

Université de Montréal

**Reconciling Transition Paradigms:
A Cross-National Analysis of Democratization During the
Third Wave.**

par Anja Brunner

Département de science politique, Faculté des arts et des sciences

Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph.D.
en science politique

juin 2016

© Anja Brunner, 2016

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales

Cette thèse intitulée:

Reconciling Transition Paradigms:
A Cross-National Analysis of Democratization During the Third Wave.

Présentée par:
Anja Brunner

A été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

Magdalena Dembinska
présidente-rapporteuse

Diane Éthier
directrice de recherche

Frédéric Mérand
membre du jury

Dirk Berg-Schlosser
examineur externe

Remerciements

Je tiens à remercier en premier lieu ma directrice de thèse Diane Éthier qui a vu grandir cette thèse pendant les six dernières années. Ses conseils judicieux et sa confiance à toute épreuve en mes recherches ont été une source de motivation incroyable pour moi. Chère Madame Ethier, je vous remercie du fond de mon coeur pour votre exceptionnelle chaleur et générosité. Vous êtes une personne extraordinaire et je ne vous oublierai jamais.

Je souhaite également remercier ma mère, Anne Brunner, et mon père, Dr. Franz Brunner, qui ont été une source inépuisable d'encouragement, de soutien affectif et d'appui moral. Ils ont travaillé dur, chacun à sa manière, pour que j'aie la possibilité de poursuivre mes rêves, et je leur en serai éternellement reconnaissante. Sans eux, cette thèse n'aurait jamais vu le jour. Merci!!

Mes remerciements vont aussi aux organismes suivants pour leur soutien financier : le Fonds de Recherche Société et Culture Québec (FQRSC), la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales de l'Université de Montréal et le Département de science politique de l'Université de Montréal.

Enfin j'aimerais remercier ma fille Mailys Isabella pour être mon soleil même dans les moments les plus difficiles. Je t'aime mon ange!

Résumé

Cette thèse étudie les transitions de l'autoritarisme vers la démocratie. La question à laquelle elle tente de répondre est: quelles sont les conditions nécessaires à l'instauration d'une démocratie minimale? Notre réponse est qu' un processus de démocratisation réussi dépend de deux facteurs essentiellement: (1) la pression exercé sur le regime autoritaire par des mobilisations d'opposition de masse; (2) la volonté d'une partie des élites au pouvoir de procéder à des réformes, mise en évidence par une crise du régime autoritaire. D'un côté, les mobilisations de masse indiquent clairement au régime qu'une libéralisation est inévitable. Elles ébranlent l'unité du bloc au pouvoir et assument une fonction importante de "surveillant" de la transition en cours. D'un autre côté, les réformes sont possibles uniquement si des forces modérées, qui embrassent l'idée d'ouvrir l'espace politique, réussissent à s'appropriier "les rênes du pouvoir" au sein du régime autoritaire. Ces deux éléments sont les clés qui permettent de comprendre pourquoi, et comment les pays se démocratisent. Afin de démontrer notre hypothèse, nous avons réalisé vingt-cinq études qualitatives de transitions survenues entre 1973 et 2004. Nous avons ensuite testé ces dernières à l'aide d'une analyse qualitative comparative (QCA) à valeur multiple et illustré nos résultats à l'aide d'une étude de trois cas types de transitions réussies ou avortées: ceux de la Tanzanie, du Togo et de l'Indonesie. Cette thèse apporte une contribution nouvelle et importante à l'étude des transitions vers la démocratie, dans la mesure où elle démontre que le succès de ces dernières ne peut être expliqué uniquement, ni par les mouvements de contestation de la société civile, comme le prétend la théorie des *transitions from below*, ni par une crise du regime autoritaire, comme le soutient la théorie des *transitions from above*. La prise en compte de ces deux theories est essentielle à la compréhension de ce phénomène.

Mots-clés: transition démocratique; transitions "from above"; transitions "from below"; crise du régime autoritaire; mobilisations de masse; démocratie minimale

Abstract

This thesis studies transitions from authoritarianism that lead to democracy. We ask: Which conditions are necessary for the instauration of a minimally democratic regime? Our answer to this question is that successful democratization hinges on the presence of essentially two factors: (1) pressure "from below" in the form of mass mobilization; and (2) willingness "from above" to carry out reforms, evidenced by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. On one hand, mass mobilization is an unmistakable indicator to rulers that liberalization is inevitable. It shakes up the internal unity of the ruling block and fulfils a crucial watchdog function throughout the transition process. On the other hand, reform is only possible if moderate forces embracing the idea of opening up the political space manage to grab "the reins of power" within the authoritarian regime. Both elements are thus key to understanding why and how countries democratize. To demonstrate our argument we examine twenty-five transition cases between 1973 and 2004 using multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and supplement our results with three illustrative case studies of Tanzania, Togo and Indonesia. The central contribution of our thesis is to reconcile the two main theoretical debates in the democratization literature by showing the complementarity of theories on transitions "from above" and transitions "from below".

Keywords: transitions to democracy; transitions "from above"; transitions "from below"; authoritarian regime crisis; mass mobilization; minimal democracy

Table of Contents

Remerciements	iii
Résumé	iv
Abstract	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables	ix
List of Abbreviations	x
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 - Democratization: The State of the Discipline	11
1.1. Literature Review	12
1.1.1. Preconditions to Democratization	13
1.1.2. Transitions "From Above" - Elite-Driven Democratization	17
1.1.3. Transitions "From Below" - Mass-Mobilizing for Democracy	21
1.1.4. Hybrid Approaches to Regime Change	24
1.2. Research Problem, Hypotheses and Research Objectives	31
1.3. Justification of Research and Originality of Contribution	34
Chapter 2 - Explaining Regime Change: Moving Beyond the Theoretical and Methodological Divide	39
2.1. Methodological Framework	39
2.1.1. The Statistical Versus the Comparative Method	39
2.1.2. QCA: a Research Approach and a Technique	42
2.1.3. Strength and Limits of QCA	43
2.1.4. Appropriateness of Method	45
2.1.5. Choice of QCA Type	47

2.2. Conceptual Framework	49
2.2.1. Definition and Calibration of "Minimal Democracy" (Outcome)	49
2.2.2. Definition and Calibration of "Crisis of the Authoritarian Regime" (Condition I)	54
2.2.3. Definition and Calibration of "Mass Mobilization" (Condition II)	63
2.3. Case Selection: Principles and Practice	75
Chapter 3 - Testing Transition Theories: Assessing Their Explanatory Power	85
3.1. Conditions and Data	87
3.2. Truth Table and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions	89
3.3. Minimizing the Dataset	91
3.4. Interpreting the Results	93
Chapter 4 - From Theory to Practice: An Empirical Demonstration of Our Argument	105
4.1 Introduction and Background Information	106
4.2 Identification of Mass Mobilization	107
4.2.1. Indonesia	107
4.2.2. Togo	109
4.2.3. Tanzania	111
4.3. Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis	114
4.3.1. Tanzania	115
4.3.2. Indonesia	119
4.3.3. Togo	122
4.4. Interpreting Transition Results	126
Conclusion	129
Bibliography	139

Appendix: Gathering Data - Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis	172
1. Spain	173
2. Portugal	183
3. Greece	192
4. Argentina	201
5. Chile	212
6. Paraguay	219
7. Uruguay	229
8. Bolivia	238
9. Algeria	250
10. Tanzania	258
11. Mali	262
12. Zambia.....	268
13. Malawi	277
14. Benin	284
15. Cameroon	291
16. Nigeria 1	297
17. Nigeria 2	308
18. Kenya	316
19. Togo	325
20. Poland	328
21. Romania	336
22. Mongolia	344
23. South Korea	352
24. Philippines	360
25. Indonesia	367

List of Tables

I	Presence / Absence of Authoritarian Regime Crisis	62
II	TMMI / CTMMI Index	73
III	Total Number of Transitions	81
IV	Selected Transitions	83
V	Outcome	87
VI	List of Conditions	88
VII	Truth Table	89
VIII	Coverage Scores of the Solution for Outcome = 1	93
IX	Comparative Level of Mass Mobilization	97
X	Transition Attempts Initiated by Popular Protest Movements	98

List of Abbreviations

ABN	Association for a Better Nigeria
ABRI	<u>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</u> (Armed Forces of Indonesia)
AD	Alliance for Democracy
ADEMA	<u>Alliance Démocratique du Mali</u>
AEEM	<u>Association des Elèves et Etudiants du Mali</u>
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
ANR	<u>Assemblée Nationale Révolutionnaire</u>
APP	All Peoples Party
CCAOD	<u>Comité de Coordination des Associations et Organisations Démocratiques</u>
CCM	<u>Chama cha Mapinduzi</u> (Party of the Revolution)
CD	Campaign for Democracy
CDS	Centre for Democratic Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNID	<u>Comité Nationale d'Initiative Démocratique</u>
CNTS	Cross National Time Series
COD	<u>Collective d'Opposition Démocratique</u>
COFADENA	<u>Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Desarrollo Nacional</u> (Armed Forces Corporation for National Development)
COMELEC	Commission on Elections
CPDM	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
csQCA	crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
CTMMI	Comparative Transitional Mass Mobilization Index
DGS	<u>Direção-Geral de Segurança</u> (Directorate-General of Security)
DINA	<u>Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional</u> (National Intelligence Directorate)
EE	Eastern Europe
ERP	Economic Recovery Plan
ESA	<u>Ελληνική Στρατιωτική Αστυνομία</u> (Greek Military Police)
ETA	<u>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</u> (Basque Country and Freedom)

FAR	<u>Front d'Action pour le Renouveau</u>
FAT	<u>Forces Armées Togolaises</u>
FELD	<u>Front estudiantin de lutte pour la démocratie</u>
FIS	<u>Front Islamique du Salut</u>
FOD	<u>Front d'Opposition Démocratique</u>
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
fsQCA	fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRAD	<u>Groupe de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Dialogue, la Démocratie et le Développement</u>
HCR	High Council of the Republic
ICMI	<u>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</u> (Indonesia Association of Muslim Intellectuals)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
ING	Interim National Government
INUS	Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KGB	<u>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti</u> (Committee for State Security)
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDU	Mongolian Democratic Union
MELD	<u>Mouvement estudiantin de lutte pour la démocratie</u>
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	<u>Movimento das Forças Armadas</u> (Movement of the Armed Forces)
MIC	<u>Movimiento de Integración Colorado</u> (Colorado Integration Movement)
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MNP	<u>Movimiento Nacional y Popular</u> (National Popular Movement)
MP	Member of Parliament
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party

mvQCA	multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis
MYP	Malawi Young Pioneers
NATO	North American Treaty Organization
NCC	National Consultative Council
NCCR	National Committee for Constitutional Reform
NDP	New Democratic Party
NECON	National Electoral Commission
NRC	National Republican Convention
OPZZ	All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions
OULDT	<u>Organisation universitaire de lutte pour la démocratie au Togo</u>
PCP	<u>Partido Comunista Portugues</u> (Portuguese Communist Party)
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PERC	<u>Processo Revolucionario Em Curso</u> (Ongoing Revolutionary Process)
PIDE	<u>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado</u> (International and State Defense Police)
PPD	<u>Partido Popular Democrático</u> (People's Democratic Party)
PRPB	Peoples' Revolutionary Party of Benin
PS	<u>Partido Socialista</u> (Socialist Party)
PSOE	<u>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</u> (Spanish Socialist Workers Party)
PUWP	Polish United Workers' Party
PZPR	<u>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza</u> (Polish United Workers' Party)
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RAM	Reformed Armed Forces Movement
RENAMO	<u>Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana</u> (Mozambican National Resistance)
RIT	<u>Régiments Interarmes Togolais</u>
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPT	<u>Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais</u>
RTNM	<u>Radiotélévision de la nouvelle marche</u>
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SBSI	<u>Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia</u> (Confederation of Indonesia Prosperous Trade Union)

SEA	South-East Asia
SDF	Social-Democratic Front
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SUIN	Sufficient but Unnecessary part of a configuration that is Insufficient but Necessary
TMMI	Transitional Mass Mobilization Index
UCD	<u>Union de Centro Democratico</u> (Union of Center-Democratic Parties)
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDP	<u>Unidad Democratico y Popular</u> (Democratic and Popular Union)
UNIDO	United Nationalists Democratic Organization
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNTM	<u>Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali</u>
ZCTU	Zambian Congress of Trade Unions

Introduction

Why do some countries democratize whereas others do not? That is the \$3,1bn question – at least to the US government, which spent that amount in 2013 to promote democracy, human rights and good governance around the world (USAID 2013). Yet, despite significant sums being devoted to advancing that mission, authoritarianism seems to be on the rise. In its annual report on democracy in the world, Freedom House (2015, 1) stated that global freedom "declined for the ninth consecutive year in 2014", the longest period of decline since the organization's start in 1972. Decision-makers are at a loss at these developments, which so obviously run counter to what Diamond (1996, 29) calls "the ideological hegemony of democracy": to live under autocracy, or even be an autocrat, is considered backward and uncivilized. And whereas there is now indeed hardly any world region that has not been touched by what Huntington has labeled "the Third Wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991), probably less than half of these transitions from authoritarianism have actually led to democracy¹. How can we explain this puzzle? This is the subject of our thesis.

In fact, why should we study transitions to democracy? Why should they attract our attention? Well, as we already hinted at, a look at the budget of virtually every Western government and major international organization today should convince us that transitions from authoritarianism on one hand, and the conditions of such transitions leading to a democratic outcome on the other hand, is indeed a topic worth investigating. In fact, the last three decades have seen a veritable democracy promotion industry come into being (Carothers 2007, 112 – 113), which was fuelled primarily by the successes of the early democratizers of the 1970s and the magnitude of the transition wave in the 1990s. At the time, the idea that somehow the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992) with democracy as the final form of human government (Sen 1999) had come gave rise to downright euphoria, prompting even critical scholars such as Larry Diamond (2003) to proclaim that the whole world could become democratic. However, the hope driving the Third Wave never

¹ In fact, according to Geddes (1999a, 115 – 116), among the 85 regimes that initiated a transition from either autocracy or some form of authoritarianism during the Third Wave, only 30, or roughly one-third, became stable democracies.

materialized. Practitioners and scholars alike soon realized that what they were experiencing on the ground did not fit the standard transition blueprint; that is to say, most of these transitions did not bring about regimes with frequent, fair, free, and competitive elections and respect for political rights and civil liberties. Instead, it became clear that more and more countries that were thought to be on the way to democracy were in fact either stagnating, developing into some kind of authoritarian hybrid, or outright returning to sometimes even harsher forms of authoritarianism. Diamond (2002, 27) was then forced to draw the frustrating conclusion that "authoritarian forms of multiparty electoral competition have increased during the third wave much more rapidly than democratic ones".

When historicizing the literature on democratization, we can see that the investigative focus of researchers reflects these changes. After spending many years analyzing the causes of democratic stability following the breakdown of the German and Italian Republics in the 1920s/30s, scholars successively directed their interest at the determinants of democratization in the context of the Third Wave (1973 – 1995); at the factors that favor democratic consolidation (during the 1990s); and at the causes of hybrid regime proliferation since the end of the Cold War (during the years 2000 – 2010). Finally, in light of the disappointing results of the Third Wave transitions and the increasing power of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China, the focus of the present decade are questions relative to the causes of authoritarian resilience and hybrid regime consolidation (Ethier 2014). They all form a logical sequence of scientific inquiry.

Why then have scholars not been able to predict the limits of democratization? The answer to this question is related to the way democratization specialists have approached the study of transitions since 1973. In fact, there are only a handful of theories that try identifying the causes of success or failure of transitions from authoritarianism², and they either concentrate their explications on the attitudes of elites (transitions "from above", proposed first by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986)) or the mobilization of mass actors (transitions "from below", proposed by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce

² Most existing theories either investigate issues prior to the actual transition dynamics – the so-called "preconditions literature"- or questions related to democratic consolidation and stability, which become salient once a transition process has been successfully concluded.

(2003))³. However, there is a growing consensus in the scholarly community that neither approach taken alone is able to adequately explain why certain transitions succeed while others fail. Collier's (1999) case study on Spain, Wood's (2000) case studies on El Salvador and South Africa, Bermeo's (1997) study on Eastern Europe, Shin's (2008) study on East Asia and Denny's (2006) case study on Indonesia are only some examples of an emerging corpus of literature evidencing that elements of both approaches – "top down" and "bottom-up" – might be required for transitions to result in democracy. On one hand, these studies contest interpretations of transitions that are too elite-centered, claiming that mass movements play a much bigger role in determining the outcome of a transition project than assumed by "top-down" theorists. On the other hand, they also demonstrate that intra-elite dynamics, most often in the form of divisions between the authoritarian ruler and its coercive apparatus, are crucial to many transitions "from below" (McGowan 2003, 339; Morency-Laflamme 2014; forthcoming 2016). In our opinion, this shows that the strict separation of transitions "from above" and "from below" leads to a false debate between approaches that are, in essence, complementary. Hence, there is a clear need to revise and integrate theoretical frameworks.

Our central research question is: did democratization in Third-Wave transitions happen "from above", like O'Donnell and Schmitter claim; "from below", like Bratton and Van de Walle/Bunce envision; or did it result from a combination of these two scenarios, like certain case studies seem to demonstrate?

Adopting a conciliatory spirit, our hypothesis postulates that transition outcomes are decisively shaped both by intra-elite dynamics and mass action, and thus combine elements from both "top-down" and "bottom-up" theories. In other words, democracy is the result of both a conflict within the authoritarian regime between reformist and conservative forces and large popular protest movements pushing for the extension of

³ Theories "from above" argue that the critical causes of democratic success are located in the realm of reformist ruling elites. Popular participation in the transition process is viewed with suspicion, and is generally considered to diminish the chances of producing a successful transition outcome. By contrast, theories "from below" argue that mass actors are the dominant force behind successful transitions. "Democracy results from, mobilizes, and reshapes popular contention", writes McAdam (2001, 269). "The former does not occur without the latter." There is also a third category, "transitions imposed by foreign actors". However, there is no serious study on this kind of transitions, and authors have tended to ignore them. They have generally been associated with the 2nd wave regime changes that resulted from the Allied victory over the Axis powers or the struggle for national liberation of former British colonies (Ethier 2010).

political rights. These “defining features” of each mode of transition will be elaborated on in detail in Chapter two. We will show that analyzing individual transitions in light of the presence, or absence, of a previously established and clearly defined set of characteristics allows us to carry out relatively objective comparisons of democratization attempts both in a cross-regional and cross-temporal perspective. Thus, the objective of our thesis is twofold: On one hand, we aim at testing the validity of the existing theories on transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. More importantly, however, we attempt to surpass the sterile academic debate between transitions “from below” and “from above” and to reconcile two seemingly incompatible positions.

To our knowledge, no prior research has attempted the systematic comparison of the determinants of successful democratic transitions across a large number of cases and various world regions. This might seem surprising at first, given that the study of political regime change is such a large subfield in Comparative Politics. When taking a closer look, however, it becomes clear that democratization studies have been highly empirically driven, and new subjects of interest often replaced older questions even before they were satisfyingly answered. The question of what causes transitions to succeed might have fallen victim to that dynamic, because it is likely that seeing so many Third Wave transitions fail prompted many researchers to move on to “greener pastures” instead of going over old theories again to see whether an adjustment could more adequately account for what was happening on the ground. Moreover, democratization specialists most often only focused their work on a single world region, ignoring those parts of the globe where authoritarianism is still the most common regime type (such as Africa and Asia). So, while we do not pretend to “re-invent the wheel”, we do think that our thesis offers an important contribution to the existing pool of scholarly knowledge.

On one hand, our contribution is methodological and relates to the number of cases used in this analysis, and the way our explanatory variables are constructed. Existing studies on democratic transitions are for the most part single case studies or area-bound comparisons of a small number of cases, primarily due to the complexity of the concepts and the difficulty of representing strategic dynamics in standard statistical frameworks. Moreover, in identifying their explanatory variables, authors often do not agree on what exactly constitutes a transition “from above” or “from below”, which led to many

competing explanations for Third Wave transitions. Both these facts hamper what is considered by many to be the primary goal of scientific enquiry: to formulate generalizable propositions. Our thesis, by contrast, compares twenty-five cases of transitions in a cross-regional setting and uses coding criteria that are clearly defined and grounded in theory. By doing so we provide a road-map for comparing democratization that can be applied to any individual transition attempt irrespective of temporal and regional context, and thus we offer much more fertile ground for generalization.⁴

On the other hand, we also offer a theoretical contribution, specifically with regards to the relative importance of our explanatory variables for democratization success. Although one would be hard pressed today to find researchers who profess their loyalty solely to one variable (either the nature and extent of divisions within the authoritarian regime or the strength of social movements) without granting the other at least some explanatory weight, the reality is that most scholars have rallied behind either one or the other of the competing theories on transitions. As Foweraker (1994, 218 – 19) notes, there is a top-down and a bottom-up approach, but "ne'er the twain do meet". More importantly, both factors have yet to be established as being either necessary or sufficient for a transition to end in democracy. Our research methodology offers both: on one hand, it treats the crisis of the authoritarian regime and mass mobilization as equally important, with no bias in the analysis towards either variable. On the other hand, it is specifically designed to test whether either of these conditions alone, or in combination, is necessary for a successful transition to democracy. Such knowledge could prove crucial particularly for the improvement of potential democracy promotion programs, which have traditionally focused more on civil society actors than on intra-regime dynamics.

Ultimately, the main "plus value" of our thesis is to offer an integrated theory of transitions that combines the strongest explanatory elements of the two main theoretical contenders (transitions "from above", and transitions "from below") and tests them over a

⁴ This statement has to come with a qualifying remark. There is nothing that indicates that our way of analyzing transitions could be applied successfully to transitions of the First, or the Second Wave. Most scholars would agree that the dynamics of these transitions differed markedly from those found in Third Wave transitions and beyond. Therefore we hold that our analysis is valid primarily for transitions within the Third Wave timeframe, but could also conceivably be applied to later transitions (for example the Arab Spring transitions, which certain scholars consider to be the beginning of a "Fourth Wave".)

large number of cases for their explanatory value. Whatever the outcome of our analysis may be, we hope it enhances our understanding of how and why countries democratize either by demonstrating the superior relevance of one theory over the other, or by showing their complementarity and thus the relative futility of the debate that has been dividing the scientific community for decades.

With regard to the methodological foundations of our thesis, we opt for a "Third Way" between quantitative (variable-oriented) and qualitative (case-oriented) techniques. Firstly, we define our explanatory variables and establish the conditions of their occurrence. Our variable "mass mobilization" is coded using an adapted version of the Transitional Mass Mobilization Index (TMMI) of Soe (2009) that is based on the Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) dataset. Using that index, it is possible to identify the event count data of mobilization on a per annum basis for any one of our individual transition cases and compare it with regards to other transition cases in the same, or different world regions. Our variable "crisis of the authoritarian regime", on the other hand, needs to be coded manually according to carefully selected and theoretically sound indicators, because there is currently no index in the literature that would allow an easy identification of transitions that experienced splits between regime reformers and conservatives. To create such an index we use qualitative case studies whose presentation follows the structured and focused method as described by George and Bennett (2004, 67). The method is structured insofar as the empirical material in each case is gathered with a view to answering the same generic questions ("Are there softliners within the regime?"; "Do they have a majority within the regime?"). It is focused in the sense that specific aspects of the political history in each country are examined based on the identification of a small number of precise indicators. The intent is to standardize the way to report facts in order to make it possible to compare findings, not only within our sample but potentially also for scholars wishing to do further research on the subject.

Secondly, in order to test our hypotheses we employ multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA), a set-theoretic method which forms part of what Cronqvist (2007) calls "configurational-comparative methods". In their origin, set-theoretic methods follow Mill's (1858) methods of agreement and difference, and are presented as a "synthetic strategy" to "integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the

best features of the variable-oriented approach" (Ragin 1987, 84). mvQCA, a variant of the traditional QCA technique, is based on Boolean algebra and addresses the presence or absence of conditions under which a certain outcome is obtained. It is thus well placed to investigate whether one or both of our explanatory variables are necessary for successful democratization.

Our research asks big questions and tries hard to provide parsimonious answers. In that sense, we found it useful to support our QCA analysis with illustrative cases so that the nuances of our line of reasoning can be captured and our readers are provided with a better understanding about how our explanatory variables were ascertained. The cases for this demonstration were chosen with a view to their potential as "ideal types" representing each one of the theories our thesis set out to test: Tanzania as example for "transitions from above", Togo as example for "transitions from below" and Indonesia as example for our own hypothesis combining both theories "from above" and "from below". We do not pretend that these cases are a representative sample of all transitions over the period covered; nor do we claim that our results automatically apply to all countries undergoing some sort of transition. The idea is not to ask if another case could have been selected, but if collectively the three cases provide a sufficient empirical basis to gauge the relevance of our statistical results.

Our case sample of twenty-five (25) transition attempts spans the timeframe between 1973 and 2004, with the Portuguese transition as the arguably first transition belonging to the Third Wave, and the Indonesian transition being the last. Our thesis therefore belongs to the "middle N"-studies, for which QCA is considered to be at its strongest. We use a combination of random and purposeful selection to obtain our case sample: we first identify the total number of transition attempts in the period under review by help of Freedom House and Polity databases. In a subsequent step we exclude all transitions that are unfit for this study on theoretical and methodological grounds; and finally we select our cases by the help of a random number generator. This method ensures that, within limits, the selection process remains relatively objective and unbiased.

Finally, the information used to conduct the research in this thesis is mostly qualitative with data collection based on secondary sources: that is, transnational, international and national organizations, media and scholarly publications. Primary sources such as semi-structured interviews, surveys or participant observation are sidelined for two reasons. For one, we believe that enough information already exists in the specialized literature to provide a solid empirical basis for the identification of our variables and the creation of our index. For two, given our sample size, the fieldwork required to gather the necessary information would involve significant resources and an overly time-consuming effort.

In practical terms, the thesis is divided as follows. The first chapter entitled "Democratization: The State of the Discipline" opens with a review of the main theoretical debates in the democratization literature since the inception of the discipline in the 1960s. It distinguishes structural approaches to regime change from process-oriented approaches, and presents the different facets- economic, cultural, institutional, and international- of the so-called "preconditions"-literature, before explaining why these types of explanation are largely deemed unsuitable to explain transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Subsequently, the chapter turns to process-oriented approaches to regime change and introduces the two principal contending theories in the field: transitions "from above", formulated by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and transitions "from below", represented by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce (2003). Obviously there are also other authors whose works contributed to defining and refining these theories, but no explanation of transitions from authoritarianism could be valid without references to these three core authors. Following a critical assessment of the explanatory power of either theory is the presentation of a third, more recent body of literature that attempts to connect both approaches. It is used as anchor point to frame our research question and introduce our own take on the debate: "What factors are necessary for a successful transition to democracy?" This last section explains the logic behind our hypotheses, spells out our research objectives, and puts them in perspective to the existing literature in order to show the originality of our academic contribution.

The second chapter entitled "Explaining Regime Change: Moving Beyond the Theoretical and Methodological Divide" presents the reader with an overview of the

methodological basis of this thesis. It comprises three sections. The first is dedicated to explaining our choice of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research approach and a technique. It will show that QCA is, so to speak, a synthesis between the statistical and the comparative approach and demonstrate its fit with the eclectic character of our argument. The second section presents an overview of the concepts used in this thesis. It includes a definition of what democracy and democratization is, an introduction and definition of our two main explanatory factors ("crisis of the authoritarian regime" and "mass mobilization") and an explanation of how they are made operational. Finally, the last section spells out the rationale behind our choices in terms of types of data, size of case sample and case selection procedure.

The third chapter entitled "Testing Transition Theories: Assessing Their Explanatory Power" represents the core of our thesis. It serves to test the explanatory value of the hypotheses we constructed on the basis of the various theories on transitions: (1) democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime WITHOUT mass mobilization (transitions "from above"); (2) democracy results from mass mobilization WITHOUT a regime crisis (transitions "from below"); and (3) democracy results from both mass mobilization AND a regime crisis (our own hypothesis). These hypotheses are tested using the *Tosmana* software for multi-value QCA, with consistency and coverage scores being calculated manually. The first part of the chapter will show that only an integrated theory of transitions combining both explanatory variables (i.e. our hypothesis 3) can adequately explain why some transitions lead to democracy while others do not. The second part is dedicated to discussing these results, how they relate to the principal contending theories in the literature, and what limitations need to be accounted for.

Finally, the fourth chapter entitled "From Theory to Practice: An Empirical Demonstration of Our Argument" contains the empirical demonstration of the findings of our QCA analysis. It serves to deepen our understanding of the political dynamics of transitions to democracy by the help of case studies that each represent one of our original hypotheses. The cases chosen for this demonstration are Tanzania (1), Togo (2), and Indonesia (3). Each case study is organized the same way: In a first step, we establish the level and nature of mass mobilization and assess its impact on the transition dynamics of our specific case. In a second step, we verify whether these mobilizations were preceded,

or accompanied by, a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In order to do so, we first clarify whether or not softliners existed within the regime by the help of previously defined indicators. Subsequently, we determine whether these softliners were majoritarian, and thus able to influence the transition dynamics according to their preferences (liberalization). Lastly, we compare the respective transition outcomes in light of the presence or absence of our two variables to show their impact on the democratization process.

1

Democratization: The State of the Discipline

What do we know about democratization, and what do we yet have to learn? The main purpose of this chapter is to present our argument and our research goals by the help of a literature review. To this end, we first introduce the theoretical framework our thesis is built on, with the objective of showing that our argument derives from a critique of the existing approaches to transitions. This section essentially aims at providing the reader with a state of the art on the subject. It will be shown that studies on transitions have been treated, in the vast majority of cases, as belonging into one of three categories: transitions "from above", with O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) as their main defenders; transitions "from below", proposed by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Bunce (2003); and "hybrid" transitions that combine both approaches. The third category is a relatively new field of literature that inspired both qualitative and quantitative scholars, but which has also important shortcomings that our thesis wishes to address.

In a second step we frame our research problem and introduce our hypotheses. With a view to the existing literature, it will be shown that our research fulfils three objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute to the overarching goal of generalization.

A critical assessment closes the chapter. The idea is to pinpoint what the literature on transitions from authoritarianism says about the elements that account for success or failure of transitions, and what research avenues this literature has neglected. By doing so we will allow the problematic of our thesis to stand out, while at the same time demonstrating the originality of our contribution.

1.1. Literature Review

In the history of democratization studies, a major part of the discussion has been empirically driven. Whereas at the beginning of the Third Wave in 1974 only a few countries had moved towards democratization, the 1980s and 1990s saw many more countries initiate transitions, which often occurred under very different circumstances and also yielded differing results. By extension, explanations for these transitions – and transition outcomes – have also evolved over time. At the broadest level, understanding democratization was seen as hinging on two distinct questions: (1) What are the conditions for a transition from some form of authoritarianism to democracy? and (2) What are the factors that account for the durability, or endurance of democracy⁵? (Munck 2011). The first question was further disaggregated into two separate study fields, the conditions for a transition from authoritarianism, and for a transition to democracy. This distinction underscores that a theory of the demise of authoritarian rule is not, by itself, a theory of democratic transitions and grew important only very recently, when scholars, in light of the disappointing developments of the post-Third Wave era, proposed to abandon research on theories of democratic transitions altogether and focus instead on theories explaining authoritarian resilience⁶ or the proliferation of hybrid regimes⁷. Generally speaking, however, the study of the evolution of political regime change can be described as a paradigm shift between essentially two approaches with distinct modes of explanation:

⁵ As this question relates to the consolidation of an already democratic regime, it is beyond the scope of our thesis, and shall therefore not be treated in our literature review.

⁶ Works focusing on authoritarian stability are, for example, Dimitrov's (2013) and Saxonberg's (2013) studies on the resilience of Communist regimes in Asia and Central America (for a critical review see Ethier 2014). The main idea of these studies is that authoritarian regimes, at some point in their existence, suffer a legitimacy crisis, and only those able to respond adequately to these challenges (via reforms, or repression) manage to survive. If those regimes do not find an appropriate answer to the legitimacy issues, they break down and a transition to some other form of government can ensue. However interesting, these theories are not relevant for our thesis, principally for two reasons: (1) Firstly, the subject of our thesis are transitions to democracy, and efforts that aim at identifying the conditions that lead, or do not lead, to the initial breakdown of an authoritarian regime are therefore located outside of (and prior to) our research framework. (2) Secondly, none of these studies has conclusively demonstrated why certain authoritarian regimes were able to adopt reforms that allowed them to remain stable, whereas other authoritarian regimes underwent a transition. Moreover, these studies do not provide an answer to the question of why some of these transitions ended in democracy, and others did not. Therefore, they are not useful for answering our research question, which aims at clarifying exactly this point.

⁷ Theories on hybrid regimes are not relevant for our thesis. In fact, Levitsky and Way (2010), their main defenders, primarily intended to explain the causes of the stability of such regimes, investigating why some evolved into democracies while others did not. Their explanatory focus is principally on external factors such as the geographic proximity with Western states, as well as their economic and commercial interdependence. They thus focus on the conditions that could prompt a hybrid regime to move towards democratization, but do not explain the process of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, the subject of our thesis. For further review of the literature on hybrid regimes see Gagné (2012).

structural theories and process-oriented theories, or "causes" versus "causers" of regime change (Huntington 1991).⁸

1.1.1. Preconditions to Democratization

Structural theories dominated mainly the initial phase of the study of regime change, although some of their explanatory variables seem to be making a comeback in recent years. These theories are concerned primarily with factors that make a transition process more likely to occur, rather than the process that leads to a new (democratic) regime. As Shultziner (2010, 14) puts it, structural approaches attempt to explain, or at least indirectly account for, why, how and when people develop political attitudes congenial to democratic progress. They conceptualize democratic pressures as outcomes of macro-factors that lead to transitions, and try to understand which general factors create, enable, or enhance such pressures⁹. Inconveniently enough, however, there is a consensus that "transitions have no single precipitating cause" (Friedheim 1993, 489). By consequent, structural approaches have variedly stressed economic, cultural, institutional, and international "generative forces" (Mahoney and Snyder 1999) to explain why countries set out to democratize.

Economic explanations to regime change have centered mainly around the relationship between development measured in terms of economic growth and democratization. The alleged connection, coined "Modernization theory", was first formally articulated in the 1950s (Lipset 1959) but its roots lie earlier, particularly in the works of Max Weber who connected economic modernization with cultural and value change. The basic tenet of modernization theory is that growth favors changes in class structure, particularly through increased industrialization, urbanization, communication, education¹⁰ and literacy. As countries modernize and education spreads, the political interests and values of key actors, particularly the new middle classes, become more

⁸ See for example Levine 1988, Bermeo 1990, Karl 1990, Remmer 1990, Kitschelt 1993 and Munck 1994.

⁹ Compare, for instance, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 210 – 230; Tilly 2007; and Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 65 – 80)

¹⁰ Education occupies a special place in modernization theory, as it is seen to increase people's capacity for rational electoral choice. The benefits are twofold: Increasing literacy fosters a population's interest and capability in political participation, and thus engenders pressure for democratization from below (Cutright and Wiley 1969). However, it may also lead the elite to initiate, rather than oppose, democratization, and therefore favour democratization from above (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000).

liberal, in the sense of favoring greater political participation and government responsiveness to the entire population. Lipset thought that such a change in cultural values could promote democratic stability; later defenders of the theory, however, most often focused on how the level of wealth of a nation could help "predict which countries are most likely to become democratic" (Inglehart 1997). The positive relationship between development and democracy has been consistently replicated in quantitative studies on democratization¹¹, indicating that the correlation is not simply "a spurious effect of flawed methods" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 4). Details, however, are still hotly debated (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003), as the relationship seems to depend greatly on the definition of democracy employed (Epstein et al. 2006). Therefore, more recent research turned away from the impact of aggregate economic growth to focus more on the political consequences of equal versus unequal growth¹².

By contrast, institutional explanations focus on variables such as the strength of the state, and the role of the previous authoritarian regime. The explanatory logic is that strong systems can repel pressures for democratic progress, suppress dissatisfied social classes and prevent reform, whereas weak states are less capable of meeting such challenges (Skocpol 1985; Bellin 2004; Sandoval 1998; Goldstone 2003). Furthermore, authors contend that different types of authoritarian regimes show different propensities to democratize: while personalist dictators are said to cling to power as long as possible, systems that already have some form of electoral contestation, even if phony, are considered most likely to become "stepping stones to democracy" (Lussier and Fish 2012; Brownlee 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2006; 2007; Geddes 1999b; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006; 2007). The logic behind that assumption is that authoritarian regimes with more open electoral systems generally have lower levels of repression, which in turn

¹¹ See, for example, Cutright 1963; Jackman 1973; Coulter 1975; Bollen & Jackman 1995; Muller 1988, Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994; Vanhanen 1997; Barro 1999.

¹² On one hand, the redistributive approach (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Zak and Feng 2003) suggests that democratization is more likely when income distribution is more equal, because the median voter's preference with regard to taxes will then be less confiscatory. The basic claim is that elites are willing to cede some power rather than risk the costs of revolution when they expect democracy not to lead to extremely redistributive taxation. On the other hand, the contractarian approach (Ansell and Samuels 2010) suggests that elites' fear of the coercive and expropriative authority of the state itself is the primary factor driving calls for political liberalization.

offers greater potential for the emergence of movements, protests, strikes and underground resistance networks that can push for liberalization and, eventually, democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Finally, while the primacy of domestic variables for regime change is still a widely accepted fact in the scholarly community (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991), research on democratization after the end of the Cold War suggests that international "effects" have grown relatively more important for domestic-level regime change. Empirical research is particularly rich (Colaresi and Thompson 2003; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Wejnert 2014) and variedly stress the importance of diffusion (Levitsky and Way 2006; Gleditsch 2002; Weyland 2009); political conditionalities (Baylies 1995; Burnell 1994; Kubicek 2003; Ethier 2003; Carothers 2004, 2007); membership in regional organizations and transnational networks (Whitehead 1996; Finnemore 1996; Schimmelfennig 2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Pevehouse 2002); democratization by imposition (Ethier 2010); and foreign aid (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal- Querol 2008; Dunning 2004; Bermeo 2011; Brautigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2004; Easterly et al. 2004). Of these factors, the conditionality applied by the European Union to certain Eastern and Central European countries in the framework of their accession to the European Union was long considered the most important predictor of democratization; this conclusion, however, has recently been disputed by studies that seem to demonstrate that the efficiency of EU conditionality has varied from one candidate country to another in function of the attitude – conciliatory or refractory- of elites in power (Pridham 2005; Grabbe 2006; Vachudova 2006, 2007; Ethier 2006, 2008).

Theories postulating pre-conditions to democracy have been largely abandoned since the arrival of the Third Wave. Whereas it is still accepted that structural factors play a role in the emergence of democracies, scholars tend to converge around "pluralist" explanations like the theories of Dahl (1971) and Huntington (1991) who stress a combination of factors (historical sequences, levels of socio-economic development, the concentration of power, socio-economic inequalities, cultural cleavages, political beliefs and foreign domination) that help or hinder democratization. On one hand, this is a consequence of the excessive determinism of structural approaches. As Przeworski (1991, 96) once remarked, in the works of Lipset, Moore and others, outcomes were "uniquely

determined by [macrosocietal] conditions, and history . . . [went] on without anyone ever doing anything." As such, structural theories offered no guidance to political actors, or even worse, seemed to invite quiescence towards the authoritarian status quo¹³. On the other hand, the predictions made by structural approaches often turned out to be false, particularly when faced with empirics from African and Asian democratization experiences. If, as scholars alleged, certain macro-societal elements such as wealth, equality, or a democratic international environment needed to be in place for democracy to emerge, how could one explain that countries that did not feature any of these elements could so rapidly democratize? Most important, however, is in our opinion the fact that structural approaches could not adequately explain the outcomes of regime change, since the impact of their explanatory variables most often played out prior to the transition process itself. As such, they were able to explain the origins of transitions from authoritarianism, but remained silent on why some transitions were successful whereas others failed¹⁴. In the words of Huntington (1991, 106 - 107) the general causes of the third wave did not make democratization a necessary outcome: "A democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people." He, along with many others (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Bermeo 1990; Bellin 2000), therefore suggested that research be shifted from the causes to the "causers of democratization".

Process-oriented studies on regime change emphasize the crucial role of agency in determining transition outcomes. This "is not to deny that the macrostructural factors are still there", but rather "those [structural] mediations are looser, their impacts more indeterminate, than in normal circumstances" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 5). From such a perspective, regime transitions are special times when the causal impact of structural factors is temporarily relaxed. Most process-oriented studies on democratic transition between 1973 and 2004 fall into one of two categories: transitions "from above" and transitions "from below" (Dahl 1971; Linz and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1991)¹⁵.

¹³ "None of the countries we are studying have the conditions that the literature tells us are requisite for democracy", Philippe Schmitter once said, "and if we accept the odds established by all previous attempts at democratization in Latin America since 1900, two out of every three of our potential transitions are soon doomed to fail" (Karl 2005).

¹⁴ However, structural variables can take on renewed importance if one accepts the premise that they are facilitating the creation of favorable conditions for strategic variables, and thus can indirectly influence the transition outcome.

¹⁵ Authors have tended to use these labels rather indiscriminately and so far there have been few, if any, attempts to clearly devise measuring criteria for either one type of transition. By consequent, "from above"

1.1.2. Transitions "From Above" - Elite-Driven Democratization

Most scholars refer to the privileged role of state actors and their strategies when talking about transitions "from above". Here, traditional rulers "remain in control, even when pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force – or some mix of the two – to retain at least part of their power" (Karl 1990, 9). Those conceptions of transitions are elite-centered and mostly internalist (Fishman 1990) in that the origins of these transitions can be found in problems that arise *ex natura* from within the authoritarian regime itself. Collective actors, mass mobilization and protest are largely exogenous to the model, and the emphasis is instead placed on pacting and controlled liberalization by incumbents.

The concept of transitions "from above" has been defined for the first time in O'Donnell and Schmitter's seminal work *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, the fourth volume of *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy* in 1986. Since then, the "transitology theory" has risen to the ranks of a quasi-hegemonic paradigm in the academic debate on regime change (Collier 1999, Bunce 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000). Building on the work of Rustow (1970)¹⁶ who stressed the importance of actor-based explanations of transitions, this theory argues that transitions to democracy are essentially top-down processes initiated, controlled and directed by (reformist) elites of the incumbent regime (Bermeo 1997; Geddes 1999b).

and "from below" have been used to refer to either the distinctive dynamic of the transitions ("modes of transition") or the leading actors of the democratization process (elites or mass actors), or a combination of both.

¹⁶ Rustow, in his seminal article *Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model*, emphasizes the crucial role of agency in transitions. According to him, every transition is initiated by a conflict between the authoritarian regime and opposition forces. While the nature of these forces may vary, it most commonly involves a power struggle between old ruling elites of the authoritarian regime and new elites. This conflict results in democracy only if the struggling factions manage to agree on a certain number of rules and procedures that allow them to resolve their differences and to negotiate a compromise. Even though Rustow was the first to propose an explanation of the conditions leading to the emergence of democracy, his theory has remained rather marginal due to two major caveats: Firstly, his findings are corroborated by only two case studies (Sweden and Turkey), both of which have completed their transition prior to the beginning of the Third Wave; and secondly, his working definition of democracy is very vague and does not correspond to the procedural minimal criteria outlined by Schumpeter (1942)

According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, at the roots of every transition is a conflict within the ruling block itself between conservative/hardliner and reformist/softliner forces whose unity had previously assured the survival of the regime. Aside from cases in which the authoritarian regime is said to suffer an internal collapse or breakdown, incumbents generally divide into factions over questions of how to achieve legitimacy and the problem of how to consolidate or institutionalize the regime. According to Collier (1999), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19 – 20) recognize that in some cases this "initial" split among rulers may be a reaction to opposition protest. Yet they treat this opposition as prior to the sequence of the events they define as initiating the transition (a transition begins when incumbents announce their intention to liberalize and are believed, therefore altering opposition strategies), and hence as exogenous to their model and excluded from their analysis.

When the reformist faction among the authoritarian regime gains the upper hand, the regime crisis may lead to a liberalization process initiated by incumbents. Reformists (softliners) believe that the only solution to the legitimacy-consolidation problem can be found in easing repression and opening up the regime to greater popular participation. Liberalization, even though not an actual project for democracy, puts the regime on a slippery slope by starting a process that opens up some space for opposition and for a dynamic that may push change further than what had originally been intended. Liberalization also presents opportunities for what O'Donnell and Schmitter call "the resurrection of civil society": a fairly brief phase, in which mass actors such as students and the working class may engage in protest. This phase of mobilization is generally considered insofar as it affects the strategies and negotiation dynamics of individual leaders during the bargaining over the basics of a new political regime. Scholarly opinion on the usefulness of popular protest is divided. On one hand, demonstrations may strengthen opposition moderates by signaling to rulers that the costs of repression and retreating from a reform trajectory have become substantial. Alternatively, they may weaken the bargaining position of potential regime moderates and give hardliners a reason to subvert the process.

In fact, O'Donnell and Schmitter warn that a regime crisis and subsequent liberalization only leads to the instauration of a democratic regime if the warring factions

(a majority of regime softliners together with a united front of moderate opposition leaders) manage to negotiate a compromise – often in form of a pact - that is acceptable for the regime hardliners. The negotiation of such pacts is difficult, as they imply concessions that are often hard to swallow for opposition forces. Many pacted transitions in South America, for example, contained clauses that provided the former military rulers with a general amnesty. Therefore, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, the probability of obtaining a successful agreement depends in a large part on the ability of opposition moderates to sideline radicals and Jacobins and to keep popular contestation low. Mobilized masses "spoil the party" (McFaul 2002), as mass movements are prone to escalation and radicalization that can scare potential softliners within the authoritarian regime and drive them closer to the hardliner faction. Increased activity is particularly dangerous if "widespread violence recurs" or if it threatens "the vertical command structure of the armed forces, the territorial integrity of the nation-state, the country's position in international alliances, [or]... the property rights underlying the capitalist economy" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 27). In those cases, "even bland regime actors will conclude that the costs of toleration are greater than those of repression" and the movement for democracy will fail (Bermeo in Anderson 1999)¹⁷.

By consequent, proponents of transitions "from above" view the participation of popular forces in the making of democracy with great suspicion, considering that such participation generally diminishes the chances of producing a successful transition outcome. In their opinion, transitions "from above" are more likely to lead to democracy than transitions "from below" (Baloyra 1987; Huntington 1984; Morlino 1987; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Share 1987; Stepan 1986; Edvardsen 1997). Karl (1990), for example, claims that in Latin America no stable democracy has emerged in which mass actors have gained, even momentarily, control over traditional ruling classes. Weiner (1987, 26) argues that pressure from left-wing parties is often least effective for democratization because they frequently provoke "only (...) increased authoritarianism". Ironically, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992, 271/223) who claim that democracy is the outcome of

¹⁷ Ironically, more than twenty years after the inception of the transitology theory, the founding fathers seem to have at least partially revisited their position as to the usefulness of popular protests. On one hand, Schmitter still argues that civil society can only push the moderate elements in the opposition forces and the authoritarian regime to the negotiation table but is incapable of influencing the outcome any further (Schmitter 2010, 24). On the other hand, O'Donnell contends that civil society plays a crucial role in pushing political reforms beyond mere liberalization (O'Donnell 2010, 30).

working-class mobilization pursue a similar point when asserting that radical mass parties are more likely to "evoke strong defensive, anti-democratic reactions" when compared to moderate clientelistic parties. Levine (1988, 392) also asserts that the "obvious" lesson from experience is that "conservative transitions are more durable". Finally, Huntington, judges that "democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action" (1984, 212).

Since its inception in 1986, many specialists have adopted O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory on transitions. Przeworski (1991) for example, one of its most ardent defenders, argues that the transitology paradigm does not only explain the transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe but can also be applied to later transitions, particularly those in Eastern Europe¹⁸. Dean McSweeney and Clive Tempest, two experts on Communist countries, confirm such a view. They claim that in Poland, democracy emerged out of a compromise between PUWP reformers and Solidarity moderates, with regime members Jaruzelski, Rakowski and Interior Minister Kiszczak playing a crucial role in pushing their own hardliners to the negotiating table (McSweeney and Tempest 1993). Lucas Way (2011) goes even further and claims that the failed Arab Spring protests can also be explained by O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory, since leaders "who can keep the support of crucial elites [notably the security forces] are likely to survive even severe crises (...) The readiness of elites to back the regime in a crisis is generally more decisive to authoritarian survival than the number of protesters in the streets" (Way 2011, 15).

Despite the popularity of O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory among transitologists, the empirical reality of most of the 13 case studies used in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* does not confirm the theory. Firstly, many of the authors involved in the "Transitions" project differ in their interpretation of the cases from the conclusions reached by

¹⁸ In asking why Communism collapsed in those countries he underlines endogenous causes, most importantly tensions within the Communist leadership and its supporters that made the system disintegrate from within. In his point of view, regime softliners realized that the ideology on which the Soviet Union was built had lost its appeal among her subjects and that change was necessary in order to retain at least part of their power. As Przeworski puts it, Party bureaucrats "calculated how many thousands of people they could beat up if they persevered, how many Ministerial posts they would have to yield if they compromised, [and] how many jobs they could retain if they surrendered" (1991, 23). Their position was further compromised by the Army's decision to side with regime opponents and refused to "come to the rescue [of the Communist leadership]. In Poland, the Armed Forces led the reforms; in all other countries, including Romania, they refused to repress". Therefore, the internal forces that had held the system together slowly collapsed and gave way to negotiated transition projects.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (Lowenthal 1986). Secondly, most case studies treat transitions that had either failed or had barely begun by the time the book was published. A priori, only three case studies seem to confirm the theory: the chapter on Portugal (Maxwell 1986), on Brazil (Martins 1986) and on Venezuela (Karl 1986). But interpretations of at least two of the latter (on Portugal and on Brazil) have been contested by authors that claim that popular protest movements have been at the origin of these transitions (Bermeo 1997; Garreton 1989). In the words of Diamond (1999, 233 – 237), it became evident that most intra-regime divisions were in fact the outcomes of dynamic popular struggles against nondemocratic systems, and not the other way around.

1.1.3. Transitions "From Below" - Mass-Mobilizing for Democracy

Although scholars of top-down approaches to democratization acknowledge that contentious collective action can help push autocracies toward regime change, their idea of the nature and impact of this "resurrection of civil society" suggests that they view protest movements more as a symptom than a cause of democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 54–6). After the end of the Cold War, however, many former Communist countries and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa successfully set out on the road to democratization. Scholars studying these transitions (Bunce 2003; McFaul 2002; Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) quickly recognized that protest movements played a much bigger role in determining the outcome of these instances of regime change than originally assumed by the transitology project. In fact, they found that mass mobilization had not only a substantial impact on the transition process, but that it was even sometimes the catalyst that set a transition in motion. Theories on transitions "from below" were thus developed largely as an answer to a state-centric conception of transitions that failed to recognize that elites are not socially disembodied, but represent and draw upon collective groups when entering negotiations (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Anderson 1999).

For most part, theories on transitions "from below" ignore intra-regime dynamics and either omit or outright deny that ruling members split into pro- and anti-reform forces. In contrast to transitions "from above", collective actors are the dominant force behind successful transitions "from below", as their mobilization and demonstration of strength is crucial to signalling the regime that reforms are not an option but a necessity. Analyzing

African transitions in *Democratic Experiments in Africa - Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, 179) were among the first to issue a call for "bringing the people back in" the framework of analysis. In contrast to Latin American transitions, they argue, democratization in Africa commonly occurred from below when a mobilized civil society pushed reluctant rulers into political reforms (1997, 198). These rulers, so they claim, did not split into hardliner and softliner factions, because the neopatrimonial nature of African regimes effectively precludes the apparition of such schisms¹⁹. Therefore, interactions between incumbents and challengers tended to play out in the streets instead of a traditional negotiation table, and were mostly determined by the strength of opposition forces. In fact, incumbents only decided to cede ground to some liberalization demands once popular numbers had become too big to be ignored. Most African transitions, so Bratton and Van de Walle argue, have culminated in "National Dialogues", public round-tables between the old regime and challengers. However, these were only the end of a long informal circular dynamic of protest and reaction (Tarrow 1994) where the display of opposition strength (as evidenced, for example, by mass rallies) provoked either repression or concessions, or a mix of both, from the authoritarian regime.

Bunce (2000, 709 - 710) and Bermeo (1997, 314) identify a similar pattern in a number of Eastern European transitions. Although Bunce does not outright refuse the possibility that those transitions could have been initiated or accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian regime, she does not elaborate on it. Instead, she argues that elites do have a role to play in expanding the political sphere, but that such expansion often responds to political demands emerging from massive political protest. In fact, she claims that most Eastern European transitions have not only been initiated "from below" by the mobilization of grass-root forces, but were also largely determined by the strength and perseverance of these mobilized mass-actors²⁰. Bermeo, on the other hand, challenges O'Donnell and Schmitter's argument that popular mobilization can undercut the democratization process by provoking a backlash among frightened elites. Instead, she argues that "in many cases,

¹⁹ Bratton and Van de Walle explain that in Africa, the access to and control of patronage resources and the lack of political institutionalization of the regime favors struggles between regime "insiders" and regime "outsiders" rather than divisions within the ruling clique itself.

²⁰ Interestingly enough, McFaul's work on hybrid regimes (2002, 212 - 244) seems to confirm Bunce's argument. He claims that power-sharing agreements among elite actors in fact favour the development of hybrid regimes rather than democracies, and that in many post-Communist transitions, democracy was only brought about where pro-democratic groups could force democratization on reluctant authoritarian elites.

democratization seems to have proceeded alongside weighty and even bloody popular challenges."²¹

A significant body of research ensued which identified contentious collective action as an important element of the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Nonetheless, we find the core argument of transitions "from below" debatable. Not only did Bratton and Van de Walle omit to empirically test their theory, their main body of work centers on democratic transitions that have in great part failed, since a large majority of them have culminated in a simple liberalisation of the authoritarian regime or in the instauration of a hybrid regime. Instead of wondering whether authoritarian regime dynamics might be somehow related to these transition failures, they state clearly that in Africa, authoritarian regimes do not split into hardliners and softliners. While Bunce is not quite as categorical in her analysis of the Eastern European transitions, she also neglects the elite dimension of transitions in her analysis and only mentions in passing that protest movements could have been initiated or accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In general, we find that approaches that center on mass mobilization cannot explain plausibly why most transitions "from below" have failed whereas a selected few succeeded. In our point of view, scholars rightfully contend that it is highly unlikely that a regime that is still in full possession of its coercive capability agrees to relinquish power solely because of popular protest (Hyug-Baeg, Im. 1997). Recent scholarship on the involvement of the military in democratic transitions tends to confirm this point of view, demonstrating that many transitions "from below" feature an important split within the authoritarian regime between the ruling clique and its coercive apparatus (McGowan 2003, 339; Morency-Laflamme, forthcoming).

²¹ Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) extend the argument, saying that it is precisely because the regime often employs a disproportionate amount of violence against the protesters that these challenges are so effective in provoking democratisation. Violence against peaceful protesters, they say, is likely to backfire, stimulating wider anti-regime mobilisation, precipitating international sanctions and support for the opposition, and causing defections in the security forces which will be reluctant to fire on unarmed fellow citizens.

1.1.4. Hybrid Approaches to Regime Change

As we have seen, both theories of transitions "from above" and transitions "from below" have flaws that make them look either unconvincing or out of sync with empirical reality. For this reason, scholars increasingly argue for the need to revise and integrate both approaches, especially since there are more and more studies that show that most transitions feature elements of both theories. This emerging body of literature can loosely be divided in two categories: studies that treat democratization from a quantitative angle, and those that favor single case studies or very small samples of cases.

On the quantitative end of the spectrum, Geddes's (1999a) large-N study on authoritarian breakdown rises some interesting points that closely relate to our own proposition in this thesis. She argues that different types of authoritarian government break down in characteristically different ways: whereas military regimes tend to split when challenged, personalist regimes and Single Party regimes most often try to cling to power as long as they can and must be forced out of office by popular uprising, revolution, invasion or assassination. According to her, military regimes are more likely to negotiate their own withdrawal and democratize, whereas the other two forms of authoritarian regimes are more likely to end in violence and upheaval and to be followed by other types of authoritarian regimes. Her statistical analysis of a new data set comprising information on all regime changes since 1946 tends to confirm these findings.

Geddes' argument is interesting because it provides support for O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) idea that a schism within the ruling section, or close supporters to the ruling section (like the military) is essential for a successful transition. It also grants an important place to popular protest movements by linking authoritarian regime type and forms of contestation that are likely to shape the transition. Her reasoning is based on a game-theoretical model stressing the different effects various types of authoritarian regimes have on the incentives confronting regime supporters when faced with challenges. Whereas military regimes are concerned with the integrity of the military as institution and are therefore more likely to split into factions when their corporate identity is threatened, personalist dictatorships (such as in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa) and Single Party regimes tend to circle the wagon and to co-opt their challengers by using their

extensive patronage resources. She does therefore implicitly accept the argument of Bratton et al. (1997) that such regimes do not necessarily experience divisions from within that lead to their breakdown. Her methodology, however, does not verify whether such an interpretation is actually true, since her game-theoretical model is based on assumptions of strategic behavior that are fixed prior to the analysis itself and there is no in-depth analysis of cases that could confirm such a point of view. Moreover, her study is regime-centric and even though popular protest movement is considered essential to end certain types of authoritarian regimes, its contribution is largely instrumental and exogenous to the model. In summum, her argument tends to support O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory in certain cases, and Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce's argument in other cases, but does not attempt to link both theories.

Collier (1999), analyzing 27 cases of transitions spanning multiple "waves", concentrates more specifically on the labor movement and its contribution to democratization. She claims that the contribution of labor to the transition process varies according to the timing of movement activity and the stance of the authoritarian regime vis-à-vis the prospect of reform. To illustrate this proposal she constructs a typology of transitions into which she categorizes her case studies: "Destabilization/Extrication", "Transition game" and "Parallel tracks". According to her, the transitions of Spain, Peru and Argentina all followed a pattern of "destabilization/extrication" where collective protest (notably of labor) delegitimizes authoritarian incumbents and forces their retreat. On the other hand, Uruguay and Brazil followed a pattern she calls "transition game". In this pattern incumbents prepared for limited liberalization but labor protest reshaped the project and forced the regime to move forward with reforms. Finally, Chile followed the "parallel track". In this pattern, authoritarian incumbents had an explicit transition project and a timetable for retreat, and labor organizations took an early lead in the transition by coordinating the democratic opposition. Collier even speculates about a possible contribution of labor in triggering the elite project of handing over power. Therefore, so she argues, working class mobilization can exert an important influence on elite choice in transitions both in impelling and in shaping the transition dynamics. Similar to a "watchdog", popular mobilization can push transitions forward and contribute to creating more inclusive outcomes. In Spain, one of the canonical initial cases of transitions, labor strikes and continuous protest precipitated the transition by undermining the strategy of

limited liberalization pursued by then Prime Minister Arias Navarro. As labor mobilization grew stronger, the fear of a vacuum of authority and a possible sudden transfer of power to an opposition that was quite radical at the time prompted the authoritarian regime to take measures for the introduction of democracy in order to avert chaos.

Collier's causal mechanisms detailing labor influence on democratization show important parallels to our propositions in this thesis. However, Collier's study shows some important methodological flaws. Firstly, she concentrates solely on the labor movement and neglects other forms of opposition to the authoritarian regime. Therefore she classifies transitions that did not involve a strong labor component (for example Greece) as being "elite dominated", even though such a definition includes groups as diverse as white collar workers, professionals, and bourgeois sectors that have been seen as crucial elements "from below" in many sub-Saharan transitions (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Secondly, since her analysis encompasses transitions from several different waves, the definition of democracy employed in the study is necessarily too vague for present-day standards. Acknowledging that even universal suffrage would exclude many cases from her sample, Collier settles for universal male suffrage as a measure, and allows for undemocratic institutions such as unelected senators. For example, Weimar Germany is included as a case of successful democratization, even though it lasted only a few years and most analysts would agree that the Weimar regime was extremely flawed. The same problem is found in several of her contemporary cases of democratization, none of which ended in the establishment of a lasting electoral democracy.

In other editions of the argument, among others the papers written in collaboration with James Mahoney (1999), there are some changes to the number of cases analyzed and the definition of democracy employed. Nevertheless, two problems with Colliers' study remain constant: Firstly, while two of her modes of transition (Transition game and Parallel Tracks) are in fact initiated by the authoritarian regime, she does not elaborate on how this decision to liberalize comes about. She therefore ignores the main element of O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory, the crisis of the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, she does not confirm Van de Walle's theory either, since she does not explicitly deny the possibility of such a crisis. Secondly, she equals civil society with labor movement, thereby ignoring other important forms of popular participation such as opposition parties

and student movements. Her thesis is ultimately that labor plays a role in the transition process, but she does not demonstrate that its participation is either sufficient or necessary. Therefore, her conclusion is not novel, as O'Donnell and Schmitter's elite model does not negate the possibility of civil society participating to some degree in shaping the outcome of transitions. By contrast, this thesis argues that mass mobilizations (including but not limited to labor) and a crisis of the authoritarian regime are necessary conditions for a successful transition to democracy.

On the qualitative end, there are also a number of recent attempts to bridge the divide between top-down and bottom-up approaches to regime change. Wood (2000, 866), for example, claims that nearly all transitions from authoritarian rule combine elements "from above" with elements "from below", and that mobilization by subordinate social actors in some circumstances may be crucial to the success of democratic transitions. Her analysis of El Salvador and South Africa found that mobilization by the economically and socially marginalized impelled the transition to democracy by transforming key interests of economic elites. This led to pressure on the state to compromise with the opposition, thereby strengthening regime moderates over hardliners and forcing the initial liberalization of the regime. However, she confounds transitions from civil war with peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule, and by including armed guerrilla insurrection in her definition of transitions "from below" she falls into the trap of conceptual overstretching (Sartori 1991). Not only are the structural conditions for transitions radically different in the context of an enduring civil conflict, but the transition dynamics are centered on negotiating peace rather than establishing a democratic system as such. Therefore, they differ considerably from the Third Wave transitions democratization theories actually aim to explain. Finally, Wood's claim that armed guerrilla insurrection helped pave the way for democracy in El Salvador and South Africa is debatable, given that only South Africa is classified as electoral democracy by Freedom House.

Threlfall (2008) revisits the Spanish case, which has often been stereotyped as a typical example for an elite-dominated transition, and finds strong arguments to reassess the importance of civil society. She argues that the Spanish transition was the result of a difficult "co-construction process" between regime and opposition, where civil society played a crucial role both by engaging itself in mass actions through politicized or non-

politicized civil organizations, and in negotiations with regime actors through the representation of the newly created parties. In contrast to the "elitist" account of the transition, she offers evidence to show, among other things, that (a) the widespread actions of civil society organizations were the real cause of the failure of Navarro's government and of his forced resignation, and (b) that the new Constitution adopted after the 1977 elections largely reflected the ideals and demands civil society political actors made on elites during the transition. Threlfall's position is rather consistent with the more known interpretation of the process given by Maravall (1986), which states that the Spanish transition was the complex and delicate result of a sum of components which can be resumed in: firstly, the reformist politics "from above"; secondly, the pressures and demands "from below", and thirdly, the political context of the country as a whole. As a single case study, however, Threlfall's work cannot be used to generalize to other transition cases.

Finally, there are also excellent examples of hybrid studies examining transitions in the Eastern hemisphere. Doh Chull Shin (2008), for example, analyzes a variety of countries in South-East Asia that democratized towards the end of the Third Wave. Questioning whether there is a uniquely "Asian way" of democratization, he finds that almost all cases of transition have featured both civil society and elite interaction, albeit to various degrees. According to his typology, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand have all known a mode of transition known as "transplacement", i.e. a mode of transition where elites play the leading role, whereas the transition in the Philippines was largely determined by civil society and therefore followed a mode of transition called "replacement". Based on those results, he concludes that "of the people involved in the democratization process, political elites are known to be the most powerful causers" (2008, 94). This view, however, is not universally shared: Denny's (2006) study of Indonesia shows that from 1997 to 1998, the economic crisis in combination with large protest events by non-elite forces have not only initiated the transition, but also contributed significantly to creating divisions between Suharto-Loyalists and Suharto-Traitors. They also played a large part in the subsequent adoption of a democratic agenda. However, in his analysis, mass pressure also led to ethnic conflict and religious enmity.

Looking at the Communist transitions, White et al. (1990) point out that popular protest initiated the transitions in cases where ruling groups were reluctant to reform. Instead of a simple resurrection of civil society as described by O'Donnell and Schmitter, these protests were an independent force for change that didn't need divisions within the leadership to prompt it into existence. The authors also confirm that it was indeed the protests that broke the unity of the ruling block, citing the example of Czechoslovakia: "The division [of the authoritarian elite into softliners and hardliners] was not perceptible until after the demonstrations had begun" (White et al. 1990, 285)

In sum, this brief literature review attempted to show that during the last four decades, democratization scholars essentially focused their efforts on endogenous democratic transitions that took place after 1973. The two main theories elaborated to that end agree on two points: (1) Transitions are initiated by a conflict between national actors, and (2) they only lead to minimal democracy if the warring factions manage to compromise on the adoption of rules and procedures characterizing the new regime. There are also two main points of contention between the two theories. The first concerns the nature of the conflict at the roots of democratic transitions: specialists disagree whether it is a conflict between the elites of the ruling block itself (transitions "from above") or a conflict between opposition forces and incumbents (transitions "from below"). In other words, is the transition initiated by an endogenous crisis of the authoritarian regime, or can popular mobilization initiate transitions? The second point of disagreement concerns the importance of mass mobilization for the outcome of transitions: whereas for scholars advocating a "top-down" approach mass mobilizations need to remain low and transitions involving mass actors are unlikely to lead to democracy, scholars of a "bottom-up" perspective argue that mass mobilizations are decisive contributors to democracy and must be present throughout the transition process.

At the same time, the number of scholars adopting hybrid approaches to transitions is steadily growing. Yet, they almost always explicitly or implicitly subscribe to one approach – top-down or bottom-up – with the other playing only a very marginal role in the explanatory framework. It is rare to see studies that grant equal importance to both variables, and if they do, they rarely connect the presence or absence of these variables to the transition outcome as a necessary or sufficient condition. They therefore fail to

conclusively demonstrate not only the complementarity of both approaches, but also their indispensability for a successful transition outcome.

By consequence, there are also few attempts at formulating generalizations. Although there are many single case studies that eloquently demonstrate the importance of both authoritarian regime crisis and popular protest for bringing a transition successfully to fruition, they cannot make any sort of general statement about whether this relationship is anything more than a spurious coincidence – they simply have too few cases to know. On the quantitative end, by contrast, the problem is rather that scholars either focus on one variable to the detriment of the other (as in Collier and Mahoney’s analysis on the contribution of labor movements to democratization), or that their research question is not primarily geared towards demonstrating a link between the two approaches (as in Geddes analysis which aims at showing that different kinds of authoritarian institutional frameworks are vulnerable to different types of transition dynamics). In this case, both top-down and bottom-up approaches remain separated, and the correctness of such a typology is not questioned.

1.2. Research Problem, Hypotheses and Research Objectives

The shortcomings pointed out in our literature review serve as anchor point for our own research question. Is a democratic regime a result of a victory from below, in which subordinate or excluded groups wrest power from a reluctant elite, or a conquest from above, in which those in power or rising economic groups not holding power pursue their own political agendas and seek to strengthen their positions (Collier 1999)? Confronted with seemingly irreconcilable positions, our research aims at integrating both approaches into a more general framework and to prove that propositions derived from that framework possess greater universal validity than either approach taken on its own. We therefore seek to answer the following research question:

Have the successful post-1973 democratic transitions been determined "from below", as posited by the paradigm of Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce; "from above", as claim O'Donnell and Schmitter; or by the combination of these two scenarios, as evidenced by certain case studies?

As we have noted earlier, existing theories of transitions have privileged either a top-down approach or a bottom-up approach to democratization, but the categories transitions "from above" and transitions "from below" have not always been clearly defined and delimited in the literature. This has led to a number of competing explanations for certain Third Wave transitions. Our analysis attempts to circumvent this problem by identifying specific elements that we consider "defining features" of each mode of transition; these are our explanatory conditions. We believe that such an approach is more fruitful in producing statements that are valid over a large number of cases, one of the key goals of the scientific approach.

Following O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), we consider transitions "from above" as distinguished, above all, by a schism within the ruling elite, or the ruling elite and close supporters. Our first condition is therefore the crisis of the authoritarian regime²². By

²² Although O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) make it very clear that a successful transition requires not only a crisis between the authoritarian regime members, but also a successful bargaining process between regime softliners and opposition leaders, we consider transitions "from above" to be principally defined by the crisis

contrast, transitions “from below” feature an important degree of mass mobilization and collective action by various spheres of the population before, during and after the initial liberalization of the regime. Thus, our second condition is mass mobilization against the regime and/or its policies.

In an attempt to answer our research question, we aim at testing three hypotheses:

- (1) Transition to democracy initiated by a crisis within the authoritarian regime and controlled by the incumbents (Theory of O’Donnell and Schmitter)

In Scenario (1) regime reformists institute a certain number of democratic reforms. Meanwhile, there is no meaningful contestation of the authoritarian regime by opposition forces. Moderate (non-radical) opposition forces then react positively to these reforms and enter a dialogue with regime reformists. This dialogue culminates in a democratic compromise. Our first hypothesis therefore postulates that democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime without large-scale mass movements.

- (2) Transition to democracy initiated and controlled by popular protest movement (Theory of Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce).

In Scenario (2), moderate and/or radical opposition forces orchestrate protest movements that mobilize a large fraction of the population in the capital city and/or the main cities of the country. These uprisings appear before the authoritarian regime shows any hint of willingness to undertake democratic reforms. After several days/weeks/months of protest, the regime proceeds with democratic reforms either unilaterally or after having negotiated the latter with opposition forces. Our second hypothesis postulates that democracy results from popular mobilization without a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

of the authoritarian regime. We think such a choice is justified given that negotiations between regime and opposition are not exclusive elements to theories from above. Most theories "from below" also provide for the possibility that democratic transitions can be negotiated, and in fact, many successful transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa that featured "Roundtables" include an important negotiation element. We do, however, recognize the importance of that variable and therefore included "successful compromise" as base element in each of our hypotheses.

Combining those theoretical positions we elaborate a third pattern that departs from the standard accounts of democratization but seems to be supported empirically by several case studies. In fact, our review on the existing literature on democratic transitions and the taking into account of research on failed transitions (notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union) gives us reason to believe that successful transitions from the post-1973 period have indeed all been determined – in various chronological order - by both a conflict within the authoritarian regime between Moderates and Conservatives, and large popular protest movements pushing for democracy²³. Building on the typology developed by Collier (1999) and Collier and Mahoney (1999), this pattern constitutes a synthesis of approaches:

- (3) Transition to democracy initiated and jointly negotiated either by
 - a. large popular uprisings that provoke a crisis of the authoritarian regime
 - b. a crisis of the authoritarian regime and simultaneous protest movements that feed the crisis and drive the reform process forward

In Scenario (3a), popular mobilization precedes any sign of an internal crisis of the authoritarian regime. Such mobilization then initiates a transition by fulfilling a signalling role, telling rulers that reform is inevitable and eventually breaking up the internal unity of the ruling block.

In Scenario (3b), a reformist majority within the authoritarian regime initiates the transition by proposing a limited reform project, which is meant to be at the same time a concession to potential regime opponents, and a tentative to remain in control of the political apparatus. Almost simultaneously, mass protests orchestrated by opposition leaders arise and fuel the crisis by demanding full democracy and by rejecting the regime's proposal for limited reform. These movements transform the original reform plan into a

²³ It is important to specify that the mass mobilizations in our scenarios are different from a simple "resurrection of civil society" as proposed by O'Donnell and Schmitter. In their view, resurrection of civil society refers to relatively brief episodes of mainly moderate protest that is firmly controlled by opposition elites. These leaders undertake great efforts to keep "radicals" and "extremists" sidelined so as not to compromise the democratization process, which is almost exclusively a product of elite negotiations. By contrast, in our conception of scenario (3), mass mobilizations are long, protracted periods of struggle that can comprise several cycles of mobilization, demobilization and re-mobilization (Tarrow 1994) if the reform process threatens to stall or reverse.

veritable project for democracy and push the transition forward by fulfilling a watchdog function throughout the bargaining process.

In all cases the transition leads to democracy if regime reformists and opposition forces manage to strike a compromise on the new democratic rules and procedures. Our third hypothesis therefore postulates that democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime in combination with high levels of mass mobilization in various chronological order.

With a view to the existing literature, our research should primarily fulfil three objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute to the overarching goal of generalization. In other words, we aim at testing the validity of the theories on transitions to democracy while at the same time attempting to surpass the sterile academic debate between transitions "from below" and "from above" and to reconcile two seemingly incompatible positions.

1.3. Justification of Research and Originality of Contribution

To our knowledge, there is currently no answer to our research question in the literature. This might seem surprising at first, given that the study of democratic transitions as a separate subfield in Comparative Politics has existed since the 1970s. A closer look, however, reveals that democratization studies have been highly empirically driven, and new subjects of interest often replaced older questions even before they were satisfyingly answered. The problem of what causes transitions to succeed and the importance of masses versus regime actors is one of those questions that had taken a backseat prior to the arrival of the Arab Spring rebellions in 2011. But when Tunisian dictator Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak both were driven from power by mass protests, scholarly interest was sparked again and a host of new studies on the importance of mass movements for democratization saw the day (Mansfield and Snyder 2012; Snow and Moss 2014; Shehata 2014; Salvatore 2013; Paczynska 2013). Generally, intra-regime dynamics did not figure in this new

literature; a fact that is particularly important considering the outcome of most of the Arab Spring rebellions: so far, only Tunisia has completed the transition to democracy and all the other countries have either fallen into civil war or returned to authoritarianism. When analyzing the causes for this failure, scholars rediscovered the crucial role of authoritarian regime actors (Bellin 2012; Morency-Laflamme and Brunner 2015). Hence, we believe it more important than ever to have another look at transition dynamics and revive old questions: Are successful transitions really the product of one class of actors alone? Can mass movements force an authoritarian regime to democratize, or isn't it more likely that democracies are the product of the combined effects of elite and mass action, "from above" and "from below"?

Although the questions we ask are hardly new, our thesis is novel in several respects. Firstly, as previously stated, there is a growing consensus in the scholarly literature that the strict separation of transitions into narrowly defined categories such as transitions "from above" and "from below" isn't capturing reality and that there is a need to revise and integrate theoretical frameworks. In fact, many transitions to democracy can't easily be classified in one or the other category, as authors often do not use the same coding criteria, are inattentive to chronological detail, and do not necessarily agree on what exactly constitutes a transition "from above" or "from below". By consequent, there are many competing explanations for Third Wave transitions, such as the case of Portugal (Maxwell 1986 vs Bermeo 1997); Chile (Huntington 1991 vs Garreton 1989); and Eastern Europe (Przeworski 1990 vs Bunce 2003). Our thesis, on the other hand, uses coding criteria that are carefully defined and grounded in theory and also includes many contested cases in the analysis. This could help eliminate confusion and provide more fertile ground for further research on the subject.

Secondly, while most democratization scholars have rallied behind one or the other of the competing theories on transitions, the origins of the transition process and the dynamics contributing to its success or failure have never been systematically investigated over a large number of cases. In fact, there is an important prejudice amongst many scholars of democratization against a quantitative approach to studying regime change, primarily due to the complexity of the concepts and the difficulty of representing them in standard statistical frameworks. By consequent, studies contesting either O'Donnell and

Schmitter's or Bunce / Bratton and Van de Walle's theory are for the most part area-bound or single case studies. They do not attempt to form a coherent theoretical framework, nor do they incorporate their findings into the existing framework of either one particular theory. The purpose of our thesis, by contrast, is to integrate existing theoretical positions in order to arrive at a circumscribed set of generalizable propositions. To this end we combine a quantitative methodological framework (QCA) with qualitative case studies in a medium-N setting, something that to our knowledge has not been attempted before in the study of democratic transitions. Such an approach offers a number of advantages: On one hand, the comparatively high number of cases provides security that our findings are not just spurious correlations, and are indeed likely to be repeated in cases outside of our sample. The cross-regional focus of our thesis additionally increases that likelihood, and provides greater credibility to our claims than an analysis that is carried out through a regional lense alone. On the other hand, the "qualitative anchoring" of our concepts protects them from becoming overly simplified in a quantitative analysis.

Thirdly, the proliferation of hybrid regimes and of "democracy with adjectives" (Collier and Levitsky 1997) has led to a growing disillusionment in the scholarly community with existing explanations of transition dynamics. Whereas elite-led transitions "from above" had once been considered the magic formula for democratization, many studies that take a closer look at the origins of certain transitions show that popular participation has a much bigger part in the success of these processes than previously assumed (Porras 2007). As Nancy Bermeo (1997) aptly synthesized, the literature on democratization generally accords much less attention to popular organizations than to political elites. Thus, the role of popular organizations in the making of democracy remains a subject of confusion. Many of the major theoretical works on democratization suggest that popular mobilization is important for regime change, but even this very simple proposition is not universally shared. Linz and Stepan (1996, 88), for example, acknowledge that Spanish political reform occurred in "a context of heightened societal pressure for, and expectations of, change" and that "popular pressure kept the transition going forward". Yet they fall short of situating the role of collective actors on an equal level to elite negotiations and rather choose to classify Spain as "regime initiated transition (...) under the pressure of society". By contrast, R.Y. Ortega Ortiz (2000, 69) qualifies the predominant explanation of the Spanish transition as "myth" and claims that high levels of

contestation-mobilization by diverse societal actors (workers, students and political parties) before and throughout the transition process were essential to the downfall of the authoritarian regime. Similarly, Maravall's (1978, 103 – 117) analysis of the Spanish student movement makes clear that student mobilizations were key elements for the formation of the opposition political programme and for the development of a national consciousness about the necessity for a radical transformation of the regime. In short, it is still unclear just how important mass movements are in the processes of regime change, whether they are ever the primary actors, and whether there are regional distinctions in the relative balance between elite and masses. Our thesis could be very helpful in this respect, as our method of analysis allows identifying exactly which transitions have been impelled by popular protest movements, and hence contributes to better estimating the relative importance of mass action in transition dynamics.

Lastly, as Karl (2005) recently stated, a central finding of 40 years of "transitology" is that democratization is the result of a combination of causes, and no single factor has yet been identified as being either necessary or sufficient across a range of cases. It is here that our thesis offers the potentially greatest plus-value: Focusing on two of the most frequently named causes of democratization, the nature and extent of divisions within the authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka 1999) and the strength of social movements (Tarrow 1994; Collier 1999; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997), our research methodology is specifically designed to test whether either of these conditions alone, or in combination, is necessary for a successful transition to democracy. Such knowledge could prove crucial particularly for the improvement of potential democracy promotion programs, which have traditionally focused more on civil society actors than on intra-regime dynamics.

This chapter summarized the principal theoretical debates about democratization processes and introduced our own argument. It explained that early research focusing on structural theories was found inadequate to explain processes of change that feature dynamic interplays between calculating societal actors. As scholars turned to voluntarist approaches to democratization, two principal competing theories emerged: firstly, O'Donnell and Schmitter's transitology theory, and secondly, the theory of Bratton and Van de Walle, and Bunce. Whereas O'Donnell and Schmitter offer an elitist approach ("from above") that views transitions as regime-initiated and –dominated exercise in negotiation between a small circle of regime and opposition elites, Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce postulate that transitions are primarily determined by the mobilization of mass actors ("from below") with the capacity to force a reluctant authoritarian regime out of power. Although both theories have been used by a number of scholars to explain Third Wave transitions, they offer an incomplete view of reality. Therefore, scholars are slowly turning to "hybrid" approaches to democratization that incorporate elements "from above" and "from below" in an attempt to obtain a more realistic model of how transitions to democracy come about, and what makes them succeed. In this chapter we presented examples from quantitative and qualitative scholarship, and showed that our own research problem derives from a critique of these existing approaches to transitions. After having outlined our research question and our hypotheses, the chapter finally ended with a justification of our research project and a delineation of how our thesis adds value to the current scholarly pool of knowledge. The purpose of the following chapter is to introduce our research methodology and our case sample.

Explaining Regime Change: Moving Beyond the Theoretical and Methodological Divide

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological basis our thesis is built on. In the first part we present the methodological framework within which the comparative method is situated, before turning to configurational methods and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the method used in this thesis. After a general overview of the principles and practice of QCA, we discuss the strengths and limits of the approach, its appropriateness for our research project and the type of QCA used in this study. The second part is dedicated to establishing the conceptual framework of this thesis. After defining our outcome condition, "minimal democracy", and our explanatory conditions, "crisis of the authoritarian regime" and "mass mobilization", we turn to the operationalization and the measurement of these concepts. Lastly, we present our case sample and explain the principles behind our case selection.

2.1. Methodological Framework

According to Sartori (1991), comparing is at the heart of every scientific endeavor. Only by contrasting competing hypotheses it is possible to evaluate theories and, ultimately, discard explanations of reality that are found to be incorrect. In most, if not all studies on democratization, this comes down to choosing between the statistical versus the comparative method.

2.1.1. The Statistical Versus the Comparative Method

According to Lijphart (1971), three types of methods together form the fundamental strategies of scientific research: the experimental method, the statistical method, and the comparative method. Even though the experimental method is considered "the gold standard", its specifics (working with control groups, the *ceteris paribus* clause, etc) make it often unfit for use in the social sciences (Lijphart 1971, 683). Alternatively,

researchers approximate experimental design by choosing between the statistical method and the comparative method. While the statistical method proceeds on the basis of a large number of cases, drawn at random if possible, and a relatively small number of variables, the comparative method offers a number of techniques that are often case-based, specifically in the case of small- and medium N-research design (Ragin 1987). Both methods have their respective strengths and weaknesses (for discussion see Brady and Collier 2004; King, Keohane and Verba 1994). However, the nature of statements that can be generated by variable-oriented research is fundamentally different from the ones that can be generated by case-oriented methods. Whereas variable-oriented methods try to predict the (average) influence of a given variable on the dependent variable irrespective of case context, case-oriented methods aim at finding commonalities and differences between groups of cases (Landman 2000, 27 – 32). This leads to more complex causal explanations in which context plays a decisive role (Ragin 1987, 34 – 82).

This thesis tries to find a "via media" between "qualitative" (case-oriented) and "quantitative" (variable-oriented) techniques. To this end, we employ QCA, a set-theoretic method which forms part of what Cronqvist (2007) calls "configurational-comparative methods". Configurational-comparative methods are presented as a "synthetic strategy" to "integrate the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best features of the variable-oriented approach" (Ragin 1987, 84). On one hand, configurational-comparative methods postulate that correlations between social facts can only be discovered by treating cases as "wholes" and taking into account contextual specificities. On the other hand, they also require that prior to formal analysis, possible variables be identified which could later serve as potential conditions for the phenomenon to be examined. The values of these variables taken together form the configuration of a case, and these configurations later become the units of the configurational-comparative analysis. By doing so, researchers try to find explanations that are as broad-based as possible while still remaining sensitive to the fact that causality is often more complex.

Set theory is one variant of the configurational-comparative approach, and has been defined by Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 6) as follows: "Set-theoretic methods are approaches to analyzing social reality in which (a) the data consists of set membership scores; (b) relations between social phenomena are modeled in terms of set relations; and

(c) the results point to sufficient and necessary conditions and emphasize causal complexity in terms of INUS and SUIN causes²⁴." The use of set theory in the social sciences is not as new as it might seem. Indeed, a closer look reveals that they provides the underlying logic for many, mostly qualitative approaches in the social sciences that aim at giving a causal interpretation to patterns found in data. In their origin, set-theoretic methods follow Mill's (1858) methods of agreement and difference. The method of agreement is based on the idea that a phenomenon of interest observed across a number of cases can be explained by one or several independent variables that do not vary in value. For example, if we assume that autocracy is correlated to strong militaries and extensive natural resources, we expect to find the presence of both conditions in all cases of autocratic regimes under study. By contrast, the method of difference aims at examining whether variance in the independent variable results in different values for the phenomenon of interest in otherwise identical cases. In the social sciences, this usually happens in two steps: first, if a variable X is suspected to cause a certain effect, the researcher examines whether this variable is present in all cases featuring the phenomenon of interest Y. In a second step, he then investigates whether X is also present in cases that do not feature Y. If this is not the case, he can deduce that phenomenon Y is contingent upon cause X (Berg-Schlusser 2003, 110 – 113).

Mill's canons imply rather rigid assumptions about relationships of cause and effect, which are difficult to establish even in the "hard" sciences (Berg-Schlusser et al. 2009). However, although they may not "prove" any causal relationship, they constitute a valuable step toward Popper's (1959) principle of falsification: the elimination of irrelevant factors and the approximation of "conditions of occurrence" of a phenomenon, to a point where we can say that one hypothesis is preferable to its rivals (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 267). In fact, the various techniques of QCA are designed precisely to identify and narrow down such conditions of occurrence.

²⁴ INUS and SUIN refer to "Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient" for their effects (Mackie 1965), and respectively, "Sufficient but Unnecessary part of a configuration that is Insufficient but Necessary" for the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 79).

2.1.2. QCA: a Research Approach and a Technique

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is arguably the most formalized technique among all set-theoretic methods (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). However, it is also a research approach which has made its way into a number of social science disciplines, including political science and international relations (e.g. Thiem 2011), economics (e.g. Evans and Aligica 2008), management (e.g. Greckhamer 2011), legal studies and criminology (e.g. Arvind and Stirton 2010), education (e.g. Glaesser and Cooper 2011), and health policy research (e.g. Harkreader and Imershein 1999). Following King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 3-4), qualitative methods are based on the intensive examination of selected cases in order to develop a deep understanding of the researcher's phenomenon of interest. Quantitative methods, by contrast, are defined by their use of numerical measures of specific phenomena in order to achieve general statements and theories. In this sense, QCA must be understood as a quantitative method that uses qualitatively coded data (Cronqvist 2007). QCA is based on Boolean algebra, where a case is either in or out of a set, and in its most simple form uses binary-coded data, with 1 indicating a condition to be true (or present), and 0 indicating the condition to be false (or absent). The typical Boolean-based comparative analysis thus addresses the presence, or absence of conditions under which a certain outcome is obtained. The data is then represented in a truth table in order to identify prime implicants and formulate conditions of necessity and sufficiency (for extensive explanation of the technical aspects of QCA see Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

It is crucial to bear in mind that QCA does not take onboard some basic assumptions that underlie most statistical techniques. Berg-Schlosser (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 9) succinctly summarizes: "First, 'additivity' is no longer assumed: This means that the idea that each single cause has its own separate, independent impact on the outcome is abandoned and replaced by the assumption that 'conjunctural causation' is at work, meaning that several causes can be simultaneously present (or be combined, somehow), constituting a 'causal combination', for the outcome to occur. Second, a given causal combination may not be the only route to a specific result; other combinations also may be able to produce it. Third, the uniformity of causal effects is not assumed; on the contrary, a given condition may, combined with different others, sometimes act in favor of the

outcome, and sometimes, differently combined, act against it. Fourth, causality is not assumed to be symmetrical— rather, causal asymmetry is assumed, meaning that the presence and the absence of the outcome, respectively, may require different explanations." Lastly, and in line with Mill's earlier works, since causality is considered to be context and conjuncture specific, QCA rejects any form of permanent causality.

