

Université de Montréal

**Power, Knowledge, Interests:
Understanding the Emerging Regime to Control Small Arms and Light Weapons**

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Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures

Cette thèse intitulée :

Power, Knowledge, Interests :
Understanding the Emerging Regime to Control Small Arms and Light Weapons

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RÉSUMÉ

Pourquoi les États coopèrent sur certaines questions en relations internationales, tandis que d'autres les ignorent? Cette thèse va tenter d'éclaircir la question en ce qui a trait aux armes légères, qui sont restées "des armes oubliées" depuis bien longtemps au chapitre des priorités mondiales. Nous allons également explorer l'émergence d'un régime "novice" qui veut contrôler les armes légères et les armes portatives, sujet faisant partie inhérente du Programme d'action des Nations Unies en vue de prévenir, combattre et éliminer le commerce illicite des armes légères sous tous ses aspects (2001).

L'hypothèse avancée dans cette thèse démontre que trois facteurs (le pouvoir, le savoir et les intérêts) sont les principaux responsables de l'émergence d'un ensemble de facteurs de contrôle mondial en ce qui concerne le problème des armes légères. Une telle hypothèse découle de la conviction que la création de régimes, pour faire face à *toutes* les questions au niveau mondial, peut être expliquée par le développement de ces trois facteurs. Ainsi, l'absence de régime peut être expliquée par le non-développement d'un ou de plusieurs de ces facteurs. La présence de ces forces motrices fait l'objet de recherche durant deux périodes : avant la fin de la guerre froide et après la fin de celle-ci, y compris la période qui suit le 11 septembre (1990 à 2005). Nous essayons de démontrer que les facteurs favorables à la création d'un régime n'étaient pas développés dans la première période que nous étudions, période caractérisée par le manque de volonté des États-nations d'investir dans un régime. Les facteurs favorables ne sont apparus que

durant la seconde période, qui a coïncidé avec le début de la coopération en matière d'armes légères.

Nous postulons, tout d'abord, que l'intérêt des grandes puissances conditionne l'émergence d'un régime. Le pouvoir est donc un facteur important en ce qui a trait à la faisabilité du régime. Nous constatons, dans cette perspective, qu'il y avait un manque d'intérêt initial de la part des grandes puissances pour le contrôle des armes légères durant la première période couverte par cette étude. Durant la seconde période, l'intérêt de la grande puissance paraît mitigé. Dans le chapitre suivant, nous analysons le régime à travers le prisme du « savoir collectif » et de sa diffusion, afin de déterminer s'il s'est produit une progression d'idées qui auraient pu amener les États à tenter de résoudre les problèmes posés par les armes légères et les armes portatives. À vrai dire, nous avons pu déterminer qu'un savoir collectif est apparu et que les informations ont été diffusées lorsque les États ont commencé à agir sur la question des armes légères. Finalement, le facteur d'intérêt est expliqué dans le cadre néolibéral de prénégociation. Nous avons constaté que c'est seulement lorsque les facteurs liés à la crainte de coopérer sont maîtrisés (par exemple, prépondérance de solution, répartition de gains et problèmes d'application), que les perspectives de création d'un régime paraissent plus positives. Cette thèse épouse de façon ferme une vue pluraliste de la théorie de régime dans laquelle des aperçus de réalisme (pouvoir), libéralisme (savoir) et néolibéralisme (intérêts) sont considérés en parallèle avec leurs interactions.

Mots clés : Théorie des régimes. Organisation internationale. Sécurité. Armes conventionnelles. Questions globales. Nations Unies. Paix.

ABSTRACT

Why do states cooperate on some issues, and not others in international relations? The puzzle of why small arms remained “forgotten weapons” on the global agenda for so long is pieced together in this dissertation. We also explore the emergence of a fledgling regime on controlling small arms and light weapons, encapsulated in the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (2001).

The hypothesis advanced in this dissertation is that three variables (power, knowledge, and interests) are chiefly responsible for producing a set of global controls on the small arms issue. Such a hypothesis arises out a conviction that the creation of regimes for *all* global issues can be explained by the development of these three variables. Alternately, an absence of a regime can be accounted for by the lack of one or more of these variables. The presence of the respective driving forces is sought in two periods: before the end of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War, including the post September 11 period (1990 to 2005). We aim to show that those variables favourable to the creation of a regime were not developed in the first period under study, an interval of time characterized by an unwillingness on the part of nation-states to invest in a regime. Only in the second period did the variables appear, coinciding with the dawn of cooperation on the small arms issue.

After developing power as a variable (we state that great power interest will determine the general mould of feasibility for the regime), we note that major power interest on small arms control was lacking in the first period under study.

Great power interest appeared mixed in the second period. In the next chapter, we analyze knowledge through the lens of “knowledge collectives” to see if a progression of ideas that might have caused states to learn about the problems posed by small arms and light weapons occurred. Indeed, we find that a knowledge collective formed and diffused information at a time when states began to act on small arms. Finally, the variable of interest is explained within a neoliberal framework of prenegotiation bargaining. Only when factors related to the fear of cooperation (e.g. solution-salience, distribution of gains and enforcement issues) are overcome do we find that the prospects for regime creation appear more positive.

This dissertation firmly espouses a pluralist view of regime theory in which insights from realism (power), liberalism (knowledge) and neo-liberalism (interests) are considered, along with their interplay.

Keywords: Regime theory. International Organization. Security. Global Issues. United Nations. Peace.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

2001 UN Small Arms Conference UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Lights Weapons, 2001

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ASEAN Association of South-East Asian States

AU African Union

BASIC British American Security Information Council

BMS The UN Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms

CAD Canadian Dollars

CASA Coordinating Action on Small Arms

CATT Conventional Arms Transfer Talks

CCW Convention on Conventional Weapons

CFE Treaty Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

CFR Council on Foreign Relations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CICAD Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission

COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EU European Union

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

G-8 Group of Eight Nations

GATT The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDR German Democratic Republic

GNP Gross National Product

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms

ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IO International Organization

Interpol International Criminal Police Organization

IR International Relations

IRA Irish Republican Army

JANSA Japanese Action Network on Small Arms

LDC Less Developed Country

LTTE Tamil Tigers

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System

MERCOSUR Mercado Commun del Sur South American Common Market

MIIS Monterey Institute of International Studies

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non Governmental Organization

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OAS Organization of American States

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PACDC Programme for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion

Para Paragraph

PfP The NATO Partnership for Peace

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PrepCom Preparatory Committee For a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons

RFID Radio Frequency Identification

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

RECAAL Congolese Action Network on Small Arms

SAND Programme on Security and Development (Monterey Institute of International Studies)

SAANSA Southern Africa Action Network on Small Arms

SADC Southern African Development Community

SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - first round

SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – second round

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

TRIPS Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights

UN DDA UN Department for Disarmament Affairs

UN Firearms Protocol The Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

UN GA United Nations General Assembly

UNIDIR The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

USD US Dollars

WHO World Health Organization

WMD Weapons of mass destruction

WTO World Trade Organization

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Ottawa, March 2005

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: 'SMALL ARMS, BIG PROBLEM'¹

Everywhere there were guns. That great Beirut bazaar now seemed to have narrowed down to one commodity – guns of all shapes, sizes and nationalities, from pistols, rifles and machine-guns, to mortars, bazookas and heavy artillery. At a roadblock the militia waved their American M16 rifles in the air in one hand, in the same cocky style as the film posters, while they sipped Pepsi with the other. In a bar a group of middle-aged businessmen carried big pistols hanging uneasily around their paunches, while the young men displayed fancy pistols shiny with chromium-plate, with Texan-style patterned holsters. The trading genius of the Beirutis had quickly adjusted itself to the weapons market, and everyone knew the current price of a Kalashnikov rifle or a Browning pistol, which fluctuated each week with the state of supplies or the prospects of peace [...]

On one day I was there, a hundred people were killed on both sides --- nearly all of them civilians. At the street-corners plain posters were stuck on the walls with photographs of dead youths or children. It was, everyone explained, a coward's war: only between five or ten per cent of the dead were soldiers.

Anthony Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar*²

We will shoot until our guns stop.

Captor in School, Beslan, Russia, September 3, 2004³

It is unnecessary to amplify in words what one sees happen in so many places, for the memory of these happenings alone fills one with horror.

Jean Bodin, *Six Books on the State*⁴

¹The title of this chapter is borrowed from a special issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1999) "Small Arms, Big Problem," devoted to the small arms and light weapons issue.

²Anthony Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar*, 2nd ed. (London: Coronet Books, 1978), 18.

³"Death and horror at siege school," *Cable News Network (CNN)*; On-line article accessed October 1, 2004; Available from <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/09/03/russia.school.quotes/index.html> ; Internet.

⁴In the original, which appeared in 1576, the quotation is as follows, "Et n'est besoin d'amplifier de paroles ce qu'on void effectuer et pratiquer en tant de lieux, que la memoire seule fait dresser les cheveux aux plus asseurez," Jean Bodin, *Les six livres de la République: Livre cinquième*,

This dissertation has one main objective. That objective is to uncover and explain the principal factors that contributed to the ascendance of the small arms and light weapons (SALW) issue on the international global agenda from object of neglect to target of multilateral cooperation. Since the 1990's, policy-makers have begun to take note of, and to tackle the problems related to light weapons availability and proliferation. Once thought of as the "forgotten weapons" in international arms control – or "arms control's orphans" ---, what we are now witnessing is a regime-in-the-making for small arms. This fledgling regime is embodied in a United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspect (Programme of Action), the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), and a range of regional agreements and international projects. In this work we ask: *Why now and not before?*

Before we proceed any further, there is merit in asking – since all subsequent analysis will flow from this one question – whether or not our research objective is characteristic of a "genuine puzzle."⁵ Genuine puzzles, it has been argued, are a prerequisite of theoretical and empirical advancement in social

new and rev. ed. (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1986), 131. Translated in William Ebenstein and Alan O. Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present*, 5th ed (Fort Worth, TX: Hartcourt Brace College Publishers, 1991), 396.

⁵ See James N. Rosenau: "Puzzlement in Foreign Policy," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no.4 (summer 1976) and James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Driven Actors in World Politics," *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (autumn 1986), *passim*.

inquiry⁶. Genuine puzzles stem from and stir our curiosity. If sufficiently puzzled by a phenomenon, an element of discipline imposes itself naturally. We, as investigators, are driven to sharpen our instruments accordingly -- our concepts, our methods, the data needed to collect – in order to be able to finally fit the pieces of the puzzle together. That same element of propulsion is not experienced when a researcher fails to specify an outcome in the relationship under study. When the question is overly open-ended, the investigator will tend not to be driven relentlessly to “get to the bottom of things” because any number of answers will do. Had Isaac Newton, for example, simply asked,

“Why do apples do what they do?” a question that lacks a precise outcome – he and his disciples might well have gone off in a variety of unrelated directions (‘Why do apples grow on trees?’ ‘Why do they sometimes host worms?’ ‘Why do they have yellow, red and green skins?’) and may have eventually have lost interest in the subject without contributing to such an important advance in our understanding of the world around us” [as why apples *fall*]⁷.

Likewise, International Relations scholars cannot merely ask, “Why do nations do what they do?” because again, an interest in a relationship that involves a particular consequence or set of consequences is missing. As seen, genuine puzzles are actually hard to devise. Even an apparently satisfying and challenging question like “What seems to be the net effect of transnational relations on the abilities of

⁶ Rosenau, “Puzzlement,” 3 and P. Terrence Hopmann, “Identifying, Formulating, and Solving Puzzles in International Relations Research” in *In Search of Global Patterns*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1976), 192.

⁷ Rosenau, “Puzzlement,” 5.

governments to deal with their environments?”⁸ does not meet the criteria of a genuine puzzle as described above.

Aware of the difficulties in puzzle-formulation, we nevertheless believe that our approach *is indeed founded on* an authentic puzzle. Let us clarify. We ask why countries are now considering cooperation on the small arms issue. To do that, we must first wonder why cooperation was not considered before. This is a mystery of some normative gravity.

The fact that not once did global decision-makers gather together to contemplate placing restraints on the mass diffusion and misuse of small arms except in belated fashion seems strange when one considers that small arms are the class of weapons that are *actually doing the killing in our time* -- not nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. This is happening (and has happened) in places as varied and as familiar to us from our television sets as Baghdad, Bosnia, Bolivia and Burundi. As United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan points out in his *Millennium Report*, “The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems – and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”⁹ Yet, no regime was developed to control small arms, as regimes did develop for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – until now. As compelling as this part of the conundrum is, we are aware that it is desirable to also focus on a particular outcome – and not just an absence of an outcome, which we do. That outcome is the beginnings of cooperation in a

⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), xi, quoted in Rosenau, *Puzzlement*, 6.

⁹ Kofi A. Annan, United Nations Secretariat, *‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (Department of Public Information) 2000, 52.

regime – a new level of governmental activity – the origins of which are at present unknown.

The answer to the puzzle –the hypothesis advanced here— is that three variables (power, knowledge, and interests) are chiefly responsible for producing a set of global controls on the small arms issue. Such a hypothesis arises out of a conviction that the creation of regimes for *all* global issues can be explained by the presence of these three variables. Alternately, an absence of a regime can be accounted for by the want of one or more of these variables. Such a line of thinking fits into an already-established research program aimed at grappling with why some transboundary issues are taken up as objects for cooperation, and not others (with apparently similar attributes). Why a global treaty for the ozone layer and not deforestation? Why a treaty to protect the polar bear but not the humpback whale? And, of course – the most pertinent of puzzles for our purposes as puzzles go – *Why agreements on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and not small arms?* Although we disagree with and eventually depart from some of the positions held by those working in the field of cooperation, we never leave the program entirely. If we did – and went our separate way entirely – that would mean (we feel) missing out on a solid opportunity to contribute knowledge to the field of cooperation studies which –one assumes— is bettered by and enlivened by debate. Ultimately, in pursuing work along these lines, we believe that we assist theorists in moving further along the road towards one day being able to more accurately predict “when and under what conditions states will agree to restrict their sovereign authority and abide by new international rules that constrain and channel their subsequent

actions.”¹⁰ In short, beyond the immediate interest in focusing on a matter foremost among the issues that have frustrated peace efforts in the past century, this study offers an avenue to examine how and when cooperation amongst global actors occurs.

Chapter Overview

In the remainder of the Introduction, we define small arms and light weapons and describe why they are a problem today. Next, we detail the regime-in-the-making and review the literature on small arms and cooperation. We then discuss and defend our theoretical approach to small arms cooperation--- that of regime analysis. The theoretical framework of regime analysis is laid out in some detail. From there, we enter into a description of the research design of the study. Our hypothesis is refined, the way we will go about verifying the hypothesis is addressed and the variables delineated. The timeframe of the study is also stipulated. We furthermore elaborate upon what type of information will be gathered (the method of data collection). At the very end, we evaluate the contribution to the advancement of knowledge that we hope to make before finally outlining what will be broached in each chapter.

¹⁰ Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, eds., *Polar Politics: Creating International Economic Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), vii.

What Are Small Arms?

Even the most casual observers of military affairs normally have at least an intuitive idea of what small arms are. The public mind has learned to make a distinction between major conventional weapons – the stuff of elaborate defense systems – and smaller fare. But what are small arms and light weapons exactly? A small arm is “a weapon which is generally manportable.”¹¹ A light weapon is a “crew-portable land-based armament”¹² For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms “small arms,” “light weapons” and “SALW” (for small arms and light weapons) are used here interchangeably. This definitional approach is a standard one adopted by those dealing with the topic. Therefore, when not otherwise specified, any of these three terms should be taken to mean “not only small arms in the narrow sense, but also light weapons, ammunition and explosives which can be operated by one or two persons and can be carried by one or two persons by a pack animal or light vehicle.”¹³ Excluded from the category are “anything heavier”¹⁴: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles or missile systems.¹⁵ Always, the emphasis is on *military-style* weapons, that is, weapons “which are manufactured to

¹¹ C. J. Marchant Smith and P.R. Haslam, *Small Arms and Cannons*, Brassey's Battlefield Weapons Systems and Technology vol. v (Oxford: Brassey's Publishers, 1981), 195.

¹² Christopher Smith, “Appendix 14F: The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: A Case Study of South Asia” in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 583.

¹³ International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), “Founding Document” (May 1999), 1.

¹⁴ Michael Klare, “The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security,” *Current History* 96, no.609 (April 1997): 173.

¹⁵ These are the categories of weapons covered in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which restricts itself to major conventional weapons.

military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war.”¹⁶ Popular small arms and light weapons in use today are pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, small-caliber cannons, light support weapons, combat grenades, mortars, anti-tank weapons, anti-tank mines, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and ammunition for the above. Anti-personnel landmines are usually considered separately because they are treated that way – apart – in the context of arms control negotiations¹⁷.

Why Are Small Arms a Problem?

Many of the effects of small arms and light weapons are indirect. Nonetheless, the problems¹⁸ they pose, whether direct or indirect, are compelling. They include:

¹⁶ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*, UN Document A/52/298, 1997, 11.

¹⁷ *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8.

¹⁸ The most comprehensive and frequently-cited references on the *problem* of small arms are *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), *Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) *Small Arms Survey 2004*, Jasjit Singh’s edited anthology, *Light Weapons and International Security* (1995) and Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed’s collection of essays by a group of small arms specialists participating in a project by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995). In addition, three landmark reports have laid the foundations for much research to come: the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1997) on “the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade” and its follow-up (1999), a parallel study of member-state’s firearm regulations by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1997), and the “Benson Report” or *Light Weapons Controls and Security Assurance: A Review of Current Practice* (1998), published as part of a project on light weapons and peacebuilding in Central and West Africa by International Alert (an NGO). See also the special issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* titled “Small Arms, Big Problem” which features short pieces by leading authors in the field.

a) The Human Toll

The human death toll caused by light weapons since the end of the Cold War is over six million¹⁹. Since the end of the Second World War, the figure ranges in the tens of millions. A significant portion (estimates range between thirty-five and ninety per cent, depending on the conflict) of the slain and injured are civilians, in particular women and children²⁰. Small arms and light weapons, of course, do not themselves cause conflict. Humans must intervene. Yet the sheer number of SALW in circulation is inescapably related to the incidence of intrastate and interstate hostilities as well as levels of crime and violence in every part of the world²¹.

b) The Creation of a Culture of Violence

These arms frequently play a significant role in creating and maintaining a 'culture of violence' in regions in which they are found in high abundance²². Once such a culture of violence is in place, demand can persist and even grow. As observed by Andrew Latham,

....a special premium comes to be placed on the possession of arms as a consequence of the militarization of society that often accompanies protracted social conflict. Whatever the roots and specific nature of the gun culture, once established it provides a powerful and independent impetus to proliferation²³.

¹⁹Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Instruments of War," *Arms Control Today* (August/September 1998): 15.

²⁰*Small Arms Survey 2002*, 163. Civilians accounted for only 5% of victims in World War I.

²¹*Small Arms Survey 2004*, 1.

²²Piotr Sztompka, "Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 3, no. 4 (2000): 449-466.

²³Andrew Latham, "Taking the Lead? Light Weapons and International Security," *International Journal LII* (spring 1997): 325. See also John Sislin, Frederic S. Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka and Jeffrey Eigand, "Patterns in Arms Acquisitions by Ethnic Groups in Conflict,"

The diffusion of small arms into all levels of society has meant that many communities are replacing traditional (and peaceful) practices of conflict resolution with the resort to violence. Individuals who had never before felt the compulsion to acquire weapons for self-defense have begun to arm, provoking group fear²⁴.

c) The Lengthening and Intensification of Conflict

Of the fifty-five major conflicts that have erupted since 1990, light weapons were the sole or main instruments employed in forty-eight and only two (the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO campaign against Kosovo) were dominated by heavy weapons. (In the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, small arms were or are being heavily used in combat²⁵). In many cases, the availability of SALW serves a role in the lengthening and intensification of conflicts²⁶. When light weapons are not collected or destroyed after war, the destructiveness of war frequently persists and peacekeeping and post-conflict building operations are impaired²⁷. Scarce UN

Security Dialogue 29, no.4 (1998) and Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "‘Why We Fight’: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone," *Africa* 68, no. 2 (1998): 183-210 for detailed examinations of the motivational forces behind the use and purchase of arms.

²⁴This aspect of the SALW problem is discussed in detail in Chapter Four, e) Interest Variable: Cooperation in the Balance, section "Individual and Group Motives that Make it More Difficult for States to Cooperate."

²⁵ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 7. A total of 229 armed conflicts in 148 countries occurred between 1945 and 2003, many of them involving primarily small arms. Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2003," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 5 (2004): 625-636.

²⁶ According to a multivariate model developed by Cassidy Craft and Joseph P. Smaldone, the arms trade is *undeniably* responsible for violence in parts of Africa. See Craft and Smaldone, "The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967-1997," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 6 (November 2002): 693-710.

²⁷ On this topic, see Ernie Regehr, "Small Arms: Testing the Peacebuilding Paradigm," in *Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player.*, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart and Martin Rudner (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 1999), 253-273; Ernie Regehr, "Militarizing Despair: The Politics of Small Arms," *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action* 2:4 (1997): 3-7; and Margaret (Peggy) Mason, "Practical Disarmament Measures to Consolidate Peace in Post-Conflict Environments." In *Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and*

resources are drained in the process. “Nowhere,” writes Michael Klare, were thwarted efforts to disarm factions and implement peace

more evident than in Somalia, where U.S. soldiers’ confrontations with an armed and angry populace ultimately ended in tragedy and failure. Worse, as a result of the Somalia experience, the United States and many other nations have begun to shy away from international peacekeeping responsibilities. Thus, the world’s ability to cope with ethnic warfare has become that much more diminished²⁸.

Small arms have continued to pose problems in subsequent peace and post-conflict operations, including in Afghanistan (ISAF), Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI), Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)²⁹.

d) Vast Accumulation and Growing Number

The picture that is emerging is one in which “[s]mall arms are so ubiquitous that many regions of the world find themselves awash in them.” In one government official’s words, obtaining light weapons today is “as easy as buying fish in the market”³⁰. The total number of firearms in global use is estimated at between 500 million to a billion; Over 100 million military-style assault rifles exist at large. The

Disarmament: Enhancing Existing Regimes and Exploring New Dimensions, ed. Peter Gizewski (Toronto: Center for International and Security Studies, York University, 1998), 147-171.

²⁸ Michael T. Klare, “Armed and Dangerous,” *In These Times* (June 1994): 19.

²⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*, A/55/502 (October 20, 2000) and Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, “Introduction: Thinking Anew About Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 1-15.

³⁰ Michael Renner, *Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament*, Worldwatch Paper 137 (October 1997), 20.

figure for Kalishnikovs or AK-47s produced since 1947, of which most are still in use, has reached approximately 70 million.³¹

The most significant producers of small arms and light weapons in the world today are the United States, the former Soviet Union, China, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Israel. A steady cottage industry is also growing in less developed countries. Over 1,200 light weapons-producing companies in ninety nations are thought to be in operation³². Once produced, light weapons and small arms simply do not go away – their longevity is remarkable. Vintage light weapons from World War II, and even some from World War I, co-exist with more advanced wares as tools in contemporary battles. Further contributing to the problem of accumulation of light weapons is the release of vast surpluses of Cold War stocks into the global environment.

Total world trade of SALW equals approximately \$5 billion US per year³³. This may not seem like a lot in comparison with total expenditures in heavy weapons. But “because light weapons cost so much less per item than heavy weapons, \$5 billion represents an enormous sum.”³⁴ For the price of a single modern jet fighter -- \$50 million – it is possible to equip two hundred thousand men with assault rifles. One billion dollars will buy four million AK-47s at \$350 each. And even a small quantity of light weapons can cause great harm. One hand grenade (at five dollars US) thrown into a bustling marketplace may result in as

³¹ Renner, *Small Arms, Big Impact*, 19.

³² *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 7.

³³ It is estimated that 13 per cent of total world arms exports, measured in dollars, consist of small arms and ammunition.

³⁴ Klare, “Armed and Dangerous,” 16.

many as two dozen deaths or injuries. The latest developments in technology have produced assault rifles now capable of firing three hundred rounds per minute.

The situation is not likely to change any time soon. While arms trade analysts reported a decline in major conventional weapons sales in the past years³⁵, the trend is not the same for small weapons.

...while recent changes in the international system may be responsible for a decline in the trade in major weapon systems, they appear to be stimulating an increase in the trade in small arms and other light weapons. Indeed, many of the same phenomena that are said...to explain the decline in major weapons trafficking, such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw pact, have given a boost to the trade in light weapons³⁶.

To those special circumstances that govern the flow of the subset of small arms in the conventional weapons trade and affect their trafficking and use, we might add an increasingly unmanageable underground economy, the privatization of security, a shift towards intrastate (as opposed to interstate) conflict as the dominant type of warfare, and the growth in the number of nonstate actors.

³⁵ The trend of declining conventional weapons trade is now beginning to stabilize. Paul Levine and Ron Smith, "Arms Export Controls and Proliferation" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 6 (December 2000): 1.

³⁶ Michael T. Klare, "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post Cold War Era," in Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds., *Lethal Commerce*, 33. See also Lucy Mathiak, "The Light Weapons Trade at the End of the Century," in *Society under Siege: Crime, Violence, and Illegal Weapons*, ed. Virginia Gamba (Cape Town, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1997), 73-102; R. T. Naylor, "The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market," in *Lethal Commerce*, eds. Boutwell et al., 44-57; Jo L. Husbands, "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies," in *Lethal Commerce*, eds. Boutwell et al., 127-138; Edward J. Laurance, "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint," in *Lethal Commerce*, eds. Boutwell et al., 140-157; and Susannah L. Dyer and Natalie J. Goldring, "Analyzing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers," in *Light Weapons*, ed. Singh, 127-139.

e) Ownership by Irresponsible Users

The low cost of rifles, mortars and other man-portable instruments has meant that they have become the weapons of choice of insurgents, ethnic separatists, local warlords, criminal gang members, and mercenaries with few resources in developing countries. Irregular forces, unlike members of regular armies, have a greater tendency to act contrary to the basic norms of international humanitarian law (although this is not exclusively true; many members of regular armies have acted contrary to the laws of war over time. A debate has opened in industrialized countries on the possible justification of torture –e.g. of detainees who are members of al-Qaeda and whether “desperate times require desperate measures”³⁷). A further commonly trespassed principle in customary law is the deliberate targeting of civilians.

While it would be hard to prove quantitatively that the “widespread availability of arms *causes* violations of international humanitarian law or a deterioration in the situation of civilians in armed conflicts,”³⁸ it could certainly be said that likelihood becomes stronger as a function of availability.

³⁷ Neil MacMaster, “Torture from Algiers to Abu Ghraib,” *Race and Class* 46, no. 2 (2004): 1-21.

³⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (June 1999), Geneva, ICRC, 8.

f) Child Soldiers

The minimal need for professional training to utilize such arms has meant a not uncommon recruitment of children and adolescents as soldiers. The estimate of the number of child soldiers exploited in this way is 300,000 in thirty countries³⁹.

g) Illicit Trade

The portability and concealibility of light weapons has translated into a significant rate of covert, illicit transfers of arms alongside state-sanctioned transfers. About half of the transfers of light weapons are believed to be illegal⁴⁰.

h) The Drugs-Arms Nexus

Narco-activity, which remains high in certain corners of the world, particularly in Latin America and South Asia, invariably goes hand in hand with light weapons⁴¹. Links include the fact that light weapons are often used as payment for narcotics by traffickers, for protection of marijuana plantations or drug caches, and to carry out kidnappings, carjackings, extortion and bank assaults. In many respects, guns have become “just another currency,” good for exchange for drugs and other commodities like diamonds. Their part in crime, whether organized (Mafia) or not, is certain. Armed crime is a salient concern in the United States

³⁹ See Mike Wessells, “Child Soldiers,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1999), 32-39 and Guy Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn, *Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts*, a study for the Henry Dumant Institute, Geneva. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

⁴⁰ *Small Arms Survey 2004*.

⁴¹ Phil Williams, “Drugs and Guns,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1999), 46-48.

where more people are killed in crime-related murders, on average, in a single week than in a single year for many Western European nations⁴².

i) Loss to Economic Viability and Impediment to Development

The majority of today's conflicts are played out in some of the poorest areas of the world. Among the factors surrounding loss to economic viability and SALW are: criminal disruption of normal economic activity, the physical destruction of infrastructure, diversion of funds away from spending on basic human needs in Third World countries, and the warding-off of long term investment (due to instability)⁴³. The delivery of humanitarian assistance in times of crisis becomes a treacherous undertaking when there is a heavy presence of arms in a society⁴⁴. Bringing humanitarian assistance to areas affected by the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia was impeded by armed conflict ongoing between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian military. Lastly, the challenge of re-integrating combatants into civilian economic life after a war is of issue⁴⁵.

⁴² United Nations, *International Study on Firearm Regulation* (New York: United Nations, 1998), 179-181.

⁴³ Joseph Di Chiaro, *Reasonable Measures: Addressing the Excessive Accumulation and Unlawful Use of Small Arms*, A background paper presented for the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in association with the Bonn International Center for Conversion (June 1998), 4.

⁴⁴ Peter Herby, "Arms Transfers, Humanitarian Assistance, and Humanitarian Law," in *Light Weapons and Civil Conflicts: Controlling the Tools of Violence*, ed. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999): 197-202.

⁴⁵ Mark Knight and Alpastan Özerdern, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no.4 (2004): 499-516.

j) Undermining of Institutions

Links have been made between the high-level availability of light weapons and the fact that traditional and modern institutions of security are undermined. It has furthermore been said that availability can be connected with the likelihood that authoritarian governments will be sustained and progress towards democratic governance impeded⁴⁶.

k) Refugee Flows

Over twenty million refugees have been created in the 1990's and in this century. When entire nations become theatres of war, the number of people driven from their homes is high. Wars waged in the name of "ethnic cleansing" pose the most acute problem for refugee flows because the main goal is not to "put enemy troops hors de combat," it is to vacate territory⁴⁷. Abundant supplies of small arms, which are the prevalent tools in these instances, make the task of removing people through "terror, forced displacement, killings, or a combination of all these"⁴⁸ that much easier. Also, "refugee militarization" can occur when armed refugees go

⁴⁶ See Christopher Louise, *The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation*, Discussion Paper 59, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (March 1995). Challenges to self-governance in post-election Iraq and in the Balkans (despite a heavy international presence) are due in large part to continued episodes of small arms violence. See Al Pessin, "US Officials Predict Violence Will Continue in Iraq after Election," Voice of America News, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-01-27-voa1.cfm> ; Internet News Article; Accessed February 10, 2005 and Radoslava Stefanova, "New Security Challenges in the Balkans," *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 2 (2003): 169-182.

⁴⁷ ICRC, *Arms Availability*, 3.

⁴⁸ ICRC, *Arms Availability*, 3.

across borders without giving up their weapons, sometimes causing new conflict or bringing the risk of small arms conflict to neighbouring countries.⁴⁹

The Regime-in-the-Making: What is Being Done

At present, there is no full-fledged regime that incorporates the participation of all relevant members to control small arms and light weapons. However, there is a multilateral regime-in-the-making. “[G]overnments have moved frenetically on this issue in the past five years – relative to its complete absence from the international agenda before that time...”⁵⁰

The main components of the regime-in-the-making are as follows. First, the centrepiece of the regime is the UN Programme of Action (see Appendix One). The Programme of Action was negotiated at the July 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the UN Small Arms Conference). In the Programme of Action, states made promises to follow new measures at the national, regional and international level. These measures are: to render illicit small arms and light weapons production and possession a criminal offence; to establish national coordination agencies on small

⁴⁹ Edward Mogire, *A Preliminary Exploration of the Linkages between Refugees and Small Arms*, Bonn International Centre for Conversion Paper 35 (Bonn: BICC, 2004). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Rudd Lubbers cited stepping up small arms disarmament as the key immediate need to restore order and bring Liberian refugees home to safety after visiting Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia in February 2005. “Lubbers Ends West African Trip in Cote d’Ivoire,” UNHCR News Stories (February 7, 2005), <http://www.unhcr.ch>; accessed February 9, 2005.

⁵⁰ Lora Lumpe, “A ‘New’ Approach to the Small Arms Trade,” *Arms Control Today* 31, no.1 (January-February 2001): 11.

arms; to identify and destroy surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons; to maintain a record of officially-held small arms and light weapons; to ensure that end-user certificates for exports/transit of small arms and light weapons are drawn up; to notify original supplier nations of re-export; to implement programs of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, including collection and destruction of their weapons; to support regional agreements on small arms control; to encourage moratoria on the small arms trade; to mark small arms at the point of manufacture for identification and tracing purposes; to maintain a record of small arms and light weapons manufacture; to engage in information exchange on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; to strengthen enforcement of arms embargoes; and to act inclusively towards non-governmental organizations in efforts to prevent small arms proliferation⁵¹.

Complementing the UN Programme of Action is the United Nations Firearms Protocol (2001), negotiated in Vienna in 2001. This protocol is a supplement to the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The 'Vienna Process,' as the process associated with the protocol is called, applies only to non-state weapons transfers (it is limited to regulating criminal transfers of small arms and light weapons by persons and commercial entities). Nevertheless, the protocol, too, is a milestone, for international small arms control.

Next, several regional institutional arrangements form part of the regime: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons (1998), the Nairobi

⁵¹ United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 20, 2001), A/CONF.192/15. See Appendix One.

Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2000), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001), the Organization of American States (OAS) Convention against Illicit Firearms Manufacture and Trafficking (1997), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission's (CICAD) Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (1997), the European Union Programme of Action for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (1997) and the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998).

Many actors are involved in the regime-in-the-making. The actor in charge of providing integrated support within the UN is the Coordinating Action on Small Arms or CASA. Upon his succession as Secretary-General, Kofi Anann, like his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wished to elevate the issue of small arms and light weapons to a higher level than before. One way of doing this was by creating an "in-house mechanism" - CASA (which became the responsibility of the Department of Disarmament Affairs [Conventional Arms branch]). CASA groups together relevant UN agencies, that is, the agencies and departments that are implicated in, or that have chosen to take on some aspect of the issue, such as: the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Public Information (DPI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs

(DESA), the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CPCJ), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). CASA is meant to be a focal point for the above entities so that objectives on small arms control pursued by each agency and department do not overlap, and are coherent with each other.

Other international actors are involved in the issue: Members of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Multilateral Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods (the Coordinating committee for Multilateral Export Controls or COCOM's successor) have developed plans to control small arms; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a small arms control program; the OSCE has produced a *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (2000); and Interpol has developed the International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System, a database on illegal firearms trafficking.

The first UN Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) was held in New York in July 2003 to examine the progress towards implementation of the UN Programme of Action. The second Biennial Meeting was held in July 2005. In 2004 and 2004, an "open-ended working group" to negotiate an international tracing instrument made progress on developing such an instrument. Plans are underway for a 2006 UN Small Arms Review Conference of the Programme of Action.

Small Arms and Cooperation

Strangely, theory-making on what is required for cooperation to occur to curb the largely unencumbered flow of light weapons has been scant. Three principal factors stand out as reasons why. The first factor is few systematic attempts have been made to apply International Relations (IR) theory to the concrete phenomenon of small arms availability and proliferation at all. With the exceptions of Keith Krause's work⁵², Edward Laurance's report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict⁵³ and Suzette Grillot's study on small arms⁵⁴, there is a dearth of theoretical exploration of the topic. The lacuna is unfortunate – there has been a need for theories that lend themselves to universalization in order to capture what is common (for instance) between gang wars in Los Angeles and communal rivalry in Karachi (the most obvious common denominator being the weapons themselves and ultimately, as far as solutions go, their control).

What does exist at present on small arms supply and cooperation is an uneven medley of government⁵⁵ and international organization publications⁵⁶, non-

⁵² Keith Krause, "Norm-Building in Security Spaces: The Emergence of the Light Weapons Problematic," <http://www2mcgill.ca/regis/krause.pdf> (accessed January 13, 2004); See also Keith Krause, "Review Essay: Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons," *Global Governance* 8, no. 2 (April/June 2001): 247-263 for a process-tracing approach to the issue.

⁵³ Edward J. Laurance, *Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action*, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (July 1998), http://www.iansa-org/oldsite/documents/research/res_archive/r9.htm.

⁵⁴ Suzette Grillot, "The Emergence and Effectiveness of Transnational Advocacy Networks," (paper presented at the International Studies Association-Southern Region meeting, Winston-Salem, NC, October 12-14, 2001).

⁵⁵ See for example, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *Light Weapons and Micro-Disarmament* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1997).

governmental organization (NGO) recommendations⁵⁷ and occasional declarations by academics that “something must be done.” Some are helpful beginnings. For example, Michael Renner’s conceptualization of small arms as “orphans” of arms control opens the way for discussion on why cooperation *did* take place for other categories of weapons but *did not* for small arms. His premise is very similar to that of this thesis regarding the same weapons as “forgotten” until now. Unfortunately, Renner’s idea remains underdeveloped. The conditions required for light weapons to be “adopted” or “remembered” as an issue-area of cooperation are left unexplored aside from a few references to the need for an increased spotlight on them.

Some academics, along with governments, NGOs and authors of international organization publications concentrate on recommendations as the bulk of their analysis: expanding the UN Conventional Arms Register to encompass SALW, developing regional and international codes of conducts on the arms trade, providing assistance to states for the destruction of surplus weapon stocks, tightening import and export regulations, and formulating stricter enforcement of laws on illicit trafficking. All are important and many incisive. However, a problem is that these scholars generally dwell on the *form* of cooperation envisioned while giving short shrift to how the international community is expected to get to the points suggested (the conditions). Another limitation is that there is often little to

⁵⁶ See for example Pericles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, eds., *Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Agenda (UNIDIR), 1998.

⁵⁷ See for example Oxfam & Amnesty International, *Shattered Lives: The Case For Tough International Arms Controls* (London: Amnesty International & Oxfam, 2003), and Owen Greene, *Tackling Light Weapons Proliferation: Issues and Priorities for the EU*, Saferworld Report, April 1997.

distinguish the content of academic work from that of international organizations (IOs) and the impassioned pleas of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from which we would *expect* recommendations in isolation, (that is, not necessarily placed in historical or theoretical context). It would seem that, to date, few academics have put their occupational uniqueness to good use --- what we would presume to be the offering of more neutral vantage points. Instead, so much cross-pollination has occurred that much of the academic literature simply blends in with that of NGOs and IOs. Care must be taken to distinguish political analyses by groups and individuals who bring to the analytical process their own biases in the course of arguing the strengths and weaknesses of particular proposals from the works that do not take part in this cross-pollination. Lamentably, the most respected catalogue of the literature to date – an annotated bibliography published by the Canadian government and considered a “must-have” for researchers world-wide does not take such care. The bibliography lumps together papers by NGOs like Saferworld and the British American Security Council (BASIC) and reports released by foreign ministries with scientific outputs from research institutes and universities. All are listed as “scholarly studies.” We will do our best to be mindful of the distinctions between different types of contributions to the field.

Secondly, the traditional body of conventional arms trade analysis has grown stagnant. The supply of conventional weapons --- particularly trade and production aspects – has, over the years, received fairly extensive treatment in classic works like *Merchants of Death*, *The Arms Bazaar*, *Supplying Repression*, *Engines of War*, *Spoils of War* and *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military*

Production and Trade. Without exception, these classic texts deal principally with major conventional weapons. Recent works stress long-term continuities, not newness in trends. “[T]he failure to react to the changing political environment is perplexing⁵⁸,” writes Aaron Karp. “A cold war Rip van Winkle waking from a long nap would find the field completely familiar, dominated by the same policy questions and the same actors.”⁵⁹ The situation would not be so bad for the small arms analyst if it were possible to extrapolate from conventional arms trade analysis what one needs to know about the trade and control of light weapons. This is not feasible, however. Caution must be exercised in overgeneralizing from this family of works. As more and more authors have begun to suggest, the diffusion of light weapons appears to follow a logic of its own⁶⁰.

A third reason for the general lack of resort to theories of international cooperation by those interested in small arms is that when small arms are treated in rigorous or scholarly manner, they are often situated within one particular debate. That debate concerns what issue-areas should be deemed “high politics” (as opposed to “low politics”) on the global agenda – a debate preoccupied with changing conceptions of international security. The “fall” of the study of “high politics” was forecast by a small minority of writers who included Richard Ullman and Jessica Mathews (who wrote in the 1980’s that the “1990s will demand a redefinition of what constitutes national security.”⁶¹) This demand was met by a flood of literature on the worthiness of devoting attention to concerns of “human

⁵⁸ Aaron Karp, “The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms,” *Washington Quarterly* 17, no.4 (autumn 1994): 66.

⁵⁹ Karp, “Arms Trade Revolution,” 66.

⁶⁰ Karp, “Arms Trade Revolution,” 65-77.

⁶¹ Jessica Mathews, “Redefining Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 68 (spring 1989).

security” over an “excessively narrow”⁶² understanding of security (centered on the East-West conflict between states, nuclear holocaust, etc.) Human security is defined as “the security of individuals as an object of international policy” and entails protection of people from the threat of disease, hunger, crime, social conflict, political repression, environmental dangers....⁶³ Understandably, those writers who had been interested all along in SALW but who had felt as though their pleas for greater attention (both political and academic) had fallen on deaf ears during the Cold War have been quick to attach the issue-area to the list as a threat. They have seized the opportunity as an entry-point (again both political and academic). Michael Klare’s many articles – among them, “The New Arms Race: Light Weapons and International Security” – are typical.

While the immersion into the debate of redefining security was probably a necessary stage through which International Relations scholars dealing with small arms had to pass in order to “claim” the issue – to frame it, to develop its parameters – it is theoretically sterile. Its only conceivable intellectual endpoint or contribution to knowledge, however valuable it may be in itself, is singular in scope. That contribution is to “prove” or reinforce the view that we should pay attention to SALW.

A fourth factor of why theories of cooperation have yet to be seriously applied to small arms is the mistaken impression by some authors that the topic is irrelevant at the international level as it fails to qualify as a transboundary issue.

⁶² Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security* 8, no. 1 (summer 1983): 15.

⁶³ P.H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” *Security Dialogue* 43, no. 4 (2002): 473-488.

It has been argued that small arms has not or should not receive scholarly international attention because the issue-area is purely within the domestic purview of states (as the case is made, for instance, by members of the National Rifle Association in defense of the right of citizens to bear arms and who devote significant funds to counter any movement towards international control)⁶⁴. In fact, too many “weak states’ with loss of control over their security functions exist to make that claim. Borders across which “excessive and destabilizing” quantities of weapons – to use an oft-repeated term originating in the 1997 *UN Governmental Experts Panel Report on Small Arms* – are too permeable for the opposite to be said. The complex trajectories of light weapons criss-crossing the globe are creating a need for states to cooperate with one another. Although little understood, the extent to which these routes are complex is such that:

[...g]uns left behind by the United States in Vietnam in the 1970s [have] showed up in the Middle East and Central America; U.S. Soviet armaments pumped into Central America in the 1980s are now part of a black market feeding violence in Colombia and Mexico; weapons from Lebanon’s civil war of the 1970s and 1980s were used in Bosnia; leftover weapons from conflicts in Mozambique and Angola are now being smuggled into South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia; and in a recent expose in the *New York Times*, Raymond Bonner traced arms flows from the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Mozambique to the Tamil Tigers, the guerillas waging a bloody struggle for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ See Natalie J. Goldring, “The NRA Goes Global,” *Bulletin of American Scientists* (January/February 1999): 61-65.

⁶⁵ Michael Renner, “An Epidemic of Guns,” *World Watch* (July-August 1998): 26.

Clearly, as the above section illustrates, it is time to move beyond the stage of establishing the issue and begin theorizing about solutions to the SALW problem at a systematic level.

