Université de Montréal

The Role of Political Culture in Shaping Canadian, EU and US Disarmament Initiatives

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Ce mémoire intitulé:

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RÉSUMÉ

Le Canada et l'UE partagent une culture politique similaire, basée sur le multilatéralisme et l'utilisation des forces diplomatiques; néanmoins, au cours des quinze dernières années, le Canada a parfois adopté des mesures de désarmement similaires à celles de l'UE et différant de celles des Etats-Unis, contrairement à d'autres moments où il s'agissait de l'inverse. Il en découle que la seule similitude des cultures politiques ne suffit pas pour que la politique étrangère de deux entités différentes converge, et que de ce fait, certaines conditions sont nécessaires afin que la culture politique prenne le pas sur les intérêts matériels quand on touche aux enjeux de sécurité. En considérant les décisions canadiennes, américaines et européennes relatives au problème des mines antipersonnelles, ainsi qu'en étudiant spécifiquement le dilemme posé par la prolifération nucléaire iranienne, cet essai tente de définir les conditions dans lesquelles la culture politique nourrit la gémellité des mesures de sécurité.

Mots clés: constructivisme; néoréalisme; culture politique; Union européenne (UE); Canada; Etats-Unis; Iran; mesures de sécurité; mines antipersonnelles

ABSTRACT

Canada and the EU share a similar political culture, one that is based on multilateralism and the use of soft power; nevertheless in the past fifteen years Canada has been sometimes adopting disarmament policies that are similar to those of the EU and different from those of the US, while in other times it has been adopting policies that are similar to those of the US and different from those of the EU. This indicates that similarity in political culture alone is not sufficient enough to create convergence on foreign policies and that certain conditions must first be met for political culture to take precedence over material interests when dealing with security issues. Using Canadian, EU and US decisions on anti-personnel land mines problem and Iran's nuclear proliferation dilemma as a case study, this paper analyses the conditions under which political culture plays a role in forming similar security policies.

Key words: **constructivism; neorealism; political culture; European Union (EU); Canada, United States; Iran; security policy; land mines**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APMs	Anti Personnel Land Mines
BHMAC	Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center
CDI	Center for Defence Information
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSIS	Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EEC	European Economic Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EPC	European Policy Center
EU	European Union
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Land Mines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDRC	International Development Research Center
KUL	Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
LEU	Low-Enriched Uranium
LSN	Landmine Survivors Network
MAC	Mine Action Canada
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organization(s)
NPT	Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty
PC	Political Culture
SEU	Slightly Enriched Uranium
UN	United Nations
UNDDA	United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
US(A)	United States (of America)
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

DEDICATION

Acquiring knowledge is a continuous and a reciprocal process, one that develops through listening to, analyzing and debating various points of views; therefore, this learning experience would not have been fruitful without the unremitting discussions with my colleagues, politically conscious friends, and most importantly my father who I consider to be my first political science teacher and thus I dedicate my thesis to him.

AKNOWLEDGMENT

This proposal would not have become a reality without the help of my research director Dr. Frédéric Mérand, Montreal University, who supported me through my Master's journey and like a child in the world of academia, he taught me how to take my first steps. I also like to thank my professor and mentor Dr. Barbara Haskel, McGill University, who was the first to introduce me to the world of the European Union; this fascinating domain which became one of the corner stones of my comparative study. I particularly thank Professors Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe, McGill and Leuven University respectively, who helped me to get a fellowship at KUL in Belgium, an opportunity that gave the defining characters of this paper. I am especially grateful to Dr. Diane Ethier, Montreal University, who introduced me to the concept of constructivism; her excellent explanations allowed me to understand this concept and use it in this thesis.

Outside the world of academia, I am very appreciative to Ambassador Kinsman who offered me the chance to do an internship at the Canadian Mission to the EU in Brussels, where I learned from him and other colleagues the details of everyday Canadian

politics. I want as well to express my deep gratitude to Counsellor Stewart Henderson from the Canadian Mission who spent long hours with me during our interview to discuss my research questions. He expressed great deal of compassion and enthusiasm for young scholars and offered me his valuable advice on my thesis. Last but not least I thank the Institute for European Studies Montreal-McGill University for their generous scholarship, which allowed me to conduct my research in Europe.

PREFACE

Thirteen years ago when I first arrived as a Syrian immigrant to Canada, I thought like many in the Middle East that Canada is an extension to the United States with identical culture and politics. However, after years of living here and getting involved in Canadian politics I came to realize the major cultural and political differences between us and our neighbors to the south. I started to call Canada the Switzerland of the new world, then with time I began to defend and define these differences to non-Canadians and my interest in understanding these cultural particularities grew. During my political science undergraduate years, I focused my studies on Canadian, EU and American foreign policies and wrote several papers that dealt with Canadian role in the world. When I started my graduate studies two years ago, this fascination with the Canadian identity followed me and the need to comprehend my new political identity and how it differs from that of the American and European one, urged me to formulate my thesis around this issue. Thus, this work is an academic mean to pursue a personal quest to understand who Canadians are, why they are the way they are and how their identity influences their actions.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the past decade there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the neorealist approach in explaining foreign policies, and a growing interest in using cultural arguments to explain international relations and security policies. "In the post- Cold War world," argues Huntington, "for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational."[1] During the Cold War global politics was bipolar but after the collapse of the communist bloc in the late 1980s, that international system became history. Hence, during the post-Cold War era, according to Huntington, "the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural...People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups."[2] The neorealist theories that dominated the field during the 80's and early 90's and were focused on power, capability, political and economic distinctions suddenly seemed incapable of explaining state behavior during the post-Cold War era, when states started acting very often in a contradictory fashion to the prediction of neorealist scholars. As a result of this theoretical deficiency, and the increased importance of cultural affiliations, scholars of political science and international relation started using other approaches to explain states' unforeseen behaviors.[3]

Culture as a variable appeared promising in explaining these phenomena; but we must not forget that cultural explanations come in a multiplicity of forms such as military

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[1] Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. p. 21
[2] Ibid., p. 21
[3] John Duffield. "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism."
  International Organization. 53, no.4 (Autumn1999). p. 765

culture, strategic culture, organizational culture, global or world culture and political culture. In this paper I focus on the variable of political culture since, as Duffield puts it, "Political culture promises to explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of leading noncultural theories, such as neorealism. Yet it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases than do the alternative cultural concepts that have been employed."[4] I also adopt Risse's definition of political culture which refers to those "worldviews and principled ideas—values and norms—that are stable over long periods of time and are taken for granted by the vast majority of the population. Thus the political culture as part of the domestic structure contains only those ideas that do not change often and about which there is societal consensus."[5]

Notwithstanding the rising strength of cultural variable and political culture in particular in explaining states actions since the end of the Cold War, the cultural argument has also been criticized for its inability to explain some forms of state behavior, such as those that states adopt despite their obvious contradiction with the prevailing political culture. Thus, a closer look would lead us to realize that in order for the cultural variable to be sufficient in explaining state behaviors, especially in international security domain, certain conditions need first to be met. Therefore, the question of this paper is this: under which condition(s) does political culture play a leading role in shaping foreign policies, and in inducing cooperation or non-cooperation on security policies regardless of the state's material gains or losses?

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[4] Ibid., p. 766
[5] Thomas Risse-Kappen. "Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War." *International Organization*. 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994). p. 209

I argue that three conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously for political culture to count as an explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. First, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat or risk issue. Only then can a state's action converge or diverge based on its political culture. If it is otherwise, the state will take actions to insure its security and self preservation regardless of its political culture. Second, the public needs to be aware of the issue, and public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. Public opinion can be either manifested through strongly expressed views in the street or organized through NGO's and civil society movements. Third, the political elite or policy maker, be it a group or an individual, which is involved in the decision making process must be an idealist, legacy seeker or a firm believer in the issue as well as the political culture that is being represented. In other words the policy maker or political entrepreneur must represent and act on behalf of the political culture of the collective.

In order to illustrate the importance of these three conditions which allow political culture to matter in forming foreign policies, I will first demonstrate that Western political culture has some important variations. So, contrary to Huntington who groups the West—Europe, Canada and the US—under one big cultural umbrella, [6] The West now in my opinion is composed of two forms of political cultures that correspond to two different levels of "cultural internalization."[7] Accordingly, the US has a different political

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[6] Samuel Huntington. p. 46

[7] Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 250, 254

culture from that of Canada and the EU due largely to historical reasons, but also to variations in distribution of capabilities that might shape state identity and have independent effect on state interests.[8] Thus, the US has a political culture of what Wendt would call a second degree level of internalization,[9] focused on self interest, unilateralism and militarism. Canada and the EU, on the other hand, have a political culture of the third degree which emphasizes legitimization of actions, multilateralism and the use of soft-power.[10] Next, I compare the actions (including ends and means) of Canada to that of the EU and the US regarding two different disarmament policies: banning personnel land mines and stopping Iran's Uranium enrichment. Research results demonstrate that Canada converged with the EU but not the US when it came to the land mine issue and converged with the US but not the EU on the Iranian nuclear program. I attribute the differences between Canada and the EU on the Iran question to the fact that the three conditions I mentioned earlier were satisfied during the land mine situation but not met during the Iranian case. The fact that Canada and the EU acted differently when it came to policies on banning landmines than on prohibiting Iran's nuclear ambitions—despite the political culture differences between Canada and the US, and in spite of the political culture similarities between Canada and the EU—shows that political culture is not sufficient to explain foreign policies on its own and that it needs to be looked at within a framework of available circumstances.

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[8] Philip Resnick. *The European Roots of Canadian Identity*. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005. p. 8
[9] Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. p. 246-312
[10] Ibid.

2. METHODOLOGY

This is a comparative case study to test under which condition(s) constructivism, and in particular its political culture variable, will be able to hold a better explanatory power than neorealism when dealing with international relations. In order to reach a conclusive result on whether political culture matters in shaping Canada's world view and actions and under which condition(s) it does so, I first compare the political culture of Canada to that of the EU and the US. Then I compare policies adapted in Canada to that adopted in the EU and the US on two security/disarmament issues—the ban of anti-personnel land mines and the anti-proliferation of Iran's nuclear weapon. In this paper I choose to focus on the EU as a whole, instead of particular European member states, because there seem to be a rise of CFSP role in the Council of the EU in both disarmament issues: landmines and nuclear non-proliferation.

The research uses—as its primary sources—non-governmental organizations documents, unclassified government records and treaties, official statements of policy makers which were published in national dailies and The Disarmament Digest which is produced by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. These primary sources shed light on the process of policy formulation and give an overview of security policies and the influence of policy makers and civil society at the time of decision making. This paper also uses—as its secondary sources—academic books, scholarly articles and the opinion of various officials which were obtained through one-on-one interviews or during public conferences. Articles and book are mainly used to define terms and formulate the theoretical frame work of this thesis, while officials perspectives

are used to affirm some predictions I made in this paper and to explore details about certain security initiatives—such as the Ottawa Convention and the solutions to the Iranian nuclear dilemma—in order to understand if and how civil society and policy makers helped push forward these policies.

Traveling to Brussels was necessary to gather information, obtain a clearer picture of the EU decision-making process and conduct interviews which enriched my thesis. I spent three months last summer at *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven* in order to check their library, which is rich with references on EU foreign policy; and to discuss my topic with professors who worked on related subjects. Then I spent eight months in Brussels (from September 2005 to April 2006) doing internships within governmental and non-governmental organization. Also during this time I did fourteen—open ended question—interviews with officers, managers, advisors, analysts, editors, directors or counsellors from the: EU Commission- DG RELEX and ECHO, Council of the EU- External and Politico/Military Transatlantic Affairs, European Parliament- Green party, European Defence Agency (EDA), Canadian Mission to the EU, UK delegation to NATO, US Department of State- during their EU visiting Programme, Center for Defence Information (CDI), New Defence Agenda (NDA), International Security Information Service (ISIS), European Policy Center (EPC), EUROPE'S WORLD, OXFAM and PLAN.

