

Université de Montréal

***The politics of bureaucratic mobility: Historical changes  
across Public Service Bargains in Canada's provincial  
governments***

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## Résumé

Cette thèse présente l'évolution temporelle du lien entre les variables politiques et la mobilité des élites administratives dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada. Considérant la relation entre le gouvernement et l'administration comme une relation mandant-mandataire (*principal-agent*), la littérature en administration publique décrit l'influence de diverses dynamiques politiques – par exemple un changement de parti au pouvoir – sur le degré d'intervention des gouvernements dans la dotation du personnel administratif.

S'appuyant sur la notion de marché bureaucratique (*Public Service Bargain*) de Hood et Lodge (2006), la présente thèse estime que la relation entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité des fonctionnaires s'inscrit dans un contexte sociohistorique. Plutôt que de percevoir l'ensemble des relations politico-administratives comme présentant les caractéristiques de la théorie mandant-mandataire, avec de nombreux conflits pour l'atteinte des objectifs et une grande asymétrie des informations, cette thèse suggère que la mesure dans laquelle diverses dynamiques politiques poussent les gouvernements à procéder à des mises à pied ou à des nominations stratégiques varie avec le temps, en suivant les changements dans ce qui entoure les relations politico-administratives.

Les statistiques descriptives et la régression logistique sont principalement utilisées pour analyser l'association entre les variables politiques et la mobilité, à l'aide d'une base de données originale repostant des changements de sous-ministres dans la fonction publique provinciale au Canada de 1920 à 2013. Les résultats empiriques permettent de conclure que l'influence des dynamiques politiques sur la mobilité des fonctionnaires varie en fonction des différents marchés bureaucratiques.

Avant la mise en place d'une fonction publique professionnelle, où les relations politico-administratives s'inscrivaient dans un *spoils bargain*, les changements de gouvernement entraînaient une importante rotation des fonctionnaires. Cette pratique est conforme à un marché bureaucratique où les critères de compétences des fonctionnaires sont indéfinis, et où les fonctionnaires sont loyaux au parti au pouvoir.

Dès la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, jusqu'aux années 1980, l'association entre les dynamiques politiques et la mobilité diminue grandement. Cette pratique correspond au marché bureaucratique de Schaffer (*Schafferian bargain*), où les gouvernements favorisent la connaissance technique des politiques et la bonne volonté des fonctionnaires à donner des conseils avisés aux membres du gouvernement, peu importe le parti au pouvoir.

Dès les années 1980, les dynamiques politiques sont de nouveau associées à la mobilité. Or, non seulement les changements de parti, mais également l'élection de nouveaux chefs à la tête de ceux-ci entraînent une plus grande mobilité. Cette pratique va dans le sens du *managerial bargain*, où les nominations sont utilisées pour encourager l'allégeance à l'agenda gouvernemental et la compétence est comprise comme étant la bonne gestion du personnel et des ressources dans le but de répondre aux directives du gouvernement.

Étudiant les actions stratégiques des gouvernements dans leur contexte sociohistorique, cette étude contribue de manière originale à l'administration publique et à la politique canadienne, en démontrant que les dynamiques politiques jouent un rôle quant à la mobilité des fonctionnaires, bien que la nature de ces dynamiques et l'étendue de leurs effets varient selon les époques, qui présentent des marchés bureaucratiques distincts.

**Mots-clés :** Bureaucratie, Politique exécutive, Contrôle, Nomination, Mobilité du personnel, Marché bureaucratique, mandant-mandataires, Patronage, Politisation, Westminster, Canada, Provinces.

## **Abstract**

This dissertation studies temporal variances in the relationship between political variables and the mobility of administrative elites in Canada's provincial bureaucracies. Conceptualizing the association between the government and the bureaucracy as a principal-agent relationship, research in public administration has identified how various political dynamics – such as a transition in the governing party – affects the extent to which governments interfere in the staffing of bureaucratic personnel; removing incumbents and replacing them with persons who are believed to be loyal to government's policy agenda. This dissertation contributes to this literature by identifying the historical contingencies with which political dynamics effect mobility.

Drawing upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain (PSB), the relationship between political dynamics and mobility is situated within a more precise social-historical context. Rather than approaching political-administrative relationships as universally reflecting the specifications of principal-agent theory – exhibiting a high incidence of goal conflict and information asymmetry – this work claims that the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically dismiss and appoint personnel has varied over time, in tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships; specifically, the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and its loyalty.

Primarily using descriptive statistics and logistic regression the association between political variables and mobility is tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in Canada's provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility has varied over time across distinct PSBs.

Prior to the development of the modern professional bureaucracy, where political-administrative relationships reflected a *spoils* bargain, transitions in the governing party resulted in increased mobility. Such actions are congruent with a PSB where the nature of governance is of a minimal character; there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy's competency; and the bureaucracy's loyalty is of a partisan nature towards the governing party.

Starting in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, the association between political dynamics and mobility is significantly reduced. Such is congruent with a *Schafferian* bargain where governments encourage technical knowledge of policies and a willingness amongst bureaucrats to provide frank counsel to government office holders, regardless of the party in power.

Starting in the 1980s however, political dynamics are once again positively associated with mobility. Yet now, not only transitions in party, but all newly elected heads of government lead to increased mobility. This is consistent with a *managerial* bargain where appointments are used to encourage loyalty to the government's policy agenda and competency is understood as the ability to manage personnel and resources to realizing the directives dictated by the government.

Situating the strategic actions of governments within their social-historical context, this work makes original contributions to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics by showing that when it comes to bureaucratic mobility, political dynamics matter; but which dynamics, and the extent of their effects, vary over time across distinct PSBs.

**Keywords:** Bureaucracy, Executive politics, Control, Appointment, Mobility, Public Service Bargain, Principal-agent theory, Patronage, Politicization, Westminster, Canada, Provinces.

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## **Abbreviations**

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CCF	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CEO	chief executive officer
COO	chief operating officer
DM	Deputy Minister
ENPC	elected-but-no-party-change
GDP	gross domestic product
NDP	New Democratic Party
NPM	New Public Management
UN	Union Nationale
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PC	Progressive Conservative
PM	Prime Minister
PQ	Parti Québécois
PSB	Public Service Bargain
UK	United Kingdom

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## **Abbreviations Canadian Provinces**

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BC	British Columbia
AB	Alberta
SK	Saskatchewan
MB	Manitoba
ON	Ontario
QC	Québec
NB	New Brunswick
NS	Nova Scotia
PEI	Prince Edward Island
NL	Newfoundland and Labrador

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We were once asked by sociologist C. Wright Mills to use our *sociological imagination* to understand better the environmental factors affecting what otherwise appears to be our individual success and failure. While successfully completing my Ph.D. has been one of my greatest achievements, using my *sociological imagination* to reflect on the past four years I spent at the Université de Montréal is a humbling exercise.

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## **Chapter 1. Introduction**

*Chapter one summary.* This introductory chapter offers a synopsis of the dissertation. After briefly outlining the practical and intellectual reasons for why the mobility of administrative elites is a valuable topic of study, the research question is outlined, and the theoretical framework, research design and methods are described. The conclusions main findings of this work are stated. The primary contributions this work makes to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics are identified. The structure of the dissertation is presented and a brief summation of each chapter is provided.

## Introduction

At a roundtable panel sponsored by the *Journal of Canadian Studies* to discuss the ostensibly increased political interference in the staffing of administrative personnel by the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, former political advisor, lobbyist, and policy consultant, William Neville, made the following remark:

I can't tell whether this media and public criticism of patronage is just a thing of the moment arising out of circumstances of the last election, or whether there is a more rooted trend there. It bothers me because the only alternative to the exercise of political discretion is bureaucratic discretion....It's unaccountable. It's undemocratic. (Panel on Patronage 1987, 191)

With 30 years having passed since Neville's comments, it seems fair to conclude that such curiosity was not of a fleeting nature, simply reflecting the ebb and flow of a more systemic 'issue-attention cycle' (Downs 1972). Reviewing print media before and after Mulroney's time as prime minister displays an enduring interest in the appointment, rotation and dismissal of bureaucratic elites. With fanfare and flourish, headlines have reported; '*Ottawa bureaucrats get axe*'; '*Tory policies weed out 16 deputy ministers*'; '*Deputy Ministers shuffle revealing*'; '*La haute fonction publique retourne au rouge*' and '*Top civil servants engaged in musical chairs*' (The Ottawa Bureau of The Globe and Mail 1977; Winsor 1993; Mackie 1997; Winsor 1999; Lessard 2014).

Interest in the mobility of administrative elites has not been limited to the media. International organizations, public servants, and political parties, have voiced concern over what they perceive to be the increasing propensity of governments to remove and appoint bureaucratic elites (Matheson et al. 2007; CBC 2013, 2014). From an academic perspective, interest in mobility is well warranted. Political interference in the staffing of administrative personnel goes

to the heart of longstanding normative question over the appropriate relationship between politics and administration and also touches upon a more recent body of research empirically examining how turnover affects organizational performance.

Accordingly, scholars have become interested in the various factors influencing mobility. Yet as this chapter makes clear, research studying the politics of mobility faces some pressing challenges. Most notably, recent studies using longitudinal data have failed to find any relationship between mobility and some of the foremost political variables (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014). This work argues that a key reason for the puzzling results is that the relationship between politics and mobility has shifted over time across historical periods. Whereas researchers have largely approached the relationship between politics and mobility by drawing upon principal-agent theory – assuming that governments universally desire administrative elites who display an unquestioning willingness to carry out policy directives – from a theoretical perspective that is more sociological, this work instead argues that the extent to which political variables prod governments to dismiss and appoint administrative elites is contingent on the types of professional behaviours governments wish to foster amongst bureaucrats. While concurring with principal-agent theory that governments strategically appoint bureaucratic elites as a means to ‘control’ the bureaucracy’s behaviour, this work problematizes the notion of control by challenging its implied usage by principal-agent theory as exclusively meaning that bureaucrats display an unquestioning responsiveness to realize the government’s policy agenda.

Drawing upon the Public Service Bargain (PSB) literature to identify changes in the nature of political-administrative relationships over time, this work outlines three ideal-type bargains – *spoils*, *Schafferian* and *managerial* – each varying in the types of professional traits

that governments desire bureaucrats to display. Using quantitative and qualitative data of administrative mobility over approximately the last 100 years in Canada's provincial bureaucracies, this work finds empirical support that the extent to which political variables prod governments to interfere in the staffing of administrative officials is contingent on the types of competency and loyalty that governments seek to foster amongst bureaucrats.

### **The Politics of Mobility: Practical Implications and Normative Debate**

*Practical implications: Elite mobility and organizational performance.* An increasing body of research suggests that administrative mobility can positively affect a battery of socioeconomic indicators. Since Seymour Martin Lipset first articulated his economic development thesis in 1959, a tenant within the social sciences has been the positive correlation between democracy and socioeconomic growth (Heo and Tan 2001; Lipset 1959; Midlarsky 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). Emerging research in political science (Evans and Rauch 1999; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016) and economics (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Brousseau, Schemel, and Sgard 2010) however, suggests that while democracy is certainly a central component of socioeconomic development, another key facilitator is the nature of a state's administrative apparatus.

Crucially, many of the characteristics positively associated with socioeconomic development reflect Weber's (1991) ideal-type bureaucracy, including, permanent office holders, the appointment of personnel according to merit, and the implementation of impersonal rules in a hierarchical structure (Fukuyama 2013; Cingolani, Thomsson, and de Crombrughe 2015; Bersch, Praça, and Taylor Forthcoming). Amongst these components, the stability of bureaucratic personnel and the sheltering of their career from political interference, have been

associated with greater levels of economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999), democratic stability (Cornell and Lapuente 2014) as well as lower levels of corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Bersch, Praça, and Taylor Forthcoming).

Beyond socioeconomic development, scholars in public administration as well as organization and management studies have also studied the association between an organization's performance and the stability of personnel (March 1991; Waldman et al. 2004; Evans, Nagarajan, and Schloetzer 2010; Boyne et al. 2011; He, Sommer, and Xie 2011; Cornell 2014; Villadsen 2016). When it comes to the turnover of administrative elites, there are good theoretical reasons for believing that mobility can have a direct impact on an organization's operations.

Since Chester Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive* (1938) challenged Frederick Taylor's (1911) theory of scientific management by insisting that an organization's efficiency stemmed from the behaviour of the executive rather than the structural division of tasks, scholars have been interested in the role of executives in determining organizational performance (Selznick 1957; Conger 1999). On the one hand, turnover of personnel has been identified with positively affecting performance. By bringing in new actors, mobility is believed to introduce new ideas into the organization and can serve as an important source of innovation (March 1991; Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003; Teodoro 2009). Being unfamiliar with the organization's culture, turnover can also serve to counter the behavioural pathology of 'goal displacement' prone to bureaucratic organizations (Merton 1940), whereby an emphasis on routines can lead to 'trained incapacity' (Veblen cited in Merton 1940, 198) and actions that are ultimately detrimental to the organization's original objectives, negatively affecting performance, and in the case of public

bureaucracies, the overall quality of democracy (Brewer and Walker 2010; Moynihan and Herd 2010).

Yet on the other hand, others suggest that mobility can negatively affect performance. Identifying replacements, training new employees and socializing them into the organization's culture, all place demands on the organization's financial and human resources (Waldman et al. 2004). Turnover can also deplete organizational memory, impede long-term planning and direct attention away from ongoing projects (Cohen 1998; Lewis 2007; Gallo and Lewis 2012; Cornell and Lapuente 2014; Cooper and Marier Forthcoming). Moreover, when the mobility of public officials is politically motivated, some link this to weakening the overall quality of governance, by reducing their willingness to voice opinions contrary to those of the government (Weller 2001; O'Toole 2006; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Aucoin 2012; Resh 2015), a possibility that is particularly troublesome for those who believe the bureaucracy is an independent political institution entrusted with representing interests different than those of the elected government (Rohr 1998; Cooper 1998).

*Normative debate: The proper relationship between politics and administration.* Beyond affecting organizational performance, government meddling in the staffing of bureaucratic personnel also touches upon a central and longstanding normative issue within the discipline of public administration: what should be the proper relationship between politics and administration?

On one side of the debate are proponents drawing heavily upon the formative writings of Woodrow Wilson (1887) and Frank Goodnow (2003), contending that politics and administration are separate realms, and that the intrusion of the former into the latter, is

detrimental to the quality of governance (Blinder 1997; Meier 1997; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016). As stated by Wilson in one of the earliest treatises on the study of administration:

Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. (1887, 210)

The extent to which governments influence the appointment of administrative personnel has also been a long-standing issue in the public realm. Many of the formative reforms leading to the development of the modern professional bureaucracy such as the United States' Pendleton Act and the UK's Northcote-Trevelyan Report aimed at constraining government intervention in staffing administrative personnel (Dreyfus 2000). Yet while institutional reforms via the establishment of Public Service Commissions during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries limited the government's power to freely appoint and dismiss persons to administrative offices (Scarrow 1957; Love 1988; Juillet and Rasmussen 2008), in large part such modifications never made their way to the apex of the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the Westminster tradition of government, found in Canada's federal and provincial governments, the appointment and removal of the highest-ranking bureaucrats (deputy ministers) has largely continued to be the exclusive pleasure of the Crown outside the dominion of any Public Service Commission (Neilson 1984; Smith 1987; Bourgault and Dunn 2014).<sup>1</sup>

Questions concerning the extent to which governments should be able to staff elite bureaucrats continue to remain politically charged. For instance, in response to a scathing report from Auditor General Sheila Fraser chastising the behaviour of senior public servants in awarding public contracts to Liberal-friendly firms, the *Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities* (Gomery Commission) established by the

government to study the issue improve the quality of governance, identified the need to better isolate the careers of DMs from political interference and recommended eliminating the first minister's power to appoint and dismiss DMs.

With an underlying normative tone alluding to a preference for the rule of the technocrat over that of the elected, the belief that better decisions would be made if the careers of administrative elites were sheltered from political interference is a contributing factor in recent reforms of certain elite administrative positions, such as fiscal councils (Kopits 2011), and is an opinion still defended by many within public administration. For instance, seeking to improve the quality of government, Kenneth Meier, a leading voice in contemporary public administration, has suggested that “our basic problem of governance is that the long-running interplay between bureaucracy and expertise on one hand, and responsiveness and democracy (read electoral institutions) on the other hand, has swung too far in the direction of democracy” (1997, 196).

On the other side of this debate, are those who prefer the rule of the elected politician to the appointed official. Proponents of this position tend to concur with the writings of Dwight Waldo (1948) and Paul Appleby (1947) rejecting the notion that politics and administration are separate realms, and are generally uncomfortable with the prevalent antipathy towards politics voiced by some, that, in an effort to improve the quality of governance, seeks to shift decision-making powers away from democratically elected governments and into the hands of insulated officials. Michael Spicer's recent book, *In Defense of Politics in Public Administration*, excellently illustrates this position. Drawing upon the writings of Bernard Crick, Spicer asserts that:

...there is reason to worry, in my view, when those who would seek to advice and educate our public policy-makers and administrators so often express what is clearly an anti-

political attitude. There is a danger here that the public administrators we help train might internalize such an attitude and actually come to see themselves as somehow superior to, or above politics. Crick, recognizes this danger when he warns of “those who think that administration can always be clearly separated from politics, and that if this is done, there is really very little, if anything, that politicians can do that administrators cannot do better.” This is “the view of the servant who would not merely be equal, but who would be master, of the administrator who feels constantly frustrated in *his* work by the interventions of politicians”. (2010, 5)

Exponents of this perspective defend political control of staffing administrative elites as a necessary means to ensure that the democratically elected are well disposed to govern as they desire (Flinders and Matthews 2010; Meyer, Höllerer, and Leixnering Forthcoming).

Proponents of this normative position can also be found in contemporary the public arena. Vehemently opposed to the Gomery Commission’s recommendation that the prime minister’s power to appoint DMs be reduced, a number of actors comprising business CEOs, academics, consultants, former deputy ministers, political advisors, and politicians, publicly reproved the idea in an open-letter addressed to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, proclaiming that:

We also believe that the selection of these officials [deputy ministers], who will be a key source of support to you and your Cabinet colleagues, is too important a task to entrust to any kind of independent selection system detached from the political process. You [the prime minister], as the head of the government, need the ability to organize it in ways that best respond to your objectives, and to place in the most senior positions the professionals who, in your judgment, are best able to meet the needs of a particular department and agency. It is difficult to contemplate how any large business organization would survive if vice presidents and senior officers were selected by a group independent of the CEO. (Canada 2006)

### **The Politics of Administrative Mobility: The State of the Discipline**

*From methodological limitations to theoretically puzzling results.* Although the politics of bureaucratic mobility has received interest from the media, political parties, international governmental organizations and government mandated commissions, scholarship in public

administration has been somewhat more laggard in its efforts to apprehend the extent to which politics affects bureaucratic mobility (for some notable early exceptions see, Finer 1952; Derlien 1988; Bourgault and Dion 1989a; Weller 1989; Neilson 1990). Instead, largely influenced by research in organization and management studies, a prominent body of research has focused on the role that nonpolitical variables have in influencing mobility (Caillier 2011; Bertelli 2007; Cho and Lewis 2012; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). The slow manner in which public administration has moved to consider the politics of mobility is part of what some see as a larger trend within the discipline to move away from its roots in political science and its preoccupation with relationships of power (Lodge and Wegrich 2012; Meier 2007; Fry and Raadschelders 2008).

In contrast to this general trend, a growing number of scholars have taken-up interest in studying the political dimensions of bureaucratic mobility (Grzymala-Busse 2003; Peters and Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2008; Boyne et al. 2010; Flinders, Matthews, and Eason 2012; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2014a, 2014b; Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa 2014; Veit and Scholz 2016). Recognizing the power that the heads of government in some countries have in staffing administrative elites, this research draws primarily (albeit often implicitly) upon principal-agent theory to hypothesize as to how political dynamics<sup>2</sup> – such as a transition in the governing party or the government’s legislative strength – affect the extent to which governments strategically remove and appointment bureaucratic elites.

Yet despite its merits, this burgeoning research faces two difficulties, one methodological and one theoretical. Methodologically, as noted by others (Boyne et al. 2010; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 892; Veit and Scholz 2016), few studies have tested

simultaneously competing explanatory factors. Instead, research has tended to rely on descriptive statistics and only focus on one political variable. For instance, in one of the earliest empirical works, Bourgault and Dion (1989) limit their study of DM mobility in Canada's federal bureaucracy to transitions in the governing party. More recent work by Bierling et al. (2000; 2014) studying the mobility of deputy and assistant deputy ministers in Canada's provincial bureaucracies from 1987 to 2007, constrain their attention to whether an election has occurred.

One reason for the inability to test competing explanatory variables is difficulty generating datasets with enough observations to test multiple independent variables at the same time. This problem is even greater for scholars studying parliamentary countries, where, in contrast to the United States where the president controls approximately 3,000 administrative offices (Lewis 2008), there are fewer positions under the command of the first minister. Recognizing the need for more rigorous empirical tests, recent attempts have been made to generate larger datasets. Notable examples include work by Dahlstrom and Niklasson (2013) and Ennser-Jedenastik (2014a), who, by enlarging their sampling population across spatial units and through time, have produced some of the first large-N studies in parliamentary systems, encompassing 1,608 and 1,671 observations, respectively.

A second difficulty with the emerging literature on the politics of administrative mobility is theoretical. Compared to previous work, the findings of these recent studies using longitudinal data are leading to a confounded set of conclusions. For instance, using data extending back to 1970, Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup (2014) find no statistically significant relationship between a change in the governing party and the replacement of bureaucratic elites – a main supposition of the literature. Elsewhere, using data sampling back to 1960, Dahlstrom

and Niklasson fail to discover a statistically significant relationship between mobility and any political variable. In light of the puzzling results, the authors conclude that “none of the previously used explanations – ideological bias of the government, the number of years that the government has been in power, and the parliamentary support for the government – holds. Our general conclusion is therefore negative and emphasizes the need for more systematic research on this question” (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 891). In sum, as researchers have developed larger datasets by drawing upon observations further back in time, the relationships previously believed to exist between political dynamics and administrative mobility are no longer holding-up. Of course, contradictory and inconclusive results are a normal part of science (Lakatos 1970), encouraging the kind of additional research suggested by Dahlstrom and Niklasson.

*Advancing research: A proposed solution to the puzzling results.* This dissertation advances the literature by overcoming the long-standing methodological and more recent theoretical difficulties by retesting the most prominent hypotheses with an original dataset of deputy minister mobility in Canada’s ten provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. Although used less frequently in public administration than in other fields of social science, panel data (sometimes referred to as time-series cross-sectional or pooled data) offers advantages helping to overcome the methodological and theoretical difficulties identified above (Pitts and Fernandez 2009; Zhu 2013). Unfortunately, because of the high financial cost and time required to develop such data, its use continues to be sparse in many fields of science (Hardy 2001, 1341).

Methodologically, by collecting data from the ten Canadian provinces over a period of approximately 100 years, this study increases the number of observations roughly tenfold without introducing as much variation in alternative explanatory variables specific to spatial units, such as political culture and institutions, as would be the case if drawing observations

from across different countries. Comparativists in political science frequently identify the Canadian provinces as an ideal case selection when desiring a greater deal of control in institutional variables (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 2011; Turgeon et al. 2014).

By collecting data across the ten Canadian provinces over approximately 100 years this project joins in the recent effort by some to overcome methodological difficulties by simultaneously testing explanatory variables. By collecting observations across so many jurisdictions over a such a long period of time the dataset generated for this work contains 16,660 observations, approximately ten times greater than the previous large-n study of bureaucratic mobility in a parliamentary system (Enns-Jedenastik 2014a).

In addition, the large number of observations over an extended period of time also offers a means to potentially overcome theoretical difficulties by exploring temporal variances in the relationship between politics and mobility. Specifically, it puts principal-agent theory in its historical context by discerning whether the relationship between political dynamics and mobility varies across historical periods embodying distinct political-administrative relationships.

Importantly, research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility has predominantly drawn upon principal-agent theory (sometimes referred to simply as ‘agency theory’), a variant of rational choice theory, to hypothesize over the causal relationships between political variables and the strategic removal and appointment of bureaucratic elites. By paying attention to the preferences and strategic actions of individuals, rational choice theories have been an important theoretical guide in understanding the underlying dynamics of social phenomena, including, the development and transformation of institutions (North 1981), joining an organization (Olson 1965), participating in a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), the actions of social movements

(McCarthy and Zald 1977), voting in a democratic election (Blais 2000), engaging in corrupt behaviour (Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1994), as well as in the field of public administration, government control of the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002), including the appointment of administrative elites (Lewis 2008).

As the use of rational choice amongst social scientists began to grow in the 1990s however, so too did it attract a great deal of criticism (Green and Shapiro 1994). At times originating from within its own ranks (Bates et al. 1998), some of the more constructive critiques helped improve its theoretical rigour and empirical application. Amongst the various points raised, one issue was the static nature of the models. As stated by two proponents of principal-agent theory in public administration:

While this principal-agent model has been well articulated, its assumptions rarely have been analyzed. The principal-agent literature in political science has paid little attention to these key elements, contending only that they exist and then going on to the other empirical questions at hand. Information and goal conflict both are treated as constants in the model, with little change over time or across settings. As a result the theory becomes static rather than dynamic and may force the analyst to frame questions in an inappropriate manner. (Waterman and Meier 1998, 177)

Recent work studying political-administrative relationships has begun to allow the components of these models to vary (Gailmard and Patty 2012; Krause and O'Connell Forthcoming). Yet when it comes to studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, research has generally continued to apply a static version of principal-agent theory. Reflecting the influential descriptions of Weber (1991), Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971), hypotheses assume that political-administrative relationships are fraught with goal conflict and information asymmetry that are assumed to be problematic for governments presumed to desire bureaucrats who accept and enthusiastically work towards realizing the government's policy directives. Governments are then assumed to strategically use administrative appointments to ensure that bureaucrats are

responsive to their policy agenda. The problem, however, is that these hypotheses may not be suitable for different historical periods in which governments do not have the same core preference that bureaucrats simply accept and work towards realizing the government's policy agenda.

### **Beyond Agency Theory: Situating Strategic Actions within the Sociohistorical Context**

Influenced by the sociological writings of Marx (1963), Weber (1978) and Polanyi (1944), other social scientists have brought attention to the antecedent social context in which individuals develop their preferences (March and Olsen 1983; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Jenson and Mérand 2010). What individuals come to recognize as good and desirable, how they interpret the intentions of others, and what they view as appropriate behaviour in pursuit of their preferences, are not universally given to the individual, but rather, are influenced by the larger sociohistorical setting in which they belong. True, individuals act strategically in pursuit of their preferences, but the nature of these preferences are embedded within a larger sociohistorical context.<sup>3</sup> While the strategic nomination of administrative elites in the modern period may reflect the assumptions of agency theory – that governments view goal conflict and information asymmetry as problematic due to their preference for bureaucrats who indisputably accept the government's policy directives and manage resources towards making them reality – this may not be the case in sociohistorical periods defined by fundamentally different political-administrative relationships.

The 20<sup>th</sup> century was a period of profound social, industrial and technological transformation (Inglehart 1977). The same is also true of our systems of governance and the relationship between elected governments and administrators, including the nature and purpose

of governing, the nature of the bureaucracy's competency as well as its loyalty (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Silberman 1993; Savoie 2003; Yang and Holzer 2005; Chapman and O'Toole 2009). Research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, however, has not yet considered that the relationship between politics and the strategic appointment of bureaucrats may vary alongside historical transformations in political-administrative relationships. While principal-agent theory has explained the underlying motivates as to why governments remove and appoint bureaucratic elites (responsiveness to their directives in an environment where goal conflict and information asymmetry are viewed as problematic), these hypotheses may be contingent to a specific modern, *managerial*, era of governance, witnessed in many industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1980s (Pollitt 1993; Saint-Martin 2000). This dissertation postulates that as the nature of governance and the contours of political-administrative relationships have shifted during the 20<sup>th</sup> century there have been changes in the extent to which political variables are associated with bureaucratic mobility, thus potentially explaining the puzzle that as researchers have begun to use longitudinal data pooling observations back in time before the 1980s, the association between political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility is no longer present.

To understand better how the relationship between politics and administrative mobility has varied over time, this dissertation draws upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of Public Service Bargain (PSB) to outline the contours of different political-administrative relationships appearing over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, specifically, differences in the nature of the bureaucracy's competency as well as its loyalty. Unlike previous research that has assumed governments use appointments to ensure responsiveness to the government's directives, this dissertation reformulates prominent hypotheses by situating the actions of governments within

their sociohistorical context embodying distinct PSBs. It is argued that as the nature of the competency and loyalty which governments seek to encourage amongst bureaucrats has shifted across PSBs, so too have there been changes in the extent to which political variables prod governments to move persons in and out of administrative offices in an effort to encourage such traits.

Change in the relationship between politics and administrative mobility over time across PSBs is tested primarily with descriptive statistics and logistic regression using an original dataset measuring yearly change in personnel holding DM positions for each department in Canada's provincial bureaucracies between 1920 and 2013. The empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the association between mobility and several key political dynamics does exhibit a great deal of variation across different PSBs.

Specifically, before the advent of the modern professional bureaucracy, a transition in the governing party is most associated with increased mobility. This is congruent with a *spoils-type* Public Service Bargain where the nature of governance is of a minimal and incremental character, there are no specifications concerning the bureaucracy's competency and the its loyalty is of a partisan nature oriented towards the party in government. In the *spoils* bargain, incoming governments, no matter how long the previous party had been in power, strategically use their prerogative to staff administrative offices to reinforce this partisan loyalty by nominating individuals who had supported their party. Equally important, when controlling for a transition in party, changes in premier have no relationship with mobility. This reflects a strategic staffing of bureaucratic elites by governments, which is not preoccupied with limiting bureaucratic drift and ensuring commitment towards the head of government's policy agenda, but instead, is oriented towards reinforcing partisan electoral support to the party.

Beginning in the postwar period and lasting until the 1980s, however, the relationship between most political dynamics and mobility is significantly weakened. The weak association between political dynamics and mobility corresponds with a *Schafferian* bargain, where the competency governments desire bureaucrats to possess is a more detailed knowledge of policy issues, meanwhile the loyalty preferred is of an impersonal nature oriented to the office of the government which encourages bureaucrats to provide honest and frank advice on the basis of their expertise regardless of the party in power. To foster such qualities governments strategically leave elite bureaucrats in their positions regardless of a change in party or premier.

From the 1980s and onward, political dynamics once again begin to have a marked effect on mobility. This time, however, in contrast to the *spoils* bargain, all changes in the first minister, rather than a transition in the governing party, are positively associated with mobility. The shift from a partisan to a personal political dynamic reflects the political-administrative relationship found in a *managerial* bargain. Here, the type of competency governments want the bureaucracy to possess is the ability to effectively manage personnel and resources towards realizing the government's policy agenda, and not, as in the case of the *Schafferian* bargain, provide advice about the nature of policy decisions. The type of loyalty desired by politicians in the *managerial* bargain is oriented to the policy agenda set by the head of government. The result is that even when there has been no change in party, all newly elected heads of government are now associated with increased levels of mobility. Different than the *spoils* bargain, when controlling for transitions in the governing party, changes in the first minister heading the government, are most strongly associated with mobility.

## **Contributions**

*Contributions to public administration.* This dissertation makes original contributions to the fields of public administration and Canadian politics.<sup>4</sup> By situating the government's strategic actions within a sociohistorical context, a primary contribution of this dissertation to public administration is the demonstration that the relationship between politics and bureaucratic mobility is historically contingent, varying alongside changes in the contours of political-administrative relationships. When it comes to the mobility of bureaucratic elites, this work shows that politics matters, but which political variables, and the strength of their relationship with mobility, varies across periods embodying distinct PSBs.

By providing one of the first applications of PSBs to formally postulate and empirically test how a government's strategic actions are mediated by the character of the sociohistorical institutional setting, this work deviates from the dominant use of PSBs by scholars to describe changes in the roles of bureaucrats over time and across countries (Lodge 2010; Bourgault 2011; Steen and Van der Meer; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 2011; Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; Hondeghem and Van Dorpe 2013; van der Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013), and attests to its utility to understand how the nature of political-administrative relationships influences government action.

*Contributions to Canadian political science.* By studying a key aspect of political-administrative relationships amongst the Canadian provinces through an extended period of history, this dissertation also makes an important contribution to Canadian political science. A key issue of interest amongst Canadian political scientists is the decision-making style of the

executive (Heeney 1946; Lindquist and White 1997; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005; Lewis 2013), and more precisely, the increasing centralization of power of the Prime Minister (PM). In his *Governing from the Centre*, Donald J. Savoie forcefully argues that since the end of the 1970s, decision-making within the Canadian federal government has become centralized in the hands of the PM. Speaking to the minimal role of cabinet in Canadian politics, Savoie boldly asserts that “no one, at least in government in Canada, believes any longer that the prime minister is *primus inter pares*” (1999, 13).

Yet others have been somewhat sceptical of Savoie’s conclusions. Some question the validity of Savoie’s deductions given that the research methods used were a non-random selection of interviews with political elites from within the executive (Clercy 2000). Concerns have been raised that the failure to triangulate conversations with other sources of evidence, or even conduct interviews with actors outside the executive centre of government, may have biased Savoie’s conclusions, especially considering the penchant for political elites to exaggerate the accuracy of events to emphasize their importance (Berry 2002).

Others take issue with the assertion that the exercise of first ministerial power has become more centralized since the 1980s, claiming that earlier PMs were also autocratic (Bakvis 2001). Some research of the Canadian provinces suggests that the temporal component of Savoie’s “governing from the centre” thesis is less valid at the provincial level where governments have only known a dominant premier (White 2005). Likewise, in his historical comparative study of cabinet in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, Christopher Dunn (1995) has noted a historical change in the cabinet style emerging after the Second World War, from an *unaided* to an *institutionalized* cabinet structure. While the two cabinet styles are distinguished by formal organizational differences such as the introduction of cabinet

committees, they also involve a behavioural shift in the distribution of power. In contrast to Savoie, who sees a centralization of power, Dunn claims that the transformation from the *unaided* to the *institutionalized* cabinet witnessed a shift in the decision-making style of premiers from a dominant style to a “general tendency for collective decision-making and a less dominant premier” (1995, 13). More recent applications of Dunn’s work, however, in light of Savoie’s differing conclusion, provide evidence of an increased centralization of power from the *institutionalized* cabinet, to a *premier minister-centered* cabinet (Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005).

