisans which positions they should adopt. If parties influence nationalism, we should find that BNG identifiers have become less nationalist following its moderation, while its opponents have become less anti-nationalist. Supporters of the PP should also have become less anti-nationalist and those who reject that party should have become less nationalist, following its movement towards moderate nationalism.

Nevertheless, conflicts involving nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia in which state-wide parties, especially the PP, have adopted anti-nationalist positions may have been more conducive to party cue effects on nationalist opinions. Polarization at the national level between the PP, on the one hand, and left-wing and nationalist parties, on the other, may have led to increased support for nationalism in Galicia among BNG supporters and PP anti-partisans. Conversely, support for nationalism may have decreased when the the PP and left-wing pro-nationalist parties moderated their positions among supporters of the latter and opponents of the PP.

Moreover, the Galician party system has evolved in recent years. The BNG entered the regional government between 2005 and 2009 in coalition with the Socialists. However, this followed and was followed by considerable losses of support. The party went from 24.8% of the vote in the 1997 regional election to 10% in the most recent election in 2012 (Generalitat valenciana, 2016). It now also has a competitor on the left, In Tide (En Marea), a coalition of left-wing parties, including Podemos and the nationalist Anova-

Nationalist Brotherhood (*ANOVA-Irmandade Nacionalista*), led by former BNG leader Xosé Manuel Beiras. While clearly on the left, En Marea has taken some nationalist stances, notably asserting that Galicia is a nation and by supporting a right to self-determination.

Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of territorial preferences in Galicia over time. We can see a gradual increase in support for the status quo over time. We can also see that support for more regional autonomy increased up to the late 2000s, then it dropped. In chapter 5, we will consider whether these changes have been the result of party influence.

Figure 3.5: Preferences for the Territorial Organization of Spain in Galicia over Time

3.6 Concluson

We have seen here that Spain was created by historic territories that came together. Some of these retained considerable autonomy for centuries. In the 18th century, the

state began taking away the regions' autonomy and, in the late 19th century and early 20th century, a reaction to these moves towards centralization occurred in the form of movements defending regional identities. These movements were and always have been stronger in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Valencia and Galicia.

The various parties in each region have adopted positions that either support or oppose regional nationalism. Nationalism has generally been greatest among parties of the left. While regional nationalist parties exist on the left or the right, support for nationalism has been greatest among left-wing statewide parties. The major right-wing national party, the People's Party, opposes nationalism, although less clearly so in Galicia. Moreover, its degree of opposition to nationalism has varied over time.

If parties influence nationalist opinions, we should find that, when parties move in a pro-nationalist direction, their partisans become more supportive of nationalist options, while people who dislike them become less favourable towards such positions. When they become less nationalist, their supporters should also become less nationalist, while their opponents should become more pro-nationalist. Furthermore, when people learn the parties' positions, they should adjust their opinions in the direction of the position adopted by the parties they like (and against the position of parties they dislike).

The next two chapters seek to assess the first possibility, that is, when a party changes its positions, do its supporters shift theirs in the same direction and its opponents move theirs in the opposite direction? In order to assess this possibility, the next chapter measures the positions expressed by parties over time in a systematic way. The following chapter then determines whether partisan groups react in ways that are consistent with party following. The final chapter then uses experiments to assess whether people change their opinions when they learn parties' positions.

Chapter 4

Measuring Party Positions on Nationalism

We saw in chapter 2 that numerous studies have shown that citizens tend to adapt their opinions to the positions of the parties with which they identify. These studies either use experimental data showing that citizens react to party cues by adopting their preferred party's positions (e.g. Broockman and Butler, 2015; Kam, 2005; Merolla, Stephenson and Zechmeister, 2007, 2008) or they use panel data showing that citizens adopt their party's positions when they become aware of them or when parties make obvious changes in them (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Lenz, 2012). However, the evidence that citizens are even aware of party positions is mixed (compare Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009 and Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2011, on the one hand, to Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2014 and Fortunato and Stevenson 2013, on the other). Consequently, even though citizens may adopt party positions when they are forced to read them in the context of an experiment or when parties make a major change that many citizens become aware of, they may not do so more generally in the real world. An important complement to experimental work is thus establishing that citizens do notice changes in party positions and that they do react to them.

This chapter focuses on issues involved in measuring party positions on regional nationalism in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Valencian Community. It then shows that citizens, at least in three of the regions, are aware of the positions that legislators take. The next chapter shows that partisans and opponents of parties adapt their opinions to reflect the positions adopted by the parties with which they identify and sometimes to oppose the positions of the parties they dislike. Of course, these chapters can only make limited causal claims. We have no way of knowing whether citizens are reacting to the positions adopted by parties or to something else. It is also impossible to know, without having access to panel data, that supporters or opponents of a party adjust their opinions to reflect the positions adopted by parties and not that citizens re-evaluate parties on the basis of their opinions. Consequently, chapter 6 presents experimental evidence that citizens follow party cues.

What existing studies lack are regular measures of party positions. If we can determine parties' positions at different points in time, it is possible to assess whether citizens react to them in general. In this chapter, I measure party positions on the two dimensions of regional nationalism. Gellner (1983) argued that nationalism is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1). This definition implies that the political (institutions) and national (nation) units should be adapted to each other. I thus distinguish the nation-building dimension, which focuses on promoting a regional identity and culture from the state-building dimension, which is about increasing the political autonomy of a region, and possibly pursuing independence. I consider any debate that deals with language policies, symbols or remembering the past to be part of the nation-building dimension. I place any debate about increasing regional autonomy, about conflicts with the central government or about moves towards independence in the state-building category.

In the Basque Country, I also measure positions along another dimension that has been related to nationalism, political violence. In that region, the terrorist group ETA

as well as numerous smaller groups have used violence in the pursuit of independence. I thus consider positions along this dimension as well in that region's parliament. I consider debates to be about political violence if they mention terrorism, political or street violence (*kale borroka*), ETA or its political associates (the *Abertzale* left).

In recent years, considerable progress has been made in developing methods to automatically measure parties' positions (see especially Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). However, current implementations of these methods make some major assumptions. In this chapter, I measure party positions by applying the popular scaling program Wordfish to transcriptions of legislative speeches in the four regional parliaments and in the national parliament. I first justify my use of this approach. I then address four key assumptions underlying that program: that the dimension of interest is the dominant dimension underlying text, that words alone contain sufficient information about party positions, that word meaning is stable over time, and that having more than one language necessarily prevents a unidimensional method like Wordfish from measuring party positions. I conclude this chapter by showing that changes in citizens' perceptions of party positions on a regional nationalism scale follow actual changes in the positions adopted by parties.

4.1 Using Legislative Speeches to Measure Party Positions

A number of different methods have been used to measure party positions. These include expert surveys, elite surveys, mass surveys, automated content analysis, the hand-coding of party manifestos, the analysis of roll-call votes, and the analysis of legislative speeches (for reviews of many of these approaches, see Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). The major problem with most of these for tracking changes in positions

over time is the availability of data on party positions at different points in time. As we will see, analyzing legislative speeches has the potential to produce frequent measures of party positions.

Expert surveys (e.g. Bakker et al., 2015; Castles and Mair, 1984; Huber and Inglehart, 1995) are generally not useful when measuring party positions over time. They are difficult and costly to repeat (Slapin and Proksch, 2008) and, when repeating them is possible, they must be planned in advance. It is impossible to find out how an expert would have placed a party at some point in the past unless they were actually asked to place them then. This is a particular problem when we want to observe changes in party positions that clearly occur prior to changes in public opinion.

Similarly, elite surveys can provide a detailed snapshot of the positions of political elites at a particular point in time. *The Study on Political Elites in Spain* has made an important contribution to our knowledge of elites in that country (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2013). Miley conducted another valuable elite survey (See, for example, Miley, 2014). Both of these are very useful for studying the closeness between citizens and parties at a particular moment. However, they are not very useful for measuring changes in party positions over time, since they are infrequent.

Mass surveys frequently include questions on perceptions of party positions. Questions asking citizens to place parties on a regional nationalism scale from 1 to 10 have been asked in Spain by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). These have a number of problems, however. First, they are not very frequent, which also makes it difficult to identify the timing of changes in positions. Second, they are likely not an objective measure of party positions and are influenced by people's attitudes, possibly those that interest scholars. The necessary level of nationalism for a party to be placed at a given level may vary over time as people become more or less nationalistic. Finally, there are theoretical reasons to expect that citizens' attitudes towards parties influence their perceptions of the parties. There is a rich literature on the individual-level biases in placements using

such measures, generally called differential item functioning (e.g. Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Brady, 1985; King et al., 2004). A recent article on ideological placement in the US (Hare et al., 2014) found that many citizens tend to place themselves and their preferred presidential candidate in moderate positions, while they place the other party's candidate in a more extreme position (765-766). Given that citizens at one point in time are biased in their placement of themselves and of the parties, it is likely that there are similar over time biases. Following the same logic, when a party becomes more popular, citizens should be more likely to place it in a centrist position. When it falls out of favour, citizens should be more likely to place it in a more extreme position. I thus opt not to rely on mass placements on these scales. Nevertheless, I do show that the movements I identify using text analysis are reflected in movements over time in citizens' perceptions.

Considerable work has been conducted on measuring party positions using manifestos (Alonso, Gómez and Cabeza, 2013; Budge, 2001). The recent analysis of regional manifestos by the Regional Manifestos Project (Alonso, Gómez and Cabeza, 2013), in particular, is extremely valuable. However, there are two key obstacles to successfully using them for my purposes. Manifestos are produced infrequently, only when elections are held. This would make it difficult to determine whether parties change positions before citizens do. Moreover, numerous comparative studies show that citizens are not aware of changes in parties' positions in manifestos (Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2011, 2014) and that, if they do react to them, they only do so with a delay (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). On the other hand, work on US politics suggests that citizens react to parties' activities in the legislature (e.g. Ansolabehere and Jones, 2010; Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009). One recent study on European politics shows that citizens update their perceptions of parties to reflect their participation in governing coalitions (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu (2014) found that citizens' perceptions of party positions are responsive to positions measured in expert surveys, which they consider to reflect of the "global information environment" (968). In short, while there is evidence that citi-

zens are aware of some movements in party positions, there is no evidence that they are conscious of changes in positions in manifestos. It would thus be unlikely to find that positions measured using manifestos would be related to changes in citizens' opinions.

A final alternative method for measuring elite positions is the analysis of roll-call votes. These can provide frequent measures of party positions (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, 2007). However, such votes tend to be uninformative in parliamentary systems due to party discipline (Laver, 1999; Spirling and McLean, 2007).

Speeches are generally less influenced by party discipline. Thus, they likely are more informative about both party positions and the degree of party cohesion and hence the clarity of the information parties transmit to citizens, which, has been shown to condition the effectiveness of party cues (e.g. Ray, 2003). Recent work has found evidence for intra-party differences in positions expressed in speeches, reflecting the interests of legislators' constituents (Herzog and Benoit, 2015; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016). One of these studies showed that intra-party differences are greater in speeches than in roll-call votes (Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016). Nevertheless, Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2014) do find evidence of party constraint on legislators' speeches. However, such limitations on the ability of deputies to express themselves are relevant in my analyses since they imply that the signal sent to citizens about a party's position is clearer.

Another considerable advantage of scaling speeches over roll-call vote analysis is the existence of selection effects in the recording of votes (Carrubba et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008). Many votes are simply not recorded, which is problematic if the recorded votes are systematically different from those that are not recorded. Few votes are recorded in the legislatures I consider. Thus, speeches provide much more complete data on positions than roll-call votes can.

In recent years, major advances have been made in methods for estimating party positions using automated text analysis methods (notably Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). While these methods have been successfully used to estimate

party positions in party manifestos covering a short period of time, it is less clear how effective they are at estimating party positions in legislative speeches, particularly in debates on nationalism. Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) point to some of the difficulties involved in estimating party positions using speeches. They tend to be limited to a single issue and their political context is not as clear as that of manifestos. Furthermore, the type of language used in speeches may also be quite different from that used in manifestos. They are also much shorter than manifestos, increasing the uncertainty surrounding estimates of party positions (327). While Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) report success at estimating party positions on a government-opposition dimension in a confidence debate in Ireland (326-328), another early study attempting to measure party positions in the US Congress, produced puzzling results (Monroe and Maeda, 2004). Nevertheless, a number of recent articles (Herzog and Benoit, 2015; Lowe, 2013; Proksch and Slapin, 2010; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016) have produced valid measures of party positions in legislative debates.

Moreover, measuring positions using legislative speeches has many advantages. It is inexpensive, fast, and can produce frequent measures of party positions. In Spain, legislatures were created in the early 1980s in each of the four regions covered by my project, allowing me to measure the positions of parties at the regional level in addition to the national level. I thus opt for this approach.

The two major methods for measuring party positions using text are Wordscores and Wordfish (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). The key difference between them is that, while Wordscores is a supervised method, thus requiring reference documents with known positions to determine the political meaning of words, Wordfish is an unsupervised method, meaning, as we will see, that rather than using reference texts to ensure measured positions are those scholars are looking for, it requires the assumption that the political dimension of interest is the primary explanation for word use by political actors (3).

4.2   Assumptions Necessary to Measure Party Positions Using Wordfish

I address four major assumptions underlying Wordfish. First, since, unlike Wordscores, it does not use reference texts to define the political dimension, users must assume that the political dimension of interest is the first dimension underlying word use (Slapin and Proksch, 2008, 711). I ensure this by selecting debates on each of the dimensions of nationalism. Second, like Wordscores, it makes the naive Bayes or "bag of words" assumption, according to which words are counted on their own. In other words, information about political positions can be found by simply considering the frequency of individual words. I show that this assumption makes little difference when debates have a clear underlying dimension. Third, to compare party positions over time, applications of Wordfish have to assume that word meaning is stable (708). I show that this assumption is not reasonable when analyzing parliamentary speeches. Consequently, I focus on estimating relative positions in each debate. Finally, users of Wordfish typically assume that all documents are in the same language. Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) argue that analyzing texts in multiple languages is likely to produce a linguistic rather than a political dimension. I show that this is not a problem when the language used is associated with the position expressed, which is the case when analyzing nationalism.

4.2.1   Dominance of the Political Dimension in Debates

While Wordfish is unsupervised (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013), in that it does not rely on knowledge of some documents' positions (what Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) call reference documents), it can be used to estimate positions on a political dimension that is defined either *a priori* or *a posteriori.* In their initial article, Slapin and Proksch (2008) scale texts on a predetermined dimension by selecting documents, sections of party

manifestos, that deal with particular policy areas. For example, they place parties on an economic dimension by analyzing sections of manifestos that deal with the economy. In another article (Proksch and Slapin, 2010), they use Wordfish to place parties on a dimension defined *a posteriori*, meaning that they identify it after conducting their analysis. They run Wordfish on all speeches in the European Parliament during the 5th session. They then identify the dimension as a combination of views about both European integration and national interests about redistribution. Recent applications of Wordfish to legislative speeches (Lowe and Benoit, 2013; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016) adopt a similar approach to that used by Slapin and Proksch (2008). They estimate party positions in particular debates, the 2010 Irish Budget Debate (Lowe and Benoit, 2013) and a debate about nuclear energy that took place in Switzerland in 2002-2003 (Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016). By limiting their analyses to individual debates, they estimate positions on a dimension defined by each of those debates.

Neither approach to estimating positions is ideal for measuring party positions on regional nationalism. While using only speeches in one particular debate estimates positions that are specific to the issue they discuss, using all speeches produces positions that reflect some unknown dimension. The first approach has the advantage of nearly ensuring that the positions measured are on the particular debate. In order to measure nationalism, I use the former approach but repeat it for all debates that are related to each of the dimensions of regional nationalism. Positions on these dimensions should be measurable as some combination of the positions expressed in each of the debates. Since I have no *a priori* way of knowing which debates are most relevant, I simply present the results in graphs in the chapter appendix (and again in chapter 5) with a LOESS line representing a moving average of positions throughout the period of interest. I also calculate the means of positions expressed prior to each of the surveys I use.[1]

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[1]Note that I could also use factor analysis as Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) do, but since all debates in each category share the same underlying dimension and since the goal is simply to visualize positions over time, I opt for these simpler approaches.

Having identified the approach I will adopt to analyzing debates, I now explain the procedure I followed for obtaining and analyzing the debates. To begin, using Python scripts, I downloaded transcriptions of all speeches in the four regional legislatures since they were created in the early 1980s and of all speeches in the national legislature since it became democratic in 1977. Transcriptions prior to the mid 1990s are in scanned PDF files which are frequently of poor quality. Moreover, few relevant survey questions were asked before then, preventing me from observing whether citizens react to changes in party positions. I thus opted to select legislatures that are recorded in unscanned PDFs, with the exception of the fourth session in the Valencian Community, which was recorded in unusually good quality scanned PDFs. The legislatures covered by my analyses are thus the sixth to the ninth (1998-2012) in the Basque Country, the fifth to the tenth (1995-2015) in Catalonia, the fourth to the eighth (1993-2012) in Galicia, the fourth and the fifth (1995-2003) in the Valencian Community, and the sixth to the ninth (1996-2011) in the national parliament.

I then used Python code to organize all speeches by deputy and to remove all text that was not a transcription of what legislators said, like headers, footers, quotes, descriptions of what happens in the legislature, and the text of bills. I also omitted all words spoken by the speaker of the legislature and by other legislative officers, since these should be entirely procedural. Like Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003); Schwarz, Traber and Benoit (2016), I retained all words used by legislators, even if they are part of conventional lists of stop words. Monroe, Colaresi and Quinn (2008) show that such words may be relevant for certain debates. In debates on abortion, for example, they find that feminine pronouns like "she" tend to reflect pro-choice positions, since they signal an emphasis on the point of view of women (378). In nationalist debates, first person plural pronouns like "we" or "our" may be associated with nationalist positions because they refer to a particular group, which may be contrasted to another group. Like other studies measuring party positions using text (e.g. Herzog and Benoit, 2015; Slapin and Proksch, 2008), I did not

stem words. I then produced Wordfish estimates using the wordfish function in the austin package made by Will Lowe for R (Lowe, 2015).

For these analyses, I consider a debate a discussion that occurs among deputies from at least three parties on one or more days. At least three parties are necessary to recover positional information from text. I considered a set of dialogues between government and opposition members to constitute a debate as long as they were immediately contiguous and clearly on the same issue. I included all deputies who spoke in each debate, but I only retained positions of deputies from the major parties.[2] All positions presented below are relative to the mean of major party positions. In other words, I subtracted from estimated positions the mean position of the major parties. I did this to prevent a party from appearing more moderate when a more extreme party participated in debates.

One issue that arose was how to anchor scales. In unsupervised scaling methods, users have to specify at the very least that one actor should have a higher score on the latent variable than another actor. The general approach was to ensure that more legislators from nationalist parties were placed in more nationalist positions than those from anti-nationalist parties than would be the case if the scale were flipped. If there was a tie between the two orientations, I made sure the deputies at the extremes were from parties on the right side.[3]

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[2]I consider parties major if they were in the legislature for the entire period of time covered by these analyses. It would be impossible to assess the influence of other parties on opinions.

[3]In Catalonia, this meant ensuring that there were always more ERC deputies who were scored as more nationalist than PP representatives in the 5th to the 7th legislatures, and both PP and Ciutadans deputies, beginning in the 8th legislature, when the latter party first entered the regional parliament. In some of the debates in the 8th legislature, Ciutadans and the PP were on opposite sides of ERC. In those cases, the scale was oriented so that either the PP or Ciutadans is at the anti-nationalist extreme. In Galicia, since there are only three major parties and since the PP has often adopted pro-nationalist positions, I ensured that the nationalist party, BNG, is always in the upper half of the dimension. There was one debate in which BNG deputies were on opposite sides. I that case, I ensured the most nationalist deputy was from that party and the least nationalist was from the PP. In the Basque Country, I required that the PNV always be placed in a more nationalist position than the PP, except on the violence dimension, where the requirement was that an *Abertzale* party (except Aralar, which rejects violence) be placed in a more nationalist position than the PP. When no *Abertzale* party participated in a debate, I ensured that EA was scored as more nationalist than the PP. In the Valencian Community, I ensured that as many PSPV and EUPV deputies as possible were placed in more nationalist positions than Unió valenciana (UV) in debates in which it participated and the PP when UV was not present. When only three parties were present and

4.2.2   Bag of Words

A key assumption of Wordfish, like Wordscores and other automated text analysis pro-grams, is that information about the positions expressed in text documents can be entirely recovered from the frequency of words they contain. These programs thus assume that the order of words is not necessary to estimate positions. This assumption has been called 'bag of words' or naive Bayes. The current implementations of these methods have produced valid measures of party positions without ever testing this assumption (e.g. Laver, Benoit and Garry, 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). As Grimmer and Stewart (2013) argue, all quantitative models of text are wrong, but what matters is that they be useful (3). They argue that the 'bag of words' assumption is clearly wrong but it is useful because it works. However, while it seems to work in the cases of published papers, we currently do not know how often and when it works. In particular, we do not know if it works in the nationalist contexts and languages I work with here.

In this sub-section, I test the 'bag of words' assumption by comparing results produced making that assumption to results from a method that makes a very different assumption. I compare results from Wordfish to those produced using string kernel Principal Components Analysis (PCA), which focuses on very different features of texts. The latter approach was used by Spirling (2012) in his analysis of U.S. treaties with American Indians. Like Spirling (2012), I implemented string kernel PCA using the stringdot and kpca functions in the kernlab R package (Karatzoglou et al., 2004).[4] While Wordfish assumes all information about party positions is contained in words, irrespective of their order, string kernel PCA uses substrings (sets of character) as indicators and ignores words. This allows us to

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when a PP deputy was between deputies from EUPV and the PSPV, I ensured that the PP deputy was on the anti-nationalist side of the dimension. In the national Congress of Deputies, I ensured that there were always more deputies from nationalist parties who were place in more nationalist positions than PP legislators than if the scale were flipped. When there was a tie in the number of nationalist legislators on each side of the dimension, I gave more weight to Basque and Catalan nationalists than to more moderate Galician nationalists.

[4]Like Spirling (2012), I use substrings of five characters.

consider the ordering of words (Spirling, 2012, 88). Of course, neither approach is a correct model of legislative speech-making. However, if measures produced using these two very different methods are similar, we can be more confident that the assumptions about the relevant textual features does not matter. I present all results from each of the methods and identify the conditions under which the assumptions about textual features are least consequential. In other words, I assess the convergent validity (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) of my results and identify the conditions under which this form of validity is greatest.