In addition to these interviews, I had the opportunity to attend many public security related conference of which quite a few dealt directly with the issues in this

paper. I took advantage of the question-answer period to asked pertinent questions to my research, which were answered by highly qualified speakers and experts from the audience. One of the last conferences was on 23 March 2006 in Brussels, organized by the European Policy Center (EPC), titled 'Iran's nuclear program: a transatlantic assessment'. The speakers were Gregory Schulte, US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Gareth Evans, President and CEO, International Crisis Group (ICG); and Björn Larsson, from the European Council's Middle East Task Force, Secretariat Policy Unit. The EPC's Chief Policy Analyst Antonio Missiroli chaired the event. This conference shed light on the validity of the threat perception, due to Iranian insistence on Uranium enrichment, from the US, EU and Iranian sides.

3. PART ONE (THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK)

3.1. NEOREALISM VS. STRUCTURAL-CONSTRUCTIVISM:

3.1.1. Main concepts of constructivism and their definitions

> *Those who decide on a country's course in world politics cannot divorce themselves from the interplay of undercurrents, of mood, tone or milieu, of a climate of feeling that almost imperceptibly insinuates itself into concrete ideas and actions. These ideas form the parameters of decisions, or the bounds of acceptable policy behavior. —Robert Dalleck, 1983[11]*

Constructivism is a distinctive approach to international relations which emphasizes the social and inter-subjective instead of the objective dimension of world politics.[12] It is a domain that stems from: post-modernism, which is sociological in origin and is somewhat hostile towards claims of universal or absolute truth that is external to

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[11] Kim-Richard Nossal. *The Politics of Canadian foreign Policy.* Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997. p. 138

[12] Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics.* p. 1-2

our reality and independent of our perception, and from post-positivism, which rejects the idea that the scientific method—logical reasoning and empirical experience—is the only source of knowledge.[13] Constructivism has few forms with slight variations, but the focus in this paper is on structural (a.k.a systemic) constructivism, which takes the structure of the international system into consideration and hence is applicable for this study. [14]

Systemic constructivism insists that international relations cannot be reduced to rational actions within material constrains (as neorealism claims).[15] Its proponents accept that anarchy is the characteristic condition of the international system, but argue that by itself it means nothing.[16] For instance, anarchy of friends is very different from anarchy of enemies. Although both are possible, the level of the state's cooperation in the former differs from the later. Thus, what matters is the variety of social structures that is possible under anarchy and not anarchy itself.[17]

Systemic constructivism stands for idealism as opposed to materialism (of the neorealist approach), and for holism as opposed to individualism.[18] Thus, the collective culture of a state at a given time is socially constructed through ideas that are shared. These ideas are in general homogeneous, interdependent and shaped by sentiments such as self-assertion and common fate. In turn these collectively shared ideas shape state perception of interests and state identity. These interests may include: security, economic

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[13] Ibid., p. 32-39
[14] Ibid., p. 2
[15] Ibid., p.15-22
[16] Ibid., p. 19-22
[17] Ibid., p. 23-24
[18] Ibid., p. 26-32

well being, ego, survival, autonomy, distribution of power internationally and/or maintaining a certain prestige.[19] In other words, for structural constructivists the national culture of a state, with its various degrees of cultural internalization or maturation, in a system of anarchy with various levels of cooperation between actors, constructs ideas which form certain conceptions about interests. Consequently, state interests are not given by nature and are not exogenously formed, as proponents of realism claim. They are, in fact, socially constructed (figure 1).

Constructivists do not say that "brute material forces"—such as distribution and composition of states material capabilities, demography, natural resources and geography—do not have a role in shaping state interest; but these scholars argue that these material forces, which may have some independent effect on state interests, are not the main factor in forming those interests. And unlike the neorealists, who claim that state interests and identity are constrained by brute material forces, systemic constructivists say that state interests and identity are generally shaped by collective ideas that are socially constructed and are not limited to distribution and composition of the state's material capabilities.[20]

For constructivists it follows that state interests and identity affect state behavior and the structure of human association, whether this formed structure is materialist and self-centered, or ideational and a seeker of legitimization of actions.[21] From here they say that the structure of human association influences present and future practices and

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[19] Ibid., p. 23
[20] Ibid., p. 135-138
[21] Ibid., p. 249-259

interactions of state agents and states in the international system at large. This interaction, however, is a historical social process; it is not static and it goes in a circle, where the practices might end up changing the political culture. In turn this cultural change affects the collective ideas, and these new ideas shape different states interests and identity. New identities and interests produce new structures of human association which then induce

Figure 1
Structural constructivism theory

international culture at a given time (under some type of anarchy) — socially constructs → ideas collectively shared — shapes →

perceptions of state's interests and state's identity — affect → stat's behaviors and structure of human association (materialist or ideational structure)

brute material forces may have independent effect on shaping state interest by shaping its political culture

influences → present and future practices, Interactions of agents and historical social processes — in turn it can slowly change →

international culture (from one type of anarchy to another one) → and so on (goes in a circle)

new practices that might progress to change the political culture that we started with and so on.[22] Nevertheless, this circle goes on for centuries before it is completed and before any tangible cultural changes occur, because the social construction of collective ideas is a slow process that forms over a very long period of time and produces stable if not stubborn collective identity and behaviors. That is why we find political culture to be stable over a very long period of time and does not change often, which is an important aspect of its definition and it allows political culture proponents to operationalize it.[23]

To analyze my case studies in later chapters, I employ Wendt's constructivist paradigm. The core of Wendt's argument is that "Anarchy is what states make of it."[24] Thus, the type of anarchy which a state finds itself in during a certain period in history depends on the social norms and behaviors that tend to create or alter the view of "agents" (in this case states) in themselves and in others.[25] In chapter six of his book Wendt identifies three "cultures of anarchy" at various points in the history of international relations.[26] Each culture of anarchy differs in its tendency for conflict; thus, states act in certain ways, vis-à-vis each other depending on the distinct behavioral standards of each culture of anarchy.[27] A Hobbesian anarchy is based on the concept of "kill or be killed"; so with this type of anarchy, states view each other as adversaries that will use violence and will stop at anything to protect their own survival.[28] A Lockean anarchy is based on the concept of "life and liberty". Typical of this anarchical condition

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[22] Ibid., p. 366-369
[23] Thomas Risse-Kappen. "Ideas do not Float Freely." p. 209
[24] Alexander Wendt. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization.* 46, no.2 (Spring 1992). p. 391
[25] Ibid., p. 21-22, 257, 369
[26] Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics.* p. 249
[27] Ibid., p. 258
[28] Ibid., p. 260, 265

is states viewing each others as competitors who may use force to protect their interests, as long as they avoid eliminating each other.[29] A Kantian anarchy is based on the concept of "perpetual peace"; here, we see states viewing each others as friends. Therefore, they do not use violence to solve disagreements, but instead work as a team against external menaces.[30]

Each culture of anarchy has specific norms that are known by all the actors who share that particular type of anarchy. Therefore, one can say these norms constitute the lowest common denominator of cultural values for actors.[31] According to Wendt, these norms can be internalized to three distinguishable degrees.[32] In the first degree, actors comply with the norms solely due to fear of sanctions that may be imposed on them by another more powerful actor; so compliance to the norm is a mechanism that is being used by the actors to avoid punishment.[33] With regards to the second degree, actors comply with the norms not out of fear of violence or care for legitimacy, but out of need to advance their self interests; so compliance to the norm is a mechanism that is being used by the actors to get what they want.[34] Hence, compliance with the norms at the first and the second degree is just a means to an end, and when the costs and benefits of compliance change, actor's behavior should change as well. Contrary to this, when functioning at the third degree, actors comply with the norms not out of fear of sanctions or concern for self interests, but out of desire to internalize the norm as legitimate; so

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[29] Ibid., p. 279-280
[30] Ibid., p. 297-298
[31] Ibid., p. 250
[32] Ibid., p. 254, 286
[33] Ibid., p. 268-269
[34] Ibid., p. 271, 287

compliance to the norm is an end to itself, which is being used by the actors to "construct" their states identities and interests.[35]

The first degree of cultural internalization—which states that compliance to the norm is solely a function of force—is not applicable to Canada, the US and the EU which I examine in my case studies. Thus, my focus here is on the second and third degree of cultural internalization. We must realize that when Western states deal with each other

Figure 2
Cultural degrees and Canada-EU-US position

	High level			
Degree of Cultural Internalization	(Legitimization) 3^{ed} degree	X	X	
	(Self interest) 2nd degree			X
		Canada	EU	US
	Low level			

and with other non-Western states, they diverge in their behavior and exhibit different degrees of cultural internalization. For instance, the political culture of Canada and the EU—a structure that is based on multilateralism, soft power and preference for moral legitimization (as I will later demonstrate)—is a proof of a higher level or a "third

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[35] Ibid., p. 272, 305

degree" of cultural internalization.[36] On the contrary, the political culture of the US which revolves around unilateralism, hard power and lack of concern over moral legitimacy, indicates a lower level or a "second degree" of cultural internalization (figure 2).[37]

3.1.2. Differences between structural constructivism and neorealism

Contrary to structural constructivists, who put emphasis on collective ideas—and not on material forces which they considered to play only a secondary role—in shaping states interests, neorealists stress that in a system of anarchy, where there is no overarching power above the state to enforce international rules, rational states compete with each other and use their material forces in a self-help fashion to maximize their interests; and unlike constructivists, who argue that state interests are not exogenously given but socially constructed, neorealists believe that these interests are dependent on the distribution of power among strong and regional powers.[38]

Neorealism is a dominant and persistent theoretical approach to study international relations. Nevertheless, according to constructivists, it paints a pessimistic image of politics, where inter-state politics is essentially the realm of survival rather than progress. Necessity, not morality, is the realist starting point for understanding international relations. Although neorealism prevailed for a long time especially during the Cold War, it was the subject of great criticism by constructivists since the early 90's

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[36] Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. p. 254
[37] Ibid.
[38] T.V. Paul, and John Hall. *International Order: and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 4-5

because it seemed inadequate in explaining: the end of the Cold War (i.e. the end of balance of power), [39] and the democratic peace theory, which claims that democracies do not go to war with each other. [40]

What is more relevant to this paper is that neorealism since the end of the Cold War has become less useful in explaining the differences in foreign policies between Western countries or institutions; [41] for instance, variation in disarmament policies between Canada the US and the EU are not easily understood by resorting to neorealism alone. In addition, Kenneth Waltz, the father of neorealism, acknowledges that neorealism does not aim to provide a theory of foreign policy. [42] According to him, neorealism aspires to explain durability rather than interruption in the international system. [43] The theory thus does not try to predict or explain specific state actions; rather, it attempts to explain the general rules that regulate relations between states in an anarchic international system. [44] In fact, if neorealism still dictated how states should behave internationally, we would not have seen such important distinctions in foreign policies between Western liberal democracies with regards to non democratic societies. However, this is not the case and states are acting more often in a contradictory fashion to what neorealism would dictate. For example, when we look at the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation Canada sided with the EU on the banning of anti-personnel land mines, and at the same time it sided with the US on Iran's nuclear proliferation.

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[39]John Duffield. "Political Culture and State Behavior." p. 268
[40]Bruce Russett. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 72-73
[41] Samuel Huntington. p. 21
[42] Kenneth Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities, 1979. p. 121-123
[43] Ibid., p. 117
[44] Ibid., p. 118

Neorealist would say that Canada is "bandwagoning", where it sides with the group that insures its interests at a certain time.[45] However, a closer look at the issue and a quick calculation of Canada's material gains and losses would demonstrate that Canada, in purely economic terms, did not gain but in fact lost by spending a huge amount of money when it sided with the EU on the land mine issue. Hence, it looks like neorealism can not account fully for Canada's action in the case of land mines; while political culture in this case gives a better explanation to Canada's action. That is because certain conditions were met during the land mines issues, which is an important factor in order for political culture explanations to take precedence over neorealist ones, while they were not satisfied in the Iranian case. In fact, we must keep in mind that neorealists' explanations work very well when it comes to Iran's nuclear proliferation problem. In this case Canada sided more with the US and disregarded its political culture and affiliation with the EU in order to insure its security and survival; thus, at least one of the conditions for political culture to play a role in shaping the international policy was not satisfied. Of course, I discuss these conditions in depth in chapter four where I deal with the case study in details.