The Theoretical Framework

How is one to go about doing that? In our case, the assignment can be undertaken by finally bringing theories of international cooperation within the field of International Organization (IO) to bear on the subject matter. The study of cooperation within the subfield of International Relations (IR) known as International Organization has a long lineage. The special thrust in this thesis is on regimes. A regime is defined as a “set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area.”⁶⁶ We feel that we must justify our choice in focusing on regime analysis. This is done in two ways: (1) by articulating the central place that regimes have come to occupy in IO and (2) by contrasting the merits of regime theory (for the needs of this thesis) with those of alternative theories.

i) The Central Place of Regimes and an Overview

On the first note, it is fair to say that the development of the domain of IO has been marked by a number of analytical shifts. That this is so has led certain

⁶⁶ Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (spring 1982): 185.

authors such as Martin Rochester to lament what they view as a lack of cumulative knowledge. Not surprisingly, those who express doubts concerning “the fruits of [past] scholarly labour”⁶⁷ are equally suspicious of the latest, most notable shift in IO: a move away from a strict focus on international institutions. In the past twenty-five years, analysts have begun to devote greater attention to looser forms of institutionalized behaviour – particularly regimes. Rochester, echoing Susan Strange⁶⁸, dismisses attention to regimes as a “fad” or temporary aberration.

However, most scholars would assert that the above point of view is an underestimation of the extent to which IO has in fact been characterized by progression. Not only has the study of regimes “emerged as a major [and sustained] focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations,”⁶⁹ the area of inquiry is increasingly recognized as a logical outgrowth of IO’s “intellectual odyssey.”⁷⁰ Authors such as Friedrich Kratchowil and John Gerard Ruggie suggest, in convincing manner, that regimes have a capacity of bridging the traditional analytical core of IO – formal institutions --- with newer explorations.

These newer explorations contend with two real-world facts: a range of regularized state behaviour exists that would simply be missed by an overview of organizations like the United Nations or the International Labour Organization alone. (However compatible they may be, regimes have been created in the absence of organizations). Additionally, the present period is one in which actions of states

⁶⁷ J. Martin Rochester, “The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” *International Organization* 40, no.4 (autumn 1986): 778.

⁶⁸ Susan Strange, “Cave! hic dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (spring 1982): 479-496.

⁶⁹ Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (summer 1987): 491.

⁷⁰ Friedrich Kratchowil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” *International Organization* 40, no.4 (autumn 1986): 759.

and private entities intrude upon and interact with each other in more complex and frequent manner than ever before⁷¹.

With this in mind, how are we to know a regime when we see one? A recognizable feature is the explicit nature of the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures – the components that make up the consensus definition stated above. Of importance is the fact that a regime cannot rest on the implicit convergence of actor expectations alone. If this were the case, almost any sign of cooperation among states would qualify as a regime. Regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour, and assist in cooperation, but stand apart from cooperation by demanding more than a consensus reached by states. A formal component to regimes is essential. In most cases, they are embodied in conventions or treaties like the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) or the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1996).

To fully understand “what is a regime,” it is helpful to look at the components of a regime more closely. According to Stephen Krasner,

Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of right and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁷²

For example, the missile proliferation control regime is based on the *principle* that missile proliferation impinges on global security; the fundamental *norm* is that of halting and reversing missile proliferation; the *rules* deny missile-

⁷¹ Victor D. Cha, “Globalization and the Study of International Security,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (May 2000): 391-403.

⁷² Krasner, “Structural Causes,” 186.

related technology to certain states, and the *decision-making procedures* of this regime are loosely conducted by intergovernmental consultation at Missile Technology Control Regime meetings held every year. As another example, the main *principle* at stake in the environmental regime governing greenhouse gases is that “green house gas emissions hurt the environment;” the *norm* or standard of behavior to be upheld by regime participants is to restrict emissions, the key *rules* consist of national quotas whereby industrialized countries are asked to reduce emissions to a certain percentage by 2008 and the *decision-making procedures* are presently unfolding under a framework established at Kyoto⁷³.

It is true that international regimes come in all “sizes and shapes.”⁷⁴ Some are more institutionalized and/or more strongly administered than others are. Some are more broad and some more narrow in scope. But global regimes are “almost invariably responses to specific problems.”⁷⁵ And when in doubt in identifying a regime, one can always return to the fact that a regime will necessarily combine the elements of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.

In order to make sense of the different theories that have arisen around the concept of regimes, it is useful to typify them. To begin, many of the theories have been designed to account for the creation, the extent of influence on other actors and the maintenance of regimes. We are interested in what the specialists have to say about regime creation, as a regime for SALW has not yet been formed. Next,

⁷³ Dinshaw J. Mistry, “International Cooperation in Arms Control: Building Security Regimes to Contain Missile Proliferation,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999), 42.

⁷⁴ Oran R. Young, *Governance in World Affairs* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 6.

⁷⁵ Young, *Governance*, 6.

Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger have divided the studies on regime creation into three groups or schools of thought (elaborating upon earlier distinctions made by Haas)⁷⁶.

The first school of thought counts realists among its members. Realism has long held a dominant position in the field of International Relations. The proponents' most prominent contribution to regime creation is the notion of "hegemonic stability" which specifies that a leading power is needed to "impose" a regime on other states, a notion inspired by the economic regimes established under the preponderant powers of Great Britain and the United States respectively⁷⁷. Building on economist Charles Kindleberger's ideas, IR writers such as Duncan Snidal, Barry Eichengreen and Robert Gilpin have adapted the insights to IR. The second school is cognitivist or liberal in accent. Forwarding that "ideas matter," writers like Ernst Haas, Peter Haas, and Christer Jonsson have highlighted the intersubjective nature of regimes. A centerpiece of cognitive/liberal theory is the role of "epistemic communities," or a group of experts that operate as a "knowledge collective" to spur movement towards the formation of regimes in a given issue-area. Most recently, a group of writers we might label "strong cognitivists" have advanced a rather radical research method under the banner of constructivism⁷⁸. We will not enter into detail on this group's method of placing the very identities we

⁷⁶ Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40 (1996): 177-228. See also Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁷⁷ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 74.

⁷⁸ For a general overview see Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (summer 1998): 171-200 and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50 (January 1998): 324-48.

take for granted in International Relations – such as the state as a fixed-interest actor – into question in this Introduction. Suffice it to say for now that the compatibility of a weaker form of constructivism (and its worthwhile appreciation of the place of norms in global society) with regime theory needs to be addressed, and will be addressed in chapter three. Lastly, neo-liberal⁷⁹ analysts have engaged in thinking on what is required for common interests to be forged in order for a regime to come about through analysis of actors' evaluations of what they stand to lose or gain. Robert Keohane, Arthur Stein, Norman Frohlic and Joe A. Oppenheimer (among others) are interested in dilemmas of collective action popularly expressed in the form of prisoner's dilemmas, the tragedy of the commons, or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's parable of the stag hunt⁸⁰.

While these classifications are important, there is considerable overlap at times. As well, in acknowledgement of the fact that “none of the schools alone can capture all the essential dimensions of regimes,”⁸¹ Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger have instigated a movement to join them together. Can the schools' assumptions be reconciled? We believe not only that they can but also that they must. In fact, this belief in the necessity of pluralism is where our main theoretical innovation or contribution will lie. It is common for regime scholars to “stick to their own school,” emphasizing realism, liberalism or neo-liberalism at the price of

⁷⁹ Some academics may object to the term “neo-liberal” being used to describe this direction of regime study and prefer “liberal institutionalist.” We believe that these terminology differences can be overcome by simply using the name of choice consistently.

⁸⁰ Stéphane Roussel and Michel Fortmann, in “‘Eppur, si muove...’ Le régime de sécurité européen, les Etats non belligérants et la guerre en ex-Yougoslavie,” *Etudes internationales* XXV, no. 4 (December 1994): 729-762 underscore the usefulness of using a regime theory rubric from an interest-based point of view to better understand the dynamics of European regional cooperation (and how dilemmas of collective action were solved in light of coping with the Yugoslav conflict and potential spillover of the conflict).

⁸¹ Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge,” 217.

ignoring or relegating the other theoretical approaches to the background. We will not do this. While such a pluralist direction is somewhat new, we are not the first to “take the path less travelled.” A three-pronged theoretical approach was put into application with success in Oran Young and Gail Osherenko’s *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes* involving controlled comparisons of international regimes that emerged and failed to emerge on Arctic issues. Other sympathizers exist. In support of synthesis, Arild Underdal comments,

[t]he fact that [the] propositions are *different* does not necessarily mean that they are *incompatible*. To some extent, the different ‘schools’ focus on different aspects of the regime-formation process; what one of these schools says about its aspects may be valid or enable without challenging what another school has to say about some other aspect⁸².

An even more optimistic and ambitious proponent of the possibility of collaboration, James F. Keeley forwards:

Regime theory gives us a chance to build upon the insights of realism while escaping the restrictions of its structuralist formulation. It gives us a chance to move beyond the old liberal-realist [and neo-liberal] debate, to draw on philosophical, sociological, and other sources of insight that could liberate us from this debate, and thus possibly to grapple more successfully with a world that fits neither a narrow realist nor a liberal perspective. It gives us a chance to bring real political philosophy – real inquiries into the character of political life, rather than the special pleadings and schemes of ideologues and apolitical utopians or their equally sterile rejection in the name of eternal verities of power – back into the study of international relations⁸³.

⁸² Arild Underdal, “The Study of International Regimes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no.1 (1995): 117, emphasis in original.

⁸³ James F. Keeley, “The Latest Wave: A Critical Review of Regime Literature” in *World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence*, eds. D.G. Haglund and M.K. Hawes (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace and Javanovich, 1990), 565.

ii) Contrasting Regime Theory with Alternatives for the Needs of this Thesis

As seen in the above section, (beyond the “school debate”), there is obvious potential for the concept of regimes to explain the absence or presence of cooperation for a wide spectrum of issue-areas. At the same time, it should be recognized that this concept is not the only explanatory tool in the security studies inventory. Other authors have looked at the joint behaviour of states with regard to military-related aspects of IR through the prisms of security institutions, global governance, pluralistic security communities, alliances, and Robert Jervis-inspired “security regimes.” None meet the match of regimes for their power to shed light on small arms control.

The first approach – institutions – is too narrow. As suggested before, and as Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst remind us, “By studying the larger processes and sets of arrangements [rather than institutions] that a regime encompasses, we gain a better conception of the multi-faceted nature of global problem solving.”⁸⁴ The second approach – global governance – is too broad and arguably inexact. Its proponents hold out little hope for “grand logics that postulate a measure of global coherence,”⁸⁵ a hope we refuse to relinquish. As much as we might agree with James Rosenau that the control mechanisms in transboundary relations (among which one finds regimes) are disaggregated, we also value attempts at parsimony

⁸⁴ Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, “Multilateral Institutions and International Security,” in *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century’s End*, eds. Michael Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 267.

⁸⁵ James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-first Century,” *Global Governance* 1:1 (winter 1995): 16.

amid real-world complexity. The third is limited in application. Pluralistic security communities, first conceived by Karl Deutsch⁸⁶, presuppose the existence of cooperation in a setting of like-minded states. Thus, isolating conditions for cooperation becomes beside the point. Alliances, a fourth alternative, are overly subject to changeability. Focusing on alliances would ignore the “constraining effects of enduring institutional factors”⁸⁷ that sometimes remain in place after alliances change, an argument developed by Robert Keohane in *After Hegemony*.⁸⁸

Finally, it would appear at first glance that Jervis’s conception of “security regimes” is particularly apropos for this thesis⁸⁹. That conclusion would be based on his incorporation of regimes as a starting point, and the fact that conditions for the growth of cooperation in the domain of security are explicitly outlined – the sort of conditions we seek out. The conditions include: a desire by the great powers to take part in a security regime, a belief by participants that others share the same priorities of mutual security and cooperation, a prevalent sense that war is costly, and an absence of belief by actors that security is best provided for by expansion⁹⁰. However, a principal deficiency lies at the heart of Jervis’s approach for the needs

⁸⁶ Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁸⁷ John S. Duffield, “International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels,” *International Organization* 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 833. Also see Arthur A. Stein’s chapter on “Alliances and Dilemmas of Entanglement” in *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 151-171.

⁸⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁸⁹ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 173-194. See also Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 58-79 and Harold Müller, “The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes,” in *Regime Theory*, ed. Rittberger, 361-390.

⁹⁰ Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 176-178.

of this work. That deficiency is that he thinks in grand terms, envisioning a global security regime (the prime example being the historically unique Concert of Europe). He does not tailor his conditions for the study of security sub-issues. The downside of adopting his approach is the risk of overlooking institutionalized patterns of behaviour that may not appear prominent in a sweeping overview of the domain of security (such as controls on light weapons and other categories of weapons). Joseph Nye understood that risk and chose to take another course when he suggested to his readers in 1987: “[r]ather than focusing on whether the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship can be categorized as a security regime, we should more fruitfully consider it as a patchwork quilt or a mosaic of subissues in the security area, some characterized by rules and institutions we would call a regime and others not.”⁹¹

General regime theory allows us to accept the wisdom of Nye’s words. By thinking in terms of sub-issues and sub-regimes, it becomes clear that there have been a number of instances of arms control since 1945, defined as “process[es] involving declared steps by a state to enhance security through cooperation with other states.”⁹² According to Frederic S. Pearson, the world presently relies on four main regimes to restrain the spread of threatening military capabilities. They are: (1) the ensemble of mass destructive weapons accords (for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons such as START, the NPT and CWC); (2) the Missile Technology Control regime (an agreement among a number of powers to consult and limit the

⁹¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (summer 1987): 376.

⁹² Gregory J. Rattray, “Introduction,” in *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century*, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 8.

export of ballistic missile technology, particularly nuclear-capable delivery systems); (3) the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (now modified from the Cold War to seek restrictions on sensitive military transfers to Less Developed Countries but formerly an agreement among Western countries to restrict high-tech technology flows to the East); and (4) an evolving set of conventional arms transfers controls⁹³. Deviating slightly from Pearson, we would consider each of the mass destructive accords as separate regimes, and would add the recent addition of a regime to ban anti-personnel landmines to the tally, bringing the number of security regimes up to seven, but the point remains the same. General regime theory, unlike Jarvis' vision, permits us to compare the norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedure in these security areas and to ask why regimes did not appear in other areas.

A vast legacy of regimes and sub-security issues has been left to us from which to learn by. Insights are to be found in books such as *The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons* by Thomas Bernauer and *Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime* by Nye and James Schear⁹⁴. For a realist perspective, Roger K. Smith's dissection of the non-proliferation regime in relation to the theory of hegemonic stability is useful, among other examples⁹⁵. With respect

⁹³ Frederic S. Pearson, *The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 85.

⁹⁴ Thomas Bernauer, *The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining International Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons* (Dartmouth Publishing Company: 1993) and Joseph Nye and James Schear, *Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime* (University Press of America: 1998).

⁹⁵ Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no.2 (spring 1987): 253-281.

to liberalism, it is practicable to consult Nye's classic work on "nuclear learning" in which he shows how the introduction of the nuclear winter thesis enhanced the fear of mutually assured destruction and had an impact on security agreements like the 1982 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks⁹⁶. Several studies on the calculations of advantages involved in arriving at an acceptable treaty on security matters have also been published from which to benefit, like Graham S. Pearson's analysis of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention⁹⁷, viewed through the lens of neo-liberalism, as well as works on negotiation such as Fen Osler Hampson's studies on human security negotiation⁹⁸. On the absence of a particular regime, one may refer to articles like that of Etel Solingen who explores how the three major theoretical thrusts in regime theory account for the non-appearance of nuclear controls in the Middle East⁹⁹. It is within this tradition – the tradition in which these authors are steeped – that we will immerse ourselves. However, we cannot predispose our outlook to the results of these works. To avoid selection bias, we consider broader historical and documentary evidence from the working paper series of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Congressional Research Service documents and contributions to major scholarly journals on arms control and theory writ large like *International Security*, *International Organization*, *Conflict and Cooperation*, *International Relations*, *Security Dialogue*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and others.

⁹⁶ Nye, "Nuclear Learning," 371-403.

⁹⁷ Graham S. Pearson, "The Protocol to Strengthen the BTWC: An Integrated Regime," *Politics and Life Sciences* (September 1998): 189-201.

⁹⁸ Fen Osler Hampson with Holly Reid, "Coalition Diversity and Normative Legitimacy in Human Security Negotiations," *International Negotiation* 8 (2003): 7-742.

⁹⁹ Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (1994): 305-337.

Research Design

a) The Hypothesis

The puzzle that this dissertation seeks to solve is: What are the principal factors that have influenced the preliminary creation of a regime in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons? Also, why did the availability and proliferation of small arms go largely unchecked for so long? Our proposed answer to the puzzle (hypothesis) is that three variables are primarily responsible for producing multilateral cooperation on the small arms and light weapons issue. Those variables are power, knowledge and interests. The beginnings of a formation of a small arms regime is treated in this thesis as the dependent variable, subject to the appearance of the independent variables of power, knowledge and interests.

b) How the Hypothesis Will be Tested (Verification)

A hypothesis is a “supposition which serves as a starting point for further investigation by which it may be proved or disproved.”¹⁰⁰ In the spirit of Popperian social inquiry, it is appropriate to first indicate how a contention might be disproved or falsified before illustrating how one would attempt to verify it. In the philosopher (Popper’s) eyes, one must avoid above all a hypothesis that could never be wrong, even in principle. Hypotheses for which refutation is impossible fall into the realm of the unscientific. “Science is demarcated from non-science, from the ordinary stock of human speculations, fashions, faiths, and ideologies, by its testability –

¹⁰⁰ Kenneth R. Hoover, *The Elements of Social Scientific Thinking*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 28.

more specifically, by its refutability”¹⁰¹.

Our hypothesis could conceivably be falsified in the course of the investigation if one or more of the three variables are shown to have negligible effect on SALW cooperation. The onus falls on us, then, to prove that *all* variables are relevant and that these factors are the *principal* ones influencing cooperation---not any other. If we succeed, the hypothesis is verified. The act of verifying is carried out by examining each variable said to contribute to small arms cooperation in detail and by looking for other potential variables that may have greater validity along the way. As a further check, we contrast two time periods with one another. We aim to show that those variables favourable to the creation of a regime were not present in the first period under study (before the end of the Cold War), an interval of time characterized by an unwillingness on the part of nation-states to invest in a regime. Only in the second period did the variables appear, coinciding with the dawn of cooperation on the small arms issue. Finally, we note progress made in arms control and global issues dealing with other categories of weapons, namely nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and anti-personnel landmines. Should it be verified, as we expect, that the variables of knowledge, power and interest were present for the other arms control but not (initially) for light weapons, the explanatory power of the variables in predicting the occasion of cooperative endeavours would appear powerful.

The hypothesis is relatively modest in scope as well as being non-prescriptive. We do not lay out plans for a mini-world order to eradicate violence,

¹⁰¹ Bernard Susser, “Social Science and the Philosophy of Science,” in *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 107.

to halt abuses of small arms, and to banish their illegal trade for all time. As Thomas Schelling once said in 1966 at the beginning of his book *Arms and Influence*,

I have not tried to re-organize NATO, to contain Communist China, to liberate Cuba, to immobilize the Vietcong, or to keep India from wanting nuclear weapons; I have not tried to support or to depreciate the manned bomber, nuclear-powered vessels, or ballistic-missile defenses; I have not tried to choose between death and surrender, or to reorganize the armed services¹⁰².

We aim simply to understand a process and an outcome.

c) Elaboration of the Variables in the Hypothesis

Here we elaborate on the variables in the hypothesis. The elaboration will be descriptive in kind – formal operationalization occurs later in the respective chapters of the dissertation.

1) The Power-Based Variable

The first variable (stressed by realists) is power. Cooperation in a regime strongly benefits from the existence of a major country with the desire to induce other states to act, to assume the responsibility of institution-creation. Inertia will govern the issue-area without the interest of a major power.

Taken to the extreme, this translates into the failure of any global cooperative endeavour not supported by the United States and the Soviet Union

¹⁰² Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), vi-vii.

during the Cold War, and by the United States in the present time. (This thesis will not challenge today's dominant status of the United States, despite some appeals that the country is slipping in rank, since no other country's policies --- diplomatic, commercial and military --- have a comparable capacity to create reverberations beyond its borders).

Actually, lesser powers can have influence upon regime creation too -- though *lesser* influence. In general, great power interest sets the general mould of feasibility for a regime.

2) *The Knowledge-Based Variable*

The second determinant of regime formation (underlined by liberal cognitivists) is knowledge, or "the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal."¹⁰³ New knowledge leads to the redefinition of state interests (states "learn"). States need to come to a shared understanding of the problem that requires a regime in order to act. Learning does not automatically translate into policy change, however. Once lessons are drawn, they may or may not be acted upon. The "how" and "when" of this process is presently at the source of much spirited discussion among cognitivists. One of the group's most promising leads concerns the role of epistemic communities or "knowledge collectives". On this front, cooperation is possible if there exists a group of experts and/or NGOs, sharing a

¹⁰³ Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 1980: 357-405.

common set of ideas about the problem, and employing effective means to spread information about it.

3) *The Interest-Based Variable*

The final determinant is self-interest as most often advanced by neo-liberals¹⁰⁴. While some studies advance that actors offset the costs of establishing a regime with the advantages expected from it,¹⁰⁵ we believe that a cool cost-benefit analysis is not always possible or useful for understanding the emergence of a regime. One must also consider that cooperation will occur depending on whether a solution to the problem could conceivably be as air-tight and compelling as possible to reassure states that changing their interests will be worthwhile. States wavering in their decision to forego national interest for common interest must be convinced, to alleviate their concerns, that the potential agreement will be deemed a good one by all (it takes a solution that is easy to grasp, and that is appealing, to defeat narrow state self-interest), that equitable distribution of the “payoffs” results, in which no member will benefit more than others¹⁰⁶ and that the agreement will prevent others from cheating. If the regime is perceived by countries to meet these criteria in a satisfactory manner, the future of that regime is brighter. Cooperation

¹⁰⁴ David A. Baldwin, ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

¹⁰⁵ Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen Krasner 141-171 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1982), 154.

¹⁰⁶ Duncan Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” *The American Political Science Review* 79 (autumn 1985), 923-42.

can be *negotiated* (issues worked out in a bargaining process), ultimately altering state calculations of advantage¹⁰⁷.

Since we argue that all three variables are essential to the outcome of a light weapons regime, such a claim naturally leads one to ask: is one variable more important than another or do they carry equal weight? As might be expected, echoing the previous discussion on the “school debate,” ringing endorsements on the special significance of the respective determinants of regime formation emanate from the groups of authors focusing on the various variables. It has been said that “a realist perspective stressing power and the concern for relative gains can account, to a large extent, for both the content and success”¹⁰⁸ of regimes. In turn, knowledge-based theories have been described as possessing “a dynamic other theoretical approaches lack.”¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, interest-based theories have been thought of as “extraordinarily influential”¹¹⁰ in the quest to understand cooperation. *In truth, the schools often borrow variables from each other.* Knowledge may affect the way interests are constituted; Power may influence what knowledge is brought to the fore and so on. The process is one of complex interplay with no easy answers concerning relative weights. Deferring the answer to one dependent on context and case, we only partially sidestep the need to broach the methodological task of assigning a value to each variable --- a formidable task that many regime theorists

¹⁰⁷ I. William Zartmann, “Managing Complexity,” *International Negotiation* 8 (2003): 179-186 and Peter Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain With the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization,” *International Negotiation* 8 (2003): 79-109 and Javier Arregui, Frans Stockman and Robert Thomson, “Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions,” *European Union Politics* 5, no. 1 (2004): 47-72.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, “Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives,” in *Regime Theory*, ed. Rittberger, 408.

¹⁰⁹ Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” 510.

¹¹⁰ Hasenclever et al., “Interests, Power, Knowledge,” 183.

admit they are daunted by. At a minimum, if it is not possible to solve, in resolute fashion, the mystery of the precise influence of the individual variables, it is at least possible to join the other theorists on the road to discovery. We engage in the same “intriguing detective work [as they do] as they endeavour to understand the synergy generated by the interaction of two or more driving forces”¹¹¹ in regime formation.

d) Historical Timeframe

The presence of the respective driving forces is sought in two periods: before the end of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War (1990 to 2005). The second period includes the post September 11 period. (September 11, 2001 is the day on which terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the US Department of Defence Headquarters [Pentagon], plus the downing of an airplane near Shanksville, Pennsylvania took place). The timeframe begins with 1945. As Trevor Taylor explains, “[d]espite the periodic appearances through history of unilateral and multilateral restrictions on weapons and their transfer, arms control was not recognized as a specific process in international relations”¹¹² until that time. It could even be argued that it was not until “well into the Cold War period”¹¹³ that arms control became a focus of concern.

¹¹¹ Young and Osherenko, *Polar Politics*, 250.

¹¹² Taylor, “Arms Control Process” in *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century*, eds. Larsen and Rattray, 35.

¹¹³ Taylor, “Arms Control Process,” 35.

e) Sources and Method of Data Collection

Information for this study comes from a number of sources, both primary and secondary. Recourse is made to published and unpublished government documents, newspaper articles, and the already-existent literature on security and regimes. Weighty recourse is given to the *Small Arms Survey*, the “principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms”¹¹⁴ and to United Nations voting records and documents. In addition, I borrow insights derived from interviews (conducted between June 1999 and November 2004) of over fifty people involved in, or close to the process of regime formation in the issue-area of small arms. These individuals include state officials at the United Nations Headquarters, in Washington D.C. and in Ottawa, members of nonstate groups such as Human Rights Watch, Saferworld, the Federation of American Scientists, and sports shooting groups, academic leaders in the field (i.e. members of the small arms knowledge collective) like Edward Laurance at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and Keith Krause, at the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as defense staff, and representatives from private weapon companies between June 1999 and November 2004.

Facts on arms transfers are located in a number of data bases: the Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing World Report, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the World Military Expenditures and

¹¹⁴ *The Small Arms Survey*, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>.

Arms Transfer Report. Not all sources contain information about small arms. This is not a serious impediment to the goals of the thesis since our information needs lie more essentially in the diplomatic (political) realm and thus the need is for diplomatic and political evidence (concerning the conduct of states as well as transnational actors).

Conclusion: Contribution to the Advancement of Knowledge

We stated at the beginning that a good research project, one that contributes to the advancement of knowledge, emerges out of genuine puzzlement. Two other criteria were developed by Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. One is real-world importance¹¹⁵. On this count, we believe that the criterion is met. It is becoming increasingly apparent that one can no longer ignore the consequences of the unregulated flow of light weapons.

Throughout the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, small arms and light weapons (SALW) flowed largely unfettered across borders. They passed with ease through the hands of guerillas, bandits, gang members, criminals, mercenaries, terrorists, and ordinary citizens. They undid peaceful societies, killing civilians in the millions along the way. For those caught up in the crossfire, life was very much as it was for the hapless inhabiting Thomas Hobbes'

¹¹⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 15.

fictional state of nature --- “nasty, brutish, and short.” Like Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, this work is “occasioned by the disorders of the present time.”¹¹⁶

Hopefully, our contribution will have deeper impact than the latest wave of literature on small arms that aimed simply to move “low politics” into “high gear,” that is, to announce the arrival of the topic on the security agenda. We seek to begin theorizing – we ask, “What next?” – rather than merely engaging in the rationalization of our subject matter for which there is no longer need.

The second criterion stipulates “a research project should make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world.”¹¹⁷ This dissertation endeavors to do that through an effort to further research in regimes that combines the three schools of thought (realism, cognitivism and neo-liberalism). It is becoming clear that a synthesis of the variables (power, knowledge, and interests) that each school emphasizes is desirable. Taken together, a more coherent whole is produced than when considered alone. Admittedly, understanding of the relationship between the variables and their respective influences is as of yet immature. However, this thesis will attempt to shed some light on the matter especially by developing an approach whereby power is thought to set a general mould for regime creation, knowledge permits new ideas to come forward that can enhance the prospects for regime creation, and interests transform possibilities in final bargaining stages. Ultimately, this thesis will attempt to advance knowledge

¹¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, new and rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 728. Hobbes’ “present time” was the mid-seventeenth century.

¹¹⁷ King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 15.

on the conditions governing formal international cooperation: why solutions are sought for certain problems and why other equally pressing problems are forgotten.

Study Overview

This thesis is organized into five chapters. In the chapters that follow, each independent variable is taken up and studied at close range. Chapter Two covers the variable of power, Chapter Three, the variable of knowledge, and Chapter Four, the variable of interests. In the conclusion, we summarize the prospects for the creation of an international regime and comment on the interplay of the variables.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POWER VARIABLE: CALLING THE SHOTS

The international arena can be a brutal and treacherous place. Power clashes are common in a world that has no formal overarching government, no “Eternal Parent”¹¹⁸ to keep order, as governments are designed to do (but often do not) in domestic arenas. “Ten or twelve years ago, many people thought that the end of the Cold War had liberated the world not only from a terrifying arms race, but also from *political shackles* that had prevented the world from truly confronting tyranny, armed violence and poverty,” reflects United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette. She concludes that it must be realized that expressions/clashes of power (like Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the leveling of Grozny by Russian troops, political conflict in Venezuela intensified by US involvement, China’s threatening stance towards Taiwan) still do take place.¹¹⁹

At the same time, the variable of power, it would seem, does not explain everything.

The frequent failure of power predictions has been noted so often by scholars, journalists, statesmen, and the “man in the street” that it deserves a label – something like “the paradox of unrealized power.” How is it that “weak powers” influence the “strong”? How is it that the “greatest power in the world” could suffer defeat at the hands of a “band of night-riders in

¹¹⁸ Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. 6 vol., (London: J.B. Bury 1776-1788).

¹¹⁹ Louise Fréchette, “Deputy Secretary-General, In Address to Montreal Model United Nations, Says ‘Nations Working Together Can Make a Difference,’” Montreal, *United Nations Press Release DSG/SM 186* (January 24, 2003). Emphasis added.

black pajamas” [the Vietcong]? How do we explain the “cruel and ridiculous paradox” of the “big influence of small allies”? ... How can tiny Israel exercise so much influence on US foreign policy?¹²⁰

How is that the US army is unable to defeat Iraqi insurgents as it attempts to restore order in a nation-building mission in that country in 2005? These exceptions (among others) to the rule of *realpolitik* in international relations may help explain why Realism, the school of thought in IR which features power as its centerpiece variable, has received such a beating over time, particularly in recent years. One has only to witness the proliferation of articles with titles such as “What’s the Matter with Realism?” “Is Realism Dead?” and “No One Loves a Political Realist”¹²¹ to confirm this.

So where does that leave the study of power? Banished to the sidelines? No. That power does not explain *everything*, or that it is difficult to measure, certainly does not mean that we should ignore the variable altogether. Doing so would, in fact, be unwise for theorists for it remains that “Realism ...knows one big thing, that systemic forces and relative material power shape state behaviour. People who ignore this basic insight will often waste their time looking at variables that are actually epiphenomenal.”¹²² What the “paradox of unrealized power” *does* mean for scholars working within the tradition of Realism is that they should proceed with caution. Investigating the influence of the distribution of power in the international

¹²⁰ David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 131-132.

¹²¹ Justin Rosenberg, “What’s the Matter With Realism?” *Review of International Studies* 16 (1990): 285-303, Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” *International Organization* 49, no. 4 (autumn 1995): 751-774 and Robert Gilpin, “No One Loves a Political Realist” in *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 3-26.

¹²² Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics* 51 (October 1998): 165.

system on an outcome should be thought of as a crucial beginning step in the analytical process. One “should try realism first”¹²³ --- and then leave room for the consideration of other factors to fill in some of the blanks later.

So it is that this chapter, emphasizing power, is a “first-cut” look at the puzzle we have before us. That puzzle, as outlined in chapter one, is figuring out why countries are now considering cooperation towards curbing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons whereas they never had before. Here we investigate whether power has been a key factor in contributing to change and to present-day international efforts to arrive at a comprehensive regime to place restrictions on small arms. Detailed analysis of other potential factors (factors other than power) is tackled in later chapters.

The Hegemonic Stability Thesis

The most common argument on regime creation forwarded by realists is that the presence of a hegemon is a necessary precondition for a regime to emerge. This is the hegemonic stability thesis. Put simply, the hegemonic stability thesis argues that collective behaviour (in the form of a regime) is ordered by the strongest state and is reflective of the hegemon’s concerns. A negative view of the theory sees the leadership as coercive. A hegemon creates and enforces rules with positive and negative sanctions. It may also extract payments from smaller states to maintain the regime. The benevolent (and much more prevalent)¹²⁴ view understands the

¹²³ Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 373.

¹²⁴ What makes the theory unique and noteworthy is that a positive outcome is presumed for all in the international system. The fact that smaller states “bear none of the costs of provision and yet share fully in the benefits,” clarifies Duncan Snidal, is what “gives the theory its distinctive bite.

hegemon as a charitable despot that willingly supplies the regime to a “privileged” group of states regardless of their contributions. Either way, stability is achieved through the provision of the regime. And although the dominant leader profits from the arrangement, smaller states gain from it too. They need not bear the costs of provision. If they contribute minimally, the costs of their contributions do not outweigh the larger benefits of the regime.

When the theory of hegemonic stability was first formulated by Charles Kindleberger, it seemed to offer a cogent interpretation of the creation of free trade regimes in the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries during the *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, respectively. The singular impact of Great Britain and the United States on the development and enforcement of a set of monetary rules, institutions and procedures was helped by the fact that they were both, in their time, the undisputed economic heavyweights. Not only were they strong, they were willing to assume the leadership role, possessing as they did a vested interest in the proliferation of

After all, there is little new in the claim that a dominant state will enforce a stable global order for its own benefit; it is much more novel to claim that domination will benefit all and especially the weaker members of the international system.” (Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability,” *International Organization* 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985): 582.) Hegemons are thought to be charitable and self-sacrificial in the stance they take on --- adopting a sort of *noblesse oblige* on a worldwide scale. Kindleberger, creator of the theory, reflects on the nature of the hegemon’s role by recalling what his Presbyterian mother-in-law used to say, “You have it to do” and adding, “A leader, one who is responsible or responds to need, who is answerable or answers the demands of others, is forced to “do it’ by ethical training and by the circumstances of position.” “It” to the hegemon is keeping world order at a price. (Charles P. Kindleberger, “Hierarchy versus Inertial Cooperation,” *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 845-846.

An economist by trade, the author would often express surprise to see his name “cropping up” in the “foreign’ field” of political science,” but also disgruntlement over the fact that some International Relations authors had “transmuted the concept of leadership” into a concept coloured with overtones of “force, threat [and] pressure.” *His* version of leadership involved none of that. Rather, factors such as “conscience, duty, [and] obligation” were the guiding forces in the motivations and actions of the hegemon (Kindleberger, “Hierarchy,” 840-841.)

classical liberalism, a system that relies first and foremost on a free market with the minimum of barriers to the flow of private trade and capital¹²⁵.

However, there have always been concerns about the thesis' validity. Some scholars doubt its applicability to realms other than the economic. Others reject the appropriateness of comparing Britain's situation in the nineteenth century with that of the United States after the Second World War. Still others find fault with "a conception of global world history as a succession of empires."¹²⁶

Duncan Snidal writes in his article, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,"

If the theory could be taken at face value, it would be among the most powerful and general in all of international relations. Yet its widespread use seems more closely associated with an equally widespread sloppiness in "applying" the theory than with any general or fundamental validity...the range of the theory is limited to very special conditions. While some international issue-areas may possibly meet these conditions, they do so far less frequently than the wide application of the theory might suggest¹²⁷.

In relation to the purported, commonplace "sloppiness in 'applying' the theory", we do find that the theory has, at times, been used in an "elastic" manner. The main way that the theory has been stretched is this: chaos or the failure of regimes to be created has been explained by both the rise *and* fall of powers. Such an error in logic (or overextension of the theory) is associated with the theory being form-fitted by scholars to correspond with historical trends.

¹²⁵ Gilpin, *Political Economy*. 72-77.

¹²⁶ Timothy McKeown, "The Foreign Policy of a Declining Power," *International Organization* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991).

¹²⁷ Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability," 579.

Like many theories, the theory of hegemonic stability experienced an apex period – a period during which scholars seem particularly enchanted by the idea and produced streams of articles feeding off each other until the idea cooled and settled, particularly in the United States. That apex occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. This time coincided with a period of heightened anxiety among practitioners and intellectuals alike over America's presumed decline on the world stage. Beginning in the late 1960's

...a number of Americans began to suspect that the United States might be losing its grip as the major power in the international system. Domestic conflict, the intractable problem of the Vietnam War, and crises in financial and commodity markets created in turn a domestic crisis of confidence in American power. This situation provided fertile ground for what might be called the "declining hegemony thesis," the idea that U.S. power had peaked at some time during the years spanning the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations, and that a prudent U.S. foreign policy should be directed toward maintaining waning U.S. power to cushion our inevitable fall from dominance¹²⁸.

There was never any question at the time of the theory's popularity that the problem to be addressed was a potential *lack* of leadership and its repercussions. Explains Kindleberger, who had the Depression foremost in mind when he introduced the theory (such that the world crisis was caused by the fact that Britain was willing yet weak to undertake the necessary leadership to reverse instability; the United States, able but unwilling), "The danger we face is not too much power,

¹²⁸Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability," 579.

but too little, not an excess of domination, but a superfluity of would-be riders, unwilling to mind the store, and waiting for a storekeeper to appear”¹²⁹.

Those of fatalist mind read America’s fall as inevitable --- a given --- and answers were sought as to how the problem of international stability could be circumvented in the absence of strong leadership. Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony* fit into this line of thinking. Because he saw hegemonic leadership as unlikely to be revived in the past century or in this one, he was driven to ask whether present-day regimes would remain, or dissolve. With the loss of leadership, was cooperation among nations doomed? Pessimism coloured his thoughts:

In the study of politics, perhaps nothing seems so dismal as writing about international cooperation. Indeed, when I told a friend and former teacher of mine that I was writing a book on this subject, she replied that it would have to be a short book. Was I planning extra-large type and wide margins to justify hard covers?¹³⁰

But we never found out what would happen when the USA collapsed as a major power (because it has not yet). Instead, the country rose like a phoenix in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The US is now the world’s only remaining superpower – or a *hyperpower* to use a term favoured by French scholars¹³¹. And yet, not without some irony, the same argument of hegemonic stability is being used

¹²⁹ Charles P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” *International Studies Quarterly* 25: 253, quoted in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, 89.

¹³⁰ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 5.

¹³¹ For example, “We cannot accept a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, not the unilateralism of a *single hyper-power*,” Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine for President Jacques Chirac, quoted in Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, “Thucydides and Hegemony in Athens and the United States,” *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001): 607.

in the “before” and “after” of this radical change in current events. The disorder presaged by America’s decline is now being explained by America’s rise¹³².

¹³² That there are problems with hegemonic stability poses the question: So why, “like a fantasy, [has the theory] linger[ed] in the mind long after it has [apparently] proved fallacious?” First, that the theory of hegemonic stability has long appealed to Americans may come as no surprise.

While it is fairly understandable that the theory, of American origin (and the notion of casting one’s own country in the role of the “good guy”), would resonate in the United States, Isabelle Grunberg has shown that the thesis has reached a broad enough audience and has fairly widespread appeal, (Grunberg, “Exploring the ‘Myth’ of Hegemonic Stability,” *International Organization* 44, no. 4 [autumn 1990]: 431-477). How is that to be explained? Apart from its objective merits (of which she is unsure), Grunberg makes the powerful case that myths helped shape the emotional attachment exhibited towards the hegemonic stability thesis. Reducing the theory to a “narrative core” which the author reads as “1) the dominant actant declines or disappears 2) As a result, all others undergo (or the world undergoes) a period of crisis and instability”, she found a number of possible foundations for why those who find this theory credible believe in it. These foundations are patterns located in the subterranean depths of the human mind, their status intuitive rather than scientific. Unless drawn out, they will lurk, influencing perceptions of reality in unknown ways.

“The hegemon is first and foremost a father,” states Grunberg. Indeed, Kindleberger explicitly draws upon the metaphor of fatherhood in laying out his theory: “I think it is possible to lead without arm-twisting, to act responsibly without pushing and shoving other countries. *The father of a family*, for example, acts this way. As everyone knows, father figures (or mothers) cannot preside over their crew forever. They inevitably grow old and can no longer take care of the family. The hegemon, like a parent is described as “aching to escape from the burdens of leadership.” The hegemon suffers “economic aging, the loss of economic vitality,” (Grunberg, 431-477).

Sadness over decline – melancholy – whether relating to generational succession or the rise and fall of empires is familiar terrain in all cultures, often accompanied with regret over loss of innocence and childhood. Grunberg claims that the Western unconscious mind has never fully recovered from the fall of the Roman Empire. (“Perhaps, Rome is not perishing; perhaps she is only scourged, not utterly destroyed; perhaps she is chastened, not brought to nought. It may be so; Rome will not perish . . .” (Augustine in *The Political Writings of Saint Augustine*, ed. Henry Paolucci [Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 1990], 46. Images of “setting suns” are frequent in the discourse of hegemonic stability scholarship (as in *The Sun Never Sets on The British Empire*) Quebec director Denis Arcand tapped into such a feeling of depression (matching material decay with inner moral decay) in his 1986 film *Le declin de l’empire americain*. In this film, he “[s]urprised his public by dealing with subjects apparently as remote as can be from the topic of declining America: subjects such as the sexual mores in academia. The unspoken link between the title of the film and its content was precisely, beyond the lighthearted bawdiness, this mood of despair and the themes of decline and decadence,” (Grunberg, 460).

A change in leadership can also be disruptive, jarring, calamitous. There is often acrimony. Before the fall, the father/hegemon may grow bitter of his “ungrateful offspring” – or “ungrateful allies” and “free-riders” in international relations terms, particularly if the leader triggers his own decline by giving too much, and the offspring, bitter, in turn. Power may be usurped before the end of a reign by a rival hegemon/son. This archetypal event is etched in mythology over and over again, in tales of sons killing their fathers: Zeus, Paris, Heracles, Gilgamesh and Moses. As a contemporary example taken from poetry, one might add Sylvia Plath’s well-known “Daddy” in which she moves her anger from private experience to larger historical culture that contains and informs her original, personal subjectivity. (Sylvia Plath, “Daddy,” *The Collected Poems of Sylvia Plath*, ed. Ted Hughes [New York: Harper, 1981] 222-224). The result is chaos. We find ourselves in Pandemonium – Milton’s capital of hell. Gone is the “golden epoch” of stability.

Finally, the hegemonic stability thesis may not actually be a realist thesis at all.

This proposition may come as a shock. The hegemonic stability thesis has long been thought of as the realist answer to regime theory – the power-variable explanation of order and cooperation.

We argue that such an assumption is wrong.¹³³ Firstly, the hegemonic stability thesis, with its emphasis on benevolence is, at its core, a thesis about *public diplomacy, legitimization and ideas*: idealism, America's duty, and *principled leadership*. Realist theory – as Realists should own up – is not primarily a theory about ideas. The body of Realist scholarship is fundamentally about power in a traditional sense. When we talk about ideas, we are entering into territory treated by theorists in alternate schools in much more adequate manner. Propositions concerning influences other than traditional power (e.g. soft power) involve a strikingly different type of explanation. They are not incompatible, but it is not

Beyond these fairly obvious parallels, there is also the tendency of a cross-cultural religious nature to fix upon/search for a saviour (“*Si Dieu n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer*”). In Christianity, the slain saviour is associated with martyrdom (the hegemon who gave too much). “Of course,” Grunberg assures us, it would be “misleading to make simplistic equations, such as the hegemon in equal to either God or the father or the mother. The point is that there is a cluster of patterns, a complex network or images and associations all intersecting and obeying the law of the unconscious, the law of noncontradiction. Thus, the same actant may be a father and mother simultaneously or may even be God and the Son of God at the same time, as in the figure of Christ. In other words, the actant is symbolically overdetermined.” And how can we deny Bachelard’s words, surely shedding some light on the staying power of the hegemonic theory and the proponents’ capacity to convince others of their word, “One persuades well ...by suggesting basic reveries”? (Grunberg, 465).

