


**UNIONS AMONG CANADIAN BANK WORKERS:
GROWTH AND ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE**

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ABSTRACT

UNIONS AMONG CANADIAN BANK WORKERS: GROWTH AND ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE

The emergence of recent unionization among Canadian Bank workers began following a Canada Labour Relations Board decision that a single branch is an appropriate bargaining unit. The organization drives proved to be extremely difficult and the present research sought to identify those factors responsible for the massive revocations which ensued shortly thereafter.

The following explanatory variables were tested against the probability of revocation (recision), with expected results shown as signs on the coefficients, b :

- H_1 : unit size; $b_1 < 0$.
- H_2 : percent members at certification; $b_2 < 0$.
- H_3 : employer opposition; $b_3 > 0$.
- H_4 : relative employment instability; $b_4 < 0$.
- H_5 : union support; $b_5 < 0$.

The empirical verification of these hypotheses was carried out using data from the CLRFB files on every certification order. A two-model, multiple regression analysis with the SPSS program validated all hypotheses except unit size.

RÉSUMÉ

La désyndicalisation des banques canadiennes: analyse et description

Le récent mouvement de syndicalisation dans le secteur bancaire remonte à 1977 suite à la décision du Conseil canadien des relations du travail (CCRT) à l'effet qu'une succursale constitue une unité de négociation appropriée. Le secteur bancaire s'est avéré dans les faits fort difficile à syndiquer et nous avons tenté de découvrir pourquoi ces travailleurs décident si massivement de révoquer leur accréditation syndicale. Les variables explicatives suivantes furent retenues ainsi que les hypothèses posées quant à leurs effets respectifs, sur la probabilité de retrait de l'accréditation.

H₁: Taille de l'unité; $b_1 < 0$.

H₂: Pourcentage de membres à l'accréditation; $b_2 < 0$.

H₃: Opposition patronale; $b_3 > 0$.

H₄: Instabilité relative d'emploi; $b_4 < 0$.

H₅: Soutien syndical; $b_5 < 0$.

Afin de vérifier empiriquement les hypothèses théoriques, nous avons étudié tous les dossiers confidentiels du CCRT relatifs à chaque succursale syndiquée (à l'aide d'une grille d'analyse). Nous utilisons une méthode de type économétrique de l'analyse de régression multi-variée que nous appliquons à l'aide du programme informatique, "*Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*".

Ces tests statistiques nous ont permis de confirmer toutes les hypothèses à l'exception de celle sur l'effet de la taille de l'unité de négociation sur le retrait d'accréditation.

UNIONS AMONG CANADIAN BANK WORKERS: GROWTH AND ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE

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Ironically, despite its numerical importance and crucial role in the financing of the nation's economy, the Canadian Banking system generally, and its employment situation specifically have received relatively little attention from serious labour relations researchers¹. Among the images which occasionally reach the visual media are the traditionally poor working conditions and inequitable treatment of women as employees of Canada's chartered banks².

One response to such a situation in a democratic society has been to seek collectivization as a means of reducing the imbalance in bargaining power between worker and employer and thus attempt to obtain improvement through unionization and collective bargaining as provided for in our constitutional and legal regime.

The present paper reports on the unsuccessful unionization efforts by Canadian bank workers over the period 1977-84 (and 1992) when several intense organizing drives were initiated and during which time these new, certified units were rapidly eliminated. The Canada Labour Relations Board (CLRB) policy regarding the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit (ABU) is initially discussed after which the analytical methodology presents two theoretical and empirical models. The final section covers results, observations and policy prescriptions.

The CLRB bank unit policy, 1959-85. Over the early decades, and given its national role, the CLRB viewed as appropriate only nationwide BU. The results of this policy are manifest in the BU of the railroad industry, broadcasting³, the airlines and other sectors within its jurisdiction.

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¹ Among the notable exceptions are Bain, 1981; Lowe, 1980; Moore, 1981, Ponak and Moore, 1981, Weiler, 1980.