It is important to keep in mind that the West is not one big indistinguishable entity, which is only trying to balance the power of the East in order to insure its survival and economic interests. On the contrary, the West since the early 90's is increasingly divided along political cultural lines and each culturally distinct entity is trying to act according to its collective values and world view, which produce at times policies that can even be seen as antagonistic to state security and economic interests as generally

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[45] T.V. Paul, and John Hall. p.72

defined by neorealists. This is not to say that neorealism is not right and that it can not explain international policies, but it is to say that it is not applicable to all cases and "need to be supplemented by more complex approach to explain the dramatic changes in world politics." [46] At the same time, systemic constructivism is not enough to account for all security policies that Canada, the EU and the US adopt; it can supplement but not supplant neorealism.[47] Hence, we can say that there are cases where neorealism prevails in explaining state's behavior. However, there are other cases where systemic constructivism makes a better job at explaining those actions; precisely because the constructivist approach works better when certain conditions are met. In other words, in order for a state's identity to affect a state's behavior certain condition must first be satisfied, and when they are not then there is a political culture vacuum which allows more space for pure survival and economic interest to take precedence. From here it follows that determining the conditions, under which constructivism triumphs over neorealism in explaining outcomes, becomes crucial.[48]

3.2. POLITICAL CULTURE:

3.2.1. What is it, why use it and where was it used?

Risse defines political culture as those "worldviews and principled ideas—values and norms—that are stable over long periods of time and are taken for granted by the vast majority of the population. Thus the political culture as part of the domestic structure contains only those ideas that do not change often and about which there is societal

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[46] Thomas Risse-Kappen. "Ideas do not Float Freely." p. 188

[47] Michael Desch. "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies." *International Security*. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998). p. 158-169

[48] Ibid., p. 169

consensus."[49] And according to Duffield, political culture has been used as a term to emphasize the inter-subjective orientation of assumptions about the political world. These assumptions and perceptions of members of a particular society guide and inform their political actions. Three basic components of political culture have been distinguished by scholars: "the cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values, norms and moral judgments; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional attachment, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference."[50]

There are four characteristics that define culture in general and thus political culture variable, as a branch of cultural approaches, in particular. Firstly, political culture is an ideational variable, a mental activity common to a particular group; whether it is defined in a cognitive, evaluative or expressive term or defined as a combination of these three. Therefore, culture needs to be distinguished from two other phenomena; behavior and "formal institutions that exist external to human actors." In order to be able to use culture as an independent variable, to explain policy outcomes and to avoid circular argument, culture, behavior and institutions should be treated independently from one another; only then we can measure the effect of culture on behaviors and on institutions.[51] Secondly, political culture is a collective variable, one that is shared by many individuals that constitute the group and not particular to certain individuals. Norm, values and feelings must be common to the whole group that constitutes the unit we are looking at; whether this unit is a region, an institution or a state. Thirdly, political culture is a

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[49] Thomas Risse-Kappen. "Ideas do not Float Freely." p. 209
[50] John Duffield. "Political Culture and State Behavior." p.774
[51] Ibid., p. 769

distinctive variable, so it is a defining characteristic that can distinguish one group, institution, state, region from the other. These cultural distinctions become very important when we are trying to explain variations of behaviors between groups in a similar international structure. Fourthly, political culture is a relatively stable variable; it is less volatile than material forces. That is because material conditions are externally acquired and often change over a long period of time, while collective identity is socially constructed over a long period of time and thus changes very slowly and only as a result of dramatic events or great losses.[52]

The last characteristic of political culture, precisely cultural stubbornness and continuity regardless of changes in material forces, is very important from a scholarly perspective. In fact, because of this continuity political culture can be seen as a useful variable in forming causal mechanisms which explain security policies in terms of culture. Cultural persistence is needed in order for political culture to be viable in explaining consistent behaviors that do not seem to be affected by the external environment. Thus, when neorealism loses its adequacy in accounting for all disarmament policies in the West, other approaches, like structural constructivism and its political cultural variable must be taken into consideration. In some cases and under certain conditions cultural explanations can even have a better explicatory power and prediction ability and hence offers a solid alternative to neorealism. [53] Nonetheless, culture as a theoretical approach comes in different forms such as strategic, military, organizational or political; so, which one should we choose?

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[52] Ibid., p. 770
[53] Ibid., p. 768

Like Duffield and Risse-Kappen, I argue that political culture is the most suitable form of cultural variable to explain puzzling variations in disarmament policies in the West, because political culture is a parsimonious concept that is "likely to apply to broader range of cases and thus represents a more useful starting point in the analysis of foreign and security policy than do other cultural concepts." [54] In addition political culture "subsumes most alternative societal-level cultural constructs, such as strategic culture and military culture, while remaining focused on political phenomena in contrast to national character."[55]

3.2.2. Political culture debates and criticisms

There are basic ways in which political culture can directly influence behavior of the collective; as such, political culture helps define the political goals of the group. Actually, it can define the way a state or an institution perceives its interests and in turn the way they pursue policies that will insure these interests. In other words, culture can shape group identity and hence affect the structure of their association; depending on whether the goal of the group is to have a materialist or an ideational type of association. In addition, political culture can shape the group's perception of the external environment. As a result, the group pays particular attention to certain events and actions that challenge their political culture, while neglecting other that do not touch their identity. Also, political culture may eliminate or put emphasis on certain actions. Thus, some behaviors or policies become an impossible solution while others become viable

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[54] Ibid., p. 774
[55] Ibid., p. 777

options depending on the limits that political culture draws for the group. Finally, political culture can "condition the group's understanding" of the solutions and outcomes at hand. Hence, perception of outcomes of certain behavior may vary from one state to the other depending on the political culture of the state, which makes some solutions and outcomes impossible to some states yet acceptable to others.[56]

Applying political culture as an independent variable to account for security and foreign policies has been criticized for years due to various reasons. One of these criticisms considers the study of the effect of political culture on states behavior as "ethnocentric", one that is not based on empirical evidence but on feeling or intuition. However, "these early criticisms were addressed through an increased use of more systemic techniques such as sample survey, quantitative content analysis, and structured interviews." Another common criticism is that cultural explanations are methods that scholars resort to whenever they are short of other explanations which are based on more concrete factors. Clearly, this criticism does not flow from the inherit limitations of cultural variables but from the way they have been used. Thus, scholars should not wait for other explanations to be exhausted before they resort to culture. On the contrary, they should look at it from the start, and define immediately the unit and the cultural form that they are going to use—be it is institution, global, military or political—and remove behavior from their definition of culture to avoid tautology. Finally, the most frequent and serious criticism "concerns the difficulty of defining, operationalizing, and measuring cultural variables." Political culture has been criticized by many scholars—such as Desch—for lacking a clear definition; however, one could object to this claim since Risse

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[56] Ibid., p. 772

and Duffield seem to give a clear definition of political culture (as was mentioned earlier in this section.) Also, Desch's criticism may apply to many other concepts, such as power which is used by neorealist and lacks a clear definition as well. Add to that, Desch who himself criticizes cultural approach concedes that "the definitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather than principle, because it is possible to clearly define and operationalize culture."[57]

3.3. POLITICAL CULTURE CONDITIONS AND INDICATORS:

3.3.1. Predictions of the neorealist argument

The neorealist argument, which focuses predominantly on the international system and on the distribution of power and material forces,[58] seems to suffer from serious weakness if we wish to use it to compare disarmament policies in the West (i.e. between Canada, the US and the EU). In fact, the West has to a great extent a similar international structure, type of anarchy (Kantian one that is based on friendship or cooperation) and ideology (capitalism and liberal democracy). Neorealism in general expects that Western supra-national institutions (like the EU) and states (like Canada and the US) in that similar international system to behave in somewhat comparable fashion. For instance, neorealists would expect Canada, the US and the EU to have similar disarmament and non-proliferation policies because they face a similar form of anarchy, interests and ideology. Still, this is not the case because these three entities represent different sets of values (these values I discuss in details in chapter four); and these values

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[57] Ibid., p.773

[58] Peter Katzenstein. "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Politics." *International Security*. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993). p. 88

under certain conditions lead them to have different disarmament policies. Therefore, a scrutinizing look at these values and circumstances will help us understand how political culture plays a role in forming foreign policies.

Although we can see that structural conditions and ideologies are clearly similar in Canada, the EU and the US, Canada tends to follows the EU on some foreign policies and the US on other policies due to variations in their political culture which plays a role under certain conditions. However, despite the inclination of Canada and the EU towards multilateralism and antimilitarism due to their political culture, when certain conditions are not provided we can see that they diverge on security policies. We can also dismiss the neorealist argument that Canada is merely bandwagoning when it switches from the EU to the US side because when Canada sides with the EU or the US on certain issues, it does so despite its material losses and regardless of which entity might win or loose. It only acts in a contradictory fashion to its political culture because certain conditions were not met for this political culture to take precedence. For example, on the land mine issue Canada sides with the EU and not the US, despite the fact that it incurred a significant investment, [59] manifested in the government spending $43 million since 2003 on Mine Action alone.[60] Obviously Canada is not bandwagoning in this case because there is not a loser or a winner to side with one instead of the other. So, the only reason why Canada chooses to side with the EU on this policy instead of the US is clearly due to its political

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: Canada's Support for Mine Action*, 2006. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/menu-en.asp

culture. Neorealism in this case with its tenets can not fully explain this puzzling policy variation.

On the other hand, Canada and the US adopt a similar policy when it comes to the Iranian nuclear proliferation ambition issue, which differs from that of the EU. With regards to the Iranian issue Canada, the US and the EU have similar goals—to stop nuclear proliferation in Iran—but they use different means to achieve their ends—the US and Canada push for sanctions while the EU pushes for negotiations. Neorealism in this case can explain this policy variation in terms of bandwagoning and material gains, because the conditions that are needed for political culture to take residence in forming security policies are not available. If neorealism was the only explanation to disarmament policies in the West and balance of power was the only mean to attain security, we would not have witnessed such huge differences in security policies between Canada, the EU and the US over the past fifteen years. Furthermore, we would not have seen a country like Canada adopting policies that are not necessarily in its best material interests. Hence, neorealism works very well in explaining foreign policies when certain conditions are lacking for political culture to take precedence, but if we rely only on the neorealist school to try and explain every foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, then we will be facing several challenges in explaining why Western states adopt different disarmament policies. Only by supplementing neorealism with political culture explanations that we can clarify these puzzling behaviors.

3.3.2. Predictions of the political culture argument

Neorealism proved insufficient in explaining and predicting all disarmament policies in the West because it stresses that states in a similar international structure at a certain time will have similar interests. In other words, according to realist state's main interest is security and material gains, and they try to insure their interests through balance of power or bandwagoning. Therefore, the chief problem with neorealism—which makes it different from social constructivism—is that it assumes a state's interest to be identical and exogenously formed, and it considers the behavior to be dictated by the external environment. However, and as my case study will prove, interests are not homogeneous in the West and actions varies as well, due to a number of reasons. First, interests are socially constructed, and thus they depend on the perceptions of these interests. Of course, distribution of capabilities might have an independent effect on shaping these interests, but only over a long period of time which makes it part of historical development and thus culture formation. Second, a state's identity which is also socially constructed affect behaviors and policies which might be accepted or rejected depending on the political culture of the group (their values and norms). Therefore, when neorealists say that Western states are only concerned with bolstering their own security and that they will achieve it solely through balance of power or bandwagoning is not necessarily correct, because what states conceive of as in their best interest might not be the same and what it considers acceptable action might not coincide with the balance of power idea. Also, and as this case study will show, under certain conditions where a state's survival is assured material gains and loses are not taken into consideration during the process of forming a security policy. In addition, after the end of the Cold War, the

absence of ideological differences left a vacuum for cultural differences to gain prominence and replace them.