2.1.3. Strength and Limits of QCA

Since the beginning of the "Ragin Revolution" (Vaisey 2009) in 1987, there has been a number of debates on the virtues and limits of QCA. We shall focus only what we consider the most "salient" traits; for a more extensive discussion, see for instance Ragin (2000) and Berg-Schlosser (2003). Firstly, in our opinion, one of the main strengths of QCA is the fact that it combines aspects of both the qualitative and the quantitative research tradition. As such, it allows researchers to develop both an analytical strategy (defining variables) and to keep in touch with the holistic perspective of the cases examined (grouping the variables into configurations, which are then compared as units). When looking at the field of comparative politics, and particularly democratization, the utility of such an approach becomes very clear. Prior quantitative studies in democratization have in large part focused on a small set of structural factors assumed to be operating analogously across cases (see, for example, research related to modernization theory; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). In order to assess the conditions conducive to the emergence and the stability of democracy, most scholars have employed sophisticated statistical models that were able to test the correlations between basic socioeconomic factors such as the level of economic development or the level of literacy and industrialization (Lipset 1959) and democratic stability. However, the model of democratization employed in the present study is based on strategic interaction between different actors of the old regime and the opposition. Authors usually contend that statistical models are not well suited for this type of analysis, because the conditions required for the successful use of regression-based modes of explanation do not apply. Hall (2006, 26), for example, claims that "the task of producing quantifiable measures of the relevant variables requires such oversimplification that the resulting proxies distort reality beyond reasonable limits". In contrast to the statistical approach, the empirical observations in QCA do not enter the analysis in their raw form, but are interpreted in

relation to a theoretical construct, which is why Ragin calls them "qualitative data" (Ragin 2000, 9). The use of such data is advantageous because it enables researchers to code theoretical constructs that cannot be observed directly (for example democracy, or degree of corporatism) qualitatively instead of using (potentially erroneous) dummy variables (Cronqvist 2007). On the flipside, qualitative coding depends in large part on the conception a researcher has of the underlying theoretical construct and therefore cannot be entirely objective.

Secondly, QCA is a method which is particularly well suited for small and medium-N research. Even though it suffers from the same shortcomings as other small-N research methods (for extensive discussion see King, Keohane and Verba 1994), it is still better placed than statistical approaches for circumventing the problem of "many variables, small number of cases" which is so common in comparative politics (Berg-Schlosser 2003, 105 - 106; Landmann 2000)²⁵. As Ragin (1987) criticized, oftentimes researchers of the mainstream quantitative traditions recommend simply to increase the number of observations, which potentially leads to conceptual overstretching (Sartori 1971, 1034 – 1035) and a dilution of the comparability of the cases. On the other hand, many qualitative methods are also ill equipped to deal with research designs that feature more than a handful of cases, because they have no formal way of describing conjunctural and multiple causality (Cronqvist 2007). QCA, on the other hand, offers procedures to uncover complex causality in both case ranges, with calculations that follow clearly defined rules. In fact, another advantage of QCA techniques is their transparency. QCA offers tools that are both formalized and replicable- two aspects that many scholars would consider indispensable for good scientific research (see, for example, King, Keohane and Verba 1994). The rules of Boolean algebra are relatively straightforward even for novices, and thinking in dichotomic terms often feels "natural" when looking at social facts. However, dichotomization in QCA also can be a problem, especially when we have variables which, for empirical or theoretical reasons, can take on more than two values. To accommodate for this possibility, new variants of QCA such as fuzzy QCA and multi-value QCA have

²⁵ Statistical approaches are ill suited for most small-N comparative research designs, because often the addition or subtraction of a single case is sufficient to significantly alter the result of a regression analysis. Additionally, the proper application of many premises of statistical approaches (normal distribution; random sampling etc) cannot be guaranteed.

been developed, but the integration of variables pertaining to one framework into another still remains complicated (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

Lastly, QCA as a method can contribute to producing "modest generalizations" (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). As we have said before, the search for "explicit connections" (Rihoux 2008) is an important part of any scientific endeavor. In fact, only generalization makes it possible to achieve explanations that are not "individualized", and therefore nothing more than an accumulation of descriptions. Yet, generalizations achieved using QCA techniques need to be treated with caution. Since QCA in principle is based on Mill's methods, they are subject to the same restrictions Cohen and Nagel already identified in 1934 (see Berg-Schlosser 2003, 113): Although Mill's methods can be used to falsify hypotheses, they cannot be used to actually validate theories. Additionally, QCA does not have rules like the 5 percent significance level to confirm results (Cronqvist 2007), and efforts to generalize need to remain inside the initial "homogeneity space" within which the empirical data set is contained (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). By consequence, the results obtained by QCA are *per se* not generalizable. However, one of QCA's key strengths is singling out "conditions of occurrence" of phenomena; therefore, the approach is well placed to develop and test hypotheses on "middle-range theories" (Merton 1968). In that sense, while the external validity of QCA results may be low, internal validity will be significantly higher in small-and medium sized research settings.

2.1.4. Appropriateness of Method

As Hall (2003) has said, researchers looking to choose a method should aim to achieve a good fit between ontology and methodology. In the framework of this thesis, we believe QCA to be a good fit partly because of theoretical expectations about the underlying causal processes at hand, and partly because of technical considerations. Firstly, we are interested in set-relations, as opposed to simple correlations. By extension, we believe that our research project is best explained in terms of necessary and sufficient causes: we aim to show primarily that either one of our conditions (crisis of the authoritarian regime; mass mobilizations) taken alone is necessary, but insufficient to produce the outcome "minimal democracy". In our opinion, standard statistical techniques are not well suited for such a research goal, because the correlations obtained with a

regression analysis do not tell us anything about the nature and direction of the causality involved. Identifying INUS and SUIN conditions, on the other hand, is one of the key strengths of QCA.

Secondly, we have strong reason to believe that the outcome we are interested in (minimal democracy) is the result of a specific kind of causal complexity (combination of two conditions: crisis of the authoritarian regime, and mass mobilisations). The two are mutually reinforcing: While mass mobilization can contribute significantly to the creation of a disruption in the continuity of the authoritarian regime (Martins 1986), a crisis within the ruling clique in turn encourages what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call "resurrection of civil society". Therefore both conditions are related and would result in multicollinearity in a standard statistical analysis. In QCA, however, this does not constitute an obstacle to the analysis, since we are not looking to find the isolated effect of one variable, or finding the most powerful predictor for explaining variance in our outcome.

On a more technical note, QCA is a good fit for our thesis both in terms of the size of the dataset- 25 cases would be considered a classic medium-N research project – and in terms of the nature of our data, which is mostly of a qualitative nature. With reference to the first point, sample size, using QCA is very advantageous since correlations derived from standard regression in a sample as small as ours might be deemed spurious (Mahoney 2003, 363). With reference to the latter point, data quality, QCA does not require primary data to be quantitative. In fact, it is perfectly possible to work with "subjective", or qualitative data, as long as it is possible to transform these data into categories or numbers. Additionally, a set-theoretic perspective is useful for this kind of data, since it helps maintaining a strong link between the meaning of a concept and its operationalization, and therefore avoids that measures become oversimplified.

Last but not least, we are interested in producing knowledge that can potentially be generalized to cases other than the ones examined in our sample. As we have elaborated before, generalizations derived from QCA work best for middle-range theories, which are limited in conceptual (and often regional) range, and do not try to determine the overarching independent variable that would operate in all social processes. The theories

on democratization which are the focus of this thesis are classic middle-range theories, and therefore lend themselves well to verification using Boolean techniques. Furthermore, we believe that by identifying the key conditions leading to the occurrence of our outcome of interest (democratization) in a selection of cases as diverse as the one used in our sample, we have grounds to assume with a reasonable degree of certainty that our results would be replicated at least in cases that share commonalities with the ones examined by us (i.e. other Third Wave transitions). Such modest generalization is maybe less impressive than the creation of grand theories, but also more substantial (Merton 1968).

2.1.5. Choice of QCA Type

As Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend, the choice of a QCA subtype should be made in function of the nature of the variables at hand. If all conditions are dichotomous by nature of the concepts, crisp set QCA (csQCA) should be used. If on the other hand, there are conditions that do not easily lend themselves to dichotomization without losing important information, fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) or multi-value QCA (mvQCA) should be the preferred approach. While fsQCA was designed as an alternative approach to csQCA in cases where conditions need fine-grained scaling of membership scores, mvQCA is considered an extension of csQCA and still retains the main principles of crisp analysis. However, it also allows limited use of multi-value variables and therefore researchers can avoid a forced dichotomization of conditions.

Due to its novelty, mvQCA as a set-theoretic technique received a lot of criticism since its inception in 2004 (for the methodological debate, see Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Vink and van Vliet 2009; Thiem and Dusa 2013; Thiem 2013). Nonetheless, we chose to work with mvQCA as opposed to fsQCA for two reasons. Firstly, since only one of our explanatory conditions, "mass mobilization", is a variable where differences in the level of mobilization are important for the analysis all the while our other conditions remain dichotomous, our analysis is best suited for a crisp-set approach. Naturally, the transformation of ordinary type of data (such as the CTMMI²⁶ index for our mass mobilization variable) into categories, as is necessary for the use of mvQCA, involves a

²⁶ The CTMMI refers to the Comparative Transitional Mass Mobilization Index, as explained further in this chapter.

certain loss of data that could be avoided by using fuzzy scales. In our opinion, however, the information loss is not substantial enough to impact the results of our analysis. In fact, as Hermann and Cronqvist (2006, 2) show, mvQCA constitutes the most suitable method for analyzing case sets which necessitate the conservation of some, but not all raw-data information. This is precisely the case for our thesis: While we still need the conservation of enough raw data information to enable us to decide whether to classify a case into "high levels of mass mobilization", "low levels of mass mobilization" or "no mass mobilization", we do not need to know the relative position of countries within these categories to assess their contribution to the democratization process (for the theoretical debate see O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986 vs Bunce 2000 and Bermeo 1997). For example, it is irrelevant to our analysis to know whether Mali had higher or lower levels of mobilization than Benin if we know that both form part of the set "countries with low levels of mass mobilization". Secondly, we prefer working with mvQCA as opposed to fsQCA due to the nature of our outcome variable, which is dichotomous. In such a setting, using fsQCA is problematic, because fuzzy-set analysis is designed to use degrees of variation on the causal configuration to explain degrees of variation on the outcome. If the outcome (such as democratization) is not, or cannot be operationalized in a way other than in dichotomous terms, there is no real rationale for the use of fuzzy analysis (Vink and van Vliet 2009).

2.2. Conceptual Framework

The following section is dedicated to establishing our conceptual framework. The purpose is to define and calibrate our conditions. In set-theoretic language, calibration refers to the process of assigning set membership scores to cases. In essence, this process requires firstly the operationalization of the concepts at the basis of our conditions, and secondly, a decision on how these concepts are measured.

2.2.1. Definition and Calibration of "Minimal Democracy" (Outcome)

In Boolean language, the outcome condition refers to the phenomenon to be explained. As we have stated in the previous chapter, our research focus are transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. A transition first and foremost designates "the interval between one political regime and another" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6). Hence, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are "intermediate phases" between the dissolution of an old, autocratic regime and the establishment of a new, democratic one (Cortona 1991, 316). A transition begins with the introduction of some democratic measure into the system, and comes to an end when new rules of governance have been established – in the case of a successful democratic transition, typically by the holding of a founding election (Lindberg, 2006, pp.140-141). We consider it therefore a composite variable, comprising two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes: political liberalization and democratization (Przeworski 1986; Welsh 1994)²⁷.

A priori, the starting point of a transition can either be full-blown authoritarianism, or a hybrid regime. Authoritarianism in this thesis is defined as a form of government where the opposition has no viable means to achieve power (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). Following Haggard and Kaufman (1995), "the key difference between authoritarian regimes and their democratic successors is that the rules of the latter guarantee opposition groups the right to challenge incumbent rulers and policies, and to replace those rulers

²⁷ This distinction is important in order to differentiate transitions to democracy from a simple change in the nature and/or composition of the authoritarian regime. Political liberalization generally refers to a relaxation of previous government restrictions, usually in the realm of civil and political freedoms (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), whereas democratization refers to the introduction of some institutional measure of democracy (Polity IV User Manual).

through competitive elections". Such a definition therefore allows for a wide range of autocracies to be included, for example monarchies, sultanistic regimes, bureaucratic authoritarianism and single party regimes. All these regimes are characterized by the fact that democratic institutions do not even exist. By contrast, a regime in which democratic institutions exist but are deeply flawed is a hybrid regime (Levitsky and Way 2010). For the purpose of our analysis, however, we treat "autocracies" as a residual category, encompassing both regimes that do not meet any of the criteria for a democracy, or only partly meet those criteria. We believe that such an approach is justified because our analysis is centered on events that occur after the breakdown of the old regime. Therefore, assuming structural factors do not influence transition dynamics, any prior institutional arrangements are irrelevant for our thesis.

The end point, or "outcome", of a successful transition is democracy. Democracy, as pointed out by philosopher G.W. Gallie, is perhaps "*the* appraisive political concept *par excellence*" (Gallie 1956, 184), and there is hardly any other concept that has engendered as much disagreement about its meaning. J. Peter Euben (1993, 478) captured the crux of the dispute as taking place between the "contemporary consensus view" that "democracy is largely a matter of choosing among elites in periodic elections" and "what is literally meant: the kratia (power, rule, mastery) by the demos". By consequence, scholars have witnessed throughout the years a veritable proliferation of "democracy with adjectives": guided democracy, tutelary democracy, popular democracy, people's democracy, unitary democracy, consensual democracy - "thinly-disguised attempts to justify something that was not at all or only remotely democratic" (Schmitter 1991, 20). While the general understanding of what constitutes a democratic regime has evolved during time, Huntington (1991, 7) confirms that by the 1970s a consensus had formed among scholars around the procedural definition of democracy provided first by Schumpeter (1942) and later refined by Dahl (1971):

"Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, [we define] a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, democracy involves the two dimensions –

contestation and participation – that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns."

While certainly restrictive, such a definition presents several advantages. Firstly, it allows an easy classification of regimes into democratic and non-democratic while still preserving the idea of the existence of certain civil rights and freedoms pertaining to the political realm. Secondly, whereas there is vast disagreement among scholars which elements should be added to a more liberal conception of democracy, most scholars today would agree that Dahl's categories of competition and participation are the basic criteria without which no regime could be called democratic (O'Donnell 1996, 35; Merkel 2004, 42). Finally, such a definition works well with the main database on regime change we work with (Freedom House), as they use fairly similar coding criteria. Freedom House's list of electoral democracies, a largely under-utilized database that qualitatively assesses regimes on an annual basis, assigns the designation "electoral democracy" to countries that exhibit (a) a competitive, multiparty political system; (b) universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses); (c) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will; and (d) significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning. Although Freedom House's rating process also includes questions related to extended civil liberties, such as the rule of Law and personal autonomy and individual rights, these subcategories are not taken into account when deciding whether or not to classify a country as an electoral democracy, and therefore we consider that the differences between their coding criteria and ours are negligible.

"Democracy" in our thesis is a dichotomous variable, in that a transition either ends in minimal democracy (value: 1) or not (value: 0). In order to distinguish between regimes that are minimal democracies and those that aren't, we employ the Freedom House list of electoral democracies, a relatively under-utilized database. Even though the Freedom House list provides explicit information on minimal democracies only from 1989 onwards,

we were able to fill potential empty cells through a manual verification of Freedom House "Freedom in the World reports" compiled by Brownlee (2009). We believe this method to be appropriate, given that Freedom House's definition of democracy is a direct derivative of Huntington and Dahl's concepts and therefore most closely related to the definition employed in this thesis.

The choice of this database may seem arbitrary at first, given that there are a variety of sources – quantitative and qualitative - on political regimes based on reasonably similar definitions of democracy available. On the qualitative end, the most extensive source is the compilation of Third Wave transitions elaborated by Huntington (1991). On the quantitative end, there are two other databases on regime change relevant for our topic of study: On one hand, a new dataset developed by Geddes et al. (2012) provides transition information for 280 autocratic regimes in 110 countries (with more than a million population) from 1946 to 2010, identifying the nature of their government, the duration of their rule, how regimes exit power, how much violence occurs during transitions and whether or not the succeeding regimes are democratic. On the other hand, there is the Polity IV database that monitors the degree of institutionalized democracy and autocracy of all states in the world in a time-series format spanning from 1800 to 2010. The "Polity score" captures the regime authority spectrum of any given country in a specific recording year on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) and also provides information on dates and magnitude of Polity changes (i.e. transitions to new forms of government) (Polity IV Codebook).

When taking a closer look at these sources, however, it becomes clear that they are inappropriate for our thesis. The dataset of Huntington, for example, is incomplete and does not provide sufficient information on what criteria were used to distinguish between democratic and semi-democratic regimes, and whether semi-democratic regimes were actually classified as minimal democracies. On the quantitative end, the Geddes (2012) dataset employs a definition of democracy that is too large. Geddes et al. (2012, 6) define a democratic political system as "a regime in which the executive achieved power through (a) a direct competitive election in which at least 10% of the total population (equivalent of 40% of the adult male population) were eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or (b) indirect

election by a body at least 60% of which was elected in direct, reasonably fair competitive elections; or (c) constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive." Her definition therefore is also based on Dahl's two criteria, but her minimum requirement for suffrage (10% of the total population) differs from Huntington's idea that "virtually all of the adult population" should be eligible to vote. Since we believe that the opportunity to express one's political preference by ballot is one of the core elements of modern-day democracy, we cannot use the Geddes database for the purpose of differentiating between democratic and autocratic regimes.

The Polity project, on the other hand, is among the most widely used indices of democracy and is often given credit in terms of the reliability of the index: the coding rules are clearly specified in the users' manual, the component variables are presented in disaggregate form and several coders are used in the coding process²⁸. However, it relies on an institutionalist definition of democracy (excluding civil rights and liberties, a crucial element of many liberalization processes) and does not offer a theoretical justification for the way the component variables are aggregated to a single regime index. Most importantly, since Polity does not provide a cut-off point above which countries are classified as democratic, it is less useful for deciding whether or not a given transition ended in minimal democracy²⁹.

²⁸ See Hadenius and Teorell (2005), Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Chapter 5 in Rydland et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion of the comparability and quality of democracy indices in general.

²⁹ On one hand, a positive POLITY score of a given regime generally indicates that the regime's institutional structure is more democratic than autocratic. However, it is difficult to determine a threshold; when is a POLITY score high enough to confirm that the regime has reached the status of a minimal democracy? The Polity codebook remains silent on this question. Even though it is possible, by looking at the combined values of EXREC (the executive recruitment concept) and POLCOMP (the competitiveness of participation concept) to identify several scenarios that would allow for the possibility of having a minimal democracy (or higher), such a classification implies a great deal of arbitrariness on the part of the researcher. For instance, POLCOMP values of 6 could potentially be associated with electoral democracy, but the Polity codebook does not provide indications for which country cases such an assumption is true. Instead, the authors only state that such a possibility is "less likely, although not inconceivable" (Polity IV User Manual, 78). Therefore, we would need to manually verify each country case to which such a score is attributed, provided that EXREC scores also allow for the possibility of the country to be democratic.

2.2.2. Definition and Calibration of “Crisis of the Authoritarian Regime” (Condition I)

In the framework of this analysis, the most elusive concept is without doubt the crisis of the authoritarian regime, as developed first by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). Ironically enough, the authors never actually attempt to define this variable clearly and unambiguously. According to them, a crisis is synonymous to a split of the ruling elite in reformist ("softliner") and conservative ("hardliner") factions, generally over questions of how to achieve legitimacy and the problem of how to consolidate or institutionalize the regime. However, they do not elaborate further, and only specify one proxy indicator by which such a crisis could be identified – the presence, or absence, of serious and committed reform propositions. Therefore, defining and clearly delimitating this variable in order to make it operable will be one of the main contributions of our thesis.

First and foremost, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is a disintegration of the ruling block’s internal cohesion. A member of the ruling block (the authoritarian elite) is any individual who has some form of privileged position within an authoritarian regime, either from the bureaucracy, governing officials, officers within the security sectors (particularly the Armed Forces), heads of strategic economic corporations or any other organizations which is of intrinsic value to the survival of the authoritarian regime. These individuals have a high degree of privilege in terms of tenure in offices and access to state resources compared to the rest of the population (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, pp.86). In times of regime crisis, the authoritarian elite can become divided in two groups: pro-reformists and anti-reformists. Pro-reformists are individuals who want to open the regime’s base of support through reforms and potentially electoral means. This does not make them fully opposed to a violent crackdown of opposition forces, but this option is not their favourite in the face of growing popular discontent (Crescenzi, 1999, pp. 194). Anti-reformists are members of the authoritarian elite who want to preserve the status quo and are therefore more comfortable with the use of coercive means in the face of growing pressure against their regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 14-15).

It is very important to distinguish such a crisis of the authoritarian regime from simple tensions between different factions of the ruling clique. Authors studying different

types of authoritarianisms have long contended that authoritarian regimes are not homogenous and that there are almost always tensions between different members that compete for influence within the regime. Such tensions may not be visible to the public eye and may persist for a very long time without necessarily threatening the cohesion of the regime as a whole, which explains why so many authoritarian regimes can survive external threats to their rule fairly well. A crisis, on the other hand, implies that the power balance between reformist and conservative forces is shifted in such a way as to allow reformist forces to take the reins and to impose their agenda onto reluctant regime hardliners. Such a shift can be caused by a number of factors, the investigation of which is beyond the scope of our thesis. We do, however, believe that large popular mobilizations are one prime factor in changing the stance of certain key regime actors and deciding the struggle for control between regime factions in favor of softliners. In the spirit of O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory, therefore, our first explanatory condition, "crisis of the authoritarian regime", designates a rupture in the unity of the ruling block, following which softliners succeed in taking over control from the hardliner regime factions.

Just like our outcome, our explanatory condition "Crisis of the authoritarian regime" is dichotomous, meaning that we witness either the presence of a crisis (value: 1) or its absence (value: 0). However, here we face a practical dilemma. As Martins (1986, 75) has noted, "the main difficulty of an investigation into the genesis and development of a crisis under an authoritarian regime comes from the lack of visible or reliable indicators. (...) As a consequence, the evaluation of critical situations must rely heavily upon the analyst's intuitive perceptions and procedures, which substantially increases the margin of error in the analysis of a transition process." It is virtually impossible to know what exactly causes softliners to emerge and how their cost-benefit calculations evolve during a given situation, as strategic factors are extremely difficult to measure. Huntington (1991, 593) claims that decisions may be based on a number of factors. On one hand, the costs of staying in power may be considered too important, particularly for military governments. On the other hand, the fear of holding onto power and losing it to a strengthened opposition may prompt regime actors to think that losing office is better than losing life. Softliners may also believe that they would be elected if they ran in fair elections; they may opt for democracy out of opportunism and a desire to reap certain benefits (such as

IMF loans and US support), or simply out of a genuine conviction that democracy is the "right" form of government.

Scholars have tried in different ways to avoid this problem and many attempts have been made to identify "objective signals" (Przeworski 1986, 55) that allow approximating whether a given regime is going through an internal crisis. Przeworski, for example, stresses the strategic postures of different regime actors and classifies them by their risk aversion. According to him, scholars trying to establish that a regime crisis is present should ask whether or not changes in circumstances may have increased risks for certain key factions and led them to change their preferences. When investigating such change in circumstances, one may distinguish between "internal crises", i.e. change that originates from problems related to the "internal economy" (Martins 1986) of the regime, and "external crises", i.e. crises related to society-level changes that have an impact on the strategic calculations of regime actors. As Martins notes, authoritarian regimes form some sort of inner world with specific interests, tensions and rules of equilibrium. The regime's operational capability depends on how these elements interact, and they do not necessarily correspond to the existing social interests, tensions and rules of equilibrium prevailing in society. Changes related to the internal economy of authoritarian regimes could therefore concern the regime's decision-making structure, its ideological coherence, rules of succession, etc.

Przeworski (1986, 55) claims that objective signals for a crisis of the regime's internal economy are, for example, the imminent death of the founding and not yet succeeded leader of a regime; and the impending collapse of the authoritarian institutions, whatever the cause. Stepan (1986, 76) particularly stresses the corporate interests of military governments, claiming that the perception of an intense threat to the integrity of the military-as-institution (f.ex. through disastrous public policies carried out by the authoritarian regime) can lead certain factions of the military to move towards liberalization in an attempt to transcend the crisis and reequilibrate the situation, as was the case for example in Greece and Peru. Cardoso (1986) analyzes the Brazilian transition and notes that circumstances were favorable to liberalization, as the authoritarian regime was in a critical stage in the battle for presidential succession and Geisel was faced with opposition from within the Armed Forces (as evidenced by the fact that the opposition

party was running a political campaign with a General as presidential candidate). Garreton (1986) adds ideological shifts to the objective signals for an authoritarian regime crisis. In his analysis of the Chilean transition, he notes that the regime's fragmentation was evidenced by the progressive disappearance of the economic team that had formed the dominant current after 1975.

External crises originate from changes on the society-level and affect the strategic calculations of the ruling clique. Martins (1986) identifies six types of such changes. Firstly, the growth and/or diversification of societal demands can lead to social unrest, the appearance of new collective actors, and a new capacity of groups and classes to express themselves politically. Such developments that evidence a manifest loss of legitimacy can undermine the apparent unity of the dominant bloc and provoke changes in the stance of key actors. Garreton (1986), for example, stresses the importance of the emergence of independent actors from the capitalist class and from sectors of the middle classes that broadened the debate about democratization after 1980 in Chile. Middlebrook (1986) claims that the political opening in Mexico in 1977 was the result (among other factors) of the emergence of several new opposition political parties outside the officially recognized party system. Secondly, the diversification of strategic group's interests or by new coalitions among them can erode the regime's support and lead key actors to believe that a new policy orientation is necessary in order to hold onto power. Whitehead (1986), for example, claims that the rupture of the military-peasant pact was an essential ingredient to the disintegration of the Bolivian military regime in 1978. Thirdly, incongruence between societal requirements and the ideological stand or the operational performance of the authoritarian regime (obsolescence of values, inefficiency or corruption of the bureaucracy, etc.) can also lead to divisions within the authoritarian regime. This element is particularly important if alternative political projects emerge at the same time, and if these projects can mobilize the support needed for a redefinition of political coalitions. Fourthly, the emergence of an economic crisis could affect the regime's ability to control the economy and/or allocate financial rewards to its supporters. Kaufman (1986), for example, claims that economic crises are triggers for regime change, as they erode middle sector and capitalist support for the regime. Cardoso's analysis of the Brazilian transition shows that the evolution of the international economic crisis and the worsening foreign debt lessened the authoritarian regime's room for manoeuvre considerably and led to

criticism and disobedience of leading industrialists who used their support for economic liberalism as vector for the expression of demands for political freedoms (1986, 144). According to Cardoso, this unsettled the linchpins of the systems of alliances that sustained the authoritarian military regime. Finally, Przeworski (1986) claims that foreign pressure to reform or even outright intervention can also contribute to creating a crisis within the authoritarian regime.

However, most of the indicators identified by the literature refer to probabilities, i.e. to conditions under which a crisis of the regime is most likely, and cannot be used to determine without doubt that, indeed, a split within the authoritarian regime has taken place. Analysts can be certain about the presence of softliners only if and when they publicly reveal themselves. Following this logic, our proxy measures of a regime crisis are designed to identify softliners on the basis of their public actions. In order to do justice to our definition of "crisis", we first need to distinguish between indicators that show the presence of softliners within the regime, and indicators that unequivocally demonstrate their superiority in the power struggle with regime hardliners. Both are necessary for us to label a situation as "crisis of the authoritarian regime".

Firstly, (1) softliners are present when some members of the ruling block publicly denounce the regime and/or its policies. This includes the appeal to outside support in favor of the overthrow of the regime (Przeworski 1986). This indicator seems like a relatively strong proof of disunity within the authoritarian regime. In any organization, individuals that remain loyal to the organization itself and its goals will refrain from publicly criticizing either the leadership or its policies in order to avoid destabilization. On the other hand, if dissatisfaction is becoming too great for certain individuals, they may choose to carry their grief out into the open where the conflict is no longer confined to the "interior economy" of the ruling clique.

Secondly, (2) we can confirm the presence of softliners in situations in which government officials charged with a certain portfolio quietly change government policies within their area of responsibility to introduce new ideas or steer the authoritarian regime into a direction of greater openness (Hawkins 1998). For instance, Bahrain's crown prince Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa, the principal softliner of the Bahraini regime, gained

influence largely as part of a broad reform project called the "Economic Vision 2030" which established a series of reform-minded institutions and was considered by many observers a direct challenge to the way the hardliner Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman had been handling the economy since Bahrain's independence from Britain (Hammond 2012).

Thirdly, (3) the defection of key regime supporters, such as the Armed Forces, and the refusal to obey orders by certain government branches, is also strongly susceptible to indicate softliners, and potentially a regime crisis. As Oberschall (1996, 100) explains, in a crisis, when the regime weakens and the opposition might emerge the winner, agents of the state lose fear of their superiors and [...] build some credit with the opposition. For instance, Krenz (1990, 134 – 136) points out that Communist party chief Honnecker in East Germany ordered repression to stop the Monday night marches in Leipzig, but his plans were thwarted when police and Army refused to execute his orders.

In order to determine whether those softliners are predominant within the regime, and whether a true crisis situation as defined in this thesis is present, we look at two other indicators:

Fourthly, (4) a regime crisis is present when members of the authoritarian regime propose, and carry through, credible, serious and committed reform plans (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). This is the proxy indicator identified deductively by O'Donnell and Schmitter themselves. According to their logic, there is no liberalization without a prior regime crisis, or a struggle between softliners and hardliners. Therefore, if we are able to identify reforms, we can necessarily conclude not only that such a crisis has been present, but also that the balance of power between hardliners and softliners was such that softliners managed to impose their agenda onto the hardliner faction. This line of argument is problematic for two reasons. First, it is based upon almost axiomatic reasoning, given that the indicator only holds if the basic assumption is accepted to be true: an authoritarian regime only carries out reforms if it has previously lost its unity and softliners have emerged as the driving force. Secondly, we have shown in the literature review that this is exactly the point of contention between the two main theories. Whereas O'Donnell and Schmitter claim that there is no transition without crisis, Bratton and Van de Walle and

Bunce argue that an authoritarian regime may adopt reforms because they are forced upon its leadership, which remains relatively united throughout the transition process. Therefore, the problem remains: how to differentiate reform propositions originating from a crisis between hardliners and softliners from reforms forced onto a reluctant regime that keeps its internal unity? In other words, how can we really be sure that reforms were the consequence of a crisis? This problem is mitigated by the methodology of our study: By first identifying softliners within the regime via our indicators 1 – 3 we know that a power struggle within the ruling clique has actually taken place. Therefore, reforms stemming from this power struggle credibly suggest that they were the direct consequence of this struggle, and necessarily, of softliner predominance.

Finally, (5) by implication, continued repression and the use of excessive force on reform-minded elements can be considered an indicator for the absence or the weakness of softliners and the predominance of hardliner factions, and therefore the absence of a regime crisis as defined in this study. The bloody repression of the Tiananmen square protests in China in 1989, for example, clearly demonstrated that the authoritarian government was united enough to act as one in order to defend the integrity of the regime under threat.

Unfortunately there is no readily-available database for our variable "crisis of the authoritarian regime". We therefore needed to create our own database by means of systematic qualitative analysis of our case sample³⁰. To this end we relied both on primary and secondary literature, as well as a variety of quantitative databases. In order to identify our indicator "reform propositions", we used databases that register democratic progress on an annual basis in target countries such as the Polity dataset, the Freedom House annual reports and the Inter-Legions Unit Reports of the Economist. Furthermore we had access to sources such as the Europa Yearbook, CIA Facts and Files and primary literature such as journals, political commentaries and newspaper articles reporting on legislative change in target countries. The data we were interested in was primarily related to changes in political and civil liberties, i.e. legislative changes carried out by the authoritarian regime with a view of allowing greater contestation and participation to take place. For instance,

³⁰ The database is available in its entirety in the annex of this thesis.

the extension of the right to vote to formerly disenfranchised groups of the population, or the removal of bans on opposition parties were both considered key reforms potentially indicating a regime crisis. For our indicators "defections", "repression", as well as our indicators "public discourse of members of the authoritarian regime" and "policy change in government portfolios", we used mainly primary sources such as journal articles and archives, but also secondary literature such as doctoral theses and scholarly articles where appropriate. A resume of our findings can be found in Table I.

Table I
[Presence/Absence of Authoritarian Regime Crisis]

	Transition Attempt	Result	AR Crisis
<i>Transitions in LA/SE</i>	1982 – 1983 Argentina	Success	Yes
	1976 – 1979 Spain	Success	Yes
	1974 – 1976 Portugal	Success	Yes
	1979 – 1990 Chile	Success	Yes
	1973 – 1974 Greece	Success	Yes
	1988 – 1993 Paraguay	Success	Yes
	1980 – 1984 Uruguay	Success	Yes
	1978 – 1980 Bolivia	Failure	No
<i>Transitions in Africa</i>	1988 – 1992 Algeria	Failure	No
	1992 - 1994 Tanzania	Failure	Yes
	1990 – 1991 Zambia	Success	Yes
	1991 – 1992 Mali	Success	Yes
	1993 – 1994 Malawi	Success	Yes
	1990 – 1991 Benin	Success	Yes
	1987 – 1993 Nigeria (1)	Failure	No
	1998 – 1999 Nigeria (2)	Success	Yes
	1990 – 1992 Kenya	Failure	No
	1991 – 1993 Togo	Failure	No
	1990 – 1992 Cameroon	Failure	No
<i>EE</i>	1990 – 1991 Mongolia	Success	Yes
	1988 – 1991 Poland	Success	Yes
	1990 – 1992 Romania	Success	Yes
<i>SEA</i>	1978 – 1979 South Korea	Failure	No
	1983 – 1986 Philippines	Success	Yes
	1998 - 1999 Indonesia	Success	Yes

2.2.3. Definition and Calibration of "Mass Mobilization" (Condition II)

Societal forces opposed to the authoritarian regime carry through mass mobilization. In our thesis, those forces are defined as "any group that has the necessary resources to organise and mobilise in order to push for a regime change" and that possesses some bargaining power vis-à-vis the regime (Crescenski 1999, 194). Such bargaining power generally stems from sheer numbers; organized protest in the framework of a democratic transition generally involves significant numbers of people. In the Philippines, for instance, the popular uprising dubbed "People Power Revolution" that forced President Marcos into exile involved as many as 500.000 ordinary Filipinos, as well as a number of religious, political and military leaders (Shin 2008, 100).

Protest events, on the other hand, are "basic units of an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities or other political actors" (Kriesi 1997, 53). For the purpose of this thesis, three aspects of protest become particularly significant: (1) Origin/Timing of mobilization; (2) scope of mobilization; and (3) strategies of mobilization.

(1) Origin/Timing of mobilization

Earlier research on collective action argued that social movements were spontaneous, unorganized and irrational phenomena that occurred in highly charged contexts characterized by mass enthusiasm, social contagion and mass hysteria (Morris 1999, 531). Aristide R. Zolberg (1972) qualifies them as "moments of madness", and "times of extreme outrage and collective hopes, not of particular interest and personal calculation" (Thompson 2000, 9). By contrast, more recent approaches formulated, among others, by Tarrow (1994), Tilly (1978), McCarthy and Zald (1977), Gamson (1975) and McAdam (1982) stress agency, strategizing, reasoning, analyses and rationality in the causation and the direction of movements. In fact, many of these scholars insist on the concept of political opportunity structure to account for movement origins. Political opportunity structure refers to the "consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure" (Tarrow 1994, 85).

According to Tarrow, particular emphasis needs to be placed on the mobilization of resources external to the group, since potential challengers are unlikely to generate and sustain movements because of their weak social position. Movements are likely to emerge only when favorable changes occur in the external political system, the likelihood of which significantly increases when divisions develop among political elites. However, such a model underestimates challenging groups' capacity to generate and sustain collective action and is therefore only partly useful to describe transitions to democracy. Its main limitation stems from the assumption that external political opportunities must first become available before challenging groups can generate collective action, even though empirical examples (e.g., Kurzman 1996; Rasler 1996) suggest that enormous collective action can burst forth precisely when the political authorities close ranks and when heavy repression is unleashed. As Morris (2000, 447) remarks, "in some instances collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously; in other instances political opportunities can clear the way for collective action. The temporal sequence is to be determined on empirical grounds rather than on a priori theorizing". Our hypothesis is based on a similar assumption: protest movements may pre-exist divisions within the authoritarian regime, and even provoke and amplify such divisions. This, in turn, generates favorable opportunities for other challengers and creates circumstances in which political openings are more likely to take place. Therefore, the origins of mass mobilizations as relevant for our thesis may be situated either before concrete liberalization efforts are undertaken by the authoritarian regime or during the transition process itself.

(2) Scope of mobilization

As Stepan (1986) has noted, protest movements can be diffuse or coordinated and can be organized by various sectors of society³¹. Although they do not always involve the

³¹ Whitehead (1986, 55) for example points to a series of conflicts and protest movements that preceded the announcement of an electoral timetable by the Bolivian Banzer regime in 1987; these protest campaigns rallied students, workers and peasants around a coalition that ranged from progressive Churchmen to Communist Trade Unions. Garreton (1986, 113) on the other hand describes a series of "national protests" in his account of the Chilean transition in which activists from many different spheres of society were implicated: opposition parties, Church representatives, left-wing political organizations, students and labor unions.

same protagonists, they generally mobilize a wide array of actors. These groups are united in that they are excluded from the polity and have no political access and share the common goal of obtaining it. They also share some common identity based upon their understanding of their shared interests and by their imagining solidarity with others (Bayat 2005). Oberschall (2000, 43) for example explains that the lack of a credible Communist ideology in the last years of the Soviet Union enabled the rapid formation of a collective identity among thousands of ordinary hitherto apolitical citizens, symbolized by the emergence of a common consciousness of “We the people” against “them, the Communists”.

While it does happen that a large turnout of collective actors does not translate into political gain (see Hornsey et al. 2006), empirical evidence shows that successful transitions (such as, for example, the 1989 transitions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia) often involve numbers that range from several hundred thousand participants to millions (Bunce 2003). Anthony Oberschall (2000, 30 – 31) explains this as follows: In an authoritarian regime, rulers need only the conformity of the ruled, not their votes. Challengers to the rule therefore need to create a negative inducement (a cost) in order for their demands to be heard. This cost is usually created by protest, disorder or trouble- visible denials of the regime’s claim to legitimacy both on the domestic and the international level. On one hand, the challenger offers to stop disorder if the regime yields on substantive demands and/or is willing to negotiate. On the other hand, the regime can choose to either concede all or at least part of the demands, or to exercise repression. However, a big factor influencing the regime’s decision-making during contention is the challenger’s capacity to mobilize supporters in the face of regime threats. Bermeo (1997) argues that the significance of popular protest is found precisely in elite calculations regarding the strength of the protesters. By consequence, a wider participation of civil society in mass protests ensures that the cost of repressing dissent outweighs the cost of liberalizing, therefore making a transition to democracy more likely. In South Korea, for instance, street demonstrations referred to as the "June Popular Uprising" forced the Chun government into deciding whether to quell demonstrations bloodily just a few months before the scheduled Summer Olympics and risk international condemnation, or to accept the demands of antigovernment forces for the direct election of the president by the people. In the end the government ceded to the protesters’ demands for reforms (Shin 2008, 100).

In order to avoid weighting issues, we differentiate in this thesis between low and high levels of mass mobilization solely on the basis of the number of mobilizations taking place, without taking into account how protest movements are actually composed.

(3) Strategies of mobilization

When analyzing strategies of confrontation, it is important to distinguish peaceful demonstrations of civil society organizations (as evidenced, for example, in many sub-Saharan transitions; see Bratton et al. 1997) from insurrections, armed rebellions or violent revolutions (see, for example, Wood 2000; Stepan 1986). In many of these cases, democracy may only be an unintended by-product: as Waterbury (1999, 200) suggests, many struggles that are followed by institutional change towards greater participation can probably be better understood as violent episodes of state construction. Our thesis is not concerned with any of these phenomena, as the dynamics of a transition from civil war differ considerably from peaceful transitions from authoritarian rule. Examples of acceptable nonconventional collective action are "marches, demonstrations, petitions, strikes, riots, boycotts [and] symbolic protest" (Oberschall 2000, 27 – 28). Most often mass protest takes on the form of strikes and lockouts, such as the General Strike of July 17, 1977 in Peru; student demonstrations (such as in Greece) or general delegitimizing campaigns. Ortega Ortiz (2000) for example writes that the Mexican regime between 1935 and 1940 faced an average of 478 strikes per year involving around 61.000 strikers. Maravall (1978) analyzes the Spanish student movement and finds that they frequently joined hands with the Spanish worker unions in General Strikes and boycotts in order to bring their political demands across. Middlebrook (1986) also notes that the presence of national debates is a form of mass protest against the authoritarian regime.

Protest strategies included in this thesis are "any kind of public action of a demonstrative, confrontational, or violent form, which is reported in the [sources] we analyzed" (Kriesi 1997; 53). More specifically, this refers to strikes/lockouts, anti-government demonstrations and riots, an operationalization that is consistent with constructs of political protest used, among others, in Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Taylor and Jodice (1983), Banks (1971) and Zimmerman (1980).

A fourth variable, the goals pursued by the protesters, has been excluded from our analysis on methodological grounds. Qualitative studies have long recognized the importance of a "pro-democratic agenda" among opposition groups as a requirement for successful democratization. This does not mean that protests should center solely on democratic change – in fact, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, ethnic identities and discrimination all provide important ground for grievances (Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2001). However, if the opposition focuses solely on the removal from power of the current authoritarian leader without genuinely desiring political change towards greater accountability of powerholders and popular participation in the political arena, democratization is generally considered unlikely. The nature of the database we work with, however, does not allow us to take this fourth variable into account. The Cross-National Time Series dataset (CNTS) compiles protest events on an annual basis and only provides information about the general nature of the protest (strikes, anti-government demonstrations or riots). It does not inform us about either scope of individual protests, the composition of the protest movement or its demands. Weighting in such information would force a manual recoding of every single protest-event taking place within our predetermined temporal framework in every country under study – a task that is impossible to accomplish with the resources at hand. We therefore deem it justified excluding the variable "goals of the protest movement" from the analysis, even though we recognize its theoretical importance.

In order to measure "mass mobilization" we take into account the three characteristics we identified above as being relevant to protest movements in this study: (1) Timing of mobilization; (2) Scope of mobilization; and (3) Strategies of mobilization. For the purpose of testing our hypotheses on the relationship between mass mobilization and democratization we first need to know whether or not mass mobilization took place at all, that is, the actual level of mass mobilization. In order to decide whether mobilization can be part of our set "high level of mass mobilization", we further need to know the comparative level of mass mobilization, in order to categorize mobilization as either "low" or "high". Finally, our model will need to be adapted for the possibility that protest taking place outside of the formal temporal framework of a transition (defined as the moment in

which the first reforms are introduced into the system) still decisively contributes to the transition outcome by creating a crisis within the authoritarian regime.

We measure the actual level of mass mobilization using a modified version of the "Transitional Mass Mobilization Index" (TMMI) developed by Htun Htun Soe (2009)³². In line with our observation on protest strategies, this index is created from the number of General Strikes, anti-government demonstrations and riots reported annually in the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset. The CNTS dataset considers General Strikes as "any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority." Its CNTS variable name is S17F2 General Strikes. Riots are defined as "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force" and its CNTS variable name is S17F6 Riots. Finally, anti-government demonstrations are defined as "any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature." Its CNTS variable name is S18F1 Anti-Government Demonstrations.

Event count data of mass mobilization in the CNTS dataset is compiled from the daily files of the *New York Times* and is a widely used instrument in measuring mass mobilization³³. The database contains information on all countries in the world and reaches as far back as the mid-20th century or even earlier for certain cases. Whereas there might be a danger of reporting bias due to the narrowness of its source, the consistency of the CNTS database is probably one of its greatest advantages. In fact, although mass mobilization is relatively easy to measure, the challenge of finding reliable datasets to work with is considerable. Nancy Bermeo once lamented: "Cross-national time series data for a phenomenon as varied as "popular mobilization" are [simply] not available..." (1990, p. 311). Bermeo was consequently obliged to use the number of strikes and lockouts compiled by the International Labor Organization as a proxy indicator of mass mobilization. Although certainly valid in the context of her study, we find her indicator too restrictive, as there are many forms of protest movements that do not all involve organized

³² Soe developed this and another index of mass mobilization in order to test the relationship between mode of transition and resultant quality of democracy.

³³ See, for example, Przeworski et al. 1996; Ulfelder 2005; and Richards and Gelleny 2006.

labor. We therefore consider the trade-off between source variety and consistency in the CNTS dataset to be worthwhile.

It is also important to note that the CNTS database reports only event count data without taking into account the protest magnitude (as defined by size, duration and space; Soe 2009, 95). At first glance this might seem disadvantageous; however, it makes sense for the purpose of our thesis, since the taking into account of such variables would force excessive weighting of our index³⁴. Furthermore, "the size and claim thresholds in the Banks definitions (...) probably enhance the comparability of the data across cases with varying degrees of press freedom and international interest" (Ulfelder 2005, 321). Therefore, rather than take into account the scope of individual protest events it is preferable to estimate the magnitude of mass mobilization over the course of a transition (by classifying mobilization as "high" or "low").

Our "Transitional Mass Mobilisation Index" (TMMI) is calculated according to the following formula:

$$\ln[1 + \text{mean} \{((\text{Number of General Strikes} \times 43) + (\text{Number of Riots} \times 102) + (\text{Number of Anti - Government Demonstrations} \times 200)) \div 4\}]^{35}$$

TMMI is equal to the natural log value of one plus the mean value of the weighted mass mobilization indicators. The weighting follows the one proposed by the Weighted Conflict Index of the CNTS database, according to which anti-government demonstrations are weighted approximately four times more than strikes and two times more than riots. Such treatment of the indicators is consistent with the spirit of this analysis, since we consider that in a transition context the former is more of a direct challenge to the non-

³⁴ For a more detailed explanation of the weighting issue, see Soe, Htun Htun (2009), pp. 95 - 96

³⁵ Our Mass Mobilization Index follows the way the Weighted Conflict Index is calculated in the CNTS dataset. In the CNTS Data Archive, the Weighted Conflict Index is computed from the event counts as follows:

$$\{(\text{Assassinations} * 24) + (\text{General Strikes} * 43) + (\text{Guerrilla Warfare} * 46) + (\text{Government Crises} * 48) + (\text{Purges} * 86) + (\text{Riots} * 102) + (\text{Revolutions} * 148) + (\text{Anti-Government Demonstrations} * 200)\} / 9$$

The sum of the 8 weighted values of each event are then divided by 9, the number of component variables plus one. Our TMMI has been created according to the same logic.

democratic incumbents than the latter two. One is added in order to bring the smallest value of the TMMI to zero, since the natural log of one is zero (Mertler and Vannatta 2002, 32). Contrary to Soe (2009) who originally developed this index, our mean value is the average value of the weighted three mass mobilization indicators in (maximal) three non-democratic years preceding the transition plus the years of the actual transition process (i.e. the year in which the first reforms are introduced, the interval in-between and potentially either the year of the founding election or the year in which the transition process was aborted).

Why should this be an appropriate measure? Firstly, including actual non-democratic years before the start of a transition attempt takes into account our premise that mass mobilizations can initiate transitions by pushing the authoritarian regime into committing to reform plans. We arbitrarily set this number to three (or less, in case that no mass mobilization took place), as we believe that the contribution to reform efforts of the authoritarian regime by protest that is too far apart in time is likely very small. Secondly, our research is not only interested in mobilization that takes place before an actual transition attempt is started, but also in protest that takes place simultaneously with the transition process. Mass protest as relevant for our hypotheses covers potentially the entirety of a transition, and must therefore include activity both before and after first reforms. In order to decide whether or not to include mass mobilization taking place during the final year of a transition attempt we follow Soe's lead and use Polity IV data on the end of the *ancient regime*.³⁶ In fact, Soe (2009, 99) pinpoints the crux of the problem: "If mass mobilization in the [end year of a transition] is not taken into account, the democratic transition could have [ended] sometime in the mid-year and mass mobilization could have occurred in the earlier months of the year [and therefore an important contribution to the transition ending would be missed]. On the other hand, if the mass mobilization in the [end year of transition] is taken into account in all transition cases, the given mass mobilization could be a result of [the new regime] rather than a cause (...)." In this study, we include mass mobilization during the final year of a transition only in cases where Polity records the ending of the old regime later than June. This solution is relatively simple and to a certain degree arbitrary, but we justify this arbitrariness on the grounds of practicality.

³⁶ Since the data in the CNTS dataset is compiled on a per annum basis, it is impossible to know in which month mass mobilization occurs.

TMMI is a non-negative index, the minimum index value "zero" (0) indicating no mass mobilization and index value "one" (1) indicating the lower bound if some mass mobilization did take place (Soe 2009, 51). There is no upper bound to the index, as there is no limit to the number of strikes, riots and anti-government demonstrations that can take place. Whereas the TMMI is enough to measure the absolute level of mass mobilization, it does not measure the relative, or comparative level of mass mobilization, and therefore does not provide information on the scope of mobilization (low or high). In order to get an idea of the magnitude of mass mobilization compared to regional and non-regional counterparts, we use a second index, Soe's Comparative Transitional Mobilization Index (CTMMI). This index is created "from multiplying TMMI with its ratio to the regional mean and with its ratio to the global mean before finding its cube root if TMMI of a given case is smaller than the global median [or] multiplying TMMI with its ratio to the regional mean and with its ratio to the global mean before finding its cube root and multiplying it with 1.25 if TMMI is larger or equal to the global median" (Soe 2009, 104)³⁷.

If TMMI of a transition case is smaller than the global median,

$$CTMMI = \frac{TMMI}{\sqrt[3]{(regional\ mean) \times (global\ mean)}}$$

If TMMI of a transition case is larger than or equal to the global median,

$$CTMMI = \frac{TMMI}{\sqrt[3]{(regional\ mean) \times (global\ mean)}} \times (1.25)$$

While both our outcome condition "minimal democracy" and our first explanatory condition "crisis of the authoritarian regime" are dichotomous, we feel that "mass mobilization", by nature of the concept, does not lend itself well to such treatment. To the contrary, forced dichotomization would lead to a loss of information on differences in mobilization scope, as cases without mobilization (such as, for example, Tanzania) would be classified in the same category as cases with low mobilization (for example Zambia), because they both do not fit into the set "high levels of mobilization". This, in turn, could

³⁷ For a more detailed explanation of the model and its rationale see Soe 2009, 95 – 105.

have repercussions on the findings we obtain from our QCA analysis and lead to wrong interpretations. Therefore, we decided to give our condition "mass mobilization" values on a 3-point scale, ranging between 0 (no mass mobilization), 1 (low levels of mass mobilization) and 2 (high levels of mass mobilization). To do so required a transformation of CTMMI values in order to classify our cases³⁸. We decided to use the mean value of CTMMI to define the threshold between low and high levels of mass mobilization³⁹. If the CTMMI value of a transition case was zero, it had no mass mobilization whatsoever and the set value was set to 0. If the CTMMI value was smaller than its mean but greater than zero, we categorized it as "low levels of mass mobilization" and set the value to 1. By contrast, if the CTMMI value was greater than its mean we set the value to 2.

³⁸ In our dataset, the CTMMI takes on values between 0 and 2,68. Potentially, however, higher values are possible with a different case sample, if such a sample contained cases with higher levels of mass mobilization than those found here.

³⁹ Despite the fact that Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 33) explicitly caution against using information internal to the data at hand, such as the median or the mean, to indicate thresholds, we would like to defend our choice of using the CTMMI mean to find the point of indifference. Schneider and Wagemann warn that parameters such as the mean are inappropriate for calibration purposes since they imply that the classification of a case depends not only on this case's own absolute value but also on its relative value with regards to other cases. However, in our research, this is precisely the case. It would be useless to know that Kenya has an absolute level of mobilization of 6 if we do not know what this value means in relation to other African countries that also experienced protests, or to countries in other world regions. Therefore, we believe that using the CTMMI mean as a cut-off point between low and high levels of mobilization is justified, since the CTMMI is a combined indicator comprising information on both absolute and relative levels of mobilization.

Table II
[TMMI/CTMMI Index]

	Transition Attempt	TMMI_{tot}	TMMI_{bef}	%TMMI_{bef}	CTMMI*
<i>Transitions in LA/SE</i>	1982 – 1983 Argentina	4,94	4,36	88 %	2,17
	1976 – 1979 Spain	6,07	5,60	92 %	2,66
	1974 – 1976 Portugal	5,21	2,87	55 %	2,29
	1979 – 1990 Chile	5,40	2,25	42 %	2,37
	1973 – 1974 Greece	4,36	3,54	81 %	1,53
	1988 – 1993 Paraguay	3,69	4,21	114 %	1,29
	1980 – 1984 Uruguay	4,13	0,00	0 %	1,45
	1978 – 1980 Bolivia	4,37	4,32	99 %	1,92
<i>Transitions in Africa</i>	1988 – 1992 Algeria	4,29	0,00	0 %	1,76
	1992 - 1994 Tanzania	0,00	0,00	0 %	0,00
	1990 – 1991 Zambia	2,78	0,00	0 %	1,14
	1991 – 1992 Mali	2,62	0,00	0 %	1,08
	1993 – 1994 Malawi	3,26	3,76	115 %	1,34
	1990 – 1991 Benin	3,27	3,55	109 %	1,35
	1987 – 1993 Nigeria (1)	4,00	3,28	82 %	1,65
	1998 – 1999 Nigeria (2)	4,40	3,94	90 %	2,26
	1990 – 1992 Kenya	4,39	2,25	51 %	2,26
	1991 – 1993 Togo	4,53	3,64	80 %	2,33
	1990 – 1992 Cameroon	3,55	0,00	0 %	1,46
<i>EE</i>	1990 – 1991 Mongolia	3,93	0,00	0 %	1,45
	1988 – 1991 Poland	4,96	4,21	85 %	2,29
	1990 – 1992 Romania	5,12	3,94	77 %	2,36
<i>SEA</i>	1978 – 1979 South Korea	5,23	4,77	91 %	2,24
	1983 – 1986 Philippines	5,98	5,34	89 %	2,56
	1998 - 1999 Indonesia	6,25	5,23	84 %	2,68

*Mean value: 1,84

A final word maybe needs to be said on the concrete use of our TMMI index. *A priori*, only the CTMMI is relevant for the verification of our hypotheses, since only the transformed values of this index enter the data matrix of the QCA truth table. In that sense, TMMI needs to be calculated in order to obtain CTMMI, but has no further bearing on the analysis. TMMI is useful, however, since it enables us to at least somewhat assess the timing component of mass mobilization in transitions. By calculating TMMI first for the entire duration of the transition process (hereafter referred to as TMMI_{tot}) and then calculating it again for the 3-year period leading up to the first reform introductions only (hereafter referred to as TMMI_{bef}) and then comparing the two values we get an idea of the role mass mobilization could have played in a given transition attempt: in other words, it allows us to distinguish transitions where mass mobilization conceivably initiated the process (i.e. contributed decisively to provoking a crisis of the authoritarian regime) from transitions where the contribution of mass mobilization was situated more in the bargaining period between the introduction of reforms and the holding of elections.

2.3. Case Selection: Principles and Practice

After having delimited our conditions, we now turn to selecting our case sample. In a first step, it is important to note that our thesis exclusively focuses on transitions belonging to the Third Wave and excludes the most recent attempts at democratization in the context of the Arab Spring. It is generally accepted that the Third Wave started with Portugal in 1973. As to the end, there is no consensus in the literature: while some authors associate the Third Wave to transitions that took place between 1973 and 1995, others include even very late transitions such as the one of Indonesia in 2004⁴⁰. We err on the side of caution, and therefore set our observational reference frame between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 2005. We also need to keep in mind to select only cases where a transition process has in fact been initiated, and to exclude what Bratton and Van de Walle call "precluded transitions"- transitions where one of our independent variables is present, but no transition has taken place, as happened, for example, in China in 1989. Disregarding this condition would run counter to the aim of our thesis: determining the conditions that lead to a successful conclusion of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

In a second step, it is important to select a suitable database from which our cases can be drawn. Even though a variety of data sources for case sampling exist, the two most complete and widely used databases (and also the ones used in this study) remain Polity IV and the Freedom House "Freedom in the World" database⁴¹. The Freedom House "Freedom in the World" surveys provide the most suitable way to identify transition attempts in the framework of our thesis. Even though Polity also provides a number of mechanisms (DEMOC, AUTOC and POLITY score⁴²) for measuring modifications in the

⁴⁰ It is important to note that the later years of the third wave have been marked by a return to authoritarianism, or to semi-authoritarian regimes in a number of countries; for this reason, some authors hesitate to extend the duration of the Third Wave to transitions that took place between 1995 and 2004.

⁴¹ There is another recent database developed by Geddes et al. (2012) which lists all authoritarian regimes that have ended between 1945 and 2010, excluding micro-states, non-independent territories and territories that are occupied by foreign forces. This database is useful above all for a first pre-selection of cases because it enables us to eliminate exogenous transitions (i.e. transitions that have been imposed by former colonial powers and foreign occupation forces). For the actual choice of cases, the Geddes database is not so appropriate because it does not provide information on the "degree of democraticness/autocraticness" of a given country, and is therefore unable to monitor gradual changes that might indicate transition attempts.

⁴² Institutionalized Democracy Score, which is referred as "DEMOC score" in this paper, is "an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive." The AUTOC score is "an eleven-point Autocracy scale (0-10)" and the "operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation,

institutional structure of target countries, it ignores changes in civil and political liberties, which are most often precursors to institutional change. By relying solely on Polity we run the risk of committing Type I error, failing to identify a transition, or identifying a transition much later than it actually occurs (for example Peru (1975) where Polity identifies institutional change only in 1978). Freedom House, by contrast, focuses not only on institutional change but also on civil rights and liberties; a crucial component in liberalization processes. Most, if not all, transitions begin with liberalization and a relaxation of the civil and political restrictions imposed on the citizenry. Only Freedom House is able to measure those changes through their index "civil rights"; more profound, institutional changes are usually measured through the index "political rights". There are several ways to use the Freedom House database to identify transition attempts, but not all of them are suitable for our research design.

The first (1) possibility is to use changes in Freedom House's classification of countries (Non-Free, Partly-Free and Free) to identify regime change. However, not all transitions feature a change from one category to the other; for example, sometimes countries will maintain a "Partly Free" status all along even though within this category certain institutional changes take place. These kinds of transition attempts would therefore remain hidden from the researcher's eye. On the other hand, some transitions directly jump from the "Non-Free" category to the "Free" category, but Freedom House registers the change only when the transition was already a long time underway (for example in Portugal). Either way, our research design would be vulnerable to Type I error, failing to identify transition cases even though they occur, or identifying a transition case much later than it actually occurs.

The second (2) possibility is to look at changes in both the Civil Rights (CR) and Political Rights (PR) categories. Similarly to how the Polity codebook identifies general "regime change"⁴³, an X-point change in either one or both of these categories would

the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive." Finally, the "combined POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to - 10 (strongly autocratic)." (Polity IV User Manual)

⁴³ Polity IV defines "regime transition" as a 3-point change in the POLITY variable, "with each continuous, sequential change (in the same general direction) in a complex transition occurring within three years or less of the previous change" (Polity IV User Manual, 30). A "democratic transition" is said to occur if there is at least a 3-point POLITY value change in three years or less from autocracy (i.e. a negative or zero Polity

indicate a modification in the general authoritarian structure of the regime, granting either greater freedoms and civil liberties or providing greater opportunities for political participation. This method is advantageous because it allows identifying transitions even in very early stages. However, like Polity's "3-point"-rule, we need to introduce a threshold below which modifications are too insignificant to be taken into account. This is necessary in order to distinguish simple modifications of an authoritarian regime from genuine transition attempts⁴⁴. After comparing the Polity and Freedom-House scales of democracy (Polity uses a 10-point scale and Freedom House a 7 point scale), we decided that there should be at least a 2-point change in either the Civil Rights or Political Rights categories or in a combination of both, for us to classify a country as "transitional". Transposed to Polity's coding system, this number corresponds exactly to Polity's 3-point rule, and can therefore be considered reasonable. By adopting this threshold we avoid potential Type II errors (identifying a transition even though one could legitimately argue that none occurs) and, more importantly, diminish the risk of Type I error since, by looking at the isolated indices, we register even small modifications in authoritarian regimes.

In light of these considerations we choose our cases based on sampling technique (2) and use the Polity DEMOC score⁴⁵ as additional tool to control our selection⁴⁶. As we have explained in our section on concepts, a transition to democracy is defined to take place when some democratic measures are introduced into a formerly undemocratic system. These democratic measures could include, for example, holding elections – especially in the transitions from military regimes; legalization of other political parties – especially in the transitions from one- party-dominant regimes; and introduction of institutional constraints on the chief executive- especially in the transitions from personalistic regimes (Polity IV).

score) to a partial democracy (POLITY values +1 to +6) or full democracy (POLITY values +7 to +10; Polity IV User Manual, 35).

⁴⁴ This distinction is of greater importance than one could potentially think. The works of Carothers (2002) and other scholars confirm that especially in the first half of the 1990s, when political change accelerated in many regions, numerous policy makers and aid practitioners reflexively labeled any formerly authoritarian country that was attempting some political liberalization as a "transitional country", only to realize a decade later that those countries were in no way on the road to democratization.

⁴⁵ DEMOC scores start at 0 for countries whose institutional structure is purely autocratic. As soon as some democratic measure (in institutional terms) is introduced in the system, DEMOC score becomes positive.

⁴⁶ In our selection, DEMOC scores usually became positive only a few years after the first democratic progress in FH's CR and PR indices had been registered. This can be explained, again, by the fact that institutional progress usually takes place only after some liberalization of rights and freedoms has occurred.

Hence, in operational terms a transition attempt is said to occur

- a) in the year a positive change in either Civil Rights (CR) or Political Right (PR) score is assigned to a polity that has been classified by Freedom House as "Non Free" or "Partly Free" (but not an electoral democracy!) in the preceding year
- b) IF this change is accompanied by an instance of regime change as defined by a 2-point change (or higher) in the PR, the CR, or both variables.

For instance, Brazil's PC and CR scores changed from 5/5 in 1973 to 4/4 in 1974. Since this is a two-point change in a positive direction (following the Freedom House coding criteria) we can therefore confirm that Brazil in 1974 started a transition to democracy.

Some might argue with that definition, contending that the starting point of a transition should be defined as the year in which the first popular protests are registered, since typically transitions "from below" feature a significant amount of mass mobilization before the actual reaction of the authoritarian rulers occurs. In our opinion, however, a transition, can only take place with a change in the rules of the game by the incumbent regime; therefore, the starting year of the transition will be the year in which such a change takes place, and not the year in which the first protests were registered⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ We did, however, add an additional time component to our mass mobilization index in order to account for the possibility of transitions being initiated by protest movements.

Having thus delimited the beginning of a transition attempt, we consider that a transition to democracy has ended if either event occurs:

- a) Founding elections are held and the polity obtains the designation "minimal democracy" by Freedom House;
- b) Founding elections are held but the polity does not obtain the label "minimal democracy" by Freedom House;
- c) No founding elections are held and the authoritarian regime continues in power;
- d) Free and fair elections are being held in a polity where elections were already common, but which usually were restricted, fraudulent or extremely unfair. The polity obtains the designation "minimal democracy" by Freedom House.

Information on the holding of founding elections is obtained by combining information on the end of the ancien regime found in quantitative databases (Geddes 2012; Freedom House) with qualitative literature on transitions. The information on whether a regime obtained the status of minimal democracy is gathered from Freedom House's list of electoral democracies, as explained prior in our section on the calibration of the outcome condition. The resulting universe of cases is potentially fairly big. Due to theoretical constraints, however, we have to narrow the population down purposefully, with the aim of achieving the most significant results possible. As Retherford and Choe note (1993, 9), cases can be selected at random, by purposeful selection, or by some combination of the two such as stratified random sampling or systematic sampling.

In a first step, we exclude independent polities whose current population (2015) is inferior to one million, such as Cap Verde, Djibouti, Suriname, Samoa, Grenada and Sao Tome and Principe. This exclusion is consistent with the methodology employed by similar quantitative studies carried out among others by Geddes (2012) and Soe (2009) and serves the purpose of increasing the representativity of our case sample.

Secondly, we exclude cases of (attempted) democratization after civil war, such as El Salvador (1979 - 1992), Angola (1975 – 2002), Cambodia (1993), Liberia (1989 – 2003), Mozambique (1994), Nepal (after 1996) and Zimbabwe (1979). We justify this exclusion by pointing out that there is considerable agreement in the literature that the dynamics of transitions in a post-conflict setting differ markedly from "regular" transitions from authoritarianism; too much, in our opinion, to warrant inclusion in our case sample. As Joshi (2010) argues, the anarchy of armed conflict not only creates conditions hostile to the emergence of democracy in the target country (such as the destruction of the economic infrastructure, the disintegration of the social fabric and a political climate marked by increased hostility and mistrust (Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Licklider 1995; Kumar 1998) but also creates different priorities for any future leadership to address. In fact, most scholars agree that states in the immediate aftermath of conflict have to resolve issues of peace, political stability and the establishment of an effective administration over the territory. Compared to an autocratic state that has not witnessed a civil war, the dynamic of a transition therefore follows very different patterns.

Finally, cases are excluded if foreign troops occupied and governed the country, and if democratization resulted from such occupation, as happened in Panama (Geddes 2012). We justify this exclusion by the fact that decision-makers in such countries are not independent, and therefore studying the interaction between the country's leadership would yield biased results.

According to these selection criteria, we identified 71 transition attempts between 1973 and 2005. This number represents our total population. Of these transition attempts, 51 are considered successful transitions (ending at least in minimal democracy) and 20 are considered failed transitions (not ending in minimal democracy). The ratio of failed to successful transitions is roughly $\frac{2}{5}$ or 0.4, meaning that successful transitions constitute approximately 60% of total transition attempts.

Table III

[Total Number of Transitions]

<i>Successful transitions</i>			
1982 – 1983	Argentina	1990 – 1993	Niger
1981 – 1982	Bolivia	1999 – 1999	Niger
1974 – 1985	Brazil	1977 – 1979	Nigeria
1979 – 1990	Chile	1998 – 1999	Nigeria
1976 – 1979	Ecuador	1990 – 1991	Zambia
1977 – 1978	Dom. Republic	1991 – 1992	Mali
1986 – 1990	Haiti	1999 – 2000	Mexico
1974 – 1976	Portugal	1992 – 1993	Czech Republic
1985 – 1991	Bangladesh	1990 – 1994	South Africa
1998 - 1999	Indonesia	1993 - 1994	Slovakia
1990 – 1991	Mongolia	2001 – 2002	Senegal
1990 – 1991	Nepal		
1984 – 1988	Pakistan	<i>Failed transitions</i>	
1983 – 1986	Philippines	1978 – 1980	Bolivia
1984 – 1987	South Korea	1976 – 1979	Bangladesh
1986 - 1996	Taiwan	1979 – 1980	Nepal
1973 – 1975	Thailand	1978 – 1979	South Korea
1978 – 1988	Thailand	1988 – 1992	Algeria
1991 – 1992	Albania	1988 – 1990	Tunisia
1990 – 1991	Bulgaria	1988 – 1992	Burkina Faso
1988 – 1990	Hungary	1990 - 1992	Cameroon
1988 – 1991	Poland	1991 - 1992	Chad
1990 – 1992	Romania	1975 – 1978	Senegal
1990 – 1991	Benin	1989 - 1990	Ivory Coast
1977 – 1978	Burkina Faso	1990 - 1991	Gabon
1991 – 1993	CER	1990 - 1991	Guinea
1991 – 1992	Congo Brazzaville	1990 - 1992	Kenya
1977 – 1980	Ghana	1991 – 1993	Jordan
1988 - 1996	Ghana	1987 – 1993	Nigeria
1991 – 1994	Guinea-Bissau	1992 - 1994	Tanzania
2002 - 2003	Kenya	1991 – 1993	Togo
1991 – 1993	Lesotho	1980 – 1981	Uganda
1990 – 1993	Madagascar	1990 - 1991	Mauritania
1993 – 1994	Malawi		

Source: Freedom House, Polity IV

From this universe of cases we selected twenty-five (25) cases using a combination of random and purposeful assignment. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 94) have argued, random selection and assignment are beneficial to the scholarly task of drawing causal inferences because they automatically ensure that the research design doesn't suffer from either endogeneity, selection bias, or omitted variable bias. However, our random selection had to fulfill two conditions. Firstly, in order to obtain an appropriate balance between our positive and our negative cases, we separated transitions into "successful" and "failed" and set the number of cases randomly drawn from each category to be proportionate to their ratio to the total number of transition cases. By consequent, successful transition attempts accounted for 60% of the total number of transitions analyzed, whereas failed transitions only accounted for 40%. We did this with a view to increasing the validity of our findings, as our case sample is still small even for Boolean techniques. Secondly, our selection had to be geographically representative, since the main purpose of our thesis is the testing, in a cross-regional setting, of hypotheses developed in a regional context. Latin America and Southern Europe (grouped together for the purpose of simplification, as the timing of those transitions is relatively similar) account for approximately one third of the total number of transitions and are therefore represented by 8 cases in our sample. Africa (including the MENA region) accounts for a bit less than half of the total number of transitions and obtains 11 cases in our sample. South-East Asia and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States both obtain 3 cases in our sample. In order to ensure that the random cases drawn from each category fulfill our requirement of having each region represented (irrespective of transition outcome), we subdivided the categories "successful" and "failed" transitions geographically and made sure that the distribution of cases corresponded reasonably closely to the geographical weighting.

In operational terms, we allocated a number to each of our transition attempts both for the category "successful" and "failed" transition. We then selected our cases according to the numbers obtained, using a random number generator and taking into account the two restrictions explained above⁴⁸. Our final case selection comprises 25 transition attempts between 1973 and 2005, 17 of which are successful transitions to democracy and 8 of which are failed transitions.

Table IV
[Selected Transitions]

<i>Successful transitions</i>		<i>Failed transitions</i>	
1982 – 1983	Argentina	1990 - 1992	Cameroon
1998 - 1999	Indonesia	1991 – 1993	Togo
1988 – 1991	Poland	1992 - 1994	Tanzania
1983 – 1986	Philippines	1988 – 1992	Algeria
1974 – 1976	Portugal	1987 – 1993	Nigeria
1998 – 1999	Nigeria	1978 – 1979	South Korea
1979 – 1990	Chile	1978 – 1980	Bolivia
1990 – 1991	Benin	1990 - 1992	Kenya
1993 – 1994	Malawi		
1991 – 1992	Mali		
1990 – 1992	Romania		
1976 – 1979	Spain		
1973 – 1974	Greece		
1990 – 1991	Zambia		
1988 – 1993	Paraguay		
1980 – 1984	Uruguay		
1990 – 1991	Mongolia		

Source: Freedom House, Polity IV; random selection using a number generator

⁴⁸ Although we did our best to keep the sampling process as unbiased as possible, we did have to discard the results of the number generator twice, in cases when lengthy research on the respective transitions showed that there simply was not enough information on the authoritarian regime available to conduct a conclusive case study. The two discarded cases were Burkina Faso (1977 – 1978) and Nigeria (1977 – 1979), which we manually replaced with Kenya (1990 – 1992) and Nigeria (1998 – 1999). We are also aware that most transitions of our sample are rather short in duration, with Chile being the only transition of "longue durée" in our selection. This, however, is purely due to sampling hazard, and given that there are only three other long-lasting transition processes in our total universe of cases (Taiwan 1986 – 1996, Thailand 1978 – 1988, and Brazil 1974 - 1985), we do not think that our results will be unduly influenced by this.

This chapter presented and defined the methodological and conceptual framework our analysis is based on. It outlined the ontological and methodological principles our research is grounded in, and explained the method (QCA) we decided to adopt to test our hypotheses. In a second step, it introduced the conditions that form the core theoretical framework of our thesis ("minimal democracy", "crisis of the authoritarian regime" and "mass mobilization"), and presented ways for assessing and measuring them. Finally the chapter offered an overview of our case sample as well as an explanation of how this sample was obtained. In the following chapter we will conduct our QCA analysis and interpret the results with a view to assessing the truthfulness of our hypotheses.

3

Testing Transition Theories: Assessing Their Explanatory Power

In this chapter we conduct the QCA analysis to test the three causal hypotheses derived from the various competing theories on transitions to democracy: the theory "from above" by O'Donnell and Schmitter; the theory "from below" by Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce; and a hybrid theory that combines key elements of both theories.

To recapitulate, the three hypotheses are:

- a) Democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime without high levels of mass mobilization (theory "from above")
- b) Democracy results from high levels of mass mobilization without a crisis of the authoritarian regime (theory "from below")
- c) Democracy results from a crisis of the authoritarian regime and high levels of mass mobilization (hybrid theory "from above" and "from below")

Translated into Boolean language, these hypotheses read as:

- a) **ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(0,1) → MINDEMO**
- b) **ARCRISIS(0)*MASSMOB(2) → MINDEMO**
- c) **ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(2) → MINDEMO**

Formulated in INUS terms⁴⁹, for hypothesis (a) we expect to find a positive transition outcome only in cases where transitional countries experienced a crisis of the authoritarian regime (1) but where mass mobilization was either completely absent (0) or remained very limited (1). Accordingly, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is considered a necessary and a sufficient condition for the instauration of a democracy.

For hypothesis (b) we expect a positive transition outcome if transitional countries experienced high levels of mass mobilization against the regime (2) but where such mobilization did not result in the disintegration of the unity of the ruling bloc (0). In such a conception of transitions mass mobilization alone is necessary and sufficient for a democratic outcome.

For hypothesis (c) we expect a positive transition outcome to be the consequence of both a crisis of the authoritarian regime (1) and significant levels of mass protest (2). Hence, our analysis is guided by the general expectation that transitions end in democracy if there is both significant disunity among regime actors and a high degree of popular contestation of the political status quo. In our opinion, these two elements are necessary conditions for the instauration of a (minimally) democratic regime, and neither one taken alone is sufficient. A priori, our expectation is to find only hypothesis (c) confirmed; both (a) and (b) should lead to a negative outcome.

In the next section we review the conditions derived from the literature and the data we used. After that, we first present the process of searching for necessary and sufficient conditions and then show the causal model obtained after minimization. In the final section we discuss these results and weigh the implications of our results for further studies.

⁴⁹ INUS stands for "Insufficient but Nonredundant part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition" (Mackie 1965). Mahoney describes INUS conditions thusly: "INUS conditions are parts of larger combinations of factors that are jointly sufficient for outcomes. Thus, while an INUS condition is itself neither necessary nor sufficient for an outcome, it is part of a larger combination of factors that is sufficient for an outcome" (Mahoney 2010, 131).

3.1. Conditions and Data

The outcome is minimal democracy, defined as a political system in which citizens freely participate in the political process, in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections, and in which those civil and political freedoms exist to speak, publish, assemble, and organize. We assign membership or non-membership in the set "minimal democracies" to our transitional cases based on the Freedom House dataset on electoral democracies.

Table V
[Outcome]

Caseid	Transition attempt		Minimal Democracy
ARG	1982 – 1983	Argentina	1
IND	1998 - 1999	Indonesia	1
POL	1988 – 1991	Poland	1
PHI	1983 – 1986	Philippines	1
POR	1974 – 1976	Portugal	1
NIG(2)	1998 – 1999	Nigeria(2)	1
CHI	1979 – 1990	Chile	1
BEN	1990 – 1991	Benin	1
MAW	1993 – 1994	Malawi	1
MAL	1991 – 1992	Mali	1
ROM	1990 – 1992	Romania	1
SPA	1976 – 1979	Spain	1
GRE	1973 – 1974	Greece	1
ZAM	1990 – 1991	Zambia	1
PAR	1988 – 1993	Paraguay	1
URU	1980 – 1984	Uruguay	1
MON	1990 – 1991	Mongolia	1
CAM	1990 - 1992	Cameroon	0
TOG	1991 – 1993	Togo	0
TAN	1992 - 1994	Tanzania	0
ALG	1988 – 1992	Algeria	0
NIG(1)	1987 – 1993	Nigeria(1)	0
SOK	1978 – 1979	South Korea	0
BOL	1978 – 1980	Bolivia	0
KEN	1990 - 1992	Kenya	0

As Table V shows, there are 17 cases that are members of the set "minimal democracies"⁵⁰. There are also 8 non-members, for example Cameroon or Bolivia.

⁵⁰ Members of this set vary a lot in the degree of their "democraticness": On one hand, these are countries like Paraguay and Nigeria which only exhibit the basic criteria for being classified as an electoral democracy.

Going from the outcome to the conditions, the following factors are used in the analysis: the crisis of the authoritarian regime (ARCRISIS(0,1)), and mass mobilization (MASSMOB(0,1,2)). Whereas ARCRISIS is coded dichotomously, MASSMOB has multiple values, which made the application of mvQCA necessary. As we explained previously, we used existing data like the CNTS database for measuring popular protest, but for ARCRISIS we had to collect our own data, mostly from primary and secondary literature. This is marked as "qualitative research" in the "Source" column of Tab. VI, and is detailed in the appendix of this thesis.

Table VI

[List of Conditions]

Condition	Values	Indicators and coding rules	Source
ARCRISIS	0=no crisis of the authoritarian regime 1= authoritarian regime splits in softliners and hardliners, and softliners gain control of the decision-making process	0 = regime employs heavy repression against opposition, regime members remain united in public, no loss of support among the security forces, no defections 1 = defections from within the ruling clique, loss of support particularly among the coercive apparatus, credible reform plans are being proposed and carried out, regime members speak publicly against the regime or act in a subversive manner	Qualitative research
MASSMOB	0 = no mass mobilization 1 = low levels of mass mobilization 2 = high levels of mass mobilization	0: CTMMI = 0 1: $0 < CTMMI \leq 1,84$ 2: $1,84 < CTMMI$	CNTS database, recoded into the CTMMI according to the model of Soe (2009)

On the other hand, there are also Spain and Portugal which, shortly after ending their transition, transformed into liberal democracies. As our thesis is not concerned with issues related to the quality of the resulting regimes, those differences are not important for our analysis.

3.2. Truth Table and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

In the next step, we construct a truth table from the raw data using the QCA software *Tosmana* created by Cromqvist (2011).

Table VII
[Truth Table]

V1: massmob **V2:** Arcrisis
O: mindemo **id:** Caseid

V1	V2	O	Id
2	1	1	SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND
2	0	0	KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK
0	1	0	TAN
1	1	1	GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON
1	0	0	ALG,NIG(1),CAM
Logical Remainders (R) : 1			

Created with Tosmana V 1.302

The truth table allowed us to synthesize the evidence substantially, by transforming our 25 cases into 5 configurations. We found out the following:

- (1) there are 2 distinct configurations with a (1) outcome, corresponding respectively to (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, NIG(2), POL, ROM, PHI, IND) and (GRE, PAR, URU, ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON). In other words, there are two different ways to reach a successful transition outcome: transitions that exhibited a combination of (ARCRISIS(1)) and (MASSMOB(2)) on one hand, and transitions that exhibited a combination of (ARCRISIS(1)) and (MASSMOB(1)) on the other hand. This is in line with the concept of equifinality, the idea that there are several paths leading to the same outcome.

- (2) There are (3) configurations leading to a (0) outcome, corresponding to 8 cases: (KEN, BOL, TOG, SOK), (TAN), and (ALG, NIG(1), CAM). Expressed differently, transitions fail if either there is a combination of (ARCRISIS(0)) and (MASSMOB(2)), a combination of (ARCRISIS(1)) and MASSMOB(0)), or a combination of (ARCRISIS(0)) and (MASSMOB(1)).
- (3) Finally, 1 non-observed logical remainder ("R") configuration. Hence, there is limited diversity in the data: as the 25 observed cases correspond only to 5 configurations, the remaining Boolean property space is devoid of empirical cases.⁵¹

We can now verify whether any of our two conditions (ARCRISIS and MASSMOB) is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the outcome (MINDEMO) to be present. Since ARCRISIS(1) was present in all cases of MINDEMO(1), we conclude that the crisis of the authoritarian regime must be a necessary condition for a transition to terminate in minimal democracy. On the other hand, ARCRISIS(1) was also present in the case of Tanzania, where the outcome was negative (MINDEMO(0)). Therefore, while a split within the ruling elite is necessary for a democratic regime to ensue, it is not a sufficient condition, i.e. it does not guarantee a democratic outcome.

On the other hand, MASSMOB was also present in all cases of successful transition outcomes, all the while the level, or the intensity of protest, didn't seem to matter: MASSMOB(1) and MASSMOB(2) both are connected to MINDEMO(1). Hence, we conclude that MASSMOB(1,2) is also a necessary condition for obtaining a minimal democracy. By contrast, it does not seem to be sufficient, since there are configurations in which MASSMOB is present but the transition outcome is negative (as for example, in Cameroon or Kenya). Therefore, at this point, the analysis of our truth table enables us to confirm our idea that neither ARCRISIS nor MASSMOB alone are sufficient conditions for obtaining a democratic transition outcome.

⁵¹ As we have only two conditions, the number of logical remainders is still very small, despite the fact that we are working with mvQCA.

Using the formulas by Thiem (2015, 663) we calculate a consistency⁵² of 1,0 for ARCRISIS as a necessary condition for the instauration of minimal democracy. The value for MASSMOB is also 1,0⁵³. We thus obtain perfect consistency for both conditions, a fact that strongly suggests that a perfect subset relation between condition and outcome exists.

3.3. Minimizing the Dataset

Minimizing for outcome = 1 without logical remainders produced the following solution formula:

massmob(2) * arcrisis(1) + massmob(1) * arcrisis(1)
 (SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND)
 (GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON)

According to this formula, minimal democracy is achieved either by combining high levels of mass mobilization and a crisis of the authoritarian regime, or low levels of mass mobilization and a crisis of the authoritarian regime

Minimizing for outcome = 0 without remainders we get the solution formula:

massmob(2) * arcrisis(0) + massmob(0) * arcrisis(1) + massmob(1) * arcrisis(0)
 (KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK) (TAN) (ALG,NIG(1),CAM)

This formula tells us that a failed transition outcome is the result of either (a) high levels of mass mobilization without an authoritarian regime crisis; or (b) a crisis of the authoritarian regime without mass mobilization; or (c) low levels of mass mobilization without an authoritarian regime crisis.

⁵² Set-theoretic consistency "assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combination of conditions (...) agree in displaying the outcome in question. That is, consistency indicates how closely the subset relation is approximated" (Ragin 2006). In general, consistency scores should be as close to 1,0 as possible. The reason for this is that scores close to 0,5 indicate that there is some contradiction in the data (i.e. some cases that show the same conditions but have a different outcome) which point to either a.) errors in measurement for either conditions or outcome; or b.) an important variable is missing in the model.

⁵³ The value for MASSMOB(1) is 0,47, while the value of MASSMOB(2) is 0,53. Together, the consistency for MASSMOB(1,2) is 1,0.

Including all the remainders for reduction, we get the parsimonious solution formula for outcome = 1:

massmob(1,2) * arcrisis(1)
(SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND +
GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON)

The solution formula shows that all cases with outcome = 1 result from the combination of an authoritarian regime crisis AND mass mobilization, regardless of mobilization levels.

Since the results of the solution with outcome = 1 are not always symmetrical with the solution formula with outcome = 0, we then conducted a separate analysis for outcome = 0, including logical remainders for reduction. This produced the following solution formula:

massmob(0) + arcrisis(0)
(TAN) (KEN,BOL,TOG,SOK + ALG,NIG(1),CAM)

In essence, this means that a failed transition results from either the absence of mass mobilization, or the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis. As expected, this mirrored the solution for outcome = 1⁵⁴.

Going back to our solution formula for outcome = 1, we then calculated the following coverage scores⁵⁵ (see Tab. 9): "(a) raw coverage: the proportion of (1) outcome cases that are covered by a given term; (b) unique coverage: the proportion of (1) outcome cases that are uniquely covered by a given term (no other terms cover those cases) and (c) the solution coverage: the proportion of cases that are covered by all the terms" (Rihoux

⁵⁴ For the solution for outcome = 1, no simplifying assumptions were necessary. For outcome = 0, the figure was 1 (massmob(0)arcrisis(0)). There were no contradictory simplifying assumptions.

⁵⁵ Set-theoretic coverage assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome. In other words, coverage assesses the "relevance" of the causal condition, i.e. the degree to which instances of the causal condition are paired with instances of the outcome (Ragin 2006).

and de Meur 2009, 64). In our case, the solution coverage is 100%, since we have no contradicting outcomes and all cases are taken into account by our solution formula.

Table VIII

[Coverage Scores of the Solution for Outcome = 1]

Term	Cases covered	RC	UC
massmob(1,2) * arcrisis(1)	(SPA,ARG,POR,CHI,NIG(2),POL,ROM,PHI,IND + GRE,PAR,URU,ZAM,MAL,MAW,BEN,MON)	100%	100%

3.4. Interpreting the Results

Our mvQCA analysis has found that transitions from authoritarianism result in democracy only if both conditions, ARCRISIS and MASSMOB, occur together. If either element is missing, the transition is likely to fail – a finding that is supported by the empirical reality of our case sample. How do these results support the postulates of the competing theories on democratic transitions? A closer look at the different hypotheses will bring clarity.