¹³³ For another point of view on why the hegemonic stability thesis is non-realist, see Steven Holloway, “U.S. Unilateralism at the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists,” *Global Governance* 6, no. 2 (July-September 2000): 361-382.

necessary to equate the two. There is place for both explanations. A misdeed lies in confusing explanations, or passing off one for another.

Of course, leadership requires at least some sort of legitimacy to persuade others. “[B]uilding structures of authority and identifying leaders is not a magic solution to a group’s cooperation problems,” comments a professor studying the social psychology of groups. “Those leaders must be able to use their authority to effectively shape the behaviour of the members of their group. If leaders cannot motivate group members to cooperate, then they will be unable to fulfill their role as a leader.”¹³⁴

That legitimacy is required or is missing for effective leadership has been ardently reiterated in articles on power in the post-September 11th, 2001 world. Stefano Guzzini laments “foreign policy without diplomacy.”¹³⁵ Actually, what is transpiring is “bad politics” for leadership strength on the part of major powers, but it does not change the theory of power politics. Since the mid -1990’s, the United States seems to have lost touch with its ability to practice strategic restraint.¹³⁶ The Russian Federation has had a similar problem with a lack of strategic restraint, making for “bad leadership politics” - “If Moscow does not start realizing that coercive tactics in its near abroad ([e.g. interference in, and efforts to destabilize Georgia’s ethnic populations, like closing its trade borders with Abkhazia, openly backing the “pro-Russia” candidate in the Ukrainian election over the opposition

¹³⁴ Tom R. Tyler, “Leadership and Cooperation in Groups,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 45, no. 5 (January 2002): 769-782.

¹³⁵ Stefano Guzzini, “Foreign Policy Without Diplomacy: The Bush Administration at a Crossroads,” *International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2002): 291-297.

¹³⁶ J. Feffer, ed. *Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003).

leader in November 2004) are causing a loss of support from these states, it will continue to see its interests in the region weaken,”¹³⁷ warns one author. The word “hubris” comes to mind when observing aggressive policies of the major powers that seem to be based on a strong sense of self-entitlement. In Greek tragedy, hubris is an excess of ambition or pride, ultimately causing the transgressor’s ruin; it is the delusion of actors whose power leads them to complacency and to overvalue their ability to control other people (states), and the course of events¹³⁸.

However, these hubristic policies could change (possibly for the more restrained). And right now, although the strength of the major powers may have been weakened (e.g. Bush’s inability to pull together a large coalition for his invasion of Iraq in 2003), no other country receives what it wants more than the great powers. Furthermore, no matter how much “legitimacy” one tries to layer on to major powers, “subordinates are never really reconciled to their status and are readily angered by treatment that reminds them of it,” states Richard Ned Lebow, speaking from Thucydides¹³⁹.

Analyzing Power: Back to Basics

So how should we go about analyzing power, if the hegemonic stability thesis is not all that useful in a power analysis? With what devices are we left? We must return to the roots of realism.

Jean Bethke Elshtain writes:

¹³⁷ Molly Crso, “Moscow’s Political Tactics Alienating Its Near Abroad,” *Power and Interest News Report*, February 5, 2005, <http://www.pinrcom>.

¹³⁸ *Collins English Dictionary*, s.v “hubris.”

¹³⁹ Lebow and Kelly, “Thucydides and Hegemony,” 593-609.

A student of international relations, or IR, I absorbed the dominant tradition ... It was called realism, and it had roots. These roots were, according to my class notes: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau; the Federalist Papers numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 16; Friedrich Meineke's *Machiavellianism* (1924); Reinhold Neibhur's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932); Hans J. Morgenthau's *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (1946) ... culminating in the emergence of a demarcated subdiscipline of political science, a discourse of, by, and for professionals: IR¹⁴⁰.

Realism is a general explanation of state behavior. In realism, the state is *the* interacting unit in a system of states. States are not and have never been the only actors in the international arena. Should the impact of nonstate actors on transnational activities one day surpass the impact of states, then the system will be redrawn. However, so long as major states are the major players, the system will necessarily be defined in terms of them. "When the crunch comes," writes Kenneth Waltz, "states...make the rules by which other actors operate."¹⁴¹ Furthermore, realism for the most part ignores perturbing factors, like domestic politics, that might cloud its view – it is the study of "high politics." It does not matter that one state is totalitarian, democratic, experiencing civil strife, peaceful, poorly populated, rich in culture, cold in climate, or has a prime minister instead of a president. According to realism, these national matters complicate the process of predicting the behaviour of states with other states, and are more often irrelevant than they are relevant. By treating states as similar so long as they are sovereign, realism focuses on the single category that matters most. It is *this* category – the distribution of power – that sets states apart in a meaningful way. Countries are consumed with the

¹⁴⁰ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (Basic Books, 1987), 29, quoted in Daniel Mahoney, "Notes on Political Philosophy and Contemporary International Relations," *Teaching Political Science* 15, no. 1 (Fall 1987).

¹⁴¹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 94.

gains and losses of power and naturally seek to maximize their own. Their preoccupation with who has what stems from a sense of insecurity in a hostile environment. Small states know that they are at the peril of large states; large states know that their strength will eventually decline or be challenged; both small and large states recognize that they have only themselves to rely upon in order to survive¹⁴². Drawing on these general principles, one can reasonably rely on states to behave in expected ways in certain situations.

How does the above translate into a testable hypothesis with regard to regime formation? The assignment is quite simple (let us not forget that this chapter is a “first-cut look”, and that realism is known for its parsimony): We argue that a regime is more likely to appear if it is in alignment with great power interest.

The *specific* hypothesis which we seek to verify is that a shift in great power interest in small arms control policy contributed towards a new level of governmental activity – the beginnings of a regime – in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons. A great power (or superpower) is defined as a country with a preponderance of power in the international system¹⁴³ or “dominant hierarchical position within their group.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” *International Organization* 38:2 (spring 1984); Alan James, “The Realism of Realism: The State and the Study of International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989): 215-229.

¹⁴³ According to William J. Lahneman, C. Krauthammer believes that the international system, while unipolar, will “give way to multipolarity;” G.H. Snyder finds the system *looks* unipolar but actually is multipolar; Samuel Huntington understands the international system as “uni-multipolar,” meaning the settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states, the single superpower, however can veto action on key issues by combinations of other states.’ Finally, W. C. Wohlforth maintains that “the system is now unambiguously unipolar, with the United States as leader and that this configuration is both prone to peace and durable.” William J. Lahneman, “Changing Power Cycles and Foreign Policy Role-Power Realignments: Asia, Europe, and North America,” *International Political Science Review* 24, no. 1 (2003): 97-111, 97-98.

¹⁴⁴ Tyler, “Leadership,” 770.

Combining indicators of power, economics, and prestige,¹⁴⁵ the great powers of the Cold War are almost universally considered to have been the Soviet Union and the United States, with some consideration given to China and Europe as contenders. The great powers today are the United States with Russia, China and the EU in contention.

Our hypothesis may not seem like a particular dramatic or original one. But in a certain sense it is, since not that many realists today focus on the “limits [and opportunities] imposed on states by the international distribution of material resources”¹⁴⁶, preferring to “hedge their bets” by adding other factors to their examination, such as domestic-level variables. The broadening of realism has reached such a point that Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik were moved to write in a 1999 article,

It would be quite an intellectual coup for realists to demonstrate --as realists from Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Morgenthau sought to do – that the impact of ideas, domestic institutions, economic interdependence, and international institutions [like regimes] actually reflects the exogenous distribution and manipulation of interstate power capabilities. Some contemporary realists do continue to cultivate such arguments, yet such efforts appear today more like exceptions to the rule¹⁴⁷.

In our limited way, this is what we attempt to do.

¹⁴⁵ This classification is from a recent and well-thought-out source on the matter [of great power classification], Stacy Bergstrom Haldi and Ariana Hauck, “Constructing Great Powers: Power, Wealth and Prestige,” Paper prepared for *Millennium* Conference, “Facets of Power in International Relations” October 30-31, 2004, London, UK.

¹⁴⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist? *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 6. Key authors who broaden realism include Jack Snyder and Fareed Zakaria.

¹⁴⁷ Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, 6.

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth complain that “dozens and dozens of articles”¹⁴⁸ ran with the novel idea that it was *ideas* (glasnost) that led to the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet Union’s demise, the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War. The authors of these articles, in their haste to stress the significance of ideas, forgot to show how (other than “a few bare-bones accounts”)¹⁴⁹ very real material incentives and pressures acted on events at the time (as well). “We can only know where the world of ideas begins if we know what international behaviour can be explained by changing material incentives,” Brooks and Wohlforth remark. In other words, ideational models very much rely upon explanations rooted in a material base.

The only difficult part is determining the interests of the great power(s) (the changing material incentives mentioned above). Hans Morgenthau acknowledges that interests are hard to know:

....[T]he kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue¹⁵⁰.

¹⁴⁸ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” *International Security* 25, no. 3 (winter 2000/2001), 5-53. An example of an article that ran with the argument that it was ideas that changed Soviet foreign policy was Rey Koslowski and Freidrich V. Kratchowil’s “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 215-247.

¹⁴⁹ Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization,” 6 and 53.

¹⁵⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 9.

This problem is not insurmountable, however. We can assume this much: “Regardless of the myriad ways that states may define their interests [...] they are likely to want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so.”¹⁵¹

Essentially, we ask (for power to be investigated): what are the major powers’ policies on international small arms control? If a major power is interested in an issue (backs it), the likelihood for a regime being formed is virtually secured. Alternately, if the major powers strongly want to block a regime, they can and will. We test for small arms policy interest across time (comparing the presence or absence of interest in small arms policy by the great powers in two periods [during and after the Cold War], one characterized by governmental activity, the other not) to see if a relationship exists.

1945--1989: The Superpowers and Small Arms Policy:

Frozen in the Cold War

The first period under study was dominated by superpower confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The American national interest during the Cold War centered on the containment of communism and Soviet power and the prevention of nuclear war¹⁵².

¹⁵¹ Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 152.

¹⁵² According to recently available archival data and in the words of Maxim M. Litnov, the former chairman of the Soviet Ministry’s special Commission on post-war order and preparation of peace treaties, “While there are no deep reasons for serious and long-term conflicts between the USA and USSR in any part of the world (with the possible exception of China), it is difficult to outline some concrete basis for their positive political cooperation apart from a mutual interest in the preservation of world peace.” This statement in Litnov’s report was underlined by Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, *The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain*, Working Paper

For most of the Cold War, observes Michael Klare, decision-makers “ignored the role of small arms and other light weapons in international security affairs, considering them too insignificant to have an impact on the global balance of power or the outcome of major conflicts.”¹⁵³ Small arms and light weapons were rarely considered apart from conventional weapons as a class of weapon. For this reason, it is nearly impossible to separate the two with relation to national interest in the years 1945 to 1989 -- the separation would come later, in the post-Cold War era.

Time and time again, we witnessed the coupling of conventional arms transfers – not conventional arms control -- with the national interest. This practice got underway in the United States with the Destroyer-Bases Agreement of 1940 and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, when the US began transferring military equipment to other nations. Prior to this, such transfers were largely the domain of private arms merchants like Alfred Krupp, Lord Armstrong and Sir Basil Zaharoff who showed no particular national affiliation when it came to doing business. “I sold armaments to anyone who would buy them,” Zaharoff told the *London Sunday Chronicle* in 1936. “I was a Russian when in Russia, a Greek in Greece, a Frenchman in Paris¹⁵⁴.” (It is important to note, however, that private dealers, like Ernst Glatt, would continue to play a significant role in small arms and light weapons transactions [destined for small-scale wars] throughout the Cold War and beyond-- particularly those transactions that the government wished not to air publicly.)

No. 13, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (May 1995) Washington DC Cold War International History Project, 11.

¹⁵³ Klare, “New Arms Race, 173.

¹⁵⁴ Anthony Sampson, *Arms Bazaar*, 49-50.

In 1949, the US and its allies created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to limit trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. At its height, seventeen states – NATO, minus Iceland, and including Japan and Australia met weekly to discuss controlled items. This act of cooperation was clearly motivated by power politics – the desire to keep certain crucial materiel from the “enemy”.

Sales of weapons by governments were initially low and did not reach \$1 billion until the 1960s. The trend, at first, was one of offering security assistance in the form of grants. This policy of “give-aways” changed after the “United States achieved many of its chief national security objectives, most notably the economic and military rebuilding of Western Europe and the defense of South Korea against communist aggression.”¹⁵⁵ The general tendency then became one of military *sales* in accordance with President John F. Kennedy’s belief, upon entering office, that too much stress was being placed on military, rather than economic aid, along with the understanding that the country would best be served by encouraging the purchase of US weapons and weapons systems by allies who could afford them (with Europe in mind).

By 1966, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, foreign military sales were double that of grant assistance (excluding the heavy aid being sent to South Vietnam). An unthinking acceptance of sales as an acceptable foreign policy tool by the public and by many in government began to erode, however¹⁵⁶. Greater flows

¹⁵⁵ Paul L. Ferrari, Jeffrey W. Knopf and Raúl L. Madrid, *U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors* (Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1987), 19.

¹⁵⁶ A tentative détente resumed in the mid-1960’s.

were being sent to the Third World, away from core Communist borders, meeting less obvious national aims. President Richard Nixon's offer to sell F-14 fighters and advanced Spruance class destroyers to the Shah of Iran, without consultation, generated controversy. And later, a "post-Vietnam war feeling that arms relationships often served only to draw America into unwanted conflicts"¹⁵⁷ would persist.

The one great attempt at introducing a global regime on conventional arms sales during the Cold War occurred under the Carter administration. Building on changes pushed through by Congress, culminating in the Arms Export Act of 1976, President Jimmy Carter took the following tack. He announced in 1977 that from that moment onwards, Washington would look upon arms transfers as "an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests."¹⁵⁸ His view was that "the virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world". He added that "because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiraling traffic, and because of the special responsibilities we bear as the largest arms seller, I believe the United States must take steps to restrain its arms transfers."¹⁵⁹ The United States could not accomplish the goal of reduction alone, however; multilateral cooperation was needed. The Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT) were thus instigated. Delegates from Washington and Moscow met four times to discuss controlling the

¹⁵⁷ Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, *US Arms Exports*, 23.

¹⁵⁸ Jimmy Carter, *Statement by the President on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy* (Washington: Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 19, 1977).

¹⁵⁹ Carter, *Statement on Conventional Arms*.

trade from December 1977 to December 1978. The talks failed, however. No final agreement was produced. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had grown tense over this time due to the lead-up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also, although Vice President Walter Mondale had approached the principal suppliers of conventional weapons in Europe in private before the talks, the European nations were not part of the final round, undermining the possible outcome. Carter himself undermined the process as cracks began to be revealed in his overall resolve. A few too many exceptions to the rule were made by him on the strict unilateral guidelines he developed for US arms export policy, causing supporters to doubt him, and in the end the CATT were relegated to second-class priority¹⁶⁰.

One study concluded:

Despite his desire for restraint and his public and diplomatic support for restraint, President Carter learned that because of the limited number of instruments available to him for dealing with international problems, arms transfers were simply too useful for too many purposes to be extensively curtailed¹⁶¹.

Carter's successor, President Ronald Reagan showed little interest in carrying the arms control torch for conventional weapons. Instead, in what has been termed the "Reagan Reversal," changes were made to *facilitate* the transfer of

¹⁶⁰ Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, *U.S. Arms Exports*, 24-29.

¹⁶¹ Paul Hammond, David J. Louscher, Michael D. Salomone and Norman A. Graham, *The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers Inc., 1983): 194, quoted in Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, *U.S. Arms Exports*, 29.

weapons as an instrument of national policy. The new Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, James Buckley made some strong statements on the matter, declaring that Carter's thrust had "substituted theology for a healthy sense of self-preservation"¹⁶² given the threat of Soviet power faced by the United States. With regard to Congress' new laws on arms exports, he had this to say: "While these well-intentioned efforts have had little detectable impact on such behaviour or intentions, they did lead at times to the awkward result of undercutting the capabilities of strategically located nations in whose ability to defend themselves we have the most immediate and urgent self-interest."¹⁶³ During Reagan's presidency, many anticommunist insurgent groups across the globe, in countries such as Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan, were secretly supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with conventional weapons, including thousands of small arms and light weapons. Covert military supplies did not begin with Reagan, but classified operations did reach a crescendo in the 1980's¹⁶⁴. Between 1979 and 1991, for example, mujahideen factions in Afghanistan received, from the CIA, 400,000 AK-47 assault rifles (via Pakistan), an unknown quantity of Stinger

¹⁶² James Buckley, "Arms Transfers and the National Interest," (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Affairs, May 21, 1981), *Current Policy* No. 279, quoted in Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, *U.S. Arms Exports*, 29.

¹⁶³ Buckley, "Arms Transfers," 29. .

¹⁶⁴ How widespread was the reliance on covert action using small arms? Throughout the cold war, and particularly in the post Vietnam era, the superpowers are said to have relied "extensively" on covert action and unconventional warfare, to the point that, ". . . over the years, covert activities became so numerous and widespread that, in effect, they became a self-sustaining part of American foreign operations. The CIA became a government within a government, which could evade oversight of its activities by drawing the cloak of secrecy around itself," according to Clark Gifford who supervised the drafting of the US National Security Act under which authority for covert activities fell. These covert wars involved states sponsoring nonstate actors, acting as proxies or surrogates and staging armed coups d'états, revolutions, and paramilitary destabilization of countries and regions in support of a foreign policy. David F. Rudgers, "The Origins of Covert Action," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no.2 (2000): 249-262.

portable antiaircraft missile launchers and missiles, large amounts of Italian—made anti-personnel mines, 60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns, and over 100 million rounds of ammunition (from Turkey), forty to fifty Oerlikon Swiss-designed antiaircraft guns, mortars from Egypt, Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles from the United Kingdom, and 1,000,000 rifles from India by the CIA in the name of deterring the spread of communism.¹⁶⁵

The United States was not always the largest supplier of conventional arms and light weapons during the Cold War years. Sometimes the Soviet Union eclipsed the USA, although knowing who was “ahead” was at times difficult according to the different methodologies used to arrive at the figures (for example, by the Congressional Research Service or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency methodologies). Some questioned the utility of making comparisons:

[The Administration] has inflicted its bipolar view of global politics on the facts of increased arms sales and declared another arena for U.S./Soviet competition. By viewing regional problems through an East-West optic, there is a likelihood that the administration has misread and misrepresented the potential dangers of unbridled trade in sophisticated weapons...¹⁶⁶

Overall, however, just as in the nuclear arms arena, US administration officials took a keen interest in calculations that suggested that one or the other country was ahead.

¹⁶⁵ Lora Lumpe, “U.S. Policy and the Export of Light Weapons,” in *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 78.

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee, *An Unconventional Arms Policy: Selling Ourselves Short, Promotion of Foreign Military Sales to the Developing World Under the Reagan Administration* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, quoted in Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, *U.S. Arms Exports*, 14.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was also concerned with the distribution of power in the international system and the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. Just as in the United States, conventional weapons were considered a “safe” alternative to transfers of nuclear weapons, and were widely relied upon. According to Julian Cooper, the Soviet government pursued arms sales for political ends within the context of rivalry in a manner that remained fairly consistent from the late 1940s to *perestroika*. Although secrecy surrounded the decisions made – with no statistics published on numbers and with no discussion in that country's press on export policy (discussion was banned) over the years,¹⁶⁷ we now know enough about Soviet motivations to conclude that Moscow greatly counted on the use of conventional arms transfers in the Third World as a means to counter the forces of the West (particularly as it lacked funds to funnel economic aid of consequence).

In sum, military assistance patterns reflected the shape and character of power relations during the Cold War. The Cold War failed to produce a regime to control small arms (or conventional weapons). Great power alignment did not appear to be in favour of such a development during these years.

1990-2005: Selective US Backing of Small Arms Control Policy

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the distribution of power in the international system was undeniably altered.

¹⁶⁷ Julian Cooper, “Russia,” in *Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation*, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 173-202.

Not since the Roman Empire has a single power, without a counterbalancing rival, so dominated the world, economically, technologically, and militarily. [The United States] is unlikely to face a “peer competitor” for at least two decades. In the military sphere alone, the US accounts for one-third of all defence expenditures and almost 2/3 of NATO’s. And the US is not resting on its laurels, but is investing in advanced military technology – the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – in order to ensure that it retains its military advantage¹⁶⁸.

Before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, the US did not have a “consistent or coherent project”¹⁶⁹ for its foreign policy. Today, arguably, stopping arms proliferation has surfaced as *the* main military threat along with terrorism. Serious attention is being paid to the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons– including the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. Paradoxically, however, small arms transfers are viewed as highly valuable for security as well.

In the period 1991 to 1992, old patterns from the Cold War resumed: small arms and light weapons continuing to be invisible on the US agenda with a sole focus –when conventional weapons were considered as objects for control – on major conventional weapons. In the realm of major conventional weapons, the P-5 talks – three rounds of meetings of the six major suppliers (United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, Germany and China) foundered after President George H.W. Bush sold 150 F-16s to Taiwan, arguably in contravention of a U-S China Joint

¹⁶⁸ David A. Charters, “Canada-US Defence Cooperation,” Report on Defence Forum, Fredericton, New Brunswick, April 2000: 2. Available from http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/org/dg_coord/d_pub/sdf/reports/unb_forum_e.htm; Internet; accessed March 28, 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Hurrell, “‘There Are no Rules’ (George W. Bush), International Order after September 11,” *International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2002): 185-204, 199.

Communiqué banning US arms sales of a certain level to Taipei. The sale caused the Chinese government to boycott the talks. The planned fourth round, to take place in Moscow, never occurred¹⁷⁰.

But in 1995, a remarkable change in direction in US foreign policy took place – President Bill Clinton stepped up to the podium at the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations and urged countries to join with the United States “to shut down the gray markets that outfit terrorists and criminals with firearms.” This marked the first moment in history in which the problem of small arms and light weapons was addressed as a global concern in its own right by an American leader. A flurry of activity on the small arm front followed in Washington. In 1995, the OAS General Assembly adopted a U-S-authored resolution instructing its Permanent Council to put into place a Committee on Hemispheric Security, the first permanent regional forum on arms control, nonproliferation and security. In 1996, a law was passed clamping down on U.S. arms brokers operating in other countries, ensuring that they would be rendered accountable to regulations at home. In 1997, the United States and twenty-seven other governments in the Americas signed an OAS convention against the illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms, ammunition and related materials. Notable provisions of the treaty are: the requirement of an effective licensing or authorization system for the import, export, and in-transit movement of firearms, an obligation to mark firearms at the moment of manufacture and import to assist in tracing the source of illegal guns, and a demand that states criminalize the illegal manufacturing of and trafficking in

¹⁷⁰ Andrew J. Pierre, “Toward an International Regime for Conventional Arms Sales,” in *Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation*, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 377-380.

firearms. Pursuant to this action, the United States helped set into motion the Model Regulations to Control the Movement of Firearms, Ammunition and Firearms Parts and Components created by the OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission.

In 1998, the United States joined with other G-8 countries in Birmingham in issuing a statement on fighting the proliferation and misuse of small arms. In December 1999, the US agreed to the U.S.-EU Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in effect endorsing the principles contained within the European Union Code of Conduct on small arms. In November 2000, the country signed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms, which specifies a list of common criteria for authorizing and licensing small arms exports and related technology. The United States is helping governments in Eastern Europe and Africa destroy surplus weapons. In particular, the United States backs a number of small arms programs in Africa, such as the West African Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons. US arms control experts provided technical advice to the government of Mali to help draft the moratorium. In the sphere of conventional arms at large, the United States was one of the original sponsors of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Since its inception, the US has submitted information to the register on a yearly basis. A participant in and originator of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a novel thirty-three-member product of the post-Cold War and successor to COCOM, the US seeks to increase transparency in the transfer of conventional arms, and to foster international control and restraint concerning the

selling of weapons to destabilized regions and to those states at risk of posing a threat to international security¹⁷¹.

Throughout the Clinton presidency, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright chose to speak out on tackling the obstacles presented by the excessive flow and indiscriminate use of small arms and light weapons in a series of major speeches. In February 2000, John Holum, the then U.S. Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security closed an address to a Washington-based small arms working group with the words, “Rest assured that the United States will continue to do its part, and to be a *global leader* in this fight.”¹⁷². The administration under George W. Bush underscored the willingness of the United States to assume a shepherding role on this issue with Ambassador Donald J. McConnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Operations, reaffirming that “The United States is a *global leader* in efforts to mitigate the illicit trafficking and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons through multilateral diplomacy and bilateral assistance to countries in need.”¹⁷³

Overall, the US position encompasses many policies in support of a small arms control regime. They include: “building and enhancing enforcement and legal capacities, controlling proliferation to areas of conflict, providing training on export controls and customs practices, discouraging irresponsible and indiscriminate

¹⁷¹ Michael Lipson, “The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post Cold-War Export Controls,” *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1999): 33-57.

¹⁷² John Holum, “Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons: U.S. Perspectives and Priorities.” February 4, 2000. Speech delivered to Small Arms Working Group Meeting at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C. (http://www.iansa.org/documents/gov/2000/us_holum.htm), emphasis added.

¹⁷³ Donald J. McConnell, “Combating the Spread of Small Arms: the US Approach.” *US Foreign Policy Agenda*. June 2001. Journal on-line. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0601/ijpe/pj62mccconnell.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 September 2001.

exports, strengthening sanctions against violators of embargoes, and enhancing security and destroying excess weapons.”¹⁷⁴

Where anti-terrorist activities and small arms control meet - like a Venn Diagram “area of intersection” - we find US national security interests manifesting themselves into action. New US priorities are: homeland security, the campaign to destroy terrorist organizations, and removing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the wrong hands.¹⁷⁵

What the Venn Diagram intersection set means for small arms is great strides being made on certain areas related to small arms control. For example, members of today’s trading community are taking steps to protect their cargo from being exploited by terrorists. Canada, China, the UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Singapore and other countries with major seaports have signed onto the Container Security Initiative which was conceived by the United States as a “pre-emptive strike” against the smuggling of weapons on one of the approximately 200 million sea cargo containers moving across the world’s waterways (16 million enter U.S. ports each year.”¹⁷⁶)

Similarly, (then Canadian Foreign Minister) John Manley and Tom Ridge (then White House Homeland Security Advisor) met in Ottawa in December 2001

¹⁷⁴ McConnell, “Combating the Spread.”

¹⁷⁵ Laurence Kapp and Thomas Lum, *Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade: Key Issues for the 108th Congress*, Report for Congress, (January 3, 2003), Congressional Research Service, 1.

¹⁷⁶ Scott Miller, “U.S. Customs Chief Cites Importance of Container Security Initiative,” United States Mission to the European Union document; quoted in Carolyn Lloyd, “Is Secure Trade Replacing Free Trade?” *Trade Policy Research 2003*, Trade and Economic Analysis, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 74.

to create the Smart Border Declaration between Canada and the United States to stop illegal activity at the border, including cross-border arms trafficking¹⁷⁷.

The United States has increased its development assistance programs since September 11, 2001. Admittedly, much of the increase in assistance is military-oriented (weapons, combat training) destined for states fighting terrorists or “the terrorists formerly known as rebels” (such aid is referred to by some analysts as “anti-terrorism rewards”¹⁷⁸). And US aid is being streamlined, sent particularly to countries with large Muslim populations and insurgency movements, or to nations deemed “hospitable”¹⁷⁹ to transnational crime and terrorism — e.g. Pakistan, India, Philippines, and Indonesia. In Indonesia, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took action to restore a US-sponsored International Military Education and Training program in that country. (The program had previously been withheld from Indonesia due to human rights abuses carried out by the Indonesian military and security forces.)¹⁸⁰

Lastly, the Bush administration has demonstrated strong policy interest in state-building and post-conflict reconstruction (some of this interest has fed into support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs, integral aspects of the UN Programme of Action on SALW). The link between state-

¹⁷⁷See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html> for more information on the Smart Border Declaration.

¹⁷⁸Federation of American Scientists, “The Terrorists Formerly Known as Rebels,” *Arms Sales Monitor*, no. 47 (January 2002), 2.

¹⁷⁹Nations “hospitable” to transnational crime are believed to have ‘official corruption, incomplete or weak legislation, poor enforcement of existing laws, non-transparent financial institutions, unfavourable economic conditions, lack of respect for the rule of law in society and poorly guarded national borders.’ LaVerle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, Jon N. Gibbs, Rex A. Hudson, Tara Karacar, Nina Kollars and Ramon Miro, *Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC (October 2003).

¹⁸⁰The massacre of civilian protestors in Dili, East Timor in 1992 and attacks in East Timor in August 1999 following the UN-backed referendum on independence. *US State Department update*, February 26, 2005.

building and DDR is that security (collecting and destroying weapons, reintegrating soldiers into civilian life) is a foundation for the latter. DDR has become a standard aspect of the majority of operations” in state reconstruction¹⁸¹. As Fearon and Laitin analyze US interest on the topic:

Ironically [considering past resistance], the Bush administration has since undertaken state-building projects that are vastly larger and more difficult than anything the Clinton administration ever attempted. The U.S. military is now building kindergartens in Afghanistan, in addition to paving roads and assisting with many other major infrastructure projects in both Afghanistan and Iraq¹⁸².

But could the US *really* be called a leader on small arms? No, not really. Why do we say “not really”? Is it because other powers, though lesser in influence,¹⁸³ are more assiduous in leadership? This is only a partial answer. It is true, that different countries/actors, and indeed the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UN DDA) (CASA) have all shown signs of leadership and interest towards small arms control regime formation in ways not simply brought about as a by-product of national security and the post 9/11 environment. It is the president of Mali (a country deeply affected by SALW) who made an initial request for help to the UN Secretary-General in October 1993, which led to two UN panel reports on small arms (in 1996 and 1997). These reports serve as a main focal point for small

¹⁸¹ *Small Arms Survey 2003*, 292.

¹⁸² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), 6.

¹⁸³ Lesser powers (like lower rungs on a ladder) have lesser influence - -but cannot be denied either. For example in the Cold War, Romania, the People’s Republic of Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were said to have “general modifying influence” over the Soviet union on US-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations. (Douglas Selrage, “The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1963-1965,” Working Paper No 32, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [April 2001], Cold War International History Project).

arms control developments. It is Norway that acted as an early organizer of countries on the issue – twenty-one countries met in July 1998 in Oslo to discuss what could be done on the issue. (They produced a document called “An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding.”¹⁸⁴) It is Switzerland and France that work tirelessly on promoting the idea of the marking and tracing of illegal SALW - hosting workshops, lending technical expertise, etc. It is Japan that initiated and now promotes the notion of controlling SALW ammunition. It is Canada that particularly advances small arms issues related to war-affected children including child soldiers¹⁸⁵. Finally, it is the Foreign Minister of South Africa who actually called for a UN conference on SALW at a UN meeting in late September 1998 (this suggestion then became a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1999, mandating a UN conference)¹⁸⁶. And many European countries have increased their small arms DDR budgets, believing that tackling development issues is the best way to tackle terrorism- and less so a military approach (counter-terrorism)¹⁸⁷.

While all these shows of leadership are significant in themselves, it remains that the United States actually does a great deal to confront the issue of SALW¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁴ The communiqué from the Oslo meeting, “An International Agenda for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding” (July 1998) can be viewed at: http://www.nisat.org/export_lawsregs%20linked/norway/oslo_meeting_on_small_arms_13.htm.

¹⁸⁵ Belgium had until recently been a contender for middle power leadership until a change in government. Official of Belgian Department of Foreign Affairs, interview with author, Brussels, Belgium, June 23, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Stefan Brem, “Restricting the Illicit Trade in and the Misuse of SALW: What Can We Learn from Ottawa?” Annual ISA Convention, Chicago, February 20-24, 2001.

¹⁸⁷ Antonio Tujan, Audrey Gaughran and Howard Mollett, “Development and the ‘Global War on Terror’” *Race & Class* 46, no. 1 (2004): 53-74.

¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, middle power states are not immune to weak or wrong-headed leadership themselves. For example, “human security” is forwarded as a prominent concern in European and Canadian rhetoric. However, the concern for human security does not always figure as prominently in the strategic culture and practice of these countries’ foreign policies. Frédéric Ramel, “La sécurité

Rather, the reason the “label” of leader on small arms control does not entirely “ring true” is that the United States is a “selective leader”. No state and especially no major powers act like Kindleberger envisioned a major power: as the truly caring actor creating regimes so the world can know nurturance, peace and stability. (States do not “feel”). This insight that states must be hard-nosed in an anarchical world (as discussed at the beginning of the chapter) was the basic foundation of early to mid-20th century realists and it stands today. The insight is behind Reinhold Niebuhr’s apt title “Moral Man, Immoral Society.”¹⁸⁹ Even when generosity might be expected, magnanimity may not be extended in international affairs. (Kim Richard Nossal gives the example of the United States not being particularly generous – not backing down on many issues - in negotiations leading up to the development of a bilateral free trade regime between Australia and the United States, even after Australia had just lent its support to the US war against Iraq). In the end, Nossal reminds us (from classical realism), “the strong [do] what they [have] the power to do, and [the] weak accept what they [have] to accept.”¹⁹⁰

Perhaps the greatest fault (damage done) of the hegemonic stability thesis is to encourage a naïveté amongst political scientists when observing great power leadership. A. Hartley, just before the resignation of President Richard Nixon,

humaine: Une valeur de rupture dans les cultures stratégiques au Nord?” *Revue Etudes Internationales* XXXIV, no. 1 (March 2003): 79-104.

¹⁸⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1932). For an updated review of *Moral Man*, see Joel H. Rosenthal, “Private Convictions and Public Commitments: *Moral Man and Immoral Society* Revisited,” *World Policy Journal* (summer 1995): 89-96.

¹⁹⁰ Kim Richard Nossal, “Upper Hand Down Under: American Politics and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement,” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America, Toronto, February 20-21, 2004. See also Nossal, “Without Regard for the Interests of Others’: Canada and American Unilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 27 (Summer 1997), 179-97.

expressed the hope in an *Adelphi Paper* that history would be “re-knit” in the 1970’s (a “fresh start”). Like many analysts, Hartley aspired to what is in fact an unreasonable expectation – that America would “draw upon the lessons to be learned from the great constructive period for the Marshall Plan and the founding of the North Atlantic Alliance.”¹⁹¹ In his mind, the US could conceivably begin to show more patience, more consultation with other states, and more “acceptance of a common interest” than foreign policy in the recent past.¹⁹² We know this generally did not happen in the remainder of the 1970’s.

Today we continually find stunned, hurt or impatient reactions by leading scholars in major journals and other observers – when events do not turn out as hoped, multilaterally¹⁹³. In the same vein, scholars tend to forget about the central role of force in IR in times of peace¹⁹⁴.

We must remember the tenets of realism and not be fooled by great displays of benevolent activism. When the United States has conducted such displays, it has been because the activism was attractive to them – in the sense that the US could do as it wished. A prime example of such a time is a period which has never left our collective mind for the evidence is still largely with us. This was when, in “the

¹⁹¹A. Hartley, “American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era”, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 110 (1974/1975), 35.

¹⁹²Hartley, “American Foreign Policy,” 35.

¹⁹³ As just a small sampling, Steven Holloway has said that “there are grounds for doubting the constancy” of US foreign policy – in “leading the world community” (Holloway, “US Unilateralism,” 361. In a 1998 editorial of the *Economist*, the US was called a “half-hearted friend.” (quoted in Holloway, “Unilateralism,” 361). When the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was not ratified by the United States (among several other arms control failures in the late 1990’s and 2000’s), one analyst said, “Over the past few years, the United States has gone from being a leader in terms of traditional arms control to being a reluctant giant.” (Deborah A. Ozga, “The Reluctant Giant of Arms Control,” *Security Dialogue* 34, no. 1 [March 2003]: 87-102, 1).

¹⁹⁴ “[Force] is too often dismissed as no longer applicable because international conditions have supposedly changed.,” recognizes Robert J. Art, “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force,” *Security Studies* 4 (summer 1996): 7-42, 11.

aftermath of World War II, [with] the prewar order in ruins, [and] the European great powers beaten down,”¹⁹⁵ the United States (being in control) played a leading role in establishing literally dozens of regimes and organizations¹⁹⁶.

Much of the time, the United States focuses its attention on preserving its status in world affairs. Lately, it has confronted scenarios when it has not been in control¹⁹⁷ when confronting newly divergent European and Canadian stances, the “coalition of the unwilling”¹⁹⁸).

In irritation, the great power has shown its “true colours” by co-opting, discrediting, and so on¹⁹⁹ the ideas of challenging actors. We have witnessed the above tendencies transpiring in the issue-area of small arms.

¹⁹⁵ See Chapter One in G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

¹⁹⁶ The Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Development Association, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT (succeeded in 1995 by the World Trade Organization WTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency International Labour Organization, the international Bank for reconstruction and development (World Bank), the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the World Health Organization (WHO). The United States also strongly supported the creation of the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). From John F. Murphy, *The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2-3.

¹⁹⁷ Murphy, *The US and the Rule of Law*, 6.

¹⁹⁸ David G. Haglund, “Canada and the Anglosphere: In, Out or Indifferent?” *Options Politiques/Policy Options* (February 2005): 72-76, 73.

¹⁹⁹ Some have described issues the US has with “turning back” on cooperation (undermining leadership credibility)— William Korey observes “impressive leadership” by the United States in the drafting of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), followed by a forty year lag for the United States to ratify the convention. William Korey, “The United States and the Genocide Convention: Leading Advocate and Leading Obstacle,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 11 (1997): 271-290, 272. Kenneth Anderson labels US foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War period as the “runaway bride phenomenon.” What he means by that is that the United States, like the title character of the movie *Runaway Bride* has developed a habit of “leading partners to the altar after insisting on elaborate prenuptial agreements, only to jilt them during the final vows” Kenneth Anderson, quoted in Stewart Patrick, “America’s Retreat from Multilateral Engagement.” It is a routine of channeling negotiations towards an American-defined endpoint...and opting out at the last moment. *Current History* (January 2000), 431.

For instance, we have found that the United States has engaged in a mode of thinking of denying it is wrong on various concerns (related to small arms) and imputing that others are.²⁰⁰ The United States does not like to admit that it may have a hand in some of the problems caused by SALW – (“We are proud of our record, and would hope that the Programme of Action would encourage all nations to adopt similar practices,” the American representative, John Bolton said at the UN Conference on small arms). As the leading exporters of SALW (the country sold approximately \$1.2 billion worth of SALW in 1998), along with fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US has tended to minimize the fact that legal small arms transfers can enter the illicit market.²⁰¹

Also, the United States partly diminishes/opposes the Southern version of events (which is “we are attempting to control small arms as impediments to development and as a serious humanitarian threat in the name of the goal of ‘freedom from fear’”) each time it reinforces the view, in direct counter-point, that it must protect the freedom of American sports shooters to own guns²⁰².

Because the United States likes *parts* of the small arms regime-in-the-making, it has tried to co-opt or regain control of it. A typical way of co-opting is to try to move the venue of the fledgling regime to a forum where control may be re-asserted. Experts point out this characteristic desire (for a great power) when they say “Washington naturally prefers regimes that reflect its dominance – through such

²⁰⁰A companion theory to classical realist thought is the strangely similar underlying logic of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder, first developed by Ernest Jones and Sigmund Freud – patients are possessed of a false, grandiose self and will never admit to wrong, in order to permit the continuation of the grandiose self. Nancy McWilliams and Stanley Lependorf, “Narcissistic Pathology of Everyday Life: The Denial of Remorse and Gratitude,” *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 26, no. 3 (July 1990): 430-41.

²⁰¹Murphy, *The US and the Rule of Law*, 220.

²⁰²Grillot, “Transnational Advocacy Networks,” 28.

features as weighted voting – rather than diluting it in universal, one-state, one-vote bodies”²⁰³ e.g. OAS, NATO and the G-8, *not* the United Nations.

In the brusqueness in tone (in a much-talked about speech, with attacks on the small arms control process) delivered by John Bolton, the US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security at the UN Conference on Small Arms in 2001, we witnessed American displeasure with the small arms control process at the UN. The United States has expressed the view that it does not support a mandatory Review Conference of the UN Conference, as outlined in Section IV of the Programme of Action, which is thought by the US to “serve only to institutionalize and bureaucratize this process”²⁰⁴.

There is hope for the future of the regime however, because people, unlike states, can *feel* (and lesser states seem to possess more sensitivity). The regime could move very quickly forward if activists or other countries in support of a regime exert strong pressure and succeed in changing US thinking on small arms. The US government could furthermore arrive at the conclusion that global controls need not unduly interfere with domestic legislation that permits ownership of nonmilitary-style weapons and that a focus on placing global restrictions on the legal trade in SALW is actually in their long-term interest.

²⁰³Patrick, “America’s Retreat,” 433.

²⁰⁴John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “Plenary Address to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects, July 9, 2001); accessed February 20, 2005; Available from <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/4038.htm>; Internet.

Conclusion

Finding that the traditional power-centric analysis of regime creation – hegemonic stability – is more a theory of public diplomacy and of ideas– of winning public support abroad for a government and its foreign policies - than of power itself, we turned to an older version of realism. We treated the hegemonic stability thesis as a launching pad to consider questions of power in a time when we are seeing, since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, a “resurgence of [a] military-security worldview”²⁰⁵ by the US, China and Russia in global affairs today.

Fortunately, power politics do not preclude cooperation. Had it not been for a shift in great power interest, a regime in the issue-area of small arms would not have begun to emerge. Recent American backing and interest in tackling the problem has been crucial in forwarding many changes that would have been unheard of during the Cold War. However, the regime’s current strengths and weaknesses reflect strong and weak points of interests by the US. The selectiveness of US leadership means that the general “mould” of regime feasibility is one that is conducive to only certain areas of small arms cooperation.

This chapter cannot stand alone. A power analysis is a first step in understanding regime creation. Further exploration needs to be conducted on other variables. Thus, we turn to the variable of knowledge in the next chapter.

²⁰⁵ Pavel Baev and J. Peter Burgess, “Editor’s Comments,” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 2 (2001): 131-136, 132.

CHAPTER THREE

THE KNOWLEDGE VARIABLE:

“WHERE THERE IS NO VISION, THE PEOPLE PERISH”²⁰⁶

Taking into account knowledge as a variable in regime formation --“the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal”²⁰⁷ invites consideration of the non-material world. A central provision of regimes is that *actor expectations converge* in a given issue-area. The convergence of expectations lies in the realm of the cognitive, or of the subjective, rather than an “objective” reality²⁰⁸. Expectations are not facts. They depend on individual cognitions. In a setting as uncertain as the international arena, there is an absence of authoritative interpretations of meaning. Unlike a sport, where uncertainty is governed by referees, or in domestic society, with its binding courts of law, global actors must look beyond the facts of overt behaviour to intersubjective meanings²⁰⁹.

If knowledge regarding a specific issue-area like small arms and light weapons is shared, states *can and do expect* other states to act in a certain way.

²⁰⁶ Proverbs 29:18.

²⁰⁷ Haas, “Why Collaborate?,”: 367-368.

²⁰⁸ Christer Jonsson. “Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics,” in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): 202.

²⁰⁹ That the Soviet Union withdrew from, and agreed to the neutralization of Austria in 1955 is, for example, a fact. At the same time, this decision raised the expectations of Eastern Europeans and Americans about the motives of the Soviets. It was perceived as a conciliatory gesture and caused other countries to reciprocate accordingly Friedrich Kratochwil, “Regimes, Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of Politics: A Reappraisal,” *Millennium* 17, no. 2 (1988): 277.

Without the convergence of expectations, it is argued, a small arms regime is less likely to come into existence. For a regime to succeed, we need the parties to “know” about the problem at hand (the intersubjective element of regimes) to entertain the idea of a regime.