² The 7 major, federally-chartered banks, in their 7 000 Canadian branches employ some 170 000 workers, of whom 80 % are women, occupying mainly the lowest-paying jobs. See Lowe, G., 1980.

³ See Bernard Brody, "Broadcasting Labour Relations", *Relations industrielles*, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1972, pp. 436-453. See also, B. Brody, "The Bargaining Unit for Quebec", Chapter 8, in E.E. Herman, *The Size and Composition of the Bargaining Unit*, Task Force on Labour Relations, (the Woods Commission), study No. 26, Ottawa, 1969.

(continued...)

Up to 1959 there was little unionization activity among Canada's federally-chartered banks. In that year the three employees of a Kitimat, BC Branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia applied for a BU. The board rejected the application on the grounds that the only ABU was one covering all eligible employees of a single bank, coast-to-coast. Given this herculean task (each bank averages 1 000 branches of some 15 employees each⁴) there were no unions among Canada's banks.

Eight years later, in 1967, the Quebec Labour Relations Board did certify all 1 200 eligible employees of the Montreal City and District Savings Bank, but this institution, being local in its presence and limited in its services, was under provincial, not federal jurisdiction⁵.

The year 1977 marks a significant policy revision by the CLRB which, genuinely attempting to offer these workers access to unionism, was forced to realize that the national BU they espoused as "appropriate", effectively inhibited bank workers from organizing. On June 10th, the CLRB approved three BNS Ontario certificates for the CUBE. Six weeks later, it was a feminist group, Service, Office, Retail Workers Union of Canada (SORWUC) which applied for a single branch unit of the CIBC in Vancouver and obtained certification from the CLRB. Given this incentive, seven other unions joined the fray and many additional certificates were granted on a single-branch basis. However, as rapidly as certificates were issued, they were subsequently, systematically and dramatically revoked over the following half-decade, a phenomenon unique in North American labour relations history. We trace the growth and decline of union presence and then, through two complementary models, seek to explain the decertification phase by identifying some of the factors structurally related to these annulments.

CERTIFICATION and DECERTIFICATION, 1977-84 and 1992. As table 1 shows, from zero in 1976, the number of certifications grew steadily at an average of some 30 per year over the following 3 years, then growth tapered off in 1980 for a total of 138 in 1982, with no new units recognized as of 1983. In addition, 38 certification applications over the period 1977-83 were rejected by the Board because of a lack of a majority vote.

³(...continued)

In the 1960's national bargaining units were under pressure because of regional and linguistic demands especially from Quebec and particularly from the CSN. The federal government introduced Bill C-8 to provide nominal accommodation for such units. The law was never adopted, but the CLRB did modify its view of the strictly national appropriateness a decade later.

⁴ Canadian Bankers Association, special compilation, February 12, 1992.

⁵ Quebec's century-old, deeply-established, near-bank, credit union network (Caisse populaire Desjardins), also under provincial jurisdiction, has been unionized (26,7 % of employees, 29,3 % of caisses) since 1956 on a branch-by-branch basis.

TABLE I
Certifications and Decertifications, 1976-83 and 1992

Certificate Status	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	...	1992
New Certificates	0	30	37	31	18	12	10	0		0
Total Certificates issued	0	30	67	98	116	128	138	138		138
Decertifications	0	0	26	3	13	20	15	11		16
Total Decertifications	0	0	26	29	42	62	77	88		104
Certificates left	0	0	41	69	74	66	61	50		34

Source: CLRB, special compilation

REVOCATIONS AND RECISIONS. A revocation involves a decision by the CLRB to withdraw a certificate previously issued by it and follows a vote by members of the bargaining unit in a manner similar to the certification procedure whereby 50 % + 1 represents the will of those in the unit. The 26 decertifications in 1978 are actually a special case of "recisions", voluntary surrender of certificates⁶, by a single, Western-Canadian bargaining agent. SORWUC was an unaffiliated union, founded in 1972 whose major goal was specifically to improve the wages and working conditions of women. After successfully and innovatively organizing 26 bank units, it became subject to enormous and systematic resistance and opposition from the banks, which rapidly drained its limited resources. An appeal to the CLC fell on deaf ears since the Congress had important affiliates already in bank organizing and their internal pressures won the day. Isolated and frustrated, with not a single collective agreement signed, in desperation, SORWUC committed hari-kari.