Without empirical evidence that can be systematically compared, disagreements over the centralization of power in the first minister are difficult to resolve. By analyzing the mobility of bureaucratic elites from before the development of the professional Weberian bureaucracy into to the modern era this dissertation provides one means of measuring the centralization of power. Importantly, amongst the various indicators suggesting a centralization of power identified by Savoie, is the increased reappointment of bureaucratic elites. As he explains:

A minute of council first issued in 1896 and last reissued in 1935 gives the prime minister the power to appoint deputy ministers. All prime ministers have made it a point to retain this power in their own hands and for good reason. It is key to controlling government operations and to ensuring that the government goes in the intended direction. (Savoie 2005, 37-38)

Critically, while all PMs have retained their power to appointment DMs, prime ministers since Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) have increasingly made use of this prerogative as a means to increase their control of the bureaucracy. Savoie alleges that:

Trudeau believed that entrenched bureaucrats in line departments had too much influence, if not power, over policy and administration. He became convinced that they ran departments like personal fiefdoms and all too often left outsiders, including ministers out of the loop. They could not be easily challenged either by line ministers, central agencies or cabinet because of their intimate knowledge of the sector, the department, and the department's policy and program history. Rotating civil servants would serve many

purposes, one of which was that it would place ministers and senior bureaucrats on a more equal footing, since both would become birds of passage in government departments and agencies. (2008, 224-225)

By being able to identify trends in the mobility of DMs over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this dissertation provides an empirical test as to the first minister's centralization of power in Canada. The evidence from this dissertation lends strong support to Savoie's thesis. Whereas prior to the 1980s changes between premiers from within the same party were not associated with increased bureaucratic mobility, since this period, newly elected first ministers, regardless of whether or not the new premier is from the same party, are now associated with higher levels of mobility, congruent with an increased concentration of power in the first minister.

### **Plan of Dissertation**

The remainder of this dissertation is organized into five chapters. After briefly reviewing explanations in organization and management studies, Chapter 2 turns to research studying the politics of mobility. Noting the tendency of principal-agent theory to universalize the preferences of heads of government underlying the strategic manipulation of bureaucratic offices, this review introduces Hood and Lodge's concept of a Public Service Bargain to better understand how the relationship between political variables and mobility may vary over time alongside changes in political-administrative relationships, specifically concerning the type of competency and loyalty governments desire bureaucrats to possess. Chapter 3 outlines the research design, data, variable operationalization and methods used to test the hypotheses. The strengths and limitations of these choices are also discussed. The empirical analysis of this work is divided into two chapters.

Chapter 4 takes a first step to investigate changes in the relationship between mobility and politics over time. Evidence based on descriptive statistics generally suggests that the relationship between most political dynamics and mobility has varied over time across distinct PSBs in a manner congruent with theoretical expectations. In addition to descriptive statistics Chapter 4 also draws upon a body of primary and secondary sources to conduct a qualitative inquiry to identify whether the strategic reasons as to why governments remove and appoint administrative elites over the last 100 years have shifted in tandem with changes in the contours of political-administrative relationships in a manner congruent with theoretical expectations.

The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) then makes use of statistical regression to simultaneously test the association between key political variables and mobility while controlling for alternative predictors identified by organization and management studies. Even when controlling for additional factors influencing mobility, the findings support the conclusion that the extent to which some key political dynamics have influenced mobility has shifted across diverse PSBs.

The concluding chapter reviews the dissertation's objectives, its central argument, the empirical evidence, as well as its main conclusions. The findings implications for scholarship studying administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics are considered. Limitations of this study and potentially promising future avenues of research unaddressed in this project are also identified.

### **Conclusion of Chapter One**

This introductory chapter has provided a synopsis of the dissertation. After introducing the topic of bureaucratic mobility, it was claimed that despite its merits, burgeoning research studying the

politics of bureaucratic mobility has continued to face methodological and theoretical challenges. Most importantly, as researchers have developed larger datasets by using observations further back in time, the empirical results have led to conclusions challenging the most prominent hypotheses. It was postulated that one reason for these puzzling results may be due to variation in the contours of political-administrative relationships.

As the nature of governance has changed over the last 100 years, and the type of competency and loyalty governments want bureaucrats to exhibit has accordingly shifted also, so too, it is postulated, has there been changes in the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically manipulate elite administrative offices. It is worth emphasizing that this theoretical position does not oppose the tenant of agency theory that governments strategically appoint administrative elites in order to control the behaviour of the bureaucracy. Instead this work asserts that while all governments seek to control the bureaucracy's behaviour, the nature of the behaviour sought by governments varies across historical periods.

The theoretical framework, research design and methods used to test this possibility were also discussed. By studying the mobility of DMs in Canada's provincial bureaucracies over a period of 94 years, this dissertation creates the largest dataset to date of administrative mobility in a single parliamentary system (N = 16, 660). Drawing upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain, a primary contribution of this dissertation is the demonstration that the relationships between political dynamics and mobility vary alongside historical changes in political-administrative relationships. This chapter concluded by outlining the structure of the dissertation and providing a synopsis of each successive chapter.

## **Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

*Chapter two summary.* This chapter reviews previous research studying the causes of administrative mobility. It is observed that whereas research strongly influenced from the fields of organization and management studies have overlooked political dimensions, a second growing corpus of research drawing upon principal-agent theory has begun to explore the effects that political variables can have on mobility. After reviewing the central hypotheses identified by this emerging research, this chapter claims that the underlying causality between political variables and mobility underpinning the hypotheses may be contingent on a specific managerial type of political-administrative relationship, unique to the contemporary era of governance.

From a sociological perspective there are good reasons for postulating that the relationship between political dynamics and mobility may vary over time. To understand how the association between political variables and mobility may vary alongside historical variations in political-administrative relationships, this chapter draws upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain to place the strategic actions of governments within three distinct sociohistorical contexts of a *spoils-type*, *Schafferian*, and a *managerial* bargain.

*I share quite a lot with those rational choice theorists who are willing to situate actors in a given and partially manipulable institutional context... I call them institutionally situated rational choice analysts. They do not presume that the entire world is one big Adam Smith-style free market. They ask about strategies and outcomes within settings that have institutional rules of the game in place.*

- Theda Skocpol (1995, 106)

*Patronage appointments are those that can be made by elected politicians without any encumbrance in terms of due process or transparency. In reality, even patronage powers exist within a certain bounded rationality which constrains choices such as political calculations or informal brokering.*

- Matthew Flinders and Felicity Matthews (2010, 647)

### **What Explains Administrative Mobility?**

*Organization and management studies.* Strongly influenced by organization and management studies, a prominent body of research in public administration has focused on the relationship between the turnover of personnel and an individual's characteristics, an organization's features as well as labour market conditions. Generally, this research tends to operationalize mobility by asking individuals whether they intend to leave their position in the near future. Personal characteristics observed with influencing an individual's intention to depart include age, gender, education, and the amount of time they have been in their position.

Age has been shown to have a U-shaped relationship with mobility, with the youngest and oldest displaying a greater propensity to leave than those in the middle (Borman and

Dowling 2008; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011). Similarly experience with the organization is found to have the same U-shaped relationship (Lewis and Park 1989). A higher portion of persons first entering their position leave within an initial period due to a discrepancy between the actual responsibilities of their job and their expectations prior to beginning. Those persons remaining in their position after this initial period, however, are generally satisfied with their job and thus have lower levels of mobility. Yet towards the end of their career, time is once again associated with turnover as persons are likely to retire from the work place.

Education has been shown to be inversely associated with an intention to depart (Cho and Lewis 2012). Others have shown that the field of study is an important factor affecting mobility. Persons having degrees in subjects with greater commercial value in the private sector such as science and mathematics are associated with higher levels of turnover (Ingersoll and May 2012). Conventionally, males have been identified with lower levels of turnover (Lewis and Park 1989), albeit some suggest that as the prevalence of ‘male-breadwinner’ family model has lessened and women’s income is no longer supplementary, the relationship between gender and mobility no longer exists (Moynihan and Landuyt 2008). An employee’s satisfaction with remuneration, their decision-making autonomy, and their ability to influence the direction of policy, have all been found to be negatively associated with an employee’s intention to quit (Arcand, Tellier, and Chretien 2010; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011). Beyond individual characteristics, economic growth is positively associated with mobility (Kirschenbaum and Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013). By expanding the labour market, economic growth creates more employment opportunities and fosters confidence amongst employees that they can easily find employment elsewhere. Beyond demand, the supply of labour may also affect mobility. When the pool of candidates is small, employers are more likely to provide more

generous remuneration, and may be less willing to dismiss staff. Conversely, when the supply of qualified personnel available is large, employees may receive less generous salaries and face employers more willing to dismiss them (Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). The same is also true of the size of the organizations. Larger organizations may be associated with higher levels of mobility due to the larger resource pool from which employers can draw upon to replace personnel (Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin 1988). As the organization grows larger, the costs associated with searching for and identify replacements decreases, thereby increasing the probability of mobility.

*Organization and management studies: Where's the power?* Despite contributing to our understanding of administrative mobility by uncovering the individual, organizational and market characteristics affecting mobility, two critiques can be launched against this literature. First, rarely do these works study actual levels of mobility. Instead, turnover of personnel is operationalized via the individual's stated intention to leave their position in the near future. While this method has the advantage of allowing researchers to gather additional information of the employee alongside questioning them about their intentions to quit, such as their age, gender and feelings of empowerment, an important limitation of this method is that intention to leave is not actual departure. A few studies having tested the association between intentions and actual departure have found less than convincing evidence. For instance, in one study of public school teachers, only 20 percent of persons having expressed an intention to depart had left their position two years later (cited in Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). Given the weak link between intention and actual departure, some researchers have warned that, "the argument for the use of

intent to turnover as a surrogate for actual turnover might be less than compelling” (Dalton, Johnson, and Daily 1999, 1343).

A second shortcoming of this body of research is that by limiting analysis of mobility to an employee’s intention to depart leaves unexamined another important cause of mobility: involuntary forced departure. While voluntary withdrawal is likely a predominant cause of turnover amongst lower tier staff, there are good reasons for believing that it accounts for much less mobility at the apex of the bureaucracy.

First, bureaucratic elites generally exhibit those personal traits and hold jobs whose characteristics are associated with lower intentions to leave, such as middle age, greater influence over policy and higher financial remuneration (Evans, Lum, and Shields 2014; Zussman 2014). Research from the public service motivation literature also notes that those in executive positions are more likely to be generally more satisfied with their position (Jabes and Zussman 1988; Camilleri 2007; van der Wal 2013). As former Canadian Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet, the highest-ranking public servant, Alex Himelfarb (2002-2006), stated in his address to the annual Public Policy Forum Dinner in 2013, “My hunch is that I can speak for all the former clerks here this evening that for us public service was deeply satisfying, a privilege, a source of pride, an opportunity to make a difference. Public service was more often than not fulfilling, and, believe it or not, even fun” (Himelfarb 2013, par. 2).<sup>5</sup>

Studies based on the direct observed behaviour of administrative elites also suggest that voluntary departure is less common than other positions. Studies documenting actions of bureaucrats following their dismissal have noted disappointment or even anger amongst the departed (Cooper Forthcoming). As noted by professor of sociology, policy consultant, and former DM in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, John. D. House:

Whenever there is a change in government, particularly when a new party comes into power, the established senior bureaucrats fear for their jobs. The transition period between the old regime and the new regime is when they are most likely to be replaced. (1999, 75)

Furthermore, House observes that in addition to fearing for their jobs, the ‘Old Guard’ of incumbents sought to deter the government from dismissing them. Speaking of the phases undertaken by elites upon a change in government, House remarks that:

The first and most fundamental was *survival*. They were quick to disavow any particular political affiliation with or personal loyalty to the old regime. They presented themselves as being loyal public servants to whichever party was in power and whoever was premier. While often critical of the premier and various ministers behind their backs – sometimes scathingly so, [sic] the Old Guard were always careful to be completely obedient, supportive, and loyal to their faces. (1999, 76)

Beyond demonstrating that bureaucratic elites tend to enjoy their positions of power, House’s observation brings attention to the central place that forced departure plays in bureaucratic mobility as well as highlighting the essential fact that underlying such staffing decisions is a strong political dimension. By failing to consider forced departure, a severe shortcoming of organization and management studies is its failure to study mobility from a perspective of power.

### **The Politics of Mobility**

*Positions of importance and the power to appoint.* There are two primary reasons for why considerations of power and political dynamics are an important component in understanding the mobility of bureaucratic elites. The first is the importance of administrative offices for heads of government. As the highest ranking non-political position within each ministry, DMs can have enormous responsibilities and can possess a great degree of discretion in decision-making (Weller and Rhodes 2001). Deputy ministers are also invested with a vast deal of resources.

Bureaucratic elites are also in a position of being able to develop substantive knowledge of policy issues and organizational logistics in addition to fostering important relations with key stake holders (Hecl 1978; Evans 1995; Carpenter 2001), who can be essential in the development and implementation of policies and programs. This knowledge asymmetry favouring the ‘trained expert’ over the ‘political master’ has since Weber (1991, 232) been recognized by students of bureaucracy (Finer 1941; Putnam 1973). With potential to have such a great deal of discretion in matters of administration, policy, and even politics, governments have a pronounced degree of interest in who occupies these elite administrative positions. To borrow a metaphor from Richard Rose (1987), governments wishing to ensure that the ship of governance sails in the direction they so desire, have a great deal of interest in the characteristics and intentions of those persons holding the helm.

More than having an interest in who the occupants of these elite administrative are, the second reason for why considerations of power and political dynamics are an important aspect of mobility is the discretion governments enjoy in staffing these offices. As elaborated upon in greater detail below (p. 39), the power governments wield in staffing elite administrators is especially true in the Canadian variant of Westminster, where, as Order-in-Council appointments resting at the exclusive ‘pleasure of the crown’ (represented by the first minister), there are no institutional constraints impeding the first minister from appointing and dismissing deputy ministers (Neilson 1984; Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009; Boston and Halligan 2012; Aucoin 2012; Bourgault and Dunn 2014). Although voluntary departure is beyond the government’s control,<sup>6</sup> the reappointment, demotion, promotion and dismissal of DMs are not. Simply put, when it comes to staffing bureaucratic elites, personnel decisions, are decisions, steeped in politics.

*Mobility and control.* Recognizing the interest and power that governments have in staffing administrative elites, a second body of research in public administration has been more attuned to political factors affecting mobility. While not constituting a monopoly of the field, the earliest and largest body of this research comes from the American ‘Control of the Bureaucracy’ literature. Having identified various ways governments control the bureaucracy, such as budgetary reports, legislative hearings, and third-party monitoring (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; Huber and Shipan 2008), researchers have recognized the *ex-ante* appointment of administrative personnel as one of the most common and efficient means for presidents to increase their control (Nathand 1983; Waterman 1989; Wood and Waterman 1991; Bertelli and Feldmann 2007; Aberbach 2009; Moe 2012; Lewis and Waterman 2013;). Conceptualizing the rapport between politicians and bureaucrats as a delegated relationship between a principal and an agent, this scholarship has predominantly drawn upon principal-agent theory to hypothesize about the causal relationships between political dynamics and mobility (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Lewis 2008; Clinton et al. 2012).

While the majority of this research has emerged from the United States, researchers studying parliamentary countries have also remarked of the propensity of first ministers to strategically staff administrative personnel as a means to increase their control (Bourgault and Dion 1989a; Boyne et al. 2010; Flinders, Matthews, and Eason 2012; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2014a; Park and Kim 2014). Despite the commonality of viewing the appointment of administrative elites as a means

of control, there are some important differences between the American and parliamentary systems that deserve mentioning.

A first difference concerns the absolute number of appointees. Whereas the American president has the power to make more than 3, 000 appointments to government agencies and bureaus (Lewis 2008), first ministers in parliamentary systems have much fewer positions at their disposal. What they lack in quantity, however, first ministers make up for in quality, ultimately having a great deal more of power to appoint and dismiss the top administrative positions within each ministry as well as various government agencies, boards and committees than compared to the United States, where Congress approval is often necessary (Lewis 2008). As will be mentioned below in the discussion of institutional constraints limiting appointments (p. 39), the power of the first minister is especially strong in some countries such as Canada, where the appointment and removal of DMs is the sole prerogative of the first minister, unhindered by any institutional constraint.

A second difference between the United States and parliamentary countries concerns the nature of the appointees themselves. Whereas in the United States most elite appointees are recruited from outside the civil service (Ouyang, Haglund, and Waterman 2014), constituting what has been referred to as an 'in-and-outer' system (Hecl 1988), in parliamentary systems, research suggests that first ministers tend to draw from within the bureaucracy (Barberis 1996). For instance, studying the effect that a change in government has on DM mobility in Canada between 1887 and 1986, Bourgault and Dion (1989a) claim that while there were some dismissals, mobility was mostly a mixture of horizontal reappointments, demotions, and promotions.

Nevertheless, by instilling the belief amongst bureaucrats that “their survival in office depends on the survival of the government” (Bourgault and Dion 1989a, 126), this act of ‘musical chairs’ is nonetheless a deliberate tactic used by governments to gain control of the bureaucracy. Reappointing an agent to an elite position by heightening her awareness that the office she holds is at the grace of the principal’s approval. Knowing who appointed them, civil servants are reminded that if they do not meet the first minister’s expectations, their appointer can just as easily remove them.

A few examples illustrate the intentions underpinning the staffing of administrative personnel in parliamentary systems. Wanting to increase her control of a civil service she felt was serving its own interest rather than the government’s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to rely upon the appointment of elite administrative offices to encourage the type of behaviour she desired. Reflecting on this point, Thatcher stated in her memoir that “it became clear to me that it was only by encouraging or appointing individuals, rather than trying to change attitudes *en bloc* that progress would be made. And that was to be the method employed” (as cited in Richards 1996, 669). Likewise, in the Canadian context, evidence of this logic is glimpsed in a memorandum sent to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney from political advisor Peter G. White. Following his electoral victory, White briefed Mulroney that:

No single area of government is more important than the management or deployment of senior personnel...we must make an early start on gaining control of the bureaucracy by identifying and installing some of our own chief operating officers [deputy ministers]...This should not be done with fanfare and only at long intervals, but routinely and continuously over the government’s mandate. (cited in Newman 2005, 456)

For scholars of parliamentary systems of government, the tendency for heads of government to draw from within the civil service when making strategic appointments arises from the first

minister's dual preferences to both increase her control over the bureaucracy and efficiently realize policy objectives. One means of achieving both objectives is to nominate persons believed to be enthusiastic towards the government's policy agenda by drawing from a pool of candidates already acquainted with the administrative structures necessary to efficiently implement the government's policy agenda: public servants.

By strategically using the power of appointment to increase responsiveness without having to resort to recruiting from outside the civil service, parliamentary heads of government have been hailed by some as having found a way to improve bureaucratic responsiveness all the while gleaning some of the advantageous of a professional public service (Institute for Public Policy Research 2013, 53).<sup>7</sup> In this manner, the strategic appointment of administrative elites in many parliamentary systems reflects an important equilibrium concerning the long-standing question within public administration as to the proper balance between the independence of the bureaucracy and its capacity to 'speak truth to power' on the one hand, and responsiveness from administrators towards realizing the policy directives of the elected government, on the other hand (West 2005; Aucoin and Savoie 2009). Thus whereas some view the strategic appointment of administrative personnel by governments as constituting an act of 'politicization', due to the incursion of political considerations into the realm of administration (Peters and Pierre 2004; Hustedt and Salomonsen 2014), scholars of parliamentary systems tend to speak of such strategic appointments with careful nuance, referring to the practice as a form of 'moderate' (Bourgault and Dion 1989a) 'functional' (Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014), 'managerial' (Mulgan 1998, 7), 'personal' (Richards 1996), or 'bounded' (Meyer-Sahling 2008) politicization.

In sum, despite disparities between the United States and parliamentary systems as to the number of bureaucratic appointees and their career backgrounds, researchers studying both systems agree that the appointment and dismissal of bureaucratic elites is a central instrument used by governments to control the bureaucracy. The following section reviews the most prominent hypotheses between political variables and administrative mobility from this literature.

### **Prominent Political Factors**

*Political culture.* One group of scholars have focused on political culture to explain differences in the degree to which governments interfere in the nomination of administrative personnel. These works generally follow the practice of Almond and Verba (1965) and view political culture as embodied in the political attitudes of the citizenry. Variation in political interference by governments in administration is thus explained by the embedded attitudes and values held by the members of society (Sotiropoulos 2004; Taylor and Williams 2008). Simply put, in some societies political interference in administration is accepted amongst the citizenry, while in others, it is not.

In Canada there is a long tradition of explaining differences in political behaviour as stemming from differences in political cultures across regions of the country (Simeon and Elkins 1974; Boychuk 1998; Wiseman 2007; Anderson 2010; rejecting the presence of inter-regional differences in culture see, Porter 1965; Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams 1980). As stated by Bell, “regionalism, like other ‘isms’, involves values, sentiments, and beliefs” (1992, 127), and differences in values, sentiments and beliefs lead to different political behaviours. Various studies have used regional and political culture to explain the degree with which provincial

governments dismiss and appoint administrative elites (Heintzman 1983; Noel 1987; Crossley 2000; Johnson 2005; MacLeod 2006; McKenna 2014; Lindquist and Vakil 2014; Rasmussen 2014).

A problematic issue with explanations resting on political cultural, however, is that so many works suggest that the province they are studying has a culture favourable to the dismissal and appointment of administrative elites. With regional cultures having a positive disposition to political manipulation of administrative personnel being so ubiquitous, such explanations offer little prowess in understanding variation across provinces who all share a similar cultural disposition, nor does it offer an explanation for intra-provincial differences over time.

Many critiques have been made against cultural theories as offering ‘just so’ explanations for the minimal attention they give to the preferences and actions of individuals (see reviews by, Formisano 2001; Wedeen 2002). Relying on culture has possibly led scholars in Canadian public administration to overlook other possible explanations. What appears to be culture may in fact be explained by differences in the political parties forming government, the length of time a party stays in power, the frequency of elections and government’s legislative strength.

*Formal political institutions.* A second explanation for differences in the degree to which governments remove and appoint bureaucratic elites is the formal institutional constraints limiting the government’s role in the appointment process. When compared to other systems of government, the fusion of the legislative and executive branches and the custom of responsible government within the Westminster tradition gives the head of government a great deal of power. This power has traditionally been extended to making appointments to various powerful

and prestigious political and administrative positions, including; department ministers, judges, members of the upper house of bicameral legislatures, ambassadors, ministerial exempt staff, elite bureaucratic officials, executives in arm's length government agencies, boards and commissions, and in the case of the United Kingdom, even ecclesiastical positions (Bakvis 2001; Flinders 2012). In the last 20 years, however, some Westminster countries have introduced institutional reforms designed to limit the first minister's power in appointing these offices, including deputy minister positions (Elgie 1998; Pond 2008; Matthews and Flinders 2015). As shown in Table 1, amongst the Westminster countries of the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, New Zealand and Australia, a distinction can be made between two broad appointment processes, varying in the extent to which the first minister's power in the appointment process is limited.

On the one hand are countries with an appointment process that can be referred to as a 'decisional body' system. In this model, found in New Zealand and to a lesser extent in the UK, an administrative body is invested with the responsibility of undertaking and making decisions concerning the appointment of administrative executives. These tasks include advertising, searching, interviewing, short-listing, and most essentially, the selection of the successful candidate.

In the UK the body is the Civil Service Commission made-up of commissioners and non-executive directors outside the civil service. In New Zealand this body is the Chief Executive of the State Services Commission (also known as the Commissioner). While consulting with members of the government and the civil service, the Commissioner is solely responsible for searching, short-listing, interviewing and selecting the successful candidate (Institute for Public Policy Research 2013).

Table 1: Typology of executive appointments in selected Westminster jurisdictions

State	Appointment Model	Role of Third-party	Clerk of Executive Council and Cabinet Secretary	Role of First Minister	Justify Decision	Transparency of Process
New Zealand	Decisional body	Advertise, interview and select appointee. (State Services Commission)	Advisory	Veto decision by State Services Commission.	Yes	High
United Kingdom	Decisional body	Advertise, interview, recommend candidates, approve final selection. (Civil Service Commission)	Advisory	Accept or veto decision by Commission.	No	Moderately low
Australia	Advisory body	Advises (Public Service Commission)	Advisory	Appointment and dismissal.	No	Low
Canada	Advisory body	Advises Clerk of EC of talent within civil service (Committee of Senior Officials)	Advisory	Appointment and dismissal	No	Low
Canadian Provinces	Advisory body	Advises Clerk of EC of talent within civil service	Advisory	Appointment and dismissal	No	Low

(Source: Aucoin 2006; Matheson et al. 2007; Institute for Public Policy Research 2013; Paun, Harris, and Magee 2013)

Yet despite the fact that in the decisional body model many of the steps in the nomination of bureaucratic elites are made by a decisional body, the first minister ultimately has the final say

in who is appointed. In the UK the appointment and dismissal of permanent secretaries must still be approved by the PM, who is not obligated to justify any such decision. In New Zealand the final appointment of chief executives does not need the explicit approval of the PM, although the prime minister retains the power to veto any appointment, which unlike the UK, must be publicly justified.

To avoid the embarrassment of having a selection vetoed by the first minister, the decisional body consults with the prime minister as well as the relevant minister to ensure an appropriate and acceptable selection. Importantly, while this decisional body model limits the power of the first minister, such restrictions are not definitive. At any time, the first minister can override the staffing decisions of the decisional body. According to the authors of a report commissioned by the Cabinet Office in the UK studying the appointment process of administrative elites, despite the involvement of the Civil Service Commission in the selection of permanent secretaries “there is a long history of Prime Ministers taking advantage of this power: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair reportedly were very involved in the appointment of Permanent Secretaries” (Institute for Public Policy Research 2013, 15). In sum, Rhodes’ statement of the power of the executive in the Westminster tradition that “there is no constitutional constraint on that executive beyond those it chooses to accept” (1999, 353), remains an accurate description of the first minister’s power in staffing administrative elites in a decisional body model, where the degree to which any staffing decision made by the decisional body is accepted by the first minister, rests at her unrestrained discretion.

On the other hand, there is an appointment process that can be referred to as an ‘advisory body’ model. Found in Australia and Canada, in this model the first minister is provided with advisory assistance in identifying and selecting candidates. Assistance, however, is strictly

advisory in nature and this body does not have the power to make and present the first minister with a decision. In this system the final selection is at the unfettered discretion of the first minister. Whereas in the decisional body model the process of identifying and selecting a candidate is outside the direct oversight of the first minister (although the first minister is consulted and retains the ultimate power to accept or decline the selected candidate), in the advisory body model, the degree to which the first minister is involved in the entire process of searching, identifying and selecting candidates is itself determined by the first minister.

Without any formal institutional constraint limiting the power of the first minister in the advisory body model, there is potential for a greater variety of voices advising the first minister. The members of this advisory body are fluid and itself at the discretion of the first minister. Such actors can include, the head of the civil service (herself selected by the first minister), interested ministers, political advisors and party loyalists, interested stake holders, as well as other deputy ministers. In the end, however, the involvement and power which this body has is always at the discretion of the first minister who retains an unchecked degree of power over the appointment, retention, and dismissal of bureaucratic elites.

Another difference between the decisional and advisory selection models is the degree of transparency of the processes. In the advisory model there is much less transparency or conformity as to the process by which candidates are selected (Bourgault 2014). For instance, based on his time as Public Service Commissioner in Australia, Andre Podger (2002-2005) criticized the nominally reduced role of Australia's PM to appoint bureaucratic elites. Podger remarks that "...neither Moore-Wilton nor Shergold directly sought my views on specific appointments. They were not legally obliged to, and perhaps Prime Minister Howard's desire for tight control precluded any involvement of the Commissioner" (2007, 135). Offering his

reason for the dismissal of some civil servants but the renewal of contracts for others, Podger claims that “A better explanation is that there are favoured and not so favoured secretaries, and that the prime minister favours closer control and greater flexibility in managing the senior echelons of the APS [Australian Public Service] (2007, 137).

Ultimately however, regardless of whether the selection process of administrative elites is a decisional or an advisory body model, the constraints limiting the first minister to influence the nomination of administrative elites rests weakly on the first minister’s good will to accept a limited role. Without institutional constraints able to effectively tie the hands of the first minister, institutional explanations offer little explanatory power as to the degree with which first ministers appoint and remove administrative personnel. With so much power invested in the hands of the first minister, attention instead needs to focus on those political factors varying within each country that can influence the incentives and the propensity of governments to reappoint bureaucratic elites.

*Government’s incentive to appoint.* Although often done so implicitly, research placing the preferences of heads of government at the centre of theoretical explanations of mobility has predominantly drawn upon principal-agent theory. Surfacing in political science (Mitnick 1973; Mitnick and Weiss 1974) independently (Shapiro 2005, 271; Mitnick 2013) and approximately at the same time as it first appeared in economics (Spence and Zeckhauser 1971; Ross 1973), by the 1980s agency theory had become a prominent theoretical approach to analyze relationships in which one actor, the principal, delegates responsibility for carrying out tasks to another, the agent. In political science this theory was quickly adopted by scholars in public administration to examine one of the most vital cases of delegation in representative democracy:

the delegation of tasks from the elected government to the unelected administrative official (Mitnick 1975; Moe 1984).

Importantly, postulates concerning the behaviour of principals forwarded by principal-agent theory are based on presumed characteristics of the relationship between politicians and public administrators, heavily influenced from an earlier body of research applying economic theories to study the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, including the writings of Parkinson (1957), Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), and Niskanen (1971).

A first presumption of agency theory is that the preferences of politicians and civil servants are dissimilar. Describing this goal conflict, Niskanen claimed that whereas by desiring to be re-elected, politicians want to implement policies reflecting the public interest, the same preference is not shared by bureaucrats. Refuting the notion that administrators primarily seek to serve the public interest, Niskanen famously claimed the preferences of bureaucrats as seeking to maximize their budget, stating that:

It is impossible for any one bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of the limits of his information and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal motivations...A bureaucrat who may not be personally motivated to maximize the budget of his bureau is usually driven by conditions both internal and external to the bureau do just that. One should not be surprised, therefore (as I was initially), to hear the most dedicated bureaucrats describe their objectives as maximizing the budget for the particular service(s) for which they are responsible. (1971, 39)

Alongside divergent preferences, a second maxim of principal-agent theory is that administrative officials possess more information than politicians concerning the agent's own competencies and behaviour, as well as the details of policies and programs. As Weber famously noted:

Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret...In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy, out of pure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or from interest groups. Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament. (1991, 233-234)

These two aspects of agency theory – goal conflict and information asymmetry – lead to expectations that bureaucrats, in pursuit of their own preferences, will behave in ways that go against the preferences of politicians. Desiring agents who will loyally execute tasks in conformity to the principal's policy agenda, agency theory further postulates that politicians will appoint agents to ensure such loyalty. As Downs states:

Personal loyalty to one's superior, and from one's subordinates, plays vital functional roles within a bureau. Its first role stems from the rarely discussed fact that all top-level officials (and many others) are frequently in danger of being embarrassed by revelations of their illegal acts, failures, lack of control over their subordinates and sheer incompetence. If their subordinates are personally loyal to them, they can rely upon those subordinates to be discreet in the handling of information dealing with these potentially scandalous matters. Therefore, in order to protect themselves, they tend to select subordinates who exhibit such loyalty...Because superiors value personal loyalty in their subordinates, such loyalty is one of the qualities they look for when deciding whom to promote. As a result, subordinates seek to exhibit personal loyalty so as to increase their chances of promotion. (1967, 71-72)

In sum, based on the presumption that politicians desire bureaucrats who will carry out tasks congruent with their directives, and that goal conflict and information asymmetry are viewed as an impediment to such, agency theory has developed hypotheses between various political dynamics and the propensity with which governments remove and appoint administrative elites in an effort to limit bureaucratic drift and ensure that tasks are carried out as directed.

*Time since change in government.* In his seminal history of the British civil service, Parris described the meaning of permanence in the Westminster tradition asserting that; "... permanence in a civil servant means something more than security of tenure or the mere

retention of a job for a long time. It means the retention of that job during a change in government” (1969, 27). While permanency of position may be an ideal feature of the modern bureaucracy in Whitehall, a major tenet of research studying the politics of mobility is the reappointment of administrative elites by newly elected governments. Following a transition in power, the newly elected government may be prone to questioning the willingness of officials to provide enthusiastic and impartial service, who, all but a short period ago, had worked for the previous governing party (Bourgault and Dion 1989a; Boyne et al. 2010).

Yet not all changes in government are the same. Accordingly, others specify that the degree to which newly elected governments dismiss and appoint administrative elites is a function of the duration of time the previous party had formed the government. An entrenched period of time in power can lead opposition parties to view the bureaucracy as closely associated with the political agenda of the government, resulting in increased levels of mobility once a change in party takes place (Michelmann and Steeves 1985; White 1993; Lewis 2005; Derlien 1988).

An example of this type of thinking is demonstrated in the memorandum sent to Progressive Conservative (PC) Prime Minister Brian Mulroney by his close political confidant Peter G. White shortly after taking power, insisting that:

The Liberal Party, in office for 20 years out of 21 up to 1984, built the public service that we have inherited....These appointments were made in a conscious and perfectly proper effort to fashion a senior public service that would be compatible with Trudeau’s style and approach – the very style and approach that Canadian voters so emphatically rejected in September 1984. It is idle to think that these men and women, who have spent most of their public service careers designing and implementing the Trudeau-Pitfield approach to government, could suddenly become strongly committed to radically altering their own creation. (Newman 2005, 545)

Studying the mobility of DM in Canada's federal bureaucracy between 1867 and 1986, Bourgault and Dion (1989a) note that after decades of rule by the Liberal party, the PC government of Brian Mulroney, in a manner congruent with counsel from his political advisors, removed every incumbent DM. The meaning of this action was Mulroney's concern for control. As Bourgault and Dion explain, "this series of transfers was seen as a way of quickly establishing political control of bureaucrats. Administrative officials judged too imbedded with the thinking of the previous government or too compromised by some of the government's policies were expelled from their lairs" (1989a, 144).

*Political ideology.* The political ideology of governments is another key factor believed to affect efforts to control the bureaucracy. Preferring the provision of goods and services via markets rather than through state involvement, governments on the ideological right are commonly seen as being more suspicious of bureaucrats whose careers are linked to the vitality of state programs. For example, studying the relationship between political parties and public sector employees in Canada, Britain, France and the United States, Blais, Blake and Dion (1997) show that governments on the ideological left display more favourable treatment towards the bureaucracy than governments on the right. Research from the United States also suggests that making appointments is primarily a Republican strategy, due to their belief that public administrators have an ingrained bias towards the expansion of social programs (Waterman 1989; Rourke 1992; Dickinson and Rudalevige 2004; Moynihan and Roberts 2010).

Similar relationships between a political ideology and mobility have not been shown in other countries, however (Bourgault and Dion 1989b; Rouban 2004; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013). This may also be the case in Canada, where some maintain that ideological differences

between political parties have never been greatly pronounced (Clarke et al. 1996; Brodie and Jenson 2007).

In addition to the strong presence of ‘brokerage parties’, case study research studying the behaviour of political parties in Canada suggests that while prior to the Second World War patronage was a defining mechanism used by parties to maintain support in a party system where there was “almost complete agreement between Liberals and Conservatives both in theory and in policies” (Dobie 1936, 154), that eventually some parties believing in the perils of patronage, halted the practice to a greater extent than others. In *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System 1901-1920*, John English (1977) describes how the Conservative Party in Canada under the leadership of Robert Borden sought to ‘bring an end to patronage’ at both the federal and provincial orders of government (also see, Dutil and MacKenzie 2011).<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile the Liberal party continued to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel to administrative positions based on partisan loyalty to a greater extent than other parties (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; Smith 1975; Campbell 1988; Marier 2013; for a dissenting opinion see Dobie 1936; Laycock 1990).