A relatively new school called “constructivism” has been at the vanguard of exploring intersubjective meanings in International Relations. These scholars take a step back when looking at international phenomena, placing relationships normally taken for granted by other scholars under the microscope. What if the meanings we attribute to objects and social relationships – constructivists ask-- are not “real” but arbitrary? What if identities long accepted as “facts” are, instead, socially constructed? Perhaps more than any other group of researchers, constructivists pay attention to the world of intentions and meaning. It makes sense for us to see what constructivists have to offer if it brings us closer to understanding the intentions of governments. (The study of the non-material world is not the exclusive domain of constructivists, however. Insofar as there are turf wars in IR, it could be said that constructivists downplay the degree to which realists are capable of incorporating knowledge and other non-material elements into their analyses, thereby promoting what they see as their advantage over realism. It is true that realists are much more comfortable in relying on numbers of nuclear warheads, GNP and so on – observable attributes of member states – as explanatory variables constraining and enabling cooperation in the international system. But few are zealous in their adherence to this point. After all, no one wishes to be backed into a theoretical *cul-de-sac*. “Pure materialists’ who regard belief [or ideas] at best as an unimportant

mask for interest hold to a highly implausible position insofar as they suggest that human history would have run the same course even had paganism, world religions, and Marxism never been invented."²¹⁰

The main features of the constructivist approach are as follows (on each point, we try to link the feature to its relevance to regime creation):

First, constructivists question the limits of the objective value of truth.

Many coming-of-age stories deal in some form or another with a child's encounter with the notion of the objective value of truth --that pivotal period in a young person's development when he or she begins to realize the limitations of his or her own parents/teachers' advice. What has been taught all along holds *only to a certain point*, as he or she discovers, as there are other possible visions of the world, including one's own. A wake-up call occurred for many in the Western world in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA, shattering presumptions of "one world/one vision," when increased media coverage on alternative, Islamic points of view on—including a parade of experts on "Muslim rage"-- forced the public to consider that not everyone sees American foreign policy in the same (American) way. The implications for regime formation are that, "[a]t any point in time and place of a historical process, international actors...may be affected by politically relevant collective sets of understandings of the physical and social

²¹⁰ John A. Hall, "Ideas and the Social Sciences," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 39.

world that are subject to political selection processes and thus to evolutionary change.”²¹¹

Secondly, constructivists argue that the identities of actors are not fixed. For example, first-wave feminists led by Simone de Beauvoir employed constructivist logic when the revelation was put forth – dramatic at the time – that the gender identities of men and women –their differences –are not necessarily biologically innate. Rather, the argument goes, identities are *socially, historically, politically and culturally determined*. Today, the debate rages on. In some circles, feminists claim that the male identity has depended, historically, “on its relationship to a devalued female ‘Other’”²¹² (again reinforcing the notion that identity is not fixed for all time, but the product of the values of society, which can shift). Similarly, “whereas conventional accounts of colonialism and imperialism rely on disparities in relative material power to explain relations of domination and subordination, constructivists would add that no account of such hierarchical outcomes is complete without exploring how imperial identities are constructed both at home and with respect to the subordinated Other abroad,” as Ted Hopf notes.²¹³ A more neutral but related point on identity is that countries “wear many hats” –they have multiple personalities in world politics depending on the countr(ies) with which they are dealing and/or the forum in which they are

²¹¹ Emmanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Programme.” *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (winter 1992): 372.

²¹² J. Ann Tickner, “Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives,” in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996): 148.

²¹³ Hopf, “Promise of Constructivism,” 195.

interacting²¹⁴. Constructivist studies on NATO (not a regime exactly, but an alliance) have focused on how members' expectations are shaped by the liberal identities of each other rather than a view of each other as counter-balancing realist states²¹⁵.

As another point, constructivists posit that rational self-interest may not be the main goal of actors; situation-appropriateness may be the more pertinent goal. For instance, individuals in attendance at a social event may not have specific, self-interested goals in mind (e.g. widening circles of business contacts, making friends) but may primarily be concerned with acting *appropriately* in accordance with the setting of the party (as role-players rather than utility-maximizers). “What kind of situation is this?” the party-attendees may ask themselves, “What am I supposed to do now?” instead of “How do I get what I want?”²¹⁶ Cues on how to behave are drawn from the environment. International Relations constructivist Martha Finnemore believes nations are also prone to asking: “What should we do now? What is it that we want?” refuting the assumption that national interests are ready-made. A case she explores is the flowering of new national science bureaucracies in a number of UNESCO-member countries in a short period of time, including some countries where “there were no significant material benefits to be reaped from setting up these bureaucracies.” In some of these countries, in fact, there was little scientific activity to be governed at all. The explanation she offers for this curiosity is that nations “sensed” that establishing a science

²¹⁴ Hopf, “Promise of Constructivism,” 193.

²¹⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies* 8 (winter/spring 1998/99), 198–234.

²¹⁶ Questions taken from Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 29.

bureaucracy was the “appropriate” thing to do.²¹⁷ She adds, “thoughtful, intelligent political behaviour...may be governed by notions of duty and obligation as much as by notions of self-interest and gain.”²¹⁸ It may thus be thought “appropriate” in this light for countries to join a regime even if it is not in their interest.

As well, constructivists forward that actors and structures are mutually constituted. In the eyes of constructivists, actors are so influenced by the social fabric that envelops them, the power to act on one’s own, completely freed from all “culture, norms, rules, and social practices” is in doubt. Actors and structures are mutually constituted²¹⁹ – in the sense that one cannot think of one without the other. Scholars refer to the power to act as “agency” and intend “structure” to mean “a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of” an actor.

A story many use in first-year international relations courses to demonstrate the structural extreme, that is, a situation where no agency is imaginable, illustrates the point. The scenario is a fire in a theater where all run for the exits. But absent knowledge of social practices or constitutive norms, structure, even in this seemingly overdetermined circumstance, is still indeterminate. Even in a theater with just one door, while all run for that exit, who goes first: are they the strongest or the disabled, the women or the children, the aged or the infirm, or is it just a mad dash? Determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the distribution of material power or the structure of authority. One will need to know about the culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the structure alike²²⁰.

²¹⁷ Creating such a bureaucracy was viewed by some countries as a symbol of the ‘modern state’, Finnemore, “*National Interests*, , 34-68.

²¹⁸ Finnemore, *National Interests*, , 29.

²¹⁹ See Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (summer 1987): 335-370.

²²⁰ Arnold Wolfers, paraphrased in Hopf, “Promise of Constructivism,” 173.

However, here are several problems with constructivism. First of all, if constructivist researchers are to deliver on the promise of offering a new precision, the level of research involved may be unrealistic. That "...all data must be 'contextualized' that is, they must be related to, and situated within, the social environment in which they were gathered, in order to understand their meaning"²²¹ makes investigations commensurate with constructivist standards nearly impossibly difficult.

Constructivism's theory of process and commitment to interpretivist thick description place extraordinary demands on the researcher to gather mountains of elaborate empirical data. To reconstruct the operation of identity politics, even in a limited domain for a short period, requires thousands of pages of reading, months of interviews and archival research, and a host of less conventional activities, such as riding public transportation, standing in lines, and going to bars and cafes to participate in local practices. (The latter need not be so onerous). The point here is that the evidence necessary to develop an understanding of, say, a national identity, its relation to domestic identities, the practices that constitute both, implied interests of each, and the overall social structure is necessarily vast and varied²²².

The above raises the question of whether we can *ever* know all that we need to know in this vein. This is especially so for understanding identities and structures of the past, in times and places in which we, as observers, cannot physically insert ourselves. When it comes to resuscitating long-dead music, Andrew Manze, the great violin soloist of baroque music, reminds us, "the two most important

²²¹ Hopf, "Promise of Constructivism," 182.

²²² Hopf, "Promise of Constructivism," 198.

ingredients in music making can never be replaced or recreated: the original performers and listeners.”²²³

The elusive dream of arriving at the high levels of reconstruction demanded by the school does not damage constructivism irreparably. However, once all the “thick data” has been gathered as well as can be, what does one do with it? To date, constructivists have been weak on theory development, leading critics to stamp the school a method or approach more than anything else. The distance that remains to be travelled by constructivists is considerable. “Having demonstrated that social construction matters, they [constructivists] must now address when, how, and why it occurs, clearly specifying the actors and mechanisms bringing about change, the scope conditions under which they operate, and how they vary across countries.”²²⁴ Of key concern for many is that “constructivism lacks a theory of agency. As a result, it overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place.”²²⁵

Next, some – though certainly not all – of what constructivism has to say is banal, undermining its contribution. The most banal and potentially dangerous conclusion that reappears in the literature is that weapons –as physical objects – “do not matter”. (The line normally used is, “After all, the United States worries very little about the large quantity of nuclear weapons held by the British; however, the possibility that North Korea might come into possession of even one or two generates tremendous concern²²⁶.”) Well, we see the point, but it is a bit of a stretch

²²³ Andrew Manze, *Portrait*, Harmonia mundi USA (2000).

²²⁴ Checkel, “Constructivist Turn,” 325.

²²⁵ Checkel, “Constructivist Turn,” 325.

²²⁶ Checkel, “Constructivist Turn,” 325. 326.

(there is more to the equation than that). Tangible reasons exist why we do not worry about Britain's nuclear arsenal: for one thing, a tight command and control system seriously prevents the chances of unwanted use and theft of nuclear weapons in that country. The inverse could not be said, from the evidence that we have gleaned to date, for would-be nuclear proliferators like North Korea.

Finally, in our view, the departure from rationalism is untenable. Following the old adage, "You must stand for something, or you'll fall for anything," a stand must be taken in a field which studies a diplomatic universe so vast and confusing that Raymond Aron once referred to it as an "echo chamber" (where "the noises of men and events are amplified and reverberated to infinity"²²⁷). A modicum of organizational decisiveness in theory-making must be taken or the scholar will be more "hard of hearing" than he or she was before his or her investigation began. Constructivists have a tendency to scoff at those "scholars [who] are committed to a version of science in which acts or policies have to be unambiguously and objectively identified and classified."²²⁸ By stubbornly going in the other direction, though, they are distancing themselves from positive science, maintaining as they do that "the purpose of theory is not to search for prediction within the context of determinate, transhistorical, and generalisable causal claims but rather contextual understanding and practical knowledge."²²⁹ To assume that actors, whether nations or people, generally pursue goals that are in their interest (and go about this

²²⁷ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Doubleday, 1966): 373.

²²⁸ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* (1996) 40: 237.

²²⁹ Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda," 243.

rationally, to the extent that they are able), is a pretty basic stance to adopt, which we are prepared to defend.

Liberalism is a second (and older) school that considers knowledge in International Relations. Scholars such as Immanuel Kant, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, and more recently, Michael Doyle, Francis Fukuyama, Stanley Hoffmann and Richard Rosecrance people the long intellectual history of liberalism. Given the shortcomings in theory-making of constructivism, liberalism may serve as a more appropriate theoretical backdrop for analyzing knowledge in the formation of a regime. In addition, while we appreciate the interest in knowledge by constructivists at a more fundamental (radical?) level than liberalism—knowledge constituting states and identities —what we really want to know is rather simple. The puzzle at stake –the causal chain we wish to understand –is how states move from point A (having no interest in a regime) to point B (accepting a regime). Liberalism presents an opportunity to do just that. “Existing liberal hypotheses...offer...a theory of when the transnational transmission of ideas matter something for which ‘systemic’ constructivists as of yet lack an explanation”²³⁰.

For instance, liberals hold a faith in individuals and their ideas as motors of change in regime creation (it will be recalled that constructivists lack a theory of agency). An important thrust of liberalism is in an unassailable belief in people power. The opening sentences to *Our Global Neighbourhood* – prescriptive liberal reading for the 1990’s –wrap this sentiment up nicely:

²³⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (autumn 1997): 540.

The collective power of people to shape the future is greater now than ever before, and the need to exercise it is more compelling. Mobilizing that power to make life in the twenty-first century more democratic, more secure, and more sustainable is the foremost challenge of this generation. The world needs a new vision that can galvanize people everywhere to achieve higher levels of co-operation in areas of common concern and shared destiny²³¹.

Former Czech Republic president Vaclav Havel meant the same thing when he said famously, "the salvation of this human world lies nowhere else than in the human heart, in the human power to reflect, in human meekness and in human responsibility."²³²

Finally, Elise Boulding drew attention to "group power" with this statement,

As we are all aware, a crucial development of the twentieth century has been the rise of the NGOs – the global civil society that transcends national boundaries in its concern for human well-being. Representing the whole range of social, scientific and cultural know-how of our times, and the bearers of values that transcend nationalism, NGOs are able to penetrate into problem areas in ways that governments and the UN cannot²³³.

In our opinion, the school of liberalism includes the best of constructivism – an emphasis on ideas and knowledge – minus a number of the weaker points.

In 1997, Andrew Moravcsik did a great service to the tradition of liberalism by helping to rescue it from caricature – that is, from a series of portraits dating from the interwar years showing liberalism, in laughing stroke, as representing a

²³¹ Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.

²³² Vaclav Havel, "A Joint Session of the U.S. Congress," *Toward a Civil Society: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1990-1994*, 31-45.

²³³ Elise Boulding, "Roles for NGOs in Reducing or Preventing Violence," *Transnational Associations* (June 1997): 317.

naïve utopianism. “[T]he basic liberal insight about the centrality of state-society relations to world politics” he insisted, “can be restated”²³⁴ as a scientific theory. He based the scientific theory on three main assumptions:

That fundamental actors in international politics can be individuals and private groups with differentiated interests, each engaging in collective action to promote their views; that states and other political institutions are made up of a subset of domestic society (state officials defining state preferences) and that “the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour.”²³⁵

These assumptions – in a nutshell (for our purposes), telling us that ideas can shape the preferences of countries and influence their behaviour, coupled with the belief that transnational actors are capable of making a difference in the way states behave— open up an important avenue for exploring the knowledge variable in regime-building: learning.

In the summer of 1987, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. published a seminal article titled “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes” in which he wondered at length how change occurs leading to cooperation in the sphere of security.²³⁶ He was particularly interested in how the United States and the Soviet Union came to cooperate with each other on arms control. One way that foreign policy changes course is through shifts in the distribution of power in the international system. Another, self-evident way in which foreign policy can be altered is through a domestic shift in power. An election or coup d’état can produce leaders with

²³⁴ Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 515.

²³⁵ Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 516, 518, 520.

²³⁶ Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 371-403. Also see Jakob Gustavsson, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 1 (1999): 73-95.

perceptions of interest and goals that differ from their predecessors. A further potential source of change is the introduction of new and compelling knowledge in an issue-area that leads to the redefinition of state interests. As Nye observed, states may “learn” new interests²³⁷.

What is learning? To learn, according to the *Collins English Dictionary*, is to i) gain knowledge of something; ii) to gain by experience, by example; or iii) to become informed (know). On one level, there is broad historical learning which, when broached by historians/writers/scholars, is often articulated in the form of lament. “If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us”²³⁸ bemoaned Samuel Coleridge. “It appears,” reflects Jack S. Levy, “that decision makers are always seeking to avoid the failures of the past and that generals are always fighting the last war.”²³⁹ Many a statesperson's memoir has consisted, in bulk, of analyses along the lines of “I learned from X experience that such and such an action was required...”

The “lessons of Munich” were invoked by Harry Truman in Korea, Anthony Eden in Suez, John Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam and George Bush in the Persian Gulf War. The “lessons of Korea” influenced American debates about Indochina, and the “lessons of Vietnam” were advanced in debates about crises in the Persian Gulf and in Bosnia. Statesmen at Versailles sought to avoid the mistakes of Vienna and those at Bretton Woods, the errors of the Great Depression. Masada still moves the Israelis, and Kosovo drives the Serbs. Inferences from experience

²³⁷ Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 378.

²³⁸ Samuel Coleridge, quoted in Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 280.

²³⁹ Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy,” 280.

and the myths that accompany them often have a far greater impact on policy than is warranted by standard rules of evidence²⁴⁰.

Nye, however, was not as interested in how we learn from those events that stand out in our collective memory as he was in what happens when new and detailed scientific information is introduced into the calculus of decision-makers when considering the necessity of a regime. A varied set of cases exists where it is thought that governments learned from new knowledge, changing their interests, and leading to cooperation: evidence on the threat posed by chlorofluorocarbons helped the realization of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer²⁴¹; a consensus on how to contain cholera and other communicable diseases made possible the formation of an international public health regime²⁴²; in global finance, a cognitive shift occurred from postwar Keynesianism to neoclassicism due, in part, to the persistent dissemination of information by a group of experts centred on the Bank for International Settlements²⁴³; and the introduction of the nuclear winter thesis enhanced the fear of mutually assured destruction and had an impact on security regimes like the 1982 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks²⁴⁴.

Nye's model of learning is highly instructive for studying the causes of regime formation. For a regime to emerge, according to knowledge-based theories,

²⁴⁰ Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 280.

²⁴¹ See Richard Elliot Benedick, *Ozone Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

²⁴² See Richard N. Cooper, "International Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Macroeconomic Cooperation" in *Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation*, eds. Richard N. Cooper, Barry Eichengreen, C. Randall Henning, Gerald Holtham and Robert D. Putnam (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions, 1989).

²⁴³ See Eric Helleiner, *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) and Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance," *World Politics* 48 (January 1996).

²⁴⁴ See Francis P. Hoerber and Robert K. Squire, "The 'Nuclear Winter' Hypothesis: Some Policy Implications," *Strategic Review* (summer 1990) and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Winter and Policy Choices," *Survival* XXVII, no. 2 (March/April 1986).

...a network (an international organization or some less formal arrangement) must arise to link the community of those who share a common understanding of the problem and its solution and to allow them to communicate their ideas persuasively to policy makers. This network [...] becomes a significant force in the process of regime formation. Its members offer authoritative and concordant advice in areas in which policy makers are poorly informed or plagued by uncertainty. By creating a common set of interpretations, the [knowledge collective] reduces uncertainty and influences the form and range of the options considered in regime formation. Such a community may also become influential enough to prevent opposing views and values from gaining currency at the domestic level in each of the relevant states²⁴⁵.

Nye explicitly draws from liberalism for his model of learning. In his study, he expresses the belief that Realism “is the most parsimonious and may be the most useful first approximation, but it does not take us very far” in explaining how regimes come about. More is needed. “Try realism first,”²⁴⁶ he suggested, but supplement with liberalism²⁴⁷.

²⁴⁵ Young and Osherenko, *Polar Politics*, 20.

²⁴⁶ Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 373.

²⁴⁷ A few further points need to be made on Nye’s model of learning:

a) *Learning is not always “effective” or “positive”.*

“It seems odd”, Nye has said, to say that one has ‘learned’ that two plus two equals five. But the situation is different with complex social phenomena. The Keynesian revolution in economics meant that some ‘laws’ learned in the 1920s were wrong in the 1930s. Some economists today believe that early Keynesian formulations about inflation were far too simple. The effectiveness of altered cognitive beliefs is sometimes only known with great delay, and sometimes not at all (Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 379.)

Also, we must be wary of automatically equating learning with “good things”. Learning can be dangerous; wrong lessons have been drawn on many occasions. Global problems have been misunderstood and faulty information brought forth to remedy them. Robert Jervis devoted an entire (influential) book to the causes and consequences of misperception, including the misinterpretation of information, in international relations Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

c) *Individual learning is not the same as institutional learning.*

Organizations cannot learn per se. Only individuals can. “Organizations do not literally remember, think, or learn” observe Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon; “Organization learning is a metaphor.” It is necessary for individual learning to become ensconced in an organization through routine for action to be taken, which leads us to the following point. Nye, “Nuclear Learning,” 379., Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, *Organizational Learning* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980), 9-11, 28, quoted in Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy,” 288.

Analyzing Knowledge and Learning

Equipped with an awareness of the above liberal elements on knowledge and learning, how are we to test for the influence of knowledge in the emerging small arms control regime? How do we measure knowledge? How do we “spot” – and isolate – the ideas which cause decision-makers to learn and subsequently to entertain the idea of a regime?

Many would say that one cannot “spot” and measure ideas because “[i]deas do not float freely”²⁴⁸ (in the words of Thomas Risse-Kappen). Ideas do not hang, ghost-like, in the air, waiting to be grabbed. Ideas need *bearers* to carry them forth; learning is enabled by “*teachers*” of sorts. It is therefore natural to focus on the bearers of ideas – the teachers—as a way to gain access to knowledge as a variable, short of “spotting” an idea. (This way of proceeding is also a next-best option to being able to directly ask foreign policy decision-makers of the world over, “Have you recently learned that the excessive and destabilizing availability and use of small arms and light weapons poses a grave problem? If so, did new knowledge of that problem shape your preference in considering a regime in the issue-area?”) Certain practicalities prevent us from doing this, and we are not sure that pursuing

d) Learning does not always translate into action.

Once lessons are drawn, they may or may not be acted upon. “Actors may learn from experience but be prevented by domestic, economic, or bureaucratic constraints from implementing their preferred policies based on what they have learned.” Learning will have little impact unless the learners are in a position to put into place their desired policies or to persuade others to do so. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy,” 290.

²⁴⁸Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (spring 1994): 185-214.

this method would generate a very accurate picture of what we want to know, in any event).²⁴⁹

Our approach to testing for the influence of knowledge is four-pronged. Let us briefly outline each step.

(1) First, as we have said, learning cannot take place without teachers, or the introduction of knowledge by knowledge-bearers. We are going along with the liberal assumption that “human agency lies at the interstices between systemic conditions, knowledge, and national actions.”²⁵⁰ At a basic level, we ask: *Are* there “teachers” in the field of small arms and light weapons? Their presence is not taken as a given. In other words, we conduct an “investigation” for small arms “teachers” in the two periods under study.

Let us be more specific. We *could* use the term “epistemic community” to refer to what we are seeking in each time frame. Peter M. Haas and numerous followers have written in the spirit of the logic we wish to pursue on teacher-like actors called “epistemic communities.” Epistemic communities are “network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain.”²⁵¹ These

²⁴⁹ Some scholars are not satisfied with this approach, however. They are those who believe that ideas *can and do* stand alone. Based on their acceptance of this premise, they see a focus on the carriers of ideas, rather than on ideas themselves, as skirting the issue. Albert Yee is one such critical scholar. “Unfortunately,” declares Yee, approaches that focus on knowledge-bearers “neglect [those] ideational qualities that enables ideas *themselves* to affect policies. Instead the causal effects of ideas on policies are displaced onto the political effects of experts.” And yet, whether or not one believes ideas float by themselves, one still runs into the problem of isolating them and measuring their impact! As Yee himself admits “the measurement of ideas poses particular problems for causal modeling.” For this reason, we have no qualms about the “displacement” he speaks of negatively. Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (winter 1996): 86. 73.

²⁵⁰ Yee, “Causal Effects,” 73.

²⁵¹ Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (winter 1992): 3.

groups are thought to serve as “channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country.”²⁵² Conceived broadly, in the way that Haas conceives “epistemic communities,” the members include a wide array of individuals and organizations and not just professionals and technical experts in the field --much like Fleck’s thought collective, he has said. However, because a “scientist” connotation clings to the term despite Haas’ efforts to keep it broad, we prefer (using a little freedom) a more generic or open-ended name: “knowledge collective”. In this way, activists can then be considered alongside scientists under the rubric of the term. For good or bad, there is increasingly little meaningful difference between intellectuals and transnational advocacy network members who work to advance ideas in many issue-areas today – they appear to act so much in concert, that to neglect one group would be wrong, and to separate the two, difficult.

(2) The second step is to inquire into the membership of “the knowledge collective” if one is to be found. How large is the group? The types and numbers of members reveal much about the level of resources, motivation and political capacity of the group and their information²⁵³.

(3) The third step is to identify the ideas of the community. What knowledge is being advanced? Knowledge, as we said before, is the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which a group shares. In addition to technical information, a knowledge collective may promulgate value-

²⁵² Haas, “Epistemic Communities,” , 27.

²⁵³ Ronda C. Zakocs and Jo Anne L. Earp, “Explaining Variation in Gun Control Policy Advocacy Tactics Among Local Organizations,” *Health Education & Behaviour* 30, no. 3 (June 2003): 360-34, 362.

laden knowledge in the form of principles and norms. Principles –like “slavery is unjust” or “free speech is a right,” – have a special role to play in the process of regime formation in situations of uncertainty. This is because “principled ideas enable people to behave decisively *despite* causal uncertainty. [They] can shift the focus of attention to moral issues and away from purely instrumental ones...” This means that even though issue-related experts may be divided on their plan of action, there is still room for knowledge to have effect. Such a line of thinking is important because not every knowledge collective finds itself in a position of unanimity. On this point, Jack Levy writes,

there may be some issue-areas for which a consensus may emerge among experts regarding causal laws (particularly with respect to technology, natural or biological science, or possibly some economic relationships), [but] that is the exception rather than the rule in security policy.

(4) Finally, we trace the activities of the knowledge collective to see what, if any, is its influence on decision-makers. A knowledge collective may cause decision-makers to learn and take action in several ways. At the most basic level, knowledge collectives have a potential impact on decision-makers simply by generating information. Decision-makers frequently do not know a great deal about the myriad issues they confront, and look to experts for answers. However, there is no guarantee that government officials will consult experts, unprompted. It often “...take[s] a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur [policy-makers] to seek help from a [knowledge collective.]” Particularly in international relations (that is, more so than in domestic politics), international

crises and shocks precipitate attention to an issue and generate a need for immediate information²⁵⁴. Experts on terrorism were quickly consulted and in demand in the wake of the September 11, 2001 events.

In some cases, information generated by a [knowledge collective] may in fact create a shock [in itself], as often occurs with scientific advances or reports that make their way into the news, simultaneously capturing the attention of the public and policymakers and pressuring them into action.

The discovery of the “ozone hole” over Antarctica in 1985, which became a driving force in negotiations to ban substances that deplete the ozone layer is a perfect example of this phenomenon. Not all examples are as “perfect,” of course. Depending on the nature of the issue-area, certain types of newly introduced information simply do not hold shock value.

Knowledge collectives may also influence policy-makers through the active *promulgation* of information, for example, through public awareness campaigns. Certain members of the knowledge collective may engage in advocacy. Lastly, various members of a knowledge collective may infiltrate the channels of political power (e.g. through the bureaucratic process) and generate change in that way.

Let us embark, now, on our investigation.

²⁵⁴ Dan Wood and Jeffrey S. Peake, “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting,” *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 1 (March 1998): 173-174. Wood and Peake give the following domestic examples of precipitating crises or important events that led to greater attention on an issue, and a need to seek out the advice of experts on that issue: the Martin Luther King “I Have a Dream” speech and civil rights, the thalidomide controversy and drug safety, the attempted presidential assassination of Ronald Reagan and gun control.

1945-1989: Cold War Silence

The words “small arms and light weapons” and “control” rarely passed through the lips of those working in lobby group offices in capitals across the world, in research institutes and in universities in the approximately fifty years that followed the second world war.

When people spoke of “arms control,” the expected understanding was “nuclear arms control.” When they said “disarmament” or even “general and complete disarmament,” it was assumed that the subject being discussed was the disarmament of major weapons²⁵⁵.

It was not as though small arms and light weapons did not pose a problem. They did. A gross misnomer applied retrospectively to the Cold War is “golden age of stability”. The years 1945 to 1989 were a golden age of stability, yes, for Europe, the Soviet Union and North America insofar as they suffered no direct military collision, but not so for Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East²⁵⁶. “Little wars” ravaged the Third World, fought for the most part with small arms and light

²⁵⁵ Take this snippet, for example, from a 1962 volume titled *Arms and Arms Control* by Ernest Lefever (New York, published for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research by Praeger, 1962) which shows the usage so very typical in the day of “arms control” and “disarmament” to mean – in automatic fashion – “nuclear arms control disarmament.” The excerpt furthermore reveals to us – in vivid manner due to the author’s excitement -- that even nuclear arms control and disarmament, as established and accepted as a field of inquiry and advocacy as it seems now, had a beginning: “The current upsurge of interest in arms control and disarmament in the United States is a remarkable phenomenon. Arms control has become a respectable, even fashionable, problem for discussion and study in the university and the research community. The growing stream of articles, pamphlets, and books, both scholarly and popular, threatens to overwhelm the concerned citizen whose desire to understand the complexities of world politics is sometimes pre-empted by his eagerness to do something now to prevent nuclear war. This new concern on the part of citizen and scholar coincides with the most serious and comprehensive disarmament effort the United States Government has yet undertaken.”

²⁵⁶ John Mueller, “The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble After the Cold War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 359-360.

weapons, circulating widely and without difficulty²⁵⁷. The use of mercenaries “held by no other bond than their own commodity,”²⁵⁸ illegal gunrunning, drug feuds, the targeting of civilians, the exploitation of children in war (as in the case of Iranian children being dispatched in waves over minefields, or the exposure of children to mental terror and physical abuse by Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge to produce “fearless little warriors”²⁵⁹) and other unsavoury practices related to these weapons were just as prevalent then as now. Small arms and light weapons also made their way into criminal activity with homicide rates in major cities across the world hovering as high then as now (highest in Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, the Philippines, South Africa, Zambia and the United States), with gang violence just as common, and with young demobilized men in post-conflict areas turning to armed banditry to survive as they are still found to do today. Due to the infiltration of weapons into daily life on both conflict and crime fronts, thousands across the globe in the post-war years knew no such thing as “freedom from fear.”²⁶⁰

Might we find, if we tried hard, signs of tentative fumbblings towards the beginning of a small arms and light weapons knowledge collective between 1945 and 1989? The answer is mainly no. To be sure, there were glimpses of mention on the subject here and there, outcries by lone spokespersons, evidence of semi-related discussion in intellectuals and activists circles...but one must not make too much of

²⁵⁷ Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004): 173-189.

²⁵⁸ Sir Walter Raleigh, quoted in Ulric Shannon, “Human Security and the Rise of Private Armies,” *New Political Science* 22, no. 1 (2000): 105.

²⁵⁹ Goodwin-Gill and Cohn, *Child Soldiers*, 93.

²⁶⁰ Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union address outlined four reasons for the United States’ support of the Allied nations in World War II - four basic freedoms to which all people are entitled: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

these fragments. They do not add up to signs of a “knowledge collective” in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons – and perhaps not even the roots of one. While other knowledge collectives made great headway, in nuclear and human rights spheres, for example, the world’s experts and protesters who might have had something to say on small arms and light weapons stayed silent. As we said in the Introduction to this paper, small arms and light weapons were the “forgotten weapons” in international relations –or “arms control’s orphans.”

The most obvious scene of neglect was in the arms control community. A key group of arms controllers – many attached to the RAND Corporation – including several “political scientists versed in history”²⁶¹ (Bernard Brodie, William Kaufmann and Alexander George) and mathematicians, physicists and economists (Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, James Schlesinger, Andrew Marshall, Henry Rowen, Malcolm Hoag, Carl Kaysen, and Daniel Ellsberg) “spawned much of the theoretical corpus that undergirded academic study of strategy during the cold war”²⁶². For the most part, these scholars did not concern themselves with “the political dimension of internal or civil war, and the operational dimension of irregular or subconventional war”²⁶³ – along with the weapons that fuelled such kinds of conflicts. Instead, the nearly single-minded focus was on nuclear weapons. The irony of so much brainpower being devoted to interstate war and nuclear weapons when “most of the conflicts that actually occur [and occurred

²⁶¹ Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” *World Politics* 50 (October 1997): 12.

²⁶² Betts, “Strategic Studies,” 12/.

²⁶³ Betts, “Strategic Studies,” 22. 22.

then] are of the other sorts”²⁶⁴ became somewhat apparent with the onset of the Vietnam War. These experts found themselves scrambling. “[A]s Colin Gray put it, the leading strategists knew ‘next to nothing’ about ‘peasant nationalism in Southeast Asia or about the mechanics of counterrevolutionary war.’”²⁶⁵ And yet the weak spot in their research was not thereafter corrected.

Military annuals systematically excluded data on small arms and light weapons. If one opens up old copies of *RUSI & Brassey’s Defence Yearbook* one will see full-page advertisements by the British Limbless Ex-Service Men’s Association: “We, the Limbless, Look to You For Help!” but, paradoxically, no mention of landmines or small arms in the contents, the weapons actually inflicting limblessness (and other injuries) on soldiers and civilians alike. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute occasionally contemplated tracking small arms, but never did²⁶⁶.

In the human rights sphere, those interested in security issues did not generally link small arms and light weapons with armed conflict. Torture, police brutality and other abuses inflicted by small arms did not raise a hue and a cry as they do today²⁶⁷. The subject of denying military and economic aid to regimes that violated the human rights of their citizens would reappear throughout the Cold War,

²⁶⁴ Betts, “Strategic Studies,” 22.

²⁶⁵ Colin Gray, quoted in David Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” *World Politics* 48 (October 1995): 124.

²⁶⁶ SIPRI ultimately decided not to focus on SALW in their arms transfer project in the 1960’s and the 1970’s (when they considered it) for two reasons. First, “unlike for major weapons, there was not enough publicly available information to get a complete picture of SALW transfers on a global level. [Secondly,] the SIPRI database was mainly to explain relations between friendly countries and to some extent the ‘military balance’ between unfriendly countries. Major weapon transfers were seen as the best indicator of friendly country-country relations and having the most impact on relations between possible adversaries.” Siemon Wezeman, Researcher with SIPRI, e-mail correspondence with author, February 28, 2005.

²⁶⁷ Jack Donnelly, “Rethinking Human Rights.” *Current History* 95, no. 604 (November 1996): 387-391, 387.

but never connected with small arms. In 1979, Amnesty International tried to start a project on small arms and light weapons, but the project did not get off the ground. Research and activism in domestic gun control was in-depth and steady, but never reached an international pitch. Public health experts and field workers with first-hand experience of the consequences of small arms and light weapons, including the International Red Cross, with its long history and special interest in the management of war-wounded had information to share, but that information was diffuse and uneven. Legalists devoted their attention to weapons that were indiscriminate or caused superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering (e.g. the dum-dum bullet), a category into which small arms (apart from landmines) did not readily fall.

Cold War journalists missed one of the bigger stories of the middle part of the century by not putting into words the crisis caused by small arms. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, deputy editorial page editor of *The Washington Post* in the mid-1980's came close with an article appearing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1986. The piece –“The Guns of July” – was an attack on the Reagan Doctrine of military intervention.

On a long hot day last June and then three straight days in early July, American foreign policy clicked into a new phase whose implications the nation is only beginning to explore. In rapid succession, the House of Representatives, dominated by the Democrats and until then an off-and-on check on the bent of a Republican President and Senate, took four signal votes. The House dramatically reversed itself and voted “humanitarian” aid to the contras in Nicaragua. It initiated the first open American assistance to the non-communist resistance in Cambodia. It repealed a ten-year-old legislative ban on military aid to antigovernment guerillas in Angola. And for the first time it publicly voted funds to sustain the resistance in Afghanistan²⁶⁸.

²⁶⁸ Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “The Guns of July,” *Foreign Affairs* 64, no. 4 (spring 1986): 698.

But what Rosenfeld glossed over, like so many of his colleagues writing in the same time and same vein, were the guns of the “guns of July” He and others did not evince, in a more to-the point manner, the on-the-ground costs of some of the policies of the United States (and the Soviet Union) for the citizens in the countries on the receiving end of this “military aid”. What they might have said, but did not, was this:

Many of the wars of the 1970s and 1980s saw the massive arming of poor countries with automatic weapons by the Cold War super-powers. Soviet arms flooded into wars from Ethiopia to Angola. The US arming of vigilantes and paramilitaries in ‘low-intensity conflicts’ bequeathed to many countries a vast proliferation of small arms, outside the control of the military, facilitating widespread violence and banditry²⁶⁹.

Peace movements furthermore failed to pick up the issue of small arms and light weapons²⁷⁰ in a significant way. In 1983, Edward C. Luck observed,

Compared to the tidal wave of public anxiety about nuclear weapons, conventional arms control has hardly stirred a ripple of concern. It still lacks a constituency during a period in which nuclear arms control has been gaining an enormous, if amorphous public following. While hundreds of thousands of Europeans, Japanese, and Americans have turned out for anti-nuclear rallies, conventional arms issues have lacked the emotional appeal necessary to attract wide public attention²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Edmund Cairns, *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Cost of War* (Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 1997), 33.

²⁷⁰ See James Hinton, *Protests and Visions: Peace Politics in 20th Century Britain* (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989); Pam Solo, *From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1988); Katsuya Kodama and Unto Vesa, “Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements,” (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990).

²⁷¹ Edward C. Luck, “Placing Conventional Arms on the Multilateral Agenda,” in *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative*, ed. Edward C. Luck (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 177.

Conventional weapons captured the attention of some faith-based groups (those involved with the anti-war movement) but small arms and light weapons were not part of their lexicon or thoughts. “I guess we saw the large [weapons] as the biggest and most obvious blasphemy and went after them,”²⁷² Reverend George Armstrong of the United Religions Initiative recalls.

The World Disarmament Campaign, organized by the United Nations in 1982 with the goal of worldwide disarmament education, did not succeed in the sense that the public did not become particularly informed about small arms and light weapons during the Cold War²⁷³.

Artists were part of the peace movement and they, too, seemed not to notice small arms and light weapons. Instead, the political inspiration for their outputs was, for the most part, the nuclear scare, and opposition to fighting in Vietnam. In the inventory of folk songs of a political bent – a genre that reached its zenith in the 1960’s and 1970’s, we find but one or two songs on small arms and light weapons specifically, apart from those dealing with the blows of violence in the civil rights movement and crime in general. One such song is “Handsome Johnny” penned by Richie Havens and Lou Gossett about a young boy who marches to every (U.S.) war there ever was, from the Battle of Concord, to Gettysburg, to Dunkirk, to Korea, to Vietnam, Panama, and onwards, carrying a different light weapon in his hand each time, as history also marches on --- from a musket, to a flintlock, to a

²⁷² George Armstrong, e-mail letter to author, 27 November 2001. In a memorable moment of the Cold War, a Quaker group from Philadelphia blockaded merchant ships carrying armaments (mainly aircraft parts) during the war of West Pakistan on East Pakistan.

²⁷³ Edith Ballantyne and Felicity Hill, “Lessons from Past UN Disarmament Education Efforts,” *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2001).

carbine, to an M-1, to an M-15, and so on...To show the endlessness and repetition of `Johnny's suffering, the refrain of the song is "It's a long, hard road."

Of course, we cannot be *too* critical of the above-mentioned players who committed these oversights. We have the advantage of time passed in this sweeping overview. (A critic in another field cautions, "[n]othing is more embarrassing today than when small-minded people, taking advantage of the fact they have been born later in time, venture to criticize those who first opened up paths along which we are now treading.") It will legitimately be remembered that a feeling of impending nuclear doom pervaded all thoughts in the Cold War, blocking out many others. The fear of entire cities being obliterated in less than an hour (in the thirty to forty minutes required for a ballistic missile to travel between continents), coupled with Britain (in 1952), France (in 1960), and China's (1964) acquisitions of nuclear weapons and the concern of spread to other states such as Israel, India, South Africa, and North Korea²⁷⁴ was palpable and understandable. Still, given the seriousness of this issue, and the implications of neglect, it is a "puzzle" that small arms and light weapons were forgotten altogether.

²⁷⁴ It should be noted, too, that nuclear public and knowledge collective interest was not a constant and not a preoccupation evenly dispersed across the globe (e.g. Latin America did not produce a very strong anti-nuclear knowledge collective)—the highs of interest occurred in the late 1940s, late 1950s, early 1960s and the 1980s. This lack of constancy/dispersal reveals that the absence of a knowledge collective on small arms/appearance of small arms regime during the Cold War cannot simply be explained by a total preoccupation with and dominant overlay of nuclear concerns (i.e. This information refutes the argument advanced by some that "of course" there was no small arms control regime [before the early 1990's] "*because it was the Cold War*"). Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975-78," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 4 (July 2003), 435-456. "By the early 1970s, relatively little remained of the once turbulent nuclear disarmament campaign. Many of the mass nuclear disarmament organizations of the past had disappeared, including West Germany's Struggle Against Atomic Death, Scandinavia's campaign against nuclear weapons, Switzerland and France's Movement Against Atomic Armaments, and Canada, Australia, and Ghana's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Others, like Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Canada's Voice of Women, and the USA's Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and Women Strike for Peace (WSP), had dwindled into tiny, marginal groups," 436.

1990-2005: Small Arms Knowledge Action

Things changed in the 1990's. Many writers observed a burst of knowledge collective activity on small arms and light weapons at about the same that new policy initiatives were unfolding on the issue. This is something we want to explore. However, before we can do that –before we can assess whether an actual knowledge collective on small arms has developed (and if so, what is its influence), we must first turn to an examination of *another* related collective, that of landmines – for it was information introduced on landmines by such a group that led to similar stirring on small arms.

There was a time, it will be recalled, when the words “landmines” and “ban” (like small arms control) had no currency in international relations. The public, militaries, experts, advocates, and government officials simply did not think of landmines as a problem. Yet, in 1997, as our readers are aware, a global regime was created to ban landmines –the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction,²⁷⁵ or the Ottawa Landmine Convention, as it is better known. For an area of concern in international relations to pass from being a subject most knew little about to the target of formal multilateral cooperation in a matter of years is quite remarkable. *How did this happen?*

The landmine example is proof that power politics explanations of change sometimes fall short. The landmine regime (in the form that emerged) came about despite superpower resistance. Major powers like the US, Russia and China were

²⁷⁵ 122 countries signed the treaty in December, 1997.

opposed to a landmine regime like the one that appeared (preferring a “go-slow” approach) and, in fact, tried to derail the “Ottawa Process”. Another way foreign policy changes occur, as we said at the beginning of the chapter, is through governments changing hands. While it is true, for example, that Britain’s announcement to work vigorously towards a worldwide ban came after the Conservatives (opponents of strict controls on landmines) were replaced by the Labour Party²⁷⁶, this case (amongst a couple of others) were isolated and could not possibly have accounted for the government turnarounds we witnessed *en masse*. Could it be that the states that chose to participate in the landmine regime *learned* that landmines were a problem through new knowledge introduced on the matter?

There is certainly quite a bit of evidence to support this hypothesis. At a minimum, there must actually *exist* a group of “educators” to disseminate information in the issue-area for the knowledge variable to be salient. By 1993 or 1994, we could say that there was. A multifarious set of groups and individuals – academics, environmentalists, physicians, human rights activists, children’s advocates, journalists, landmine survivors, development economists, clergy members, legal experts, veterans, security analysts and arms controllers – began to think, write and teach about landmines in that period. Most remarkable was the springing into action of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), initiated by six NGOs in 1992: the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (US), Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (US), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (UK), and Physicians for Human Rights (US).

²⁷⁶ Tim Butcher, “Labour Bans Landmines from 2005,” *Electronic Telegraph* 727 (May 1997).

These six groups would form the steering committee of the ICBL, with Jody Williams of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation as the co-ordinator²⁷⁷. A number of nations organized their own campaigns under the umbrella of the ICBL²⁷⁸. In time, the international network would build up a membership list of over 1,300 NGOs from seventy countries.

The knowledge on landmines being advanced was, in part, factual²⁷⁹. Some of the facts brought to attention were: landmines kill 500 people a week; an

²⁷⁷ Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, "The International Campaign To Ban Landmines," in *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, eds. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20-47.

²⁷⁸ For example, Mines Action Canada (the Canadian landmine campaign) is supported by agencies such as the Anglican Church of Canada, the Mennonite Central Committee, CARE, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, Oxfam Canada, Project Ploughshares, Science for Peace and the Working Group on Refugee Resettlement. It simultaneously aims to meet national objectives (through public outreach programmes, research, policy development and dialogues with the government and other parties) as it strives towards international objectives by working closely with the ICBL.