In order to prove the aforementioned points, I choose for my case study to compare political culture and two disarmament policies—banning of anti-personnel landmines and interdicting proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran—in Canada, the EU and the US. I found that although Canada and the EU share a very similar international political culture (generally focused on soft-power-politics and multilateralism), which is different from that of the US, Canada sided with the EU and not the US on the landmine issue and it sided with the US and not the EU on the Iranian issue. In order to understand the factors behind Canada's decision, I analyzed the conditions under which political culture operates.

I argue that, for political culture to have an impact on state behavior, three conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously. Only when these conditions exist will states act according to their political culture when it comes to security policies, regardless of their economic gains and losses. First, the influence will be particularly strong when the international setting is characterized by relatively low level of complexity, and when the security issue at hand is perceived of as a low threat/ risk one; only then states action can converge or diverge based on their political culture and values. Otherwise states will pursue actions that will assure their self preservation regardless of their collective values since they will perceive of the issue as direct threat to their existence, and in this case cultural and moral considerations play a secondary role. Second, political culture will

also feature more importantly as an explanation when the public is more aware of the issue, and when public opinion is highly involved in the decision making process; whether this opinion is manifested through strongly expressed views in the street or organized through NGO's and civil society movements. In general, public involvement is more likely to happen when the issue at hand is considered over a long period of time, and not under specific conditions when actions are decided hastily and under conditions of high security or time pressure, such as in wartime. Third, political culture will have a bigger role when the political elite—be it a group or an individual—who is engaged in the decision making process is a political entrepreneur, a legacy seeker and/or a firm believer in the issue as well as the national values that are being represented. In other words the elite must represent and act on behalf of the political culture of the collective.

In order to operationalize political culture and its three conditions, we must specify indicators for each condition and verify when they function.[61] With regards to the first condition—which states that in order for political culture to matter the international setting must not be complex and the issue must not be perceived of as high risk—the indicators for complexity are the high level of ambiguity or uncertainty and the time that is needed to take a decision; while the indicator for high risk is the threat imposed on national security or the fact that an issue is dealt with at a time of war. For instance, the land mine issue is not a complex one because a state's intentions and desires are very clear, there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the policy process, and it took only a year between bringing the issue to the negotiation table and signing the treaty. In addition, the land mine issue is considered a threat to human security only, not a threat to national

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[61] John Duffield. "Political Culture and State Behavior." p. 778

security or a state's survival and it was not an issue during war. However, the Iranian proliferation issue is considered very complex because the intentions of the current Iranian president (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) are considered ambiguous and his future goals are uncertain. Ahmadinejad's insistence on acquiring the "know how" on Uranium enrichment—despite all the other solutions given to him by the international community to obtain nuclear power for civilian use through other less threatening ways—is not understood or explained in a satisfying manner, and seems to hide behind it an aggressive agenda which affects the level of trust in his objectives. Moreover, the time it took to negotiate this issue exceeded three years already and a conclusive plan of action has not yet been reached. The issue is also considered a high risk one because nuclear proliferation in Iran, a country which is perceived of by the West as an Islamic-fundamentalist country that is antagonistic to Israel and Western liberal democracies, poses a threat to national security.

With regards to the second condition—which stresses that political culture features more importantly when the public is more aware of the issue, and when public opinion is highly involved in the decision making process—the indicator for public awareness is the level of public and/or NGO's participation in the decision making; while the indicator of public involvement is tested by looking at the number of public organizations or protestors who are dealing with certain policy. For example, if we study the land mine issue, we can observe that the level of public participation during the policy making process was very high, which indicates that there is public awareness. Furthermore, when it comes to land mines NGO's are highly involved and expressive,

which is noticeable from the huge number of NGO's and speeches that deal with this problem and work with various governments to find viable solutions. On the other hand, if we examine the Iranian proliferation issue, we can see that the level of public participation during the policy making process was close to nil, which indicates a lack of public awareness. Furthermore, when it comes to the Iranian problem NGO's did not get involved and the public did not express their views on the issue.

With regards to the third condition—which emphasizes that political culture will have a bigger role when the political elite is an idealist who is trying to represent the collective values of his state—the indicators for such personal qualities are observed by measuring the level of the elite's charisma, honesty, experience or leadership which he is believed by his group to possesses. For instance, if we look at the land mine issue when it first came to the table in 1996, we can say that the Canadian Foreign Minister at the time (Lloyd Axworthy), who hosted the conference in Ottawa, had a lot to do with pushing for signing the agreement.[62] He even "surprised EU representatives at the end of the conference when he asked the delegates to return to Ottawa the following year to sign a comprehensive ban-personnel land mines treaty."[63] This incident is a good indicator of his character; a statement such as that shows his leadership quality and his zeal for his ideas and his desire to leave a legacy behind him. Moreover, the fact that he was supported by his government, and the Prime Minister at the time (Jean Chrétien), demonstrate that he was a trusted man, with charisma and experience to pull such a statement and to act according to Canada's political culture. On the other hand, if we

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[62] David Long. "The European Union and the Ottawa Process to Ban on Landmines." *Journal of European Public Policy*. 9, no. 3 (June 2002). p. 433

[63] Ibid.

inspect the Iranian proliferation issue, we can observe that there is a lack of a prominent leadership. So far, there has not been a 'political entrepreneur' in Canada—like Axworthy—who can enforce his own views and make his government adopt what he believes to be the best solution to deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge.

Thus, we can predict with more confidence that political culture will play a prominent role in shaping security and foreign policies if the three aforementioned conditions are present. However, if one or more of these conditions are missing then it is likely that political culture will not be sufficient to explain these policies, and we will need to resort to realist explanations which emphasize state survival, differences in distribution of brute material forces, balance of power and bandwagoning arguments to explain security and foreign policies.

4. PART TWO (CASE STUDIES—DISARMAMENT POLICIES)

4.1. CANADA, EU AND US POLITICAL CULTURE:

4.1.1. Political culture origins

The West encompasses some important variations when it comes to political values and economic abilities; for instance, Canadian and EU political cultures—which stress multilateralism and antimilitarism/soft power—are different from that of the US—which emphasizes unilateralism and militarism/hard power. The development of this political culture variation between Canada, the EU and the US can be attributed to two reasons: the first, and the most important, reason is historical; the second reason, which might have some independent effect on shaping political culture and hence collective

identities and interests, is material. In this section I start by defining the terms multilateralism and soft power versus unilateralism and hard power. Next, I analyze Canadian historical factors then the material ones, and their effects on shaping Canadian political culture. Subsequently, I compare historical then material factors and their effects in both the EU and the US. In the next section I draw conclusion about the similarity and differences between Canadian, EU and US political culture and I dive deeper into the different political culture forms (table 1).

Whereas unilateralism consists of performing foreign policy without the help or consent of allies,[64] multilateralism is both the purveyor of "multilateral diplomacy" and the support of institutions that facilitate this practice.[65] The term multilateralism refers to the "practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions;" and the term multilateral diplomacy refers to "working with coalitions of states, primarily but not exclusively within formal associations or institutions, to achieve foreign policy objectives."[66] Multilateralism "implies a willingness to maintain solidarity with these coalitions and to maintain support for these institutions;" and multilateral diplomacy dictates encouraging others to follow the same path regardless of "particularistic interests of the parties" or "strategic exigencies" that can exist in certain events.[67] Thus, we can say that multilateralism involves greater attention to the process of decision making than to the decisions

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[64] R.E. Allen, H.W. Fowler, and F.G. Fowler. *The Concise* Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. p. 1337

[65] Tom Keating. Canada and world order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002. p.4

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

themselves, and that it "suggests a subjective approach and a conscious commitment to the process and substance of the association."[68]

As for the term power, it means in general the capacity to get the results that one desires;[69] and soft power in particular means the "ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments," which hard power relies on. Soft power "rises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies."[70] Hence, soft power of a state is enhanced when its policies are perceived of as legitimate by others. Seduction is often more efficient than compulsion, and principles such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law are very seductive.[71] Both multilateralism and soft power are traits of Canadian and EU political culture for historical and material reasons as I am about to demonstrate.

Canada "in certain respect is an odd kind of nation-state." Canada became a federation in 1867, then a sovereign state since the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and finally a "constitutionally modern" state since the adoption by Pierre Trudeau (Canada's Prime Minister) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.[72] Canada was involved automatically in the First World War in 1914 when Britain declared the war.[73] The Canadian military divisions that were sent were mostly formed by volunteers; however, because casualties were so high, in 1917 Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden had to

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[68] Ibid.

[69] Joseph Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. p. 1

[70] Ibid., p. x (Preface)

[71] Ibid.

[72] Philip Resnick. *The European Roots of Canadian Identity*. p. 11

[73] William Halsey, and Emanuel Friedman. *Merit Student Encyclopedia: History of Canada*. Vol. 4, New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1985. p.136

send other divisions through conscription, which was highly contested in Quebec.[74] In 1919 Canada joined the League of Nations to try to avoid another war where Canada will have to participate in,[75] since most officials did not see the war in Canada's interest or responsibility.[76] Nevertheless, in 1939 when Britain failed to appease Hitler and after the great depression that Canada faced in the 1930s, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King secured parliamentary approval to participate in the Second World War, and again it was despite Quebec's disapproval of conscription.[77] So, if we look at the historical and geographical development in Canada, we can see that it had to juggle between maintaining unity at home, dealing with its colonial ties with Europe and living in harmony with the most powerful nation in the modern world which is its neighbor to the south—the US.[78] Canadian officials played a big role in the late 1940s in trying to construct a multilateral framework that would "offset the dominant and potentially domineering power of the United States and, at the same time, provide a stable structure of peace and prosperity."[79] However, unlike the US, Canada's isolationist desire to avoid "entanglement in British foreign policy" did not induce the government to decline engagement in the League of Nations.[80] On the contrary, membership was "actively sought as an avenue for furthering Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs... [it was] the government's strategy to gain recognition for Canadian autonomy while limiting the country's commitment to the international community."[81] In fact, membership in the League of Nations secured Canada's sovereignty and position, and it kept the country

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[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., p. 136-137
[76] Tom Keating. p. 6
[77] William Halsey, and Emanuel Friedman. p. 137
[78] Tom Keating. p. 1
[79] Ibid., p. 2-3
[80] Ibid., p. 7
[81] Ibid.

away from the conflicts that were taking place in Europe.[82] Hence, Canada's initial involvement in multilateral organizations was very different from its involvement in the post-war period, because with time this "isolationist view" was fading away as the League on Nations became a rallying platform for those who wanted to see Canada play a role in world affairs.[83] Later on, the Canadian government started to approach other multilateral institutions (like the UN and NATO) with a different prospective since "the country immerged from the Second World War as a significant global power."[84] Thus, Canada's "historical experience" persuaded its leaders to take a more active role and it encouraged its policy makers to "look at multilateralism as the preferred mode to peruse this activism."[85]

On the material side, Canada is considered a middle economic and military power.[86] Indeed, Canada acknowledges that it is not in the US league when it comes to economic and military powers, and it is this fact that forced it to seek a middle power status to separate itself from small powers, exert influence globally and maintain a special status among great powers.[87] Consequently, it had to influence others of its vision without the resort to coercion and inducements, which are beyond its means. It did so through its moral authority as a "good citizen of the world" and its international assistance.[88] In general, soft power of a state relies on three assets: its culture, when "it is attractive to others;" its political values when it demonstrates by example; and its foreign

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[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid., p.8
[84] Ibid., p.9
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Interview, Canadian Mission to the EU, Brussels, 2005

policies, "when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority."[89] Therefore, Canada's military and economic situation makes it lean towards the use of soft power, where it uses its culture and institutions to attract and persuade others. It does so by using peaceful tactics such as multilateral diplomacy and negotiations. It therefore avoids using hard power as a solution.[90]