THE BANKS AND THE UNIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND DECERTIFICATIONS Table 2 shows the certifications obtained and annulled for each of the 7 unions active in this sector, and Table 3 gives the same information from the banks' perspective.

⁶ The term "decertification" covers both revocation and recision.

TABLE II
Certificates in Effects and Certificates Annulled
by Union

Unions								
Status	UBE	CSN	UFCW	USWA	OTEU	SORWUC	OPEIU	Total by Status
Certificates in effect	30 (54 %)	3 (23 %)	11 (33 %)	3 (60 %)	1 (33 %)	0 (0 %)	2 (100 %)	50
Certificates annulled	26 (46 %)	10 (77 %)	22 (67 %)	2 (40 %)	2 (67 %)	26 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	88
Total (per union)	56	13	33	5	3	26	2	138

Source: CLRB files and Labour Canada. For abbreviations, see appendix.

TABLE III
Certificates in Effect and Certificates Annulled
by Bank

Bank								
Status	RB	BM	BNS	CIBC	NB	TDB	BBC	Total by Bank
Certificates in effect	12 (60 %)	14 (33 %)	6 (35 %)	5 (28 %)	11 (34 %)	1 (14 %)	1 (50 %)	50
Certificates withdrawn	8 (40 %)	28 (67 %)	11 (65 %)	13 (72 %)	21 (66 %)	6 (86 %)	1 (50 %)	88
Total (per bank)	20	42	17	18	32	7	2	138

Source: CLRB files and Labour Canada, for abbreviations, see appendix.

As table 2 demonstrates, of the unions most represented, and aside from SORWUC (26/26 recisions), the CSN (10/13 revocations, 77 %) and the UFCW (22/33 revocations, 67 %) were the biggest losers in relative terms, while UBE, the most present of the unions, had the lowest loss rate (26/56 revocations, 46 %), but equally, the highest absolute loss (26). From table 3 we observe that, among the banks, the TDB was most successful in divesting itself of the unions on a percentage basis,

(6/7, 86 %), followed by CIBC (13/18, 72 %) and a cluster of three banks at 65 %: BM, BN, and BNS. In absolute terms, the BM "freed" itself of the most units, 28.

THE VARIABLES, THE MODELS AND METHODOLOGY

Because of its powerful capacity, i.e., its ability to identify the independent effect of an explanatory variable, multiple regression analysis was selected as the analytical instrument in order to understand the decertification activities. By accounting simultaneously for all of the variables tested, this technique permits the estimation of the specific effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES. The object of this exercise is to explain the observed revocations, the values taken by the dependent variable, (DV) which must therefore be quantified. Two measures were constituted which led to the specification of two equations (models) having a common core of independent variables (IV) and others, model-specific.

The first DV is dichotomic, taking the value of 1 when the certificate has been annulled (revoked or rescinded) and 0 if still in effect. This measure, and its attendant equation, are labelled the "dichotomic model". The population studied covers all 138 cases units originally certified. The second DV is the vote in favour of revocation, operationalized as the percentage of employees in the BU so voting. While the first model seeks to identify the factors responsible for the disappearance of the certificate, the second attempts to explain the voting outcome: it is the "continuous model". For the continuous DV the minimum value needed to revoke, being a simple majority, 50 % + 1, is the baseline, with a maximum of 100 %. In our population, the mean vote to revoke was 73 %, the minimum, 22.5 % (in only 2 cases did the vote fail to revoke) and in 9 of the 64 cases covered in this model the vote was 100 %.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. From a detailed review of the existing literature and theory on certification and decertification activity and conditional upon data availability, the following independent variables have been retained and tested in the models.