²⁷⁹ Knowledge, like knowledge about the landmine crisis, is accepted belief and not necessarily correct belief. Some of the information put forward by the ICBL and other involved persons in the lead-up to the ban was dubious. For example, the *Daily Telegraph* published the following comment by a former mine-clearer who believed that estimates of sown anti-personnel mines were politically manipulated: "The figures being bandied about have been arrived at by methods of which the general public know little. These figures are then written up in briefing sheets and passed on the journalists who accept them without question." There was also the question of the reconfiguration of certain arguments contrived to pack the maximum punch. The most widely observed instance of this was the refusal by some members to admit to evidence on the military utility of landmines. The 75-page International Red Cross Committee booklet *Friend or Foe? A Study on the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines* chronicled twenty-six conflicts in which mines were deployed, from World War II to the brief armed conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. Each conflict was said to have scarcely, or not at all, benefited from the use of mines. One grudging concession was made: "At best, these weapons had a marginal tactical value under certain specific but demanding conditions..." (ICRC, *Friend or Foe? A Study on the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines* (Geneva: ICRC, 1996). *Friend or Foe?* is footnoted in the majority of works on landmines, and has been labeled "the bible of the NGOs." In addition, "An Open Letter to President Clinton," published in the May 3, 1996 New York Times and signed by fifteen high-ranking retired military officers, including General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, stated that "banning [antipersonnel mines] would not undermine the military effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other nations." What is rarely acknowledged is that "before they signed it, they only got part of the story," according to one Pentagon source, adding that the officials were unaware that the statements in the letter would apply to self-destruct mines in addition to dumb mines. (Pentagon official, interview by author, Department of Defence, Notes, Arlington, Virginia, May 12 1997). This letter was to be frequently found framed in the offices of campaigners. To a lesser degree, members of the knowledge collective misrepresented arguments on the economic interest of landmines by emphasizing the small number of companies that relied on landmine production for their financial well-being, and de-emphasizing the lucrative possibilities of scatterable mines and

estimated 100 million anti-personnel landmines lie scattered in over sixty countries; a landmine costs as little as three dollars, but as much as \$300 to \$1,000 per mine to clean up, using local deminers; the annual number of AP mines (in the mid-1990's) being deployed was at least 1 million; in the same period only 100,000 were being cleared which meant at that time that it would take 1,100 years to complete the world's task of de-mining if no more mines were placed. A main point repeatedly raised was that these weapons are unable to distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of a child²⁸⁰. It was found that the victims most commonly afflicted were unsuspecting children at play²⁸¹, women gathering firewood or farmers in their field – people living far away from battlefields. Unlike a bomb or artillery shell, which explodes when it hits its target, a landmine lies in wait, sometimes long after the fighting has ceased. The socio-economic costs of landmines were also laid bare. A stream of articles written by concerned physicians discussed the egregious injuries resulting from mine fragmentation on soldiers and civilians, for example²⁸². Also, texts by legal scholars began to accumulate in journals such as the *Fordham International Law Journal*, the *Georgia Journal of International Law*, and the *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, generally emphasizing the idea that the

delivery system accessories. But a large number of experts donated a body of knowledge that was informed and reasoned. And in a certain sense, the inflation of figures like the number of sown mines, if indeed they were exaggerated, was of minimal consequence. One had only to travel to Cambodia, Mozambique or Croatia to witness the devastation characteristic of mine-infested areas to believe that there was a crisis.

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997); Kevin Cahill, *Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Landmine Crisis* (New York: Basic Books and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).

²⁸¹ Many children mistake mines for toys.

²⁸² See James C. Cobey, Eric Stover and Jonathon Fine, "Civilian Injuries due to War Mines," *Techniques in Orthopaedics* 10, no. 3 (fall 1995); R. M. Coupland, "The Effects of Weapons: Surgical Challenges and Medical Dilemma," *Journal of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh* 41 (April 1996); Jody Williams, "Landmines: A Global Socioeconomic Crisis," *Social Justice* 22, no. 4 (1995).

way in which AP mines were used already rendered them illegal by the standards of customary and treaty law²⁸³.

Some of the knowledge being put forward was principled in nature. What “messages” did the body of knowledge contain? Aside from a call for increased resources for demining and victim assistance, there was only one: a total ban “without exceptions, reservations or loopholes”²⁸⁴ on the production, use, stockpiling, and export of anti-personnel mines was needed. That the message was simple and singular in scope aided the community in the transfer of knowledge.

Of the three possible avenues for influencing governments, the landmine knowledge collective used them all. Firstly, they were assiduous generators of new information, researching and uncovering data that the world did not know about before. Secondly, the group actively promulgated the information through public awareness programs. Reports were circulated, conferences held, Internet sites posted. Documentaries like David Feingold’s *Crucial Steps: Landmines in Cambodia* (1995), *Silent Sentinels, Cowards War* (1995), *Terror in the Mine Fields* (1996) and *Small Targets: Landmines and Children in Mozambique* (1997) brought the reality of life with landmines in developing countries home to the North²⁸⁵.

Many members of the knowledge collective engaged in hard-hitting advocacy. Anti-landmine demonstrations were popular (typically involving the

²⁸³ See Paul J. Lightfoot, “The Land Mine Review Conference: Will the Revised Land Mine Protocol Protect Civilians?” *Fordham International Law Journal* 18, no. 4 (April 1995); Jack H. McCall, Jr., “Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare,” *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 24, no. 229 (1994); Peter J. Eckberg, “Remotely Delivered Land Mines and International Law,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 33, No. 1 (1995), among many others.

²⁸⁴ Jody Williams, quoted in Celina Tuttle, “Action Alert: Canada Must Stand Firm for a Total Ban,” (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, July 8, 1997).

²⁸⁵ The British Parliament and U.S. Congress had viewings of some of these films.

erection of piles of shoes in remembrance of the victims across the world who had lost a limb or life to landmines)²⁸⁶. The ICRC, for the first time since its inception, mounted a political campaign, running public service announcements on national medias (daily broadcasts on Russia's three national television stations, billboard advertising in Switzerland and the United Kingdom – in total reaching a potential audience of over 600 million). One print advertisement produced by the ICRC showed a line-up of crutches and prosthetic legs and read: "Forget London, Paris and Rome. This is What the Women in Phnom Penh are Wearing." Another chilling slogan read "Civilized Countries Are Supposed to Lock Away Child Killers, Not Export Them." Testimony by landmine survivors added a human dimension to the campaign. In conjunction with the ICBL, the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children organized a 1996 Landmines Awareness Speaking Tour in which survivors aged four to fifty-six toured cities and towns and spoke to the public. The ICBL had a "poster child" – an eleven-year-old named Elsa Armindo Chela who had, while picking mangoes in the Angolan central highlands, lost an eye, a leg and her cousin. Her face, and the story behind it, became a symbol of the suffering of children caused by landmines. Tun Channareth from Cambodia, another landmine survivor, helped circulate a worldwide petition to ban landmines, which received over two million signatures. In addition, a number of high-profile personalities lent their name to the cause. No one can forget the late Princess of Wales's visit to Angola, where she was captured on camera stepping through a minefield and speaking with crippled victims. "My purpose," she said, "was to draw

²⁸⁶ Demonstrations took place, among other locations, at Lafayette Peace Park opposite the White House at the Parvis du Trocadero in Paris, and outside Alliant Tech Systems, the largest producer of landmines in the United States in Hopkins, Minnesota.

world attention to this vital but hitherto largely neglected issue. Anyone would be drawn to this human tragedy and therefore I hope you will understand why I wanted to play my part in working towards a worldwide ban on these weapons.”²⁸⁷ Prominent Canadian musician Bruce Cockburn contributed royalties from his record company Ryodisc towards the cause and composed a stirring song titled “Mines of Mozambique.” The UN secretary-general, Pope John- Paul II and Nobel Peace Laureates, Mairead Maguire of Northern Ireland, Lech Walesa of Poland, Reverend Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa, Oscar Aria Sanchez of Costa Rica, Elie Wiesel of the United States, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma and Rigoberta Menchu Tom of Guatemala added their voices by giving their endorsement to a ban, raising the profile of the issue. Finally, members of the knowledge collective infiltrated the political and bureaucratic process through networking, befriending allies in government, and serving as official observers (in the case of the ICBL) at the Ottawa Process meetings.

We know that the collective of landmine specialists and advocates captured the attention of the public. An outpouring of public sympathy and interest tells us this (e.g. popularity of “Adopt a Minefield” programs, “landmine essay contests” for schoolchildren, etc. and overall awareness). However, whether the collective captured the attention of policy-makers to the point that they not only learned that “something must be done about landmines”²⁸⁸ but that they *did* something is

²⁸⁷ Princess Diana, quoted in Roxanne Roberts, “From London, a Blitz With Glitz,” *Washington Post* (June 18 1997), D1.

²⁸⁸ It has been suggested that the in-the-face tactics of the knowledge collective – the portrayal of “first-hand and graphic experiences of human tragedy” triggered the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance in some leaders, forcing them to abandon old views of landmines as “weapons of no particular ill repute”. “The difficulty of not feeling repelled by the tragic images of the effects

another question. According to the results of a survey administered by a group of Canadian researchers and distributed to delegates at the Ottawa conference, the influence of the knowledge collective in shaping the decisions of governments was substantial. Prompted to list the factors that influenced their country's decision to sign the Convention, delegates most often cited "pressure exercised by NGOs."²⁸⁹

A further gauge of influence is the public acknowledgements of the role of the knowledge collective in shaping decision-making by those governments opting for a ban. Mozambique's foreign minister, for instance, said,

The government took its decision [to join the Ottawa Process to ban anti-personnel landmines] because of the mobilization work undertaken by the Mozambican Campaign against Landmines. The campaign collected 100,000 signatures from citizens who thought that antipersonnel mines should be banned throughout the world. They spoke with me. The head of state received them. They were received by other members of government. They told us what the aims of the campaign were, and we thought we should support them²⁹⁰.

Finally, many scholars point out that the group so effectively stigmatized mines (by depicting their horrifying effects and indiscriminate nature) that they, in effect, created a new norm in international relations on the interdiction of anti-personnel mines by which government now feel bound. Even governments that

of mines meant that many decision makers who had to take responsibility for those consequences may have been particularly susceptible to moral persuasion," Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, no. 3 (summer 1998): 623, 617, 623.

²⁸⁹ Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin, "To Walk Without Fear," in *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, eds. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), 10.

²⁹⁰ Leonardo Simão, quoted in Human Rights Watch, *Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), 101

have not signed onto the landmine ban have felt compelled to try to rationalize their stance²⁹¹.

The landmine knowledge collective set the stage for the entry of *another* knowledge collective, one that interests us even more. At the closing ceremony of the Ottawa Landmine Convention, some interested parties already began to ask the question: “What’s next?”²⁹²

The “next” big issue on the humanitarian/arms control agenda would become small arms and light weapons. In the mid to late 1990’s, we began to see the burgeoning of a community of people willing to tackle those other weapons that wreak havoc in societies across the globe. Today we can affirm, without hesitation, that a lively knowledge collective on small arms and light weapons now exists.

Geraldine O’Callaghan and Brian Wood note the reversal in tide:

Enlightened politicians and officials are awakening to the fact that hundreds of millions of small arms and light weapons are in circulation, accumulated through decades of irresponsible trade and Cold War giveaways. A new climate of opinion is emerging in the West, as pictures of child soldiers and dead and wounded civilians are beamed onto television screens and as foreign holiday destinations are declared non-go zones. Organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have raised awareness, too, by exposing the use of weapons against civilians. Developmental, humanitarian, and other agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, are calling for much stricter limits to the trade²⁹³.

Who belongs to the small arms and light weapons knowledge collective?

²⁹¹ See Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights.”

²⁹² A working session on small arms and light weapons was held during the proceedings of the Landmine Convention conference.

²⁹³ Geraldine O’Callaghan and Brian Wood, “Wheeling and Dealing,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1999): 52.

As was the case for the landmine community, membership is eclectic. Members are once more academics, environmentalists, physicians, human rights activists, children's advocates, journalists, survivors of small arms and light weapons, development economists, clergy members, legal experts, veterans, security analysts and arms controllers – but also, gun controllers, specialists in the area of communal conflicts, criminologists, and anti-violence and anti-terrorist experts.

Spearheading knowledge collective activity is the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), headquartered in London (with local coordinators in New York, Brussels and Rio de Janeiro)--a global network of nearly 500 non-governmental organizations from 100 countries (among them groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Saferworld, Oxfam, the British American Security Council, Physicians for Global Survival, the Arias Foundation, the World Council of Churches and Viva Rio). Currently, the leader is Rebecca Peters, a lawyer, professor, and specialist of gun control issues²⁹⁴.

How did IANSA get its start? Not a week had passed after the signing of the Ottawa Landmine Treaty (December 1997) before a group of NGOs – twenty-three representatives in all, many whom had been implicated in the landmine issue - - met in Washington to discuss options on how they could involve themselves in the small arms problem. The groups present were Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi, International Alert, Saferworld, BASIC, World Vision and the Federation of American Scientists. Two months later, another, similar, meeting was held in London. This time, a greater number of European NGOs were

²⁹⁴ Formerly, the leader was Sally Joss, who had previously headed Oxfam's cut conflict programme.

brought into the fold of discussions. Brainstorming continued in Johannesburg in May 1998. “[R]epresentation [at the Johannesburg meeting] was very different than at the Northern meetings,”²⁹⁵ comments Keith Krause. The South African locale drew a number of development and faith-based groups into the circle interested in small arms (which until that point had been dominated by disarmament and conflict groups).

At the same time as these meetings were unfolding, a “virtual” pre-campaign on small arms came into existence. We say “virtual” as the entity really only existed in cyberspace in the form of a website maintained in a small office in Monterey, California. We use the term “pre-campaign” to signify the fact, in the words of William Godnick, then the operations director, “We [were] not [a] global campaign, we [were] trying to organize groups to create a campaign.”²⁹⁶) The preparatory campaign was called “Project PrepCom” or the Preparatory Committee For a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The goal was to “provide a ‘place’ for NGOs and other interested individuals [to] meet and access all of the information on the subject with the intent of organizing a coordinated and global effort to address the spread and unlawful use of small arms and light weapons”²⁹⁷ The idea came from Professor Edward Laurance of the Monterey Institute of International Studies who suggested it at the meeting in Washington. Within a month, the project was up and running, with Laurance (as executive

²⁹⁵ Krause, “Norm Building,” forthcoming.

²⁹⁶ Bill Godnick, quoted in Sue Fishkoff, “Fewer Guns, Fewer Deaths: MIIS Website Trying to Organize Campaign for Small Arms Control.” *Coast Weekly*. 23 April 1998 [article online]; available from <http://sand.miis.edu/about/news/coastweekly.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 November 2001.

²⁹⁷ Edward Laurence, “Message From Prep Com Administrator Ed Laurance”(November 1998), PrepCom materials; <http://sand.miis.edu/about/>.

director),²⁹⁸ Godnick, webmaster Dan Budiharjo and a group of keen students at the Monterey Institute nurturing it²⁹⁹.

Project PrepCom was significant in the trajectory of the development of a knowledge collective on small arms and light weapons. It got people on board. And it facilitated the networking of groups and individuals working on small arms issues with each other from all over the world— even those who could not afford to attend the swirl of international meetings. An excerpt from a 1998 article (written when PrepCom was still in existence) explains this point:

Many NGOs in developing countries don't have a budget to send representatives to international meetings, Godnick says. But they all have computers, and access to the Internet. "Even if they're working on old 386s," he notes. "We can set up virtual conferences in real time, or enable them to 'take part' in meetings happening in other countries." In order to enable all computer-users to access their Website, the Prep Com folks maintain two versions of the site: one with full graphics, for all computers, and a text-only Website that can be downloaded by 386 computing systems using older software.

²⁹⁸ Keith Krause has said, "Although singling out individuals is invidious, Ed Laurance's role in advancing this issue, especially as the force behind prepcom.org, should be underlined, especially since he does not represent a major NGO interest, but is an academic at the Monterey Institute. Laurance was present at all three of the meetings noted above (Washington, London, Johannesburg), offered opening 'briefings' at two of them, and he was the first to promote the idea of an international 'Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons.' This idea did not meet universal approval in the NGO world, and was subsequently dropped." (Krause, "Norm-Building," 14.)

²⁹⁹ Project PrepCom had a home within a home at the Monterey Institute (MIIS)— a research center called the Programme on Security and Development (SAND), which was previously the Programme for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC). The official mission of SAND (now defunct) was to "document, investigate and consult on practical measures that can be undertaken to improve security and the conditions for basic development in the regions of the world affected by the proliferation and indiscriminate use of small arms and light weapons". PrepCom had a budget of \$160,000 US. Funds were provided by the governments of Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Japan as well as the Ploughshares Fund, MacArthur, Arca, Winston and Riordan Foundations. Projects SAND was involved in other than Project PrepCom included: the development of a small arms/ light weapons field guide in conjunction with the Bonn International Project Center for Conversion (BICC), the monitoring of small arms proliferation in Central America and the creation of a "Geneva 2001 Database" of official statements made and action taken by governments leading up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects.

The ease of access to the Internet levels the playing field between participants. A small NGO in sub-Saharan Africa can post documents and photographs of its activities just as easily as the US State Department, and get its message out to the world community easily and effectively.³⁰⁰

Proving that “if you build it, they will come,” twelve individuals and NGOs signed onto Project PrepCom right away. By 1999, there were over 200 Project PrepCom members, all interested in thinking, writing and doing something about the problem of small arms and light weapons.

In August 1998, forty-five individuals representing thirty-three organizations from eighteen countries (eight from Northern countries and ten from Southern countries) met for three days at Lake Couchiching near Orillia, Ontario. It was here where it was agreed that an international NGO network was in order. During the meeting, a campaign document was “hammered out” that would serve as the founding document of IANSA³⁰¹. According to one participant, “we were told to lock ourselves in a room for a few days and come out with [a founding statement]”³⁰² The meeting was sponsored by the Canadian government and the Ford Foundation and organized by the Canadian-based Project Ploughshares group. The steering committee for the drafting of the document was mainly academic.

The steering committee moved forward in Brussels, in October 1998, where the scope and nature of IANSA was decided upon. One hundred and eighty

³⁰⁰ Fishkoff, “Fewer Guns.”

³⁰¹ Project Ploughshares, “Controlling Small Arms: International Action Network Established.” *Ploughshares Monitor* [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mons98f.html>; Internet; accessed October 14 1999.

³⁰² Krause, “Norm-Building,” 17-18.

individuals representing over 100 NGOs were part of the decision-making. “[A] unique sense of purpose,” came out of Brussels. “[A] conviction that working together, the international NGO community could bring about constructive change”³⁰³ was shared. In May 1999, IANSA was officially launched at the Hague Appeal for Peace³⁰⁴.

Several national campaigns and action networks have been put together in conjunction with IANSA. They include the French Campaign (“Small Arms: It’s Time For Us to Call the Shots!”), a Spanish Campaign (“Farewell to Arms: Campaign to Control Small Arms”), a Southern Africa Action Network on Small Arms (SAANSA), a Togolese national network (La Coalition de la Société Civile Togolaise de Lutte Contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et pour La Paix), a Congolese Action Network on Small Arms (RECAAL), an Argentinian national network (Red Argentina para el Desarme), a Japanese Action Network on Small Arms (JANSA), a Serbian national network (Mreza za Mirovnu politiku) and the Small Arms Working Group of the United States. However, these campaigns operate more loosely under the umbrella of the network than national campaigns did under the ICBL. Campaigns organized along other lines, that is, not based on nationality, exist: an IANSA Ecumenical Network, Women’s Caucus, Children’s Caucus, and Humanitarian Coalition.

Quantitative information brought forward to date by the knowledge

³⁰³ IANSA, *Founding Document* (May 1999), 1.

³⁰⁴ It was at this point that Project PrepCom’s resources were transferred to IANSA; International Action Network on Small Arms, “IANSA at the Hague Appeal for Peace,” available from <http://www.gn.apc.org/sworld/news&views/iansa.html>; Internet; accessed October 26 1999.

collective includes the following facts: the human toll caused by small arms and light weapons in the ten years since 2005 is over six million, greatly surpassing the toll caused by weapons of mass destruction. Civilian percentages of casualties range between thirty and ninety per cent. Small arms kill one person per minute in the world. The total number of firearms in global use outside the control of police and security services is estimated at between 500 million to a billion; over 100 million military-style assault rifles exist at large³⁰⁵.

Qualitative information on small arms has also grown exponentially in the 1990's. To date, it has served to illuminate 1) the causal factors associated with the supply of light weapons 2) the causal factors related to the demand for light weapons; and 3) the impacts of light weapons on communities and development.

[O]ne of the most important (if not catalytic) research studies was sponsored by Human Rights Watch, an internationally-recognized human rights NGO that had hitherto done little work on arms and conflict issues. This study documented the role played by outsiders in supplying arms to the Rwandan genocide and achieved a considerable profile, if measured by the subsequent launching of governmental or United Nations inquiries into arms transfers to the Great Lakes region³⁰⁶.

Key work on the impact of small arms and light weapons has been generated by physicians, including members of groups like Physicians for Global Survival and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and experts on children's rights have documented the extreme psychological trauma experienced

³⁰⁵ See <http://www.iansa.org>.

³⁰⁶ Krause, "Norm-Building," 12.

by children who are victims of violence or who kill others as child soldiers³⁰⁷. The International Red Cross has focused on “arms availability and the situation of civilians in armed conflict.” Interestingly, pilots have recently offered new insights into the clandestine trade in small arms (to complement earlier work by investigative journalists and other researchers on the underworld of arms brokers and middlemen, a world of illicit gunrunning which experts, advocates and governments increasingly recognize must be fissured).³⁰⁸

A series of briefings forming part of a series called *Biting the Bullet*, published by three British NGOs (the British American Security Information Council, International alert and Saferworld) have gained a reputation for containing solid information on the small arms issue in all its dimensions, as has a new annual titled the *Small Arms Survey*, the brainchild of Professor Keith Krause at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

The principled message of the small arms and light weapons community is not as simple as that of the landmine knowledge collective. IANSA is really a “campaign of campaigns.”³⁰⁹ The problem is not one problem but many problems.

³⁰⁷ For example, see Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, “Aiming for Prevention: The Scourge of Small Arms and Light Weapons,” International Medical conference on Small Arms, Gun Violence and Injury, (September 28-30, 2001), <http://www.ippnw.org>; Accessed February 21, 2005.

³⁰⁸ Pilots have shared their experiences of being approached by arms brokers who offered them large sums of money to fly weapons into conflict zones, or instances of when they became aware only after the fact that they had delivered an illegal shipment. For example, “In 1994, a private company in Britain hired Capt. Mike Selwood to fly a batch of arms to government troops in Goma in eastern Congo. ‘I and the crew absolutely thought these guns were for Zaire,’ Selwood told [the audience at a news conference at the United Nations on March 26, 2001], using Congo’s former name. Instead, he now believes they went ‘straight over the border’ to the war in Rwanda and into militia hands”³⁰⁸. (“Pilots Shed Light on Clandestine Trade of Small Arms,” (March 26, 2001); [article on-line]; available from <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/03/26/un.clandestine.arms.ap/index.htm>; Internet; accessed April 19 2001.)

³⁰⁹ Grillot, “Emergence and Effectiveness,” 20.

Consider the multiple aims. On restricting the supply of weapons, they are: (1) controlling legal transfers between states; (2) controlling the availability, use, and storage of small arms within states; (3) preventing and combating illicit transfers; (4) collecting and removing surplus arms from both civil society and regions of conflict; and (5) increasing transparency and accountability. On reducing the demand for small arms and light weapons, they include: (1) reversing cultures of violence; (2) reforming the security sector; (3) creating norms of non-possession; (4) enhancing demobilization and reintegration programs; (5) halting the use of child combatants; (6) combating impunity; and (7) tackling poverty and underdevelopment³¹⁰.

In general, however, members of the small arms knowledge collective are in agreement that the misuse, destabilizing accumulation and excessive proliferation of light weapons can no longer go unchecked – that is their principled message. They are concerned that “governments will take a piecemeal approach.”³¹¹ Due to such a concern, members stress co-ordination of issues and transnationalism.

The small arms knowledge collective is presently busying itself in several ways that have conceivably already had an influence on governments. Firstly, the members devote much of their time to the generation of information as shown above. As we mentioned elsewhere, information uncovered by a knowledge collective can sometimes create a shock that brings governments to attention. Although this happens more often than not in the realm of natural sciences (an article on the cure for a disease appears in a medical journal, for example, causing

³¹⁰ IANSA’s aims as synthesized by Grillot, “Emergence and Effectiveness,” 19.

³¹¹ IANSA *Founding Document*, 2.

ripple effects...), shocks have been known to happen in realms that do not involve information in the natural sciences. Some say that newly released information on landmines was enough to produce a shock of this nature. (According to Richard Price, “[t]he case of AP landmines confirms the oft-argued thesis among international relations scholars that the perception of a crisis or shock is a crucial factor in precipitating ideational or normative change”³¹²). In contrast, there has been no *one* revelation or event that has precipitated a shock of equal value in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons, but this may have more to do with the complexity of the issue (difficult to convey in short, shock-like, “sound byte” terms) than its degree of severity. Small arms and light weapons actually cause *graver* damage than landmines –their impact on society is more widespread, and they result in more deaths per year³¹³.

Many members of the small arms knowledge collective actively *promote* their ideas whether through public awareness or advocacy, although it has been suggested that advocacy has not been as hard-hitting as it could be.

³¹² Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights,” 622.

³¹³ The fact that we live in a world of “mini-holocausts” has apparently not been enough to create the needed global shock. Cairns, *A Safer Future*, 5. It is important to add, however, that domestic crises, including scandals, have spurred domestic action on small arms control in certain countries. The so-called “Wazan debacle” in South Africa “was a diplomatic embarrassment” for the newly democratic state. This 1994 debacle, which involved the shipping of 10,000 AK 47 assault rifles, 15,000 G3 rifles and one million rounds of ammunition to Yemen (then at war) from South Africa (via Lebanese agent Ali Wazan) led to the creation of a commission on decision-making procedures, international obligations, and the weapons trade. Former President Nelson Mandela, who appointed the judge to lead the commission, pronounced, “Our morality as a democratic government dictates that we have to act in accordance with internationally acceptable norms and standards...In our approach to the sale of arms, we are resolved to act responsibly for the purpose of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country, not to undermine any considerations of humanity nor to suppress the legitimate aspirations of any community.” Xolani Skosana, “Arms Control, South African Style: The Dynamics of Post-1994 Arms Export Control Policy,” Institute for Security Studies, ISS Paper 62 (October 2001): 3-4.

Consider advocacy at the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms In All Its Aspects in July 2001, for example. As Aaron Karp notes, the “real tone” of international conferences is frequently determined by NGO activities and their parallel NGO forums. “Often huge and raucous, these assemblies are given to shrill pomposity,” he writes.

It’s no wonder the news media greatly prefer them to the official meetings. Violent anti-globalization demonstrators in Seattle in 1999 totally eclipsed the meeting of the World Trade Organization they came to protest. The extremism of the NGOs can be ugly, but it also is uniquely fertile, giving birth to a rich spectrum of ideas which governments take and turn into something more palatable to the political center. This process was much in evidence six weeks later in Durban, South Africa, where the UN-sponsored World Conference Against Racism amid great excitement. The NGO Forum at the Small Arms Conference in New York, by comparison, was the most mild mannered in memory. Compared to the 4,000 activists in Durban, roughly 170 were accredited in New York. Durban deteriorated into farce. New York never rose above analytic sobriety³¹⁴.

Where was the creative protesting that was needed in New York? he wondered. “These [groups] were the inheritors of the 1980s peace movement, campaigners against NATO Pershing-2 and cruise missile deployments, and sponsors of the nuclear freeze”— but, he felt, they showed none of the same pizzazz.³¹⁵

We agree, but offer some additional observations.

First, it is not true that the NGOs did *nothing* exciting at the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference. An international rally against gun trafficking, “Guns Know No

³¹⁴ Aaron Karp, “Laudable Failure: The UN Small Arms Conference,” paper presented at the International Studies Association-Southern Region, Salem, North Carolina, 12-14 October 2001, 3-4.

³¹⁵ Karp, “Laudable Failure,” 5.

Borders” was held at the Dag Hammarskjold Plaza. Organized by Amnesty International USA, the American Friends Service Committee, New Yorkers Against Gun Violence, and Silent March, it featured dance, poetry, a program of speakers “I Do Mind Dying!” giant, mocking puppets of President George W. Bush, then President of China Jiang Zemin (and other leaders from the Security Council member states), petition-signing, a silent vigil for victims and a display of gun victim’s empty shoes. Splashy posters were issued, T-shirts that read “SAVE LIVES, STOP GUNNRUNNING” were handed out, and delegates passed by display cases put up by various groups en route to discussions. At the session of the conference open to NGOs, members from a number of groups spoke out passionately on the issue. The leader of the Million Mom March, Mary Leigh Blek, whose son Matthew was shot dead in 1998, received thunderous applause when she rebutted the NRA’s position on small arms control at the conference³¹⁶.

Second, *outside and beyond* the conference, those members of the knowledge collective aiming to influence governments have employed some effective techniques. As far as getting information out, there is no shortage of websites devoted to small arms and light weapons and at any point in time, somewhere on the globe, a conference or seminar that either touches upon or fully

³¹⁶ The thousands of victims affected by small arms (injured, or relatives of the dead) have a hard time articulating interests because they have often have pressing life-and-death concerns to which they must attend (surviving). Many times victims are not politically active or involved citizenry on the issue. Also, “It makes no sense to expect people to be global citizens when they feel disenfranchised in their own polity.” (Edwards, *Future Positive*, 189). They are the “voices from the margins.” Dianne Otto, “The Third World and International Law: Voices from the Margins,” *Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law* (Washington DC: April 5-8, 2000), 50-52. At the same time, “victim leaders likely have strong incentives for encouraging their organizations to act politically due to their personal tragedies and desire to remedy the problem” and thus, it is argued, make a significant difference in public awareness. Zakocs and Earp, “Variation in Gun Control Policy,” 357.

addresses small arms and light weapons is either beginning or ending – such is the pace of these events. *Armed to the Teeth* (2000) and *Small Arms in Cambodia* (2001) are two documentaries that have been shown to governments and the public to raise consciousness of the issue.

The hosting of ceremonies to mark the public destruction of weapons (symbolic “Flames of Peace” or weapons bonfires) have become increasingly common and have captured media attention the world over.³¹⁷ In 2004, in the city of London, UK, families who have lost their children to armed violence used a steamroller to flatten 300 small arms and light weapons during the Global Week of Action Against Small Arms. During the same week, the Togalese public watched as more than 5,000 firearms were demolished. More than 1000 illegally owned weapons in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania were burned and over 18,000 surplus military firearms in Venezuela were destroyed³¹⁸.

Testimony by small arms victims has also proved to be a powerful tool – which IANSA promotional materials makes use of. “My name is Janet,” begins one such testimony,

I am sixteen years old and come from Alero in Gulu, Northern Uganda. I was a student in primary five. Sometimes in June 1994 at around 8:00am I was digging the compound at home when seven armed rebels came to our home...³¹⁹

³¹⁷ For example, a flame of peace burned at the Hague Appeal for Peace, and a public weapons destruction event took place in Durban, South Africa to coincide with a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in November 1999.

³¹⁸ IANSA, “The Year in Small Arms,” (2004), print-out.

³¹⁹ Janet, quoted in Liza Sekagya, “Girls Under Fire: True Life Story of the Plight of a Girl Child in Northern Uganda,” in *The Devastating Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Lives of Women: A Collection of Testimonies*, ed. Magdalene Hsien Chen Pua (International Action Network on Small Arms, IANSA Women’s Caucus, 2001), 1.

The story finishes with the young woman being raped, beaten, and having to watch other children being killed.

Some “big names” have been drawn to the cause. An Eminent Person’s Group was formed out of concern for the problem of small arms, Members --Robert MacNamara (former U.S. Secretary of Defense and past President of the World Bank) and Michel Rocard (former Prime Minister of France) among them --have lent the weight of their names to add weight to the issue. Seven heads of state officially support the Control Arms campaign, jointly run by IANSA, Amnesty International and Oxfam. The campaign collects “signatures” (in the form of faces – photographs posted on-line) for its petition to regulate the arms trade. This “Million Faces” petition now has over 200, 000 “signatories”³²⁰.

A number of Nobel Peace Laureates as well as actors Michael Douglas, Emma Thompson and Helen Mirren³²¹ have implicated themselves in the cause.

In 1999, Jose Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Laureate pronounced,

The extraordinary availability of small arms will, I hope, one day be looked back upon as one of the most paranoid, destructive and unbalanced periods in human history. How many Denvers and Dunblanes it will take before this comes to pass cannot be imagined. But until we *all* stand up and say that we will not countenance the market for these appalling weapons, the sad surety is that the unimaginable will happen again and again.

“In my role as UN Messenger for Peace, “ Michael Douglas said in 1998,

³²⁰To view the “Million Faces” petition, see <http://www.controlarms.org/>.

³²¹“Individuals Who Care,” *Disarmament Times: Small Arms Daily, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, NGO Committee on Disarmament, (July 11, 2001), 2.

I hope to add my voice to your calls for greater controls on small arms. Anyone who has witnessed the scenes of violent tragedy, from Kosovo to Colorado, that are beamed across the world on our television screens will know that we can no longer ignore this problem.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that the campaign *is* lacking in drama. Karp believes that the reason for this has something to do with the leadership of the knowledge collective, which has shown a tendency for being “better suited to evaluating ideas rather than inventing them.”³²²

With leadership coming mostly from American professors and British activists (themselves of an analytical bent), the new group [has] a decidedly academic flavor. Its strength is listening and organizing, not innovating and broadcasting³²³.

He brings up an important point, which raises a larger issue. Surely, the reader might ask, academics are not part of the advocacy wing of the small arms knowledge collective (along with NGOs like Amnesty International)? In fact, they are, and prominently so.

In the old way of seeing things, academics would remain neutral in the issue-area in which they specialized. But—to use an expression of Bob Dylan’s pointing to the spirit of this particular knowledge collective and which could be their motto: “you either got faith or you got unbelief, and there ain’t no neutral ground.” Issue-area politics, today, (not just in this case), have more and more a religious feel to it – information politics *is* vision politics. Contributing members to the knowledge collective, it would seem, (from what we have observed to date), are

³²² Karp, “Laudable Failure,” 3.

³²³ Karp, “Laudable Failure,” 3.

either “on board with the cause,” or they are not – including small arms specialists in research institutes and universities. Many academics have abandoned the old divide between facts and values, which used to testify to their scientific character.³²⁴

The downside (not only for science) is that academics, as seen here, are typically “quiet types” – not the best suited for “rattling the walls.”

In a way, the stripe of the member agitating for change does not *matter*, for *anyone* would have a hard time jazzing up the recommendations on small arms by the very nature of the issue’s intricacy. The recommendations, which have been described as “sensible but unexciting,” “disappointingly technical” –the kind that “might appeal to a persistent cop” but not ideal for “galvan[izing] public opinion”³²⁵ leave little room for re-arrangement. How does one insert the need for “legal reform to better regulate the gun trade and better accountancy for global small arms inventories³²⁶,” for example, into a memorable slogan? The moment one attempts to be bold – to move past these nuanced emphases – proposals become unfeasible, and members know this. It seems that the issue *demand*s that the knowledge collective be the “sober and analytical” lot that they are.

At this juncture, it should be noted that other campaigns in other issue-areas are also not that simple and still meet with success. One can become blinded by the dazzling success of the campaign to eradicate landmines. (By any standards, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is a tough act to follow. After all, it has

³²⁴ Johan Eriksson, “Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 3 (1999): 31-330. Critical/constructivist scholars are the most likely to observe and advocate at the same time as the school of critical studies has an “emancipatory goal” (for members to “reconstruct practices theoretically and in literal manner,”); the school is the “most explicitly concerned about the political responsibility” of scholars, 318-319.

³²⁵ Karp, “Laudable Failure,” 5, 3.

³²⁶ Karp, “Laudable Failure,” 3.

been referred to as “the single most effective exercise of civil society since World War II.”³²⁷ Jody Williams and the ICBL were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997). Initially, members of the small arms knowledge collective were prone to sighing in disheartened fashion that “this campaign will not be like that idyllically simple campaign of landmines (idyllic in hindsight) with its one message, one class of weapon to consider, one fast-track operation, one ban.” After a while, comparisons were dropped or mentioned less frequently as they were thought to unnecessarily reduce morale among members and hamper progress³²⁸. Yes, it was agreed, the small arms knowledge collective may owe its *impetus* to the landmine collective, but the two collectives in scope and task are “utterly different beasts.”³²⁹

Interestingly, to show that a complicated issue is not an unsolvable one, Natalie Goldring elaborates,

[t]he complex of U.S. initiatives in the area of automobile safety is an apt analogy for what campaigners against the misuse of small arms can hope to accomplish: a radical reduction in fatalities was achieved through a mix of stricter government regulations, public information, and technical improvements. Driving is still dangerous, but not nearly as dangerous as it was two or three decades ago before consumer advocates, anti-drunk-driving activists, and other interested citizens and governmental actors joined together to promote a broad array of traffic-safety measures. And while the effects of small arms proliferation are far more widespread and devastating than those of traffic accidents, the concept of crafting a multifaceted approach to put limits on dangerous behaviour is still instructive³³⁰.

³²⁷ Stephen Lewis, quoted in Human Rights Watch, *Still Killing*, 177.

³²⁸ See “Walking Together or Divided Agenda? Comparing Landmines and Small-Arms Campaigns.” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 2 (June 2001): 167-186.

³²⁹ Edmund Cairns, Senior Policy Advisor, Oxfam UK, interview by author, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 19 July 2001.

³³⁰ Natalie Goldring paraphrased in William D. Hartung, “The New Business of War: Small Arms and the Proliferation of Conflict,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 15, no. 21 (June 2001), 92.

Members of the knowledge collective have been able to infiltrate into bureaucracies and other political institutions. A surprising number of countries (Germany, Canada, South Africa...) include experts and NGOs as part of their national delegations in negotiating fora. Furthermore, though government-NGO consultations (Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs is known among NGOs as being the most receptive to "learning" from NGOs; the Department holds a great number of these consultations), the collective has had a chance to air its concerns and offer expertise. Direct contact with officials through lobbying also frequently occurs. At the UN Conference, members of IANSA stalked the lobbies and staked out the "Vienna Café" (situated outside the main negotiating room) in order to intercept as many diplomats as possible to plead their cause.

Has all this translated into action at the government level?³³¹ The answer to that, confesses Keith Krause, is hard to know, given the wide-ranging aims of the knowledge collective (and thus the wide-ranging possibilities for policy effects):

The practical and analytical problem with [a] broad action plan [as is held by the small arms knowledge collective] is that it is difficult to trace how the concrete measures that may emerge [or that have emerged already] have been influenced by the efforts of the IANSA coalition, unless it becomes more clearly focused on particular initiatives. The simple assertion that a wide range of NGOs think there is a problem does not necessarily mean action to address it can be traced to this assertion. Likewise, an open-ended agenda means that it is difficult to see how, in a specific context, NGO efforts to influence state policies and negotiations have any impact. For example, in the case of the campaign to ban landmines, the clarity of the

³³¹ The author sent out e-mails to over a hundred heads of states in the world asking each one what were the factors that influenced their current policies on small arms. As might be expected, however, due to the busy agendas of heads of states, the responses received were too few to put together a comprehensive review of self-declared views of policy-makers on the issue.

NGO goal (a total ban) provided a measure against which the evolution of state policies could easily be judged. No such measure yet exists in the small arms and light weapons context³³².

Still, we can see, at least at the level of rhetorical support, signs that governments are aware of, and are learning from, the knowledge collective. Here is a sampling of statements made at the 2001 United Nation Conference where the contributions of the collective were acknowledged:

The role of civil society is pivotal for a successful programme on small arms.”

--Jerry Ekandjo, Minister of Home Affairs (Namibia)

“We ...recognize the very valuable work done by civil society and non-governmental organizations...”

--George W. McKenzie, Ambassador to the UN (Trinidad and Tobago)

The small arms issue has been placed at the forefront in the UN and in the consciousness of governments, in no small part because of the work of NGOs and other members of civil society.”

--Jose. D. Lina, Jr. Secretary of Interior and Local Governments (the Philippines)

³³² Krause, “Norm-Building,” 20.

In lieu of a universal norm based on the stigmatization of small arms and light weapons (which can never be embraced because light weapons have legitimate uses in certain circumstances), the small arms knowledge collective has been advancing an agenda that is taking hold—even in its unwieldy complexity—in many governments. If it were possible to re-run the past few years in the absence of knowledge collective, we doubt that we would see the extent of global government activity on small arms that we do today. We know this, in part, because of the deafening silence from governments on the issue when no knowledge collective existed to teach the world about the small arms predicament and what could be done about it during the Cold War.

Conclusion

Amid the darkest reflections on international politics shine speckles of light. Those who carry the torches of hope believe that the sway of institutions, ideas, and knowledge in shaping the interaction of countries with one another is not negligible. These scholars belong to the tradition of liberalism. They hold a long-standing position in the pantheon of International Relations and it is their convictions that were explored here. Liberals forward that ideas, like poetry, both reflect and promulgate change. A shift in the “poetic world mind” was observed by Jon Stallworthy in his introduction to *The Oxford Book of War Poetry*:

Man’s early war-songs and love-songs were generally exhortations to action, or celebrations of action, in one or other field, but no such similarity

exists between what we now more broadly define as love poetry and war poetry. Whereas most love poems have been in favour of love, much – and most recent – war poetry has been implicitly, if not explicitly, anti-war. So long as warrior met warrior in equal combat with sword or lance, poets could celebrate their courage and chivalry, but as technology put ever-increasing distance between combatants and, then, ceased to distinguish between combatant and civilian, poets more and more responded to `man's inhumanity to man'³³³.

Shifts in the historic world mind have resulted in changes over time on a whole host of issues –we think differently about war, about slavery, about the rights of children, about colonialism – than we did ten, twenty, a hundred or a thousand years ago. We now think differently about small arms. We have learned of their troubling aspects.

In this chapter, we examined how ideas – like ideas on the need to impose controls on small arms – have been known to take flight in international politics, how new knowledge about global problems is brought to the fore by groups of experts in a variety of issue-areas and how new norms take effect resulting in the beginnings of regimes. It is the contention of this chapter that knowledge matters and that this variable was responsible for helping governments move forward in considering a small arms control regime.

³³³ Jon Stallworthy, ed., *The Oxford Book of War Poetry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), xix.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTEREST VARIABLE: COOPERATION IN THE BALANCE

The major task of this dissertation is to identify the conditions under which the small arms control regime began to emerge. What we see at present for small arms and light weapons is the dawn of a “negotiating/bargaining phase”. We are not there yet, precisely. But in the case of the initiatives that do exist – had it just been left up to power and knowledge, actual agreements on small arms would probably have never made it to the table without some consideration of factors that are conducive to negotiation. In this chapter, we try to determine whether interests in favour of a regime have played an important role in explaining the strong show of governmental action on small arms in recent years. Interestingly, as neo-liberal scholars have noted, states may be influenced by other states’ interests – the interplay of interests of all states (not just great powers) will be the focus of this chapter.

“Interest” is defined as “a benefit or advantage.”³³⁴ “Self-interest” is “one’s personal interest or advantage.”³³⁵ At the level of countries, self-interest is usually thought of and referred to as “national interest.” Whether national interests can be objectively defined is uncertain. “National interest” is a slippery concept. The crux of the concept, though, is that nations must look out for themselves. Statespersons

³³⁴ *Collins English Dictionary* (1979), s.v. “interest.”

³³⁵ *Collins English Dictionary*, s.v. “self-interest.”

must think of the needs of their nation before other nations in the international system³³⁶.

Anyone who has ever studied national interests and the process of cooperation will have most likely encountered at least one of the following analytical problems. A first problem is the danger of imputing interests *post facto* from the record of state behaviour. This is because it is difficult to know just how states will define their national interest at a given time with respect to a given issue. What are to a country's advantage can be many things. After an action is taken, it is easy to say that X was done "in the national interest." These kinds of statements can never be disproved: If a nation did something, it must have been in its interest (as if there were no other historical possibilities), which is not saying much at all³³⁷.