The historical development of the EU is focused on Europe's involvement in the First and the Second World War, its commitment to peace and prosperity, and its need for self protection from the hegemony of the US.[91] After years of bloody wars in Europe, there was a desire to rebuild Europe and to prevent it from ever again getting involved in such disastrous events.[92] Therefore, some European countries decided to join in economic communities such as the ECSC in 1951, hoping that economic cooperation will spill over to cooperation in other fields, and that economic integration will deter the parties from going to war with each other.[93] The ECSC led to the integration of six countries two of which were major adversaries during the war—Germany and France.[94] The EEC, which was established with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957,[95] grew from six states to include ten then fifteen and recently 25 member states since 2004.[96] So, what started as a deterrence mechanism from getting involved in another major war again, became with time a way of life.[97] These 25 European countries pool their

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[89] Joseph Nye. p. 11

[90] Ibid., p. 31

[91] Mark Leonard. *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. p. xi, 27-29

[92] Elizabeth Pond. *The Rebirth of Europe*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. p. 24

[93] Ibid., p. 23-24

[94] Ibid., p. 27

[95] Ibid., p. 23

[96] Mark Leonard. p. 81-82

[97] Interview, European Commission- DG RELEX, Brussels, 2005

sovereignty and resources on issues that range from economic to high level security matters.[98] That is not to say that some policies—which are related to defence issues—are not still decided intergovernmentally; however, we are seeing a trend in giving these issues up to be decided at the EU (supra-national) level.[99] Thus, like Canada, EU's development and survival depends greatly on its involvement in multilateralism; not only to insure that it will not get involved in other wars, but also to maintain a balance of power against US's hegemony while preserving the transatlantic alliance.[100]

On the material side, the EU is considered a strong economy like the US,[101] but more like Canada in regards to its military power; it too is not in the US's military league.[102] Therefore, in order to get what it wants, the EU relies on soft power instead of hard power.[103] According to the present EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldener, during a press conference at the EPC on February 3, 2006 "the EU's strength resided in the use of soft power—diplomacy and development through trade and aid—to bring about positive change. The crucial thing is to persuade emerging powers to sign up to the rule of law upon which the present international order is based." It is clear from this quotation that Europe prefers using soft power to get what it wants, and we only need to look at the results of this method in Central and Eastern Europe to realize how effective it can be.[104]

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[98] Mark Leonard. p. 65-68
[99] Interview, European Defence Agency, Brussels, 2005
[100] Mark Leonard. p. 29
[101] Ibid., p. 2
[102] Joseph Nye. p. 78-79
[103] Ibid., p. 81
[104] Ibid.

One recent historical event that definitely shaped US's contemporary approach to international relations, is the end of the Cold War and the fact that the US emerged from it victorious as a superpower.[105] "The international system since 1990 has been unipolar;" and the US came out of the Cold War with technological dominance, military and economic primacy.[106] So, although the US supported to some extent multilateralism during the early post-WW II period, it felt that it does not need to do so in the post-Cold War era; indeed, it "became one of the UN's principal antagonists in what developed into a sustained attack on the whole practice of multilateral cooperation and international law."[107] Therefore, this decline in US support for multilateralism formed a political culture rift between Canada and the EU, who support multilateralism and the US, who does not support it to the same extent; and no doubt US's superpower status and hegemonic inclinations lead to its unilateralism.

On the material side, the US is considered a strong economy and a great military power.[108] It emerged from the Second World War and the Cold War victorious and technologically advanced.[109] These factors helped to make the US a country that believes more in the advantages of hard power and the use of coercion, deterrence, inducement and sanctions to get what it wants,[110] instead of the use of attraction, persuasion and diplomacy that Canada and the EU adopt to get what they want.[111] History is full of examples that demonstrate this point; one only has to look at US's policies during the

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[105] John Ikenberry. *American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Essays*. New Jersey: Longman, 2002. p. 573
[106] T.V. Paul, and John Hall. p. 31
[107] Tom Keating. p. 111
[108] T.V. Paul, and John Hall. p. 31
[109] Ibid.
[110] Joseph Nye. p. 134-135, 139
[111] Ibid., p. 128

past fifteen years with regard to the Middle East to realize its preference for the use of hard instead of soft power.[112]

Table 1
Political culture origins and effects

Country Or region	Canada	EU	US
Historical Factors	Involvement in World Wars & seeking Independence	Involvement in EU building & Fear of US hegemony	End of Cold War & US victory
Material Factors	Middle economy & Middle power	Strong economy & Middle power	Strong economy & Great power
E F F E C T	-Multilateralism -Antimilitarism/ Soft power -Legitimization of actions -High PC internalization	-Multilateralism -Antimilitarism/ Soft power -Legitimization of actions -High PC internalization	-Unilateralism -Militarism/ Hard power -No legitimacy-self interest -Low PC internalization

4.1.2. Applying theory to case studies

From the previous analysis we can see the effect of historical and material factors on political culture. We can also conclude that Canada's political culture resembles that of the EU and differs from that of the US (table 1). Obviously, Canadian and EU political

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[112] Ibid., p. 140-141

culture leans towards multilateralism and the use of soft power in the realm of foreign affairs. Still, despite the fact that Canada and the EU share a similar political culture—one that is based on multilateralism and soft power—in the past fifteen years Canada has been sometimes adopting disarmament policies that are similar to those of the EU and different from those of the US, while at other times, it has been adopting policies that are similar to those of the US and different from those of the EU. In other words, the EU has been mostly following its political culture and the US has been mostly regarding its self-interests, while Canada has been following its political culture sometimes and regarding its self-interests in other times (or *bandwagoning* with the US). Thus, Canada's behavior indicates that similarity in political culture—like in the case of Canada and the EU—alone is not sufficient enough to create convergence on foreign policies all the time, and that certain conditions must first be met for political culture to take precedence over material interests. This is the case, primarily when dealing with security issues. In order to prove my hypothesis with a case study, in the next couple of chapters I will compare Canadian, EU and US decisions on the anti-personnel landmine problem and Iran's nuclear proliferation dilemma, to analyses these specific conditions under which I expect political culture to play a significant role in forming similar security policies.

4.2. ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND MINES TREATY:

4.2.1. Who launched and supported this initiative? Why?

The Ottawa Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty is a formal "convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines

and on their destruction."[113] The treaty was later upgraded to include giving assistance to victim relief, humanitarian aid and de-mining efforts.[114] Accordingly, this treaty only covers APMs. So, other explosive devices against objects or persons—such as mixed mines, anti-tank mines, anti-vehicle mines, anti-handling devices and UXO—are not included in it.[115] On September 1997, the treaty was open for signature in Oslo-Norway, and on March 1999 it entered into force.[116] The ICBL 2006 report indicates that 154 countries signed the treaty and 151 of them already ratified it,[117] while 40 states have not yet signed it including the US.[118] The report shows that Canada and all of the EU member states signed and ratified the treaty—except Poland (who signed but did not ratify yet)[119] and Finland (who did not sign the treaty, although it does not use or produce APMs, because it shares borders with Russia who is a non signatory to the treaty which poses a direct threat to Finish security).[120]

The first steps that were taken to deal with the "landmines crisis" were addressed at the European Parliament in 1992, where the topic was put forth as a humanitarian and development issue that needs to be dealt with in order to protect human security and rights.[121] So, one can say that the APMs campaign started as a European initiative and

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[113] David Long. "The European Union and the Ottawa Process to Ban on Landmines." p. 429
[114] Ibid., p. 430
[115] Mines Action Canada. *Global Survey,* 2003-2004. p.6. Available online from
    http://www.minesactioncanada.org/files/Global_impact_survey.pdf
[116] Canada Treaty Information. *Ottawa Convention,* 2006. Available online from
    http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/Details.asp?Treaty_ID=102758
[117] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *States Parties*, 2006. Available online from
    http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members
[118] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *States not Parties*, 2006. Available online from
    http://www.icbl.org/treaty/snp
[119] Ibid.
[120] David Long. "The European Union and the Ottawa Process to Ban on Landmines." p. 438-439
[121] Ibid., p. 431

later got "hijacked" by the Canadians.[122] In October 1996, Canada hosted the so called "Ottawa International Strategy Conference Towards a Global Ban on APMs."[123] NGOs representatives and 71 states from all over the world attended the conference,[124] and by the end of it Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, surprised and challenged states delegates in his closing speech, by asking them to meet within a year to sign a Mine Ban Treaty as follows:

> *And so Mr. Chairman, I have one final point to add to your action plan. That point comes in the form of both an invitation and a challenge. The challenge is to see a treaty signed no later than the end of 1997. In the coming days, I will be writing to your ministers and to others not represented here to seek their views on how we can move ahead together. I will tell them that if the will is there, Canada is prepared to convene a meeting in December 1997 to sign such a treaty.[125]*

Fortunately, the continuous negotiations and meetings between Mr. Axworthy and Foreign Ministers of various countries over the whole year after the Conference were not in vain, because in December of 1997, 122 out of the 150 states who had attended the Ottawa Convention have signed the treaty during the event.[126]

The Convention required at least forty ratifications to come into force.[127] Nine months after the "signing ceremony" that number was achieved; thus, by early 1999 the

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[122] Ibid., p. 431, 434

[123] David Lenarcic. *Knight-Errant? Canada and the Crusade to Ban Anti-Personnel Land Mines.* Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998. p. 11

[124] Ibid.

[125] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Mr. Axworthy- N0. 96/41- Address at the Closing Session of the International Strategy Conference in Ottawa,* 1996. Available online from http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.asp?publication_id=377025&Language=E

[126] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: The International Movement to Ban Landmines-Ottawa Convention Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum,* 1997. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/II/II_D-en.asp

[127] Ibid.

treaty became an internationally binding law among ratifying states.[128] In order to implement the treaty, a ratifying state or a "State Party" must stop producing and transferring APMs, destroy all the stockpiles of APMs in its possession within four years and comply with other conditions of the Convention, like providing humanitarian assistance to mine victims.[129] Under Article 3 of the Ban Mine Treaty, the State Party is allowed to keep only a small number of mines for educational and research purposes, such as mine-clearance and mine-detection trainings, while under Article 5.1 the State Party must, within ten years of ratifying the treaty, clear all mines from areas under its control.[130] However, since this might be a hard mission for many states for reasons of financial difficulties or technology, Articles 5.6 and 6.1 permit these states to request an extension or assistance at the annual meetings.[131] For the first five years of the treaty entering into force, these meetings are held annually at different States Parties all around the world to monitor progress. Later on, they might be held every five years or upon the request of a State Party to provide an opportunity to discuss accomplishments and ask for support. [132]

According to the 2005 Landmine Monitor Report, 84 states and 8 territories had been identified as affected "to some degree by landmines and/or UXO, of which 54 are

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[128] Ibid.

[129] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: Implementing the Ottawa Convention*, 2003. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/III/menu-en.asp

[130] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Text of the Mine Ban Treaty*, 1997. Available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english

[131] Ibid.