I argue that using words or substrings makes no difference to the estimation of political positions, because these indicators of positions are only relevant in particular political debates. No meaning is lost by using either approach, because, when legislators discuss nationalism, those who are more nationalistic use certain words and sentence constructions more often than speakers who are less nationalistic. The latter use other other words and sentence constructions more often than the former. Consequently, it is possible to pick up the positions of interest by measuring the first dimension underlying either words or string kernels. We will see below that word meaning is variable over time and debates. Thus, the particular words used do not matter. All that matters is that certain words and other linguistic features are used more often by legislators with different levels of nationalism.

Figure 4.1 shows all positions that I have estimated in each of the parliaments using string kernel PCA on the vertical axis and Wordfish on the horizontal axis. I also included a LOESS curve for each type of issue. All positions were estimated within debates, within which they were normalized to have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. We can see that the general pattern is that there is a positive correlation between positions estimated with the two methods. However, positions estimated as being nationalistic by Wordfish in Catalonia tend to be estimated as less nationalistic by string kernel PCA. This may be because the expression of nationalist views requires the use of words that have clear nationalist meaning. Moreover, the relationship between Wordfish positions and string

kernel PCA positions is weaker in the Spanish Congress of Deputies. Finally, there is considerable heterogeneity in how close Wordfish positions are to those estimated using string kernels.

Figure 4.1: String Kernel PCA and Wordfish Positions

(a) Basque Country

(b) Catalonia

(c) Valencian Community

(d) Galicia

(e) Congress of Deputies

In this subsection, my key claim is that, when there is a clear single dimension under-

lying a particular debate, the nature of the textual features, whether words or subsets of strings, we scale does not matter. Unidimensionality is key unless we have good knowledge of the dimensionality in a debate. As Benoit and Laver (2012) show, if we do not know *a priori* the number or the nature of dimensions underlying a set of indicators, scaling methods tend to produce surprising results.

I analyze speeches within particular debates. However, it is less clear that these debates on individual issues contain party positions as clearly as the manifesto sections Slapin and Proksch (2008) use. While manifestos are explicit statements of party positions, speeches are not clear statements of positions. Moreover, legislators frequently go off topic. Thus, the position estimates should be most valid when we can be confident that a single dimension underlies word (or substring) usage.

While we have no way of determining if speakers focus on providing their views on a particular issue, we can determine the extent to which there is a clear first dimension underlying the language used in a particular debate. If one dimension explains much more of the variance in language in a particular debate on a given issue, it is not unreasonable to assume that actors' positions on that issue are prominent in that debate. The assessments of validity in the final section should further increase readers' confidence that the results of my analyses pick up positions on nationalism.

I assess the strength of the first dimension using eigenvalue ratios for both words and string kernels. Eigenvalues are measures of how much is explained by each dimension. Higher eigenvalues mean that a dimension explains more variance. The eigenvalue ratios I construct are the ratio of the first eigenvalue (first dimension) to the second eigenvalue (second dimension). The logic underlying the eigenvalue ratio is similar to that of the scree plot commonly used to infer dimensionality in scaling methods like factor analysis. A scree plot shows the eigenvalues for different numbers of dimensions. An analyst typically selects the number of dimensions corresponding to the number preceding where there is an elbow, that is where adding another dimension does not contribute much to explaining

variance in a set of indicators (Benoit and Laver, 2012, 205). The eigenvalue ratio tells us how much more variance is explained by the first dimension than the second dimension. Consequently, a high eigenvalue ratio is the equivalent of a scree plot with an elbow at two.

Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between the dominance of the first dimension and the correlation between results from the two scaling approaches in each of the legislatures. We can see that convergent validity generally depends on how unidimensional a debate is. If a debate has one dimension that clearly dominates all other, in other words, if the first eigenvalue is considerably larger than the second (and necessarily all other) eigenvalues, both Wordfish and the first dimension of string kernel PCA give results that are strongly correlated. I consider correlations strong if they are at least 0.5 (the threshold suggested by Cohen (1988)). The graphs in figure 4.2 include vertical dashed lines at eigenvalue ratios of 1.2. They also indicate the debates with the highest and lowest eigenvalue ratios with grey squares and triangles respectively. In the Basque Country, 90.1% of debates with eigenvalue ratios of 1.2 or above have strong correlations between Wordfish and string kernel positions. In Catalonia, 80.4% of debates with eigenvalue ratios of at least 1.2 have strong correlations between the two measures. In Galicia, the proportion is 78.9%. In Valencia, it is 81.5%. It is considerably lower in the Congress of Deputies (48.5%), perhaps suggesting problems with dimensionality there. Given the various regional nationalist movements that exist in Spain, nationalism is thus likely not as clearly a single dimension at the national level.

Figure 4.2: Relationship between Word Eigenvalue Ratios and Convergent Validity

(a) Basque Country

(b) Catalonia

(c) Valencian Community

(d) Galicia

(e) Congress of Deputies

This subsection has shown that results produced using either assumption about text

generation, that information is contained in words or that information is contained in substrings, are similar, especially when debates have a clearly dominant first dimension.

In order to ensure that the measures of party positions I present below do not depend on the method used, I only kept debates in which the correlation between positions estimated using Wordfish and those estimated using string kernel PCA is strong (at least 0.5). Doing so ensures that the results I focus on are not dependent on the key assumption underlying the text analysis method I use.

In order to better understand the implications of multidimensionality for scaling speeches, here, I discuss the debate with the highest eigenvalue ratio (clearest first dimension) and the debate with the lowest eigenvalue ratio (least unidimensional) in Catalonia. These debates are indicated with a grey square (highest eigenvalue ratio) and triangle (lowest eigenvalue ratio) in figure 4.2. The highest eigenvalue ratio was 3.6 and the lowest was 1.01. The interpretation of these ratios relates to how much more of the variance in word usage is explained by the first compared to the second dimension. We can assert that, in the first debate, the first dimension explains 3.6 times more of the variance in word usage than the second dimension, while, in the second debate, the first dimension only accounts for 1.01 times as much variance as the second dimension.

The most unidimensional debate in Catalonia was on a motion in favour of reinforcing the "plurilingual" character of the Spanish state. It took place on October 30, 2014. Positions in this debate estimated with both methods are presented in figure 4.3. The motion was introduced by deputy Xavier Sabaté i Ibarz of the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), who argued that the central government should take concrete measures to promote the use of regional languages, particularly Catalan. Among the actions mentioned are allowing the use of Catalan in the national parliament. He also devoted part of his intervention to criticizing the Spanish government, under the PP, for failing to promote regional languages and for trying to divide the Catalan language by promoting variants of Catalan such as Valencian as distinct languages (Parliament of Catalonia, 2014, 54-55).

Following his introduction of the motion, Marc Vidal i Pou of Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV) advocated increasing the use of regional languages by central government institutions and criticized the Spanish government for failing to live up to its constitutional obligations to promote Spain's languages. He added a number of amendments to the motion to strengthen its language, for example, by rejecting its mention of a single "Spanish culture", which he argued does not exist in Spain given its cultural diversity (55-56).

Following these speeches by members of these two left-wing parties, Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó and Teresa Vallverdú Albornà of nationalist parties Convergence and Union (CiU) and the Catalan Republican Left (ERC), respectively, supported the idea of promoting regional languages by the Spanish state. They also criticized the Spanish government for failing to promote regional languages and concluded that it is impossible to get Spanish support for regional languages and that the only solution is independence. In spite of their declaration of support for independence, they only stated those positions in passing and focused their interventions on the issue of plurilingualism, mostly agreeing with the positions of the PSC and ICV. Their focus on the language debate can be reconciled with their support for secession by the fact that they assert that, even if Catalonia becomes independent, it is important for the Spanish state to continue to promote its regional languages (56-58).

After these arguments in favour of measures to promote the plurilingual character of Spain, deputies María José Garcia Cuevas of the People's Party (PP) and Carlos Carrizosa Torres of Ciutadans argued that Spain already makes considerable effort to promote regional languages. They instead asserted that more should be done to recognize the bilingual character of their region, where, in their view, governments of both CiU and the PSC had failed to guarantee the rights of Spanish speakers. They point out that, while central government institutions in Catalonia use both languages, the regional government only uses Catalan (58-59).

Finally, David Fernàndez i Ramos of the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) supported the motion, while criticizing both the Catalan and Spanish socialists for not doing enough to promote regional languages when they governed Catalonia and Spain. He also declared his support for independence, but, like his counterparts from CiU and ERC, his intervention was mostly focused on language policy (59-60).

As we have seen, deputies from all parties focused their interventions on the issue of the promotion of regional languages instead of Spanish. Even separatist politicians, while declaring their support for that option, focused their speeches on the issue of language. Those who supported the motion argued in favour of doing more to promote regional languages, especially Catalan. Those who opposed it suggested that regional languages already receive strong support from the central government and that more should be done instead to safeguard the rights of Spanish speakers in Catalonia.

Figure 4.3 shows that both Wordfish and string kernel PCA clearly recover the nationalist positions defended by the PSC, CiU, ICV, and the CUP, on the one hand, and the anti-nationalist positions of C's and the PP, on the other. It is quite appropriate that the PSC deputy's position was estimated as most nationalist, since it is he who introduced the motion. The other left-wing legislator (from ICV) and the nationalist deputies (from CiU, CUP, and ERC) merely expressed support for his proposal and suggested some minor modifications to the motion.

Figure 4.3: Position Estimates in Plurilingualism Debate (String Kernel PCA vs Wordfish)

Table 4.1 shows the 10 most and least nationalist words in this debate (based on word coefficients as estimated using Wordfish). We can see that most nationalist words are all Catalan words, while the least nationalist words are all Spanish words. Some of the words at both extremes are merely functional words (*por*, *los*, *cap*). Others are more clearly related to the positions expressed. It is quite fitting that the Catalan name for Catalonia (*Catalunya*) is a strongly nationalistic word, while the Spanish name for Catalonia (*Cataluña*) is a strongly anti-nationalistic word. This reflects the fact that nationalists were expressing support for a greater place for the regional language in Catalonia, while anti-nationalists were voicing their preference for a Catalonia in which Spanish would have more prominence in public institutions. The same reasoning explains why *castellano* (the Spanish language) is one of the most anti-nationalist words. The next section considers whether the use of two languages in debates on nationalism is problematic for estimating positions.

Table 4.1: Most and and Least Nationalist Words in Debate on Plurilingualism

	in Catalan/Spanish	in English
10 Most Nationalist Words	grup	group
	possible	possible
	seva	its
	volem	we want
	suport	support
	sigui	is
	tots	all
	aquests	these
	cap	none
	catalunya	catalonia
10 Least Nationalist Words	por	for
	los	the
	porque	because
	ustedes	you
	pero	but
	castellano	Spanish (language)
	sin	without
	las	the (feminine)
	cataluña	catalonia
	solo	alone

Now let us look at the debate with the lowest eigenvalue ratio. The debate that is least clearly unidimensional was on the popular consultations on independence that were organized at the municipal level from 2009 to 2011 (see Muñoz and Guinjoan, 2013). The debate took place on March 10, 2011. Reading thorough the transcription, we can see why party positions do not clearly emerge from a unidimensional analysis. Deputies discussed a number of related but distinct issues: Catalan independence, Catalonia's right to self-determination, the municipal consultations on independence, recognizing Kosovo as an independent state, and whether other issues are more important.

The debate began with Uriel Bertran Arrué of Catalan Solidarity for Independence (SI) declaring his support for independence and introducing the four parts of the motion: a declaration of Catalonia's right to self-determination, a statement that the Catalan

Parliament is the seat of Catalan sovereignty, an acknowledgment of the work done by volunteers in the local consultations on Catalan independence, and an expression of support for future consultations on independence, particularly the one that was to be held in Barcelona. He then asserted that his party would present another motion to recognize the independence of Kosovo (Parliament of Catalonia, 2011, 18-19).

The next intervention was by Dolors Camats i Luis from ICV who declared her support for Catalan self-determination and her party's "respect" for the popular consultations in general. She, however, expressed some concern that the independence consultations were being used as a political tool to further some groups' interests. She also criticized the governing CiU for rejecting popular legislative initiatives on issues her party considers more important like genetically modified food (19-20).

Dolors Batalla i Nogués from CiU came next. She started off denying that the nationalist coalition was moving towards supporting independence. She then, nevertheless, declared her party's support for the popular consultations and for Catalonia's right to decide its future (20-21).

Albert Rivera Díaz of Ciutadans began his intervention declaring his opposition to following the example of the unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo. He then criticized other Catalan parties for not focusing on Catalonia's self-government within Spain, notably, by not adopting a regional electoral law. He then affirmed the right of Catalan legislators to support independence but declared that moving towards independence would require following the "rules of the game", notably that the Spanish population as a whole has the right to decide Catalonia's future (21-22).

Oriol Amorós i March of ERC then criticized Rivera for denying Catalonia's right to decide its future and suggested that his stance is undemocratic. He then stated his party's support for the motion but argued that it was quite conservative since his party had already presented numerous motions in favour of Catalonia's right to decide. He argued that he would be more enthusiastic about it if it had promised more resources to support

the popular consultations on independence (22-23).

The next speaker was María de Llanos de Luna Tobarra from the PP who began by arguing that a right to self-determination does not exist. She asserted that, rather than supporting such a right, her party believes in the right of businesses to use their language of choice on signs and in parents' right to send their children to school in their preferred language. She affirmed her party's commitment to the rule of law and thus rejected the local popular consultations for going against the established constitutional order. She then argued that there are much more important issues for Catalan politicians to deal with, especially unemployment (23-24).

The final speaker was Laia Bonet Rull of the PSC who rejected the popular independence consultations. Much of her speech centred on her party's opposition to independence. She asserted that Catalans have much more varied positions than the pro-independence stance advocated by Beltran. She did, however, assert that she supported Catalans' right to decide the future of the region. She qualified this right by arguing that it must respect the established rules, which do not allow Catalonia to unilaterally declare independence (24-25).

In sum, this debate does not have a clear unidimensional scaling solution, since representatives of each of the parties did not clearly express positions on a single issue. Figure 4.4 shows positions in this debate estimated using string kernel PCA and Wordfish. The string kernel estimates essentially distinguish the PP legislator from those of the other parties, maybe because that party asserted the greater importance of other issues or maybe simply that its representative was the only one who spoke Spanish (see subsection 2.4). It is not clear what the Wordfish positions represent. One possibility is that they reflect how clear parties' positions on independence were. The representatives of Ciutadans and the PSC explicitly stated their opposition, while SI clearly stated its support for independence. On the other hand, the CiU legislator denied that her party supported independence but failed to say it opposed it either. The PP speaker focused her intervention on rejecting

Catalonia's right to self-determination and on arguing that other issues are more important. Neither ERC nor ICV were clear about their positions with respect to independence. There may also be no reason to think their level of clarity about Independence was somewhere between that of the CiU and the PP, on the one hand, and C's, the PP and SI, on the other. Nevertheless, the point is that parties here do not express clear positions along a single issue dimension, which means that a unidimensional representation is not appropriate (as reflected in the low eigenvalue ratio and the fact that each scaling method seems to pick up a different dimension).

Figure 4.4: Position Estimates in Debate on Popular Consultations (String Kernel PCA vs Wordfish)

Since the positions that were expressed in debates like this one are not clear, the information citizens perceive about party positions is ambiguous. Citizens do not have access to clear cues about party positions, which might lead them to change their opinions or to change their party support. Therefore, it makes sense to exclude debates like this one. Since there is no single dominant dimension, each scaling method appears to pick

up a different dimension. In this debate, the correlation between the two measures is -0.54, which is a strong negative correlation. I thus, focus on debates in which the two methods produce similar results. As mentioned above, in subsequent analyses, I only include debates in which the correlation between string kernel and Wordfish estimates is at least 0.5. This is a level that is generally regarded as strong (Cohen, 1988). That way, I ensure that I retain debates with clear party cues that citizens can use.

4.2.3 Stability of Word Meaning

Scholars who use automated text analysis to estimate party positions have been reluctant to measure party positions over time, since word meaning may not be stable. Benoit and Laver (2007) assert that words have such changing meaning over time that they advise against using Wordscores to create time series of party positions. Slapin and Proksch (2008) are somewhat more sanguine about the possibility of estimating time series using Wordfish. They successfully estimate time series of German party positions and convincingly show their validity. Their use of Wordfish to create time series is limited to manifestos, however. Language use in manifestos may be more stable over time than that used in speeches, particularly within the clearly defined policy areas in which they measure party positions. As Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) suggest, the context of speeches is not so clear (327). Thus, the assumption of constant meaning over time is more questionable when it comes to speeches. We will see in this subsection that the meaning of words, even the meaning of a word that is generally considered important for nationalism, is unstable.

Table 4.2 shows the smallest standard deviation of a word coefficient estimated using Wordfish across debates in each parliament. Here, I consider only words that were used in at least one high-convergent validity debate on each dimension in each legislature. I standardized all slopes around the mean of the coefficients of these common words within each debate (to ensure coefficients are not affected by uncommon words). I then calculated

the standard deviation of the word coefficients in all debates in which each word is used. We can see that even the smallest standard deviation is usually quite large, suggesting that even the most stable word is actually quite variable over time. We can get an idea of the magnitude of these standard deviations by observing that the smallest standard deviation on the nation-building dimension in Catalonia (0.43) is larger than the distance between CiU and the PSC (0.41) in the plurilingualism debate considered above.

Note the exception of Valencia where standard deviations are small. This is likely due to the fact that my analyses cover a small number of debates (31) there over a relatively short period of time (1995-2003). Note also that, when I take average slopes (for every year or for every legislature), standard deviations decrease, but that is because they average out to 0. In other words, they become more stable but words lose their political meaning. This suggests that the positional information in words in legislative debates is specific to their use in a debate at a particular point in time.

Table 4.2: Smallest Standard Deviation of Word Coefficients

Legislature	Nation-Building	State-Building	Political Violence
Basque Country	0.20	0.14	0.17
Catalonia	0.43	0.25	NA
Galicia	0.31	0.30	NA
Valencia	0.08	0.00	NA
Congress of Deputies	0.18	0.23	NA

Figure 4.5 illustrates the problem of word instability. It shows the slope in all state-building debates in Catalonia of the word *independència* (independence), a word that ostensibly is an indicator of nationalism in that region. In the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the word had a strongly nationalist meaning but was rarely used in state-building debates. In the late 2000s, it began to be used much more, but it was associated with anti-nationalist positions at that time. It only became a nearly consistently

nationalist word after 2011. Its political meaning has still varied across debates since then though. A possible explanation for this pattern is that independence became increasingly discussed in the late 2000s, but, before it became a popular option, the word independence was more often used by opponents of that option to accuse nationalists of supporting an option that at the time was widely perceived as radical. By the 2010s, support for independence had surged, allowing supporters to openly use the word. This instability in word meaning shows that an apparently simple approach to text analysis involving counting words with ostensibly nationalist (or anti-nationalist) meaning would not produce the requisite measures of nationalist positions.

Figure 4.5: Word Coefficients: *independència*

Unfortunately, the variability of political language over time also makes it impossible to compare positions at different points in time. If we simply combined all debates into a single analysis, as Slapin and Proksch (2008) do with German manifestos, words would lose the political meaning they have in each individual debate. If we assume that word meaning is constant, measured changes may be due either to shifts in an actor's preferences or to changes in the meaning of words. If a member of a legislature uses a word more often one year than in the previous year, it may be because he or she has become more nationalistic

or simply that that word has become part of the lexicon used by legislators sharing the position that legislator had the previous year. It is thus impossible to automatically assess how much more or less nationalistic a speech one year is than a speech given another year, since a fixed reference point against which to measure changing positions is required to assess change (e.g. Bailey, 2007, 439).

Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate positions of legislators relative to each other in particular debates. If what matters is how legislators of each party are positioned relative to representatives of other parties, this information may be sufficient to consider how parties influence citizens' attitudes. For the goal of this chapter and the next, such relative information is sufficient. All position estimates are relative positions around the average of a set of parties that is constant over time. I can thus assess the impact relative changes in party positions have on citizens who support them and on people who oppose them.

4.2.4   Monolingualism of Debates

Language is generally seen as an extra dimension that may make unidimensional scaling methods, like Wordfish, inappropriate (see, for example, Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016). A recent article avoided the language issue in a bilingual parliament by excluding speeches in the minority language (Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2016, 18). Here, I consider whether language is also a problem when measuring positions on regional nationalism. It may not be, because the language used to discuss nationalism is generally associated with the position that is expressed.

The language of speeches became a potential problem for text analysis in Catalonia during the 8th legislature (2006-2010) when the anti-nationalist party Ciutadans entered the regional legislature. It frequently made anti-nationalist speeches in Spanish. Possibly spurred by the arrival of this new anti-nationalist party, the People's Party followed suit

and began regularly using Spanish in debates in the Catalan legislature in order to oppose nationalism. Both parties have also used Spanish in subsequent legislatures. They use Catalan as well, often to express similar positions.

The language used may be essential to the positions that are expressed. That is particularly the case with nationalism, which is strongly related to language. Previous work has identified a strong connection between the language used and the political positions expressed in Catalonia (Laitin and Gomez, 1992). Some positions are apparently better expressed in a particular language. Similarly, Proksch and Slapin (2010), in their analysis of speeches in the European Parliament in English, French, and German, found that speeches in German were less well measured when translated into the other two languages than in their original version (599).

If having speeches in more than one language is a problem for measuring positions by inducing multidimensionality, we should find that eigenvalue ratios, both of words and of substrings, are lower for debates in both languages. If language contributes to expressing positions on nationalism, on the other hand, we should find that the dimensionality is clearer the more Spanish is used. Table 4.3 shows mean word eigenvalue ratios and table 4.4 shows mean string kernel eigenvalue ratios in the 8th to 10th legislatures in the Catalan Parliament. It breaks them down by how present Spanish is. Language may be more of a problem if the use of Spanish is independent of the position expressed. This would be the case if either a representative of the PP or of Ciutadans used Spanish, while the other used Catalan, presumably both to express anti-nationalist positions. Language should be less problematic when it is clearly associated with nationalist positions, that is when both parties use Spanish. The tables also show eigenvalue ratios for speeches in Spanish translated into Catalan using Google Translate, so that all speeches are in the same language. If translation is a solution to the problem of multilingualism, we should find higher eigenvalue ratios in debates that have been translated so that all of them are in the same language.