H1: The theory "from above" by O'Donnell and Schmitter

Our findings partly confirm, and partly disconfirm the principal hypothesis of the theory "from above". To recapitulate, O'Donnell and Schmitter claimed that authoritarian regimes do not initiate reforms unless the unity reigning among the members of the ruling bloc is broken first. In other words, a crisis of the authoritarian regime is necessary for a transition to terminate in the instauration of a minimal democracy. Mass mobilization can help liberalization efforts along if protest remains limited and controlled by moderate opposition leaders. On the other hand, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, such mobilization is not required for a successful democratic transition outcome; quite to the

contrary, mass protest, if carried too far, is dangerous and likely to compromise the transition success. The crisis of the authoritarian regime is thus considered to be not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition for democratization. Our analysis corroborates the first part of O'Donnell and Schmitter's hypothesis: we found that, indeed, an authoritarian regime crisis is a necessary condition for a successful transition outcome. Additionally, we can also confirm that low levels of mass mobilization, coupled with a split within the ruling apparatus, did lead to minimal democracy in almost half of all positive transition cases. However, we found that successful transition outcomes in which an authoritarian regime crisis was supplemented by high levels of mass protest were even slightly more frequent. Thus, we can disconfirm the claim that higher levels of mobilization are dangerous for democratization; if anything, we side with Bermeo (1997) who dispelled the "myth of moderation" and claimed that higher mobilization holds better chances for democracy. More importantly still is our finding that, contrary to O'Donnell and Schmitter's hypothesis, splits within the ruling elite alone are not sufficient for a democratic transition outcome. Although we currently only have one case exhibiting such a configuration⁵⁶, it is not unlikely that other cases could be found if the database on ARCRISIS was enlarged to other Third Wave transition attempts.

H2: the theory "from below" by Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce

Again, the results of our analysis confirm only part of the theory. According to Bratton, Van de Walle and other theorists „from below“, authoritarian regimes do not reform unless they are forced to by overwhelming mass mobilization. Consequently, the higher protest levels are, the more effective the pressure on the authoritarian regime is, and the higher the likelihood that eventually rulers are either forced to relinquish power, or to initiate reforms that lead to democratization. These reforms, according to Bratton and Van de Walle, are not a consequence of a crisis within the ruling elite- to the contrary, they claim that African regimes, by nature of their composition, do not split in pro- and anti-reform forces. Democratic regimes thus are achieved solely by people power, and depend to a crucial degree on the level of people's involvement in the transition process. In other words, high levels of mass mobilization are necessary for the instauration of a democratic

⁵⁶ The case is Tanzania, where an authoritarian regime crisis without mass mobilization did not lead to minimal democracy.

regime. We found that mass mobilization is indeed a necessary condition, although the level of mobilization is less important than assumed by theories "from below". Low levels of mass mobilization may also lead to democracy, although the cases in our sample that exhibited the configuration "minimal democracy" and "high levels of mass mobilization" were slightly more numerous. On the other hand, both the information obtained during our data gathering process and the QCA results disconfirm the claim that successful transitions "from below" do not experience authoritarian regime crises. Particularly, all those African transitions that succeeded featured important splits between the ruler and its support circle, in most cases the coercive apparatus. Conversely, with the exception of Tanzania, all cases of failed transitions we examined in our analysis lacked the condition ARCRISIS despite often significant levels of mass mobilization. Therefore we conclude that mass mobilization alone is not a sufficient condition for democratization.

H3: "hybrid" theory combining elements of "from above" and "from below"

We discussed in our literature review that an increasing number of scholars today support the idea that nearly all transitions from authoritarian rule combine elements "from above" with elements "from below". This tendency is evidenced by the apparition of a host of new "hybrid" studies that feature both variables, the split within the authoritarian regime and mass mobilization, to explain transition outcomes (see for example Wood 2000, Threlfall 2008, Shin 2008). As of yet, however, this new strand of research has not attempted to formulate a new and coherent theory of transitions integrating both factors, nor has it made any claims regarding necessity and sufficiency relations of either variable for a successful democratic transition. Our thesis attempts to fill this gap. Following Collier (1999), we elaborated two scenarios to describe how such transition dynamics could potentially unfold: (a) a transition project is initiated by large popular protest movements that either provoke or reinforce tensions within the authoritarian regime, to the point where these tensions transform into a veritable regime crisis that leads to a reform of the political system; or (b) a split between pro-and anti-reform factions within the authoritarian regime prompts the progressive forces among the ruling elite to initiate a more or less limited liberalization project. In this scenario, the ensuing mass mobilization acts both as an amplifier to the regime crisis, and as a watchdog over the reform process. In both cases, high levels of mass mobilization and authoritarian regime crisis are necessary


to successfully terminate the transition, i.e. to obtain a (minimally) democratic political regime.

The results of our QCA analysis generally support such a conception of transition dynamics, and even allow us to fine-tune certain ideas we originally had with regards to our hypotheses. Firstly, we were able to confirm that both conditions, regime crisis and mass mobilization, are necessary for a successful transition outcome. This finding is evidenced by our case sample: of the 25 examined cases, 17 cases were classified as "minimal democracies" by the end of their transition process (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, NIG(2), POL, ROM, PHI, IND, GRE, PAR, URU, ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON) and our conditions ARCRISIS and MASSMOB were found consistently in every positive transition case. Additionally, there were no contradictory outcomes, i.e. our case sample did not contain any case of failed transition where both conditions were also found. Indeed, every transition case that failed, i.e. did not lead to minimal democracy, featured only one condition: either ARCRISIS(1)*MASSMOB(0) like in Tanzania, or ARCRISIS(0)*MASSMOB(1,2) like for example in Kenya, Cameroon, South Korea or Bolivia. Therefore, we conclude that neither condition alone is sufficient for democratization.

These findings become particularly relevant if we compare them to research that claims that there is a distinct "regional" component to transitions. Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1988), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and Geddes (2012) are only a few examples of scholars that insist that transition dynamics vary significantly according to world region, time period or institutional setting. Military regimes of Latin America, for example, are said to democratize primarily by splitting into different regime factions, whereas African regimes do not split, even when challenged. Conversely, Eastern European, Asian and African transitions are considered primarily driven by mass mobilization, whereas elite negotiations without much mass involvement characterize the transitions of Southern Europe and Latin America. The results of our cross-regional analysis only partially support this point of view. In fact, when looking at the comparative level of mass-mobilization across our case sample, we find that Portugal, Spain and Chile form part of the transitions with the highest level of protest, whereas many African transitions exhibit comparatively

low levels of mobilization⁵⁷. As expected from the literature, however, the South-East Asian transitions exhibit the highest levels of mobilization, followed in some distance by the Eastern European transitions.

Table IX
[Comparative Level of Mass Mobilization]




On the other hand, we also confirm that not only the military dictatorships from Latin America and Southern Europe experienced an authoritarian regime crisis during their transitions but all successful transitions of our case sample, irrespective of regional affiliation, period of democratization or type of authoritarian institutions. In our opinion, this is a case in point for the idea that democratizing countries are, in fact, comparable across world regions, despite obvious differences related to socio-cultural and structural background.

⁵⁷ We can confirm though that African transitions seem to be impelled to a disproportionate degree by popular protest movements.

Secondly, there are indeed a number of transitions in our case sample that seem to have been impelled by mass mobilization. This figure is larger, and more diverse than conventionally assumed in the literature: even cases such as Spain, which scholars traditionally describe as being elite-dominated, experienced considerable mass mobilization in the years before the first reforms were enacted. According to our coding criteria⁵⁸, they can therefore be considered protest-initiated. These transitions are listed in Tab. X:

Table X

[Transition Attempts Initiated by Popular Protest Movements]



However, not all of these transition attempts also featured a crisis of the authoritarian regime. The cases of Togo, Nigeria(1), South Korea and Bolivia all exhibited initial levels of mass protest beyond 77%, yet none of these mass movements were able to transform existing tensions within the ruling elite into a full-blown regime crisis. This

⁵⁸ We consider a transition to be initiated by protest movements if the percentage of mobilization prior to the beginning of the transition is higher than 75% of the total mobilization that country experienced during its transition attempt. In formal terms, a transition is protest-initiated if $TMMI_{\text{bef}} > \frac{75}{100} TMMI_{\text{tot}}$. The beginning of a transition is marked by the year in which the first reforms were enacted.

finding shows that our scenario (a), although plausible in many instances of our successful transition cases, does not apply consistently across all cases with high initial mass mobilization. Hence, mass mobilization can be a decisive factor in provoking a split between regime forces (as was the case for example in the Philippines, or Spain) but as the literature on preconditions to democracy suggests, it is far from being the only factor in play. Although we eliminated structural conditions as irrelevant to the actual transition dynamics from the analysis, we do contend that they become relevant again when questions about the likelihood of obtaining specific configurations are being asked, i.e. when one attempts to determine how to increase the chances of, for instance, an authoritarian regime crisis to occur. This finding, however, does not directly affect our main hypothesis, since we did not attempt to identify the factors that encourage either the occurrence of an authoritarian regime crisis or mass mobilization. Instead, we were content to show that both conditions need to be present for democracy to result.

For most of our remaining 10 cases (POR, KEN, MOL, CHI, URU, ALG, TAN, ZAM, MAL, CAM) the percentage of mass mobilization that occurred prior to the first reforms was negligible; only in three transition attempts (Portugal 55%, Chile 42% and Kenya 51%) the amount of mobilization prior to, and during the actual reform process was relatively equal. Our scenario (b) could therefore have been a plausible option for many of those transition that ended successfully. Again, the failed transitions hinge for most part on the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis, which we interpret in the following way: if the ruling elite offers limited liberalization but remains sufficiently cohesive to avoid a regime crisis, even sustained mass mobilization might not be enough to tip the balance in favor of authentic reform. On the other hand, in Tanzania we identified the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis, but the absence of mass mobilization led the transition attempt to fail. In our view, this underlines the importance of mass pressure as vehicle for change when faced with a regime that might be only lukewarm about reform: if the popular desire for change is lacking, even progressive members of an authoritarian regime might be tempted to keep liberalization at a controllable level.

A qualifying remark, however, must be made with regards to our condition MASSMOB. *A priori* we went with the opinion of theorists "from below" in assuming that high levels of popular protest are more conducive to pressuring an authoritarian regime

into opening up than weak mass mobilization. Our analysis, however, provided strong evidence against such claims, suggesting that cases with low mass mobilization (GRE, PAR, URU, ZAM, MAL, MAW, BEN, MON) were almost equally as likely to lead to democracy as cases with high mass mobilization (SPA, ARG, POR, CHI, NIG(2), POL, ROM, PHI, IND). Accordingly, we suggest a modification of our original hypothesis: a minimally democratic regime is the result of an authoritarian regime crisis coupled with mass mobilization, irrespective of protest intensity.

How do our findings fit into the general framework of transitology? Above all, we think that demonstrating the complementarity of the two main transition theories is the central contribution of this thesis. Indeed, the forty-year old argument about which mode of transition has greater explanatory power has proven to be a false debate, as both sides are right and wrong at the same time: each theory (from above, AND from below) contributes a decisive element to a successful transition story, and no single theory alone accounts for all the factors that are necessary for achieving minimal democracy.⁵⁹ On one hand, mass mobilization, particularly at high intensities, has proven to be much more important than envisaged by O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory "from above". On the other hand, a split within the authoritarian regime in pro- and antireform forces is also a vital ingredient, despite its absence in Bratton and Van de Walle and Bunce's theory "from below". In short, both theories complete each other and should figure prominently in an integrated theory of transitions.

Despite that fact, we unavoidably ended up being confronted with the issue of weighting: are both theories really equally important? If not, which factor should be considered prime mover, and what evidence do we have to support such a claim? First of all, we believe that gauging the relative importance of one factor over the other is a very complex subject, partly due to the nature of the variables themselves (both reinforce each other and are therefore not completely independent of one another) and partly due to our

⁵⁹ This statement has to come with a qualifying remark: Our analysis did show that the theory "from above" alone was enough to explain transition success in certain cases (specifically those where an authoritarian regime crisis was coupled with low intensity mass protest). However, there were more cases where protest intensity was high and the transition still led to minimal democracy; a case that O'Donnell and Schmitter did not account for. Hence, we deem it justified to say that both theories, "from above" and "from below", share the explanatory power, although maybe not in equal parts. We will discuss the latter point in a subsequent section.

research method, which is not equipped for making such distinctions in a quantitative manner.⁶⁰ One should always keep in mind that no transition is like the other, and definitive conclusions can only be drawn after examining each case in detail, ideally using some sort of process-tracing. Based on our research results, however, we are able to draw certain qualitative inferences about potential general hierarchies among our conditions.

We found that there were many instances of transitions in which high levels of mass mobilization were recorded, but where the absence of a clear intra-regime split with a reform-committed majority still led to transition failure. The cases of Kenya, Togo or South Korea come to mind, where even significant mass protest did not manage to provoke a crisis of the authoritarian regime. By contrast, the opposite was true in only one case: in Tanzania, the absence of mass mobilization despite an (albeit weak) authoritarian regime crisis also resulted in a non-democratic transition outcome. While there could be many reasons for these uneven numbers,⁶¹ the fact that there are significantly more cases of transition failures in which the non-institutionalization of minimal democracy seems to hinge solely on the absence of an intra-regime crisis indicates to us that this condition occupies somewhat of a special place in an integrated theory of transitions⁶².

What consequences would we expect this to have, both in terms of applied policy making and future scholarly research? For the former, we do believe that a shift in emphasis is not only necessary but long overdue. In fact, since the arrival of the first African and Eastern European transitions involving organized mass resistance, politologists, decision-makers and aid organizations have tended to overemphasize the democratizing potential of civil society and mass movements. "The hallmark of successful and stable democracies", the secretary general of the United Nations recently said, "is the presence of a strong and freely operating civil society" (United Nations 2015). The fallacy

⁶⁰ As we have noted before, QCA, contrary to standard statistical techniques, is not suitable for measuring variables against each other, as it does not employ any sort of control factors.

⁶¹ On one hand, they could either be purely coincidental, or related to case selection issues, since we did not select our transitions upon the explanatory variables- had we specifically checked whether there were other cases with no mass mobilization and purposefully included them in our analysis, we might have a better idea of whether Tanzania is particular in its transition dynamics or not. On the other hand, they could also be a consequence of the fact that it seems to be rare, even in theoretical terms, to have an authoritarian government initiate a change as fundamental as a transition from authoritarianism without even the slightest meaningful popular contestation of the political system in place.

⁶² This finding ties in with the most recent trends in democratization research, as scholarly interest has started to shift towards intra-regime dynamics to explain the breakdown or stability of authoritarian regimes (see, for instance Morency-Laflamme (forthcoming), Bellin (2000), Geddes (2012)).

of such a unilateral conception of transitions is particularly evident in the context of the 2010/11 Arab Spring rebellions, in which mass mobilization was hailed by many as a miracle weapon against reform-unwilling dictators. Yet, four years later most of these transition attempts have either returned to authoritarianism (Egypt, Bahrain) or descended into civil war (Libya, Syria, Yemen). *A priori* there is only one country, Tunisia, that successfully transitioned to democracy, and even there citizens and authorities are struggling to keep whatever democratic gains they have made. In our opinion, the fact that decision-makers both in opposition movements and in foreign aid organizations underestimated the importance of intra-regime splits certainly played a role in the low success rate of these transitions.

By consequence, we think that future research should be oriented towards investigating the conditions that foster the likelihood of an authoritarian regime crisis as prime mover of transition dynamics. As we have seen, mass mobilization can lead to a break in the unity of a ruling bloc, but it is probable that it is but one condition among many. In fact, even a hundred-thousand people protesting against the Syrian regime could not topple President Assad - and neither could those demonstrating in Tiananmen, China in 1989, or those in many Sub-Saharan countries in the 1990s. In our opinion, this could be a further avenue for comparative studies where QCA could be successfully applied.

Lastly, we feel that two things should be said about potential limitations to our study. The first is related to the number of cases employed in our sample. Although our thesis figures among the medium-N research settings, our case sample of 25 is still relatively small, with all the methodological difficulties such a setting implies. The prime reason for our small case number is the difficulties in measuring our condition "ARCRISIS": since there was no pre-existing index of this variable, we had to conduct extensive qualitative research in form of in-depth case studies, which was time- and resource-intensive. If scholars working on democratization in the future were to extend the index by adding other cases, it could be used to verify the reliability of the results of this thesis. Without this possibility, the generalizability of our results based solely on the number of cases is limited. In our view, however, the fact that our findings were consistent, i.e. in 25 cases there was not a single case disconfirming our minimal formula, adds weight

to the idea that a democratic transition might indeed require both an authoritarian regime crisis and popular protest, even if other cases were chosen for the sample.

The second limitation is related to our choice of conditions. As we have previously stated our research focuses solely on actor-based, or "strategic" factors and excluded structural conditions on the grounds that we assume they do not influence transition dynamics directly. While we believe this to be justified on theoretical grounds, there might very well be certain structural factors that can influence transition dynamics in an indirect manner, for example by impacting on one hand the degree to which demands for change arise from below, and on the other hand the degree to which incumbents are able to contain these demands either by coopting or repressing them. In our literature review we did hint at this possibility by naming specific economic factors – oil rents, or foreign aid for example – whose presence might enable the ruling elite to coopt potential challengers or pacify sceptics in the own ranks, and therefore prevent splits in the regime. Nwajiaku (1994) for example, claims that the differing outcomes of the National Conferences in Africa can be attributed to the degree to which national leaders found themselves disempowered faced with economic crisis and, by extent, a reduced bargaining potential. He points out that the extent to which the Armed Forces still benefited from the neopatrimonial system was particularly important, as they could ultimately swing the balance of power between opposition forces and incumbent leadership. On the other hand, it is very conceivable that certain institutional settings – a competitive authoritarian regime that regularly holds elections, for example – influences the attitude and behavior of regime actors when faced with political opposition. In other words, it is possible to think that a more moderate authoritarian institutional framework also encourages greater openness towards divergent political opinions, and therefore fosters a higher number of reform-oriented individuals within the ruling circle. This, in turn, would make the occurrence of a regime crisis more likely. Structural factors might also influence the attitude of mass actors towards the regime. Haggard and Kaufman (1995, 7) for example, argue that all regimes (even nondemocratic ones) rest on bargaining between political leaders and key support groups, and that the stability of that pact hinges on economic conditions. "Good times generate support"- when there is a high level of economic growth, citizens won't protest and authoritarian rulers are likely to stay in power. By contrast, in times of economic crisis many people are unhappy with their circumstances, which increases the likelihood of

political protest "from below". In light of these considerations it would be interesting to run our QCA analysis again after including certain of these structural variables, and paying particular attention to the cases of failed transitions. If the presence or absence of certain structural conditions was positively and consistently related to the presence of our two necessary conditions, an authoritarian regime crisis and mass mobilization, we could gain important new insights on the way countries democratize- or, respectively, why certain countries seem to be "refractory" to democracy (Elbadawi and Makdisi 2010).

In this chapter we proceeded to test the validity of the main hypotheses elaborated by the various theories on democratic transitions. After reviewing the main theories to test, the data at hand and the selected conditions, we conducted our analysis within a multi-value QCA framework. We found that both a crisis of the authoritarian regime and mass mobilization are necessary conditions for the instauration of a minimal democracy. Our results thus partly corroborated and partly disproved the theories "from above" and "from below", and made a strong point for the conciliation of both theories into a third, "hybrid" approach to transitions. The following chapter is intended to reinforce that point: by qualitatively analyzing three cases of transitions we aim at deepening the analysis and at demonstrating the utility of a combined approach from a case study point of view.

From Theory to Practice: An Empirical Demonstration of Our Argument

Quantitative studies of democratization remain simplifications of complex processes that sometimes seem detached from the actual cases they try to explain. The purpose of this chapter is thus to tie back into the "qualitative material" we used to conduct our QCA analysis, and explore our results a little bit more in depth. To recapitulate, the heart of our QCA analysis was a theoretical dispute between two competing transition theories that each featured a characteristic element: (a) an authoritarian regime crisis; and (b) mass mobilization of varying intensity.

These two factors form essentially three combinations of conditions:

- (1) Transition with authoritarian regime crisis AND mass mobilization (at varying intensity levels)
- (2) Transition with mass mobilization (at varying intensity levels) WITHOUT authoritarian regime crisis
- (3) Transition with authoritarian regime crisis WITHOUT mass mobilization

Our analysis showed that only configuration (1) led to the desired outcome – democratization – whereas all configurations lacking one factor ended in a failed transition. In order to illustrate how the presence, and respectively, absence of conditions helped shaping these different paths (democratization versus continued authoritarianism), we chose three cases from our sample that each represent one configuration, and compare them as qualitative case studies. The cases chosen are Indonesia for (1), Togo for (2) and Tanzania for (3). The purpose of this comparison is twofold: on one hand, it serves to illustrate once again the research problem our thesis is concerned with, and on the other hand, it exemplifies the methodology our thesis employs in its search for a solution to the puzzle.

We chose these three cases with a view to their potential as "ideal types" representing each one of the theories our thesis set out to test: Tanzania as example for transitions "from above", Togo as example for transitions "from below" and Indonesia as example for our own hypothesis combining both theories "from above" and "from below". We do not pretend that these cases are a representative sample of all transitions over the period covered; nor do we claim that our results automatically apply to all countries undergoing some sort of transition. The idea is not to ask if another case could have been selected, but if collectively the three cases provide a sufficient empirical basis to gauge the relevance of our statistical results.

The chapter is structured as follows: After giving a brief background overview of our transitional cases, we will first compare their levels of mobilization and their impact on the specific transition dynamics. In a second step, we will examine whether or not these mobilizations were accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Lastly, we will compare the respective transition outcomes in light of the presence or absence of these two aspects, mass protest and regime crisis.

4.1. Introduction and Background Information

Our thesis departed from the basic question of what causes democratic transitions to succeed, given that less than half of all third wave transitions actually terminated in the instauration of a minimal democracy. Our case study selection illustrates this point well: between the three of them, only Indonesia has completed its transition to democracy. As we will see, it is also the only transition case that experienced both significant mass mobilization, and an authoritarian regime crisis. Whereas Togo and Tanzania both form part of the "African spring", the time period in the nineties when almost all African countries underwent transitions from authoritarianism, Indonesia is often considered to be the last third wave country to democratize. A priori, however, the pre-transition situation of all three countries had many commonalities, the most acute of which was economic hardship. Indonesia, for instance, was caught in the devastating Asian economic crisis with fuel and commodity prices skyrocketing and the rupiah declining to one-sixth of its original value by January 1998. Unable to stabilize the economy, the Suharto government had to seek assistance from the IMF and adopt stringent austerity measures, which further

increased unemployment and hardship on the population (IMF 1998). Togo, on the other hand, had already implemented a structural adjustment program by the time of its transition, yet the Togolese economy continued to spiral downward and traditional patronage networks were in the process of disappearing. Finally, Tanzania's socialist economic system experienced a crisis in the 1980s that was so severe that external donors, who at that time provided more than 30 percent of the country's GDP in aid to the country, pressured the Tanzanian government into joining a SAP (Planmo 2002). Whereas the Tanzanian citizens did not react strongly to the economic woes of their country, the Indonesian and Togolese populace responded by mobilizing massively against the regime. In fact, both in Indonesia and in Togo more than 77 percent of mass protest action took place prior to the first reforms, which strongly indicates to us that mass mobilization initiated these transitions.

4.2. Identification of Mass Mobilization

We would like to remind the reader that our thesis considers mass mobilization to be either strikes, riots or anti-government demonstrations. In accordance with this definition, our case studies will concentrate only on these three forms of mobilization, although there might of course have been other forms of subversive actions (for example the distribution of anti-government leaflets by Togolese students), too.

4.2.1. Indonesia

Since the the worsening of Indonesia's economic situation at the beginning of the 1990s, a de facto anti-Suharto coalition combining a new generation of middle-class democratic activists with dissident nationalists, traditional Muslims, Marxists, human rights workers, labor activists, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, and even East Timorese freedom fighters had formed that opposed Suharto's three-decades long "New Order" (Liddle 1996; 2002). However, it was only in the years immediately leading up to 1998 that various groups of that coalition started to organize in mass action against the regime. In July 1996, for example, riots broke out in Jakarta after the government ousted Megawati Sukarnoputri as leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (The Independent 1998). A further wave of protests took place before, during and after the rigged General

Elections in May 1997, which the ruling Golkar party won with 70 percent of the votes. On one hand, thousands of workers coordinated by the SBSI organized strikes and anti-government demonstrations in a number of industrial areas in Java, calling for basic worker rights, the abolition of the restrictive authoritarian laws and an end to the political involvement of the Armed Forces (Simanjuntak 1997). On the other hand, supporters of the United Development Party orchestrated massive anti-government demonstrations during the days set aside for their election campaign (Lane 1998). In the aftermath of the election, another round of militant protest over voting irregularities took place, leading to riots that left many police stations and government offices in East Java and Madura destroyed.

By early 1998, however, the most influential voice of criticism came from students (Noble 2009). Several months into the devastating Asian economic crisis and just a few months away from the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly in which Suharto was preparing for his fifth consecutive "reelection", students and opposition groups (involving, among others, retired members of the military) organized petitions calling for "reformasi damai" (peaceful reform) and Suharto's resignation as president. Protest within universities grew to tens of thousands of participants within two months, and despite the government's attempts to open talks with the student protestors, the students refused to meet, continuing their protest demonstrations instead (Chicago Tribune 1998a). However, not only did Suharto ignore their calls for his resignation and instead accepted a fifth mandate on March 10, 1998, he also announced a 70 percent increase in fuel prices in early May 1997. Outraged, student protesters took to the street where they were joined by swells of other Indonesian citizens.

Observers agree though that the turning point of these demonstrations was the twilight of May 12 when security forces shot dead six student protesters at Jakarta's Trisakti University and triggered what Asiaweek magazine called "Ten Days that Shook Indonesia" (Bird 1999) Between 500 and 2000 people died and many more were raped in the most violent and massive riots that Indonesia had ever seen (Richburg 1998a; Noble 2009). On the worst day of rage, more than ten thousand Indonesians went on a looting spree in central Jakarta, torching shopping malls, movie houses and other businesses (Chicago Tribune 1998b). On May 18 and the following days, demonstrations with close to one million participants shook Jakarta and other cities (CNN 1998c). Additionally, more

than 3000 students staged a sit-in in the Parliament building until they were forcefully evicted by the military (Chicago Tribune 1998c). Opposition to the Suharto regime was so strong that Suharto decided to appear on television for the first time and announced his intention to eventually resign, but without giving a concrete timetable (The Independent 1998). In response, around 700.000 protesters turned out in cities throughout Indonesia, and students overran Parliament, this time unhindered by police or the Armed Forces. It was the last major protest event before Suharto conceded defeat and resigned, and also coincided with the moment when most of Suharto's supporters abandoned him. For instance, fourteen members of Suharto's Cabinet resigned and General Wiranto as representative of the Armed Forces made it clear that the protesters' demands were legitimate and backed by the military (Los Angeles Times 1998). In our opinion, it is therefore plausible to say that mass mobilization contributed significantly to creating the rift between Suharto and his power base.

4.2.2. Togo

In Togo, by contrast, mass mobilization provided the impulse for a National Conference, but in the end did not lead to a crisis of the authoritarian regime. This is interesting, given that the overall scope of pre-transition mobilization was only slightly smaller than in Indonesia⁶³. The Togolese reform movement emerged in 1990 as a reaction to economic hardship and the gradual waning of patron-client relationships. It was spearheaded by a frustrated intelligentsia and directed against the corporatist government of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his Single Party, the "Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais" (RPT), who had been ruling Togo since 1967 (Decalo 1987, 172). The prelude to the transition began on October 5, 1990 when two University professors were detained by the Togolese security services for distributing antigovernment tracts. The arrests sparked large public demonstrations and resulted in violent repression by government forces, the most infamous of which – the massacre of the Bè Laguna – left several dozen people dead (Engueleguele et al., 2013).

⁶³ This statement is based upon our analysis of the CTMMI of both countries shown in table 10 in the previous chapter.

Despite the government crackdown, demonstrations intensified in 1991 under the auspices of the "Front d'Action pour le Renouveau" (FAR), an umbrella of opposition groups led by Yaovi Agboyibo, and several student organizations⁶⁴. Student grievances were directed primarily against SAP austerity measures (Heilbrunn 1993). After Eyadema refused to acknowledge a petition prepared by the coalition of student groups calling for both better education and the holding of a National Conference for political reform, the students started a strike in March 1991 to lend force to their demands. The strike turned into violent rioting when government forces attacked thousands of student protesters with live ammunition and tear gas (New York Times 1991a) and finally led to the signing, on March 22, 1991, of an agreement between the FAR, the students and President Eyadéma. The agreement provided for a general amnesty, a new Charter on political parties and the organization of a National Forum on Dialogue tasked with elaborating the conditions for Togo's transition to a more participatory political system (Huband 1991).

Whereas the first two laws entered into force, the National Forum on Dialogue never took place, as the FAR decided they would no longer be satisfied with anything other than a National Conference (Letogolais.com, 2013). Hence, scattered protest events continued throughout April and May 1991 mostly under the auspices of the Democratic Opposition Front (FOD), a coalition of 11 newly legalized opposition parties. At one point, armed citizens even had taken over parts of Lome and were announcing plans for an armed rebellion in the street (Rennebohm 2011). In an attempt to pacify the opposition, Eyadema agreed to stand down from the post of Defence Minister which he had held since 1967 (Minorities at Risk 2010). Yet he offered no further concessions, and therefore the FOD called for an indefinite General Strike to begin in June and to last until Eyadema resigned or a National Conference was organized. The strike, which also involved a major pro-democracy rally with as many as 30.000 participants, was supported by most citizens of Lome and other cities in Togo and completely paralyzed the entire country for several weeks (Rennebohm 2011). Astonished by the severity of popular disaffection with the regime, the Eyadéma government ended up giving in to opposition demands for a National

⁶⁴ According to a March 1991 BBC report, students were mobilized by four independent student organizations: the Mouvement estudiantin de lutte pour la democratie (MELD), the Students' Front for Democratic Struggle (FELD), the Youth Reflection and Action Group for Democracy (GRAD) and the University Organization for the Fight for Democracy in Togo (OULDT) (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994).

Conference. Thus, we can confirm that, like in Indonesia, mass mobilization played a significant part in fostering the initial movement towards regime change in Togo.

4.2.3. Tanzania

In contrast to the Togolese and Indonesian experiences, the Tanzanian experience with political liberalization in the 1990s was not propelled, or even accompanied, by significant popular protest movements. When the Tanzanian leadership began to move the country toward democracy in the early 1990s, neither an organized opposition to the ruling party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM)⁶⁵ nor a demand for a multiparty democracy existed (Hoffman and Robinson 2009). The absence of contestation is said to have several reasons: Firstly, the values of civic peace and social harmony are considered to be very important to most Tanzanians, and could explain why there were no riots or strikes prior to the initiation of reforms by the government (Hydén 1999). In fact, acts of anti-government demonstrations remained small and so limited in size that they were not considered significant enough to enter our mass mobilization index.

For instance, at the beginning of 1990s, "disturbances" had been reported on the island of Pemba (Daily News 1990d) where "political bandits" were said to have burned down a CCM party headquarters building (Yakuti 1990a). In another incident, workers at CMC Motors in Dar es Salaam closed down the CCM and Jawata Union office in early April (Daily News 1990e), a move that Regional CCM Party Secretary John Nchimbi called "illegal and unheard of" in Tanzania (Daily News 1990f). The biggest show of opposition to CCM rule happened on September 6, 1992, when the Business Times reported that 27 people had been arrested after marching on the Ministry of Home Affairs in support of a new political group called "Chama Cha Wananchi", which was said to be led by Civil Rights campaigner James Mapalala (Tanzanian Affairs 1992a).

⁶⁵ Apart from some small activist groups in Zanzibar that favored the separation from the mainland, sources attest only one minor opposition movement, the "Tanzanian Revolutionary Youth Movement" (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1989).

Secondly, surveys of ordinary Tanzanians show that the concept of political pluralism was either not well understood⁶⁶ or not a very high priority⁶⁷ in the eyes of most people. In fact, interview answers seem to support the thesis of a British academic who dismissed advocates of pluralism in Tanzania as "middle level Tanzanians and frustrated professional and business people who feel they have been politically marginalized" (Tanzanian Affairs 1991). In fact, there is considerable evidence to believe that the great majority of Tanzanians felt genuinely satisfied with the kind of political regime the CCM had been providing (Afrobarometer 2012). A 1992 public opinion survey, for example, revealed that 77 percent of respondents preferred Tanzania to remain a one-party state with the CCM in control (Amon et al. 2002), a fact that led the 1995 presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa to proudly boast that the party "didn't need to cheat [in potential multiparty elections] because it was quite certain that CCM was going to win" (Agence France Press 1995)⁶⁸.

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the first steps towards political change in Tanzania emanated "from the top", initiated by former President "Mwalimu" Nyerere. Nyerere, the father of the Tanzanian Socialist "Ujamaa", retired voluntarily from the Presidency in 1985 and handed over power to his chosen successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who also became chairman of the CCM in 1990. Although once a fierce defender of "one-party democracy", it was Nyerere who first drew the attention of the Tanzanian leadership to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to the inevitability of a similar political transition in Africa (Hydén 1999). On February 21, 1990, in a widely publicized interview before the heads of the national mass media, Nyerere dramatically opened the national debate over multipartyism, while stressing at the same time the critical task of protecting Ujamaa (Sunday News 1990a, 7). Suggesting that Single Party rule

⁶⁶ An anecdote told by David Martin, journalist of *The Independent*, on November 3, 1990 evidences this point well: Asked about political pluralism, one old Tanzanian answered: "Plurality? Does that mean more than one wife?" When he was explained that it meant two or more political parties, so that voters could have a choice, his answer was: "What is the point of that?" (Tanzanian Affairs 1991)

⁶⁷ A street vendor who was interviewed by the *Daily News* in Dar es Salaam, for example, claimed that "I do not care what is happening in CCM as long as I get my bread peacefully and I can sell my shirts and sunglasses" (Tanzanian Affairs 1992b).

⁶⁸ The truth of this statement is evidenced by a 2008 Afrobarometer survey in which 56 percent of respondents in Tanzania claimed to trust opposition parties either not at all or only a little bit, while 51 percent claimed to trust the CCM a lot. Along the same lines, of the 81 percent of respondents who said that they felt close to a political party, 90 percent responded that the party they felt close to was the CCM. Similarly, 79 percent responded that if an election were held tomorrow, they would vote for the CCM. (Hoffmann and Robinson 2009)

might be a root cause for complacency in senior government officials (Wiseman 1990, 186), he argued that the Tanzanian system had developed a dangerous tendency towards authoritarianism. According to Nyerere, "when a Tanzanian cannot write an article and argue the need for more than one party – and by doing so he is committing treason – then at that stage we shall have gone too far" (Sunday News 1990b, 4). Referring to events in Eastern Europe, he added that "Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a single party is God's wish" (Sunday News 1990a, 7).

Officially, Nyerere recommended adopting a multi-party system in Tanzania because (1) the political environment was different from that of the 1960s and therefore the timing for introducing multiparty politics was opportune; (2) the CCM was a democratic party that wanted to preserve peace, stability and national harmony; (3) democracy was considered a precondition to Socialism, hence there was no ideological conflict in pluralism; and (4) the party wanted to remain modern and ahead of possible opposition movements to ensure its legitimacy and future political survival (Ngasongwa 1992). On the other hand, however, one can hypothesize that the introduction of multipartyism was a tactical decision in order to recover a socialist agenda threatened by economic hardship and donor pressure to open up the political system (Ake 1991, 32 – 44). In fact, Tanzania in the 1990s experienced a "perestroika without glasnost" (Zirker 1997): largely as a result of pressure by external donors, who provided more than 30 percent of the country's GDP in aid from 1985 to 1993, Tanzania joined a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) leading to a period of privatisation, reduction in salaries and subsidies and rampant corruption (Planmo 2002). Hence, by recommending multipartyism, Nyerere might have believed he could garner support for a government immersed in the most traumatic policies of a foreign-encouraged economic liberalization program (Zirker 1997).

Following Nyerere's speech, the CCM party hierarchy complied and scheduled a National Conference on the political changes in Eastern Europe and a three-day symposium on "Socialist construction in the world" (Anglin, 1990, 435). Furthermore, in 1991, President Mwinyi appointed the so-called Nyalali-Commission tasked with the mandate to enquire whether Tanzanians actually wanted a change of the current political system, and what legal and constitutional changes were demanded to reintroduce multiparty politics (Planmo 2002). In response, the political opposition forces formed an

independent National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) to spearhead demands for a Constitutional Conference (Nyirabu 2002). The leader of NCCR, Chief Abdallah Fundikira, qualified the Nyalali Commission as "a waste of taxpayers' money" and threatened to call on the president to establish a transitional government in preparation for multi-party elections (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). However, the government did not cede to these demands, and when the Nyalali Commission presented its initial findings and recommended the adoption of multipartism (even though only a minority of Tanzanians actually favored such change), the National Executive Committee of CCM complied: on condition that national unity be preserved and Tanzanians learn the art of "contestation without confrontation" (Martin 1992), the CCM accepted on February 29, 1992 to end its monopoly of political activities and its supremacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

We have seen now that mass mobilization initiated the transitions of Indonesia and Togo, but not the transition of Tanzania. In a next step we consider the presence or absence of the condition "crisis of the authoritarian regime". We will show that only the regime in Tanzania and Indonesia experienced splits where softliners emerged victorious over anti-reform forces, whereas the Togolese government succeeded in preserving its unity over the course of the transition attempt.

4.3. Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis

To recapitulate, in order to identify a crisis of the authoritarian regime, we first consider the presence of softliners and hardliners within the ruling clique. We distinguish both groups on the basis of a) their public statements; b) eventual defections; and c) policy shifts within their respective government portfolios towards greater liberalization. In order to determine whether softliners are majoritarian, however, we look at d) credible reform propositions and reform implementation; and e) repression of opposition forces. Although not every indicator is present to the same degree in every case study (the indicators "defections" and "policy shifts", for example, are amiss entirely in the case of Tanzania), combining the individual weights of the indicators we do find is enough for us to decide whether or not a crisis of the authoritarian regime has taken place.

4.3.1. Tanzania

In Tanzania, the presence of real softliners is a point of contention. In fact, some might argue that dissensions between former President Nyerere, the main advocator of liberalization, and President Mwinyi were merely disagreements on modifications of the authoritarian government, and not signs of a real crisis of the authoritarian regime. Holders of that opinion might say, for example, that the struggle between regime softliners and hardliners was not much of a struggle at all, since hardliners were swayed rather quickly into adopting political reforms; a fact that would suggest more dissensions between ruling factions than a real regime crisis. Indeed, one might either think that there were no true hardliners at all, or that people that could have conceivably been considered hardliners, such as President Mwinyi, were not the true wielders of power, and therefore couldn't act independently.

For instance, many journalists have underlined the significant power that elder statesman Nyerere kept exercising in Tanzania's government even after he had stepped down from all ruling functions. One of them, Ulli Mwambulukutu, managing editor of the government-owned newspaper "Daily Times" remarked in 1985 that there was little doubt that Nyerere's voice was going to be heard in Tanzanian politics, as he was still "chairman of the party, and the party is very powerful" (Gargan 1985). Nyerere indeed gave ample grounds to the suspicions that he remained "the power behind the throne" (Edlin 1987): he intervened at least twice during Mwinyi's presidency to silence party dissenters, once against rebel MPs from the G55 who demanded Tanganyika be separates from Tanzania, and once against radical students from Dar es Salaam University who organized a series of strikes (Africa Review 2013). Hence one could be tempted to agree with the Economist who qualified President Mwinyi as "Mr. Nyerere's man" (Tanzanian Affairs 1985) - a puppet without real decision-making power.

However, looking at Mwinyi's policy-making, there is no evidence of such assumptions. In fact, the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) was launched in 1986 against the will of Nyerere who frequently voiced his hostility to the program by lancing thinly-veiled attacks on President Mwinyi's leadership (Africa Review 2013). Nevertheless, Mwinyi insisted that his government would continue to adhere to these liberalization policies, even

though it meant actually rescinding some of the most fundamental principles the Nyerere regime had been built on such as the Arusha Declaration (Zirker 1997). Furthermore, Mwinyi's actions and his remarks in public after Nyerere dramatically called for an overhaul of Tanzania's political system show that he was indeed very much a hardliner. After his initial response to the crisis, a half-hearted attempt to clean the ruling party from corruption by sacking certain cabinet ministers,⁶⁹ did not silence his critics, he publicly rebutted Nyerere on April 10, 1990, arguing that Tanzania needed economic development more than multipartyism (Southall 2006, 272). He also lauded the Single Party for having been able to bring national unity and stability to the country after the chaos of decolonization⁷⁰. He was joined by then-Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa who claimed that there was already sufficient political pluralism in Tanzania's Single Party system (Daily News 1990c, 1) and Zanzibari President Idris Wakil who judged that "a multi-party system will not provide solutions to the economic problems Zanzibar is facing at the moment and will, instead, wreck unity, peace and stability in the island" (Yakuti 1990b). Therefore, we can definitely confirm the existence of hardliners within the Tanzanian ruling elite.

On the other hand, one could argue that Nyerere was not really a softliner at all. In fact, up to 1989 he seemed to be a firm believer in one-party rule, and even told a political rally in Zanzibar on March 5, 1989 that it was time for the state to use its powers to silence activists opposed to the ruling party's views in order to restore public confidence in the party and its founders (Nyirabu 2002). Only when he noticed the emergence of real divisions within the ruling party did he advocate liberalization, possibly to rally the elite around the flag (Southall 2006, 272). He also kept to a very restrictive idea about political opening. For instance, he demanded that Ujamaa be protected at all costs, and were the CCM to allow the formation of other parties, these would have to be national, secular and Socialist parties (Mruma 1990, 1). Furthermore, he stated that if the Army were to retreat from politics, he would rather keep the current political arrangement and forego liberalization altogether (Martin 1992). Once the transition was underway, Nyerere even

⁶⁹ Mwinyi did in fact defend the ministers, calling them "nice, decent and clean people [that were sacked] because a lot of evils have been going on in their respective ministries. It is a question of accountability and nothing else" (Daily News 1990a, 3)

⁷⁰ He further opined that "what Africans want is a fair return for their sweat through a new international economic order" and not the creation of multiple ethnic-based political parties "which can bring chaos instead of progress" (Daily News 1990b, 1)

helped to obstruct political succession, influencing the nomination of the CCM presidential candidate in 1995 and discrediting the opposition by effectively participating in the 1995 election campaign on the side of the ruling party (Peter and Koepsieker 2006).

However, as O'Donnell and Schmitter have pointed out themselves, softliners need not necessarily be democrats. In fact, most softliners do not want the regime to fall, but they fight for a less restrictive form of government as a means of legitimizing the current system. This seems to be clearly the case for Nyerere whose efforts seem to have aimed at saving Ujamaa from a Single Party state that was moving the system toward economic liberalization and Capitalism (Zirker 1997). Although he technically did not defect from the government (but instead stepped down voluntarily from all ruling functions), many of his public statements, as well as the public statements of other regime members (our indicator (a) for the presence of softliners) substantiate this claim.

In fact, after Nyerere toured the country in 1986/87 to "dynamise" the party, he was shocked by how far from the people the CCM had gone, and by how complacent the leadership had become (Tambila 1995, 475 – 476). Possibly influenced by this experience, Nyerere then suggested that CCM could and should welcome the sweeping democratic changes across the globe, and to be prepared "to change and oversee that change, rather than be made to change" (Daily News 1992). He also suggested that multipartyism could be the remedy to the nation's crippling economic problems and the rampant corruption within the CCM (Tanzanian Affairs 1992b). Once adopted, he added, there was going to be no alternative to multipartyism, and the democratic experiment had to succeed- otherwise, an even harsher form of authoritarianism could be the result. He said, "when you divorce your wife and then marry another and you discover that your second wife is a disaster, it is difficult to return to your former wife. If we try multi-party democracy and then fail the likeliest system to ensue thereafter will be a one-man dictatorship or military rule" (Tanzanian Affairs 1990). Additionally, there is no doubt that in the years leading up to 1990 the authoritarianism of other members of the Tanzanian ruling elite was also attenuated, not least because of the economic dysfunction of the system and the apparent imminence of an economic liberalization program (Pratt 1976, 263). After Nyerere's February interview, for example, a wide range of prominent CCM members (for example Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the Secretary of the CCM National Executive Committee for

Ideology, Political Education and Training) warned of the potential dangers of Single Party systems (Musendo 1990, 1) and stressed the need to increase the legitimacy of the Tanzanian political system (Mshana 1990, 1).

Therefore, if one adopts the position, as we do, that there was indeed a split between softliners – even reluctant ones - and hardliners, it remains to be seen whether softliners were indeed majoritarian. To this end we look at credible reform propositions emanating from the softliner regime faction, as well as their actual implementation in the course of the transition process (our indicator d for softliner predominance). On one hand, we confirm that there was a significant growth in press freedom and freedom of speech in the late 1980s (Diamond 1988, 23). Revealing reports of public corruption, the economy and even human rights violations by the police appeared, and even though hardliner Ahmed Hassan Diria, then-Minister for Information and Broadcasting, warned the press against "Western imperialist style reporting and yellow journalism" (Daily News 1989, 5), the debate on multipartyism in the press continued without significant repression by the regime. On the other hand, the sacking of a number of Ministers accused of corruption might also indicate a shift towards greater accountability of the political system, and softliner predominance. In mid-March 1990 President Mwinyi asked for the resignation of his entire Cabinet for reason of "lack of accountability", adding that "we now want Party and government decisions to be implemented fully" (Daily New 1990a, 3).

The greatest indication, however, is the fact that Tanzanian hardliners complied with softliner demands and adopted reforms. For instance, despite his personal opposition to multipartyism, Mwinyi followed Nyerere's wishes and announced to members of his ruling party that the time was ripe for Tanzania to have a multiparty system (Christian Science Monitor 1992b)⁷¹. He also implemented the recommendations for reform proposed by the Nyalali Commission in 1991 (Mwesiga 2000), even though some caveat remained: several controversial pieces of legislation, including the Preventive Detention Act, were left unchanged (Hydén 1999, 144), and new laws on political parties tilted the playing field

⁷¹ While some analysts suggest that the reason for such rapid compliance is the fact that Tanzanian politics traditionally exhibited a strong culture of avoiding conflict and striving for unity within the government (Mueller 2013), we do believe that political culture is no sufficient explanation for institutional suicide. Instead, we believe that softliners must have been in a position of significant power to overrule hardliner opposition; again, a fact that would corroborate the existence of a true regime crisis.

excessively in favor of the ruling CCM party⁷². Additionally, the government decided to postpone the elections for Parliament and the Presidency for another three years (Hydén 1999, 144). However, we argue that even though reforms were flawed, they were in fact implemented, which is another major sign for the power of softliners within the regime. For the sake of comparison, in 1983 the ruling party offered proposals to the public for debate in order to amend Tanzania's Constitution, but when the public's demands turned against the Single Party state, the regime quickly refused to introduce political reforms (Nyirabu 2002). In short, while we do contend that Tanzania's political liberalization was the result of an authoritarian regime crisis, we admit that the split between reformers and conservatives was not as significant as in other Third Wave countries and did not create as big a rift between old and new system.⁷³

4.3.2. Indonesia

In Indonesia's transition to democracy, things are less ambiguous. Not only can we clearly distinguish softliners and hardliners both within Suharto's party apparatus and his coercive apparatus, but we also know that softliners eventually managed to impose their course of action onto the reluctant hardliner factions. Whereas in Tanzania the leading softliners came from within the ruling party, in Indonesia the Armed Forces played the biggest role in reform efforts. Starting during the years leading up to the transition, observers witnessed dissensions between Suharto and his power base, mostly in form of public statements (our indicator (a) for the presence of softliners). Both members of the perennial ruling party Golongan Karya (Golkar), as well as parliamentary representatives of the Armed Forces demonstrated their democratic predisposition by periodically issuing calls for greater accountability of the President, and by keeping the debate about openness alive in Parliament (Lane 1991a). People such as Deputy Speaker Syaiful Sulun, Police Colonel Roekmini, and Major General Samsuddin regularly called for a stronger Parliament, and were in turn dropped from the list of Golkar candidates to be elected. A

⁷² For instance, every new party had to submit an application for registration and comply with a number of more or less arbitrarily defined requirements, independent candidates were banned from participating in elections, and the Registrar office was allowed to cancel the registration of any party that, in the eyes of the government, ceased to qualify for registration under the new legislation (Nyirabu 2002).

⁷³ In fact, the transition to a multiparty system in 1992 was accompanied by only limited institutional change and resulted in few substantial alterations in the operative rules of the political game (ARD 2003). In our opinion, it is clear that the lack of popular contestation prevented a deeper schism between regime forces, and is therefore indirectly responsible for the failure of the transition project.

similar fate struck Speaker Kahris Suhud, a softliner who had introduced reforms such as direct questions and answer sessions with Ministers.

On the other side, there had been ongoing power struggles between Suharto and his long time power base, the Armed Forces (Liddle 1996). Dissatisfaction within the officer corps of ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) was linked to a number of issues, including “unfair” promotions and transfers, “scapegoating” of the military for human rights violations, interference by non-military politicians in purchases of armaments and equipment, and most importantly, resentment created by the increasing wealth of the Suharto family and their associates (Aspinall 1995). Whereas Suharto had gone to great lengths to periodically purge the officer corps from soldiers considered disloyal, military elites also worked to undermine Suharto on numerous occasions. Examples include the "Petition of 50" episode of the early 1980s (Lane 1991b); the warning by ABRI commander Benny Murdani over the Suharto family's business dealings in 1988; the imposition of Tri Sutrisno as Vice President in 1993; and the help to Sukarno's daughter Megawati in becoming President of the Indonesian Democracy Party in 1993 (Case 2000). In general, the younger generation of ABRI officers was more democratically minded and wary of Suharto, considering “he's [held the Presidency] too long and is too powerful” (Richburg 1998b).

At the time of transition, ruling members who publicly declared their opposition to Suharto evidenced the lack of cohesion within the regime first. On one side, Amien Rais, a key member of the government's top Islamic advisory board ICMI, first severely criticized Suharto's ruling style and even declared his willingness to challenge Suharto for the presidency. He later switched sides to join the opposition and became a major supporter of student protests. On the other side, managers of state enterprises such as Djiteng Marsudi, Director of the National Electricity Utility, as well as technocrats and former Cabinet Ministers Sumitro Djojohadikusomo and Mohammad Sadli declared in the legislature the need for a new government (Case 2000). Outside the confines of the legislature, softliners were reaching out to the opposition. Adi Sasono, head of an ICMI research institute, proposed a national dialogue between government and opposition leaders, and was supported in this effort by Syarwan Harid, head of the Armed Forces delegation in Parliament. Most importantly, however, ABRI commander General Wiranto expressed his

support for student demonstrators and what he called "the aspirations of the people", as long as their activities remained inside university campuses (Crouch 1999, 61). He even went as far as proposing that he and selected Cabinet Ministers hold face-to-face talks with student leaders. "As long as their goals are constructive, I think it's good," Wiranto said "Like the demand to have a clean Cabinet, that's normal and constructive. But if they become destructive, disturb the peace and step on other people's rights, then it's not correct" (CNN 1998d). According to him, the Army backed gradual political and economic reform as the only way out of the crisis (Chicago Tribune 1998d). He also acknowledged that for some time, ABRI had studied other recent cases of transition from military to civilian rule, especially with regard to the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, so as to prepare itself for such an eventuality⁷⁴ (The Straits Times 1996, 14).

As the transition progressed and Suharto's position became more and more precarious, even regime insiders known to be very close to Suharto publicly requested his departure. Parliament Speaker Harmoko, third in the ruling hierarchy and a long-time friend of Suharto, pressed Suharto to step down and even went as far as to threaten impeachment of the President, should he not conform to Parliament's wishes (CBC News 1999; Head 1998). After he had issued the call, he and other Assembly leaders, including the heads of the dominant military and Golkar party factions, went to see Suharto at his residence to reiterate the appeal for Suharto to vacate office (Chicago Tribune 1998e). There were also many defections by regime insiders (our indicator (b) for the presence of softliners). Within the last days of Suharto's struggle alone, thirteen cabinet ministers resigned (Noble 2009) and of the fourteen economic ministers asked to participate in the President's proposed "reform council", all fourteen refused. In a widely quoted riposte, one nominee asked, "Are you crazy? The people will burn down my house" (Vatikiotis and Schwarz 1998, 22).

Finally, Suharto's loss of support among his power base and the predominance of softliners are best exemplified by the evolution of military violence during the transition (our indicator (e) for softliner predominance). Whereas hardliners such as the commander

⁷⁴ A senior adviser to President Habibie later confirmed Wiranto's claims, saying that, "the [Indonesian] military saw the coming of democracy to Asia and Indonesia, and were preparing for that" (Acharya 1998, 10).

of the Strategic Reserve, General Prabowo Subianto, had taken advantage of the riots after May 12, 1998, and even actively instigated violence in order to provide a pretext for rolling back the transition (Case 2000), General Wiranto, the Minister of Defense, facilitated peaceful protest by refusing to use violence on protestors and thereby effectively removing military support from beneath Suharto. For instance, Wiranto ordered that students marching on the Parliamentary building be allowed to protest off their campuses, and enter the government building without molestation by military forces (Chicago Tribune 1998d). Buses escorted by troops ferried the students from the University of Indonesia to the downtown parliamentary complex. Along the way, many of the soldiers guarding the streets gave the protesters the thumbs up (Chicago Tribune 1998f). In another incident, Armed Forces representative Colonel Sriyanto met with 5000 students at his palace complex, pledging a symbolic amount of Rp 1,111.111 to support the students' calls for reform (Purdey 2006, 130). Finally, another officer admitted that "soldiers at certain barricades in parts of the city had not even loaded their guns with rubber bullets, but rather with blanks, so that no harm would come to protesters had they been ordered to shoot" (Noble 2009, 6). When Suharto stepped down, the military threw its support behind the transition and Habibie, Suharto's chosen successor (Richburg 1998a), despite the fact that there had been much conflict between Habibie and the military High Command in previous years (CNN 1998b). At that point it was clear that softliners had won the power struggle within the regime, and the transition could move forward.

4.3.3. Togo

In contrast to Tanzania and Indonesia, the Togolese government did not split during the transition attempt, although popular mobilization continued even after the National Conference had been called.⁷⁵ This was principally due to the unwavering loyalty of the Armed Forces to President Eyadema. Whereas in Indonesia the Army turned into a key player for democratization, in Togo they became the main obstacle to reform and effectively prevented a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In fact, there were hardly any softliners within the Togolese ruling elite to begin with. We have very little proof of

⁷⁵ In 1992, there were several pro-democracy rallies (February 9, July 30, November 11, November 22) gathering more than 200.000 participants and another General Strike that was called by the Collective of Democratic Opposition 2 (COD2) on November 16 (Minorities at Risk 2010).

significant disunity within the regime, either within party ranks or within the coercive apparatus. This is maybe not so surprising, given that many scholars consider the RPT to be a simple emanation of the Togolese Army (Toulabor 1999; Lodonou 1988). In reality, the Togolese military (Forces Armées Togolaises, FAT) were certainly not that monolithic. In fact, even though the Constitution prohibited the military from organizing outside of the framework of the RPT, a small minority of soldiers created in 1991 the "Association des militaires démocrates" which supported the democratization process (Amnesty International 1993). However, there is nothing that leads us to believe that these forces were ever strong enough to be a real counterweight to the dominant hardliners within the Togolese military, especially since soldiers suspected to be members of the Association were regularly persecuted, arrested and executed.

To the contrary, throughout Eyadéma's rule in general, and between 1990 and 1993 in particular, the Togolese Army and President Eyadéma continued to profess their unconditional support and loyalty to each other (our indicator (a) for the presence of softliners). For instance, Eyadéma publicly declared that the Army "must not be excluded from the political life of the nation", and that it was "infinitely more preferable to implicate the military in a permanent way and on all possible levels (decision-making and execution of tasks) in the resolution of a country's problems" (free translation, Amnesty International 1993). In exchange, senior Army officers repeatedly warned the participants of the National Conference that their troops remained loyal to Eyadéma, and that any threat to his power risked civil war (Los Angeles Times 1991b). Amela Amelavi, former Minister of National Education and port-parole of the government during the 1991 National Conference confirms that Togo's Army had a symbiotic relationship with the Eyadema government and would not have been loyal to any ruler it did not choose itself⁷⁶. The Togolese military's allegiance to the ruler instead of the nation, and particularly to Eyadema himself, stands out particularly strikingly if one considers that Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Zachari Nandja only recently suspended Togo's Constitution to appoint Faure Gnassingbé, the son of Eyadema, new head of state after his father's death.

⁷⁶ He said: "Vous savez, le Togo est en paix, essentiellement grâce à l'armée. Et l'armée a fait son choix (...) Et la paix ne sera garantie que si l'armée voit ses revendications satisfaites (...) Je vois mal l'armée au garde-à-vous pour quelqu'un qu'elle n'aura pas choisi" (Djouamon 2005).

Faced with such overwhelming hardliner power, it is not surprising that softliners never had any significant weight in the decision-making process throughout the transition. This fact is evidenced in several ways. Firstly, reform plans (our indicator (d) for softliner predominance) did almost never emanate from the government. Instead, they were extracted under the sheer pressure of the street, or simply imposed by the opposition-dominated transitional government. What little liberalization was initiated by the Eyadéma regime was timid and for the most part not followed through, as Eyadéma had never made a secret out of the fact that he was openly hostile to democratization (Pilon 1993)⁷⁷. For instance, the government put in place a Constitutional Commission in 1990 in order to elaborate a new Constitution – a move clearly designed to placate the rising fury of the street. However, the referendum to ratify the constitutional amendments set for February 1991 never took place, under the pretext that the constitutional project first had to undergo the scrutiny of experts (Letogolais.com, 2013). Similarly, when opposition groups demanded greater political participation and the holding of a sovereign National Conference, the Eyadéma government tried to shelter his country from what he viewed as "unnecessary political disruption" and instead offered a "National Dialogue Forum" as substitute to real democratic change⁷⁸. Only after mounting pressure did he give in to opposition demands, all the while reiterating that such a National Conference amounted to a "civilian coup" (Los Angeles Times 1991a).

Secondly, the military repeatedly communicated that it was not prepared to accept Eyadéma's ouster by the National conference⁷⁹. After the Conference declared itself sovereign, one military leader warned they would not sit and watch, like their counterparts in Benin did⁸⁰. It is quite telling that the military delegation, after walking out in protest, never returned to the negotiating table. Furthermore, the High Command of the military made it clear they would neither respect nor obey the transitional government. When elements of the Army took over the state-controlled radio and television station RTNM

⁷⁷ Prime Minister Koffigoh once put the finger on it when he exasperatedly complained that Eyadema "has never wanted democracy, and he doesn't want it [now]." (Christian Science Monitor 1992a)

⁷⁸ He said: "Just because my neighbour's house is on fire, I won't set my own alight" (Seely 2005, 363).

⁷⁹ In order to save the regime, the military went to great lengths. For example, after the conference had stripped Eyadema of his powers, troops loyal to Eyadema surrounded the Prime Minister's palace with tanks and threatened to reduce this city to cinders if the longtime ruler's powers were not restored (New York Times 1991b)

⁸⁰ They said: "We saw what happened in Benin. We knew what would happen. We are not sheep" (Seely 2005, 364).

(Radiotélévision de la nouvelle marche) on October 1, 1991, they only accepted to return to the barracks after Eyadéma himself had commanded them to do so (Diaspora Togolaise pour la Démocratie 1998). In a later incident, when Prime Minister Koffigoh ordered the Army to reopen the street separating the Camp of the "Régiments Interarmes Togolais" (RIT) from the suburb of Tokoin (a part of the city of Lomé), the military sent a message that the Prime Minister should "execute his orders himself" (Letogolais.com 2012).

Finally, the persistent political violence perpetrated throughout the transition by the Togolese Armed Forces (our indicator (e) for softliner predominance) is, in our opinion, the clearest proof that hardliners dominated Togo's authoritarian regime. Police and military showed themselves prepared and willing to pass from selective targeting of political dissidents to large-scale terrorization of opposition groups and civil society (Toulabor 1996). In April 1991, for example, security forces under the command of Captain Ernest Gnassingbe, a son of President Eyadema, shot 28 civilians, amongst them a pregnant woman and a toddler, and dumped their corpses into the Lagune de Bè in a suburb of Lomé (Ameganvi 2011). In 1993, when Eyadéma's announcement of the end of the transition sparked new public demonstrations, security forces fired on demonstrators, killing at least 19 people and forcing 300.000 more to flee to neighboring countries (US Department of State 2015).

Most importantly, several military operations severely sabotaged the work of the transitional government and significantly contributed to Eyadema's hold onto power. The attack on the Primature, on December 3, 1991 (Los Angeles Time 1991c), several botched coup attempts (Los Angeles Times 1991d) and the attempted kidnapping of Prime Minister Koffigoh (Los Angeles Times 1991e) all exemplify the degree of cohesion within the Eyadema regime and its willingness to do away with any progressive force threatening its position. For instance, when Koffigoh made a televised address to the nation after the attack on the Prime Minister's palace on December 3, he declared that he decided to give himself up in order to avoid "a bloodbath" (Penne 1999, 281; Tété 2012). Asked about his red and swollen face, he claimed to have been attacked by bees, but many Togolese suspected that security forces had abused him.

4.4. Interpreting Transition Results

After having examined both mass mobilization and regime crisis in our case countries, it is interesting to see how the different combinations of conditions actually translate into results; i.e. which configuration of conditions led to a successful transition outcome. Indeed, only Indonesia managed to reach the status of a minimal democracy. It is also the only country where we identified both an authoritarian regime crisis and significant mass mobilization. The dynamics were mutually reinforcing: Firstly, mass mobilization instigated the transition by provoking a crisis between Suharto and his power base, and eventually forcing the ouster of Suharto. In fact, after having lost the support of the Army, Suharto resigned and handed his office to his Vice President B.J. Habibie in a nationally televised ceremony (Mydans 1998; CNN 1998a). Habibie, a technocrat and relatively weak executive figure, subsequently guided the country through the transition from the autocratic New Order to the genuinely fair election of Megawati Sukarnoputri in October 1999 (Thompson 1999). Whereas the bulk of protest events took place prior to Suharto's ouster, there was still some mobilization centered primarily on student activism that helped the transition move along smoothly (The Dispatch 1998, 2; Symonds 1998; Chicago Tribune 1998g). Although we haven't treated this "second phase" mobilization in detail in this chapter, we do consider it to be particularly important, since Habibie himself admitted, he didn't "want to say goodbye" to power (Deseret News 1999). Thus, while he is certainly to be credited with the introduction of democratic reforms, we opine that civic activism fulfilled a non-negligible watchdog function over the process.

By contrast, the transitions in Togo and in Tanzania both failed, since neither country was classified as a minimal democracy by the end of the transition. In Togo, the decisive factor for failure was clearly the absence of an authoritarian regime crisis. While mass mobilization managed to force Eyadema into agreeing to a National Conference, the resistance of the Armed Forces prevented any further step towards a political opening. In fact, military support⁸¹ during the three years following Eyadema's unilateral ouster by leaders of the National Conference helped Eyadema gain the upper hand again in the struggle against the new transitional government. When in October 1991 the HCR voted to

⁸¹ For instance, this period was marked by several unsuccessful coup attempts and persistent political violence carried out by Eyadema loyalists.

dissolve Eyadéma's political party and to curtail the power of the military, the Army overthrew Koffigoh's transitional government in what would be known as the "attack on the Primature" on December 3, 1991. This coup initiated Eyadéma's gradual recuperation of power (Letogolais.com, 2013). Koffigoh, under pressure of the Army, negotiated with Eyadéma a "National Unity government" in which the most important ministerial posts were assigned to RPT figures (New York Times 1991c). Even though a new democratic constitution was adopted on September 27, 1992, a second military coup in October 1992 effectively put an end to the interim legislature when elements of the Army held the HCR hostage for 24 hours. Shortly after the incident, elections that had originally been scheduled for December 1992 were postponed and Eyadéma unilaterally declared that the transition had ended (Engueleguele et al. 2013). In January 1993 he reappointed Koffigoh as Prime Minister whose government, though nominally independent, cooperated closely with the President throughout the year and regularly took policy positions consistent with Eyadéma's views (U.S. Department of State 1994). It is interesting to note that even though mass mobilization continued - there was, for instance, another General Strike in 1993 (US Department of State 2015) - such protest did not lead to any more significant liberalization. The most the opposition achieved was the signing of the Ouagadougou agreement which set forth conditions for the 1993 presidential and legislative elections. But despite the agreement, the election process was so fraudulent that the opposition boycotted the elections and Eyadéma won reelection as President with a voter turnout of only 36 percent.

In Tanzania, a crisis of the authoritarian regime initiated a controlled liberalization process "from above", but due to the lack of popular input – either before, or during the transition – reforms remained superficial and limited to the formal introduction of multipartyism. In fact, the lack of popular pressure and demand for reform had two consequences: Firstly, it allowed reluctant softliners to set the terms of the transition unilaterally. For instance, in May 1992, Parliament endorsed the recommendation to start the transition to multiparty politics, amended several articles of the Constitution and legalised opposition parties. However, it also imposed two important caveats: Parties could not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life (Bjerk 2010, 276). Secondly, it prevented the appearance of deeper fissures in the Tanzanian ruling

elite, and thus constituted a missed opportunity for potentially greater reform. In fact, when in 1995 the first multiparty parliamentary elections were held CCM took 80 percent of seats and its presidential candidate, Benjamin Mkapa, won the presidential election with 62.8 percent of votes. Tanzania's transition therefore ended up with a mere modification of its authoritarian regime.

This chapter compared the transition dynamics of three Third Wave transitions: Indonesia, Togo and Tanzania. These cases were chosen based upon their quality as examples for the three configurations encountered in our QCA analysis: a) a successful transition that coupled regime crisis with mass mobilization (Indonesia); b) a failed transition that featured mass mobilization without a regime crisis (Togo); and c) a failed transition that featured a regime crisis without mass mobilization (Tanzania). Intended as a supplement to the QCA analysis of the previous chapter, the analysis aimed at showing how the presence, or absence of conditions contributed to creating a particular transition outcome. The following conclusion will summarize the results of our thesis and discuss their implications within the greater framework of transitology.

Conclusion

Our thesis presents an attempt to empirically test the validity of the main competing theories on transitions from authoritarianism. We hope that it will enable academics and policy-makers especially in the international democracy promotion industry to better understand the factors necessary to successful democratization, and how they interact in order to produce a democratic outcome. Two conditions were identified by the literature as being paramount in that undertaking: a split between reformers and conservatives within the ruling regime (the so-called "crisis of the authoritarian regime"), and significant levels of popular contestation of, and mobilization against the regime. They represent the theories of transitions "from above" and respectively, transitions "from below". Variation with regard to the presence, or absence, of these conditions is said to be at the origin of the differences we observe in the outcome of the Third Wave transitions, with each research tradition claiming prime mover status for "their" explanation to the detriment of the other. In light of this conflict in the literature, our research wanted to advance three main objectives: (1) conclusively demonstrate the complementarity of the two main theories on democratic transitions; (2) show that both elements from above and elements from below are necessary conditions for a successful democratic transition; and (3) increase the scholarly understanding of transition dynamics in a medium-N setting and hence contribute to the overarching goal of generalization. Now that we arrived at the end of our study it is time to ask whether these research goals were fulfilled.

First and foremost, our study includes a significantly higher number of cases than the vast majority of other existing works. It also uses a method that is transparent, easily replicable and increasingly popular in many fields of social science. Therefore, we believe that goal (1) was reached and we did conclusively demonstrate that the theories "from above" and "from below", instead of two warring enemies on the battlefield of transitology, are really two sides of the same coin. Their postulates are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary; a point of view that is supported by the fact that neither a crisis of the authoritarian regime nor mass mobilization alone - regardless of how powerful - was found to be sufficient to produce democratization in all cases under study. We do in no way pretend that these findings somehow revolutionize what we already know

about transitions; as our literature review has shown, other people recognized this rather obvious fact before and a number of good studies exists that are based - explicitly or implicitly - on the assumption that both theories on transitions complete each other. The merit of our thesis is in confirming these intuitions by virtue of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Looking at the results of our QCA analysis, we deem it justified to claim that goal (2) has also been accomplished. Assuming that no variables other than the strategic factors selected significantly influence the outcome of a transition process, we did in fact demonstrate that both the authoritarian regime crisis and mass mobilization - at low and high levels - are necessary conditions for successful democratization. This finding is novel in the sense that while both theories claim that their explanatory factors were crucial ingredients in many transitions, no research before has tried extrapolating from these claims to arrive at a more general statement that would be valid for all Third Wave transitions, and potentially even beyond. Critics may complain that our case sample, although bigger than many others, is still very small to make such an ambitious claim. Yet, the fact that our hypothesis was confirmed in all cases under study, that our cases were selected randomly (within reason), and that they represent almost 35 percent of the total population speaks in favor of our argument.

Finally, we take a look at our research goal no. (3): contributing to a better understanding of how transitions from authoritarianism can become transitions to democracy. So, how do our findings tie into what we know about democratization, and how do they change what, up to now, we did not know?

On one hand, past research often stated that democratization follows certain patterns that vary distinctively from one world region to the other. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Karl (1986; 1990), and Burton, Gunther and Highley (1992) for example stress that most Latin American and Southern European transitions share the following common features: (a) the authoritarian regime initiates the transition itself; (b) it subsequently negotiates some sort of pact with a small circle of opposition leaders; and (c) the vast majority of the people remains deliberately excluded from the action. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and other Africanists, on the other side, note that African transitions

rather occur through a mobilized civil society forcing a reluctant ruler to either concede reforms or step down, often within the framework of an opposition-dominated National Conference. Thirdly, scholars examining the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe often claim that Communist transitions, and especially the transitions from totalitarianism, are so different from all other transition cases that they can't even be compared (Meiklejohn Terry 1993).⁸² Bunce (1995c) points out what she perceives as being distinctive about these transitions: (a) pacts between the regime and opposition were exceptionally rare, and if they did occur, they lacked durability; (b) the temporal lag between mass mobilization and the formation of pacts was very brief; and (c) in most cases mass mobilization led directly, i.e. without the intervention of a regime crisis, to the termination of authoritarian rule. Finally there are those who claim that democratization is less the result of regional dynamics than a product of the distinctive historical context of individual countries. Hence, if countries undergo a transition to democracy, they do so following specific critical junctures which are not likely to be repeated elsewhere. Barrington Moore's (1966) account of the transformation of pre-industrial agrarian social relations into "modern" democracies in Western Europe is an example of such an interpretation, which renders comparisons of democratization processes virtually impossible.

The findings of our thesis relativize these positions considerably. Methodologically speaking, they make clear that processes of regime change need to be investigated under a global lense, instead of a regional perspective. More specifically, they show that while there might indeed be circumstances common to certain world regions or time periods with regards to the onset of a transition - a question that was deliberately excluded from our research framework - the process of democratization *per se* seems to be much less time- and context-sensitive than previously thought. Although the temporal order of events may vary (for example, African transitions do seem to be impelled to a disproportionate degree by popular protest movements), the two central ingredients to a democratic outcome are the same in all cases we examined. For one, there needs to be a noticeable demand for democracy "from below"; empirics show that without endogenous pressure it is unlikely that an autocratic regime magically discovers the virtues of participative decision-making.

⁸² For this debate see, for example, Schmitter and Karl 1994, Bunce (1995a; 1995b) and Karl and Schmitter (1995).

For two, there needs to be at least a basic willingness on behalf of a majority of the ruling elite to allow some sort of liberalization to occur. If all members of the regime remain firmly opposed to such an opening and are prepared to use force to prevent it, no amount of mass mobilization will bring about democracy. Our analysis provides plenty of evidence to support these claims, yet there is also room for improvement. In fact, future research might find it interesting to rerun our analysis including either a larger case sample or different cases, with a view to increasing the validity of generalizations derived from the findings presented here. As we have noted elsewhere, the biggest practical limitation to such an undertaking is the availability of information on the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime in transitional countries. We therefore hope that our attempt to define and operationalize this variable inspires other researchers to enlarge and potentially improve our index with more qualitative case studies.

Secondly, scholars generally like to point out that so far no single factor has been identified as being either necessary or sufficient to produce democracy. The general consensus reflects Karl's (2005, 13) assessment that democratization is the result of a combination of causes, not merely one single cause. While certainly true in some respects, such a point of view is not conducive to developing parsimonious answers. Hence, we found it helpful to distinguish elements that cause transitions to occur from those that determine the direction of a transition. The latter is part of the framework of our thesis; the former is not. A critical read of the literature, however, shows that in practice scholars often treat both types of issues indiscriminately, and consequently fail to distinguish between causes that really only affect one type of question. Taking that fact into account, we excluded structural variables, such as the level of wealth, education or industrialization (Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 2000), the distribution of ethnic groups (Offe 1998), international pressure (Whitehead 1996) or the location of countries in a pattern of international diffusion (O'Loughlin et al. 1998) from our analysis on the grounds that they do not directly influence the dynamics of a transition once it is started.⁸³ Structural variables, such as the strength and coherence of the authoritarian regime, and the mobilizing potential of mass actors are the only elements thought to be of interest in our

⁸³ For explanation on how the onset, and the termination of a transition are determined in this thesis see chapter 2.

thesis, and whose necessity for the instauration of minimal democracy has been empirically demonstrated in the course of our argument.

Nonetheless, we do not know whether they are the only conditions required to obtain such a result. In other words, since we did not include any factors other than strategic ones, we cannot say with certainty that, taken together, they are sufficient for democratization. It is possible, however unlikely, that some other structural variable remained undetected in the course of our analysis, and was co-responsible for the failure, or respectively, the success of all the transitions examined. We do not believe this to be the case, as our sample is simply too big for such a coincidence. However, we do accept the idea that there could well be certain structural factors that influence transition dynamics in an indirect manner, for example by impacting on one hand the degree to which demands for change arise from below, and on the other hand the degree to which incumbents are able to contain these demands either by coopting or repressing them. In our literature review we hinted at this possibility by naming specific factors – oil rents, prior experience with democratic institutions, or foreign aid for example – whose presence might either enable the ruling elite to prevent splits in their own ranks, or the aggrieved population to express their demands more effectively. In other words, these elements might make the occurrence of our explanatory conditions more or less likely, which could be an important point to consider when estimating the chances of a transitional country to become democratic. It might therefore make sense to future researchers to rerun our analysis with a larger eventail of conditions to test our variables for sufficiency on one hand, and to check for potential correlations and mutual reinforcements between structural and strategic variables on the other hand.

On the other hand, our findings also have important implications for the current strand of research on regime change. In fact, we believe that they provide a better framework than earlier theories for explaining why so many Third Wave transitions either led to semi-authoritarian hybrids or new authoritarian regimes. In our point of view, the questions of why some countries democratize and why other countries do not really are two sides of the same coin, and hinge critically on the relative importance of elite versus mass actors. In fact, almost fifteen years ago, Thomas Carothers (2002) claimed that the end of the "transition paradigm" à la O'Donnell and Schmitter had come. According to him,

their theory was no longer able to adequately describe the realities of the late Third Wave transitions, because these countries simply did not seem to democratize despite significant popular pressure. In light of our results, however, it becomes clear that Carother's critic might be symptomatic of a larger trend among democratization specialists towards underestimating the importance of O'Donnell and Schmitter's crucial theoretic construct—the authoritarian regime crisis.

Generally speaking, while many questions are being asked about what causes transitions to succeed, more often than not the answers exhibit a clear bias towards the democratizing potential of civil society and mass mobilization. Virtually all democracy-promoting programs of all major international players today operate under the premise that supporting civil society equals successful democratization. Yet, there is ample evidence to show that the exaggerated focus on civil society to the detriment of intra-regime dynamics is flawed. Looking to the MENA region five years after the onset of the Arab Spring, only Tunisia has completed its transition to democracy, while most other countries that experienced protests have either descended into civil war or returned to an even harsher form of authoritarianism. Thirty years earlier, then-Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad bloodily ended an uprising of Sunni Moslems in the city of Hama, leaving between 10.000 and 25.000 people dead. Around the same time, only a few years later, the student uprising in Tiananmen Square in China ended in a deadly crackdown, orchestrated by a regime that remained united and determined to squash the popular challenge. Returning to the results of our thesis, we found that there were many instances of transitions in which high levels of mass mobilization were recorded, but where the absence of a clear intra-regime split with a reform-committed majority still led to transition failure. By contrast, the opposite was true in only one case: in Tanzania, the absence of mass mobilization despite an (albeit weak) authoritarian regime crisis also resulted in a non-democratic transition outcome. In short, the fact that there are significantly more cases of transition failures in which the non-institutionalization of minimal democracy seems to hinge solely on the absence of an intra-regime crisis indicates - at least to us - that elite disunity should occupy a much more important place in the democratization literature than it does today.

Intra-regime splits are important because they can provide crucial insights in the three most prominent research subjects of today: (1) the stalling, and eventual authoritarian

reversal of transitions; (2) the proliferation of hybrid regimes; and (3) the resilience of authoritarian regimes. Firstly, one should note that many, if not most authoritarian regimes are not monolithic. Quite to the contrary, tension between different authoritarian factions are latent and often persist over many years, and sometimes even decades, before they finally break out in the open. Nonetheless, the fact alone that there are members of the authoritarian regime who are not completely opposed to modifying the political rules of the game does not guarantee that a potential transition will be successful. Softliners also need to be majoritarian, and there are many stumbling stones in the negotiation process which could make reformers shy away from democracy. An authoritarian reversal of the transition is the likely consequence. Contrary to what is often claimed by the literature, our thesis has shown that high levels of mass mobilization are not necessarily a "risk factor" for such a reversal; but many qualitative studies (see, for example, Morency-Laflamme, forthcoming; Morency-Laflamme and Brunner 2015) seem to indicate that the type of demands made by mass actors and opposition leaders most definitely is. Morency-Laflamme's analysis of the Togolese transition, for example, suggests that the Togolese Armed Forces, the principal enemy of reform, might actually have been willing to accept greater liberalization if opposition demands had been more moderate. We think there are many such cases where a transition reversal can be ascribed to softliners either getting "cold feet" during the transition, lacking support among the other regime members more generally, or becoming eclipsed by a stronger hardliner faction. Several of the failed African transitions in our annex evidence exactly that kind of dynamic; we thus believe it highly justified to recommend taking a new look at how intra-regime dynamics shape transition destinies.

Intra-regime splits are also exceptionally relevant for explaining the proliferation of authoritarian hybrids. Hybrid regimes have institutionalized some sort of "middle way" between full-blown democratization and full-blown autocracy, often as a result of pressure from below for more opportunities for participation in decision-making processes. While scholars long thought that these regimes were still somehow "on the way" to democracy, a look at the growing number of these hybrids today led most democratization specialists to accept that they form a separate category of regimes and must be investigated as such. To be sure, no one really claims that hybrid regimes are a new phenomenon (Diamond 2002, 23), but there is definitely a tendency to think of them as by-products of the Third Wave.

Levitsky and Way, for example, find that hybrid regimes "have clearly proliferated in recent years" (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 60), so that they now represent "the modal type of political regime in the developing world" (Schedler, 2006, 3; see also Brownlee, 2007, 25). They claim that these regimes most often emerged either from a transition from authoritarianism that failed due to the weakness of opposition movements (for example many Sub-Saharan transitions); or from the collapse of an authoritarian regime where rulers lacked the capacity to consolidate another fully fledged authoritarian regime (for example in Eastern Europe). In our opinion, the explanatory power of both pathways is rather superficial, because they conceal the real issues underneath: Why did rulers not manage to institute another authoritarian regime? Why did the lack of strength of opposition movements actually matter to the outcome of the transition? When looking at intra-regime dynamics, all of a sudden these questions make sense. We think there are potentially two options for the birth of a hybrid regime (as opposed to a democratic one): On one hand, the relative power distribution within the authoritarian regime between softliners and hardliners could be such that no party really managed to completely marginalize the other. That means, softliners could have succeeded in pushing through a certain degree of liberalization, but were stopped by reticent hardliners when reforms threatened to go too far. Conversely, hardliners could have wanted to answer demands for greater political participation with the repression of opponents, but intra-elite fragmentation prevented them from effectively eliminating all areas of contestation. In both cases, some sort of "middle way" explicitly or implicitly became institutionalized, and a hybrid regime resulted. On the other hand, a hybrid regime could also emerge from a lack of softliners. If an authoritarian regime basically consists of opportunistic hardliners, a transformation of the regime into something more socially "acceptable" might be accepted, provided there are sufficient guarantees the incumbents do not lose power. Certain qualitative studies seem to indicate that this scenario is likely when external hegemony try and pressure a regime into democratizing, either by using threats such as the withholding of aid, or incentives (Menocal et al. 2008). Oftentimes the results are disappointing- as Dahl once remarked, "dictators and oligarchs are not easily beguiled by foreign assistance into destroying their regimes" (Dahl 1971, 12). In fact, Whitehead (1986, 45) finds that authoritarian leaders gradually learned that they could influence external forces and even manipulate their division and rivalries analogous to their domestic opponents. According to him, "policies aimed at 'promoting democracy' (...) are likely to constitute an open

invitation for manipulation by local political actors", including such practices as staged elections whose results are predetermined. Kirschke's analysis of Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya (Kirschke 2000) supports this dim view. She argues that in the early 1990s many African transitions were initially forced from the outside and often lacked internal developments that could account for a fundamental regime change. As a result, not only were regimes more likely to sponsor "informal repression", covert violations by third parties, to regain political control, but they were also more likely to degenerate into "new democratic hybrids" (Decalo 1992, 8), deliberately contrived to satisfy prevailing international norms of "presentability" (Joseph 1998, 3-4) while being devoid of any real democratic practice.

Finally, intra-regime splits could also be promising in explaining why some countries, or groups of countries, just do not seem to democratize - ever. The Middle East has perhaps one of the longest traditions of authoritarian rule, with scholars citing mostly structural reasons such as oil rents (Ross 2001), political Islam (Huntington 1984, 208) or hegemon pressure to account for this "exceptionalism". However, we find that these explanations of authoritarian persistence (and, indeed, resilience) in the region are not fully satisfactory; in particular, because many of the variables used to explain the puzzle are not unique to the Middle East, and do not seem to have a negating effect on democracy elsewhere.⁸⁴ Instead, we would like to point to process-oriented variables, and particularly intra-regime splits, as potentially much more fruitful explanations. In fact, the MENA cases provide a particularly good example for countries in which the lack of softliners, or their total marginalization within the ruling circle, has successfully precluded democratization despite massive popular demand for greater accountability. Morency-Laflamme and Brunner (2015) demonstrate this using the example of Bahrain, where Crown Prince Salman, a reformer, slowly became eclipsed by the hardliner Generals who commanded the security apparatus during the 2012 Arab Spring mobilizations.

Hence, we call for a reorientation of scholarly priorities in favor of an investigation into the genesis of authoritarian regime splits. If we discover the workings of the inner circle of an authoritarian regime, that is, if we know the elements that can make the

⁸⁴ For example, Norway is one of the biggest oil exporters, yet no scholar would dispute that it is one of the most progressive countries in the world.

occurrence of splits between conservatives and reform-oriented parties more likely, we have a much better chance of assessing a country's potential to move towards genuine democracy. We are also better positioned to potentially help a stalled transition move forward; something that is of great practical relevance to any organization involved in democracy promotion activities. Attempting to open the "blackbox" of the authoritarian circle is a difficult undertaking, as even O'Donnell and Schmitter themselves have recognized. Nonetheless, we think this is probably the single most promising research avenue indicated by the results of our thesis.

Bibliography

- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Acharya, Amitav. 1998. "Democratising Southeast Asia: Economic Crisis and Political Change". Working Paper No. 87. Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Australia.
- Africa Review. 2013. "They retired with their secrets in their hearts". October 11. Available at: <http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/They-retired-with-their-secrets-in-hearts/-/979182/2027796/-/h4kbg0/-/index.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Agence France Presse. 1995. "Future Tanzanian President Rejects Election Fraud Claims". November 20th. Quoted in Barack Hofmann and Lindsay Robinson. 2009. "Tanzania's Missing Opposition". *Journal of Democracy* 20(4): 123 - 136.
- Ahluwalia, Pal and Abebe Zegeye. 2001. "Multi-party Democracy in Tanzania – Crises in the Union". *African Security Review* 10(3): 35 – 47.
- Ake, Claude. 1991. "Rethinking African Democracy". *Journal of Democracy* 2(1): pp. 32-44.
- Ameganvi, Claude. 2011. "Il y a 20 ans: le clan des Gnassingbé inaugurerait les massacres à la Lagune de Bè". Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC), April 9th. Available at: <http://www.anctogo.com/il-y-a-20-ans-le-clan-des-gnassingbe-inaugurerait-les-massacres-a-la-lagune-de-be-3108>. Accessed September 14th, 2015.
- Amnesty International. 1993. "Togo: Les forces armées tuent impunément". AI Index AFR 57/13/93/F. October 5th. Available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR57/013/1993/fr/65dfd4d4-ecbb-11dd-85fd-99a1fce0c9ec/afr570131993fr.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Amon, Chaligha, Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek Davids. 2002. "Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanian's Views of Political and Economic Reform". Working Paper No. 18. Afrobarometer (March).
- Anderson, Lisa. 1999. *Transitions to Democracy*. Columbia University Press.

- Anglin, Douglas G. 1990. "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(3): 431 - 455.
- Ansell, Ben and David Samuels. 2010. "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach". *Comparative Political Studies* 43(12): 1543 - 1574.
- ARD inc. 2003. *Democracy and Governance Assessment of Tanzania: Transitions from the Single-Party State*. Report submitted to the United States Agency for International Development, Contract No. AEP-I-00-99-00041-00, November.
- Arvind, Thiruvallure T. and Lindsay Stirton. 2010. "Explaining the reception of the Code Napoleon in Germany: A fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis". *Legal Studies* 30(1):1 – 29.
- Aspinall, Edward. 1995. "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period". *Indonesia* 59 (April): 21 – 44.
- Baloyra, Enrique. 1987. *Comparing New Democracies: Transitions and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone*. Westview Press: Boulder.
- Banks, Arthur. 1971. *Cross-Polity Time-Series data*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
- Barro, Robert J. 1999. "Determinants of democracy". *Journal of Political Economy* 107(S6): 158 – 183.
- Bayat, Asef. 2005. "Islamism and Social Movement". *Third World Quarterly* 26(6): 891-908.
- Baylies, Caroline. 1995. "'Political Conditionality' and Democratization". *Review of African Political Economy* 22(65): 321 - 337.
- Bellin, Eva. 2000. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries". *World Politics* 52(2): 175 - 205.
- Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 139 - 157.
- Bellin, Eva. 2012. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism Reconsidered: Lessons of the Arab Spring". *Comparative Politics* 44(2): 127 - 149.

- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk. 2003. "Makro-Qualitative vergleichende Methoden". In Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds), *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. 4th ed., Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 103 - 125.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, Gisèle de Meur, Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin. 2009. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach" in Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin (eds), *Configurational Comparative Methods*. California: Sage Publications, 1 - 18.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking Regime Change". *Comparative Politics* 22(3): 359 - 377.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1997. "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflicts during Democratic Transitions". *Comparative Politics* 29 (3): 305 – 322.
- Bermeo, Sarah. 2011. "Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent". *World Development* 39(11): 2021 – 2031.
- Bird, Judith. 1999. "Indonesia in 1998: The Pot Boils Over". *Asian Survey* 39(1): 27 – 37.
- Bjerk, Paul K. 2010. "Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State." *History in Africa* 37: 275 - 319.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization". *World Politics* 55(4): 517 – 549.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. and Robert W. Jackman. 1995. "Income inequality and democratization revisited: Comment on Muller". *American Sociological Review* 60(6): 983 – 989.
- Bourguignon, François, and Thierry Verdier. 2000. "Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth." *Journal of Development Economics* 62(2): 285 - 313.
- Brady, Henry and David Collier. 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transition in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Bräutigam, Deborah A. and Stephen Knack. 2004. "Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa". *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52(2): 255 – 285.
- Brinks, Daniel and Michael Coppedge. 2006. "Diffusion is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy". *Comparative Political Studies* 39(4): 463 - 489.
- Brownlee Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2009. "Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions". *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 515 - 532.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1995a. "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" *Slavic Review* 54(1): 111 - 127.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1995b. "Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers". *Slavic Review* 54(4): 979 - 987.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1995c. "Can we compare democratization in the East versus the South?" *Journal of Democracy* 6(3): 87 - 99.
- Bunce, Valerie. 2000. "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations". *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6/7): 703 – 734.
- Bunce, Valerie. 2003. "Rethinking Recent Democratization – Lessons from the Post-Communist Experience". *World Politics* 55(2): 167 – 192.
- Burkhart Ross E. and Michael Lewis-Beck. 1994. "Comparative democracy: The economic development thesis". *American Political Science Review* 88(4): 903 – 910.
- Burnell, Peter. 1994. "Good Government and Democratization. A Sideway Look at Aid and Conditionality". *Democratization* 1(3): 485 - 503.
- Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther and John Higley. 1992. "Introduction: Elite transformations and democratic regimes". In John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 - 37.
- Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1989. "*République-Unie de Tanzanie: informations sur le groupe politique 'Zanzibar alternative Democratic'*". June 15th,

TZA1029. Available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac7388.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2016.

Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1994. "*Togo: Information on the Mouvement d'étudiants de lutte pour la démocratie and human rights abuses against its members*". July 1st, TGO17878.E. Available at:
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaf558.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2016.

Cardoso, Fernando. 1986. "Entrepreneurs and the transition process: the Brazilian case". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds). *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Comparative perspectives. Volume 3*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 137 – 153.

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. "The End of the Transition Paradigm". *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5 – 21.

Carothers, Thomas. 2004. *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, Thomas. 2007. "How Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing Fallacy'". *Journal of Democracy* 18(1): 1 - 17.

Case, William F. 2000. "Revisiting elites, transitions and founding elections: An unexpected caller from Indonesia". *Democratization* 7(4): 51 - 80.

CBC News. 1999. "*Parliament presses Suharto to step down*", June 5th. Available at:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/parliament-presses-suharto-to-step-down-1.165355>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

Chicago Tribune. 1998a. "*Suharto Pal Given No. 2 Spot As Student Protests Continue*". March 12th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-03-12/news/9803120186_1_president-suharto-research-and-technology-minister-anti-government-rally. Accessed November 22th, 2015.

Chicago Tribune. 1998b. "*One Thing Clear in Indonesia – Army Holds the Power*". May 24th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-24/news/9805240188_1_president-suharto-habibie-suara-pembaruan. Accessed November 22th, 2015.

Chicago Tribune. 1998c. "*Peaceful End To Indonesian Student Protest Just a Lull*". May 24th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-24/news/9805240078_1_student-protesters-habibie-president-suharto. Accessed November 22th, 2015.

- Chicago Tribune. 1998d. “*Indonesia Lurches Toward Anarchy*”. May 15th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-15/news/9805150197_1_president-suharto-amien-rais-indonesia. Accessed November 22th, 2015.
- Chicago Tribune. 1998e. “*Military Mobilizes Around Jakarta*”. May 20th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-20/news/9805200196_1_hang-suharto-president-suharto-golkar. Accessed November 22th, 2015.
- Chicago Tribune. 1998f. “*Indonesian Army Helps Students Air Grievances*”. May 18th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-18/news/9805180036_1_president-suharto-peoples-consultative-assembly-indonesia. Accessed November 22th, 2015.
- Chicago Tribune. 1998g. “*Scorn, Distrust Greet Indonesia’s New President*”. May 22nd. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-05-22/news/9805220284_1_president-suharto-habibie-indonesia-at-northwestern-university. Accessed November 22th, 2015.
- Christian Science Monitor. 1992a. “*Togolese Opposition Calls Strike to Protest Military Rule*”. November 17th. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/1117/17052.html>. Accessed November 22th, 2015.
- Christian Science Monitor. 1992b. “*Tanzania announces move toward democracy*”, February 20th. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0220/20033.html>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.
- CNN. 1998a. “*Habibie Becomes President After Suharto Resigns*”. May 20th. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/20/indonesia.suharto/>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.
- CNN. 1998b. “*Analysis: Indonesian President Suharto Resigns*”. May 20th. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/21/indonesia.analysis/>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.
- CNN. 1998c. “*Indonesian opposition leader tries to call off protest*”. May 19th. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/19/indonesia.pm/index.html>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.
- CNN. 1998d. “*Indonesian Students Stage Anti-Suharto Protests*”. April 20th. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9804/20/indonesia.change/>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.

- Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive*, 1815–2003. 2005. Databanks International, Binghamton, NY.
- Cohen, Morris and Ernest Nagel. 1934. *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*. London: G. Routledge & Sons.
- Colaresi, Michael and William R. Thompson. 2003. “The Economic Development-Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?” *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 381 - 403.
- Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”. *World Politics* 49(3): 430 - 451.
- Collier, Ruth. 1999. *Paths towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and Southern America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collier, Ruth and James Mahoney. 1999. “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe”. In Anderson, Lisa (eds), *Transitions to Democracy*. Columbia University Press: 79 – 95.
- Cortona, Pietro Grilli di. 1991. “From Communism to Democracy: Rethinking Regime Change in Hungary and Czechoslovakia”. *International Social Science Journal* 43(2): 315 – 330.
- Coulter, Philip. 1975. *Social mobilization and democracy: A macro-quantitative analysis of global and regional models*. Lexington, KY: Lexington Books.
- Cowles, Maria Green, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (dir.). 2001. *Transforming Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Crescenski, Mark J. C. 1999. “Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(2): 192 – 212.
- Cronqvist, Lasse. 2007. *Konfigurationelle Analyse mit Multi-Value QCA als Methode der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft mit einem Fallbeispiel aus der Vergleichenden Parteienforschung (Erfolg Grüner Parteien in den achtziger Jahren)*. Doctoral thesis. University of Marburg, Germany.
- Cronqvist, Lasse. 2011. *Tosmana, version 1.3.2.0 [computer program]*. University of Trier, Germany.

- Crouch, Harold. 1999. "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998". In Budiman, Arief, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds), *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute.
- Cutright, Phillips. 1963. "National political development: Measurement and analysis". *American Sociological Review* 28(2): 253–264.
- Cutright, Phillips and James Wiley. 1969. "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927 - 1966". *Studies in Comparative International Political Development* 5(2): 23 - 44.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Daily News. 1989. "*Diria Tells Journalists To Avoid Western Imperialist Reporting*". December 15th: 5. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Daily News. 1990a. "*Mwinyi Drops Seven Ministers and Throws Challenge to New Cabinet*", March 16th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Daily News. 1990b. April 11th. Quoted in Mwakikagile, Godfrey. 2006. "Tanzania Under Mwalimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman". Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press.
- Daily News. 1990c. May 16th. Quoted in Mwakikagile, Godfrey. 2006. "Tanzania Under Mwalimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman". Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press.
- Daily News. 1990d. March 26th: 1. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Daily News. 1990e. April 2nd: 3. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Daily News. 1990f. April 3rd: 3. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.

- Daily News. 1992. "Address to CCM Extra-Ordinary Congress". February 29th. Quoted in Nyirabu, Mohabe. 2002. "The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party". *African Journal of Political Science* 7(2): 99 - 112
- Decalo, Samuel. 1987. *Historical Dictionary of Togo*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Decalo, Samuel. 1992. "The process, prospects and constraints of democratization in Africa". *African Affairs* 91(362): 7 - 35.
- Denny, J. Ali. 2006. *Democratization From Below: Protest Events and Regime Change in Indonesia, 1997 – 1998*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- Deseret News. 1999. "Habibie anti-riot plea falls on deaf ears". October 18th. Available at: <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/723459/Habibie-anti-riot-plea-falls-on-deaf-ears.html?pg=all>. Accessed on May 7th, 2015.
- Diamond, Larry. 1988. "Introduction". In Diamond, Larry, Seymour M. Lipset and Juan Linz (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume Two, Africa*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Diamond, Larry, Seymour M. Lipset and Juan Linz. 1988. *Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Diamond, Larry. 1996. "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7(3): 20 – 37.
- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry. 2003. *Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Policies*. Center for the Study of Democracy. Irvine: University of California.
- Diaspora Togolaise pour la Democratie. 1998. "Démocratisation à la togolaise". Available at: <http://www.diastode.org/Droits/tete4b.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Djankov, Simeon, Jose Garcia Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. "The Curse of Aid". *Journal of Economic Growth* 13(3): 169 – 194.
- Djouamon, Sylvestre. 2005. "De la démocratie au Togo: un ancien ministre d'Eyadéma s'exprime sur l'élection présidentielle". April 15th. Available at: <http://www.cuverville.org/spip.php?article43165>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

- Dimitrov, Martin K. 2013. *Why Communism Did Not Collapse. Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dunning, Thad. 2004. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa". *International Organization* 58(2): 409 – 423.
- Easterly, William, Ross Levine and David Roodman. 2004. "Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment". *American Economic Review* 94(3): 774–780.
- Edlin, John. 1987. "Ex-President to Hand over Political Power to West-Backed Successor". AP News Archive, July 19th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Ex-President-to-Hand-Over-Political-Power-to-West-Backed-Successor/id-7f241b83c6bf4e8d4e3d9132faa24bbe>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Edvardson, Unni. 1997. "A Cultural Approach to Understanding Modes of Transition to Democracy". *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24(1): 211 – 234.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik. 1999. *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Samir Makdisi. 2010. *Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit*. Routledge: Taylor & Francis.
- Engueleguele, Maurice, Comi Toulabor, Guy Labertit, Stephen Smith, Bernard Diallo and Yves Lacoste. 2013. "République du Togo - Bilans annuels de 1983 à 2013". *L'état du monde*, La Découverte. Available at: www.cairn.info/l-etat-du-monde-togo-page-01.htm. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions". *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 551 - 569.
- Ethier, Diane. 2003. "Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives". *Democratization* 10(1): 99 - 121.
- Ethier, Diane. 2006. "Promotion de la démocratie dans les Balkans. L'inégale efficacité de la conditionnalité et des incitatifs". *Revue canadienne de science politique* 39(4): 803 - 827.

- Ethier, Diane. 2008. "Comment expliquer l'inégale efficacité de la conditionnalité de l'UE en Europe de l'est et du sud-est?" *Transitions* 48(1): 163 - 187.
- Ethier, Diane. 2010. "L'imposition de la démocratie a-t-elle été l'exception ou la règle depuis 1945?" *Études internationales* 41(3): 313 – 339.
- Ethier, Diane. 2014. "Résilience et transition des régimes communistes". *Revue française de science politique* 64(4): 1214 – 1220.
- Euben, Peter J. 1993. "Democracy Ancient and Modern". *Political Science and Politics* 26(3): 478 – 481.
- Evans, John and Paul Dragos Aligica. 2008. "The Spread of the Flat Tax in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study". *Eastern European Economics* 46(3): 49 – 67.
- Fearon, James D. and David Laitin. 2001. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war". Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fishman, Robert. 1990. "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's transition to democracy". *World Politics* 42(3): 422 - 440.
- Foweraker, Joe. 1994. "Popular Political Organization and Democratization: a Comparison of Spain and Mexico". In Budge, Ian and David McKay (eds.), *Developing Democracy*. London: Sage Publications.
- Freedom House. 2015. *Freedom in the World*. Annual Report.
- Friedheim, Daniel V. 1993. "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse". *East European Politics and Societies* 7(3): 482 –512.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and The Last Man*. Free Press.
- Gagné, Jean-Francois. 2012. *Alliance Politics in Hybrid Regimes: Political Stability and Instability since World War II*. Doctoral Thesis. Department of Political Science. Université de Montréal.
- Gallie, Walter B. 1956. "Essentially Contested Concepts". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56(1955 - 1956): 167 - 198.

- Gamson, William. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Gargan, Edward. 1985. "Nyerere steps down but keeps his hand in". *New York Times*, November 3rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/03/weekinreview/nyerere-steps-down-but-keeps-his-hand-in.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Garreton, Manuel A. 1986. "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 95 – 122.
- Garreton, Manuel A. 1989. *The Chilean Political Process*. Westview Press Inc.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999a. "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument". Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Atlanta, September 2–5.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999b. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115 – 144.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2012. "*Authoritarian Regimes: A New Data Set*". Manuscript. Available at: <http://dictators.la.psu.edu>. Accessed September 19th, 2012.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Glaesser, Judith and Barry Cooper. 2011. "Selectivity and flexibility in the German secondary school system: A configurational analysis of recent data from the German socio-economic panel". *European Sociological Review* 27(5): 570 – 585.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. *All international politics is local: The diffusion of conflict, integration and democratization*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Michael Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization". *International Organization* 60(4): 911 – 933.
- Goldstone, Jack. 2003. *States, Parties and Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Grabbe, Heather. 2006. *The EU Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan.
- Greckhamer, Thomas. 2011. "Cross-cultural differences in compensation level and inequality across occupations: A set-theoretic analysis". *Organization Studies* 32(1): 85 – 115.
- Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2005. "Assessing alternative indices of democracy". C&M Political Concepts Working Paper 6. IPSA (August).
- Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2006. "Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change and Pathways to Democracy, 1972–2003." Kellogg Institute Working Paper. Notre Dame University.
- Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 18(1): 143 – 56.
- Haggard, Stephen and Robert Kaufman. 1992. *The Politics and Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haggard, Stephen and Robert Kaufman. 1995. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Peter. 2003. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research". In Mahoney James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, Chap. 11.
- Hall, Peter. 2006. "Systematic Process Analysis: When and How to Use it". *European Management Review* 3: 24 – 31.
- Hammond, Andrew. 2012. "Analysis: Bahrain hardliners in driving seat after F1 fiasco". April 24th. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/us-bahrain-protests-idUSBRE83N0GK20120424>. Accessed August 8th, 2014.
- Harkreader, Steve and Allen W. Imershein. 1999. "The conditions for state action in Florida's health-care market". *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 40(2): 159–174.
- Hawkins, Darren. 1998. "Sustaining Authoritarian Rule: Democratization Theory Meets Cuba". Paper prepared for the XXI Latin American Studies Association Conference, Chicago, Illinois, September 24 - 26.

- Head, Mike. 1998. "Suharto resigns in bid to preserve Indonesian regime". *World Socialist Web Site*. May 21st. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1998/05/ined-m21.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Heilbrunn, John R. 1993. "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(2): 277 – 299.
- Herrmann, Andrea and Lasse Cronqvist. 2006. "Contradictions in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Ways Out of the Dilemma". EUI Working Papers SPS 2006/06. Available at: <http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/handle/1814/6305>. Accessed October 21th, 2015.
- Hoffman, Barak and Lindsay Robinson. 2009. "Tanzania's Missing Opposition". *Journal of Democracy* 20(4): 123 – 136.
- Hornsey, Matthew J., Leda Blackwood, Winnifred Louis, Kelly Fielding, Ken Mavor, Thomas Morton, Anne O'Brien, Karl-Erik Paasonen, Joanne Smith and Katherine White. 2006. "Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness". *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 36(7): 1701 - 1722.
- Howard, Marc Morje and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes". *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 365 – 81.
- Huband, Mark. 1991. "Togo Rioters Win Pledge of Reform". *The Guardian*, April 11th. Available at: <http://www.markhuband.com/togo-rioters-win-pledge-of-reform/>. Accessed May 9th, 2016.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1984. "Will more countries become democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99(2): 193 – 218.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hydén, Goeran. 1999. "Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania". *Journal of Democracy* 10(4): 142 – 155.
- Hyug-Baeg, Im. 1997. "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea". In Sang-Yong Choi (eds), *Democracy in Korea: Its Ideals and Realities*. Seoul: the Korean Political Science Association, 133 – 151.

- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1998. *Indonesia Letter of Intent*. November 13. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1113a98.htm>. Accessed December 12th, 2015.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackman, Robert. 1973. "On the relation of economic development to democratic performance". *American Journal of Political Science* 17(3): 611 – 621.
- Joseph, Richard. 1998. "Africa, 1990–1997: From *Abertura* to Closure". *Journal of Democracy* 9(2): 3 – 17.
- Joshi, Madhav. 2010. "Post-civil war democratization: Promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946 – 2005". *Democratization* 17 (5): 826 – 855.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1986. "Petroleum and Political Pacts: the Transition to Democracy in Venezuela". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 196 - 220.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1990. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America". *Comparative Politics* 23(1): 1 - 21.
- Karl, Terry Lynn and Philippe Schmitter. 1995. "From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?" *Slavic Review* 54(4): 965 - 978.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 2005. "From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transitions from Authoritarian Rule". CDDRL Working Papers No. 45.
- Kaufman, Robert. 1986. "Liberalization and Democratization in South America: Perspectives from the 1970s". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 85 – 107.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Kirschke, Linda. 2000. "Informal Repression, Zero-Sum Politics and Late Third Wave Transitions". *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3): 383 – 405.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1993. "New Social Movements and the Decline of Party Organization". In Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds.), *Challenging the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 179 - 208.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka, 1999. *Post- communist party systems: competition, representation and inter-party cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Knack, Stephen. 2004. "Does foreign aid promote democracy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48(1): 251- 266.
- Krenz, Egon. 1990. *Wenn Mauern fallen*. Wien: Paul Neff.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni. 1997. "New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe". In Dough McAdam and David A. Snow (eds), *Social Movement*. Arizona: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Kubicek, Paul. 2003. *The European Union and Democratization*. London: Routledge.
- Kumar, Krishna. 1998. "Post-Conflict Elections and International Assistance". In Kumar, Krishna, *Post-Conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Kurzman, Charles. 1996. "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979". *American Sociological Review* 61(1): 153 - 170.
- Landman, Todd. 2000. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Lane, Max. 1991a. "Suharto moves to silence parliamentary critics". *Greenleft Weekly*. October 30th. Available at: <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/366>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Lane, Max. 1991b. "Suharto's isolation increasing". *Greenleft Weekly*. May 29th. Available at: <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/1294>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

- Lane, Max. 1998. "Indonesia: Behind the "anti-Chinese" riots". February 25th. Available at: <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/18353>. Accessed January 10th, 2014.
- Letogolais.com. 2012. "*Togo: le 3 Décembre 1991 éclata la piteuse guerre d'Eyadéma contre la Primature*". December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=7529>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Letogolais.com. 2013. "Togo: Proposition du GRAD pour une sortie de la crise togolaise". Conference SAAD & GRAD, July 1st. Available at: <http://www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=7656>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Levine, Daniel. 1988. "Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy". *World Politics* 40(3): 377 – 394.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism". *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 51– 65.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2006. "Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change". *Comparative Politics* 38(4): 379 – 400.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945 – 1993". *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681 – 690.
- Liddle, R. William. 1996. "Indonesia: Suharto's Tightening Grip". *Journal of Democracy* 7(4): 58 – 72.
- Liddle, R. William. 2002. "Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules". In Reynolds, Andrew (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 373 – 399.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method". *American Political Science Review* 65(3): 682 - 693.
- Lindberg, Staffan I. 2006. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lindberg, Staffan I. 2007. "The Surprising Significance of African Elections". *Journal of Democracy* 17(1): 139 – 51.

- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". *American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69 - 105.
- Lloyd Parry, Richard. 1998. "Indonesia crisis: Riots, looting and student protest: The fall of an autocrat". *The Independent*, May 22nd. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/indonesia-crisis-riots-looting-and-student-protest-the-fall-of-an-autocrat-1157981.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2016.
- Lodonou Kpakpo, Afiwa Pepevi. 1988. *Le rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT): instrument de légitimation du pouvoir militaire*. Doctoral thesis. Université de Bordeaux II.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991a. "World in Brief: Togo: President Agrees to Crisis Conference". June 13th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-13/news/mn-894_1_national-conference. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991b. "World in Brief: Togo : Military Ruler Gives up Power". August 29th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-08-29/news/mn-1845_1_military-rule. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991c. "Troops in Togo Back President, Besiege Premier". November 29th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-29/news/mn-205_1_longtime-president. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991d. "2 Coup Attempts Thwarted in Togo". October 2nd. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-02/news/mn-3064_1_coup-attempt. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991e. "World in Brief . Togo : Prime Minister Eludes Kidnappers". October 9th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-09/news/mn-255_1_prime-minister. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1998. "Troops Keep Uneasy Peace at Riot Sites in Indonesia". May 8th. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/08/news/mn-47619>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Lowenthal, Abraham. 1986. "Foreword". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative perspectives. Volume 3*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Lussier, Danielle and Steven Fish. 2012. "Indonesia: The Benefits of Civic Engagement". *Journal of Democracy* 23(1): 70 – 84.
- Lust-Okar Ellen. 2004. "Divided they rule: The management and manipulation of political opposition". *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 159 - 179.
- Mackie, J. L. 1965. Causes and Conditions. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2(4): 245 - 265.
- Mahoney, James et Richard Snyder. 1999. "Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34(2): 3 – 32.
- Mahoney, James et Richard Snyder. 1999. "Review: The Missing Variable: Institutions and the Study of Regime Change". *Comparative Politics* 32(1): 103 - 122.
- Mahoney, James. 2003. "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis". In Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 337 - 372.
- Mahoney, James. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research". *World Politics* 62(1): 120 - 147.
- Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder. 2012. "Democratization and the Arab Spring". *International Interaction* 38(5): 722 - 733.
- Maravall, José María. 1978. *Dictatorship and Political Dissent*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Maravall, Jose Maria and Julian Santamaria. 1986. "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Volume 1*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 71 – 108.
- Martin, Denis-Constant. 1992. "Demokrasia ni Nini? Fragments swahili du débat politique en Tanzanie". *Politique Africaine* 47: 109 – 134.
- Martins, Luciano. 1986. "The "Liberalization" of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 72 - 94.

- Maxwell, Kenneth. 1986. "Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Volume 1*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 109 - 137.
- McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212 - 1214.
- McFaul, Michael. 2002. "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship—Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World". *World Politics* 54(2): 212 – 244.
- McGowan, Patrick J. 2003. "African Military Coups d'état, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(3): 339 - 70.
- McSweeney, Dean and Cliff Tempest. 1993. "The Political Science of Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe". *Political Studies* 41(3): 408 – 419.
- Meiklejohn Terry, Sarah. 1993. "Thinking About Postcommunist Transitions: How Different Are They?" *Slavic Review* 52(2): 333 - 337.
- Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. "Embedded and Defective Democracies". *Democratization* 11(5): 33 - 58.
- Mertler, Craig and Rachel Vannatta. 2002. *Advanced and multivariate statistical methods: Practical Application and Interpretation*. Pyrczak: Los Angeles, 2nd ed.
- Merton, Robert King. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. MacMillan USA.
- Middlebrook, Kevin. 1986. "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Mexico". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 123 - 147.
- Mills, John Stuart. 1858. *A System of Logic , Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

- Minorities at Risk. 2010. "Chronology for Ewe in Togo". University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Available at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=46101>. Accessed January 24th, 2014.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2014. "Military Defection and Democratic Transitions: A Study of the Armed Forces Actions during Periods of Regime Crisis in Benin and Togo". Working Paper. Department of Political Science. University of Montreal.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. Forthcoming 2016. *Democratization in Africa: A Study of the Armed Forces' Influence*. Doctoral thesis. Department of Political Science. University of Montreal.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien and Anja Brunner. 2015. "United They Stand? A Study of Authoritarian Responses During the Arab Spring". *New Middle Eastern Studies* 5. Available at: <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/archives/1389>. Accessed May 1st, 2015.
- Morlino, Leonardo. 1987. "Democratic Establishments: A Dimensional Analysis". In Baloyra, Enrique (eds.), *Comparing New Democracies. Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and Southern Cone*. Westview Press: Boulder, 53 - 79.
- Morris, Aldon. 1999. "A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks". *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 517 - 39.
- Morris, Aldon. 2000. "Charting Futures for Sociology: Social Organization". *Contemporary Sociology* 29(3): 445 – 454.
- Mruma, Issac. 1990. "Ujamaa Shall Not Vanish in Tanzania--Nyerere". *Daily News*. February 22nd: 1. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania", *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Mshana, Daniel. 1990. "CCM Must Deliver Goods". *Daily News*. March 26th: 1. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania", *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Muller, Edward N. 1988. "Democracy, economic development and income inequality". *American Sociological Review* 53(1): 50 – 69.

- Mueller, Julia. 2013. *Tanzania's Political National Identity and Democratic Development*. MA thesis. University of Leiden.
- Munck, Gerardo L. 1994. "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective". *Comparative Politics* 26(3): 355 - 375.
- Munck, Gerardo L. and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. "Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: evaluating alternative indices". *Comparative Political Studies* 35(1): 5 – 34.
- Munck, Gerardo. 2011. "Democratic Theory after 'Transitions from Authoritarian Rule'". *Perspectives on Politics* 9(2): 333 – 343.
- Murdoch, James and Todd Sandler. 2002. "Civil Wars and Economic Growth: A Regional Comparison". *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(6): 451 – 464.
- Musendo, Zephania. 1990. "Don't Glorify Leaders, Say Participants". *Sunday News*. March 25th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania", *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Mwesiga, Baregu. 2000. "Tanzania's Hesitant and Disjointed Constitutional Reform Process". Paper presented at the Conference on Constitution Making Processes in Southern Africa, Dar es Salaam, July 26 – 28.
- Mydans, Seth. 1998. "The Fall of Suharto: The Overview; Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down after 32-Year Rule in Indonesia". *New York Times*, May 21st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/21/world/fall-suharto-overview-suharto-besieged-steps-down-after-32-year-rule-indonesia.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- New York Times. 1991a. "Police Fight Protesters in Togo for Second Day". March 17th, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/17/world/police-fight-protesters-in-togo-for-second-day.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2016.
- New York Times. 1991b. "Togolese Loyalists Threatening Interim Ruler". November 29th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/29/world/togolese-loyalists-threatening-interim-ruler.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2016.
- New York Times. 1991c. "Togo's Prime Minister Compromise". December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/03/world/togo-s-prime-minister-proposes-compromise.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Ngasongwa, Juma. 1992. "Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System". *Review of African Political Economy* 54: 112 – 116.

- Noble, Sarah. 2009. "Indonesian's Overthrow President Suharto, 1998". *Global Non-Violent Action Database*. Available at: <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/indonesians-overthrow-president-suharto-1998>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Nwajiaku, Kathryn. 1994. "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32(3): 429 – 447.
- Nyirabu, Mohabe. 2002. "The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party". *African Journal of Political Science* 7(2): 99 – 112.
- Oberschall, Anthony. 1996. "Opportunities and framing in the Eastern European revolts of 1989". In McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements – Political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural framing*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 93 – 121.
- Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. "Social movements and the transition to democracy". *Democratization* 7(3): 25 - 45.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, Volume 4*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. "Illusions about Consolidation". *Journal of Democracy* 7(2): 34 – 51.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 2010. "Schmitter's Retrospective: A Few Dissenting Notes". *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 29 - 32.
- Offe, Claus. 1998. "Designing Institutions in East European Transitions". In Goodin, Robert E. (ed.), *The Theory of Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 - 226.
- O'Loughlin, John, Michael D. Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin S. Cohen, David S. Brown, David Reilly, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Michael Shinn. 1988. "The diffusion of democracy, 1946–1004". *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88(4): 545 – 574.
- Ortega Ortíz, Reynaldo Yunuen. 2000. "Comparing types of transitions: Spain and Mexico". *Democratization* 7(3): 65 - 92.

- Paczynska, Agnieszka. 2013. "Cross-Regional Comparisons: The Arab Uprisings as Political Transitions and Social Movements". *Political Science and Politics* 46(2): 217 - 221.
- Penne, Guy. 1999. "La longévité du 'Grand Timonier' africain". In Penne, Guy (ed), *Mémoires d'Afrique 1981 – 1998*. Paris: Fayard, Chap. XVI.
- Peter, Chris M. and Fritz Koepsieker. 2006. *Political Succession in East Africa: In Search for a Limited Leadership*. Kenya: Kituo Cha Katiba and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Pevehouse, John. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization". *International Organization* 56(3): 515 – 549.
- Pevehouse, John. 2005. *Democracy from Above*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pilon, Marc. 1993. "La transition togolaise dans l'impasse". *Politique Africaine* 49: 136 - 140.
- Planmo, Markus. 2002. *From Patron-Client to Client-Server: e-democracy in Tanzania?* MA Thesis. Uppsala University.
- Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis". *American Political Science Review* 88(4): 853 – 72.
- Polity IV. 2005. "*Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002*". Dataset Users' Manual. Available at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/>. Accessed August 7th, 2013.
- Popper, Karl. 1959. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Routledge.
- Porras, Jaime. 2007. *Le cinéma dans la transition espagnole*. Doctoral thesis. Université de Montréal.
- Pratt, Cranford. 1976. *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. 2005. *Designing Democracy. EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Postcommunist Europe*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1986. "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds),

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Volume 3.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 47 – 63.

Przeworski, Adam. 1990. *The State and the Economy under Capitalism. Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics.* 40 Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 1996. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7(1): 39 - 55.

Przeworski Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts". *World Politics* 49(2): 155 – 184.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Purdey, Jemma. 2006. *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies.* California: University of California Press.

Ragin, Charles. 2000. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, Charles. 2006. "Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage". *Political Analysis* 14(3): 291 – 310.

Ragin, Charles. 2008. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rasler, Karen. 1996. "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution". *American Sociological Review* 61(1): 132 - 52.

Remmer, Karen. 1990. "Democracy and Economic Crisis". *World Politics* 42(3): 315 – 335.

Rennebohm, Max. 2011. "Togolese citizens campaign for democracy, 1991". *Global Non-Violent Action Database.* Available at:

<http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/togolese-citizens-campaign-democracy-1991>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

Retherford, Robert D. and Minja Kim Choe. 1993. *Statistical Models for Causal Analysis*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Richards, David and Ronald D. Gelleny. 2006. "Banking Crises, Collective Protest, and Rebellion". *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 1 - 25.

Richburg, Keith. 1998a. "Suharto Resigns, Names Successor". *Washington Post Foreign Service*. May 21st.

Richburg, Keith. 1998b. "Deepening Crisis Emboldens Suharto's Critics: Disenchanted Indonesians Openly Urge Longtime Leader to Step Aside". *Washington Post Foreign Service*. November 11th.

Rihoux, Benoit. 2008. "Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques: Recent advantages and challenges". In Pickel, Susanne, Gert Pickel and Hans-Joachim Lauth (eds), *Neuere Entwicklungen und Anwendungen auf dem Gebiet der Methoden der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft. Volume II*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 365 - 384.

Rihoux, Benoit and Gisèle De Meur. 2009. "Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)". In Ragin, Charles and Benoit Rihoux (eds), *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques*. Sage Publications, 33 - 68.

Menocal, Alina Rocha, Verena Fritz and Lise Rakner. 2008. "Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries". *South African Journal of International Affairs* 15(1): 29 - 40.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does oil hinder democracy?" *World Politics* 53(3): 325 - 361.

Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model". *Comparative Politics* 2(3): 337 - 363.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne H. Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rydland, Lars Tore, Sveinung Arnesen and Ase Gilje Ostensen. 2008. "Contextual data for the European Social Survey. An Overview and assessment of extant resources". NSD Report No. 124. Norwegian Social Science Data Services.

- Salvatore, Armando. 2013. "New Media, the 'Arab Spring', and the Metamorphosis of the Public Sphere: Beyond Western Assumptions on Collective Agency and Democratic Politics." *Constellations* 20(2): 217 - 228.
- Sambanis, Nicolas. 2002. "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War". *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3): 215 - 243.
- Sandoval, Salvador A. M. 1998. "Social Movements and Democratization: The Case of Brazil and Latin Countries". In Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds), *From Contention to Democracy*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 169 – 201.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1991. "Comparing and Miscomparing". *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3(3): 342 – 357.
- Saxonberg, Steven. 2013. *Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schedler, Andreas. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2002. "Liberal Community and Enlargement. An Event History Analysis". *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(4): 598 - 626.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. "What Democracy Is . . . And Is Not". *Journal of Democracy* 2(3): 75 - 88.
- Schmitter, Philippe. 1991. *The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop*. National Research Council, Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Lynn Karl. 1994. "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt To Go?" *Slavic Review* 53(1): 173 - 185.
- Schmitter, Philippe. 2010. "Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings". *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 17 – 28.
- Schneider, Carsten Q. und Claudius Wagemann. 2012. *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences. A Guide for Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Fuzzy Sets in Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper.

- Seely, Jennifer C. 2005. "The legacies of transition governments: post-transition dynamics in Benin and Togo". *Democratization* 12(3): 357 – 377.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development As Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Share, Donald. 1987. "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction". *Comparative Political Studies* 19(4): 525 – 548.
- Shehata, Dina. 2011. "The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End". *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 26 - 32.
- Shin, Doh Chull. 2008. "The Third Wave in East Asia - Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives". *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 4(2): 91 - 131.
- Shultziner, Doron. 2010. *Struggling for Recognition: The Psychological Impetus for Democratic Progress*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Simanjuntak, Togi. 1997. "Indonesia's New Social Upsurge". *Solidarity*, July – August. Available at: <https://www.solidarity-us.org/node/2172>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Skocpol, Theda, Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Snow, David A. and Dana M. Moss. 2014. "Protest on the Fly Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements." *American Sociological Review* 79(6): 1122 - 1143.
- Soe, Htun Htun. 2009. *Mode of Transition and Resultant Democracy*. MA Thesis. Northern Illinois University.
- Southall, Roger. 2006. "Troubled Visionary: Nyerere as a former President". In Southall, Roger and Henning Melber (eds), *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: HSRC Press, 233 – 255.
- Stepan, Alfred. 1986. "Paths toward redemocratization: theoretical and comparative considerations". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Volume 3*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 64 - 84.
- Stephan, Maria J and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict". *International Security* 33(1): 7 - 44.

- Sunday News (Dar es Salaam). 1990a. February 25th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Sunday News (Dar es Salaam). 1990b. February 26th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Symonds, Peter. 1998. "Student Protests Call for Indonesian President to Resign". *World Socialist Web Site*. October 30th. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1998/10/indo-o30.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Tambila, K.I. 1995. "The Transition to Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania: Some History and Missed Opportunities". *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America* 28(4): 468 – 488.
- Tanzanian Affairs. 1985. "Ali Hassan Mwinyi nominated as next President". Issue 22, October 1st. Available at: <http://www.tzaffairs.org/1985/10/ali-hassan-mwinyi-nominated-as-next-president/>. Accessed January 12th, 2014.
- Tanzanian Affairs. 1990. "Major Leadership Changes". Issue 27, September 1st. Available at: <http://www.tzaffairs.org/1990/09/>. Accessed January 12th, 2014.
- Tanzanian Affairs. 1991. "Election Results- Mwinyi Re-elected". Issue 38, January 1st. Available at: <http://www.tzaffairs.org/1991/01/>. Accessed January 12th, 2014.
- Tanzanian Affairs. 1992a. "Multiparty Democracy- The Latest". Issue 41, January 1st. Available at: <http://www.tzaffairs.org/1992/01/multi-party-democracy-the-latest/>. Accessed January 12th, 2014.
- Tanzanian Affairs. 1992b. "Mageuzi". Issue 42, May 1st. Available at: <http://www.tzaffairs.org/1992/05/>. Accessed January 12th, 2014.
- Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles L. and David A. Jodice. 1983. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Tété, Godwin. 2012. "Il y a 21 ans éclata la piteuse guerre eyadémaïenne de la Primature : 03 décembre 1991". *Afrikinfos.com*. December 14th. Available at:

<http://fr.afrikinfos.com/2012/12/14/il-y-a-21-ans-clata-la-piteuse-guerre-yadmaenne-de-la-primature-03-dcembre-1991/>. Accessed January 13th, 2014.

The Dispatch. 1998. "Students Protest Against Habibie". May 23rd. Available at: <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1734&dat=19980523&id=kuAhAAAAI BAJ&sjid=5lIEAAAAI BAJ&pg=5469,2121490&hl=de>. Accessed May 8th, 2016.

The Straits Times. 1996. "Abri Looking to Ease Out of Political Role". June 22nd. Quoted in Acharya, Amitav. 1998. "Democratising Southeast Asia: Economic Crisis and Political Change". Working Paper No. 87. Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Australia.

Thiem, Alrik. 2011. "Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996-2006." *European Political Science Review* 3(1): 1 – 33.

Thiem, Alrik and Adrian Dusa. 2013. *Qualitative comparative analysis with R: A user's guide*. New York: Springer.

Thiem, Alrik. 2013. "Clearly crisp, and not fuzzy: A reassessment of the (putative) pitfalls of multi-value QCA". *Field Methods* 25(2): 197 – 207.

Thiem, Alrik. 2015. "Parameters of fit and intermediate solutions in multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis". *Quality & Quantity* 49(2): 657 - 674.

Thompson, Eric C. 1999. "Indonesia in Transition: the 1999 Presidential Elections". NBR Briefing Policy Report 9 (December): 1 – 17.

Thompson, Mark. 2000. "Whatever happened to democratic revolutions?" *Democratization* 7(4): 1 - 20.

Threlfall, Monica. 2008. "Reassessing The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain". Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Chicago, April 28th.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, Charles. 2007. *Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Toulabor, Comi M. 1996. "Jeunes, violence et démocratisation au Togo". *Afrique Contemporaine* 180 (October – December): 116 – 125.

Toulabor, Comi M. 1999. "Violence militaire, démocratisation et ethnicité au Togo". *Autrepart* 10: 105 – 115.

- Ulfelder, Jan. 2005. "Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes". *International Political Science Review* 26(3): 311 – 334.
- United Nations. 2015. *Global Issues: Democracy and Civil Society*. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/civil_society.shtml. Accessed May 10th, 2016.
- U.S. Department of State. 1994. *Togo Human Rights Practices, 1993*. Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Togo.html. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- U.S. Department of State. 2015. *Togo Information Sheet*. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/togo/99446.htm>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- USAID. 2013. *Foreign Aid Dashboard Data*. Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-dashboard.html#2013>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.
- Vachudova, Anna Milada. 2006. "Democratization in Postcommunist Europe. Liberal Regimes and the Leverage of International Actors". Working Paper No. 139. Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
- Vachudova, Anna Milada. 2007. "Political Change in the Western Balkans. What Can the EU's Active Leverage Deliver?". Communication presented at the congress of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, May 17 – 19.
- Vaisey, Stephen. 2009. "QCA 3.0: The "Ragin revolution" continues". *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 38(4): 308 – 312.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 1997. *Prospects of democracy: A study of 172 countries*. London: Routledge.
- Vatikiotis, Michael and Adam Schwarz. 1998. "A Nation Awakes". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4th: 21 - 22.
- Vink, Maarten P. and Olaf van Vliet. 2009. "Not quite crisp, not yet fuzzy? Assessing the potentials and pitfalls of multi-value QCA". *Field Methods* 21(3): 265 – 289.
- Waterbury, John. 1999. "Fortuitous Byproducts". In Anderson, Lisa (ed.), *Transitions to Democracy*. Columbia University Press, 200 – 217.
- Way, Lucas. 2011. "The Lessons of 1989". *Journal of Democracy* 22(4): 13 – 23.

- Weiner, Myron. 1987. "Empirical Democratic Theory". In Weiner, Myron and Ergun Özbudun (eds), *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Wejnert, Barbara. 2014. *Diffusion of Democracy: The Past and Future of Global Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Welsh, Helga. 1994. "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe". *Comparative Politics* 26(4): 379 - 394.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2009. "Diffusion Dynamics in European and Latin American Democratization". APSA Meeting Paper, Toronto.
- White, Steven, John Gardner, George Schopflin and Tony Saich. 1990. *Communist and Postcommunist Political Systems: An Introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Whitehead, Laurence. 1986. "International Aspects of Democratization". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Volume 3*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3 - 46.
- Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiseman, John A. 1990. *Democracy in Black Africa; Survival and revival*. New York: Paragon House.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2000. *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yakuti, Abdallah. 1990a. "Bandits Burn Party Office in Pemba". *Daily News*. August 3rd: 1. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Yakuti, Abdallah. 1990b. "We Can't Be Cowed", *Daily News*, June 3rd. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Zak, Paul and Yi Feng. 2003. "A dynamic theory of the transition to democracy". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 52(1): 1 – 25.

Zimmerman, Ekkart. 1980. "Macro-Comparative Research on Political Protest". In Gurr, Ted Robert (ed), *Handbook of Political Conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.

Zolberg, Aristide R. 1972. "Moments of Madness". *Politics and Society* 2(2): 183 - 207.

Appendix: Gathering Data

Identification of the Authoritarian Regime Crisis

As explained previously, there is no database for our condition "crisis of the authoritarian regime" because the concept is based on strategic factors that have never been systematically assessed for most Third Wave transitions. We thus establish our own dataset on this variable by conducting twenty-five case studies of transitions¹, using the indicators identified previously:

- (1) Public denunciation of the regime and/or its policies by members of the ruling block
- (2) Liberalization of certain policy areas by progressive government officials
- (3) Defection of key regime supporters, such as the Armed Forces, and the refusal to obey orders by certain government branches
- (4) Proposal and execution of credible, serious and committed reform plans by the authoritarian government
- (5) Continued repression as an indicator for the absence or the weakness of softliners and the predominance of hardliner factions

Using the structured and focused method as described by George and Bennett (2004, 67), our cases are examined with a view to identifying one or several of these indicators in order to determine whether or not a crisis of the authoritarian regime occurred during the transition process. The cases are grouped according to their respective world regions, mixing both successful and failed transitions.

¹ Since the transitions of Tanzania, Togo and Indonesia are treated more in detail in Chapter 4, we only include a short resume here.

(1) Spain

Spain's transition to democracy is usually said to have begun with the death of Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. The transition itself unfolded in two steps: firstly, a period of "apertura" (1975 – 1976) characterized by a limited liberalisation of the rules of the game within the existing legal framework of franquism; and secondly, a period of democratization (1976 – 1978) in which the restoration of civil liberties and democratic institutions and a gradual integration of opposition parties into the political system took place (Ethier 1986). In an immediate prelude, the assassination of Franco's Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973 laid bare the vulnerability of the unreformed regime (Bermeo 1987) and exacerbated the rifts between "Inmovilistas"², "Rupturistas"³ and "Reformistas-Apertura"⁴ that had built up during the years of the economic crisis. After Franco's death, the first government under Arias Navarro reflected these divisions: while Arias himself was a Conservative, his cabinet included both more progressive elements such as José María de Areilza as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Garrigues y Díaz Cañabate as Minister of Justice, and Manuel Fraga Iribarne as Interior Minister, and hardliners such as General Fernando de Santiago as Vice-Chairman for Defense (Sacchetti 2009). Arias' nomination as head of government took place in a context of heightened social and political tension: ETA terrorist attacks in the Basque Country worsened, worker strikes in industry and public services paralyzed many cities, and street riots coupled with police reprisals fueled the popular ire against the regime. Furthermore, the political system was strongly polarized: whereas the reformist elements of the political class called for the establishment of fundamental rights and political associations as stipulated by the Charter

² This category comprises both "Continuistas" and "Ultras", groups that favored the perpetuation of Franco's policies and regime style. The Continuist group featured many of Franco's former politicians and officials, including the organic Assembly (the Cortès) and the higher echelons of the Armed Forces. On the other hand, the Ultras, also known as "the Bunker", were individuals active in Francoist institutions such as the National Council of the "Movimiento" (the Francoist Single Party), the vertical syndicate and the Falangist organizations (Colomer 1995).

³ On one hand, this category comprises groups as diverse as anarchists, revolutionary Marxists and radical nationalists. On the other hand, it also refers to the democratic opposition that from March 1976 on grouped together in the Democratic Coordination and later in the Platform of Democratic Organisms. This platform was composed basically of Communists, Socialists, Basque/Catalan Nationalists, Liberals and Christian Democrats. Rather than a continuation of Franquism, they favored a radical break with the past and a return to a Republican ruling style (Colomer 1995).

⁴ Openists (such as Carlos Arias and Manuel Fraga who formed the government during the first six months after Franco's death) and Reformists, grouped together around the government of Adolfo Suárez and King Juan Carlos, favored a procedural type of continuity, i.e. reform from within the Franquist legal system (Perricone 2001).

of the Movimiento, the hardliners pushed for increased repression against the opposition. Confronted with those incompatible demands, Arias Navarro adopted an ambivalent posture: on one hand, he tightened repression against the most radical elements of the opposition (Ethier 1986); on the other hand he proclaimed a formal apertura on February 12, 1974 (Bermeo 1987). However, after months of delaying reforms and objecting to real democratization, King Juan Carlos ordered Arias' resignation and appointed the technocrat Adolfo Suarez to take his place. Indeed, Suarez quickly presented a clear political program based on two points: Firstly, the adoption of a "Law for Political Reform" that, once approved by the Cortès and the Spanish public in a referendum, dismantled the Francoist legal system and replaced it with a new democratic bicameral Parliament; and secondly, the organisation of free and universal elections with the participation of all political parties in June 1977 in order to elect a constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution. Despite hostile reactions from the Bunker and the Army, Suarez and his reformist cabinet also managed to push through a partial political amnesty in July 1976, the dismantling of the Francoist secret police in December 1976, the legalization of trade unions in March 1977 and the legalization of the Communist party in August 1977 (Sacchetti 2009). Authors unanimously agree that the progressive attitude of the King, as well as Suarez' close relations to reformists in the Armed Forces were largely responsible for these successes. In Spring 1977, Spain held her first free legislative elections after Franco, which were won in large part by the moderate centre parties Union de Centro Democratico (UCD) and the PSOE (El Pais 1977). Subsequently, the Constituent Cortes began to draft the new Constitution in the summer of 1977, which was ratified on October 1978 and approved in a popular referendum on December 6 with 87,8% votes in favor (UAB 2003).

In Spain, the ruling clique split very early into those who favoured reform, those who opposed it and those who, while uncomfortable with too much change, were at least inclined to go along with it as long as they were able to retain some privileges from the past. However, it was only after the death of Franco that softliners were able to occupy decisive positions of influence from where they were able to push democratization forward. After the initial debacle of Arias Navarro's attempt to introduce a "democracia a la Espanola" (Share 1987), the reins of control were firmly in the hand of a "trias of reformists" formed by King Juan Carlos as Franco's handpicked successor, Adolfo Suarez

in the bureaucracy and General Gutierrez-Mellado in the Armed Forces. Their skilful leadership, as well as the fact that they occupied the most sensitive positions within the regime explains why hardliners were never majoritarian throughout the transition process.

The engine of transition was Juan Carlos whose support for reform was crucial in obtaining the compliance of middle forces (such as the Cortès) and in marginalising the hardliner elements of the regime (Bregolat 1999). Mistrusted at first by both the democratic opposition and the Falangists and disparaged as "idiot king" (Der Spiegel 1975), Juan Carlos turned out to be a genuine democrat whose reform-oriented attitude combined with his "francoist loyalty" played a crucial role in bridging the old and the new order. Portraying himself as the "King of all Spaniards", he admitted to the New York Times that already in 1969 he "had no intention of presiding over a dictatorship" (Preston 2004, 254 - 55) and that he did not want to help with the continuation of the current regime (Fernandez-Miranda Lozana 1995, 50). Instead, he chose democracy as a means of gaining legitimacy for a constitutional monarchy, and to guarantee its survival (Fawcett 1989; Martinez undated)⁵.

Given the strength of the Bunker movement⁶, Juan Carlos' nomination of Arias Navarro to lead the first post-Franco government⁷ should be seen as an attempt to lend the reform process an air of continuity - "el mayor cambio posible sin ruptura del sistema institucional" (Medina Gonzales 1975). Navarro, a self-proclaimed "servidor de la nacion" (El Pais 1976) whose goal was to "deflower Spain without pain or sin, by the help of

⁵ As the king explained to his advisor Fernandez-Miranda, "la monarquia no puede ser azul, falangista, ni siquiera puede ser franquista. La Monarquia viene de atrás, de los otros reyes, de la Historia y no se puede concretar en las actuales instituciones excesivamente parciales (...) el futuro del país se encuentra en manos de muy pocas personas. No será nada parecido a lo que es ahora. La Monarquia tiene que ser democrática. Es la única manera de que pueda ser aceptada por Europa y por el mundo y de que pueda subsistir." (Rose 2012)

⁶ Convinced that "Spain doesn't need reforms", these hardliners fought to conserve Franco's "thousand-year-empire" (Der Spiegel 1975) and included, among others, the former Chief of the Guardia Civil, General Iniesta Cano, Falangist and President of the War Veterans José Antonio Giron as well as Cortès-Member and Fuerza-Nueva leader Blas Pinar. Giron stood out for his frequent public stances against the reforms carried out first by the Navarro and Suarez governments. Confirming that he "defended political participation, but not from within a political party" (Giron 1974), he threatened that those "who hope for a change of regime are gravely mistaken" and warned that a multiparty system would be catastrophic for Spain (Die Welt 1975). Miguel Primo de Rivera y Urquijo, another hardliner, echoed this line in an article published in the journal *Arriba* when he stated that "nuestro Estado debe ser un Estado autoritario que permita una libertad política ordenada contra el libertinaje que proclama el Estado liberal" (Gaceta Ilustrada undated).

⁷ In order to gauge their support for his ideas, Juan Carlos asked several Spanish politicians during Franco's final years to express in writing what they would do if they were appointed prime minister when Franco died. Adolfo Suarez stated that through this opportunity he was able to develop his ideas on transitions to democracy, a key reason why the king later put him in charge of the government (Bregolat 1999).

vaseline" (Der Spiegel 1975) initially seemed to offer some hope for a reformist strategy. Like Caetano in Portugal he followed a path of limited liberalization followed by retrenchment designed to appease the hardliners (Fawcett 1989). However, in doing so he was unable to mobilise support for his policies from both the regime softliners and the conservatives and deprived many of his ministers of their once apparently promising "reformist" credentials (De Areilza 1977). Moreover, he wasn't strong willed enough to resist the pressure of the Bunker, who forced the dismissal of several ministers considered too liberal.⁸ Most importantly, Arias never accepted the idea of transforming the regime into a truly pluralist democracy (Maravall and Santamaria 1986, 81), as he remained dedicated to Franco and the idea that any legal and institutional reform would have to be carried out "como Franco hubiera deseado" (Ardanaz 2014)⁹. He managed to guide a new law on political associations through the Cortès but the opposition rejected it, as it legalized only those associations¹⁰ the government did not deem "subversive" (New York Times 1976). When Juan Carlos finally realized Arias' "democracia a la espanola" had little in common with his own plans to establish in Spain "una democracia sin adjetivos" (Cuadernos para el dialogo 1976) he dismissed Arias, calling him an "unabashed disaster" (Newsweek 1976).

The King's presence and behavior was paramount for Arias' successor, Suarez, and his ability to gain support within the regime, as Juan Carlos embodied the legitimacy of the Franquist system (Share 1987). Suarez, at first denounced as "an obscure falangist

⁸ Among the victims of the Bunker were Chief of Staff General Manuel Diaz Alegria Gutierrez (Der Spiegel 1975), Minister of Information Pio Cabanillas, and Minister of Haciendas Antonio Barrera de Irima who resigned in protest at the dismissal of Cabanillas. Minister of Labor M. Licinio de la Fuente also resigned, citing his opposition to a new law project that would have enabled employers to dismiss striking workers (Le Devoir 1975). In response to the personal changes, the group "Tacito" published in their journal "Ya" a disenchanted note saying "Ahora todo tiene a ser mas claro (...) Se tuvo la oportunidad de elegir un camino, el que los discursos presidenciales senalaban y nosotros apoyamos. Se ha elegido otro... Cuando el pasado predomina, solo los arcaizantes se imponen y con ellos es dificil intentar una nueva andadura..." (Gaceta Ilustrada 1974).

⁹ As Fawcett (2009) states, Arias really saw "apertura" as a means of bringing disaffected Franquists back into the regime. In a meeting with Fernandez-Miranda on February 11, 1976 he clarified his views by confessing: "What I want to do is continue Francoism. And as long as I'm here or still in political life, I'll never be anything other than a strict perpetuator of Francoism in all its aspects and I will fight against the enemies of Spain who have begun daring to raise their heads and are just a hidden and clandestine minority (Fernandez-Miranda Lozana 1995, 53)". In response, the editorial of the journal "Cuadernos para el Dialogo" wryly summarized: "Si al principio deciamos 'Arias y la reforma', al final nuestras propias palabras nos conducen a decir 'Arias o la reforma'" (Roca I Junyent 1976).

¹⁰ Arias contended that associations were the "mas expedita proyeccion politica del pluralismo de la vida social espanola", but still refused to legalize political parties (Laborda and Fernando undated).

functionary" and "pure bunker" (Cambio 1976, 18), unequivocally stated that "popular sovereignty resides in the people" and promised to work for "the establishment of a democratic political system based on the guarantee of civil rights and freedoms, on equal opportunities for democratic groups, and the acceptance of genuine pluralism (Powell 1996, 114 - 115). Following a strategy laid out by the King's advisor Fernandez-Miranda, "de la ley, a la ley", his goal was to enact democratic reforms through the existing Francoist institutions, with the holding of free universal elections as essence of his task (Linz and Stepan 1996). In doing so, Suarez was able to offer something to both sides: "to the conservatives (...) a commitment to legal process and an affirmation of existing institutions and powers; to the opposition (...) a commitment to the sort of change it favoured" (Graeme 2000, 131 - 132). His cabinet featured reformists such as Martin Villa, Landelino Lavilla, Marcelino Oreja, Abril Martorell and Calvo Sotelo, and within a year and a half a number of reforms were enacted. The most important of these were the passage, through the Cortès, of the Ley para la Reforma Publica and the legalization of the Communist party¹¹, which Suarez achieved through a combination of incentives and threats. For instance, Suarez promised to the Cortès members representation in the new Senate through a modification of the electoral law, stressing that the new democratic institutions would have the same number of seats combined as the Francoist Cortès (Preston 2004, 373)¹². At the same time, he coerced the unwilling into complying, for example by threatening the members of the Cortès with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, with making public the recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had placed in their homes and offices, and with the live transmission, on television, of the vote for the Reform bill, so that those who voted "no" would have to face a consequent drop in popularity (Colomer 1991).

In dealing with the most hardline members of the military, Suarez stressed that his reform process did not stray from Francoist legality, permitted the upholding of national

¹¹ The decision to legalize the Communist party ended any doubts about the sincerity of Suarez' personal commitment to democracy, as he acted on the grounds that not legalizing the party would affect the inclusiveness of contestation. As he stated himself, "not only am I not Communist, but I reject strongly its ideology (...) but I am a Democrat (...) and therefore I think that our people are sufficiently mature (...) to assimilate their own pluralism" (Linz and Stepan 1996, ii).

¹² Suarez later jokingly commented his strategy to Emilio Attard: "But come now! If I hadn't been able to pull out of the hat some seats in the senate to offer to the hara-kiri procurators, how would I have brought off the political reform?" (Colomer 1995)

unity, and was the King's will (Preston 2004, 372)¹³. He also guaranteed not to legalize the Communist party, a promise that he later reneged on¹⁴. He was supported by the democratic wing of the military under the leadership of General Gutierrez-Mellado, whose insistence that "el ejercito permanecera neutral" (Agencia EFE 1976) was critical in easing tensions particularly after the government's most controversial reforms¹⁵. Acting as "the King's umbrella", and protecting the regime from all sorts of attacks (El Pais 2002), Mellado wanted to avoid another civil war at all costs, and was therefore prepared, together with a critical mass of progressive-minded soldiers, to isolate potential troublemakers within the Armed Forces. His maxime was that "todo lo que desuna es malo para el ejercito" and that "among the causes that may cause disunion between us, the most dangerous is the political cause" (Agencia Cifra 1976). The dismissal of the first Vice-president of the government, Lieutenant-General Fernando de Santiago y Diaz de Mendivil, together with the Head of the Civil Guard Carlos Iniesta after their criticism of a government bill regarding syndical liberty is but one of several instances in which these principles were put into practice (Colomer 1995)¹⁶.

¹³ The king's relationship with the Armed Forces was crucial in preventing an authoritarian backlash. As Franco's heir and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, the King constantly reminded the military that the most important quality in a soldier and in an Army was discipline, whether or not one agreed with a specific decision (Juan Carlos I de Borbon y Borbon 1977). The Armed Forces, on their part, found themselves between a rock and a hard place: Whereas the Army's mission had traditionally been to preserve Francoism, Franco had given orders before his death that the military should obey the king with the same loyalty (Cercas 2011, 30). This contradiction somewhat removed their capacity to act subversively, something that was particularly important after the legalization of the Communist party in 1977 when the Army felt that the Suarez government had betrayed their trust. Although the Army High Council sent a confidential letter to Juan Carlos warning him that "his standing amongst Army officers had suffered a severe blow" (Preston 2004, 385; Powell 1996, 128 - 129), their anger did not translate into violence against the monarchy or the regime.

¹⁴ As Paul Preston writes, the clothing of the reform bill in Francoist attire led many of those still loyal to the ideals of Franco to believe that in voting for the bill, they were supporting a necessary evolution of the Fundamental Laws. For instance, the Minister for the Navy, Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga, remarked: "My conscience is clear because the democratic reforms will be carried out through Francoist legality" (Preston 2004, 373 - 374) and the Captain General de Burgos, Mateo Prada Canillas, even went as far as proclaiming: "Presidente, viva la madre que te pario!" (El Pais 2012)

¹⁵ For instance, after Suarez presented his reform bill to the High Command of the Armed Forces, Mellado sent an intimidating report to all the higher officers demanding their abstention from all political activity or ideological statements. He warned them: "Whoever does not feel able to do so and has such imperious ideals which are, in his own opinion, higher than what the Army demands of him, must relinquish his duties (...) the Army is prepared to expel from its ranks all those who do not maintain its discipline" (Colomer 1995).

¹⁶ Another important example is the reaction of the Armed Forces to the legalization of the Communist party. Whereas leaders were fuming at the government's decision - Manuel Fraga declared that "the legalization of the Communist party is a genuine coup d'état", Alfonso Armado denounced "treason", and General De Santiago even stated that "With me as vice president, this would not have happened (...) I'd have brought out the tanks"- they were unable to pose any subversive action due to pressure from Gutierrez-Mellado's and other reform-minded officers. In the end, the High Command of the Armed Forces announced "general condemnation by all Army units", but added a paragraph in which they "admitted the accomplished fact with

Resume:

The “reformist trias” kept the reins of the Spanish transition process throughout the period 1976 - 1978 without significantly losing ground to opposition from hardliners either in the civil or the military wing of the regime. Therefore, it is adequate to confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

- Agencia Cifra. 1976. “*Todo lo que desuna es malo para el ejército*”. November 3rd. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Ficha.asp?Reg=R-31358>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Agencia EFE. 1976. “*Francia: 'El Ejército permanecerá neutral'*”. October 26th. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Ficha.asp?Reg=R-43348>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Ardanaz, Natalia. 2014. “Los discursos políticos televisados durante la transición española”. UAB Working Paper. Available at: <http://www.publicacions.ub.edu/bibliotecaDigital/cinema/filmhistoria/Art.Ardanaz.pdf>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Areilza, José María de. 1977. *Diario de un ministro de la monarquía*. Barcelona: Planeta.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1987. “Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal”. *Comparative Politics* 19(2): 213 - 231.
- Borbón y Borbón, Juan Carlos I de. 1977. *Palabras de Su Majestad el Rey a las Fuerzas Armadas en la Pascua Militar*. Public Speech. Available at: http://www.casareal.es/ES/actividades/Paginas/actividades_discursos_detalle.aspx?dat. Accessed May 16, 2016.
- Bregolat, Eugenio. 1999. “Spain’s Transition to Democracy”. *SAIS Review* 19(2): 149 - 155.

discipline, in consideration of national interests of a higher degree, and recalling its loyalty to the monarchy, the flag, and the unity of the fatherland” (Colomer 1995)

- Cambio. 1976. July 12th. Quoted in Bermeo, Nancy. 1987. "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal". *Comparative Politics* 19(2), 219.
- Cercas, Javier. 2011. *Anatomy of a Moment*. Translated by Anne McLean. New York: Bloomsbury USA.
- Colomer, Josep. 1991. "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way". *The American Political Science Review* 85(4): 1283 - 1302.
- Colomer, Josep. 1995. *Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: the Spanish Model*. Elgar Publishing.
- Cruz, Juan. 1977. "Los españoles han votado por la moderación". *El País*, June 17th.
- Cuadernos para el Diálogo. 1976. " *Otro Gobierno para las promesas del Rey*". June 12th.
- Der Spiegel. 1975. "Franco: Eingegraben zum letzten Gefecht". October 6th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41443433.html>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Die Welt. 1975. "Interview with Señor Girón: "El que espere un cambio de Régimen se equivoca gravemente". Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=R-73679>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- El País. 1976. "Un servidor de la nación". July 2nd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1976/07/02/espana/205106417_850215.html. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- El País. 2002. "Los militares que hicieron la reforma". June 15th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2002/06/15/espana/1024092033_850215.html. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- El País. 2012. "La hoz, el martillo y los sables". April 1st. Available at: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/03/31/actualidad/1333145225_788201.html. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- El Referéndum Constitucional de 6 de Diciembre de 1978*. 2003. Digital Documents of the UAB. Available at: <http://ddd.uab.es/pub/expbib/2003/lce/referendum.pdf>. Accessed March 3rd, 2014.

- Ethier, Diane. 1986. *La crise et la démocratisation des régimes autoritaires dans les pays semi-industriels: étude comparée des cas brésilien et espagnol*. Doctoral thesis. Université Paris VIII.
- Fawcett, Kevin. 1989. *The Transition to Democracy in Iberia: A Comparative Analysis of Democratic Genesis*. MA Thesis. McMaster University.
- Fernández-Miranda Lozana, Pilar and Alfonso Fernández-Miranda. 1995. *Lo Que El Rey Me Ha Pedido: Torcuato Fernández-Miranda Y La Reforma Política*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores.
- Gaceta Ilustrada. Undated. "Girón: trabajar por España". Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=r-73692>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Gaceta Ilustrada. 1974. "Los rumores de una crisis". Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=R-8983>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Giron, Don Jose Antonio. 1974. "Defiendo la participación política, pero no desde un partido". June 3rd. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=R-76215>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- González, Guillermo Medina. 1975. "El primer Gobierno del Rey". *Informaciones*, December 6th.
- Graeme, Gill J. 2000. *The Dynamics of Democratization, Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process*. Palgrave: Macmillan.
- Laborda, Cisneros and Gabriel Fernando. Undated. "Ratificación del '12 de febrero', Blanco y Negro: 26 - 27. Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=R-3563>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Le Devoir. 1975. "Après la démission de La Fuente: Arias Navarro pourrait procéder à un remaniement ministériel". February 27th. Available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1250&dat=19750227&id=kD0gAAAAIBAJ&sjid=e14EAAAIBAJ&pg=3957,4331459>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.

- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Maravall, Jose Maria and Julian Santamaria. 1986. "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Volume 1*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 71 – 108.
- Martinez, Julian. Undated. "Londres: El Rey Juan Carlos procederá a una democratización gradual". Archivo Linz de la Transición Española. Available at: <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=R-25091>. Accessed June 17th, 2014.
- Newsweek. 1976. April 19th. Quoted in Colomer, Josep. 1995. *Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: the Spanish Model*. Elgar Publishing, 41.
- New York Times. 1976. "Progress in Spain". June 14th.
- Perricone, Giuseppe. 2001. "Il ruolo della Monarchia nella transizione spagnola alla democrazia". *Ricerche di Storia Politica* 1: 35 - 58.
- Powell, Charles. 1996. *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Preston, Paul. 2004. *Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.
- Roca I Junyent, Miguel. 1976. "Arias y la reforma". *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, May 8th. Quoted in Catalán, Ernesto Cruzado. 2004. "La dimisión de Arias Navarro, factor clave para la transición. El papel de la prensa escrita en la crisis". Working Paper. Universidad de Castilla - La Mancha.
- Rose, Benjamin. 2012. *King of all the Spaniards: An Analysis of the Spanish Transition to Democracy Through the Words of Juan Carlos I*. BA Thesis. Wesleyan University, Connecticut.
- Sacchetti, Fabiana. 2009. "The Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in Spain (1975 – 1982)". Working paper. IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca.
- Share, Donald. 1987. "Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction". *Comparative Political Studies* 19(4): 525 – 548.

(2) Portugal

Portugal in 1974 overthrew the authoritarian “Estada Novo” regime in a coup d’état known as the Carnation Revolution (Varol 2012) as the first in a long line of “Third Wave” democratizers (Huntington 1991). However, the country’s drive towards multiparty rule began much earlier, in 1968, when Antonio de Salazaar, Portugal’s longtime dictator, became incapacitated and Marcello Caetano was chosen to succeed him as Prime Minister. Formerly a protégé of Salazaar, Caetano initiated a series of “political decompression” measures, such as introducing a “liberal wing” into the National Assembly, relaxing press censure and allowing the return from exile of Socialist party leader Mario Soares (Freitas do Amaral 1999). Yet, a group of powerful regime hardliners known as “the Ultras”¹⁷ thwarted any attempt at meaningful political reform. The first great oil shock of 1973 and the continuing economic and human drain caused by Portugal’s colonial wars in Africa increased the pressure on Caetano whose idea of “continuity and evolution” increasingly lost support in both the hardliner and the liberal ranks of the regime. The decisive ingredient in these tensions turned out to be dissensions within the Armed Forces, long a bulwark of support for the regime. When General Antonio de Spínola, a high-ranking regime figure, published his book *Portugal and the Future* in which he severely criticized the government’s conduct of its Africa wars, it sent ripples throughout the political establishment in Lisbon. Caetano answered with destituting Spínola from his functions, a move that only served to alienate him further from his power base. In fact, reform-oriented regime members increasingly came to realize that the only way to greater political freedom was by means of revolution. On April 25, 1974, a group of disaffected younger officers belonging to an underground organization, the “Movimento das Forças Armadas” (MFA) successfully toppled Caetano in a bloodless coup and Spínola emerged as the titular head of the new government. The move set in motion a true “resurrection of civil society” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Within days, tens of thousands Portuguese citizens poured into the street, cheering the coup leaders and demanding further democratic change. A tumultuous two-year transition period known as the “Ongoing Revolutionary Process” (Processo Revolucionario Em Curso, “PERC”) ensued, during which various political

¹⁷ This group of ultra Salazaarists included members as illustrious as Admiral Americo Tomas, Portugal’s president, some senior military officers and the heads of prominent financial corporations.

factions ranging from the far left to the center right of the spectrum competed for power¹⁸. After six provisional governments, an attempted Marxist-Leninist revolution and a coup by reactionary military units in November 1975, Portugal's political turmoil finally culminated in the proclamation of a new Constitution on April 2, 1976 and the end of the *Proceso Revolucionario* (Linz and Stepan 1996).

In Portugal, divisions between softliners and hardliners are well documented and appeared as early as 1968, the moment when Marcelo Caetano took the office of Prime Minister from Salazaar. Assessments of Caetano, the central figurehead of the regime until 1974, are difficult to make, mostly because of his mixed record of reform attempts on one hand, and repression on the other. At the very least, he could be considered a moderate authoritarian who realized the need to reform at least part of the structure the Salazaar regime was built on. Having served in Salazaar's regime for 25 years, Caetano had built himself a somewhat liberal reputation¹⁹, and indeed, his early actions in office suggested to some that reform might be underway.

For instance, his televised appearances "conversa em familia" in which he openly exposed the country's problems became famous among the Portuguese (Bailby 1969). In a gesture of openness without precedent, he received the chief editors of Portugal's most important newspapers, discussed with them the status of the press²⁰ and promised a more lenient approach to censure, demonstratively replacing Salazaar's strict chief censor Venancio Pauro Rodriguez with less orthodox Cesar Moreira Batista (*Der Spiegel* 1968)²¹. In choosing his cabinet, Caetano also exhibited a more "modernist approach". Whereas ultra Salazaarists Correia de Oliveira (former Finance Minister) and Franco Nogueira

¹⁸ Organizations participating in the power struggle included the Socialist Party of Portugal (Partido Socialista, "PS"), the radical Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues, "PCP"), the moderate People's Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democratico, "PPD") and the factionalized and partially radicalized MFA itself.

¹⁹ Caetano had once been Salazaar's proclaimed "heir" to the throne, but broke with the dictator in 1958, criticizing Salazaar's tendency to concentrate all decision making power in the executive hands (*Der Spiegel* 1968). Later, he prevented police from abusing a mass of student demonstrators in 1957 and then resigned from his position as rector of Lisbon University in protest against police actions on University property in 1962 (Bermeo 1987).

²⁰ Caetano later announced his desire to amend the 1933 Constitution in order to introduce a new law on Press freedom before Parliament. However, he also stated that press freedom would continue to know limits, especially when "the public interest" and "the international prestige" of the country was at stake (Bieber 1970)

²¹ As a result, the Portuguese daily "Vida Mundial" was allowed to print an article denouncing police brutality against student protestors in neighboring Spain (*Der Spiegel* 1968).

(Foreign Affairs) lost their seats in the government (De la Souchère 1970), several sub-ministries (for example the Ministries of Social and Economic Affairs) went to young Christian-progressive technocrats²² with a more favorable outlook on press freedom and the creation of political parties.

He also allowed Mario Soares and the bishop of Oporto, two prominent opposition figures, to return to Portugal from exile (Bermeo 1987) and made some effort to liberalize PIDE, Portugal's secret police (Fawcett 1989). Most importantly, in the runup to the October 26, 1969 legislative elections, he authorized for the first time the creation of electoral committees which were allowed to hold supervised meetings. He even granted opposition candidates a voice in newspapers²³ (De la Souchère 1970). When members of the "Portuguese Legion", a fascist paramilitary group under authority of government hardliners, broke into the Lisbon office of one of these committees threatening and abusing their candidate Eduardo Souto de Moura, Caetano reacted by personally receiving Moura and assuring him of his protection (Jaenecke 1969).

However, powerful hardliner factions made it very clear that they wouldn't hesitate to employ force to stop liberalization if they deemed it was carried to far²⁴. During his mandate as Prime Minister and until his forced resignation in 1974, Caetano proved unable to turn this power struggle within the regime in his favor. Partly, this can be explained by the relative strength of hardliners. For instance, President Admiral Americo Thomaz, a devoted Salzaarist and hostile to Caetano's reform plans²⁵, had just been reelected in office for another seven years. Prior to his election, a small group of progressive-minded individuals within the regime had tried to get Caetano to run for the office himself. If successful, he could have nominated a technocrat for Prime Minister, which might have

²² For instance, he elevated Alfredo Vaz Pinto, director of Portugal's airline TAF, to the rank of a State Minister. Only a few months earlier, Pinto had declined Salzaar's offer for a government post (Der Spiegel 1968). Another reformer, M. Melo e Castro, was promoted head of the National Union (De la Souchère 1970)

²³ However, radio and television remained reserved for the regime.

²⁴ For instance, "Ultra" General Venâncio Deslandes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, warned Caetano not to go too far in his efforts to search a peaceful solution to the ongoing colonial war, stating that [the hardliners] "would never accept the abandoning of our overseas-provinces" (Bailby 1969). He was echoed by then Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira who stated that Portugal's traditional foreign policy with regards to its African colonies was going to be maintained "at all costs" (Carion 1969)

²⁵ It is no secret that Admiral Americo Thomaz, Portugal's President, was hostile towards Caetano from the start, and spoke "against the solution Caetano" for the office of Prime Minister (Carion 1969).

facilitated the carrying through of reforms. However, the plan failed, not least because of the support Thomaz enjoyed within the ranks of the Salazaarists (Thomaz 1972). Caetano was also enormously unpopular with hardliner elements of the Armed Forces. In December 1973, for example, a “palace coup” led by General Kaulza de Arriaga²⁶, MM. Adriano Moreira and Franco Nogueira²⁷ was carried out with the tacit approval of President Thomaz²⁸. The coup failed, and several participants were subsequently placed under house arrest (Delemos 1974).

As a result, most of Caetano’s reforms fell short of true openings. The new “Status on the Press” in force since June 1, 1972 conformed essentially to the old reglementation, with the Information Minister Moreira declaring that “it is perfectly normal to control the press in order to avoid any abuse of freedom, which is always regrettable” (De Campos 1973). Unions were still illegal, striking workers found themselves criminally prosecuted, and no political organization outside of the “National Union Party” was allowed to form (De la Souchère 1972). In the same spirit, the newly reformed Secret Police (DGS, former PIDE) led vast repression campaigns against anticolonial movements, and didn’t hesitate to employ torture (De Campos 1974)²⁹. Most importantly, even though Caetano had promised open competition for the 1969 Legislative Assembly, the “National Union Party” “won” every seat, demasking Caetano’s liberalization efforts as a farce (Bermeo 1987)³⁰. Another part of the blame may be placed on Caetano himself, because his lack of will to break entirely with Salazaar’s corporatist project alienated him from fellow reformists

²⁶ A few years earlier, Kaulza de Arriaga in a Spino-la-esque fashion had criticized Caetano’s “weak leadership style” in his book *The Portuguese Answer* (Bieber 1974).

²⁷ Kaulza de Arriaga was the former chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique; Moreira and Nogueira were both Ministers under Salazaar. Further participants were General Joaquim da Luz Cunha (Kaulza de Arriaga’s brother in law), General Henrique Troni (Minister of Defence), General Silvino Silvério Marques (Governor-General of Angola) and José Manuel Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese Guinea).

²⁸ Their idea was to have Thomaz stay President for a while and dismiss Caetano, and instead appoint a new cabinet headed by Moreira. Thomaz who had planned on resigning upon his 80th birthday in November of 1974 would step aside, with the Council of Ministers and Corporate Chamber nominating Kaulza de Arriaga as President (Soares 2009)

²⁹ Directives from the Ministry of the Interior were clear; although police were to act within the law, no failure to pursue “subversive elements” was to be tolerated by the regime (De la Souchère 1970).

³⁰ Additionnally, Caetano had decided to prohibit discussion of all three of the opposition’s main campaign subjects in the months leading up o the election. Caetano himself claimed that such a step was necessary because “he realized that Portugal wouldn’t be able to survive a mass movement similar to that of the May Revolution of 1968 in France” (Bieber 1973a).

within the regime (Wiarda 1977, 257; Bieber 1970)³¹. His vision of “transforming many things, for the essential to remain unchanged” (De la Souchère 1970) caused great disappointment among both members of his own cabinet (Saldanha 2010), as well as the newly founded “Liberal Wing” of Parliament (Bieber 1973a) and prompted many reformists to defect to the opposition³² (De Campos 1973).

Finally, Caetano’s stance on the colonial question and the frustration of large swathes of the Armed Forces would prove decisive in tipping the stalemate between regime factions in favor of democracy. Prior to 1974, progressive elements of the military had repeatedly voiced their opposition to the ongoing wars in Africa³³. Particularly, the junior officers³⁴ felt that the army had become “the scapegoat” of a colonial policy that had lost all legitimacy in their eyes (Delemos 1974; Binnendijk 1987; Cuzan 1999). As Caetano himself reveals in his memoirs, he was aware that Portugal’s colonial policy was an obstacle to its declared foreign policy goal of cooperating more closely with other European countries (Die Zeit 1974) and was ready to grant greater autonomy to some of its provinces as early as 1972 (Soares 2009). However, staunch opposition of Ultras thwarted any of his attempts to deviate from the regime’s traditional Africa policy³⁵. On top of this,

³¹ Manuela Soares who wrote Caetano’s biography described him as “um homem autoritário”, claiming that “a democracia não fazia parte do seu pensamento” (Soares 2009)

³² In 1972, Joao Salgueiro, Sub-Secretary of Planning, resigned, followed by Rogerio Martins and Xavier Pintado, Ministers of Economy and Finances. A year later, in 1973, Liberal Parliament members Francisco Sa Carneiro, Miller Guerra, and Francisco Balsamao announced their dropping out of Parliament after their proposal on abolishing censure was rejected without discussion (Hermet 1973).

³³ General Antonio de Spínola, for example, was one of many vocal critics of Caetano’s Africa Policy. In 1972 he declared that “this war is not so much being won in Guinea as being lost in Lisbon” (Mauersberger 1979). In February 1974, he published his book *Portugal and the Future* in which he claimed that the war in Africa could not be won and that the only way to keep the African possessions was to grant some sort of autonomy to the provinces. According to him, Portugal was “draining its resources in a war that cannot be won (...) In this war we fight for ideals that are neither moral nor useful to the Portuguese people” (Bieber 1974).

³⁴ Officers like Vasco Goncalves, Otelo Cavalho, Melo Antunes, Vitor Alves, Vasco Lourenco and Rosa Coutinho explained their doubts with these words: “We were leading a war against people that spoke the same language. We had little understanding of racial differences... We were badly equipped, malnourished and in many respects similar to the Guerrilleros (...) There was little difference between an officer of the Frelimo and us” (Huebner 1976)

³⁵ When in 1969 Caetano first formulated the idea of “a federation of nations” as opposed to Salazaar’s ideal of an “indivisible Portugal”, the powerful corporate groups Champalimaud and the Overseas National Bank headed by the President of the National Union Party, “Ultra” Castro Fernandez, put such pressure on Caetano that he abstained from implementing the reforms planned for January 1970 that would have granted greater administrative authority to Angola and Mozambique (De la Souchère 1970). Two years later, in 1972, a secret pact between Bissau’s revolutionary Amilcar Cabral and Caetano that would have resulted in Bissau’s independence failed because details of the negotiations became known to hardliners in Lisbon. In Mid-January, Caetano, visibly under pressure, declared over television and radio that “negotiations with the

Caetano's reform of the military promotion system created resentment among many regular officers, because they felt that the government's efforts to facilitate the obtention of battlefield commissions by new recruits was an unfair discrimination to those who had waited years to rise in ranks (Cuzan 1999; Joxe 1974). As a result, between 1970 and 1972 more than 20 percent of young officers deserted the Armed Forces (Ramos de Almeida 2002).

Finally, the military's increasing conviction that the solutions to Portugal's problems "could only be brought by the Army itself" (Carion 1969) culminated in the April 1974 coup that deposed Caetano³⁶. In a communiqué issued in the aftermath of the "Viragem Historica" (Canto 2007), the military committed itself to the establishment of a democratic regime and promised to hold popular elections within twelve months for a Constituent Assembly, which would then draft a new democratic Constitution (Varol 2012). The coup was met with no resistance from either the security agencies or other elements of the regime – on one hand, a proof of softliner domination, and on the other hand, an accurate reflection of the fact that by that point, very few people considered the regime worth fighting for (Kohler 1982, 169).

Resume:

We confirm that the Portuguese democratic transition was accompanied by a crisis of the authoritarian regime, which manifested itself in the overthrow of Caetano by a disaffected softliner faction of the Armed Forces.

References:

Bailby, Edouard. 1969. "Le Portugal après les élections : la tâche de l'opposition reste aussi difficile". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November. Available at:

liberation movements in Africa and the cession of individual provinces" were impossible and therefore not worth discussing (Bieber 1973b). Finally, when Spínola published his book criticizing the government's colonial policy, Caetano was forced to seek a confidence vote in Parliament and to dismiss Spínola as well as Spínola-friendly Ministers Veiga Simão (Education) and Rebelo de Souza (Overseas-Territories) (Bieber 1974).

³⁶ Otelo de Carvalho, a member of the Captain's Movement that led the coup, later said about the putsch: "We discovered we were able to think" (Mauersberger 1979)

<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1969/11/BAILBY/29273>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

- Bermeo, Nancy. 1987. "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal". *Comparative Politics* 19(2): 213 - 231.
- Bieber, Horst. 1970. "Zaghaft in Richtung Reform: Der portugiesische Premier rueckt aus Salazar's Schatten". *Zeit Online*, December 11th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1970/50/zaghaft-in-richtung-reform>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Bieber, Horst. 1973a. "Maulkorb fuer die Opposition: Caetano stoppt die Liberalisierung". *Zeit Online*, November 2nd. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1973/45/maulkorb-fuer-die-opposition>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Bieber, Horst. 1973b. "Ueberleben in Uebersee?" *Zeit Online*, February 9th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1973/07/ueberleben-in-uebersee>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Bieber, Horst. 1974. "Ein Krieg der nicht zu gewinnen ist – General Antonio de Spínola brachte mit seinen Thesen die Politik in Bewegung". *Zeit Online*, March 22nd. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1974/13/ein-krieg-der-nicht-zu-gewinnen-ist>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Binnendijk, Hans. 1987. "Authoritarian Regimes in Transition". *The Washington Quarterly* 10(2): 151 - 164.
- Canto, Christelle. 2007. "Le coup d'État du Mouvement des Forces Armées du 25 avril 1974 au Portugal à partir des archives de la radio". *IRICE, Bulletin de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin* 26(2): 113 – 122.
- Carion, Jacques. 1969. "Le Dr. Caetano continuateur ou reformateur?" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February. Available at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1969/02/CARION/28820>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Cuzan, Alfred. 1999. "Democratic Transitions: The Portuguese Case". In Rimanelli, Marco (ed), *Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-Party-Dominant Countries*. New York: St Martins Press, 119 – 136.
- De Campos, Alcides. 1973. "M. Caetano pratique habilement la répression dans la continuité". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August. Available at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1973/08/CAMPOS/31661>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

- De Campos, Alcides. 1974. "Le 'quatrième front de lutte' élargit son action". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April. Available at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1974/04/CAMPOS/32297>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- De la Souchère, Elena. 1970. "Au Portugal: La politique d'ouverture de M. Caetano est freinée par les nostalgiques du Salazarisme". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February. Available at: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1970/02/LA_SOUCHERE/29488. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- De la Souchère, Elena. 1972. "Au Portugal: La guerre africaine freine la 'libéralisation' du régime". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August. Available at: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1972/08/LA_SOUCHERE/31039. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Delemos, Virgilio. 1974. "La fin du colonialisme 'ultra' n'est pas la démocratie". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May. Available at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1974/05/DELEMOS/32339>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1968. "Caetano : Wie andere Maenner". No. 46, November 11th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45878720.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Die Zeit. 1974. "Der Krieg ist verloren: Portugiesischer General erregt mit einem Buch die Nation". March 15th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1974/12/der-krieg-ist-verloren>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Fawcett, Kevin. 1989. *The Transition to Democracy in Iberia: A Comparative Analysis of Democratic Genesis*. MA Thesis. McMaster University.
- Freitas do Amaral, Diogo. 1999. "Reflections on the Portuguese Revolution". *Journal of Democracy* 10(2): 113 - 123.
- Huebner, Hans. 1976. *Portugal – Prüfstein der Demokratie*. Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch.
- Jaenecke, Heinrich. 1969. "Kleine Freiheit fuer 30 Tage". *Zeit Online*, October 24th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1969/43/kleine-freiheit-fuer-30-tage>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Joxe, Alain. 1974. "Le Mouvement des Forces Armées portugaises". *Politique étrangère* 6(39): 659 - 687.
- Kohler, Beate. 1982. *Political forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal*. London: Butterworth.

- Mauersberger, Volker. 1979. "Sag mir wo die Nelken sind: Was ist aus der portugiesischen Revolution geworden?" *Zeit Online*, April 27th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1979/18/sag-mir-wo-die-nelken-sind>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Ramos de Almeida, P. 2002. "Uma década revolucionária em África e em Portugal". *O Militante* 260 (September/October): 37 - 45.
- Saldanha, Ana. 2010. "Révolution des Œillets : transition sociopolitique et démocratisation au Portugal". *ILCEA* 13, November 30th. Available at: <http://ilcea.revues.org/872>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Soares, Manuela Goucha. 2009. *Marcello Caetano - O Homem que Perdeu a Fé*. A Esfera dos Livros.
- Thomaz, Americo. 1972. "Thomaz gewaehlt". *Zeit Online*, August 4th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/1972/31/thomaz-gewaehlt>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Varol, Ozan O. 2012. "The Democratic Coup d'État". *Harvard International Law Journal* 53(2): 292 – 356.
- Wiarda, Howard. 1977. *Corporatism and Development: the Portuguese Experience*. Amherst Mass: University of Massachusetts.