[132] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Annual Meetings*, 2006. Available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/meetings/annual

State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty;" [133] such as Cambodia, Angola, Sudan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Albania and Laos to name a few.[134] Since 2003 the BHMAC has recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) alone the existence of still 18,600 landmines, despite all the constant de-mining efforts.[135] Most of these mines lie along the deserted front lines where opposing ethnic enemies fought the Bosnian-Serbian War (1992-1995), "covering approximately 4.4% of the total landmass of BiH."[136] They were dropped by NATO air-fighters when its troops intervened to stop the Serbian aggression in December 1995. [137] According to an interview I conducted with an expert on the issue, the number of landmines could be higher than reported; no one knows precisely how many mines were buried but went unrecorded. [138]

Realizing the urgency and gravity of the situation, Canada and the EU with the help of various NGOs mobilized quickly to deal with this dreadful human security condition.[139] They pursued policies, which were in accordance with their political culture and their aspiration to promote human security globally through multilateral cooperation, despite the huge economic cost that they knew they would incur for this mission. Actually, at the time the UN estimated that the cost of removing all the active landmines

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[133] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report: Major Findings*, 2005. Available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/
[134] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *States Parties*, 2006. Available online from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members
[135] International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report: Bosnia-Landmine and UXO Problem*, 2005. Available online from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/bosnia.html#Heading59
[136] Ibid.
[137] Rae McGrath. *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: A Resource Book*. London: Pluto Press, 2000. p. 42, 195, 135-136
[138] Interview, Center for Defence Information (CDI), Brussels, 2005
[139] Cameron Maxwell, et al. *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 32, 34, 40-41

will accumulate to US $33 billion and will take many years to accomplish.[140] Canada and the EU still joined in this international campaign that would not only prohibit them from the use, transfer and production of APMs, but that would also require them to destroy their stockpile of it and provide humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programs to landmines victims.[141] Canada's Prime Minister in 1998—Jean Chrétien—in order to help "universalize the land mines convention and allow it to achieve its humanitarian objectives," allocated CAN $100 million for this cause over a period of five years, which was renewed for CAN $72 million for another five years (2003-2008).[142] At the same time the EU allocated €60 million of its budget, which would be renewable over a period of two years. Nonetheless, the estimate of total EU assistance for mine action during 2005-2007 surmounts to €140 million.[143]

It is worth noting here that the US response to the Ban Landmines Treaty was different from that of its Western partners. It was not because there was a lack of public support for the treaty; in fact, several American NGOs pushed for it.[144] They did not sign it because the US owns the biggest stockpile of these weapons. It is also the main producer and user of landmines. Most importantly, it does not want to clear its stockpile from North Korea or not be able to use them if necessary in that region.[145] In fact, the US

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[140] David Lenarcic. p. 3

[141] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: Canada's Support for Mine Action,* 2006. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/menu-en.asp

[142] Ibid.

[143] European Commission External Relations. *European Union and Anti-Personnel Landmines Challenge: EU Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007,* 2004. Available online from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/mine/intro/strat05_07.htm

[144] Cameron Maxwell, et al. *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 p. 22, 100

[145] David Lenarcic. Knight-Errant? Canada and the Crusade to Ban Anti-Personnel Land Mines. Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998. p. 25-26

wanted to take part in the treaty, especially when it sensed that it was being left out of the initiative,[146] but the international community could not convince it to bend on the North Korea exception. Consequently, Canada and the EU signed a comprehensive treaty, while US national security and realist considerations took precedence over humanitarian security. In the end, the US acted according to its political culture, which is generally self regarding, and did not sign the treaty.[147]

4.2.2. Canada, EU and US response in light of political culture

I argued earlier in this paper that Canada and the EU have similar political culture which is different from that of the US. I also said that regardless of economic gains and loses, the EU will mostly adopt foreign policies that correspond with its political culture, while Canada will sometimes do so as well, depending on whether certain conditions are all being satisfied or not. Then, by explaining in the previous section the Canadian, EU and US responses to the land mine issue, I demonstrated that in this case political culture did play a significant role and shaped these entities' foreign policy. Clearly, Canadian and EU's general preference for multilateralism and their concern about human security distinguishes them from the US and makes them sign humanitarian agreements, like the Ottawa Convention, when the US does not. However, political culture on its own does not account for the EU and the Canadian response. So, now in order to prove my point I will go on to discuss in detail those three conditions which made political culture matter in the case of landmines.

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[146] Ibid.

[147] Rae McGrath. *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: A Resource Book*. London: Pluto Press, 2000. p. 8

The first condition stresses that the security issue affecting the state needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. As was mentioned in the previous section, APMs are considered a low risk issue for Canada and the EU because it poses a threat to human security but not to a national one; thus, strategically it is not as important as Iran's nuclear proliferation for example. And yet, it is important enough from a humanitarian perspective. The speech of Jean Chrétien, Canada's Prime Minister, at the treaty signing conference in 1997, demonstrates clearly that land mines are a human security concern more than anything else:

> *We have come together today to bring an end to the landmine epidemic. The sting of death that remains long after the guns grow quiet, long after the battles are over. At international conferences, there is always a great deal of talk and debate. But the most powerful voices here in Ottawa will not be the ones inside this conference site. They will be the cries of the victims of landmines-from the rice fields of Cambodia, to the suburbs of Kabul; from the mountainsides of Sarajevo to the plains of Mozambique. A chorus of millions of voices, pleading with the world, demanding the elimination of anti-personnel landmines.* [148]

Human Rights Watch estimated that about 10 million landmines were produced a year, while the US Department of States estimated that in mid-1990s there were around 90 million landmines planted in more than sixty countries which resulted in about 40,000 casualties a year.[149] Still, landmines in less developed countries are not considered a direct menace to Canada's or EU's survival and peace. Also, there are no landmines in Canada or in EU member states to worry about; so, political culture and moral

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[148] Canadian Government Library and Archives. *Jean Chrétien Speech at the Treaty signing conference,* 1997. Available online from http://www.collectionscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4081-e.html
[149] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2004. p. 129

considerations can have the upper hand in this situation.[150] In addition, there was no ambiguity or uncertainty in the objectives behind this policy; on the contrary, negotiations on land mines had a relatively transparent character.[151] Certainly, public attention to this grim issue was grasped not only by the statistics but also by the testimonies of landmine victims, who survived to tell their stories.[152] These victims got involved with important organizations, such as Landmines Survivors Network, and their stories were picked up by the media and received words of sympathy from the Pope John Paul II and celebrities like Princes Diana.[153]

The second condition emphasizes that public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. Public pressure to get something done on landmines was, and still is, very prominent; ICRC, ICBL, MAC, are among few of the organizations that are working diligently to eliminate this perfidious weapon and the suffering that is associated with it.[154] Unfortunately, on the government side there is some hostility towards NGOs.[155] Many politicians are irritated by NGOs taking their position on decision making, when politician consider themselves to be elected representatives of the people and thus better at judging what the people want.[156] Hence, there seems to be "a mutual agreement between NGOs and the government to keep a distance, operate in different

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[150] United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). *Video: If There Were Landmines Here, Would You Stand for Them Anywhere?,* 2006. Available online from http://www.stoplandmines.org/slm/index.html
[151] David Long. "The European Union and the Ottawa Process to Ban on Landmines." p. 442
[152] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* P. 130
[153] Ibid.
[154] Cameron Maxwell, et al. *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 163, 168, 173, 176, 180
[155] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* p. 139
[156] Ibid.

spheres and intersect only on specific issues."[157] Luckily, on the landmines issue Canadian Foreign Affairs officials "rewrote the script" in cooperating with NGOs and accepting their advice.[158] For instance, in his speeches Minister Axworthy quoted Red Cross doctors—who deal with treating landmines civilian victims, especially children— saying that the "worst results are not physical. The most serious consequence was psychological trauma, the aftermath of being suddenly mutilated, of having their lives drastically changed for no reason. This required careful and often prolonged counseling."[159] Indeed, there is a huge number of NGO's that got involved and pushed the US, Canada and EU member states to sign the ban-land mines treaty.[160] However, NGOs did not succeed in the US because landmines for the US are a national security matter since it involves North Korea, and generally the US follows its interests more than international norms. However, even without the US's support the treaty was signed after a year of negotiations only, which makes it one of the fastest treaties to be signed and ratified due to NGOs and public intense involvement.[161]

The third condition focuses on the role of the leader in setting the agenda and pushing for the policy. The political entrepreneur who took the leading role on the APMs treaty was definitely the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996 under the Liberal

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[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid., p. 131
[160] Richard Matthew, Bryan McDonald, and Kenneth Rutherford. *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy.* New York: State University Press, 2004. p. 6
[161] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: The International Movement to Ban Landmines-Ottawa Convention Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum,* 1997. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/II/II_D-en.asp

Party, Axworthy (table 2).[162] He is an idealist who is also a firm believer in Canada's multilateralism and soft power traditions.[163] In his book he says that his own resolve was certainly strengthened when he could not find an acceptable answer to his young son's question, who asked him, while they were touring a landmine exhibition, "why would any one use such weapons to kill children?"[164] No doubt that Axworthy's leadership ability granted the success of the Ottawa Convention and his nomination in 1997 to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on banning landmines, which he did not get but was thanked by the recipient—ICBL—for his outstanding role in banning landmines.[165] However, Axworthy was not the only Canadian official who pushed for the treaty. Indeed, Minister Axworthy writes in his book about the Ottawa Process:

> *There was growing support at the public level and a well-organized campaign, and a number of governments saw the need for substantial change but nowhere to make it happen. It was at this point that Mark Moher, our ambassador for disarmament, announced that Canada would host a meeting in Ottawa to plan follow-up strategy. Our government was eager to be involved. As early as 1994, my predecessor, Andre Ouellet, had begun to advocate to the defence minister, David Collenette, the idea of declaring a moratorium on the use of land mines by Canadian forces to demonstrate Canadian seriousness.[166]*

According to Axworthy, the landmine problem was not new to him when he took over at Foreign Affairs.[167] Apparently, he became aware and interested in the topic during his time in opposition. Therefore, when he came to office he "decided to give it

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[162] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's Guide to the Global Ban on Landmines: Documents and Research Materials-Judy Williams Speech,* 1997. Available online from http://www.mines.gc.ca/VII/VII_A_xi_c_2-en.asp
[163] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* p. 1-2
[164] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* p. 136
[165] David Lenarcic. p. 64
[166] Lloyd Axworthy. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* p. 133
[167] Ibid., p. 134

top priority so as to establish Canadian leadership on the land-mine issue."[168] Axworthy with his staff at Foreign Affairs developed a three tier plan to tackle this matter. First, they paid lots of attention to "strategy meetings" that prepared for the Ottawa Convention. Second, they "stepped up" diplomatic engagement at the UN to demonstrate Canada's interest and presence. Third, they worked hard to convince Canadian Defence Ministry to get rid of Canada's landmines stockpile. On the day of the Conference in 1996, just before it started, Axworthy met with officials from his cabinet and with some important NGOs representatives. He confesses that at that meeting no one new if the Conference and his initiative to call on countries to sign the Treaty within a year will succeed but they were all willing to give it a go. At that moment he realized that the decision was in his hands alone and he said "It's the right thing. Let's do it."[169] Axworthy's decision to take the lead, and his incredible political will was fruitful. The Canadian initiative shifted the movement on land mines from Geneva to Ottawa and made the Ottawa Convention a Canadian as well as a humanitarian legacy.[170]

So, we can conclude that despite the financial costs that Canada and the EU have to incur, they pursued foreign policies based on their political culture when it came to landmines because these three aforementioned conditions were satisfied.

Table 2
Disarmament Policies and Decision-Makers[171]

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[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid., p. 137
[170] Ibid., p. 134-135
[171] This is a self-made table, required gathering information from about 15 different sources

Case	Parties involved	Year the issue started	Year of ratefying and signing the treaty	Prime Minister of Canada	Canada's minister of Foreign Affairs	Canadian Minister of Defence	President of EU Commission	EU Commiss-ioner of Foreign Affairs	EU High repres-entative for CFSP	U.S. President	U.S. Secretary of State	US Secretary of Defence
Ottawa Convention	Canada + EU only	1996	9/18/1997	Chretien	Axworthy	Young	Santer	Brittan	n.a.	Clinton	Albright	Cohen
Iran nuclear program	US + Canada + EU	2003	n.a.	Martin/ Harper	Graham/ pettigrew/ Mackay	Pratt/ Graham/ O'connor	Prodi/ Barroso	Patten/ Ferrero-Waldner	Solana	W.Bush	Powell/ Rice	Rumsfeld

4.3. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROLIFIERATION PROGRAM:

4.3.1. Which parties are involved in this initiative? Why?

In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970.[172] This legally binding treaty obligates five nuclear-weapon states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US) to disarm and prohibits the ratifying states from pursuing proliferation of WMD.[173] Nevertheless, Article 4 of the NPT, the third pillar on peaceful uses, "allows parties to engage in peaceful nuclear programs;"[174] such as the production of nuclear energy for domestic use as long as it is under the IAEA safeguard.[175] For years, Iran concealed the fact that it was building Uranium enrichment facilities. Suddenly in August 2002, an Iranian opposition activist, Alireza Jafarzadeh, revealed the existence of two unknown nuclear sites: Natanz Uranium enrichment facility

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[172] Canada Treaty Information. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,* 2006. Available online from http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/Details.asp?Treaty_ID=103576

[173] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Introduction to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),* 2006. Available online from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/intro-nuclear-treaty-en.asp

[174] Ibid.