Results all point in the same direction. The more Spanish is used (in addition to Catalan), the more a single dominant dimension is present either looking at word use or at substrings. Word eigenvalue ratios are on average slightly larger for debates with one Spanish speaker than for debates that are all in Catalan. The average word eigenvalue ratio is 1.28 larger for debates in which both parties used Spanish than in debates in which only one party used Spanish. For string kernels, the difference between the mean eigenvalue ratio for debates with one party that used Spanish and for debates in which neither party used Spanish is 0.32, while the difference in average eigenvalue ratios between debates in which both the PP and Ciutadans use Spanish and those in which only one uses Spanish is 0.19.[5] In no case does translation help. Eigenvalue ratios are always lower when Spanish speeches are translated into Catalan using Google Translate. Using more than one language in debates on nationalism thus appears to increase the dominance of the first dimension, suggesting that multilingualism is not a problem for measuring positions on nationalism.

Table 4.3: Word Eigenvalue Ratios and Language (Catalonia)

	Untranslated	Translated
All in Catalan	1.30	
One Party Used Spanish	1.38	1.17
Two Parties Used Spanish	2.66	1.49

Table 4.4: String Kernel Eigenvalue Ratios and Language (Catalonia)

	Untranslated	Translated
All in Catalan	1.30	
One Party Used Spanish	1.62	1.33
Two Parties Used Spanish	1.81	1.45

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[5]Note that I consider a party to have used Spanish if at least one of its legislators used Spanish for more than half their speech.

Table 4.5 shows mean correlations between Wordfish and string kernel PCA estimates in the three categories of debates. The convergent validity of estimates is greater in debates with more Spanish. Translating Spanish speeches seems to decrease convergent validity. These findings support the conclusion that having speeches in both Catalan and Spanish improves our ability to measure nationalism.

Table 4.5: Correlations between Wordfish and String Kernel Results and Language

	Untranslated	Translated
All in Catalan	0.41	
One Party Used Spanish	0.52	0.47
Two Parties Used Spanish	0.92	0.81

It is possible to conclude that these results merely reflect the limitations of automated translators like Google Translate. Fortunately, we have access to professional translations in the Basque Country, where two languages are also used in the regional legislature. Speeches there have always been given in both official languages of that region, Basque and Spanish. All speeches are professionally translated into the other language. I have run all analyses in the Basque Country on speeches in their original languages and on speeches in Basque (with Spanish speeches translated into Basque).

In the Basque Country, speeches have always been presented in their original language and in a translated version. This affords us the opportunity to assess the ability of Wordfish and string kernel PCA to validly estimate party positions in the two languages. As we have seen, Proksch and Slapin (2010) found that Wordfish was less effective at measuring positions that were expressed in German when they were translated into English or French. Table 4.6 shows word and string kernel eigenvalue ratios for debates in their original language and for translated debates. We can see the same pattern as in Catalonia. The first dimension underlying translated speeches is always less dominant than that in speeches in their original languages. Moreover, results are more dependent on the assumption about

the relevant linguistic features (words or string kernels) when using translated speeches.[6]

Table 4.6: Eigenvalue Ratios, Convergent Validity, and Language (Basque Country)

	Original	All in Basque
Word Eigenvalue Ratio	3.00	1.23
String kernel Eigenvalue Ratio	2.88	1.38
Correlation between SK and WF	0.71	0.46

Perhaps more important is evaluating how positions in translated speeches compare to those in untranslated speeches. Figures 4.6 shows all positions in debates in which Catalan and Spanish were used in the Catalan Parliament estimated using speeches in their original languages and those estimated from debates in which Spanish speeches were translated into the regional language. It separates debates into those in which either the PP or Ciutadans used Spanish and those in which both used that language. Overall, positions are similar whether measured in the original language or using translations. There are a few exceptions though. Some parliamentarians are estimated as being more or less nationalist using translated compared to untranslated speeches. What stands out is that we can clearly see why eigenvalue ratios are higher when both Ciutadans and the PP use Spanish in Catalonia: legislators are clearly separated with representatives of the two anti-nationalist parties on the one side and those from all the other parties on the other. The separation into two clusters is less clear when only one of the two uses Spanish. This suggests that positions are less clearly expressed when anti-nationalists do not all use Spanish.

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[6]Note that, in the Basque Parliament, there is no simple way to distinguish debates based on how much each language is used, since speeches there have always been in both languages.

Figure 4.6: Translated vs Original Language Speeches (Catalonia)

(a) One Party Translated

(b) Two Parties Translated

In Figure 4.7, which compares positions in debates that are all in Basque to positions estimated in debates in speeches' original languages in the Basque Country, we can see a similar correspondence between the two sets of estimates. There is considerable heterogeneity though, particularly on the anti-nationalist end of the scale. A clear pattern is that many deputies who were estimated as having anti-nationalist positions in the original language are estimated as being more nationalist using speeches that are all in the regional language.

Figure 4.7: Translated vs Original Language Speeches (Basque Country)

Perhaps the ultimate test is how often estimates produced using translated and untranslated speeches are ordered so that deputies from clearly nationalist parties are placed in more nationalist positions than those from anti-nationalist parties. Table 4.7 shows the proportion of debates in each category where the mean positions of legislators from the parties are correctly ordered. I consider correct orderings in Catalonia those in which the the average positions of parliamentarians from the nationalist Catalan Republican Left (ERC) and Convergence and Union (CiU) are estimated as being more nationalist than the anti-nationalist Ciutadans and the PP. We can see that the order is always correct when both Ciutadans and the PP use Spanish and speeches are analyzed in their original languages. The order is correct slightly less often (92.9%) when speeches are translated. It is also correct almost all the time when all speeches are in Catalan. The ordering is more problematic when parliamentarians from only one of the two parties use Spanish. Only about two out of five of these are correctly ordered when using speeches in their original languages. Three out of five are correctly ordered when speeches are translated so that all are in Catalan. In this category, parliamentarians from one of the two anti-nationalist

parties may use Catalan because they want to express a more moderate position. Thus, translation does not necessarily imply an improvement. Nevertheless, the conclusion that translation is not always useful still holds. Most of the time, debates in the two languages do not lead to incorrect estimates. More frequently incorrect estimates of positions result when language is not perfectly related to the position expressed, as is the case when only one of the two anti-nationalist parties use Spanish. However, the fact that the proportion of correct orderings is considerably lower in this category suggests that there may also be a large amount of ambivalence in the information about party positioning.

Table 4.7: Correct Ordering (Catalonia)

	Original	All in Catalan
All in Catalan	94.4%	
One Party Used Spanish	41.9%	58.1%
Two Parties Used Spanish	100%	92.9%

The conclusion that the use of more than one language is not always detrimental to text analysis is supported by table 4.8 which shows how often the nationalist Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in the Basque Country are estimated as having more nationalist positions than the PP in untranslated and translated speeches. We can see that the proportions are nearly identical, with untranslated debates having a slightly higher proportion of correctly ordered measures. Consequently, I can safely assert that bilingualism does not always prevent us from correctly estimating legislators' positions.

Table 4.8: Correct Ordering (Basque Country)

	Original	All in Basque
All in Catalan	64.8%	60.3%

Having observed that, in general, unidimensionality and convergent validity are higher when both Catalan and Spanish are used, we will now return to the debate on plurilingualism we explored above. We will now see that the strength of its first dimension appears to be partly due to the use of different languages by supporters and opponents of the motion.

Figure 4.8 compares party positions estimated using speeches that are all in Catalan on the vertical axis to positions estimated using all speeches in their original language on the horizontal axis. We can see that now positions more closely reflect the positions the deputies had with respect to the motion. The PP representative was opposed. The representative from Ciutadans supported the principle of plurilingualism but argued that the Catalan government, rather than the Spanish government, should do more to achieve that end by expanding the use of Spanish in Catalan institutions. The PSC legislator proposed the motion, which was supported by ICV. The representatives of CiU and the CUP also supported it, but they suggested that more should be done and they were more critical of past performance of the PSC and its Spanish counterpart, the PSOE, on policy towards regional languages. The largest shift is in the position of ERC, which goes from a positive position to a negative position. This change reflects the fact that its speech expressed support for the general idea of the motion, promoting regional languages, notably Catalan, but did not agree that doing so within the present context of the Spanish state is realistic (Parliament of Catalonia, 2014, 57-58). Both C's and ERC abstained in the vote on the motion. Thus, positions estimated using translated speeches appear to be more closely related to positions with respect to the motion than to nationalism.

Figure 4.8: Wordfish Estimates in Debate on Plurilingualism (Original vs Translated Speeches)

Table 4.9 shows the most and least nationalist words in the translated debate on plurilingualism. The most nationalist words are not clearly about the substantive debate. They generally seem to be about supporting the motion. Words like give (support) and yes score high. Collaboration and exterior are also strongly associated with nationalist positions which makes sense since the motion suggested collaborating with the rest of Spain to promote regional languages as well as projecting them outwards (Parliament of Catalonia, 2014, 55). Anti-nationalist words are similar to those in the debate in its original languages, although now all are Catalan words.

Table 4.9: Most and Least Nationalist Words in Debate on Plurilingualism (Translated)

	in Catalan	in English
10 Most Nationalist Words	després	after
	donar	give
	interpel·lació	interpellation
	parla	talks
	sí	yes
	bé	well
	col·laboració	collaboration
	exterior	exterior
	això	this
	moció	motion
10 Least Nationalist Words	perquè	because
	lingüística	linguistic
	seus	their
	castellà	spanish
	vostès	their
	només	only
	bilingües	bilingual
	parlen	speak
	mirin	look
	exemple	example

Translating speeches very modestly improved the convergent validity of estimates ($\rho = 0.982$ compared to $\rho = 0.985$). It actually decreased the eigenvalue ratios both of words (from 3.52 to 1.59) and of string kernels (from 1.99 to 1.49). Thus, translation has not significantly improved the convergent validity of estimates and it has actually reduced the clarity of dimensionality. What it seems to have done is make results more about procedural support or opposition towards a particular motion and less about nationalism in general.

It is not clear that estimated positions actually reflect parties' positions on nationalism. While the ERC did not support the plurilingualism motion, its representative did voice strong support for promoting regional languages, Catalan in particular (57-58). Thus, in terms of the nation-building dimension of nationalism, its position was not really midway

between that of parties supporting the motion and that of the PP. Moreover, the Ciutadans deputy was not any less critical of the motion than the PP was. He merely affirmed that it was the Catalan government, rather than the Spanish government, that had been failing to promote plurilingualism by not granting more of a place for the Spanish language within Catalonia (59). In this dissertation, I am interested in the cues parties offer to citizens. ERC and Ciutadans did abstain on this motion. However, they expressed very different positions and if citizens were in fact exposed to the positions that were expressed in these speeches, they would most likely retain the fact that ERC was supportive of regional languages while Ciutadans focused on increasing the institutional presence of Spanish. Because of these results and because of the more general results on the impact of language, I have decided to use position estimates from speeches in their original languages and not from translated speeches.

4.3   Validating Estimates of Party Positions Using Citizens' Perceptions

I present all the positions I have estimated here in the chapter appendix. I also present in more detail positions on the state-building dimension in the next chapter. In this section, I focus on validating the positions I have estimated using Wordfish.

In the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, as mentioned above, surveys by CIS have asked respondents to place parties on regional nationalism scales from 1 to 10. If my estimates of party positions based on automated text analysis of legislative speeches are valid, changes in these positions should be related to changes in survey respondents' perceptions. In particular, changes in mean perceptions should be associated with changes in mean party positions. I have thus regressed the changes in mean perceptions of party positions between consecutive surveys on changes in mean party positions, where I cal-

culated the mean of positions during the two-year period preceding each survey.[7] Mean positions are weighted, using measures of convergent validity (correlation between Wordfish and string kernel PCA results) as weights.[8] Note that, unlike the analyses in the next chapter, I did not lag changes in party positions in these models. I simply assess whether citizens' perceptions of parties' positions changed at the same time as changes in the party positions I estimated.

I distinguish nationalist (EA and PNV in the Basque Country, CiU and ERC in Catalonia, and BNG in Galicia) and statewide parties (IU, PP, PSOE, and their regional branches and affiliated parties). I also separate speeches by the dimension of nationalism they deal with, state-building, nation-building, and political violence in the Basque Country. I also consider how perceptions reflect positions in the national compared to the regional legislatures. Note that all models contain fixed effects for party. Results are similar without fixed effects.

Table 4.10 shows results from regressions of changes in perceptions of positions of nationalist parties on changes in mean positions in regional legislatures. We can see that perceptions are significantly and positively related (p=0.052) to positions measured on the state-building dimension. They are also positively, but not significantly associated with positions on the nation-building dimension.

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[7]Note that this two-year time period was chosen in order to avoid missing data, since debates on each dimension of nationalism did not always take place every year.

[8]As mentioned above, I only include debates with correlations of at least 0.5 between Wordfish and string kernel positions.

Table 4.10: Regression of Changes in Perceptions of Nationalist Parties on Changes in Party Positions in the Regional Legislature

	State-Building	Nation-Building
Intercept	0.05	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.15)
Position	0.40†	0.27
	(0.20)	(0.21)
N	24	24
R^2	0.25	0.16
adj. R^2	0.05	-0.07
Resid. sd	0.34	0.36

Standard errors in parentheses

Models include fixed effects for party

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table 4.11 shows results for statewide parties. Since statewide parties are more prominent at the national level than at the regional level, I also include models in which I regress changes in perceptions on changes in mean positions expressed in the national Congress of Deputies. We can see that shifts in perceptions of statewide parties' positions are weakly and not significantly related to changes in positions expressed in regional legislatures. They are much more strongly related to positions in the national legislature, especially on the nation-building dimension, where the coefficient on position is significant at the 0.05 level. Perceptions of statewide parties are also significantly related to positions on the state-building dimension (at the 0.1 level). In sum, while the positions of regional nationalist parties are strongly related to positions expressed on the state-building dimension in regional legislatures, positions of statewide parties are most strongly related to positions in the national parliament but the relationship is stronger on the nation-building dimension

than on the state-building dimension.

Table 4.11: Regression of Changes in Perceptions of Statewide Parties on Changes in Party Positions in Regional and National Legislatures

	State-Building	Nation-Building	State-Building	Nation-Building
Intercept	0.00	0.00	0.18	−0.02
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Position (Regional)	0.10	0.10		
	(0.11)	(0.11)		
Position (National)			0.27†	0.36*
			(0.14)	(0.15)
N	38	38	32	38
R^2	0.23	0.23	0.38	0.34
adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.16
Resid. sd	0.39	0.39	0.35	0.36

Standard errors in parentheses

Models include fixed effects for party

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

In the Basque Country, I also consider how perceptions of party positions relate to positions on the political violence dimension. Table 4.12 shows results from a regression of changes in perceptions in that region on shifts in party positions on that dimension. We can see that, while the positions of regional nationalist parties are not significantly associated with this dimension, those of statewide parties are positively and significantly (at the 0.1 level) related to it.

Table 4.12: Regression of Changes in Perceptions of Parties in the Basque Country on Changes in Party Positions on the Political Violence Dimension in the Regional Parliament

	Regional Nationalist	Statewide
Intercept	0.07	−0.17
	(0.26)	(0.19)
Position (Regional)	0.05	0.64†
	(0.28)	(0.29)
N	8	12
R^2	0.09	0.39
adj. R^2	−0.28	0.16
Resid. sd	0.53	0.33

Standard errors in parentheses

Models include fixed effects for party

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that regional nationalism at the party level can be measured using transcriptions of parliamentarians' speeches. I produced measures of parties' positions in four regional parliaments in Spain as well as in the national parliament by analyzing speeches in debates on the nation and state-building dimensions of nationalism and on the political violence dimension in the Basque Country using Wordfish. This approach has the tremendous advantage that it allows us to quickly obtain frequent measures of party positions over time.

I argued that we can measure party positions along dimensions like these nationalism dimensions using legislative speeches by selecting debates that deal with issues related

to them. Moreover, I showed that a major assumption underlying that method, that sufficient positional information is contained in words on their own, makes little difference as long as there is a clearly dominant dimension underlying debates. We also saw that there is little support for a key assumption necessary for time series analysis, that word meaning is stable over time. I, consequently, focus on measuring relative positions within individual debates. Moreover, we saw that having speeches in two languages does not reduce the dominance of the first dimension or the convergent validity of measures and it generally does not lead to position estimates that appear any less valid than those produced using speeches translated so that they are all in the same language. I ended this chapter by presenting party positions and showing that changes in my estimates of positions are associated with changes in citizens' perceptions. In short, it is possible to measure party positions on nationalism using legislative speeches and changes in estimates of these positions are perceived by citizens.

The positions I have estimated in this chapter are presented in the chapter appendix. We can see that changes in positions are usually distinct on the different dimensions. It is thus important to distinguish the dimensions. In the next chapter, I focus on the state-building dimension and consider whether changes in party positions on it are followed by changes in the public's state-building preferences.

I should point to a major limitation of this chapter. Debates on each dimension were selected by the author on the basis of the criteria outlined above. The point was to show that, by selecting particular debates that relate to a political dimension, we can produce valid estimates of positions on that dimension. Obviously, it would be better to use an automated method for selecting debates that is less reliant on human judgment. It may be possible to do so using a dictionary or a machine-learning approach. However, doing so necessarily must rely on an assumption about the stability in the topical meaning of words. Future work should explore such automation. For now, I argue that manual selection is useful, because it allows us to produce estimates of positions on the dimension of interest

without making an assumption about how words relate to topic. As we saw, my approach has produced valid measures of party positions, changes in which are perceived by citizens.

Chapter Appendix: Party Positions

These graphs all show LOESS curves that summarize all positions taken by parliamentarians from each major party at various points in time. They were all created using a span of 0.75, except those from the Valencian Community where a span of 0.9 was used to avoid over-fitting.

Figure A4.1: Positions of Main Parties in the Basque Country

(a) Nation-Building

(b) State-Building

(c) Political Violence

Figure A4.2: Positions of Main Parties in Catalonia

(a) Nation-Building

(b) State-Building

Figure A4.3: Positions of Main Parties in the Valencian Community

(a) Nation-Building

(b) State-Building

Figure A4.4: Positions of Main Parties in Galicia

(a) Nation-Building

(b) State-Building

Figure A4.5: Positions of Main Parties in the National Congress of Deputies

(a) Nation-Building

(b) State-Building

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
Chapter 5

When Parties Move Do Their Partisans (and Anti-Partisans) Follow?

Chapter 4 dealt with the issues involved in measuring party positions using the automated text analysis of legislative speeches on nationalism. We saw that, in the three regions where the necessary data are available, citizens change their perceptions of parties when the latter change their positions. The question I address in this chapter is whether citizens also respond to these changes in party positions by adapting their opinions to them. If citizens follow party cues in general, I should find that they adjust their opinions when parties they like and/or parties they dislike change their positions.

As we saw in chapter 2, there is a long line of research showing that citizens tend to adopt the positions of parties they like (e.g. Kam, 2005; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Lenz, 2012). This chapter considers the opinions of different groups of partisans using repeated cross-sectional surveys over time. Here, I test a major implication of arguments about party cue effects. If partisans follow parties' positions, we should find that, in the aggregate, when a party moves, its supporters change their opinions in the same direction

and its anti-partisans change theirs in the opposite direction. When people see that a party they like or a party they dislike changes its position, they may be induced to change their opinions due to the attitudes they have towards those parties. When people see that a party they neither like nor dislike changes its positions, they have no reason to adjust their opinions, because they have no attitudes towards it.

Some readers may be skeptical that the changes observed in this chapter actually reflect the influence of parties on opinions. They may prefer to call the movements I find here "sorting", whereby citizens come to adopt the political views of the elites of their preferred party, which encompasses both citizens adjusting their opinions to reflect their partisanship and changing their partisanship to match their opinions (Levendusky, 2009, 4). It is true that it is impossible to be entirely confident that these aggregate patterns reflect citizens taking on the opinions of elites. However, the aggregate patterns I show here are necessary implications of party cue effects.

Moreover, the fact that, in many cases, opinions move overall in a region following changes by one or more parties suggests that people change their opinions rather than their partisanship. Such overall changes cannot be due to citizens simply moving from one party to another. Furthermore, in many cases, party preferences are stable, which also suggests that people change their opinions rather than their attitudes towards parties.

In spite of its reliance on repeated cross-sections, I argue that the approach I adopt in this chapter has huge advantages. It allows us to observe the relationship over time between party positions and the opinions of citizens who feel close to each party as well as among those who feel distant from them. This allows me to show what happens in the real world. The next chapter using experimental evidence allows us to see how citizens respond to party cues in the context of short experiments in which they are forced to read party positions. As we will see there, however, many people already know the parties' positions and thus cannot be expected to be hugely influenced by cues in the context of an experiment. Such pre-treatment effects limit our ability to observe how people react to

party positions (e.g. Slothuus, 2015). As we saw in the last chapter, in general, citizens do perceive changes in party positions. Thus, it is important to consider how citizens respond to real-world movements in party positions as they occur. Moreover, while experiments are always at least somewhat artificial, observing real changes, as I do here, allows me, to be more confident that people actually do respond to party cues on nationalism.

I focus on the state-building dimension of nationalism, which, as discussed previously is about increasing the political power of a region, either by increasing its autonomy or by seeking independence. I consider whether citizens adjust their preferences for the organization of the state in response to changes in parties' positions on that dimension. In other words, I consider whether, when a party becomes more or less nationalist in speeches on regional autonomy, their partisans move their territorial preferences in the same direction and/or their anti-partisans move theirs in the opposite direction.

In chapter 2, I argued that citizens tend to follow party cues when parties adopt contrasting positions. In other words, when a party a citizen likes a lot has one position while a party they strongly dislike has the opposite position, they are more likely to adopt the position of their preferred party. In the aggregate, when a party moves in one direction, while a party which is disliked by many of the partisans of the first party moves in the other direction, we should find that partisans of the first party move in the same direction as it. As mentioned above in the previous chapter, however, given the variability in word meaning over time, it is impossible to compare party positions over time. I can thus only observe relative positions. If I measure that a party has moved into a more extreme position relative to other parties, it is impossible to know whether it has moved or whether another party (or other parties) have moved. However, we can assert that its position has become more distant from other parties in general. Conversely, if a party moves into a more moderate position, we have no way of knowing whether it has moderated or whether other parties have radicalized. However, we know that it has become closer to parties that are in the centre of the dimension. While I cannot know in this chapter which party people

are responding to, I can see whether opinion change appears to follow relative changes by liked parties or relative changes by disliked parties. In this chapter, I thus test my first two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 *When a party changes its position, people who feel close to it move in the same direction as it more than people who do not.*

Hypothesis 2 *When a party changes its position, people who feel distant from it move in the opposite direction from it more than people who do not.*

In sum, people who like a party should move in the same direction as that party, while people who dislike a party should move in the opposite direction. Moreover, the change should be limited to citizens who like or dislike a party or at least it should be larger in the category that is expected to move in a particular direction than among other citizens. When a party moves, its partisans and anti-partisans are exposed to a treatment, a movement by a party they like or dislike, other citizens are not exposed to that treatment. Consequently, they should not move as much as those who feel positively or negatively towards the party.[1]

5.1   Data and Methods

In this chapter, I use the measures of party positions I produced by applying Wordfish to legislative speeches, as explained in chapter 4. As we saw there, citizens update their perceptions of the parties' positions on the state-building dimension of nationalism to reflect changes in parties' positions. We saw that, while citizens' perceptions of regional parties are influenced by the positions they express in regional legislatures, their views of statewide parties depend on their positions in the national legislature.