1. The employers. All 7 major chartered banks were involved in the unionization drive beginning in 1977. Given the absence of formal organizational interdependencies, it must be assumed that variations exist among them in their attitudes, strategies and behaviour towards the unions. While no employer is anxious to see his workers unionize, the degree of hostility and the means taken to avoid or to divest themselves of a union can be expected to vary. The effect of different inputs of such a nominal variable is ascertained by omitting one observation (one bank) and obtaining coefficients on each of those remaining, which then represent the effect on the DV relative to the omitted employer. These are then "binary" or "dummy" variables. No specific hypotheses on the relationships between the DV and IV can be formulated given the absence of information in this regard for the individual banks.

HYPOTHESIS. Unknown, $b_1 \leq 0$.

2. The unions. Given that 7 different union organizations were active in the banking industry during the period under study, and for reasons analogous to those given for the employers, it can be expected that each union will have its own particularities in terms of resources, attitudes and therefore in behaviour towards the revocation actions facing them. Also, since the different unions are likely to deal differently with the various firms, they will probably evoke varying degrees of (in)tolerance from them. As with employers, the same difficulty exists in formulating hypotheses on the expected causation direction among the unions and the likelihood to revoke. Again, because these are nominal variables with the same "dummy" characteristics, one union will be omitted in each equation set.

HYPOTHESES. Unknown, $b_2 \leq 0$.

3. Unit size (at certification) Size, the number of unionizable employees per branch, has been retained for the following five reasons. Firstly, it is commonly believed and empirically verified that small work units are characterized by more personalized contacts between managers and workers. Such minimal organizational hierarchies permit greater pressures, formal and informal, direct and implied, to be brought upon individual employees as compared to the larger, more bureaucratic work units. Even where certifications were obtained, this potentially intimidating process may be effective in creating a successful decertification drive.

. . . la taille de l'unité de négociation a des effets contradictoires sur la croissance syndicale car elles indiquent que les syndicats ont autant de chances à la fois à l'accréditation qu'au retrait d'accréditation dans les petites unités. (Bain, 1981).

Secondly, it has also been suggested that unions apply an implicit cost/benefit analysis in determining their levels of servicing. Since smaller units represent higher costs per member, this may therefore constitute a relative disincentive to satisfy such members' needs. Thirdly, *ceteris paribus*, it is easier to create a collective, union spirit within smaller groups of employees and thus facilitate the signing of cards. A contrario, the same ease of consensus-building likely prevails in the opposite direction, i.e., during a revocation vote.

. . . l'établissement d'unités de négociation par succursale est une épée à deux tranchants: si elle favorise l'organisation dans l'immédiat, elle affaiblit le syndicat à la table de négociation en rendant l'utilisation de la grève difficile. (Ponak and Moore, 1981).

Fourthly, given a single, large employer, and other things equal, a union's relative bargaining power is partially dependent upon the size of the bargaining unit, the larger, the stronger. This reemphasizes the relative weakness of smaller groups, as is the general case in banking where the mean unit was 15 unionizable workers. A smaller unit may therefore be expected to obtain lesser bargaining gains, possibly leading to dissatisfaction with the union. Finally, for the same number of employees leaving, the turnover rate, with its disturbing effects on solidarity, is higher in the smaller unit.

HYPOTHESIS. The likelihood of revocation is negatively related to branch unit size, and $b_3 < 0$.

4. Employee support of the union (at certification). We assume a "consistency principle" whereby those in favour of the union at certification will maintain that position during an ensuing decertification vote⁷ and it is a truism that as member support goes, so goes the union.

. . . a union which does not have the allegiance of its members will in all likelihood collapse. (Krislov, 1956).

⁷ Intervening or conditioning variables are, a physical factor, continuity of tenure, and a cognitive factor, satisfaction with union services. We are naturally aware that this principle, that the underlying values, attitudes, strategy and behaviour remains unchanged, is neither iron-clad nor universal in time or space but is valid as a general rule of thumb, the continuity being the more relevant as the elapsed time between certification and decertification is shorter. The average lifespan of a certificate in banks over this period was only 7 months!