[175] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Iran Safeguards Agreement,* 1974. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

and Arak heavy water facility.[176] This discovery created tension between Iran and the West and Iran's nuclear activities became scrutinized and feared by the US, Europe and Canada.[177] Therefore, by September of 2003 Germany, France, and Great Britain or "the big three" under the coordination of Javier Solana—the EU High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (table 2)—got involved in lengthy negotiations with Iran, through an initiative knows as the E3/EU format, in order to solve the crisis and failed to persuade Iran to abandon its Uranium enrichment program through a set of political and economic incentives.[178]

At first, the initiative seemed to be working since in December 2003 Iran—in an attempt to increase its nuclear program transparency—signed (however still did not ratify) an additional protocol to the IAEA Safeguard Agreement, which strengthens the IAEA role by allowing its inspectors to access Iran's procurement information, energy production facilities, certain military sites and research and development buildings.[179] Then later in November 2004, Iran—in order to demonstrate its "peaceful intentions" to the West—signed the Paris Agreement with the E3/EU, which emphasized that Iran will "voluntary" and "temporarily" suspend its Uranium enrichment activities until a compromise is reached through further negotiations, and that it will still respect the NPT

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[176] Strategic Policy Consulting (SPC). *Biography: Alireza Jafarzadeh,* 2005. Available online from
http://www.spcwashington.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=43
[177] European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS). *Newsletters no. 19: dialogue with Iran-the EU Way out of the Impasse,* 2006. Available online from http://www.iss-eu.org/newslttr/n19.pdf
[178] Ibid.
[179] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Safeguards Additional Protocols Status,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

treaty and not develop nuclear weapons.[180] On August 9, 2005, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a "fatwa" (a legal opinion based on Islamic law) which was released in an official statement to the IAEA, that the "production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons."[181] On September 15, 2005 the new Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—who was elected in August of that year—publicly stated at a UN high-level summit that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and that Iran will also not forfeit its right under the NPT to develop civilian nuclear power for peaceful purposes.[182] In January 2006 Iran allowed inspections of nuclear facilities by the IAEA, and the IAEA concluded in its update statement of that month that the facilities were not related to any secret military nuclear program.[183] The update also stated that Iran informed the Agency that as of February 9, 2006 it desired to resume Uranium enrichment in small amounts for development of peaceful nuclear technology, and the update indicated as well that "Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations."[184]

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[180] European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS). *Chaillot Paper no. 89: Iranian Challenges,* 2006. p. 106-107. Available online from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai89.pdf

[181] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *Publications—Documents: Information Circulars No. 657,* 2005. p. 121. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcircnr12005.shtml

[182] United Nations. *60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: Presidential statement—Iran,* 2005. Available online from http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/

[183] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Documents and Reports— January Update,* 2006. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

[184] Ibid.

On February 4, 2006, the IAEA board of governors issues a resolution requesting the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, to report Iran's nuclear activities to the UN Security Council, and the resolution passed by a vote of "27 in favor, 3 against and 5 abstentions."[185] Right after the resolution of the Agency, Iran announced that it will resume its enrichment program—but emphasized that it will still be for civilian and domestic use—and that it will only cooperate with the IAEA within the legal limits of the NPT and Safeguard Agreement.[186] In April 2006, Ahmadinejad publically announced that Iran managed to enrich Uranium to fuel-grad/LEU (of 3.5%) with the use of its 164 cascading centrifuges; this fact was soon verified and confirmed by the IAEA.[187] The UN Security Council on July 2006 declared that, after three years of investigation, the IAEA is still unable to provide assurances about Iran's nuclear activities beyond the shadow of a doubt.[188] Thus, the Security Council ordered Iran to halt all its enrichment activities by August 31, 2006 or it may face political and economic sanctions. The General Assembly with a vote of 14 to 1 adopted this resolution.[189]

Despite the repetitive verbal assurances by Iranian officials and the fact that up to the latest IAEA report there is no clear evidence of Iran enriching Uranium to nuclear weapon-grade/HEU (which needs higher than 20% Uranium enrichment and about

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[185] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: News Update on IAEA & Iran— February 4 Resolution,* 2006. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline3.shtml

[186] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Documents and Reports— February IAEA Board Report,* 2006. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

[187] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Documents and Reports— April IAEA Board Report,* 2006. Available online from http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

[188] Washington Post. *Security Council Sets Deadline for Iran,* 2006. Available online from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/31/AR2006073100353.html

[189] Ibid.

16,000 cascading centrifuges),[190] Western governments remain greatly concerned that Iran is using its civilian nuclear programme to mask an undeclared military nuclear agenda for several reasons. Firstly, Iran's radical Islamic views and its overt (moral or material) support to anti-Western "terrorist" organization such as Hezbollah raise many red flags in the West.[191] In fact, David Harris, a former agent with CSIS (the Canadian spy agency) says that "Iran is the world's most dangerous country, its fundamentalist oil rich, Islamic regime a far more potent threat than the North Koreans today, or the Taliban when it held power in Afghanistan."[192] Harris also reminds us that "Ahmadinejad has also called Israel a disgraceful stain on the Islamic world and has vowed to have Israel wiped off the map."[193] So, although Iran now is stressing its commitment to the NPT, the fear is that once it develops nuclear weapons it will act like North Korea and abandon the treaty and sell its knowledge to rogue states and terrorist organization.[194] These intentions were presented in Khamenei's statement that Iran is "prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its nuclear scientists."[195] Hence, the West views the verbal assurances by Iranian officials and supreme religious leaders as time buying mechanisms that will change once Iran acquires nuclear defence capabilities. Second, Iran's lack of

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[190] Global American Institute. *Informed Comment: Iran Can Now Make Glowing Mickey Mouse Watches,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.juancole.com/2006/04/iran-can-now-make-glowing-mickey-mouse.html

[191] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). *Publications—Iran: Iran's support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3360/

[192] Canada.com. *News-World: Appeasement won't Satiate Iran's Quest for Arab World Nuclear Supremacy,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=e014328f-124a-411c-8eb8-e5c5a27f991a&k=95729

[193] Ibid.

[194] New Threat Initiative (NIT). *Issue and analysis: Iran,* 2004. Available online from
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_59a.html

[195] Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). *Publication—Iran: Better Carrots not Centrifuges,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranissuebrief.pdf

transparency, its failure to report to the IAEA the construction of nuclear facilities and its pursuit of nuclear technology covertly for 18 years have fuelled suspicion in the West that Iran's nuclear programme has a "military dimension" to it.[196] Indeed, in February 2006, ElBaradei reported that the Agency has not seen clear indications of deviation of nuclear material to nuclear weapons; however, he also noted that there was a lack of cooperation and transparency from the Iranian side over the past three years of dealings with the IAEA,[197] which created, according to may Western analysts, a "confidence deficit" regarding Iran's intentions.[198] Third, many governments, including the US, the EU and Canada, do not understand Iran's insistence on acquiring the 'know how' of nuclear technology, and enriching Uranium on its soil if it was only for civilian use. Actually, one of the alternatives or "carrots" that was proposed by the E3/EU and refused by Iran in 2004 was for the EU to provide all necessary civilian nuclear energy to Iran, as long as the latter agreed to suspend all its nuclear activities. [199] In addition, the West claims that Iran does not need nuclear power due to the fact that it has the third largest oil reserve in the world, and that nuclear power is more expensive for the Iranians to generate than oil-fired power.[200] However, Iran's Oil Ministry Deputy for International Affairs, Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, argues otherwise, insisting that at the current rate of oil production (which is 1.5 billion barrel a year), Iran's reserve (of 133.3 billion barrels)

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[196] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). *In Focus IAEA and Iran: Documents and Reports—February Resolution,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

[197] Ibid.

[198] European Policy Center. *Iran's Nuclear Programme-a transatlantic assessment,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.theepc.be/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=582

[199] New Threat Initiative (NIT). *Nuclear Chronology: Iran,* 2004. Available online from
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_4398.html

[200] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). *The world Factbook: Iran,* 2006. Available online from
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html

will deplete within 90 years,[201] and Iran does not want to be dependent on others for its domestic energy in the future.[202] Lastly, an assessment made by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2005 concluded that "if Iran threw caution to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade."[203] Furthermore, in June 2nd 2006 US Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, estimated that Iran, if left unchecked, could build a nuclear bomb between 2010 and 2015.[204]

Due to all of the aforementioned concerns the West has been exerting a huge amount of pressure on Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear programme and to stop all its nuclear activities. However, despite all of this pressure Iran has been slow to react; it insists that the pressure is only a way for the US to prevent it from obtaining civilian nuclear technology, which Iran is entitled to legally under the NPT, based on unsubstantiated fear of it developing nuclear weapons.[205] The possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapons, or even knowing how to, causes a great concern in the West since it poses a "threat to the stability in the Middle East," which is strategically

[201] Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections. *News: Iran May run out of Oil in 90 Years*, 2005. Available online from http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntm54300.htm

[202] BBC News. *Analysis: Iran's Nuclear Fuel Debate,* 2006. Available online from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5235732.stm

[203] International Institution for Strategic Studies (IISS). *Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes—a net assessment,* 2005. Available online from http://www.iiss.org/index.asp?pgid=5498

[204] BBC News. *Middle East News: Iran Bomb within 10 Years,* 2006. Available online from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5039956.stm

[205] Public conference: Q/A period, European Policy Center (EPC), *Iran's Nuclear Programme-a transatlantic assessment,* Brussels, 2006

very important for the West to maintain.[206] So, Canada, the EU and the US appear to view these ambitions as an imminent threat to their national security and deem it a fatal situation. For that reason they all agree that they cannot allow Iran to continue with its Uranium enrichment program.[207] However, when it comes to Iran, despite the fact that the West shares the same views/goals its entities do not seem to agree on the means to achieve these ends. The US has been pressuring the UN Security Council and the EU to enforce sanctions against Iran while the EU keeps pushing for diplomacy and negotiations. This point is clearly demonstrated in the UN Disarmament Digest article on March 2, 2006 which was titled "US Gives Unenthusiastic Support to the EU Talks with Iran":

> *The United States gave halfhearted support Thursday to upcoming talks between three top European nations and Iran over Tehran's controversial nuclear program. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli said Britain, France and Germany talked to the United States about Friday's ministerial talks. "We're under no illusions," Ereli said. The so-called EU-3 "talked to us about it," Ereli said. "As we have throughout this process, we're supportive of the EU-3 -- I think we're working well together," he said. "Let's see what happens on Friday." "But the baseline is the same. Is Iran going to suspend enrichment activity? Is Iran going to return to the negotiations? Or is Iran going to continue, as we think they have, to stall and prevaricate and extend things in a meaningless way in order to avoid censure?" Whatever the outcome of the talks between the European foreign ministers and Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ereli said the matter should go to the Security Council. "We expect it to come up at the Security Council after March 6," he said. (Reuters)[208]*

Canada, when Iran's nuclear activity was discovered in 2002, appeared to err on the side of caution by not stating openly its unconditional support for the US regarding Iran's nuclear problem. In fact, at first it was hard to infer clearly from officials'

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[206] European Policy Center. *Iran's Nuclear Programme-a transatlantic assessment,* 2006. Available online from
http://www.theepc.be/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=582