Another problem for the analyst studying national interests is being able to tally – in a decisive way – the costs and benefits of a foreign policy decision so as to be able to conclude that something is in a nation's interest. We are not talking about the near impossibility of being able to "look over a [statesman's] shoulder"³³⁸ to figure out how he or she processes information. Although divining the innermost

³³⁶ For discussions on the concept of national interest, see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 1996), Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, *Origins of National Interests* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), Moroslav Nincic, "The National Interest and Its Interpretation," *The Review of Politics* 61, no. 1 (winter 1999): 29-55, Fred A. Sondermann, "The Theory of the National Interest" in *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, ed. William Clinton Olson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990): 35-42 and Steven W. Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1995): 5-14.

³³⁷ Sondermann, "The Theory of the National Interest," 36.

³³⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5. A hope expressed by Morgenthau was that by using simplifying assumptions, we could actually read the statesman's mind: "We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself."

thoughts of a political leader *is* a dilemma for the analyst (for which there are few satisfying answers), what we mean to point out *here* is the complexity for the statesperson *him or herself* in drawing up a balance sheet of what actions to take. In Miles Kahler's words, "international politics imposes heavy information-processing demands on policymakers"³³⁹. Often, nations must "feel out" their interests by finding out what the interests of others are³⁴⁰. Sometimes the information they gather is incorrect (e.g. a state may not necessarily know another state's true priorities across issues). Also, it is difficult to predict outcomes for different alternatives (how choices will play out under changing conditions), regardless of the level and quality of information states may have.³⁴¹

Not only that, rare is a foreign policy decision *categorically* in a country's interest. Therefore, it is frequently misleading to say that something is in the national interest when most likely it is on some counts, but not all, and the decision could go either way. States find "rational logics for competing options"³⁴².

A fourth intricacy of studying interests is the curious puzzle of states not being able to cooperate even when it appears that they have strong common interests to do so. This is a strange but recurrent phenomenon in International Relations. In Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, comments Robert Keohane, "Romeo and Juliet have the same interest – to marry one another – but the inability of Friar

³³⁹ Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (autumn 1998), 926.

³⁴⁰ Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 163-178.

³⁴¹ John S. Odell, "Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy: The Nature of Decision-Making," in *Governing the World's Money*, eds. David M. Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). See also Michael Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 48-51.

³⁴² Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, 20.

John to deliver a message from Friar Laurance to Romeo leads to the failure of Friar Laurence's plan and the death of both lovers."³⁴³ In other words, the real dilemma is that nations often find it hard to act in concert- even when they would benefit from forging bonds! What conclusion is one to draw from this curiosity and how to allow for it in analysis?³⁴⁴

There is a tentative way to circumvent the above four impediments to analysis and still arrive at a meaningful picture of interests in the process of regime formation. The approach lies in focusing on the bargaining or negotiation process in an international setting to understand just how countries might become interested in a regime. This approach can serve as an important bridge to explanation. A key measure of a theory is its ability to explain real events in the real world. There is no way for us to make a balance sheet of all manner of interests confronted by, and held by, all statesmen contemplating a regime – let alone one statesperson or country! Therefore, we use simplifying assumptions. We specify, in this chapter, only the structure of the game (of negotiation) and the effects it creates. In our last chapter, we showed how interests can change, leading to a regime, through learning

³⁴³ Keohane, *After Hegemony*: 65-66.

³⁴⁴ This dilemma is usually attributed to the fact that, though there is a common zone of agreement, some parties may nonetheless wish to maximize their interests to the highest level, even at the risk of derailing the cooperation process. Also, although a common zone of agreement may exist, cooperation may be impeded based on the fact that parties are concerned about how cooperation on this issue may affect their negotiating positions on other issues (issue-linkage). Finally, while mutuality of interests may be present, trust may not be, ultimately preventing, cooperation from occurring. See Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), James K. Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties," *International Organization* 37 (Spring 1983): 281-316, contributions to Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, and the body of literature on game theory.

and new knowledge. Here we are less interested in how interests change as we are in how “the bargaining process itself is a potential source of change.”³⁴⁵

We hasten to add that since the small arms regime is just beginning to coalesce, we focus on what has been termed the prenegotiation phase. By that we mean, “the span of time and activity in which the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solution.”³⁴⁶ The starting point is “when one or more parties considers negotiation as a policy option and communicates this intention to other parties” and the ending point is “when the parties agree to formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation as a policy option.”³⁴⁷

Bargaining/negotiation theory in International Relations draws its inspiration from several sources: from neo-liberalism (the encompassing framework for this chapter), from collective bargaining (the process by which unions and employers arrive at and enforce agreements is similar to how representatives of countries arrive at and enforce agreements)³⁴⁸, from economics³⁴⁹, from the school

³⁴⁵ Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, “The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy,” *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (winter 1994): 78.

³⁴⁶ I. William Zartmann, “Prenegotiation, Phases and Functions” in *Getting to the Table: the Process of International Prenegotiation*, ed. Janice Stein (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1989), 4.

³⁴⁷ Zartmann, “Prenegotiation,” 4.

³⁴⁸ See Kenneth Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), William McCarthy, “The Role of Power and Principle in Getting to Yes,” in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, eds. J. William Breslin and Jeffery Z. Rubin, (Cambridge: The Programme on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1991), 115-122, and Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965).

³⁴⁹ See John A. C. Conybeare, “Public Goods, Prisoner’s Dilemmas and the International Political Economy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (1984): 5-22, Ken Binmore, Ken and Partha Dasgupta, eds., *The Economics of Bargaining*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) and Vernon L. Smith, *Bargaining and Market Behaviour: Essays in Experimental Economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

of foreign policy decision-making³⁵⁰, from rationalism³⁵¹, and game theory³⁵². Politics is in large part the art of attempting to evaluate correctly what others will do. Thus, it is understandable that the notion of “politics as a game” should have developed with a significant body of theory attached to it. This theory considers the plans, ploys, expectations, gambits, manoeuvres and so on that each state in a game of approximately 190 players (the world) uses to “win.” As in chess, players attempt to guess the strategy of others to compete properly³⁵³.

Before we arrive at an analysis of this negotiation/bargaining stage, it is meaningful to outline how studying interests in the issue-area of small arms is complex and ambiguous. What we are dealing with is a mixed-interest game. On the one hand, it is possible to see how cooperation in the issue-area of small arms is extraordinarily hard as tough vested interests *not to cooperate* on the part of states and individuals are present. On the other hand, formidable interests exist *for* states to join a regime. Even though we cannot operationalize the study based on these interests due to their heterogeneity (leading to a possible wrong conclusion of their impact on the evolution of a small arms regime), they can *inform* the analysis.

³⁵⁰ In particular, the journal *International Negotiation*, Fen Osler Hampson, *Multilateral Negotiations* (Baltimore: MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1999); K. J. Holsti, ed., *Why Nations Realign. Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); G. Snyder and P. Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations. Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); L. Neack, J. Heyand and P. Haney, eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995); B. White, “Decision-Making Analysis”, in T. Taylor (ed.) *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*, (London: Longman, 1978); and Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

³⁵¹ See Sidney Verba, “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System,” *World Politics* 1 (October 1961): 93-117.

³⁵² See T.C Schelling, “What is Game Theory?” in *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992): 318-346.

³⁵³ John W. Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play* (Congressional Quarterly Books, 1995), 8.

This chapter returns to a discussion of the bargaining process (the “working basis” for this chapter) once we demonstrate the extent to which the small arms issue is a deeply mixed issue. The rationales that states have *for* and *against* a regime are outlined in detail.

Analyzing Interests and Small Arms: A Mixed-Interest Game

Strong military, economic and political interests in the use, production, stockpiling, import and export of small arms make cooperation on controlling them difficult. Keith Krause offers a useful starting point to understanding the underlying motive forces at play in the production and export of conventional arms in *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade*³⁵⁴. His work is not specific to small arms. However, as researchers have only begun to examine the budding topic of small arms systematically, we find it necessary, in this instance, to reach out to the surrounding literature on major conventional arms and interests. This allows us to build up the theoretical base on small arms and interests and to help solve the puzzle of regime movement to curb the proliferation and use of such weapons. With certain caveats, we feel that it is indeed possible to extend Krause’s framework to our study. He divides the motive forces of states into three: power, wealth and war, with each motive corresponding to a “tier” or group of arms-

³⁵⁴ Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 22, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). This work was written in Krause’s previous theoretical incarnation – not as a present-day constructivist.

producing/transferring states. The first tier of states includes the United States, the Russian Federation and China. The second tier of states consists of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Canada, Brazil, India, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan³⁵⁵. The third tier of states consists of almost all other nations, such as Chile, Malaysia and Nigeria, engaged in the craft production of, acquisition of, and occasionally the export of small arms. Interestingly, like Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, there is an evolutionary hierarchy or ladder at play. Needs range from the basic "physiological" interests of states – or safety -at the bottom of the ladder to economic gain through to positional politics or "self-actualization" at the top. Only the most well-established arms-producing states have the luxury to think of loftier needs like the accrument of power and position in international society, as opposed to the more mundane needs related to state-maintenance with which less developed countries are preoccupied (winning skirmishes, economic well-being).³⁵⁶

Obviously, there is overlap (Krause does not pretend that there might not be – he considers the three categories "ideal types"); for instance, military, economic and political goals are not exclusive to any of the tiers of states.

As a case in point, one of the most commonly evoked interests in small arms control debates in support of the status quo has been raised by first, second and third tier producers/exporters/acquirers alike: military prerogative. When a country evokes this rationale it is to say that every country is entitled to self-defence in

³⁵⁵ Small Arms Survey 2003, 9-55.

³⁵⁶ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed., (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is interpreted by most states as a right to acquire or produce the means of self-defence and to transfer those means (weapons, including light weapons) to other states according to their security needs³⁵⁷.

Economics can be a concern for first tier states. Russia has recently been driven to maintain employment and infrastructure in its small arms industry by making a policy to group together all developers and manufacturers of small arms and light weapons under two large nationally-owned holding companies. They will become the Small Arms and Cartridges Corporation and the High-Precision Weapons Corporation³⁵⁸. Also, third tier states like Algeria and the Philippines use small arms production to increase the level of local skills and technological capability and to displace imports to save hard currency and improve the balance of payments.³⁵⁹

Finally, no country is completely immune to power politics with regards to small arms. France and the United Kingdom as second-tier states have historically supplied their former colonies with surplus small arms as a symbol of commitment to them. And many developing countries in the third tier –like Argentina - jostle for regional power, arming their neighbours or themselves with SALW to maintain a regional balance of power³⁶⁰.

Overlap is not so much a concern as the fact that the small arms trade has its own contours and peculiarities that are not like major conventional weapons. While

³⁵⁷ For a discussion of self-defence under international law regarding SALW, see *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 181.

³⁵⁸ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 15.

³⁵⁹ *Small Arms Survey 2002*, 17 and Krause, *Arms and the State*, 162.

³⁶⁰ See *Small Arms Survey 2004*.

Krause's model is sufficient to observe most of what we need to know about interests and small arms, it will be noted where the peculiarities of the small arms trade do not fall into the above rubric of tiers.

a) Main Interest of Tier-Three Arms Producing States: War

Krause lists "war" and self-defence as a major motivation for third-tier states to produce/acquire/use weapons. The main aspects at stake involved in this military-based rationale for weapons are:

- 1) guarantee independence of arms supply to ensure military security;
- 2) assist friends and allies to maintain an effective (and/or common) defensive posture against external threats;
- 3) substitute for direct military involvement;
- 4) maintain a defensive or offensive posture for direct military involvement.³⁶¹

On the first point, tier-three producers seek to manufacture light weapons to attain a level of self-sufficiency for their armed forces. The path of military industrialization through small arms production allows many (mostly developing) third-tier countries a certain safety net – that is, for military aims not to be hampered by international arms embargoes or other threats to small arms supply lines. Because military security is so important to third-tier states, these states sometimes feel they cannot let dependence on changeable ties with foreign suppliers impede national security affairs. The fear is of having some critical war matériel withheld in wartime. For example, when the weapons supply line from the Soviet Union became uncertain in the 1950's, Egypt initiated its own arms

³⁶¹ Krause, *Arms and the State*, 162.

industry³⁶². Further, when the US Congress passed the Kennedy Amendment in 1974 to ban US arms sales and security assistance to Chile, that country went on to develop its own means to small arms production (the state-owned company, *Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército*³⁶³).

Not all third-tier states can and do produce arms and thus find other ways to obtain light weapons (through import). Those that do produce light weapons often supplement their supplies with acquisitions from outside sources. The major powers remain an important source of weapons for third-tier states (though the Cold War patron-client system has dissolved and pure “giveaways” and subsidized security assistance are less common). But third-tier states have learned how to vary their suppliers to get what they want, through direct purchases on the international arms market. These purchases are often made from nearby states (Uzbekistan and Afghanistan helped fuel the conflict in Tajikistan with small arms³⁶⁴; Liberia supplied light weapons to Sierra Leone). Many other third-tier states buy from the former Soviet bloc and Eastern European countries (Yemen, Colombia, and Cote d’Ivoire all receive light weapons from the Czech Republic, Guinea from Georgia) or from second-tier states (such as Italy and Spain)³⁶⁵.

³⁶² Jurgen Brauer, “The Arms Industry in Developing Countries,” 6.

³⁶³ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 22-23.

³⁶⁴ Bobi Pirseyedi, *The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications*, *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Reports*, (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000), 52-56.

³⁶⁵ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 109-114 and David Kinsella, “Mapping the Small Arms Trade: Insights from Social Network Analysis,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association March 17-20, 2004, Montréal, 20-23.

Those third-tier states not in the throes of conflict still have an interest in arming as prevention against domestic and external attacks.³⁶⁶ They view small arms as integral to overall national defence. One author explains such a tactical motive as the “preemptive strategic motive.” “It runs as follows,” he says. “Even if no actual conflict involving the country is thinkable, a country may nonetheless wish to produce arms indigenously *just in case* a conflict emerges.”³⁶⁷ In general, though, poorer countries, which make up the bulk of tier-three producing states, are found to be three times at greater risk of war than other countries.³⁶⁸ Eight of the ten poorest countries in the world have recently experienced war; and 56% of the fifty poorest countries have experienced war in the past twenty years³⁶⁹. A country with a per capita GNP of \$250 has a fifteen per cent chance of experiencing conflict in the next five years.³⁷⁰ Seen in this light, preparing for war (and having the weapons to fight) is thus a brutal necessity for most of the third tier.

³⁶⁶ Marc V. Simon and Harvey Starr, “Two-Level Security Management and the Prospects for New Democracies: A Simulation Analysis,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (September 2000): 391-422.

³⁶⁷ Jurgen Brauer, “The Arms Industry in Developing Countries,” 6.

³⁶⁸ Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Macartan Humphreys, “Aspects économiques des guerres civiles,” *Revue Tiers Monde* XLIV, no. 174 (April/June 2003), 271; Devika Paul, “Ethnic Violence: Some Theoretical Issues,” *Paper Presented at the XVIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association* (August 1-5, 2000); Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” *World Politics* 54 (2001), 99-118.

³⁶⁹ J. Cartier-Bresson, “Comprendre et limiter les violences: une présentation,” *Revue Tiers Monde* XLIV, no. 174 (April/June 2003), 258.

³⁷⁰ Humphreys, “Aspects économiques des guerres civiles,” 272.

b) Main Interest of Second Tier States - Wealth

“The pursuit of wealth” is a “shorthand way”³⁷¹ to describe the economic forces governing second-tier countries interested in the production and trade of arms.

The main features of this slice of interest, according to Krause, are:

- 1) provide foreign exchange and positively affect the balance of payments;
- 2) reduce the cost of domestic weapons procurement through economies of scale in production;
- 3) maintain employment and infrastructure in defence-related industries;
- 4) recoup research and development expenditures; and
- 5) use military production as an engine of growth for economic development³⁷².

The pursuit of wealth is a dominant interest of second-tier states— middle-range countries like Belgium and Germany and the United Kingdom. These countries had a strong hand in the small arms trade during the Cold War. While the long-term viability of the largest arms-producing states is not in doubt, smaller second-tier arms-producing states are feeling reduced demand more acutely with the ever-growing number of suppliers (an increase of manufacturers of 25 per cent between 1985 and 1995³⁷³). Their ability to persevere in a rapidly more competitive and globalized arms marketplace is being challenged by the multinational firm and a trend towards concentration. As well, second-tier arms-producing states feel the threat of not being able to provide the same sophisticated purchase marketing

³⁷¹ Krause, *Arms and the State*, 13.

³⁷² Krause, *Arms and the State*, 97.

³⁷³ ICRC, *Arms Availability*, 24.

incentives and payment plans that first-tier states can. Flexible payment terms can help facilitate the purchase transaction/acquisition for the clients. Larger manufacturers are able to extend more generous credit to purchasers in the form of notes or lines of credit³⁷⁴.

From a micro-economic perspective, selling abroad has frequently been seen as necessary to achieve economies of scale for second-tier countries or to create a certain amount of demand to be able to run a factory economically. Modest-sized countries have come to see investment in small arms production as a way of remaining somewhere near the vanguard of new technology. Denel, a South African arms manufacturer was recently given an export contract worth \$2.8 million CAD to make electronics for a new light field artillery gun. "We are delighted with this new order from BAE Systems as it demonstrates Denel's ability to compete internationally with world-beating and innovative technology," commented Denel chief executive, Victor Moche. "We are fulfilling our obligation to stimulate new economic activity by creating opportunities for exports of South African products,"³⁷⁵ added Jonathan Walton, Vice President for BAE Systems, South Africa. The foreign exchange accumulated from the sale of SALW leads to a favourable increase in the state's balance of payments. This can then be used to purchase other goods from trading partners.

The employment experience is not the same for all second-tier states. The employment stake in the continued export of small arms is stronger for new or weak

³⁷⁴ *Small Arms Survey 2004.*

³⁷⁵ *Mail and Guardian Online*, Pretoria, South Africa, "Denel gains R14m export business," September 22, 2004 [Internet Article]; Accessed September 22 2004; Available from <http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?cg=BreakingNews-Business&ao=122639> .

small-arms producing states (e.g. in Central and Eastern Europe), where the arms industry has often been a core industry (after decades of Soviet military industrialization), compared to other countries of the second-tier (Western Europe, Australia, Canada, Israel and South Africa). Also, compared to other countries of the second-tier, new and weak states rely on the production and export of small arms for income and employment far more due to extreme pressures on the economy as they attempt to adapt to new economic systems. Subsidies and governmental support are now being lessened in the ex-Soviet states and Eastern Europe, leading, in some cases, to reduced military production and factory closures³⁷⁶. A key dilemma for nearly all second-tier states is that productive capacity is often many times greater than domestic demand. Interestingly, in order to preserve jobs in the small arms industry, Europe has leaned heavily towards the US domestic market³⁷⁷. Many EU exporters would have difficulty surviving without the US market, according to the *Small Arms Survey 2004*. In particular, Austrian firms ship seventy-two per cent of their handguns, rifles, and shotguns to the US (to law enforcement agencies, the armed forces and the civilian market). Italy ships just over fifty per cent of its small arms to the United States.³⁷⁸

Overall, the macroeconomic interest of the small arms trade is actually not that significant. As we know, only a tiny percentage of the global small arms

³⁷⁶ Jurgen Brauer, "The Arms Industry in Developing Nations: History and Post-Cold War Assessment," in *Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure and Arms Production and Trade in Developing Countries*, eds. Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne (New York: Palgrave, 2002) and Pete Abel, "Manufacturing Trends- Globalizing the Source) in *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms*, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 81-104; and J. Paul Dunne and Gordon Macdonald, "Procurement Practices and State-Industry Relations in the United Kingdom," presented at "The Future of European Arms Production" conference, SIPRI, Sweden, October 2000.

³⁷⁷ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 124.

³⁷⁸ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 124.

stockpile comes from new production - less than one per cent a year. It is rather the re-transfer of light weapons that is relevant to the problem of excessive availability in the world³⁷⁹. The worldwide approximate value of SALW and ammunition is only USD 7.4 billion including both commercial and military-style firearms. From the macroeconomic view, small arms have failed to be a major contributor to GNP or an important generator of jobs.

On the other hand, the swathe of countries making up the second tier of small-arms producing states is much larger in numbers than the category for major conventional weapons as it is simply easier for mid-sized countries to reach a higher status of production in small arms than it is for major weapons (in Krause's model, developing countries are assumed to be mainly arms recipients). The difference for small arms on this front, compared to that of more sophisticated weapons, is that the same level of industrialization and economic infrastructure is not needed. Ninety-two countries, many of which have vested interests in their defence industries, and 1,249 companies produce light weapons,³⁸⁰ making up a much more significant number of countries with vested interests in production and export. Of these ninety-two, approximately twenty-three are second-tier countries³⁸¹.

c) Main Interest of 1st Tier States – Power

The pursuit of power is frequently, but not exclusively, the domain of first-tier states – the United States, the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China– production and trade innovators. The importance of the pursuit of power as

³⁷⁹ *Small Arms Survey* 2002, 103.

³⁸⁰ *Small Arms Survey* 2003, 4.

³⁸¹ *Small Arms Survey* 2004, 9.

a driver of arms acquisitions and transfers by great powers has already been addressed in Chapter Two. In Krause's eyes, the notion of power as a motive in the issue-area of arms production and trade encapsulates the following:

- 1) provide access to and influence over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of foreign policy;
- 2) symbolize commitment to the recipient's security or stability against internal or external threats;
- 3) create or maintain a regional balance of power;
- 4) create or maintain a regional presence.³⁸²

To review what was argued in Chapter Two, the superpowers, allies and China armed substate actors and foreign governments for political ends during the Cold War. The American M-1 rifle was effective for these ends as was the Russian-developed Ak-47 Kalashnikov automatic rifle and the Israeli Uzi submachine gun. In order to influence leaders and elites, the US sent arms to groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Cambodia; the USSR to groups in Ethiopia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Western Sahara and to the PLO; and China to various African countries and the Middle East³⁸³.

Political interests remain in the present. US foreign policy under President George W. Bush is "oriented largely around the U.S. advantage in physical power, especially military power... 'primacy' as it was originally conceived"— including readiness for ground fighting with small arms and light weapons³⁸⁴. With the attacks on the US of September 11, 2001, arms export laws have been relaxed, and

³⁸² Krause, *Arms and the State*, 98.

³⁸³ Nicholas Marsh, "Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* IX, no. 1 (spring 2002), 221.

³⁸⁴ Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (summer 2003), 6 and 30-31.

“transfer constraints [are] melting away.”³⁸⁵ The United States recently modified its list of countries eligible to receive light weapons to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Yugoslavia³⁸⁶ and Yemen³⁸⁷ – all countries previously denied weapons but which are now fighting terrorist groups in accordance with US policy. From 2001 to 2005, China, in following a low-risk foreign policy approach, which did not counter the US, lent it support for the US-led war against terrorism. At the same time, the country has been keenly interested in keeping a regional presence³⁸⁸ and is a main exporter of small arms in such Southeast Asian countries as Laos and Myanmar, partly as a bulwark against US expansion in that area. Russia, like China, was also allied with the US on the war on terrorism during this period (e.g. In November, 2001, the Russian Defence Ministry transferred arms, including light weapons to the Northern Alliance as a contribution to the war against terrorist groups in Afghanistan.³⁸⁹) The school hostage-taking and massacre of September 2004 of over three hundred children, teachers and parents in Beslan (a town situated in the North Caucasus region of Russia) also seemed to solidify

³⁸⁵“And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Arms Export Policy and Military Aid Post-911,” *Arms Sales Monitor* 47 (January 2002), 1.

³⁸⁶ Rachel Stohl, “Post-Sept 11 Arms Sales and Military Aid Demonstrate Dangerous Trend,” *CDI Terrorism Project*, available from <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/military-transfers-pr.cfm>; accessed January 12, 2002; Kapp and Lum, *Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade*.

³⁸⁷ Peter Willems, “US Lifts Ban on Arms Sales,” *Yemen Times*; Internet article; available from <http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=770&p=front&a=4>; accessed 14 September 2004.

³⁸⁸ For a better understanding of China’s position, read Robert Sutter, “Why Does China Matter?” *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (Winter 2003-2004): 75-89; Shen Dingh, “China’s Evaluation of the Adjustment to US Security Policy Since September 11, 2001,” *Defence and Security Analysis* 19, no. 4 (December 2003): 319-326 and Yong Deng, “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations,” *The China Quarterly* 154 (June 1998): 308-329.

³⁸⁹ See Maxim Pyadushkin with Maria Haug and Anna Matveeva, *Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, Exports and Stockpiles in the Russian Federation*, Occasional Paper No. 10 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003).

Russia's position in the US-oriented war on terrorism³⁹⁰. (The situation was blamed on Chechen terrorists and foreign Muslim militants). But the Russian Federation, like China, has its own power-related concerns, such as maintaining leverage in the Soviet- successor states and Central Europe. "There is a widespread view in the Russian government that it would be a dangerous oversight not to provide modern weaponry to the near abroad countries, even if some of them are still insolvent. Clearly, keeping them dependent on arms supplies from Russia would be another powerful tool for retaining the near abroad countries in the sphere of Russia's interest."³⁹¹ As well, Russia continues to ship arms to a country that is part of the American "axis of evil" (Iran).

Sometimes foreign governments are aiming to influence the outcome of a particular conflict inside a country and deem sending small arms and ammunition shipments as an opportune or efficient means of interfering³⁹². The small arms "grey market" trade (government sanctioned black marketing) "could be viewed as the arms trade as a foreign policy tool in its purest form."³⁹³ Governments ship deliveries of light weapons to governments or guerilla forces of their choosing, based on national interests, without resort to the usual licenses or end-user certificates. Such transfers are often coordinated by some of the same individuals

³⁹⁰ "Russia to Launch Beslan Inquiry," *BBC News World Edition*; Internet Report; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3645022.stm>; accessed September 11, 2004.

³⁹¹ Igor Khripunov, "Russia's Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Period," *Washington Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1994),

³⁹² Perseyedi, *Central Asia*, 9.

³⁹³ "Report on International Small Arms Production and Proliferation," Prepared for the Embassy of Japan, Washington D.C., Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security, Alexandria, Virginia (March 1995), 17.

said to be involved in black market trading (although data is hard to obtain on these arrangements due to their inherently covert nature).³⁹⁴

d) Addendum to the “Arms and the State” Framework: Where Small Arms Depart

Further adding to the complication of understanding the interests at play in the issue-area of small arms, is that motive forces are often steered by the motives of individuals and groups—rebels, militias, tribes, clans, ethnic groups, religious groups, criminals, terrorists, mercenaries, brokers-- within states, across borders as well as states themselves. The individual motive figures much more in the issue-area of small arms than it does for major conventional weapons and trends. As just one example, the issue of civilian weapon possession is not raised in Krause’s model as the average person, needless to say, does not own a submarine or battle tank.

We do not need to consider every individual motive. It is the state that ultimately decides to join or not to join a regime. Thus, the focus of our attention should be, and is, on the state motive. At the same time, some of the following points where small arms depart from major weapons trends are relevant to understanding how governments have arrived at the point that they have in regime creation. For as we will see the “individual” or “group fact” as it relates to the production, acquisition, possession, use, and supply of small arms has ramifications for, and is intertwined with, state motives in the issue-area.

³⁹⁴ Ibid; and Clark Gifford, quoted in Rudgers, “Origins of Covert Action,” 249-262.

Firstly, we will discover how strong individual and group motives for various activities related to small arms, including illicit activity, make it hard for states to cooperate to control such activities. Legally or pragmatically, how the individual and group might fit into or be held accountable in a regime is not itself necessarily problematic—regimes are somewhat accustomed to addressing non-state actors owing to their encompassing and fluid nature. For example, the Child Soldier’s Treaty (Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child) contains provisions for non-state actors. Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Protocol states that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years”³⁹⁵. And one has only to think of the Montreal Protocol and its legal prescriptions for firms that produce ozone-depleting substances. The individual and group have, in recent years, grown to acquire more of a “legal personality” (possessing duties and rights) under international law³⁹⁶. The now rather common separation in regimes between members of the regime (states) and those whose behaviour is being targeted (e.g. manufacturers, power plants, airlines, combatants) has found a way of being accommodated. States normally translate the provisions of

³⁹⁵ Optional Protocol, *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child*. For a good discussion of the ramifications of this point and the rights of children, refer to Jo de Berry, “Child Soldiers and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” *Annals of the American Political Science Association* (May 2002), 575.

³⁹⁶ The responsibility of the individual has been considered and applied furthermore in the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, proceedings are required to take place for serious crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture irrespective of nationality of perpetrator or victim. See, for example, Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jordan J. Paust, *et al*, *International Criminal Law* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000).

the regime into domestic prescription (usually, but not always through incorporation of prescriptions into domestic law or policy). They also find ways to elicit compliance from the non-state actors by holding them accountable for non-performance of certain duties or prohibited actions taken³⁹⁷. However, the extent to which the individual and group needs are intractable will influence the degree to which governments are willing to work to meet their needs or override their actions. If there is little chance that non-state actors' behaviour will be altered by a regime (no deterrent strong enough to overcome their will), this eliminates much of the possible good of a regime.³⁹⁸ Accordingly, the willingness of states to work towards a regime is reduced. Why participate in a regime if a whole set of actors' behaviours are too hard to manage and go unaddressed?

Secondly, it can, on occasion, be difficult to distinguish state actor from non-state actor. This is especially so in weak states when one wonders whether those holding onto the state apparatus would better be qualified as a non-state group as it fulfills few if any state functions (including the "baseline function of...providing security for its citizens"³⁹⁹). The quasi-state's motives (can) differ radically from the Westphalian/typical state. Thirdly, we will review how states are frequently complicit with the illegal actions of groups and individuals both knowingly and unknowingly.

³⁹⁷ Levy and Zurn.

³⁹⁸ Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," *European Journal of International Law* 6, no. 538 (1995).

³⁹⁹ Yale H. Ferguson, Richard W. Mansbach, Robert A. Denemark, Hendrik Spruyt, Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Janice Gross Stein, and Michael Mann, "What Is the Polity? A Roundtable," *International Studies Review* 2:1 (spring 2000): 21.

e) Individual and Group Motives that Make it More Difficult for States to Cooperate

In many instances, the expression, “where there is a will, there is a way” applies to individuals and groups when it comes to the production, use and export of small arms.

One way in which individual motivation is at play is that ordinary individuals, as opposed to state officials and members of the security sector (e.g. police, military), are the main owners of firearms. (Depending on the gun-control laws of a particular nation, citizens are either banned from possessing weapons or are permitted to own anything from pistols and sport-shooting guns to fully automatic rifles. Citizens also hold illegal light weapons in large numbers). Across the globe, 378 million firearms are in the hands of civilians. In 2001, ordinary citizens bought approximately eighty-five per cent of the guns made in the world. The United States is the most heavily armed country in the world with approximately eighty-three to ninety-six firearms per 100 people. Yemen is second on the list of number of firearms per person with a ratio of thirty-three to fifty firearms per 100 people and Finland is third with a ratio of thirty-nine firearms per 100 people⁴⁰⁰. The possession of guns by individuals has become a contentious issue, particularly in the United States. While there is strong evidence that a wide availability of, and easy access to small arms is linked to the escalation and lengthening of conflict and violence, emotional debates rage over whether access to firearms (and indeed assault rifles) is a fundamental freedom of individuals. It is thought by many that gun possession should more properly be thought of as a

⁴⁰⁰ *Small Arms Survey 2003*, 61.

“social good” (that is, as source of protection for the individual)⁴⁰¹ rather than a source of harm. The “pro-gun” interest (as exemplified by the NRA agenda) in the United States (and in South Africa)⁴⁰² has apparently had more influence on the regime than the interests of those with restrictionist views. According to some sources, a “cosmopolitan gun-control view” (a view that tends to question gun ownership as risky) is more prevalent in the media. However, gun owners are more likely to cast votes on the basis of the single issue of gun policy and vote-conscious policy-makers are attentive to that fact⁴⁰³.

Fear deriving from internal security dilemmas has recently been cited as a main factor for gun acquisition, stockpiling and use.⁴⁰⁴ In an internal security dilemma, one man (or group) arms for self-defence. In doing so, he instils fear in

⁴⁰¹ Natalie J. Goldring, “The NRA Goes Global,” *Bulletin of the American Scientists* (January/February 1999): 61–65, “Second Amendment Symposium: Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters,” *Brigham Young University Law Review* 55 (1998), Jens Ludwig, “Gun Self-Defence and Deterrence,” in *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, ed. Michael Tonry, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 363–417; Nelson Lund, “The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms,” *Georgia Law Review* 31, no. 1 (Fall 1996) 1–76; and Anthony J Dennis, “Clearing the Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment,” *Akron Law Review* (Summer 1995).

⁴⁰² “Black” South Africans (people classified as Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians in South Africa) were not permitted to receive firearm licenses until 1983 and only in limited fashion until 1994. There is thus a present-day movement to defend the rights of ownership against new gun control laws – that is, once granted the full right to own arms in 1994, blacks generally do not want to give up that right today. See *Small Arms Survey 2001*, 45.

⁴⁰³ Douglas Downs, “Representing Gun Owners: Frame Identification as Social Responsibility in News Media Discourse,” *Written Communication* 19, no. 1 (January 2002), 44–75 and Christopher Caldwell, “Turning Away From the Gun,” *Financial Times* (September 25 2004), 7.

⁴⁰⁴ See Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1999); Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, 27–47; Paul Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?’, *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 183–202; Charles Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’, *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 1, October 1997, 171–201; Stuart, J. Kaufman “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War”, *International Security* 21, no.2 (1996): 108–38; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origin and Management of Ethnic Conflict”, *International Security* 21, no.2 (1996): 41–75; and Erik Melander, *Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy*. Report No. 52, (1999), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

his fellow men. The other men, not being able to read their neighbour's mind to know his motives, assume the worst. They arm too. A spiral of fear and distrust is unleashed. Competitive arming leads to insecurity and sometimes even war or violence. The tragedy of the intrastate security dilemma is that the motives on the part of individuals/groups initially arming may very well have been benign (and the need for arming becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy). In Iraq, as the forces of Saddam Hussein were defeated and disbanded in April 2003, at least 7 to 8 million firearms flooded into circulation in the country –into private hands. As a demonstration of the effects of the internal security dilemma, the flood of weapons has actually increased demand for guns by the Iraqi population.⁴⁰⁵

Internal security dilemmas typically take place within weak states. This is because weak states have poorly developed institutional mechanisms to manage conflict. The state may simply not be strong enough to protect citizens. In areas of Kenya where state administration does not extend (like the remote North Rift Province of the Borderlands, for example), there is a strong possibility for chaos to result when small arms are introduced into the community. The typically peaceful cattle-raising community of the Borderlands was severely disrupted when several farmers acquired AK-47s. As others acquired assault rifles too, a high incidence of murders and raids on cattle farms followed.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁵ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 44-47.

⁴⁰⁶ Taya Weiss, *Guns in the Borderlands: Reducing the Demand for Small Arms*, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 95 (January 2004). Also compare internal security dilemmas depicted in Colombia, Somalia, and Georgia. Mohamed Nur Galal, "The Case of Somalia," in *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues*, eds. Jayantha Dhanapala, Mitsuro Donowaki, Swadesh Rana and Lora Lumpe, UNIDIR (Geneva: Ashgate Publishing, 1999): 133-136; Kim Cragan and Bruce Hoffman, *Arms Trafficking and Colombia, prepared for the Defence Intelligence Agency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003)* and chapter on "Dangerous Supply: Small Arms and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia" in *Small Arms Survey 2003*: 191-210.

It should be noted (primarily to show how individual small arms interests are widespread) that the fear of violence is not exclusive to citizens of weak states. While it may seem strange to compare the arming of citizenry where the rule of law is currently weak or where there is wrenching chaos (the borderlands of Kenya or Iraq) with the arming of citizens where the rule of law is strong (e.g. Canada or France), there is a commonality of motive across the globe. Fear and suspicion of one's potentially armed neighbour. True, levels of actual violent threats may differ in different parts of the world and fear on the part of some citizens in industrialized countries may lean towards the less-justified or "panic" end of the spectrum. But the *perception* of threat (e.g. of violent crime) may - nonetheless cause security dilemmas, and is thus "real" in that sense⁴⁰⁷. This fear can be accentuated by isolated but highly publicized mass shootings in industrialized countries like the 1989 massacre of fourteen women at the École Polytechnique in Montreal, the Dunblane, Scotland primary-school shootings of 1996 and the 2002 sniper attacks in Washington DC. The rise of the "gated community" and the private security company in industrialized countries -as response to fear—is telling.

The tendency of fear in individuals produced by security dilemmas is hard to counteract. One way policy-makers have tried to counteract the fears of people (and their corresponding impulse to arm) is through the implementation of programs to remove excess or illegal guns from society. Gun collection

⁴⁰⁷ Karen Lysaght, who is interested in perceptions of fear, focuses on the city of Belfast in Northern Ireland in her work to understand how fear of an assault from neighbours influences the residents on a daily basis to the extent that choice of where one lives - "spatial negotiation"- is influenced by security dilemmas. See "Reasonable/Unreasonable Fear" (2004 Cultures of Violence conference papers) at <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/s12.htm>.

programs have been attempted in locales as diverse as Colombian, Cambodian, and Californian cities. However, the organizers of disarmament programs frequently run into the intense desire of citizens to hold onto weapons for reasons of prestige and masculinity, in addition to self-defence. “Can men live without the gun? Do they want to?” a recent report on controlling the arms trade asked. In both industrialized and traditional cultures, the role of protector and defender is strongly associated with the idea of manhood and owning a gun⁴⁰⁸. In many cultures where carrying weapons is traditional, the bow and arrow has been replaced by firearms. When a boy is born in Yemen, guns are fired in celebration into the air while people shout out, “We have increased by one gun!” Children easily absorb such components of their cultures. In the words of a North London youth worker, ‘Children come out of school talking about guns. The mentality is so much more vicious now. They don’t talk about beating each other up. They talk about killing each other. The simple fact is that with a gun, you are someone, you can hold your own. Without one, you are a dead man.’⁴⁰⁹

States must also face the rather intractable desire of people to commit crime with small arms. While war may be predominant in the third tier, crime and human aggression (or malevolence) is known to all tiers. When John Herz first developed the concept of “security dilemma” in the late 1930’s, he meant it as an antidote to the motive of human aggression as explanation for interstate war (which has since

⁴⁰⁸ In an interesting study, Elizabeth A. Saylor, Katherine A. Vittes and Susan B. Sorenson explore the attitudes and emotions that firearm advertising in the United States attempts to tap into (e.g. Western, sporting or military lifestyle, feeling of ruggedness, or other) to know the appeal of owning firearms from a marketing perspective. “Firearm Advertising: Product Depiction in Consumer Gun Magazines.” *Evaluation Review* 28, no. 5 (October 2004): 420-433.

⁴⁰⁹ Oxfam & Amnesty International, “Shattered Lives: The Case For Tough International Arms Controls” (London: Amnesty International & Oxfam, 2003), http://www.controlarms.org/downloads/shattered_lives.htm.

been adapted to intrastate violence as used here). Thinking normatively, he supposed that there were reasons for war and violence that fell into the category of “unintended consequences”⁴¹⁰ (like the situations of misplaced distrust mentioned above). However, he also did not rule out innate human aggression as cause. Indeed, one of the most influential theoretical contributions to criminology over the last fifteen years has been M.R. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi’s general theory of crime which asserts that violent crime is the aggressive result of the most basic human inclinations: the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.⁴¹¹

Human vice will always exist, of course; but it is worth pointing out the extent to which so-called peaceful states find themselves hampered and frustrated by the actions of gangs and drug dealer activity alongside Southern hemisphere states. They must contend with the passions of the people, a standard challenge for states at the origin of the “social compact” outlined by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – but pushed to the limit by the overabundance of, and lethality of small arms. The ready availability of small arms greatly facilitates the capacity for criminals to threaten, kill, or injure others at will. War has crept into Western domestic policy lexicons with expressions like the “war on crime” and “war on

⁴¹⁰ John H. Herz, “The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems,” *International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2003), 411-416; Paul Roe, “Actors’ Responsibility in ‘Tight,’ ‘Regular’ or ‘Loose’ Security Dilemmas,” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 1 (March 2001): 103-116, 103.

⁴¹¹ M.R. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi, *A General Theory of Crime* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); H.G. Grasmick, C.R. Tittle, R.J. Bursik, Jr. and B.J. Arneklev, B. J., “Testing the core empirical implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime,” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 30 (199), 5-29.

drugs”.⁴¹² Much urban anarchy more closely resembles war zones. In 1995, Richard Ford wrote a novel titled *Independence Day* depicting the day-to-day violence faced by the average American – acts of crime so random, profound, heartless and common – it appeared that Americans are still at war with each other, as they were in 1781⁴¹³. In North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, sixty per cent of homicides are committed with a firearm⁴¹⁴. There is an estimated 200,000 non-conflict-related deaths by firearms per year around the globe, easily outstripping the number of combatant and non-combatant fatalities of the 2003-2004 Iraqi war.⁴¹⁵ In some countries, (like Mexico) there are as many as seventeen homicide deaths by firearms per 100,000 people⁴¹⁶.

Then there is crime linked with conflict. Crime is being studied more and more in this context. “To address one [crime] is to address the other [conflict],” writes Tara Kartha: “the twin phenomena of rising crime as well as armed conflicts and terrorism are indissolubly linked to a global proliferation and movement of weapons.”⁴¹⁷ The difference between war as a public enterprise and instances of private violence (murders, kidnappings, bank robberies and other examples of small arms misuse)⁴¹⁸ is a delicate one. For some authors, the key distinction when

⁴¹² See Magnus Hornqvist, “The Birth of Public Order Policy,” *Race & Class* 46, no. 1 (2004): 30-52 and Heinz Steinart, “The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the Contradictions of the State’s Monopoly of Force,” *Theoretical Criminology* 7, no. 3 (2003): 265-291.

⁴¹³ See Carolyn Lloyd, “Political Culture: Comparisons of Canada and the United States in Four Contemporary Works of Fiction,” Undergraduate Thesis, Bishop’s University, Lennoxville, Quebec, 1996.

⁴¹⁴ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 173-175.

⁴¹⁵ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 173-175.

⁴¹⁶ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 51.

⁴¹⁷ Tara Kartha, “Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *Strategic Analysis* XXI, no. 10 (January 1998), 1491.

⁴¹⁸ For a strong analysis of the coming together of security and anti-crime policies, see Hornqvist, “Birth of Public Order,” 30-52.

defining a situation as “criminalized war” is the extensive implication of professional and petty criminals in starting or contributing to conflict. The phenomenon of crime intermingled with warfare – looting and an underground political economy run by non-state actors in Bosnia, for example -- is understood to be commonplace in wars that are fought (mostly) with small arms.

As evident in the Bosnia case, these actors do not merely profit from and feed off of military conflict but can be decisive in its outbreak, longevity, and outcome. They are not simply the unavoidable and predictable byproducts of war but are integral to the very conduct of war. Moreover, many of these actors emerge from the devastation of war as part of a new elite with close ties to political leaders and the security apparatus, often impeding reforms and complicating post-conflict reconstruction efforts.⁴¹⁹

Further, the motives of crime are also relevant in the “relatively lawless interregnum between war and peace” of post-conflict situations.⁴²⁰ Incidences where low violence follows even after ceasefires have been declared testifies to this and the possible artificiality of boundaries between crime and war. A group of colleagues, including Marie-Joëlle Zahar and Stephen Stedman, have written on “spoilers” - individuals who purposefully obstruct peace processes for personal

⁴¹⁹ Peter Andreas, “Criminalized Conflict in Bosnia”, On-Line Paper; Available from www.watsoninstitute.org/cland/Andreas.pdf 1; and James H. Mittleman and Robert Johnston, “The Globalization of Organized Crime, the Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society,” *Global Governance* 5, no. 1 (January/March 1999): 103-126.