(3) Greece

The long course towards Metapolitefsi, the Greek transition to democracy, began in June 1973 when the head of the Greek military junta, Georgios Papadopolous, initiated a number of educational and economic reforms³⁷ in order to legitimize his government. Facing growing unrest within the junta's own ranks and increasing popular opposition to military rule and economic hardship, these reforms attempted to defuse the tension and sideline opponents within the junta who had attempted to overthrow Papadopolous in an aborted naval coup only a month earlier (US Department of State 1973). Through a controversial plebiscite, Papadopolous transformed Greece into a "presidential parliamentary republic" (Woodhouse 1985, 117) and announced that the country would pass to an interim government charged with organising elections no later than the end of 1974. At the same time, however, he granted himself vast executive powers that further alienated the population and fuelled doubts about his actual willingness to hand over power to a civilian government. In November 1973, a series of national strikes and student demonstrations increased those tensions. Particularly, the occupation of Athens Polytechnic, lasting from November 14 – 17, became the epicentre of opposition to the regime and catalyzed popular mobilization in many sectors of Greek society (Kassimeris 2005). Demanding "bread, education and liberty", the protests escalated rapidly into a general political uprising against the military dictatorship and prompted Papadopolous to mobilize the military and quell the unrest by force. The exact number of casualties still remains unknown because many people refused to attend hospitals for fear of brutality (McDonald 1990, 298 - 99). Whereas the effects of the student uprisings on the further course of Greece's transition are often exaggerated in the literature, there is no doubt that the violence used in repressing them critically alienated and divided the ruling military junta (Tsiridis 2008). Furthermore, it accelerated the hard line coup led by General Ioannidis that overthrew Papadopolous from office on November 25, 1973. After installing Phaedon Gizikis as figurehead president of Greece, Ioannidis pursued a double strategy, cracking down on opponents internally with the support of "the small junta" (Psyharis 1975), and forcing an aggressive expansionism externally. Following his proclaimed goal of achieving "Enosis", the unity of Cyprus and Greece, he orchestrated the overthrow of

³⁷ These reforms included a general amnesty to all "political criminals" and the subsequent releasing of 300 prisoners; the lifting of martial law and the easing of press censorship (Tzortzis 2002).

Cyprus' President Archbishop Makarios III; a move that prompted the Turkish invasion and partition of the island and dealt the fatal blow to the internal cohesion of the Greek regime. Faced with the threat of a war that Greece was not prepared to fight, Ioannidis was forced out of office by his fellow Generals and the decision was made for former Prime Minister Karamanlis to return to his position (Arapakis 2000). He was sworn in to office on July 24 and immediately moved to reinstate democracy (Veremis 1997, 170).

The Greek transition was characterized by continuous clashes between softliner and hardliner factions within the military junta, producing one crisis after another until finally softliners prevailed in 1973. Papadopolous' timid liberalization efforts in the beginning of the 1970s were followed by a hardliner backlash in 1973, but in response notably to Ioannidis' disastrous foreign policy, a major part of his support base switched allegiances to support regime softliners and democratization. Until that turnaround in 1973, however, we can say that softliners were never really in control of the transition process. Instead they were walking a fine line between pursuing liberalization efforts and appeasing hardliner opposition; an effort that ultimately failed when student revolts plunged the country into turmoil.

Papadopolous himself was somewhat of a contradictory figure in that regard. A reluctant softliner at best, he indicated at least the intention of ending military rule once a satisfactory level of political stability had been reached (Coerant 2001). To this end he often compared Greece to the "patient in a cast", claiming that he put the patient (Greece) in a cast ("ασθενή στον γύψο" literally: patient in gypsum) so that he could fix her skeletal (Shugart 1997). According to his "Program for the Development of Democracy", within a timeframe of 15 years the Greek per capita income should rise to 2600\$, and potentially allow the holding of democratic elections (Der Spiegel 1972a). But when popular unrest started to spread in 1972, he was amongst the first to recognize the writing on the wall and urged his followers to speed up the process of restoring some form of parliamentary democracy, saying the military "must definitely leave office this year and surrender power to civilians" (Tzortzis 2002, 4).

On the other hand, however, Papadopolous did not make a secret out of his authoritarian tendencies, describing the real nature of his regime's brand of democracy by

contending that “even the shadow of martial law is more effective than the normal process of law” (Green 1971, 192). During his time as Prime Minister he flaunted the principle of separation of powers by amassing a key number of ministerial portfolios, including Defense and Foreign Affairs (Danopoulos 1983). Later on he added the post of regent to the list by replacing General George Zoitakis after the latter opposed his plans to replace Cyprus’ President Makarios with a more pliable figure (Der Spiegel 1972b)³⁸. Eventually Papadopolous abolished the monarchy in a controversial referendum in which he was the only candidate, and which was heavily influenced by coercion³⁹. Proclaimed “elected president in a July 1973 contest”, he dismissed the remaining members of the junta that brought him to power (Der Spiegel 1973a) and postponed the implementation of all articles and provisions of the new Constitution regarding elections, political parties and freedom of speech and other civil liberties (Papadopoulos 1986 – 1972, 3: 84).

By exhibiting such an ambivalent posture towards democratic processes Papadopolous estranged himself from other softliners within the regime, notably the Crown, the civil servants and parts of the military (Diamandouros 1986, 146 - 47)⁴⁰. But whereas Papadopolous’ efforts at reform failed partly because of his own distrust towards democratic principles, they were also thwarted by hardliner opposition⁴¹. In fact, as early

³⁸ Zoitakis had been criticizing Papadopolous’ ruling style since the late 1960s when he pleaded for an amnesty of Papadopolous-assailant Panagoulis. Furthermore, he repeatedly declined to sign Papadopolous’ decrees (Der Spiegel 1972b)

³⁹ For instance, in the run-up to the referendum on the new Constitution, Interior Minister Stylianos Pattakos made clear that those who would not participate would have “to explain their reason for abstention to the police in writing” (Grigoriadis 1975, 212 - 14).

⁴⁰ Papadopolous’ regime traditionally sought to subordinate the bureaucracy and regularly dismissed thousands of civil servants considered politically unreliable (Keefe 1977, 157). In reaction, the administration deprived the regime of technological and communication skills, withholding information from their superiors whenever considered safe (Danopoulos 1988), and undermining the regime’s policy directives. A former Minister once sarcastically joked that even after five years in power, Papadopolous and his junta members hadn’t found as many collaborators as the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War (Der Spiegel 1972a). The Navy mutiny of May 22 – 23, 1973, is another example of the falling out Papadopolous had with part of his power base. In an anti-junta protest, the HNS Velos under the command of Nikolaos Pappas took his vessel out of NATO manoeuvres, declared himself and his crew against the regime and sailed for Italy after it had become public that a number of fellow Naval officers had been arrested in Greece for planning to act against the junta (Bangor Daily News 1973). The incident sparked a wave of arrests in the Navy and also spilled over into the Air Force and parts of the regular Army.

⁴¹ The junta’s position towards free elections is but one of many examples of such resistance. In an interview with the German magazine “Der Spiegel” in 1969, Interior Minister Pattakos dismissed all talk about elections, saying that people should not expect “miracles like Christ did in three days”. In 1971, Minister of Social Affairs Ladas commented on the same subject: “We are not stupid. We know we wouldn’t stand a chance in free elections. Therefore we have to educate the people until they are ready for elections, even if that takes 20 or 30 years”. Finally, Constantine Papadopolous, a brother of the Premier Papadopolous,

as 1986 he attempted to initiate reforms. His point of view was that if the junta remained in power longer than a certain time it would consolidate into a regime, something that was never intended. However, stiff resistance from hardliners, among others Ioannidis, frustrated any attempt at liberalization, and after two years of struggle, Papadopolous considered resigning (Tzortzis 2002)⁴². Instead, in summer 1973 he appointed Spyros Markezinis, leader of the tiny Progressive Party and a committed softliner, as Prime Minister, with the mandate to hold popular elections some months later (Danopoulos 1983).

Although the dominant argument concerning the “Markezinis experiment” has been that it was a mere trick on behalf of Papadopolous to find a way to secure his position in a pseudo-democracy (Tzortzis 2002), there is no doubt that Markezinis genuinely tried to advance the democratic project (Theodoracopoulos 1976, 235). Since 1969 he advocated for a compromise between the military and old guard politicians in order to return to constitutional rule (Der Spiegel 1973b), and when made Premier, he did not hesitate to trumpet his intention to full and inclusive democracy⁴³. In interviews with the foreign press he claimed that “in the new Parliament he would seek a radical amendment of the Constitution so that the powers of the President be reduced” (Grigoriadis 1975, 36) and if he did not agree with the President [Papadopolous], he would resign. However, his plans quickly went beyond the limits of toleration of even the moderate factions in the Army (Bonanos 1986, 128), and rumors of an imminent coup had been circulating openly in the Defence Ministry before they were overtaken by the events at the Polytechnic (little Tzortzis 2002). As the situation got out of control for Papadopolous and Markezinis, the final word was in the hardliner forces that controlled the Army; a fact that facilitated the subsequent coup by General Ioannidis, described by Markezinis as the “Greek Qaddafi” (Meletopoulos 1996, 34).

shrugged: “What do you want, we have a democracy except we don’t have elections. Is that really so important?” (Der Spiegel 1972a)

⁴² Complaining that he lacked support from other leading figures in the junta, he claimed that he was “being subverted by my fellow Evelpides cadets” (Tzortzis 2002, 4) and only stayed in office after faction leaders renewed their trust to him.

⁴³ Markezinis is reported to have said: “I did not and do not have any illusions: in the elections I will get 15%. I hoped, however, that finally the old parties would participate and we could come to terms on forming a government” (Konofagos 1982, 113; Markezinis 1979, 411).

Ioannidis, a powerful hardliner and commander of the Greek military police ESA, had never been secretive about the fact that he would try removing Papadopolous from power if the latter betrayed the principles of the 1967 revolution. In his eyes, almost everything that the Markezinis government did from the day it took office brought that moment nearer (Martin 2010). Moreover, he had been capitalizing on the growing discontent among large swathes of the lower and middle rank officers, who believed that Papadopolous with his accumulation of offices and titles "was harming the seriousness of the regime and giving it an unacceptable image" (Bonanos 1986, 110 – 112; Veremis 1997, 266 - 67). Dismissed by Papadopolous as “*Arsakeiás*”⁴⁴, Ioannidis was portrayed by the American ambassador to Greece as an “incompetent” (Borchgrave 1974) who did not believe in Western style democracy (American Embassy in Greece 1973). Indeed, after the coup Ioannidis warned Pattakos that “[he was] not playing” and that he “shall have a dictatorship (...) and stay in power for thirty years” (Tzortzis 2002, 10)⁴⁵. To this end he reinstated repressive measures such as censorship⁴⁶, expulsions, arbitrary detentions and torture.

Instead of consolidating the regime, however, Ioannidis’ hardline policies exacerbated the existing tensions between different regime factions. As Kissinger explains, by the end of 1973 the Greek military regime was split in three groups: firstly, a small, hardline nucleus of around 20 to 30 junior to middle grade officers loyal to Ioannidis; secondly, a group of tough nationalists called the Qaddafites who reportedly favored a neutralist position of Greece towards NATO; and finally, a moderate majority in the Armed Forces centered on senior officers from the Navy and the Air Force who worried about the implications of continuous Army involvement in the government. According to Henry Tasca, US Ambassador to Greece, these officers believed that “the close identification of the Greek Army with the present regime is not only seriously discrediting

⁴⁴ In Greek, this refers to a quiet, shy girl (Kathimerini 2008)

⁴⁵ Similar statements from Ioannidis had been issued already prior to the coup: In 1969, the German magazine “Der Spiegel” obtained access to a secret letter from Ioannidis to Papadopolous, in which the former issued an ultimatum in 11 points. According to Ioannidis, these were issues that the Armed Forces “were displeased about and that were to be changed”- among others, he demanded that Papadopolous publicly declare that Greece was not to return to parliamentarism (Der Spiegel 1973c)

⁴⁶ To publishers, Ioannidis made it clear that any talk about elections was not welcome under his rule, and whoever was not happy with the regime’s policies was free to close down his publishing house and leave the country. He also warned the general populace that they would have to prepare themselves for a long rule by decree, and that any and all opposition would be “swept away” (Der Spiegel 1973d).

the Greek military in the public mind but is also dividing the Army into factions and undermining its military capabilities" (Library of Congress Manuscript Division 1974). The Greek involvement in the Cyprus debacle finally was the spark that lit the fire and allowed softliners to take back the reins of power. In fact, when Turkey decided to invade Cyprus, Ioannidis' decision to order a general mobilization left the small group of ultras completely isolated (Tsiridis 2008): not only did large parts of the Reservist Army openly defy their officers, laying bare the lack of military preparedness for a war, but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to abandon Ioannidis and to seek "a political solution" to the crisis (Diamandouros 1984)⁴⁷. Former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was tasked with setting up a civilian government and oversee a peaceful transition to democracy (Xydis 1974).

Resume:

We confirm that the removal from power of Greek military ruler Ioannidis was the product of a crisis of the authoritarian regime that occurred after a series of controversial policy decisions helped softliners in the Army gain the decisive edge.

References:

American Embassy in Greece. 1973. "*Greek Prime Minister Confronts Serious Problems*". Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State. Athens, November 26th. National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 GREECE.

Arapakis, Petros. 2000. *To Telos tis Siopis (The End of Silence)*. Ekdotikos Oikos A. A. Libani.

Bangor Daily News. 1973. "*Analysis: Mutiny bodes ill for Athens*". May 28th. Available at:
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2457&dat=19730528&id=V4ozAAAIBAJ&sjid=9TgHAAAIBAJ&pg=4011,4608669>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.

⁴⁷ Diamandouros explains that "the Joint Chiefs, invoking the threat of war, reasserted the hierarchical lines of command within the Armed Forces and effectively neutralized (...) the hard-liners" (Diamandouros 1986, 157). Indeed, on July 22, 1974, senior generals in the junta informed President Gizikis that they would no longer take orders from Ioannidis, and instead demanded the formation of a "National Salvation Council" (Library of Congress Manuscript Division 1974).

- Bonanos, Grigoris. 1986. *I alithia (The Truth)*. Athens.
- Borchgrave, Amaud de. 1974. "Tasca: The Inside Story". *Newsweek*, September 2nd: 34.
- Coerant, Albert. 2001. "The boy who braved the tanks". *Athens News*, November 16th:A08
- Danopoulos, Constantine. 1983. "Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece, 1967-1974". *Political Science Quarterly* 98(3): 485 - 506.
- Danopoulos, Constantine. 1988. "The military and bureaucracy in Greece: 1967 – 1974". *Public Administration and Development* 8: 219 - 231.
- Der Spiegel. 1972a. "Wozu Wahlen?" No. 39, September 18th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42842944.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1972b. "Alle meine Kräfte". No. 14, March 27th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42972090.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1973a. "Symbol der Einheit". No. 25, June 18th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42001426.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1973b. "Spyros Markezinis". No. 44, October 29th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41898436.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1973c. "Neuer Gaddafi". No. 48, November 26th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41840268.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 1973d. "Heirat verboten". No 49, December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41840156.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Diamandouros, Nikiforos P. 1984. "Transition to, and consolidation of, democratic politics in Greece, 1974–1983: A tentative assessment". *West European Politics* 7(2): 50 - 71.
- Diamandouros, Nikiforos P. 1986. "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Volume 2*, 146 - 47.
- Green, Hugh Sir. 1971. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, 1st session. Quoted in Papadopoulos, Georgios. 1968 - 1972. *To Pistevo Mas: Logoi tou*

- Proedrou tis Kyvernisis Georgiou Papadopoulou (Our Creed)*. Athens: Government Printing Office.
- Grigoriadis, Solon. 1975. *I Istoría tis Diktatorías (The History of the Dictatorship)*. Athens: Kapopoulos.
- Kassimeris, George. 2005. "Junta by Another Name? The 1974 *Metapolitefsi* and the Greek Extra-parliamentary Left". *Journal of Contemporary History* 40(4): 745 – 762.
- Kathimerini. 2008. "Ioannides the invisible dictator". July 27th. Available at: <http://www.kathimerini.gr/329690/article/epikairothta/ellada/iwannidhs-o-aoratos-diktatwr>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- Keefe, Eugene. 1977. *Area Handbook for Greece*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Konofagos, C. 1982. *I exegersi tou Polutehneiou (The Polytechnic uprising)*. Athens.
- Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. 1974. *Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger*. Kissinger Papers, Box CL 324, Policy Planning - History, Selected Papers. V. 3, European Affairs, 1973–75, February 15th.
- Markezinis, Spyros. 1979. *Politikiai Anamniseis (Political Memoirs)*. Athens.
- Martin, Douglas. 2010. "Dimitrios Ioannidis, Greek Coup Leader, Dies at 87". *New York Times*, August 16th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/europe/17ioannidis.html>. Accessed May 15th, 2014.
- McDonald, Robert. 1990. "The Colonel's Dictatorship". In Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve (eds), *Background to Contemporary Greece*. London: Merlin Press, 298 - 299.
- Meletopoulos, Meletis. 1996. *I diktatoria ton Syntagmatarxon (The Dictatorship of the Colonels)*. Athens.
- Papadopoulos, Georgios. 1968 - 1972. *To Pistevo Mas: Logoi tou Proedrou tis Kyvernisis Georgiou Papadopoulou (Our Creed)*. Athens: Government Printing Office.
- Psycharis, Stayros. 1975. *Ta Paraskinia tis Allagis (Backstaging the Change)*. Dimosiografikos Organismos Lampraki.

Shugart, Diane. 1997. "The colonels' coup and the cult of the kitsch". *Athens News*, April 20th: A01.

Theodoracopoulos, Taki. 1976. *The Greek upheaval: kings, demagogues and bayonets*. London: Caratzas Brothers.

Tsiridis, Georgios. 2008. *Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective: Democratic Transitions in Portugal, Greece, and Spain*. MA Thesis. Utrecht University.

Tzortzis, Ioannis. 2002. "The Metapolitefsi that Never Was: a Re-evaluation of the 1973 'Markezinis Experiment'". Paper, University of Birmingham. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/TheMetapolitefsiThatNeverWas.pdf. Accessed May 15th, 2014.

U.S. Department of State. 1973. *Fall of Papadopolous*. Electronic Telegram, November 29th. Available at: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE234518_b.html. Accessed May 15th, 2014.

Veremis, Thanos. 1997. *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy*. London: Hurst & Co.

Woodhouse, Christopher M. 1985. *I anodos kai i ptosi ton Syntagmatarhon (The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels)*. New York: Franklin Watts.

Xydis, Stephen G. 1974. "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973". *Political Science Quarterly* 89(3): 507 - 538.

(4) Argentina

In the late 1970s, Argentina's ruling military junta decided that the "National Reorganization Process" launched after the overthrow of Peron in 1976 had been successful, and that there was a need to develop new projects for institutionalizing the future political order (Bombal 1991). In 1979, this vision slowly crystallized around a "political dialogue" intended to create a new regime in which the military was to occupy a legitimate and permanent tutelary role. At the same time, organized labor, supported by business leaders and civic groups such as the Mothers of the Disappeared, slowly began reasserting its voice and called for a return to democracy. Serious economic problems, mounting charges of corruption and a growing external debt increased the sociopolitical tensions, and in 1981, just as the Videla administration was leaving office, Argentina plunged into a deep recession (Schumacher 1984). The new government led by Lieutenant General Roberto Viola and Lorenzo Sigaut adopted a number of limited political liberalization measures, but was hesitant in addressing the economic situation, which increased the crisis of confidence in the regime and heightened inner-military tensions. In a palace coup General Leopoldo Galtieri replaced Viola after only eight months in office (Acuna and Smulovitz 2007). Galtieri's strict economic recovery program temporarily succeeded in bringing the economic unraveling under control, but he could not quell the spreading of strikes and protests by an increasingly militant civil society. Against this background, several political parties grouped together and formed the "Multipartidaria", a coalition that demanded respect for human rights, an end to the "Dirty War", a lifting of the state of emergency, and an immediate return to constitutional democratic rule (Hang 2013). At the same time divisions within the junta deepened as more and more Generals became disillusioned with the military's capability to redress the inner-political situation and favored a return to the barracks. In a desperate attempt to rally the population around the flag and to turn attention away from the junta's internal problems, Galtieri embarked on a military conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, or "Malvinas" (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1992, 94 - 168). However, the country's defeat in 1982 irreparably discredited the Argentine government in the eyes of the public and escalated the conflict within the junta. Popular unrest exploded and led to a wave of violent street demonstrations directed against the government and the Armed Forces. On June 18, 1982, Galtieri was forced to resign from his post, and retired General Reynaldo Bignone was

named President (Malloy and Seligson 1987, 29). Bignone lifted the ban on political parties, gradually restored basic political liberties and announced free elections to be held in early 1984. In the face of prolonged popular protest and strikes, this timetable was moved up to autumn 1983, and on October 30 Argentinians elected Raul Alfonsin of the Union Civica Radical as their new civilian President.

In the Argentine transition we identify conflicts within the ruling junta on several different levels which increased in intensity as the political situation unfolded. On one hand, a power struggle took place between hardliners and softliners about the future institutionalization of the regime and the question of how to deal with Argentina's growing socioeconomic problems. Whereas softliners favored an eventual return of the military to the barracks and greater liberalization, hardliners wished to secure a permanent role for the military in politics. On the other hand, a conflict about power distribution within the ruling junta pitted the three Army branches (Army corps, Navy and Air Force) against each other, and exacerbated the softliner-hardliner rift. The intensification of the divisions took place in three different phases and led to a crisis of the authoritarian regime in 1982.

The first divisions within the Argentine junta reared their heads already in the late 1970s, when the Chief Commander of the Army General Jorge Rafael Videla seemed intent on pursuing a reconciliation strategy with union leaders in order to arrive at a consensus that would allow him to perpetuate military rule⁴⁸. He was opposed by the Chief of the Navy, Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier Orlando Agosti, Commander of the Air Force, who both favored political reform through a pact with the traditional political parties (Sanabria 1977; Agencias 1978a). The conflict became public for the first time in 1977 when Massera, in an interview with the daily journal "El Nacional" declared he was "un democrata convencido" who desired the liberation of all political prisoners in the country. Asked by the journalist about the possible evolution of Argentina's government towards a pro-democratic formula similar to Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador, Massera responded

⁴⁸ Videla was perhaps the most notorious hardliner in the Argentine junta. In 1975 he declared that "in Argentina, in order to ensure the security of the country, as many persons as necessary should die" (Morin 2014), and he was ruthless in his approach towards the "war against terrorism". He also insisted that "no se modificara el actual esquema del poder" even in the case of a possible return to some sort of tutelary democracy tentatively set for 1991 (El Pais 1977b). In an interview in 1978 he confirmed that he would not hand over power to "whomever was democratically elected, because the Argentine people was not sufficiently mature" for self-government (Fuensalida, José Román 1978)

that such an evolution was logical, since the military “didn’t know how to govern” (El Pais 1977b). The divisions deepened in 1978 when it became known that Massera was opposed to Videla remaining President yet another term (Agencias 1978b). Instead, he favored a democratization of the military regime, with himself occupying the central role of “el hombre de la transición” (De la Calle, Angel Luis 1978a)⁴⁹. However, when Videla retired from his post in 1981, he was succeeded not by Massera (who retired in September of the same year) but by Army commander General Viola (Skaar 1994). Viola’s reputation was clearly less authoritarian than that of his predecessor (Ceberio 1980) – in fact, he entered office with the promise to renew the dialogue between the government and opposition parties. Therefore, this change of leadership suggested that whereas softliners succeeded to impose a certain direction on the political course of the Argentine junta, the control of any such process was to be assumed by the Army, and not any of the other service branches (De la Calle, Angel Luis 1978c).

During Viola’s presidency, the internal divisions of the military junta worsened (Snow and Manzetti 1993, 35). Viola, feared by hardliners for his ideas “of a freer society” (The Economist 2003), announced that his objective was to establish a stable democracy, and that during his presidency, the necessary laws for the reestablishment of political parties, “responsible” freedom of speech and civil liberties would be passed (Ceberio 1981)⁵⁰. Most significantly, he attempted to strike a pact with the *Multipartidaria* in 1981, but the civilian leadership refused to enter into negotiations with the military junta (Skaar 1994). On the other hand, hardliners in the Armed Forces who opposed party activity and elections left Viola hardly any manoeuvring space (AFP 1981a). The Navy, for example, still recalling the humiliation suffered by Massera, opposed Viola’s reform attempts and its Commander in Chief, Vice Admiral Jorge Issac Anaya, declared in 1981 that he favored the establishment of an even stricter authoritarian state. He said he felt that Viola’s

⁴⁹ According to Massera, “el poder corrompe, y el poder ejercido absolutamente corrompe absolutamente” (Candau, Julian García 1978). Affirming that the military junta had failed to achieve success in two of its main areas of interest – the economy, and education- he insisted that the time was ripe for a change. Later it became known that Massera had secretly sent a group of representatives to Washington in order to present his ideas about democratization and to seek North-American support for this goal. During the trip, he supposedly portrayed himself as the only person “capable of bringing such an undertaking to fruition” (De la Calle, Angel Luis 1978b). However, it is debatable how much Massera’s ambitions to become Argentine’s democratic strongman was fueled by resentment over the unfavorable internal power distribution between the Navy and the regular Army corps (El Pais 1977c)

⁵⁰ Among other liberalization measures, he facilitated the obtaining of information about the “desaparecidos” in the Dirty War, alluding to them for the first time as “ausentes para siempre” (AFP 1979; EFE 1979).

political line contributed to diminishing the role of the Armed Forces, and especially that of the Navy (AFP 1981b). The revolt by the Third Army corps commander Luciano Menendez against Viola over the liberation of the former editor of the newspaper *La Opinion*, Jacobo Timerman, in 1979 (Canelo, 2004, 286) is another typical example of Viola's standing among many junta members who considered him excessively "blando" (El Pais 1980; Agencias 1979). Finally, the 1981 coup of hardliner Army commander Galtieri ended the short interlude of political liberalization (The Telegraph 1981)⁵¹, bringing hardliners back to the forefront of action⁵².

Galtieri, a fervent devotee of military control and partisan of a "strict and rigorous" policy towards dissenters (AFP 1981c)⁵³, entered office endowed with much larger powers than his predecessor, something that irritated and eventually alienated other junta members⁵⁴. He strongly supported the military crack-down on political opposition (The Telegraph 2003), and the ruthlessness with which several protest marches in 1982 were repressed left no doubt that liberalization was over (El Pais 1982)⁵⁵. However, similar to the scenario in Greece, Galtieri's hard-line policies also served to exacerbate divisions between the hardliners and softliners within the Armed Forces. Firstly, the nationalistic sectors of the officer corps were unhappy with Roberto Aleman, Galtieri's ultraorthodox Minister of the Economy, who initiated an extensive privatization program that threatened the military's corporate interests (Snow and Manzetti 1993). On the other side, softliners that considered their mission to defeat terrorism completed were increasingly eager to

⁵¹ According to former military president Juan Carlos Onganía, rumors about an impending coup had been around for some time in 1981, but General Viola had never said a word and instead spent most of his days smoking cigarettes and drinking whisky with fellow officers. According to him, such behavior was symptomatic for the prevailing opinion among the junta members that "the Process (...) was exhausted and the Military Junta is trying to elude responsibility of all of Argentina's disasters" (Mercopress 2011)

⁵² Together with Viola, liberal Cabinet Ministers Oscar Camilion (Foreign Affairs) and Gen. Diego Urricariet (Public Works) were forced out. Galtieri therefore succeeded in forcefully eliminating the biggest proponents of "apertura", after he had reportedly tried for eight months to convince Viola to step down peacefully. Viola, on the other hand, had refused and told Galtieri he would only resign "for political reasons" (Rush 1981).

⁵³ In an interview with Bernardo Neustadt, Galtieri made no secret of his aversion towards democratization. Asked whether "las urnas estan muertas", he answered that "seria funesto acelerar un transito a las urnas", and that "antes de sacar las urnas debemos fijar las pautas, a partir de las cuales se implementara el nuevo sistema para evitar (...) caer en el abismo" (Neustadt 1980).

⁵⁴ Air Force Chief Brigadier Lami Dozo, for example, resigned from the military junta when he found out about the enhanced powers of Galtieri, angrily shouting: "On these conditions I am not taking the job" (Mercopress 2011).

⁵⁵ For instance, the protest march of labor unions to demand "paz, pan y trabajo" in April 1982 ended with more than 1000 arrests and left hundreds of people wounded in Buenos Aires and other cities (Fermosel 1982).

return to the barracks while the Armed Forces were still in a somewhat favorable position to negotiate an exit (Skaar 1994). However, the turning point of the crisis came with Argentina's defeat in the Falkland war.

Military sources reveal that already before entering the war Galtieri did not enjoy the support of all branches of the Armed Forces (Irigaray 2009). However, the humiliating defeat and Galtieri's insistence on continuing a confrontation that could have led Argentina to the edge of the abyss⁵⁶ eroded his power base among the remaining junta members and tipped the balance in favor of the softliners (Lakeland Ledger 1982). Galtieri himself claimed he "voluntarily retired" because the Army "did not give him the political support to continue as commander and President of the nation" (Meislin 1982), and affirmed he'd rather step down "than call on loyal troops to defend him" (Burns 1983). However, rumor has it that Galtieri was awakened from a nap and, clad only in his underwear, was told that he was no longer President (The Economist 2003). This version of events is corroborated by a number of defections of high-ranking Cabinet Ministers right after Argentina's surrender (El Pais 1982b), and by the fact that swathes of security personnel ordered to break up a protest vigil outside the Argentine Defense Ministry decided to join the protesters instead (Oakley 2011). Against the background of a deeply divided officer corps – the Air Force and the Navy had withdrawn from the junta and left all political responsibility to the Army (Gadsden Times 1982) – retired General Reynaldo Bignone, a convinced softliner, was elected President. In an unprecedented meeting with Argentina's civilian political leaders, he promised to lift the ban on political activity and to hold elections (Ocala Star Banner 1982), a promise the junta followed through in 1983. In our opinion, this demonstrates that softliners had reached a critical mass over the remaining hardliners⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ Journalists claim that when it became clear that the Falkland war was lost, a reunion of 14 Army Generals was held, in which 12 Generals were in favor of a complete stop of hostilities and a diplomatic solution, whereas Galtieri was one of two Generals that objected (Yuste 1982)

⁵⁷ Interior Minister, Gen Llamil Reston, for example, supported Bignone and assured that the Army would honor its commitment to democracy. Another General, Alejandro Agustin Lanusse, recognized that the Army's reputation had been badly tarnished, and that "never again" should the military rule Argentina (Goodsell 1982). Finally, even Galtieri's successor, General Nicolaidis, regarded as a direct, no-nonsense hardliner (New York Times 1982), publicly assured that "the Argentine military will never again overturn a constitutionally elected government" (Prieto 1983) and promised "full support" to the transition project (Schumacher 1982).

Resume:

Disastrous and divisive policies by Argentine dictator Galtieri, along with a gradual strengthening of reformist military factions, resulted in the crumbling of Galtieri's support base and democratic elections. Thus, we confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

- Acuña, Carlos H. and Catalina Smulovitz. 2007. "Militares en la transición argentina: del gobierno a la subordinación constitucional". In Pérotin-Dumon, Anne (ed), *Historizar el pasado vivo en América Latina*. Available at: http://www.historizarelpasadovivo.cl/es_resultado_textos.php?categoria=Argentina%3A+el+tiempo+largo+de+la+violencia+pol%EDtica&titulo=Militares+en+la+transici%F3n+argentina%3A+del+gobierno+a+la+subordinaci%F3n+constitucional. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- AFP. 1979. "El reconocimiento de las 'desapariciones', un cambio de postura del Gobierno argentino". *El País*, August 25th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/25/internacional/304380010_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- AFP. 1981a. "Se agrava en Argentina el clima de incertidumbre política". *El País*, June 20th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1981/06/20/internacional/361836012_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- AFP. 1981b. "La Marina obstaculizará un proceso aperturista en Argentina". *El País*, August 14th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1981/08/14/internacional/366588015_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- AFP. 1981c. "El general Galtieri inicia en Argentina un Gobierno 'firme' y 'riguroso'". *El País*, December 23rd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1981/12/23/internacional/377910014_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Agencias. 1978a. "Los militares argentinos no cederán el poder". *El País*, August 12th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/08/12/internacional/271720818_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

- Agencias. 1978b. "La Junta argentina debate el tema de la presidencia de la República". *El País*, April 22nd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/04/22/internacional/262044017_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Agencias. 1979. "Insubordinación del cuerpo de ejército argentino con base en Córdoba". *El País*, September 30th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/09/30/internacional/307490413_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Bombal, Inés González. 1991. "El diálogo político: La transición que no fue". CEDES paper No. 61. Buenos Aires: CEDES.
- Burns, Jimmy. 1983. "Arrest of Galtieri lights fuse under Argentina's apprehensive generals". *Christian Science Monitor*, April 18th. Available at: [http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0418/041858.html/\(page\)/2](http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0418/041858.html/(page)/2). Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Candau, Julian García. 1978. "El almirante Massera, un militar con futuro político en Argentina". *El País*, November 14th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/11/14/internacional/279846021_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Canelo, Paula. 2004. "La política contra la economía: las elecciones militares frente al plan económico de Martínez de Hoz durante el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional". In Pucciarelli, Alfredo (ed), *Empresarios, tecnócratas y militares. La trama corporativa de la última dictadura*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Ceberio, Jesús. 1980. "El general Viola, virtual heredero de Videla en la Presidencia argentina". *El País*, September 19th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/09/19/internacional/338162415_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Ceberio, Jesús. 1981. "El presidente argentino consideró a los partidos 'indispensables para la democracia'". *El País*, April 1st. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1981/04/01/internacional/354924022_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1978a. "Massera se opone a la continuidad del general Videla". *El País*, April 20th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/04/20/internacional/261871221_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1978b. "Hacia un cambio del esquema de poder en Argentina". *El País*, April 13th. Available at:

http://elpais.com/diario/1978/04/13/internacional/261266413_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1978c. « Con el general Videla como unico árbitro, Argentina comienza una nueva etapa política”. *El País*, August 2nd. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/08/02/internacional/270856812_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

EFE. 1979. "Argentina facilitará información sobre desaparecidos". *El País*, July 1st.
Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/01/internacional/299628001_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

El País. 1977a. “*Polémica en torno a unas declaraciones del almirante Massera*”,
November 26th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/11/26/internacional/249346809_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

El País. 1977b. “*Cono sur: democracia, pero para el año 2000*”. July 17th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/07/17/internacional/237938411_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

El País. 1977c. “*Argentina: las fuerzas políticas tradicionales podrían pactar con los militares*”. January 29th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/01/29/internacional/223340413_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

El País. 1980. “*Un producto típico del régimen militar*”. October 4th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1980/10/04/internacional/339462015_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

El Pais. 1982. “*La policía argentina reprimió duramente la mayor manifestación contra la Junta desde 1976*”. April 1st. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1982/04/01/portada/386460002_850215.html. Accessed
June 23rd, 2014.

Fermosel, José Luis. 1982. “Los militares argentinos reprimieron sin contemplaciones la mayor manifestación contra la Junta desde 1976”. *El País*, April 1st. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1982/04/01/internacional/386460001_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Freedman, Lawrence and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1992. *Señales de guerra. El conflicto de las Islas Malvinas de 1982*. Buenos Aires: Javier Vergara.

- Fuensalida, José Román. 1978. "La madurez del general Videla". *El País*, September 13th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/09/13/opinion/274485603_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Gadsden Times. 1982. "New Argentine President: Bignone Promises Freedoms", June 25th. Available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19820625&id=P6YfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ZtYEAAAIBAJ&pg=5982,4023147> (last accessed on June 23, 2014)
- Goodsell, James N. 1982. "Argentina: some generals unwilling to relinquish power". *Christian Science Monitor*, December 16th. Available at: [http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/1216/121653.html/\(page\)/2](http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/1216/121653.html/(page)/2). Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Hang, Julio. 2013. "Argentina: A Transition without Conditions". In Blair, Dennis (ed), *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*. Volume Two: Regional and Country Studies. Brookings Institutions, 48 – 66.
- Irigaray, Juan Ignacio. 2009. "El ex dictador Galtieri iba a invadir el Chile en 1982". *El Mundo*, November 22nd. Available at: <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2009/11/22/argentina/1258929360.html>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Lakeland Ledger. 1982. "Galtieri steps down". June 18th. Available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1346&dat=19820618&id=JqpNAAAAIBAJ&sjid=rfsDAAAIBAJ&pg=5987,681708>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Malloy, James and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. *Authoritarians and Democrats : Regime Transitions in Latin America*. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Meislin, Richard. 1982. "Galtieri resigns in Argentina; new leaders say they'd bring P.O.W.s home with British help". *New York Times*, June 18th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/18/world/galteiri-resigns-argentina-new-leaders-say-they-d-bring-pow-s-home-with-british.html>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Mercopress. 2011. "How the Argentine military to save a collapsing regime, planned the Malvinas invasion war". October 5th. Available at: <http://en.mercopress.com/2011/10/05/how-the-argentine-military-to-save-a-collapsing-regime-planned-the-malvinas-invasion-war>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.
- Morin, Maeva. 2014. "Le 'Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional': retour sur les années de la dictature argentine". Sciences Po, Observatoire politique de l'Amérique Latine et des Caraïbes. Available at: <http://www.sciencespo.fr/opalc/content/le-proceso->

de-reorganizacion-nacional-retour-sur-les-annees-de-la-dictature-argentine.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Neustadt, Bernardo. 1980. "Entrevista a Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri". *Revista Extra XV* No. 178 (April), 'Somos pie y tenemos el as de espadas'. Available at:
http://www.bernardoneustadt.org/contenido_488.htm. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

New York Times. 1982. "Man in the news; new army strongman: Cristino Nicolaidis". June 18th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/18/world/man-in-the-news-new-army-strongman-cristino-nicolaidis.html>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Oakley, Chris. 2011. "Do Unto Others: The 1982 South Atlantic Crisis". Available at:
http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/coldwar/do_unto_others4.htm. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Ocala Star Banner. 1982. "Bignone promises political freedom". June 25th. Available at:
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19820625&id=KJdPAAAIBAJ&sjid=6gUEAAAIBAJ&pg=5840,5017741>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Prieto, Martin. 1983. "El general Cristino Nicolaidis asegura que el Ejército argentino no volverá a derrocar por las armas a un Gobierno constitucional". *El País*, April 22nd. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1983/04/22/internacional/419810408_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Rush, Cynthia. 1981. "After the coup: power is still unresolved". *Executive Intelligence Review* 8(50): 37.

Sanabria, Manuel. 1977. "Argentina: las fuerzas políticas tradicionales podrían pactar con los militares". *El País*, January 29th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/01/29/internacional/223340413_850215.html.
Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Schumacher, Edward. 1982. "Argentine Politicians Hail New President After Talks". *New York Times*, June 26th. Available at:
<http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/26/world/argentine-politicians-hail-new-president-after-talks.html>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Schumacher, Edward. 1984. "Argentina and Democracy". *Foreign Affairs*. Available at:
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/38790/edward-schumacher/argentina-and-democracy>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Skaar, Elin. 1994. "Human Rights Violations and the Paradox of Democratic Transition - A Study of Chile and Argentina". Report of the Chr. Michelsen Institute. Norway: Bergen.

Snow, Peter G. and Luigi Manzetti. 1993. *Political Forces in Argentina*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

The Economist. 2003. "Leopoldo Galtieri". January 16th. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/1534686>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

The Telegraph. 1981. "Galtieri 5th to head Argentina this year". December 23rd. Available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19811223&id=h6ErAAAIBAJ&sjid=gfwFAAAIBAJ&pg=5632,5230320>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

The Telegraph. 2003. "Obituary: General Leopoldo Galtieri". January 13th. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1418678/General-Leopoldo-Galtieri.html>. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

Yuste, Juan Gonzalez. 1982. "Galtieri, depuesto de la presidencia argentina por sus compañeros de armas". *El País*, June 18th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1982/06/18/internacional/393199204_850215.html. Accessed June 23rd, 2014.

(5) Chile

The quest for multiparty politics in Chile began in 1983 during a deep economic crisis when protests against Augusto Pinochet's longtime military rule broke out. On one hand, popular discontent was directed at the regime's vision of a totally unrestricted market economy, elaborated by a set of technocrats known as the "Chicago Boys" (Boeninger 1985/1986). On the other hand, it defied Pinochet's longterm project of a "protected democracy", which had been enshrined in a new Constitution just a few years earlier via a controversial plebiscite that also guaranteed Pinochet continuation in office until at least 1989 (New York Times 1988). The protests were first peaceful, but quickly degenerated into violent clashes with the Army and State Security notably due to the violence of two extremist demonstration groups, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Bernath-Plaistad and Rennebohm 2008/2011). At the same time, the regime attempted to foster limited liberalization by slightly increasing press freedom, allowing political exiles to return to the country, and holding meetings with opposition groups (The Washington Post 2000). In March 1985, the political murder of three well-known Communist leaders by a special unit of the Carabineros, Chile's police force, galvanized the opposition and the independent Right into signing the National Accord that called for a transition to full democracy. The Accord, backed by the Catholic Church and signed by all political parties except the radical Left and the sectors allied to the government, had an enormous impact on public opinion and a considerable effect on the Armed Forces (Boeninger 1985/1986), but Pinochet rejected all calls for talk. Instead, demonstrations and strikes, along with attacks on civilians continued through 1987 when Pope John Paul II visited Chile and condemned Pinochet's government as constraining the ideals of democracy (Bernath-Plaistad and Rennebohm 2008/2011). In order to quell unrest following the visit, Pinochet announced that a national plebiscite would be held to either approve or reject his continuation as president. Dismissing requests by the Catholic Church for appointment of a "consensus candidate", he still allowed the "No"-camp to campaign in a relatively free atmosphere, because he believed that his economic success story would earn him the gratitude of the Chilean populace and another mandate (AP News Archive 1988). However, on October 5, 1988, Chileans voted with a 55% majority against Pinochet. With the Armed Forces supporting the outcome of the referendum and refusing to intervene in favor of Pinochet, the President found himself

forced to hand over power to a transitional government, and on December 14, 1989, Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin became Chile's first democratically elected president in nearly 20 years (Dow 1998, 62).

In Chile we find clear evidence of a split within the authoritarian power base, particularly between hardliner General Pinochet and pro-reform members of his military junta. These tensions transformed into a true crisis of the authoritarian regime when Pinochet's attempt at an auto-golpe to perpetuate his hold on power was foiled by opposition from his own ranks. Prior to 1987, the cornerstone of Pinochet's power was the loyalty of the Armed Forces, which stemmed from a tradition of vertical command, professionalism and legalism (Constable and Valenzuela 1989/1990)⁵⁸. This is not to imply that Pinochet's policies went entirely unchallenged. As civilian opposition to the regime mounted, softliners within the regime spoke out against Pinochet as early as 1975, when a group of Generals sent Pinochet a letter criticizing the latter's economic "shock" policies and the role of the secret police, DINA (Remmer 1989). Three years later, a call for a return to democracy issued by the Commander of the Chilean Air Force led to the forced retirement of General Gustavo Leigh and eight other senior Air Force members, whose permanence had theoretically been guaranteed by the Statute of the government junta (Délano 1986). Generally speaking, the 1980s witnessed a gradual weakening of the Armed Forces' attachment to authoritarianism (Library of Congress 2001), a tendency that was amplified by the 1985 verdict of Judge Jose Canovas who openly challenged the Pinochet regime in his investigation of a triple political involving members of the police force murder (Los Angeles Times 1992).

Two of the most important softliners in this respect were, without doubt, Air Force Commander General Fernando Matthei and Head of the Naval Forces, Admiral José Toribio Merino. Speculations about a fallout between Matthei and Pinochet had been circulating already in 1984 when Matthei openly pleaded in favor of greater openness of

⁵⁸ The professionalism of the Chilean military was unrivalled in Latin America, and was upheld by a strict separation of the military as institution and government. Officers were forbidden to maintain military ties if assigned government posts, or even to discuss politics; a rule that was strictly enforced by Pinochet who retired several Generals that were too outspoken (Constable and Valenzuela 1986). For example, in August 1985, General Cesar Mendoza, the head of the Carabineros, was dismissed, and Pinochet also threatened his Air Force Commander General Matthei, raising the specter of General Leigh's dismissal in 1978 (Remmer 1989, 159).

the regime towards the opposition (Reuters/EFE 1984). In 1987, after the papal visit, these impressions took on a concrete form when Matthei confirmed his belief that it was time for the Army to return to the barracks and for civilians to take over the government in a process of genuine democratization⁵⁹. A similar tune came from Merino who, despite declarations from the official government speaker Francisco Javier Cuadra that the regime would not alter its policies, confirmed that there could be dialogue with the opposition as long as the various parties had a doctrine and a program (Délano 1987). During the preparations for the 1988 referendum, the split between Pinochet and his Army base became even clearer. In fact, part of Pinochet's junta (particularly the Ground troops) supported his candidacy⁶⁰, but Matthei, Merino and later also the head of the Police force, Rodolfo Stange, expressed their preference for a civilian candidate, possibly from the centre-right⁶¹. Additionally, Matthei stressed that the Armed Forces “no deben estar involucradas en el proceso electoral, no deben ser juez y parte; quien sea candidate debe presentarse como civil y las fuerzas armadas son garantes del proceso y no parte del proceso” (Agencias 1987). He was thus indirectly discouraging Pinochet from campaigning, who, at that time, retained both titles of President and Head of the Armed Forces⁶².

When Pinochet later that year prepared to turn the referendum on an extension of his presidency into a fear campaign, painting the spectre of chaos if the opposition's “No”-vote was to be victorious, Matthei publicly contradicted Pinochet and affirmed that “Chile was sufficiently mature to confront the “Si” and the “No” in the same way. More importantly, he added that the Armed Forces would ensure that the outcome of the plebiscite was respected, no matter the result” (Délano 1988a); that there was to be a

⁵⁹ According to Matthei, “el momento es ideal para que militares y civiles estrechemos la mano (...)” since the military “están dispuestos a vivir en paz y construir una verdadera democracia” (Délano 1987)

⁶⁰ For example, the Defense Minister Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal declared that Pinochet was “the ideal candidate”. In an article of the journal “El Mercurio” he claimed that “en los nueve años que he servido en el Gabinete ministerial he podido apreciar muy de cerca la labor que, con misticismo y vocación de estadista, ha realizado Su Excelencia para el bien de Chile, y creo que es legítimo expresar mi anhelo de que pueda, constitucionalmente, prolongar su mandato” (Comas 1987)

⁶¹ Interestingly enough, Matthei later admitted in his Memoires that he actually voted for Pinochet in the referendum out of loyalty, but that in doing so he betrayed his personal convictions that Chile was ready for democracy. He claimed that he hoped the No-Side would win, and when his hopes were confirmed, he hurried to be the first to announce the victory to the Chilean public (El Mostrador 2013)

⁶² It is noteworthy that at the same time government hardliners started a smear campaign against Matthei in order to marginalise him on the political front. For instance, the journal El Mercurio published an article claiming that Matthei was born out of wedlock; a claim that, if proven true, could have cost him his position in the military junta (Comas 1987).

competitive election of President and Parliament, should the “No”-side win; and that they were free to modify the Constitution as long as it took place within the existing legal framework (Délano 1988b). Rodolfo Stange, for his part, confirmed that there would be no state of emergency during the referendum, a fear voiced by many opponents of Pinochet (Délano 1988a).

The decisive moment for the Pinochet regime, however, was the night after the referendum when results showed the victory of the “No”-campaign. In his memoirs, Matthei writes that Pinochet was convinced of winning the plebiscite, but that as a precaution, he had ordered the Intelligence services to prepare an alternative plan in case the opposition was victorious (Mercopress 2003)⁶³. “I am not leaving, no matter what”, he told advisors, and planned “to do whatever was necessary to stay in power” (BBC 2013)⁶⁴. Newly declassified CIA papers described Pinochet as “nearly apoplectic about the results” as he summoned members of his military junta to his palace to try and have the results overturned (USA Today 2013). Matthei, in an interview with the journal “La Nacion”, confirmed that Pinochet was prepared to send the Army to the streets to seize the capital. He also said Pinochet pressed the other junta members to sign a decree that would have given him powers far-reaching enough to even marginalise the junta itself (EFE 2000). However, General Matthei, General Merino and Rodolfo Stange, together with the members of the Junta that acted at the time as a legislative body, firmly opposed Pinochet's intentions and refused to sign the decree⁶⁵. By consequence, Pinochet found himself forced to accept defeat.

⁶³ According to testimonies, the plan involved creating the impression of post-referendum violence in order to justify military intervention and the imposition of martial law. While the vote count was still going on, a series of explosions shook the capital and Pinochet was heard commenting about groups of hooded gunmen on the street. “If anyone moves, we will hit them with everything”, he said (De Lama 1988)

⁶⁴ US security cables reveal that members of Pinochet's military junta as well as opposition leaders suspected in advance that Pinochet wasn't going to recognize the referendum results. General Matthei, for example, explained that Pinochet tried to rally support for a defiance of the vote by persuading the Armed Forces that they “could never turn over the country to civilians because [they] would end up accused [for Human Rights abuses committed by the Pinochet regime] (Spooner 2011, 20 – 21). Suspicious of the delay in the release of the referendum results, Matthei therefore took the lead and admitted them to the press before even meeting with Pinochet (Christian 1988). “It seems to me, really, that the “No”-side won”, he said, as he went to the Presidential palace for a meeting with the President shortly after midnight. The government refused to comment on the results.

⁶⁵ Instead, Matthei applauded the responsibility shown by the political parties that participated in the referendum, saying that the popular will was to be respected: “El pueblo dijo no por una amplia mayoría del 12%. Y esto es tan claro como echarle agua (...) Ahora es otra generación la que debe pensar. Son civiles los que deben llevar la bandera” (Délano 1988c).

Resume:

Pinochet's removal from power was in large part a consequence of an internal conflict pitting progressive Air Force and Navy commanders against hardliners from the regular Armed Forces. Thus, we confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

- Agencias. 1987. "Dos miembros de la Junta piden que Pinochet no sea candidato". *El País*, June 13th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1987/06/13/internacional/550533614_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- AP News Archive. 1988. "*Pinochet says Presidential Referendum to be held in early October*". August 19th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Pinochet-Says-Presidential-Referendum-To-Be-Held-In-Early-October/id-179871fddecaff0de9baa67f43158feb>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- BBC. 2013. "*Chile's Gen Pinochet 'tried to cling to power' in 1988*". February 24th. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21563384>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Bernath-Plaistad, Shandra and Max Rennebohm. 2008/2011. "Chileans overthrow Pinochet regime, 1983-1988". *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. Available at: <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chileans-overthrow-pinochet-regime-1983-1988>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Boeninger, Edgardo. 1985/1986. "The Chilean Road to Democracy". *Foreign Affairs* 64: 812 – 832.
- Christian, Shirley. 1988. "Foes of Pinochet win Referendum; Regime Concedes". *New York Times*, October 6th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/06/world/foes-of-pinochet-win-referendum-regime-concedes.html>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Comas, José. 1987. "Pugna entre camaradas de armas". *El País*, June 18th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1987/06/18/internacional/550965606_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.

- Constable, Pamela and Arturo Valenzuela. 1986. "Is Chile Next?" *Foreign Policy* 63: 58 - 75.
- Constable, Pamela and Arturo Valenzuela. 1989/1990. "Chile's Return to Democracy", *Foreign Affairs* 68:89-90. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/45139/pamela-constable-and-arturo-valenzuela/chiles-return-to-democracy>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- De Lama, George. 1988. "Chile's Pinochet Concedes Vote". *Chicago Tribune*, October 6th. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-10-06/news/8802050105_1_interior-minister-sergio-fernandez-gen-augusto-pinochet-electoral-irregularities. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Déllano, Manuel. 1986. "La Fuerza Aérea chilena expresa su apoyo a los procesados por la desaparición de 10 personas". *El País*, August 20th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1986/08/20/internacional/524872811_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Déllano, Manuel. 1987. "El general Matthei propone un diálogo político, tras la visita papal". *El País*, April 14th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1987/04/14/internacional/545349620_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Déllano, Manuel. 1988a. "Matthei contradice a Pinochet y afirma que no habrá caos en Chile si gana el 'no'". *El País*, March 24th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1988/03/24/internacional/575161211_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Déllano, Manuel. 1988b. "La cautela de la derecha pinochetista". *El País*, October 18th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/18/internacional/593132404_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Déllano, Manuel. 1988c. "La Junta chilena rechaza el diálogo entre la oposición y el Ejército". *El País*, October 13th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1988/10/13/internacional/592700413_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Dow, Jay K. 1998. "A Spatial Analysis of the 1989 Chilean Presidential Election". *Electoral Studies* 17(1): 61 - 76.
- EFE. 2000. "Pinochet trató de abortar la apertura democrática, según un ex general chileno". *El País*, October 7th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/2000/10/07/internacional/970869629_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.

- El Mostrador. 2013. “*Fernando Matthei dice que votó Sí por lealtad y admite que traicionó sus convicciones*”. December 15th. Available at: <http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2013/12/15/fernando-matthei-dice-que-voto-si-por-lealtad-y-admite-que-traiciono-sus-convicciones/>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Library of Congress. 2001. *Chile: The Crisis of 1982 and the Erosion of Military Rule*. Country Studies. Available at: http://workmall.com/wfb2001/chile/chile_history_the_crisis_of_1982_and_the_erosion_of_military_rule.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1992. “*Jose Canovas; Foe of Pinochet Regime in Chile*”. February 27th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-27/news/mn-3995_1_pinochet-regime. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Mercopress. 2003. “*Pinochet's 1988 coup attempt*”. August 12th. Available at: <http://en.mercopress.com/2003/08/12/pinochet-s-1988-coup-attempt>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- New York Times. 1988. “*Chile: The Pinochet Years*”. October 6th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/06/world/chile-the-pinochet-years.html>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Remmer, Karen. 1989. “The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973 – 1987”. *Comparative Politics* 21(2): 149 - 170.
- Reuters/EFE. 1984. “El jefe de la Fuerza Aérea desmiente tener discrepancias con Pinochet”. *El País*, December 2nd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1984/12/02/internacional/470790012_850215.html. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- Spooner, Mary Helen. 2011. *The General's Slow Retreat: Chile After Pinochet*. University of California Press
- The Washington Post. 2000. “*Pinochet's Chile*”. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/pinochet/overview.htm>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.
- USA Today. 2013. “*Report: Chile's Pinochet wanted anti-vote violence*”. February 23rd. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/23/report-chiles-pinochet-wanted-anti-vote-violence/1941493/>. Accessed March 8th, 2014.

(6) Paraguay

Paraguay's quest for democracy began in the late 1970s/early 1980s when economic troubles brought the patronage network of Paraguay's longtime ruler Stroessner to a halt (Powers 1992). Realizing that Stroessner's backward, bureaucratized government prevented a much needed liberalization of the economy, regime critics in the opposition parties, labor organizations, business groups, student organizations and the Catholic Church, backed by international support notably from the United States, began mobilizing against the regime (Carter 1990, Cotas 1981, 1,2,6; LARR 1985). The first direct political expression of such opposition found its expression in 1986 with the signing of the Acuerdo Nacional between four political parties, of which only one, the Febrerista Party, was officially recognized by the regime. Their demands included the restoration of democracy in Paraguay, the lifting of the state of siege, the release of political prisoners, a new electoral system, and the independence of the judiciary (Bareiro-Saguier 1979). Despite constant harassment by the government, the Acuerdo Nacional managed to organise rallies in Asuncion (1985) and Caraguatay (1986), which attracted several thousand people before being dispersed and repressed by police (Nickson 1988). In a subsequent step, the Acuerdo, backed by the Catholic Church, launched a major initiative to start a National Dialogue between the government, private business and opposition parties in order to promote democracy in Paraguay (Nickson 1988). However, the initiative failed, because the regime refused to participate on the grounds that the Acuerdo included political parties that were not officially recognized. Ultimately, however, scholars agree that it was a succession crisis and a subsequent fracture within the ruling Colorado party and the military which brought down the Stroessner regime. As it became clear that the "lider eterno" (Nickson 1989) was seriously ailing, divisions appeared in the once-monolithic ruling bloc between "tradicionalistas" and "militantes". The traditionalists favored a more open approach to politics and argued for a non-personalist transition that would still include a role for the Colorados in future Paraguayan politics. On the other hand, the militants remained fanatically devoted to Stroessner and pursued a succession plan that would transfer power to Gustavo Stroessner, the dictator's son (Lezcano 1990, 26). In 1987, the militants finally succeeded in gaining control of the National Party Convention and initiated a purge of traditionalists within the party (Rodriguez Alcala 1988; Sondrol 1992). They also cracked down hard on dissent within the populace. For example, they

brutally repressed a Silent March organized by the Church in Asuncion on December 10th to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Nickson 1989); they broke up opposition meetings (Long 1988); and they closed down media stations and newspapers (Orlando Sentinel 1987). However, when the new militant leadership attempted to bring the Armed Forces under control by retiring their leadership (which was generally known of harboring sympathies for the traditionalist faction of the Colorado party), a faction of the Army led by Gen. Andres Rodriguez decided to stage a coup on February 2, 1989 (Abente 1989). Rodriguez assumed the presidency promising democratic reforms and initiated substantial political liberalization. Only two months later, in May 1989, free presidential and congressional elections were held which were won by Rodriguez and the Colorado party, marking the end of the “stronato” (Miranda, 1990, 144).

Paraguay demonstrates impressively how divisions within one pillar of the ruling group can lead to democratization by spilling over into other institutional areas of the regime, finally leading to its downfall. As we have pointed out before, three key developments helped bringing about the overthrow of Stroessner: the split within the ruling party into traditionalist/militant factions; the growing radicalization of the dominant militant faction and its exacerbating effect on existing institutional tensions; and finally, the attempt by the militants and Stroessner to purge the Armed Forces.

Although the traditionalists were hardly convinced softliners – in fact, their role in destituting Stroessner was very timid - they have generally been identified as less aggressive and violent than the militants, and as favoring at least some type of limited reform⁶⁶. However, they were also very fragmented, with factions coalescing around a specific charismatic leader⁶⁷. In contrast, the militants were clearly hardliners and

⁶⁶ The “tradicionalistas” wanted to go back to the original content of Colorado ideology, and hoped to move away from hard-line authoritarianism (Abente 2009). They believed Paraguay was moving towards a more open system, and further emphasized democracy and social justice. Most of their leaders came from families that had played a major role in the party already since the 1940s (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).

⁶⁷ The traditionalist group closest to the regime was led by Juan Ramon Chaves, the president of the party and the senate. Although in favor of limited reform, this group was not prepared to oppose Stroessner. In contrast, the “eticos”, a faction that developed around National Committee member Carlos Romero Arza, urged a return to the traditional values that inspired previous Colorado governments, and openly called for a dialogue between the party and the opposition (Pereira 1987, 509). Two additional groups formed in 1987: firstly, the Movimiento de Integracion Colorado (MIC) composed of retired Colorados that had fallen out with Stroessner and led by former Interior Minister Edgar Ynsfr’an. This faction advocated the reassertion of

constantly called for even greater repression of the opposition (Abente 1989). They felt generally more loyal to Stroessner than to the Colorado Party, referring to themselves as “*militantes combatientes stronistas*” and affirming that there was no “*coloradismo sin Stroessner*” (Salgueiro 2008)⁶⁸.

Even though open confrontation between the two groups did not occur until 1987 (LAWR 1989, 2), the first signs of discord surfaced already in 1980/1981 when, for the first time, more than one list competed in “*seccionales*” elections. In prior elections, “a single united slate of candidates for the junta [had been] proclaimed and unanimously approved” (Abente 1995, 309), and therefore, the possibility of incorporating open competition into the party greatly disturbed the inner circles of the party leadership (Abente 1995, 310). The emerging divisions broke into public prominence for the first time in 1984 following elections for members of the National Committee. At that time, party leaders who once refused to even hint at discord in the party publicly acknowledged that a power struggle was under way, and that Stroessner himself was at least a behind-the-scenes instigator (The Telegraph 1985). In what was considered by many a fight for democratization of the party, militants attempted to have Mario Abdo Benitez, Stroessner’s private secretary, elected first vice president, but the traditionalists rejected the bid. The struggle subsequently spread to the local committee level with conflicts becoming public in some towns and rival Colorado groups appealing for support from different members in the National Committee⁶⁹ (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).

The factionalism deepened in September 1985 following an intervention of Carlos Romero Pereira, a junta member who publicly denounced the lack of political ethics and

authority of the National Committee, greater independence by the Junta de gobierno, a restructuring of the party to confront the opposition in a more open system, and a civilian presidential candidate (Nickson 1988; 1989). Secondly, the *Movimiento Nacional y Popular* (MNP) led by Colorado intellectual Leandro Prieto Yegros worked for a reunification of the party and proposed to serve as bridge between traditionalists and militants (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).

⁶⁸ There was factionalism among militants, too, but the dividing line did not run along ideological issues. Rather, the orthodox (“*ortodoxo*”) and institutionalists (“*institucionalistas*”) disagreed upon the succession issue: whereas the orthodox favored Stroessner’s son, Gustavo, succeeding Stroessner after his death, the institutionalists adopted a more pragmatic stance. For instance, the Minister of Public Health and Social Welfare Adan Godoy Jimenez proposed that Stroessner stay in power until he died or resigned, after which either a civilian or a military figure with the same general orientation would assume power (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).

⁶⁹ The party infighting weakened its support base and dealt a severe blow to its legitimacy; a fact demonstrated by a letter published in the weekly newspaper “*El Pueblo*” from a Colorado seeking to resign from the party- a virtually unheard of event in Paraguay (The Telegraph 1985).

the corruption in the Colorado party and referred to the militants as culprits (Nickson 1989)⁷⁰. The conflict took a dramatic turn in early 1986 when the ethicals, and later also the MIC, publicly opposed Stroessner's bid for yet another term of office and openly called for a civilian Colorado Party candidate in the 1988 elections (Long 1988). It was the first time since 1959 that an organised group within the party had opposed Stroessner, who reacted in April 1986 by castigating the ethicals and the MIC as “deserters” and forced Romero Arza to resign from the Council of State (Nickson 1988). Subsequently, in May 1987, the militants announced a hardline-slate for the presidency and the three vice presidencies of the National Committee. The “golden foursome” was headed by Interior Minister Sabino Augusto Montanaro, and also included Benitez, Justice and Labor Minister Jose Eugenio Jacquet and Minister of Health and Social Welfare Ad’an Godoy Jimenez. The group demonstrated its strong links to the repressive apparatus when police barred the entry of the party convention to traditionalistas (Long 1988), which resulted in the militants capturing all four leadership posts and all other seats on the National Committee. This victory was repeated in November when all 874 militant delegates unanimously chose Stroessner to be the Colorado presidential candidate for the elections scheduled for February 1988. They also drew up a slate of congressional candidates that excluded any traditionalists (Hanratty and Meditz 1988).

However, the traditionalists remained an active dissident group and launched a political offensive in 1988 in order to discredit the militant Junta (Arditi 1990). For instance, a string of statements by high-ranking Colorado dissidents designed to “erode the legitimacy of the militante-controlled group” (Abente 1995, 311) was published in newspapers in December 1988 and January 1989 (Abente 1989). One of the authors, Humberto Dominguez Dibbs, Stroessner’s former son-in-law and once a loyal supporter, even called the militants “political eunuchs” (Long 1988), and former Supreme Court President Luis Maria Argaña organized meetings in militant strongholds during which he would strongly attack the party leadership (Abente 1989).

The divide between militants and traditionalists ultimately undermined Stroessner's support among the military, which turned into a decisive pro-democracy force (Bethell

⁷⁰ The intervention followed the uncovering of a major financial scandal involving the “militante” president of the Central Bank (Abente 1989).

1991; Fregosi 1997, 259). In fact, even those in the Armed Forces who did not join the coup such as Maj. Gen. Gustavo Prieto Busto, expressed publicly that they had been increasingly disconcerted and demoralized by events since 1987 (El Diario de Noticias 1989b, 10). There were several contentious issues. Firstly, soon after their taking over of the National Convention, the militant leadership demanded that the Armed Forces renew their partisan loyalties to the new party line (Salgueiro 2008). The military, itself divided into “stronistas” and “institucionalistas”, felt torn: whereas the stronistas conformed to the order established by Stroessner, the institutionalists felt a strong antipathy towards the way the military as institution had become under Stroessner, whom they considered “too dictatorial”⁷¹ (Naville 2008; The Globe and Mail 1989a, A6). The fact that the new Colorado leadership now attempted to establish a correlation between loyalty to Stroessner and the rank and file officers were able to attain in the Army laid the groundwork for the scissions that would later provoke the coup of 1989 (Riquelme 2003, 198 - 201). Furthermore, large sections of the Army identified much more strongly with the traditionalist faction of the Colorado party and personalities such as Luis Maria Argena, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (The Inquirer 1989) than the militant leadership, most of whom were regarded as “upstarts” (Orlando Sentinel 1987). Most importantly, they resented that the militant leadership treated the Armed Forces as an extension of the police. This fact that had become clear when in November 1988 the Army had been ordered to cordon off the town of Concepcion to stop a protest march in support of the local bishop who had been publicly insulted by a militante leader (Nickson 1989).

The widespread dissatisfaction of young officers whose promotions were being indefinitely postponed (Bouvier 1988, 33), along with the rise of Gustavo Stroessner who threatened to retire a number of more senior Generals, created additional pressure (Abente 1989). Vara describes the succession problem as one of “internal distributive illegitimacy” (Vara 1989, 9), as the professional soldiers complained that salaries were too low and the military hierarchy was disrupted. For instance, the higher officers received the lion’s share of the spoils of corruption and Gustavo Stroessner himself was an undistinguished officer

⁷¹ Further, rumor had it that the marriage between Stroessner’s son and coup-leader General Rodriguez’ daughter had gone awry, therefore weakening an important link between the military and the government (Roett 1989)

of the Air Force, a minor branch (Sondrol 1992)⁷². Tensions were exacerbated by rumors that the militant leadership, in what was considered an illegitimate power grab by the Colorado party, was planning to forcefully retire hundreds of high-ranking colonels. Within this context many felt the need for a preemptive coup, as the leadership of the military was not willing to suffer the fate of the traditionalists at the 1987 party convention (Abente 1989)⁷³. General Rodriguez himself was reportedly ordered to give up his command and retire, or accept the ceremonial post of Defence Minister – an order he refused (Deseret News 1989) With the strength of the first Army corps behind him (Smith 1989a), and Infantry and Air Force divisions joining in (Heath 1989), he ousted Stroessner on February 3, 1989 and announced a political opening intended to bring “democratisation, human rights and the full and total unification of the Colorado Party” to Paraguay (Comas 1989; Smith 1989b)⁷⁴.

Resume:

Paraguay’s dictator Stroessner was ousted following a conflict between party factions that ultimately spilled over into the Armed Forces and provoked a rift within his military support base. We confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

⁷² Moreover, Gustavo Stroessner ordered Generals around as though they were his subordinates (Abente 1989), which provoked coup-leader Rodriguez, who had long been Stroessner’s handpicked successor himself (Powers 1992). Indeed, a Brazilian official later commented that “Rodriguez decided not to wait until the old man’s death (...) He had to act now or see himself removed from the succession race” (Riding 1989).

⁷³ According to civilian leader Edgar Ynsfran, the military decision to strike had been made in December 1988, but the coup was delayed for a week because Stroessner discovered it and traveled to Germany, taking with him Col Lino Oviedo, the officer who later held the gun to Stroessner’s head (El Diario de Noticias 1989a, 9; Mendelson Forman 2013). Military sources, however, claim that the coup had been planned already in August 1987 when the militants displaced the traditionalist faction in the party convention. According to General Eumelio Bernal, Commander of the First Division of Infantry, Rodriguez expressed his preoccupation and said: “Bernal, tenemos que buscar la forma de arreglar esto”. General Oviedo confirmed these claims, explaining that there were various plans to remove Stroessner from office. A decisive moment is said to have been a visit in 1988 from General Frederick Woerner, Chief of the Comando Sur of the United States, which told Rodriguez in a private meeting that the White House would look favorably on “any military action that brought a democratic opening to Paraguay” (Ultimahora.com 2014)

⁷⁴ Although Rodriguez had never publicly spoken against Stroessner (Los Angeles Times 1989), opposition leaders were confident that they “saw several signs that the new government was genuinely committed to moving toward democracy”. Indeed, Chaves, a traditionalist who was named a Minister without portfolio in the Rodriguez cabinet said in an interview that the changes would be profound, and that all parties would be permitted to organize and take part in the elections – a promise Rodriguez kept for the most part (Smith 1989c).

References:

- Abente, Diego. 1989. "Stronismo, Post-Stronismo, and the prospects for democratization in Paraguay". Working Paper 119. Kellogg Institute.
- Abente, Diego. 1995. "A Party System in Transition". In Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully (eds), *Building Democratic Institutions*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Abente, Diego. 1996. "Un Sistema de Partidos en Transición. El caso del Paraguay". *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* 27(96): 245 - 262.
- Abente, Diego. 2009. "Paraguay: The Unravelling of One- Party Rule". *Journal of Democracy* 20(1): 143 - 156.
- Arditi, Benjamín. 1990. "Elecciones y partidos en el Paraguay de la transición". *Revista Mexicana de la Sociología* 52(4): 83 - 98.
- Bareiro-Saguier, Ruben. 1979. "Paraguay-culture of fear". *Index on Censorship* 8(1): 26 - 32.
- Bethell, Leslie. 1991. *The Cambridge History of Latin America Volume VIII: Latin America since 1930: Spanish South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bouvier, Virginia. 1988. *Decline of the Dictator: Paraguay at a Crossroads*. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
- Carter, Miguel. 1990 "The Role of the Paraguayan Catholic Church in the Downfall of the Stroessner Regime". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32(4): 67 - 121.
- Codas, R. 1981. "Structural Change in Paraguay Threatens Old Order". *Washington Report on the Hemisphere* 1(10), February 24th.
- Comas, José. 1989. "La oposición paraguaya defiende hoy en la calle el cambio". *El País*, February 11th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1989/02/11/internacional/603154819_850215.html. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Deseret News. 1989. "*Military Coup Ends 35-Year Paraguayan Rule*". February 3rd. Available at: <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/33127/MILITARY-COUP-ENDS-35-YEAR-PARAGUAYAN-RULE.html?pg=all>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

- El Diario de Noticias. 1989a. February 14th: 9. Quoted in Abente, Diego. 1989. "Stronismo, Post-Stronismo, and the prospects for democratization in Paraguay". Working Paper 119. Kellogg Institute.
- El Diario de Noticias. 1989b. February 14th: 10. Quoted in Abente, Diego. 1989. "Stronismo, Post-Stronismo, and the prospects for democratization in Paraguay". Working Paper 119. Kellogg Institute.
- Fregosi, Renée. 1997. *Le Paraguay au xX^e siècle: Naissance d'une démocratie*. Paris, Éditions L'Harmattan.
- Hanratty, Dannin M. and Sandra W. Meditz. 1988. *Paraguay: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Available at: <http://countrystudies.us/paraguay/55.htm>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Heath, William. 1989. "Army Revolts, President Stroessner Reported Under Arrest". *AP News Archive*, February 3rd. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Army-Revolts-President-Stroessner-Reported-Under-Arrest/id-527e6781982852f1ceb0086af658cf7e>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Latin American Regional Report/Southern Cone (LARR-SC). 1985. *Acuerdo Nacional Riding High*. RS-85-04, May 24th.
- Lezcano, Carlos M. 1990. "El régimen militar de Alfredo Stroessner: Fuerzas Armadas y política en el Paraguay (1954-1989)". *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* 74: 117 - 146.
- Long, William. 1988. "Paraguay: Struggle Begins Over Future Leader : Guessing Who Will Succeed Aging Dictator Has Become a National Pastime". *Los Angeles Times*, May 7th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1988-05-07/news/mn-2329_1_national-pastime. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1989. "2 Generals Were Once Firm Allies: Rodriguez Was Seen as a Loyal Follower". February 4th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-04/news/mn-1505_1_andres-rodriguez. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Mendelson Forman, Johanna. 2013. "Paraguay: A Political Milestone". CSIS. Available at: <http://csis.org/blog/paraguay-political-milestone>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Miranda, Carlos. 1990. *The Stroessner Era*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Naville, David. 2008. *Transition et processus démocratique au Paraguay, la société civile dans une impasse*. MA Thesis. Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Nickson, Andrew. 1988. "Tyranny and Longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay". *Third World Quarterly* 10(1): 237 - 259.
- Nickson, Andrew. 1989. The Overthrow of the Stroessner Regime: Re-Establishing the Status Quo." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 8(2): 185 - 209.
- Orlando Sentinel. 1987. "Political Tremors Rattle Paraguay Stroessner Clamps Down As Opposition Challenge Grows". September 20th. Available at: http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1987-09-20/news/0150020129_1_stroessner-paraguay-colorado-party. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Pereira, Carlos Romero. 1987. *Una propuesta etica: analisis de la realidad nacional*. Asunción: Edicion Historica.
- Powers, Nancy. 1992. "The transition to democracy in Paraguay: problems and prospects". Working paper 171. Kellogg Institute.
- Riding, Alan. 1989. "Paraguay party rift led to coup". *The Milwaukee Journal*, February 5th.
- Riquelme, Marcial Antonio. 2003. "Desde el stronismo hacia la transición a la democracia: el papel del actor militar". In Riquelme, Quintin (ed), *Los sin tierra en Paraguay. Conflictos agrarios y movimiento campesino*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- Rodriguez Alcala, Guido. 1988. *Author interview with journalist*. Asuncion (Paraguay), June 7th. Quoted in Sondrol, Paul C. 1992. "The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34(2): 127 - 163.
- Roett, Riordan. 1989. "Paraguay after Stroessner". *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/44327/riordan-roett/paraguay-after-stroessner>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.
- Salgueiro, Jorge Silvero. 2008. "Reforma politica en Paraguay". In Zovatto, Daniel and J. Jesus Orozco Henriquez (eds), *Reforma política y electoral en America Latina 1978 – 2007*. Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas de UNAM, 783 – 819.
- Smith, James. 1989a. "Paraguay's El Tigre: Rodriguez Proves Wily in the Ways of Power". *Los Angeles Times*, February 12th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-12/news/mn-2839_1_paraguay-s-el-tigre. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

Smith, James. 1989b. "Military Coup Topples Paraguay's Stroessner: Incoming President Promises Democracy, Respect for Rights". *Los Angeles Times*, February 4th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-04/news/mn-1491_1_military-coup/2. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

Smith, James. 1989c. "New Paraguay Leaders Pledge Early Open Vote". *Los Angeles Times*, February 5th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-05/news/mn-2546_1_colorado-party-president. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

Sondrol, Paul C. 1992. "The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34(2): 127 - 163.

The Globe and Mail. 1989a. "Paraguay's new general". February 6th: A6. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1990. *Paraguay: Information on conflicts (November 1988 - March 1989) between government and opposition leading to coup in February 1989; treatment of government employees in Asunción before and after 1989 coup*. January 1st, PRY3692. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac3244.html>. Accessed May 14th, 2016

The Globe and Mail. 1989b. "Paraguayan rebellion feared as tanks on move". February 3rd: A1. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1990. *Paraguay: Information on conflicts (November 1988 - March 1989) between government and opposition leading to coup in February 1989; treatment of government employees in Asunción before and after 1989 coup*. January 1st, PRY3692. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac3244.html>. Accessed May 14th, 2016.

The Inquirer. 1989. "General Leads Paraguay Rebels, Vows He Will Restore Democracy". February 3rd. Available at: http://articles.philly.com/1989-02-03/news/26153112_1_ruling-party-paraguay-stroessner-s-colorado-party. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

The Telegraph. 1985. "Paraguay leader not planning to quit but parties vie for power". July 18th. Available at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19850718&id=0ZsrAAAIBAJ&sjid=dvsFAAAAIBAJ&pg=7032,3030073>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

Ultimahora.com. 2014. "En agosto de 1987 ya se decidió echar a Stroessner". February 2nd. Available at: <http://m.ultimahora.com/en-agosto-1987-ya-se-decidio-echar-stroessner-n764272.html>. Accessed June 20th, 2014.

Vara, Augusto. 1989. "Crisis de legitimidad del autoritarismo y transición democrática en Chile". Working Paper No. 415. Santiago: FLACSO.

(7) Uruguay

Uruguay's first steps towards democracy started in 1976, when President Juan Maria Bordaberry was forced to abdicate after submitting a proposal to the military calling for the elimination of all political parties and the creation of a permanent dictatorship headed by Bordaberry himself. He was succeeded by General Aparicio Mendez who in 1977 revealed the military's political plans for the future: After purging Uruguay's National Party and the Colorado Party, a new Constitution would be elaborated and submitted to a plebiscite in 1980. Subsequently, national elections would be held with a single candidate agreed on by both parties, while the military would retain tutelage over the future executive (Hudson and Meditz 1990). Despite all attempts to silence opposition, however, the Uruguayan populace rejected the project to found "a new Republic" with 57% of votes (Rilla 1997), a decision that spiralled the ruling military government into a four-year period of open confusion and bitter inner-political struggle (Sanguinetti 1991). After breaking ranks and exposing a corruption scandal within the military, retired General Gregorio Alvarez Armelino became the next President and slowly adopted measures to restore political dialogue in the country. A new "cronograma" providing for a three-year democratic transition and a new Law on Political Parties was adopted in order to regulate the election of political leaders, the functioning of political conventions, and the preparation of political platforms (Romero 2009). This new political plan was to allow the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties to choose new leaders by means of primary elections in 1982, who would then meet with representatives of the Armed Forces and, via negotiations, rewrite the Constitution. The text would be submitted to another plebiscite concurrently with a General Election in November 1984 (Gillespie 1985). The 1982 primaries resulted in an even greater popular rejection of the regime, as sectors opposing the dictatorship won overwhelmingly in both traditional parties. The so-called "Dialogo" between politicians and the military advanced only slowly and was increasingly marked by civil resistance and radicalization, as Uruguay went through her worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Confrontation came to a head in August 1983 when both traditional parties pulled out of negotiations, and the government temporarily suspended all public political activity (Pion-Berlin 2011). This spurred mass protests and labor strikes and eventually prompted the more moderate Generals of the junta to rehabilitate most of Uruguay's politicians, including part of the Left (Gillespie 1985). A second round of talks

in 1984 between the military and civilian politicians culminated in the Naval Club Pact. Signed by the Armed Forces and representatives from the Colorado Party, the UC and the Broad Front, the pact called for national elections to be held in November of that same year. It also settled the question of a military tutelage over a future civilian government, with the military giving up its long-sought goal of “cosena”, a virtual veto power over all civilian government decisions. Instead, they settled for an advisory board that would be controlled by the President and the cabinet (Hudson and Meditz 1990). On the other hand, it was agreed that the military would not be prosecuted for Human Rights violations, and that the radical leader of the Blanco Party, Wilson Ferreira, would be barred from running for President – a concern that had been particularly prominent for the ruling junta (Pion-Berlin 2011). Competitive elections were held in November 1984, with the Colorado Party winning most of the votes, and Julio Maria Sanguinetti being sworn in as President on March 1, 1985.

In Uruguay, we identify a crisis of the authoritarian regime that evolved through various phases. Tensions between different power centers within the military first surfaced clearly in 1976 when the Uruguayan Armed Forces broke ranks with President Bordaberry. When the latter suggested the permanent abolition of political parties and the construction of a corporatist dictatorship under his own command, the majority of the Generals of the Junta de Oficiales Generales balked at the idea, since they didn’t believe that corporate authoritarianism would either be successful or legitimate in Uruguay (Gillespie 1985)⁷⁵. On the other hand, they also strongly opposed Bordaberry’s suggestion that the military abandon public administration and return to the barracks. With the military divided into a hardline Army, softline Navy and a middle-of-the-road Air Force (Gillespie 1986, 176), the conflict resulted in the ouster of Bordaberry and a victory for the proponents of the so-called “cronograma”, a leisurely timetable for the reinstitutionalization of the regime⁷⁶.

⁷⁵ The Armed Forces maintained that it was necessary to maintain the two main traditional parties, the Colorado Party and the Blanco party, as they considered them to be the only way to return, at some undetermined point in the future, to a representative democracy (EFE 1976b). General Eduardo Zubia, one of the leaders in Bordaberry’s ouster, explained the situation with these words: “El presidente quiere un barco nuevo y nosotros sólo queremos calafatear el barco viejo y seguir adelante” (Maragall 1978)

⁷⁶ In our opinion, it would be erroneous though to equate the ouster of Bordaberry with a victory of regime softliners over hardliners, as the resulting cronograma did not constitute a true attempt at democratization of the regime. Although hardliner Generals such as Esteban Cristi who were thought to oppose any type of electoral legitimation lost power (Gillespie 1986), the constitutional project that followed Bordaberry’s ouster reflected the fact that the dominant current in the military remained at least moderately authoritarian.

This project, however, was not aimed at democratization but rather constituted a controlled liberalization of the regime. The real decision-making power remained with the National Security Council, which was dominated by senior Generals and the Commanders of the Armed Services. The nomination of Aparicio Mendez, a moderate authoritarian with little to no personal power as President, and the subsequent policy changes that curtailed political rights of traditional Uruguay parties reinforce this point (New York Times 1988). Whereas Mendez recognized that the military government in its current form “could not last forever”, he also spoke out against too much democracy, claiming it would invite “terrorism and communism” (Der Spiegel 1979). In his opinion, the political reins of the country should be handed back to the traditional parties “dentro de un termino razonable”, but only after they had been “depurados, regulados y reorganizados” (Beck 2013a; EFE 1976a). The constitutional project proposed by the military reflected these beliefs: a permanent executive role for the National Security Council, a Political Control Commission with powers to dismiss any civilian official, and a prohibition on all leftist parties were only a few of the antidemocratic features that voters eventually rejected in the 1980 plebiscite (Pion-Berlin 2011).

The failure of the project to found a democradura spiralled tensions within the military into an open crisis of the authoritarian regime (Gillespie 1987). From that moment on, according to Gillespie, “a power struggle broke out between those officers that wanted to continue redemocratization with 'valid interlocutors' of the traditional parties, and those that wanted democracy to remain outside of the cronograma” (Gillespie 1995, 88)⁷⁷. Out of this bitter conflict, General Gregorio Alvarez finally emerged as the regime’s next President after exposing a corruption scandal within the military junta⁷⁸, even though the

⁷⁷ Prior to the plebiscite, there was a general consensus among the military that their proposal was going to be accepted by a margin of at least 6% (Radiopasillo 2013), a belief that was later confirmed by a number of high-ranking officials. After the clear “No”-victory, divisions in the military ran deep. On one hand, Generals like Vice Admiral Hugo Marquez publicly admitted defeat and declared that “como demócrata, acataba la decisión de la mayoría y la hacía suya” (Ceberio 1980). Moreover, when asked in private, they opined that the refusal, by the Uruguay voters, to accept the new Constitution allowed for an honorable exit to the military. On the other hand, hardliners like General Rapela, head of the Political Affairs Commission, kept referring to the “No”-voters as puppets of the terrorist “tupamaro”-network, and refused to cede power. When El Pais journalist Battle told Interior Minister General Manuel Nunez, for example, that the only possibility to salvage the situation in Uruguay was to include the traditional parties into negotiations about a new democratic constitution and the return of the military to the barracks, he was jailed for several days (El Pais 1980).

⁷⁸ Although it would be tempting to interpret Alvarez’ betrayal of esprit de corps as an indicator of his democratic disposition, we believe that it was rather a tactical decision to outmanoeuvre potential enemies

Navy vigorously opposed his candidacy (Sebastian 1978). Although Alvarez ascended to the Presidency when a new “aperturista” wind blew through the Uruguayan Armed Forces, his personal commitment towards democracy was doubtful (El Pais 1981). Not only had he been one of the most active leaders in the golpe of 1973 that destroyed Uruguay’s democratic institutions, but his attitude towards political parties had always been one of deep disdain (Rodriguez Larreta 1981). Indeed, Alvarez’ ambitions remained ambiguous throughout the transition process, and often stood in the way of confidence-building (Gillespie 1986). For instance, prior to the plebiscite he encouraged his comrades in arms not to pact with the political parties, as they "provocaron la pérdida de fe en las instituciones y comprometieron el destino del país" (Ceberio 1981).

However, after the victory of the No-vote, he changed course, publishing a calendar with the following political goals: the approbation of a law on political parties in 1982; constitutional reform in 1983; and general elections in the first trimester of 1984. He continued oscillating between liberalization in certain areas, while maintaining repression in others⁷⁹; therefore we believe he was a reluctant softliner at best, and a moderate authoritarian at worst. Indeed, during 1983 and 1984 there was increasing divergence between the more committed softliners in the military and Alvarez, who pursued a harder course and was even suspected to want to perpetrate himself in office (EFE 1985). As events unfolded, however, it became clear that regime softliners were in the majority, which explains why the commitment of the Armed Forces to holding elections in 1984 remained strong despite the ambivalent attitude of the President towards the process⁸⁰. For instance, in 1983 Alvarez, together with Coronels Bolentini and Carrera Hughes, proposed twice to create a “political party of progress”, which was to consist of dissident figures from the traditional parties and which would promote Alvarez’ candidacy for the 1984 elections. However, he did not receive the necessary support from within the Armed

within the junta de oficiales generales. However, it is undisputable that Alvarez’ actions directly contributed to the dismissal, and therefore sidelining, of important hardliner figures, such as the Interior Minister Manuel Nunez (Ceberio 1981).

⁷⁹ For instance, one month after Alvarez’ inauguration in September 1981 it was announced that a new machinery for primary elections was to be set up, so that the traditional parties could choose new leaders who would negotiate a new constitutional framework with the military. Paradoxically, the same month the newspaper “La Democracia” was temporarily shut down for publishing a letter from a banned Christian Democrat (Gillespie 1986).

⁸⁰ In March 1984, for example, the Colorado party accused the Blanco party of having conducted secret talks with Alvarez, in which the idea of indirect presidential elections with Alvarez as candidate was discussed. This scandal was not only damaging to the Blanco party, but it also showed further evidence of the increasing isolation of Alvarez within a military in which the dominant current was reformist (Gillespie 1986).

Forces (Romero 2009; Beck 2013b). Furthermore, whereas Alvarez remained adamant to not reopen negotiations with the traditional parties after the breakdown of the first “Dialogo” in August 1983, many of his fellow officers defied him and sometimes publicly, sometimes privately, sought the contact with the civilian politicians to end the crisis (EFE 1983). For instance, Interior Minister General Hugo Linares Brum reassured Uruguayans that “la finalidad permanente del proceso de reconstrucción nacional es instaurar un régimen verdaderamente democrático” (Agencias 1983). Only a few months later, the Navy and the Air Force commanders hinted at being willing to achieve an agreement with the two traditional parties to hand over power in elections even without a new constitutional framework; something that had always been a condition sine qua non for Alvarez and more conservative elements in the Armed Forces (Prieto 1983).