Readers will also recall that these measures are relative measures, meaning that they tell us where each party is on the state-building dimension relative to other parties. Thus,

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[1]I thank André Blais for this insight.

irrespective of the validation I presented of those changes in those positions, they can be seen as changes in the distance between the language used by the different parties on the first dimension underlying word use. The relative nature of changes is a limitation to the analyses I present in this chapter, but it also facilitates the interpretation of my measures of positions. We can see when extreme parties moderate their positions and when moderate parties radicalize their positions relative to the other parties and then consider whether the different categories of partisans respond.

In order to assess the response by citizens to changes in party positions, I use the survey data I presented in chapter 3. For Catalonia, where the richest data are available, I use surveys from the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) from 1995 to 2002 and from the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO) from 2005 to 2013. I selected these sources because, in addition to having frequent surveys, they both include questions on territorial preferences, that is, people's preferred status of Catalonia with respect to Spain, and on people's party preferences. The territorial preferences question asked by the ICPS was: "With respect to Spain, you believe Catalonia should be: a region of Spain, an autonomous community of Spain, a state in a federal Spain, an independent state". The CEO asked a similar question. After a prior question about the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, it asked respondents: "In any case, how do you think this relationship should be? You believe that Catalonia should be". Respondents were then offered the same four options as the ICPS.

The ICPS question on party preferences was "Now, I will read you a list of parties. Can you tell me, for each of them, if you feel very close, somewhat close, neither close nor distant, somewhat distant, very distant". The CEO question was similar: "Do you feel very close, close, neither close nor distant, distant, very distant [to/from] each of the following parties". Unfortunately, neither source included both questions on territorial and party preferences in 2003 and 2004 and the CEO only started asking these questions

in 2005. The ICPS runs a survey every fall.[2] While the CEO conducts multiple studies every year, I selected the surveys they ran in the fall in order to create time series that were as close as possible to regular annual series. I combined the two close ("Very close" and "Close") and distant ("Very distant" and "Distant") categories and calculated the proportion who preferred independence among people who felt close to and among those who felt distant from each party.

In this chapter, in the interests of linguistic variety and simplicity, I use the words partisans, supporters, and identifiers, along with related words, to refer to people who feel close to a party. I also refer to them as people who like a party. I call people who feel distant from a party anti-partisans or people who dislike, reject or oppose a party.

In the Basque Country, Galicia, and the Valencian Community, fewer data points are available. For those regions, I use surveys from the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), which are less frequent than those in Catalonia. The territorial preferences question asked by the CIS for most of the period covered by my analysis was: "I am now going to present to you some alternative forms of territorial organization in Spain. Tell me, please, with which of these you agree the most". The options are a centralized state with no autonomous regional governments, a state with autonomous communities like in the present, a state in which the autonomous communities have more autonomy than in the present, and a state that recognizes the possibility that autonomous communities can become independent states. Some CIS surveys in recent years have asked the same question but with an added option: autonomous communities with less power. Responses to this question are substantially different, with considerably fewer responses in all other categories. I thus only consider changes between surveys asking the question in its original format. I focus on changes in support for what would be considered a nationalist option in each region.

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[2]They stopped asking the question about party preferences in 2003. Thus, I switched to CEO data when it became available.

In the Basque Country, I focus on support for self-determination (the possibility of regions becoming independent). In Galicia and in the Valencian Community, given the weakness of the self-determination option in these regions where nationalism has less support than in the Basque Country and Catalonia, I consider support for increased regional autonomy or self-determination. The CIS studies also included the party preferences questions. The wording was nearly identical to that asked by the ICPS.[3]

Given the relatively large number of data points in Catalonia, I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models regressing changes in opinions on changes in party positions there to assess the extent to which citizens follow movements in the positions of parties. I calculated the weighted mean of party positions on the state-building dimension for the year preceding each survey. Weights, as explained in chapter 4, are correlations between Wordfish measures and string kernel PCA measures of positions. I regress changes in preferences between two surveys on changes in party positions between the year preceding the first survey and the year before that. When there were no debates on the state-building dimension in a particular year, I simply used the average positions from the previous year on the assumption that they were the best available information citizens' had about the parties' positions.

Since data are less frequent in the Basque Country, Galicia, and the Valencian Community, in those regions, I identify visible changes in party positions and then consider whether there was a change in subsequent surveys in the territorial preferences of partisans and/or anti-partisans that is greater than that among people who did not share these attitudes. Like the approach I follow in Catalonia, this approach allows me to observe reactions in public opinion to prior changes in party positions. Most theories in the social

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[3]Note that it was not clear whether the party preference questions asked about feelings towards parties at the national level or at the regional level. While this is not a problem for regional parties, it makes it difficult to know whether respondents were thinking about statewide parties nationally or their regional branches, which frequently adopt a regional name in addition to the national name and, in the case of the ICV and the PSC in Catalonia, are independent parties that are affiliated with the national party. In this chapter, I ignore the distinction and simply assume that respondents were thinking of both levels when they answered the party preference questions.

sciences do not specify the lag at which changes occur (De Boef and Keele, 2008, 186). The party cue literature is no exception, I thus remain agnostic about the timing of reactions and consider changes at various lags. However, as a practical matter, I believe that readers would agree that if a change in opinions begins more than one year after a change in party positions ends it cannot be caused by that change.[4] I assessed reactions to changes in party positions by stacking survey data sets from two or more years following a change by parties and then running logistic regressions to compare the change among partisans and/or anti-partisans of each party to everyone else. Normally, however, I was limited by the timing of surveys and thus I am unlikely to have used the ideal lag of change in party positions.

For both types of analyses, in order to conclude that parties are influencing partisan groups, three conditions must be met. First, a change in a party's position in a prior period must be associated with a significant subsequent change in opinions in the same direction among people who feel close to that party and/or a shift in the opposite direction among people who feel distant from it. Second, these changes must be greater than those among people who do not feel close to or distant from the party. Third, overall support for the nationalist option must have changed in the same direction as the party. Alternatively, party preferences should not have significantly changed.

Stable party preferences and overall opinion change are conditions that individually are strongly suggestive of party influence. In some cases, parties may influence their partisans and/or their anti-partisans and party preference may also change. Similarly, a party may not influence overall opinions if it pulls one group in one direction and another in the other direction. Reactions to other party's position changes may also cancel out opinion changes that are due to a particular party. Thus, stable party preferences and aggregate changes are both sufficient conditions to suggest party influence has occurred.

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[4]Note that for the OLS models in Catalonia, I had to select a uniform lag for the models. I selected one in order to avoid losing data points.

In some cases, it may, however, be impossible to demonstrate either condition in spite of the existence of party influence. In this chapter, I simply aim to show that, much of the time, public opinion moves in ways that are consistent with party influence. There may be other situations in which parties do exert influence but this party influence is difficult to observe.

The rest of this chapter is organized by region. For each region, I first present the party positions I measured in the last chapter and discuss the changes that have occurred in them. I then consider whether there is evidence to conclude that opinions moved in ways that are consistent with party influence.

5.2 Analyses

5.2.1 Catalonia

Figure 5.1 shows LOESS lines summarizing the positions on the state-building dimension of the five major parties in the Catalan legislature. We can see that Catalan Republican Left (ERC), which, as we saw in chapter 3, has supported Catalan independence since 1989, clearly had the most nationalist position in the late 1990s. It then became less nationalist for most of the 2000s. Its nationalism only began to pick up in the late 2000s, when it moved back to its previous position as the most nationalist party. Note that, between 2003 and 2010, it was part of tripartite coalition governments with the less nationalist Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV) and the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC). It appears to have moderated its positions prior to entering that coalition and to have radicalized its positions towards the end of its time in government. The two left-wing parties with which ERC governed between 2003 and 2010 made movements that largely mirrored its shifts. While ERC moderated its nationalism prior to and during the early years of the tripartite government, its coalition partners ICV and the PSC moved up the

state-building dimension at this time. However, ICV and the PSC then diverged. ICV continued its nationalist ascent until the late 2000s, while the PSC slowly moved away from nationalism, perhaps in response to the creation of the anti-nationalist Ciutadans (C's) in 2005-2006, with which it likely competed for the votes of Catalans who were less committed to nationalism.

Figure 5.1: Positions of the Major Parties in the Parliament of Catalonia on the State-Building Dimension

The average position of the centre-right nationalist coalition Convergence and Union (CiU) on this dimension dropped from a high in the late 1990s to a trough in the mid to late 2000s. It then became increasingly nationalist. However, the biggest move on the state-building dimension in Catalonia was made by the PP. It became increasingly favourable towards nationalism up to the late 2000s. There are two explanations for the moderation of both CiU and the PP at this time. On April 28th, 1996, the leader of the national People's Party (PP), José María Aznar, and the CiU premier of Catalonia, Jordi

Pujol, signed an agreement at the Majestic Hotel in Barcelona in which CiU agreed to support a PP government, which lacked a majority in the national Congress of Deputies. In exchange for increased decentralization, CiU, along with Basque and Canary nationalists, ended up voting to make Aznar prime minister of Spain in May 1996 (For more about the agreement, see Field, 2016, 103-111). A follow-up to this partnership occurred in 1999, when CiU lacked a majority in Catalonia and got support from the PP so that Pujol could form another regional government. Following the 1996 agreement, anti-nationalist Aleix Vidal-Quadras resigned as leader of the PP in Catalonia to be replaced by the more moderate Alberto Fernández Díaz. Furthermore, in 2003, Josep Piqué became leader of the Catalan PP and took it on a "Catalanist turn", seeking to appeal to moderate nationalists (For a history of the PP in Catalonia, see Culla, 2009).

Around the time of Piqué's departure in the summer of 2007, the PP dropped to extreme anti-nationalist positions. Another likely reason for the increased anti-nationalism of the PP is that Ciutadans, which voiced strong positions against nationalism, entered the legislature in 2006, possibly forcing the PP to compete for more anti-nationalist votes.

Did changes in these positions influence Catalans' territorial preferences? Table 5.1 shows opinion change models for Catalan nationalist parties in which I regress (using OLS), changes in the proportions of the different partisan categories who support independence between each year and the previous year on the difference between the average position of each party on the state-building dimension in the regional parliament during the year prior to the first survey and the year before that. Thus, as in all analyses in this chapter, all changes in party positions occur prior to changes in citizens' opinions. Note that there is one exception in my calculation of differences from one year to the next. As mentioned above, there is a gap in the data on partisanship and territorial preferences in 2003 and 2004. In the results I present, I simply pretend that these two years did not happen. In other words, I calculated the difference between people's preferences in 2005 and those in 2002. For party positions, I took the difference between the average position in the year

leading up to each of those surveys. As explained below, results are robust to different ways of dealing with this issue.

Model 1 considers the relationship between changes in the proportions of partisans supporting independence and prior changes in the positions of the nationalist parties (CiU and ERC) in the Parliament of Catalonia. Model 2 focuses on how people who feel distant from each of these parties react to changes in their positions. Model 3 analyzes the relationship between changes in support for independence among people who feel neither close to nor distant from each nationalist party. Model 4 shows how aggregate preferences react to changes in party positions. All models include fixed effects for party. I also ran models without fixed effects and the results are nearly identical.

Table 5.1: Models of Opinion Change in Catalonia in Response to Movements by Nationalist Parties in the Regional Parliament

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Close	Distant	Neutral	Aggregate
Intercept	0.03	$0.02^\dagger$	0.04^*	0.02^*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Position	0.11^*	0.04^*	-0.02	0.08^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
ERC	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	28	28	28	28
R^2	0.21	0.19	0.02	0.30
adj. R^2	0.14	0.13	-0.06	0.24
Resid. sd	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.04

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Consistent with hypothesis 1, we can see that the positions of the two major nationalist

parties in Catalonia are positively and significantly related to their supporters' preferences for independence. As expected, they are unrelated to the preferences of Catalans who feel neither close to nor distant from the these parties. Prior changes in the two nationalist parties' positions are also significantly related to later changes in aggregate opinions, showing that Catalans changed their opinions following changes in party positions and did not simply change their partisanship. We can gain a good idea of the magnitude of the relationship between changes in party positions and changes in mass opinions by looking at figure 5.1. One point on the party position scale corresponds roughly to the difference between the centre of the dimension and the most extreme LOESS average party position. Thus, the results in table 5.1 show that, when a nationalist party moves from the centre of the state-building dimension to an extreme position, its partisans become 11 percentage points more supportive of Catalan independence. In the aggregate, Catalans become 8 percentage points more supportive of independence in such circumstances.

Unexpectedly, however, nationalist parties' positions are positively related to the opinions of people who feel distant from them, suggesting that hypothesis 2 is incorrect. How can we account for this anomaly? The correlation over time between the positions of CiU and ERC is 0.42. Moreover, a quick look at the relationship between preferences for the two Catalan nationalist parties in the survey the CEO conducted in May 2013 suggests a possible explanation for the surprising finding that people who feel distant from the nationalist parties also follow them. While there is some overlap between feelings towards the two nationalist parties, a third of Catalans who felt distant from CiU were close to ERC, while a quarter of those who felt distant from ERC were close to CiU. Thus, people who feel distant from each nationalist party may follow the other, which tends to move with it. Thus, Catalan nationalism may benefit from the existence of two distinct nationalist parties, one on the left and one on the right, that appeal to electorates that are somewhat different. In contrast to those of nationalist parties, none of the positions of statewide parties in the Catalan Parliament have any significant influence on the preferences of any

of the partisan groups (see table A5.1 in the chapter appendix).[5]

In sum, I have found support for hypotheses 1 for nationalist parties in Catalonia. When these parties change their positions on the state-building dimension in the Catalan Parliament, their partisans move in the same direction. Aggregate public opinion also moves, while Catalans with neither positive nor negative attitudes towards those parties do not change their opinions. There is no support for hypothesis 2, however. Anti-partisans of the two nationalist parties actually move in the same direction as those parties in the regional parliament, although the change is smaller than it is among partisans.

In spite of the lack of findings on the influence of parties people dislike, these parties may still influence opinions. This chapter is limited by the fact that the positions I measured are relative positions. It may be the positions of the nationalist parties relative to those of statewide parties that matter. Thus, statewide parties may play a key role in shaping the preferences of people who dislike them. The next chapter seeks to assess the importance of disliked parties for party influence.

Did Catalans react to changes by statewide parties in the national Congress of Deputies? Given that the statewide parties mainly act at the national level and that I found in chapter 4 that people update their perceptions of national parties in response to changes in the national parliament, they may influence Catalans' opinions.

Figure 5.2 shows positions of statewide parties in the national Congress of Deputies on the state-building dimension over time. Positions were estimated including all parties that participated in each debate. However, the positions are relative to those of deputies from the three major statewide parties, United Left (IU), the PP, and the PSOE. In other words, I subtracted the mean position of deputies from these parties from each deputy's estimated position and only included legislators from these three parties. This was done in order to ensure that positions are not affected by parties entering or leaving the legislature

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[5]Note that I consider ICV, the PSC, and the PP statewide parties in spite of the independence of the first two from the national organizations. I do so because they are associated with national parties. They are thus clearly different from nationalist parties like CiU and ERC.

or only participating in certain debates. I present these positions here and assess reactions to them in Catalonia and in other regions below.

Figure 5.2: Positions of Statewide Parties in the Congress of Deputies on the State-Building Dimension

We can see that the left-wing IU and PSOE have generally been more pro-nationalist than the PP. However, the PP had moderate positions at the beginning of the period for which I have data, which followed the Majestic Pact its leader José María Aznar signed with the Catalan premier, Jordi Pujol. The PP then moved to its most anti-nationalist positions when the PP won a majority government in 2000 and Aznar could govern without the support of regional nationalists. We can also see that both IU and the PSOE became more pro-nationalist in the late 1990s. IU then reduced its support for nationalism beginning in the early 2000s. The PSOE reached a peak in its support for nationalism in 2005, when the socialist government of Zapatero was negotiating a new statute of autonomy for Catalonia. After this period, the PSOE's positions on the state-

building dimension got closer to those of the PP after Mariano Rajoy took over as leader of the PP. As with statewide parties in the regional parliament, there is no evidence that changes in their positions in the national legislature influenced support for secession (see Table A5.2 in the chapter appendix).

As mentioned above, there is a gap in the survey data on support for independence in 2003 and 2004. There is also a complication resulting from the fact that I had to change the source of the survey data between 2002 and 2005, from the ICPS to the CEO. I am confident that results are not influenced by these issues for two reasons. First, I ran models in which I interpolated the data points from 2003 and 2004 and the results are very similar.[6] Second, I ran models omitting the ICPS data. Even though these analyses are based on only eight time points, the coefficients representing the effect of regional party positions on their partisans and on aggregate opinions are still positive and significant.[7]

Given the interest in the surge in support for Catalan independence in recent years (e.g. Muñoz and Tormos, 2015), I now focus on the relationship between changes in party positions and support for secession since the late 2000s. In the year between October 2006 and September 2007, the average position of CiU on the state-building dimension was -0.52. Its average position between October 2007 and October 2008 was -0.12.[8] ERC's position went from 0.21 to 0.42 at the same time. Meanwhile, the PP went from -0.30 to -1.41. Thus, while the two major nationalist parties both became more nationalist, the PP became less nationalist. Looking back at figure 5.1, we can see that these three parties continued to move in these directions in the following years. The only exception is CiU which moderated its nationalism somewhat in 2012 when one of its constituent parties, Democratic Union of Catalonia, voiced its opposition to independence. ICV moved from an average of 0.62 to an average of 0.26, although it had become considerably more nationalist

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[6]I interpolated missing values using the na.approx function in the zoo R package. I used the default linear interpolation.

[7]At the 0.05 level for overall opinions and at the 0.1 level for people who are close to a party. Results not shown.

[8]Note that I selected these dates because they correspond to the years preceding surveys.

over the preceding two years. The Catalan Socialists became more nationalist (from -0.03 to 0.86). Like ICV, however, there was no clear trend in its position. I thus expect that, in the subsequent years, CiU and ERC partisans became more supportive of independence. Catalans who felt distant from the PP should also have increased their support for that option.

Table 5.2 shows models of the reactions of various partisan categories over the four years following these changes in party positions. I stacked the surveys conducted in the fall of 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The 2008 survey immediately followed the change. The others allow us to observe change between each of the following years and this baseline year. I then ran logistic regression models of a binary variable indicating whether a respondent supported independence on a dummy variable for the year in which they were interviewed and a dummy variable distinguishing the partisan group that should react to the party (either positively or negatively) from those that should not move. The partisan group dummies were coded 1 for the category that should not respond to the party position changes and 0 for those that should react. I also included interaction terms between the year dummies and these partisan category dummies. For the CiU and ERC models, I coded people who did not feel close to one of the party in question 1 and I coded those who felt close to each of them 0. For the PP, I coded those who did not feel distant from that party 1 and those who felt distant from it 0. This coding allows us to observe the change in support for independence in the group that should react by looking at the coefficients on the year dummies. These tell us whether partisans of CiU and ERC, on the one hand, and anti-partisans of the PP, on the other, became more supportive of secession in 2009, 2010 or 2011 compared to 2008.

We can see that a year after the initial change happened (2009), supporters of ERC had become more supportive of independence (p<0.1). Furthermore, those who felt distant from the PP became significantly more favourable towards that option. By 2010, supporters of both CiU and ERC as well as anti-partisans of the PP were more supportive

of independence than in 2008. The overall increase was also significant beginning in 2009, suggesting that opinion change and not party preference change occurred at this time. As we saw in the results above, the effect was not limited to people who were in the partisanship categories that should have reacted. The coefficients on the interaction terms between the year dummies and the "Not close/distant" dummies should be significantly negative, indicating that the change in the relevant partisan groups was significantly greater than it was among other Catalans. However, none of them are significant. This is likely due to the fact that both the left-wing and right-wing nationalist parties moved in the same direction, thus pushing partisans of each in the same direction.

Table 5.2: Reactions to Increased Nationalism by ERC and CiU and Increased
Anti-Nationalism by the PP in Catalonia Between 2006 and 2008

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	CiU	ERC	PP (Distant)	Aggregate
Intercept	-1.27^{***}	-0.46^{***}	-1.13^{***}	-1.26^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
2009	0.18	$0.22^{\dagger}$	0.22^{**}	0.20^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)
2010	0.33^{**}	0.44^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.27^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)
2011	0.63^{***}	0.68^{***}	0.54^{***}	0.51^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Not close/distant	0.04	-1.37^{***}	-1.47^{***}	
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.27)	
Not close/distant*2009	0.04	0.10	0.20	
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.34)	
Not close/distant*2010	-0.12	-0.17	-0.17	
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.36)	
Not close/distant*2011	$-0.27^{\dagger}$	-0.23	-0.03	
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.33)	
N	7872	7861	7896	8068
AIC	9186.89	8422.61	8963.39	9382.06
BIC	9409.97	8645.64	9186.57	9494.00
$\log L$	-4561.45	-4179.31	-4449.70	-4675.03

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

These results show that, following movements in the nationalist direction by CiU and

ERC and in the anti-nationalist direction by the PP, partisans reacted in a way that is consistent with party following. Changes were considerable. Between 2008 and 2010, support for independence went from 19.7 % to 28.0% among CiU partisans and from 33.3% to 49.6% among ERC supporters. Support for separation increased from 20.2% to 29.5% among Catalans who disliked the PP. Overall, support for secession went from 20.2% to 29.5%. In the following years, this surge would continue. These movements in public opinion suggest that party influence may be one reason why support for independence surged in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

For the other three regions, as mentioned above, given data limitations, it is impossible to conduct over-time analyses like those I presented for Catalonia. However, I do present analyses for the other regions similar to this last analysis. In the other regions, I systematically consider all parties and all time periods when following can be assessed.