*From partisan to personal politics: Change in premier.* Certainly an important factor, a transition in the governing party is not the only variable associated with increased mobility. Others have noted that even when there is no transition in the party, a simple change in the individual heading the government can lead to increased levels of turnover. Studying Denmark, Christensen, Klemmensen and Opstrup (2014) observe that while a change in the governing party does not lead to an increase in mobility, a change in the head of government from within

the same party does. One possible reason for this outcome offered by the authors is because of the problem of adverse selection that new heads of government face in choosing personnel.


Desiring to increase their control over the bureaucracy as well as ensure the efficient implementation of programs, newly elected heads of government appointed following a transition in the governing party may be more cautious in reappointing incumbent bureaucrats than newly appointed heads of government from within the same party as the previous government. All else being equal, heads of government following a change in party are less familiar with administrative personnel and the inner workings of programs than are heads of government whose party was previously in power. Fearing that a poor staffing decision could harm administrative outputs, new heads of government arising from a transition in party are less likely to alter administrative personnel than new heads of government from the same party.

The suggestion that a simple replacement in the head of government matters at least as much as transitions in the governing party may be especially true of parliamentary countries in the last thirty years where research suggests there has been simultaneous trends towards; (a), a personalization of politics centering around the personality of the party leader and away from a previous era of party-led politics (Peters and Savoie 2000; Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012); and (b), an increased centralization of decision-making power around the first minister and away from a more consensual decision-making style amongst cabinet members (Savoie 1999; Rhodes, Wanna, and Weller 2009; Karvonen 2010). Trends, which taken together have been referred to by some as a ‘presidentialization’ of politics in parliamentary systems (Poguntke and Webb 2005).

Furthermore, research suggests that the increased centralization of power around the first minister has been most pronounced in Westminster countries. Figure 1 displays the results from an expert survey measuring the concentration of power of first ministers in 22 parliamentary countries (O'Malley 2007). Comparing scores amongst the Westminster countries of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand against other parliamentary countries indicates a score 18 percent higher for Westminster countries than other parliamentary countries. Equally important is that amongst Westminster countries, Canada was viewed as the country with the greatest concentration of power, with a measurement 18 percent higher than Australia, 21 percent greater than the UK and 34 percent higher than New Zealand.

What's more, scholars of Canadian politics claim that the concentration of power has been even greater at the provincial level where the smaller scale and less complex nature of governing has led to an even more personal style of governing concentrated in the hands of the first minister. Reviewing recent developments in provincial politics, White concludes his comparison of first ministers Canada's federal and provincial governments, stating that "provincial government is indeed premier's government" (2005, 77). Now with an individualized style of governance centered on the first minister's preferences, being a member of the same party as the previous leader is no longer enough to warrant the presumption that the new first minister automatically has the loyalty of the bureaucracy.

Figure 1: Concentration of first ministerial power in parliamentary countries



(Source: O'Malley 2007, 20-24)

A possible exception to the above, however, is temporary ‘interim’ premiers. Often due to the resignation of the premier following dissatisfaction amongst party members as to the party leader’s performance and their concern with the prospects of the party to be re-elected to government (Cross and Blais 2012), the party may nominate a temporary premier to head the government until the next election. It is probable that such interim premiers hold a different orientation to governing that is unique amongst premiers finding themselves at the head government.

According to Savoie, one of the reasons for why there is such a centralization of power in the first minister is the personalization of politics, including the outcome of elections (1999, 96). Savoie states that:

Winning candidates on the government side know full well that their party leader's performance in the election campaign explains in large measure why they themselves were elected...It should come as no surprise then that if the leader is able to secure a majority mandate it is assumed that the party is in his debt, and not the other way around. (1999, 80)

As party leaders now take on a great deal of responsibility for the electoral success of their party, they also now command a greater degree of control over the directions of policy (also see, Pal 1992; Cross and Blais 2012). This is not likely to be the case, however, of interim premiers. Without yet having brought their party to victory, interim premiers are not likely to exhibit as much ability to control the policy agenda within cabinet as are those premiers who brought their party to victory and have been legitimized by the electorate. Equally true, due to the shorter time horizon in front of them, interim premiers are also constrained in their ability to introduce new policies, and instead are more likely to turn their attention to the next election (Cooper, Marier, and Halawi 2014). In sum, as they are less likely to unilaterally control the policy agenda and bring forth new policies, interim premiers may have a lessened disposition to seek responsive competence from the bureaucracy.<sup>9</sup>

*Legislative strength.* Another variable believed to affect the degree to which bureaucratic elites are strategically reappointed is the government's legislative strength. One body of research suggests that legislative strength is negatively related to mobility. Governments with only a minority of the seats in the legislature face a greater degree of uncertainty over their future; any mishap reflecting poorly on the government could push opposition parties to bring forth an

undesired election (Hodgson 1976). Minority and coalition governments may therefore be more obsessed with controlling all aspects of governance, including the actions of the bureaucracy. Using descriptive statistics of DM mobility during minority governments at the federal level in Canada since the 1960s, Bourgault (2011) notes that newly elected minority governments have made a large number of bureaucratic reappointments.

At the same time, however, there are good theoretical reasons for hypothesizing that legislative strength is positively associated with bureaucratic mobility. Economic theories of behaviour suggest that minority governments uncertain over how long they will remain in power may refrain from purging the civil service for fear that the incoming party will do the same (Hammond 1996; Christensen 2004). Ting et al. (2013) have shown that governments lacking confidence in their future prospects of power are more likely to refrain from politicizing the bureaucracy. Likewise, studying East Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2003) observes that legislatively weak governments make fewer political appointments.

### **Methodological and Theoretical Difficulties**

By studying how considerations of power influence bureaucratic mobility, the literature reviewed above provides an important deviation from research heavily influenced by organization and management studies tending to overlook the role of political dynamics. Yet despite its merits, this emergent literature has faced both methodological and theoretical difficulties. Methodologically, as noted by others, while research has identified several explanatory variables these “have rarely been tested in a systematic way, and even more seldom tested together” (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013, 892). A likely reason for this is the tremendous effort involved in generating datasets with a sufficient number of observations capable of

simultaneously testing multiple predictors. This problem is especially true for scholars studying parliamentary countries, where, in contrast to the United State, there are fewer administrative positions controlled by the first minister.

To overcome this methodological challenge a few researchers have recently generated some of the largest datasets of administrative mobility by enlarging their sampling population across spatial units and over time (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2014a; Christensen et al. 2014). Yet as researchers have taken the first steps to overcome these methodological challenges, a new theoretical difficulty has arisen. Compared to previous work, the findings of these recent studies, specifically those using longitudinal data collecting observations prior to the 1980s, are challenging the most standard hypothesized relationships between political dynamics and mobility. Whereas transitions in the governing party, government ideology and legislative strength were all once believed to be strongly associated with bureaucratic mobility, research testing these explanatory variables with longitudinal data, are showing few if any significant associations between the political dynamics and administrative mobility.

Perplexed, and likely somewhat dismayed, scholars have suggested the need for further research. Venturing some reasons for the null findings in their recent study, Dahlstrom and Niklasson (2013) note that amongst other factors such as the predominance of studies from the United States compared to the few empirical studies conducted in parliamentary systems that “[another possible] reason for this [i.e. the inconclusive results] might be that many of the studies from which these explanations stem are case studies from one specific point in time” (2013, 905).<sup>10</sup> While merely an additive remark at the end of their work, the authors are well justified in making this point.

Research studying the politics of administrative mobility has predominantly used data drawn from the 1980s and onward. This is possibly a significant detail because the hypothesized relationships tested by this research have drawn heavily upon principal-agent theory, which, while possibly an appropriate theoretical depiction of political-administrative relationships in the modern era of governance in which the theory was first developed (as shown above p. 43-45), may be less suitable for historical periods where the contours of political-administrative relationships are quite different. When considering historical variations in the nature of political-administrative relationships and the core preferences of governments the hypotheses generated from the literature is problematically static: goal conflict and information asymmetry are presumed to be present and problematic to governments that are presumed to prefer principles that carry out directives as articulated to them (Waterman and Meier 1998).

Over the last 100 years, however, political-administrative relationships have undergone considerable changes including the characteristics government's desire the bureaucracy to possess (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Silberman 1993; Savoie 2003; Yang and Holzer 2005; Chapman and O'Toole 2009). These changes may have important consequences for the degree to which political variables prod governments to strategically remove and appoint administrative elites. Research studying the politics of bureaucratic mobility, has not yet considered that the relationship between mobility and politics may vary over time alongside historical changes in the political-administrative relationships. While principal-agent theory has explained the motivations for removing and appointing bureaucratic elites, these may be historically contingent to a specific modern, managerial, era of governance, witnessed in many industrialized countries since the beginning of the 1980s (Pollitt 1993; Saint-Martin 2000). As the contours of political-administrative relationships has shifted throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it

is possible that there have been changes in the nature and extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically staff bureaucratic elites. This is because of the differences in the underlying nature of political-administrative relationships and the traits government's desire bureaucrats to exhibit. To better explore this possibility the next section draws upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of Public Service Bargain to understand how the relationship between mobility and politics may vary according to different political-administrative relationships found in diverse historical periods.

### **Public Service Bargains**

Several different concepts have been developed to describe variances in political-administrative relationships across jurisdictions and over time (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Peters 1987; Hood 1998; Knill 1999; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005). That of a Public Service Bargain, first put forward by Hood (2000, 2002) and advanced by Hood and Lodge (2006), is particularly advantageous due to its detail and clarity, and has consequently become a popular analytical tool to understand shifts in political-administrative relationships (Lodge 2010; Bourgault 2011; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 2011; Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; van der Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013).

Hood defines a PSB as “any explicit or implicit understanding between (senior) public servants and other actors in a political system over their duties and entitlements relating to responsibility, autonomy and political identity, and expressed in convention or formal law or a mixture of both” (2000, 8).<sup>11</sup> As an ideal-type, PSBs can be analyzed and distinguished

according to three primary components of; (a) the nature of the bureaucracy's competency, the knowledge and skills public servants are expected to possess; (b) the nature of the bureaucracy's loyalty, whom public servants are expected to work for; and (c) rewards, what civil servants receive in return for carrying out their duties in a manner that conforms to expectations (Hood and Lodge 2006).

Importantly, PSBs advance models studying the strategic behaviour of governments by paying greater attention to the sociohistorical context within which such action is oriented. Using PSBs as a theoretical framework constitutes a variant of historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998) that complements, rather than opposes, methodological individualist approaches focusing on the purposive actions of persons. As stated by Hood:

Viewing the relationship between public servants and other social actors as some form of bargain...puts the spotlight on the balance between inducements and contributions faced by each of the actors, and so lends itself both to strategic-interaction or 'gaming' analysis and to constitutional and historical analysis of the part played by public servants in a society. (2000, 8)

Importantly, PSBs informs us that rewards, to which the nomination of individuals to elite offices certainly belongs, is a central means used by governments to encourage and reinforce the type of traits they desire bureaucrats to display. As stated by Hood and Lodge:

But who or what controls the rewards of public servants...is always central to the politics of PSBs. So it is not surprising that those who wish to reform bureaucracies and change bureaucratic behaviour – whether it be to reduce corruption or shirking, make bureaucrats more responsive, more entrepreneurial, more independent, or whatever other purpose it is that reformers seek – often see the reward component of PSBs as the most important thing they have to change to achieve their goals. (2006, 64)

Unlike principal-agent theory, however, theorizing about the strategic staffing of administrative elites through a framework of PSBs leads to expectations that the relationship between politics

and mobility will vary across social-historical contexts because of differences in the type of competency and loyalty governments desire bureaucrats to possess.

To be clear, using PSBs as a theoretical framework does not lead to the conclusion that some governments are unconcerned with ‘controlling’ the bureaucracy. The principle that all governments, regardless of the historical period, desire that the bureaucracy’s actions are compatible with its own preference is congruent with a framework of PSBs. The difference between the theoretical approach advanced here and agency theory, is that the former postulates that the end towards which governments seek to steer the bureaucracy – the objectives they have in mind when deciding to strategically appoint and dismiss administrative elites – are not universal, and vary across historical periods embodying fundamentally different political-administrative relationships, whereas the former offers a static vision of control assuming that governments desire bureaucrats who unquestionably accept directives and manage resources towards making orders reality.

Drawing upon Hood and Lodge (2006), as well as scholarship studying the history of politics in Canada’s provincial bureaucracies, Table 2 summarizes three ideal-type PSBs along the dimensions of the bureaucracy’s competency as well as its loyalty. Table 2 also includes a category concerning the nature of governance. Although not a formal element of a PSB, the overarching nature of governance is a differentiating component of distinct temporal periods embodying unique political-administrative relationships (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1993).<sup>12</sup> The contours of bargains shift as changes take place in the “purposes, values, and preoccupations of the regime” (Hood and Lodge 2006, 91), and thus allows each PSB to be better situated in its historical period. Table 2 also specifies how bureaucratic offices are used as a reward by governments to encourage those traits they desire bureaucrats to display. As a means of

exemplification, Table 2 also provides an illustration of the political attitude underlying the staffing of administrative offices in each PSB.

In sum, the theoretical framework advanced here postulates that the extent to which political dynamics, such as a change in the governing party or a transition in the head of government, prod governments to strategically reappoint administrative elites varies according to the type of competency and loyalty the government is seeking to reinforce. Simply put, political variables do not have the same relationship with mobility in dissimilar PSBs, because the qualities governments want bureaucrats to possess are not the same.

*Spoils-type PSB.* Previous research studying political-administrative relationships in Canada up until the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century describe what can be characterized as a ‘spoils-type’ bargain (MacKinnon 1951; Love 1988; Granatstein 1982; Gow 1985; Noel 1990; Dyck 1991; Saywell 1991; Aucoin 2000; McDonald 2009; McKenna 2014). Not yet having moved towards the development of the welfare state, governing in the provinces was of a minimal and incremental nature. Governing entailed little need for the study of issues and the planning of programs. As a result, governments did not require, nor expect, a great degree of technical competency from the bureaucracy.

While the bureaucracy’s competency is an unspecified afterthought, loyalty, is well stipulated and oriented to the political party in power. Unlike the *managerial* bargain discussed below, loyalty to the political party is not directed towards realizing the government’s policy objectives, but instead is a partisan loyalty to the governing party’s electoral success. Whereas in the *managerial* bargain support to the policy agenda of the government concerns actions after the government is in power, and is thus forward-oriented action (to realize the policy agenda),

loyalty in the *spoils* bargain is oriented towards rewarding past actions that helped the party form government.

*Schafferian PSB*. Labeled a *Schafferian* bargain after Bernard Schaffer's (1973) description of political-administrative relationships in Whitehall, the second PSB marks a shift in the relationship between the government and administrators spearheaded by a transformation in nature of governance. Reflecting a trend witnessed in many Western countries during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the use of administrative offices by political parties to reward and encourage partisan electoral support came to be viewed unfavourably, and was associated with corrupt behaviour and government incompetency (Silberman 1993; Dreyfus 2000; Juillet and Rasmussen 2008). Expressing his frustration with the *spoils* bargain during his time as Prime Minister of Canada (1911-1920), Robert Borden lamented that:

Three-fourths of the time of members supporting a government is occupied with matters of patronage. Party patronage and party service have more weight than character and capacity. The public service is cumbered with useless officials. I am convinced that we shall perform a great public duty by establishing in this country that system which prevails in Great Britain, under which a member of Parliament has practically no voice in or control over any appointment to the civil service. (cited in Simpson 1988, 127)

Table 2: Strategic appointment of personnel in Public Service Bargains

	<b>Nature of Governance</b>	<b>Competency</b>	<b>Loyalty</b>	<b>Utility of office/ Reward</b>	<b>Political attitude towards offices<sup>13</sup></b>
<b>Spoils-type</b>	Minimalist/ incremental.	Little substantive skills.	Party loyalist/ Personal loyalty to the political party.	Used by political parties to reward partisan electoral support/Based on personal relationship with party.	<i>“The Spoils System has for years been in full force in Newfoundland. Given the conception that it is quite fair, whilst one’s party is in power, to make what one can for oneself and one’s friends, it is natural, that in the minds of many people politics should be regarded simply as job farming.”</i> - Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933 (Amulree 1933, 229)
<b>Schafferian</b>	‘Puzzling’ /Technocratic planning.	Policy advisor. Knowledge of policies and programs.	Serial loyalist/ Impersonal loyalty to the office.	Used by governments to strengthen issue specific expertise and willingness to provide honest advice based on expertise/Based on merit and seniority.	<i>“I can’t understand why some political leaders insist on clearing out the upper echelon of the public service when they come into office. You are just not able to pick up a deputy minister caliber individual on a street corner.”</i> - Richard Hatfield, (New Brunswick Premier 1970-1987) (cited in Savoie 1989, 40)
<b>Managerial</b>	Market efficiency/ Top-down democracy.	Manager. Motivator of personnel and resources towards deliverance.	Executive loyalist/ Personal loyalty to the premier and her policy agenda.	Used by head of government to ensure responsiveness to her policy agenda and limit information asymmetry/Based on competition and chance.	<i>“...it is clearly essential for any government to have its own people in these key positions [deputy minister offices]. If the ministers are the CEOs, clearly they must have compatible people as their chief operating officers – people who share the goals and convictions of the government.”</i> - Peter G. White, Advisor to PM Brian Mulroney. (cited in Newman 2005, 453)

(Based on Hood 2000; Hood and Lodge 2006)

In the Canadian provinces distaste with the *spoils* bargain came to a head in the aftermath of the Second World War. As with other parts of the world (Korpi 1989), in the provinces the postwar years witnessed a shift in the nature of governance that replaced the minimalist state with one that had a greater presence in society through the development and implementation of social and economic policies, constituting what is sometimes referred to by scholars of Canadian politics as a period of “province building” (Chandler and Chandler 1982; Black and Cairns 1966; Finkel 2006; Rice and Prince 2013). Explaining change in the role of provincial governments in the postwar years, Hodgetts and Dwivedi note that one reason for this is “attributable to changing philosophies of state intervention, which in turn provide support for new roles and functions for the state, as well as for enlarged expectations of the populace for more and better services” (1974, 14).

In tandem with increased state involvement is a qualitative change in how policies are developed. Whereas during the minimalist state policy decisions were made in an incremental manner, the new more interventionist state developed policies through a rational and scientific study of problems and a laborious planning of programs. To borrow terminology used by Hecló (1974, 304), the formulation of policy was no longer viewed as an exclusive political activity; governments not only ‘powered’, they now also ‘puzzled’. Much more than before, policymaking now required detailed study and planning to identify the causes of problems and the most efficient means of alleviating them. Critically, desiring to develop, plan and implement larger and more complex policies, governments identified the bureaucracy as the means to foster such expertise. Civil servants were expected to possess knowledge gained from education and experience in the policies and programs overseen by their departments. Speaking of the change in the Canadian provinces and the need for such knowledge, Hodgetts and Dwivedi note, that

“the shift to white-collar work, requiring managerial, administrative, professional, scientific, and technical knowledge and aptitudes of a higher order, is a prominent feature of modern government bureaucracies” (1974, 13).

Yet in addition to desiring that civil servants possess policy relevant knowledge, there is also a corresponding change in the type of loyalty governments want to bureaucracy to exhibit. Public servants are no longer expected to display a partisan loyalty to the political party. Instead, now possessing such desired technical knowledge, governments want public servants to advise them on policy matters with frank counsel on the basis of their expertise and experience, regardless of who is in power, reflecting what is described by some scholars as ‘neutral competence’ (Kaufman 1956; Rourke 1992). In this manner civil servants are now serial loyalists impersonally serving all governments with the same advice founded on their expertise and experience.

Rather than viewing dissenting opinions from bureaucrats as a manifestation of goal conflict, such expert, and potentially conflictual advice, is not only tolerated but in fact desired by governments. As expressed by Mitchell Sharp (1911-2004), former deputy minister, turned politician:

Politicians, particularly Ministers, require the best impartial advice that they can get if they are to make wise decisions. Sycophants who echo their boss’s views are of little value; indeed they can be positively dangerous as advisers if they are not prepared from time to time to tell their bosses the painful truth that their pet idea is unworkable. That is one of the reasons why I am not in favour of the principle, which is sometimes advanced, that the top positions - the heads of departments - should be filled by those who are in sympathy with the views of the party in power and should depart with their Ministers when the government is replaced. (1977, 180)

Importantly, in the *Schafferian* bargain governments cultivate such competency and loyalty by strategically leaving individuals in their positions. This allows civil servants to accumulate detailed knowledge of issues and programs and fosters confidence that they can provide candid advice without fear of admonishment. This type of competency and loyalty reflects former British Cabinet Secretary Sir Edward Bridges' description of the role of civil servants as developing and advising on the basis of a 'departmental philosophy'. As stated by Bridges in his treatise *A Portrait of a Profession*:

There has been built up in every Department a store of knowledge and experience in the subjects handled, something which eventually takes shape as a practical philosophy, or may merit the title of a departmental point of view...But in most cases the departmental philosophy is the result of nothing more startling than the slow accretion and accumulation of experience over the years...These departmental philosophies are of the essence of a Civil Servant's work. They are the expression of the long continuity of experience which can be one of the strongest qualities of an institution, if well organized. (1950, 16)

Permanency of position is thus an integral part in fostering the type of competency and loyalty desired by governments in the *Schafferian* bargain.<sup>14</sup> As noted by one scholar of the Canadian provinces, the desire for greater government intervention through the development and implementation of policies and programs during this period meant that:

...there was greater need for more competent and qualified DMs. It became clear to the political executive that this could best be accomplished by tapping into the expertise and knowledge of an existing permanent officialdom. Many of those who became DMs during this period, then, had actually worked their way up the bureaucratic ladder or came up through the ranks of an incipient provincial public service. (McKenna 2014, 76)

*Managerial PSB*. Beginning in the 1980s however, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats abruptly changed. Principals of the *Schafferian* bargain once esteemed as ensuring good governance had now become identified as a key source of what plagued modern

government. Writing in the journal *Papers on Non-market Decision Making* (renamed in 1968 *Public Choice*), Gordon Tullock claimed with sincerity that “the word ‘bureaucratic’ in fact, can legitimately be used to replace ‘inefficient’ in many uses without changing the meaning of the sentence” (1967, 93). The result was a drastic change in the nature of political-administrative relationships, constituting a new ‘managerial’ bargain.

Whereas the postwar era exhibited an approach to governance emphasizing technical expertise and long-term planning, beginning in the 1980s a new way of thinking had emerged. Inspired by the same work applying economic theories of decision-making that is at the origins of principal-agent theory such as that by Downs and Niskanen, this new approach placed a greater emphasis on governing with improved efficiency by relying less on the bureaucracy (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971). In pursuit of purging modern governance of its inefficiencies, this *managerial* bargain sought to run government more like a private business operating in a free market economy (Hood 1989; Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 1993).

Whereas in the *Schafferian* bargain, competency of public servants required technical knowledge of past policies and programs, in the *managerial* bargain such detailed knowledge is now seen as a problem of information asymmetry enabling bureaucrats to shirk and pursue their own preferences. In the *managerial* bargain, governments no longer desire bureaucrats boasting in-depth knowledge of policies and programs, but instead they want individuals who are capable of mobilizing resources and personnel towards the realization of the government’s already established policy objectives. The shift in competency from the *Schafferian* to the *managerial* bargain is captured by Dargie and Locke who remark that governments now desire ‘*can do*’ *managers* rather than ‘*wait a minute*’ *advisors* (Dargie and Locke 1999, 181). Similarly, Siegel

describes this shift in competency from a ‘manager as policy advisor’ to a ‘manager as manager’:

The conventional wisdom now is that the role of the manager as policy adviser has been supplanted by the role of the manager as manager. In the halcyon days of expanding government, the minister needed policy advice about which initiatives to pursue and which new programs to adopt. In an era of restraint, the emphasis is on a manager who is able to do more with less or who is able to motivate employees even though the financial and other rewards are no longer there. (1988, 189)

The *managerial* bargain also involves a shift in the type of loyalty bureaucrats are now wanted to display. Whereas in the *Schafferian* bargain loyalty is of an impersonal commitment to serve government in a frank manner on the basis of expertise, this is no longer sought after. Any will politicians once had for bureaucrats to loyally serve them in a spirit akin to ‘speaking truth to power,’ has vanished. Holding the view that politics and administration are two distinct realms, and that bureaucrats should not be involved in deciding the objectives of policy, providing opinions that are contrary to the government’s is seen as indicating the presence of goal conflict. In the words of Aucoin, “the managerialist paradigm...reasserts the policy/administration dichotomy with a vengeance” (1990, 127).

In this *managerial* bargain, loyalty is instead directed to the policy directives as stipulated by the head of the government. Like the *spoils* bargain previously, loyalty of the bureaucracy is of a personal nature. This time, however, loyalty is not of a partisan nature dedicated to the electoral success of the party, but instead a commitment to the policy objectives as expressed by the head of the government. As Prime Minister Margret Thatcher famously insisted, the ultimate question in staffing permanent secretaries was whether they were ‘one of

us', to which she meant that they shared a commitment and enthusiasm to realize the government's policy agenda, and not that they were partisan Tories (Aucoin 2012, 187).

This new type of loyalty is sometimes referred to by scholars of public administration as 'responsive competence'. Explaining responsive competence and the commitment to the government's policy objectives, Aberbach and Rockman maintain that:

The administration, in such circumstances, wants responsive appointees and, when they can find them, equally responsive career civil servants in top positions. Their job is to do what the administration wants. In the extreme case, the responsive individuals are there because they share the world-view of the president. Analysis of problems is unnecessary because the answers are already known. All that may be required is advice on a strategy for implementing solutions, advice that one could only trust from other believers. In this scheme of things, the role of civil servants is to administer solutions decided by others. Their advice is not wanted. As a leading figure in the Nixon White House (John Ehrlichman) is reputed to have said of the proper role of civil servants: "When we say jump, their only question should be 'How high?'" (1994, 466)

Finally, the use of administrative offices by governments in the *managerial* bargain is used to encourage the type of competency and loyalty they now desire from bureaucrats. Once seen as being an important component in making good decisions, knowledge of past policies and programs is also no longer positively viewed. A long period of time in the same department impedes both the government's efforts to control the bureaucracy and the development of loyalty to the government's policy agenda. Permanency of position is believed to accentuate information asymmetries between politicians and bureaucrats which can impede governments from realizing their policy objectives. Spending too much time in the same position is seen as fostering loyalty to their department rather than to the head of the government and her policy agenda. To alleviate the "centrifugal tendencies of modern bureaucracies" (Bourgault, Dion, and Lemay 1993, 73), governments seek to foster a spirit of "solidarity above all with the corporate authority [of the government] instead of the line department" (Bourgault, Dion, and

Lemay 1993, 77). Alongside other tactics such as performance appraisals, and the proliferation of central agencies; rotating deputy ministers is identified as a principle means to prevent bureaucrats from developing and pursuing “parochially defined interests” (1993, 73), and instead, induce allegiance to the corporate culture of the government. To reorient their loyalty, governments remove incumbents and replace them with persons believed to have a greater degree of loyalty to the policy agenda (Savoie 2008). Manipulating administrative offices in this manner is seen as an essential tool enabling governments to effectively realize their policy objectives (Flinders and Matthews 2010).

### **The Politics of Mobility Revisited: Variation across PSBs**

Having reviewed three ideal-type PSBs, it is now possible to revise the most prominent hypotheses between political dynamics and administrative mobility by taking into consideration the varying types of political-administrative relationships. Table 3 outlines the expected relationship between political dynamics and administrative mobility in each PSB.

In the *spoils* bargain, with a central preference that bureaucrats exhibit loyalty to the political party, transitions in the governing party are expected to have the strongest association with mobility as incoming governments remove incumbents and nominate their own supporters. As long as the same political party remains in power, little mobility is expected. Transitions in the governing party are expected to lead to an initial increase in mobility, after which mobility should be much lower. Furthermore, appointments are used to reward partisan loyalty to the party and not to ensure the realization of policy objectives while in power, factors associated

with decreasing the bureaucracy's willingness to implement the government's policy agenda are not expected to have any effect.

Time prior to a change in government is therefore not expected to be associated with increased mobility. A newly elected party has little concern whether the previous party was in power for one year or 10 years. All that matters for governments in the *spoils* bargain is that they now have the opportunity to reward loyalists with administrative offices. Likewise, changes in the head of government, when coming from the same party as the previous first minister, also are not expected to be positively associated with mobility.

Table 3: Hypotheses between political dynamics and mobility by PSB

	<b>Spoils-type Bargain</b>	<b>Schafferian Bargain</b>	<b>Managerial Bargain</b>
H1) Transition in the governing party is positively associated with mobility	Expected	Not Expected	Expected
H2) Interaction of a transition in governing party AND the time the previous party was in power is positively associated with mobility	Not Expected	Not Expected	Expected
H3) Ideologically right governments are positively associated with mobility	Not Expected	Not Expected	Expected
H4) Change in premier is positively associated with mobility	Not Expected	Not Expected	Expected
H5) Legislative strength is positively associated with mobility	Expected	Not Expected	Expected

Nor are there expected to be differences between which parties take power. Distrust in the intentions of bureaucrats has little to do with the strategic staffing of bureaucrats. Governments are more concerned instead with maintaining the electoral support of partisan loyalists. Hence left/right ideology representing divergent preferences for the provision of services via markets or government involvement is not expected to play a role in the politics of mobility.

Legislative strength, however, could be linked to lower levels of mobility. Research suggests that regardless of whether the nomination of administrative elites is aimed at rewarding partisan supports or ensuring commitment to the government's policy objectives, weaker governments unsure about their future may refrain from interfering in the careers of civil servants (Ting et al. 2013).

During the *Schafferian* bargain, the relationship between political dynamics and mobility is expected to be severally reduced. Desiring bureaucrats who possess expertise and experience and a willingness to advise any government on the basis of such knowledge, political events are expected to have little effect on mobility. On the heels of a transition in the governing party or a change in the head of government, incumbent officials should remain in their position. In its ideal form, political dynamics should not to be associated with increased mobility during this PSB.

In the *managerial* bargain, the relationship between political dynamics and increased mobility is once again expected. Wising to diminish information asymmetry and ensure that civil servants are motivated managers working towards realizing the government's policy objectives, certain political dynamics should have a strong association with mobility. Unlike the

*spoils* bargain however, the strategic use of appointments is not oriented to reward and ensure partisan loyalty to the governing party.

With the appointment of administrative elites by governments being motivated to foster ‘can do’ managers loyal to the head of government’s policy directives and mitigate goal conflict and information asymmetry, political variables leading governments to question the intentions of bureaucrats are now expected to have a greater effect on administrative mobility. Hypotheses developed drawing upon agency theory are in the *managerial* PSB most valid.

While transitions in the governing party are expected to be associated with increased levels of mobility, it is now expected that mobility following a change in party should be higher the longer the previous party was in power. The reason being that the longer the previous government was in power the less confidence governments have that incumbents will enthusiastically work towards the new government’s policies. Equally important, and especially when it comes to the case of Canada, is the expectation that all newly elected heads of government should be associated with increased mobility. Loyalty is not oriented to the party but instead to the premier and her policy agenda. With policy directions coming from the centre, heads of government seek to ensure that loyalty is their personal policy agenda. Legislative strength is also expected to be positively associated with mobility for the same reasons as the *spoils* bargain: legislatively weak governments will refrain from making appointments due to their uncertain future.

## **Conclusion of Chapter Two**

This chapter reviewed previous research studying the causes of administrative mobility. It was shown that while a large body of research drawing upon organization and management studies has identified the personal characteristics, organizational features and market conditions associated with mobility, such research has overlooked power dimensions affecting turnover of bureaucratic elites. Drawing primarily upon principal-agent theory, a burgeoning body of research has begun to examine the relationship between political dynamics and mobility. Reviewing such research has uncovered an important puzzle: as researchers have begun to test hypotheses using longitudinal data from periods stretching back to prior to the 1980s the empirical results have failed to find any meaningful relationships. This chapter advanced the argument that these perplexing results may be that the relationship between politics and mobility varies over time across periods embodying distinct political-administrative relationships. Unlike previous research that has universally applied agency theory to explain the relationship between political dynamics and administrative mobility, this dissertation reformulates prominent hypotheses by situating government's strategic actions within their sociohistorical context.

Drawing upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of a Public Service Bargain, this chapter explained how the extent to which some political dynamics prod governments to move personnel in and out of administrative positions may vary according to the contours of the political-administrative relationship, specifically the type of competency and loyalty governments seek to foster amongst bureaucratic elites. Distinguishing between three ideal-type PSBs, this chapter revisited prominent hypotheses and outlined to what extent the nature of these relationships are expected to vary across PSBs. The next chapter outlines the research design, data and methods used to investigate this possibility.

## Chapter Two Appendix I

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### The Appointment Process of Deputy Ministers in Canada's Provinces

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In Canada the appointment and dismissal of deputy ministers is the institutional prerogative of the first minister (Aucoin 2006), which, following challenges by disgruntled deputy ministers, has been reaffirmed by the courts at several times (Cooper Forthcoming). Officially, as specified in each province's Public Service Act, deputy minister positions are Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council appointments and are a special executive class excluded from the rules overseeing the appointment and dismissal of regular staff.

Although the first minister retains the power to nominate and dismiss DMs, it is common practice for the first minister to consult with others from both political and administrative milieus. In the initial days upon forming a government, the first minister receives advice concerning appointments from the Clerk of the executive council – the head of the civil service, and herself a deputy minister appointed by the premier – as well as members of the government and partisan advisors from the premier's entourage. The nature of such consultation, however, is strictly advisory and is not institutionalized. As the 'exclusive pleasure of the crown', the final decision concerning the appointment, retention and dismissal of DM appointments is at the sole discretion of the first minister (Neilson 1984; Bourgault and Dunn 2014).<sup>15</sup>

## **Chapter 3. Research Design, Data and Methods**

*Chapter three summary.* This chapter describes the research design, data collection, variable operationalization and methods used to test hypotheses between politics and mobility over time. The advantages and limitations of these choices are considered. Summary statistics of the principle variables contained in the dataset are analyzed.

Public administration is out of balance relative to other social sciences, and in general it is quite far behind with regard to analyzing data in meaningful ways. This is certainly a correctable situation...We encourage a greatly enhanced focus on empiricism and rigorous quantitative approaches.

- Jeff Gill and Kenneth J. Meier (2000, 195)

Public administration research also tends to recognize the importance of context, and qualitative research approaches contribute perspectives and insight on context that quantitative research cannot.

- Larry S. Luton (2010, 10)

If there is such a thing as hell on earth, it must be an academic field in which members are condemned to have the same conversation over and over ad infinitum. Like Sisyphus, public administration appears to have been sentenced to an eternal fate: Ours is to battle over our logic of inquiry but never to get anywhere.