HYPOTHESIS. Decertification is more probable where the percentage vote for the union at certification was lower, and that $b_4 < 0$.

5. Employer opposition. The behaviour of an employer can be determinate in the success of a certification or a decertification drive.

... bank management has responded by, on the one hand, rectifying a number of the causes of employee dissatisfaction, and on the other hand, raising the price of unionism by aggressively resisting organizing and bargaining efforts. (Moore, 1981).

However, since federal labour law does not permit an employer to interfere with a revocation vote, we were forced to rely on a proxy. Because of data availability, it was possible to create an innovative measure of the extent of employer opposition at certification⁸. From the CLRB files, we identified the concrete measures taken by the respective employers in each case of a certification application. There was provision in the certification process for an employer to intervene directly and indirectly regarding his employees individually and collectively, and, of course, he can act outside the limits or the spirit of the law and the regulations. The following eleven potential employer initiatives were identified and verified in each case: 1. petition opposing the certificate application, 2. representation by a lawyer (intensity of opposition), 3. request for a public hearing (delays), 4. elapsed time between certification application and certification order (attributable, in part to the employer, during a delicate period for fragile membership), 5. request for revision of certification order, 6. if revision refused, appeal to the Federal Court, 7. complaints of unfair labour practices (ULP) upheld by the CLRB, 8. complaints of ULP withdrawn or rejected (which remain indicators of overt friction and opposition activity during the certification process), 9. request for conciliation in the bargaining phase (delays conclusion of a collective agreement)⁹, 10. elapsed time between certification and signing of a collective agreement (delays discourage members by diminishing the perceived advantages of unionization)^{9, 10}, 11. absence of a collective agreement⁹.

The presence of each indicator of employer opposition was assigned a value of 1 and the sum was expressed as a percentage of the maximum, 11. Thus a single measure present produced an index of 9 %, while ten present gave 91 %.

HYPOTHESIS. Revocation is positively related to employer opposition; $b_5 > 0$.

6. Relative Employment Instability (REI). It seems reasonable to expect that where a certificate has been obtained, ensuing departures from the BU will likely weaken continued union support and therefore constitute a potential for revocation.

⁸ As with the previous variable, we assume the "consistency principle", this time on the employers' side.

⁹ Data obtained from Labour Canada.

¹⁰ The average time taken to reach a collective agreement in the Canadian banking system was 10 months. This figure was used to distinguish employers opposing (> 10 months) from those not opposing (< 10 months).

In the losing fight by the unions to organize and hold the allegiance of employees, the traditionally high turnover of bank workers, most of whom are women, has worked in favour of the banks. (Globe and Mail, 1982).

and

The cohesive element in any organization is that element which brings and keeps together the individual parts of the organization and in therefore vital to its existence. (Chafetz and Fraser, 1979).

While previous decertification studies used gross turnover rates as indicators of employment disturbances, such a measure, which fails to distinguish between departures of union members and non-members lacks sufficient accuracy to adequately capture the continued presence of supportive employees¹¹.

... turnover rates disclose only the absolute number of employees who have leave and tell us nothing about which employees these are. (Chafetz and Fraser, 1979).

The "consistency principal" applies here on the assumption that those who signed cards at certification will oppose revocation. Fortunately, the CLRB files do permit differentiation of members from non-members at both ends of the certification-decertification process. On this basis we created a ratio, K, to indicate this relative employment instability as between non-members and members.

$$K = \frac{\text{non member departure rate}}{\text{member departure rate}} = \frac{\frac{NML}{NM}}{\frac{ML}{M}}$$

where NML = number of non-members who left (present at certification absent at decertification),

NM = number of non-members at certification,

ML = number of members who left,

M = number of members at certification.

A value of $K > 1$ means the non-member departure rate exceeds that of members, a situation relatively unfavourable to revocation. Conversely, when $K < 1$ the union member departure rate is greater than that of non-members, which should facilitate revocation, a condition favourable to employers. HYPOTHESIS. The higher the relative employment instability, the lower the likelihood of revocation, and $b_6 < 0$.