5.2.2   The Basque Country

Figure 5.3 shows LOESS lines representing the positions of the five main parties in the Basque Parliament over time. These are the nationalist Basque Solidarity (EA, Eusko Alkartasuna) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco) as well as the statewide People's Party (PP), the Basque Socialist Party (PSE, Partido Socialista de Euskadi), the regional branch of the PSOE, and the United Left-Greens (EB-B, Ezker Batua-Berdeak), the regional branch of IU.[9] I do not include the *Abertzale* left parties in my analyses, because they have had an irregular presence in the Basque and national parliaments and have changed names several times, making it difficult to analyze the relationship between the positions they expressed in the legislature and changes in public opinion.

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[9]Note that, in March 2012, The Plural Left (Ezker Anitza) became the Basque federation of the statewide IU.

Figure 5.3: Positions on the State-Building Dimension in the Basque Parliament

EA was the most nationalist party in the late 1990s, following its participation in the Lizarra Pact. It then became considerably less nationalist in the early 2000s when that agreement broke apart and after it joined a coalition government with the more moderate PNV and the previously anti-nationalist regional branch of the statewide United Left (EB-B). Overall, its state-building positions tracked those of the PNV, with which it formed electoral coalitions in 2001 and 2005. Following this period of collaboration with the PNV, it moved closer to the radical *Abertzale* sectors and, in the 2012 Basque election, ran as part of the Euskal Herria Bildu radical separatist coalition. Its deputies expressed increasingly nationalist positions at this time, while it competed with the PNV and EB-B for the most nationalist position among non-*Abertzale* parties.

The PNV's nationalism declined throughout most of the period covered by my analysis. Its position on the state-building scale dropped following the failure of the Lizarra Pact, except for a bump in 2004 when the Ibarretxe Plan was approved in the Basque Parliament.

It hit a floor near the centre of the state-building dimension in 2008. It then increased its level of nationalism again and, in the early 2010s, competed with EA and EB-B for the position of most nationalist party.

In the late 1990s, Ezker Batua-Berdeak (EB-B) had positions close to the anti-nationalist PP and the PSE. At the time, even though EB-B had signed the Lizarra Pact with nationalist parties, including the radical Herri Batasuna (HB), there was considerable opposition to the party's support for the pact within the party.[10] However, following the 2001 regional election, EB-B entered the regional government in coalition with nationalist parties EA and the PNV. This coalition was repeated in 2005. As we can see, at this time, the party's positions became increasingly nationalist, and, by 2008, it had become more nationalist than both EA and the PNV. It did momentarily moderate its nationalism in 2011 when one sector of EB-B decided to run in the national election under the Spanish name of the statewide party.[11]

Both the Basque Socialist Party (PSE) and the People's Party (PP) remained at the low end of the state-building scale throughout this period. The PP progressively became more anti-nationalist, however. The only exception was a slight moderation in its opposition to nationalism in 2008, although this may simply be due to movement in the anti-nationalist direction by the Socialists, who clearly opposed the PNV's plans to hold a referendum on self-determination. The PP clearly moved in an anti-nationalist direction in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the regional parliament, perhaps in reaction to the Lizarra agreement, but also likely because Aznar led the national party. The Basque Socialist Party (PSE) moderated its anti-nationalist positions between the late 1990s and 2002. It then shifted in an anti-nationalist direction between 2002 and 2008. Between then and the early 2010s,

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[10] *El País*. 1999. "La Asamblea de IU vasca respalda por la mínima la gestión de Madrazo." December 19. `http://elpais.com/diario/1999/12/19/espana/945558006_850215.html` (accessed August 12, 2016).

[11] *El Mundo*. 2011. "IU concurrirá en Euskadi el 20-N como 'Izquierda Unida Los verdes: Ezker Anitza.'" October 13. `http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/13/paisvasco/1318520155.html` (accessed August 12, 2016).

however, it moderated its anti-nationalism.

How did people react to these changes? The CIS asked the necessary questions to assess following in 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009.[12] I, unfortunately, cannot assess responses to the first set of changes, the decrease in nationalism by EA and the PNV, the increased nationalism of EB-B and the PSE, and the increased opposition to nationalism by the PP. The large gap between the 2002 and 2005 surveys included movements by EA, the PNV, and the PSE in the opposite direction. Thus, it is not clear how their partisans and anti-partisans should change their preferences at this time.

I can, however, assess reactions to the overall changes that occurred during the first half of the 2000s. Between 1999 and the year prior to the February 2005 survey, the PNV's position on the state-building dimension dropped from 1.04 to 0.94, EA moved from 1.24 to 0.17, Meanwhile, IU increased its level of nationalism from -0.56 to -0.28 and the PSE went from -1.14 to -0.63. The PP became more anti-nationalist, moving from -0.48 to -1.03.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows the results of logistic regression models in which the dependent variable is a binary variable coded 1 if a person supported the possibility of regions becoming independent states (self-determination) and 0 otherwise. I stacked the February 2005 and January 2009 surveys. I regressed the self-determination variable on a dummy variable indicating responses from 2009 and on dummies distinguishing people who should not react to changes from those who should. In Table 5.3, this dummy indicates people who did not feel close to a party. In Table 5.4, it indicates Basques who did not feel distant from a party. As in the results presented above in Catalonia, this coding allows me to observe the changes between 2005 and 2009 in the groups that should change their opinions by simply observing the dummy for 2009.

People who felt close to a party should have moved in the same direction as that

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[12]Later surveys asked the modified version of the territorial preferences question making it difficult to compare responses over time. I thus ignore these surveys.

party. People who felt distant from a party should have moved in the opposite direction from it. I thus expect EA, PNV, and PP partisans to have become less supportive of self-determination. IU and PSE supporters should have become more supportive of that option. On the other hand, people who felt distant from EA, PNV, and the PP should have become more favourable to self-determination, while those who disliked IU and the PSE should have become less favourable to that option.

Table 5.3: Models of Opinion Change in the Basque Country Between 2005 and 2009 Among Basques Who Felt Close to Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	EA	PNV	EB-B/IU	PSE-PSOE	PP	Aggregate
Intercept	0.24*	0.03	−0.71***	−3.07***	−4.71***	−0.71***
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(1.00)	(0.06)
2009	−0.45**	−0.79***	−0.14	0.07	1.74	−0.26***
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.40)	(1.10)	(0.08)
Not Close	−1.17***	−1.26***	0.10	2.70***	4.23***	
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.35)	(1.01)	
Not Close*2009	0.29	0.97***	−0.22	−0.35	−2.17*	
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.41)	(1.11)	
N	3261	3318	3271	3305	3302	3581
AIC	3888.39	3942.79	4002.45	3703.82	3907.93	4326.66
BIC	3985.83	4040.50	4099.94	3801.47	4005.57	4376.13
$\log L$	−1928.20	−1955.39	−1985.23	−1835.91	−1937.97	−2155.33

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

We can see that, as expected, supporters of the two nationalist parties became significantly less supportive of self-determination. However, there was no significant change among supporters of any of the statewide parties. The coefficients on the interaction be-

tween the 'not close' dummy and the 2009 dummy was positive for both EA and the PNV, meaning that the change was smaller among those who were not close to these parties. However, it was only significantly smaller among people who did not feel close to PNV. The fact that the decrease was not smaller among people who did not feel close to EA may be explained by the fact that, in February 2005, 44.5% of people who felt neither close to nor distant from EA felt close to the PNV. Overall, there was a significant decrease in support for independence, suggesting that the decreased support for self-determination among partisans of the two main non-*Abertzale* nationalist parties that followed their moderation on the state-building dimension represents opinion change and not simply people changing their party preferences.

Table 5.4: Models of Opinion Change in the Basque Country Between 2005 and 2009 Among Basques Who Felt Distant from Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	EA	PNV	EB-B/IU	PSE-PSOE	PP
Intercept	−1.30***	−1.36***	−0.68***	−0.09	−0.33***
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
2009	0.17	0.51***	−0.19†	−0.21*	−0.43***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Not Distant	1.20***	1.09***	0.13	−1.82***	−2.42***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.28)
Not Distant*2009	−0.79***	−1.30***	−0.35*	0.19	1.03**
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.33)
N	3261	3318	3271	3305	3302
AIC	3894.16	3981.09	3997.68	3630.60	3817.36
BIC	3991.60	4078.80	4095.17	3728.25	3914.99
$\log L$	−1931.08	−1974.55	−1982.84	−1799.30	−1892.68

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 5.4 shows that, as expected, Basques who felt distant from EA and the PNV became more supportive of self-determination at this time. The change was significant for the PNV. It was also significantly smaller among people who did not feel distant from the PNV. However, the proportion of Basques who disliked the PNV changed significantly at this time (See Table A5.3 in the chapter appendix). People who disliked EB-B became less supportive of the nationalist option (p<0.1). The negative change was actually significantly larger among people who did not feel distant from the party (p<0.05), suggesting that the party was not influencing support for self-determination. PSE and PP anti-partisans became significantly less supportive of self-determination. This change is

only consistent with anti-partisans following a negative cue for the PSE. However, people who did not say they felt distant from the PSE did not move significantly less. Thus, there is little clear evidence that parties negatively influenced their anti-partisans.

These results are consistent with those from Catalonia, where nationalist parties influenced their partisans, while there was no evidence that any parties influenced their anti-partisans. I did not find any evidence for influence by statewide parties either. These findings suggest that, as in Catalonia, nationalist parties may have influenced a major change in support for nationalism among the public. EA and the PNV moderated their nationalism and their supporters (and overall public opinion) moved against self-determination. The 2009 survey was the last survey including the four-category territorial preferences question and the partisanship questions. There was only one survey that included the new question and the partisanship question. I can thus not assess responses to regional positions in subsequent years.

How did Basques react to changes in statewide party positions at the national level? We saw above that, in the late 1990s, the left-wing IU and PSOE became more favourable towards nationalism, while the PP became more opposed to it. Table 5.5 shows models of support for self-determination in which I stacked the surveys from May 1998 and September 2002. These changes began prior to the 1998 survey. These data are thus appropriate to consider how partisans reacted to these changes at the national level.

Table 5.5: Models of Opinion Change in the Basque Country Between 2002 and 2005 Among Basques Who Felt Close to Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	PSOE	EB-B/IU	PP
Intercept	−2.94***	−1.33***	−2.56*
	(0.73)	(0.37)	(1.04)
2002	−0.55	0.81†	−0.61
	(1.25)	(0.45)	(1.46)
Not Close	1.87*	0.16	1.41
	(0.74)	(0.40)	(1.04)
Not Close*2002	1.07	−0.38	1.17
	(1.26)	(0.49)	(1.47)
N	724	720	724
AIC	826.01	853.02	841.75
BIC	899.37	926.29	915.11
$\log L$	−397.00	−410.51	−404.88

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table 5.5 shows how Basques who felt close to each of the parties reacted between 1998 and 2002. We can see that the only significant change was among IU supporters. However, it is only significant at the 0.1 level and Basques who did not feel close to that party did not move significantly less than its partisans. Thus, statewide parties in the national parliament do not appear to have influenced their own partisans.

Table 5.6 shows that anti-partisans reacted more than partisans to changes in positions at the national level. We can see that both people who felt distant from the PSOE and those who rejected the PP increased their support for nationalism at this time. Moreover, those who were not distant from these parties did not move in this direction. While PSOE

anti-partisans moved in the same direction as the party they disliked, opponents of the PP moved against it as expected. The movement of PSOE anti-partisans in the wrong direction is likely due to the fact that, in 1998, 91.9% of PSOE anti-partisans in the Basque Country also disliked the PP. In the aggregate, Basques became significantly more supportive of self-determination between 1998 and 2002. Thus, by becoming more anti-nationalist at the national level, the PP appears to have provoked an increase in support for the possibility of independence.

Table 5.6: Models of Opinion Change in the Basque Country Between 2002 and 2005 Among Basques Who Felt Distant from Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	PSOE	EB-B/IU	PP	Aggregate
Intercept	-0.85^{***}	-1.10^{***}	-1.06^{***}	-1.28^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.11)
2002	0.55^{**}	0.23	0.63^{***}	0.31^{*}
	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.15)
Not Distant	-0.93^{***}	-0.19	$-0.46^{\dagger}$	
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.28)	
Not Distant*2002	-2.02^{**}	0.52	-3.14^{**}	
	(0.66)	(0.34)	(1.05)	
N	724	720	724	978
AIC	791.98	851.21	813.22	1089.64
BIC	865.34	924.48	886.57	1128.72
$\log L$	-379.99	-409.60	-390.61	-536.82

The second major set of changes at the national level occurred in the early 2000s when the PP became less anti-nationalistic compared to the left-wing parties as Aznar's time as prime minister of Spain came to an end. The IU became less favourable towards nationalism at this time, while the PSOE became less pro-nationalist in the second half of

the decade. By 2005, the distance between left-wing and right-wing parties had become considerably smaller.

We saw above that, between 2005 and 2009 (see Table 5.4), Basques who were distant from the PP became less supportive of self-determination. I concluded there that, the evidence was not consistent with anti-partisans moving against party cues, because PP anti-partisans moved in the same direction as that party in the regional parliament. However, they moved away from the PP in the national legislature. People who did not feel distant from the party did not move away from the PP. Moreover, there was a decrease in support for the possibility of independence overall. Thus, not only do nationalist parties in the regional legislature appear to have influenced support for the nationalist option among their supporters but also the PP seems to have increased it among Basques who felt distant from it.

The results from the Basque Country show that, after the two main Basque nationalist parties in the 2000s, EA and the PNV, moderated their nationalism in the regional parliament, their supporters followed. At the same time, when the PP moderated its anti-nationalism (relative to the left-wing parties) in the national parliament, anti-partisans of the PP also moved away from the radical nationalist option. We also saw that overall Basques became less supportive of self-determination at this time. The changes in opinions that followed the movements in party positions were substantial. Support for the nationalist option dropped from 59.4% among EA partisans to 42.7% between 2005 and 2009. Support for that option fell from 51.5% to 30.4% among PNV supporters. Among anti-partisans of the PP, it dropped from 43.9% to 32.4%. Overall support for self-determination declined from 35.5% to 28.0%.

Further confirmation that public support for nationalism did in fact decrease at this time can be found in the Euskobarómetro data presented in chapter 3. The average support for independence in 2009 was 22.5% compared to 35% in 2005 (Euskobarómetro,

2016, 81).[13] Unfortunately, the Euskobarómetro does not share individual-level data. It is thus not possible to determine whether changes are significant or which partisan groups shifted their preferences. However, it is clear that overall preferences moved during this period and this change followed movements by EA, the PNV, and the PP.

I should reiterate the major caveat of this chapter. The measures of party positions I produced are relative positions. Thus, it is impossible to be sure which of the two parties actually changed their positions. Moreover, 73.0% of PNV partisans also disliked the PP, thus making it impossible to know whether nationalist parties influenced their partisans or anti-nationalist parties influenced their anti-partisans. As mentioned above, in this chapter, I do not seek to determine which of these possibilities explains the results. I leave that for chapter 6.

5.2.3 Galicia

Figure 5.4 shows the positions of the three parties that have been present in the Galician Parliament between the fourth and the eighth legislatures (1993-2002). The Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) remained in a moderately nationalist position throughout this period, although it did become somewhat more nationalist when it participated in the regional government (between 2005 and 2009). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the PP moved to very moderate nationalist positions, while the Galician Socialist Party (PSdeG) moved into clearly anti-nationalist positions. Both statewide parties moved to more moderate anti-nationalist stances in the late 2000s, when the PSdeG governed in coalition with the BNG.

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[13]The question was about the preferred state organization for the Basque Country and included the same four options as in the CEO studies in Catalonia: centralization, autonomy, federalism, and independence.

Figure 5.4: Positions of the Major Parties in the Parliament of Galicia on the State-Building Dimension

I first consider reactions to the increased nationalism of the PP and the increased anti-nationalism of the PSdeG in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. As in the Basque Country, the necessary survey data are available in 1998, 2002, 2005, and 2009. To assess reactions to the first set of changes, I stacked the surveys from 1998 and 2002 and ran logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is support for self-determination or regional autonomy. In Galicia, as in Valencia, support for the possibility of independence is low (only 3.7% in 1998). I thus consider support for either nationalist territorial option.

None of the groups that felt close to any of the parties significantly changed their territorial preferences during this time (see Table A5.4 in the chapter appendix). Table 5.7 shows that Galicians who felt distant from each of the three parties increased their support for self-determination ($p<0.1$ for the BNG; $p<0.05$ for the PSdeG and the PP). The change was significantly smaller among Galicians who felt neither close to nor distant

from the latter two parties. This evidence is only consistent with party influence for the PSdeG, which had moved in the anti-nationalist direction in the previous period. The overall significant change suggests the PSdeG may have influenced opinions at this time. However, the finding among PP anti-partisans is odd. It may be due to the fact that 37.5% of Galicians who disliked the PP also disliked the Galician Socialists. As we will see below, this change may have been caused by the change in the PP's position at the national level.

Table 5.7: Models of Opinion Change in Galicia Between 1998 and 2002 Among Galicians Who Felt Distant from Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	BNG	PSdeG-PSOE	PP	Aggregate
Intercept)	-1.54***	-1.17***	-0.72***	-1.12***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.09)
2002	$0.40^{\dagger}$	0.57*	0.48*	0.27*
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.13)
Not Distant	0.78***	0.24	-0.49*	
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	
Not Distant*2002	-0.24	-0.56*	-0.54*	
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)	
N	1077	1107	1103	1236
AIC	1273.86	1327.42	1285.69	1447.70
BIC	1353.58	1407.57	1365.78	1488.66
$\log L$	-620.93	-647.71	-626.84	-715.85

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

The next major change occurred in the early to mid 2000s, when the PP moved in an anti-nationalist direction, while the PSdeG moderated its opposition to nationalism in the

region. The BNG also became somewhat more nationalist relative to the other parties. If Galicians were following parties, after these changes took place, BNG and PSdeG partisans should have become more nationalist and Galicians who liked the PP should have decreased their support for nationalist options. Table 5.8 shows the results of logistic regressions performed on stacked surveys from 2005 and 2009. We can see that BNG identifiers became less supportive of nationalism at this time (p<0.1). Thus, they moved against their party. Supporters of the statewide parties also moved against the changes by their parties in the regional parliament. While supporters of the Socialists became less nationalist, following increased nationalism by that party, PP identifiers became more nationalist after a move in the anti-nationalist direction by that party. Those movements were limited to people who felt close to those parties, as the significant interaction terms show. Thus, partisans of all parties moved in the wrong direction at this time.

Table 5.8: Models of Opinion Change in Galicia Between 2005 and 2009 Among Galicians Who Felt Close to Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	BNG	PSdeG-PSOE	PP	Aggregate
Intercept	0.21	-0.31^*	-2.01^{***}	-1.06^{***}
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.09)
2009	$-0.37^\dagger$	-0.54^{***}	$0.53^\dagger$	-0.11
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.10)
Not Close	-1.50^{***}	-1.11^{***}	1.28^{***}	
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.30)	
Not Close*2009	0.14	0.70^{**}	-0.83^*	
	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.32)	
N	3359	3375	3375	3605
AIC	3548.94	3751.98	3770.52	3973.27
BIC	3646.85	3849.97	3868.50	4022.79
$\log L$	-1758.47	-1859.99	-1869.26	-1978.64

Standard errors in parentheses

$\dagger$ significant at $p < .10$; $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table 5.9 shows models of opinion change among people who felt distant from each party. We can see that, after the Galician Socialist Party became more favourable to nationalism, PSdeG anti-partisans increased their support for nationalism. PP anti-partisans decreased their support for nationalist options after a movement away from nationalism by that party. Thus, anti-partisans of these parties also moved in the wrong direction for parties to be influencing opinions.

Table 5.9: Models of Opinion Change in Galicia Between 2005 and 2009 Among Galicians Who Felt Distant from Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	BNG	PSdeG-PSOE	PP
Intercept	−1.66***	−1.75***	−0.28*
	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.13)
2009	0.14	0.70**	−0.34*
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.14)
Not Distant	1.02***	0.97***	−1.36***
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.20)
Not Distant*2009	−0.47†	−1.08***	0.37†
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.22)
N	3359	3375	3375
AIC	3730.97	3788.07	3633.66
BIC	3828.88	3886.05	3731.64
$\log L$	−1849.48	−1878.03	−1800.83

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

How did Galicians respond to changes in the national Congress of Deputies? We saw above that the first major change at the national level was when IU and the PSOE became more supportive of regional nationalism, while the PP became more opposed to it. We also saw that, between 1998 and 2002, none of the partisan groups followed their parties. However, Galicians who disliked the PP increased their support for nationalism following a move in the nationalist direction by the PP in the regional parliament. As I noted, this change is inconsistent with party following at the regional level. However, given that the PP nationally had been becoming increasingly anti-nationalist, it suggests that anti-partisans of the PP were moving against the PP's change at the national level. We also

saw that the overall change was significant. Thus, while PSdeG anti-partisans adjusted their opinions in the opposite direction from their disliked party in the regional parliament, PP anti-partisans moved theirs against the change of the national PP.[14]

The other important change at the national level was the moderation of the pro-nationalism of the PSOE and of the anti-nationalism of the PP in the early to mid 2000s. We saw above that, between 2005 and 2009, Socialist partisans became less nationalist at this time, while PP partisans became more nationalist. Both changes were limited to Galicians who felt close to these parties. While these results suggest that Galicians were not following statewide parties in the regional parliament, they are in the right direction for PP supporters and Socialist partisans to have been following their parties in the national parliament. However, there was no significant overall change. PP party preferences do not appear to have significantly changed over time (Socialist preferences did, see Table A5.5 in the chapter appendix). Thus, we can conclude that PP partisans became more supportive of nationalism following a decrease in anti-nationalism by that party at the national level. It is not so clear that people who were close to the PSOE did as well.

Similarly, Galicians who felt distant from the Socialists became more nationalist, while those who disliked the PP became less nationalist. There was no significant change in negative partisanship between 2005 and 2009 (see Table A5.5 in the chapter appendix). Thus, we can assert that PP partisans became more favourable to nationalist territorial options following a moderation in the PP's anti-nationalism at the national level. At the same time, PP anti-partisans became less supportive of nationalism. When the PSOE became less favourable to nationalism in the Congress of Deputies, its anti-partisans became more favourable to it.

In sum, we have seen that Galician nationalism seems to be primarily influenced by changes in positions by statewide parties, especially at the national level. Their reac-

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[14]Note that I do not consider the influence of IU in Galicia, because the CIS has not asked about it on a regular basis.

tion was relatively strong. Following the PP's move in the anti-nationalist direction, between 1998 and 2002, support for nationalism among PP anti-partisans increased from 32.8% to 44.2%. Overall, it moved from 24.6% to 30.0%. After the PP and the PSOE moderated their positions with respect to nationalism in the early 2000s, the former's partisans increased their support for nationalism from 11.7% to 17.5%, while support for nationalist options dropped from 43.0% to 32.5% among its opponents. Among Socialist anti-partisans, it increased from 14.8% to 24.7%.