Finally, the ascension of General Hugo Medina to the key post of Army Commander in Chief in 1984 seemed to indicate that regime softliners had definitely gained the upper hand. A reformist himself, in his inaugural speech he committed the Army to an honorable exit (EFE 1984a) and affirmed that a newly elected civilian government would be accepted and respected by the military. Furthermore, he gave assurances that those who had acted “sin honestidad” during the military regime would be trialed (El Pais 1984). Events leading up to the November 1984 elections supported the truthfulness of his words: not only did the military and civilian politicians sign a “Normalization Act” that annulled many of the repressive legislation media and traditional parties had been subjected to under military rule (EFE 1984b), but when the opposition and the labor movements organized strikes, the regime either did not react at all, or showed restraint (Becker 2010)⁸¹.

⁸¹ It was rumored that Alvarez was planning to retaliate against the strikers by ordering mass arrest of politicians, but the military commanders refused to comply with the orders (Becker 2010)

Resume:

The predominance of softliner military figures after the failed plebiscite of 1980 steered Uruguay towards the democratic elections of 1984, despite resistance from hardliners and ambivalent General Alvarez. We therefore confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

- Agencias. 1983. "El Gobierno uruguayo restringe las actividades políticas en el país". *El País*, August 4th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1983/08/04/internacional/428796004_850215.html.
Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Beck, Luis Casal. 2013a. "Méndez: un blanco notable que fue durante cinco años dictador". *La Republica*, September 1st. Available at:
<http://www.republica.com.uy/aparicio-mendez-blanco-dictador/>. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Beck, Luis Casal. 2013b. "Gregorio Alvarez, el militar con mayor poder que tuvo Uruguay en el siglo XX". *La Republica*, January 27th. Available at:
<http://www.republica.com.uy/gregorio-alvarez-el-militar-con-mayor-poder-que-tuvo-uruguay-en-el-siglo-xx/>. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Becker, Meghan Auker. 2010. "Uruguayans general strike against the military government, 1984". *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, February 21st. Available at:
<http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/uruguayans-general-strike-against-military-government-1984>. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Ceberio, Jesús. 1980. "Segun el jefe de la Marina, la situación política deberá ser replanteada". *El País*, December 2nd. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1980/12/02/internacional/344559604_850215.html.
Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Ceberio, Jesús. 1981. "Uruguay comienza hoy su última etapa de régimen Militar con la presidencia del general Álvarez". *El País*, September 1st. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1981/09/01/internacional/368143213_850215.html.
Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Der Spiegel. 1979. "Uruguay: 1600 Probleme". No. 52, December 24th. Available at:
<http://extern.peoplecheck.de/link.php?q=aparicio+mendez&url=http%3A%2F%2F>

www.spiegel.de%2Fspiegel%2Fprint%2Fd-40348593.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1976a. "Habr  reformas gubernamentales en Uruguay". *El Pa s*, July 18th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1976/07/18/internacional/206488809_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1976b. "El presidente Bordaberry se enfrenta a las Fuerzas Armadas". *El Pa s*, June 8th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1976/06/08/internacional/203032802_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1983. "La multitudinaria concentraci n en Montevideo evidencia el creciente aislamiento del r gimen militar uruguayo". *El Pa s*, November 29th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1983/11/29/internacional/438908406_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1984a. "El general Hugo Medina, nuevo jefe del Ej rcito de Uruguay". *El Pa s*, May 30th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1984/05/30/internacional/454716024_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1984b. "El Gobierno uruguayo levanta restricciones pol ticas y de prensa". *El Pa s*, August 10th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1984/08/10/internacional/460936811_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

EFE. 1985. "El general  lvarez abandona la presidencia de Uruguay". *El Pa s*, February 12th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1985/02/12/internacional/477010821_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

El Pa s. 1980. "*Los generales, uruguayos se aferran al poder*". December 7th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/12/07/internacional/344991601_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

El Pa s. 1981. "Nuevo presidente en Uruguay". September 5th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1981/09/05/opinion/368488806_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

El Pa s. 1984. "*Los militares uruguayos aceptan entregar el poder a los civiles antes de marzo de 1985*". August 5th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1984/08/05/portada/460504803_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.

- Gillespie, Charles. 1985. "Uruguay's Return to Democracy". *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 4(2): 99 - 107.
- Gillespie, Charles. 1986. "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule". In O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Volume 2*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 173 - 195.
- Gillespie, Charles. 1987. "From Authoritarian Crises to Democratic Transitions". *Latin American Research Review* 22(3): 165 – 184.
- Gillespie, Charles. 1995. *Negociando la democracia. Políticos y Generales en Uruguay*. Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, Instituto de Ciencia Política.
- Hudson, Rex A. and Sandra W. Meditz. 1990. *Uruguay: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
- Maragall, Josep. 1978. "Retorno gradual a la democracia en Uruguay". *El País*, May 6th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1978/05/06/internacional/263253612_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- New York Times. 1988. "Aparicio Mendez, 84, Uruguay Ex-President". June 29th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/29/world/aparicio-mendez-84-uruguay-ex-president.html>. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Pion-Berlin, David. 2011. *Military Dictatorships of Brazil and the Southern Cone*. World Scholar: Latin America & the Caribbean.
- Prieto, Martin. 1983. "Marina y Aviación de Uruguay, contra el general Álvarez". *El País*, November 13th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1983/11/13/internacional/437526013_850215.html. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Radiopasillo. 2013. "Plebiscito de 1980: entrevista con el organizador del debate televisivo". January 22nd. Available at: <http://www.radiopasillo.net/2013/01/plebiscito-de-1980/>. Accessed March 9th, 2015.
- Rilla, José. 1997. "Uruguay 1980: Transición y democracia plebiscitaria". *Nueva Sociedad* No. 150: 77 - 83.
- Rodriguez Larreta, Aureliano. 1981. "Un general puede presidir la apertura política en Uruguay". *El País*, July 18th. Available at:

http://elpais.com/diario/1981/07/18/internacional/364255202_850215.html.
Accessed March 9th, 2015.

Romero, Maria José. 2009. "Plebiscitos y Reglas de Juego en la Transición a la Democracia: Chile y Uruguay". *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política* 18(1): 117 - 136.

Sanguinetti, Julio María. 1991. "Present at the transition". *Journal of Democracy* 2(1): 3 - 10.

Sebastian, Pablo. 1978. "Montevideo, centro de operaciones políticas de unos militares mediocres y divididos". *El País*, December 20th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/12/20/internacional/282956404_850215.html.
Accessed March 9th, 2015.

(8) Bolivia

Bolivia's failed attempt at democracy began in 1977 when General Banzer, under the general pressure of the Army and civil society, decided to relax most of his authoritarian decrees and promised presidential elections in 1980. Although he accepted to not stand as a candidate himself, he refused to grant a total amnesty to all syndical and political leaders still in exile, possibly hoping to indirectly maintain himself in office through another military candidate. Faced with massive strikes and labor agitations, however, Banzer was forced to concede the amnesty (Sanchez 1978a) and to call early elections in 1978 (Sanchez 1978b). He announced General Pereda Asburn as his preferred successor, and promised that the new regime would establish democracy if Pereda was elected. To the shock of the military, however, a large amount of voters, and particularly peasants, supported the UDP, a newly formed grouping of left and center parties. This rupture of the traditional military-peasant pact was such a harsh blow to the regime that Pereda, backed by the hardliner faction of the Armed Forces, decided to stage a coup. But his government lasted only a few months, before a new junta under General David Padilla removed Pereda. Padilla, a softliner who belonged to the moderate Institutional faction of the military, openly favored a return of the military to the barracks. Not only did he promise free elections in early 1979, but he also declared that the government would not present a formal candidate of its own, or even support any of the civilian contenders (Klein 2003). Although the election proved to be one of the fairest in Bolivian history, none of the main candidates was able to gain a majority. It was only when the military showed signs of acute impatience that Walter Guevara Arze, a compromise candidate with no backing amongst any of the major parties, was appointed interim President and mandated with organizing new elections in 1980. Additionally to having no own power base and unable to take independent action to alleviate the country's economic problems, Guevara also faced the hard task of overseeing the trial of former President Banzer; a project that the newly elected Parliament decided to undertake against the will of the military and which outraged even the more moderate faction under General Padilla (Dunkerley 1982). By consequence, in a disastrous blow to the constitutionalist experiment, the first civilian regime since 1964 was overthrown in November by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch, a hardline military commander, following a rebellion by the 11th garrison of Trinidad against Guevara's "weak government". Natusch, who had connections

to Banzer, sought to establish a form of bonapartist regime in which both Congress and Trade Unions participated in an administration directed by, and “under the discipline of the Armed Forces” (Aqui 1979). When Natusch stepped down after only two weeks because of intense civilian opposition and only limited backing amongst the military, another compromise candidate, Lidia Gueiler Tejada, was appointed interim president. In 1980, she presided over elections in which the parties of the Left under Siles Zuazo gained a clear majority of the vote. Before Zuazo could take office, however, the process was disrupted by a military coup led by hardliner General Luis Garcia Meza who seized the government and, returning to an early Banzer-style authoritarian military regime, closed the chapter of the democratic experiment for the following two years (Rex and Hanratty 1989).

According to our coding criteria, Bolivia’s 1978 – 1980 transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Although the Bolivian Armed Forces were split in a conservative core and more progressive elements (the so-called “institutionalists”), the latter’s reformist project was short lived and didn’t have enough support to withstand the opposition of defenders of the status quo.

From its inception, Bolivia’s transition attempt stood on shaky feet. Although General Hugo Banzer announced a liberalization program in 1977, he did so out of a sense of vulnerability and a desire to relegitimize an already dwindling grip on power, rather than a deep-seated democratic conviction (Whitehead 1986). In fact, in 1977, the Banzer regime was badly riven by corruption and internal dissent, to a point where regime officials spoke of a true “desgaste politico” of the Armed Forces (Sanchez 1977a). Large foreign loans weighed heavily on a struggling economy, Banzer’s self-declared foreign goal to recuperate access to the coast had not brought fruit, and an increasingly vocal civil society demanded the return to constitutional rule. Moreover, a growing sector of the Armed Forces sought a revision of the terms of the “banzerato”, “with the prime objective of diminishing its unpopularity and vulnerability to internal division, as well as reversing the extended hegemony of Banzer’s personal following within the institution” (Dunkerley 1982). Notwithstanding, for the longest time Banzer refused to publicly name a concrete date for the convocation of elections (De la Calle 1977), and only relented after the loss of support from his own ranks culminated in an announcement made by six Generals who had once helped bringing Banzer to power. They declared that the government no longer

represented the spirit of the majority within the Armed Forces, and that it was time to stop assuming the role of a political party (Sanchez 1978a). Only a few months earlier, the High Council of the Armed Forces had forced Banzer, along with 50 other Generals and Coronels, to retire to the Reserve Forces (Sanchez 1977a).

However, even after embarking on the electoral transition train, Banzer's attitude towards handing over power remained highly ambiguous, and he likely had no sense of being defeated (Whitehead 1986). In an interview with *El Pais*, for example, he admitted that "cuando los militares llegamos al poder, es muy dificil hacernos abandonarlo" and even hinted at a possible interruption of the transition process, should certain "criterios individuales opuestos a la constitucionalizacion" come to pass (De la Calle 1978a). Doubts about Banzer's sincerity intensified when the news about a failed coup against the regime spread. According to the Interior Ministry, the coup protagonists were "reactionary elements" of the military that planned to interrupt Banzer's liberalization process (*El Pais* 1977). However, only four days later General Villalpando, head of the "Ejercito", denounced the accusations as false, claiming that two of the five officers involved were openly known for their progressive opinions. Therefore, many feared that the incident was orchestrated to show that Bolivia still lacked the preconditions for holding elections and therefore could serve as a pretext for postponing the transition timetable (Sanchez 1977b).

When the election date drew closer, it turned out that Banzer's preferred candidate, his ex-Minister of the Interior, Airforce General Juan Pereda, was likely not going to win the vote and therefore Banzer's efforts to assure a placid "continuismo" were not going to bear fruit. To avoid losing power Banzer then organized - or at least acquiesced in - a massive and open fraud in the poll, which plunged the Bolivian regime into a deep crisis. The reaction of the populace forced Banzer to publicly declare that he would devolve power to the Armed Forces by the end of his mandate on August 6, 1978, given the absence of a clear electoral mandate (Dunkerley 1982; Whitehead 1986). The election fiasco, coupled with the ADN's positive attitude towards the Natusch and Mesa coups demonstrate that Banzer always preferred some sort of "guided rule" with the Armed Forces still exerting a considerable amount of tutelary control over the process. We believe it therefore adequate to qualify Banzer a moderate hardliner who never intended true democratization in the first place.

During the short interregnum of his successor, General Pereda, the democratic project in Bolivia remained stagnant principally because of Pereda's own lack of democratic ambitions. On one hand, he assured the Bolivian public early on that he had the intention of "contribuir decididamente a la instauracion de un regimen democratico autentico" (EFE 1978a), announced the opening of a political dialogue with the various political forces in the country (EFE 1978b) and even abolished some of the most draconian of Banzer's legislations such as the Ley de Seguridad de Estado (EFE 1978c). On the other hand, however, all the key positions in his government were kept in the hands of the military, and soon detentions and acts of repressions became so common that the Catholic Church deemed it necessary to initiate a petition demanding the respect of Human Rights (El Pais 1978a). Most importantly, however, Pereda did not call for elections despite his promise to do so (De la Calle 1978b; Rex and Hanratty 1989). He ended up being overthrown by General David Padilla Arancibia, a member of the younger institutionalist faction of the military, in a bloodless coup in November 1978.

Padilla, along with the military faction supporting him, considered that the main role of the Armed Forces was to be defenders of the country rather than political intervention (Rex and Hanratty 1989). In this point, Padilla was categorical: His administration sought only to maintain public order and oversee the preparations for, and the holding of another poll in 1979 (Padilla Arancibia 1980). He also refused to name an official government candidate, promising that on August 6, 1979 the Armed Forces would hand over power to whoever was democratically elected (De la Calle 1978b). A genuine softliner, he allowed the political spectrum to develop into a much fuller array of political forces than had been the case under the Banzerato, which made him the candidate of choice for any "salida democratizante" to opposition forces (Dunkerley 1982). Siles Zuazo, moral victor of the fraudulent 1978 elections, even qualified Padilla's coup as "patriotic" (El Pais 1978b) and both Walter Guevara Arce and Lidia Gueiler, civilian presidents between 1979 and 1980, confirmed that they believed Padilla was serious and honest in his claim that the Armed Forces would be returning to the barracks (Santa Cruz 1979a; El Pais 1979a).

However, multiple efforts by regime hardliners to destabilize the Padilla regime and its subsequent civilian administrations show that the institutionalist faction, or “Karachipampas”, did not have much support within the military as a whole, and that the civilian representatives of the government were weak and powerless (Dunkerley 1982). Firstly, both Walter Guevara Arce and Lidia Gueiler were compromise figures born from an electoral deadlock and the impending threat of another golpe⁸². As such, they had no significant power base of their own and were constantly subject to harassment and pressure from regime conservatives. More importantly, however, the policies they tried to implement were highly controversial and divisive particularly among the military, especially between those loyal to former President Banzer and those who favored a quick and thorough “desbanzerisacion” of the Armed Forces. The first civilian President, Guevara Arce, alienated a big part of the military by suggesting that he would not incorporate any military members into his government (Santa Cruz 1979b), and by initiating a public trial against Banzer for corruption and Human Rights violations⁸³ that was viewed negatively even by the most moderate parts of the Armed Forces⁸⁴.

As a result, Arce was removed from power through a coup by hardliner Coronel Alberto Natusch, a first clear sign that the balance of power had started to shift decisively towards the anti-democratic faction of the military (El Pais 1979b). Accusing Congress to act “en forma ajena a las verdaderas angustias nacionales” (Agencias 1979a), Natusch justified the coup as “necessary to save Bolivia from the shipwreck of a dysfunctional parliamentarism” (Santa Cruz 1979c). Despite the backing of a number of Army garrisons

⁸² Banzer first voiced the possibility of another military takeover in a reunion with Siles Zuazo and Victor Paz Estenssoro after both refused to give up their claim to the Presidency (El Pais 1979c). Padilla later reiterated that option (Agencias 1979c) and insisted that “el país no puede estar sujeto a los vaivenes de un peligroso juego de intereses de partido... Ser político no significa impunidad para sembrar desconfianza y crear divisiones» (Santa Cruz 1979f)

⁸³ It was alleged, among other things, that after the 1979 elections the military led by Banzer had presented a 16-point set of demands to the civilian candidate, including involvement of the High Command in all Cabinet discussions and decisions, preservation of the purchasing power of all military salaries, with pay rises for the officer corps, and a guarantee of adequate resources for COFADENA, the military institution that operated various strategic public enterprises (Whitehead 1986).

⁸⁴ Padilla, for example, publicly declared that the officer corps was afraid the process was going to transform into a general indictment of the Armed Forces, and warned that the military would not tolerate “insultos ni calumnias” against Banzer, or accept that the prestige of the Armed Forces as institution was jeopardized (De la Calle 1979). A year later, General Meza used the Banzer trial as a pretext for his own coup, declaring that “es un proceso que va más contra la institución castrense que contra el ex mandatario” and because of that, the Armed Forces “responderán con las leyes militares a los congresistas a cuya iniciativa se debe el juicio” (El Pais 1980c).

and part of the Army High Command⁸⁵, civilian and military opposition to Natusch's coup was so strong that Natusch was eventually forced to surrender power (Santa Cruz 1979d).⁸⁶ However, he had succeeded in neutralizing an important part of the institutionalist wing of the Armed Forces⁸⁷, therefore unknowingly paving the way for General Meza's authoritarian regime only half a year later.

The subsequent appointment of Lidia Gueiler, another compromise candidate, revealed the extent of divisions within the Armed Forces, and the degree to which the hardliners had an advantage over the institutionalists. For one, the "golpistas" were placed under the authority of a President who left them largely undisturbed (Dunkerley 1982). For two, only within a week the leading patron of deposed Colonel Natusch, General Luis Garcia Meza, staged a passive coup in La Paz' Miraflores barracks in a refusal to accept Gueiler's new military appointments which largely favored the institutionalist camp⁸⁸ (Agencias 1979b; Santa Cruz 1979e). Over the coming months the hardliners increased their hold over a lackluster Gueiler regime. They committed acts of terrorism against left-wing political figures, including an attempt on the life of the President herself (AFP 1980), and pursued a "strategy of tension" that culminated with Meza's forced appointment to the rank of Army commander (IPS 1980). In June 1980 the Army High Command issued a communiqué signed by all three Army branches (Earth, Air and Navy) that demanded the postponement of the upcoming poll by at least a year. They warned that the elected

⁸⁵ Among the high-ranking officers, Padilla's immediate successor, General Victor Castillo, as well as Hugo Banzer himself were the most important supporters of the coup (El Pais 1979d).

⁸⁶ We believe that this was due principally to two factors: Firstly, Natusch's coup came at a time when softliners within the Bolivian military still had a certain degree of support. Secondly, Natusch himself had only a limited followership within the Armed Forces, which centered mainly on a group of comrades in arms that, like Natusch himself, had not managed to ascend to the rank of "General" within the military. This lack of support on part of the Armed Forces became most evident when more than 200 Army officials headed by Coronel Rolando Saravia and Coronel Jorge Escobar signed a manifesto that called upon their comrades to "oponerse a un Gobierno que está conduciendo al país al borde de la guerra civil" (Santa Cruz 1979g), following which the National Police stopped carrying out orders to suppress protestors demonstrating against Natusch in La Paz (Santa Cruz 1979h).

⁸⁷ After Natusch's coup, General Padilla and several other high-ranking institutionalist officers publicly denounced the takeover declaring that "El 95% de los militares estamos cansados de convulsiones políticas fruto de ambiciones personales" and expressed their allegiance to civil President Guevara Arce (Santa Cruz 1979i). However, they were arrested and put on trial, which left the democratic faction of the military marginalized and deprived of their key members (Santa Cruz 1979j; EFE 1979).

⁸⁸ Gueiler attempted to change the High Command that had survived the fall of Natusch after she had received a petition from a group of institutionalist officers that accused them of "delitos de 'lesa patria' and 'lesa institución'" (Santa Cruz 1979k). Meza himself was to be substituted with General Rene Villaroel, but pressured Gueiler into appointing General Rubén Rocha Patiño, a fellow hardliner (Santa Cruz 1979l). Meza saw his "línea dura" reinforced when the commanders of the operative garrisons issued a communiqué unanimously declaring their support for the current High Command (Santa Cruz 1979m).

government “no tendrá la capacidad suficiente para gobernar” (Agencias 1980a), and that the Armed Forces would not recognize whichever candidate emerged victorious (De la Calle 1980a). However, Congress rejected their ultimatum, and the left-wing UDP under Siles Zuazo won a decisive majority (De la Calle 1980b). As a result, the bloody uprising of the Trinidad garrison early on July 17 under the leadership of General Meza and the unanimous support of the principal Army branches (El País 1980a) violently ended “las aventuras electorales” (El País 1980b)⁸⁹ and returned Bolivia to an authoritarian regime similar to the early Banzerato for the next two years.

Resume:

Despite attempts of softliner military factions to install a democratic regime, Bolivian hardliners remained dominant and ended liberalization attempts with a bloody coup. Therefore we confirm that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

AFP. 1980. “La presidenta interina de Bolivia, Lidia Gueiler, escapa a un intento de asesinato”. *El País*, June 10th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/06/10/internacional/329436020_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Agencias. 1979a. “Los golpistas bolivianos disuelven el Parlamento y proclaman el estado de sitio”. *El País*, November 3rd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/03/internacional/310431611_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Agencias. 1979b. “El ex jefe del Ejército boliviano se rebela contra los nuevos nombramientos militares”. *El País*, November 25th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/25/internacional/312332414_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Agencias. 1979c. “Amenaza de solución militar en Bolivia si no se consolida el proceso constitucional”. *El País*, August 1st. Available at:

⁸⁹ Meza himself portrayed his coup as an attempt to save the country from an impending Communist takeover, but did not hide his true intentions: “Soy como el general Pinochet. Permaneceré veinte años en el poder” (Agencias 1980b).

http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/01/internacional/302306401_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Agencias. 1980a. "El Ejército boliviano pide la suspensión de las elecciones". *El País*, June 11th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1980/06/11/internacional/329522401_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Agencias. 1980b. "La Junta Militar boliviana permanecerá en el poder hasta 'eliminar el cáncer marxista'". *El País*, July 26th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1980/07/26/internacional/333410411_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Aqui. 1979. No. 38, December 1st - 7th. Quoted in Dunkerley, James. 1982. *Bolivia 1980 – 1981: the political system in crisis*. University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1977. "1980, año de la esperanza para Latinoamérica". *El País*, October 19th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/10/19/internacional/246063612_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1978a. "Las fuerzas armadas respetarán los resultados de las elecciones". *El País*, January 28th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/01/28/internacional/254790013_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1978b. "Los golpistas prometen elecciones libres para julio de 1979". *El País*, November 25th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/11/25/internacional/280796401_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1979. "El juicio a Bánzer, un proceso a las fuerzas armadas bolivianas". *El País*, September 4th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/09/04/internacional/305244005_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1980a. "Dos generales bolivianos anuncian que no reconocerán al ganador de las elecciones". *El País*, June 25th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1980/06/25/internacional/330732010_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

De la Calle, Angel Luis. 1980b. "El Ejército boliviano amenaza con un nuevo golpe". *El País*, June 1st. Available at:

http://elpais.com/diario/1980/06/01/internacional/328658407_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Dunkerley, James. 1982. *Bolivia 1980 – 1981: the political system in crisis*. University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies.

EFE. 1978a. "El presidente boliviano promete nuevas elecciones para 1980". *El País*, August 8th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/08/08/internacional/271375213_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

EFE. 1978b. "El presidente boliviano invita a los partidos a establecer la democracia". *El País*, September 16th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/09/16/internacional/274744809_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

EFE. 1978c. "El Gobierno boliviano suprime tres leyes represivas". *El País*, August 13th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/08/13/internacional/271807213_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

EFE. 1979. "El ex comandante en jefe del Ejército boliviano pide el pase a la reserva". *El País*, November 30th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/30/internacional/312764425_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

El País. 1977. "*Fallido golpe de Estado derechista en Bolivia*". December 10th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1977/12/10/portada/250556401_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

El País. 1978a. "*El golpe de Pereda duró cuatro meses*". November 25th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/11/25/internacional/280796407_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

El País. 1978b. "*Golpe de Estado en Bolivia*". November 25th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/11/25/opinion/280796409_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

El País. 1979a. "*Los militares se volverán a encontrar con el pueblo si intentan un nuevo golpe*". November 18th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/18/internacional/311727608_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

- El País. 1979b. “*Un 'cuartelazo' contra la democracia*”. November 3rd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/03/opinion/310431605_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- El País. 1979c. “*Los militares bolivianos advierten que pueden quedarse en el poder*”. August 4th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/04/portada/302565603_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- El País. 1979d. “*Desarrollo del pronunciamiento castrense*”. November 2nd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/02/internacional/310345211_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- El País. 1980a. “*Triunfa un golpe de Estado en Bolivia*”. July 18th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/07/18/internacional/332719204_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- El País. 1980b. “*El presidente de la Junta Militar boliviana anuncia el fin de las 'aventuras electorales'*”. July 20th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/07/20/internacional/332892004_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- El País. 1980c. “*El jefe del Ejército boliviano amenaza al Congreso*”. May 30th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/05/30/internacional/328485611_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Hudson, Rex A. and Dennis M. Hanratty. 1989. *Bolivia: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
- IPS. 1980. “La derecha militar retoma el control del Ejército boliviano”. *El País*, April 16th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1980/04/16/internacional/324684017_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Klein, Herbert S. 2003. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Padilla Arancibia, David. 1980. *Decisiones y Recuerdos de un General*. La Paz.
- Sanchez, Roberto. 1977a. “Bolivia: el desgaste militar abre paso a las urnas”. *El País*, December 1st. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1977/12/01/internacional/249778819_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

- Sanchez, Roberto. 1977b. "El frustrado golpe boliviano pudo ser un 'globo sonda'". *El País*, December 16th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1977/12/16/internacional/251074810_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Sanchez, Roberto. 1978a. "El regimen boliviano del General Banzer, al borde del colapso". *El País*, January 12th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/01/12/internacional/253407612_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Sanchez, Roberto. 1978b. "El Gobierno boliviano concede una amnistía sin restricciones". *El País*, January 30th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1978/01/20/internacional/254098807_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979a. "Una tutela de las fuerzas armadas sería algo inaceptable para mí". *El País*, August 22nd. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/22/internacional/304120804_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979b. "Un Gobierno de "conciliación nacional" sustituye a los militares en Bolivia". *El País*, August 8th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/08/internacional/302911206_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979c. "El coronel Natusch, decidido a mantenerse en el poder en Bolivia". *El País*, November 13th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/13/internacional/311295610_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979d. "Lidia Gueiler desplaza de la presidencia boliviana al coronel Natusch". *El País*, November 17th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/17/internacional/311641203_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979e. "Solución precaria para la crisis militar de Bolivia". *El País*, November 25th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/27/internacional/312505221_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.
- Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979f. "El Ejército entregó el poder a los civiles en Bolivia". *El País*, August 9th. Available at:
http://elpais.com/diario/1979/08/09/internacional/302997612_850215.html.
Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979g. "Llamamiento de más de doscientos jefes militares contra el régimen golpista boliviano". *El País*, November 16th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/16/internacional/311554823_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979h. "Incierta situación en Bolivia tras la negativa del coronel Natusch a dimitir". *El País*, November 7th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/07/internacional/310777206_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979i. "El Ejército boliviano insiste en un Gobierno tripartito encabezado por el coronel Natusch". *El País*, November 14th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/14/internacional/311382007_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979j. "Ruptura abierta en el Ejército boliviano". *El País*, November 15th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/15/internacional/311468420_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979k. "Oficiales bolivianos piden la destitución de los generales nombrados por Natusch". *El País*, November 22nd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/22/internacional/312073219_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979l. "Solución precaria para la crisis militar de Bolivia". *El País*, November 27th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/27/internacional/312505221_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

Santa Cruz, Angel. 1979m. "Dos facciones militares rivalizan por conseguir el alto mando castrense en Bolivia". *El País*, November 23rd. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1979/11/23/internacional/312159625_850215.html. Accessed January 18th, 2015.

(9) Algeria

Algeria's bid for democratization began in the early 1980s when Chadli Bendjedid, President of Algeria from 1979 to 1991, introduced a series of economic reforms to stabilize the country after the devastating oil shock of the 1970s (Evans 1992, 5). However, the reforms backfired and led to increased government corruption, a growing foreign debt and worsening living conditions for ordinary Algerians. In autumn 1988, food shortage, growing frustration with the inefficiency of the ruling "National Liberation Front" (FLN), and a corruption scandal involving one of the President's sons (Belkaid 2011) set off work strikes and food riots that spread chaos in many Algerian cities. Martial law was installed and the military violently repressed the protests, killing between 150 and 400 people. At the same time the President embarked on a series of political reforms aimed at restoring government legitimacy, starting with the release of all prisoners taken during the October riots, a general amnesty, and the loosening of press censorship (Volpi 2003, 83). In February 1989, the Constitution was modified to allow for multipartism (Lahouari 1996), and President Bendjedid promised free General Elections for 1991. As a result of these liberalization efforts, more than sixty new political parties emerged, among which the fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) quickly became one of the most influential contenders for power (Lahouari 1997). In fact, the FIS swept the first local elections under the new electoral system in June 1990. Encouraged by their victory, members of the FIS majlis ash-shura cautioned that the decision to participate in the political process might pose significant risk to the ruling party (Cook 2004). Boasting slogans such as "Pas de démocratie"⁹⁰, and "l'État islamique par l'urne ou le fusil" (Bi Essandouk aou bi elbendoukia) (Nezzar 2000), Ali Belhadj, one of the party leaders, declared that the FIS "has committed itself to the immediate implementation of Islamic law and trying former Algerian officials if it wins the general elections scheduled for 27 June" (FBIS-NES-91-092, 1991). Although this message surely was not warmly received with the government,

⁹⁰ FIS party leaders actually made it clear that the party would not hesitate to use democracy to gain power, but that it would subsequently tolerate pluralism only if it did not compromise Islamic values and principles. Party leader Ali Benhadj, for example, declared in the journal "l'Horizontaté" of February 1989 that he would "end pluralism if it allows political parties to spread ideas and opinions that are in contradiction to the beliefs of Islam". Party cofounder Abbassi Madani, for his part, confirmed to the journal "Algérie Actualités" of December 24, 1989 that "if democracy is a framework of dialogue and respect for opinions, we agree with the concept. However, we do not accept that an elected official be in contradiction with Islam, the Sharia and its values" (MAOL 2011).

the election process went ahead and the first round of the legislative race was held in December 1991⁹¹. When the FIS registered another stunning victory and obtained more than two thirds of available seats, Bendjedid prepared negotiations with the party leaders and even invoked the possibility of cohabitation (Rocherieux 2001; Kaush and Youngs 2008). The Army responded by canceling the second ballot and forcing Bendjedid to resign on January 11, 1992 (Algeria-Watch 2012). A “High Council” formed by military officers took over the reins of power, thus putting an end to the fledgling democratization process (WDR 2012). More than 150.000 Algerians are believed to have lost their lives in the ensuing civil war (Lymo 2005).

In Algeria we do identify a split within the ruling elite into hardliners and softliners. But whereas a crisis as defined in this study requires softliners to be in the majority, in Algeria they ended up being eclipsed by regime hardliners. This fact was evidenced not only by sheer numbers, but also by the way the democratization process unfolded: Slowly, pro-reform forces were sidelined, and finally the hardliner forces of the military shut down the transition process. Between 1989 and 1992 President Chadli Bendjedid and his Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche were the two main softliners of the Algerian regime. Hamrouche, a former Colonel, introduced a number of reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy and eradicating corruption⁹². For instance, he tried to suppress the "intermediary chain of command" within the party hierarchy in a bid to increase transparency of information (MAOL 2011). He also separated the portfolio of the Defense Ministry from the Presidency to create a more balanced power structure⁹³. Furthermore, Hamrouche was credited with having ended 30 years of state monopoly on print and audio media, loosening censure and allowing the creation of 169 journals (for example “Le Quotidien d’Algerie”, “El Watan”, or “Le Soir d’Algérie”) (Rocherieux 2001). “Reforms without liberty are

⁹¹ A member of the “Mouvement Algerien des Officiers libres” who held the post of chief of research and analysis (SRA) during the Bendjedid era claims that the 1991 elections were Algeria’s first and only truly free elections. According to him, General Mohamed Betchine had given direct orders that vote-rigging was out of the question, and certain officers even prevented actions of ballot-stuffing in certain election offices (MAOL 2011).

⁹² These reforms included the negotiation of a medium-term agreement with the IMF to stabilize the country’s financial situation (MAOL 2011)

⁹³ Hamrouche’s efforts earned him the ire of the Defense Minister, hardliner General Nezzar, who complained in an interview with the journalist Sid Ahmed Semiane that it was “a perturbation” to be subordinated to someone of lesser rank (Semiane 1988).

doomed to fail”, he once declared, (El Watan 2011) “we must go towards a veritable transition” (El Watan 2007).

On the other hand, most of Hamrouche’s reforms wouldn’t have taken shape without the support of President Chadli Bendjedid (Le Quotidien d’Algérie 2012). Insisting that “les reformes, c’est moi” (LeMatin.dz 2012), Bendjedid is often viewed as the “father of Algerian democracy” (Daou 2012), even though some claim he never intended a political opening, only greater freedom within the FLN (MAOL 2011)⁹⁴. But insiders to the regime, such as former Minister of Interior Larbi Belkheir, opine that Bendjedid “really was in favor of democratization” (Slate Afrique 2012). According to Belkheir, Bendjedid “wanted to create great things, dreaming that Algeria was the most beautiful country in the world and wanted prosperity for everyone (...) He maybe didn’t envision a total and brutal political opening, but he wished to open the door within the party to other political currents, which, later, would have led to political pluralism” (Semiane 1998, 111 - 126). Nonetheless, many of Bendjedid’s reform projects remained flawed, possibly because of hardliner resistance. For instance, the 1989 Constitution retained a variety of authoritarian structures such as the state security courts and the powerful presidency⁹⁵, and it did nothing to curtail the political power of the Army.⁹⁶ Laws regulating the creation of new political parties were also demonstratively restrictive (Cook 2004).

When in 1992 the military cancelled the 2nd round of elections, Bendjedid reaffirmed his support for democratization. “We cannot pretend to be a state with a rule of law if we do not respect the verdict of the polls, no matter what the result may be⁹⁷”, he

⁹⁴ Critics cite Bendjedid’s pre-1988 discours in which he said that “those who are not satisfied with our way of ruling the country are free to leave Algeria” (L’Expression 2007).

⁹⁵ Rachid Tlemçani, a political scientist at the University of Algiers once joked that the Algerian President is “empowered with all the attributes of an enlightened sheikh” (Tlemçani 1990, 14).

⁹⁶ In fact, the military itself indicated after the adoption of the Constitution that it would remain engaged in politics (Cook 2004)

⁹⁷ In an interview with the journal “Sophia Asian Studies”, Bendjedid confirms that the government should have respected the will of the people (“La démocratie a donné au peuple algérien le choix des islamistes en toute liberté, exactement comme cela s’est passé en Palestine quand le peuple palestinien a voté pour Hamas”, Koudil 2010)

declared, echoing the words of Hamrouche⁹⁸ a year earlier. (LeMatin.dz 2012). Even before the balloting took place, he indicated that although “he preferred an Islamist defeat, he was ready to come to terms [with the FIS] should the occasion arise” (Charef 1994, 236). Bendjedid’s position within the Algerian regime gradually weakened in the course of the transition in favor of the ascension of hardliners. The “coalition of military officers” formed by figures such as Defense Minister Khaled Nezzar, Interior Minister Larbi Belkheir and Ground Forces commander Mohamed Lamari were said to be the “de facto rulers of Algeria”⁹⁹ (Volpi 2003), and they didn’t keep their aversion to Bendjedid¹⁰⁰ or the democratization process a secret¹⁰¹. Belkheir, for instance, gave the Minister of Justice an ultimatum to put an end to the electoral process¹⁰² and met the President personally to let him know he would not tolerate cohabitation with a party that doesn’t subscribe to constitutional principles (Semiane 1998, 111 - 126).

Their power was evidenced by their capacity to sabotage the reforms passed under the Hamrouche government¹⁰³, and to marginalise reform-minded factions within the ruling circle. For instance, in 1987, General Belloucif and his associates, the Minister of Military Justice and Social Action, were forced from office and in 1989, the Chief of the National Gendarmerie force, Hachichi Zine El Abidine, was dismissed (MAOL 2011). In 1991, Mouloud Hamrouche would share their fate after a long campaign of destabilization¹⁰⁴. After a short episode of martial law following a FIS-organized general strike, General Nezzar and General Belkheir forced Bendjedid’s hand in dismissing Hamrouche, telling him “a political decision was in order” (Nezzar 2000). In 1992,

⁹⁸ In 1991 after the sweeping victory of the FIS in the 1st round of legislative elections, Hamrouche graciously accepted the results, declaring that “our defeat attests even more to our desire for a democratic opening than would a victory in which one would have been suspected of irregularity” (Wynn 1994, 36)

⁹⁹ According to Lahouari (1996), these officers considered it “as normal as breathing that the military hierarchy should have the final say in forming the government”.

¹⁰⁰ In his Memoires, Nezzar claims that Bendjedid “n’était pas fait pour être président de la République” (Nezzar 2000), et “quand il disait quelque chose d’intelligent, on devinait qu’il venait de recevoir Mouloud Hamrouche” (LeMatin.dz 2012).

¹⁰¹ Nezzar denounced the political opening, arguing “qu’elle nous menait droit vers tous les dangers”, and that the government position towards the FIS “ne tenait pas la route” (Nezzar 2000).

¹⁰² According to Nezzar, Belkheir screamed “Si vous ne le faites pas, j’ordonnerai dès demain aux walis d’arrêter le processus” (Nezzar 2000).

¹⁰³ The Interior Ministry, in violation of the new laws on the creation of Unions and political associations, continued to refuse registration to a number of new Unions and political associations outside the ruling circle (El Watan 2011).

¹⁰⁴ Hamrouche and his ministers of the Interior and the Economy suffered from delegitimizing attacks by the hardliner-controlled press and security services who regularly insulted them publicly and even fed them false information to discredit them in the eyes of the President (Moussa 2012; MAOL 2011).

Bendjedid's actions indirectly confirmed the military council's immense influence. In fact, he made sure to dissolve Parliament prior to resigning himself, in order to avoid that the President's constitutional successor, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, took over the Presidency, because he knew that Belkhadem didn't enjoy the approval of the military (AF 2012; Charef 2012).

Finally, the cancellation of the 2nd round of the 1992 polls and the dismissal of President Bendjedid show most clearly that Algeria's authoritarian regime did not experience a crisis. Until today, accounts on the true facts "behind the scenes" of Bendjedid's resignation diverge. When the President announced his decision to leave office on 11 February, Algerian officials and press confirmed that his demission resulted from an ultimatum by the Army's top command which opposed Bendjedid's power-sharing plans with the FIS (Kaush and Youngs 2008)¹⁰⁵. Major-General Nezzar himself reports in his memoirs that within days of the first round of voting in 1991 the military resolved not to allow the FIS to attain a majority in the National Assembly (Nezzar 2000, 236) and that the second round of voting would not take place (Algeria-Watch 2012). He even gives precise indications about the day when Bendjedid supposedly "lost the support of the Army", but denies that Bendjedid's resignation was a coup d'Etat¹⁰⁶ (Nezzar 2000, 237). Bendjedid later confirmed this thesis in his memoirs, claiming he resigned deliberately in order to "limit the bloodshed of Algerians" (AF 2012). It remains that the Generals prevailed, and they didn't hesitate to declare that "they are willing to exterminate three million Algerians to re-establish order" (MAOL 2011).

Resume:

When Algerian president Bendjedid offered the possibility of reform and open elections in 1992, the Algerian military formed a united front against their President and forced him to cancel the election. We therefore confirm that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime.

¹⁰⁵ Hichem Aboud, for example, tells the story of General Lamari pinning Bendjedid with his collar to the wall in his office with the words: "Here is your resignation letter, and you will read it now in front of the cameras, or you'll know the same fate as Ceausescu" (Aboud 2002, 147)

¹⁰⁶ To prove his claims, he cites the fact that Bendjedid did not experience any reduction in his prerogatives or liberties either before or after his resignation. He does, however, admit that "practical, political and military measures have been considered", but that Bendjedid's resignation took away the need to resort to such extremes (Nezzar 2000, 236).

References:

- About, Hichem. 2002. *La Mafia des Généraux*. JC Lattès.
- Algerie-Focus.com (AF). 2012. "Les croustillantes révélations de Chadli Bendjedid". October 10th. Available at: <http://www.algerie-focus.com/blog/2012/10/les-croustillantes-revelations-de-chadli-bendjedid/>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Algeria-Watch. 2012. "Algérie, 11 janvier 1992 – 11 janvier 2012 : vingt ans après, toujours lutter". January 11th. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/aw/20_ans.htm. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Belkaid, Akram. 2011. "Octobre 1988 : retour sur un 'Printemps algérien'". *Slateafrique.com*, October 5th. Available at: <http://www.slateafrique.com/48875/octobre-1988-printemps-algerien>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Charef, Abed. 1994. *Algeria : The Grand Skid*. La Tour d'Aigues : Editions de l'Aube.
- Charef, Abed. 2012. "Mémoires de Chadli Bendjedid: je n'ai pas agréé le FIS, j'ai été mis devant un fait accompli". *Maghreb Emergent*, October 10th. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/hist/1992/chadli_memoires.htm. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Cook, Steven A. 2004. "A Cautionary Tale for Policymakers: Political Liberalization in Algeria". NESA Occasional Paper, February.
- Daou, Marc. 2012. "Le président Chadli Bendjedid 'a échoué sur toute la ligne'". *France24.com*, October 10th. Available at: <http://www.france24.com/fr/20121009-chadli-bendjedid-president-algerie-bilan-politique-bouteflika-obseques-deces-1988-fis>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- El Watan. 2007. "Mouloud Hamrouche revient sur l'initiative des Trois: Repenser le mode de gestion de l'Etat". November 3rd. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/pol/partis/initiative_trois.htm. Accessed May 15th, 2016.
- El Watan. 2011. "Les acquis perdus d'une révolte: les leçons d'Octobre". October 5th. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/hist/88/acquis_perdus.htm. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Evans, Martin. 1992. "Algeria: Thirty Years On". *History Today* 42(7): 4 – 6.

- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) - Near East and South Asia (NES) - 91 - 092. 1991. *Belhadj Warns FIS Will Try Ministers, Military*. May 13th.
- Kaush, Kristina and Richard Youngs. 2008. "Algeria: Democratic Transition Case Study". CDDRL Working Papers 84. August.
- Koudil, Salim. 2010. "Les révélations choc de Chadli Bendjedid". *Liberté*, October 4th.
- Lahouari, Addi. 1996. "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions". *Journal of Democracy* 7(3): 94 – 107.
- Lahouari, Addi. 1997. "Political Islam and Democracy: The Case of Algeria". In Hadenius, Axel (ed), *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- LeMatin.dz. 2012. "Ah, il parle, il parle, maintenant, Nezzar... ". October 17th. Available at: <http://www.lematindz.net/news/9921-1-ah-il-parle-il-parle-maintenant-nezzar.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- L'Expression. 2007. "Un gout de cendre". October 4th. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/hist/88/19_ans.htm. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Le Quotidien d'Algerie. 2012. "M.C. Mesbah : Ce que je sais de Chadli". October 9th. Available at: <http://lequotidienalgerie.org/2012/10/09/m-c-mesbah-ce-que-je-sais-de-chadli/>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Lymo, Karl. 2005. "Tanzania: Algeria's Failed Democracy Has Lessons for Tanzania". *AllAfrica.com*, October 12th. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200510120076.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Moussa, K. 2012. "Mémoire de Chadli: Larbi Belkheir était-il derrière la création du FIS?". *Echorouk*, October 11th. Available at: <http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/144214.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres (MAOL). 2011. "Les Généraux et le GIA". Available at: <http://www.anp.org/fr/LesGenerauxEtLeGIA/LesGenerauxEtLeGIA.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.
- Nezzar, Khaled. 2000. *Memoirs of General Khaled Nezzar*. Algiers: Chihab Editions.

Rocherieux, Julien. 2001. "L'évolution de l'Algérie depuis l'indépendance". *Sud/Nord* 1(14): 27 - 50.

Semiane, Sid Ahmed. 1998. *Octobre, ils parlent*. Alger: Editions Le Matin.

Slate Afrique. 2012. "*Ce que l'Algérie doit à Chadli Bendjedid*". February 13th. Available at: <http://www.slateafrique.com/95805/algerie-ce-que-l-algerie-doit-retenir-de-chadli-bendjedid>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.

Tlemçani, Rachid. 1990. "Chadli's Perestroika". *Middle East Report* 20(163): 14 - 18.

Volpi, Frederic. 2003. *Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria*. London: Pluto Press.

Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). 2012. "4. März 1992 - Verbot der "Islamischen Heilsfront" (FIS) in Algerien: Ein Land im Chaos". March 4th. Available at: <http://www1.wdr.de/themen/archiv/stichtag/stichtag6426.html>. Accessed January 18th, 2014.

Wynn, Janice M. 1994. *Algeria in Transition : The Islamic Threat and Government Debt*. MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

(10) Tanzania¹⁰⁷

Contrary to most other African transitions, the Tanzanian experience with political liberalization in the 1990s was not propelled, or even accompanied, by significant popular protest movements. When the Tanzanian leadership began to move the country toward democracy in the early 1990s, neither an organized opposition to the ruling party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) nor a demand for a multiparty democracy existed (Hoffman and Robinson 2009). In fact, a 1992 public opinion survey revealed that 77 percent of respondents preferred Tanzania to remain a one-party state with the CCM in control (Amon et al. 2002); a fact that led the 1995 presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa to proudly boast that the party “didn’t need to cheat [in potential multiparty elections] because it was quite certain that CCM was going to win” (Agence France Press 1995). The political transition was therefore initiated “from the top”, and was largely influenced by former President Mwalimu Nyerere. Nyerere, the father of the Tanzanian socialist “Ujamaa”, retired voluntarily from the Presidency in 1985 and handed over power to his chosen successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who also became chairman of the CCM in 1990. Although once a fierce defender of “one-party democracy”, it was Nyerere who first drew the attention of the Tanzanian leadership to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to the inevitability of a similar political transition in Africa (Hydén 1999). On February 21, 1990 in a widely publicized interview before the heads of the national mass media, Nyerere dramatically opened the national debate over multipartyism, while stressing at the same time the critical task of protecting Ujamaa (Sunday News 1990a, 7). Suggesting that Single Party rule might be a root cause for complacency in senior government officials (Wiseman 1990, 186), he argued that the Tanzanian system had developed a dangerous tendency towards authoritarianism. According to Nyerere, “when a Tanzanian cannot write an article and argue the need for more than one party – and by doing so he is committing treason – then at that stage we shall have gone too far” (Sunday News 1990b, 4). Referring to events in Eastern Europe, he added that “Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a Single Party is God’s wish” (Sunday News 1990a, 7). Officially, Nyerere recommended adopting a multi-party system in Tanzania because (1) the political environment was different from that of the 1960s and therefore the timing for

¹⁰⁷ Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4

introducing multiparty politics was opportune; (2) the CCM was a democratic party that wanted to preserve peace, stability and national harmony; (3) democracy was considered a precondition to Socialism, hence there was no ideological conflict in pluralism; and (4) the party wanted to remain modern and ahead of possible opposition movements to ensure its legitimacy and future political survival (Ngasongwa 1992). On the other hand, however, one can hypothesize that the introduction of multipartyism was a tactical decision in order to recover a Socialist agenda threatened by economic hardship and donor pressure to open up the political system (Ake 1991, 32 – 44). In fact, Tanzania in the 1990s experienced a “perestroika without glasnost” (Zirker 1997): largely as a result of pressure by external donors, who provided more than 30 percent of the country’s GDP in aid from 1985 to 1993, Tanzania joined a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) leading to a period of privatisation, reduction in salaries and subsidies and rampant corruption (Planmo 2002). Hence, by recommending multipartyism, Nyerere might have believed he could regather support for a government immersed in the most traumatic policies of a foreign-encouraged economic liberalization program (Zirker 1997).

Following Nyerere’s speech, the CCM party hierarchy complied and scheduled a National Conference on the political changes in Eastern Europe and a three-day symposium on “Socialist construction in the world” (Anglin, 1990, 435). Furthermore, in 1991 President Mwinyi appointed the so-called Nyalali-Commission tasked with the mandate to enquire whether Tanzanians actually wanted a change of the current political system, and what legal and constitutional changes were demanded to reintroduce multiparty politics (Planmo 2002). In response, the political opposition forces formed an independent National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) to spearhead demands for a Constitutional Conference (Nyirabu 2002). The leader of NCCR, Chief Abdallah Fundikira, qualified the Nyalali Commission as “a waste of taxpayers’ money” and threatened to call on the President to establish a transitional government in preparation for multi-party elections (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). However, the government did not cede to these demands, and when the Nyalali Commission presented its initial findings and recommended the adoption of multipartism (even though only a minority of Tanzanians actually favored such change), the National Executive Committee of CCM complied. On condition that national unity be preserved and Tanzanians learn the art of “contestation

without confrontation” (Martin 1992), the CCM accepted on 29 February 1992 to end its monopoly of political activities and its supremacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

In May 1992, Parliament endorsed the recommendation to start the transition to multiparty politics, amended several articles of the Constitution and legalised opposition parties. However, it also imposed two important caveats: Parties could not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life (Bjerk 2010, 276). When in 1995 the first multiparty parliamentary elections were held amid widespread reports of irregularities, CCM took 80 percent of seats, and its presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 62.8 percent compared to 27.8 percent for the leading opposition candidate Augustine Mrema.

References:

- Agence France Presse. 1995. “*Future Tanzanian President Rejects Election Fraud Claims*”. November 20th. Quoted in Barack Hofmann and Lindsay Robinson. 2009. “Tanzania's Missing Opposition”. *Journal of Democracy* 20(4): 123 - 136.
- Ahluwalia, Pal and Abebe Zegeye. 2001. “Multi-party Democracy in Tanzania – Crises in the Union”. *African Security Review* 10(3): 35 – 47.
- Ake, Claude. 1991. “Rethinking African Democracy”. *Journal of Democracy* 2(1): 32 - 44.
- Amon, Chaligha, Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek Davids. 2002. “Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanian’s Views of Political and Economic Reform”. Working Paper No. 18. Afrobarometer (March).
- Anglin, Douglas G. 1990. “Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments”. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28(3): 431 - 455.
- Bjerk, Paul K. 2010. “Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State.” *History in Africa* 37: 275 - 319.
- Hoffman, Barak and Lindsay Robinson. 2009. “Tanzania’s Missing Opposition”. *Journal of Democracy* 20(4): 123 – 136.

- Hydén, Goeran. 1999. "Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania". *Journal of Democracy* 10(4): 142 - 155.
- Martin, Denis-Constant. 1992. "Demokrasia ni Nini? Fragments swahili du débat politique en Tanzanie". *Politique Africaine* 47: 109 – 134.
- Ngasongwa, Juma. 1992. "Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System". *Review of African Political Economy* 54: 112 – 116.
- Nyirabu, Mohabe. 2002. "The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party". *African Journal of Political Science* 7(2): 99 – 112.
- Planmo, Markus. 2002. *From Patron-Client to Client-Server: e-democracy in Tanzania?* MA Thesis. Uppsala University.
- Sunday News (Dar es Salaam). 1990a. February 25th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Sunday News (Dar es Salaam). 1990b. February 26th. Quoted in Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.
- Wiseman, John A. 1990. *Democracy in Black Africa; Survival and revival*. New York: Paragon House.
- Zirker, Daniel. 1997. "The Executive Origins of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania". *Martin Journal of Peace and Conflict Research* No. 1. University of Idaho.

(11) Mali

By the late 1980s, many Malians had become disenchanted with the regime of Moussa Traoré who had ruled the country since his ascension to power in 1969. Struggling with a stagnating economy and a corrupted leadership, they felt that Traoré's regime was both detrimental to the country's well-being, and unreformable¹⁰⁸. During the year 1990 opposition to the military dictatorship began forming around three main groups, which quickly consolidated into the Comité de Coordination des Associations et Organisations Démocratiques (CCAOD): the Comité Nationale d'Initiative Démocratique (CNID), the Alliance Démocratique du Mali (ADEMA) and the Association des Élèves et Étudiants du Mali (AEEM) (Bertrand 1992; Sidibé and Kester 1994). The CCAOD would later move to the forefront of dissent by helping to initiate the mass demands for a multi-party system and democracy in Mali. Paradoxically, however, some of the first public demands for greater pluralism came from inside the regime itself, when the UNTM, Mali's government-sponsored Union, declared her support for the instauration of multipartyism during her extraordinary session on May 28/29, 1990. Three months later Mali's barrister association echoed this call in an open letter to the President published in the independent journal *Les Échos* (Lange 1999). In early 1991, CCAOD convened a series of talks on greater political openness with the government. The talks, however, failed due to Traoré's unwillingness to discuss the issues put forth by CCAOD, notably an investigation into the death of some pro-democracy protestors at the hands of security forces (Passanante and Rennebohm 2011). Only a month later, on March 17, 1991, CCAOD organized a "National Day of Martyrs" demonstration which more than 100.000 people attended. They reiterated their demands for a National Congress to establish a multi-party system. Additionally, AEEM announced a 48h student strike to begin the next day, and a protest march to take on place on March 22. Traoré responded by instating a state of emergency and ordering riot police and the military to repress the demonstrations, which resulted in the death of at least 22 participants. At the same time, he offered concessions to opposition leaders, promising to free hundreds of political prisoners and to consider the instauration of a multiparty system.

¹⁰⁸ The dismissal, in 1987, of Soumana Sacko, a Finance minister hailed for his integrity, was only one of many instances that proved to ordinary Malians that reform-minded individuals were not particularly welcome in Traoré's regime (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005, 55).

Yet he refused to resign as President (Reuters 1991). Conversely, the opposition rejected any deal that fell short of Traoré leaving power, and on March 25, thousands of workers followed a call by the UNTM for a national strike meant to last until Traoré resigned. Demonstrations continued in force, but for the first time since the beginning of demonstrations the Army did not shoot on protestors (Reuters 1991). One day later, a military group led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré toppled General Traoré in a palace coup and promised to turn Mali into a multi-party democracy and to organize elections. Indeed, in 1992 Alpha Oumar Konaré of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali won Mali's first free and fair legislative and presidential elections.

In Mali's democratic transition, divisions within the regime were apparent in both the civil machinery and the military, even though the latter should prove decisive in tipping the balance of power in favor of regime softliners. On the side of the bureaucracy, there were people like Bakary Karambé, the UNTM's General Secretary, who were sympathetic to the democratic sentiment among the populace and who pushed within regime organisations for greater openness. It is significant that civil members of the regime were among the first to raise the call for multipartyism: first during a conference of the Single Party in March 1990 (Diarrah Totoh 1996, 34), and then again in May 1990 during an extraordinary session of the regime-associated Workers' Union (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005)¹⁰⁹.

During the course of the transition, several other high ranking figures from Traoré's ruling apparatus publicly denounced Traoré's stubbornness and his lack of comprehension for the gravity of the situation, and declared their willingness to work with opposition leaders towards a democratic solution. Reports claim that during the protests of March 22 and 23, 1991, Mathieu Tiona Koné, Minister of Communication, called Traoré to alert him on the deteriorating situation and advised him to announce immediately the instauration of multipartyism. Laughingly Traoré replied: "Tu t'affoles pour rien" (JeuneAfrique.com 2011a). Two days later, when Traoré sent away an opposition delegation demanding his

¹⁰⁹ The Union representatives ended their reunion by declaring: "Considérant que le parti unique constitutionnel et institutionnel ne répond plus aux aspirations démocratiques du peuple malien (...) le conseil central extraordinaire rejette en bloc le dirigisme politique qui entrave le développement de la démocratie au Mali (...) et opte pour l'instauration du multipartisme et du pluralisme démocratique" (Cerdes 1995, 33).

immediate resignation, the Minister-General of the Presidency, Django Sissoko, is said to have run after the delegation members, begging them to come back and negotiate, and confirming that softliners within the regime were willing to consent to change: “Revenez, ne partez pas! Ne faites pas comme lui (...) Le Mali ne se limite pas à un seul homme!” (JeuneAfrique.com 2011b; JeuneAfrique.com 2011a). Finally, the Single Party’s administrative secretary M’Bouillé Siby and Traoré’s political secretary Djibril Diallo publicly dissociated themselves from Traoré by calling for the establishment of a multi-party system (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005). Diallo also resigned from his post as a show of support for the protesters (Wilmington Morning Star 1991), claiming that this was “in agreement with [his] conscience as a man, a militant and a citizen” (Faul 1991a)¹¹⁰.

Within the military, support for Traoré essentially centered on a hardliner group of senior leaders that cultivated a close friendship to Traoré, notably Air Force commander and Minister of Defense General Mamadou Coulibaly, and Interior Minister General Sékou Ly. When demonstrations against Traoré started, Ly promptly proceeded to prohibit political activities by CNID, ADEMA and AEEM and threatened violence against those who would defy his orders (Villalon and Von Doepp 2005). Heeding Traoré’s call to “braid [dissenters] crowns of fire” (JeuneAfrique.com 2011b), Ly was at the forefront of repression against protestors in March 1991, showing that at least part of the Army was still loyal to the President (Faul 1991b). On his orders, soldiers fired into protesting crowds with live bullets, killing at least 148 and wounding hundreds, and then blocked hospitals to stop the wounded from getting help (New York Times 1991; Reuters 1991). Some accounts claim they even burnt down several shops at the market with their customers still inside (Morrison and Azam 1999).

On the other hand, a large number of young soldiers and officers were in favor of a return to the barracks and sympathetic to the protestors’ plight (Faul 1991a). By March 26, thousands of soldiers put down their arms and joined the pro-democracy movement in the streets, refusing to execute Traoré’s orders to shoot on the protestors. The same day, after several previous coup attempts had remained unfruitful, a group of young officers led by Lieutenant Col. Amadou Toumani Touré overthrew President Traoré with the support of

¹¹⁰ Diallo had tried to resign already in 1990 after telling the ruling party that “the one-party system has reached the threshold of incompetence”, but his request had been denied (Faul 1991a).

Anatole Sangaré, Chief Security Director, Oumar Traoré, Assistant Chief of Staff, and Oumar Diallo, Chief of Staff, who promised to support the coup by facilitating access to Traoré's office. Touré, claiming that the Army was forced to act to "put an end to the bloodthirsty and corrupt regime of Moussa Traoré" (New York Times 1991), promised a return to the barracks for the Army¹¹¹ and the instauration of "social justice and total democracy" (Los Angeles Times 1991b). To this end he solicited the collaboration of the Committee of Pro-Democracy Associations (Diop 2011), announced the disbanding of the Single Party and the organization of free and fair elections within a year.

Resume:

Touré's successful coup proves that softliners within the regime had marginalised the hardliner group sufficiently to take over the reins of power; we therefore believe it correct to confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime in Mali's democratic transition.

References:

Bertrand, Monique. 1992. "Un an de transition politique : de la révolte à la IIIe République". *Politique africaine* 47: 9 - 22.

Cerdes: Coalition Mondiale Pour l'Afrique et Africa Leadership Forum. 1995. *Le Processus démocratique malien de 1960 à nos jours*. Bamako: Editions Donniya.

Diarra Totoh, Seydou Mamadou. 1996. *Le Mouvement démocratique malien. L'itinéraire de l'Adema-PASJ: origine et parcours*. Bamako: Graphique Industrie SA.

Diop, Mame Diarra. 2011. "26 mars 1991 - 26 mars 2011: que reste t-il de la révolution démocratique?" *Journal du Mali*, March 25th. Available at: <http://www.journaldumali.com/article.php?aid=2926>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.

¹¹¹ Traoré insisted that the Army would no longer meddle in politics, and that the reason for which they had decided to overthrow Traoré was the suffering of the Malian people (Press 1992; Government of Mali 2010). "C'est le vendredi 22 mars que nous avons compris que Moussa avait atteint le point de non-retour et que nous devons intervenir (...) A partir du 22 mars, quand les gosses ont exposé leurs poitrines aux balles, suivis de leurs mères - nos sœurs, nos femmes -, on ne pouvait plus hésiter. (...)", Touré explains in an interview with the weekly journal "Jeune Afrique" (Diop 2011). "J'avais honte d'être officier de l'armée. Moussa Traoré ne servait plus les intérêts du pays" (Radio France International 1992).

- Faul, Michelle. 1991a. "Opposition leaders says Mali President captured by troops". *AP News Archive*, March 26th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Opposition-Leaders-Says-Mali-President-Captured-by-Troops/id-345ab6769179ef92548ee3f54564c708>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Faul, Michelle. 1991b. "Thousands strike in Mali's capital". *AP News Archive*, March 25th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Thousands-Strike-in-Mali-s-Capital/id-cdfb4c04409a2a49849b7fce3ae3bb56>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Government of Mali. 2010. *Amadou Toumani Toure sur l'ORTM: Un temoignage instructif*. March 29th. Available at: http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4022. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Jeune Afrique.com. 2011a. "Mali: Comment Bamako a chassé Moussa Traoré il y a vingt ans". Available at: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110322164211/>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- JeuneAfrique.com. 2011b. "De la médiocrité à la boucherie: le règne de Moussa Traoré au Mali (1968-1991)". Available at: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110322115442/mali-alpha-oumar-konare-bamako-attde-la-mediocrite-a-la-boucherie-le-regne-de-moussa-traore-au-mali-1968-1991.html>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Lange, Marie-France. 1999. "Insoumission civile et défaillance étatique : les contradictions du processus démocratique malien". *Autrepart* 10: 117 - 134.
- Los Angeles Times 1991a. "Soldiers in Mali Kill 7 in 3rd Day of Anti-Regime Protests". March 25th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-25/news/mn-610_1_mali-radio. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1991b. "Leader of Mali Coup Promises Democracy". March 27th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-27/news/mn-944_1_coup-leader. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Morrisson, Christian and Jean-Paul Azam. 1999. *Conflict and Growth in Africa The Sahel, Volume 1*. OECD Publishing.
- New York Times. 1991. "Mali's Dictator Is Overthrown in Coup". March 27th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/27/world/mali-s-dictator-is-overthrown-in-coup.html>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.

- Passanante, Aly and Max Rennebohm. 2011. "Mali's defeat dictator, gain free election (March Revolution), 1991". *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. Available at: <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mali-ians-defeat-dictator-gain-free-election-march-revolution-1991>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Press, Robert. 1992. "Mali's Interim Leader Promises Democracy". *Christian Science Monitor*, February 13th. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0213/13052.html>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Radio France International. 1992. "*ATT, des armes aux urnes*". Available at: http://www1.rfi.fr/actu/fr/articles/029/article_14953.asp. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Reuters. 1991. "Mali Shaken by New Rioting, Nationwide Strike". *Los Angeles Times*, March 26th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-26/news/mn-747_1_nationwide-strike. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Sidibé, Oumarou and Gérard Kester. 1994. *Démocratie et Concertation nationale. La mise en oeuvre du Conseil économique, social et culturel du Mali*. La Haye-Paris: Padep- L'Harmattan.
- Villalon, Leonardo Alfonso and Peter Von Doepp. 2005. *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions*. Indiana University Press.
- Wilmington Morning Star. 1991. "*Violence in Mali : Workers rally, want chief out*". March 26th.

(12) Zambia

Zambian disaffection with the regime of Kenneth Kaunda increased sharply during the 1980s when the socio-economic decline, combined with Kaunda's first attempt to implement an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program, led to a rapid rise in the cost of living and to serious legitimacy problems for UNIP, the ruling Single Party (Los Angeles Time 1986). In 1986, the so-called IMF riots broke out after the government tried to cut the maize subsidies, and forced Kaunda to abandon the IMF policies. Three years later, inspired by the changes taking place in the former Communist countries, the Trade Union leadership of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) resolved to spearhead a campaign for greater governmental accountability and the restoration of multi-party politics (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). ZCTU-President Frederick Chiluba, who would later become Zambia's first freely elected President, declared in March 1990 that "the ZCTU believes that the one-party system is open to abuse" and called on President Kaunda to hold a national referendum on democratic pluralism (Times of Zambia 1990a). Anxious to take back the initiative, Kaunda agreed a month later to hold such a referendum, but stressed that UNIP would be campaigning for a "no"-vote because multiparty politics risked fragmenting Zambian society and returning it to the "Stone Age politics" of ethnic violence (Reuters 1990a). But the referendum campaign was overtaken by events: In June 1990, in an attempt to get the economy back on track and rekindling ties with the IMF, the government decided to double the prize of "mealie-meal", a dietary staple. In response, three days of riots and looting occurred in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, with security forces killing at least 27 people and arresting near one thousand more. Additionally, in what seemed to be an ill-prepared coup attempt by a group of disaffected junior Army officers, a rebel Army lieutenant broadcasted from the government radio station on June 30 that there had been a change of regime, prompting jubilant crowds to surge into the street – only to be disappointed hours later when Grey Zulu, UNIP's General secretary, went on air to announce that the putsch had failed (Beatwell 1991).

In the meantime, a National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy spearheaded by figures from civil society (Frederick Chiluba) and former UNIP-members

that had defected to the opposition¹¹² formed in July 1990 and pushed for the abandoning of the referendum and the immediate organization of multiparty elections (Bratton 1992). But Kaunda stalled, and soon peaceful mass protests calling for the President's resignation were held in almost every major city. Pushed into a corner, in September 1990 Kaunda acceded to the opposition's demands, appointed a commission to draft a new Constitution and legalized independent political parties. By January 1991, the National Interim Committee itself registered as a political party under the name of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and its chairman Frederick Chiluba won Zambia's first free presidential elections only a few months later.

In Zambia, we find that softliners started showing their colors fairly early in the transition, and they were present both in the civilian and the military wing of the regime. However, the Zambian transition is peculiar among African transitions in that it did not culminate in the forceful removal of the dictator, as happened for example in Mali. In fact, if one listened to an interview Kaunda gave to the New York Times ten years after his abdication, one might be surprised that the former dictator even stayed in power as long as he did, given his vocal support for popular self-determination¹¹³. But whereas Kaunda might have had a more moderate predisposition towards leaving power than many of his African peers, he certainly was not a convinced softliner. In fact, Kaunda openly favored the retention of the one-party-system and often warned against the pitfalls of multipartyism which "would only bring chaos to the nation". Instead, he appealed to the opposition to "come back to the fold", arguing that "multiparty politics in the Third World, especially developing countries in Africa, brought nothing but hatred, as those in opposition failed to look at matters but created conflicts which led to death." (Times of Zambia 1990b). In fact, Kaunda believed that opposition was foreign to African tradition, and believed that it would be unfair to expect Africa to follow pure, modern democratic principles if these principles took centuries to develop in European countries (Olivier 1981). Therefore, even after agreeing to restore Zambia's multiparty system, Kaunda's government continued to arrest political opponents, ban opposition gatherings, fire critics from within the ruling

¹¹² The two members in question were former Finance Minister Arthur Wina and former Foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga.

¹¹³ "There is no shame in leaving power", Kaunda affirmed, and went even further: "Why should anyone in public life impose himself on the people? (...) The decisions must be made by the people" (Swarns 2002).

party and order riot police to suppress protestors (Ham 1991), all the while disparaging political foes by labeling them “misfits, malcontents and drug traffickers” (Reuters 1990b).

Why did Kaunda then decide to give in to opposition demands, organized elections and willingly stepped aside when it became clear that Chiluba had won? On one hand, overconfidence in his own and his party’s popularity might explain part of the paradox¹¹⁴. On the other hand, however, we believe that softliner pressure, and particularly the fear of an eventual loss of support of the Armed Forces played a major part in Kaunda’s decision to accept pluralism. In the civil wing (UNIP) of Kaunda’s regime, dissident voices had appeared already in the early 1980s. In Parliament, for instance, where all members belonged to UNIP, backbenchers acted as the “unofficial opposition” and displayed a high degree of independence in opposing those government policies they felt to be against the interests of the majority of Zambians (Gertzel 1984). They rejected, for instance, Kaunda’s project to transform the legislative mandate of Parliament into a part-time mandate (Merino 2013).

Calls for reform increased in number and strength by the end of the 1980s. Kaunda’s abandoning of the IMF-guided economic recovery program in 1989 gave new legitimacy to voices like ex-foreign Minister Vernon Mwaanga, who called for the abolition of state monopolies and free competition in all sectors of the economy, and former UNIP General Secretary Humphrey Mulemba, who demanded an end to the state of emergency, increased protection for Human Rights, an end to political interference in the judiciary and civil service, and the establishment of a Constitutional Commission (Times of Zambia 1989). These calls were echoed at UNIP’s Fifth National Congress in March 1990. Former Finance minister Arthur Wina, for example, demanded a re-examination of UNIP’s political dominance. Alexander Chikwanda, another former Finance Minister, attacked the one-party state and called for the reform of local government and emergency powers, civil rights and elections. (Bartlett 2000). By consequent, delegates to the UNIP

¹¹⁴ These miscalculations were nourished partly by incorrect assessments of UNIP’s support base. UNIP General Secretary Grey Zulu, for example, argued that UNIP would succeed “even in the multiparty state because in the 17 years of one-party participatory democracy a lot of achievements had been made and those ought to be credited to UNIP” (Times of Zambia 1990d). Therefore, right after voting, Kaunda declared that he “expect[ed] to win the game, and the election” (Los Angeles Times 1991).

Congress passed resolutions in support of political liberalisation measures (Times of Zambia 1990c; Mwaanga 1990, 80), but nevertheless voted to retain the one-party system.

After Kaunda had presented a bill to Parliament that would have strengthened the existing executive structures, Parliament, by rejecting the bill, once again demonstrated its dissident character towards the regime (Times of Zambia 1990e). Only one month later, in April 1990, Kaunda announced his intention to hold a referendum on the reintroduction of multi-party elections. A second incident, however, prompted him to abandon his referendum plans in favor of a direct move to elections: in August 1990, the National Assembly unanimously approved the Haimbe Report (Government of the Republic of Zambia 1990), which recommended far-reaching reforms of the structure of the political regime to increase popular participation in political affairs and improve the accountability of party and government (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). During the first quarter of 1991, calls from inside UNIP for Kaunda's resignation became more and more frequent, as less and less members openly supported UNIP. One UNIP member, Enock Kavindele, even offered to challenge Kaunda for the party presidency and the party presidential nomination (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). Other leading members of the UNIP central committee, such as Elijah Mudenda, Reuben Kamanga, and Gray Zulu, declined to stand for reappointment (Phiri 2001).

Furthermore, a number of high-level UNIP politicians, including at least 20 former or sitting UNIP MPs and 12 former UNIP Cabinet Ministers, had defected from the ruling party and joined the MMD camp (Bartlett 2000). At an August MMD rally in Lusaka, MPs Bennie Mwiinga, Humphrey Mulemba and Sikota Wina, as well as UNIP Central Committee member Ludwig Sondashi publicly resigned from the party, and MP Joshua Lumina apologized to the crowd for supporting UNIP (National Mirror 1990a). Most importantly, three of the plotters of a 1980 coup attempt to overthrow Kaunda (Brig. Godfrey Miyanda, Mbita Kabalika and Valentine Musakanya) were among the MMD's main organizers (Perlez 1991).

The dominant position of softliners within UNIP and the number of defectors explain in part why party hardliners were unable to gather sufficient support to derail the

transition process¹¹⁵. The other part of the explanation lies within the softliner faction in the military, which made it clear that, while unwilling - for the moment - to support a coup, they looked favorably upon the claims of the protesters. By the start of 1991, UNIP's and Kaunda's position looked increasingly shaky, and the loyalty of the Armed Forces was in question (IISS 1990). Kaunda seemed to be aware of this fact, since after announcing his decision to hold elections, he implored the Defence Forces to remain loyal to the "government of the day", affirming that "as UNIP is in power, your loyalty to the UNIP government should remain unquestionable" (Times of Zambia 1990b). His fears were not without foundation, as there had been several unsuccessful coup attempts in the past decade¹¹⁶, the most recent of which occurred in June 1990¹¹⁷.

Although the coups were foiled by government troops, one of their senior commanders, Lt. General Hannania Lungu revealed that it was not so much loyalty to Kaunda as to the Constitution that motivated the intervention: "We were ready to bomb the Mass Media Complex if it meant to defend the state (...) it does not matter who is in power but people should always believe in democracy" (Chifuwe 2003). His words are further corroborated if one considers that loyalist forces in the aftermath of the putsch attempt hesitated several hours before coming to the President's rescue (Borger 1990), and truckloads of military policemen were seen giving thumbs-up signs as an indication of support for the protesters that had come to cheer Kaunda's fall (Perlez 1990). Therefore,

¹¹⁵ For instance, at an UNIP party rally in November 1990, the Secretary of State for Defence and Security unsuccessfully tried to convince the crowd that they should identify multiparty advocates in their own neighborhoods: "We have to demarcate our sections, branches and wards and know how many of the houses are not UNIP. Mark the enemies by their language and notify the government, which will find means of converting them to UNIP. If that fails, the government will find other means of making it practically impossible for them to live in Lusaka" (National Mirror 1990b) Party hardliners also verbally attacked the international election observers, accusing them of being "a big imperialist plot" intended to install "a puppet MMD government" in Zambia (Bjornlund et al. 1992, 425), but Kaunda moved quickly to restrain these voices and he publicly called on Zambians to support the observation mission.

¹¹⁶ Zambia's first coup attempt in 1980, initiated mostly by businessmen, was preempted days before its implementation by the arrest of the coup plotters and their armed supporters on a farm in Chilanga (Times of Zambia 1980). In 1988, a second coup attempt led by former Vice President Lt. Gen Christon Tembo and fifteen other high-ranking dissidents was also foiled and the plotters imprisoned. They were released in the course of the transition (Ham 1990)

¹¹⁷ During this coup, Lt. Mwamba Luchembe, together with a handful of fellow officers, took control of the national radio for several hours, claiming that the Army had taken over the government (Legum 1996, 676). Speaking about the attempted putsch, Luchembe claimed that he took action because of the government's poor performance and the shortage in basic necessities (Times of Zambia 2013). Although Kaunda was quick in dismissing the plotters as "confused persons" (Los Angeles Times 1990), it was clear that the plotters had the backing of senior officers such as Army commander Lt-Gen Gary Kalenge, and the Inspector General of the Police, Josiah Konayuma, both of which lost their posts after the coup was foiled (Mills 1992).

the very real fear of a successful coup attempt sooner or later might have been a key factor in Kaunda's change of position towards democratization.

Resume:

Softliner pressure, together with fear of losing the support of a progressively oriented military, led hardliner Kaunda to accept opposition demands and to hold democratic elections. We therefore confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

Bartlett, David. 2000. "Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429 - 446.

Beatwell, Chisala. 1991. *Lt.Luchembe: Coup Attempt*. Lusaka: Multimedia Zambia.

Bjornlund, Eric, Michael Bratton and Clark Gibson. 1992. "Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons From Zambia". *African Affairs* 91(364): 405 - 431.

Borger, Julian. 1990. "Zambian Unrest Spurs Plebiscite On Kaunda Rule". *Christian Science Monitor*, July 10th. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/0710/ozam.html>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Bratton, Michael. 1992. "Zambia Starts Over". *Journal of Democracy* 3(2): 81 - 94.

Chifuwe, Sheikh. 2003. "Zambia: Former ZAF Commander Recounts Luchembe Coup . . . We Were Ready to Bomb ZNBC". *The Post*, January 12th. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200301130882.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Erdmann, Cero and Neo Simutanyi. 2003. "Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic". Occasional Paper. Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Gertzel, Cherry. 1984. "Dissent and Authority in the Zambian State 1973-80". In Gertzel, Cherry, Louise Baylies and Morris Szeftel (eds), *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Government of Republic of Zambia. 1990. *The Report of the Special Parliamentary Select Committee*. Lusaka: Government Printer.

Ham, Melinda. 1990. "Senior Army Officers Freed in Zambia". *AP News Archive*, July 31st. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/Senior-Army-Officers-Freed-in-Zambia/id-c250afaf57db9a19b14ad183e1ed5f51>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Ham, Melinda. 1991. "Kaunda manipulates media in struggle for political survival". *AP News Archive*, January 2nd. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Kaunda-Manipulates-Media-in-Struggle-for-Political-Survival/id-82c296859b47e91e70333eab1e887ae6>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 1990. *The Military Balance 1989-90*. London: Pavilion Books.

Legum, Colin. 1996. *Africa Contemporary Record 1989-90: Annual Survey and Documents*. New York: Holmes and Meier.

Los Angeles Times. 1986. "Thousands of Youths Riot in Zambia Over 100% Rise in Price of Corn Meal". December 10th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-10/news/mn-2287_1_price-of-corn-meal. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Los Angeles Times. 1990. "3 Reported Slain After Coup Is Crushed: Zambia: Troops fire on a celebrating crowd in the capital. President Kaunda denounces the plotters". July 1st. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-01/news/mn-919_1_coup-plotters. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Los Angeles Times 1991. "Zambians Go to Polls in First Multi-Party Elections Since '68". November 1st. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-01/news/mn-604_1_multi-party-elections. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Mérino Mathieu. 2013. "République de Zambie - Bilans annuels de 1983 à 2013". *L'état du monde, La Découverte*. Available at: <http://www.cairn.info/l-etat-du-monde-zambie-page-bilan.htm>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

Mills, Greg. 1992. "Zambia and the Winds of Change". *The World Today* 48(1): 16 - 18.

Mwaanga, Vernon J. 1990. "Can The Party (UNIP) Reform Itself?" In Mbikusita-Lewanika, Akashambatwa and Derrick Chitala (eds), *The Hour Has Come: Proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-Party Option*. Lusaka: Zambia Research Foundation, 80 - 82.

- National Mirror. 1990a. September 29th. Quoted in Lebas, Adrienne. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- National Mirror. 1990b. November 24th. Quoted in Lebas, Adrienne. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Perlez, Jane. 1990. "Failed Zambia Coup Weakens Leader". *New York Times*, July 1st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/01/world/failed-zambia-coup-weakens-leader.html>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.
- Perlez, Jane. 1991. "Zambian Voters Defeat Kaunda, Sole Leader Since Independence". *New York Times*, November 2nd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/02/world/zambian-voters-defeat-kaunda-sole-leader-since-independence.html?src=pm&pagewanted=2>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.
- Phiri, Bizeck J. 2001. "Colonial Legacy and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964 – 1991". *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 10(2): 224 - 244.
- Reuters. 1990a. "Kaunda Sees Riot Area as Zambians Urge Him to Quit". *Los Angeles Times*, June 29th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-29/news/mn-665_1_food-riots. Accessed June 18th, 2014.
- Reuters. 1990b. "Zambia's Leader Agrees to Free Political Captives". *Los Angeles Times*, July 26th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-26/news/mn-965_1_political-prisoners. Accessed June 18th, 2014.
- Swarns, Rachel. 2002. "Lusaka Journal; Look at Him Now: Kisses, Cheers and a Serenade". *New York Times*, January 31st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/31/world/lusaka-journal-look-at-him-now-kisses-cheers-and-a-serenade.html>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.
- Times of Zambia. 1980. October 17 - 24th. Quoted in Olivier, B.J. 1981. "Kaunda's Zambia". *Africa Insight* 11(1): 33 - 39.
- Times of Zambia. 1989. October 16th, 17th; November 11th, 29th; December 6th, 8th. Quoted in Bartlett, David. 2000. "Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429 - 446.
- Times of Zambia. 1990a. March 16th. Quoted in Bratton, Michael. 1992. "Zambia Starts Over". *Journal of Democracy* 3(2): 81 - 94.

Times of Zambia. 1990b. December 12th. Quoted in Mills, Greg. 1992. "Zambia and the Winds of Change". *The World Today* 48(1): 16 - 18.

Times of Zambia. 1990c. March 13th, 19th. Quoted in Bartlett, David. 2000. "Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429 - 446.

Times of Zambia. 1990d. December 25th. Quoted in Mills, Greg. 1992. "Zambia and the Winds of Change". *The World Today* 48(1): 16 - 18.

Times of Zambia. 1990e. April 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 25th. Quoted in Bartlett, David. 2000. "Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429 - 446.

Times of Zambia. 2013. "Zambia: Mwamba Luchembe Reflects on Failed Coup". September 28th. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201309300568.html>. Accessed June 18th, 2014.

(13) Malawi

Malawi's transition to democracy began in the early 1990s when "lifetime president" Hastings Kamuzu Banda encountered increasing domestic and international criticism to his rule (CIIR 1993; Mchombo 1998; Newell 1995; Clapham 1996, 202; Decalo 1998, 96). In the midst of a deepening economic crisis, domestic opponents led by Trade Union leader Chakufwa Chihana and exiled political dissidents were becoming more vocal in their denunciation of Banda's Human Rights abuses, the IMF-imposed structural adjustment program and Banda's authoritarian leadership style (Phiri 2011). The spark ignited a fire in March 1992 when Malawi's Roman Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter brandishing the country's corruption and mismanagement, and calling for political reform and the reestablishment of multiparty politics (Kirby 1994). Only days later, protests against Banda's regime broke out in Zomba, Blantyre and other cities and turned into nationwide industrial riots in which at least 38 people were killed by police and security forces (Somerville 1992, 11). In response to the unrest Banda tightened repression, boasting that dissidents would be "meat for crocodiles" (Africa Research Bulletin 1992, 10509). But as plans to kill the Bishops who issued the letter leaked to the media (Patel 2006, 16), Western nations suspended their aid to Malawi in order to force the regime to comply with international humanitarian law; a move that some cite as having important repercussions for the democratisation process in the aid-dependent African nation (Ihonbere 1997). The June 1992 legislative elections under the Single Party represented another blow for the Banda regime. Not only did these elections record the lowest voter turnout in the country's political history, they also witnessed the defeat of almost half the Parliamentarians, including those nominated and endorsed by Banda. In July, the regime's decision to imprison Chihana led to further public demonstrations. Reeling from the unrest, in autumn 1992 the regime offered a number of concessions to civil society, including the establishment of a "Presidential Committee on Dialogue" and the creation of a Public Affairs Committee with the participation of Malawi's churches and leading opposition movements (Ihonbere 1997). The first meeting between proponents and opponents of democracy took place on October 19, and on the eve of this meeting Banda announced his plans to hold a referendum to assess the popular desire in the country for constitutional reform (Kirby 1994). It was clear from his press statement that the exercise was not

intended to be a neutral assessment of voters' preferences, but would provide Malawians with an opportunity to show support for “their Kamuzu” (Ng'ong'ola 1996). However, in June 1993, 63 percent of the citizenry voted in favor of multi-party democracy, prompting Banda to reluctantly accept the results and to announce General Elections to be held within a year. Leading up to these elections, continued violence by Banda's private security forces, the “Young Pioneers” (MYP), prompted many to fear a reversal of the transition process if Banda should lose. Unexpectedly, however, a rebellion of enlisted personnel and junior officers of the regular Malawian Army proved crucial: in a military mission called “Operation Bwezani” they forced the disbanding of the MYP and therefore ensured equal competition for all political contenders (Phiri 2011). As a result, in May 1994, Banda was compelled to relinquish the presidency to Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF).

In Malawi's democratic transition we can identify regime softliners both within the civil and the military wing of the governing circle. However, it was only in December 1993, when the majority of Banda's coercive apparatus stopped supporting the regime, that a real crisis of the authoritarian regime unfolded. Prior to these events, the hardliner faction around Kamuzu Banda remained dominant and successfully stifled internal dissent through repression. Banda himself never made his hostility towards opposition a secret (Nsanja 2006)¹¹⁸. Even dissidents operating outside Malawi were in constant danger of being killed, as the deaths of exiled Malawian organizer Attati Mpakati in Zimbabwe (1983) and journalist Mkwapatira Mhango in Zambia (1989) show (Posner 1995). When in 1983 Dick Matenje, then-Secretary General of the Single Party, introduced a motion in Parliament that would have resulted in a modest liberalization of the regime, his bullet-riddled body was found together with those of two other Ministers, Aaron Gadama, and Twaibu Sangala, in an overturned car near the Mozambique border (Van Donge 1998). Critics say the support of those Ministers for multiparty politics angered John Tembo, uncle of Banda's longtime companion Cecilia Kadzamira and head of the feared MYP, who planned to succeed the aging Banda but who lacked the support of the civil servants and

¹¹⁸ Banda himself said: “There is no opposition in heaven. God himself does not want opposition – that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu have opposition?” (Short 1974, 40). In order to maintain his dominance he was willing to go to great lengths: As early as 1966 he announced: “If to maintain political stability and efficient administration I have to detain 10.000, 100.000, I will do it (...)” (Phiri and Ross 1998, 49). “The Malawian system, the Malawian style is that Kamuzu says it's that and then it's finished. Whether anyone likes it or not, that is how it's going to be here (...)” (Virmani 1992, 78).

the Armed Forces (Robinson 2009). When it became clear that Tembo was quickly consolidating his power, many former Banda loyalists broke away from the ruling MCP, for example Dr. Bakili Muluzi who formed the UDF. It was also a wake-up call for many inside and outside the regime circle that a change in the political system was becoming an imminent necessity (Phiri 2011).

Why then did Banda accept to hold a referendum on his rule and set up elections? In fact, we think that even though government hardliners accepted a certain liberalization process, they did so begrudgingly and with the idea that, should their electoral appeal prove insufficient to keep office, their repressive capacity certainly would (Brown 2004). This turned out to be a major miscalculation given the alienation of the Malawi Armed Forces, a vital part of Banda's support base. Anger about Banda's leadership style had been growing within the lower and middle ranks of the military since the 1960s, when Banda started to concentrate resources in the hands of a paramilitary security force, the Young Pioneers. With acquiescence of the senior military leadership, Banda was diverting resources from the regular Armed Forces towards the MYP¹¹⁹ and humiliated them in the face of their MYP counterparts by entrusting the task of Presidential Guard to the MYP instead of the military (Phiri 2011)¹²⁰. Furthermore, the rise of John Tembo and his involvement in the RENAMO uprising in neighboring Mozambique seriously alienated both senior and junior leadership of the Malawi Army (Rupiya 2005). Deployed into Mozambique in order to help the government in place fight a guerrilla rebellion, Malawi soldiers were furious when they realized that MYP was covertly supporting RENAMO rebels, and that they were losing men in a war which was being fuelled by their own country (Phiri 2000)

As a consequence, the Armed Forces occupied an unusually reformist role in the transition to democracy (Forster 2000). When students protested in March 1992, junior Army officers stationed nearby offered them encouragement and protected them from the

¹¹⁹ The lower and middle rank officers of the Malawian Army knew that the arming of the Young Pioneers went through the Army itself; their suspicion was confirmed when they found Cobbe Barracks of the Malawi Army at bases of the Young Pioneers during the Bwezani raids (The Monitor 1993b). This discovery strengthened the sense of betrayal these officers felt towards the senior military leadership and Banda himself.