[207] Public conference: Q/A period, European Policy Center (EPC), *Iran's Nuclear Programme-a transatlantic assessment,* Brussels, 2006

[208] United Nations Department of Disarmament. *Disarmament Digest: Peace and Security through Disarmament,* 2006. Available online from http://disarmament.un.org

statements whether Canada was on the EU's side (diplomacy) or on the US's side (sanctions):

> *The fundamental goal...is to recognize that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security, and to propose positive steps to be taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that region. Clearly, Israel's adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state would be such a positive step. On that basis, Canada voted in favor of this resolution last year, and has done so again this year. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon all of the states in the Middle East to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to nuclear non-proliferation...The long history of Iran's concealment of its nuclear activities, revealed as a result of two years of IAEA investigation, remains a matter of serious concern to Canada. We believe the....universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations applies to all states, both those outside and those inside the Treaty.[209]*

However, since 2003 as time went by under the liberal party—and continuing with the recent appointment of a Canadian Prime Minister (Stephen Harper) who represents the conservative party and seems to be pro-American—it looks like Canada on the Iranian issue has succumbed completely to the will of the US and is now swimming with their current and echoing their voice. This continuity in the reaction against Iran's nuclear program, under both liberal and conservative parties, indicates that partisan politics is not what is affecting Canada's response. Instead, Canada's behavior is affected by the non-satisfaction of the three conditions which are needed for political culture to play a role in foreign policy. One only has to read the following official statement of Mackay, the current Canadian Foreign Minister, after the UN Security Council 1696 Resolution on 31 July, 2006 on Iran's nuclear program, to realize how Canada is bandwagoning with the US:

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[209] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *The Risk of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Middle East,* 2002. Available online from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/resolutions/ga60_92-eov-en.asp

Canada fully supports the Resolution issued today by the UNSC, reiterating the international community's serious concerns about Iran's past and ongoing nuclear activities... It also notes Iran's failure to comply with the measures demanded of it in the UNSC Presidential Statement of March 29, 2006, as well as in various International IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions...Through this Resolution, the UNSC has made the suspension of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing activities mandatory. Canada urges Iran to implement this suspension immediately and to enter into negotiations toward a long-term comprehensive settlement, on the basis of the proposal offered on June 6 by the EU High Representative on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States...Canada also supports the UNSC's determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA in order to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear program. Canada urges Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, including through resumed application of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as a necessary step toward a long-term comprehensive settlement.[210]

4.3.2. Canada, EU and US response in light of political culture

I also argued earlier in this paper that despite the fact that Canada has similar political culture to that of the EU, which is different from that of the US; it will adopt foreign policies that do not correspond with its political culture when three conditions are not met. Then by using the Iranian nuclear proliferation issue as my case study I demonstrated how Canadian material interests—and not political culture—shape its policies regarding this problem. Canada, the EU and the US in this case all have similar fears and goal, which is to stop Iran's Uranium enrichment program, nevertheless they use different means to achieve this goal. In dealing with Iran the EU follows to a certain degree its norms and political culture, and hence it prefers the use of diplomacy and persuasion. The US follows its interests and political culture, and so it favors sanctions and use of force. While Canada in this case (unlike on the landmines issue) does not follow its political culture but considers its strategic interests and thus it bandwagons

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[210] Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *News Releases: Statement by Minister Mackay on UNSC Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Program,* 2006. Available online from http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=384286&Language=E

with the US, abandoning its soft power tradition in the adopting of the US's hard power rhetoric. The reason behind this Canadian behavior, is that the three conditions which are essential to be satisfied in order for political culture to play the main role in shaping foreign policies (that were present in the landmines case) are absent in the Iranian situation. In order to prove my argument, I will go on to discuss those three conditions and their effects in detail.

The first condition stresses that the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. This is obviously not the situation here since the Iranian problem poses a threat to national security and to the survival of the state. Iran's nuclear ambitions are of great concern to the West; not only because Iran's purposes for insisting on enriching Uranium on their soil is ambiguous to the West, but also because Iran's previous policies and statements have had aggressive tendencies and tones towards the West. Canada, the EU and the US seem to be uncertain that the Iranian government would act responsibly and refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in order to advance some of their Islamic fundamentalist goals.[211] The fear of Iran's advanced nuclear program and its intentions to develop nuclear weapons is not new. In a joint declaration released on June 3 2003, the G-8 nations—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — harshly criticized Iran's lack of transparency and its failure to abide by its IAEA safeguards agreement. According to the G8 "such actions undermine the nonproliferation regime and are a clear breach." The G8 also said "We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

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[211] Public conference: Q/A period, European Policy Center (EPC), *Iran's Nuclear Programme-a transatlantic assessment*, Brussels, 2006

and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security."[212] Canada in particular expressed its great concern about Iran's nuclear program in its statement to the 47th General Conference of the IAEA on 16-17 September 2003:

> *Nuclear security and the threat posed by nuclear terrorism were clearly at the forefront of our concerns at the last General Conference, however events during the last twelve months have demonstrated, once again, that while new threats may appear, old ones do not consequently disappear. In this regard, it is of paramount importance that the international community with the support of the Agency continues to persevere in the strongest possible way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as they continue to be the most serious threat to international peace and security. We must learn from past experiences to ensure that we are well equipped to respond to these renewed threats. We must emphasize to potential proliferators that there will be "zero tolerance" for non-compliance with international non proliferations norms and obligations. North Korea's admission, last fall, that it had a clandestine Uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes and its subsequent expulsion of IAEA inspectors, the resumption of weapons inspections in Iraq and the subsequent war in that country, as well as the international community's grave concern about Iran's nuclear program, have clearly brought back to the forefront of global affairs the threat of nuclear proliferation that is at the very origin of the NPT and this unique organization.[213]*

The second condition emphasizes that public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. On the Iranian nuclear proliferation topic, public pressure—whether organized through open demonstrations or through NGOs—is absent in Canada the EU and the US. The subject has been discussed for three years already solely through high level officials. Civil society appears to agree with their respective governments on the problem and the solutions. However, the absence of civic participation might also be due to the lack of government's transparency on the topic—which usually tends to

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[212] New Threat Initiative (NIT). *Nuclear Weapons: G8 Declaration on Iran Nuclear Program*, 2003. Available online from http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_3.html

[213] Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD). *47th General Conference of the IAEA: Canadian Statement*, 2003. p. 2. Available online from http://www.crcpd.org/International_Issues-Topics/IAEA-2003/Canada.pdf#search=%22canada%2C%20iran%2C%20nuclear%2C%20proliferation%2C%20security%2C%20threat%22

alienate citizens and creates apathetic feeling towards the issue—or it may be due to the fact that the horrific effects of using nuclear weapons are not as tangible on a daily basis, as the consequences of using other conventional weapons like landmines.

The third condition focuses on the role of the leader in acting on behalf of his collective identity and pushing for the policies that would advance his countries political culture. For the EU, Solana seems to be the main political figure dealing with Iran's nuclear file and he has been trying hard to calm down the rising conflict between the US and Iran. For instance, on Wednesday August 30, 2006, the Financial Times published and article which stated that Solana is "ready to continue discussions with Iran over its nuclear programme even though a United Nations deadline for Tehran to restrict its nuclear activities expires on Thursday."[214] "The 31 August date [to suspend enrichment] is important because that was the date set by the Security Council, said a senior European diplomat. But that doesn't mean we can't continue any exchanges with the Iranians...We will be available to talk to them, there are things we are ready to pursue. He stressed that the lack of unanimity of the Security Council—and the hope that Tehran may yet agree to suspend enrichment—are the chief reasons why the EU is set to keep the contacts going. He also added that the EU would seek to pursue 'two tracks in parallel'—continuing contacts, while seeking to impose incremental restrictive measures on Iran."[215] As far as the US is concerned, it is President Bush who has been lobbying very strongly against enrichment. For example, in an article which was published on August 31 2006, also by the Financial Times, US President George W. Bush announced that Iran had to face the

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[214] Financial Times. *EU Will Continue Nuclear Talks with Tehran*, 2006 Available online from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/90a61514-3853-11db-ae2c-0000779e2340.html
[215] Ibid.

outcomes for its "failure to meet a United Nations deadline to halt its nuclear activities. "We must not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. There must be consequences for Iran's defiance" Mr. Bush said, in a statement "seemingly intended to build international support for sanctions on Tehran." However, his incendiary towards such measures "has been undermined by Russia and China's continued resistance to sanctions."[216] Conversely, in Canada there is obviously a Canadian leadership deficiency when it comes to Iran (table 2). Certainly, it looks like there is a growing rift between Canada's foreign policies on Iran (among other issues) and Canada's political culture, especially since Harper came to office in 2006. Moreover, Canadian Liberal and Conservative party officials—like Martin, Harper, Pettigrew and Mackay—seem to lack charisma, experience or popularity. All of these are necessary leadership qualities, without which it becomes hard for a leader to consolidate his political culture into concrete policies that he can convince his government and other governments to adopt.

So we can see that regardless of the similarity in Canadian and EU political culture they diverged in their mood of actions regarding the Iranian problem. We can thus conclude that political culture on its own is not sufficient to explain foreign policies; and that when the three aforementioned conditions are not satisfied states will pursue their material interests, regardless of their political culture orientation, in accordance with neorealist predictions.

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[216] Financial Times. *US Says Iran Must Face Consequences*, 2006 Available online from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/95b60d46-3909-11db-a21d-0000779e2340.html

5. CONCLUSION

Despite the prominence of the neorealist approach in explaining states decisions in the international realm, since the end of the Cold War the theory has been facing some difficulties in accounting for all states security decisions. At times states seem to be adopting policies that are not in their best interests—from a neorealist perspective—but more in accordance with their political culture, while at other time the opposite is true. It occurred to me that certain circumstances must be ripe for one approach to be more employable than the other one to account for this policy alteration. Therefore, this article addresses the conditions under which the political culture approach can be used as an alternative to neorealism in order to explain security policies in the West.

I started by showing that Canadian and EU political cultures are similar, while US one is different. Canada and the EU prefer multilateralism and the use of soft power, and the US prefers unilateralism and the use of hard power. I demonstrated that the reasons behind this cultural variation can be attributed mostly to historical and material factors. I then used two case studies which deal with disarmament policies—anti-personnel land mines and Iranian nuclear proliferation—to illustrate that despite political culture similarities between Canada and the EU, they have adopted different paths when they tackled each issue. This again proves that political culture alone is not sufficient for two entities to have similar security policies, and that certain conditions need to be first satisfied in order for political culture to matter in forming foreign policies (table 3).

I argue that three conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously for political culture to count as an explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. First, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat or risk issue. Hence, it has to be an issue that threatens human security and not national security. Second, the public needs to be aware of the issue, and public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. Public opinion can be either manifested through strongly expressed views in the street or organized through NGO's and civil society movements. Third, the political elite, be it a group or an individual, who is involved in the decision making process must be an idealist, legacy seeker or a firm believer in the issue as well as the political culture that is being represented. In other words the elite must represent and acts on behalf of the political culture of the collective. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that when the three aforementioned conditions are present political culture can be used as a viable supplementary to neorealism in order to explain Western security policies.

Table 3
Case study inferences

Conditions	Political Culture	Example	Policy Comparison
-low risk issue -public involvement -prominent leader	play role	landmines	Canada & EU same political culture EU signs treaty to ban landmines US does not sign treat to ban land mines Canada signs and supports EU
-high risk issue -public absence -no leadership	does not play role	Iran	Canada & EU same political culture EU prefers negotiations and diplomacy US prefers sanctions and use of force Canada bandwagons and supports US

Finally, by using my two case studies I managed to demonstrate how these conditions were present in the landmines case and absent in the Iranian one. Thus, I inferred that the presence of the conditions in the former matter leads to prominence in political culture explanation; while their absence in the latter matter leads to prominence in neorealist explanations.

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Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *News Releases: Minister Pettigrew Welcomes IAEA Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Program to,*

2005. Available online from
http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=382895

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