5.2.4 The Valencian Community

Figure 5.10 shows the positions of the three parties that were present in the Valencian Parliament throughout the fourth and fifth legislatures (1995-2003): United Left of the Valencian Country (EUPV, Esquerra Unida del País Valencià), the regional branch of IU, the Socialist Party of the Valencian Country (PSPV-PSOE), and the People's Party (PP). The major change that occurred was that, while the three parties were towards the centre of the state-building dimension around 1995, when the Socialists lost control of the regional government and were replaced by the PP, a major divergence opened up between the left and right on the state-building dimension, with the PSPV moving to the nationalist side of the dimension and the PP to the anti-nationalist side. The EUPV remained on the pro-nationalist side of the dimension. One possible explanation for the divergence is that, in the late 1990s, the PP progressively took over Valencian Union (UV, Unió Valenciana), which adhered to anti-nationalist Blaverist ideas. The changes in the Valencian Parliament are similar to those that occurred in the national Congress of Deputies. We can thus assess reactions to these changes in a single set of models.

Figure 5.5: Positions of the Major Parties in the Valencian Parliament on the State-Building Dimension

Table 5.10 shows models of opinion change among Valencians who felt close to each of the parties. As in Galicia, I considered changes in support for either increased autonomy or self-determination (in May 1998, only 5.1% of Valencians supported self-determination). I stacked the surveys that were conduced in 1998, 2002, and 2005, since, following the initial changes, party positions have been relatively fixed at both the national and regional levels in the period up to 2002. Changes between 1998 and 2002 or between 1998 and 2005 may be due to party following. I ran logistic regressions that are similar to those presented above, but, here, I included dummies for both 2002 and 2005 as well as their interactions with the dummies for the groups that should not react to changes in party positions.

We can see that, following EUPV and IU's shift in the nationalist direction in the regional and national legislatures, respectively, United Left partisans became significantly more supportive of one of the nationalist options, whether looking at 2002 or 2005. Both

changes were significantly smaller among Valencians who did not feel close to United Left. PSOE partisans became significantly more supportive of nationalism in 2005 and that change was smaller among Valencians who were not close to that party. There was no change among PP partisans. There was also no overall change in support for nationalist options. However, support for the PSOE did not significantly change between 1998 and 2005, suggesting that PSOE partisans moved in the nationalist direction following that party's increased sympathy for regional nationalism. Support for IU did change (see Table A5.6 in chapter appendix). There was no change among Valencians who disliked the parties (see Table A5.7 in chapter appendix). Thus, only partisans of the Socialists appear to have followed their party. The change was substantial. Between 1998 and 2005, support for nationalist options among PSOE partisans in Valencia went up from 31.2% to 41.3%.

Table 5.10: Models of Changes in Partisans' Opinions in Valencia Between 1998 and 2002 and 1998 and 2005

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	EUPV/IU	PSPV-PSOE	PP	Aggregate
Intercept	−0.45*	−0.79***	−1.54***	−1.03***
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.08)
2002	0.67*	0.07	0.09	0.02
	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.12)
2005	0.81**	0.44*	0.03	0.14
	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.12)
Not Close	−0.67**	−0.32†	0.75***	
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)	
Not Close*2002	−0.70*	−0.11	−0.20	
	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.29)	
Not Close*2005	−0.75*	−0.52*	0.16	
	(0.32)	(0.24)	(0.28)	
N	2103	2121	2121	2182
AIC	2418.13	2476.83	2465.67	2567.19
BIC	2553.76	2612.66	2601.50	2635.44
$\log L$	−1185.07	−1214.41	−1208.84	−1271.59

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided evidence from four regions of Spain that, when parties change their positions on the state-building dimension of nationalism, their partisans tend to move their preferences for the territorial organization of Spain in the same direction

as the move by their party. There is also some evidence that anti-partisans move their opinions away from their preferred party when it changes its positions. I have thus found support for hypothesis 1 and some support for hypothesis 2.

Nationalist parties influence their partisans' opinions in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where nationalism is strong. Statewide parties also seem to influence the opinions of people who feel distant from them in the Basque Country. They also influence their supporters' preferences in Galicia and the Valencian Community, where nationalism is weaker. Much of the influence parties seem to have on people's preferences in those two regions appears to be on people who feel distant from them.

In Catalonia, using OLS regression, I have shown that changes in the positions of the two major nationalist parties there, Catalan Republican Left and Convergence and Union, have been followed by changes in preferences for independence among their supporters and by overall changes in support for independence. There was no evidence from Catalonia that statewide parties have influenced support for secession or that parties influence the opinions of people who dislike them.

In the other three regions, I considered all cases where the necessary data were available to assess following. In the Basque Country, I found that the major non-*Abertzale* regional nationalist parties appear to have influenced their partisans when they moderated their positions. The PP, particularly at the national level, also appears to have influenced support for nationalism in the Basque Country, by moving its anti-partisans towards self-determination when it became more opposed to nationalism and away from that option when it became less anti-nationalist.

In Galicia, support for nationalism appears to have been driven primarily by the positions taken by the PSOE and the PP at the national level. In Valencia, Socialist partisans appear to have been influenced by the positions taken by the Socialists at both the national and regional levels.

This chapter has shown clear support for hypothesis 1. When parties change their

positions, their supporters follow them. The clearest test of this is in Catalonia where frequent survey data allow me to test this hypothesis in a neat way. Evidence for hypothesis 2 is mixed overall and non-existent in the OLS models in Catalonia. Nevertheless, in some cases, people do appear to adjust their opinions away from the position of a party they dislike.

While I have found evidence that people tend to adjust their opinions following changes of parties' positions in ways that are consistent with party following, these results are at the same time likely an overestimate and an underestimate of party influence. Given the limited survey data that are available, it is likely that I have been unable to observe some instances of people following parties, simply because no survey data allowed me to observe changes when they occurred. On the other hand, these analyses do not show that parties caused changes in opinions. People may change their opinions for other reasons. Moreover, it is impossible to entirely rule out the possibility that changes observed in cross-sectional data are due to people changing their party preferences and not their opinions. My results only show that changes in opinions that are consistent with party cue effects often follow changes in party positions.

The analyses in this chapter have another key limitation. Given that the positions I have measured using text analysis are relative positions, it is impossible to know exactly which parties are moving and which parties people are reacting to. Citizens are exposed to the positions of parties they like and of parties they dislike, as well as other parties. It is thus impossible to know, using the data I have presented here, which parties are actually influencing opinions. The next chapter uses experimental data to seek to disentangle the effects of different parties.

5.4 Chapter Appendix

Table A5.1: Models of Opinion Change in Catalonia in Response to Movements by Statewide Parties in the Regional Parliament

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Close	Distant	Neutral	Aggregate
Intercept	0.01	$0.03^{\dagger}$	0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Position	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
ICV	0.02	−0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
PP	−0.00	0.00	−0.04	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
N	42	42	42	42
R^2	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.04
adj. R^2	−0.01	−0.02	−0.00	−0.04
Resid. sd	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table A5.2: Models of Opinion Change in Catalonia in Response to Movements by Statewide Parties in the National Parliament

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Close	Distant	Neutral	Aggregate
Intercept	$0.03^{\dagger}$	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Position	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
PP	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
IU	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
N	45	45	45	39
R^2	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00
adj. R^2	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.09
Resid. sd	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A5.3: Model of Negative Party Preference Change Between 2005 and 2009 in the Basque Country

	Model 1
	PNV (Dislike)
Intercept	-0.33***
	(0.06)
2009	-0.56***
	(0.07)
N	3591
AIC	4540.57
BIC	4590.06
$\log L$	-2262.29

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Note that these are the results of a logistic regression model in which I regress a binary variable (coded 1 if respondents dislike the PNV and 0 if they do not dislike it) on a dummy distinguishing the 2009 survey from the one in 2005. The significant coefficient on the year dummy indicates that party preferences changed between 2005 and 2009.

Table A5.4: Models of Opinion Change in Galicia Between 1998 and 2002 Among Galicians Who Felt Close to Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	BNG	PSdeG-PSOE	PP
Intercept	-0.39^*	-1.09^{***}	-1.59^{***}
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.19)
2002	0.46	0.46	0.37
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)
Not Close	-0.90^{***}	0.08	0.85^{***}
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.22)
Not Close*2002	-0.18	-0.32	-0.35
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.32)
N	1077	1107	1103
AIC	1258.38	1330.30	1301.01
BIC	1338.09	1410.45	1381.10
$\log L$	-613.19	-649.15	-634.51

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A5.5: Party Preference Models (2005 to 2009 in Galicia)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	PSdeG-PSOE (Close)	PP (Close)	PSdeG-PSOE (Distant)	PP (Distant)
Intercept	0.36***	0.22***	0.23***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
2009	−0.05*	−0.01	0.02	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	3375	3375	3375	3375
AIC	4405.73	3504.05	3923.40	4842.63
BIC	4454.72	3553.05	3972.39	4891.62
$\log L$	−2194.86	−1744.03	−1953.70	−2413.31

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A5.6: Party Preference Models (1998 to 2002 and 1998 to 2005 in Valencia)

	Model 1	Model 2
	EUPV/IU	PSPV-PSOE
Intercept	0.18***	0.36***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
2002	−0.10***	−0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
2005	−0.06***	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	2103	2121
AIC	1249.62	2785.89
BIC	1317.43	2853.81
$\log L$	−612.81	−1380.95

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Note that the coefficient on the 2005 dummy does not become significant when I exclude data from 2002 and omit the 2002 dummy. Thus, there is no evidence that positive identification with the Socialists changed between 1998 and 2005.

Table A5.7: Models of Changes in Anti-Partisans' Opinions in Valencia from 1998 to 2002 and 1998 to 2005

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	EUPV/IU	PSPV-PSOE	PP
Intercept	−0.99***	−1.12***	−0.43***
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)
2002	0.16	0.25	0.08
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.19)
2005	−0.17	−0.19	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.18)
Not Distant	−0.00	0.18	−0.98***
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Not Distant*2002	−0.40	−0.40	−0.08
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Not Distant*2005	0.60*	0.44	0.20
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.24)
N	2103	2121	2121
AIC	2467.29	2496.73	2423.88
BIC	2602.92	2632.56	2559.71
$\log L$	−1209.65	−1224.37	−1187.94

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Chapter 6

Nation vs Party: Assessing Citizens' Reactions to Party Cues on Regional Nationalism

We saw in the last chapter that, in four Spanish regions, movements by parties on the state-building dimension of nationalism are followed by changes in the territorial preferences of their partisans, occasionally of their anti-partisans, and often of residents of the region as a whole. Those findings suggest that parties influence nationalist opinions. In spite of these findings from observational data, it is still possible that parties may not be causing changes in preferences. Citizens may be reacting to other developments that are simultaneous to movements by parties. They may also be changing their party preferences to reflect their opinions. Moreover, we saw that it is hard to distinguish following a liked party from seeking to contrast one's position from a disliked party using observational data. This chapter thus seeks experimental evidence to bolster the claim that parties influence nationalism. It also attempts to identify the source of party cue effects. Do they result from cues from a citizen's most liked party, from their least liked party or from both?

Numerous studies have used experimental evidence to show that citizens change their

opinions in response to party cues (e.g. Kam, 2005; Slothuus, 2015). Rather than showing that prior party attitudes lead to later changes in opinions, such studies generally compare a treatment group that receives information about the positions adopted by parties and a control group that does not. These studies have found effects of varying sizes (For a review of many of these studies, see Bullock, 2011).

Some party cue experiments present real party positions (e.g. Lenz, 2012; Slothuus, 2015), while others rely on manipulating parties' actual positions (e.g. Bullock, 2011; Cohen, 2003; Kam, 2005). The latter category includes studies like those by Bullock (2011) and Cohen (2003) that present positions on policies that have clear ideological implications and manipulate whether Democrats or Republicans favour them. It also includes the much-cited study by Kam (2005), who presents cues on a policy, food irradiation, that does not have clear ideological implications. Both types of studies find that participants are more supportive of their party's position, and less supportive of the other party's position, when exposed to cues, regardless of the direction of the parties' positions.

The advantage of these approaches is that they allow scholars to avoid pre-treatment effects (Druckman and Leeper, 2012; Slothuus, 2015). However, they do not allow us to know whether and how citizens react to real-world party positions, which may allow citizens to rely on predispositions like ideology to help them formulate their opinions. This is particularly problematic given the finding that the content of political messages influences citizens' opinions about policies even in the presence of party cues (Bullock, 2011, 508). Thus, the effects of cues in the real world may be very different from the effects of artificial cues.

On the other hand, using real policy positions does present the major problem of pre-treatment. In the real world, citizens are likely exposed to the same positions to which they are exposed in a party cue experiment. Slothuus (2015) identifies two varieties of this pre-treatment phenomenon. On the one hand, citizens may be aware of party positions, because they have featured prominently in the media. On the other hand, citizens may be

aware of party positions, because they are consistent with party reputations. If a party supports a position that reflects its general orientation, citizens may be able to figure out which side the party is on. Thus, to the extent that experimental participants are already aware of party positions, they should be less responsive to cues. Such participants do not learn party positions by being exposed to cues, because they already know those positions. I thus expect party cues to influence only people who do not know party positions prior to an experiment. In this chapter, I test two key hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3 *People who lack knowledge of party positions move in the direction of their most liked party in the presence of party cues.*

Hypothesis 4 *People who have knowledge of party positions do not move in the direction of their most liked party in the presence of party cues.*

Existing research has found that citizens tend not to significantly change their evaluations of elites when they are exposed to positions with which they disagree (Broockman and Butler, 2015). Lenz (2012), similarly, found that, on a range of issues in various contexts, citizens do not change their attitudes towards candidates or parties on the basis of their policy preferences, but they do change their opinions. This evidence is consistent with the notion of partisanship being a powerful and enduring force (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). My third hypothesis is thus:

Hypothesis 5 *When exposed to positions of the party they like the most which they do not share, citizens do not significantly change their evaluations of that party.*

We saw in chapter 2 that existing studies do not clearly show which parties are responsible for party cue effects. Do people follow cues from parties they like or from parties they dislike? The design of studies in the US does not allow us to know which type of party influences opinions. Studies in multi-party systems may underestimate the effect of party cues because they rely on the concept of party identification. A much stronger potential basis for party cue effects in multi-party systems are party attitudes, which most citizens have. In spite of not having a real identification with a party, a citizen who likes

one party considerably more than another has a prior attitude that may influence the way they evaluate information from the two parties. I thus expect that party cue effects in a multi-party system only occur reliably when contrasting cues from a very liked and a very disliked party are presented.

Hypothesis 6 *Party cue effects only occur when people are exposed to the position of their most liked party and that of a disliked party with a contrasting position.*

The conditioning effect of the awareness of party positions on a particular issue on party cue effects in an experimental context should be distinct from the effect of broader political awareness. Leeper and Slothuus (2014) argue that cue taking is related to motivated reasoning, people's tendency to want to maintain their current attitudes by dismissing incompatible information. People with more information about politics have more resources to defend their partisanship against new information. Thus, party cues should influence them more. Zaller (1992), similarly, suggests that citizens with higher levels of political awareness are more selective in the elite communications they accept.

As Slothuus (2015) argues, higher political awareness should lead to greater influence of party cues in general, but such effects may be dampened due to pre-treatment among more aware experimental participants. I thus, argue that political awareness only has a positive effect on party following among people who do not know party positions. I expect that:

Hypothesis 7 *Among non-pretreated individuals, people with high political knowledge move in the direction of their most liked party more than people with low knowledge when shown party cues.*

Readers may be thinking that knowledge of party positions is simply a component of political information. However, knowledge of party positions depends on rationalization as much as on broader political knowledge (e.g. Achen and Bartels, 2016, 269-276). Thus, people's correct perception of parties' positions depend on their partisan attitudes in addition to their level of political sophistication. We will see below that many experimental

participants, in spite of having high political knowledge, do not place parties on the correct side of issue scales.

Here I consider these hypotheses in three studies on party cue effects on regional nationalism in Spain. Study 1 considers how people respond to cues from two parties, the party they like the most and the party they dislike the most among parties that have a position opposite to that of their most liked party. It is a lab experiment conducted in Catalonia in which participants were presented party cues on two issues on which they do not share the position of their most liked party. Study 2, a survey experiment carried out in Galicia, assesses responses to cues in two stages. It first looks at how people respond to the position of the party they like the most. It then considers reactions to the positions of both their most liked party and a disliked party. It thus allows us to see whether party following effects are stronger or only present when both cues are shown. Study 3, a survey experiment conducted throughout Spain in the context of the 2016 Spanish general election campaign, then considers how citizens respond to cues from the People's Party (PP). The PP is many Spaniards' most liked party as well as the least liked party of many other people in Spain. This final experiment thus allows me to observe how people respond to a cue from a single party, either one they like the most or one they dislike the most.

We will see that party following effects occur when citizens are not aware of party positions prior to the experiment. Such effects are stronger among citizens with high political awareness and when they get cues from their most liked party as well as a disliked party. Party cues, as we will see push those with ambivalent national identities to adopt the positions espoused by their most liked party and opposed by their disliked party. There also is some evidence that a cue from a disliked party is sufficient to make people adjust their opinions in the direction of their preferred party.

6.1   Study 1: Lab Experiment in Catalonia

Study 1 was conducted in the Research Laboratory on Behavioral and Experimental Sciences at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. The objective of the study was to assess how citizens change their opinions and/or their evaluations of parties in response to party cues on issues on which they do not share the position of the party they like the most. The experiment dealt with five issues.

The five issues were selected to represent the different facets of Catalan nationalism. Two are about the region's political status within Spain, two were about the status of the regional language and one was about the recognition of the region as a nation. They were all presented as positive statements. The first was that the government of Catalonia should take unilateral steps towards independence. This is probably the issue that is currently most salient in the region. The parties that presently govern Catalonia ran in the 2015 regional election on a common platform to take steps towards independence for the region without prior negotiations with the Spanish government. Only that coalition, Together for Yes (JxSí), including its constituent parties, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and Catalan Republican Left (ERC), as well as the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), which has provided support for the Catalan government, agree with that position. All other parties are opposed.

The second issue statement is that Spanish should keep its official status in Catalonia. This issue has become salient in recent years as separatist politicians have asserted that Spanish should remain an official language in an independent Catalonia, perhaps to increase the support base for independence. They have thus been expressing positions that depart from conventional peripheral nationalism, an aspect of which is to promote the regional language. While Together for Yes and its constituent parties, CDC and ERC, in addition to the anti-nationalist Citizens' Party (C's) and the People's Party (PP), have clearly stated their support for this position, most left-wing parties and coalitions, includ-

ing Catalonia Yes We can (CSQP), its components Podem and Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV), the Socialist Party of catalonia (PSC), and the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), have, without opposing an official status for Spanish in Catalonia, focused on stressing the importance of promoting the Catalan language, a position that is more in line with conventional nationalism in Catalonia. Given that there is no reason to expect that these parties are opposed to a status for Spanish, I have added a clear sentence at the end of their statements on this issue in which the parties assert their support for an official status for Spanish. Thus, rather than opposing the status of the Spanish language, the statements participants read have the parties voicing somewhat less clear support for keeping an official status for Spanish.[1]

The third issue statement is that Catalonia should become an independent state from Spain. This issue clearly separates the governing secessionist coalition, Together for Yes, its component parties, Democratic Convergence of Catalonia and Catalan Republican Left, as well as the Popular Unity Candidacy, which clearly support separation, from all other parties that have explicitly stated their opposition.

The fourth issue is that more classes should be taught in Spanish in schools in Catalonia. This has been a long-standing issue in Catalan nationalism. Since the 1980s, the Catalan government set up an immersion school system in which all classes are taught in Catalan, except a small number of hours of Spanish language classes. The Citizens' Party and the People's Party have consistently opposed this system calling for an increased presence for the Spanish language. All other parties oppose increasing the number of class hours in Spanish in Catalonia.

The fifth issue statement is that Catalonia is a nation. All parties support this statement except the Citizens' Party and the People's Party.

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[1]Since it is unclear how partisans of the latter parties should respond to party cues, their responses to this issue were removed from all analyses. Participants who were exposed to these positions because they dislike these parties were retained, because the direction they should move in is clear. Their preferred parties were clearly more favourable to an official status for Spanish.

Table 6.1 summarizes the positions of each party on these issues.

Table 6.1: Party Positions on Five Issues in the Experiment in Catalonia

	Unilateral	Spanish	Independence	School	Nation
Together for Yes (JxSí)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Catalonia Yes We Can (CSQP)	No	Ambivalent Yes	No	No	Yes
We Can (Podem)	No	Ambivalent Yes	No	No	Yes
Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV)	No	Ambivalent Yes	No	No	Yes
Catalan Socialist Party (PSC)	No	Ambivalent Yes	No	No	Yes
Citizens' Party (C's)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
People's Party (PP)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Prior to the experiment, an email was sent out to the lab's list of potential participants, consisting mostly of students. They were asked to fill out a short questionnaire asking them to provide their opinions on the five policy statements related to Catalan nationalism and to evaluate 10 major parties and electoral coalitions in Catalonia.[2] Both opinions and party evaluations were on scales from 0 to 10, where 0 meant totally disagree/really dislike party and 10 meant totally agree/really like party. I have opted for this measure of party preferences, because it is more appropriate than the conventional measure of party identification in multi-party systems (Rosema, 2006). Participants were given the option of filling out the questionnaire in either official language of Catalonia, Catalan or Spanish. The language they selected at this stage was later used for their participation in the experiment. In total, 506 people filled out the pre-experimental questionnaire.

Only responses from eligible voters in elections to the regional parliament were retained. Ninety-one percent (461) of respondent met this condition. For each eligible respondent, I determined the party they rated highest. If there was a tie, I kept note of all the parties they rated highest. I then determined the issues (of the five on which they were asked

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[2]Note that all parties and electoral coalitions that ran and won seats in the last regional election were included. Coalitions and the parties they are composed of were included in order to allow participants to express different levels of support for different labels.

to provide an opinion) on which they had an opinion that was different from the position of the party they like the most (or from one of the parties they like the most). I then selected potential participants who had at least two such positions that were inconsistent with the party they like the most or with at least one of the parties they like the most.[3] Sixty-two percent met this requirement (284). If there was a tie in the scores they gave to two or more parties they liked most and they had two or more inconsistent opinions with more than one of those, I randomly selected one of those parties. I considered that party the party they liked the most. For each selected respondent, I randomly selected two of those issues when there were more than two. For each issue, I identified the party with the position opposite of that of the party they like the most that they dislike the most. Ties were broken randomly. I then invited 250 respondents who were available at the times of the experimental sessions to participate. If more respondents qualified and were available for an experimental session than it was possible to accommodate, I randomly selected respondents to invite among all eligible and available potential participants.