¹²⁰ Another embarrassment to the military was the fact that by 1985, the MYP had a commander that was more senior in rank than the commander of the regular Armed Forces.

police (Amnesty International 1992, 11). A month later, senior and middle-ranking officers met with Banda and made clear that they would not be used for MCP partisan purposes or for repressing Malawians calling for multipartyism (Brown 2004). Some even claim that the only reason for why Banda accepted the referendum results was because of pressure from the Army (Meinhardt and Patel 2003).

Finally, the turning point in the Malawi Army's relationship to politics came in December 1993, when a minor incident between soldiers and MYP members sparked "Operation Bwezani"¹²¹, the violent disarming of the Young Pioneers. What started out as a soldiers' rebellion (Van Donge 2002) was also a catalyst for the transition to democracy, as the elimination of the MYP destroyed Banda's last meaningful influence on the security machinery and made it impossible for the regime to forcefully interrupt the democratisation process (Meinhardt and Patel 2003). Whereas Operation Bwezani was clearly motivated at least partly by inner-military tensions¹²², there was also a decidedly political aspect about the operation, which was the Army's general support for the democratic transition. For instance, during the operation soldiers took Fred Nseula, the head of the Transitional Committee NCC, on a tour to see the weapons they had recovered. This gesture signalled that they recognized the alternative civilian leadership to Banda, even though the NCC at that time had no executive or legislative power (Chirambo 2004). Afterwards, when the Army returned to the barracks, officers made it clear that they did so out of respect for the opposition-dominated NCC rather than because they continued to recognize the authority of Banda's Single Party (Posner 1995). By the same token, the return to the barracks was interpreted by many as a tacit approval of the process of political change, since the Malawi Army could have easily taken over the government (Chirwa 1994). For an Army that traditionally maintained a "detached loyalty" to the regime, Operation Bwezani was a major turning point (Phiri 2000) and one that would decide the crisis of the authoritarian regime in favor of softliners.

¹²¹ Bwezani means "give back", and is a reference to the fact that the Malawi Army was retrieving military material that the MYP was not willing to give up (Chirambo 2004).

¹²² Operation Bwezani had, in fact, produced a coup within the Army's own ranks, as lower and middle-rank officers demanded the resignation of senior officers perceived to be corrupt and "compromised by politics" (The Monitor 1993a).

Resume:

The military's support for the democratic transition and their refusal to exercise their repressive capacity on Banda's behalf sealed the fate of Malawi's dictatorship. We thus confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

- Amnesty International. 1992. "*Malawi. March-July 1992: Mass Arrests of Suspected Government Opponents.*" London: Amnesty International.
- Brown, Stephen. 2004. "Born-Again Politicians Hijacked our Revolution": Reassessing Malawi's Transition to Democracy". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38(3): 705 - 722.
- Catholic Institute for International Relations. 1993. *Malawi: A Moment of Truth*. CIIR: London.
- Chirambo, Reuben. 2004. "Operation Bwezani: The army, political change, and Dr. Banda's hegemony in Malawi". *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13(2): 146 – 163.
- Chirwa, Wiseman. 1994. "We want change: Cleaning house in Malawi". *Southern Africa Report* 9(4). Available at: <http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=4009>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Clapham, Christopher. 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Decalo, Samuel. 1998. *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-1990*. Gainesville and London: Florida Academic Press.
- Forster, Peter G. 2000. "Democratisation in Malawi: Extended Review". *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(4): 857 - 861.
- Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1997. "From despotism to democracy: The rise of multiparty politics in Malawi". *Third World Quarterly* 18(2): 225 - 248.
- Kirby, Michael D. 1994. "Round table on transition to multi-party democracy in Malawi". *Commonwealth Law Bulletin* 20(1): 293 - 298.

- “Malawi: Anger Builds Up”. 1992. *Africa Research Bulletin* 29(3): 1 - 31.
- Mchombo, Sam A. 1998. "Democratization in Malawi: Its Roots and Prospects." In Gros, Jean-Germain (ed), *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press.
- Meinhardt, Heiko and Nandini Patel. 2003. *Malawi's Process of Democratic Transition: An Analysis of Political Developments Between 1990 and 2003*. Lilongwe: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Newell, Jonathan. 1995. "A Moment of Truth? The Church and Political Change in Malawi, 1992." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 33(2): 243 - 62.
- Ng'ong'ola, Clement. 1996. "Managing the transition to political pluralism in Malawi: legal and constitutional arrangements". *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 34(2): 85 - 110.
- Nsanja, Alinane R. 2006. *The Political Crisis in Malawi: From Authoritarianism to Democracy*. MA Thesis. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.
- Patel, Nandini. 2006. "Political Parties: Development and Change in Malawi". Electoral Institute of Southern Africa Research Report 21. Johannesburg: EISA, 15 - 16.
- Phiri, Hartone Lawrence. 2011. *The rebellion of enlisted personnel and democratization in Malawi*. MA Thesis. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
- Phiri, Kings and Kenneth Ross. 1998. *Democratisation in Malawi. A Stocktaking*. Blantyre.
- Phiri, Kings. 2000. "A Case of Revolutionary Change in Contemporary Malawi: The Malawi Army and the Disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers". *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies* 1(1). Available at: <http://malawiyoungpioneer.freeservers.com/article3.html>. Accessed May 6th, 2014.
- Posner, Daniel. 1995. "Malawi's New Dawn". *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 131 - 145.
- Robinson, David. 2009. "Renamo, Malawi and the struggle to succeed Banda: Assessing theories of Malawian intervention in the Mozambican Civil War". *Eras* 11 (December).
- Rupiya, Martin. 2005. "The odd man out: A history of the Malawi army since July 1964". In Rupiya, Martin (ed), *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Short, Philip. 1974. *Banda*. Routledge & Kegan Paul: Boston.

Somerville, Keith. 1992. "One Man Banda." *New African* (July): 11 - 13.

The Monitor. 1993a. December 6th. Quoted in Chirambo, Reuben. 2004. "Operation Bwezani: The army, political change, and Dr. Banda's hegemony in Malawi". *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13(2): 146 – 163.

The Monitor. 1993b. December 10th. Quoted in Chirambo, Reuben. 2004. "Operation Bwezani: The army, political change, and Dr. Banda's hegemony in Malawi". *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13(2): 146 – 163.

Van Donge, Jan Kees. 1998. "The Mwanza Trial as a Search for a Usable Malawian Political Past". *African Affairs* 97(386): 91 - 118.

Van Donge, Jan Kees. 2002. "Malawian Society and the Charismatic Heritage of Kamuzu Banda and Kamuzuism after". Working Paper.

Virmani, K. 1992. *Dr. Banda in the making of Malawi*. Kalinga: Delhi.

(14) Benin

Like many other African transitions, Benin's quest for democracy started with an economic downturn in the mid-1980s when President Kerekou's position became increasingly precarious both among supporters of his regime and the opposition (Banégas 1995a; Gisselquist 2008).¹²³ When state resources dried up further, Benin adopted an IMF-prescribed structural adjustment program, but the measures were too little too late: in 1988, Benin's three state-owned banks collapsed, and in 1989, the government was unable to pay the salaries of its civil servants, including most of its soldiers (Banégas 2003, 77). After several months of unpaid salaries, students and public sector workers, together with exiled opposition politicians, launched a first wave of strikes that was violently repressed by the regime's security forces¹²⁴ (Noudjenoume 1999, 126). A few months later, in April 1989, a second wave of strikes shook the country, and by December 1989, 40,000 Beninese demonstrated in the streets of Cotonou against Kerekou's regime (Heilbrunn 1993, 286). In response to this upheaval, Kerekou announced that steps would be taken to "introduce a healthy political climate" in the country (Reuters 1989b) and the PRPB, Benin's Single Party, embarked on a cautious liberalization program. In August 1989, several hundred political prisoners were granted amnesty, and in December 1989, Kerekou announced the abandonment of Benin's Marxist-Leninist state doctrine (Aube Nouvelle 2010). Following the counsel of his advisors, he also announced that a National Conference known as the "Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives" would be held in which representatives of all sectors of Benin's society could propose reform plans to the government (Morency-Laflamme 2015). All but one political party, the Parti Communiste du Dahomey, agreed to take part in the conference (Banégas 2003, 147) which took place from February 19 - 28 in Cotonou (ONEPI 1990). However, only a few days after the start of negotiations opposition politicians gained the upper hand and voted the conference sovereign, an act which de facto destituted President Kerekou. The motion passed with 372 votes for to 17 against with 32 abstentions; numbers that demonstrate that at least some government representatives supported the declaration (Seely 2001). Initially infuriated

¹²³ As early as 1985, students began launching small-scale strikes against the government's policies. Together with public sector workers they also organized clandestine unions that paralleled state-sponsored official unions (Nwajiaku 1994, 435).

¹²⁴ Kerekou had ordered the Armed Forces to stop the protesters by all means, authorizing the use of force if necessary (Reuters 1989a).

about this “civilian coup d’État” (Faul 1990)¹²⁵, Kerekou later accepted the conference’s sovereignty and its new transitional government headed by Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo. A new Constitution was elaborated and the first multiparty legislative elections under the new Constitution were held on February 17, 1991. In the following presidential elections former President Kerekou participated, but lost to Soglo with 32.5 per cent to 67.5 per cent (Gisselquist 2008).

Benin’s democratic transition featured both a split within the Beninese authoritarian regime between pro- and antireform forces and a softliner majority, which played an important part in Kerekou’s decision not to contest the results of the National Conference. We can therefore confirm that Benin underwent a crisis of the authoritarian regime. As Seely suggests, the months leading up to Benin’s National Conference were dominated by a consensus, even on the part of some members of Kerekou’s regime, that reform was necessary (Adamon 1995). Kerekou was head of an effectively bankrupt state, his networks of patrimonial base had collapsed, and he was isolated from Benin’s Single Party, the PRPB (Seely 2005). Kerekou’s own position remains ambiguous: whereas some praise him as the “father of the winds of peace and democracy in Benin and Africa” (Dembele 2013), we believe it more accurate to classify him as a moderate whose anxiety for his personal survival superseded his desire for the survival of his regime (Allen 1992).

Firstly, while Kerekou was not opposed to a certain degree of reforms, he did not go out of his way to enact them. In fact, the Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives was already the third forum of this genre organised during Kerekou’s reign, but the decisions taken by the two first ones were never applied (Aube Nouvelle 2010). Moreover, when Kerekou addressed the conference on its opening day, the reforms he hoped the conference would achieve were rather minimal (Eckert 2002). Paradoxically, he recognized that “democratic renewal [in Benin was] an inescapable necessity of our time” (PBS 2001), but he nonetheless cried when the National Conference delegates told him Benin’s citizens no longer wanted him as President (Faul 1991) and refused to resign, repeatedly shouting “Don’t tell me to quit (...) Make your programme, write a new Constitution, name a Prime

¹²⁵ According to a transcript of the conference, Kerekou yelled: “You tell us that there is no longer a government, that the state no longer exists. But it is intolerable to believe that the current government is resigning, or that it will resign at the end of your labors.” (PBS 2001)

Minister, but don't tell me to resign" (Seely 2005). Later, he threatened to intervene in the electoral process if there were irregularities or violence accompanying the polls (Faul 1991), a fear that was fueled by the theft of ammunition and grenades from an Army base where pamphlets signed by an unidentified "death squadron" threatened a coup to unseat the interim government (Deseret News 1991). Pascal Gandaho, a conference delegate, captured the ambiguous role of Kerekou in the democratization process well, noting that "it seemed like [Kerekou] was not at all opposed to the conference but at the same time he acted as if the conference delegates were his guests" (PBS 2001). In fact, many participants to the conference were convinced Kerekou brought two versions of his closing address on 28 February 1990, and chose the one that accepted the conference decisions at the last minute (Seely 2005, 364).

We believe that Kerekou felt compelled to accept the democratic transition by the might of reformist divisions both in the civilian and the military wing of his regime. The first signs of internal splits within the regime bureaucracy became apparent in 1985, when the Minister of Education, Michel Alladayé, didn't overtly condemn the election of the independent student union BEN and was subsequently dismissed from his functions (Banégas 1995a). At the same time, technocrats within the various government ministries promoted economic and political liberalization (Adjaho 1992, 15). For instance, in March 1989, the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Ali Houdou, used a pseudonym to publish an article in the journal "Ehuzu" in which he blamed the state bankruptcy on a system which "doesn't want to see, hear or understand anything" and called for political reforms (Banégas 1995b). These developments created an explosive situation, as government hardliners, the "Ligueurs", were still fairly powerful and tried to block any attempt at change. At times they even entered in direct conflict with Kerekou himself (Banégas 2003, 88-89; Banégas 1995b; Morency-Laflamme 2012). These elements were outnumbered in 1989 when several pro-reform members of the ANR were appointed to government posts. Men like Robert Dossou, René Ahouanssou and M. Salifou made it clear that their participation in the regime was conditional on Kerekou's willingness to enact reforms, and they later played a pivotal role in the abandon of Benin's Leninist-Marxist doctrine and the organization of the National Conference (Morency-Laflamme 2014; Alidjinou 1992).

The division in the Armed Forces, Kérékou's main power base, would ultimately prove decisive. Throughout the 1980s, discontent with government policies steadily grew within the officer corps as the gap widened between the well-equipped Presidential Guard and the under-funded, proletarianized Army corps (Banégas 1995b). As Morency-Laflamme explains, during this period more and more officers publicly expressed their desire to "return to the barracks" and their openness to some kind of political reform, whereas the Presidential Guard remained for the most part loyal to the PRPB government (Morency-Laflamme 2014). By 1989, the Beninese Army was, according to Levitsky and Way, "the least-cohesive Army in Francophone Africa" (2010, 292) and only about 10% of the Armed Forces remained loyal to Kérékou (Noudjenoume 1999, 166). Six failed coup attempts between March and October 1988 provide ample evidence of this progressive erosion of support for Kérékou's regime (Banégas 1995b). The National Conference marked the turning point in the struggle between pro- and anti-reform groups within the leadership of the Armed Forces. In fact, hardliners led by Colonel Maurice Kouandaté threatened to use force to end the conference if delegates voted to destitute Kérékou, and even went as far as positioning tanks around the conference building (Morency-Laflamme 2011)¹²⁶. However, this threat remained empty, as the majority of the Army made it clear that it was opposed to such intervention. The next morning, Colonel Vincent Guezodje, the official representative of the Armed Forces, declared in front of the National Conference that the Army supported the reform process and would not interfere with it (ONEPI 1990). Thus, Kérékou was left with little option but to accept the results of the conference, and the ensuing democratic transition.

Resume:

A reformist majority both in the civilian and the military wing of the regime, and thus a crisis of the authoritarian regime, led President Kérékou to accept the results of the National Conference and Benin's democratization.

¹²⁶ Allies of Kouandaté supported his move, notably Colonel Martin Azonhiho, Minister of Security, who was also vigorously opposed to giving sovereignty to the conference. According to a transcript, he said: "We are in Africa, under the "Tree of Talking." And when you are under that tree, there is a chief. You are invited to come and eat. You come in, you are a guest, and you take the pot (...) We had good reason to say no to sovereignty" (PBS 2001).

References:

- Adamon, Afize. 1995. *Le renouveau démocratique au Bénin: La Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives et la période de transition*. Paris: l'Harmattan.
- Adjaho, Richard. 1992. *La faillite du contrôle des finances publiques au Bénin (1960-1990)*. Cotonou: les éditions du Flamboyant.
- Alidjinou, Dansou. 1992. *Le discours politique béninois (1972-1990)*. Doctoral Thesis. Université Montpellier I.
- Allen, Chris. 1992. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State : Democratic Renewal in Benin". *Review of African Political Economy* 54: 42 – 58.
- Aube Nouvelle. 2010. "19 février 1990 - 19 février 2010 : Il y a 20 ans, un nouveau départ au Bénin". February 19th. Available at: <http://beningate.net/over-blog.com/article-19-fevrier-1990---19-fevrier-2010-il-y-a-20-ans-un-nouveau-depart-au-benin-45297361.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.
- Banégas, Richard. 1995a. "Mobilisation sociale et opposition sous Kérékou". *Politique Africaine* 59: 25 – 42.
- Banégas, Richard. 1995b. "Action collective et transition politique en Afrique. La conférence nationale du Bénin". *Cultures & Conflits* 17: 2 - 22.
- Banégas, Richard. 2003. *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : Transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris : Karthala.
- Dembele, Françoise. 2013. "Burkina Faso: Acteurs de la conférence nationale du Bénin - Hommage rendu à un démocrate nommé Mathieu Kérékou". *AllAfrica.com*, April 29th. Available at: <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201304300021.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.
- Deseret News. 1991. "Fears of Army Intervention Won't Delay Benin Elections". March 10th. Available at: <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/150863/FEARS-OF-ARMY-INTERVENTION-WONT-DELAY-BENIN-ELECTIONS.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.
- Eckert, Amy. 2002. "Book Review: Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo". *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 31: 433 - 434.

- Faul, Michelle. 1990. "Demands for Democracy Meet Tear Gas, Tears". *AP News Archive*, February 28th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/Demands-for-Democracy-Meet-Tear-Gas-Tears/id-e45bee80bb403da918ae02455ad72abd>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.
- Faul, Michelle. 1991. "Beleaguered President Threatens to Intervene in Elections". *AP News Archive*, March 7th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Beleaguered-President-Threatens-to-Intervene-in-Elections/id-4ba39de4db0f844c399c88d17015d342>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.
- Gisselquist, Rachel M. 2008. "Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin". *Democratization* 15(4): 789 - 814.
- Heilbrunn, John R. 1993. "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(2): 277 - 299.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucas Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2011. *L'influence des forces armées sur les processus de démocratisation en Afrique Subsaharienne: Les cas du Bénin et du Togo*. 9th Annual Conference of CEPSI : "La sécurité dans tous ces états: Repenser sécurité, conflits et développement dix ans après le 11 septembre". Montréal.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2012. *Authoritarian Crises and Democratic Transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Annual Conference of the Société Québécoise de Science Politique. Ottawa: SQSP.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. 2015. "A Missing Link? Elite Factionalism and Democratization in Africa", *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 49(3): 459 - 477.
- Noudjenoume, Philippe. 1999. *La Démocratie au Bénin, 1988-1993: Bilans et Perspectives*. Paris : Editions L'Harmattan.
- Nwajiaku, Kathryn. 1994. "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32(3): 429 - 447.
- Office National d'Édition, de Presse, de Publicité et d'Imprimerie (ONEPI). 1990. *République du Bénin : Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives de la Nation du 19 au 28 février*. Documents Fondamentaux. Cotonou: ONEPI.

PBS. 2001. “*Hopes on the Horizon: Africa in the 1990s*”. Benin: Transcript, February 16th. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/hopes/benin/transcript.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.

Reuters. 1989a. “Upheaval in the East; Benin, Too, Gives Up Marxism for Reforms”. *New York Times*, December 9th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/09/world/upheaval-in-the-east-benin-too-gives-up-marxism-for-reforms.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.

Reuters. 1989b. “Anti-Government Protesters Confront Benin's Riot Police”. *New York Times*, December 14th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/14/world/anti-government-protesters-confront-benin-s-riot-police.html>. Accessed March 19th, 2014.

Seely, Jennifer C. 2001. *Transitions to Democracy in Comparative Perspective: The National Conferences in Benin and Togo*. Doctoral Thesis. Washington University.

Seely, Jennifer C. 2005. “The legacies of transition governments: post-transition dynamics in Benin and Togo”. *Democratization* 12(3): 357 - 377.

(15) Cameroon

The drive toward multiparty rule in Cameroon began in 1989 when *Le Messager*, one of Cameroon's leading journals, published an article written by Pius Njawe and JB Sipa that denounced Paul Biya's political monolithism. Biya, originally heralded as a liberal reformer, had taken over power from his autocratic predecessor Ahidjo in 1982 and had since ruled Cameroon without any significant opposition (Courade and Sindjoun 1996). Only a few months later, prominent attorney Yondo Black created the "Coordination nationale pour la démocratie et le multipartisme", a movement requesting greater openness and political participation. In consequence, in February 1990, Black and some of his collaborators were arrested and charged with attempted subversion and destabilization of the government (Kingue 2012). Despite the government crackdown on those requesting multipartism, John Fru Ndi, a librarian from English-speaking North West Province, decided to launch his own political party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in May 1990. But security forces broke up the new party's first official rally in the town of Bamenda and killed six people in what would later be known as the "Bamenda shooting" (Gros 1995). After this incident, large-scale demonstrations broke out with people carrying banners wishing "long life to his Excellence Paul Biya" and praising his "efforts to install multipartism" (Engueleguele 2013). Only at that point President Biya accepted to abandon the political monopoly held by his government party, the "Cameroon People's Democratic Movement" (CPDM). By December 1990, a series of laws aimed at legalizing political parties and establishing freedom of assembly were enacted (King 2012). Subsequent to these small steps towards liberalization, the opposition in Cameroon demanded that the government convene a sovereign National Conference, similar to the conferences that had been held in other African countries (for example Benin). This National Conference was supposed to devise rules and procedures for holding the upcoming local and national elections and put Cameroon on the road to genuine democratic governance. However, the Biya government refused, arguing that the Constitution "had always provided for multipartism" and therefore a National Conference wouldn't have any judicial basis to stand on (Engueleguele 2013). The period that followed was characterized by a wave of general strikes dubbed "Opération Villes Mortes" (Operation Ghost towns) designed to force the government into organizing a National Conference, and violent repression killing at least 300 people. However, the Biya government did not budge and after several months

of withstanding the pressure of the *Villes Mortes* campaign, the opposition came to the bargaining table. The trilateral talks, a government-initiated series of meetings between representatives of the government, opposition and civil society, were held in March 1992 to discuss a limited number of issues, such as access to the media for political parties and changes to the electoral code (Emmanuel 2012). But even though the talks cumulated in the organization of elections, no real progress on concrete politico-constitutional reform was achieved (Social Democratic Front 1991). The October 1992 presidential elections ended with Paul Biya winning by a small margin (39,9% of voices, compared to 35,9% for J. Fru Ndi (SDF)) (King 2012). The National Democratic Institute, an observer institution, condemned the poll as fraudulent and noted that “the Cameroonian government (...) took unusually extreme and illegitimate actions to ensure the President’s victory” (NDI 1993). In response to post-election riots in certain parts of the country, the Biya government proclaimed the state of emergency and jailed many opposition leaders (for example his closest rival, J. Fru Ndi). Since then, the purported swing to a democratic governance structure has only gone as far as “the political ritual of holding elections, all of which have been marred by gross irregularities and blatant disregard of the fundamental principles of democratic electioneering” (Nyamnjoh 2002).

When taking a closer look at the events in Cameroon between 1990 and 1992, it becomes clear that softliners, if existent at all, were never in a dominant position within the Biya regime. Therefore, there was never a crisis of the authoritarian regime as defined in our thesis. Firstly, the reform plans put forth by the government were neither serious, nor committed. Insisting on Cameroon’s special position amongst other (democratizing) African nations (“le Cameroun, c’est le Cameroun”, Ebolo 1996) Paul Biya made it clear that he considered pluralism an imposition and advocated for what he called “an appeased democracy” (“la démocratie apaisée”, Mugabe 2010). In 1990, for example, the government claimed to liberalize by enacting new legislation regarding the state of emergency, the press, associations and political parties. In reality, however, these new laws retained much of their repressive nature. The new press law, for instance, codified for the first time the practice of censorship and the new law on associations permitted the government to ban any organization deemed threatening to public or state security (Human Rights Watch 1992). Since their inception, the Biya administration did not hesitate to make

use of these new laws: it banned groups as diverse as Human Rights Watch, Cap Liberté, and the National Association of Cameroonian Athletes.

The government's stance on reform is also exemplified in its refusal to convene a National Conference ("I have said it, and I repeat it, the National Conference has no purpose for Cameroon", Bigombe and Enthong 1996; Krieger 1994) and its subsequent organisation of the Trilateral talks, a platform that fell far short in scope from similar conferences in other countries. Not only did President Biya not participate personally (he sent his Prime Minister instead), but he restricted the main agenda to only include the elaboration of a new electoral code and constitutional reform. Most importantly, the 1992 elections went ahead under the still-unchanged electoral laws (Gros 1995). These rules created an uneven "level playing field" for the incumbent and his challengers: for example, the campaign period was far shorter than what was constitutionally required (Bouopda 2007), the opposition parties could not organize and many voters were turned away on election day because they didn't have identification papers.

Secondly, there were few signs for discontent inside the regime itself. Only during the last phase of the transition, the presidential election, some dissident voices from the President's own ruling party, the CPDM, could be heard. Indeed, some high-profile CPDM figures (including a former Secretary General of the party and a former governor of East Province) resigned in protest over the conduct of Paul Biya's election campaign, accusing the Minister of Territorial Administration charged with the organization of the elections "of pressuring governors to do everything in their power to secure at least 60 percent of the vote for President Biya" (Gros 1995, 121).

But whatever the restiveness within party ranks, there is little doubt that the coercive apparatus remained unwaveringly behind the government during the period from May 1990 to December 1992. In fact, it is particularly striking to compare military support for Paul Biya from the 1990 transition period to recent events in which factions of the military publicly requested Biya to step down ("À bas la tyrannie de Paul Biya, du RDPC et des Généraux des forces armées", African Independent 2011). In 1990, Paul Biya surrounded himself with a group of loyal Generals sharing his ethnic and regional background who had protected him from an attempted coup d'Etat six years earlier

(Koaci.com 2011). Colonel Etoundi Nsoé Raymond, General Pierre Semengue and others not only benefitted from enormous financial advantages (Mbog 2012) but they also were fervent opponents of what they called “a civilian coup d’État” – the demand of opposition groups for a National Conference. In fact, General Pierre Semengue later admitted that, had the National Conference indeed taken place, the military would have stepped in and overthrown the government¹²⁷. These revelations explain why Cameroon’s military continued repression indiscriminately before, during and after Cameroon’s attempted democratic transition. In fact, Cameroon’s soldiers and policemen showed themselves ready, willing, and able to make warrantless arrests, detain prisoners indefinitely, publicly flog at least one opposition leader, seize dissident newspapers, intimidate opposition voters and kill demonstrators (Berlin 2011; Afrique Contemporaine 1993, 72; Africa Research Bulletin 1992, 744).

Resume:

There was never a significant split between Paul Biya and his ruling coalition, neither within the ruling party nor between Biya and his coercive apparatus. Therefore, we opine that Cameroon’s transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

Africa Research Bulletin. 1992. “*Cameroon: Electoral Irregularities Alleged*”. Africa Research Bulletin (October).

African Independent. 2011. "*Cameroun : Les militaires et les policiers refuseront de tirer sur leurs concitoyens*". February 20th. Available at: <http://juliette.abandokwe.over-blog.com/article-cameroun-les-militaires-et-les-policiers-refuseront-de-tirer-sur-leurs-concitoyens-67665318.html>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.

¹²⁷ “Je vous l’avoue aujourd’hui, si la Conférence nationale s’était effectivement tenue, l’armée aurait fait un coup d’État; que voulez-vous? C’est coup d’État pour coup d’État (...) L’armée a la force des armes, qui aurait pu s’opposer à sa prise de pouvoir? Heureusement que le président de la République a tranché le problème en déclarant "sans objet" la Conférence nationale souveraine” (Nkul Beti 2011).

- Afrique Contemporaine. 1993. 1st trimester, No. 165. Quoted in Emmanuel, Nikolas G. 2012. "'With a Friend like this . . .': Shielding Cameroon from Democratization". *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48(2): 145 - 160.
- Berlin, Erica. 2011. *A Comparative Study of Democratization in Cameroon and Tanzania*. Honors Thesis. Tufts University.
- Bigombe Logo, P. and L.M. Enthong. 1996. "Crise de légitimité et évidence de la continuité politique". *Politique Africaine* 62: 15 - 23.
- Bouopda, Pierre Kamé. 2007. *Cameroun: les crises majeures de la présidence Paul Biya*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Courade, Georges and Luc Sindjoun. 1996. "Le Cameroun dans l'entre-deux". *Politique Africaine* 62: 1 - 15.
- Ebolo, Dieudonné. 1996. "Nationalisme gouvernemental et pressions extérieures dans le contexte de la démocratisation: le cas camerounais". *Polis, Revue camerounaise de science politique* (February): 1 - 17.
- Emmanuel, Nikolas G. 2012. "'With a Friend like this . . .': Shielding Cameroon from Democratization". *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 48(2): 145 - 160.
- Engueleguele, Maurice. 2013. "République du Cameroun - Bilans annuels de 1983 à 2013". *L'état du monde. La Découverte*. Available at: www.cairn.info/l-etat-du-monde-cameroun-page-bilan.htm. Accessed January 8th, 2014.
- Gros, Jean-Germain. 1995. "The Hard Lessons of Cameroon". *Journal of Democracy* 6(3): 112 - 127.
- Human Rights Watch. 1992. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Cameroon*. January 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca3e23.html>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.
- Kingue, Edouard. 2012. "1990-1992. Comment la démocratie est confisquée au Cameroun". *Cameroonvoice.com*. Available at: <http://www.cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-8360.html>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.
- Koaci.com. 2011. "*Cameroun: Comment Paul Biya a dompté l'armée de son pays*". December 6th. Available at: <http://koaci.com/articles-71809>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.

- Krieger, Milton. 1994. "Cameroon's Democratic Crossroads 1990 - 4". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32(4): 605 - 628.
- Mbog, Raoul. 2012. "Cameroun: le jour ou Paul Biya a failli être renversé". *SlateAfrique.com*, April 8th. Available at: <http://www.slateafrique.com/85111/cameroun-retour-sur-le-putsch-manque-du-6-avril-1984>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.
- Mbuagbo, Oben Timothy and Robert Mbe Akoko. 2004. "Roll-Back: Democratization and Social Fragmentation in Cameroon". *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13(1): 1 - 12.
- Mugabe, Robert Gabriel. 2010. "De l'érosion politique au partage du pouvoir". In Mugabe, Robert (ed), "*Souillure*" or not "*Souillure*"? René-Jacques Lique - Edition L'Harmattan, 422 – 426.
- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). 1993. *An Assessment of the October 11, 1992 Elections in Cameroon*. Library of Congress Cataloguing.
- Nkul Beti. 2011. "*La dette de sang*". Available at: <http://www.nkul-beti-camer.com/ekang-media-press.php?cmd=article&Item=1281&Section=3&TAB=0&SUB=0&PHPSESSID=bg21ppjdkb9e21n4oclsjrntt2hh9jc8>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.
- Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2002. "Cameroon: Over Twelve Years of Cosmetic Democracy". *News from Nordic African Institute* 3 (October): 5 - 8.
- Social Democratic Front. 1991. *Press Statement on the Yaounde Tripartite Meeting*. November 11th. Available at: <http://www.sdfparty.org/english/releases/187.php>. Accessed January 8th, 2014.

(16) Nigeria 1

Nigeria's bid for multipartyism began in 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida announced a step-by-step political transition program. Initially welcomed as reformer, Babangida relaxed many of his predecessor's restrictions on political life and the media, initiated an economic recovery program similar to the IMF's SAP (Los Angeles Times 1989) and established the Political Bureau, composed mostly of academics, to advise him on the restructuring of the country's political system (Lewis 1999). At first Babangida established October 1, 1986 as the target date when he and the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the highest decision-making body in Nigeria, would hand over power to a civilian government. Over time, however, the regime moved away from its commitment to change, pushing back the final handover date to July 1987, then to June 1990, and finally to October 1992. At first Babangida justified this stalling by referring to a detailed plan which drew upon the Political Bureau report and included several phases, such as the drafting of a new constitution, a focused campaign of mass mobilization and political sensitization (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1989), conducting a National census (Musa 1990) and staggered local, state, and federal elections (Kraxberger 2004). Babangida made it clear that before handing over power to a civilian government he wanted to address controversial issues that, according to him, caused Nigeria's previous experiences with democracy to fail¹²⁸. To many observers, however, Babangida's determination to influence every crucial stage in the implementation of the transition program suggested rather that the President might have a "hidden agenda" of perpetuating himself in office (Olugbenga 1992, 1916). In 1989, the regime lifted the ban on political parties, but at the same time confined the scope of political debate, participation and competition. Refusing to accredit an array of independent political associations, the Babangida government instead established two officially-mandated parties, the centre-right National Republican Convention (NRC) and the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) which were to provide the framework for competitive elections over the next three and a half years. After a foiled coup attempt in 1990 and much electoral wrangling during the presidential primaries in August and September 1992, Babangida once more moved the transition

¹²⁸ In the words of Babangida himself: "What we need is not a handover programme of the 1979 experience but a broadly spaced transition in which democratic government can proceed with political learning, institutional adjustment and a re-orientation of political culture, at sequential levels of governance beginning with local government and ending at the Federal level" (Nwokedi 1994, 191).

goalposts to August 27, 1993 (Lewis 1994). By this time opposition to the regime had coalesced into a call for a sovereign National Conference championed by the Campaign for Democracy (CD), an umbrella organization of about forty different civil society groups. In January 1993 Babangida addressed these calls by appointing a civilian “Transitional Council” to act as a shadow administration until the final handover (Abubakar 1994). On June 12, 1993 Nigeria conducted what was widely considered the freest and fairest presidential elections in the country’s history, pitting two candidates against each other that both claimed personal friendship with Babangida: Moshood Abiola (SDP) and Bashir Tofa (NRC) (Adedoyin 1993). But when it became clear that Abiola who was opposed by a wide faction of the military was likely to win¹²⁹, Babangida summarily voided the elections, citing legal and administrative problems as the grounds for annulment (Ofoelue 2012; Vanguard Nigeria 2013). In riots that subsequently erupted in Lagos and other cities, security forces killed more than 100 people, and Babangida issued a decree cracking down on the independent press¹³⁰. But faced with a political impasse and a crumbling support base in the military, he found himself forced to concede to the transition deadline. Reluctantly, Babangida resigned on August 27, 1993, handing over power to an interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan (Eyinla 2001). The move was widely regarded as a sham given that General Abacha, Babangida’s right hand, was made Minister of Defence. Only three months later, those suspicions should prove true: on November 10, 1993, a High Court judge declared the interim regime illegal, and General Abacha forced Shonekan to resign, taking over power himself and ending the transition process.

In our analysis of Nigeria, we conclude that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime. Firstly, there were few committed softliners that could have pushed through the transition project. Even though there were some isolated pockets of officers that desired a return to the barracks and a disengagement from politics, by 1993 they were either

¹²⁹ Preliminary results leaked to the press showed a majority of 59% for Abiola who carried not only the southwestern Yoruba areas, but also several states in the far North, the middle belt and the minority Southeast (Lewis 1999). Following these predictions, the “Association for a Better Nigeria”, a shadowy organization of regime supporters who campaigned for the continuation of military rule, obtained an injunction from the Abuja High Court against the release of the election results.

¹³⁰ Several newspapers, including the Concord (owned by presidential contender Abiola), Punch, and Daily Sketch were permanently closed down, and Babandiga imposed a 10 year prison term for anyone convicted of spreading “false statements or rumours” after criticism by four editors of the newsmagazine Tell was published (Noble 1993).

sidelined, coopted or eliminated (Lewis 1994)¹³¹. Babangida himself was an enigma of sorts: while his public rhetorics were an indefinite discourse on democracy, they were also often thinly veiled double-speak¹³². A cunning political manipulator, he had his very own vision of the kind of Nigeria he wanted to create, and whereas some believe that the President held sincere designs at least during early phases of the transition, others conclude that Babangida never had any real intention of relinquishing power to civilians (Lewis 1994, 131 – 133)¹³³. An early assessment of Babangida's regime by Diamond and Galvan (1987, 75) perspicaciously captures this paradox: "As Nigeria made democratic progress in 1986, it also showed signs of deepening authoritarianism". As the gap between Babangida's formal commitment to the transition project and his actions widened over the years, even his close friends came to portray him as "the main obstacle to democracy in Nigeria" (Noble 1993).

Beckett and Young (1997) contend that the concept of "permanent transition" is a useful analytical framework in this context. According to them, military rule in Nigeria was legitimized by the creation of a sense of progress and transition towards civil democratic government, generating the illusion that the military intended to hand over the government while concomitantly encouraging participation of the broad section of the political class. Indeed, in his first New Year Days speech as military president, Babangida declared "that this administration does not intend to stay in power a day longer than is

¹³¹ For instance, in the wake of the annulment of the 1993 elections, officers such as Colonel Abubakar Umar and Major-General Ishola Williams who expressed a strong pro-June 12 view lost their commission (Rotini, Alana and Akinwumi 1998, 148)

¹³² To cite only one among numerous examples of Babangida's two-faced rhetoric: As late as mid-May 1993, Babangida reiterated the military's imminent disengagement from formal politics and even warned the ranks-and-file of the military not to be found "on the other side of the democracy barricade"; rather, they should get prepared for "a democratic civilian succession to which they must be subordinate". Yet during the same speech, he reiterated that the boundaries between civil and military society were not clear-cut, and that the military could intervene at any moment to rescue the nation's sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability from perceived external and internal threats (Amuwo 1995)

¹³³ Arguments and evidence can be found for both standpoints. On one hand, it is legitimate to ask why the Babangida regime would have put Nigeria through a transition process whose official cost is estimated at between 25 to 35 billion naira (Nwokedi 1994) if there was never any chance of the transition actually coming to fruition. Former Director-General of the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) and creator of Babangida's two-party system, Prof. Omo Omoruyi, supports this thesis. According to him, "the transition programme was personal to IBB (...) IBB genuinely wanted to make history (...) IBB's overriding ambition was to be a military officer who voluntarily handed over power to a democratically elected president in accordance with a programme of phased democratic transition" (Omoruyi 1993). He also said that Babangida wasn't interested in what Washington called "the West African Model" of democratic transitions, such as in Ghana, or Togo (The Nigerian Voice 2011). On the other hand, former Defence Minister General Sani Abacha once told confidants that Babangida had been toying with the idea of ruling Nigeria for 30 years (Omoigui 1993) and Chief Abiola, Babangida's friend and presidential contender, portrayed Babangida as "a man who after eight years is still as thirsty for power as on the first day" (Ajayi 2006)

required to lay the necessary institutional framework to bring about a better and more stable Nigeria” (Moody 2001). Yet from the outset, Babangida made it clear that this liberalization process was a “top-down” led process, the timing and contents of which only the regime could decide (Amuwo, 1990; Agbese and Kieh, 1992; Rotimi and Ihonvbere, 1994)¹³⁴. By consequence, political and economic reforms were implemented and rescinded at whim, serving primarily to “break the grips of former First (...) and Second Republic politicians on State institutions and resources”¹³⁵ (Reno 1993; Amuwo 1995) and to consolidate Babangida’s regime in spite of formal lip-service to a transition program¹³⁶.

The flawed character of the regime’s reform program is evident in several respects. Firstly, following the lifting of the ban on political parties in 1989, conditions for both the formation of new political associations and the candidacy to the presidency were set so stringent that they could not possibly have been met by any of the contenders for power¹³⁷. Consequently, none of the forty-some organizations that applied for registration obtained party-status (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991). Instead, Babangida announced the creation of

¹³⁴As Luckham succinctly notes, Babangida took personal control of both Army and State from the beginning, and knew what he wanted to do in power and with power (Luckham 1994, 43). He was the first military ruler to declare himself President; he was also the first to dismiss his deputy, Commander Ebitu Ukiwe, even though the latter was well respected in military circles. Finally, he was also the first to dissolve and re-compose at his whim the military “legislative” council.

¹³⁵At various points in the transition process Babangida banned “discredited” First and Second Republic politicians and military officers from partisan politics (Diamond 1991) in an effort to foster the emergence of a “new breed” of Nigerian politicians supposedly imbued with higher ethical and patriotic values. Scholars have suggested, however, that Babangida calculated that the New Breed would be too dependent and fragile to pose a real threat to his presidency, and fully expected to be asked to continue in office (Amuwo 1995). The New Breed would thus constitute the civilian base for a diarchy with Babangida at the center (Omoigui 1993)

¹³⁶For instance, when Babangida created the Political Bureau in 1986 to organise nation-wide consultations on Nigeria’s political future, he promised all but three or four members involvement in the ensuing transition politics, thereby making sure they would be loyal to him (Amuwo 1995). Throughout his reign, Babangida continued to use material inducements to keep his political allies aligned, and resorted to repression wherever cooptation proved unfruitful. The State Security Service, for example, became a power unto itself, responsible for a growing array of arbitrary arrests, Human Rights abuses and assassinations (Lewis 1994). Two open coup attempts also resulted in dozens of executions (Los Angeles Times 1990).

¹³⁷First, political parties were to have offices and a functional secretariat in all the Federal and State capitals, loval government headquarters, and wards. They were also required to provide passport photographs, names and addresses of all their members. Furthermore, the National Electoral Commission was authorized to disqualify candidates to any election irrespective of court orders and without offering credible reason for such an action (Momoh 1995). After the annulment of the 1993 elections, additional requirements were imposed on future presidential contenders, such as an age limit; a clean criminal record; and proof that they believed in the corporate existence of Nigeria and didn’t have personal, corporate or business interests that conflicted with Nigerian national interests. Most importantly, they were required to have been registered members of either of the two government-created political parties for at least one year prior to 1993, which effectively excluded all candidates that had been running in the elections from further political contestation (Ajani 2013).

two official parties, “a little to the left” (SDP) and “a little to the right” (NRC), and proceeded to build offices for these two organizations across the country and to fund their activities, including deciding on and publicising their ideological platforms (Ihonvbere 1996; Dowden 1993). Secondly, the regime adopted a number of strategies¹³⁸ to delay its own transition goalposts, which finally culminated in the annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections. In this respect, its cooperation with the shadowy “Association for a Better Nigeria” that openly campaigned for the continuation of military rule is particularly noteworthy¹³⁹.

As we have shown, there were no true softliners in the Babangida regime. His ouster in 1993 should therefore be explained by rivalry between regime hardliners rather than a crisis of the authoritarian regime. In the words of Rimmer (1994, 101 – 2), what forced Babangida out “was not the transition to democracy but the view taken by another faction of the military that his time was up”. This hardliner faction led, among others, by Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, Gen. Sani Abacha, and Brigadiers Mark and Akilu, was not willing to leave power and is said to have threatened Babangida, forcing him to choose between annulling the 1993 presidential elections or leaving office voluntarily, short of which he and the potential winner of the elections, Chief Abiola, might be killed (Omoigui 1993)¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁸ One such strategy was the creation of new states right before the presidential election in 1993 (Kraxberger 2004) in order to divide the opposition and to focus attention at the local scale (Oyewole and Lucas 2000, 79). Another strategy was the lack of preparation for the elections. In fact, no polling booths or voter registers were even set up until the director of the U.S. Information Service in Lagos warned that any postponement of the election would be “unacceptable” to America (Amuwo 1995). As a result, the CDS withdrew accreditation to Americans to monitor the election.

¹³⁹ As Nwokedi (1994) notes, the total freedom with which the ABN operated, and the financial resources which they spent on their cause were out of proportion to what should normally be expected from ordinary individuals, and strongly suggest that the ABN was manipulated and funded by the Babangida regime. Abimbola Davies, a former ABN member, confirmed this thesis and claimed that at the time of the 1992 elections, the ABN was paid to create “an organized confusion” to allow Babangida to continue in power (The Guardian 1993).

¹⁴⁰ Even though the bulk of hardliner officers did not want to give up power for either Abiola or Tofa, they were particularly hostile to an Abiola presidency, as there was strong evidence that he would have investigated the Babangida administration for crimes (Mahmud 1993). During negotiations for an Interim National Government (ING), Babangida was said to have told SDP officials that “some senior military officers were prepared to die rather than accept Abiola as president” (Africa Confidential 1993a, 7; 1993b, 2). Allegedly, Gen. Abacha was particularly opposed to Abiola, and Babangida told his friend Omoruyi: “Sani is opposed to a return to civilian rule (...) if he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola on him” (Omoruyi 1999, 165). Babangida himself had actually encouraged Abiola to run, financing his campaign with 35bn Naira and promising to make him chairman of the Transitional Council (CKN Nigeria 2013). Allegedly, Babangida saw Abiola’s candidacy as a way of resolving the credibility crisis he faced after the botched 1992 primaries (The Nigerian Voice 2011), and underrating Abiola’s clout, assumed the elections would be inconclusive. According to Babangida himself, he decided “to let the bloody thing go on” for fear of being accused again of not wanting to leave office (CKN Nigeria 2013). However,

However, pressured by the hostile reaction from the domestic and international front to the cancellation of the elections, the hardliners under Dogonyaro and Abacha realized they would have to sacrifice Babangida in order to keep office themselves (Welch 1995). Consequently, Abacha (who was said to have been scheming to become head of state himself several months earlier)¹⁴¹ organised a de facto palace coup, forcing Babangida to resign on August 27, 1993¹⁴². (New York Times 1993; Ihonvbere 1996). When his appointed successor, Ernest Shonekan, took office, most observers agreed he was a mere face-saving device for Babangida to take his exit (Nwokedi 1994)¹⁴³. Indeed, only three months later Abacha dissolved the ING to seize power on his own terms.

Resume:

The ouster of President Babandiga should be understood as an intra-regime rivalry between hardliners rather than a softliner majority. Hence, there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime in Nigeria's first transition attempt.

References:

Abubakar, Nurudeen. 1994. "*The Stalled Transition in Nigeria*". Africa Updates Archives I (4): Nigeria on the Edge? Available at: <http://web.ccsu.edu/afstudy/upd1-4.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

when it became clear that Abiola would win, Babangida found himself confronted with a hostile hardliner corps who, according to Babangida's son Muhammed, threatened him. "There were other generals, including Abacha, who said that if power was ceded to a Southerner like Abiola, the North would have nothing left," Mr. Babangida Jr. said. "They put my father in a corner. They threatened him." (Cohen 1998). Subsequently, the President told Abiola: "They will kill you rather than allow you to become the elected President, Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria. They will also kill me, if I allow you to be sworn in as the President." (The Nigerian Voice 2011).

¹⁴¹ Sources tell us that Abacha had been jealous of Babangida's position ever since the latter took office in 1985, and many say that there was some sort of "succession pact" between the two. However, allegedly their wives did not get along, and Mrs. Babangida did not relish the thought of her husband handing over power to General Abacha, which might have played a part in how the dynamics of Babangida's resignation unfolded (Omoigui 1993).

¹⁴² In fact, by July 12, 1993, Babangida was allegedly told at a marathon meeting with Principal Staff Officers and Field Commanders that he could no longer "rely on the loyalty of his Armed Forces should he stay beyond 27 August" (Africa Confidential 1993c, 1)

¹⁴³ From his first day in office, Shonekan carried the reputation of being a military puppet with Abacha exercising an active direction of the nominally civilian government (Shiner 1993). He was not sworn in as "Commander in chief of the Armed Forces", and he was to stay at the Presidential Guest House instead of the main villa. The Governors of Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Ondo States refused, at least in public, to recognise Shonekan as the Head of State (Omoigui 1993).

- Adedoyin, R. 1993. "Babangida, Abiola redefine friendship". *The Guardian*, July 4th.
- Africa Confidential. 1993a. July 30th. Quoted in Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. *General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project*. Centre d'études d'Afrique Noire: Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux.
- Africa Confidential. 1993b. November 5th. Quoted in Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. *General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project*. Centre d'études d'Afrique Noire: Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux.
- Africa Confidential. 1993c. July 16th. Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. *General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project*. Centre d'études d'Afrique Noire: Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux.
- Agbese, Pita O. and George O. Kieh. 1992. "Nigeria: Transition to Democracy and the Pathological Elite Thesis". *Zeitschrift für Afrikastudien* 15/16: 19 - 35.
- Ajani, Jide. 2013. "Why we annuled June 12 Presidential election — General Ibrahim Babangida". *Vanguard Nigeria*, June 8th. Available at: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/why-we-annuled-june-12-presidential-election-general-ibrahim-babangida/>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Ajayi, Femi. 2006. "I Cancelled, not annulled June 12": Should Nigerians trust Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida again?" *Nigeriaworld*, September 25th. Available at: <http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/092506.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Ajayi, Rotimi, Olu Alana and Yemi Akinwumi. 1998. *Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives in Nigerian Studies*. Nathadex Publishers.
- Amuwo, Kunle. 1990. "Soldier - rulers and Military Academic Advisors: Notes on Constitutionalism and Democracy in Nigeria with Specific Reference to the Babangida Administration". In Tyoden, S.G. (ed.), *Constitutionalism and National Development*. Ibadan: NPSA, 519 - 532.
- Amuwo, Kunle. 1995. *General Babangida, Civil Society and the Military in Nigeria – Anatomy of a Personal Rulership Project*. Centre d'études d'Afrique Noire: Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux.
- Beckett, Paul and Crawford Young. 1997. *Beyond The Impasse of Permanent Transition in Nigeria*. New York: University of Rochester Publishing Company.

- CKN Nigeria. 2013. "I Wanted To Make MKO Head Of Interim Govt..IBB". September 28th. Available at: <http://www.cknnigeria.com/2013/09/i-wanted-to-make-mko-head-of-interim.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Cohen, Roger. 1998. "A Nigerian Revisits His Place in History". *New York Times*, July 25th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/25/world/a-nigerian-revisits-his-place-in-history.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Diamond, Larry and Dennis Galvan. 1987. "Sub-Saharan Africa". In Wesson, Robert (ed), *Democracy: A Worldwide Survey*. New York: Praeger.
- Diamond, Larry. 1991. "Nigeria's search for a new political order". *Journal of Democracy* 2(2): 57 - 58.
- Dowden, Richard. 1993. "Babangida annuls presidential election: Britain freezes aid as Nigeria military pulls back from democracy". *The Independent*, June 24th. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/babangida-annuls-presidential-election-britain-freezes-aid-as-nigeria-military-pulls-back-from-democracy-1493454.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Eyinla, Bolade M. 2001. "Political transition and the future of democracy in Nigeria". *Africa Quarterly* 41(1-2): 61 - 89.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1989. *Political Education Manual: Towards a Free and Democratic Society*. Abuja, Nigeria, Directorate for Social Mobilisation (MAMSER).
- Hermet, Guy. 1973. "Une dictature feutrée contrainte à user de la force". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December. Available at: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1973/12/HERMET/31960>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Ihonvbere, Julius. 1996. "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24(2): 193 - 225.
- Kraxberger, Brennan. 2004. "Geo-historical trajectories of democratic transition: The case of Nigeria". *GeoJournal* 60: 81 - 92.
- Lewis, Peter. 1994. "Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition". *African Affairs* 93(372): 323 - 340.

- Lewis, Peter. 1999. "Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?" *Journal of Democracy* 10(1): 141 – 156.
- Los Angeles Times. 1989. "Nigerian Leader Vows Tough Economic Line". June 6th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-06/news/mn-1725_1_austerity-price-boosts-goods-and-services. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1990. "Nigeria: Coup Plot Suspects Hunted; 42 Executed". July 29th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-29/news/mn-1496_1_coup-plot. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Luckham, Robin. 1994. "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: a Survey of Literature and Issues". *African Studies Review* 37(2): 13 - 75.
- Mahmud, Sakah. 1993. "The Failed Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights". *Africa Today*, 4th Quarter: 87 - 88.
- Momoh, Abubakar. 1995. "The Political Economy of the Transition to Civil Rule". In Adejumobi, Said and Abubakar Momoh (eds), *The Political Economy of Nigeria Under Military Rule: 1984 - 1993*. Harare: Sapes Publishing Company, 28 - 30.
- Moody, John. 2001. "Nigeria Striking a Delicate Balance". *Time Magazine*, June 24th. Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,143131,00.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Musa S. A. 1990. *An Accountable and acceptable census: A major tool for National Development*. National Population Commission, Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- New York Times. 1993. "Nigeria's Latest Military Ruler Bans Political Activity". November 19th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/19/world/nigeria-s-latest-military-ruler-bans-political-activity.html?src=pm>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Noble, Kenneth. 1993. "Nigeria General Makes His 5th Offer to Step Down". *New York Times*, August 18th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/18/world/nigeria-general-makes-his-5th-offer-to-step-down.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.
- Nwokedi, Emeka. 1994. "Nigeria's democratic transition: Explaining the annulled 1993 presidential election". *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 83(330): 189 - 204.
- Ofoelue, Onukwube. 2012. "How Nigeria's Freest and Fairest Election Was Annulled". *National Mirror*, October 28th. Available at:

<http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/how-nigerias-freest-and-fairest-election-was-annulled/>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

Olugbenga, Ayeni. 1992. "Back on Course?" West Africa, November 9 - 15. Quoted in Lewis, Peter. 1994. "Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition". *African Affairs* 93(372): 323 - 340.

Omoigui, Nowa. 1993. "Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993". Available at: <http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui21.htm>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

Omoruyi, Omo. 1999. *The Tale of June 12: The Betrayal of the Democratic Rights of Nigerians (1993)*. Lagos and London: Press Alliance Network.

Oyediran, Oyeleye and Adigun Agbaje. 1991. "Two-Partyism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria". *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 29(2): 213 – 235.

Oyewole Anthony and John Lucas. 2000. *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria*. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press.

Reno, William. 1993. "Old Brigades, Money Bags, Newbreeds and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 27(1): 66 - 87.

Rimmer, Douglas. 1994. "Nigeria Changes Course". *Africa Insight* 24(2): 99 - 109.

Rotimi, Ajayi and Julius Ihonvbere. 1994. "Democratic Impasse: Remilitarisation in Nigeria". *Third World Quarterly* 15(4): 669 - 689.

Shiner, Cindy. 1993. "Nigeria's Military Ruler Quits; Appoints Interim Government". *The Washington Post*, August 27th. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/bab0893.htm>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

The Guardian. 1993. July 17th, citing Africa Confidential 34(13), 1993, July 2nd. Quoted in Nwokedi, Emeka. 1994. "Nigeria's democratic transition: Explaining the annulled 1993 presidential election". *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 83(330): 189 - 204.

The Nigerian Voice. 2011. "The Secret Behind the Annulment of June 12 & What Abiola Died For". June 13th. Available at: <http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/53716/1/the-secret-behind-the-annulment-of-june-12-amp-wha.html>. Accessed February 2nd, 2014.

U.S. Department of State. 1979a. *Reaction to Prisoner Release*. Telegrams from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

July 19th, Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

Welch, Claude E. 1995. "Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria: Pains of an Unaccomplished Transition". *Armed Forces & Society* 21(4): 593 - 614.

(17) Nigeria 2

Nigeria's second attempt at democracy in the 1990s began with a highly restrictive and controlled political transition program whose predetermined goal was the transformation of General Abacha from a military dictator to a civilian Head of State (Eyinla 1999). On June 8, 1998, however, just before his inauguration, Abacha died suddenly and left the reins of the country in the hands of General Abdusalami Abubakar, the Chief of Defence Staff and next in the military hierarchy. A genuine softliner, Abubakar quickly moved to dismantle the Abacha transition program: he dissolved all existing political parties, ended the term of the National Electoral Commission and annulled the fraudulent previous elections (Ojo 2014). Although he rejected the opposition's call for a Sovereign National Conference, he did announce a new agenda that pledged the return of the military to the barracks and the transfer of power to elected civilians on May 29, 1999. A series of elections and political reforms was to return the country to democratic rule, including promises for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles (Ojo and Azeez 2002); the promulgation of a new Constitution; and free and open elections supervised by an independent Electoral Commission (Lewis 1999). Four elections were scheduled between December 1998 and February 1999: the Local Government Council elections (5 December, 1998); State Assembly and Gubernatorial elections (9 January 1999); National Assembly elections (20 February 1999); and the Presidential election (28 February 1999). In a show of sincerity, Abubakar explicitly encouraged the participation of as many political associations as possible in these elections; yet only three were eventually registered as officially recognised political parties. These were the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) (Ojo 2014). The presidential contest was between retired General Olusegun Obasanjo (PDP) and Chief Olu Falae (AD/APP). Obasanjo's candidacy was backed by the military, as he was considered the one person who was able to run a "coup-proof government" (Eyinla 1999). He won the election by a wide margin. Parallel to these developments, Abubakar inaugurated an independent Committee to coordinate debates on the Draft Constitution in November 1998 and signed the new Constitution into law on May 6, 1999. The implication of this was that elections had been held before the constitutive framework for the electoral process had been laid down, which emphasizes the flaws in the conduct of the elections and shows that the transition process had been far

from ideal (Ololo 2004). Though the AD/APP alliance initially contested the election results in court, Olu Falae eventually conceded in the interest of avoiding another return to military rule. Therefore, Obasanjo was sworn in on May 29, 1999 and officially ended the Abubakar transition program (Ojo 2004).

Our analysis of Nigeria's 1998/1999 democratic transition confirms the existence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. After the failed Babangida transition of the early 1990s, hardliners under General Abacha led the country with an iron grip for several years. However, their rule was never uncontested, as pre-existing divisions within the military continued to deepen. The main issue revolved around Abacha's transition program, which adopted the same form as that of his immediate predecessor, General Babangida, and was meant to institutionalize military rule in civilian guise (Damilola 2011). While there certainly were those who supported Abacha in his endeavour¹⁴⁴, many officers felt that the military had been the biggest losers from their involvement in politics and began to join Nigerian civilians in calling for a return to true democracy (New York Times 1998a)¹⁴⁵. Prominent representatives included Maj. Gen. Ishaiya Bamayi, Chief of staff, Deputy Head of State, Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya¹⁴⁶ and, surprisingly, Abacha's presidential predecessor, General Babangida (Rupert 1998a; French 1998a). Five years after his ouster, Babangida began making statements about the need to bring military rule in Nigeria to an end¹⁴⁷. During a public lecture in Jos, for example, he dismissed military rule as "authoritarian" and declared that Africa's salvation lay in democracy (Ofuoku 2015). Moreover, he reportedly met Abacha shortly before the lecture and advised him against self-succession. In our opinion, Babangida's statements can be considered representative of a powerful tide that was moving against Nigerian hardliners even earlier than 1998.

¹⁴⁴ Certain Generals even voiced their support to the instauration of a regime modeled after the Indonesian dictatorship of President Suharto (French 1998a)

¹⁴⁵ According to a senior Nigerian General, "there are many of us who have made our lives in the Army because we were trained to believe that the military had something vital to offer to the nation. This, however, does not include politics, and we have a bunch of officers who come to think of themselves as permanent politicians. In behaving this way, they are dragging us all down" (French 1998c)

¹⁴⁶ In 1997, Diya, who was known for his "quiet" opposition to Abacha's presidential aspirations, was allegedly involved in a coup plot to remove Abacha from office. Along with six other accused officers he was arrested and later sentenced to death (Africa Confidential 1998, 1-2).

¹⁴⁷ Although we do not know to what extent Babangida's conversion to a democrat was genuine, he is said to have considerably influenced General Abubakar, Abacha's successor and convinced softliner. He also voiced regret about his cancellation of the 1993 elections, calling it "wrong" and claiming that he acted under pressure from his fellow Generals (Njoku 2001).

However, the turning point for softliners only came with Abacha's death and the instauration of General Abubakar, a democrat, over other leading hardliners¹⁴⁸. Abubakar, a soft-spoken career soldier with no political ambitions of his own, had been among those who were pressing for a rapid end to military rule (Murphy 1998). Claiming that "the survival of the country depends on a rapid and peaceful transition to a lasting democracy" (Online Nigeria 2015), he assured Nigerians that his administration "had no desire whatsoever to succeed itself", and that he respected the fact that "Nigerians want true democracy" (Vick 1998)¹⁴⁹. Immediately after taking up office, he moved to push forward reforms, while at the same time isolating hardliners within the regime. Firstly, he reaffirmed his commitment to the social-political transition program of late General Abacha and rebuffed opposition calls to hand over power by Oct. 1 to a civilian government of National Unity that would organize elections (Cohen 1998a). This move strongly indicated to observers that top officers who wanted the Army to loosen its direct political control were gaining power (French 1998a), but that they were also trying to outmanoeuvre factions in the military known to oppose any democratic change (French 1998b). Secondly, he prevented a violent clash between security forces and pro-democracy groups that had organized a series of protests linked to the fifth anniversary of the canceled 1993 elections, and subsequently released a series of prominent political prisoners including General Obasanjo, Beko Ransome-Kuti, and the Oil Union chiefs Frank Kokori

¹⁴⁸ Besides Abubakar, prospective successors had included key Abacha loyalists Maj. Hamza Mustapha, Head of Abacha's special Bodyguard Unit, and Col. Muhammad Marwa, military administrator of Lagos state. Although there are those who claim that Abubakar was named President mainly to "keep power in the upper echelons" (Rupert 1998b), there are several reasons to believe that his nomination does indicate the rising power of softliners within the Nigerian Army. Firstly, according to senior Nigerian officers, Abubakar "had no real constituency among the security forces" (French 1998a); for him to be selected he therefore must have been able to count on significant support from other, more powerful officers. Secondly, he was not the most senior soldier, and even had to be promoted to the rank of full General before taking up the Presidency (Online Nigeria 2015). In our opinion, this takes away credibility from the argument that Abubakar's nomination only happened to forestall the possibility of younger officers seizing power.

¹⁴⁹ According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, one of the key aspects of softliners being in charge of the political direction of a country is that reform plans are believed by the opposition. In the case of Nigeria, both opposition and foreign politicians confirmed that they found Abubakar's pledged sincere. For instance, after his release from prison, retired General Obasanjo claimed that he believed "General Abubakar understands that an entirely new democratic structure for the nation must be created, and that he cannot wait a day beyond Jan. 1, 1999, to hand over power to a civilian President" (Cohen 1998b). On another occasion, the Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, said he believed there was a real willingness on the part of the Nigerian government to "keep the door open to democracy" (New York Times 1998c).

and Milton Dabibi¹⁵⁰. Finally, he replaced a series of hard-line supporters of late General Abacha, among others the Chief of Security Maj. Hamza Mustapha (Los Angeles Times 1998)¹⁵¹.

However, after the sudden death of prominent opposition politician Chief Abiola, Abubakar found that continuing with Abacha's transition program posed too much of a problem in terms of credibility, and within two weeks announced a new agenda for a 10-month transition to democratic rule (Lewis 1999). Although it merely replicated the activities of previous transition programs, it still clearly carried the stamp of softliners, since the government actually tried as much as possible to detach itself from the transition implementation process in order to avoid creating mistrust in the transition exercise (Damilola 2011)¹⁵². Admitting that Nigeria's "most recent attempt at democratisation was marred by manoeuvring and manipulations of structures and actions [which] only succeeded in creating a defective foundation on which a solid democratic structure can neither be constructed nor sustained" (The Guardian 1998, 15), Abubakar then proceeded to implement a series of reforms. Firstly, he dissolved the five political parties registered by the Abacha regime and cancelled all previous elections conducted under these parties. Secondly, in an attempt to march towards genuine and fully-fledged democratic civilian rule, many transition implementation agencies established by the Abacha regime were dissolved and their decrees repealed. Finally, Abubakar pledged not to interfere with party formation. Consequently, Abacha's electoral commission, the National Electoral Commission (NECON), was dissolved and a new independent electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established. This body was charged with the responsibility of registering political parties, registration of voters and the conduct of elections (Momoh and Thovoethin 2001). Further reforms included greater press freedom (Onishi 1998) and the fight against corruption within the military hierarchy. In an unprecedented move, the junta voted to publish a list of its members' individual

¹⁵⁰ Walter Carrington, a former American ambassador to Nigeria, estimated that "the restraint that the Army showed and the subsequent release of the prisoners suggest strongly that the new leadership has gained control over hardliners in the Army" (French 1998b).

¹⁵¹The gradual replacement of hardliners with more democratic-minded officers was an important part of asserting Abubakar's authority, as reportedly hawks within the regime were already accusing him of "going soft" over the release of detainees (Simmons 1998b)

¹⁵² One of the early demonstrations of this autonomy was the fact that INEC and political institutions agreed on the modalities for the formation and registration of political parties.

assets in a bid to prove their interest in accountability (New York Times 1998b). These reforms were taken so seriously that even prominent dissidents such as Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka returned from exile, feeling confident that the new military government was serious about leading the country towards true democracy (Simmons 1998a). When General Obasanjo won Nigeria's first free and fair elections in February 1999, he repeated that belief: "Today we are taking a decisive step on the path of democracy [...] We will leave no stone unturned to insure sustenance of democracy, because it is good for us, it is good for Africa, and it is good for the world" (Onishi 1999). A few months later, when announcing the imminent release of the new Constitution, Abubakar, too, affirmed that the military had learnt its lesson, and would not interfere in politics in the future. "The era of coups is dead and buried", he said (BBC News 1999).

Resume:

After the death of hardliner Abacha, a majority of softliners took over the reins of the Nigerian authoritarian regime and pushed through democratic reforms despite opposition from the hardliner camp. We therefore confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

- Abubakar, Momoh and Paul-Sewa Thovoethin. 2001. "*An overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process in Nigeria*". DPMN Bulletin. Available at: <http://www.dpmf.org/images/democratization-in-nigeria-abubakar-sept-2001.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- BBC News. 1999. "*Abubakar: Constitution 'in two weeks'*". April 11th. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/316899.stm>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Cohen, Roger. 1998a. "New Nigeria Ruler Pledges Elections Early Next Year". *New York Times*, July 21th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/21/world/new-nigeria-ruler-pledges-elections-early-next-year.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Cohen, Roger. 1998b. "Elder Statesman in Nigeria Laments a Tattered Nation". *New York Times*, July 15th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/15/world/elder-statesman-in-nigeria-laments-a-tattered-nation.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

- Damilola, Ogidan P. 2011. "Military Disengagement from politics in Nigeria: General Abdulsalami Abubakar and the short transition". Course Paper, University of Lagos. Available at: <http://greenthesis.wordpress.com/2012/10/23/military-disengagement-from-politics-in-nigeria-general-abdulsalami-abubakar-and-the-short-transition/>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Eyinla, Bolade M. 1999. "*Political Transition and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria*". Available at: <https://unilorin.edu.ng/publications/eyinla/POLITICAL%20TRANSITION%20AND%20THE%20FUTURE%20OF.htm>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- French, Howard. 1998a. "New Nigeria Chief Pledges A Return to Civilian Rule". *New York Times*, June 10th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/new-nigeria-chief-pledges-a-return-to-civilian-rule.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- French, Howard. 1998b. "For Nigeria's Leader, Offense Is the Best Defense". *New York Times*, June 17th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/17/world/for-nigeria-s-leader-offense-is-the-best-defense.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- French, Howard. 1998c. "New Chapter in Nigeria: The Implications; Dread Rules: An Unpopular Leader Leaves Nigerians Fearful and Divided". *New York Times*, June 9th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/09/world/new-chapter-nigeria-implications-dread-rules-unpopular-leader-leaves-nigerians.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Lewis, Peter. 1999. "Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?". *Journal of Democracy* 10(1): 141 - 156.
- Los Angeles Times. 1998. "*New Leader Removes Chief of Security*". July 6th. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jul/06/news/mn-1241>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Murphy, Dean. 1998. "Unlike Predecessors, New Nigeria Military Ruler Apparently Didn't Seek Job". *Los Angeles Times*, June 10th. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/10/news/mn-58521>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- New York Times. 1998a. "*Nigeria's opportunity*". June 10th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/opinion/nigeria-s-opportunity.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- New York Times. 1998b. "*World News Briefs; Nigerian Leaders Ready To Declare Assets*". October 1st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/01/world/world-news-briefs-nigerian-leaders-ready-to-declare-assets.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

- New York Times. 1998c. "African Sees Hope for Nigerian Democracy". July 11th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/11/world/african-sees-hope-for-nigerian-democracy.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Njoku, Raphael Chijioke. 2001. "Deconstructing Abacha: Demilitarization and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria after the Abacha Era". *Government and Opposition* 36: 71 – 96
- Ofuoku, Mudiaga. 2015. "Abacha's Last Days". *Online Nigeria*. Available at: http://www.onlinenigeria.com/abacha_last_days.asp. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Ojo, Emmanuel O. and Ademola Azeez. 2002. "The military and democratic transitions in Nigeria (1976–1999)". *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* 28(1/2): 203 – 211.
- Ojo, Emmanuel O. 2004. "The military and political transitions". In Agbaje, A., Larry Diamond and Ebere Onwudiwe (eds), *Nigeria's struggle for democracy and good governance*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 60 – 82.
- Ojo, Emmanuel O. 2014. "The Military and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria: Positive Scepticism and Negative Optimism". *Insight on Africa* 6(1): 57 - 79.
- Ololo, Allen. 2004. *Democracy and election management in Africa*. Lagos: Malthouse Publishers.
- Onishi, Norimitsu. 1998. "Hopeful but Skeptical, Nigerians Await Democracy". *New York Times*, November 9th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/09/world/hopeful-but-skeptical-nigerians-await-democracy.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Onishi, Norimitsu. 1999. "Nigeria's Military Turns Over Power to Elected Leader". *New York Times*, May 30th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/30/world/nigeria-s-military-turns-over-power-to-elected-leader.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- Online Nigeria. 2015. "Nigeria - Abdulsalam Abubakar". Available at: <http://www.onlinenigeria.com/abubakar.asp>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.
- "Plots, Lies and Videos". 1998. *Africa Confidential* 39(2), January 23rd: 1 - 2.

Rupert, James. 1998a. "Six Nigerians to Die for Alleged Coup Plot; Trial Said to Widen Rifts Within Military." *The Washington Post*, April 29th.

Rupert, James. 1998b. "Nigerian Ruler Dies After Brutal Reign". *The Washington Post*, June 9th. Available at: <http://www.fraudaid.com/scamspeak/Nigerian/abacha/saniwashpost.htm>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

Simmons, Ann. 1998a. "Prominent Nigerian Dissident Ends Exile". *Los Angeles Times*, October 15th. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/15/news/mn-32746>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

Simmons, Ann. 1998b. "Nigeria's Woes Compounded by Dissident's Death". *Los Angeles Times*, July 9th. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jul/09/news/mn-2214>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

The Guardian. 1998. July 21st: 15. Quoted in Abubakar, Momoh and Paul-Sewa Thovoethin. 2001. "*An overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process in Nigeria*". DPMN Bulletin. Available at: <http://www.dpmf.org/images/democratization-in-nigeria-abubakar-sept-2001.html>. Accessed April 4th, 2015.

Vick, Karl. 1998. "Military Promises Elections in Nigeria". *The Washington Post*, July 21st.

(18) Kenya

Kenya's first attempt at reintroducing democratic governance began in the wake of the upheavals in Eastern Europe (Africa Watch 1991, 37). Throughout the late 1980s, Kenya's Single Party system had become a source of growing tension, as resistance to President Daniel Arap Moi's rule became increasingly organized and vocal. In fact, the Moi government had since 1986 faced mounting criticism from Kenyan Church groups and clandestine opposition organizations, to the extent that in 1989, the Vice President ordered a commission to investigate the matter. Whereas he concluded that a majority of Kenyans still supported the Single Party system, in 1990 intellectuals, church workers and lawyers under the leadership of former Cabinet Ministers Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba organized a series of demonstrations called "the Saba Saba", calling for a return to democracy (Africa Watch 1991, 61). The rally never took place, as Moi ordered the imprisonment of the organizers two days before the event, and kept them in jail without charges for more than six months (Hiltzig 1991). The arrests sparked a series of riots throughout the country that left more than 20 people dead (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, 182) and prompted six opposition leaders to form the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in May 1991. Among other demands, the group's program called for a repeal of the 1982 constitutional provision making Moi's party the sole legal political party; for a National Convention before any election; and for the boycott of any elections held under the one-party system (Hiltzig 1991). Shortly after its formal announcement, FORD was declared illegal by the Moi government (Throup and Hornsby, 1998, 77-8), which also banned a FORD-organized pro-democracy rally planned for November 16, 1991. When the event took place despite the prohibition, the government quashed the rally with force and wholesale arrests. Among the arrested were also eight opposition leaders who Moi accused of violating public order (Human Rights Watch 1992, 56-57). International outrage over the harsh repression eventually forced Moi to change course, as the major donors of development aid decided to suspend financial assistance over lack of reform (New York Times 1991a). Bowing to international pressure, in December 1991 Moi allowed for the restoration of multiparty government by repealing article 2A of the Constitution, which made the Kenya African National Union (KANU) the only authorized

political party (FBIS-AFR-91-23811 1991). Both domestic and international observers, however, came to realize that Moi had no intention of actually leaving office. Although he authorized many political parties to participate in the December 1992 elections (Africa Events Feb. 1992), his government kept harassing the opposition, refused access to foreign observers (BBC Summary 1992) and used force to break up further pro-democracy demonstrations, citing the increase in tribal violence as a justification for such action (Christian Science Monitor 9 Mar. 1992). Therefore, the elections were not deemed fair, as it was considered that Moi and his political machine used their incumbent status to control the results (KHRC, 1998). Indeed, Moi was elected to a fourth term as president with 36.3% of the vote ahead of Kenneth Matiba (26.0%), Mwai Kibaki (19.5%) and Oginga Odinga (17.5%).

In the Kenyan case we find that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime, although there were, indeed, a few regime members that defected from the ruling party during the period of turmoil. For instance, both FORD and the Democratic Party were founded by former members of the Moi government¹⁵³. Yet, most of those Parliamentarians, Ministers and provincial officials who left KANU to join the opposition camp did so only in the late stages of Kenya's transition attempt (Hiltzig 1992a). In 1992, for example, six Ministers – including three of Cabinet rank – resigned within a three-week period, and two others, including Peter Oloo Aringo, a Minister for Manpower Development and a leading reformist, were dismissed by Moi himself (Hiltzig 1992b). Despite their high rank, the numbers of defectors remained relatively low. In addition, it was lost on almost no one that most of the leaders deserting KANU were once part of the chorus that echoed Moi's attacks on democratic governance. It is therefore conceivable that their joining the opposition camp took place not so much out of a genuine conviction that Kenya should become democratic, but in a bid to position themselves to retain their old power under a new system (Hiltzig 1992b). By consequence, Kenya's softliners did not manage to seriously threaten President Arap Moi's power base and hardliners remained in

¹⁵³ FORD was founded by Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba, both former Cabinet Ministers in the Moi government. Matiba, out of protest, had left the government in 1988 and was later sent to prison where he suffered a stroke (Der Spiegel 1992). Together with Charles Rubia he had spearheaded the "Saba Saba" protests in 1990 that introduced the demand of multiparty politics in Kenya. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, was founded in 1991 by Mwai Kibaki, former Vice President and Minister of Health in the Moi cabinet.

control, free to pursue strategic liberalization: while they conceded the return to multipartyism, the essential rules of the game remained unchanged.

President Arap Moi himself, in fact, never made much of an effort to hide his disdain for democracy¹⁵⁴. For the longest time he staunchly resisted pressure to broaden the one-party state, maintaining that “the party is supreme” (Rule 1986), and instead offering to reform KANU to broaden its base (Perlez 1990a). In 1990, addressing a two-day convention of the governing party, Moi said Kenya need not copy what was being done elsewhere (Perlez 1990b)¹⁵⁵. As the country was “at least 200 years behind” the West in economic development, it should not expect Western style democracy for another two centuries (Perlez 1991b). Whereas the leaders of other African countries like Gabon, Cameroon or Congo at least promised some kind of political reform, Moi threatened to hunt opponents to his rule down “like rats” (Der Spiegel 1990) who “will all be picked up and kept aside to cool down (...) If they want chaos, Moi is not a coward” (New York Times 1990).

In this sense, it is clear that President Moi’s abrupt switch in favor of a multiparty system was nothing but a strategic move designed to perpetuate Moi’s authoritarian hand while at the same time showing sufficient political pluralism to persuade Western donors to restore the \$360 million in aid that were suspended until Moi conceded reforms (Perlez 1991c; Noble 1992). Indeed, Moi’s actions after legalizing opposition parties showed that he never intended for the electoral process to be genuine, saying the move had been forced on Kenya by foreign pressure (Los Angeles Times 1992) and promising that the opposition would get “zero mandate from the people” (Perlez 1991d). Reactions from both the KANU party and the security forces were almost unanimously supportive. “Aid is being used as a weapon”, said Abdul Rahman Bafadhil, the secretary of KANU’s youth branch. “What we need is public accountability.” Other delegates complained that Western donors, and particularly the US, were “forcing us to a multiparty system” (Perlez 1991d), and even put

¹⁵⁴ In 1984, for example, he explained his governing style in the following way: “I would like Ministers, Assistant Ministers and others to sing like a parrot after me (...) That is how we can progress” (Perlez 1991a).

¹⁵⁵ Moi was obviously referring to the multiple National Conferences that were being held in other African countries. He maintained that Kenya, with its strong tribal allegiances, was not cohesive enough to afford the “luxury” of multiparty politics (Le Monde Diplomatique 1992, 26; Africa Confidential 1990, 2). His Vice President, George Saitoti, echoed his words at a rally of ruling party loyalists, claiming that multiparty politics was to blame for the violence in countries such as Zaire. “Kenyans are not ready to spill blood”, he said. “They are united and have opted for one party, one government” (Perlez 1991e).

forward a resolution to make Arap Moi President for life (AFP 1991). Most importantly, however, Moi received a renewed pledge of loyalty from senior military officers (Orlando Sentinel 1990a), reassuring him that the security forces would continue to execute his orders¹⁵⁶. This explains why, in the months leading up to the election, the KANU government was able to indiscriminately use repression and to manipulate the electoral process in a way that guaranteed KANU a continuation in power.

Firstly, Moi regularly denied FORD and other opposition groups the right to hold rallies, calling their politicians “subversive and power hungry Libyan-trained thugs” and threatened to use force should they ignore his orders (Perlez 1991e). In other cases, police physically prevented the opposition party's officials from ceremonially opening provincial or district offices. Additionally, supporters of KANU tried to establish *de facto* “off limit” zones in large swathes of the country by attacking opposition leaders¹⁵⁷ (Hiltzig 1992c). Secondly, not only were opposition leaders granted virtually no access to the state-run radio and television system, there was also a renewed crackdown on independent media. In 1992, Human Rights Watch reported that Gitobu Imanyara, editor of the Nairobi Law Monthly, and Njehu Gatabaki, editor of Finance, as well as journalists Paul Amina, Macharia Gaitho and Julius Bargorett, were harassed, arrested or beaten for promoting multipartyism in their writings (Human Rights Watch 1992, 60-61). Moreover, several publications were banned (Hiltzig 1990), including some issues of the magazines Newsweek and Der Spiegel and the International Herald Tribune which reported acts of police brutality during the demonstration on 16 November 1991 (IRBC 1992). Thirdly, the organization of the election day itself also showed that the rules were loaded against opposition parties. At first, no date was set for a vote¹⁵⁸. When finally December 7 was chosen, the date was set in a way that would minimize both international scrutiny and opportunities for the opposition to organize and compete. For example, since Moi refused to allow for an effective domestic monitoring system, as many as one million voters did

¹⁵⁶ For example, riot police opened fire on the Saba Saba protestors, killing at least 20 (Perlez 1991f), and demolished a Nairobi shantytown whose inhabitants had denounced corruption in the government clique. When a senior Cabinet Minister condemned the actions of the police, Moi dismissed him (Perlez 1990c).

¹⁵⁶ On February 19, 1992, for example, a mob ambushed an 11-car convoy of FORD leaders in the town of Ngong, where 11 officials were injured (Hiltzig1992c).

¹⁵⁷ On February 19, 1992, for example, a mob ambushed an 11-car convoy of FORD leaders in the town of Ngong, where 11 officials were injured (Hiltzig1992c).

¹⁵⁸ In fact, an article in the February 1991 issue of Africa News quoted President Moi as saying, “Nobody should go around cheating the people [into thinking] that elections are on.” (Megill 2008, 530)

not receive identity cards and could therefore not register to vote (New York Times 1992). Furthermore, there were reports that teachers, civil servants, soldiers and police officers had been “admonished” to vote for Moi’s KANU party (Perlez 1992a).

Lastly, Moi did not hesitate to instrumentalize political violence to his own ends. When in 1992 tribal clashes erupted between members of President Moi’s Kalenjin tribe and the Luo tribe to which many opposition members belonged, Moi allowed the violence to spread in order to undermine the movement for democracy (Perlez 1992b). In an effort to demonstrate to the public that pluralism in Kenya would inevitably lead to political chaos, Moi did not order the police or the military to intervene; to the contrary, it is rumored that they even offered logistical help to the Kalenjins (Der Spiegel 1992). Regime critics suffered a similar fate: for instance, Anglican Bishop Alexander Muge, an outspoken critic of Moi, was murdered after a government official had warned Muge his life was in danger (Orlando Sentinel 1990b). Another high profile murder case involved former Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott, the closest aide to the President, and former Head of Internal Security Hezekiah Oyugi who was accused of killing Robert Ouko, former Kenyan Foreign Minister, after the latter threatened to expose corruption in the ruling circle (Der Spiegel 1991; Der Spiegel 1990)¹⁵⁹. As a result of all this, Kenya’s transition attempt did not lead to the instauration of minimal democracy. Instead, the 1992 election results reaffirmed KANU’s superiority and Moi remained in office until 2002.

Resume:

The Kenyan transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime, as both the bulk of the Single Party and security forces remained loyal to hardliner Moi. As a result, Moi initiated pseudo-reforms to placate Western governments while the real rules of the game remained unchanged and Moi remained in power.

References:

Africa Confidential. 1990. "*Kenya: The End of an Era*". October 26th. London: Miramoor Publications Ltd. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.

¹⁵⁹ The charges were later dropped and the public inquiry suspended (Greenhouse 1991)

1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Africa Events. 1992. "*The Countdown*." February. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Africa Watch. 1991. *Kenya: Taking Liberties, an Africa Watch Report*. New York: Africa Watch, July. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Agence France Press. 1991. "*Kenyan Opposition Declares 'Madness' Order to Expel Them from Capital*." September 29th. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 1992. "*Kenya: FORD May Boycott Elections if its Demands to the Government Are Not Met*". February 3rd. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Christian Science Monitor. 1992. "*Kenyan Political Violence March Moves Toward Democratic Reform*". March 9th. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Der Spiegel. 1990. "*Kenia: Leiche in den Fluss*", July 30th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13502460.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

- Der Spiegel. 1991. "Kenia: Leere Loecher", November 18th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13492031.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Der Spiegel. 1992. "Kenia: Friedhof fuer Tausende". May 11th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13680614.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) - Africa (AFR) - 91-238 11. 1991. "Kenya: Parliament Paves Way for 'Multiparty Democracy.'" *KTN Television*, December 10th.
- Greenhouse, Steven. 1991. "Aid donors insist on Kenya reforms". *New York Times*, November 27th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/27/world/aid-donors-insist-on-kenya-reforms.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Hiltzig, Michael. 1990. "Kenya Bans Leading Dissident Periodical : Suppression: President Moi also inveighs against church leaders and political figures urging a change in domination by his party". *Los Angeles Times*, September 30th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-09-30/news/mn-2506_1_political-figures. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Hiltzig, Michael. 1991. "Gas, Guns and Arrests Snuff Out Kenya Protest Rally : Africa: Six more pro-democracy leaders are seized. The Moi regime accuses the U.S. of orchestrating the opposition.". *Los Angeles Times*, November 17th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-11-17/news/mn-399_1_opposition-rally. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Hiltzig, Michael. 1992a. "4 Opposition Party Leaders Arrested in Kenya: Crackdown: They are charged with spreading rumors attacking President Moi's government". *Los Angeles Times*, January 15th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-15/news/mn-194_1_opposition-party. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Hiltzig, Michael. 1992b. "National Agenda: One-Party Rule Now Crumbling in Kenya: When President Daniel Arap Moi legalized opposition parties, he may have opened a door to his own demise". *Los Angeles Times*, January 7th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-07/news/wr-1601_1_opposition-party. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Hiltzig, Michael. 1992c. "Kenya Police Break Up Opposition Vigil: Africa: Signs mount that the experiment in multi-party democracy is deteriorating into partisan violence". *Los Angeles Times*, March 4th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-04/news/mn-3155_1_opposition-party. Accessed May 16th, 2016.
- Human Rights Watch. 1992. *Annual Report 1991*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Kenya Human Right Commission Report. 1998. *Killing the Vote: State Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya*. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Human Rights Commission.

Le Monde Diplomatique. 1992. "*Fin de règne mouvementée au Kenya*". January. Quoted in Canada. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1992. *Restoration of Multiparty Government and Kenyans of Somali Origin*. March 1st. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a80a28.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Los Angeles Times. 1992. "*100,000 Attend Rare Legal Rally by Kenya Opposition*". January 19th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-01-19/news/mn-928_1_opposition-rally. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Megill, Esther L. 2008. *Return to Africa: A Journal*. Bloomington.

New York Times. 1990. "*Kenya Undermined, at the Top*". October 10th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/10/opinion/kenya-undermined-at-the-top.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

New York Times. 1992. "*Kenya's Managed Election*". December 21st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/21/opinion/kenya-s-managed-election.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Noble, Kenneth. 1992. "*Kenya's Multiparty Vote Faces Critics' Wrath*". *New York Times*, December 27th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/27/world/kenya-s-multiparty-vote-faces-critics-wrath.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Orlando Sentinel. 1990a. "*Kenya President Receives Support After Fatal Riots*". July 11th. Available at: http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1990-07-11/news/9007110844_1_kenya-daniel-arap-moi-advisory-in-effect. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Orlando Sentinel. 1990b. "*Kenya To Investigate Death Of Bishop*". August 19th. Available at: http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1990-08-19/news/9008190240_1_muge-kenya-death-of-bishop. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1990a. "*With Care, U.S. Presses Kenyans To Open Their Political Process*". *New York Times*, August 6th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/06/world/with-care-us-presses-kenyans-to-open-their-political-process.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1990b. "*Kenyan Party Votes Changes Without Imperiling Its Grip*". *New York Times*, December 6th. Available at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/06/world/kenyan-party-votes-changes-without-imperiling-its-grip.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1990c. "2 Leading Foes of One-Party Rule Are Reported Arrested by Kenya". *New York Times*, July 5th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/05/world/2-leading-foes-of-one-party-rule-are-reported-arrested-by-kenya.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991a. "On Eve of Talks With Aid Donors, Kenya Is Under Pressure to Democratize". *New York Times*, November 25th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/25/world/on-eve-of-talks-with-aid-donors-kenya-is-under-pressure-to-democratize.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991b. "Kenya Tightening Curbs on Dissident Groups". *New York Times*, September 23rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/23/world/kenya-tightening-curbs-on-dissident-groups.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991c. "Kenyan Yielding on Multiparty Politics". *New York Times*, December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/03/world/kenyan-yielding-on-multiparty-politics.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991d. "Kenyan Leader Explains Reversal to Party". *New York Times*, December 4th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/04/world/kenyan-leader-explains-reversal-to-party.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991e. "Kenya's President Is Tightening His Grip". *New York Times*, October 6th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/06/weekinreview/the-world-kenya-s-president-is-tightening-his-grip.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1991f. "Riot Police Break Up Opposition Rally in Kenya". *New York Times*, November 17th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/17/world/riot-police-break-up-opposition-rally-in-kenya.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1992a. "Kenya Sets Date for First Open Vote in 3 Decades". *New York Times*, November 5th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/05/world/kenya-sets-date-for-first-open-vote-in-3-decades.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Perlez, Jane. 1992b. "Kenya Orders Ban on Political Meetings". *New York Times*, March 21st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/21/world/kenya-orders-ban-on-political-meetings.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Rule, Sheila. 1986. "Power of Kenya's Leader is Growing". *New York Times*, December 15th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/15/world/power-of-kenya-s-leader-is-growing.html>. Accessed May 16th, 2016.