- Camilla Stivers (2008, 1008)

### **Research Design**

At the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century a succession of publications roused a spirited debate within public administration as to the most appropriate research design and methods to be used within the discipline (for example, Luton 2007; Meier 2005; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Gill and Meier 2000; Meier and O'Toole 2007). For some, these debates seemed all too familiar. Not more than 10 years earlier, an equally animated quarrel had taken place in political science following the publication of King, Keohane and Verba's *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994), which had provocatively proclaimed that social science should be dedicated to deductive theory

testing and that research design and methods should be undertaken with the objective of controlling for alternative explanatory variables and increasing observations of the dependent variable (for a review and critique of *Designing Social Inquiry* see, McKeown 1999).

While the sometimes callous tone and *ad hominem* jabs exchanged between ‘qualitativists’ and ‘quantitativists’ certainly makes for entertaining reading (see for instance exchanges between Luton (2007, 2008) and Meier and O’Toole (2007)), others, more diplomatic in demeanour, note that depending on the nature of the question asked, quantitative and qualitative approaches can both be legitimate methods of research. Because there is more than one type of question, there is more than one logic of inquiry. Such is noted by Goertz and Mahoney (2012) who remark that whereas some research asks questions about the ‘causes of effects’, that being the specific causal mechanism or mechanisms that led to a particular outcome (e.g. what caused deputy minister Gérard Tremblay to leave his job in the Department of Labour?); others seek to understand the ‘effects of causes’, that being the average effect that an independent variable has on a dependent variable (e.g. what is the average effect of economic growth on employee turnover?). The former generally makes use of qualitative case studies of a few specific observations to pinpoint with greater accuracy the mechanism having brought about the outcome under question, whereas the latter tends to rely on quantitative statistics to analyze a large number of observations. Differences in qualitative and quantitative methods are therefore not necessarily epistemologically at odds with one another in their attempt to understand the social world. Rather, both approaches can be complementary, each trying to understand social phenomena, but doing so by asking fundamentally different types of questions.

The research question asked in this project is: *do the average effects that political dynamics have on administrative mobility vary across historical periods embodying different political-administrative relationships?* Rather than seeking to identify *the* primary cause of administrative mobility in a few specific cases, this dissertation assumes that several variables can all effect mobility, but their average effects are not likely to be the same. To identify the average effect that political dynamics have on bureaucratic mobility across distinct PSBs while controlling for alternative variables, this work requires a large number of observations.

To this end, this project uses an original dataset of DM mobility in Canada's provincial bureaucracies from 1920 to 2013. The unit of analysis is DM position-year observations. Rather than making the individual the unit of analysis and following her professional movement over a number of years, this projects examines DM positions year after year to determine whether a change has taken place in the person occupying the office.

There are two reasons for selecting the Canadian provinces. The first is methodological. As noticed by Veit and Scholz (Forthcoming), although mobility may be affected by several political variables, few empirical works have tested different independent variables simultaneously in a systematic manner. One likely reason for this is the difficulty of generating datasets with enough observations to overcome problems of multi-collinearity amongst competing independent variables. Avoiding an indeterminate research design while testing competing independent variables requires studies with a large number of observations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

Generating large-n datasets necessitates expanding the number of cases under study. Doing so by pooling across countries, however, introduces variation in variables endogenous to each case, such as institutions and political cultures. Interested in the extent to which political

dynamics such as a change in party heads of governments to remove and appoint administrative elites, this study desires a case selection reducing, and thus helping to control for, variation in institutional variables and political cultures across jurisdictions.

To do this, the sub-national governments of the Canadian provinces have been selected. Often praised by comparativists as an ideal case selection when desiring control for institutional variables (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 2011; Turgeon et al. 2014), comparing the Canadian provinces reduces variation in, and thus helps to control for, institutional variables to a much greater degree than would be attained even if comparing the national governments of countries sharing the same administration tradition (e.g. the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada).

In addition to offering less variation in institutional variables, the Canadian provinces are also an ideal case selection because of the unchecked power first ministers enjoy in nominating and dismissing DMs. If mobility is affected by politics, this should be observed at the provincial level of government in Canada where there are no formal institutions impeding such actions. Furthermore, although a systematic study with clear and comparable indicators has yet to be completed, some scholars have claimed that the close proximity politicians have with the citizenry at the provincial level of government has meant that staffing administrative personnel is marked by political considerations to a greater degree than at the federal level in Canada (English 1977; Aucoin 2006; White 2001; Zussman 2013).

The second reason for selecting the Canadian provinces is to contribute to the Canadian public administration literature by producing the first-ever historical study of DM mobility of all 10 provinces. Interest in Canada's provincial bureaucracies is well merited. With the development of welfare state programs, provincial bureaucracies have grown both in size and

importance since the 1960s (Chandler and Chandler 1982), and now oversee some of the most essential public policies and programs affecting the lives of their inhabitants. Fortunately, scholarly interest in public administration at the provincial level in Canada has continued to grow over the last thirty years (Gow 1985; Dunn 1995; Lindquist 2000; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005; Rouillard et al. 2008). Yet despite the growth in studies, gaining a comparative perspective across the provinces continues to be a challenge. Few studies have embraced methodological pleas for more interprovincial comparative studies (Imbeau et al. 2000; Tellier 2011; Turgeon et al. 2014; notable exceptions include, Dunn 1995; Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenblatt 2000; Mondou and Montpetit 2010).

In part, this is due to the tendency of researchers to undertake single case studies employing a unique theoretical lens and methodological approach. Most research on administrative elites in Canada tends to limit its analysis to only one province, often focusing on the ruling period of a single premier (for example, Neilson 1990).<sup>16</sup> Provincial scholarship of administrative elites in Canada suffers from a more general trait within public administration of being more “comparable than comparative” (Derlien 1992, 279). The theoretical and methodological heterogeneity of these case studies renders generalizations concerning the effects of causes quite challenging.<sup>17</sup> By studying all ten provinces with systematically comparative data this study makes more accurate interprovincial comparisons as to the effect that political dynamics have on mobility.

The choice to study DM level positions is based on their importance for governments as well as the power of first ministers to appoint and dismiss them. The period of 1920 to 2013 is selected so as to include the major periods of administrative history in the provinces; from before the development of the modern civil service, to the institutionalization of the professional

bureaucracy, and finally into the era of New Public Management.<sup>18</sup> This provides a large number of observations over time and allows for testing whether the relationship between mobility and politics varies across historical periods embodying distinct PSBs. Collecting data from the 10 provinces over 94 years produces 16, 660 observations – almost ten times greater than the previous large-n study of bureaucratic mobility in a parliamentary country (Enns-Jedenastik 2014a).

### **Data**

Data was gathered using the annually published *Canadian Almanac and Directory* (henceforth referred to as the Almanac and Directory) in all years between 1920 and 2013.<sup>19</sup> Information contained in the Almanac and Directory includes members of the government, the date of the last election, the name of each ministry, the legislation each ministry is responsible for,<sup>20</sup> and the names of the executive and administrative personnel in each ministry. In addition to using the Almanac and Directory the legislative make-up of governments were verified using Siaroff's (2015) *Provincial Political Data since 1990* and Marchildon's (2006) *Provincial Coalition Governments in Canada*. The greatest advantage of this data collection method is that it offers a highly comprehensive, systematic and standardized method of measuring DM mobility across all ten provinces over an extensive period of time. Despite its advantages, the data does have some limitations.

By only providing information at one point each year, the data does not measure more than one change in DM per year, and is thus a conservative estimate of mobility. By only providing the names of DMs, this method is also limited in its ability to collect data on the characters of personnel such as age and education. However, by studying DMs, concern over

excluding personal characteristics can be partially reduced. Still true today as it was in the past, studies of the individual characteristics of administrative elites in Canada have observed a good deal of homogeneity amongst this group. As a group, bureaucratic elites are less diverse than the populations to whom they serve; typically being white males and in their middle age (Porter 1958; Sigelman and Vanderbok 1977; Gidengil and Vengroff 1997; Evans, Lum, and Shields 2007; Evans, Lum, and Shields 2014). Therefore, while most personal characteristics cannot be identified and controlled for statistically, studying a group of persons with a greater degree of homogeneity than the general population reduces variation, and thus provides a slight degree of control that cannot otherwise be introduced into the empirical analysis.

Moreover, as previously mentioned, research has shown that the individual characteristics of staff influence mobility because of their association with the employee's desire to leave the organization (Lewis and Park 1989; Arcand, Tellier, and Chretien 2010; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011; Cho and Lewis 2012). The personal traits that administrative elites possess, however, are largely those that have a negative relationship with mobility, thus further reducing concern over the inability to control for personal characteristics.

Another limitation of the data is that it does not allow for distinctions to be made between different types of mobility. For instance, the data cannot differentiate between a DM demoted to a lower level position and one who has been fired. Mobility in this dataset is therefore the accumulation of voluntary departures, movement to other government positions (including promotions and demotions), and dismissal from the civil service. While information of the professional activities of removed DMs would allow for a more refined measurement of mobility, efforts to attain such biographical information such as consulting the annually published *Canadian Who's Who* for the period under study turned out to be unfeasible because

of the scarcity of information for observations prior to 1990. Interested in examining changes in the relationship between political dynamics and mobility across historical periods, the decision was made to measure mobility in a highly systematic manner over a longer period of time, rather than in a manner providing a richer measure of mobility but limited to a much shorter time frame.

### **Variable Operationalization**

*Dependent variable operationalization.* The dependent variable is a change in the person occupying a specific deputy minister position (often a department) in reference to the previous year; for example, whether the DM of Finance in Ontario in 2001 is the same as in 2000. A change was considered to have taken place if the name of the DM was different from the preceding year. Data was originally collected using a coding scheme of five mutually exclusive categories: no change in the DM (the same name as the previous year); change in the DM occupying the position (a change in name); vacancy in the DM position (the first year in which a position is vacant), the appointment of a DM to a newly created position (when a new appointment to a position which had not previously existed is observed for the first time), and removal of the DM following the abolition of the department (the first year in which a previously existing department no longer exists). Decisions to appoint a DM to a new department as well as removing an incumbent DM from her position by abolishing the department are both considered to encompass bureaucratic mobility. DM mobility was therefore recoded so as to include a change in DM, a new vacancy in the position, an appointment to a new department, and the removal of the incumbent DM following the abolition of the department, and given a value of '1', meanwhile no change in DM was given a value of '0'. This system of coding allows

for the robustness of the findings from the statistical analysis to be conducted by using alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable and is discussed in further detail below.

As the first year of the dataset is a reference year, the data collected comprises 16, 514 observations of the dependent variable with a meaningful value of either 0 or 1. Because DM mobility measures a change in personnel of a specific position within a department, attention had to be given to whether modifications in a department's name reflected its termination. This issue was dealt with by applying standards used in research studying the survival of organizations (Peters and Hogwood 1988; Lewis 2002). The schema used, shown in Figure 3 in Annex I of this chapter (p. 72), focused on whether the organization's primary functions remained the same or were fundamentally transformed.

*Independent variable operationalization.* Changes in the governing party and premier were given a '1' when there is a change and a '0' when no such change has taken place.<sup>21</sup> A lagged variable measuring the number of years since a change in government has occurred was also included. The legislative strength of government was coded using dummy variables to distinguish between majority, minority and coalition governments. In line with the hypotheses that governments not having a majority of seats are constrained in the degree to which they will remove and appoint administrative personnel, legislative strength was also coded as a binary variable with majority governments given a '1' and minority and coalition governments given a '0'.

In accordance with the hypothesis that political parties on the ideological right are associated with greater levels of administrative mobility than parties on the ideological left, dummy variables were used to distinguish between each political party.<sup>22</sup> In this coding a

coalition government where members of cabinet are drawn from more than one political party has been coded according to the political party of the premier. As an alternative, the ideology of political parties was also coded in a binary manner distinguishing between the ideological right ('1') and left ('0'). While much empirical work in electoral studies has been undertaken to classify the dominant parties found in Canada along such ideological frontiers (Castles and Mair 1984; Cochrane 2010), with the exception of a few notable cases (Wesley 2009; McGrane 2008), provincial parties have not been similarly scrutinized. Classification of these parties was thus based on secondary sources discussing their ideological orientation (Morton 1950; Lipset 1959; Macpherson 1962; Laycock 1990; Elkins 1976; Quinn 1979; Behiels 1985; Béland and Lecours 2007). Parties espousing reliance on the market for the provision of services rather than government involvement were coded as ideologically right, whereas parties more favourable to state administered policies were coded as ideologically left; the Progressive Conservatives, Social Credit, The Saskatchewan Party and Union Nationale were coded as ideologically right; meanwhile the Liberal party, New Democratic Party, CCF, Parti Québécois, Progressive Party/United Farmers Party were coded as left.

*Control variable operationalization.* Several control variables are also included in the dataset. A one year lagged variable of the number of departments in the province was included to control for the possibility that provinces with a larger resource pool of DMs may experience greater mobility. Even when there is no change in the first minister or the governing party, by representing an important political event giving the government a renewed mandate, it is possible that elections may also affect mobility, and has been included as a control. Following others suggesting that the age of a department may be negatively associated with mobility due

to the greater autonomy and independence possessed by departments that have endured the test of time (Verhoest et al. 2010; Niklasson and Pierre 2012; Park and Kim 2014; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016), a continuous variable of the department's age increasing by a value of one for each year after the first year it is observed was also included.

The time since a change in the DM position may also be related to mobility. The temporal dependence of the dependent variable is also a methodological issue commonly found in longitudinal data. How this issue has been addressed is discussed below in greater detail attending to the issue of serial-correlation. To identify whether DM positions filled by women experience greater mobility than positions filled by men, the gender of the DM in the position the previous year has been included.<sup>23</sup> However, because mobility is identified by a change in name, there is the danger of over-reporting mobility amongst women, stemming from changes in their surname associated with marriage or divorce. This was checked by comparing levels of mobility in Québec after 1981, where a change in name due to marriage has since been prohibited, with the other nine provinces during the same period. The results show that DM mobility amongst women is *higher* in Québec (39 percent) than in the other nine provinces (32 percent) where changes in name amongst women are expected to be more common, thus suggesting that no coding bias caused by legal changes in name has been introduced into the data (during this period the overall rate of mobility in Québec is 34 percent meanwhile overall mobility is 29 percent in the rest of Canada).

Studies also suggest that greater economic opportunity leads to higher levels of mobility (Kirschenbaum and Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). To control for this, annual percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP) has been included. Percent change in provincial GDP is gathered from Statistics Canada (2015) but is

only available from 1982. Prior to 1982, percent change in Canada's overall GDP has been used. This data was gathered from Statistics Canada (1987) for data from 1926 to 1981, and from Urquhart (1986) for years before 1926.

While it is often stated that "Canadian politics is regional politics" (Simeon and Elkins 1974, 397) there is little consensus as to the spatial boundaries demarcating distinct political behaviours. This work follows a common distinction by controlling for region by using provincial dummy variables (Elkins and Simeon 1980; Henderson 2004; Wesley 2015). Alternatively, in line with others viewing political cultures as separated by larger geographic regions analysis was also conducted distinguishing between the West (BC, AB, SK and MN) and the Atlantic region (NB, NS, PEI and NL), Ontario and Québec (Blais et al. 2002; Godbout and Belanger 2002).

The demarcation of years into the three PSBs is based on previous research on the Canadian provinces (Dyck 1991; Lindquist 2000; Chandler and Chandler 1982; Love 1988; Gow 1985; Dunn 1995). The corpus of research suggests the presence of a *spoils* bargain prior to the Second World War (1920-1949), a *Schaffarian* bargain between the postwar period until the end of the 1970s (1950-1979), whereas since the 1980s the relationship has moved towards a *managerial* bargain (1980-2013). The presence of political-administrative relationships embodying the principles of these PSBs during these blocks of time is also validated in the qualitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 examining differences in the contours of political-administrative relationships and scrutinizing how these relate to the strategic appointment and dismissal of administrative elites.

Once completed the validity of the dataset was tested by comparing the values of some variables with similar data gathered elsewhere. Studying the personal characteristics of DMs in

Ontario between 1971 and 2007, Evans, Lum, and Shields (2014, 165) find that 21 percent of DMs are female. Isolating Ontario during the same period, the original dataset used in this work reports the exact same rate (21 percent). Studying the mobility of DMs in the Canadian provinces between 1988 and 1996 Bierling Carroll, and Rosenblatt (2000) report an average annual level of mobility of 27 percent, and studying DM mobility in the Canadian provinces and territories and between 1997 and 2006, Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa (2014, 321) observe a rate of 30 percent. This work's data reveals levels of mobility that are almost exactly the same: 27 percent between 1988 and 1996, and 29 percent between 1997 and 2006. However, because appointments to new departments as well as the first year following the abolition of a department have been classified in this dataset as constituting mobility, the final rate during these two periods is slightly higher at 33 and 35 percent, respectively. Finding similar values in these values as reported in other datasets suggests that an accurate and replicable data collection method has been employed.

### **Description of Variables**

Table 4 provides summary statistics of the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and the number of observations of the variables in the dataset. The average number of observations per province is 1 666, with differences generally following the population size of the province. Ontario, the largest province in terms of population, has 2, 094 observations. By comparison, the smallest province, Prince Edward Island (PEI), has 1, 149.<sup>24</sup>

Table 4: Descriptive statistics, DM mobility 1920-2013

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>N</b>
DM mobility	.24	.43	0	1	16 514
Time since DM change	4.98	4.72	1	33	15 982
Party change	.09	.28	0	1	16 660
Time since party change	9.36	8.78	1	43	16 660
Premier change	.15	.36	0	1	16 660
Legislative strength					
Majority	.90	.30	0	1	16 660
Minority	.06	.24	0	1	16 660
Coalition	.04	.19	0	1	16 660
Political Party					
Pro. Conservative	.37	.48	0	1	16 660
Liberal	.31	.46	0	1	16 660
CCF/NDP	.13	.34	0	1	16 660
United Farmers/ Progressive Party	.04	.18	0	1	16 660
Social Credit	.07	.26	0	1	16 660
Saskatchewan Party	.01	.10	0	1	16 660
Union Nationale	.03	.16	0	1	16 660
Parti Québécois	.03	.17	0	1	16 660
Election	.27	.44	0	1	16 660
DM gender (Male)	.90	.30	0	1	15 944
Interim premier	.05	.23	0	1	16 660
Number of departments t-1	20.53	5.95	3	35	16 564
GDP growth	3.41	4.20	-20.00	14.98	16 660
Department age	33.14	24.37	1	93	16 248
Province					
BC	.11	.31	0	1	16 660
AB	.11	.32	0	1	16 660
SK	.11	.31	0	1	16 660
MB	.09	.29	0	1	16 660

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>N</b>
ON	.13	.33	0	1	16 660
QC	.11	.32	0	1	16 660
NB	.09	.29	0	1	16 660
NS	.09	.29	0	1	16 660
PEI	.07	.25	0	1	16 660
NL	.08	.27	0	1	16 660
<b>Public Service Bargain</b>					
Spoils	.18	.38	0	1	16 660
Schafferian	.33	.47	0	1	16 660
Managerial	.49	.50	0	1	16 660

The mean of DM mobility within the dataset is 24 percent. The average number of years since there was a change in the DM is a little less than 5 years. The mean of political events are; election (.27), change in premier (.15) and change in governing party (.09). The means reflect temporal occurrences of an election approximately once every four years, a change in premier once every six years and a change in government once every ten years. Infrequent changes in party are in part explained by a few cases of high party entrenchment within the dataset: 41 years of Conservative Party government in Ontario (1943-1984) and 42 years of Conservative Party government in Alberta (since 1971 until the end of the dataset).

The mean of legislative strength reflects the institutional tendency of the single-member plurality electoral system (first-past the post) to produce majority governments (Blais and Carty 1987). Of the observations, 90 percent are under a majority government, six percent are under a minority and four percent under a coalition government.

To a degree, the data also reflects the tradition of a two-party system found in Canada's federal party system (Carty and Cross 2010), with 37 percent of observations attained during a Conservative government and 31 percent from a Liberal party government. However, while

these two parties are the most prevalent, eight other parties have also formed government, although their presence is largely associated with specific regions.<sup>25</sup>

### **Research Methods**

*Quantitative methods.* To test whether the relationship between administrative mobility and political dynamics varies across PSBs this dissertation primarily makes use of descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics are used to make bivariate comparisons between mobility and the explanatory variables. Inferential statistics are employed using logistic regression, which allows for the relationship between mobility and several predictors to be tested simultaneously, while additionally controlling for alternative factors identified by organization and management studies that may also possibly affect mobility.

Despite the methodological advantages that panel data offers researchers by providing repeated observations across units and over time, such as reducing collinearity between independent variables, increasing degrees of freedom, and exploring temporal dynamics (Hsiao 2014), it also presents two important challenges which threaten to bias the estimates of standard errors and thus misrepresent the statistical significance of findings (Stimson 1985; Moulton 1990). Both problems arise from the fact that the data are unlikely to meet the assumption of regression of observation independence (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). Instead, the values of observations in panel data are likely to exhibit temporal dependence and spatial correlation (Beck and Katz 1995).

Also referred to as serial correlation, the issue of temporal dependence is that with repeated observations of the same unit over time, for example DM turnover in the department of Health between 1920 and 2013, the value of an observation at a specific time is likely to be

affected by its own past values. The value of  $y_i$  at time  $t_i$  is not independent from the value of  $y_i$  at time  $t_{i-1}$ . For scholars in public administration such temporal dependence is likely to shock very few. Several eminent works remark that bureaucratic phenomena are highly path dependent, with present values being strongly shaped by their own previous value (Lindblom 1979; Pierson 1994); as Meier maintains of panel data in public administration “serial correlation is almost a given” (1993, 403). When it comes to the mobility of administrative elites there are good theoretical reasons for suspecting that the mobility of personnel is related to whether mobility has occurred in the past (Borman and Dowling 2008; Pitts, Marvel, and Fernandez 2011).<sup>26</sup>

Researchers working with longitudinal data have developed a few different ways to address the issue of temporal dependence. One of the earliest methods recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) is to include dummy variables accounting for each increment of time since an event. While frequently used by researchers to address serial correlation (for example, Baten and Mumme 2013; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2016), the inclusion of time dummies comes at a great cost to researchers, due to the difficulty of meaningfully interpreting the results of these temporal effects. Noting this, Carter and Signorino (2010) offer an alternative approach to address temporal dependence by advocating for models to include a cubic polynomial of time since an event; that being, adding time ( $t$ ), time squared ( $t^2$ ), and time cubed ( $t^3$ ). Because of the improved ability to interpret time as a substantive variable, this method has become increasingly common in longitudinal data (for example, Gilardi 2010; Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Hollibaugh 2015; Arceneaux et al. 2016; Liang 2016). Beck (2010) however, continues to defend the use of time dummies by arguing that time is not a theoretical variable needing to be substantively interpreted. When it comes to the mobility of personnel however, a large body of

research does use time as a theoretical variable and substantively interprets its association with mobility. For this reason, to address serial correlation this work uses a cubic polynomial of time.

A second issue with panel data that potentially threatens the assumption of observation independence is unobserved heterogeneity across spatial units, also referred to as spatial autocorrelation (Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Culpepper 2013). Most phenomena studied by social scientists are of a nested nature, with lower level observations embedded within a higher level order. For example, deputy minister positions in Canada are nested ascendingly in departments, provinces and regions. Importantly, the values of observations may not be independent from the higher level units in which they reside. Higher level entities may affect the values of lower level observations, resulting in a clustering of observations that violates the assumption of observation independence.

Like temporal dependence, researchers using cross-sectional data have developed different ways to address this problem. The two most common approaches are fixed effects and random effects models (for a detailed discussion and mathematical demonstration of fixed effects and random effects see, Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013).<sup>27</sup> Traditionally, the most popular method used by social scientists is fixed effects, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by using repeated measures of the lowest level observation to create person-specific dummies to control for possible heterogeneity. As Allison explains, “[t]he essence of a fixed effects method is captured by saying that each individual serves as his or her own control. That is accomplished by making comparisons within individuals...and then averaging those differences across all the individuals in the sample” (2005, 3).

Despite being hailed as the ‘gold standard’ and the ‘default method’ to address unobserved heterogeneity amongst social scientists (Bell and Jones 2015, 149), fixed effects

also involve a great cost for researchers wanting to understand substantively the effects of time-invariant variables. As observed by Firebaugh Warner, and Massoglia, “because fixed effects models remove the effects of all time-invariant causes...the standard fixed effects model is unable to estimate the effects of time-invariant measured causes...if the causes of interest are time-invariant, standard fixed effects is not appropriate...” (2013, 116). Accordingly, a growing number of applied researchers as well as methodologists have voiced their frustration with the use of fixed effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Beck and Katz 2001; Schurer and Yong 2012; Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013). For example, Bell and Jones argue that, “in controlling out context [time invariant variables], FE [fixed effects] models effectively cut out much of what is going on—goings-on that are usually of interest to the researcher, the reader and the policy maker” (2015, 134).

Interested in understanding the effects that time invariant higher level context (such as provinces) have on dependent variables, those unsatisfied with fixed effects models for substantive reasons, have advocated that researchers address unobserved heterogeneity by using a random effects model and cluster standard errors around the higher level entity believed to be responsible for correlation amongst observations (Huber and Shipan 2002; Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007; Green and Vavreck 2008; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Andersen and Mortensen 2010). Instead of assuming that unobserved heterogeneity is fixed, as is the case with a fixed effect model, the random effect model assumes that the effects randomly vary from a larger parameter.<sup>28</sup>

For the analysis in this dissertation, there are important theoretical reasons for believing that the data may exhibit unobserved heterogeneity due to the nesting of observations within provinces. Desiring to substantively interpret the effect that provinces may have on mobility this

dissertation addresses unobserved heterogeneity by using a random effects model and clusters standard errors around provinces. Alternative approaches were also used including a random effects model that clustered standard errors on departments as well as a fixed effect model. The results from these alternative models did not substantively alter the main results suggested from the model presented in this work.<sup>29</sup>

To avoid the problem of multi-collinearity amongst the explanatory variables a variance inflation factor test was conducted. Standard practice interprets scores higher than 10 as potentially having problematic levels of multi-collinearity (O'Brien 2007). The results from a variance inflation factor test between all the predictor variables report levels below 10 suggesting no such problem.

Expecting that the nature and strength of the association between political variables and mobility should exhibit important differences across PSBs the regression models are tested separately for each PSB. Analysing temporal changes in relationships by testing the same model in different periods is an approach that has been used by researchers to identify modifications in relationships before and after particular temporal events. To test whether new legislation in Chile reduced traffic fatalities, Nazif-Munoz et al. (2015) conduct regressions in the periods before and after the new legislation was introduced. Seeking to identify how the partisan affiliation of administrative elites has affected turnover, Ennsner-Jedenastik (2014a) tests the same regression model in three different periods demarked by different coalitions of governing parties. Likewise, recently published in the *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Liang (2016) examines whether group-centric policies affect administrative outputs differently over time by testing the same model in four distinct periods.

To examine the robustness of the findings, the regression models were tested using alternative coding of the dependent variable that excluded the appointment of persons to newly created departments as well as the first year following the abolition of departments. To ensure that the findings did not represent a strong relationship existing in only one province, the regression models were run with the exclusion of a different province each time. The historical periods were also recoded so as to begin the *Schafferian* bargain in Saskatchewan in 1945 and in Québec in 1960, along the lines of some research suggesting that these two provinces were the respective temporal leader and laggard, in the development of a professional civil service. Alternative coding for region, the legislative strength of the government and the political ideology of parties discussed above were also conducted. In all of these robustness tests, the main findings remained substantially unaltered.

The results from the logistic regressions are reported using odds ratios and predicted probabilities. Rather than report coefficients as commonly done with OLS regression, odds ratios are a conventional alternative when the dependent variable is binary. Odds ratios are simply the ratio between the odds of a particular value of the dependent variable given a specific value of the predictor variable compared to having the same value of the dependent variable given a different value of the predictor variable (Pampel 2009). For example, using the original data from this dissertation, Table 5 shows the results of a cross tabulation of mobility and an election. The odds of mobility when there is an election is 1, 194 to 3, 237 (or .369), meanwhile the odds of mobility when there is no election is 2, 836 to 9, 247 (or .307). The odds ratio is then arrived at by dividing these two odds. The odds ratio of DM mobility given that there has been an election than if there is no election is 1.20 (.369 divided by .307).

Table 5: Odds ratio calculation: Cross-tabulation of election and DM mobility

Election	Deputy Minister Mobility		Total
	No	Yes	
No	9 247	2 836	12 083
Yes	3 237	1 194	4 431
Total	12 484	4 030	16 514

An odds ratio greater than one denotes a positive relationship, whereas a number fewer than one specifies a negative relationship. A value of 1.0 indicates no change in the likelihood of the outcome given differing values of the predictor. Odds ratios can then be interpreted as percentage changes in the odds of an outcome. This is accomplished when the value is greater than 1.0 by subtracting 1 from the odds ratios and multiplying by 100. When the value is less than 1.0, the percentage change in odds by simply subtracting the value of the odds ratio from 1.0 (Acock 2010, 128). For example, using the data above, an odds ratio of 1.20 of mobility when there is an election can be interpreted as an increased percentage in odds of 20 percent (e.g.  $(.307 \times .20) + .307 = .369$ ). Conversely, an odds ratio between mobility and an election of 0.95 would suggest a decrease percentage in the odds of mobility by five percent if there was an election than if there was none.

While commonly used, and more meaningful than the coefficients of log odds, researchers using logistic regression have increasingly begun to report the predictive probabilities of outcomes. The reason for doing so is that while odds ratios tell us about percent changes in odds, they say nothing substantively of the overall likelihood of the outcome itself.

For instance, an odds ratio of 2.00 means something different if the underlying probability of an event is .300 than if it is .030. Whereas the latter would result in an increase in probability from .300 to a level of .600 (now making the likelihood of the event a more probable outcome than not), the same increase percentage in odds for an event whose underlying probability is .030 would increase to a level of .060 (still an unlikely outcome). The empirical results from the regression models thus also report predicted probabilities of mobility given particular values of explanatory variables while holding constant alternative variables at their observed value, as is common practice amongst scholars (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).

*Qualitative methods.* In addition to the statistical analysis, this dissertation also undertakes a qualitative investigation to identify whether the motivations underpinning the appointment of administrative elites by governments have shifted over time in a manner that corresponds with the preferences of governments in different PSBs. If variation between political dynamics and mobility stem, at least in part, from differences in the type of traits governments seek to encourage amongst bureaucrats in different PSBs, an additional means to validate this is to examine descriptions of political-administrative relationships over time, specifically focusing on the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and loyalty, as well as the reasons motivating governments to remove and appoint bureaucratic elites.

Finding descriptions conforming to theoretical expectations would add empirical support of a different nature, which, while less systematic and comprehensive than the quantitative statistical analysis, has the advantage of providing a closer examination of the underlying incentives of heads of government. This qualitative inquiry thus helps tie together the theoretical framework and the large-n analysis by illustrating how governments in distinct

PSBs use the strategic nomination of administrative personnel to encourage different types of competency and loyalty.

The qualitative inquiry is conducted by analyzing primary and secondary sources providing descriptions of political-administrative relationships in Canada's provinces, with particular attention given to the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and loyalty as well as the considerations involved in staffing administrative elites. Fortunately, a rich body of case study material on the Canadian provinces has been produced by scholars in political science and history. Appearing in journal articles, books, as well as doctoral and master's theses, there now exist hundreds of case studies touching upon to varying degrees political-administrative relationships in Canada's provinces.<sup>30</sup> Frequently based on elite-interviews and archival research, these secondary sources regularly provide insightful descriptions of nature of the bureaucracy's loyalty and competency, and even glimpses into the government's objectives motivating the staffing of administrative offices.

In addition to secondary sources, several types of primary sources have also been consulted. These include, firsthand written accounts by politicians, civil servants and political staffers; government mandated public inquiries studying the bureaucracy; as well as various provincial and national newspaper articles often based on interviews with politicians, civil servants and political staffers. Analysis of these primary and secondary sources was oriented towards identifying the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and loyalty desired by governments as well as the reasons underlining the staffing of bureaucratic elites.

Still true today as it was noted over 30 years ago by Chandler and Chandler (1982), the provinces have not received uniform attention by researchers. Nonetheless, effort was taken to ensure that data was collected from each province. The information gathered from a variety of

sources has been compared and contrasted in a form of triangulation so as to draw more accurate conclusions.

### **Conclusion of Chapter Three**

Canada's provincial bureaucracies are an apt case selection to study whether the relationship between bureaucratic mobility and political dynamics has changed over time across distinct PSBs. Sharing the same administrative and political institutions, the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to remove and appoint administrative elites can be tested in Canada's provincial bureaucracies without having to introduce a great deal of variation in institutional variables. The relationship between mobility and politics is tested with an original dataset of DM mobility from 1920 to 2013; a period that is long enough to explore possible changes in relationships across PSBs.


This chapter outlined the research design, data collection method and the operationalization of the variables of the quantitative analysis. Descriptive statistics of central variables were presented and discussed. The qualitative methods used to scrutinize whether the relationship between mobility and politics reflects changes in the types of competency and loyalty desired by government across PSBs were described.

The next two chapters present the results and discuss the findings of the empirical analyses. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) uses descriptive statistics to investigate the relationship between mobility and key political variables across the *spoils*, *Schafferian* and *managerial* bargains. In addition, the chapter uses primary and secondary sources to identify whether the strategic considerations underpinning the appointment of administrative elites reflect differences in the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and loyalty desired by

governments in distinct PSBs. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) further scrutinizes the conclusions suggested in the first empirical chapter by using statistical regression to test simultaneously the association between mobility and several political variables while controlling for some alternative predictors identified by organization and management studies.

### Chapter 3 Appendix I

Figure 2: Flow chart classifying organizational persistence and termination



## Chapter 4. The Politics of Mobility: A Quantitative and Qualitative Descriptive Investigation

*Chapter four summary.* This is the first of two empirical chapters dedicated to testing whether the association between political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility in Canada's provincial bureaucracies has changed over time across PSBs. After identifying temporal trends of mobility between 1920 and 2013, the association between mobility and key political variables is examined using descriptive statistics.

The analysis compares levels of mobility following a transition in the governing party; a change in party while accounting for the length of time the previous party was in power; a change in party accounting for which party has formed government; a change in premier; and the legislative strength of the government. To examine temporal variation between these variables and mobility analysis is conducted across periods embodying the *spoils* (1920-1949), *Schafferian* (1950-1979) and *managerial* (1980-2013) bargains.

The evidence generally supports the conclusion that the association between some key political dynamics and mobility has shifted across distinct PSBs. In particular, whereas a change in the governing party is associated with increased mobility during the *spoils* bargain, in the *managerial* bargain, even when there has been no change in party, newly elected premiers are now also positively associated with mobility. As expected, in the *Schafferian* bargain, the association between political dynamics and mobility is severely reduced.