In total, 182 people showed up for sessions that took place between two and five days following their participation in the pre-experimental questionnaire. A total of 12 sessions were held on four different days over a two week period in May 2016. On the day of the experiment, following a questionnaire on demographics and attitudes, participants were exposed to statements in which their most liked and their disliked party clearly state their positions on the two issues that were selected for them. These statements were short paragraphs containing basic information about the proposal and most of them contained one or two arguments supporting the party's position. They were based on positions expressed in legislative speeches in the regional and national legislatives, in documents on party web-

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[3]On all issues, except the official status of the Spanish language for left-wing parties, parties clearly expressed positions in favour or against a position. I thus considered positions to be inconsistent if a party supported a position and the potential participant did not have a position over 7 on 10 or if a party opposed the position and the respondent had a position that was not below 3 on 10. Participants were thus selected if they had opinions that were opposite those of the party they like the most or if they had a less clear position than their preferred party.

sites, and in party manifestos. Paragraphs were adapted to make statements clearer and grammatically correct. The only significant change was to statements of positions on the status of Spanish, as explained above.

Participants were randomly divided into two groups.[4] A treatment group read the position statements by both parties, with the party labels clearly indicated. A control group read the same statements without the party name. Instead, the control statements began with "According to some politicians" or "Some politicians support/oppose". Changes in opinions that take place between the pre-experimental questionnaire and the post-experimental questionnaire in the control group can be attributed to the content of the statements or, to some external influence or simply to respondents giving thought to an issue. While such changes can be due to a number of different factors, if changes are greater in the treatment group than in the control group and are in the direction of the most liked party's position, given random assignment, they must be due to party cues.

Following the conclusion of the experimental sessions, an error was discovered in the Spanish version of the experiment. The problem was in the code that identified the issues on which participants had preferences that were inconsistent with their most liked party. While 24 of the 63 Spanish-language participants by chance received the correct issues, I have opted to exclude all respondents who participated in Spanish, due to the possibility that those who were exposed to the correct issues differ systematically from respondents who did not.[5] Responses from a total of 113 participants who participated in Catalan were thus retained for analyses.

The primary conclusion of this experiment is that, when people are exposed to positions they do not share with their most liked party, partisanship is generally stable while opinions are not. Figure 6.1 shows changes between the pre-experimental and post-experimental

[4]Randomization was successful. Neither participants' most liked party nor their pre-experimental opinions on any of the five issues significantly predict treatment status, as assessed using logit models with a 0.05 significance level.

[5]Note that a further 6 participants were dropped from analyses because of missing data on one or more critical variables.

questionnaires in evaluations of parties on the vertical axis and changes in opinions on the horizontal axis. Note that changes in opinions are signed so that positive changes are in the direction of one's preferred party. We can see that party preference changes are largely clustered around 0, whereas opinion changes are spread out between -3 and 6, even though both are on the same scale. It is also clear that, while in the control group, changes in opinions are roughly equally distributed around 0, changes are mostly positive (i.e. in the direction of one's most liked party) in the treatment group. Paired t-tests show that changes in party evaluations are never significant. The overall average change in party ratings was -0.04 (p=0.713). It was -0.07 (p=0.718) in the control group and -0.17 in the treatment group (p=0.261).

The mean change in opinions was 1.11 overall (p=0.000). It was 1.01 in the control group (p=0.000) and 1.21 in the treatment group (p=0.000). Overall, opinions changed more than party ratings and opinions changed slightly more in the direction of participants' favourite party in the treatment group than in the control group.

Figure 6.1: Changes in Party Evaluations vs. Changes in Opinions

Table 6.2 shows the results of OLS models in which the dependent variable consists of changes in opinions. As in Figure 6.1, they are signed so that positive changes represent movements in the direction of one's most liked party. Note that cluster-robust standard errors are shown with participants as the cluster variable to account for the fact that each participant was exposed to two issues. In model 1, changes in opinions are regressed on

a dummy variable indicating membership in the treatment group. We can see that the intercept, showing opinion changes in the control group, is positive and significant. The coefficient on the treatment dummy is positive but not significant. Thus, overall, there are no party cue effects. Participants seem to have moved in the direction of their party, but this happened equally among people in the treatment and control groups.

Table 6.2: Models of Opinion Change in Catalonia

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	1.01*	−0.22
	(0.20)	(0.31)
Treatment	0.20	1.29*
	(0.30)	(0.58)
Knows Position		1.67*
		(0.41)
Treatment*Knows Position		−1.46*
		(0.68)
N	202	202
R^2	0.00	0.06
adj. R^2	−0.00	0.05
Resid. sd	2.19	2.14

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

The absence of overall party following effects may be due to the fact that most participants already placed their most liked party on the right side of the issue scales. Seventy-two percent of participants' placements of their most liked parties on the issue scales were on the right side. Most participants thus appear to have been pre-treated. If party cues affect them at all, they have already experienced that effect. That may explain why they moved

in the direction of their preferred party even when they read the statements in the control group, which lack party labels. These statements may have reminded them of positions they already knew.

Hypothesis 3 asserted that people who do not already know their favourite party's position should move in its direction when they are exposed to cues from it, while hypothesis 4 was that those who already know their most liked party's position should not change their opinions in response to cues. Model 2 thus regresses opinion changes on the treatment dummy, a dummy indicating that participants placed their most liked party on the right side of the issue scale prior to the experiment and an interaction between the two.[6] People who knew their most liked party's position moved 1.45 points in the direction of their favourite party's position in the control group (sum of coefficient on Knows Position and the intercept, p<0.001). People who did not know the position of their most liked party but were shown that position moved 1.29 points more in the direction of their preferred party's position than comparable participants in the control group (p<0.05). The coefficient on the interaction between the treatment dummy and the knowledge of party position dummy is negative, significant, and it has a magnitude that is slightly greater than that of the coefficient on the treatment dummy alone, showing that there was no treatment effect among people who already knew their most liked party's position. There is, therefore, support for hypotheses 3 and 4.

Figure 6.2 shows changes in the direction of participants' preferred party in the treatment and control groups among all participants and among only those who did not know (DK) their most liked party's position before participating in the experiment. We can see that, among people who did not know their favourite party's position prior to the experiment, those who read the party's positions moved in the direction of their preferred party.

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[6]I consider a placement to be on the right side if it is to the left of the midpoint (5) when a party opposes a position and greater than five when a party supports a position. People who did not answer party position perception questions were coded as not knowing positions.

Figure 6.2: Opinion Changes By Condition and Prior Knowledge of Positions

As we have seen, however, people with prior knowledge of their most liked party's position moved in the direction of that party even when they were not exposed to party cues. Participants who already knew their preferred party's positions may have recognized their statements and felt pressure to move in their direction. In spite of the upcoming general election campaign in Spain, no major developments occurred around this time that could have induced participants to change their opinions in a particular direction. It is thus plausible that partisans responded to the control group statements by moving in the direction of their party, because they were reminded of the position of their preferred party. Those who lacked knowledge of their party's position, on the other hand, only shifted their opinions if they were informed of it.

We also saw that participants became somewhat less positive about their most liked party if they were in the treatment group compared to the control group. The difference is never significant, whether considering all respondents or those who knew the positions of their most liked party on zero, one or two of the issues to which they were exposed (models not shown). This supports hypothesis 5 that people do not change their evaluations of their most liked party when they are exposed to positions on which they disagree with that party. Although these differences may be significant in a larger sample, they are small, particularly compared to the effects of party positions on opinions we saw above. This evidence is consistent with that provided by Lenz (2012) that citizens follow parties

but do not vote on the basis of their political preferences.

The general conclusion of this study is that citizens follow party cues when they do not know their positions beforehand. Participants who already knew their favourite party's position also significantly moved in its direction, just less so that those who did not know its position, suggesting that the existence of pre-treatment effects does not prevent parties from influencing opinions. When people are reminded of their most liked party's position, they appear to move their opinions in its direction.

There are a number of limitations to this study. First, it was conducted among student participants in an artificial laboratory situation. A general population sample may react differently. Second, the treatments involved showing participants the positions of both the party they like the most and those of a party they dislike, making it unclear whether both cues are necessary for them to change their opinions. Finally, given the relatively small sample size, it is difficult to break the results down by issue. Small numbers of participants disagreed with their most liked party on each issue. It is also difficult to determine whether more aware participants followed cues more than less aware participants as hypothesis 6 suggests, because doing so requires interacting political information with prior knowledge of one's most liked party's position. Study 2 assesses whether a representative sample reacts to party cues in a different Spanish region, Galicia. It also seeks to determine whether a cue from one's most liked party is sufficient to get someone to change their opinion or whether cues from both one's most liked party and their disliked party are necessary to induce a change. The larger sample size in Study 2 also allows us to see on which issue movement is greatest and to determine whether cue effects are greater among the better informed.

6.2 Study 2: Survey Experiment in Galicia

While study 1 shows that participants in a lab experiment in Catalonia, most of whom were students, adjusted their opinions on issues related to nationalism in response to cues from the party they like the most and from a party they disliked, it does not disentangle the effect of a cue from their most liked party from the effect of a cue from a party they dislike. Study 2 begins the task of distinguishing the two effects. It attempts to determine whether a cue from a most liked party is sufficient to move opinions in the direction of that party or whether cues from both a liked and a disliked party are necessary.

Survey Sampling International (SSI) recruited 600 respondents in Galicia, a region in the northwest of Spain where, while always present, nationalism has always been considerably weaker than in Catalonia. Two issues were considered. The first was whether Galicia should be called a nation. The second was whether Galicia has a right to self-determination. On both these issues, the three major statewide parties: the People's Party of Galicia (PPdeG), the Party of Galician Socialists (PSdeG), and the Citizens Party (C's) have anti-nationalist positions. In other words, they are against recognizing Galicia as a nation and accepting a right to self-determination for the region. The Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) and the coalition of nationalist and left-wing parties En Marea (Podemos-En Marea-Anova-EU) are favourable to both recognizing Galicia as a nation and to granting it a right to self-determination.

All participants were exposed to positions on each of the issues. However, the order varied. Some respondents read positions on the nation issue first and self-determination second, while others read positions on the self-determination issue first and the nation issue second. They were randomly assigned to each possible order. This was done in order to determine the effect of having only a cue from one's most liked party compared to that of having a cue from both one's most liked and one's disliked party. All respondents received one position on the first issue, from their most liked party, and two positions, from

their most liked party and from their disliked party, on the second issue. Randomizing the order of issues allows me to control for the malleability of opinions on each issue. As in Catalonia, the treatment group read position statements with party cues, while the control group read statements without cues.

In a pre-treatment questionnaire, respondents were first asked which of five major Galician parties they like the most.[7] If they selected one of the three parties with non-nationalist positions on both issues (PPdeG, PSdeG or C's), they were then asked which nationalist party they like the least. If they selected one of the parties with nationalist positions (BNG or En Marea), they were then asked which non-nationalist party they like least. The objective was to create a situation in which respondents would have strong opposing feelings about parties with contrasting positions, similar to that faced by participants in study 1. They were then randomly assigned to either the treatment group or the control group.[8]

For each issue, participants were asked their perceptions of the positions of their most liked party and of their disliked party on an issue scale from 0 to 10. They then read party statements on it, from their most liked party on the first issue and from both their most liked party and their disliked party on the second issue. Following the statements, they were again asked their perceptions of the two parties' positions in light of the text(s) they had just read and to provide their opinion on the issue, again on a scale from 0 to 10. Note that this experiment, unlike the one in Catalonia, only involved a single questionnaire. There is thus only one measure of each attitude (except for perceptions of party positions). Rather than changes, the result of interest is a comparison between opinions in the treatment and the control groups.

Table 6.3 shows overall results from Study 2. The first two columns show results for

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[7]Note that participants were given the option of saying that they liked none of the parties most. If they selected this option, they were asked which of the parties they considered least bad. These respondents' choice at this second stage was used as their most liked party.

[8]Randomization was successful, as assessed by logit regressions of treatment status on most liked party and on national identification category and performing hypothesis tests at the 0.05 level.

the first issue, on which participants received only one party cue from their most liked party (ML). The third and fourth columns show results for the second issue on which participants received both cues from their most liked (ML) and disliked (DL) parties. The first and third columns show results for participants whose favourite party was pro-nationalist. The second and fourth show results for those whose preferred party was anti-nationalist. Readers should recall that issues were presented in random order. Thus, the first issue varies randomly from one respondent to the other. We can clearly see that cues from participants' most liked parties alone had weak and insignificant effects. Overall effects among participants who received both cues were stronger and significant ($p<0.05$) among those whose most liked party was a state-wide party with anti-nationalist positions. However, many of the participants in Study 2 were likely already exposed to party cues prior to the experiment. Pre-treatment likely explains why an overall effect of party cues was found among people whose most liked party opposes nationalist positions but not among those whose most liked party supports those stances. While most (66.1%) supporters of the two pro-nationalist parties (BNG and En Marea) knew their party's positions, less than half (48.0 %) of supporters of the statewide parties (C's, PPdeG, and PSdeG,) knew their party's position. There thus may have been more pre-treated partisans of the nationalist parties than of the non-nationalist parties. Thus, it is important to distinguish those know knew their most liked party's position before the experiment from those who did not (as suggested by hypotheses 3 and 4).

Table 6.3: Overall Models of Opinions in Galicia

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	ML Cue		ML and DL Cue	
	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist
Intercept	6.47***	3.21***	6.26***	3.20***
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Treatment	0.06	−0.04	0.16	−0.74*
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)
N	300	288	304	283
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
adj. R^2	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01
Resid. sd	2.94	3.07	3.11	3.01

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 6.4 shows the same results but with an interaction with a dummy variable indicating whether participants knew which side of the issue their most liked party was on prior to the experiment. We can see that, on the first issue, the results are somewhat stronger among people who did not know their preferred party's position before participating than among all participants (compared to results in table 6.3). However, there are still no significant effects on issues on which people were exposed to a single cue. On the second issue, results are considerably stronger. Supporters of parties with pro-nationalist positions who did not know their preferred party's position and received two party cues were 1.72 points more supportive of that position on a scale from 0 to 10 than those who received no cues (p<0.01). Among non-pretreated participants whose most liked party was anti-nationalist, two party cues decreased support for nationalist positions by 0.99 points (p<0.05). There were no significant effects among people who already knew their

preferred party's position. Study 2 thus provides further support for hypotheses 3 and 4. It also provides evidence for hypothesis 6, that party cue effects only occur when people receive their least liked party's position in addition to the position of their preferred party. Only party cues from both a most liked and a disliked party led to following effects. While the effect may only be significant when two cues are presented because they are both presented on the second issue, there is no reason to expect people to follow parties more after being exposed to a position on another issue on which they may disagree with their most liked party.

Table 6.4: Models of Opinions in Galicia by Pre-Treatment Status

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	ML Cue		ML and DL Cue	
	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist
Intercept	3.65***	4.69***	1.95*	5.58***
	(0.88)	(0.73)	(0.89)	(0.78)
Treatment	0.87	−0.23	1.72**	−0.99*
	(0.57)	(0.46)	(0.56)	(0.48)
Knows Position	4.13***	−3.05**	6.11***	−2.91**
	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.08)	(1.07)
Treatment*Knows Position	−1.25†	0.39	−2.29***	0.35
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.66)
N	300	288	304	283
R^2	0.14	0.16	0.20	0.17
adj. R^2	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.16
Resid. sd	2.74	2.82	2.80	2.78

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Hypothesis 7 stated that party cue effects should be greater among people with higher

political knowledge, assuming they do not already know party positions, since they have the information and the motivation to engage in motivated reasoning. Table 6.5 shows results from models in which an information scale, created by summing six political knowledge questions ($\alpha = 0.66$), was added to the model along with interactions with the other variables. This variable was coded 1 if knowledge was at or below the median and 0 if knowledge was above the median. This was done in order to clearly see the effect of the treatment among participants with high political knowledge who did not know the position of their most liked party. The coefficient on the treatment dummy thus shows the treatment effect among participants with high knowledge but who did not know their favourite party's position. The coefficient on the interaction term between the low information and treatment dummies shows how the treatment effect differs among people who had low knowledge and similarly did not know their prefered party's position. Political information was far from perfectly correlated with knowledge of party positions, probably because people tend to project their opinions onto their parties.[9] Thirty-eight percent of participants with high political knowledge did not know at least one of their favourite party's positions. There were thus 31 people in the treatment group and 35 in the control group in the crucial category that did not know their preferred party's position but had high information.

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[9] I ran principal components analysis on the six political information variables and the knowledge of position variables (for each issue) and found that, while they all load strongly on the first component, the knowledge of positions variables load very strongly on the second, suggesting that they are at least as strongly related to a second dimension. They thus are not merely indicators of political knowledge.

Table 6.5: Models of Opinions in Galicia by Pre-Treatment and Information

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	ML Cue		ML and DL Cue	
	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist	Pro-Nationalist	Anti-Nationalist
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.98	3.39*	−1.00	5.29***
	(1.53)	(1.33)	(1.70)	(1.44)
Treatment	1.71†	0.49	3.46**	−1.24
	(0.98)	(0.88)	(1.07)	(0.95)
Knows Position	5.20**	−2.15	8.89***	−2.54
	(1.73)	(1.73)	(1.87)	(1.78)
Low Info	2.85	1.79	4.23*	0.35
	(1.90)	(1.64)	(2.02)	(1.75)
Treatment*Knows Position	−1.36	0.01	−3.54**	0.68
	(1.11)	(1.13)	(1.19)	(1.16)
Treatment*Low Info	−1.47	−0.99	−2.49†	0.40
	(1.22)	(1.06)	(1.28)	(1.13)
Knows Position*Low Info	−1.48	−0.85	−4.27†	−0.72
	(2.26)	(2.32)	(2.36)	(2.33)
Group*Knows Position*Low Info	−0.08	0.31	1.70	−0.38
	(1.44)	(1.48)	(1.49)	(1.49)
N	288	262	292	258
R^2	0.17	0.15	0.23	0.17
adj. R^2	0.15	0.13	0.21	0.15
Resid. sd	2.72	2.88	2.73	2.82

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

We can see that treatment effects are stronger among people who, in spite of not knowing their preferred party's position, had high general political knowledge. Results are still stronger when people are exposed to two cues. However, the effect is no longer

significant among people who received both cues and whose favourite party has anti-nationalist positions. Nevertheless, the result is strong and significant (p<0.01) among participants whose most liked party supports nationalist positions. When they received two party cues, their support for a nationalist position increased by 3.46 points on a scale from 0 to 10. This effect is about twice the size of the effect (1.71) of nationalist parties on their partisans when they receive their preferred party cue alone. The effect was also significantly greater (p<0.1) among participants with high information than among those with low knowledge. The effect was not significant among low-knowledge participants even if they did not know the party position. These results provide support for hypothesis 7.

So far, we have seen that party cues matter for nationalist opinions in Galicia and that the effect is largest when two cues are presented. We also saw that participants who did not already know party positions prior to the experiment and those with high political knowledge responded more. We have not seen on which issues people respond more, however. Figure 6.3 plots the coefficient on the treatment variable showing how much higher support for the nationalist option is in the treatment group than in the control group among participants whose most liked party supports a nationalist position or how much lower it is in the treatment group among people whose most liked party opposes that position. All coefficients are from the second issue that was presented to participants. In other words, the graph represents the effect of receiving two party cues. A coefficient is provided for each issue. The left panel shows the coefficient for all participants who did not know their most liked party's position and the right panel shows the coefficient for those who did not know their most liked party's position but had high overall knowledge.

Figure 6.3: Effect of Party Cues

(a) Do not Know Position

(b) Do not Know Position but High Awareness

We can see that party cues had a strong effect on describing Galicia as a nation among participants who did not know their most liked party's position prior to the experiment and an even greater effect among those who did not know the position but have high political awareness. Conversely, cues on the issue of self-determination had weaker effects, whether we consider the effect among all participants who did not know their preferred party's position or only those who also had high awareness. In sum, this experiment has shown that party cues influence nationalist opinions in Galicia, particularly among people who did not know their most liked party's position before the experiment and those who had high general political knowledge. The effect was larger when the positions of participants' most liked and disliked parties were presented. The effect of cues was greater on the issue of whether Galicia is a nation.

Did party cues override people's national identification? If parties matter in the context of nationalism, we should find that people who lack a nationalist identification become more supportive of nationalism when they are exposed to party cues, since identification with parties at least partly takes over in determining their opinions. The Linz-Moreno national identification question, asking people to identify with one of five categories "Only Galician", "More Galician than Spanish", "As Galician as Spanish", "More Spanish", "Only Spanish", was asked prior to the experiment. The categories were merged to dis-

tinguish those who identified with one of the predominantly Galician categories ("Only Galician" or "More Galician than Spanish") from those who had a dual ("Equally Galician and Spanish") identification.[10]

Table 6.6 shows models in which support for the statement that Galicia is a nation, the issue on which the largest effect was found, is regressed on the treatment dummy and its interaction with the pre-treatment dummy for the two categories of national identification. This table is limited to participants whose most liked party was one of the two parties with the nationalist position on this issue, the BNG and En Marea. It only shows the effects of both most liked and disliked party cues.

Table 6.6: Models of Opinion by National Identification

	Model 1	Model 2
	Dual	More Galician
Intercept	2.44*	7.60*
	(0.64)	(1.09)
Treatment	2.02*	0.00
	(0.99)	(1.54)
Knows Position	3.94*	0.90
	(0.91)	(1.33)
Treatment*Knows Position	−2.57	−0.00
	(1.30)	(2.10)
N	74	24
R^2	0.25	0.04
adj. R^2	0.22	−0.11
Resid. sd	2.72	2.43

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

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[10]Only five supporters of the pro-nationalist parties identified as predominantly Spanish.

We can see that, the party cue had no effect among non-pretreated participants who had a predominantly Galician identity. Those who had dual identities (equally Galician and Spanish), a category 74% of participants identified with, became 2.02 points more supportive of considering Galicia a nation if they were not pretreated ($p<0.05$). In short, party cues led people with dual identities to become more supportive of considering one of the territories they identify with a nation. The results are similar for statewide parties (i.e. cues make people with mixed identities less supportive of calling their region a nation). Results were not presented to save space. Party cues thus matter. If people have an ambivalent identity, their party pushes their opinions in a pro-nationalist or anti-nationalist direction.