7. Union support at revocation. It is quasi-axiomatic to expect that the union support of its certificate during a revocation vote can help explain the outcome.

¹¹ While it was not possible to differentiate between voluntary (quits) and involuntary (discharges, transfers) departures, this additional information was not necessary given that our only interest was to measure the relative survival rate, not to explain it.

The willingness of a union to campaign against decertification may be a significant factor in reducing the probability of decertification. . . (Anderson et al., 1979).

In a manner similar to the employer's ability to intervene during certification, the union can engage in various activities to fight off a revocation offensive. As mentioned for the "size" variable, it is likely that unions use an implicit cost/benefit analysis when deciding on the allocation of resources in defending against decertification¹². Four potential initiatives were identified in the CLRB files relating to measures available following a decertification application: 1. submission of a letter of intervention, 2. representation before the Board by a lawyer, 3. request for a pre-hearing, 4. supervision of the revocation vote. The score was determined in a manner similar to that of Employer Opposition, the sum of the measures taken divided by the maximum (4), and expressed as a percentage.

Data on other possible measures of union support of their certificates such as the holding of meetings, a telephone campaign, or distribution of printed materials to members or non-members was not available in our data sources.

Other possible explanatory variables. Among the several other possible independent variables not retained were: 1. changes in perceptions of the value of union activity (expected gains compared to actual working conditions) since our data-collection instruments did not include systematic contacts with bank workers, spread out coast-to-coast.

Therefore, one reason for decertification may be a pervasive perception of an imbalance between expectations and actual rewards. The wider such a discrepancy, the greater the likelihood of a decertification. Expectations and rewards can be examined concretely as costs and benefits; specifically, members may either (1) over-estimate benefits, or (2) underestimate costs. (Chefetz and Fraser, 1979).

2. geographical location; because the limited population size would have left several empty cells.

REGRESSION RESULTS. Following are the results of the regression runs of each of the two models described above.

1. **The Dichotomic Model.** Having a binary dependent variable (certificate absent = 1, present = 0), the coefficients were generated with the relevant data using an OLS, stepwise methodology and the SPSS program.

¹² The identification of the factors that influence these decisions is beyond the scope of the present research, suffice to realize that variations in the degree of union commitment can reasonably be expected.

DICHOTOMIC MODEL

(n = 138)

(t-values in brackets)

$$y = .7503_{bo} + .1437_{(CIBC)} + .3009_{(BM)}^{**} + .2889_{(NB)}^* + .1636_{(BNS)} + .1020_{(UBE)} + .2416_{(CSN)} + \\ (2.0668) \quad (1.0735) \quad (2.7000) \quad (2.0116) \quad (1.2389) \quad (.6619) \quad (1.2640) \\ + .1900_{(UFCW)} - .5205_{(SORWUC)}^{**} - .0072x^3 - .0086x^{4**} + .0821x^{5*} + \epsilon. \\ (1.1766) \quad (-3.0364) \quad (-1.1896) \quad (-2.6353) \quad (2.1876)$$

* P < .01, ** P < .05

R² = .337, *F* < .01x³ = sizex⁴ = Employee Support of the Union (at certification)x⁵ = Employer Opposition

Discussion of Results of the Dichotomic Model.

1. The Banks. With the Royal Bank as the omitted employer, and therefore the point of comparison, ceteris paribus, employees of the Bank of Montreal and the National Bank are more likely to lose their certificates.

2. The Unions. Compared to the USWA, omitted, SORWUC units are more vulnerable, not surprising, since they had all 26 certificates recinded. This overwhelming polarization probably preempted other unions from statistical significance.

3. Unit Size. Contrary to previous findings, this variable is not statistically significant (b₃ = -.0072, t = -1.1896). This result is probably due to the relatively restricted variance about the mean (15 ± 7).