In addition to descriptive statistics, this chapter uses primary and secondary sources to conduct a qualitative investigation as to whether; (a), there are observable differences in the


contours of political-administrative relationships of Canada's provinces over the last 100 years; and (b), whether the motivations underlying the staffing decisions of administrative elites reflect changes in these relationships, specifically, the type of competency and loyalty governments desire bureaucratic elites to exhibit. This qualitative examination provides an additional means to assess whether the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically dismiss and appoint personnel varies across PSBs. This qualitative component provides a closer examination of the strategic considerations of governments in differing PSBs, and thus helps tie together the theory with the large-n analysis. The results from the qualitative analysis, generally confirm that governments in dissimilar PSBs have been motivated by different ends in their strategic decisions to remove, retain or appoint administrative elites.

### **Temporal Trends in Mobility**

Figure 3 displays the average annual percentage of DM mobility for each decade between the 1920s and the 2000s.<sup>31</sup> In its aggregate, the data shows that up until the 1960s mobility was relatively stable. Rounding to the nearest whole number, the percentage of persons who were removed or appointed to a new position ranged between 11 and 14 percent. The 1960s marked the beginning of an upward trend in mobility, swiftly reaching 26 percent in the 1970s. From the 1980s onward, mobility has continued to rise, reaching a high of 35 percent in the 2000s.

As shown in Table 6, this temporal trend in the combined total of the observations is largely replicated separately in each province. An exception to the aggregate trend found in every province apart from Manitoba however, is a more pronounced fluctuation in mobility with higher peaks and lower dips in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Figure 3: Annual mobility in Canada's provincial bureaucracies, by decade



For example, as demonstrated in Figure 4 higher levels of mobility in British Columbia during the 1920s are followed by lower levels in the 1930s, whereas in Saskatchewan a low level of mobility in the 1920s is trailed by a higher level of mobility in the 1930s. When examining average rates of mobility, which aggregate all observations together, the extremities in the data observed between the 1920s and 1950s serve to cancel each other out. A likely explanation for this is discussed in greater detail below studying the link between a transition in party and mobility (p. 107). Here it simply suffices to note that while in the aggregate levels of mobility were low during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when each province is considered separately, a greater fluctuation is observed during this period.

Table 6: Annual percentage DM mobility by province and decade

	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	Total
British Columbia	<i>14.43</i> (97)	<i>9.85</i> (132)	<i>9.80</i> (153)	<i>18.99</i> (179)	<i>9.48</i> (211)	<i>30.73</i> (218)	<i>34.65</i> (228)	<i>45.71</i> (245)	<i>40.96</i> (354)	<i>27.46</i> (1 817)
Alberta	<i>14.14</i> (99)	<i>9.92</i> (121)	<i>11.27</i> (142)	<i>8.82</i> (170)	<i>8.67</i> (173)	<i>26.16</i> (260)	<i>22.26</i> (310)	<i>28.76</i> (226)	<i>36.93</i> (371)	<i>21.96</i> (1 872)
Saskatchewan	<i>7.76</i> (116)	<i>16.30</i> (135)	<i>14.55</i> (165)	<i>9.94</i> (161)	<i>17.37</i> (167)	<i>31.08</i> (222)	<i>40.53</i> (264)	<i>37.65</i> (255)	<i>32.28</i> (347)	<i>26.42</i> (1 832)
Manitoba	<i>10.98</i> (82)	<i>10.68</i> (103)	<i>10.43</i> (115)	<i>11.90</i> (126)	<i>22.22</i> (162)	<i>32.98</i> (188)	<i>28.09</i> (235)	<i>18.86</i> (228)	<i>25.65</i> (308)	<i>21.53</i> (1 547)
Ontario	<i>10.83</i> (120)	<i>14.84</i> (155)	<i>13.69</i> (168)	<i>10.88</i> (193)	<i>15.35</i> (228)	<i>29.61</i> (223)	<i>33.96</i> (265)	<i>35.77</i> (274)	<i>37.24</i> (435)	<i>25.78</i> (2 071)
Québec	<i>7.84</i> (102)	<i>15.44</i> (136)	<i>7.34</i> (177)	<i>6.40</i> (203)	<i>20.61</i> (228)	<i>30.94</i> (223)	<i>33.06</i> (248)	<i>37.04</i> (243)	<i>39.94</i> (328)	<i>25.11</i> (1 888)
New Brunswick	<i>20.55</i> (73)	<i>10.00</i> (80)	<i>11.34</i> (97)	<i>11.82</i> (110)	<i>16.22</i> (148)	<i>17.65</i> (204)	<i>18.60</i> (215)	<i>24.65</i> (215)	<i>33.63</i> (339)	<i>21.20</i> (1 481)
Nova Scotia	<i>18.75</i> (48)	<i>17.91</i> (67)	<i>26.09</i> (92)	<i>11.28</i> (133)	<i>9.38</i> (160)	<i>19.72</i> (218)	<i>19.66</i> (234)	<i>37.60</i> (242)	<i>31.38</i> (325)	<i>23.50</i> (1 519)
Prince Edward Island	<i>10.00</i> (40)	<i>14.71</i> (34)	<i>29.63</i> (54)	<i>12.50</i> (104)	<i>13.67</i> (139)	<i>15.76</i> (184)	<i>31.37</i> (153)	<i>45.73</i> (164)	<i>28.57</i> (266)	<i>25.04</i> (1 138)
Newfoundland & Labrador	–	–	<i>69.23</i> (13)	<i>9.33</i> (150)	<i>9.36</i> (171)	<i>24.41</i> (213)	<i>23.58</i> (229)	<i>31.73</i> (249)	<i>35.49</i> (324)	<i>25.13</i> (1 349)
Equally weighed provincial average <sup>32</sup>	<i>12.81</i>	<i>13.29</i>	<i>20.34</i>	<i>11.19</i>	<i>14.23</i>	<i>25.90</i>	<i>28.57</i>	<i>34.35</i>	<i>34.21</i>	<i>24.31</i>

(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parenthesis)

Figure 4: Fluctuations in DM mobility, selected provinces, 1920s -1950s




Table 6 also brings attention to an extreme value in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador with a level of mobility of 69 percent during the 1940s. The high level of mobility is in part explained by the low number of observations (n=13) obtained from the first year Newfoundland and Labrador became a province of Canada and reintroduced responsible government through a democratic election. Since 1934, the province had been governed by a Commission of six members appointed by the British Prime Minister, which in the words of one of its Commissioners, was akin to a dictatorship (Lodge 1939). The election in 1949 was thus of great importance signifying much more than a mere change in government. By reintroducing representative self-government after a 15-year hiatus, the election marked a change in the nature of the polity from government by commission to representative democracy. Because of the uniqueness of this election, all subsequent analyses have been conducted with the inclusion and exclusion of these observations. Because this only constitutes 13 observations, however, its exclusion does not generally alter any results. When it does, mention is made to that effect.


### **Political Dynamics and Mobility: Evidence from Descriptive Statistics**

*Change in the governing party.* A principal hypothesis of research studying the politics of administrative mobility is that turnover increases the most following a transition in the governing party. This relationship is first tested by comparing the annual percentage of mobility when a change in the governing party has taken place with levels of mobility when no change in party has occurred. The results presented by decade in Figure 5 are quite revealing (exact percentages and the number of observations are provided in Table 11 Chapter 4 Appendix I, p. 149).

During the first half of the 20th century, in the period embodying a *spoils* bargain, mobility is much higher following a change in party than when no such transition had occurred. Following a change in the governing party, mobility is 20 percent in the 1920s, 29 percent in the 1930s and 22 percent in the 1940s. When there was no change in party, mobility is 11 percent in the 1920s and 1930s, and 13 percent in the 1940s.

In the postwar period of the 1950s until 1980, in the epoch embodying a *Schafferian* bargain, a change in party is associated with a lower level of mobility than during the *spoils* bargain. After a transition in the governing party mobility is 15 percent in the 1950s, 17 percent the 1960s and 25 percent in the 1970s. When no such change in party took place, mobility is 11 percent in the 1950s, 14 percent in the 1960s and 26 percent in the 1970s.

Figure 5: Annual DM mobility, discriminating for change in party, by decade



Overall absolute levels of mobility following a change in party are lower during the *Schafferian* bargain than they are following a change in government during the *spoils* bargain. Averaging all years together, during the *Schafferian* bargain mobility following a change in party is 22 percent, whereas in the *spoils* bargain it is 24 percent.

Not only are levels of mobility following a change in party lower during the *Schafferian* bargain than in the *spoils* bargain, but the difference between levels of mobility following a change in party and all other years is much less in the *Schafferian* bargain than in the *spoils* bargain. Between 1920 and 1949, mobility is 24 percent following a change in government; 12 percentage points higher than when there is no change in party (12 percent). The strong increase in mobility following a transition in the governing party during this period helps explain the fluctuations in mobility during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century identified above in Table 6 and Figure 4 (p. 104-105). During the *Schafferian* bargain, however, mobility is 22 percent following a change in government, only 4 percentage points greater than mobility when there is no such change (18 percent). Transitions in party during the *Schafferian* PSB are thus not associated with as much of an increase in mobility as they are in other periods.

From the 1980s onward, during the *managerial* bargain, levels of mobility are once again higher following a change in the governing party. After a transition, mobility is 38 percent in the 1980s, 41 percent in the 1990s and 47 percent in the 2000s. Higher than when there is no change in party; 28 percent in the 1980s, 34 percent in the 1990s and 33 percent in the 2000s. Again, not only have the absolute levels of mobility increased following a change in party during the *managerial* bargain, but the difference between levels of mobility when there has been a change in party and those when no such change in party has occurred, as with the *spoils* bargain,

is once again more pronounced. Since the 1980s, mobility following a change in party is 43 percent, 11 percentage points greater than when there has been no such transition (32 percent).

Evidence from this first analysis is congruent with theoretical expectations concerning the relationship between transitions in party and mobility across PSBs. During the *spoils* bargain, the high level of mobility following a transition in party followed by lower levels in all other years is in accordance with expectations that newly elected governments nominate partisan loyalists upon taking power and then allow these individuals to enjoy their position so long as the government remains in power. The evidence however, does not perfectly reflect the *Schafferian* bargain. In contrast to its ideal-type form, in which political dynamics should not affect mobility, changes in government are associated with increased levels. The degree however, to which mobility increases following a change in party than in all other years is considerably less than during the *spoils* and *managerial* bargains. Finally, as expected, during the *managerial* bargain changes in the governing party are associated with greater levels of mobility, thus suggesting that heads of government are once again strategically interfering in the appointment of administrative personnel upon taking power.

While the data presented in Figure 5 supports the claim that the extent to which a change in the party is associated with mobility varies across PSBs, transitions in party are not homogenous. Research suggests that differences in the nature of these transitions also affect the degree to which governments dismiss and appoint bureaucratic elites. Specifically, the length of time the previous party was in power and the ideology of the government.

*Change in party and time previous government was in power.* According to some, the extent to which a newly elected government moves people in and out of bureaucratic offices is a function

of the length of time the previous party was in power. As the time the previous government was in power grows, so too does the skepticism that newly elected governments bear towards incumbents to implement new policies whose objectives may be different than, or even controvert, those they had been cultivating under the previous government.

From a theoretical perspective of PSBs however, this relationship should be limited to a *managerial* bargain where the strategic use of appointments is oriented to ensuring commitment to mobilizing resources in pursuit of realizing the government's policy agenda. Factors likely exacerbating a government's distrust that bureaucrats exhibit such responsive competence, such as the length of time the previous government was in power, are thus expected to be associated with an increased incidence of mobility.

During the *spoils* bargain, appointments are used to reward partisan loyalists for their support to the party and not as a means to check the power of the bureaucracy and ensure responsiveness to the government's policy agenda. Elected parties are ubiquitously expected to be motivated by the desire to reward partisans for their electoral support, regardless for the length of time the previous party was in power. The desire to reward partisan supports is not expected to be any greater the longer the previous party was in power. As for the *Schafferian* bargain, just as with a change in government, it is expected that regardless of the time the previous government was in power, transitions in the governing party should have no bearing on levels of mobility.

This relationship is first tested by comparing mobility levels when there is a change in party discriminating for how many years the previous government was in power. Table 7 displays the results of such a comparison discriminating between the length of time the previous party was in power when there is finally a change in government between; 4 years or fewer; 5

to 8 years; 9 to 12 years; and more than 12 years. The analysis is conducted for all years in the dataset as well as separately for each PSB (to improve visual interpretation, this data is reproduced in Figures 8 through 11 in Appendix II of this chapter p. 150-151).

Table 7: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013 and PSB

	1-4 years	5-8 years	9-12 years	> 12 years
Spoils-type bargain	<i>20.45</i> (44)	<i>21.25</i> (80)	<i>20.00</i> (80)	<i>34.78</i> (69)
Schafferian bargain	<i>31.25</i> (48)	<i>19.31</i> (145)	<i>12.24</i> (49)	<i>23.12</i> (186)
Managerial bargain	<i>54.46</i> (101)	<i>35.08</i> (191)	<i>45.79</i> (321)	<i>39.01</i> (141)
All years (1920-2013)	<i>40.93</i> (193)	<i>26.92</i> (416)	<i>37.56</i> (450)	<i>30.81</i> (396)

(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

The evidence suggests no clear relationship between the time the previous party was in power and mobility. Examining the relationship in all years shows that mobility following a change in party is highest when the previous government was in power for 4 years or less (41 percent) and 9 to 12 years (38 percent), meanwhile levels of mobility are lower when the previous party had been in power for 5 to 8 years (27 percent) and 13 years or more (31 percent).

When this relationship is examined separately for each PSB the picture does not become any clearer. During the *Schafferian* and the *managerial* bargains the data does not indicate any clear relationship. With respect to the *managerial* bargain, this suggests that distrust towards the bureaucracy and the desire to reappoint administrative elites to secure responsiveness does not rise in tandem with the length of the time the previous government was in power. Surprisingly, in contrast to expectations, while in the *spoils* bargain levels of mobility do not rise as the length

of time increases to 12 years, after this amount of time, a transition in government is associated with higher levels of mobility.

This is in part due to a historical change in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949 which witnessed the end of Government by Commission and the reintroduction of responsible government, when upon forming government, the newly elected government replaced 9 of 13 positions. If excluded from the analysis, the level of mobility following a change in government with the previous government in power for more than 12 years is reduced to a level of 27 percent. In sum, in contrast to expectations the data suggests that length of time prior to change in government does not have any relationship with mobility during the *managerial* bargain.

*Mobility and political ideology.* Another central hypothesis is that governments on the ideological right remove incumbents and appoint new personnel to a greater extent than other parties. This is believed to stem from higher levels of distrust parties on the ideological right harness towards the intentions of public servants whose jobs represent the intrusive public programs they hope to retract. From a perspective of PSBs, the relationship between political ideology, like that of time prior to a transition in party, should be limited to the *managerial* bargain where the incidence of mobility is expected to be higher under circumstances that increase the government's doubt about the willingness of bureaucrats to be responsive to, and implement, the government's policy agenda. Governments on the right are thus expected to be associated with higher levels of mobility due to their higher levels of mistrust towards bureaucrats.

During the *spoils* bargain, governments on the ideological right should not be more prone than parties on the left to dismiss and appoint bureaucratic elites. Staffing decisions are not aimed at reducing goal conflict and information asymmetry in order to ensure that executives manage resources towards realizing the government's policy directives, but instead, are intended to encourage and reinforce loyalty to the party and its quest for power; something expected to be displayed regardless of right/left ideology.

In the case of Canada however, it is possible that in the *spoils* bargain the Liberal party will be associated with greater levels of mobility than other parties. Several case studies suggest that with the exception of the Liberal party many governments sought to bring an end to 'partyism' and the practice of patronage (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; Smith 1975; English 1977; Campbell 1988; Laycock 1990; Dutil and MacKenzie 2011).

Desiring that bureaucrats possess policy relevant knowledge and display a devotion to providing impartial neutral advice on the basis of their expertise and experience regardless of the government in power and its ideological orientation, mobility is not expected to be higher for any particular party during the *Schafferian* bargain. This is not to say that ideological differences between parties in this bargain do not exist. But having a preference for the bureaucracy to possess technical competency and serial loyalty, governments on both sides of the ideological spectrum do not view dissenting opinions with as much wariness as is the case in the *managerial* bargain where governments have a preference for bureaucrats that are '*can do*' managers rather than '*wait a minute*' advisors (Dargie and Locke 1999, 181). In the *Schafferian* bargain, governments on the right and left are not only likely to expect, but in fact value, dissenting opinions from civil servants, viewing this as comprehending the candid and


expert advice provided by the bureaucracy rather than indicating goal conflict in need of correcting

Figure 6 displays levels of mobility by political party following a change in party and when no change in party has taken place between 1920 and 2013 as well as separately by PSB (actual percentages and the number of observations are provided in Table 13 Appendix III of this chapter p.152). Analysis of mobility by political party in all years suggests little difference in the two largest parties forming government across Canada's provinces: the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives. Upon taking power mobility for both parties is 32 percent. The more ideologically left leaning CCF/NDP is associated with a slightly higher level of 35 percent. Analyzing the relationship separately in each PSB however, reveals more pronounced differences in levels of mobility between parties across PSBs.

During the *managerial* bargain the results are generally supportive of the anticipation that parties on the left are associated with lower levels of mobility. The Progressive Conservative party does have higher levels of mobility when first coming to power (48 percent) than the more centrist Liberal party (37 percent) and the left-leaning NDP (39 percent).

The data suggests that governments on the ideological right are more distrusting of civil servants than other parties and dismiss incumbents and appoint new personal to a greater extent when they first come to power than parties on the left. Equally suggestive is that the ideologically right Saskatchewan Party has a high rate of mobility upon taking power (59 percent).

Figure 6: DM mobility discriminating for political party, by PSB



The Parti Québécois (PQ) however, is also associated with a high level of mobility (64 percent). This is somewhat surprising, given that the PQ has generally been seen as being closer to the ideological left than the right (Gagnon and Lachapelle 1996; Erk 2010) thus contradicting the standard hypothesis between ideology and mobility. A possible explanation for the high level of mobility observed with the PQ may be due to its ideological commitment to the independence of the province of Québec. Having a strong stance on such a crucial issue may lead the party to be more committed to reforming the state in its own vision than is traditionally witnessed alongside right/left ideological divisions, which are often claimed in Canada to be softened due to the practice of brokerage politics amongst catch-all parties (Meisel 1974; Carty and Cross 2010). Some have noted that the degree to the commitment to large-scale reforms, which would include preparing for secession, lead governments to seek greater control of the bureaucracy. Robert Normand, deputy minister of Québec during the 1970s and 1980s made a remark to this point, commenting on the challenge that the arrival of the PQ under Premier René Lévesque in the 1970s presented to the public service:

Le principe d'une fonction publique apolitique et permanente avait désormais droit de cité. L'arrivée au pouvoir de Monsieur Levesque posa un problème plus délicat en 1976. Il s'agissait d'un gouvernement porté par un parti politique à forte teneur idéologique et qui assumait le pouvoir non pas uniquement pour assurer le mieux-être de la population suivant des critères du bonne administration mais aussi pour réaliser une option politique qui se démarquait nettement de celle des partis traditionnels. (Normand 1984, 536)

This may also explain why the CCF/NDP and the Saskatchewan Party exhibit higher levels of mobility than the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Party.<sup>33</sup> As stated by Seymour Martin Lipset in his assessment of agrarian socialism in the Canadian Prairie Provinces:

Members of the civil service [have] power to amend initiate and veto actions proposed...The political problem of the power and influence of the permanent civil service with its own goals and traditions was not important so long as the social and economic values of the bureaucracy and governing politicians did not conflict. The problem becomes crucial when a new political movement takes office and proposes to enact reforms that go beyond

traditional frames of reference...and upsets existing regulations within the bureaucracy.  
(1959, 309)

Whereas the Liberal and Conservative Party have most commonly governed the provinces, the arrival of parties with policy agendas more divergent than the traditional brokerage approach (Young 1992), may be one factor for their higher incidence of mobility.

Turning to the *Schafferian* bargain, the evidence is partially supportive of the expectancy that there be no relationship between the political ideology of the party taking power and mobility. Most political parties generally exhibit similar levels of mobility following a change in government. Two important exceptions are the Parti Québécois and the Union Nationale. Whereas the PQ has higher level of mobility of 40 percent the Union Nationale has a much lower level at slightly less than 10 percent. The higher level of the PQ addressed above may also explain the high level of mobility in this period.

The low level for the Union Nationale is perhaps surprising given the body of research that has identified the Union Nationale with practices of patronage (Quinn 1979; Behiels 1985), which according to some, was so extensive that it was impossible to distinguish between the political party and the bureaucracy (Boismenu 1981, 358). Yet especially following the death of the party's founder and leader Maurice Duplessis in 1959, the Union Nationale under the brief rule of Paul Sauvé, undertook a series of reforms aiming to purge practices of patronage, install a meritocratic bureaucracy, and establish a relationship with the bureaucracy reflecting the contours of a *Schafferian* bureaucracy. When the Union Nationale was finally brought back to power in 1966 under Premier Daniel Johnson it approached political-administrative relationships quite differently than in the period of the *spoils* bargain. Administrative offices were no longer viewed as an instrument to secure partisan support, but instead were seen as a

means to harness expertise and effectively implement new policies, as they had also been under the previous Liberal government of Jean Lesage (1960-1966) (Gow 1985). For instance, responding to the request from DM Claude Morin that Québec Premier Daniel Johnson publicly declare his confidence in him, Johnson (1966-1968) advised the public servant that his retention in the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was an act *ipso facto* reflecting the premier's trust.

As recounted by Morin, Johnson replied to his request stating that:

si je comprends bien...vous voudriez que j'exprime publiquement ma confiance envers vous. Il me semble que le fait de vous avoir gardé comme sous-ministre, au vu et au su de tout le monde, devrait suffire. Ma confiance, vous l'avez. Un tas de gens croyaient que je mettrais à la porte tous les hauts fonctionnaires nommés par Lesage. Je ne l'ai pas fait. Ça doit signifier quelque chose, n'est pas? (Morin 1991, 226)<sup>34</sup>

That a party formerly associated with using administrative offices in a manner of patronage came to refrain from using these offices in an era embodying a *Schafferian* bargain, is supportive of changes across PSB in the degree to which political dynamics effect mobility.

The results presented in Figure 6 also suggest that during the *spoils* bargain some political parties are associated with higher levels of mobility than others. As suggested by some researchers in Canada, upon forming government, the Liberal party is associated with a much higher level of mobility than any other party; 31 percent for the Liberal party whereas excluding the Liberal party the average of all other parties weighed equally is 22 percent. Even more supportive of this research, in particular that of English (1977), is that the Conservative party had the lowest level of mobility upon taking power (17 percent).


*Change in premier.* In addition to examining the relationship between transitions in the governing party and mobility, attention has also recently turned to changes in the head of government. Even when there was been no change in the party forming government, a newly

appointed head of government may desire that civil servants be loyal to her personal policy agenda. This is expected to be the case in the *managerial* bargain given the increasing importance of the head of government in setting the policy agenda and their preference that bureaucrats exhibit responsiveness to this agenda. During the *spoils* bargain, however, a change in the head of government when there has been no change in party should not influence mobility. This is because of the emphasis on partisan loyalty to the party rather than loyalty to the head of government and her policy agenda. In fact for a newly empowered premier from the same party as the previous premier to interfere in the staffing of administrative personnel would run the risk of frustrating supporters, driving them to shift their partisan support. Again, in the *Schafferian* bargain the relationship between change in premier and mobility is not expected to be present.

This relationship is tested by comparing levels of mobility following a change a premier with levels when no such change has taken place. Because a change in premier almost always encompasses a change in the governing party,<sup>35</sup> the relationship between a change in the head of government and bureaucratic mobility is analyzed by examining all changes in premier as well as isolating only those changes in premier when the party has remained the same.

The results shown in Figure 7 strongly support expectations (exact percentages and the number of observations are provided in Table 12, Appendix I of this chapter p. 149).

Figure 7: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier



In the *spoils* bargain, only a change in premier alongside a change in party is associated with higher levels of mobility. Congruent with expectations, there is no increase in mobility when there has been a change in premier but the party has remained the same.

In the *Schafferian* bargain, a change in premier is not associated with a notably higher level of mobility. While all changes in premier are associated with a slightly higher level of mobility (19 percent compared to 18 percent when there is no change in premier), the rate of mobility following a change in premier when the party has not changed is lower (15 percent).

The evidence shown in Figure 7 also supports expectations concerning the *managerial* bargain. In this period, even when changes in premier do not involve a change in party, levels of mobility are higher. This suggests that the appointment of administrative elites is not oriented to ensuring partisan loyalty to the party, but instead is geared towards encouraging responsiveness to the premier's policy agenda. As new premiers take power, even when they belong to the same party as the previous head of government, there now is a marked increase in mobility. Mobility is 42 percent for all changes in premier and 39 percent when there is a change in premier but the party has not changed, both greater than the average level of mobility when there has been no change in premier (30 percent).

While a change in premier, even when there has been no change in the governing party, is positively associated with mobility during the *managerial* bargain, not all new premiers may harness the same desire to control the bureaucracy. Some new premiers come to power supported by an election, whereas others find themselves nominated by the party following the departure of the previous premier. Often due to dissatisfaction amongst party members with the leader's performance and concern about the party's prospects to be re-elected to government,

premiers sometimes resign, with the party nominating a temporary ‘interim premier’ to head the government until the next election.<sup>36</sup>

It is probable that interim premiers have a different orientation to governing than those premiers that are elected to power. According to Savoie, one of the reasons for why there has been a centralization of power in the first minister is the personalization of politics, including election campaigns (1999, 96). As party leaders have come to assume greater responsibility for the electoral success of their party, they also now command a greater degree of control over the policy agenda (also see Pal 1992). This is not likely the case for interim premiers. Not having brought their party to electoral victory, interim premiers are unlikely to exhibit as much desire to control the policy agenda within cabinet as premiers whose position has been legitimized by the electorate.

In addition having with a shorter time horizon in front of them until the next election as a newly elected premier, interim premiers may also be less prone to introduce new policies. In sum, if increased levels of mobility are associated with new premiers due to the desire to have responsive competence to their policy agenda, then the positive relationship between a change in premier and mobility should *not* be observed amongst interim premiers, who are unlikely to set the agenda and initiate new policies.<sup>37</sup>

Differences in levels of administrative mobility between interim premiers and those premiers who are newly elected-but-no-party-change (ENPC) are shown in Table 8. The results strongly confirm expectations. Comparing levels of mobility for interim premiers with ENPC premiers, shows much higher levels of mobility for the latter group. Aggregating all observations in every year, mobility for interim premiers is 25 percent whereas mobility for ENCP premiers is 38 percent.

Table 8: Mobility following a change in premier, 1920-2013 and by PSB

	Change in premier, no change in party, with election ('ENPC premier')	Change in premier, no change in party, without election ('interim premier')	All changes in premier when no change in party	No change in party or premier
Spoils-type	<i>11.9</i> (42)	<i>9.59</i> (219)	<i>9.96</i> (261)	<i>12.3</i> (2 089)
Schafferian	<i>19.5</i> (82)	<i>13.19</i> (144)	<i>15.49</i> (226)	<i>17.87</i> (4 825)
Managerial	<i>54.04</i> (161)	<i>34.36</i> (521)	<i>39.00</i> (682)	<i>30.91</i> (6 687)
All years	<i>37.89</i> (285)	<i>24.77</i> (884)	<i>27.97</i> (1 169)	<i>23.19</i> (13 890)

(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

Examining the relationship across PSBs shows that the difference in levels of mobility for interim premiers and ENCP premiers is most pronounced in the *managerial* bargain. In the *spoils* bargain differences in mobility between interim premiers and ENPC premiers are only slight, and in both cases the incidence of mobility is lower than in years when there has been no change in premier. This is in line with expectations that the strategic nomination of mobility is not oriented towards responsiveness to the head of government's policy agenda, but instead is used to ensure loyalty to the political party.

In the *Schafferian* bargain, interim premiers do have a lower level of mobility (13 percent) than ENPC premiers (20 percent). These levels however are not much different from when there has been no change in premier (18 percent). The greatest difference in levels of mobility between interim and ENPC premiers is in the *managerial* bargain. Annual levels of mobility for interim premiers are 34 percent whereas levels for ENPC premiers are twenty

percentage points higher (54 percent). This is congruent with expectations that it is during the *managerial* bargain where changes in the head of government are associated with increased mobility due to the desire to ensure responsiveness to the government's policy agenda. When the desire to implement a new policy agenda is severely reduced, as presumed to be the case with interim premiers, the association between a new premier and mobility is concurrently lessened. The evidence shown in Table 8 is congruent with this claim.

It is possible to further test the theoretical explanation for lower levels of mobility for interim premiers by examining levels of mobility after the first election of the interim premier. If interim premiers refrain from reappointing bureaucratic elites because they are not yet in a position to introduce new policies and thus do not have the same need for responsive competence from the bureaucracy, it is reasonable to expect that when they are eventually elected to government, and are now in a position to govern according to their personal agenda, they will undertake an increased number of administrative appointments to ensure responsiveness to their agenda.

This possibility is tested by comparing levels of mobility following the first election in which interim premiers are eventually elected to government with levels of mobility following the re-election of ENCP premiers, as well as levels of mobility for all elections. The findings presented in Table 9 strongly confirm expectations.

In the *managerial* bargain, once they are elected, interim primers are associated with higher levels of mobility than when they had first come to power as an unelected interim; 46 percent once they are elected compared to 34 percent when they first came to power, almost as high as when ENPC premiers are first elected (54 percent). Equally informative is that levels of

mobility when interim premiers are first returned to government after being elected is higher than when an incumbent premier (i.e. an ENCP premier) is re-elected (32 percent).

Table 9: Mobility following election of interim and re-election of incumbent premiers

	first election interim premier	re-election incumbent premier excluding interim premiers	all elections
Spoils	<i>12.50</i> (80)	<i>13.39</i> (433)	<i>17.25</i> (748)
Schafferian	<i>18.18</i> (11)	<i>15.23</i> (1 057)	<i>17.12</i> (1 554)
Managerial	<i>46.25</i> (160)	<i>31.96</i> (1 214)	<i>37.53</i> (2 129)
All years	<i>34.26</i> (251)	<i>22.45</i> (2 704)	<i>31.17</i> (4 431)

(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

The data is congruent with the inference that reelected incumbent premiers do not use their staffing powers to ensure responsive competence to the same extent as when an interim premier is returned to office following her first electoral victory. This is because the interim premier has not yet had the opportunity to pursue her policy agenda. Now having been elected, these former interim premiers are now better situated to govern according to their policy agenda. The data suggests that this being the case, they also seek to ensure responsiveness towards their agenda via a higher number of appointments and reappointments.

*Mobility and legislative strength.* Research also suggests that a government's legislative strength is related to bureaucratic mobility. In the *Schafferian* bargain legislative strength should ideally have no effect on mobility. During the *spoils* and *managerial* bargains however,

legislatively weak governments are expected to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel to a more limited extent than majority governments.

The relationship between mobility and legislative strength is tested in Table 10 by comparing levels of mobility during majority, minority and coalition governments. The results show only slight variation between majority and minority governments. In the *spoils* bargain, minority governments are associated with lower levels of mobility than majority governments, at 10 and 14 percent respectively. This relationship is not found in the *Schafferian* and *managerial* bargains however, where minority governments actually have slightly higher levels of mobility.

Mobility under a coalition government is lower in each PSB. In the *spoils* bargain mobility is 10 percent for coalition governments compared to 14 percent for majority governments. During the *Schafferian* bargain coalition governments have a level of mobility of nine percent whereas for majority governments it is 18 percent.

Table 10: Mobility and legislative strength of government, 1920-2013 and PSB

	Majority	Minority	Coalition
Spoils-type bargain	<i>13.84</i> (2 363)	<i>10.34</i> (116)	<i>10.53</i> (437)
Schafferian bargain	<i>17.93</i> (5 097)	<i>20.69</i> (348)	<i>8.82</i> (34)
Managerial bargain	<i>32.63</i> (7 468)	<i>34.43</i> (549)	<i>29.41</i> (102)
All years	<i>24.64</i> (14 928)	<i>26.95</i> (1 013)	<i>13.79</i> (573)

(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

As indicated in Table 10, the data for coalition governments from the *Schafferian* bargain constitutes a small number of observations (N=34) obtained from British Columbia in 1950 and 1951. If analysis of mobility during majority governments is instead restricted to the period of the 1950s, the difference between coalition and majority governments is much less pronounced and closer in line with theoretical expectations. During the 1950s DM mobility under majority governments is 11 percent.

In the *managerial* bargain mobility for coalition governments is slightly lower (29 percent) than majority (33 percent) and minority governments (34 percent). The difference however is not great. One possible explanation for why coalition governments are associated with lower levels of mobility but not minority governments is that the approach to governing of the former necessitates greater compromise with members from at least one other party, whereas minority governments led by only one party, as suggested by Bourgault (2011), may be governing the state with the same gusto as majority governments and hence seeking to secure loyalty from bureaucrats to their policy agenda.

### **Underlying Motives of Appointments: A Qualitative Assessment**

The evidence above suggests two general conclusions. First, some political dynamics are indeed associated with bureaucratic mobility. A transition in the governing party, the partisan nature of the party elected, a change in premier as well as the legislative strength of the government, are all associated with varying levels of administrative mobility. Meanwhile no clear relationship is observed between mobility and the interaction between a transition in party and the length of time the previous party was in power.

Yet secondly, the evidence suggests that the nature of the relationship between mobility and some of these variables do vary across historical periods. These temporal variances are postulated to stem from differences in the contours of PSBs. As shifts take place in the type of competency and loyalty governments want to see in bureaucrats, so too are there modifications in the extent to which certain political dynamics prod governments to remove incumbents and appoint new personnel. For instance, while a simple change in premier from the same party as the previous government may lead to an increase in mobility in a bargain emphasizing responsive competence to the first minister's policy agenda, this may not be the case in a bargain instead emphasizing partisan loyalty to the party.

While the large-n quantitative data presented above is congruent with this argument, it does not provide direct evidence of shifts in the strategic considerations of governments that is theorized to explain variation in the relationship between politics and mobility across PSBs. Qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources provide an additional means to examine whether changes in the relationship between politics and mobility across PSBs varies in tandem with changes in the type of competency and loyalty desired by governments. This qualitative component thus complements the statistical analyses by imparting insight into the underlying motivations of governments concerning the staffing of bureaucratic elites across PSBs. The findings of this analysis are presented by Public Service Bargain.

*The spoils bargain: Unspecified competence and partisan loyalty.* Research studying provincial politics in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century suggests that the contours of political-administrative relationships reflected to a great extent a *spoils* bargain (Dobie 1936; MacKinnon 1951; Beck 1954; Hodgetts 1955; Scarrow 1957; Hodgetts and Dwivedi 1974; Chandler and

Chandler 1982; Granatstein 1982; Heintzman 1983; Gow 1985; Simpson 1988; Love 1988; Dyck 1991; Saywell 1991; Edward 2000; McDonald 2009; Banoub 2013).