⁴²⁰ See for example Neild, “Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies,” *Journal of Conflict, Security & Development* 1, no. 1 (2001): 21-43; Peter Andreas and Richard Price, “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State,” *International Studies Review* 3, no.3 (Fall 2001): 31-52.

gain⁴²¹. Economic conditions after a war or outcomes of peace processes that do not meet the expectations of certain parties may also prolong acts of violence.

Another pattern of strong individual interests prevailing is the following. As Stephanie Neuman has researched, subnational actors and individuals have demonstrated the capability of producing small arms. In such cases, the manufacturing process generally involves handcrafting and blacksmithing as opposed to automated processes. Some of the manufacture of craft weaponry is so simple (also clandestine) that it can effectively be done in a shed or basement without state knowledge. The IRA, Khmer Rouge, the PLO, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) are examples of groups who have made their own weapons⁴²².

Patterns of weapons acquisitions by rebel groups and their financing have received enormous attention lately as policy-makers and analysts have attempted to understand how terrorist groups may seek to gain weapons of mass destruction so as to prevent their acquisition. While some rebel non-state actors are inclined to build or acquire weapons of mass destruction and have already made attempts to do so, rebel groups are more likely to try to buy light weapons in support of their causes, as they are cheaper, more accessible and simpler to make and use. Rebel non-state actors are among the actors of greatest concern for governments in the movement to

⁴²¹ Marie-Joëlle Zahar, "Political Violence in Peace Processes: Violence, Exit and Loyalty in the Post-Accord Period," in John Darby, ed. (University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming), Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997) and Bruce Patton et al., "Legal Issues and Human Rights Dimensions of the Israeli Settlements Issue: Victims and Spoilers," *Negotiation Journal* 21, no. 2 (April 2005).

⁴²² Stephanie G. Neuman, "The Arms Trade, Military Assistance, and Recent Wars: Change and Continuity," *Annals of the American Academy* 531 (September 1995), 62-63.

control the illicit movement of small arms and light weapons. (Because non-state actors are normally banned from purchases on the legal munitions market, they must seek weaponry from illegal sources.)

A study relying on a data set of thirty-eight serious and emerging ethnic conflicts in the 1990's revealed that twenty-seven ethnic groups acquired light arms, ten ethnic groups procured both heavy and light arms and only one ethnic group (in Georgia -Abkhazia) acquired heavy arms alone ⁴²³. Terrorists are increasingly procuring AK-47, T56, G3 or M16 and standoff weapons such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and mortars⁴²⁴.

Rebel groups can be quite "ingenious"⁴²⁵ in their acquisition of arms and financing of arms acquisitions. It has been revealed that rebel groups are prone to making attempts to obtain weaponry just before or during fighting and in these ways. Modes of acquisition involve either domestic efforts (from raids on government police or military facilities, from weapons seized from dead or captured soldiers, or from weapons simply "at hand") or from importation. Non-state actors import through purchases on the international black/grey market from nearby states (carried out covertly, most often by government intelligence agencies and/or private companies connected with government agencies), from other groups (often

⁴²³ Sislin et al., "Patterns in Arms Acquisitions," 402. Some external procurement of small arms would occur later in Georgia-Abkhazia. *Small Arms Survey 2003*, 200-202.

⁴²⁴ Rohan Gunaratna, "Terrorism and Small Arms and Light Weapons," Symposium on Terrorism and Disarmament, 25 October 2002 (New York, United Nations, 2001).

⁴²⁵ Sislin, et. al., "Patterns in Arms Acquisitions," 395.

weapons recycled from previous conflicts), or by the “ant trade”⁴²⁶. The ant trade is the slow smuggling of one or two weapons at a time across borders, often by donkey or one person. Though such groups do not have the same assets as states to make weapons purchases, combatants have found creative ways to raise funds. The manner in which groups have raised resources include the exploitation of natural resources, such as diamonds (e.g. by UNITA in Angola⁴²⁷), profiting from related black market trafficking like the trade in drugs conducted by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, extortion of money from local businesses (a method favoured by Peru’s Shining Path group), looting stores and homes, and diverting relief aid. In addition, some groups, like ethnic groups in Burma (Myanmar) have taxed businesses in parts of the country they control. Lastly, members of diasporas have reported to provide finances to rebel groups to buy light weapons (e.g. members of the Irish community in North America to the Irish Republican Army [IRA]).⁴²⁸

Finally, there is the firm as group actor, exerting pressure on the state. It is true that small arms manufacturers are restricted by government licenses, which they need to export weapons. And they are at the whim of the state as they lobby for contracts to supply small arms domestically. Firms are also at the whim of the state when it comes to having their products and services promoted abroad by the relevant governmental department– or not. They further hope to be on the receiving

⁴²⁶ *Small Arms Survey 2002*, 135.

⁴²⁷ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf), 245.

⁴²⁸ Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 1-18.

end of export financing from their home government to international buyers so that they can better compete against other manufacturers.⁴²⁹

Nonetheless, we find significant evidence of the fact that small arms firms hold an independent sway over the state. For the small arms issue, there is generally *less* coordination between foreign, defence policy-making structures and private companies than there is for the trade in major conventional arms. Why is it important to know that? Because there is greater likelihood for the profit motive (over concern for social responsibility), to have causal import in the political environment and perhaps less incentive for states (those with vocal small arms industries) to participate in a regime.

For example, the Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is slowly eroding Japan's stance on military exports, which has traditionally followed strict guidelines on arms transfers. The country is finding it harder and harder to resist demands by national businessmen to soften restrictions on military exports. The government is being asked by the business lobby to review its "three principles" including the principle of not shipping weapons to countries involved in, or likely to be involved in, international disputes, in order to expand a declining military budget through exports⁴³⁰. As another example, Brazilian companies do not generally support the advancement of a global small arms control regime. Imbel (which is state-owned), Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) (ammunition) and Taurus

⁴²⁹ Peter C. Evans, "Appendix 13E. The Financing Factor in Arms Sales: The role of Official Export Credits and Guarantees," *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 539-560.

⁴³⁰ See Satoshi Ogawa, "Ono Tells U.S. Arms Trade exports May Be Eased," (21 November, 2004), Internet Article; *Daily Yomiuri (Japan)*; <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20041121wo01.htm>; Accessed 22 November 2004.

have a relationship with the state such that “the result is a great deal of company influence over both domestic and foreign policy.”⁴³¹

We used to call those who benefited from war “merchants of death”⁴³² (typified by the character Undershaft in George Bernard Shaw’s 1905 play *Major Barbara*). Nowadays, studies interested in the same subject refer to the “political economy” of war or violence. Concern remains over unwarranted power of the military-industrial complex over national export controls. After all, while the trade in light weapons is widely recognized as not like other trades (e.g. lumber, oranges), it remains that the motive of the multinational firm is to earn profits for its shareholders and to expand its market.

The greater leeway enjoyed by small arms companies in international affairs is in part a factor of greater privatization. Producers of light weapons have become more independent and profit-oriented as governments have detached themselves from state arms companies (though many still receive fairly weighty subsidies from their host countries). The *mélange* between private companies and state-owned companies is different (less tight) for small conventional weapons than it is for major conventional weapons. The mix is as follows. The major small arms producers in some countries –in Austria, Germany, Italy and the US –for instance – are private companies. State-owned companies dominate in other parts of the world

⁴³¹ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 21.

⁴³² Based on the title of a cutting exposé of the arms industry bearing that name, by H.C. Engelbrecht and F.C. Hanighen, published in the wake of World War I. H. (*Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Armament Industry*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934).

—as in Belgium, China, France, Israel and Switzerland. Brazil, among other places, reveals a mixture of private and state ownership of light weapons companies⁴³³.

The ability for companies to act in a discretionary fashion is also a function of the fact that export controls are not strong in many states and actors have grown accustomed to exploiting that fact. Cross-national ownership is common for European firms like FN-Herstal (France/Belgium), Hecker & Koch (UK/Germany), SIG Sauer (Germany/Switzerland/USA) and Beretta (France/Italy). In addition, several European companies like FN Herstal, Beretta, and SIG have well-established foreign subsidiaries.⁴³⁴ Foreign subsidiaries are not always subject to the same oversight with regards to which destinations they are directing their sales. The system of licensed production can sometimes provide opportunities for actors so inclined to jump over strict export controls and facilitate exports to prohibited destinations. Small arms manufacturing companies established through licensing agreements frequently operate and export with less oversight than do the companies in North America and Europe that issue the production license. Through the establishment of foreign subsidiaries, and the use of licensing agreements, these non-state actors (companies) are able to circumvent prohibitions on the provision of SALW to undesirable end users and substate actors⁴³⁵.

A final factor related to the influence of corporate entities is the ‘value-added’ phenomenon. As with any industry, there exists a notional spectrum of the degree of ‘value added’ during the manufacturing process along which all types of arms and weapons systems may be placed. At one end of this spectrum are high

⁴³³ *Small Arms Survey 2003*.

⁴³⁴ *Small Arms Survey 2002*, 20.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

value-added products that require knowledge-intensive research, development and manufacturing processes (i.e. fighter jets). Since the penalty for failure is so high with major weapons systems, they must undergo much scrutiny (periods during which projects are reviewed and performance assessed). Collaboration and risk sharing between corporate and government stakeholders is therefore more intense. The result is a greater degree of integration of public and private sector stakeholders. SALW dominate the lower value added end of the product spectrum. As these products are at a mature stage in their product life cycle, the degree of knowledge intensity in the manufacturing process is low. These products are standardized, (i.e. 9mm ammunition). As a result, governmental approval is not always needed to proceed with procurement in order to control costs and prevent time lags. Also, production facilities are more easily moved to a new location, if private manufacturers perceive excessive government interference, as a highly skilled labour force is not essential⁴³⁶.

We cannot forget the interests of the middlemen – the cargo handlers, brokers, and transport agents each with their own motives. “If a man exists who is happy with the resurgence in Iraqi guerrilla action, then he would be Sheik Mohammed,” observes Cécile Hennion of one such typical actor. The arms dealer, a key link in the conflict who does not mind arming opposing factions, has watched business rise dramatically – his stockroom of Kalashnikovs, Brownings, Berettas is continuously being emptied and replenished⁴³⁷. While many transfers of small arms conducted by middlemen are legitimate, illicit brokering, spurred by profit and

⁴³⁶ *Small Arms Survey 2004.*

⁴³⁷ Cécile Hennion, “Ni politique ni discrimination, c'est le credo efficace de Cheikh Mohammed, marchand d'armes,” *Le Monde (Paris)* 9 November 2004.

greed, can result in, or lead to the violation of international humanitarian law, embargoes or can be used in crimes⁴³⁸.

f) Distinction Difficult to Draw Between State and Non-State Actors

In solely relying on a motive model that considers major weapons and major wars, one might be lulled into the illusion that a clear “trinity of state, army and people” exists in countries across the globe when in fact “international violence and warfare have moved away from the Clausewitzian trinity of the state, the army, and the people to less definable violence.” Explains Tarja Väyrynen: “Wars between nations are replaced by intra-state warfare or by the ‘war against terrorism’ where national boundaries are no longer holding a central place.”⁴³⁹

Because intrastate warfare has been the mode of conflict most common in recent history – with small arms the principal instruments,⁴⁴⁰ we are forced to consider the motives of those (many of them paramilitary groups or militias) who are actually doing the fighting if we are prepared to consider measures that might counteract the motives. (And this adds a whole new dimension of complexity to the

⁴³⁸ Fund for Peace, *Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms Brokering*, Prepared for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects, Hand-Out, New York (July 9-20, 2001).

⁴³⁹ Tarja Väyrynen, “Gender and UN Peace Operation: The Confines of Modernity,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (spring 2004), 132.

⁴⁴⁰ Sislin, et. al., “Patterns in Arms Acquisitions,” 393-408. Also, in a study conducted by the Small Arms Survey, *Humanitarianism Under Threat*, with special focus on Kenya, Colombia and East Timor, it was found that all manner of light weaponry are being employed in conflict-like situations, criminal violence and circumstances of systemic insecurity –with military-style automatic and semi-automatic weapons (e.g. AK-47s, G-3s, Galils, AR-15s, grenade-launchers) most common in Kenya and Africa, a tendency towards the use of “Armas cortes” or short-barreled weapons (e.g. .32, .38 specials, 9mm revolvers and pistols) in Colombia and Latin America, and both classes of weapons availed of by paramilitaries, civilians and militia in West Timor (use of such arms has quieted for the moment in East Timor since the country’s recent independence from Indonesia). Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey Special Report, 2001), viii.

motive equation). Since 1945, intrastate violence has been a much more widespread phenomenon than interstate war.⁴⁴¹ Conflicts over the past six decades have been mostly what Kal Holsti refers to as “wars of the third kind” – or wars of national liberation (Algeria), unification (Vietnam) and secession (Bosnia). In the years after World War II, “[t]he resort to force, excluded at the centre, [was] driven outward and downward, away from nuclear annihilation towards what the jargon calls ‘low-intensity conflict’ and guerrilla operations.”⁴⁴²

In *Arms and the State*, Krause mentions, however briefly, the need for the state to “secure the regime against internal threats”⁴⁴³ – say, Russia against Chechen insurgents or Nepal attempting to deal with its Maoist uprising. Unquestionably, the state is often challenged by groups (and these groups can be studied from a state-centric “top-down” view)⁴⁴⁴ but so, too, should a people-centric “bottom up” view be taken to fully understand why light weapons are in demand from a group point of view.

We know that actors use guns to fight for a state of their own, to struggle for control of an existing state apparatus, or, particularly in the early second half of the last century, to take part in decolonization conflicts, where local nationalists struggle against an imperial power.⁴⁴⁵ It can actually be very hard to tell state actors from non-state actors in unstable countries. Though one group may have a hold on

⁴⁴¹ In 2003, 17 of the 19 major armed conflicts ongoing in the world were intrastate. The two exceptions were the war between Iraq and the US and UK-led multinational coalition as well as the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (data from SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security).

⁴⁴² Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992), 292.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁴⁴⁴ Edward A. Kolodziej, “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!” *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992), 423.

⁴⁴⁵ R. William Ayres, “A World Flying Apart? Violent Nationalist Conflict and the End of the Cold War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (January 2000), 106-107.

the state apparatus, other groups waiting in the wings to take control of power may also have sustained access to light arms and ammunition. Yesterday's members of an armed opposition group may become tomorrow's statesmen or vice versa.⁴⁴⁶

The internal security dilemmas mentioned in the previous section (on "individual and group motives that make it more difficult for states to cooperate") assumes that the state itself does not have a role to play in these events, only that its weakness is such that the state cannot prevent conflict from taking place. However, it is also true that people or groups may sometimes wish to arm because the state, rather than protecting them, is the enemy.⁴⁴⁷

From the Sudan to former Yugoslavia to Sierra Leone, the state can be a source of conflict— with elites attempting to stir up violence to keep a hold on precarious positions of privilege, a point not brought out by state-centric analyses⁴⁴⁸. With some exceptions (Chinese use of tanks against its people in Tiananmen Square), state (or police) abuse is usually conducted with light weapons. The source of conflict in the Sudan, for example, was frequently portrayed by the Sudanese government and others, including the US State Department, as stemming from "long-standing ethnic hostility" when in fact what was missing from this account was the hand the Sudanese government had in funnelling weapons and

⁴⁴⁶ *Small Arms Survey 2001*, 82. The state very rarely possesses legitimacy in the eyes of the people in these cases. See Georg Sørensen, "A State is Not a State: Types of Statehood and Patterns of Conflict After the Cold War," in *International Security Management and the United Nations*, eds. Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999): 29.

⁴⁴⁷ Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 233-244.

⁴⁴⁸ Phil Orchard, "The State as Villain: Weak States as a Cause of Communal Conflict," Paper Presented at the 2004 Annual Convention of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, MB.

granting immunity from persecution to a northern group of fighters in the country – who were strongly encouraged to brutalize the Sudanese living in the south where the land is rich in agriculture and oil.⁴⁴⁹

A part of the breakdown of the trinity of the army, people and state is that the “army” (in its current conception) is now being increasingly privatized. Private suppliers are filling the gap of protection and offensive capability that the state used to provide. Assuming that the state possesses the legitimate authority over violence ignores the dramatic rise in private militias and security companies along with a greater reliance on mercenaries in contemporary combat⁴⁵⁰. (The ratio of American troops on the ground to private contractors in the first Gulf war was fifty to one, The ratio diminished to ten to one in the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, as it is presently in the conflict in Iraq⁴⁵¹). These private actors do not have the same kind of command structure and tend to have less incentive to obey international law than regular soldiers. They either have contempt for or are unfamiliar with international law. It remains to be seen how private actors’ abuses against civilians or prisoners of war (e.g. abuse of Iraqis by American contractors in the Abu Ghraib prison) would be punished in a small arms control regime.⁴⁵² The idea of “what do we really mean by the state” surfaces on this topic in another way, too – with Israeli

⁴⁴⁹ David Keen, “Organized Chaos: Not the New World We Ordered,” *The World Today* 52:1 (January 1996), 2.

⁴⁵⁰ “Use of Civilian Contractors is at Record Levels,” *Detroit Free Press* (23 October 2004).

⁴⁵¹ Felix Rohatyn and Allison Stranger, “The Profit Motive Goes to War,” *London Financial Times* (17 November 2004).

⁴⁵² Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, “What Conclusion for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 193-194.

mercenaries and intelligence officials assisting Cote d'Ivoire and South African nationals fighting in Iraq as contractors.

With the state becoming less material as a source of protection from within, it could be said that it is also becoming “less relevant as a shield from abroad.”⁴⁵³ Borders can fail to be barriers for transnational threats – like terrorism and the influx of small arms. “On the so-called ‘dark side of globalization’ lies an amorphous world in which such diverse characters as Latin American cocaine barons, ex-KGB officers engaged in money laundering, Asian heroin traffickers, and Italian Dons exploit advances in communication, travel and commerce for illegal profit.”⁴⁵⁴ That there is a distressing downside to globalization has long been known: openness does not just facilitate the movement of products, workers, capital, technology and organizations; it also facilitates the flow of undesirables – biohazards, contagious diseases, narcotics, illicit weapons, and terrorists. However, until recently, it was widely held that an outgrowth of globalization and free trade would be peace. Open, friendly borders were understood to foster friendly international relations (the democratic peace thesis)⁴⁵⁵. Few would entertain this idea even lightly now: in light of September 11th, the tension between the two aims of security and trade/openness has become acute.

⁴⁵³ Stein and Mann, “What is the Polity?” 22.

⁴⁵⁴ Kenneth E. Peters, “Transnational Crime and Drugs” in *A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations: An Annual Publication of the United Nations Association of the United States of America*, eds. John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 190.

⁴⁵⁵ On the absence of war between liberal-capitalist democracies, see John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 87-125 and John Macmillan, “Democracies Don’t Fight: A Case of the Wrong Agenda?” *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996): 275-299.

g) States Complicit with Non-State Actor Motives: Some Hand in Hand Activities

Considering hand in hand activities leads us to reflect on the interrelated roles of individuals, governments and businesses – and how their interests are co-mingled. Industrialized states have dual goals – to advantage the opportunities for its national enterprises to “roam the world” in search of profit; and to protect their national interests from external threats,⁴⁵⁶ including data privacy (protecting sensitive, military-related data). This means that state interests are sometimes aligned with control (and regime formation) and other times not. In the 1970’s, the chairman of Northrop, Tom Jones “smoothly expounded the case that what was good for Northrop was good for the United States; the Nixon doctrine chimed perfectly with the interest of the arms sellers.”⁴⁵⁷

When deviant behaviour is involved with small arms, the question is asked: How much does the state know or is involved? to determine the level of complicity. Sometimes the state is not aware of the issue in question. In many such cases, we can expect no reason why the country would be opposed to tackling the issue upon learning about it. There is an increasing awareness of the fact that almost all illegally held and transferred weapons start out in legal channels. To the extent that this is true, states play a role in the black market of small arms, often unknowingly (as the arms are diverted after they are shipped or they are re-used in an illegal context). We find several instances of states being concerned and taking action

⁴⁵⁶ Raymond Vernon and Ethan B. Kapstein, “National Needs, Global Resources,” *Daedalus* 120, no.4 (fall 1991). 1.

⁴⁵⁷ Sampson, *Arms Bazaar*, 306.

upon discovering a transgression (e.g. arms diverted for illegal purposes in or from its territory).

Other times, states choose to “see no evil” (e.g. behaviour is tacitly allowed or mildly encouraged by the state rather than explicitly triggered by it). For example, governments vary in their intention, readiness and ability to prevent their territories from being used for illegal gunrunning. Still other countries are unconcerned with or indifferent to the issue of illicit trafficking.

Sometimes states know about behaviour that contradicts international norms or rules, but they do not do anything about it (acts of omission). “[G]overnment omissions permit corporations to pursue illegal and potentially harmful courses of action that, in a general way, facilitate the fulfillment of certain state policies.”

Occasionally, only one part of the government knows about a transgression involving small arms. Representatives of the state may undertake acts defined by law as criminal in the pursuit of their jobs (acceptance or extortion of bribes) to benefit themselves. Officeholders may directly have a hand in arms sales. The “Red Princes of China” are sons and daughters of officeholders in China who benefit from the selling of weapons.

At times, an action that is contrary to accepted standards or norms is in fact “official state policy”.⁴⁵⁸ State organized crime refers to practices that violate standards of general acceptability, and are triggered by the state (although the public is not always aware). For example, Britain invaded the democratically elected British Guyana in the early days of the Cold War to protect its sugar

⁴⁵⁸ Lora Lumpe, Sarah Meek and R.T. Naylor, “Introduction to Gun-Running,” *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 5.

interests, an interest shared with the British multinational firm, Brookers. The incident was “effectively removed from history,” says Mark Curtis.⁴⁵⁹ Other examples of quasi-official policy that is not made overt to the public is the repression of human rights in other countries by states, such as Brazil and Russia exporting ammunition, pistols and shotguns to the Algerian government where grave violations of human rights are committed by government-controlled and Islamist forces on a daily basis⁴⁶⁰. Thailand sent weapons to Burmese non-state actors with operations along the Thai-Myanmar border from the late 1980’s to the late 1990’s. Chinese arms were sent to Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge until 1991.⁴⁶¹ As might be expected, states would not be interested in having increased spotlight or transparency of the above practices – one of the core features of the emerging small arms control regime.

As can be seen, the interplay of interests involved with the small arms issue is exceedingly complex – a dizzying array. We see that the light weapons issue is a contentious, difficult issue – interests to control them are not readily on its side. Just now, we have reviewed a myriad of reasons, related to both supply and demand, of why countries would not want to participate in a regime, and why individuals and groups might want to stop movement towards a regime. However, interests to cooperate are present too. This section reviews them.

⁴⁵⁹ Mark Curtis, “Britain’s Real Foreign Policy and the Failure of British Academia,” *International Relations* 18, no. 3 (2004): 275-287, 277.

⁴⁶⁰ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 102.

⁴⁶¹ *Small Arms Survey 2002*, 129.

Why Collaborate?⁴⁶²

Given the above interests, and the difficulty in targeting individual and group interests, why would states want to collaborate?

The primary objective of a small arms control regime is to address the human suffering and insecurity caused by the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled proliferation of SALW. Not all countries are affected equally.

Governments might cooperate because they care. After all, David Lumsdaine has shown that foreign aid by states is sometimes motivated by altruism⁴⁶³. And certain evolving norms (such as those contained in the Helsinki Final Act on human rights) or norms which halted slavery appear to be based on other-regarding motives, rather than any known interests⁴⁶⁴.

It is possible that foreign leaders might care. It is easy to believe that at least a few nations' leaders have concern for the plight of people who are suffering in the world. Few are totally without regard to the "human story" as evinced by former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy below:

As I came to realize, the true narrative of politics is the human story... It is the story of land-mine victims in Chechnya, Angola, and Acholiland whose only crime is wanting freedom to farm or play. It is the story of busboys and stockbrokers in the World Trade Center who became targets for fanatics. It is also the story of innocent villagers in rural Afghanistan

⁴⁶² Expression taken from the title, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes" by Ernst B. Haas in *World Politics* (1980).

⁴⁶³ David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁴⁶⁴ See Onora O'Neill, "Ethical Foreign Policy: Where Does the Ethics Come From?" *European Journal of Political Theory* 2, no. 2 (2002): 227-234.

bombed from thirty thousand feet, and parched, starving dwellers in Basra, and it is the story of all those denied a minimum of peace from arrest, harassment, unlawful imprisonment, of the 300,000 a year who lose their lives through war and conflict and the other 500,000 who lose their lives indirectly from the same causes⁴⁶⁵.

Also, the practice (and study) of regimes emerged out of concern for solving global problems, like environmental degradation and resource depletion. Presumably, the desire to fix problems is in some way normative⁴⁶⁶ and the fact that many global regimes have been put into place to protect people is telling (such as the Convention [1951] and Protocol [1967] on the Status of Refugees⁴⁶⁷ and the food aid regime). Susan Strange has even criticized regimes for being overly value-laden in principle⁴⁶⁸.

More plausibly, according to neo-liberals (interest-based) scholars, cooperation to solve problems (while good) usually occurs when it is in the self-interest of states. That is, if states care, they see it is in their interests to care⁴⁶⁹. They contend that cases of cooperation are happy coincidences of mutual and self-interests. "No leader [...] rationally prefer[s] to solve a problem alone if working with others [...] accomplish[es] the same (or better) outcomes more quickly, cheaply, securely and efficiently."⁴⁷⁰ Does that mean that the beginnings of

⁴⁶⁵ Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 25.

⁴⁶⁶ Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 329-251.

⁴⁶⁷ See Charles B. Keely, "The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 303-314.

⁴⁶⁸ "Not only does using this word regime distort reality by implying an exaggerated measure of predictability and order in the system as it is, it is also value-loaded in that it takes for granted that what everyone wants is more and better regimes, that greater order and managed interdependence should be the collective goal." (Strange, "Cave Hic," 487).

⁴⁶⁹ Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, "Integrating Theories," 7.

⁴⁷⁰ Frank P. Harvey, "Addicted to Security: Globalized Terrorism and the Inevitability of American Unilateralism," *International Journal* LIX, no. 1 (Winter 2003-2004): 43.

movement towards a small arms regime may be due to growing perceptions of the advantages of such a regime? Well, let us first see if there are positive interests in forming a regime that states have attached themselves to.

Many countries affected by the problem of small arms are in the Third World. Why would other countries give up closely guarded sovereignty to protect people in countries not their own? Also, in traditional arms control, states are called upon to reduce their own military capabilities in return for corresponding reductions by hostile military forces that may directly threaten them. The aim is reciprocal threat reduction. In the issue-area of small arms, what is given up and what is gained is not always analogous. A country is asked to reduce a *military* capability to help tackle a *humanitarian* problem that may or may not directly affect them.⁴⁷¹ So, why would states want to cooperate in this form of arms control?

There are a variety of self-interested reasons why countries would want to act. The first is the boomerang effect. Small arms problems may rebound upon a state unexpectedly. The world may concentrate its attention on traditional weapons of mass destruction, particularly as the United States did in Iraq in the search to uncover such weapons as justification for military intervention⁴⁷². However, the more prevalent threat to security – including US security – is the gross number of simpler and cheaper weapons circulating between and inside countries. Michael

⁴⁷¹ David R. Stone claims that the concept of a state limiting its arms exports for the sake of the peace and security of *other* states is a “modern innovation” in “Imperialism and Sovereignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control the Arms Trade,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 213-230, p. 214.

⁴⁷² For further discussion, see Andrew Flitbert, “After Saddam: Regional Insecurity, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Proliferation Pressures in Postwar Iraq,” *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 4 (2003-2004): 547-567.

Klare declares, “The most deadly combat system of the current epoch is the adolescent human male equipped with a Kalishnikov assault rifle.”⁴⁷³

To think that one person could cause tremendous harm has grown credible as a theory and notion with increased instances of terrorism in the world (defined as the method of “coercive intimidation” by the few). That not much exertion is required to cause great damage in our networked, globalized world is exemplified by both the cascade effect and the cultural rogue archetype of the 1990’s and 2000’s – the teenaged computer hacker operating out of his parents’ basement and causing millions of dollars in losses to businesses and government agencies with segments of computer codes that are able to penetrate highly-securitized entities. Because it does not take much, or many, to trigger a breakdown in law and order (a mortar shell launched into a busy marketplace kills sixty-eight people and wounds two hundred one morning in Sarajevo; ten men are killed and a neighbourhood blacked out when electrical lines are targeted in a four-hour shoot-out between gang members in Vidrigal, Brazil⁴⁷⁴), the potential for human loss and the destruction of critical facilities linked to everyday life is huge⁴⁷⁵.

Also, the need to keep certain small arms from those who might one day use them against the country in question has been widely recognized as important for much of firearm history. Guns found in the Dardanelles after World War I bore the name of a British weapons firm. They had been used against British soldiers

⁴⁷³ Michael Klare, quoted in Rachel Stohl, “Iraq Small Arms Are A Big Threat,” *Christian Science Monitor* (5 November 2003), 1.

⁴⁷⁴ “Rio Gun battle leaves 10 Dead,” November 22, 2004; Internet article; accessed November 22 2004; CNN; <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/11/22/rio.shootout.reut/index.html> .

⁴⁷⁵ Thomas Homer-Dixon. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2002), 61.

when they had landed on the shore.⁴⁷⁶ Small arms supplied to Afghani forces by the CIA to be used against the Russians during the Cold War were used against American troops in 2001-2002 in Operation Enduring Freedom. Concern is presently high by American and Russian officials that the approximately 500,000 American-made and Soviet-made Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) that exist in the world may be used against them. The risk is felt that MANPADS may be employed in a terrorist attack against a civilian aircraft. This has prompted new legislation on the matter in the United States and among members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Improved safety for humanitarian aid workers, relief personnel and peacekeepers in areas of conflict would likely occur with the full advent of a small arms control regime. Thirty-six Red Cross workers died in Rwanda during combat, some deliberately targeted. Three Red Cross staff members traveling in a van were killed in Burundi and six Red Cross personnel were killed in their beds at their compound in Chechnya.⁴⁷⁷ A US Marine was the first casualty of the peacekeeping mission in Haiti in March 2004 during patrol.⁴⁷⁸ Attacks against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers in Iraq (including the beheading of a lead CARE official raise serious questions about the security of personnel in peace

⁴⁷⁶ Sampson, *Arms Bazaar*, 70.

⁴⁷⁷ Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, *Light Weapons and Civil Violence: Policy Options for the International Community Project on World Security*, Project on World Security (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1999), 13.

⁴⁷⁸ Rachel Stohl, "Haiti's Big Threats: Small Arms," *Christian Science Monitor*; *Internet article*; available online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0323/p09s02-coop.html> ; March 24, 2004; accessed July 6, 2004.

operations,⁴⁷⁹ reinforcing the notion that “something must be done” to protect foreign nationals abroad.

A main self-interested reason for cooperating includes the fact that the effects of arms acquisitions on security dilemmas have been known since the time of Thucydides. Studies using data from Singer and Small’s Correlates of War study tend to confirm that arms races increase the chances of war between or within states.⁴⁸⁰ Cassidy Craft and Joseph P. Smaldone empirically confirmed that the small arms trade increased the incidence of violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1967 and 1997⁴⁸¹. Their conclusion is that meaningful restraint by both suppliers and recipients of small arms in the form of a regime could very well “break the nexus” between arms and conflict. In an interdependent world arena, the effects of local wars can spill out, and affect the larger arena.⁴⁸² One effect of arms-fuelled conflict in the Third World for industrialized states is the threat of an interruption of oil supplies for those countries dependent on foreign oil. Other effects are military and social (the overflow of armed refugees).⁴⁸³

Because of the widespread knowledge that if one party doesn’t help, we’ll all be worse off, the chances for cooperation seem strong. It is clear that the world as a whole would gain from cooperation on the issue. There are advantages to formalizing these interests in a regime, rather than “going it alone” – unilateral

⁴⁷⁹ Renata Dwan and Sharon Wiharta, “Multilateral Peace Missions,” in *Summaries from the SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 11.

⁴⁸⁰ Wallace studies as quoted in Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*, 180.

⁴⁸¹ Craft and Smaldone, “Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence,” 693-710.

⁴⁸² Bruce Cronin, *Institutions for the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in International Society*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 93 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴⁸³ Steven R. David, “Why The Third World Still Matters,” *International Security* 17, no. 3 (winter 1992/1993), 127-159.

action. There is the knowledge, with porous borders, that not much can be done unless all states are part of the plan. Was this knowledge what swayed states to begin cooperating in a regime?

Fundamentally it is acknowledged by most rational actors, however grumblingly, that costs in the form of a tax are worth it, e.g. to achieve a public good. For citizens to pay for streetlights, we avoid walking the streets in darkness (a global regime to curtail small arms may be needed). Extended to the international sphere, most rational actors wish to avoid “the tragedy of the commons” – a situation where the selfish behaviour of states finally culminates in worse-off conditions for all.

David A. Hamburg and Jane E. Holl have made the case that preventing deadly conflict is a public good. While most people do not think of conflict prevention that way, “efforts to prevent, contain or stop a war, if successful, surely result in conditions that convey broad benefits – not only for the parties to the conflict but also for wider circles of people and states.”⁴⁸⁴

States may be motivated to partake in a small arms control regime because they have developed the habit of reaching across borders to help *individuals* in other states – in effect overriding the barrier of national security (which is thinking of one’s state before others). Human security holds a significant degree of currency in today’s international affairs as a policy⁴⁸⁵. Considering the fact that a number of

⁴⁸⁴ David A. Hamburg and Jane E. Holl, “Preventing Deadly Conflict: From Global Housekeeping to Neighbourhood Watch,” in *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, eds. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 366-381, 366.

⁴⁸⁵ Human security is not new. The insistence on security at the individual level was also the preoccupation of late Enlightenment liberalism. The human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 were the same rights of the American and French Revolutions,

states believe that the goals of humans, not just the goals of nation-states, are worthy of consideration, we understand more why cooperation may occur. Many states (like Canada, Japan and Norway) take seriously the responsibility to protect humans in other countries far and near from fear as they feel it represents well an image of foreign policy they wish to project⁴⁸⁶. Summarizes Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian values have become central to the definition of vital interests...”⁴⁸⁷

It is also true that the devastation of small arms *directly* touches nearly all countries so all countries have a stake in acting. For instance, there seems to be no question that the Third World is interested in implementing policy to better safeguard national stockpiles of light weapons. In the Central African Republic, with the aid of the government and the Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accord de Bangui, an African peacekeeping force, sixty-two per cent of small arms and light weapons believed to be floating inside the country’s border (as well as ninety-five per cent of the heavy weaponry) were recovered through a weapons collection and confiscation programme. In Croatia, a weapons buy-back programme administered by the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) helped stabilize the regions during its reintegration period in 1996 and 1997.⁴⁸⁸

movements that emphasized life, liberty, security and the right to political participation. See *Human Development Report* 1994, 22-40 and Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” *Daedalus* 124, no.3 (Summer 1995), 66.

⁴⁸⁶ All three countries have used the term “human security” in their development of foreign policy. Twelve countries form part of a “Human Security Network”.

⁴⁸⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, “The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas,” *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 1 (2000): 11-23, 23.

⁴⁸⁸ Sami Faltas et al., *Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes*, Occasional Paper No.2 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001), p. 17.

Sadly, Uganda and neighbouring countries are still – twenty-five years later – paying the price for a raid on a military arsenal after members of the deposed Amin regime fled and left well-stocked armories in Moroto and Kotido unguarded. The light weapons looted by the Karimojong and Jie in 1979 remain in heavy circulation.⁴⁸⁹ Faced with the ascendant, gun-wielding warlord, the weapons have since contributed to the decline of the position of the elder in the community– a situation of deteriorated law and order many Ugandans would certainly like to reverse if they could.

In affected countries, medical treatment and rehabilitation costs would likely become more bearable and lost productivity somewhat regained should a small arms regime come into force. Without peace, there can be no development. The “most depressing arms race”⁴⁹⁰ in the world is in the Third World where food and welfare cannot be afforded nor basic human needs met. Small arms control frees up funds for health, education and other programs. Of course, the most compelling rationale for controlling the trade, use and stockpiling of light weapons is not military or political, but social and economic.

Excessive small arms also pose problems for Northern countries that are difficult to deny. Northern states are interested in tackling the small arms and light weapons issue as crime committed with small arms wreaks havoc in cities and towns and uses up law enforcement energies. Canadian cities, for example, have been forced to come up with an urgent and appropriate response to deal with the

⁴⁸⁹ Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, “Pastoral Politics in the Northeast Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as Change Agent,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38, no. 3 (2000): 407-429, 417-419.

⁴⁹⁰ Sampson, *Arms Bazaar*, 313.

growing number and variety of crimes committed by organized criminal groups like The Big Circle group (created by Red Guard militiamen who were purged or imprisoned in the late 1960s in China) who are involved in lucrative illicit credit card enterprises among other crimes.⁴⁹¹ The Big Circle group use other Asian groups as “enforcers” (committing violence, normally with guns, to get what they want). Also, the drug trade as it is linked with violent crime (most often with small arms) and abuse has ranked high among the priorities of international organizations and most members of the global community for some time⁴⁹².

States are extremely conscious of their economic performance and desire maintaining a growth rate that is strong while warding off inflation. In Israel, a country that has one of the steepest defence burdens, it was avowed by former Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel enjoyed a “swords into silicon chips” experience with positive benefits from the military industrial sector being felt in the private, mostly technological, sector. However, when controlling for technological growth, a quantitative study by Karl de Rouen showed that increases in defence spending in fact slowed growth⁴⁹³. The advantage of a small arms control regime might well be improved growth and “peace dividends” in a number of industrialized states⁴⁹⁴.

⁴⁹¹ Glenn E. Curtis, Seth L. Elan, Rexford A. Hudson and Nina A. Kollars, *Transnational Activities of Chinese Crime Organizations*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC (April 2003).

⁴⁹² Michel Schiray, “Introduction: Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Public Policy for Drug Control,” *International Social Science Journal* (September 2001): 351-358.

⁴⁹³ Karl de Rouen, Jr., “The Guns-Growth Relationship in Israel,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no.1 (2000): 71-83.

⁴⁹⁴ See Michael Brzoska, “Military Conversion: The Balance Sheet,” *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 131-140. Another factor to consider is that tourism serves as a critical contribution to economic development, particularly critical for growth in the developing world, generating \$US 476 billion in receipts in 2000. According to Eric Neumayer in “The Impact of

Removing small arms from society makes war less likely or less destructive, reduces the economic costs of the militarization of society and prevents fragile peace agreements from being undermined. We know that there is interest in all of the above gains as we have seen unilateral attempts at small arms restraint by nearly all nations. For example, several nations have implemented national brokering regulations.⁴⁹⁵ Over ninety countries now have domestic laws penalizing the illicit manufacture, possession and trade in SALW⁴⁹⁶. Many countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States are now conducting reviews of their current firearm legislation or putting into place new laws. These efforts have touched on various aspects of national control over weapons -- citizen ownership, border management, weapon destruction, export controls, licensed production, and the marking and tracing of light weapons.

Generally speaking, any collaborative effort at arms transfer restraint – be it among importers of a given region, among exporters, or among both groups together – would favourably affect the security relationships among the participants (unless, of course, such an effort ended in acrimonious failure). The exchange of information, the candid articulation of concerns, the challenging of worst-case assumptions, the personal and professional contact, the experience of making even rhetorical or limited substantive progress, and the shaping of embryonic institutional forums (that could one day mature into active security apparatus) would all help to produce a climate more conducive to the lowering of distrust and the maintenance of peace⁴⁹⁷.

Political Violence on Tourism: Dynamic Cross-National Estimation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 259-281, tourism can recover quite rapidly after violence ends.

⁴⁹⁵ *Small Arms Survey 2004*, 162.

⁴⁹⁶ Peter Batchelor, “The First Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms: Building Momentum for Global Action.” *Disarmament Diplomacy* 72 (August/September 2003).

⁴⁹⁷ David C. Gompert and Alexander R. Vershbow, “Introduction,” in *Controlling Future Arms Trade*, 23.

According to Renée de Nevers, “self-interest motivates states to form regimes” because regimes “both regularize interactions between states and provide clearing houses for information about related state actions.” Thus, regimes reduce information costs to member states and also reduce transaction costs in global affairs. This facilitates cooperation among states⁴⁹⁸.

Keohane expands on the issue of transaction costs by declaring that international regimes allow governments to take advantage of potential economies of scale. Once a regime has been established, “the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue will be lower than it would be without a regime.”⁴⁹⁹ This point is particularly relevant for small arms as the policy area is so dense that tackling additional sub-issues on the subject would become easier once a fixed framework was established.

So do the costs for states of cooperating in a small arms control regime outweigh the benefits or do the benefits outweigh the costs? Can we know? Can leaders tasked with making prenegotiation policy on small arms know? It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that a regime has already begun to form because states possessed strong interests to move ahead on the matter. This may be true. On the other hand, what if the outcome – a regime partially formed – has not moved *more* ahead because of counter-interests?

The reader will recall from the beginning of the chapter a discussion on methodological difficulties in predicting the likelihood of a regime from pure

⁴⁹⁸ Renée de Nevers, *Regimes as Mechanisms for Global Governance*, Project on World Security, (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1999), 4.

⁴⁹⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 90.

interests. They are not determinate. We can actually suppose little that is definite from the above tally of costs and benefits of a regime, particularly as there are so many pronounced, interlinking interests/counter-interests among a variety of actors (although the review of interests give us a good background and understanding of the issue). Negotiators themselves cannot grasp the total view of the cognitive complexity involved⁵⁰⁰. “A real test of the theory requires *ex ante* rather than *ex post* specification of interests.”⁵⁰¹ We try to pursue the goal of uncovering why a small arms regime began to emerge in the 1990’s and not before by “specifying meaningful propositions that can be tested”⁵⁰² in advance.

We know that there is more to uncovering the mystery of interests than a simple tally of pros and cons because 1) some regimes fail to form despite strong interests backing them⁵⁰³ and 2) some regimes *do* form when it would seem most unlikely, considering a tally of interests alone.

Let us consider a parable on the subject, borrowed from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to find out what we need to know to arrive at a complete understanding of “why” in an interest-based study:

Five hungry men meet in the wilderness. One of the men has seen a stag in the area. The men agree to cooperate in a plan to capture the stag. They do so only after considering the odds of satisfying their hunger. In the end (after a period of reflection), they determine that the odds of getting what they want (hunger satisfied)

⁵⁰⁰ Michael Watkins, “Strategic Simplification: Toward a Modular Design in Negotiation,” *International Negotiation* 8 (2003), 149-167.

⁵⁰¹ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (summer 1995), 39.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 72.

⁵⁰³ Levy, Young and Zürn, “Study of International Regimes,” 285.

are greater if they act in concert than if they attempt to capture the stag on their own⁵⁰⁴.

The tale of cooperation in an interest-driven world would be clear-cut if the parable ended there. If it did, we could safely say that a regime has come about as interests, to capture the stag jointly, are strongly present.

However, each of the hunters knows that if a *hare* comes into reach, it can easily be grabbed by one of the participants. How much should they trust each other? For if one of the hunters *does* grab a hare to satisfy his immediate hunger, he will cause the stag to escape. In the parable, this does indeed happen. The plan fails. One man's short-term interest wins out over his impulse to care about the other hunters and their hunger (the common good). In Kenneth Waltz's words, "The story is simple; the implications are tremendous. In cooperative action, *even when all agree on the goal and have an equal interest in the project*, one cannot rely on others."⁵⁰⁵ The parable speaks to the tradeoffs between the short-term interests of an individual state (man) and the longer-term collective interest of all involved.

However, what would happen if there were ways to relieve the participants' fear of others' reneging? Also, what if there were ways, during the prenegotiation period, to reassure the participants that the plan will come to fruition (it will get off the ground) and that they will receive their fair share of meat (two other common concerns of actors during prenegotiation)?

⁵⁰⁴ Holsti, *The State, War, and The State of War*, 9.

⁵⁰⁵ Kenneth Waltz in Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With A Little Help From My Friends," *World Politics* XXIII: 1 (October 1970), 106.