4. Employee Support of the Union at Certification. The regression results confirm the hypothesis that the greater the percentage of employees who are members of the union at certification, a measure of union strength, the lower the probability of revocation (b₄ = -.0086, t = -2.6353, p < .009). This is not unexpected since, by and large, employees who originally thought that a union would help improve working conditions are not likely to consent to its disappearance less than one year later.

5. Employer Opposition at Certification. Also statistically significant (b₅ = .0821, t = 2.1876, p < .03) is the level of opposition demonstrated by the banks. The descriptive data (not reported here) shows that the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Royal Bank and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce are most intensely opposed to unionization, and that SORWUC and the CSN are the object of greatest opposition.

2. The Continuous Model. Here the dependent variable is the percentage vote for revocation.

CONTINUOUS MODEL

(n = 64)

(t-values in brackets)

$$\begin{aligned}
 y = & 88.5868_{(bo)} + 9.8398_{(BBC)} - 5.4817_{(BM)} - 12.3831_{(NB)} - 4.7859_{(RB)} - 11.8951_{(TDB)} \\
 & (-.5867) \quad (-.6498) \quad (-1.3448) \quad (-.4674) \quad (-1.1457) \\
 & -7.2755_{(BNS)} - 6.5419_{(UBE)} + 4.4041_{(USWA)} + 10.7453_{(OTEU)} + 5.6791_{(CSN)} - .1897x^3 \\
 & (-.7843) \quad (-1.0315) \quad (.3076) \quad (.8288) \quad (.7669) \quad (-1.4383) \\
 & -.2426x^{4**} - .2549x^{5*} - .0410x^6 - .2250x^{7**} + \epsilon \\
 & (-2.0740) \quad (-3.0942) \quad (-.1184) \quad (-2.2280)
 \end{aligned}$$

* P < .01, ** P < .05

 $R^2 = .461$, F = < .05 x^3 = Employer Opposition x^4 = Relative Employment Instability x^5 = Union Support at Revocation x^6 = Size x^7 = Employee Support of Union

1., 2. The Banks, the Unions. None of the individual Banks or Unions emerge as significant explanatory variables of the percentage vote to revoke relative to the respective omitted variables, the CIBC and UFCW. This is surprising since the crosstabs do show identifiable trends.

3. Employer Opposition. Unexpectedly, this variable does not emerge as significant in this equation even though it did in the Dichotomic Model. It will be recalled that there is a precondition, namely, the "consistency principle", but there is no obvious explanation for its relevance when the DV is dichotomic and the contrary when the DV is continuous. Although the question asked in the first model is what explains the absence of the certificate (a quantitative issue), while the second seeks factors responsible for the intensity of the vote to revoke (a qualitative issue). Also, it is also possible that since the specifications of the two equations are not identical, this could be the source of the difference. In addition in the bivariate analysis, not reported here, there is a reasonable, simple correlation between the percentage vote to revoke and employer opposition as measured by Cramer's $V = .3487$. Another possible explanation is that average employer opposition for the block of SORWUC's 26 rescissions, 67.5 % (n = 26), is much higher than for all other outcomes: certificates revoked, 47.6 % (n = 62), revocation attempt failed, 50.2 % (n = 2), no revocation attempted, 37.3 % (n = 48). This association between the very high employer opposition so concentrated in the rescissions, may have distorted a possible relationship between employer opposition and revocations specifically.

4. Relative Employment Instability (REI). The ratio of departure rates as between non-members and members does emerge as a significant explanatory variable ($b_4 = -.2426$, $t = -2.0740$, $p < .044$). There is, therefore, evidence that where bargaining certificates were withdrawn, a higher proportion of union members were no longer in the workplace when the revocation vote was held. The population mean K-value was 27 %, showing that members left at over 3.5 times the non-members rate and with a maximum K-value of 48 %, in that case, members departed at close to twice the non-members rate. While the reasons for leaving were not available in this study, these results are not

incompatible with a deliberate bank policy of transfer, harassment and dismissal of those employees holding union membership.