The results above provide support for hypothesis 6 that party cues influence opinions when cues from both a liked and a disliked party are presented. I suggested above that a cue from their most liked party alone, rather activating partisanship, makes people aware of how different their preferred party elite is from them. Table 6.7 allows us to assess this possibility. As mentioned above, participants were asked to place their most liked party on a scale from 0 to 10 for each issue before and after reading the party statements. I thus calculated the absolute distance between participants' opinion on each issue and their perception of their most liked party's position both before and after the experiment. I then took the difference between these. The dependent variable is thus how much more distant participants saw themselves from their preferred party after the experiment compared to before the experiment.

I regressed these differences on the treatment dummy for the issue with a single cue and for the issue with both cues. Table 6.7 shows that on, the single-cue issue, people who got the treatment increased their perceived distance from their preferred party by 0.54 points on the 0 to 10 issue scale more than those who were in the control group. This effect was significant. The smaller effect that occurred when they got two cues was not significant. These findings suggest that in the presence of a single cue, while people do

not adjust their opinions to move them closer to their most liked party, they do increase their perceived distance from it, thus recognizing that its position is an elite position.

Table 6.7: Models of Change in Distance from Most Liked Party

	Model 1	Model 2
	ML Cue	ML and DL Cue
Intercept	0.35	0.70**
	(0.26)	(0.24)
Treatment	0.54**	0.17
	(0.17)	(0.15)
N	467	458
R^2	0.02	0.00
adj. R^2	0.02	0.00
Resid. sd	1.80	1.65

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

The first two experiments have provided evidence for hypotheses 3 to 7. We have seen that party cues from both a strongly liked and a disliked party lead to opinion change in the direction of the most liked party. We saw that party cues from only a most liked party do not cause opinion changes, but they do lead people to increase their perceived distance from their preferred party. The final study considers how people react to a single cue, either from a preferred party or from a disliked party.

6.3 Study 3: Survey Experiment in Catalonia and the Rest of Spain

Study 3 is a survey experiment conducted in the context of the 2016 Spanish general election by the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project. The project graciously agreed to include two versions of a question on the unilateral steps towards independence the government of Catalonia is currently taking. Each version of the question was randomly presented to half the sample. All 2294 survey respondents throughout Spain were asked to answer one of the two versions of the question.

All respondents were informed that the government of Catalonia is currently taking steps towards independence without reaching an agreement with the Spanish government. They were randomly assigned to either the treatment or the control group.[11] The control group was then simply asked whether it strongly approves, somewhat approves, somewhat opposes or strongly opposes the Catalan government's decision. Before they were asked for their opinion, the treatment group was informed that the PP opposes the decision.

This experiment allows me to observe how people respond to a cue from a single party, either from a party they like or from a party they dislike. The PP was the disliked party of 51.2% of participants. It was the most liked party of 18.2% of them. While I do not have data on whether respondents were pre-treated, I can distinguish respondents in Catalonia from those in the rest of Spain. While most respondents in Catalonia are likely strongly aware that the PP opposes the moves that have been taken by the Catalan government, people elsewhere in Spain should be less aware of this position. I thus expect to find little or no effect in Catalonia, while there should be an effect elsewhere. If positive party cues can shape people's opinions, people who like the PP most should be less supportive of the moves by the Catalan government in the treatment group than in the control group. If

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[11]Randomization was successful. Treatment status is not significantly related to evaluations of the PP, identification with one's region or with identification with Spain. All these scales were on 0 to 10 scales. Tests were conducted using logistic regression and a 0.05 significance level.

negative party cues are sufficient to shift people's opinions, I should find that people who dislike the PP are more likely to agree with the decision by the Catalan government in the treatment group than in the control group.

I identified respondents whose most liked party is the PP and those whose most disliked party is the PP. I did so by determining whether they rated it higher or lower than all other parties. I considered the PP a respondent's most liked party or their most disliked party even if there was a tie for that position. However, if more than three parties were tied, I did not code a respondent as most liking or disliking that party, since they did not express clear favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the party.

I created two dummy variables. PP Most Liked distinguishes people for whom the PP was their most liked party from people for whom it was not. PP Least Liked identifies participants whose least liked party was the PP. I ran OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is a participant's level of agreement with the unilateral steps to independence. Note that the dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate greater agreement. Model 1 was run on data from Catalonia while Model 2 was run on data in the rest of Spain. Both include as independent variables a treatment dummy, the two dummies identifying people who like the PP most and those who like it least and the interaction between them. The treatment dummy represents the treatment effect among people who neither like the PP most nor like it least. The effects of interest are those among people who most liked and disliked the PP. These can be calculated by summing the coefficient on the treatment dummy and that on the interaction between it and each of the party preference dummies.

In Catalonia, the treatment effect among people who like the PP most is 0.10 (p=0.799). Among people who liked the party least, it is -0.09 (p=0.489). The lack of effect is probably due to pre-treatment. Given the salience of the issue in Catalonia, people there should already know the PP's position. In the rest of Spain, the treatment effect for people who like the PP most is 0.35 (p<0.000). For people who like the party least, it is 0.21

$(p<002).$[12]

Table 6.8: OLS Models of Agreement with Unilateral Steps to Independence

	Model 1	Model 2
	Catalonia	Rest of Spain
Intercept	2.20***	1.51***
	(0.12)	(0.06)
Treatment	-0.05	$0.16^{\dagger}$
	(0.17)	(0.09)
PP Least Liked	0.77***	0.43***
	(0.16)	(0.08)
PP Most Liked	-0.67^*	-0.33^{***}
	(0.29)	(0.09)
Treatment*PP Least Liked	-0.04	0.05
	(0.22)	(0.11)
Treatment*PP Most Liked	0.15	0.20
	(0.42)	(0.14)
N	506	1581
R^2	0.13	0.10
adj. R^2	0.12	0.10
Resid. sd	1.14	0.95

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at $p < .10$; $^*p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Perhaps surprisingly, being exposed to a cue that the PP opposes the Catalan moves towards independence actually significantly increased support for them among people who liked the PP most. PP anti-partisans also moved in the same direction when they received

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[12]I also ran models interacting treatment status with a political information dummy as in Study 2. The interaction was not significant. However, this is likely due to the fact that I am using an imperfect proxy for pre-treatment. Many people in Spain outside Catalonia are likely already aware of the PP's position.

the cue from the PP. These results thus provide further support for hypothesis 6, that party cue effects only occur when the position of a disliked party is present. Here we find evidence that, in the presence of a cue from a disliked party, people move their opinions away from it. Those who received a cue from their preferred party, similar to the results from Study 2, also moved away from their party's position, possibly recognizing that it is an elite position, which they as ordinary citizens have no reason to adopt.

While more work should be done to determine how people respond to cues from liked and disliked parties, the evidence in this study suggests that a cue from a most liked party does not induce people to follow that party. People who received a cue from their preferred party actually moved away from it. This is consistent with evidence from Study 2 that people who received a cue from their most liked party did not adopt its position but instead increased their perceived distance from it.

6.4   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown that, party cue effects do exist in the context of nationalism. Study 1 showed that, when exposed to cues from their most liked party and the party they disliked the most among parties with the opposite position, people who did not know their most liked party's position shifted their opinions in the direction of their preferred party and away from that of the party they dislike.

Study 2 showed that, when exposed only to a party cue from their most liked party, a representative sample of Galicians did not significantly move their opinions in the direction of that party, even in the absence of pre-treatment. When presented with the position of both the party they like the most and that of a party they dislike with the opposite position, participants who were not pre-treated did change their opinions to make them more consistent with the position of the party they like the most. This effect was strongest for the issue of whether Galicia is a nation. Party cue effects were greatest among people

with high general political knowledge, thus supporting the motivated reasoning view of party following. We also saw that participants who were exposed to a cue from their most liked party, rather than moving their opinions in its direction, increased their perceived distance from it.

Study 3 showed that people who received a cue from their most liked party adjusted their opinions away from that party. Those who saw a cue from the party they like least (the PP) also moved away from that party. More research needs to be done to determine which parties are responsible for party cue effects: liked parties, disliked parties or both. The evidence here suggests that disliked parties are necessary for such effects to occur. Future work should also consider how the impact of cues from each party depends on prior knowledge of party positions. If people already know a disliked party's position but not a liked party's position, they may respond to a cue from a liked party alone, because they have already received the negative cue. Furthermore, it may be that the evidence I found for party cue effects when people read only the position of their least liked party is due to the fact that they already knew their preferred party's position. More work is needed to find out what people react to when they are exposed to party positions and how this depends on what they already know.

Overall I have shown that party cue effects exist on nationalism especially among people who did not know their preferred party's position prior to the experiment. These findings extend findings in past studies showing that people follow parties across a range of issues. Here, I have shown that citizens adjust their opinions even on an issue that involves a competing identity.

Like the previous chapter, this one has its own limitations. It involves artificially exposing people to party positions and it thus may overstate the extent of party influence. However, this chapter in conjunction with the last one should more convincingly show that parties can influence people's opinions on nationalism.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In chapter 2, I showed that, in the literature on political behaviour, the fundamental means by which elites have been found to influence public opinion is by offering party cues. No other information is necessary for parties to influence opinions and they influence them even when frames and persuasive arguments are provided.

Countless studies, using both observational and experimental data, have found that partisanship is a powerful force and that citizens tend to adapt their opinions to the positions of parties. I pointed to a major ambiguity of such studies though. No study to date has clarified whether citizens respond to party cues from a party they like, whether they respond to cues from a party they dislike or whether they react to the contrast between the two. It also is not clear whether such party cue effects occur in the context of nationalism, which involves another identity and which frequently is a highly salient issue.

I argued that parties do influence support for nationalism, but that strong prior partisan attitudes must be evoked for such influence to occur. While many citizens in multi-party systems like Spain do not identify with a party, nearly all of them have feelings towards the various parties. The strongest partisan attitudes are the relative evaluations of strongly liked and strongly disliked parties. When people are exposed to contrasting positions, their relative preference for one party over the other is activated. Consequently,

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partisan motivated reasoning occurs and citizens adjust their opinions in the direction of their preferred party.

We then saw, in chapter 3, that Spain was created by the coming-together of a number of previously independent territories. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, movements promoting regional identities arose in the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, and Galicia. We also saw that these movements became associated with parties, both regional and statewide, which came to support or oppose them. I concluded that chapter by suggesting that these parties may influence support for territorial preferences by making citizens who like them more favourable towards their positions and citizens who dislike them less favourable.

Party cue effects have observable implications in both observational and experimental data. In the former, if citizens are following party cues, when a party shifts its position, its supporters should move in the same direction in a subsequent period and its opponents should move in the opposite direction. In the latter, when people learn parties' positions, they should move in the direction of a liked party and against a disliked party. The three empirical chapters put these possibilities to the test.

Chapter 4 focused on measurement. I distinguished two dimensions of regional nationalism. On the one hand, the state-building dimension is about increasing the autonomy of a region, either within the context of an existing state or by pursing independence from that country. The nation-building dimension involves promoting the regional identity and culture, particularly by adopting language policies. I proposed automated text analysis of legislative speeches as a possible way of measuring the positions taken by parties along these dimensions over time.

I addressed four major issues involved in measuring party positions on nationalism using speeches in legislatures in Spain. I argued that, rather than blindly applying a text analysis method like Wordfish to all speeches, selecting speeches on these dimensions should allow us to produce valid measures of positions. I also tested the assumption un-

derlying that program according to which all the necessary information about positions is contained in word frequencies. I did this by comparing the positions I estimated using Wordfish to those produced using a method relying on a very different assumption, string kernel Principal Components Analysis, which extracts information from the order of characters in texts. I found that the results are strongly correlated, especially when there is a clear dominant dimension underlying word use. This finding suggests that assumptions about the textual units containing information about party positions, whether words or substrings, are unimportant as long as the positions are clearly expressed.

In the following section, I addressed the stability of the political meaning of words by showing that the word coefficients estimated by Wordfish are quite variable over time. Even a major word many informed observers would associate with nationalist positions has unstable meaning. I thus argued that positions should be estimated within debates and not across debates. While this does limit our ability to compare positions over time, It does allow us to see how relative positions change. I then showed that having speeches in more than one language does not reduce the dominance of the first dimension or the convergent validity of estimates of party positions when language is associated with the position that is expressed. Finally, I showed that, over time, changes in the positions of nationalist parties tend to be followed by changes in people's perceptions of those positions.

In chapter 5, I considered how different categories of partisans react to changes in the positions of parties in the aggregate over time. We saw that, in Catalonia, when the two major nationalist parties change their positions, their partisans change theirs in the same direction. Aggregate public opinion also changes in response to movement by these parties. Moreover, we saw that these parties became more nationalist before support for secession surged in the region in the late 2000s. These results suggest that parties are at least somewhat responsible for the remarkable increase in support for Catalan independence over the past few years.

In the Basque Country, where data are considerably more limited, we saw that, after

the national PP became more anti-nationalist, its anti-partisans became more supportive of self-determination, while, after it moderated its anti-nationalism, PP opponents moderated their support for nationalism. At the same time the two major nationalist parties, EA and the PNV, moderated their nationalism and their partisans then followed by reducing their support for the possibility of independence. Both these opinion changes were reflected in aggregate public opinion.

In Galicia, we saw that the strongest influence on public opinion appears to have come from the two major statewide parties. Galicians who disliked the Socialists and the PP became more supportive of regional nationalism following increased anti-nationalism by the PP and the PSdeG in the national and regional legislatures, respectively. Later, when the PP moderated its anti-nationalism and the PSOE became less pro-nationalist, Galicians who felt close to the PP became more supportive of nationalism. Those who felt close to the PSOE became less favourable to regional nationalism, although it is not clear that Socialist partisans changed their opinions, because there was a significant change in identification with the PSOE at this time. Galicians who disliked the PP became less nationalist, while those who rejected the PSOE became more nationalist. Thus, in Galicia, there is evidence that partisan groups follow position changes by the two major national parties.

Finally, in the Valencian Community, in spite of the severe limitations of the data, we saw, that, when the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) moved in a nationalist direction in the late 1990s, Socialist partisans followed. The results in chapter 5 thus suggest that, whereas nationalist parties seem to influence public opinions in the Basque Country and Catalonia, statewide parties are most important in Galicia and the Valencian Community.

Chapter 6 considered party influence using three experiments. In a lab experiment in Catalonia, I showed that, party ratings are more stable than opinions. I also showed that participants who did not already know a position of their preferred party they did not

share moved their opinions in the direction of that party when they were exposed to party cues. This study of course did not allow me to determine whether participants responded to the cue from the party they like the most or from their disliked party.

In a survey experiment in Galicia, I then showed that, participants only adjusted their opinions when exposed to cues from both their most liked party and from a disliked party with the opposite position. As in the Catalan experiment, the party cue effect only occurred among participants who did not already know their most liked party's position. Consistent with partisan motivated reasoning, I found that people with high political information were most affected by party cues.

In another survey experiment conducted throughout Spain in the context of the 2016 general election, I again found that citizens did not adjust their opinions in the direction of their most liked party when they received a cue from it alone. Instead they contrasted their opinions with that party. I suggested that in the absence of competing cues, prior attitudes were not strong enough for the PP's cues to influence opinions. I did find a party cue effect in the expected direction among Spaniards outside Catalonia who disliked the PP. As a whole, my experimental data suggest that parties do influence opinions on nationalism but that they only do so when people are exposed to a position by a disliked party, possibly in addition to the position of their most liked party.

What are the implications of these findings? Most fundamentally, they suggest that parties do matter to public opinion formation even in a multi-party system in Europe. A number of studies (e.g. Kaase, 1976; Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009) have provided reasons to doubt the importance in European democracies of the American concept of party identification. However, when we give up on the idea that citizens identify with a single party that influences their attitudes, we can observe that partisanship does have an impact on political behaviour. Citizens like some parties and dislike others. Parties are constantly in conflict over political issues. Consequently, citizens are regularly in a situation in which they have prior attitudes, favourable towards some parties

and unfavourable towards others, that should influence the way they process incoming information.

I have shown that citizens, in the aggregate, move their opinions when parties they like and sometimes when parties they dislike change their positions. I have also shown that parties citizens dislike are at least as influential as those they like. Thus, when we change our way of thinking about partisanship, thinking about partisan attitudes rather than identification, we find that parties do play a major role in shaping public opinion even in a system with multiple parties. Scholars of the politics of Europe should thus consider that partisanship does matter in opinion formation. However, they should keep in mind that what matters most is conflict between parties.

Party influence is important to consider when studying contemporary developments in mass opinions. In recent years, decreased support for membership in the European Union in a number of countries in Europe as well as unfavourable opinions towards immigration have been widely discussed. Given the results I present in this dissertation, it is likely that, when parties conflict over these issues, citizens may feel pressured to adapt their opinions to make them more consistent with the positions of their preferred party as well as to contrast them with those of parties they dislike. Thus, when mainstream parties seek to rebut the claims of far-right parties, they may actually be negatively influencing opinions. People who dislike these parties may become more supportive of the agenda of the radical right.

My results also have major implications for how best to design institutions to ensure that diverse populations can peacefully co-exist in the same state. There has been a heated debate over whether providing autonomy to regions with distinct identities increases or reduces intergroup conflict and secession (e.g. Brancati, 2009; Erk and Anderson, 2009; Lublin, 2014; Lustick, Miodownik and Eidelson, 2004). Scholars remain considerably divided on this issue. Some recent studies have focused on the role of parties in moderating the impact of institutions on nationalist conflict and secession (Brancati, 2009; Fernández-

Albertos and Lago, 2015). Such studies mostly focus on the role played by nationalist parties in mobilizing conflict and public support for secession. However, as I have shown in this dissertation, what really matters when it comes to influencing public opinion is conflict between nationalist regional parties and anti-nationalist statewide parties. Consequently, the latter should be considered as well.

There may be ways to mitigate conflict between nationalist and statewide parties. An extensive literature has focused on the role of power-sharing in conflict reduction (e.g. Lijphart, 1969; Horowitz, 2000). My results suggest that the moderation such elite cooperation induces may reduce conflict in public opinion. If coalitions between different parties are formed, they may induce both nationalist and statewide parties to moderate their positions. We have seen that Spain has experience with such moderation. In 1996, the People's Party (PP) signed the Majestic Pact with Catalan nationalist Convergence and Union (CiU). While we do not have data to assess whether CiU became more moderate at this time, Figure 5.2 on page 159 shows that the PP was moderate in its anti-nationalism. It was moderate until it formed a majority government in 2000 and thus did not need to compromise with regional nationalists. At the regional level such compromise has also occurred. For example, in Catalonia in 2003, Catalan Republican Left (ERC) formed a coalition with Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV) and the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC), which are more moderate on the nationalist dimension. At this time, ERC moderated its nationalist positions. We also saw that changes in the positions of Catalan nationalist parties are associated with subsequent changes in nationalist opinions among their partisans as well as in overall opinion. Thus, such compromise may have helped reduce nationalist conflict.

How can such compromise be encouraged? Spain has a proportional electoral system, which should be conducive to the formation of coalition governments. However, scholars have noted that the Spanish electoral system is one of the least proportional systems in this category due to the existence of many small districts (Gallagher, 1991, 46-47).

Malapportionment also considerably benefits rural areas at the expense of cities (Lublin, 2014, 193-194). Increasing the proportionality of the electoral system and perhaps also improving the representation of urban areas may help ensure that single-party majority governments like the PP majorities between 2000 and 2004 and between 2011 and 2015 are less likely may foster compromise. Other countries have rules to ensure that inclusive coalitions are formed. In Belgium, governments must include equal numbers of representatives from both major linguistic groups (Lublin, 2014, 272). In Spain, a rule could be adopted to ensure that representatives of linguistic minorities are represented in government. If national governments of both the PP and the Socialists were required to include regional nationalist parties, both sides would likely moderate their positions.

Of course, institutional reform cannot ensure that parties actually moderate their positions. We saw above that individual party leaders play an important role in setting parties' positions, as was made clear by Aznar's leadership of the national PP and Piqué's leadership of the Catalan PP. If leaders decide to adopt more extreme positions, they may pull their partisans in the same direction in spite of the institutions that are in place. Nevertheless, institutions encouraging compromise may discourage parties from selecting extreme leaders.

My findings on the influence of party positions on the opinions expressed by citizens also has important implications for party strategies. Ever since Downs (1957), a line of research has argued that citizens select parties on the basis of their policy opinions (Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005; Lachat, 2015; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Moreover, parties are expected to adjust their positions to seek to appeal to voters, particularly by moving towards the median voter (Downs, 1957).[1]

While Study 1 in chapter 6 suggests that opinions do not powerfully influence party preferences during the short period of time covered by that experiment, it still may be

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[1]Note that a number of studies have attempted to account for the incomplete convergence of parties in various systems (e.g. Adams, Merrill and Grofman, 2005; Grofman, 1985). My point here is merely that parties often do try to move in the direction of where they perceive voters to be.

that people evaluate parties on the basis of policy preferences over the longer term. Even if they do not, the mere fact that party leaders believe that citizens do so likely leads them to adopt positions that are closer to those they believe citizens widely hold.

The results presented in this dissertation suggest that, by seeking to appeal to voters, parties may also influence their opinions. Thus, if a nationalist party moderates its pursuit of independence and thus adopts a position that is closer to that of its opponents, it may reduce the pressure on its partisans to support pro-independence positions. Conversely, if a nationalist party seeks to appeal to a block of voters with extreme nationalist positions, it may push citizens with moderate stances in the direction of more intense nationalism. Thus, by moving to where they perceive voters to be, parties may actually move more moderate citizens who support them in that direction.

Although, using a number of approaches, I have provided evidence that parties influence citizens' opinions on nationalism, much more research is necessary to more fully understand how party influence occurs. Future work should consider the influence of liked and disliked party cues as well as the combination of the two on opinions. Moreover, scholars should directly test the extent to which the influence of party cues is due to attitudes towards parties and not to some other attitude or identity. A major limitation of the analyses I present in this dissertation is that I never show that people respond to party cues because of their attitudes towards the parties per se and not because of other attitudes like their ideological orientations or their national identification, which are both associated with their party preferences. People may respond to cues from parties because they consider those parties to support or oppose a movement which they personally support or oppose. Disentangling the influence of partisanship per se from that of other attitudes or identities would require an experimental design with at least three conditions: a control, a party cue treatment, and a treatment with appeals to national identity, for example.

Scholars and nonacademic observers who care about public opinion on nationalism and other issues, particularly those who are concerned about finding ways of ensuring the

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peaceful coexistence of diverse groups should be aware of the consequences of the positions adopted by parties. People have attitudes towards parties. When parties adopt positions, citizens follow. We should thus take parties seriously.

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