Whereas thanks to the reforms spearheaded by Prime Minister Robert Borden (1911-1920), federal political-administrative relationships had begun by the 1930s to move away from a *spoils* bargain (Hodgetts et al. 1972; Granatstein 1982), research studying the provinces suggests that similar changes did not transpire until the 1950s.<sup>38</sup> During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century governance in the provinces was of a minimalist nature. Consequently, governments expressed little concern with the competency that administrative officials should possess. More imperative was that bureaucrats display a partisan loyalty to the political party in government. This led governments to use administrative offices as a means to reward persons for their electoral support of the party. As summarized by Dyck in his description of the government's relationship with the bureaucracy:

The functions of provincial governments were minimal until well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the number of government departments was small. No particular qualifications were required for public employment, and provinces could afford to operate on the 'spoils system'. Under this system, a wholesale turnover of public employees occurred whenever the government changed and each new government sought to reward its own friends. As in many other areas, the CCF government of Saskatchewan in the 1940s pioneered the first modern provincial public service in Canada, emphasizing expertise, permanence, and impartiality. (1996, 19)

Public inquiries established by governments during this period also mention the bureaucracy's lack of technical capacity. Like the British Northcote-Trevelyan report some 100 years earlier, these reports repeatedly blame such ineptitude on the penchant of governments to staff administrative personnel along partisan lines (Nova Scotia 1934; Kidd 1932). For example, a commission established by the Government of Newfoundland in the 1930s observed that bureaucratic appointments were used to reward partisan loyalty:

The spoils system has for years been in full force in Newfoundland. Given the conception that it is quite fair whilst one's party is in power, to make what one can for oneself and one's friends, it is natural that in the minds of many people politics should be regarded simply as job-farming. It has been the practice for each incoming Government to side-track or sweep away all Government employees who were either appointed by or were suspected of any connection, direct or indirect, with their predecessors, and to replace them with their own nominees, irrespective of the qualifications of the latter for the particular appointments assigned to them...The educated class, from which the administrative grade of the Civil Service is recruited, is very small: the members of it are all known, if not related, to each other: everyone knows everyone else's business and it is a simple matter to ascertain which way any particular Civil Servant voted, or if he did not vote, what are the political leanings of his family and his relations. If he or they voted the wrong way, then, under the rules of the game, he must be deemed to have forfeited his appointment and must make way for a personal friend or supporter of the incoming Minister...In the case of the executive staff, post-election changes are commonly of a sweeping character...(Amulree 1933, 229-30).

Opposition parties, journalists and interest groups frequently compared the relationship governments had with the bureaucracy to the 'spoils system' found in the United States and spoke against it as both a morally corrupt deed and a praxis linked to inefficient administration. In the Ontario legislature, a member of the opposition chastised the Liberal party remarking that:

They have brought into Ontario the spoils system of the United States. Tammany Hall politics, if they continue, will destroy the political system of the Province and bring about a condition similar to that in the United States. But what do you expect to happend [sic] when you have an Administration dismissing hundreds of civil servants and replacing them with men whose only asset is their political influence? (The Globe 1935, 12)

The ardent preference for partisan loyalty with little concern for any type of competency strongly reflects the contours of the *spoils* bargain. Importantly, the evidence also suggests that the appointment of personnel to administrative jobs was influenced by the desire to encourage and reinforce such traits within the bureaucracy; the exchange of jobs for support to the political party was part of the 'rules of the game' and was well understood by the public and administrative officials. For example, in his archival research studying the Liberal Party in

Alberta during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Thomas comments on letters sent from the public as well as public servants to the government petitioning for administrative jobs based on their support to the party:

From the moment that Rutherford [1905-1910] was believed to be the next premier he was importuned for appointment to the civil service. A few letters have survived....The applicants made no attempt to disguise the political nature of such appointments...A well-equipped applicant for the important post of Deputy Commissioner of Education, already holding a responsible position, thought it proper to observe, "I am and always have been an ardent Grit. There is no one, in Northern Alberta at least, who will deny the truth of this statement. Of course if the Conservatives or the 'Non-Partisans' as they now call themselves are in the majority of the new Legislature, I hope for no such favours". (Thomas 1959, 30)

*The Schaffarian bargain: Technical prowess and neutral competence.* While in some countries, a Weberian bureaucracy has been identified as an important actor bringing about the development of the welfare state (Quadagno 1987; Stolleis 2013), in jurisdictions where a professional and meritocratic bureaucracy had not yet been established, the causality also ran in the other direction (Rothstein 1998). Wanting to extend the state's involvement in society through the implementation of complex economic and social policies, governments became increasingly unsatisfied with the inefficiency of the patronage system. George Drew's 22 Point Program and Leslie Frost's Hospital Insurance and education reforms (Ontario), Jean Lesage's Quiet Revolution (Québec), Walter Shaw's and Alex Campbell's Educational and Economic reforms (Prince Edward Island), Louis Robichaud's Equal Opportunity Program (New Brunswick), and Tommy Douglas' (Saskatchewan) Health Act, are all examples of some of the major policy initiatives undertaken by provincial governments in the postwar period requiring technical knowledge and planning (Young 1987; Morin 1991; Lindquist 2000; Johnson 2004; Evans 2008; Pasolli 2009; Murphy 2014; MacLauchlan 2014).

With the nature of governance having shifted in the postwar years from a minimalist state to an approach emphasising greater involvement and technical planning, the type of traits governments desired the bureaucracy to possess also underwent a marked change. Bureaucratic competency went from an unspecified aspect in the *spoils* bargain, to a clearer stipulation for policy-relevant knowledge. Reflecting on the reasons for the change in political-administrative relationships in this period, Robert Normand, a deputy minister during the 1970s and 1980s in Québec, explained how such a shift in the nature of governance altered political-administrative relationships:

C'est essentiellement la croissance du rôle de l'État qui a amené la structuration de la fonction publique et l'évanescence des pratiques de patronage que l'on connaissait auparavant. Tout un ensemble de facteurs y ont contribué : la naissance de l'État-providence qui a suivi la crise des années 1930, la prise en charge de plusieurs secteurs par les gouvernements dans le but de soutenir l'effort de guerre de 1940 à 1945, l'accroissement du rôle des communications entre les peuples et la montée du syndicalisme qui remettait en cause l'ordre existant; tous ces facteurs favorisaient un accroissement des interventions de l'État dans les diverses sphères de l'activité. (Normand 1984, 524)

In his history of the public administration in Québec between 1867 and 1970, Gow goes even further, pointing out how the development of complex policies and programs in the postwar period led to a desire for bureaucrats that possessed policy relevant knowledge. Gow remarks that:

In the 1960s, relations between governments and civil servants changed considerably for two reasons. On the one hand, the government accepted collective bargaining of working conditions in 1965, the result of which was greatly increased job security and a proliferation of written material (contracts and regulations) which reinforced the trend towards bureaucracy. On the other hand, a new breed of civil servant was introduced at the upper echelons, who came to be known as technocrats. While some of these people had the scientific and technical training of the traditional specialists, much of the most important transformation was the hiring of specialists of the social sciences (economists, sociologists, social workers, business administration graduates, town planners and political scientists). These people possessed an analytical and planning capacity which, together with an

orientation favourable to state intervention, led them to take an entirely new attitude towards the private sector. They were prepared to plan for its development and to guide it in the name of the general interest which they were also prepared to help define. This tendency was eminently suited to the ambitions of the governments of those years, and it was widely remarked that the governments of Daniel Johnson [1966-1968] and Jean-Jacques Bertrand [1968-1970], far from repudiating the policies and appointments of their Liberal predecessors, in fact reinforced them. By the end of the decade, many observers felt that the real work of government took place within the administration, while the legislators played to the gallery. (1985, 263)

Importantly, Gow's observations bring attention to another change in the relationship between the government and the bureaucracy during this period. Not only is bureaucratic competency now well defined, but governments also desire that administrative officials, on the basis of their expertise, have a principal advisory role in the formation of policy.

During the *Schaffarian* bargain there is little concern that the roles of bureaucrats and politicians reflect the separation of tasks stipulated by the politics-administration dichotomy. Rather than being skeptical of the intentions of bureaucrats, governments are comfortable with their involvement in the selection of objectives based on their expertise and experience. Former DM Robert Normand, notes this changed attitude having taken place amongst politicians in the postwar years:

Mais il n'y a pas que le nombre et la qualité des nouveaux arrivants qui expliquent la montée des hauts fonctionnaires; il y a aussi l'attitude des hommes politiques eux-mêmes. Je ne prétends pas que la qualité des hommes politiques a baissé au cours des années au profit de leurs fonctionnaires, bien au contraire. Je prétends cependant que l'attitude des hommes politiques a changé et qu'aujourd'hui ils hésitent beaucoup plus qu'avant à faire usage de leurs pouvoirs discrétionnaires. La nature ayant horreur du vide, les champs qu'ils ont évacués ont été occupés par les fonctionnaires. (Normand 1984, 524-25)

In his study of political and bureaucratic elites in Ontario based on more than 400 interviews and surveys conducted in 1969-1970, Rich made a similar observation as to the role of public servants in developing policy, noting that:

One deputy minister formulated the relationship in this way: "...Basic policy formulation is made within departments of government and not at the ministerial level. The minister either individually or collectively in cabinet exercised a veto power over the policies formulated by senior officials." This view was rather widely shared by senior officials, and some ministers expressed views which were not very different. (1973, 209)

Former Premier of Saskatchewan Allan Blakeney (1971-1982) also makes a comparable point. Drawing upon his time as a Minister in the 1960s, prior to becoming Premier, Blakeney depicts the ideal relationship between civil servants and politicians concerning the development of policy, placing civil servants and their expertise at the centre:

The minister must be attuned to the views of the public and he must inject this element into the final determination of the departmental policy. To be attuned to public views, a minister must have time and he must have opportunity to consult, to circulate, and to listen. He must be in the position of receiving the signals from both the general public and the particular publics which his department serve. This also means, and let me stress this point, that *the minister must hold himself aloof from the decision-making process until that process is in its final stages...* The minister who permits himself to be enmeshed in that process finds that he has no time to perform his political function... How, then, do the permanent head and his senior division or branch heads best serve the minister? I believe that they should put forward to the minister recommendations based upon their best technical judgment tempered by their view of public reaction. Alternatively, they should frame their recommendations in two sets, one based upon technical considerations and the other introducing the element of public acceptability. (emphasis added, 1972, 43-44)

Research from this period also generally describes political-administrative relationships as undergoing a shift in the loyalty of civil servants. The expectation that civil servants are loyal to the party in a personal manner has been replaced with the belief that bureaucrats should develop their professional opinion on the basis of their expertise and experience, and not

according to the political leanings of the government. Civil servants thus advise governments with the same candid spirit regardless of who is in power. Studying the staffing of DMs in BC under the NDP government during this period, Brand notes that:

The persons sought to staff these units were individuals highly trained in the use of mathematical models, statistics, programme budgeting, and report writing and not people whose primary qualification for the job was their sympathy for the government's policy objectives. (1974, 63)

Significantly, being expected to advise all governments with the same professional and impersonal demeanour leads bureaucrats to develop a loyalty that is clearly beyond the party in power or the individual at the head of government. In many cases, descriptions during this era indicate a loyalty to the state (that is distinguishable from the government), their department or their profession. Loyalty to an entity beyond the government's party or the premier's policy agenda has corroborated the ability of civil servants to be seen as neutral and independent mandarins capable of serving those in government in an impersonal and professional manner. In contrast to the *managerial* bargain where loyalty is oriented to the policy agenda of the government, here politicians expect otherwise. Based on developing advice according to their expertise, civil servants in this era are expected to take what British Cabinet Secretary Sir Edward Bridges (1950) referred to in his treatise *A Portrait of a Profession* as a "departmental philosophy" (discussed in Chapter 2, p. 63).

Serial loyalty to the office of government thus encourages a loyalty that is independent of the government. To use the terms of Hood and Lodge, the independent 'judge-like' loyalty of DMs found in *Schafferian* bargain encourages a 'serial monogamous' propensity of bureaucrats to serve differing governments with equal professionalism (Hood and Lodge 2006, 117). Basing their advice on their expertise and experience gained from within the civil service

is incompatible with a partisan loyalty to a particular party or a particular policy agenda dictated by the government. In their study of bureaucratic elites in Alberta during this period, Richards and Pratt note that loyalty was oriented to the office of the state, not to the party or the policy agenda of any particular head of government:

Confident of its own administrative competence and committed to a provincial strategy of development, this state-administrative elite sees Alberta as the logical arena for the advancement of its career opportunities and, like its private-sector counterparts, it is fiercely loyal to the province as a semi-sovereign political entity and deeply involved in the process of “province building”. (1979, 167-68)

Based on his experience as DM in Saskatchewan, Johnson comments as to the likelihood for a DM to develop a departmental point of view. He determines that:

And in fact he will. For one of his prime tasks is to try to develop an appreciation of long-run social and economic trends as they affect or will affect the policies of his department. And then he evaluates these policies in that context...As for the minister, he would be more than surprised if his deputy seemed not to have a loyalty to his policies, or for that matter a taste for the “political facts of life”. (1961, 364)

Grounding advice on their technical expertise and experience, and exhibiting a loyalty to an entity beyond the party in power or the policy agenda of the premier is emblematic of civil servants loyally serving any government of the day with a frank and open demeanour. As stated in his description of relationships with civil servants, Minister of Municipal Affairs in Ontario during the 1960s, Darcy W. McKeough, specified that:

There is of course nothing irregular in senior civil servants offering advice to the government, particularly to their ministers...he cannot, unless he is a super being of some kind, ignore the collective wisdom and experience of his senior civil servants...This is not to say that the civil servant or the minister should be ‘yes-men’ for each other. What there must be is an inter-play of ideas, of suggestions, perhaps even argument, without turning into a full-scale and acrimonious debate...When a minister and his senior official disagree, the official should not resign but should set out his views clearly to his minister. Then, if

after due consideration his views are overruled, he should do his level best to carry out the policy of the government even though [sic] he might not be in personal agreement with it. In my own operation, I have gone a step further. I have told my staff, "Don't look to me for 'ideas' – that's your job. I may be capable of producing one of a hundred, if that. You bring them forward. It's my job to decide what we carry forward - what we will sell - to Cabinet, to caucus, to the public - but don't expect the politician to have all the ideas. I want bright people around me with bright ideas." (1969, 3-4)

In contrast to the *managerial* bargain, where detailed knowledge of issues and a propensity to provide honest advice to governments on the basis of such expertise is viewed by governments as indicative of information asymmetry and goal conflict needing to be controlled, this is not the case in the *Schafferian* bargain. Desiring that officials possess technical capacity and exhibit a willingness to provide candid expert advice, governments refrain from removing bureaucratic elites from their positions so as to foster such competency and loyalty.

Premier of New Brunswick Louis J. Robichaud (1960-1970) recognized that his ambitious policy objectives required greater bureaucratic capacity, and stated that the political leanings of personnel were of no concern:

The new recruitment, and the use of dedicated staff already employed in the public service when we came to office, made it possible to create the administrative framework without which it would have been impossible to implement the massive legislative program which Equal Opportunity involved. It was indicative of the new administration's attitude toward government that the political background of the teams of specialists was of no concern. The only prerequisites for employment were the ability to get things done and the acceptance of new challenges and new ideas and new solutions to both old and new problems. (as cited in, Pasolli 2009, 150)

Evidence that the decision to retain civil servants due to their unique loyalty and competency is observed in Premier Richard Hatfield of New Brunswick (1970-1987) pronouncing in no uncertain terms, "I can't understand why some political leaders insist on clearing out the upper

echelon of the public service when they come into office. You are just not able to pick up a deputy minister caliber individual on a street corner” (as cited in Savoie 1989, 40).

Equally supportive is that when Premier Edward Schreyer (1969-1977) of Manitoba was urged by political staffer Herb Schulz to boost the bureaucracy’s responsiveness by firing some elite bureaucrats, Premier Schreyer rejected the idea asserting that, “civil servants are employed for their technical qualifications and if we wish to encourage them to advise us, they must be protected against arbitrary dismissal...I say this with all the emphasis I can muster, THERE WILL BE NO POLITICAL FIRINGS” (emphasis in the original, Schulz 2005, 274).

This evidence above suggests that the strategic decision *not* to remove incumbents is congruent with a *Schafferian* bargain where governments desire bureaucrats who possess policy expertise and have a disposition to advise governments in a candid and impersonal manner on the basis on such expertise. To remove incumbents would not only weaken their policy specific expertise and experience, but would run the risk of destroying their propensity to provide forthright advice due to the fear that doing so could result in a demotion or outright dismissal. As stated a few years later by a former deputy minister in response to bureaucratic dismissals by Premier Frank McKenna in New Brunswick, “The public is not well served when you put an irrational fear of God into the minds of public servants. Dismissal of civil servants serves a political interest. It does not serve the interest of the public or of good government” (as cited in Lee 2001, 206). And again, more recently speaking of changes since the 1980s he has observed from his own experience as a civil servant, Jeff Patch stated that, “those who move up through the system and those who are given greater responsibility and are moved to what would be more favourable positions, are more likely those who would go with the flow rather than those who

would give feedback that is not consistent with what a minister would want to hear” (CBC 2014, par. 4).

Despite the general tendencies identified above, not all accounts of political-administrative relationships between the 1950s and 1970s consulted in this qualitative analysis perfectly describe the principles of a *Schafferian* bargain. In his study of administrative elites in Newfoundland and Labrador, Dunn (2014) notes that while the professionalism of the civil service did improve in the postwar years, the practice of awarding DM positions to reward support to the party was still evident in the 1950s. Furthermore, DMs under Premier Smallwood (1949-1972) played a reduced role in the development of policy. Dunn notes that a change in political-administrative relationship reflecting a *Schafferian* bargain described above did eventually occur, but this did not take place until the 1970s.<sup>39</sup> Nonetheless, on the whole, evidence from the qualitative descriptions suggests that in the postwar years political-administrative relationships did generally move away from the principles of a *spoils* bargain to that reflecting a *Schafferian* bargain. Wanting to harness amongst bureaucratic elites both expertise and a willingness to provide honest counsel, governments in the postwar period until the beginning of the 1980s did generally refrain from removing administrative personnel from their positions to a greater degree than was the case during the *spoils* bargain, and, as will be shown below, the *managerial* bargain.

*Managerial bargain: General manager and responsive competence.* Evidence suggests that since the 1980s there has been a transformation in political-administrative relationships reflecting the principles of a *managerial* PSB. A wave of newly elected premiers from various political parties expressed a newfound distrust of the bureaucracy. Critically, permanency of

position became seen as impeding the ability of democratically elected representatives to govern as well as responsible for producing various government inefficiencies (Lindquist 2000; Neilson 1990).

Expertise and experience of policies were replaced with a preference for a ‘deliverer’ competency emphasizing the ability to take the government’s directives and ensure that resources were properly mobilized so as to realize objectives. Detailed knowledge of a department’s past policies and programs, which, just a short time ago under the *Schafferian* bargain had been welcomed, was now believed to be a source of bureaucratic power impeding the government’s ability to effectively realize its policy agenda. Whereas the notion that bureaucrats would have ideas and opinions that were different than the government during the *Schafferian* bargain was seen as acceptable and desirable due to their expertise, in the *managerial* bargain any view expressed by bureaucrats that was contrary to the government was now likely to be seen negatively negating the principle that governments set the policy agenda and bureaucrats manage resources towards this end. In other words, political-administrative relationships now closely reflect principal-agent theory, presuming that governments have a preference of responsive competence from bureaucrats, that is that they enthusiastically implement the government’s directives.

Evidence from the provinces supports the inference that since the 1980s, information asymmetry and goal conflict were seen as pathological and in need of subduing. In their study of Premier Grant Devine (1982-1991) in Saskatchewan, Michelmann and Steeves conclude that information asymmetry was one of the chief attributes the government sought to curb, remarking that:

...the incoming ministers were acutely aware of their inexperience in governing, and felt vulnerable toward senior officials they did not trust. This fear, at least in a number of cases,

outweighed the policy expertise consideration that had induced some Conservatives to counsel caution. In the background, moreover, was the ever-present, almost haunting experience of the Clark government, and even, as a cabinet minister explained, the Thatcher government in Britain, both of which had, according to him, great difficulties because they had not made the necessary changes in their respective bureaucracies. (1985, 8)

Evidence also supports the claim that in the *managerial* bargain the policy agenda is already presented to the bureaucracy *fait accompli*. Research largely confirms that governments are ‘policy givers’ whereas civil servants are ‘policy takers’. One elite bureaucrat from the executive council in Alberta in the early 1980s described the new relationship between the bureaucracy and the government stating that “We stay right out of policy review and creation. We are an administrative operation. We won’t talk about the pros and cons of policy itself” (Bojechko 1982, 23). Such an admission from a member of the executive council offers a striking contrast to the involvement of DMs in the development of policy favourably shown during the *Schafferian* bargain. One political reporter described changes in Ontario under Premier Mike Harris (1995-2002) noted that:

...even impartial observers agree that the changes – both the numbers and the individuals involved – are part of a major alteration in the relationship between senior bureaucrats and politicians and their aides. Under the Conservatives, the bureaucrats have been all but excluded from policy development. Instead, they are expected to find the best ways of implementing the policies, even if they might have doubts about their wisdom....They [the government] defend their changes as an overdue rebalancing of the levers of government to ensure that elected representatives can implement the policies they promised their constituents. (Mackie 1997)

Evidence suggests that this change in the contours of political-administrative relationships was not limited to governments on the ideological right. Similar alterations are detected under NDP Premier Bob Rae (1990-1995). A former deputy minister described such distrust towards the bureaucracy lamenting that, “The minister doesn’t believe a word I’m saying...many of the new

ministers, wear on their sleeves this suspicion [i.e. the intentions of deputy ministers], sometimes bordering on hostility” (Allen 1991). Furthermore, almost perfectly reflecting the public choice undertones of principal-agent theory, the NDP identified the failures of past governments as a result of information asymmetry and goal conflict, which favoured the ability of bureaucrats to thwart the government’s objectives. Based on interviews with civil servants and political staffers, one observer noted that:

they [the NDP government] believe that the government of David Peterson lost its way between 1987 and 1990, mainly because it became a prisoner of the pet policies of the senior bureaucrats in each ministry. This government, they vowed, would set clear overall directions centrally through cabinet and ask the ministry experts to come up with ways of putting them into effect. (Allen 1991)

One bureaucrat having served various governments in Québec since the postwar years described the recent reforms in political-administrative relationships by governments as constituting ‘the twilight of the mandarins’, and based on interviews with DMs who had served the government during the era of the *Schaffarian* bargain, remarked that “from an unquestioned position of authority, the senior civil servants are now simply one part of a complex process of decision-making that involves greater participation by ministers of state...and the political staff of ministers” (Fraser 1981).

Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador Brian Peckford also expanded his source of policy advice. Whereas when Peckford first took power in 1979 he spoke of staffing DMs in a manner of fostering independent advice congruent with the features of a *Schaffarian* bargain, stating that “I encouraged a lot of internal promotion from within departments. I wanted independent people; I didn't want people who would just agree with me” (as cited in Dunn 2014, 30), he had by the mid-1980s now preferred to develop policy from a small group of a few

political advisors and ministers within cabinet. Accordingly, this group began internal reviews of DMs according to their performance, deciding to demote, promote and dismiss DMs accordingly (Dunn 2014).

Alongside a change in competency from one emphasizing expertise and experience to one emphasizing the ability to realize objectives by managing personnel and resources, is a complementary change in the loyalty of the bureaucracy. No longer do governments desire officials to impersonally advise them in a demeanor reflecting a degree of independence and a willingness to speak truth to power. Doing so in fact is now seen as reflecting bureaucratic drift and contrary to the principle of top-down democracy, whereby the government sets the policy objectives and bureaucrats ensure that objectives are attained. Instead, governments in the *managerial* bargain now desire an executive type of loyalty, in which officials express a clear commitment to the policy agenda set by the head of government.

This executive loyalty to the head of government and her policy agenda is different than the *spoils* bargain where loyalty is to the political party. During the *managerial* bargain, whether one is a Tory or Grit is of no concern. Just as Margret Thatcher wanted to ensure that administrative elites be ‘one of us’, more important for heads of government in the *managerial* bargain is that DMs enthusiastically work towards the government’s policy agenda. Whereas under the *Schafferian* bargain, civil servants would be encouraged to offer candid policy advice that questioned the principles of policy decisions, such actions are now viewed as usurping democracy and the rule of the government. With the policy agenda now coming down from the head of government rather than percolating up from the departments, bureaucratic elites are to restrict their efforts to realizing the government’s objectives. For instance, a former principal secretary to Ontario Premier William Davis (1971-1985) noted that the new actions undertaken

by various governments were altering the working relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, and that “there is relatively little active opposition among civil servants to the government’s wishes” (Allen 1991).

Evidence suggests that these changes were undertaken by governments regardless of the party in power. In B.C. the Social Credit government sought to ensure that DMs were ‘on side’ concerning the government’s policy agenda (Ruff 1996, 170). In Ontario, Premier Mike Harris, explained his decisions concerning the staffing administrative elites stating, “What we will truly rely on is who is the professional within the bureaucracy? Who are the best? Who are good? *Who understands the agenda?* ... That’s more important than whether they were brought in under the Liberals or the NDP” (emphasis added, Mittelstaedt and Rusk 1995). The same is also reflected in descriptions by civil servants who admitted that now they were to be judged upon “the bases of two criteria: competence and the degree of comfort with the policy directions of the Common Sense Revolution [the Conservative policy agenda]” (Mackie 1997). Likewise, upon taking power in Manitoba, NDP premier Howard Pawley (1981-1988) dismissed several incumbent civil servants including DMs that had served Liberal, Conservative and even previous NDP governments over the last 20 years, and justified such decisions stating that executive bureaucrats must be compatible with the minister and the direction of policy spearheaded by the government (Cleroux 1982, 12). Evidence not only supports the view that governments on the ideological left strategically used the appointments control the bureaucracy, but also suggests that they did so even when civil servants had worked previously for the same party but under a different premier.

Premier Frank McKenna (1987-1997) of New Brunswick spoke of his manipulation of administrative personnel as a means to ensure loyalty to his agenda, and explained that “We

wanted loyal people who would work with us, and we wanted to send a signal to the system and to the province that things were different” (Lee 2001, 206). When asked whether he regretted dismissing incumbent DMs upon taking power in 1987, McKenna stated frankly:

No. The only regret I have is that I did not get rid of more of them. I say this not for partisan reasons. Running government is in many ways like running a large business. You need competent and highly motivated people. (Savoie 2001, 86)

Furthermore, as noted by Savoie, McKenna made such moves to ensure the bureaucracy was responsive to his policy agenda:

McKenna’s clear preference was for “responsive competence” rather than “neutral competence.” The former is geared to the priorities of the political power of the day, while the latter speaks to the importance of unbiased advice, of speaking truth to power and maintaining the more traditional values of public service. McKenna had a strong bias for action and he expected the public service to fall in step. He knew what he wanted to accomplish and had little patience with public servants who were trained to see all sides of an issue and took professional pride in having a proper sense of detachment and nonpartisanship. (Savoie 2001, 87)

Observers also noted that the removal of incumbents by the Conservative government in Ontario was undertaken with the intention to “cut the power of the bureaucracy, *especially its ability to challenge government policies*” (emphasis added, Mackie 1997). Based on interviews with DMs and his experience as a consultant for several heads of government in Canada as well as beyond, Plumptre spoke of the strategic reason behind such bureaucratic reappointment in a similar manner:

What is to be gained by rotating deputy ministers? Perhaps changing DMS is thought by the prime minister to help put a new face on the government, rather like shuffling ministers. Some politicians may have a somewhat perverse fear that if DMS are too knowledgeable about their departments, their expertise could overpower that of their ministers. Some

turnover of deputy ministers is doubtless needed to prevent some departments' policies from becoming too set in a particular course. (1987, 380)

Appointing administrative elites who were 'on side' with the government's policy agenda was thus seen as an effective means to discourage the bureaucracy from developing loyalty elsewhere (such as for example Bridges' 'departmental philosophy') and encourage commitment to government's policy agenda.

Finally, former Premier Tommy Douglas, not only the founder of the modern Medicare system in Canada but one of the early reformers leading to the *Schafferian* bargain in Saskatchewan (for detailed discussion of Douglas' reforms to the bureaucracy in Saskatchewan see, Johnson 2004), and described by Dyck as "emphasizing expertise, permanence, and impartiality" (1996, 19) in the bureaucracy, had, by the 1970s, changed his outlook concerning the nature of political-administrative relationships. Some thirty years after he had first broke ways with the *spoils* bargain and had embarked upon establishing political-administrative relationships reflecting the principles of the *Schafferian* bargain, Douglas now viewed political-administrative relationships in a manner congruent with a *managerial* bargain. Emphasizing the importance of using administrative offices as a means to encourage responsiveness to the government's policy agenda and mitigate goal conflict and information asymmetry, Douglas confided in Premier Edward Schreyer that:

When the people change government fundamentally, they expect fundamental change in government. This will not occur unless you change your senior administrators...there is a tendency, human but unfortunate in this case, for public servants to become so identified with, and so protective of, the programs they have been administering that they become obstacles to changes determined upon them by a newly-elected government. (as cited in Schulz 2005, 266-67)

Concerning the staffing of DMs Douglas advised Schreyer that in order to ensure the adequacy of the bureaucracy's advice and compliance from public servants that he "find deputy ministers on whom you can depend explicitly. Competence is of essence but you are undertaking a small revolution and ideology will prove of importance" (Schulz 2005, 268).

### **Conclusion of Chapter Four**

This chapter conducted a first set of empirical tests to examine whether the relationship between politics and bureaucratic mobility has changed over time across differing Public Service Bargains. Using descriptive statistics mobility was found to be associated with a transition in the governing party, a transition in the governing party and the partisan ideology of government, a change in premier, and the legislative strength of government. Importantly, the extent to which some of these dynamics were associated with mobility was found to vary across PSBs.

The evidence suggests that during the *spoils* bargain changes in the governing party had the greatest effect on mobility. When transitions in government were analyzed separately for each party the evidence suggests that the Liberal party was associated with higher levels of mobility than most other parties. During the *Schafferian* bargain, while some political dynamics were found to affect mobility, in particular changes in the governing party, the level of mobility associated with these dynamics was much lower than in other periods. Finally, in the *managerial* bargain, political dynamics once again were found to have a stronger association with mobility, in particular changes in the governing party as well as newly elected premiers.

In addition to descriptive statistics, this chapter also provides a qualitative analysis to ascertain whether variation in the relationship between mobility and politics over time reflects

changes in the contours of political-administrative relationships, specifically the nature of the bureaucracy's competency and loyalty desired by governments. The results from the qualitative investigation lend additional support to the claim that as the contours of PSBs have shifted over time, so too, have there been changes in the extent to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically remove and appoint administrative elites.

While generally supportive of the conclusion that the relationship between certain political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility varies across PSBs, the evidence presented in this chapter does not test the competing strength of explanatory variables nor does it control for alternative explanations of mobility identified by organization and management studies. The next chapter provides a more arduous assessment by simultaneously testing competing variables as well as controlling for alternative predictors with the use of statistical regressions.

## Chapter 4 Appendix I

Table 11: Annual mobility by decade, change in party.

	<b>1920s</b>	<b>1930s</b>	<b>1940s</b>	<b>1950s</b>	<b>1960s</b>	<b>1970s</b>	<b>1980s</b>	<b>1990s</b>	<b>2000s</b>
No party change	<i>11.33</i> (697)	<i>11.08</i> (848)	<i>13.30</i> (1 098)	<i>10.82</i> (1 451)	<i>14.13</i> (1 684)	<i>26.20</i> (1 916)	<i>27.85</i> (2 201)	<i>33.55</i> (2 125)	<i>33.10</i> (3 039)
Party change	<i>20.00</i> (80)	<i>28.70</i> (115)	<i>21.79</i> (78)	<i>15.38</i> (78)	<i>17.48</i> (103)	<i>25.10</i> (247)	<i>37.78</i> (180)	<i>41.20</i> (216)	<i>46.65</i> (358)

(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

Table 12: Annual mobility by decade, change in premier.

	<b>1920s</b>	<b>1930s</b>	<b>1940s</b>	<b>1950s</b>	<b>1960s</b>	<b>1970s</b>	<b>1980s</b>	<b>1990s</b>	<b>2000s</b>
No premier change	<i>11.86</i> (641)	<i>10.69</i> (786)	<i>13.78</i> (965)	<i>10.85</i> (1 419)	<i>14.28</i> (1 569)	<i>26.32</i> (1 850)	<i>27.89</i> (2 105)	<i>31.98</i> (1 848)	<i>32.34</i> (2 777)
Premier change	<i>13.97</i> (136)	<i>24.29</i> (177)	<i>14.22</i> (211)	<i>13.64</i> (110)	<i>14.68</i> (218)	<i>24.60</i> (313)	<i>34.06</i> (276)	<i>42.80</i> (493)	<i>44.35</i> (620)
Premier change no change in party	<i>5.36</i> (56)	<i>13.89</i> (72)	<i>9.77</i> (133)	<i>13.33</i> (45)	<i>12.17</i> (115)	<i>22.73</i> (66)	<i>27.08</i> (96)	<i>44.04</i> (277)	<i>38.19</i> (309)

(Percentage of DM mobility in italics, number of observations in parentheses)

## Chapter 4 Appendix II

Figure 8: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, 1920-2013.