5. Union Support at Revocation. This is another highly statistically significant factor in explaining the percentage vote to revoke ($b_5 = -.2549$, $t = -3.0942$, $p < .003$) and emphasizes the meaningful role that the collective structure can play in resisting an anti-union offensive.

6. Unit Size. Contrary to expectations, size does not seem to influence the vote to revoke in this context.

7. Employee Support of the Union (at certification). As with the dichotomic model, the percentage vote in favour of the union at the outset does help to explain the percentage vote to revoke ($b_7 = -.2550$, $t = -2.2280$, $p < .031$) and tends also to reinforce the "consistency principle", this, despite the contrary influence of a higher departure rate among members (the REI).

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Two complementary models of the revocation process were specified and tested in the Canadian banking system from which several explanatory factors emerge, pointing to possible policy implications. Employer opposition and Relative employment instability are innovative variables focusing attention on the effects of employer strategy towards unions. In the first case, the "consistency principle" appears valid, implying that the employer who goes to great lengths to oppose certification will be more successful at the revocation stage. This means that both the unions and the CLRB should be more vigilant in following through the sensitive, post-certification events at such workplaces. The Relative employment instability, in its insidious employer practice mode, also calls for closer surveillance by both the unions and the CLRB through ongoing verification of changes in the composition of branch employment. Apparent quits, transfers, administrative and disciplinary dismissals may be deliberate but covert, unfair labour practices specifically designed to erode union presence.

Since lack of union support during a decertification drive does raise the likelihood of revocation, unions should, therefore, play a more imaginative and vigorous role in opposing such an event.

Because the percentage vote at certification is a determining factor of the revocation outcome, unions which are content to rely on the simple, minimal majority run a greater risk of subsequent certificate loss. As a general policy, a more vital and pervasive organizational campaign to maximize initial membership ultimately limits revocational success.

While unit size has not emerged as statistically significant in the present case, previous research consistently finds this factor relevant in explaining the precariousness of a bargaining unit. Given, therefore, that this variable does nevertheless inspire confidence, unions should pay particular attention to the smaller, more vulnerable units. Should one go so far as to suggest that, to the extent that unions do indeed apply a cost/benefit standard, it may be better for all concerned that they avoid promising unachievable workplace improvement by refraining from "organizing" such smaller, fragile units? The CLRB may also want to envisage combining branches, on a local or regional basis, single or multi-employer, thus creating broader, more stable units¹³.

¹³ Subsequently, in the mid-1980's the CLRB did again modify its perception of the appropriateness of the bank branch unit by certifying several multi-branch, intra-employer bargaining (continued...)

Subaggregate analysis, not reported here, points to other means employed by unions to resist revocation. For example, though the BEU loses more than average members between certification and revocation, it is more active during the decertification process and has greater than average success in fighting off a revocation drive.

Also, non-regression analysis of our data demonstrates that those employees most often initiating revocation come disproportionately more from the higher job classifications. The Board may want to exclude these employment classes from the certified unit in the interest of those remaining by defining a more homogeneous, stable and ultimately, viable local¹⁴.

¹³(...continued)
agents. The ultimate results were no better than with the previous structure.

¹⁴ A similar view was expressed by the unions, see Ponak and Moore, p. 14.

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APPENDIX

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Banks:</u>	BM	Bank of Montreal
	BR	Royal Bank of Canada
	CIBC	Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
	BNS	Bank of Nova Scotia
	TDB	Toronto–Dominion Bank
	BBC	Bank of British Columbia
	BN	Banque nationale du Canada
<u>Unions:</u>	SORWUC	Service, Office, Retail Workers' Union of Canada (INDEPENDENT)
	UFCW	Retail Clerks' International Union (CLC/AFL–CIO)
	CSN	Confédération des syndicats nationaux
	OPEIU	Office and Professional Employees International Union (CLC/AFL–CIO)
	CUBE	Canadian Union of Bank Employees (CLC) (merged with UBE)
	UBE	Union of Bank Employees (CLC)
	USWA	United Steel Workers of America (CLC/AFL–CIO)
	CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
	OTEU	Office and Technical Employees Union