Throup, David W. and Charles Hornsby. 1998. *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election*. Oxford, United Kingdom: James Currey Ltd.

(19) Togo¹⁶⁰

The Togolese reform movement emerged in 1990 as a reaction to economic hardship and the gradual waning of patron-client relationships. It was spearheaded by a frustrated intelligentsia and directed against the corporatist government of General Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his Single Party, the "Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais" (RPT), who had been ruling Togo since 1967 (Decalo 1987, 172). The transition began on October 5, 1990, when two University professors were detained by the Togolese Security Services for distributing antigovernment tracts. The arrests sparked large public demonstrations and resulted in violent repression by government forces, the most infamous of which – the massacre of the Bê Laguna – left several dozen people dead (Engueleguele et al., 2013). Despite the government crackdown, demonstrations intensified under the auspices of the "Front d'Action pour le Renouveau" (FAR), an umbrella of opposition groups, and finally led to the signing of an agreement between the FAR and President Eyadéma on March 22, 1991. The agreement provided for a general amnesty, a new Charter on political parties and the organization of a National Forum on Dialogue tasked with elaborating the conditions for Togo's transition to a more participatory political system.

Whereas the first two laws entered into force, the National Forum on Dialogue never took place, as the FAR decided they would no longer be satisfied with anything other than a National Conference (Letogolais.com, 2013). Astonished by the severity of popular disaffection with the regime, the Eyadéma government eventually gave in to opposition demands for a National Conference on the condition that the latter would not declare sovereignty. However, as soon as the National Conference opened in July 1991,

¹⁶⁰ Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4

the participating opposition groups immediately broke the agreement, and although severely harassed by the government, drafted an interim Constitution calling for a one-year transitional regime that would culminate in free elections for a new government. They unilaterally selected Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, a prominent Human Rights activist, as their new Prime Minister, created a transitional Parliament (the High Council of the Republic, HCR) and stripped President Eyadéma of most of his powers (although he was to remain chief of state for the duration of the transition).

Outmanoeuvred by these events, the following three years constituted a test of wills between the new transitional government and Eyadéma and his supporters, during which Eyadéma gradually gained the upper hand. This period was marked by several unsuccessful coup attempts and persistent political violence carried out by military loyal to President Eyadéma. When in October 1991 the HCR voted to dissolve Eyadéma's political party and to curtail the power of the military, the Army overthrew Koffigoh's transitional government in what would become known as the "attack on the Primature" on December 3, 1991. This coup initiated Eyadéma's gradual recuperation of power (Letogolais.com, 2013). Koffigoh, under pressure of the Army, negotiated with Eyadéma a "national unity government" in which the most important ministerial posts were assigned to RPT figures (New York Times 1991). Even though a new democratic Constitution was adopted on September 27, 1992, a second military coup in October 1992 effectively put an end to the interim legislature when elements of the Army held the HCR hostage for 24 hours. Shortly after the incident, elections that had originally been scheduled for December 1992 were postponed and Eyadéma unilaterally declared that the transition had ended (Engueleguele et al. 2013). In January 1993 he reappointed Koffigoh as Prime Minister, whose government, though nominally independent, cooperated closely with the President throughout the year and regularly took policy positions consistent with Eyadéma's views (U.S. Department of State 1994). On August 25, 1993, Eyadéma won reelection as President in a highly fraudulent electoral process marked by the non-participation of all major opposition candidates and a voter turnout of only 36 percent.

References:

Decalo, Samuel. 1987. *Historical Dictionary of Togo*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.

Engueleguele, Maurice, Comi Toulabor, Guy Labertit, Stephen Smith, Bernard Diallo and Yves Lacoste. 2013. "République du Togo - Bilans annuels de 1983 à 2013". *L'état du monde, La Découverte*. Available at: www.cairn.info/l-etat-du-monde-togo-page-01.htm. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

Letogolais.com. 2013. "Togo: Proposition du GRAD pour une sortie de la crise togolaise". Conference SAAD & GRAD, July 1st. Available at: <http://www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=7656>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

New York Times. 1991. "*Togo's Prime Minister Compromise*". December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/03/world/togo-s-prime-minister-proposes-compromise.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

U.S. Department of State. 1994. *Togo Human Rights Practices, 1993*. Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Togo.html. Accessed January 9th, 2014.

(20) Poland

Poland set off on the road towards democracy at the end of the 1980s after a long and steady economic decline. On the surface, authoritarianism remained strong (Wesolowski 1990) and few analysts would have predicted an imminent breakdown of the Communist system. But attempts at reforming the ailing Polish economy “from above” proved unsuccessful, and when in 1988 the government felt compelled to introduce a 40 percent rise in food prices to counter the worsening economic situation, a wave of strikes rippled through the country. In January 1989, there were 49 strikes with an estimated 15,000 participants; in March of the same year, the number of strikes had quintupled (Pakulski and Markowski 2010). By that time the Communist authorities recognized that they wouldn’t be able to weather crisis after crisis without building broader public support, and that they’d need “national consensus and cooperation” in order to carry out reforms (Prohntitchi 2006). Such support, they realized, was only obtainable by including at least the symbolic participation of opposition forces in the decision-making processes (Powers 1988). Therefore, when General Jaruzelski proposed reconciliation talks aimed at defusing the mounting social unrest, he gave *de facto* recognition to the banned Solidarity Union, once Poland’s most important opposition organization. On August 31, Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak initiated talks with its leader, Lech Walesa, but negotiations eventually broke down as it became clear that the Communist nomenklatura was strictly opposed to one of the most important opposition demands, the legalizing of Solidarity, and instead intended to simply place some opposition figures in its ranks without actually changing the political system (Wesolowski 1990). By mid-1989, however, the situation had shifted; partly due to social pressure and the opposition’s refusal to accept the co-optation strategy, and partly due to the strengthened position of reformists within the Communist leadership. Specifically, the Polish Army and the security forces controlled by Jaruzelski and Kiszczak had gradually moved from their position as “the faithful arm of the Communist Party” to something approximating a “third party” (Pakulski and Markowski 2010), which played a major role in opening up the way for the 1989 Roundtable talks. These talks between the party-government side, represented by both the ruling party-state apparatus and its military arm, and the Solidarity-Opposition side, led by Walesa and a number of smaller opposition groups, lasted for two months and ended with an agreement specifying the program for the gradual change of the political system and the economic model. Most importantly, partly

open parliamentary elections were to be held in April. The results of these elections came as a shock to all involved parties: While the Communists and their coalition partners received two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House, one third of the Lower House seats and almost all Senate seats were claimed by Solidarity candidates. The failure of the Communists at the polls produced a political crisis in the party headquarters. Trying to save face, First Secretary Mieczyslaw Rakoswki attempted to renege on the Round Table agreement by insisting on filling both the President and the Prime Minister positions with Communist party members and by claiming the strategic ministries of Defense, Security and Foreign Affairs (Skórzyński 2009). When the opposition declined, the National Assembly elected General Jaruzelski as President on July 19, which gave the Communists at least titular control of Poland. However, two attempts at forming a government failed, and when Lech Walesa managed to arrange a coalition uniting Solidarity with the PZPR's former allies, the Peasant and Democratic Parties, Jaruzelski gave in and asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual and Solidarity advisor, to head Poland's first non-Communist government in over 40 years (Los Angeles Times 1989). The Cabinet was reshuffled in July 1990, and in October 1990 the Constitution was amended to curtail the term of President Jaruzelski. Direct presidential elections – the first in Poland's history - were scheduled for November 1990 and were won by Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, who in December 1990 became Poland's first popularly elected President.

When analyzing primary and secondary sources, it becomes fairly obvious that the Polish authoritarian regime did experience a crisis during the country's transition to democracy. We can clearly distinguish hardliners, represented by a big part of the Communist party nomenklatura both inside Poland and the Soviet Union ally government, and softliners led by General Jaruzelski and aides, as well as the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Even though some researchers might argue that the "Gorbachev-factor" should be considered an "international factor", we disagree on methodological grounds. Earlier we defined an authoritarian regime as being composed of the ruling circle and its supportive system, particularly the coercive apparatus. However, throughout the Soviet era, Moscow prevented Eastern European regimes from developing truly national Armed Forces, and Polish rulers had to essentially rely on the Soviet Army under the Warsaw Pact in order to protect their regime both from internal as well as from external enemies (Fields and Jensen 1996). Beyond the military aspect, the Soviet

Communist Party exercised control over satellite states' governments through political, economic and cultural mechanisms, forming a unique pattern of relationships in which the Soviet Communist Party was the undisputed senior partner (Jones 1985, 2). Therefore, we argue that the Polish authoritarian government cannot be viewed separately from its Soviet counterpart, and the split between hardliners and softliners only makes sense if one includes parallel developments in the Kreml.

During the years leading up to the transition, Polish society witnessed the onset of a gradual process of "softening" of Communist power in which softliners advocated for the liberalization of civil society (Prohntichi 2006). On the side of the Polish government, several political initiatives were undertaken that reflected the growing conviction of Jaruzelski and his aides that "problems in Poland should be dealt with in a political way [negotiations with the opposition], and not in an administrative way [the use of force]" (Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006, 22). Firstly, when Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko, a prominent pro-Solidarity priest, was killed in 1984, Jaruzelski tasked his Interior Minister, General Kiszczak, with the investigation that led to four secret policemen. Jaruzelski allowed a public trial of the security forces, thereby demonstrating his acceptance of public opinion. Simultaneously, General Kiszczak moved to purge the Interior Ministry of many hardliners, and some of them were even expelled from senior party posts (Kaufman 1989). Following the Popieluszko affair, in 1986 Jaruzelski granted a full amnesty to all those arrested as a result of the 1981 imposition of martial law (The Szczerinianin 2013). He also drastically relaxed censorship, giving Poland a virtually free press. This is why, in 1988, a televised political debate between much vilified Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the leader of the pro-regime All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), Alfred Miodowicz, could take place (Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006, 22).

In 1989, it was Jaruzelski together with General Kiszczak and another close political ally, Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who managed to overcome the resistance of the Communist party leadership towards legalizing Solidarity, and they bore prime responsibility for the success of the Round Table agreements. In fact, after General Jaruzelski agreed to the first government talks with Solidarity leaders in seven years, party offices in 38 of the country's 49 provinces protested to Warsaw, and Jaruzelski was bitterly criticized at shop-floor meetings with Communist workers (Tagliabue 1989). Party and

industry conservatives feared that any recognition of the opposition organization would ultimately threaten their positions and power (Powers 1988). Reluctance to the project of legalizing Solidarity was so fierce that regime softliners had to resort to “blackmail” to force their way onto the hardliners.

During the 10th Plenary Meeting of the PZPR on December 20-21, 1988, and January 16-17, 1989, Jaruzelski “took the floor several times”, and finally even threatened his resignation, together with those of Prime Minister Rakowski, Interior Minister Kiszczak and Defense Minister Siwicki, should the resolution for lifting the ban not be adopted (Tagliabue 1989). In an effort to sway conservatives, Rakowski, who had established a reputation as one of the party’s leading Liberals during his 24-year tenure as editor of the party’s weekly magazine *Polityka*, issued a speech claiming that Solidarity, if legalized, would have to submit to strict regulations. Yet, even opposition leaders understood that “Rakowski’s conditions were empty words intended to sooth the party” (Powers 1989). In a symptomatic reaction that reflected the wind of change in the Politburo, the Central Committee endorsed Jaruzelski’s plans by a vote of confidence (Dudek 2002, 30)

On the Soviet side, a series of public declarations by Gorbachev echoed that wind. In 1986 he proclaimed “unconditional respect” for the right of every country “to choose the paths and forms of its development” (Keller 1989), thereby *de facto* abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine. In 1988 at a UN summit, he reiterated the principle of freedom of choice and proclaimed that any interference in internal affairs of sovereign states was inadmissible (Renwick 2006). On several occasions Gorbachev also intervened directly in favor of the democratization process in Poland, despite harsh criticism of Kreml and Warsaw Pact hardliners¹⁶¹. Before Jaruzelski offered round table talks to Solidarity Gorbachev visited Poland in the middle of a wave of violent strikes and made it clear to the Polish authorities that he would not approve any form of violent suppression of the opposition (Pakulski and Markowski 2010). Finally, when negotiations over a possible

¹⁶¹ In the Kreml, Radomir G. Bogdanov, a Colonel in the KGB and an official of the Soviet Peace Committee, asserted that Solidarity’s refusal to take part in a Communist-led government had the significance of a “coup” (Keller 1989). In East Germany, Honecker banned Polish newspapers and started a hostile campaign against Polish guest workers, and the Romanian Communist party sent an open letter to Polish comrades warning them against “capitulation” (Pakulski and Markowski 2010).

new coalition government in Poland after the 1989 Parliament elections stalled, he called Prime Minister Rakowski and counseled him about the need for compromise, bluntly stating that “time had come to yield power” (Parks 1989).

The most striking proof of the victory of softliners over Polish and Soviet hardliners, however, was the fact that neither Jaruzelski nor Gorbachev even considered intervening militarily after the instauration of the first non-Communist government in Poland. When comparing the situation with 1981, when Jaruzelski cut short a first attempt at liberalization by introducing martial law¹⁶², one notices two crucial differences. On one hand, the attitudinal change in the Soviet Union signalled that change was not only tolerated but welcomed (McSweeney and Tempest 1993). When Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian dictator, called for a military intervention of the Warsaw Pact States in Poland (Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczynski 2006), his motion did not find support from the rest of the leaders of the Eastern bloc, including Gorbachev who openly discouraged “a new variant of martial law”¹⁶³. This represented a significant attitudinal shift from earlier years when Moscow sent Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia to end the Prague Spring, or used Soviet troops to crush anti-Communist uprisings in Hungary and East Germany (Parks 1989). On the other hand, with the exception of top-level military and political leaders, most Poles were firmly committed nationalists, and by 1989, Polish Generals “presided over a schizophrenic Army composed of soldiers who were openly and unequivocally hostile to the Soviet Union” (Rakowska-Harmstone et al. 1984, 236). Therefore, it is not clear whether Jaruzelski would even have been able to prevent the course of events if he had tried to.

Resume:

Polish softliners under Jaruzelski, together with a reformist Army and the support of progressive-minded Soviet officials led Poland to its first non-Communist government

¹⁶² Jaruzelski later justified his actions, stating that he felt compelled to introduce martial law in order to prevent an imminent Soviet intervention (Unger 1993). He hoped to employ the minimum of force so that he would be able to reach agreements with the more moderate elements in the country, and continue those aspects of reform which would not undermine the authority of the government.

¹⁶³ According to Ash (2009), Mieczysław Rakowski sounded out Gorbachev on the possibility of ‘a new variant of martial law’ in August 1989. Gorbachev responded that it was impossible.

despite resistance from hardline Communist party officials. We therefore confirm the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

Ash, Timothy Garton. 2009. "Velvet revolution: the prospects". *New York Review of Books* 56(19), December 3rd. Available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/12/03/velvet-revolution-the-prospects/>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

Cwiek-Karpowicz, Jaroslaw and Piotr Maciej Kaczynski. 2006. "Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy: Lessons from Poland 1980 – 1999". Research Report. Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs.

Dudek, Antoni. 2002. *Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej, 1989 – 2001 (The First Years of the Third Republic, 1989 - 2001)*. Krakow: Arcana.

Fields, Frank E. and Jack J. Jensen. 1996. *Building an Army in a Democracy in Hungary and Poland*. MA Thesis. California: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey.

Jones, Ellen. 1985. *Red Army and Society*. Boston: Allen and Unwin Publishers.

Kaufman, Michael. 1989a. "An Heir For Jaruzelski; General Groomed to Succeed Polish Leader Would Preserve Army's Paramount Power". *New York Times*, July 1st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/01/world/heir-for-jaruzelski-general-groomed-succeed-polish-leader-would-preserve-army-s.html?ref=wojciechjaruzelski>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

Keller, Bill. 1989c. "The Hush in Moscow; Gorbachev Accepts Poland's New Reality, But Not Without a Few Discreet Warnings". *New York Times*, August 21st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/21/world/hush-moscow-gorbachev-accepts-poland-s-new-reality-but-not-without-few-discreet.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

Los Angeles Times. 1989. "*Gorbachev Says Party Is Vital to Polish Reforms*". August 23rd. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-23/news/mn-902_1_communist-party. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

McSweeney, Dean and Clive Tempest. 1993. "The Political Science of Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe". *Political Studies* 41(3): 408 - 419.

- Pakulski, Jan and Stefan Markowski. 2010. "The Solidarity Decade 1980 – 1989: An Australian Perspective". *Humanities Research* XVI (3): 1 - 9.
- Parks, Michael. 1989. "The Curtain Rises: Eastern Europe, 1989: Soviet Union: Gorbachev Unleashes the Forces of Reform: A hands-on crisis manager, his intercession has proved crucial in toppling the East Bloc's hard-liners". *Los Angeles Times*, December 17th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-17/news/ss-1779_1_soviet-union. Accessed January 11th, 2014.
- Powers, Charles. 1988. "Polish Communist Party Picks Premier: Former Editor Rakowski Seen as Liberal but Tough on Solidarity". *Los Angeles Times*, September 27th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-27/news/mn-2743_1_solidarity. Accessed January 11th, 2014.
- Powers, Charles. 1989. "Warsaw Tries to Define New Role for Solidarity". *Los Angeles Times*, January 19th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-01-19/news/mn-1484_1_warsaw-solidarity. Accessed January 11th, 2014.
- ProhniŹchi, Elena. 2006. "Comparative Analysis of the Modes of Transition in Hungary and Poland and their Impact on the Electoral System of these States". *CEU Political Science Journal* 3: 5 – 10.
- Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, Ivan Sylvain, and Zoltan Barany. 1984. *Warsaw Pact: Question of Cohesion Phase II, Volumes 1-3*. Ottawa: Department of Defense, Canada.
- Renwick, Alan. 2006. "Why Hungary and Poland differed in 1989: The role of medium-term frames in explaining the outcomes of democratic transition". *Democratization* 13(1): 36 - 57.
- Skórzyński, Jan. 2009. *Rewolucja Okrągłego Stołu (The Round Table Revolution)*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Tagliabue, John. 1989b. "Jaruzelski Said He'd Quit If Party Rejected His Gesture to Solidarity". *New York Times*, January 19th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/19/world/jaruzelski-said-he-d-quit-if-party-rejected-his-gesture-to-solidarity.html?ref=wojciechjaruzelski>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.
- The Szczerinianin. 2013. "Guilty – Szczecin's martial law general sentenced". April 8th. Available at: <http://sz-n.com/2013/04/guilty-szczecins-martial-law-general-sentenced/>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

Unger, David. 1993. "Editorial Notebook; General Jaruzelski Regrets". *New York Times*, March 5th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/05/opinion/editorial-notebook-general-jaruzelski-regrets.html?ref=wojciechjaruzelski>. Accessed January 11th, 2014.

Wesolowski, Wlodzimierz. 1990. "East Europe: Where from, Where to?" *Social Research* 57(2): 435 – 461

(21) Romania

Romania embarked on the quest for multiparty politics on December 16, 1989, when protests broke out on part of the Hungarian minority in Timisoara in response to a government-ordered eviction of Protestant pastor Laszlo Tokes. Earlier that year, Tokes had criticized the repressive regime of Nicolae Ceausescu to Hungarian television (Brubaker 2006), complaining about the Human Rights situation in his country. He was subsequently accused of inciting ethnic hatred and was to be sent to the countryside (Ivanes 2001). As Tokes refused to move, the crowds that had amassed in front of his house to protect him were attacked by special troops of the Interior Ministry, the Securitate, and the Romanian Army. Over the course of three consecutive days the city was clouded in a civil-war-like atmosphere, pinning unarmed protestors and heavily armed security forces against each other in what seems to have been a direct order from Ceausescu himself.¹⁶⁴ The clash left at least 400 people dead and hundreds more wounded (Siani-Davies 2005, 281), but by December 20, the Armed Forces deployed to crush the uprising were either retreating or fraternizing with the protestors. Learning about this turn of events, Ceausescu, returning from a state visit in Iran, decided to call a mass rally to demonstrate popular support to his regime in Bucharest. This move proved to be an enormous miscalculation on his part, as crowds gathered in front of his palace started jeering and calling for the downfall of the dictator (Bohlen 1990a). Mass disorders erupted in every major Romanian city as the live images of a fear-struck Ceausescu were broadcast to millions of Romanians at once (McNeil 1999). In a desperate attempt to appease the crowds, Ceausescu offered to raise the salary of every Romanian worker by 100 Leu (7 Dollar), and when the attempt failed, he ordered security troops to fire (Der Spiegel 2000). Despite a bloody night of repression protestors returned in numbers on December 22, but this time the Armed Forces refused to quell the unrest. By the late morning, the security ring outside the Central Committee building had been breached and protestors had taken over the central television station. While fighting in the streets between the Romanian Army defectors and Ceausescu loyalists was still ongoing, a group of former Communist party officials under the leadership of Ion Iliescu formed the National Salvation Front, a

¹⁶⁴“Relay my orders to all officers”, Ceausescu told General Coman, the officer responsible for the Army units stationed in Timisoara, before the shootings began. “I want that calm should be restored in Timisoara in one hour” (Bohlen 1990a).

new party and self-proclaimed interim government (Ivanes 2001). Ceausescu and his wife Elena fled in a helicopter, but their pilot defected and the Army caught them. They were later tried in an extraordinary military tribunal and executed on Christmas Day out of fear that loyalists would try and rescue them (New York Times 1990a). Four months later on May 20, 1990, Romania held her first free presidential and parliamentary elections which Iliescu's party, the National Salvation Front, won with 66,31% of the votes.

Our analysis finds that there were several types of liberalizers in Romania's regime. On one hand there was a little group of disaffected Communist officials, security agents and Army Generals that had been plotting against Ceausescu for a long time and that found the popular uprising a convenient opportunity to put their "palace coup" in motion (Chilton 1994; Haerpfer 2009; Roper 2000; Der Spiegel 2009). On the other hand, there were critics of Ceausescu from within his own ranks, which spoke out against him but did not dare engaging in regime-overthrowing activities. Finally, a third group of softliners composed of spontaneous defectors from government officials and security forces increased in number as the popular rebellion advanced. This last group encompassed notably the bulk of the Armed Forces, and was crucial in tipping the balance of power in favor of the softliners.

The first group, a number of second and third tier nomenklatura members, in cooperation with some retired Army Generals and Securitate officers, had secretly been conspiring against Ceausescu since the early 1970s (Ratesh 1991). Little is known about their true motives, but many historians believe they wanted more power than what Ceausescu was willing to concede (Zeit Online 2009). They did not want a transition to democracy but were looking to reform the existing regime in order to create a more humane form of Socialism (Ivanes 2001). In an interview with the French magazine "Le Nouvel Observateur", former conspirator General Nicolae Militaru, Minister of Defense in the post-revolutionary government, admitted that the group¹⁶⁵ had been preparing to unseat Ceausescu in Spring of 1990, and that they simply joined the uprising in December (Le Nouvel Observateur 1990). Silviu Brucan, one of the key actors of the conspiracy, explains

¹⁶⁵ Members of the group are said to have been Militaru himself, former Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe, Defence Minister Ion Ionita, Securitate official Virgil Magureanu, Army General Costyal, Silviu Brucan, editor in chief of the Party daily Scanteia, and Ion Iliescu, Ceausescu's former heir apparent who fell from favor for criticizing Ceausescu's Mao-like personality cult (McNeil 1999; Le Nouvel Observateur 1990)

in his book (Brucan 1993, 153) that the first attempt to stage a coup was planned for 1984, but that the movement was found out and many of the main instigators were arrested and executed. Nonetheless the plotting continued in secret and by 1989, he claims, sections of the Army and Securitate had already been won over. The fact that the Army and large swathes of the security services defected on the morning of December 22, 1989 could be considered proof of Brucan's claim. He also reveals that the group had received "support for their plans" both in Washington and in London, as well as from Gorbachev (Brucan 1993, 150).¹⁶⁶

The second group of softliners consisted of government and party officials who, albeit critical of Ceausescu and his ruling style, did not dare oppose him openly or undertake any subversive action against his regime. For instance, after the annual convention of the Romanian Communist Party in 1989, a "Committee for National Change within the framework of the Romanian Communist Party" came forward with a 44-point program demanding the removal from power of the Ceausescu clan and encouraged all neighboring socialist countries to cut ties to the Romanian Communist Party (Der Spiegel 1989a). However, the signatories of the letter remained anonymous; an experience that also Mr. Iliescu and Mr. Brucan had to make when looking for allies willing to participate in a hypothetical post-Ceausescu government (Bohlen 1990a). Despite good contacts in the Politbureau, both men were unable to find anyone in Ceausescu's close entourage courageous enough to make a move, although many hinted that they shared their views. Up to November 1989, the most "daring" attempt to speak out against Ceausescu were two letters. The first one was written by Brucan in March 1989 and was signed by six high-level Communist Party officials.¹⁶⁷ They demanded an end to Ceausescu's increasingly repressive reign of terror, which they considered "a danger for the biological existence of the nation" (Der Spiegel 1989b). The second letter was a report prepared by Dumitru Mazilu, a former member of the Romanian State Security Council, which was smuggled

¹⁶⁶ Similar to events in Poland, the positive attitude of the Soviet leadership provided an important boost to Romanian softliners. Not only promised Gorbachev the coup plotters the Soviet Army would not interfere (McNeil 1999), he also publicly encouraged the Romanian uprising in their "breaking off with the authoritarian regime and embarking on the road of democratic renewal" (Clines 1989)

¹⁶⁷ The signatories of the letter were Romanian diplomat Mircea Raceanu, Party Secretary Gheorghe Apostol, former Deputy Prime Minister Alexandru Birladeanu, Party founding member Constantin Pirvulescu, former Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu and Grigore Raceanu, Mircea Raceanu's stepfather (Binder 1989c)

out of Bucharest and denounced Ceausescu's Human Rights abuses and the terrible living conditions of ordinary Romanians (Lewis 1989)

By the time of the Romanian uprising, however, the third group of softliners proved decisive in transforming dissent within the Romanian regime into a true crisis from which reformers would emerge victorious. As crowds swelled in front of the Presidential palace, defections increased both within the government apparatus and the military wing of the regime. On December 17, for instance, Ceausescu threatened to execute two of his top Ministers, the Minister of the Interior and the Defense Minister, for their cautious handling of the Timisoara demonstrations. He met with a rare objection from his inner circle of advisors, notably from Ion Dinca, the former Prime Minister (Bohlen 1990b). A few days later, State Security chief Iulian Vlad announced over the radio that he was siding with the insurgents, and encouraged the Army and the Securitate to join him (Binder 1989a; Binder 1989b). Most importantly, however, the death of Defense Minister General Vasile Milea proved crucial in turning the Armed Forces against the regime. Since Milea's actions during his final hours are in dispute¹⁶⁸, the announcement of his death suggested to many that the loyalty of the Army's High Command was in doubt,¹⁶⁹ and that a similar fate could await those who stayed with the regime (Hall 2000).

Available evidence suggests that the troops did indeed initially join the shootings at Timisoara on December 17 under the direction of Chief of Staff General Stefan Guse, but that many of them were either coerced into shooting¹⁷⁰ or led to believe they were fighting Hungarian insurgents (Bohlen 1990a)¹⁷¹. However, when troops were confronted not with foreign usurpators but fellow Romanians who were voicing many of the same concerns that they and their families shared, soldiers reportedly refused to carry out their orders and some even joined in the demonstrations (Ratesh 1991, 33-34). Army Major Viorel Oancea

¹⁶⁸ Some claim he committed suicide because he couldn't bring himself to order troops to fire on innocent protestors. Others claim he was executed by Ceausescu for disobeying orders (New York Times 1990b; New York Times 1989)

¹⁶⁹ Ceausescu seemed to be aware that elements in the Armed Forces were reconsidering their loyalty to him. In response to this threat, he retired approximately half of his Generals during the Annual Communist Party congress in 1989 (Der Spiegel 1989a).

¹⁷⁰ Conscripts who refused were summarily executed, and the wounded were being killed in hospitals (McNeil 1999)

¹⁷¹ This tactic proved disastrous for Ceausescu, as the Army High Command felt betrayed and "disgraced in front of the people". As Major Lupoiu put it, "it forced officers to take a clear position, and the one [they] chose was against Ceausescu (Bohlen 1990a)

was to become the first higher-ranking Army official in Timisoara to publicly declare his allegiance to the revolution (Urian 1990, 5/11). The operation commander, General Victor Stanculescu, soon joined him. Realizing that the security forces “couldn’t kill everyone in Timisoara” (Binder 1989d), he had his leg put into a cast as camouflage and returned to Bucharest to support the uprising which most of the regular conscripts had already joined (McNeil 1999). His switching sides is generally considered one of the key moments of the democratic transition, as he ordered the Army to return to the barracks, oversaw much of the transition process as new Defense Minister, and was responsible for the capture and the execution of the Ceausescu (Der Spiegel 2009). The gruesome end of the dictator and his wife proves just how much the soldiers were disaffected with the regime: whereas only five volunteers were asked to execute Ceausescu, eighty soldiers insisted on shooting (Los Angeles Times 1990).

Resume:

Facing overwhelming crowds demonstrating for democracy, Romanian dictator Ceausescu was ousted after a critical mass of progressive elements in the civilian and the military wing of his regime turned against him. Thus it is adequate to speak of a crisis of the authoritarian regime.

References:

- Binder, David. 1989a. “Upheaval in the East: The Secret Police; Ceausescu's 'Private Army,' a Force of Unabated Cruelty and Fierce Loyalty”. *New York Times*, December 25th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/25/world/upheaval-east-secret-police-ceausescu-s-private-army-force-unabated-cruelty.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=841E2B279CF50C15D7E382FBCA51362E&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Binder, David. 1989b. “Upheaval in the East: Overview; Romanian insurgents capture Ceausescu; his police battle with army for survival”. *New York Times*, December 24th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/24/world/upheaval-east-overview-rumanian-insurgents-capture-ceausescu-his-police-battle.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=805AEF792FFE9E39006394A1678A1825&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Binder, David. 1989c. "Rumania Accuses One of Its Diplomats of Spying". *New York Times*, August 20th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/20/world/rumania-accuses-one-of-its-diplomats-of-spying.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=076D7C21303E14AE6ABA1C55B08F9B40&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Binder, David. 1989d. "Upheaval in the East; At Least 13 Are Reported Killed At Protest in Rumania's Capital". *New York Times*, December 22nd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/22/world/upheaval-east-least-13-are-reported-killed-protest-rumania-s-capital.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Bohlen, Celestine. 1990a. "Revolt in Rumania: Days of Death and Hope - A special report: How the Ceausescu Fell: Harnessing Popular Rage". *New York Times*, January 7th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/07/world/revolt-rumania-days-death-hope-special-report-ceausescu-fell-harnessing-popular.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=5B2F0523D7778CF1A09137FDE81D158D&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Bohlen, Celestine. 1990b. "Upheaval in the East: Rumania; Ceausescu's aides recall last days". *New York Times*, January 28th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/28/world/upheaval-in-the-east-rumania-ceausescu-s-aides-recall-last-days.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=E71EB2EE20CD5744DEDB2486AA2674AD&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2006. *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brucan, Silviu. 1993. *The Wasted Generation*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Chilton, Patricia 1994. "Mechanics of change: Social movements, transnational coalitions, and the transformation processes in Eastern Europe". *Democratization* 1(1): 151 - 181.

Clines, Francis. 1989. "Upheaval in the East: Moscow; Gorbachev Says He Will Confer With Allies on Aid to Rumanians". *New York Times*, December 24th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/24/world/upheaval-east-moscow-gorbachev-says-he-will-confer-with-allies-aid-rumanians.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=4C671F747BE250BFA349C66D3796170C&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Der Spiegel. 1989a. "Ein Leichentuch". No. 52, December 12th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13498846.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

- Der Spiegel. 1989b. "Land der lebenden Toten: Die 23 Millionen Rumaenen leiden unter dem ungebrochenen Terror ihres Conducators Ceausescu". November 20th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13498169.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 2000. "Das ist eine Provokation". No 41, October 9th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-17541427.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Der Spiegel. 2009. "Eine Mission der Ehre". No. 42, October 12th. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-67282847.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Haerpfer, Christian. 2009. "Post-Communist Europe and Post-Soviet Russia". In Haerpfer, Christian, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (eds), *Democratization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, Richard A. 2000. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989". *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(6): 1069 - 1093.
- Ivanes, Chris D. 2001. "Romania: A Kidnapped Revolution and the History of a Pseudo-Transition". *Eras Journal*, Monash University. Available at: <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/eras/romania-a-kidnapped-revolution-and-the-history-of-a-pseudo-transition/>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Le Nouvel Observateur. 1990. May 17th - 23th. Quoted in Ivanes, Chris D. 2001. "Romania: A Kidnapped Revolution and the History of a Pseudo-Transition". *Eras Journal*, Monash University. Available at: <http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/eras/romania-a-kidnapped-revolution-and-the-history-of-a-pseudo-transition/>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Lewis, Paul. 1989. "Smuggled Rights Report Indicts Ceausescu". *New York Times*, August 30th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/30/world/smuggled-rights-report-indicts-ceausescu.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=706D59C4EE6880BF0B5A6BB2106FD34B&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- Los Angeles Times. 1990. "Turmoil in the Soviet Bloc: Ceausescus' Firing Squad Grew From 5 Volunteers to 80". January 23rd. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-23/news/mn-611_1_ceausescus-firing-squad. Accessed May 9th, 2014.
- McNeil, Donald. 1999. "Romania's Revolution of 1989: An Enduring Enigma". *New York Times*, December 31st. Available at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/31/world/romania-s-revolution-of-1989-an-enduring-enigma.html>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

New York Times. 1989. “*Upheaval in the East: Tass; Reports From the Rumanian Capital by Correspondents for Tass*”. December 23rd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/23/world/upheaval-east-tass-reports-rumanian-capital-correspondents-for-tass.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=7F047D41DBE44A6746A662580F76F65A&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

New York Times. 1990a. “*Upheaval in the East; Tale of Panic at Execution of Ceausescu*”. January 22nd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/22/world/upheaval-in-the-east-tale-of-panic-at-execution-of-ceausescu.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

New York Times. 1990b. “*Upheaval in the East; Trial Is Told of General's Suicide After He Defied Ceausescu's Order*”. January 31st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/31/world/upheaval-east-trial-told-general-s-suicide-after-he-defied-ceausescu-s-order.html?ref=nicolaeceausescu&gwh=40D209690FE3AE1C8AFF222D1558C558&gwt=regi>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

Ratesh, Nestor. 1991. *Romania: The Entangled Revolution*. Praeger Publishers.

Roper, Steven. 2000. *Romania: the Unfinished Revolution*. London: Routledge.

Siani-Davies, Peter. 2005. *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989*. Cornell University Press.

Urian, Tudorel. 1990. "Frica, din nou pe strazi (Interview with Major Viorel Oancea)". *Cuvintul* February 14th: 5, 11. Quoted in Hall, Richard A. 2000. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989". *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(6): 1069 - 1093.

Zeit Online. 2009. “*Das Ende der Ceaușescu-Herrschaft: Die blutigste Episode der Wendezeit*“. December 15th. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/wissen/geschichte/2009-12/ceausescu-diktatur-rumaenien>. Accessed May 9th, 2014.

(22) Mongolia

Mongolia began its transition to democracy in the wake of the upheavals that took place in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Gorbachev's policy directives of Glasnost and Perestroika sent ripple effects through the MPRP, Mongolia's Communist Party, and initiated cautious movement toward reform starting in 1986: "orchloj bajguulat" (renewal), and "il tod" (transparency) (Batbayar 2003; Boone 1994). Liberalization took a big step forward in 1988, when General Secretary Jambyn Batmunkh at a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee publicly criticized former Mongolian leader Tsedenbal and triggered a public debate about national culture and the crimes committed during Mongolia's transition to Communism in the 1930s (Fritz 2008). Batmunkh's statements – virtually unheard of in Mongolia – not only contributed significantly to delegitimizing the existing regime, but they also encouraged the formation of a pro-democratic opposition. In early 1989, the first organized opposition groups emerged¹⁷² and quickly formed into political parties, such as the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU). They demanded a multiparty system, free elections with universal suffrage, the replacement of the centrally planned economy with a market system, private property, reorganization of the government, and protection of Human Rights (Heaton 1991). Whereas Batmunkh initially responded positively to these demands and promised a dialogue with the MDU, the ruling party appeared divided: Premier Dumaagiyn Sodnom denied any political or economic necessity for reform, saying that restructuring could occur gradually over five years, and other Politburo members contended that the main purpose of having other parties would be to improve the performance of the ruling party (Ulaanbaatar International Service 1990; Foreign Broadcast Information Service 1990). However, an upsurge in public political activity between December 1989 and March 1990 involving street protests with as many as 20,000 people led to a crisis of confidence within the MPRP (Sanders 1999, 692). On March 9, Batmunkh announced the resignation of the entire Politburo, signalling a major breakthrough, and a new leadership under G. Ochirbat took over the party's reins. Under Ochirbat, Mongolia entered into protracted negotiations with opposition forces to enact real democratic reform (Doh Chull Shin 2008). For instance, in May 1990, the constitution

¹⁷² Examples include a group called "New Generation" led by S. Zorig and E. Bat-Uul, and the "Club of Young Economists" led by M. Enkhsaikhan and D. Ganbold.

was amended in two ways: first, by deleting any reference to the MPRP's role as the "guiding force in the country",¹⁷³ and second, by emphasizing the "establishment of democracy" as key element (Soni 2008). Moreover, new parties were legalized; the "State Little Hural", a standing legislative body elected by proportional representation of parties was created; and a new electoral law fixing the date of the next General Election to July 1990 was approved. The first free multiparty elections were held on July 29, and the MPRP democratically renewed their rule with 85% of votes cast.

In Mongolia, high Mongolian Communist Party officials (such as G. Ochirbat himself) actually confirmed the presence of a crisis of the authoritarian regime. Our analysis comes to a similar conclusion: Although there was a small number of reticent party hardliners, softliners within the MPRP became predominant already very early in the transition and remained vastly unchallenged throughout. Similarly to other transitions in the former Soviet bloc, Mongolia's transition featured two kinds of enabling forces: On one hand, Gorbachev and the Soviet Union's Armed Forces provided a fertile climate for a democratic overhaul and effectively prevented Mongolian hardliners from organising an armed crack-down on opposition forces. On the other hand, Mongolian softliners provided the "ground work", marginalising the anti-reform forces within the Party and carrying out actual reforms in collaboration with the leading opposition figures.

The ascension to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and the domestic and foreign policy reforms he advocated were crucial for liberalization in Mongolia (Gail 1987, 1-9). In 1986, shortly after announcing his perestroika and glasnost policies, Gorbachev gave a speech in Vladivostok signalling a rapprochement with China, and at the same time a plan to reduce, and ultimately completely withdraw Soviet troops from Mongolia (Gelman 1988, 48; Heaton 1987, 76). For Mongolia's ruling party this had two important consequences. Firstly, Mongolia's Army had always been weak, given that the Soviet Union had been the main protector of its borders (Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008). As Murphy pointed out, since Mongolia became independent, Russians had been directing all important coercive organs: the Ministry of War had eight military advisors

¹⁷³ The elimination of the MPRP's monopoly on power was something that Batmunkh had been suggesting, who argued "the party [should] achieve a leading role through its work rather than through a constitutional position" (Sanders 1990a, 11).

and the head of the Secret Police was Russian, as were all the military training officers (Murphy 1966, 97). Therefore, in withdrawing that pillar of support Gorbachev favored liberalization in Mongolia by taking away the possibility for regime hardliners of organising a violent crack-down on pro-reform forces (Fritz 2008). Secondly, as Mongolia lost much of its geo-strategic importance for the Soviet Union, it also lost much of its foreign economic aid (Far Eastern Economic Review 1991). By consequent, Mongolia's domestic rulers were forced to look for alternative partners (who were also often more favorable to democratization than the Soviet Union had been) to ensure their economic and security interests.¹⁷⁴ At the same time, Gorbachev's opposition to violent reactions against anti-Communist protests in satellite countries¹⁷⁵ conveyed a very important political message to the Mongolian Communist party leadership. In fact, the replacement of Tsedenbal as Mongolia's party leader with Jambyn Batmunkh was without doubt undertaken with direct approval from Moscow (Ginsburg 1995). In short, the loss of Soviet commitment (both military and economic) in Mongolia reinforced the moderate stance of Communist elites and reduced the democratisation process to a national occurrence in which the Mongolian leadership, freed from the constraints of Soviet authority, could take decisions favorable to Mongolia's national interests (Franquelli 2013).

The first of those leaders was Jambyn Batmunkh, a young and pragmatic politician who, although very much a Communist¹⁷⁶, was less entrenched and more open to democratic change than his predecessors (Fritz 2008). Inspired by Gorbachev's lead, he initiated Mongolia's own form of perestroika and glasnost in stages, interpreting it as a way of restructuring people's old habits and thinking in order to initiate processes of renewal within the new party leadership (Sanders 1989, 46). In the first stage of reform,

¹⁷⁴ In 1987, for example, Mongolia established diplomatic relations with the United States (Akiner 1991, 66).

¹⁷⁵ When Gorbachev witnessed the Tiananmen protests in China in 1989, he addressed the media, stating that he would support the reform process in Socialist countries and that he would use political methods to resolve the situation if prodemocratic movements were to form in Russia (Pravda 1989).

¹⁷⁶ When Batmunkh came to power, he promised to continue strengthening the relationship with the Soviet Union, vowing that the political orientation of the Soviet Communist party was, and would remain, the principal line of the Mongolia Communist Party and state (Sanders 1985, 124). As Kaplonski argued (2004, 51), although Batmunkh later severely criticized the Socialist doctrine and initiated a severe reappraisal of Mongolia's approach to Socialism, the very existence of the Communist Party was not in doubt for him. In fact, in his book *Never Allow the Use of Force in Decision Making* he claimed that the reforms he introduced were not about abolishing Socialism, but about eliminating mistakes caused by the flaws of Socialism. In doing so he hoped to deepen Socialism and to move it in the right direction (Bayantur 2008).

initiated at the December 1988 MPRP plenum, Batmunkh announced that decision-making within the MPRP was to be decentralized and multi-candidate elections for all levels were to be held. Enterprises were allowed to retain a share of hard currency earnings, and a new foreign policy approach featuring greater interaction with Western and Asian economies was initiated. Most importantly, he encouraged civil society, non-governmental organizations, and their engagement in party and state issues (The Asia Foundation 2000). In the next reform stage initiated in 1989, Batmunkh introduced a number of new programs on economic productivity. On the political front he set up commissions to revise the MPRP program, draft amendments to MPRP rules, and most importantly, revise the MPRP Constitution (Sanders 1990b, 61).

It was under Batmunkh's rule that Mongolia's transition passed through one of its most decisive moments- a point in time that would show the dominance of regime softliners and the isolation of conservatives. When in early 1990 the MDU began launching a campaign for the regime to step down, the MPRP was seriously divided over how to respond (Ginsburg 1995). Hardliners pushed for a furious, Tiananmen-Square-style reaction and even sent Security Services to threaten high-ranking accommodationists (Fish 1998). However, when they wrote a decree ordering police to crack down on protesters, Batmunkh opposed it, stating: "I will never sign this. We few Mongols have not yet come to the point that we will make each other's noses bleed" (Enkhtuul and Oyun undated). Instead, he declared that he, together with the entire ruling Politbureau, resigned from their offices, and in an apparent step toward permitting the country's first multi-party-elections, recommended that the Party hold a special Congress in April 1990 to elect new leaders. "To change the party, we should change the leadership (...) by choosing clever, constructive people committed to (...) the perestroika" (Reuters 1990a), Batmunkh said¹⁷⁷.

On March 15, 1990, three important events took place: the MPRP's Central Committee inaugurated the MPRP's youngest and most reform-minded Politbureau in decades; it summarily retired 13 prominent Committee members that were considered strong Conservatives (Wilhelm 1990); and it warned five others about misuse of power

¹⁷⁷ Other steps proposed by Batmunkh included (a) eliminating a constitutional provision stipulating that the MPRP was the leading force in society; (b) revising the Constitution; and (c) rehabilitating people formerly labeled as anti-party elements (Holley 1990c).

under deposed hard-line President Tsedenbal (Reuters 1990b). At the same time, it appointed former Trade Union leader Gombogavin Ochirbat as the Party's new General Secretary; a "kind, theoretical man" who, according to high-ranking Party sources, was "reformist and forward looking" (Holley 1990a). "This is the beginning of real change in Mongolia," Foreign Ministry spokesman Tepbishiin Chimeddorj told journalists in Ulan Bator. Ochirbat admitted that the Communist Party had made "many mistakes" (Holley 1990b), and that Mongolian society "must be entirely renewed" (Los Angeles Times 1990). To this end, he announced that the MPRP was dropping "outdated tenets" such as the teachings of Marx and Lenin (Deseret News 1991) and promised to hold the country's first free elections. "The MPRP has reached a turning point in its history", Ochirbat said. "Deep and fundamental democratization of our society is the guarantee against a revival of Stalinism in our country" (Oka 1990). Finally he reaffirmed the MPRP's commitment to democratization "as fast as possible" (Esteruelas 1990), which was also a sign that he recognized the direct impact of opposition activity on the crisis within the Mongolian Communist Party.

Resume:

Resisting hardliner pressure to use force on protesters, Mongolian softliners under Batmunkh carried through reforms that led to a reformed Communist Party and free elections. Hence, we confirm the presence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

Akiner, Shirin. 1991. *Mongolia Today*. New York & London: Kegan Paul International.

Batbayar, Tsedendamba. 2003. "Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Mongolia." *Central Asian Survey* 22(1): 45 - 59.

Bayantur, Gerelt-Od. 2008. *Democratic Transition and the Electoral Process in Mongolia*. MA Thesis. University of Saskatchewan.

Boone, Peter. 1994. "Grassroots Macroeconomic Reform in Mongolia". *Journal of Comparative Economics* 18(3): 329 - 356.

- Deseret News. 1991. "Mongolian Communists Drop Teachings of Marx, Lenin". February 25th. Available at: <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/148834/MONGOLIAN-COMMUNISTS-DROP-TEACHINGS-OF-MARX-LENIN.html?pg=all>. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Doh Chull, Shin. 2008. "The Third Wave in East Asia: Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives". *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 4(2): 91 - 131.
- Doorenspleet, Renske and Mudde Cas. 2008. "Upping the Odds: Deviant Democracies and Theories of Democratization". *Democratization* 15(4): 815 - 832.
- Enkhtuul B. and R. Oyun. Undated. "Batmönkh's widow A. Daariimaa: If my husband was working as a professor, he would have been alive today". *Century News*. Available at: <http://www.bolod.mn/modules.php?name=News&nID=54864>. Accessed July 3rd, 2013.
- Esteruelas, Bosco. 1990. "'La sociedad mongol debe ser reformada por completo', dice el nuevo líder del país". *El País*, March 16th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1990/03/16/internacional/637542010_850215.html. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Far Eastern Economic Review. 1991. "The Cure Hurts: Mongolia Pursues a Painful Transition". September 19th. Quoted in Bayantur, Gerelt-Od. 2008. *Democratic Transition and the Electoral Process in Mongolia*. MA Thesis. University of Saskatchewan.
- Fish, Steven. 1998. "Mongolia: Democracy Without Prerequisites". *Journal of Democracy* 9(3): 127 - 141.
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) - Asia Pacific (DRIAP). 1990. February 16th. Quoted in Heaton, William. 1991. "Mongolia in 1990: Upheaval, Reform, But No Revolution Yet". *Asian Survey* 31(1): 50 - 56.
- Franquelli, Alessandro. 2013. *Mongolia: A Success Story? An Analysis of the Democratization Process*. BA Thesis. University of London: Birkbeck College.
- Fritz, Verena. 2008. "Mongolia: The Rise and Travails of a Deviant Democracy". *Democratization* 15(4): 766 - 788.
- Gelman, Harry. 1988. "Gorbachev's Policies in the East Asia After Two Years". *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 7(1): 47 - 54.
- Ginsburg, Tom. 1995. "Political Reform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China". *Asian Survey* 35(5): 459 - 471.

- Heaton, William. 1987. "Mongolia in 1986: New Plan, New Situation". *Asian Survey* 27(1): 75 - 80.
- Heaton, William. 1991. "Mongolia in 1990: Upheaval, Reform, But No Revolution Yet". *Asian Survey* 31(1): 50 - 56.
- Holley, David. 1990a. "Reformists to Lead Mongolia Communist Party". *Los Angeles Times*, March 15th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-15/news/mn-270_1_communist-party. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Holley, David. 1990b. "Mongolian Vote OKs Opposition Role in Government: Asia: The change follows nearly 70 years of rigid Communist rule and is seen as a major step for democracy". *Los Angeles Times*, July 30th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-30/news/mn-775_1_communist-party. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Holley, David. 1990c. "Mongolian Leader Offers to Resign : Communism: The president tells his party it must reform. His ouster was a key demand of new opposition groups". *Los Angeles Times*, March 13th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-13/news/mn-191_1_mongolian-democratic-party. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Kaplonski, Christopher. 2004. *Truth, History and Politics in Mongolia: The Memory of Heroes*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Lapidus, Gail. 1987. "The USSR and Asia in 1986: Gorbachev's New Initiatives". *Asian Survey* 27(1): 1 - 9.
- Los Angeles Times. 1990. "World in Brief : Mongolia : New Party Boss Calls for 1st Free Elections". March 16th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-16/news/mn-168_1_free-elections. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Murphy, George. 1966. *Soviet Mongolia, a Study of the Oldest Political Satellite*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Oka, Takashi. 1990. "Mongolia's Communist Party Chief Heads Down Power-Sharing Road". *Christian Science Monitor*, September 5th. Available at: [http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/0905/ooch.html/\(page\)/2](http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/0905/ooch.html/(page)/2). Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Pravda*. 1989. May 15th. Quoted in Bayantur, Gerelt-Od. 2008. *Democratic Transition and the Electoral Process in Mongolia*. MA Thesis. University of Saskatchewan.

- Reuters. 1990a. "Dimite el pleno del Politburó de Mongolia". *El País*, March 13th. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1990/03/13/internacional/637282813_850215.html. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Reuters. 1990b. "Mongolia Party Expels 7 Ranking Communists". *Los Angeles Times*, July 2nd. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-02/news/mn-518_1_communist-party. Accessed January 30th, 2015.
- Sanders, Alan. 1985. "Mongolia in 1984: From Yu. Tsedenbal to J. Batmunkh". *Asian Survey* 25(1): 122 - 130.
- Sanders, Alan. 1989. "Mongolia in 1988: Year of Renewal". *Asian Survey* 29(1): 46 - 53.
- Sanders, Alan. 1990a. "Mongolia". *Far Eastern Economic Review* 147(12).
- Sanders, Alan. 1990b. "Mongolia in 1989: Year of Adjustment". *Asian Survey* 30(1): 59 - 66.
- Sanders, Alan. 1999. *Mongolia. The Far East and Australasia*. London: Europa Publications.
- Sharad, Soni K. 2008. "Democratic Transition in Mongolia: Achievements and Challenges ahead of 2008 Elections". *Bimonthly Journal of Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation* 7(1): 31 - 55.
- The Asia Foundation. 2000. *Mongolia's Political and Economic Transition: Challenges and Opportunities*. Conference in Celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of The Asia Foundation's Mongolia Program. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, September 11th - 13th.
- Ulaanbaatar International Service (UIS). 1990. February 16th. Quoted in Heaton, William. 1991. "Mongolia in 1990: Upheaval, Reform, But No Revolution Yet". *Asian Survey* 31(1): 50 - 56.
- Wilhelm, Kathy. 1990. "President, Prime Minister Offer to Resign". *AP News Archive*, March 15th. Available at: <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/President-Prime-Minister-Offer-to-Resign/id-704ee74c2873243cceb3bdd35fc5ff1>. Accessed January 30th, 2015.

(23) South Korea

South Korea's first attempt at democratization during the Third Wave began in 1979 when the economic decline mobilized protests against long-time ruler Park Chung-Hee. Responding to opposition demands, Park relaxed the application of laws against dissent and released over 1000 political prisoners (US Department of State 1979a), but resistance to his repressive Yushin regime grew and even members of the government openly began criticizing the Park administration (US Department of State 1979b). In August 1979, almost 200 unemployed female workers of Y.H. Industrial Company staged a sit-in at the headquarters of the NDP, South Korea's main opposition party (Lee 1980). Emboldened by its success in the 1978 General Election, the NDP had recently elected Kim Young Sam as its leader, a hardliner who vowed to "overthrow the Park regime" (US Department of State 1979c) and to bring democracy back to South Korea. The government responded with a clamp down on opposition, arresting key NDP officials, confiscating NDP newspapers and raiding NDP headquarters killing several protestors in the process (Keesing's Worldwide 1980). Additionally, on October 15, 1979, Park obtained the exclusion of Kim from the government-controlled National Assembly. The next day more than 50,000 protestors rallied in the streets of Busan, Kim's hometown, and the uprising quickly spread to the neighboring Masan area. On October 18, 1979, the Park regime declared Martial Law and prepared to quell the uprisings with force. However, before such a crack-down could be carried out, Park was shot by his own security chief, Kim Chae Kyu, a moderate who claimed that his actions were motivated by a desire to further democratization. He later was arrested and executed by soldiers under Army Chief of Staff Gen. Chung Seung Hwa. After the assassination, Liberal Prime Minister Choi Kyu Han assumed the role of acting President and formed a transitional government. Choi promised to reform the Yushin Constitution "to promote democracy" (Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008) and to organize new elections. Additionally, he revoked many of the emergency decrees issued by Park, released political prisoners and restored the civil liberties of opposition politicians such as Kim Dae Jung (Dukhong 1997). On December 12, 1979, the transition suffered its first setback when hardliners Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan and Maj. Gen. Roh Tae Woo, together with members of their secret military society "Hanahoe", launched a palace coup to arrest Gen. Chung Seung Hwa along with 16 other pro—democracy officers. Following that coup Chun became chief of staff of the ROK military, and on April

14, 1980, he also took over control of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). From that moment on, Chun had become the *de facto* ruler of South Korea, reducing Choi and the other civilian members of the transitional government to a set of figureheads (Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008, 3). When another round of violent student demonstrations shook the street in May 1980, Chun pressured Choi into declaring Martial Law, suspended all political activity and deployed troops throughout the country. In Kwangju, where an uprising had taken control of the city from government forces, a brutal assault by 20,000 soldiers caused between 600 and 2,000 deaths and marked the end of any effective resistance to Chun's regime (Gi-Wook and Moon 2003). Following the Kwangju massacre, President Choi resigned and Chun ordered the National Assembly to be dissolved. On August 27, 1980, the National Conference for Unification elected Chun as his successor; he was officially inaugurated as South Korea's 5th President on September 1, 1980.

In South Korea's first attempt at democratization, we conclude that there was no crisis of the authoritarian regime, even though there was a division among the regime elite into hardliners and softliners. According to the testimony of regime insider and Park-murderer Kim Chae Kyu, the proliferation of resistance to the regime's policies caused a split within the innermost circle of the regime, pinning those who advocated a policy of conciliation toward the pro-democracy movement against those who favored even greater repression (Kihl 1984, 76; Adesnik and Sunhyuk 2008, 9). The hardline military led by Chun Doo Hwan had the goal of maintaining the authoritarian regime, whereas the mainstream military led by Chung Sung-Hwa and the Choi government could be classified as reformers. However, the pro-reform forces were quickly marginalised and eventually purged from the regime, which shifted the power relationship within the ruling bloc in favor of hardliners.

The first and possibly fatal weakness of regime softliners was their lack of cohesion, evidenced by their treatment of Park-murderer Kim Chae Kyu. For many years there was confusion about Kim's true motives for the murder. On one hand, hardliners did their best to paint Kim in a negative light, claiming the murder was a reaction to Kim's growing marginalization within the KCIA in favor of Park's bodyguard Cha Ji-Chul (Breen 2012) and Kim's own ambitions to become President (Keesing's Worldwide 1980).

On the other hand, there is much evidence that Kim was indeed a convinced reformer¹⁷⁸ who was appalled by the Busan/Masan massacres and killed Park in order to avoid greater bloodshed (Lee 1980)¹⁷⁹. The assassination of Park by Kim Chae Kyu constituted a unique chance for pro-reform forces within the Park government to seize the initiative and present a united front for change that hardliners might have found difficult to brush aside. However, in the aftermath of Park's murder, the moderate members of the regime, and particularly the military, failed to support Kim. In fact, an overwhelming majority of South Korean Generals favored an opening of the regime and a disengagement of the Armed Forces from the daily political struggles (Warner 1995)¹⁸⁰. Therefore, when Kim asked the Army Chief of Staff and martial Law Commander Gen. Chung Song-Hwa to execute a coup the evening of the murder, he was within reason to believe that Chung, who was praised by the US as "more moderate than most of his fellow Generals" (Young 2003, 60), would support the move. However, Chung refused in the name of Law and Order and proceeded to arrest Kim, who later was tortured and executed (Kihl 1984, 78).

The second fatal blow to the strength of regime softliners was dealt on December 12, 1979, when hardliners General Chun Doo Hwan, the Commander of the Defense Security Command General Roh Tae Woo, and "a group of men very close to President Park" (US Department of State 1979d) arrested Chung along with 16 other high-ranking

¹⁷⁸ Many reports prove that Kim indeed favored democracy. After his arrest calligraphy about freedom and democracy were found in his house (MBC TV 2004). The American Ambassador considered him an untypical intelligence chief, citing his apparent support for democracy and improvements in the Human Rights department (Breen 2012). For instance, he is said to have criticized the formation of Hanahoe, a fraternity of young military graduates loyal to Park. He also opposed the Yushin Constitution and tried to get it amended by asking Roman Catholic Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan to intervene with Park, comparing the President to a "sick patient" (Breen 2012). He also made contact with opposition leader Jang Jun-Ha who allegedly called him 'a patriotic soldier' and voiced hope they'd one day work together to achieve democracy (Kahm 2005). When Kim realized that Park wouldn't change his authoritarian ways, he first planned to arrest him and force his resignation on one of Park's visits to Kim's Army base. (Kyung-Ae 2011a). Later, he resolved to assassinate Park, with the date for the assassination originally set for April 1979 and later changed to October because of Park's heightened security presence.

¹⁷⁹ Until his last moments Kim maintained that he "shot the heart of Yushin like a beast. I did that for democracy of this country. Nothing more, nothing less" (Kyung-Ae 2011b). He claimed that on the evening Park died he briefed Park on the Busan rioters, telling him they were angry citizens and not the "impure elements" that the regime used to blame. He also warned that discontent could turn into a nationwide revolt and destroy the regime (Warner 1995). Park allegedly said that he would give the order to shoot demonstrators if the situation worsened, and received support from Cha who said that it wouldn't matter if one or two million Koreans were killed (Breen 2010).

¹⁸⁰ In a secret meeting held after Park's assassination, Chung, along with other "mainstream" officers, allegedly opposed the intervention of the military in politics and expressed a "moderate" political view favoring civilian rule based on a new and more moderate Constitution. In contrast, young Generals led by Chun Doo Hwan opposed civilian rule and a transition to democracy, but since Chung still maintained control over the military, their objections were ignored (Chung 1987, 98 – 99 and 239).

officers, and initiated a purge of reformers at all levels of the military (Yang 1994, 429). The coup-plotters, also known as “Shingunbu” (“the New Military”), all belonged to Hanahoe, a politicised segment of the officer corps that had accumulated vast powers under President Park (Kim 2004) and were therefore in a particularly influential position after his death. Chun ordered the arrest of Chung on allegations of the latter’s involvement in Park’s murder (Sue-Young 2010), but later testimonies of fellow Generals¹⁸¹ revealed that Roh and Chun, in a meeting on Dec 7, 1979, had already decided to overthrow the government (WuDunn 1995) and mobilized their troops to that effect (Jameson 1987). US Commander John Wickham described the coup as “an illegal power grab by an insurgent group of Generals”, lamenting that Chun and his co-conspirators were fueled more by personal ambition than by the national interest. Chun himself might also have been intent on preventing his potential marginalisation from power, as Chung had allegedly planned on demoting the General (The Korea Herald 2012).

After the neutralization of Chung and the purging of fellow reformers from the military, the moderate transitional government of Choi Kyu Han was surrounded by hardliners who subsequently dislocated the civilian leadership to take over control of the transition. Some observers blamed this development at least partly on Choi’s personality, citing his lack of “political experience and leadership qualities” (Kihl 1984, 77)¹⁸². Indeed, before his election to the presidency on December 6, 1979, Choi had never been a political figure and had neither an independent political base nor an independent support base in the military (Lee 1980). As US Secretary of State Vance famously remarked, it was “obvious to even the most unsophisticated observer that the focus of power in South Korea remained with the military” (Young 2003, 60). Even though Choi was the titular head of the Armed Forces, many doubted he was strong enough to keep the military in check (Christian Science Monitor 1980), especially after the Shingunbu won the three core Cabinet positions of Defense, Home and Justice within the Choi government (Nam 1989, 186 - 187).

¹⁸¹ Former Brig. Gen. Kim Chin Ki described the Dec 12, 1979 coup as “a thoroughly pre-planned, unsavory mutiny by junior officers against the Army leadership that completely demolished the command structure” of the Armed Forces (Jameson 1987).

¹⁸² In leaked cables US Ambassador William Gleysteen revealed that he was so pessimistic about Choi’s ability to run the government that he began to focus on other men within the regime such as Prime Minister Shin (US Department of State 1979e- h).

In our opinion, the brutal repression of the Kwangju uprisings shows most clearly that from December 1979 on, Chun, and not Choi, was in control of the South Korean regime. After enacting Martial Law on May 17, 1980, the government paratroopers of the 21st Division killed between 600 and 2000 protestors in an indiscriminate and premeditated show of strength designed to prove that the new military would treat individuals or groups who challenged the military with maximum brutality (Yang 1994, 429 - 431). Shortly afterwards, Choi resigned from the government and Chun ushered the country in another seven years of dictatorship. In sum, the demise of Park did not result in the demise of military rule in South Korea's first attempt at democratization; rather, what was toppled was an individual ruler, and not the system itself (Kim 2004, 124).

Resume:

South Korea's transition attempt did not feature a crisis of the authoritarian regime, as regime softliners were weak and divided. By consequence, hardliners were free to purge reform-minded elements from the military and to slowly eclipse the moderate civilian leadership.

References:

- Adesnik, David and Sunhyuk, Kim. 2008. "If At First You Don't Succeed: The Puzzle of South Korea's Democratic Transition". CDDRL Working Paper 83. Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
- Breen, Michael. 2010. "Assassination of President Park Chung-hee in 1979". *The Korea Times*, October 24th. Available at: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2012/09/178_75100.html. Accessed February 18th, 2014.
- Breen, Michael. 2012. "Inner circle collapses: Kim Jae-gyu and Cha Ji-cheol". *The Korea Times*, February 15th. Available at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2014/02/363_104936.html. Accessed February 18th, 2014.

- Christian Science Monitor. 1980. "South Korea: martial law fails to halt spread of civilian uprising". May 22nd. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0522/052243.html>. Accessed February 18th, 2014.
- Chung, Sung-Hwa. 1987. "Chung Sung-Hwa Jungun: 10.26eso 12.12kkaji (The testimony of Chung Sung-Hwa: from October 26 to December 12)". *Wolgan Choson* (September): 212-246. Quoted in Dukhong, Kim. 1997. *Democratization in South Korea during 1979-1987*. MA Thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- Dukhong, Kim. 1997. *Democratization in South Korea during 1979-1987*. MA Thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
- Gi-Wook, Shin and Hwang Kyung Moon. 2003. *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Jameson, Sam. 1987. "2 Ex-Generals in S. Korea Contradict Roh". *Los Angeles Times*, November 25th. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1987-11-25/news/mn-16266_1_north-korea. Accessed February 18th, 2014.
- Kahm, Myung-Guk. 2005. "Secret Promise between Jang Jun-Ha and Kim Jae-Kyu". *Sunday Journal*, November 6th.
- Keesing's Worldwide. 1980. "Assassination of President Park Chung Hee – Mr Choi Kyu Hah elected President – Cabinet formed by Mr Shin Hyon Hwack – Other Internal Developments, August 1979 to March 1980". *Keesing's Record of World Events* 26: 30216.
- Kihl, Young Whan. 1984. *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contrast*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kim, Yung Myung. 2004. "Patterns of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea". In May, R. J. and Viberto Selochan (eds), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*. ANU EPress, 119 – 131.
- Kyung-Ae, Kim. 2011a. "Recordings suggest Park Chung-hee assassination was premeditated". *The Hankyoreh*, October 25th. Available at: http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/502303.html. Accessed February 18th, 2014.
- Kyung-Ae, Kim. 2011b. "Series documents first interviews with Park Chung-hee's assassin". *The Hankyoreh*, October 18th. Available at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/501269.html. Accessed February 18th, 2014.

Lee, Chong-Sik. 1980. "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition". *Asian Survey* 20(1): 63 - 76.

MBC TV. 2004. "*Why Did Kim Jae-Kyu Shoot? Now We Can Tell the Story*". April 4th.

Nam, Koon Woo. 1989. *South Korean Politics: The Search for political Consensus and Stability*. Maryland: University Press of America.

Sue-Young, Kim. 2010. "US Expressed Deep Regrets Over 1979 Coup". *The Korea Times*, February 22nd. Available at:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/116_61256.html.
Accessed February 18th, 2014.

The Korea Herald. 2012. "*U.S. half-heartedly accepted 1979 military coup*". December 11th. Available at: <http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20121211000801>.
Accessed February 18th, 2014.

US Department of State. 1979a. *Prisoners Released as Expected on ROK Independence Day*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. August 16th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979b. *National Assembly Finishes Fourth Day of Interpellations*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. July 26th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979c. *Kim Young Sam's September 10 Press Conference*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. September 10th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979d. *Younger ROK Officers Grab Power Positions*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. December 13th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979e. *Current Political Scene Review with Member of Acting President's Staff*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. November 30th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979f. *Discussion of Military Grab with President Choi*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. December 13th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979g. *New Defense Minister*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. December 15th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

US Department of State. 1979h. *Korea Focus – My Meeting With Prime Minister December 18*. Telegram from US Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. December 18th. Kwangju Document Collection, Government Documents and Information Center, Yale University.

Warner, Denis. 1995. "An Open Wound: Remembering the Kwangju Massacre". *New York Times*, December 6th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/06/opinion/06iht-edwarn.t.html>. Accessed February 18th, 2014.

WuDunn, Sheryl. 1995. "South Korea Indicts 2 Former Presidents in Staging of 1979 Coup". *New York Times*, December 22nd. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/22/world/south-korea-indicts-2-former-presidents-in-staging-of-1979-coup.html>. Accessed February 18th, 2014.

Yang, Sung Chul. 1994. *The North and South Korean Political Systems*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Young, James V. 2003. *Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations*. Texas A&M University Consortium Press.

(24) Philippines

The Philippines set off on the road to democracy in the early 1980s. At that time, the country experienced a prolonged economic crisis and a growing Communist insurrection, but Marcos, the Philippine's longtime dictator, refused to adopt the economic stabilisation measures proposed by the IMF and other international lenders. Instead, widespread government corruption and serious electoral fraud during the 1981 presidential elections alienated large parts of the population and favored the development of a growing opposition movement to Marcos' rule. In 1983, the government-approved assassination of Benigno Aquino, a popular politician who had spent the last three years in exile, was the match that lit the fire on the Marcos regime. According to Aquino's wife Cory who would later become the leader of the pro-reform movement, "the nation was awakened by that deafening shot" (Ulgi Tavaana 2014). When Marcos banned TV coverage of the Aquino funeral, rallies and other forms of resistance sprang up in cities all over the Philippines. The sham trial¹⁸³ of the officials suspected of the Aquino murder only served to further the growing loss of legitimacy of the government (Binnendijk 1987). In November 1985, yielding to domestic and international pressure, Marcos announced his decision to hold a "snap" presidential election on an American television talk show, "This Week with David Brinkley". Threatening "to jail any foreign observers who come within 50 meters of the poll" (New York Times 1986), he believed the elections set for February 7, 1986 would solidify international support for his regime and prove he still had the support of the Philippine populace¹⁸⁴. Despite an election process marred with blatant fraud¹⁸⁵, the Marcos-dominated National Assembly proclaimed him the official winner on February 15, 1986. The Filipino people, however, refused to accept the results, asserting that Aquino was the real victor (Caouette 2012). Encouraged by the defection of two of Marcos' senior military commanders, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos, masses of protesters started pouring onto Manila's main thoroughfare, the Epifanio

¹⁸³ Despite an eyewitness testifying she saw one of Aquino's escorts, a Metropolitan Command trooper under the authority of two of the country's most senior Generals, Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas, shoot Aquino as he exited the plane, the accused were finally acquitted (Quinn-Judge 1985).

¹⁸⁴ When asked how the opposition might do in a special election, Marcos boasted: "If they can get 30 to 40 percent of the vote, I will be disappointed" (Reaves 1985).

¹⁸⁵ COMELEC vote tabulators even walked out in protest because the results of the polls were rigged in favor of the incumbent Marcos (PHVote 2013), stating they "did not want (...) to be used in any way that violates fundamental professional ethics". US Senator John Kerry, visiting from the US, remarked later that "these people are angry enough that they've walked out".

de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). When Marcos sent in tanks to clear the street, the soldiers refused to shoot, prompting one of the most iconic images of the rebellion: nuns standing in front of the tanks, offering flowers (McGeown 2011; Ulgi Tavaana 2014). Finally, the *coup de grace* to the Marcos regime was dealt by US President Reagan through Senator Paul Laxalt, who called up Marcos to withdraw his support and suggested he should “cut and cut clean” (Briscoe 2011). On the evening of February 25, the day both Aquino and Marcos had held separate inauguration ceremonies to underline their right to the Presidency, Marcos and his close entourage left the country for exile in Hawaii.

Our analysis of the Marcos government actors shows that the Philippine transition is indeed characterized by a crisis of the authoritarian regime. The decisive split took place between Marcos and his immediate family on one hand, and major parts of his coercive apparatus on the other hand. In fact, whereas certain civilian parts of Marcos’ regime also broke with the ageing dictator, the Army emerged as the principal softliner and was strong enough to force Marcos and remaining hardliner loyalists out of the country.

By the early 1980s, a number of elite divisions within the Marcos regime were manifest (Wurfel 1988), most importantly with regards to the economic business elite who felt eclipsed by Marcos’ “cronies” (Kline 1992). In 1981, the Makati Business Club was formulated as one of the first official responses to the new political situation, marking a shift from covert to overt opposition to the regime (Schock 1999). Later in the mid-1980s, Carlos Romulos, Marcos’ loyal Foreign Minister, complained to a visitor that the Marcoses “are stealing us blind” (New York Times 1986). Whereas Romulos didn’t express his frustration with the regime by overtly defecting, several high-rank politicians switched to the opposition during the years leading up to Marcos’ removal from office. Among them were for example Salvador Laurel, an assemblyman of Marcos’ New Society Movement Party¹⁸⁶; Ernesto Maceda¹⁸⁷ who was a former presidential executive secretary; and Luis Villafuerte, former Trade Minister until 1982 (The Nevada Daily Mail 1986). Finally,

¹⁸⁶ Laurel deserted Marcos in 1980 when the dictator decided to eliminate all political parties in favor of the Single Party Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). He founded the United Nationalists Democratic Organization (UNIDO) that became the main voice of opposition in the 1980s and later announced he would run for the Presidency against Marcos in 1986. He eventually abandoned his candidacy in favor of Cory Aquino.

¹⁸⁷ Maceda broke with Marcos over the Martial Law Declaration in 1977 and eventually became the advisor of Benigno Aquino. Following the latter’s assassination, Maceda became one of the leaders of the opposition during the 1984 Batasan Pambansa Campaign and the 1986 snap elections.

several hours before Marcos fled the country, a number of Foreign Ministry personnel, among them nine of the country's ambassadors and Ernesto Pineda, the Consul General in New York, issued a statement of loyalty addressed to Cory Aquino (Reaves and Cawley 1986).

Divisions in the military were decisive for the transition. They developed gradually throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to Marcos' personalization of the Armed Forces¹⁸⁸, his inability to end the Communist insurgency, and frustration among the younger officers about the corruption and lack of professionalism in the military (May, Lawson and Selochan 2004). The most significant rivalry within the Armed Forces was between General Fidel Ramos¹⁸⁹ and General Ponce Enrile¹⁹⁰ on one hand, and General Fabian Ver¹⁹¹, whose rise to power was the result of personal loyalty to Marcos, on the other hand. By 1984 Ramos and Enrile were spearheading the Reformed Armed Forces Movement (RAM)¹⁹², which claimed a following of some 70 percent of the officer corps (Cunning-Bruce 1986). When Ver and 25 other Marcos loyalists were acquitted from the murder of Benigno Aquino after a trial that many considered a travesty, the divisions within the military became visible. In the run-up to the 1986 snap elections, members of the RAM publicly announced plans for holding an election education program throughout

¹⁸⁸ Among other things, officers resented Marcos' despotism and disrespectful treatment of the Armed Forces. For instance, US diplomatic cables of 1973 reveal that Marcos forced his military chiefs to parade in women's clothes during a birthday party for his wife Imelda in front of high-ranking diplomats (South China Morning Post 2013)

¹⁸⁹ Ramos, a reform-minded West Point graduate, often complained that he was hamstrung in his effort to eliminate corruption and violence against civilians by Philippine soldiers. He added that while Marcos had assigned him to ensure clean elections, "he [Marcos] and some of his leaders were doing just the opposite" (Ellison 1986)

¹⁹⁰ Enrile had been distancing himself from Marcos for several years, sensing that the President's loyalty to him was waning. One year before the special election was called, Enrile spoke of his ambition to run for President if it turned out that neither Marcos nor his wife Imelda were interested. When it turned out that Marcos had decided to run again and Gen. Ver had been nominated to be his Vice President, Enrile supposedly told friends that he planned to leave the government because of his dissatisfaction with the Marcos regime. Then-Foreign Minister Castro, on the other hand, said Enrile was only "sulking" because he had not been chosen as Marcos' Vice President (Ellison 1986).

¹⁹¹ Ver was part of a new military structure created by Marcos which was designed to marginalise the traditional military and further the Presidential Guard. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, were viewed by most observers as being at "an all-time low: demoralized, factionalized, and seriously under-equipped". A Western military attaché described the situation of ordinary soldiers as "wretched" and stated he was surprised they hadn't mutinied yet (Quinn-Judge 1986)

¹⁹² The Movement consisted mostly of younger officers led by graduates of the Philippine Military Academy Class of 71, Lt. Col. Gringo Honasan, Lt. Col. Victor Batac, and Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan. They were united by a desire to restore some of the honor, integrity and public respect they felt the Marcos dictatorship drained away (Cunning-Bruce 1986).

the country to explain to the Armed Forces the need for “clean, fair and honest elections” (Quinn-Judge 1986). Expecting a thoroughly fraudulent election, reformists later said they had already prepared plans to withdraw their support from Marcos (Cunning-Bruce 1986). Indeed, by 1986 the US knew of the coup plans against Marcos and had expressed support¹⁹³ (Schock 1999). The initial plan included a transitional government led by a military junta that would eventually evolve into a democratic one (PCIJ 2006). However, later Enrile admitted that the turnover of authority to Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel was only their third, and least preferred, option (Positively Filipino Magazine 2013)¹⁹⁴.

After Enrile's and Ramos' defection to the opposition, they both made several appeals for Marcos to resign. Claiming he “could not serve a government that is not expressive of the sovereign will” (Government of the Philippines 1986), Enrile told Marcos “the matter [of stepping down] was no longer negotiable”, and that “the people want change of leadership.” There are ways he [Marcos] can depart peacefully quietly and enjoy his remaining years in retirement.”¹⁹⁵ Finally, the increasing defection of Army units and their refusal to obey orders to shoot sealed the fate of Marcos and the remaining hardliners. Ramos told American TV that all 13 regional Army commanders had pledged their support¹⁹⁶; a claim corroborated by the defection, on February 24, of seven helicopter gunships sent by Marcos to crush the rebels (BBC On This Day 2014; Asiaweek 1986). “We followed our conscience”, said Col. Antonio Sotelo of the Air Force 15th Strike Wing; a cry echoed by the ground troops on EDSA who neither used tear gas nor ammunition to suppress the rebellion because they did not want to attack fellow Filipinos (Briscoe 2011).

¹⁹³ Enrile later admitted that they “were thinking of protecting [themselves] because of the growing fissures in the Marcos government” and because they “felt that it was time to really dismantle the martial-law machinery” (PCIJ 2006).

¹⁹⁴ Asked why they didn't stick to their original plan, Enrile explained that “it would have been awkward (...) for the military to assert itself and assume power when there was a group, a democratic group that contested the right of Marcos to govern” (PCIJ 2006)

¹⁹⁵ In fact, on a phone conversation with Marcos Enrile ensured that they would “provide a ring of protection around him and his family”. He said they didn't have any intention to harm him but requested “that we can settle this so that we can now start working for the interest of the people” (The Courier 1986)

¹⁹⁶ In a press conference Enrile confirmed the split in the military, explaining that the commanders of the Armed Services still remained loyal to Marcos whereas the elements in the lower ranks were almost entirely on the side of the opposition (Government of the Philippines 1986).

Resume:

When mass protests shook the Philippines, progressive elements in the government and the Army decided to no longer support Marcos – a turn of events that sealed the fate of the regime. We therefore confirm the existence of an authoritarian regime crisis.

References:

Asiaweek. 1986. "*Why people came to EDSA in 1986 to save Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos from getting killed*". March 9. Available at: <http://fr.slideshare.net/raissarobles/why-people-came-to-edsa-in-1986-to-save-juan-ponce-enrile-and-fidel-ramos-from-death>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

BBC On This Day. 2014. "*1986: Filipino coup leaders tell Marcos to go*". Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/22/newsid_2519000/2519155.stm. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Briscoe, David. 2011. "Remembering revolt that ousted Filipino dictator". *The Washington Post*, February 25th. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022501387.html>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Caouette, Dominique. 2012. "*Philippines: Une transition démocratique qui n'en finit plus...*" April 1st. Available at: <http://www.reseau-asie.com/article/archive-des-articles-du-mois/philippines-transition-democratique-dominique-caouette/>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Cunning-Bruce, Nicholas. 1986. "The Philippines army revolt against President Marcos". *The Guardian*, February 24th. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1986/feb/24/fromthearchive>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Ellison, Katherine. 1986. "Two Top Aides Who Rebelled Against Marcos". *Philly.com*, February 23rd. Available at: http://articles.philly.com/1986-02-23/news/26089207_1_marcos-crony-marcos-loyalist-foreign-minister-pacifico-castro. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Government of the Philippines. 1986. *Press Conference by Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos*. February 22nd. Available at: <http://www.gov.ph/1986/02/22/press-conference-by-defense-minister-juan-ponce-enrile-and-deputy-chief-of-staff-fidel-v-ramos-on-february-22-1986/>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

- Kline, William. 1992. *The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking*. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University.
- May, R. J., Stephanie Lawson and Viberto Selochan. 2004. "Introduction: Democracy and the Military in comparative perspective". In May, R. J. and Viberto Selochan (eds), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific*. ANU EPress Publication.
- McGeown, Kate. 2011. "People Power at 25: Long road to Philippine democracy". *BBC News*, February 22nd. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12567320>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- New York Times. 1986. "*The Truth and Ferdinand Marcos*". January 27th. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/27/opinion/the-truth-and-ferdinand-marcos.html>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). 2006. "*20 Filipinos 20 Years After People Power: Juan Ponce Enrile*". Report. Available at: <http://pcij.org/i-report/edsa20/juan-ponce-enrile.html>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- PHVote. 2013. "1986 Comelec walkout not about Cory or Marcos". *Rappeler.com*, February 25th. Available at: <http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections-2013/22582-1986-comelec-walkout-not-about-cory-or-marcos>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- Positively Filipino Magazine. 2013. "*77 Hours: The Behind-the-Scenes at the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution*". February 20th. Available at: <http://positivelyfilipino.com/magazine/2013/2/77-hours-the-behind-the-scenes-at-the-1986-edsa-people-power-revolution>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- Quinn-Judge, Paul. 1985. "Filipino general likely to be acquitted. 'Tactical blunder' in Aquino trial will clear Ver, defense lawyer says". *Christian Science Monitor*, July 31st. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0731/otry.html>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- Quinn-Judge, Paul. 1986. "The Marcos Military. Can a divided army beat the communist insurgency?" *Christian Science Monitor*, January 22nd. Available at: <http://www.csmonitor.com/1986/0122/zver.html/%28page%29/2>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.
- Reaves, Joseph. 1985. "Marcos Ready To Call Election". *Chicago Tribune*, November 4th. Available at: <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-11->

04/news/8503150588_1_marcos-announcement-call-election-special-election.
Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Reaves, Joseph and Janet Cawley. 1986. "Aquino, Marcos, Chaos Rule Philippines". *Chicago Tribune*, February 25th. Available at:
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-02-25/news/8601140694_1_marcos-ceremony-marcos-and-aquino-salvador-laurel/2. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Schock, Kurt. 1999. "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma". *Social Problems* 46(3): 355 - 375.

South China Morning Post. 2013. "*Ferdinand Marcos 'forced Philippine military chiefs to parade as women'*". April 10th. Available at:
<http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1211039/ferdinand-marcos-forced-philippine-military-chiefs-parade-women>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

The Courier. 1986. "*Marcos Steps Down; Aquino Assumes Top Philippine Post*". February 25th.

The Nevada Daily Mail. 1986. "*Aquino advisors include two past Marcos advisors*". February 26th.

Ulgi Tavaana. 2014. "*The People Power Revolution in the Philippines: I saw no one yield to fear*". Available at: <http://tavaana.org/en/content/people-power-revolution-philippines-i-saw-no-one-yield-fear>. Accessed January 22nd, 2014.

Wurfel, David. 1988. *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

(25) Indonesia¹⁹⁷

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the sociopolitical environment in Indonesia had slowly been changing. Alarmed by the country's worsening economic situation, a de facto anti-Suharto coalition combining a new generation of middle-class democratic activists with dissident Nationalists, traditional Muslims, Marxists, Human Rights workers, labor activists, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, and even East Timorese freedom fighters had formed that opposed Suharto's three-decades long "New Order" (Liddle 1996; 2002). By early 1998, however, the most influential voice of criticism came from students (Noble 2009). Several months into the devastating Asian economic crisis and just a few months away from the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in which Suharto was preparing for his fifth consecutive "reelection", students and opposition groups organized petitions calling for "reformasi damai" (peaceful reform) and Suharto's resignation as president. When Suharto ignored these calls and accepted a fifth mandate on March 10, 1998, student protests defying the government's orders to stay confined to campus grounds took to the street. They were joined by swells of Indonesian citizens after a government-announced 70 percent increase in fuel prices in early May 1998. The turning point of these demonstrations was the twilight of May 12 when security forces shot dead six student protesters at Jakarta's Trisakti University and triggered what *Asiaweek* magazine called "Ten Days that Shook Indonesia" (Bird 1999) Between 500 and 2000 people died and many more were raped in the most violent and massive riots that Indonesia had ever seen (Richburg 1998; Noble 2009). Politically, the riots and the ensuing looting had grave consequences on the cohesion of Suharto's ruling group: political leaders who had supported Suharto's reelection were reconsidering their allegiances, and fractions of the military sided with the protesters, permitting them to organize and operate against the regime. When students finally marched to Parliament vowing to oust Suharto, the embattled dictator spoke on national TV on May 19 and vowed to leave office, but not until he had named a "reform council" to organize a phased transition to democratic rule. By Wednesday evening, however, most of his Cabinet had resigned, and the speaker of the Indonesian Parliament and head of the ruling GOLKAR party, Harmoko, announced that if Suharto did not step down by Friday, the People's Consultative Assembly would impeach

¹⁹⁷ Abbreviated version; for full case study see Chap. 4

him (CNN 1998). At the same time, the military, allegedly with orders to shoot, moved into the center of Jakarta and set up barriers, which caused panic in many observers who feared the outbreak of a civil war. But on May 21 Suharto gave in, resigned and handed his office to his Vice President B.J. Habibie in a nationally televised ceremony (Mydans 1998). A technocrat and relatively weak President, Habibie guided the country through the transition from the autocratic New Order to the genuinely fair presidential elections of October 1999, in which Megawati Sukarnoputri won office (Thompson 1999).

References:

Bird, Judith. 1999. "Indonesia in 1998: The Pot Boils Over". *Asian Survey* 39(1): 27 – 37.

CNN. 1998. "Habibie Becomes President After Suharto Resigns". May 20. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/20/indonesia.suharto/>. Accessed on January 9th, 2014.

Liddle, R. William. 1996. "Indonesia: Suharto's Tightening Grip". *Journal of Democracy* 7(4): 58 – 72.

Liddle, R. William. 2002. "Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules". In Reynolds, Andrew (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 373 – 399.

Mydans, Seth. 1998. "The Fall of Suharto: The Overview; Suharto, Besieged, Steps Down after 32-Year Rule in Indonesia". *New York Times*, May 21st. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/21/world/fall-suharto-overview-suharto-besieged-steps-down-after-32-year-rule-indonesia.html>. Accessed January 9th, 2014.