Figure 9: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, spoils PSB




Figure 10: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, Schafferian PSB





Figure 11: Mobility, party change by time previous party was in power, managerial PSB



### Chapter 4 Appendix III

Table 13: Mobility discriminating for political party by PSB

PSB	Party in Power	Change in Party		All Observations
		Yes	No	
Spoils-type bargain	Conservative	16.88 (77)	15.16 (488)	15.4 (565)
	Liberal	31.43 (105)	11.27 (1 304)	12.78 (1 409)
	CCF/NDP	27.78 (18)	20.69 (87)	21.9 (105)
	United Farmers/ Progressive	17.24 (29)	11.26 (444)	11.63 (478)
	Social Credit	25.00 (12)	9.84 (193)	10.73 (205)
	Union Nationale	21.88 (32)	8.66 (127)	11.32 (159)
	Average	24.18 (273)	12.07 (2 643)	13.20 (2 916)
Schafferian bargain	Conservative	19.19 (172)	20.30 (1 793)	20.20 (1 965)
	Liberal	20.75 (106)	15.57 (1 413)	15.93 (1 519)
	CCF/NDP	23.53 (51)	23.78 (614)	23.76 (665)
	United Farmers	23.08 (13)	6.90 (87)	9.00 (100)
	Social Credit	26.19 (42)	13.86 (808)	14.47 (850)
	Union Nationale	9.09 (22)	9.70 (268)	9.66 (290)
	Parti Québécois	40.91 (22)	33.82 (68)	35.56 (90)
Average	21.50 (428)	17.76 (5 051)	18.05 (5 479)	
Managerial bargain	Conservative	47.83 (207)	28.62 (3 438)	29.71 (3 645)
	Liberal	36.50 (263)	34.41 (2 017)	34.65 (2 280)
	CCF/NDP	38.61 (202)	33.22 (1 189)	34.00 (1 391)
	Parti Québécois	63.64	36.78	40.45

PSB	Party in Power	Change in Party		All Observations
		Yes	No	
		(55)	(348)	(403)
	Saskatchewan Party	<i>59.26</i>	<i>30.00</i>	<i>35.37</i>
		(27)	(120)	(147)
	Average	<i>42.97</i>	<i>31.66</i>	<i>32.71</i>
		(754)	(7 365)	(8 119)
All years	Conservative	<i>31.80</i>	<i>24.86</i>	<i>25.38</i>
		(456)	(5 719)	(6 175)
	Liberal	<i>31.86</i>	<i>22.41</i>	<i>23.27</i>
		(474)	(4 734)	(5 208)
	CCF/NDP	<i>35.06</i>	<i>29.58</i>	<i>30.26</i>
		(271)	(1 890)	(2 161)
	United Farmers/ Progressive	<i>19.05</i>	<i>10.55</i>	<i>11.17</i>
		(42)	(531)	(573)
	Social Credit	<i>25.93</i>	<i>18.02</i>	<i>18.35</i>
		(54)	(1 254)	(1 308)
	Union Nationale	<i>16.67</i>	<i>9.37</i>	<i>10.24</i>
		(54)	(395)	(449)
	Parti Québécois	<i>57.14</i>	<i>36.30</i>	<i>39.55</i>
		(77)	(416)	(493)
	Saskatchewan Party	<i>59.26</i>	<i>30.00</i>	<i>35.37</i>
		(27)	(120)	(147)
	Average	<i>33.13</i>	<i>23.56</i>	<i>24.4</i>
		(1 455)	(15 059)	(16 514)

(Percentage of mobility in italics, number of observations in parenthesis)

## **Chapter 5. The Politics of Mobility: A Difficult Test of Competing Explanations**

*Chapter five summary.* Using descriptive statistics the previous chapter identified important variances in the relationship between politics and bureaucratic mobility across the *spoils*, *Schafferian* and *managerial* PSBs. This chapter further scrutinizes these findings by using statistical regression to test the association between political dynamics and mobility while controlling for additional variables possibly affecting mobility identified by organization and management studies.

Even when controlling for these alternative factors, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that the nature with which politics affects bureaucratic mobility has varied over time across distinct PSBs. During the *spoils* bargain a transition in the governing party has a significant and positive relationship with mobility, while a change in premier has none. The association between political dynamics and mobility is severally reduced during the *Schafferian* bargain, producing few significant results. Meanwhile in the *managerial* bargain, a newly elected premier, regardless of whether or not the governing party has changed, has a strong association with mobility.

## Regression Models

The evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that the relationship between mobility and some key political variables does vary across historically contingent PSBs. Greater confidence can be placed in these conclusions by testing hypotheses while controlling for alternative factors that may also affect mobility. In this chapter mobility is regressed against the key political dynamics examined in the previous chapter in a series of models. Each model is regressed separately in the *spoils* (Models 1-7.A), *Schafferian* (Models 1-7.B) and the *managerial bargains* (Models 1-7.C).<sup>40</sup>

Each model includes a number of control variables. These are: an election, the gender of the person in the DM position the previous year, the length of time since there has been a change in the DM position, the number of departments in the province (lagged one year), the age of the department (lagged one year), percentage change in GDP, and the province (dummy variables using Ontario as the reference group). As mentioned in Chapter 3, to address the problem of serial correlation a cubic polynomial of time has been used (attained by additionally including time since a change in DM position squared and cubed). To address the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity a random effects model is used and standard errors have been clustered at the provincial level.

In Model 1 mobility is regressed on a change in government. Model 2 regresses mobility against a transition in party with an interaction measuring the time the previous party was in power (referred to in the regression tables as ‘entrenchment’). Coded in the model as a continuous variable, the time of party entrenchment was alternatively coded using ordinals of 1-4; 5-8; 9-12 and greater than 13 years, as presented in Chapter 4. The results remained unchanged (statistically insignificant) and are not reported. Model 3 and 4 examine whether mobility is greater for some political parties than others. Model 3 introduces dummy variables

for each party (Conservative Party used as a reference group), which is useful to examine whether mobility is greater under some parties than others in all years. Noting however, that mobility may be the greatest when governments first come to power, Model 4 uses an interaction term between transition in party and the partisan nature of each party. This model compares whether mobility is higher when a particular party comes to power relative to other years for this party. The results of the first four models are presented in Table 14.

The relationship between mobility and a change in premier is examined by regressing mobility against all changes in premier in Model 5 and additionally in Model 6 which adds the arrival of an interim premier as a control. Model 7 adds the legislative strength of the government using dummy variables (majority is the reference group). The results from Models 5 through 7 for each PSB are presented in Table 15.

The results report odds ratios. As explained in Chapter 3 (p. 95), a number greater than one indicates a positive association whereas a number less than one points towards a negative relationship. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates no change in the likelihood of mobility. In addition to odds ratio the predicted probability of mobility for key variables is also included. As described in Chapter 3 several alternative models encompassing alternative coding of some variables as well as a fixed effects model were tested to determine the robustness of the results. In none of these alternate approaches were the main results substantially altered.

*Spoils bargain.* The results from the regression models generally confirm inferences made in the previous chapter concerning the relationship between political dynamics and mobility during the spoils bargain. The results show that overall a transition in the governing party has a strong association with mobility. In Model 1.A, even when controlling for various alternative factors,

a change in the governing party increases the odds of mobility by approximately 100 percent relative to when there is no such change. As expected, the length of time the previous government was in power does not have a statistically significant relationship with mobility. These relationships are congruent with the *spoils* bargain, where the government's intention in appointing persons to bureaucratic offices is to encourage partisan support to the party and not to diminish the power of the bureaucracy and ensure loyalty to any particular policy agenda.

The findings also show that when first forming government some parties are associated with higher levels of mobility than others, although not along lines of a clear right/left political ideology. Model 3.A suggests that when examining mobility for all years there are only slight differences between parties, a finding also shown in Figure 6 (Chapter 4, p. 115). Theoretically, it is expected that governments will nominate and remove administrative elites when they first gain power. This is first tested in Model 4.A by including an interaction between a transition in the governing party and the political party that took power. The results support the conclusion made in Chapter 4 based on the descriptive statistics. Mobility when the Conservative Party first forms government is significantly lower than that of the Liberal Party and Social Credit. The findings clarify that while mobility during the *spoils* bargain does increase when there is a change in the governing party, the degree of mobility is not as great for the Conservative Party compared to others, thus supporting earlier research suggesting that until the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Liberal Party practiced patronage to a greater extent than others, and most notably the Conservative Party (Reid 1936; Beck 1954; Donnelly 1957; Thomas 1959; Smith 1975; English 1977; Campbell 1988; Dutil and MacKenzie 2011).

Table 14: Mobility, logistic regression models 1-4 across PSBs

Covariates	Spoils Bargain				Schafferian Bargain				Managerial Bargain			
	Model 1.A	Model 2.A	Model 3.A	Model 4.A	Model 1.B	Model 2.B	Model 3.B	Model 4.B	Model 1.C	Model 2.C	Model 3.C	Model 4.C
party change	2.08*** (.427)	1.78 (.543)	2.05*** (.411)	.94 (.368)	1.66* (.392)	.92 (.380)	1.51* (.300)	1.23 (.515)	1.47** (.279)	1.70 (.471)	1.45 (.282)	2.40*** (.509)
entrenchment		.99 (.008)				.98 (.019)				1.00 (.014)		
party change x entrenchment		1.02 (.014)				1.05 (.029)				.99 (.022)		
PC (reference)												
Liberal			.85 (.129)	.66** (.090)			.72** (.088)	.69** (.092)			1.134 (.243)	1.27 (.239)
CCF/NDP			1.76** (.350)	1.88* (.536)			.65** (.083)	.63** (.094)			1.09 (.241)	1.23 (.269)
United Farmer/ Progressive			.76 (.350)	.64 (.221)			.28*** (.032)	.20*** (.022)				
Social Credit			.58 (.220)	.46* (.167)			.671 (.171)	.66 (.169)			.92 (.144)	.98 (.149)
Sask. Party											1.00 (.162)	.91 (.149)
UN			.58* (.140)	.50* (.162)			.21*** (.030)	.21*** (.031)				
PQ							1.07 (.150)	1.02 (.153)			1.48 (.309)	1.43 (.279)

Covariates	Spoils Bargain				Schafferian Bargain				Managerial Bargain			
	Model 1.A	Model 2.A	Model 3.A	Model 4.A	Model 1.B	Model 2.B	Model 3.B	Model 4.B	Model 1.C	Model 2.C	Model 3.C	Model 4.C
party change x PC (reference)												
party change x Liberal				3.92* (2.41)				1.38 (.673)				.41** (.121)
party change x CCF/NDP				.652 (.356)				1.26 (.881)				.43 (.216)
party change x United Farmers/Progressive				1.97 (.937)				4.18** (1.74)				
party change x Social Credit				3.68** (1.654)				1.25 (.504)				1.31 (.27)
party change x Sask. Party												1.15 (.247)
party change x UN				2.51 (1.30)				1.07 (.416)				
party change x PQ								1.37 (.634)				1.15 (.247)
election	1.17 (.150)	1.19 (.156)	1.17 (.152)	1.17 (.157)	.74* (.100)	.74* (.103)	.73** (.089)	.74* (.100)	1.47* (.279)	1.18 (.189)	1.19 (.190)	1.19 (.193)
number of departments t-1	1.08 (.091)	1.07 (.086)	1.07 (.084)	1.05 (.086)	1.06** (.020)	1.05* (.024)	1.04 (.022)	1.04 (.023)	1.00 (.019)	1.00 (.013)	1.00 (.022)	1.00 (.020)
department age	.987 (.015)	.99 (.015)	.99 (.015)	.99 (.015)	1.00 (.003)	1.00 (.003)	1.00 (.003)	1.00 (.003)	.998 (.001)	1.00 (.001)	1.00 (.001)	1.00** (.001)
Male t-1	-	-	-	-	.85 (.219)	.86 (.221)	.88 (.241)	.88 (.245)	.81 (.056)	.81** (.057)	.82** (.060)	.83** (.060)
t	1.04	1.05	1.03	1.03	1.04	1.04	1.06	1.06	1.27**	1.27***	1.27**	1.27**

Covariates	Spoils Bargain				Schafferian Bargain				Managerial Bargain			
	Model 1.A	Model 2.A	Model 3.A	Model 4.A	Model 1.B	Model 2.B	Model 3.B	Model 4.B	Model 1.C	Model 2.C	Model 3.C	Model 4.C
	(.095)	(.094)	(.09)	(.090)	(.070)	(.060)	(.074)	(.073)	(.088)	(.088)	(.090)	(.088)
t <sup>2</sup>	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.005)	.98* (.009)	.98* (.009)	.98* (.009)	.98* (.009)
t <sup>3</sup>	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.013)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.001)	1.00* (.000)	1.00* (.000)	1.00* (.000)	1.00* (.000)
BC	.88 (.136)	.87 (.131)	.93 (.136)	.93 (.151)	.97 (.051)	.75 (.228)	1.42 (.256)	1.45* (.259)	1.19 (.111)	1.20** (.071)	1.19 (.164)	1.14 (.147)
AB	1.17 (.266)	1.17 (.278)	1.63 (.796)	1.64 (.766)	.71*** (.015)	.59*** (.085)	.85 (.116)	.86 (.117)	.71*** (.037)	.68 (.162)	.76** (.078)	.79* (.076)
SK	.99 (.052)	1.01 (.070)	.828 (.096)	.857 (.114)	1.19** (.068)	.90 (.290)	1.71*** (.187)	1.76*** (.234)	.99 (.065)	1.00 (.060)	1.01 (.060)	.98 (.101)
MB	.915 (.338)	.913 (.339)	1.07 (.612)	1.03 (.560)	1.55*** (.176)	1.13 (.477)	1.98*** (.198)	2.04*** (.264)	.51*** (.065)	.51*** (.039)	.51*** (.075)	.48*** (.068)
ON (reference)												
QC	.67*** (.019)	.71*** (.057)	.868 (.115)	.88 (.122)	.94 (.036)	.72 (.237)	1.83*** (.242)	1.86*** (.252)	1.10 (.111)	1.11 (.082)	.90 (.170)	.88 (.160)
NB	1.62 (.874)	1.58 (.832)	1.61 (.778)	1.46 (.756)	.89 (.098)	.65 (.246)	.89 (.094)	.90 (.116)	.65 (.070)	.65*** (.036)	.644*** (.075)	
NS	2.21 (1.32)	2.18 (1.33)	2.23 (1.19)	2.03 (1.16)	.64*** (.059)	.48* (.155)	.90*** (.124)	.72** (.087)	.70 (.073)	.70*** (.040)	.71*** (.067)	.72*** (.066)
PEI	2.72 (2.37)	2.62 (2.178)	2.65 (2.102)	2.26 (1.90)	.80 (.111)	.61 (.214)	.90 (.124)	.94 (.177)	.92 (.213)	.94 (.131)	.91 (.213)	.85 (.185)
NL	–	–	–	–	.82* (.081)	.63 (.173)	.92 (.089)	.95 (.114)	.75** (.082)	.72** (.079)	.74** (.088)	.72** (.079)

Covariates	Spoils Bargain				Schafferian Bargain				Managerial Bargain			
	Model 1.A	Model 2.A	Model 3.A	Model 4.A	Model 1.B	Model 2.B	Model 3.B	Model 4.B	Model 1.C	Model 2.C	Model 3.C	Model 4.C
GDP Growth	1.00 (.013)	1.00 (.013)	1.00 (.013)	1.01 (.014)	1.06*** (.015)	1.06*** (.018)	1.06** (.020)	1.06** (.020)	1.00 (.014)	1.00 (.015)	1.00 (.015)	1.00 (.015)
Constant	.033** (.04)	.04** (.037)	.04** (.042)	.061* (.068)	.048*** (.027)	.075** (.073)	.070*** (.041)	.070*** (.041)	.349 (.202)	.390 (.210)	.362 (.209)	.39 (.210)
Log Likelihood	-881.18	-880.82	-878.05	-872.09	-2148.9	-2142.3	-2124.6	-2123.0	-4595.2	-4577.10	-4591.64	-4577.10
Wald chi <sup>2</sup>	.0037	.0080	.0046	.0010	.0000	.0000	.00000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.224	.224	.227	.232	.168	.171	.178	.178	.102	.102	.102	.105
N	2801	2801	2801	2801	5273	5273	5273	5273	7 739		7 739	7 739

Random effects model. Robust standard errors clustered around province in parentheses.  
 \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001

Table 15: Mobility, logistic regression models 5-7 across PSBs

Covariates	Spoils Bargain			Schafferian Bargain			Managerial Bargain		
	Model 5.A	Model 6.A	Model 7.A	Model 5.B	Model 6.B	Model 7.B	Model 5.C	Model 6.C	Model 7.C
party change	1.02 (.298)	.99 (.614)	1.12 (.707)	1.17 (.590)	.80 (.357)	.73 (.349)	1.77** (.294)	1.07 (.238)	1.09 (.240)
PC (reference)									
Liberal	.66** (.081)	.66** (.081)	.65** (.087)	.69** (.092)	.70** (.092)	.72** (.092)	1.25 (.243)	1.29 (.242)	1.29 (.245)
CCF/NDP	1.84* (.550)	1.84* (.564)	1.70* (.629)	.63** (.094)	.63** (.085)	.60** (.090)	1.19 (.259)	1.18 (.251)	1.19 (.246)
United Farmer	.63 (.232)	.63 (.241)	.730 (.239)	.20*** (.023)	.19*** (.024)	.17*** (.020)			
Social Credit	.45 (.188)	.45 (.198)	.50 (.203)	.66 (.170)	.66 (.173)	.55*** (.173)	.99 (.150)	1.02 (.145)	1.03 (.142)
Sask. Party							.89 (.137)	.86 (.125)	.83 (.112)
UN	.49* (.164)	.49* (.164)	.48* (.179)	.21*** (.030)	.22*** (.030)	.22*** (.030)			
PQ				1.02 (.153)	1.02 (.151)	1.04 (.142)	1.32 (.282)	1.40 (.282)	1.40 (.277)
party change x PC (reference)									
party change x Liberal	3.96* (2.48)	3.96* (2.49)	3.61* (2.06)	1.38 (.667)	1.36 (.658)	1.35 (.713)	.42** (.122)	.41** (.119)	.41** (.118)
change x CCF/NDP	.67 (.390)	.66 (.392)	.62 (.326)	1.25 (.873)	1.23 (.857)	1.14 (.816)	.48 (.236)	.55 (.269)	.55 (.271)
party change x Farmers/Progressive	1.94 (.89)	1.96 (.95)	1.72 (.747)	4.38** (2.24)	6.36** (2.86)	5.96** (2.70)			
party change x SC	3.73** (1.79)	3.72** (1.80)	3.46** (1.45)	1.25 (.500)	1.24 (.500)	1.15 (.505)			
party change x Sask. Party							1.29 (.271)	1.27 (.271)	1.28 (.271)
party change x UN	2.56 (1.43)	2.56 (1.43)	2.38 (1.19)	1.08 (.420)	1.03 (.408)	1.10 (.463)			
party change x PQ				1.37 (.630)	1.37 (.633)	1.43 (.703)	1.21 (.247)	1.15 (.234)	1.16 (.262)
premier change	.90 (.261)	.94 (.712)	.90 (.680)	1.05 (.298)	1.61 (.508)	1.68 (.561)	1.38 (.267)	2.52** (.800)	2.46** (.780)
interim premier		.95 (.649)	1.01 (.681)		.49** (.120)	.47** (.120)		.44** (.126)	.45** (.129)
majority (reference)									
minority			.68*			1.30			1.00

Covariates	Spoils Bargain			Schafferian Bargain			Managerial Bargain		
	Model 5.A	Model 6.A	Model 7.A	Model 5.B	Model 6.B	Model 7.B	Model 5.C	Model 6.C	Model 7.C
			(.115)			(.217)			(.113)
coalition			.78 (.142)			.31*** (.070)			.74*** (.062)
election	1.16 (.157)	1.16 (.168)	1.17 (.171)	.74* (.099)	.70* (.101)	.70* (.100)	1.18 (.196)	1.07 (.198)	1.07 (.197)
number of departments t-1	1.05 (.085)	1.05 (.084)	1.05 (.089)	1.04 (.023)	1.03 (.023)	1.03 (.025)	.99 (.022)	.99 (.021)	.99 (.021)
department age	.99 (.015)	.99 (.015)	.99 (.014)	1.00 (.003)	1.00 (.003)	1.00 (.003)	1.00* (.001)	1.00* (.001)	1.00* (.001)
Male t-1				.88 (.246)	.88 (.243)	.89 (.249)	.83** (.060)	.82** (.056)	.82** (.056)
t	1.03 (.091)	1.03 (.096)	1.02 (.092)	1.06 (.073)	1.06 (.071)	1.06 (.072)	1.26** (.089)	1.26** (.088)	1.26** (.088)
t <sup>2</sup>	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.010)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.005)	1.00 (.005)	.98* (.009)	.98* (.009)	.98* (.009)
t <sup>3</sup>	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00 (.000)	1.00* (.000)	1.00* (.000)	1.00* (.000)
BC	.93 (.150)	.93 (.147)	1.03 (.218)	1.45* (.255)	1.45* (.259)	1.86*** (.220)	1.11 (.144)	1.10 (.134)	1.10 (.137)
AB	1.67 (.825)	1.67 (.824)	1.44 (.613)	.87 (.116)	.87 (.120)	1.01 (.110)	.77** (.074)	.78** (.072)	.78** (.066)
SK	.86 (.114)	.86 (.115)	.89 (.156)	1.76*** (.256)	1.77*** (.212)	1.93*** (.201)	1.02 (.100)	1.05 (.095)	1.09 (.093)
MB	1.03 (.554)	1.03 (.529)	1.06 (.488)	2.04*** (.256)	2.07*** (.249)	2.14*** (.311)	.49*** (.071)	.49*** (.067)	.49*** (.066)
ON (reference)									
QC	.87 (.127)	.87 (.127)	.86 (.136)	1.86*** (.247)	1.85*** (.236)	1.93*** (.201)	.90 (.179)	.89 (.169)	.89 (.171)
NB	1.45 (.74)	1.46 (.712)	1.51 (.800)	.90 (.119)	.90 (.117)	.93 (.156)	.61*** (.071)	.61*** (.067)	.61*** (.071)
NS	2.01 (1.13)	2.02 (1.12)	2.05 (1.24)	.72** (.086)	.71** (.085)	.70** (.100)	.70*** (.064)	.70*** (.062)	.70*** (.062)
PEI	2.24 (1.86)	2.24 (1.84)	2.30 (2.02)	.94 (.172)	.92 (.169)	.93 (.210)	.86 (.200)	.82 (.176)	.82 (.180)
NL				.94 (.113)	.92 (.115)	.93 (.139)	.71** (.082)	.68** (.072)	.69** (.075)
GDP growth	1.01 (.014)	1.01 (.014)	1.01 (.014)	1.06** (.021)	1.06** (.021)	1.06** (.022)	1.00 (.015)	1.01 (.016)	1.00 (.016)
Constant	.063** (.067)	.063** (.066)	.060* (.067)	.070*** (.041)	.073*** (.042)	.073*** (.045)	.377 (.216)	.391 (.216)	.383 (.213)
Log Likelihood	-872.00	-872.00	-871.21	-2123.0	-2121.6	-2118.5	-4570.4	-4561.4	-4560.7
Wald chi <sup>2</sup>	.0014	.0021	.0033	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

	Spoils Bargain			Schafferian Bargain			Managerial Bargain		
	Model 5.A	Model 6.A	Model 7.A	Model 5.B	Model 6.B	Model 7.B	Model 5.C	Model 6.C	Model 7.C
Covariates									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.232	.232	.233	.178	.179	.180	.107	.108	.109
N	2801	2801	2801	5273	5273	5273	7 739	7 739	7 739

Random effects model. Robust standard errors clustered around province in parentheses. \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001

The relationship between mobility and a change in party is robust; statistically significant in the other models introducing changes in premier and the legislative strength of the government.

In the *spoils* bargain, a change in premier, as expected, has no relationship with mobility. Nor is there a statistically significant relationship between mobility and an interim premier. Legislative strength is shown to have a negative relationship with mobility. Both minority governments and coalition governments have a negative association with mobility compared to a majority government, although the relationship is only statistically significant for minority governments.

During the *spoils* bargain few of the control variables have statistically significant relationships with mobility. This helps clarify trends in mobility shown in Figure 5 Chapter 4 (p. 107) where very low levels of mobility were interrupted by changes in the political party. In other words, the results suggest that during the *spoils* bargain, apart from a change in party, bureaucratic mobility was affected by little else.

*Schafferian bargain.* The results from the regression models help clarify the relationship between political dynamics and mobility during the period associated with the *Schafferian* bargain. First, in contrast to expectations, transitions in the governing party do lead to increased rates of mobility. Shown Model 1.B, while a change in the governing party is positively

associated with mobility, the magnitude of this relationship is lower than during the *spoils* bargain (an odds ratio of 1.66 versus a ratio of 2.08). What's more, the relationship is not very robust. Once additional predictors are introduced to the model the relationship is generally no longer present. As the evidence suggested in Chapter 4, there is no statistically significant relationship between the time the previous government was in power and the mobility of administrative elites.

The results also do not indicate that governments on the ideological right are associated with higher levels of mobility upon taking power than parties on the left. In fact upon forming government, all parties are associated with higher levels of mobility than the Conservative Party, although only the United Farmers has a statistically significant relationship.

The regression also shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between changes in premier and mobility; although interim premiers do have a negative and statistically significant association. The findings also show that in contrast to theoretical expectations, coalition governments do have a statistically significant and negative relationship with mobility. Although as mentioned in Chapter 4, it is important to keep in mind that coalition governments were gathered in the first two years of the 1950s and that when mobility levels of majority governments are compared during this decade with levels in coalition governments the difference is much less pronounced.


It is also worth mentioning a few control variables. As shown in Figure 3 in Chapter 4 (p. 103), following the postwar period, there was a trend of increasing incidence mobility in all years, especially during the 1970s. The empirical evidence presented above generally indicates that this increase is not due to political dynamics. This leads to the question: if not due to political factors, what then helped bring about the noticeable increase in mobility during the 1960s and

1970s? While the objective of this dissertation is not to explain all factors causing mobility, but rather, to examine whether the average effect that political dynamics have on mobility has changed over time, the statistical analysis of the data does allow for some comment on the non-political factors leading to the rise in mobility during this period.

In their study of DM mobility in Canada's federal government Bourgault and Dion note that apart from the manipulation of administrative personnel by governments, mobility began to increase in the 1960s due to the increased number of deputy ministerial positions and the increased competition for these positions arising from the professionalization and commodification of policy expertise (1989a, 143).

Based on the original dataset used in this work, Figure 12 shows that the average number of departments in the Canadian provinces did rise during these years – from 14 in 1950s, 18 in the 1960s, to 21 in the 1970s; an increase of 50 percent in 30 years. Importantly, more departments generally represent not only more DMs but also more bureaucrats in slightly lower executive levels, who are able to compete for DM positions. Research from organization and management studies suggest that such growth in the labour pool of candidates increases the likelihood of mobility (Fredrickson , Hambrick, and Baumrin 1988; Grissom, Viano, and Selin 2016). The results from regression models do show a positive association between the number of departments and mobility (odds ratio approximately 1.05). The relationship is not very robust however, only being significant in models 1.B and 2.B.

Figure 12: Average number of departments in provincial bureaucracy, 1920-2013




Organization and management studies also suggest that economic growth is positively associated with mobility (Kirschenbaum and Mano-Negrin 1999; Bertelli and Lewis 2013). As the economy develops so too are there more employment opportunities, and thus greater levels of mobility as individuals leave their positions for new prospects. This is particularly important during the postwar period where the 1960s to 1970s bore witness to the commodification of policy expertise with the emergence of the consulting and lobbying industries (Saint-Martin 1998). For example, in 1963 the Canadian Association of Management Consultants was established. During this same time a growing number of think tanks were founded, such as the Institute for Research on Public Policy (1972), The Fraser Institute (1974), and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (1980). Thus whereas an increase in economic opportunities may normally be associated with mobility this is all the more likely the case during the postwar period where a quantitative expansion in GDP was also accompanied by a qualitative change with the emergence of a new market subsector as the provision of expertise became

commodified. Mobility therefore increases in all years during this period as individuals move between positions to seek new and emerging opportunities.

Figure 13 shows Canada's GDP between 1926 and 1986. The spiked increase during the 1970s is congruent with the large jump in mobility. The regression further supports this relationship. Economic growth has a positive and statistically significant relationship with mobility. For every one percentage increase in GDP the odds of mobility increases by 6 percent. Together the expansion of the size of government and the expanding labour market opportunities in the policy industry help explain the overall rise of mobility in all years witnessed during the 30 years proceeding from the postwar period.

Figure 13: Real GDP (Canada) 1926-1986



(Source: Statistics Canada 1987, index year 1981)

*Managerial bargain.* The results from the regression models 1.C through 7.C generally reinforce the conclusions made in Chapter 4 concerning the relationship between politics and mobility within the *managerial* bargain. It contrast to the *spoils* bargain, where mobility was most strongly associated with a transition in party, during the *managerial* bargain the data suggests

that changes in the head of government matter more. As expected the data shows that the relationship is not true of interim premiers. Change in premier only has a statistically significant relationship once interim premiers are controlled for (Models 6.C and 7.C). In Model 6.C, a change in premier is associated with an increased percentage in the odds of mobility by almost 150 percent whereas interim premiers, have a negative and statistically significant association with mobility.

While the results show that changes in the head of government matter more than transitions in party, it would be erroneous to infer from this data that changes in party do not lead to escalations in mobility; they do. What the evidence does suggest however, and what is argued here, is that during the *managerial* bargain, it is not a change in the partisan nature of the political party holding office that explains why a transition in party will lead to an increase in mobility; but instead, because a change in party almost always involves a change in the individual heading the government,<sup>41</sup> it is a change head of government and not the fact that this person is a member of a different political party, that leads to an increase in mobility. This is empirically supported by regression Models 6.C and 7.C indicating that when testing simultaneously a change in party and a transition in the head of government, the latter is statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) with an odds ratio of approximately 2.5, whereas a change in the head of government, found to have a statistically significant relationship with mobility when a change in premier and an interim premier are excluded from the model, is no longer the case once a change in the head of government and interim premiers are introduced ( $p > 0.05$ ).


This is consistent with theoretical expectations that newly elected heads of government do not strategically use the nomination of bureaucratic offices as a reward to reinforce partisan support of the party, but instead to ensure loyalty to the first minister and her personal policy

agenda. The same inference that is also supported in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 indicating that, to paraphrase the statement from Premier Harris, the question of whether one “understands the agenda is more important than whether they were brought in under the Liberals or the NDP” (cited above, p. 144). Otherwise stated, loyalty to the executive and her agenda rather than being a partisan supporter to the party is the key consideration in staffing bureaucratic elites.

Furthermore this loyalty to the premier’s policy agenda is the exact opposite of the association that a change in premier and a transition in the governing party have with mobility during the *spoils* bargain. In the *spoils* bargain, Model 6.A shows that when a change in premier and an interim premier are introduced to the model, the association is not significant between mobility and a change in premier ( $p > 0.05$ ). In the *spoils* bargain, the stronger relationship remains a transition in the governing party.

The points above can be appreciated by examining Figure 14 presenting the predicted probability of mobility given there has been a change in premier discriminating for whether this involves a change in party or not. During the *spoils* bargain, in the absence of a transition in party new premiers arriving at the head of government have substantially lower levels of mobility than new premiers resulting from a transition in party (a probability of .18 compared to .11). Without a change in party, new heads of government feel little need to dismiss incumbents. Yet during the *managerial* bargain, newly elected premiers regardless of whether or not there has been a change in party, are associated with higher levels of mobility than when no change in premier or party takes place.

Figure 14: Mobility, predicted probability when change in premier



Predicted probability of mobility when change in premier; assuming random effect is zero. Party change = party change (1), premier change (1), election (1), interim premier (0). No party change = change in party (0), premier change (1), election (1), interim premier (0). Interim premier = party change (0), premier change (0), election (0), interim premier (1). All other covariates held constant at their observed value. Probability of mobility when there is no change in premier and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line. Based on coefficients from Model 7 without an interaction term between party change and party dummies.

Interestingly, newly elected premiers from the same party as the previous government are associated with slightly higher levels of mobility than premiers alongside a new political party. This finding is also suggested in Chapter 4 with the use of descriptive statistics where mobility following a change in party in the *managerial* bargain was 43 percent whereas ENPC premiers had a mobility rate of 54 percent. This is not the first work to find such an intriguing result. Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup (2014) in their study of mobility in Denmark make a similar finding, which they suggest is explained by the greater familiarity heads of government from the same party have with administrative functions and personnel than those from a different party, and thus leads them to be less cautious in moving administrative personnel.

The data also show that when a new premier is merely an interim the probability of mobility is reduced. Importantly, the substantive reduction in the probability between a change in premier and an interim premier, is greatest during the *managerial* bargain. Whereas the difference between levels of mobility for interim premiers and all new premiers when there has been no party change is very small in other periods, during the *managerial* bargain the difference becomes much more pronounced. This is congruent with theoretical expectations that interim premiers lack the necessary condition explaining why mobility is positively associated with new heads of government: the desire for bureaucrats to be committed to the leader's policy agenda and manage resources to attain policy objectives. Limited in their ability to set the policy agenda within cabinet as well as lacking the time horizon to introduce new directions in policy, interim premiers have much less need to ensure competency and loyalty from bureaucrats and hence are associated with lower levels of mobility than are newly elected premier.


As to whether in the *managerial* bargain governments on the ideological right are associated with higher levels of mobility than governments on the left, the evidence is somewhat

supportive. While in all years there is no substantive difference between parties, the results from the models examining the interaction between party change and political parties indicate that the left-leaning NDP and centre-left Liberal party have lower associations with mobility than the Conservative Party, although only the difference with the Liberal party is significant. An alternative means to appreciate the relationship is presented in Figure 15 displaying the predicted probability of mobility for each party when taking power.

Finally, while there is no difference between majority and minority governments in the managerial bargain, coalition governments are negatively associated with mobility. To better appreciate the substantive differences between legislative strength mobility Figure 16 displays the predicted probability of mobility by majority, minority and coalition governments during each PSB. As stated in Chapter 4, the data suggests that in the *managerial* bargain the absence of any difference between minority and majority governments is congruent with the argument that in the contemporary era minority governments govern in a similar manner as majority governments, that being to introduce changes in policies and programs, and accordingly, seek to ensure that bureaucrats are responsive to their policy agenda.

Coalition governments, however, are associated with lower levels of mobility. The findings here suggest that something else other than the weaker legislative strength (also shared by minority governments) is responsible for the lower level of mobility of coalition governments. Instead it could be the case that the sharing of power between two or more parties weakens the head of government's disposition to unilaterally control the governing apparatus including levels of responsiveness from the bureaucracy.

Figure 15: Mobility, predicted probability when change in party by PSB




Predicted probability of DM mobility when transition in governing party by each party; assuming random effect is zero. Premier and election held at change (1), caretaker held at (0). All other covariates held constant at their observed value. Probability of mobility when there is no change in premier and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line. Based on coefficients from Model 7.

During the *managerial* bargain, several control variables are also associated with mobility. As with previous studies positions previously occupied by men have lower levels of mobility than those held by women. As with the *Schafferian* bargain, GDP growth is associated with increased mobility, albeit here the relationship is not statistically significant. The time the DM has been in his or her position has a positive and statistically significant association with mobility. For every year a DM has been in their position the odds of a change increases by 26 percent, an association that is much greater during the *managerial* bargain than during other periods.


Figure 17 displays the predicted probability of mobility for time in position controlling for all other variables. The results show that up until the first ten years, each year the incumbent has been in the same position the probability of turnover substantively increases. The positive association between the previous time in the same position and mobility is congruent with the *managerial* bargain where this is likely to be viewed by governments as a key source of two central bureaucratic pathologies. That being: (a) goal conflict; where too much time in the same department fosters loyalty amongst bureaucrats to their department; and (b) information asymmetry; where extended time in the same department will lead bureaucrats to know more details of policies and programs than politicians, which they could then use to their own advantage. To abate these pathologies and ensure loyalty to the government's policy agenda, bureaucrats cannot remain in any one position for too long a time. It is therefore not of minor importance then that it is during the *managerial* bargain and not the previous PSBs that time in position is most strongly associated with mobility.

Figure 16: Mobility, predicted probabilities by legislative strength



Predicted probability of DM mobility by legislative strength; assuming random effect is zero. All other covariates held constant at their observed value. Probability of mobility when there is no change in premier and party with all other covariates at their observed value identified by dotted line Based on coefficients from Model 7.

Figure 17: Mobility, predicted probability by time DM in position



Predicted probability of mobility by number of years DM has been in her position. Assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from Model 7.

The results from the regression models also show some variation across provinces. Appendix I of this chapter (p. 180-182) displays the predicted probability of mobility by province based on the coefficients from regression Model 7 during each PSB. Noticing such differences across the provinces while controlling for predictors leads to new questions concerning possible explanations of interprovincial variation. While identifying the reasons for provincial differences is beyond the objective of this dissertation, one possibility may be the variety of parties observed within each province.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, some researchers have claimed that the Atlantic Provinces, Québec and British Columbia are those whose administration is the most ‘politicized’.

Otherwise stated, governments in these provinces interfere to a greater extent in administrative affairs including the staffing of personnel. The data shows that there is some support of these claims. British Columbia does have higher levels since the *Schaffarian* and *managerial* bargains, while Québec has higher levels during the 1950s through to 1980.

A more interesting case is the Atlantic Provinces (NS, NB, PEI and NL). While during the *spoils* bargain, the Maritime Provinces (NS, NB and PEI) are associated with higher levels of mobility than the other provinces (albeit this difference is not statistically significant), after the postwar period, these provinces generally exhibit lower levels. Admittedly speculative, one possible reason for this could be that in contrast to every other province, the Atlantic Provinces have been almost exclusively governed by only two parties: the Liberals and Conservatives (the exemption being the NDP government in Nova Scotia in 2009-2013). A regular shifting between two predominantly brokerage parties may have led to overall lower levels of mobility. Conversely, political entities having been governed by a greater variety of parties with a broader range of political ideologies may positively affect levels of mobility in ways that have yet to be appreciated.

An alternative hypothesis (but one that is not necessarily unrelated to the variety of parties forming government) could be that mobility is tied to the degree of divisions and political cleavages within society. The Atlantic Provinces, generally a political entity embodying a lower degree of heterogeneity, could be have lower levels of mobility than provinces whose political landscapes are home to a greater diversity of perspectives. One commentator of the administrative style within the Atlantic Provinces for instance notes a “relative absence of ideological or societal cleavages dividing the two main parties” (Johnson 2005, 95). Briefly


mentioned here, these points remain speculative and are only some of the possible explanations needing further study.

### **Conclusion of Chapter Five**

Using statistical regression this chapter undertook a more rigorous test to examine the relationship between key political dynamics and bureaucratic mobility across distinct PSBs. Even when controlling for alternative variables identified by organization and management studies the evidence suggests that the relationship between mobility and some key political dynamics does exhibit a great deal of temporal variation. This is congruent with theoretical expectations that governments in different PSBs strategically appointment administrative elites to reinforce fundamentally different types of competency and loyalty. The final chapter concludes this work by reviewing the main findings and the implications these have for scholarship studying administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics.


## Chapter 5 Appendix I

Figure 18: Predicted probability of mobility by province, spoils-type bargain (1920-1949)




Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from Model 7.

Figure 19: Predicted probability of mobility by province, Schafferian bargain (1950-1979)



Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from Model 7.

Figure 20: Predicted probability of mobility by province, managerial bargain (1980-2013)



Predicted probability of mobility by province; assuming random effect is zero. Covariates held constant at their observed value. Based on coefficients from Model 7.

## **Chapter Six. Conclusion**

*Chapter six summary.* This concluding chapter reviews the main objective, central argument, empirical evidence as well as the main conclusions of this work. The implications that the findings have for the study of administrative mobility as well as Canadian politics are addressed. Consideration is also given to the utility of PSBs as a framework for understanding the strategic actions of governments. In light of the conclusions, this chapter revisits the long-standing debate within public administration concerning the proper relationship between politics and administration. The chapter closes by considering the limitations of this work as well as highlighting a few promising avenues for future research.

### **Main Objective, Central Argument, Empirical Evidence and Conclusion**

Recognizing the important consequences that personnel turnover can have on an organization's performance, research in public administration as well as organization and management studies have become increasingly interested in identifying the causes of mobility. Yet despite good reasons for supposing that the mobility of bureaucratic elites may be influenced by considerations of power, the greater part of this research has paid scant attention to the effects of political dynamics. For example, a recent report by the Public Service Commission of Canada (2008) dedicated to better understanding the trends and causes of turnover, makes no mention that amongst executives, mobility may also be influenced by political variables.

In contrast to the above, the last few years have borne witness to a growing body of research studying the relationship between mobility and politics. As identified in Chapter 2 however, despite its merits this research has faced some challenges. While traditionally the absence of large datasets has impeded researchers from simultaneously testing competing explanatory variables, more recent research using larger longitudinal datasets by drawing upon observations from further back in time before the managerial era of governance, have failed to find meaningful relationships between key political variables and administrative mobility (Dahlstrom and Niklasson 2013; Christensen, Klemmensen, and Opstrup 2014). Answering this puzzle has been the main objective of this work.

In Chapter 2 the central argument was made that a likely reason for this conundrum may be the fact that the relationship between mobility and political variables varies over time in tandem with shifts in the contours of political-administrative relationships. Drawing upon Hood and Lodge's (2006) concept of Public Service Bargain the relationship between central political variables and bureaucratic mobility was re-examined from a new theoretical perspective.

Distinguishing between three ideal-type Public Service Bargains – *spoils*, *Schafferian* and *managerial* – each varying according to the nature of governance, the nature of the bureaucracy's competency as well as the nature of the bureaucracy's loyalty, it was postulated that the extent to which certain political variables prod governments to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel is conditioned by the contours of the broader political-administrative relationship embodied in each bargain. It was theorized that governments strategically use elite administrative positions as a means to encourage certain types of competency and loyalty amongst the bureaucracy. Because however, the type of loyalty and competency that governments desire vary across bargains, it stands that which political variables prod governments to remove incumbents and appoint new personnel will also vary.

In the *spoils* bargain, the nature of governance is of a minimal character and there are scant specifications concerning the bureaucracy's competency; loyalty however, is of a partisan nature towards the governing party. Transitions in party therefore prod governments the most to dismiss incumbents and appoint new personnel. During the *Schafferian* bargain, governments seek to encourage policy relevant knowledge amongst bureaucrats as well as a willingness to advise governments in a forthright manner and on the basis of such expertise. To foster such competency and loyalty politicians strategically leave bureaucratic elites in their positions. Ideally, in the *Schafferian* bargain, political dynamics are no longer associated with bureaucratic mobility.

In the 1980s, with the emergence of a *managerial* bargain, there has once again been a shift in the competency and loyalty that governments desire bureaucrats to display. Detailed knowledge of policies and programs is now seen as a problem of information asymmetry turning the politician into Weber's (1991, 232) 'dilettante' and potentially obstructing the government's

ability to realize its policy agenda. Instead, governments seek bureaucrats who are able to effectively manage personnel and resources towards realizing the government's policy agenda. Loyalty, for its part, is no longer of an impersonal manner, as was the case in the *Schafferian* bargain, but instead is oriented to the policy agenda as established by the head of government. Seeking to foster such competency and loyalty, changes in the head of government (she who sets the policy agenda), rather than merely a transition in the governing party, is believed to have the greatest association with bureaucratic mobility. After outlining the theoretical framework (Table 2 p. 60) the most dominant hypotheses between political dynamics and mobility were revisited and situated within each PSB (Table 3 p. 68).

Variation in the relationship between political dynamics and administrative mobility was tested with an original dataset of deputy minister turnover in Canada's 10 provincial governments from 1920 to 2013 – the largest-n study of elite administrative turnover in a parliamentary country to date (N = 16, 660). Four central hypotheses – a transition in the governing party, the political ideology of the government, a change in the head of government, and the government's legislative strength – were tested with descriptive statistics and logistic regression. Evidence from the quantitative analysis as well as a qualitative inquiry identifying the motivations underpinning the staffing decisions of administrative elites across PSBs presented in Chapters 4 and 5, generally support the conclusion that the extent to which some key political dynamics have prodded governments to reappoint administrative elites has varied over time across distinct PSBs. A review of the hypothesized relationships between political dynamics and mobility across PSBs and the conclusions from the empirical results are summarized below in Table 16.

Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and conclusions

	<b>Spoils-type Bargain</b>		<b>Schafferian Bargain</b>		<b>Managerial Bargain</b>	
	theoretically expected	empirically demonstrated	theoretically expected	empirically supported	theoretically expected	empirically supported
H1) Transition in the party is positively associated with mobility	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
H2) Transition in party AND time previous party in power is positively associated with mobility	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
H3) Ideologically right governments are positively associated with mobility	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
H4) Change in premier is positively associated with mobility	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
H5) Legislative strength is positively associated with mobility	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

### Contributions

Whereas predominant explanations of bureaucratic appointments drawing upon principal-agent theory universalize the intentions of governments underlying the appointment of bureaucratic

elites, this project makes an original contribution to the study of bureaucratic mobility by theoretically situating the actions of first ministers within their social-historical context, and then empirically showing that the relationship between mobility and key political dynamics varies over time alongside across distinct PSBs. The historical contingency of hypotheses is particularly worth emphasizing as scholars make greater use of longitudinal data. Researchers should be mindful that different periods of time may embody distinct political-administrative relationships and thus poorly reflect the underlying theoretical assumptions held by agency theory. While researchers using panel data have made great pains to understand the effects of time, they generally do so by treating it as a continuous variable. This work has shown that time can also be a categorical variable; representing significant shifts in political-administrative relationships.

By applying the concept of PSB to situate the strategic actions of governments within their sociohistorical context, this work has used the concept of a PSB in a novel manner by examining how the contours of political-administrative relationships mediate the degree to which political dynamics prod governments to strategically staff administrative elites. The use of the concept to explain variation in the strategic behaviour of governments deviates from the dominant manner PSBs has been used by scholars in public administration as a means to identify and describe changes in the roles of bureaucrats over time and across countries (Lodge 2010; Bourgault 2011; Van Dorpe and Horton 2011; Hondeghem 2011; De Visscher et al. 2011; Hansen, Steen, and Jong 2013; Halligan 2013; van der Meer, van den Berg, and Dijkstra 2013; Burns, Wei, and Peters 2013).

Noting the restricted manner in which PSBs has been applied by previous research, and the failure of scholars to ask questions as to whether PSBs influence the strategic behaviour

of politicians and bureaucrats (rare exceptions include, Hood 2002; Elston Forthcoming), some have suggested that “it might be questioned how compelling the PSB approach is” (Elston Forthcoming, 4). This is unfortunate; especially considering that Hood clearly believed the concept possessed the theoretical prowess to explicate how the social-institutional context of political-administrative relationships mediated the strategic actions of politicians and bureaucrats (Hood 2000, 8). By providing one of the first applications of PSBs to formally postulate and empirically test how the strategic actions of governments is mediated by the contours of differing PSBs, this work attests to the utility of the concept to explain the strategic behaviour of governments.

By studying the mobility of DMs over approximately 100 years in Canada’s 10 provincial governments, this work also makes an important empirical contribution to the study of Canadian politics. A key issue in the field has been the increasing centralization of power in the hands of the first minister (Hockin 1977; White 2005; Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett 2005). Admittedly, while only one indicator, the evidence presented in this work suggests that over the 20<sup>th</sup> century this has most definitely been the case. While during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century only newly elected governments shuffled bureaucratic personnel, by the 1980s the trend was clearly in place that all newly elected heads of government, regardless of whether a transition in party had occurred, engaged in a game of bureaucratic ‘musical chairs’ in order to secure loyalty to their policy agenda. Loyalty to the premier and her policy objectives rather than the party corroborates the thesis most prominently voiced by Donald J. Savoie, who, speaking of the power invested in the first minister has proclaimed that, “[in Canada] Cabinet has now joined Parliament as an institution being bypassed” (1999, 362).

The findings of this work also have implications for policies concerning administrative personnel. During the last 20 years, concern has been voiced by some over what they perceive as ‘alarmingly’ high levels of mobility (Osbaldeston 1989; Lewis 1991; Coté and Holland 2007). While such works frequently focus on various non-political factors associated with mobility such as labour market opportunities, this work provides a strong reminder that political dynamics can also be an important cause of mobility amongst bureaucratic elites.

The increased degree to which administrative careers are influenced by politics, frequently referred to by scholars in public administration as ‘politicization’, has also been noted with concern by some believing that by strengthening the link between the careers of administrators with the achievement of government’s policy agenda, the willingness of officials to provide honest counsel to governments has been weakened. According to Aucoin, things have recently gotten so out of hand so as to justify a new era of governance, which he refers to as New Political Governance (Aucoin 2012). According to Aucoin, “at best, this politicization constitutes sleazy governance; at worst, it is a form of political corruption that cannot but undermine impartiality and, thereby, also management performance to the extent that it assumes management based on nonpartisan criteria” (2012, 178).

Prominently, in its report as to the causes of the Sponsorship Scandal, the Gomery Commission identified the linkage between political considerations and the careers of civil servants as a contributing factor to the questionable actions of some deputy ministers. The Commission reported that:

The concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister is a phenomenon of modern Canadian government which has been noted with concern by academics and commentators. The dangers created by that concentration are demonstrated by the “sponsorship scandal.” As shown by the evidence, if a proposal or program is perceived as being supported by the PMO, politicians and public servants alike, mindful of the effect that opposition might have upon their careers, hesitate to object to it in any fashion, no matter how ill-conceived or

poorly administered it may be. This undermines the whole concept of a professional and non-partisan public service, fearlessly giving objective advice to its political masters. (Gomery Commission 2005, 434)

For those persons concerned about the increasing extent to which governments are staffing bureaucratic elites as a means to foster responsive competence and rescind the willingness of bureaucrats to provide candid advice, the evidence presented in this work is likely to be troublesome. The fact that mobility in the present era of the *managerial* bargain is strongly linked to the arrival of a newly elected head of government may lead some to refrain from providing advice that contradicts the accepted view of the government.

While the strategic appointment of administrative elites may influence the type of advice bestowed to governments, to then go one step further and say that this should be otherwise, remains a fundamental normative position. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this work (p. 5-8), the question as to whether or not governments should have the power to appoint and dismiss administrative elites is tied to a long-standing debate concerning the proper relationship between politics and administration. This normative issue cannot be settled by empirical proofs. Perhaps frustrating to some, no evidence presented in this work permits for a pronouncement in favour of either side of the debate. Whether heads of government should have a free hand in staffing bureaucratic elites remains a political question. While isolating the careers of bureaucratic elites may improve the impartiality of the civil service and lead to better policy decisions, democracy says nothing about making the technically ‘right’ decision. One need not go any further in political thought than Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* to discern this point. While various conceptions of the term exist (Urbinati 2006), a dominant understanding of representative government is the rule of those democratically elected in a free and fair election. A technical decision made by an un-appointed bureaucrat, while possibly a

sound choice on the basis of expertise and experience, may go against the very will of people. In an op-ed piece, former deputy minister Arthur Kroeger, himself having testified to the Gomery Commission as to the willingness of deputy ministers to unquestioningly appease the Prime Minister's policy agenda (Greenway 2004), had taken to defending the principle of representative government despite the poor decisions made by politicians and bureaucrats during the Sponsorship Scandal, asserting that "it is not in itself [the events of the Sponsorship Scandal] an adequate reason for calling into question our system of representative government – in which elected people have the last word" (Kroeger 2006).

### **Limitations and Future Avenues for Study**

As mentioned in Chapter 3, this study does have some limitations. First, by operationalizing mobility as the departure of an incumbent and an appointment to a new DM position, this study has used a broad measurement of mobility. While the reason for doing this was to ensure a systematic and comparable measure in 10 provinces over approximately 100 years, the data does not make any distinction as to the career backgrounds of new appointees nor does it tell us anything about what happened to those removed. While claims are sometimes made that the career background of those appointed to elite bureaucratic offices is qualitatively different in the more contemporary *managerial* era than during the era of the *spoils* bargain (Flinders and Matthews 2010) – where the latter often have few credentials or technical skills whereas the former are more likely to have some policy relevant skills – few studies have empirically verified whether this is indeed the case. Future research identifying the background of appointees as well as the whereabouts of those removed in Westminster countries would be

useful to better clarify whether politically motivated staffing decisions reflects a more ‘bounded’ type of politicization (Meyer-Sahling 2008).

This study has examined the influence of political dynamics in jurisdictions where there has been a great deal of centralization of power in the premier and where there are little institutional constraints limiting her ability to appoint and dismiss elites. Considering however, that the first minister’s role in bureaucratic appointments has recently been restricted in some countries such as the UK and New Zealand (Elgie 1998; Aucoin 2006; Pond 2008; Institute for Public Policy Research 2013; Paun, Harris, and Magee 2013; Matthews and Flinders 2015), research comparing mobility prior to and after these reforms would be a valuable contribution improving our understanding of the efficiency of these reforms.

A cautionary word must also be said about the applicability of this work’s findings to other jurisdictions. While it is often universally held that *managerial* bargains began to appear in most developed countries in the 1980s, it remains to be shown whether the shift from a *spoils* to a *Schafferian* bargain occurred at the same time as identified in this study. Scholars seeking to consider historical changes in PSBs in other jurisdictions should be attentive to qualitative research providing descriptions of political-administrative relationships when identifying the approximate temporal periods marking shifts in PSBs.

This study has examined DMs in line departments and the executive council. Officials in crown corporations are beyond the focus of this work. Studies of executive appointments to these quasi-governmental organizations (quangos) in various countries suggest that political dynamics do also affect mobility (Skelcher 1998; Park and Kim 2014). No studies have yet been published studying this in Canada. Exploring this question is also a promising future avenue of research. Having identified potential problems with sampling back in time, if the relationship

between political dynamics and mobility of elites in these offices is comparable, including observations from such agencies, boards and commissions could be a viable alternative to generate larger datasets.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> As discussed in detailed in Chapter 2 (p. 40) the unilateral power enjoyed by first ministers has recently been limited in a few countries, in particular the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'political dynamics' is used as a short-hand to refer to variables associated with the features of the government – such as the political ideology of the governing party, the length of time the previous party was in power, or change in the head of government – believed to be associated with mobility. The use of the term is not used with the intention to refer to political aspects within the broader society such as protests or strikes.

<sup>3</sup> To claim that the preferences of actors vary through historical periods of time is different than rational choice institutionalists that situate the strategic actions of persons within formal institutions. While such institutions unquestionably influence behaviour by affecting the costs and availability of information, transparency of actions, and the number of actors engaging in interactions, rational choice theorists do not go so far as to scrutinize how macro structures shape the axiomatic preferences of actors themselves. The point here, and that raised by more sociological thinkers, is that the more macro social institutional context exists prior to the individual. While the actions of individuals are the means through which social phenomena take shape, the underlying preferences of actors and their interactions with the social world, is strongly shaped by the larger social historical context they find themselves apart of.

<sup>4</sup> When referring to bureaucratic elites, this work predominantly does so referring to the very highest public official position, which in Canada is referred to as the deputy minister. Except when specifically speaking of elites within Canada, the use of deputy minister can apply to the equivalent positions found in other countries under differing names, such as permanent secretary (UK), secretary-general (Ireland), departmental secretary (Australia), chief executive (New Zealand) state secretary ('Staatssekretär' Germany), and Deputy Secretary (United States). This work also uses the term first minister to refer to the head of government. This is done so as to be applicable to both national and sub-national heads of government, which are frequently referred to in Canada distinctly as the prime minister and premier, respectively. Whereas some prefer to distinguish between national and sub-national bureaucracies by use the term public service to refer to the latter and civil service to the former (Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2007) no such distinction has been made. The corpus of public officials constituting the public administration is referred interchangeably throughout as the civil service, public service and the bureaucracy.

<sup>5</sup> Reflecting on trends in the public service since his removal by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006, Himelfarb is more negative, and goes on to qualify his earlier comment adding that "I wonder what proportion of public servants would say this today" (Himelfarb 2013).

<sup>6</sup> That is not to say that departures by bureaucratic elites are not affected by politics. Faced with a new political master, bureaucrats whose political orientation or policy objectives are incompatible with their own may decide to leave their position. Furthermore, one should also be careful in claiming that first ministers have no influence in preventing departures. Case studies have documented the persuasiveness of first ministers in retaining civil servants (Morin 1991; Podger 2007; MacKinnon 2004) Even when key individuals wish to leave the civil service, receiving a call from the first minister (or on her behalf) can pursue an individual to remain in their position.

<sup>7</sup> Not all agree that even when recruiting from within the civil service, the increasing manipulation of administrative offices possesses no threat to the integrity of civil servants. Aucoin (2012) for instance, fears that even if first ministers resort to recruiting from within the civil service, such 'deputy churn' will likely foster the belief that promotion comes to those who are overtly enthusiastic of the government's agenda, and therefore may cause a degradation of these civil service.

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<sup>8</sup> The degree to which Borden ride the government of patronage, however, is claimed by English as limited to the apex of administrative positions, “Like so many Canadian politicians, Borden discovered that what seemed rational in opposition was impracticable in power. Thus very little changed. Borden did succeed in depoliticizing senior administrative posts, especially those on regulatory bodies. This was in accordance with progressive dogma which held that such bodies must exist ‘beyond politics’...” (1977, 74).

<sup>9</sup> A related literature on ‘caretaker government’s, similarly suggests that under similar constraints governments undertake less ambitious policy reforms (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014).

<sup>10</sup> An important exception to this is work by Bourgault and Dion who study DM mobility in Canada’s federal bureaucracy between 1867 and 1987. Importantly, in their study Bourgault and Dion found differences in the extent to which mobility increased following an election over time. They note that “from the beginning of Confederation, changes in the ruling party had little appreciable impact on the mobility of deputy ministers” (1989a, 139). According to the authors, the reason for this is explained in part by the: (a) marginal differences in the ideologies of transitioning governments; (b) low number of transitions between parties; and (c), the strong consolidation of the British (Westminster) tradition in which civil servants are viewed as politically neutral administrators and there is a low tolerance for political patronage.

<sup>11</sup> Hood and Lodge acknowledge that they are not the first to use the concept of a ‘bargain’ to describe political-administrative relationships (Schaffer 1973; Savoie 2003).

<sup>12</sup> This is not to necessarily say that changes in the perception of governance are the central cause of shifts in PSB. Changes in PSBs could instead be brought about by various causes.

<sup>13</sup> Maintaining a focus on the prerogative of first ministers to appoint bureaucratic elites justifies focusing on the perspective that the governments have towards the bureaucracy. However, it is also possible to approach the issue from the bottom-up and examine the perspective of bureaucrats in each Public Service Bargain. Surveying statements from civil servants throughout this period supports the conclusion that civil servants having been cognizant of the contours of each bargain.

<sup>14</sup> Permanency was also the main objective of Britain’s Northcote-Trevelyan Report, generally viewed as the foundation of the professional bureaucracy and laying the ground work for the eventual Schafferian Bargain. In its introduction the report stated:

It cannot be necessary to enter into any lengthened argument for the purpose of showing the high importance of the Permanent Civil Service of the country in the present day. The great and increasing accumulation of public business, and the consequent pressure upon the Government, need only to be alluded to; and the inconveniences which are inseparable from the frequent changes which take place in the responsible administration are matter of sufficient notoriety. It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, and, to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them. (The Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1954, 1)

<sup>15</sup> A possible exception to this is the province of Alberta. In 2006 based on research conducted on its behalf, the *Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities* (the Gomery Commission) suggested that the province of Alberta had recently moved changed the process of nominating DMs by reducing the part played by the premier, and now stood as a notable difference in comparison to the other nine provinces as well as the Federal government. Criticizing the traditional process of nominating DMs in the Canadian variant of Westminster and praising recent changes in Alberta, the Commission noted that:

Appointees, in effect, are beholden to the Prime Minister who appointed them, and the Clerk who advised him/her to do so. According to this reasoning the appointment process may compromise an appointee’s ability to concentrate on what is good for his or her department, since appointees may ‘feel a greater sense of loyalty

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to [the Prime Minister and the Clerk] than to the Ministers with whom they have to work on a daily basis'. As a remedy the Commission recommends that the system of open, transparent competitions for deputy ministers used in Alberta be adopted. This system includes consultation with ministers.... Candidates are interviewed by a panel that includes individuals from outside government, and two or three names are presented to the relevant minister, who presents his/her choice to Cabinet. The Premier retains veto over appointments, but so far has not been exercised. (cited in O'Neal, Smith and Stilborn 2006, 10)

Furthermore the Gomery report claimed that "the Deputy Minister of the Executive Council of the Government of Alberta insists that there is no turning back and that the process currently in place enjoys wide support, including that inside government" (Gomery Commission 2006, 150).

The suggestion that Alberta's nomination process now involves a decreased influence of the Premier has been received with caution by some. For instance, in a particularly unfavourable assessment, Hubbard and Paquet take issue with the Commission's conclusions claiming that they were founded on "sloppy work" and that "it is not so much what Justice Gomery did not know that was problematic—it was what he thought he knew that was not in fact so" (2007, 9). Precisely, concerning the nomination of DMs, there are good reasons for being skeptical of the conclusion by the Gomery Commission that the reduced role of the premier in Alberta has permanent and institutionalized. The Commission's claim that the appointment process of DMs in Alberta is based on an interview conducted in 2005 by Donald J. Savoie with Ron Hicks the Clerk of the executive council of the province at that time. This evidence seems problematic because it is based on the oral statement rather than a formalized procedure supported by documents or the creation of an official body. Specifically, at time the interview Hicks was Clerk for Premier Ralph Klein who had been premier since 1992. With such a long-standing premier in power, in a province that had not had a change in party since 1971, it is not surprising that the nomination of DMs may have begun to be undertaken with less involvement of the Premier.

The problem, however, that such a process has not been institutionalized and the system remains fundamentally weak. The degree to which the premier delegates such tasks to others, and removes herself from the process is itself at the exclusive discretion of the premier. Under the Public Service Act DM appointments remain stipulated as, "made by order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the recommendation of the department head" (Alberta 2000).

Reviewing the process of DM appointments in Alberta, Tupper also takes issue with Gomery's conclusions claiming that "Alberta's deputy minister selection is dynamic and sometimes modified in light of changing conditions and needs. Procedures thus vary as political and economic circumstances change and as the deputy of executive council interprets them. They are not carved in stone for others to replicate and admire" (2014, 267). Recent changes in Premier further suggest that Tupper is correct. On the first day in power, following his election as premier in Alberta, Jim Prentice appointed a new clerk of the executive council as well as DMs to several departments. Explaining the reason for such a change, the Order in Council stated that "deputy minister appointments were among the top items of business decided at the first meeting of Premier Prentice's new Cabinet, which met immediately following the swearing-in ceremony" (Alberta 2014). Such decisions being taken by Cabinet immediately following the formation of government, suggests not only an opaque process, but that the appointment of DMs can remain if the premier so desires a highly political process.

<sup>16</sup> An important exception to the trend case study is work by Bierling, Carroll and Rosenblatt (2000) who study the mobility of deputy minister in the provinces between 1988 and 1996, and Bierling, Carroll and Kpessa (2014) who update the data to include mobility rates until 2007. Yet by beginning their studying during the apex of NPM reforms a historical perspective is left wanting. While the bureaucracies of the Canadian provinces have undergone institutional changes over the last 100 years, we have little systematically comparable data to with which to analyze and study whether these differences have altered the association to which political dynamics are associated with mobility. The period of 1920 to 2013 is therefore selected to include the major historical periods of administrative history in the provinces, ranging from the period prior to the development of the modern civil service, into the period of the professional bureaucracy, through to NPM reforms and into the present era.

Restricting their analysis to the use of descriptive statistics, both studies find that there is no general trend between elections and mobility rates of deputy ministers. For instance, between 1988 and 2007 some provinces such as British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador exhibited an increased rate in mobility in the first year following an election by 50%, while in other provinces such as Québec and Ontario, there was actually a decrease in mobility (Bierling, Carroll, and Kpessa 2014, 320). Although their use of a comparative method to study the mobility of deputy ministers is a welcome contribution to provincial studies, these works nevertheless do have

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some shortcomings. The most prominent of these is the failure to distinguish between elections where the incumbent party has been re-elected and those where there has been a change in government. Yet as the authors themselves note, re-election of the same government likely results in little adjustments to staff, whereas in the pursuit to increase control of the bureaucracy a transition in the governing party should lead to an increase in mobility (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenblatt 2000, 201). The inconclusive findings of the authors could very well be the result of failing to distinguish between elections resulting in a change in government and the re-election of the same party.

<sup>17</sup> This problem is summarized by Wiseman in his review of one such edited work studying transformations in provinces' bureaucracies, noting that::

For example, James Iain Gow notes that Quebec's Civil Service Commission was "the last to be formed in Canada" in 1943 (p. 288). But we learned from Donald Savoie that New Brunswick's also made its debut that year (p. 262), and both these "facts" come after John Crossley informed us that Prince Edward Island's CSC [Civil Service Commission] only appeared in 1963 (p. 211). So, which was last? This is a minor quibble, but an explicit comparative analysis would have had to confront and reconcile such discrepancies... We need comparative analysis because political theory or science, like all theory or science, depends on comparison. Without that, what we have is more institutional description and/or history... The task is daunting; perhaps local government practices lend themselves more to case studies. (2001, 135)

<sup>18</sup> All provinces are included in the entirety of the time period except for the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, which having joined Confederation in 1949, is included in the dataset as of this year.

<sup>19</sup> Before 1948 the publication was under the name of *The Canadian Almanac and Miscellaneous Directory*.

<sup>20</sup> Departmental Acts are only included in publications since 1974. Prior to this year however, the Almanac and Directory mentioned when newly named departments oversaw the functions of a previous department.

<sup>21</sup> Generally a straight forward issue of categorization one issue is with changes in the government arising from the dissolution of a coalition government to a single party. Following research studying parliamentary countries in Europe (Ennsler-Jedenastik 2014a; Ennsler-Jedenastik 2014b), a change in the party membership of a coalition government to a single party was considered to be a change in party.

<sup>22</sup> Following Johnston (2013) the CCF and NDP have been coded together. Following Morton (1950) the Progressive Party and the various provincial United Farmers parties have also been coded together.

<sup>23</sup> Prior to the 1980s initials rather than the given name is provided. Such cases were coded as male. The reason for this was the tendency of the Almanac and Directory to use the title of Mrs. or Ms. prior to 1980 thus suggesting that attention had been given to identify women though such a technique.

<sup>24</sup> In considering trends of the dataset taken as a whole, it is important to be mindful that such trends do not perfectly reflect averages across provinces. Larger provinces with more observations skew the average towards their own values.

<sup>25</sup> With the exception of a brief interlude of the New Democratic Party (NDP) forming government in Nova Scotia (2009-2013), the Atlantic Provinces have only endured Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments. The same is also true of Ontario, where a brief Coalition government between the United Farmers Party and the Labour Party (1920-1923) and an NDP government (1990-1995) broke a pattern of Liberal and Conservative governments. The greatest diversity in political parties has been observed in Québec and the Western provinces. Reflecting its strong provincial identity and desire for increased autonomy in social policies (Quinn 1979), Québec has had two nationalist governments: the Union Nationale and the Parti Québécois. Reflecting a period of vast social changes and populist thought during the first half of the twentieth century (Laycock 1990), the Prairie Provinces experienced various United Farmer Party governments, coalition governments as well as more recently the Saskatchewan Party. Finally, British Columbia has had a mix of Conservative, Liberal, Social Credit and NDP governments.

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<sup>26</sup> In addition to the substantive reasons for addressing temporal dependence, there are also statistical tests available that can identify its presence. Conducting a Wooldridge test (Drukker 2003) also shows the presence of serial correlation in the data, and further justifies the inclusion of corrective measures used in the regression models to address this issue.

<sup>27</sup> Allison explains the difference between fixed effects and random effects stating that "...a fixed effects model treats unobserved differences between individuals as a set of fixed parameters that can either be directly estimated or partialled out of the estimating equations. In a random effects model, unobserved differences are treated as random variables with a specified probability distribution" (Allison 2009, 2).

<sup>28</sup> How the fixed effects model address unobserved heterogeneity is explained by Firebaugh Warner and Massoglia stating that:

The random effects approach treats this individual-specific effect as randomly varying, whereas the fixed effects approach treats it as fixed for each individual...Unlike a fixed effects approach, random effects estimation does not discard variation across individual units. The additional information inherent in the between-unit variation implies several advantages for the random effects approach over the fixed effects approach. (2013, 117)

<sup>29</sup> Another more recent alternative to fixed effects and random effects is multilevel or hierarchical linear models. This work, however, has followed the approach of Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo. Advocating that:

While no statistical method is without its limitations, we argue that simply adjusting standard errors for clustering in data is an easy-to-implement methodology that requires fewer assumptions than the alternative technique, hierarchical linear modeling, and that the calculation of standard errors is not subject to the current computing limitations that HLM [hierarchical linear models] is. (2007, 456)

<sup>30</sup> Despite the rich compendium of information the picture is not equally complete in every province. Some provinces such as Manitoba and Prince Edward Island have not received as much scholarly attention as their peers.

<sup>31</sup> The years 2000 to 2013 constitute the 2000s.

<sup>32</sup> Average mobility reported in this table is different than the average mobility of the entire dataset in Figure (p. 106). The difference is attributed to that in this table mobility is calculated according to province and then weighted equally, whereas mobility of the entire dataset is biased towards those provinces with a greater number of deputy ministers.

<sup>33</sup> For this reason it could also be argued that the Liberal party in Québec is more ideologically committed than the Liberal party in other provinces. In fact evidence suggests this is true. In Québec, upon taking power in the *managerial* bargain, the Liberal party is associated with a level of mobility of 43 percent, which is 8 percentage points higher than levels of mobility in the same period when the Liberal party took power in provinces outside of Québec (35 percent).

<sup>34</sup> Empirical scrutiny of whether Premier Daniel Johnson removed incumbent civil servants with this project's dataset supports his claim that he generally left untouched the cadre of civil servants. Of the 24 deputy ministers, three were removed, and one position was abolished, thus providing a relatively low mobility rate of 16 percent.

<sup>35</sup> The most common exception to this case would be when a coalition of parties forming government has broken down without resulting in the dissolution of government and the election of a new party but instead the head of government of the former coalition now forming a minority government under her sole political party.

<sup>37</sup> A related literature on caretaker governments, similarly suggests that under these constraints governments undertake less ambitious policy reforms (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014).

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<sup>38</sup> Evidence also suggests that the practice of federal politics at the provincial level was also slower to change from Ottawa's efforts to purge the practice of patronage. As noted by English (1977) in his study of the Federal Conservative Party:

Provincial Tories were outraged with the end of patronage, and F.B. McCurdy public works minister chided Prime Minister Borden that such reforms were "certainly unsuited to Nova Scotia where the local provincial government continues to care for its supporters". (1977, 226)

<sup>39</sup> Dunn states of the Moores era that "Of course, DMs and ADMS were still chosen by the premier, but there was a more technocratic and less political basis for choosing them. (2014, 28)"

<sup>40</sup> This is a different approach than attempting to identify the most efficient and parsimonious model for each period, which would entail presenting models encompassing a different set of variables for each period. With the objective to identify whether there are observable differences in the association between political dynamics and mobility over time the same models are applied across PSBs.

<sup>41</sup> The exception to this would be if the party membership of a coalition government changed while the head of the government remained in her position.

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