In international relations, there are such ways. These reassurances are what states are really seeking when they engage in strategic prenegotiation.⁵⁰⁶

The answer to the puzzle of why some issues are regulated by regimes and other, equally urgent issues such as small arms go unaddressed lies in the success of negotiations to quell state fears rather than to meet their many and complex interests. “To Rousseau, the explanation [and the point of the parable] lies in the situation rather than in the caprices of human sentiment or the attributes of the states themselves.”⁵⁰⁷

Multilateral cooperation is a “highly demanding form”⁵⁰⁸ as it “requires that states sacrifice substantial levels of flexibility in decision making and resist the temptations of short-term gain in the interest of long-term benefits.”⁵⁰⁹

What sophisticated interest-based theorists do is study the conditions that would help states to overcome their fears to see if those conditions are present in order to predict the appearance of a regime. What does the neoliberal literature say?

i) Solution Salience

States are often fatalistic at the start of a new venture, according to Oran Young who pioneered a model called institutional bargaining, used particularly in

⁵⁰⁶ Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 61.

⁵⁰⁷ Holsti, *The State, War, and The State of War*, 8-9.

⁵⁰⁸ John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

⁵⁰⁹ Lisa L. Martin, “The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,” in *Multilateralism Matters*, 94.

the environmental field⁵¹⁰. They are programmed to say, “it will never work.” “This is a gamble”. No one wants to be associated with a losing cause. States have a poor or pessimistic estimation of the willingness of others to take “leaps of faith.” Many projects have failed to get off the ground due to this. “To this project,” wrote Samuel Johnson in 1775, “which is formed with great purity of intention and displayed with spriteliness and elegance, it can only be objected, that, like many projects, it is, if not generally impracticable, yet evidently hopeless, as it supposes more zeal, concord and perseverance than a view of mankind gives reason for expecting.”⁵¹¹ But what if there was a proposal on the table that seemed especially good – that captured the imagination, or that resonated with the times, and that helped build excitement or momentum? A salient solution. The perceived salience of solution is sometimes called a focal point or “hook⁵¹²”.

How might the uncertainty over whether or not a solution is good be overcome?

In general, determining whether or not a solution is intrinsically salient is rather too subjective a claim to test accurately. For this reason, we look for negotiating ploys that help all feel like they are being associated with a winning proposal - One such ploy is the “copycat factor” – bringing to the fore a solution that has already existed in the past and that has proven itself. History has shown us that once an example has been produced, it is susceptible to being re-produced. In

⁵¹⁰ Oran R. Young, “The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment,” *International Organization* 43, no. 3 (summer 1989): 349-375.

⁵¹¹ Samuel Johnson, *Lives of the Poets* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1890), vol 111, 2-45.

⁵¹² Carsten K. W. de Dreu, Sander L. Koole and Frans L. Oldersma, “On the Seizing and Freezing of Negotiation Inferences: Need for Cognitive Closure Moderates the Use of Heuristics in Negotiation,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 25, no. 3 (March 1999): 348-362.

order to overcome narrow state self-interest, draft proposals are more likely to meet with acceptance if they appeal to countries for their familiarity. So, copycat solutions are a factor to look for in our analysis.

As well, John Odell understands the non-static quality of solution salience as a variable in terms of framing (persuading others to see things one way rather than a rival's way using an attractive or memorable reference point).⁵¹³ In 2001, governmental advocates of a ministerial declaration on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and public health attempted to frame TRIPS by reference to public health values rather than property rights values.⁵¹⁴ The above assumes there is a subjective zone in the prenegotiation arena. It also assumes the possibility for some states to capitalize on the malleability of perception in an uncertain bargaining environment.

The "reframing tactic" is not necessarily traceable to a constructivist influence as some authors consider.⁵¹⁵ In rationalist terms, the reframing of a salient solution is seen as "Perception and Misperception" as in the well-known

⁵¹³ Harald Müller, "Arguing, Bargaining and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2004): 395-43.

⁵¹⁴ John Odell with Susan K. Sell. "Reframing The Issue: The WTO Coalition On Intellectual Property And Public Health, 2001." (November 2003), Unpublished paper, 14; <http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~odell/papers.html>, 14.

⁵¹⁵ Referring to changes made to stances at the UN small arms conference as the negotiations wore on, Krause summarizes, "From a theoretical perspective...the important issue is whether or not state positions on any aspects of small arms and light weapons *changed in the multilateral negotiating process*. Changes, if they pass a certain threshold of significance (here undefined) would *prima facie* provide evidence for a key constructivist claim that state interests evolve throughout negotiation and dialogue. By contrast, if the outcome of the conference can be explained simply by examining the initial position of states, plus their relative power (either as bargaining power, or within the international system), then rationalist modes of explanation should be privileged, Keith Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy" 9.

texts of Robert Jervis and Robert Axelrod.⁵¹⁶ Also, there is the negotiating tactic of “bridging.” Bridging is identifying a new formula or set of choices that satisfies some of the main needs of the parties involved. “For example, two people are in a room: one wants the window open for fresh air, but the other wants to avoid a draft by keeping the window closed. A bridging solution is one where they decide to open a window in an adjacent room, which brings in fresh air but avoids a draft, thus offering a third mutually satisfactory alternative.”⁵¹⁷

ii) *Fair Distribution of Gains*

The fear of being taken advantage of will be alleviated if it is thought there is a fair allocation of “payoffs” with no would-be member reaping more advantages from the agreement than others⁵¹⁸. States do not want to be the one who backs down in negotiation.⁵¹⁹

This factor sprung from the absolute-relative gains debate, and has culminated in James Fearon’s work on bargaining. He writes, “The relative gains debate forced institutional theorists to recognize explicitly that substantially unequal distribution of the benefits can be a key detractor in negotiation”

Fearon furthermore notes that states will care more about gains if they foresee a repeating pattern of cooperation – called a “shadow of the future”⁵²⁰ When states realized there would be biennial meeting on small arms, they began to care

⁵¹⁶ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” *World Politics* XXXVIII, no. 1 (October 1985) 226-254, 247.

⁵¹⁷ Fen Osler Hampson, “Barriers to Negotiation and Requisites for Success,” in *Multilateral Negotiations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 40.

⁵¹⁸ Young, “Politics of International Regime Formation,” 368.

⁵¹⁹ James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (spring 1998): 269-305, 287.

⁵²⁰ Following Robert Jervis, Fearon, “Bargaining,” 287.

more about their bargaining gains and losses – as they were now involved in a long-term, rather than ad hoc or one-time process.

In addition to looking for indication of a long shadow of the future, we look for evidence of coalitions forming when there is unequal bargaining power (following Fen Osler Hampson's work on negotiation⁵²¹). He believes that coalition-building (leading at times to bandwagoning) is the crucial way that states seek to right unfair distribution of gains in negotiation. Finally, when states begin to bandwagon, other states perceive the joining behaviour as a gauge of peer behaviour – and are more likely to join too⁵²².

iii) Enforcement

Finally, enforcement is a concern for many states when deciding whether or not to take part in an agreement. This factor is based on “fear of another state

⁵²¹ Hampson with Reid, “Coalition Diversity,” 7-42. William Zartmann introduces and closes a second special issue on negotiation, which highlights complexity and coalition-building as themes in negotiation. I. Zartmann, “Conclusion,” 179-186.

⁵²² A facilitating factor in multilateral negotiation, which has received an interested reception within the past five years, has been the factor of leadership. The idea has taken hold, even inspiring calls for new “leadership theories” in IR. Oran Young has been one of the leading advocates. Rather than thinking in terms of interests as applied by major states, one person -- “a moral or political entrepreneur” -- is said to make the difference and sway strategic interaction in a certain direction. The political entrepreneur is believed to be a new actor in a new statecraft. Some international scholars, however, correctly view this line of thought with wariness as it leans towards tautology. “With leadership potential (“creativity,” “vision,” or “skill”) difficult to measure, supranational leaders may be deemed “strong” because they have been successful, rather than the reverse.” The strong roles of Monnet and Delors in EU negotiations are said to be “over exaggerated – sometimes counterproductive.” In a sharp criticism of the leadership variable, Andrew Moravcsik writes, “They [scholars such as Robert Cox who have latched on to leadership] do not consider the obvious alternative hypothesis, namely that entrepreneurship is endogenous. In other words, they fail to ask whether other interested parties, above all the most interested national governments, could or did perform the same functions, thus rendering supranational entrepreneurship redundant or futile.” Moravcsik reserves his toughest critique for the fact that leadership studies have not been submitted to rigorous and methodologically sound evaluation (complaining that leadership has not been proved as independent from the power of the state in negotiations).

reneging.”⁵²³ Nearly every author dealing with interests and cooperation touches upon enforcement. It has been perhaps over-represented in the informal literature on arms control. With the exception of Chayes and Chayes,⁵²⁴ there is near universal agreement on its importance. Some well-known dilemmas with collective action – Prisoner’s Dilemmas and the game Chicken- have as their main theme the anxiety that is caused by participants not knowing whether others will comply with the joint endeavour. States with mixed interests fail to create a regime if they foresee temptations to cheat. The availability of an effective mechanism to *enforce* compliance partially solves the problem.

The fact that there is monitoring and repercussions for bad behaviour increases the allure of mutual cooperation in governments’ eyes. Enforcement mollifies the fear that the goal of cooperation will be hampered by defectors. It alters states calculations of advantage⁵²⁵. Requirements that are easy and inexpensive to enforce make the emergence of a regime much more plausible. The

⁵²³ Keohane and Martin,

⁵²⁴ New authors are beginning to say that enforcement is not necessary (Chayes and Chayes), citing the BWC which has no provisions for verification and no permanent organizational framework to ensure its implementation as an example Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, “Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles,” in *Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* by Jane E. Nolan, ed., (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 75. If defection in a regime occurs, it is believed to be due to: “not necessarily, perhaps not even usually, the result of deliberate defiance of the legal standard.’ On those rare occasions when compliance problems do occur they should not be viewed as violations or self-interested attempts at exploitation, but as isolated administrative breakdowns. The causes of noncompliance are to be found in 1) the ambiguity and *indeterminacy* of treaties, (2) the capacity limitations of states, and (3) uncontrollable social or economic changes George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996): 380-381. However, other authors have more convincingly shown that the relative absence of enforcement threats are due not so much to the irrelevance of enforcement as to the fact that states are avoiding deep cooperation – and the benefits it holds whenever a prisoner’s dilemma situation exists – because they are unwilling or unable to pay the costs of enforcement.” (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, “Good News about Compliance”, 387.) Ironically, little verification may permit more “action” in terms of cooperation (of the light variety) because states will not feel that they really have to comply.

⁵²⁵ Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge.”

fur seal regime (for which it is relatively uncomplicated to monitor harvests of seals) was brought into being with much greater ease than the regime to protect endangered species (a regime beset with problems verifying poachers and others engaged in the illegal trade).⁵²⁶

We have distilled what we consider to be the three most relevant considerations for regime formation: solution salience, gains distribution, and enforcement from the neoliberal literature, believing that they hold the most promise for an explanation of interest-based cooperation⁵²⁷. The candidate hypothesis of this chapter is that if these three factors are answered in a satisfactory manner, the chances that a regime is headed for success are much greater.

To this point we have examined interests and counter-interests and a way of approaching them. Next we analyze the evolution of the regime to regulate small conventional weapons. First, it is necessary to account for the years 1945 to 1989 when a regime on small arms found only fragile footing.

⁵²⁶ Young, "Regime Formation," 370-371.

⁵²⁷ Kenneth Oye, David Singer, and Duncan Snidal believe the key to understanding interests in cooperation lies in mathematical modeling. Their work has been continuously updated. However, like Joanne Gowa who applauds the American methodological method but believes that in some cases, it is not enough, we feel that formal modeling is not a fit for our study of interests. The qualitative outcome -- "the beginnings of a regime" -which we are trying to explain cannot be captured by a dyad for cooperation (yes/no). Thus, we do not use formal modeling in this chapter due to a too-large gap between abstract theoretical concepts and the actual outcome of qualitative performance. See Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (winter 1986): 167-186; Pierre Allan and Cédric Dupont, "International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness," *International Political Science Review* 20, no.1 (1999): 23-47.

1945-1989: Days of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Free-for-All

Bipolarity and the introduction of nuclear weapons technology to the world defined the Cold War age⁵²⁸. Leaps of cooperative faith were difficult when Soviet intentions were obscure for western planning. So too was there distrust on the Soviet side.⁵²⁹ Still, some arms control and humanitarian regimes (the Genocide Convention of 1948, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1966 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the Environmental Modification Convention of 1977, and the Moon Treaty of 1979) were negotiated during this period. Studies focusing on the Cold War system as a “comprehensive system of antagonism”⁵³⁰ miss the fact that some areas of International Relations were taken up as cooperative endeavours. A valuable perspective on the mid to late twentieth century recalls that regimes formed with the right pre-negotiation conditions. Were the requisite conditions present for a small arms control regime to emerge during the period 1945-1989?

⁵²⁸ See R. Harrison Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” *International Organization* 47. no. 1 (winter 1993), 77-106.

⁵²⁹ Stuart Croft, *Strategies of Arms Control: A History and Typology* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996), 2.

⁵³⁰ Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, “Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations: Causes and Consequences of East-West Regimes,” in *International Regimes in East-West Politics*, ed. Volker Rittberger (Longman: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 29.

i) Solution Salience Failed

“There must be a way of coming down the hill, of de-escalating,” said General Moshe Dayan in 1976. “The only solution is not to give us more arms for our security, but to give us more security so we can have less arms.”⁵³¹

Unfortunately for the prospects of a small arms control regime, there was an absence of viable models in circulation to control small arms that might have quelled fears of states in undertaking such a venture during the Cold War. No airtight solution that might have swayed states into cooperation entered into prenegotiation. As it was, the understanding of the problem of how arms transfers affects conflict was overwhelmed by fear and self-interest.

History had failed to produce a model for global gun control to this point. Plus, as there was no principle in international law that declared that states *must* conclude arms control agreements or take actions to disarm, there was little to go on. By definition, arms control begins when states are willing to consider limiting their freedom of behaviour with regard to their national armaments. And only then, arms control works if states somehow gain confidence in collectively taking part in such an arrangement⁵³².

Arms control agreements tended to be seen as part of a political relationship – to be protected much like the naval arms control agreements of the five major naval states were seen in the 1920s, as an arms control regime around which politics could be built between the powers, and into which other naval states – like Germany and the Soviet Union – could be integrated. “The agreements reached

⁵³¹ Quoted in Sampson, *Arms Bazaar*, 18.

⁵³² Jean Pictet, “International Humanitarian Law: Definition,” in Henri Durant Institute, *International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law* (Paris: UNESCO, 1988), XIX-XXI.

were to a great extent a barometer of tension versus *détente* in the international climate,” as a “main channel of political dialogue between East and West with arms reductions playing a secondary role.”⁵³³ The control of small arms was seen as too small a concern to stand as a “cornerstone” or symbol of a particular relationship between states of that time⁵³⁴.

There was little inclination to tackle the problem on a regional basis – which might have been a salient approach-- because the security concerns of some states were strongly affected by the military postures of countries lying outside the region (US, Soviet Union.)⁵³⁵ There was only one regional attempt to curtail conventional arms during the Cold War – the Ayacucho Declaration of 1974 involving the eight Andean states of South America – it was unsuccessful⁵³⁶. Chile, Ecuador and Peru continued to import massive quantities of conventional arms while Brazil never participated in the regulations in an active way.

Difficulty in framing the problem was in large part at fault. According to the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations *Controlling Future Arm Trade*:

...[W]hat does it mean to ‘control’ international arms traffic? Is the goal to reduce the quantities of arms sold or given as aid, to discriminate among those who want arms, to restrict the types of arms that may be traded, to set and enforce conditions on how the arms may be used, or a combination of these pursuits? It is difficult to get agreement among individuals, let alone among governments, as to the nature of the arms trade ‘problem’ or even whether there is a problem.⁵³⁷

⁵³³ *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, “Introduction,” 6.

⁵³⁴ Croft, *Strategies of Arms Control*, 59-60.

⁵³⁵ Croft, *Strategies of Arms Control*, 19.

⁵³⁶ Pierre, “Toward an International Regime,” 374.

⁵³⁷ Anne Cahn et al., *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 1.

The goal of “general and complete disarmament” at the 1978, 1981 and 1988 Special Sessions on Disarmament was too lofty a possibility for a focal point. While the UN Charter was drafted and signed with the regulation of conventional armaments as a main goal in mind, the dropping of a nuclear bomb just days after the UN began changed the format of the UN’s approach irretrievably. Attention to nuclear weapons dominated and conventional weapons got lost in the shuffle⁵³⁸.

ii) Distribution of Gains: Deadlock

There did not appear to be a long shadow of the future for negotiations, so it is possible that bargaining on the control of conventional weapons was not furthered in any deep or meaningful sense (took place only superficially).

Let us remember that a regime becomes more likely if parties conceive of it as offering a balanced distribution of gains. States were bedevilled between 1945 and 1989 (just as they were during negotiations of the NPT) by issues of “fairness” and who gets what, where and how. A serious problem with a global effort to control light arms transfers was that it was thought to discriminate between states that rely on their own production and states that must look to the international market for their weapons. The way this was resolved with the NPT was through a bargain – in return for giving up nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon states could expect the nuclear weapon states to provide them with nuclear technology for the development of nuclear energy industries, for the same countries to contain the vertical spiral of nuclear weapons, and for the system of relative free trade in

⁵³⁸ Derek Boothby, *The United Nations and Disarmament*, International Relations Studies and the United Nations Occasional Papers, Academic Council on the United Nations System, No. 1 (2002).

conventional weaponry to remain intact and robust. Not only did a similar bargain for differences in levels of small arms production between states fail to be apparent, this last point posed problems for conventional arms control, including the control of light weapons. It was believed that if conventional weapons were not liberally provided to non-nuclear weapons states, their motivations to develop nuclear weapons would grow.⁵³⁹

Northern countries did not want to act, believing the onus was on the South – recipient countries. Andrew Pierre expands:

The traditional and deeply held view among the arms-supplying states right up to the Gulf War was that *the recipient states* within a region were principally responsible for reaching agreement on conventional arms limitations. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, American and British representatives at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament ritualistically talked of the need to reduce conventional arms by limiting purchases. “This would be the most satisfactory way,” British Minister of State Lord Goronwy-Roberts told the conference. “If the demand is not there, the suppliers will not be able to export.” He reasoned that once recipients took the initiative and established an arms control regime, the outside powers would respect it.⁵⁴⁰

The break-up of the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks of 1977-1979 (CAT talks) revealed that the US did not feel they were advantaged in the distribution of gains in this scenario. As developed by Krause in a study of arms transfer attempts during the Cold War, “the talks collapsed because the Carter administration was unable to maintain a consensus on restraint when specific regions, such as Latin

⁵³⁹ Smith, “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime,” 258.

⁵⁴⁰ Pierre, “Toward an International Regime for Conventional Arms Sales”, 374.

America and the Middle East, came under discussion.”⁵⁴¹ Lack of faith “in the usefulness of the CAT talks as an instrument of arms control arose.”⁵⁴² The US opted for the hare rather than waiting for the stag – there was “an unwillingness to sacrifice the right to reap short-term self-interested gains in the interest of achieving a longer term maximization of pay-offs.”⁵⁴³

Overall, a general sense of futility – if we don’t sell arms, someone else will – pervaded the strategic thinking of states, preventing some states who might have been keen from acting so (from pulling back on excessive or irresponsible transfers or taking on extra responsibility). This blocked coalition building. Even to one side of the Iron Curtain, so long as there appeared little chance of getting all stakeholders (all producing/exporting/recipient states) on board, the thought was – why bother? “In many cases, states do have an interest in controlling the arms trade, yet no single state stands to gain from exercising unilateral restraint in this area. If one state stops selling armaments then other states will move in to fill the void in the market.”⁵⁴⁴ If England, for example, restrained itself by not selling arms to Sri Lanka, France might. And unless it was clear that all the key players could be rounded up, it was known that one “loose cannon” could spoil everything. Countries at the time understood this – it was a built-in part of the equation.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) began to gain clout as a coalition in this time frame. The NAM, a collection of nations organized in the Cold War and

⁵⁴¹ Keith Krause, “Constructing Regional Security Regimes and the Control of Arms Transfers,” *International Journal* XLV (spring 1990): 386-423, 401.

⁵⁴² *SIPRI Yearbook* 1980, 121-122.

⁵⁴³ Krause, “Security Regimes.”

⁵⁴⁴ Scott Bowden, “Explaining Change in the International Trade in Armaments: A Constructivist Approach,” *International Politics* 34 (September 1997): 240.

encompassing more than one hundred members, claimed to be neutral in the conflict between the US-led Western bloc and Soviet-led Eastern bloc⁵⁴⁵. Steven D. Krasner's main idea in *Structural Conflict* was that the Third World, particularly the NAM, consciously participated in regimes (particularly at the UN where they knew they were guaranteed a voice and a vote) in economics, transportation, communications, arms control and human rights, seeing such international orders as a means by which they could redistribute bargaining power in global affairs away from developed Western states⁵⁴⁶. However, a "shift in power to the third-world countries" was not as strong as many members of the coalition would have liked, their overall influence arguable.⁵⁴⁷ Furthermore, the NAM had mixed motives on making progress on conventional weapons disarmament.

iii) Enforcement: Trust, But Verify

Alternately, there was little inclination to follow already laid-out customary law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Geneva Conventions and the law of The Hague. The principles of human rights are general and are operative in times of peace and war. The law of Geneva provides provisions for the

⁵⁴⁵ Ziring, Plano and Olton, *International Relations: Dictionary*, 20.

⁵⁴⁶ See Steven D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁵⁴⁷ François Duchêne, "The Proliferation of Arms: Motives, Magnitude and Consequences," *Adelphi Paper*, no. 133 (Spring 1977) International Institute for Strategic Studies, 16-17. Sometimes the NAM got what it wanted, sometimes not. As an example of the NAM bargaining and receiving what they wanted, Communist China was supported by the majority of the newly independent countries for a permanent seat in the Security Council (the seat was occupied by Republican China, as supported by the US). Ultimately, NAM pressure worked on this point. On the other hand, the NAM did not get its way on its hope for a withdrawal from Vietnam by the US, though it regularly passed resolutions and expressed statements at the UN on the subject. ("They saw in it [the war] the continuance of the same wave of decolonization which had brought independence to many countries." Shri Prakash, "USA's Involvement in Afghanistan: Third World Perception with Special Reference to South Asian Countries and its Implication for the Future," *Islam and the Modern Age* XXXIV, no. 1 (February 2003), 24-47, 25.

safeguarding of military personnel places hors de combat and persons not taking part in hostilities. Finally, the law of The Hague, or the law of warfare, determines the rights and duties of belligerents in the conduct of operations and limits the choice of warfare methods (restricting the use of certain weapons). The main reason normally attributed to the repeated disregard of such rules was lack of verifiability of actions⁵⁴⁸.

Recall that a regime must include a strong verification system so that parties are assured that others are adhering to the rules. Verification assists states in overcoming the pressure and fears that might make them defect. During the Cold War, proposals that would enable parties in arms control to better trust each other to comply were caught up in impossible standards. The concept of transparency had been flirted with⁵⁴⁹ prior to the Cold War (with the League of Nations) but basically the players were not familiar with or at ease with transparency, absorbed as they were in SALT-like verification (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks [the 1972 SALT I Agreement, the 1979 SALT II Treaty], the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1982 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [START])⁵⁵⁰.

The sort of verification to catch cheaters that was popular at the time would have been impractical and unfeasible for small arms – or for conventional weapons

⁵⁴⁸ SIPRI Yearbook.

⁵⁴⁹ The League of Nations produced a yearly statistical yearbook that contained official national statistics on arms imports and exports. The first volume included data from twenty-three countries. The data was considered of only limited value (figures not very comparable, list of categories of arms not appropriate). The publication of the yearbook came to an end with the beginning of the Second World War. Pierre, "Toward an International Regime," 383, 384.

⁵⁵⁰ Franklyn Griffiths, "The Soviet Experience of Arms Control," *International Journal* XLIV (spring 1989): 304-360.

for that matter. Little thought was devoted to a milder form of verification in the form of transparency⁵⁵¹.

1990-2005: The Game Changes

Many analysts view the period of 1990-2001 as having been a window of opportunity for cooperative regimes. From 2001 to 2005, security has dominated the agenda of most states. In a certain sense, a focus on security has increased and decreased the bargaining opportunities for small arms regime creation.

i) Solution-Salience Found

In the beginning of the 1990's, we began to see conditions that helped generate mutual interests towards small arms cooperation, namely, salient solutions. Pessimism had long plagued attempts at small arms or conventional arms control – a sense of doom continuously prevented proposals from getting off the ground. “It will never work anyway,” those involved said, given the heavy and complicated interests (at individual, group and state levels) for small arms proliferation and use to continue. It seemed the world needed a model that worked– any model – from which to build and to provide hope that *something could, in fact, be done*⁵⁵². As it turned out, two UN Expert reports, the concept of “microdisarmament” and the approach of regionalism and small arms were able to *somewhat break the barrier of*

⁵⁵¹ Croft, *Strategies of Arms Control*, 59.

⁵⁵² Joanna Spear, “On the Desirability and Feasibility of Arms Transfer Regime Formation,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 15:3 (December 1994), 84.

pessimism and to permit a broader and more diffuse agenda of proliferation to evolve.

With the debate on the appropriate conceptualization of security in the 1990's, which had an impact on the way world threats were handled, an opening was made for prenegotiation on small arms.

As the bilateral Cold War confrontation declined, a number of “new” security challenges gained greater prominence. These included complex internal and transnational wars, the problems of armed opposition groups, warlordism and transnational crime, and the challenges for UN and other international peace support operations as conflicts came to an end. Meanwhile, many states and NGOs were developing and promoting concepts of “human security”, in which concerns about the security of people and communities were raised alongside those of states and international society. In all of these contexts, wide availability and misuse of SALW was a major problem, manifestly contributing to great human suffering and insecurity⁵⁵³.

Suddenly, arms controllers saw that small arms were not too “small” to be thought about – their impacts were huge from the security vantage point. While not in fact a “new issue,” arms controllers and disarmament officials became newly concerned about people and communities in conflict. As explored in Chapter Two, the NGO community (e.g. peace and arms control groups) helped bring about this change.

In October 1993, the President of Mali made a request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for assistance in dealing with small arms, as well as demobilizing armed rebellion in that country. That request is now widely thought of as a turning-point that would set in motion other events in the small arms control

⁵⁵³ IANSA, *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003*, 18.

movement – mainly a soul-searching in the UN for solutions to deal with the problem of SALW, at this point labeled “microdisarmament”.

UN advisory missions were sent to Mali as well as Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal to look into national and regional consequences of SALW proliferation. Following the mission, the government of Mali began to promote an initiative for a moratorium on SALW, which would become the ECOWAS Moratorium.

Under the direction of the UN, “the search was on” for a salient solution to curbing the unrestricted flow of small arms and light weapons. Based on the experience of the advisory missions in Africa, this first step towards an adequate response came in the form of a UN resolution. General Assembly Resolution 50/70 B of December 1995, sponsored by Japan, recommended that a panel of governmental experts be formed on the matter and a report prepared. The panel members, chosen by the Secretary-General, were selected by geographic representation. They came from sixteen countries: Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka and the USA. The members met three times in New York: for five days in June of 1996, eleven days in January 1997, and twelve days in July 1997. The panel also met in Tokyo in May 1997 at the invitation of the government of Japan. The report was prepared between June 1996 and July 1997. The mandate the panel members had before them in preparing the report was to investigate:

- a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations;
- b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade;
- c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict.⁵⁵⁴

When the report first appeared, many observers in the field were taken aback by the content, which was bolder and broader than had been predicted. “Because UN panels operate by consensus, “ writes Jim Wurst, “there were few expectations that the report would contain anything of substance...Most delegates and experts expected only modest statements from the panel on a few non-controversial issues. Thus, the panel’s expansive final report came as a surprise”.⁵⁵⁵

What were the points of controversy that the panel had to overcome? And how did the panel arrive at an agreement? What emerged was a cohesive report but not before much wrangling took place (or some “very intense discussions”⁵⁵⁶ in the words of Mitsuhiro Donawaki, the chair of the panel). One debate centered on *what weapons* were to be considered under the rubric of the report: should firearms for

⁵⁵⁴ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*.

⁵⁵⁵ Jim Wurst, “The U.N. Gears Up,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 1 (January/February 1999).

⁵⁵⁶ Mitsuhiro Donawaki, quoted in Panel Discussion, the UN Expert Panels on Small Arms and the UN Arms Register, United Nations, October 22, 1997, <http://disarm.igc.org/conv97.html> ; Accessed February 19, 2005.

civilian purposes and crime prevention, for example, be considered alongside light weapons made for military specifications? The answer arrived at was generally “no” in an effort not to duplicate work being conducted elsewhere on the illicit trafficking in firearms within the UN system – specifically within the context of the Vienna Commission on Crime Prevention. At the same time it was acknowledged that weapons not made to military specifications – like hunting arms and home-made weapons – are indeed commonly being used in conflicts with which the United Nations has been, or is, involved. In cases where such weapons endanger the public in wholesale fashion, they may be considered relevant to the report.

The study of *legal* transfers was also eventually ruled out – the focus became one purely on the illegal trafficking and accumulation of light weapons.

Another source of dispute lay in what exactly was meant by “excessive and destabilizing” in the phrase “excessive and destabilizing transfer and accumulation of small arms and light weapons” contained in the third item of the mandate. The experts admitted that these terms are relative and vary depending on context. It was decided that accumulations of SALW become excessive and destabilizing:

a) When a State, whether a supplier or recipient, does not exercise restraint in the production, transfer and acquisition of such weapons beyond those needed for legitimate national and collective defence and internal security;

b) When a State, whether a supplier or recipient, cannot exercise effective control to prevent the illegitimate acquisition, transfer, transit or circulation of such weapons;

- c) When the use of such weapons manifests itself in armed conflict, in crime, such as arms and drug trafficking, or other actions contrary to the norms of national or international law.

A further area of sensitivity was the delicate task of determining the nature and causes of the accumulation of weapons. “On this question,” Donawaki says,

there were many opinions because some of the panel members thought that the accumulation was the result of the excessive supply by supplier states, particularly during the Cold War years. There were other members who thought that the recipient states where the conflicts are taking place are causing the accumulation because without conflicts weapons do not come in⁵⁵⁷.

In the end, the report concluded, “there is no single cause” for accumulations and instability.

Finally, in preparing the recommendations, the panel had a hard time in sorting out what proposed solutions should properly fall into the categories of “reduction” and “prevention”. As Donowaki further explains:

We had to come up with a set of recommendations to reduce the already existing accumulation of weapons, and another set of recommendations on how to prevent such accumulations. Of course, the distinction between reduction and prevention is not always so clear-cut or neat. If you are going to demobilize weapons in an area where the conflict has come to an end, this demobilization may be for the reduction of such weapons, but at the same time it may help prevent the reoccurrence of such conflicts⁵⁵⁸.

⁵⁵⁷ Donawaki, Panel Discussion, UN Expert Panels on Small Arms.

⁵⁵⁸ Donawaki, Panel Discussion, UN Expert Panels on Small Arms.

Many of these debates – while resolved for the moment – would reverberate in discussions on SALW in other fora later on.

One particularly bold recommendation contained in the Panel Report, was that all light weapons “which are not under legal civilian possession, and which are not required for the purposes of national defence and internal security, should be collected and destroyed by States as expeditiously as possible.” Other recommendations concerning the reduction of small arms included: the adoption by the UN of a “proportional and integrated” approach to security and development in various regions of the world where internal security forces are in need of being reinforced; the furthering of a disarmament component in UN peacekeeping operations (e.g. providing assistance to negotiators of peace settlements and members of peacekeeping operations in the development of plans to disarm combatants, and to collect and destroy weapons); and the strengthening of international and regional cooperation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials as well as the implementation of mechanisms and regional network for information-sharing to help alleviate the illegal circulation of, and trafficking, in small arms and light weapons along with criminal activities related to these weapons.

On the side of prevention, all states were called upon to:

- a) make decisions on which arms are allowed to be used by civilians and under what conditions, in national laws and regulations;

- b) have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures in order to be able to exercise effective control over the legal possession of SALW and over their transfer;
- c) safeguard such weapons in storage facilities to protect them against diversion through theft or corruption;
- d) and augment their cooperative efforts in relevant regional and international organizations.

In December 1997, the General Assembly once again requested that a group of governmental experts be convened with the goal of producing a report. The objective of the report was two-fold: to take stock on the headway made on the recommendations of the previous report as well as to assess what further action needed to be taken in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons. The Secretary-General appointed twenty-three expert members to the group from a diverse set of countries: Algeria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Mozambique, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USA. The group gathered together in May 1998 in New York, in February 1999 in Geneva and in July 1999 in New York as well as attended workshops in Tokyo and Geneva over the course of 1998 and 1999. Academic experts, members of pertinent UN bodies, and representatives from NGOs and industry gave their input along the way. The Group also took into consideration replies from Member States on the matter that were submitted in accordance with a

request made by the Secretary-General in pursuance of UN GA Resolutions 52/38 J and 53/77 E.

Taken together, the reports have had far-reaching impact and have become a blueprint for action – a focal point for solution-salience. As David Biggs, formerly of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, observes:

The reports of the Panel and the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms are generally regarded as the leading reference sources in the field of small arms. As they have been adopted by the General Assembly, the recommendations contained therein have, in effect, become internationally agreed guidelines that are extensively quoted by governments, subregional and regional organizations, civil society and the media.⁵⁵⁹

In addition, a new reality began to take shape in organizational culture – a movement towards nimbler forms of organization – less hierarchical and more in line with creative solutions – more flexible, more empowering from the bottom-up and quicker to react. The origins of the “flatter” (rather than pyramid-shaped) managerial movement must be searched for not in the industrial or agricultural ages but in the remote history of 20,000 years ago when hunter-gatherers formed temporary teams, worked long hours around a project and accepted leadership based exclusively on proven merit.⁵⁶⁰ Think globally and act locally has become a mantra of modern organizational design and strategy, which emphasizes the need to implement a local-level adaptation of a global strategy.

⁵⁵⁹ David Biggs, “United Nations Contributions to the Process,” *Disarmament Forum* (2000).

⁵⁶⁰ See J.F. Rischard, *High Noon*, (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 41-44; Marie-Claude Smouts, “The Proper Use of Governance in International Relations,” *International Social Science Journal* (March 1998), no. 155, 87; and John E. Trent, “International Institutions: The Case for Innovation and Reform,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 11, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 3-20.

Rather than responding to an abstract or universal need, countries began to respond to what was most *salient* to them --- they began to act in accordance with their “special needs” (specific to region): crime in Latin America, development and security in Africa, export restrictions in Europe...

Sometimes it is easier to start smaller – Former Argentinean President Raul Alfonsin had “too many generals breathing down his back” to let him sign the 1969 NPT. Instead, he spoke bilaterally with Brazil – neighbour, rival, and fellow regional arms racer – about reciprocal inspection of the two countries’ nuclear installations – a promising start and example of how smaller can work⁵⁶¹.

In International Relations, Gilbert Winham has said, “There is a need to decompose’ the system in order to manage it effectively.”⁵⁶² Regional initiatives are helpful in encouraging the decisions of national governments as a copycat method. They can provide a template that can be adapted to a new need.

Violent crime (theft, kidnapping, murder, guerilla assaults) and drug trafficking motivated countries in Latin America to push for the *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials* which was signed by members of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1997. “Consensus was built rapidly because the OAS discussions linked illicit weapons trafficking to common regional concerns,”⁵⁶³ explains one commentator.

⁵⁶¹ *Economist*, “New Fingers Close to the Trigger.” (1985).

⁵⁶² Gilbert R. Winham, *The Evolution of International Trade Agreements* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 121.

⁵⁶³ Elizabeth Clegg, Owen Greene, Sarah Meek and Geraldine O’Callaghan, “Regional Initiatives and the UN 2001 Conference,” *Biting the Bullet*; Internet; accessed May 09, 2001; available from http://www.basicint.org/BTB_Briefing2b.htm. Page 12.

Terrorism, money laundering, and the trafficking of persons and piracy in the Southeast Asian part of the world⁵⁶⁴ led the heads of state of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to try to devise a solution within that arena to curb small arms smuggling which they believed was the link connecting such negative activities that they were jointly facing.⁵⁶⁵

In turn, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on small arms (2001) was drafted from the outlook of a region ravaged by conflict and grappling with the everyday effects of small arms and light weapons that were disturbing development and peace. The area was also enduring a rise in violent crime involving small arms⁵⁶⁶. Likewise, war weariness led the countries of East Africa and the Great Lakes region to reach agreement on the far-reaching Nairobi

⁵⁶⁴ A prime local example of how pessimism plagued efforts before hope could establish itself (from seeing other places act) is the Mindanao experience in the Philippines. One of the most important conclusions from Merliza M. Makinano and Alfredo Lubang's report, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Mindanao Experience*, prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada in February 2001 is that the people felt gloomy about the prospects of the Bring a Rifle, Improve Your Livelihood "BARIL" and other small arms disarmament programs being implemented successfully. The people believed "it would take decades or even a century to change the culture that makes possession of firearms a necessity" – and thus, why bother trying to change the situation? Just three years later, however, a campaign had begun (fuelled by similar efforts across the globe) "to reduce, if not eliminate violence" by ridding the community of firearms – this time with promise. Jewel F. Canuday, *Minda News*, "Women Call for Disarmament in Mindanao, Will Take Lead Role in Settling Conflict," (December 13, 2004), <http://www.mindananews.com/2004/12/13nws-women.htm> ; accessed February 27, 2005.

⁵⁶⁵ Katherine Kramer, *Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 3 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001).

⁵⁶⁶ Noel Stoett, *Implementing the Southern Africa Firearms Protocol: Identifying Challenges and Priorities*, Institute for Security Studies ISS Paper 83 (November 2003), 3.

Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons on small arms (2004)⁵⁶⁷.

Regionalism produced copycat arrangements. One region cooperating encouraged other regions to do likewise, bolstering confidence that solutions will succeed.

As well, countries were relatively comfortable with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because the OSCE (in its previous form) had been instrumental in the CFE Treaty. We are now seeing headway on this front. The same point is relevant for the Wassenaar Arrangement. The thirty-three members were able to push through, in December 2003, an updated version of 'Elements for Export Controls on MANPADS' (updated from a less strong version created in 2000) on transfers, stockpile management, technological developments and information exchange⁵⁶⁸.

ii) Distribution of Gains: Some Pain, Some Gain

Due to a confused time horizon, (uncertainty over the probability of the continuation of future interaction) in New York at the UN Small Arms Conference, many participants did not know how hard to bargain. Whether or not there would be a follow-up process (biennial meetings and follow-on Conference in 2006 to

⁵⁶⁷ After reaffirming the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence, the protocol opens with the statement that the countries are “gravely concerned with the problem of the proliferation of illicit SALW in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa and the devastating consequences they have had in sustaining armed conflict and armed crime...”
www.saferfrica.org/Documents.

⁵⁶⁸ Jurgen Van der Vlugt, “The OSCE Takes on the MANPADS Threat,” BASIC Report, British American Security Information Council, *Newsletter on International Security Policy*, October 2004, no. 86.

exchange information on progress and planned activities) was itself being bargained.

Still, states were very concerned about who gets what, when, where and how – the “gaps in gains” problem⁵⁶⁹ -- during negotiations of the small arms Programme of Action.

Since the separation of small arms from conventional weapons as an issue-area, many problems with distribution disappeared. It was clear that all states were affected (North and South).

Still, the major exporters of small arms felt they had more to lose. They felt this was unfair and their main strategy was to argue that we should focus on national rather than global measures (knowing that they had relatively comprehensive measures already in place.) The USA also did not want to restrict civilian ownership of weapons, seen as entering too controversially into the domain of domestic gun control. .

One had only to listen to the speech made by the head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation just before negotiations began to know that, at least initially; the major powers were not interested in a far-reaching treaty that dealt with multilateral measures. The Russian delegate pronounced, “I would like to emphasize that the promotion by a number of delegations of exceedingly ambitious proposals seems to be counter-productive, because this can undermine the fragile

⁵⁶⁹ Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation,” 315.

balance of interests. Only the observance of this balance opens a way to the success of our Conference.”⁵⁷⁰

Observers felt that the United States agreed to be a “fall guy” for China and Russia. Russia, US, China “want[ed] to accomplish very little.”⁵⁷¹ The US, China and many of the Arab countries did not want to restrict small arms sales to nongovernmental entities, to have a mandatory review conference, nor to insert a clause on encouraging international advocacy by NGOs and IGOs.

A coalition of small and middle-sized countries formed as a counter-point--consisting of EU nations – particularly Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway – Canada, India, many South American States and Africa. This group was committed to legally-binding instruments on some aspects of small arms control (brokering, marking and tracing), and they exhibited a favourable disposition towards engaging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the process.

In preparation, the coalition met several times before the UN Conference on the illicit trade in SALW: in July 1998, a meeting was hosted by Norway in Oslo (Oslo Meeting on Small Arms from which emerged “Elements of a Common Understanding.” A follow-up (Oslo II) encounter took place in December 1999. Ninety-eight countries joined together to issue a “Brussels Call for Action” on light weapons at the October 1998 “Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development” international conference in Belgium. Canada and Sri Lanka co-organized SALW conferences in June 2000, as did Poland (September 2000 and

⁵⁷⁰ S.A.Ordzhonikidze, Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the UN Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,” (New York, 9-20 July 2001) July 10, 2001.

⁵⁷¹ Representative, Human Rights Watch, Interview by telephone, June 2001.

September 2001), Bulgaria (October 2000), the European Union (in May 2001, under the Swedish Presidency of the EU), Cambodia and Japan (February 2001), and Hungary (April 2001). On November 7, 2000, the Canadian Joint Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Center for European Security and Disarmament convened a roundtable on Small Arms and Europe-Atlantic Security at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Canadian government organized an OAS seminar on the illicit SALW trade in Ottawa in May 2001. Several workshops on light weapons destruction and stockpile management took place prior to the conference and the Human Security Network was active on the issue throughout 2000⁵⁷². Within the Human Security Network, the coalition exchanged ideas on how to create a “substantial and forward-looking program”⁵⁷³ on the points that represented their interests.

Many countries of the South thought of this conference as their hope for concrete measures to stem the flow of SALW that exacerbates conflicts experienced at home and undermines basic human security throughout many Southern regions. African countries developed a “Common Position” along these lines in the Bamako Declaration. In the Declaration, the African countries declare that they agree that “it is vital to address the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in a comprehensive, integrated, sustainable and efficient manner” through ensuring (among other aspects) “the promotion of

⁵⁷² “Chronology of Key Events in the Area of Conventional Arms/Small Arms,” United Nations Conventional Arms Branch Website; <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/> .

⁵⁷³ Norwegian delegate to the UN Conference, video presentation, available from <http://disarmament.un.org>.

measures aimed at restoring peace, security and confidence among and between States with a view to reducing the resort to arms.”⁵⁷⁴

Who had to back down at the UN Small Arms Conference? As we said, every state has a fear of being taken advantage of, or being the one to have to back down.

On the one hand, the weaker coalition backed down on many points⁵⁷⁵. The United States insisted on not entering into the debate of civilian possession – From a draft Programme of Action, debated at the March 2001 Preparatory session a commitment to put in place or “seriously consider” adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the possession of SALW within national jurisdictions was dropped, after the US made this point forcefully.

Because the coalition had to back down on several points, many observers (sympathetic to or part of the coalition) deemed the conference a failure. For some parties, the outcome was downright dismal. “Arms Talks Snag at UN”⁵⁷⁶ read one newspaper headline on the eve of the final day. States agree to “Program of Inaction on Small Arms,” declared another.⁵⁷⁷ As it happens, experts and activists perceived the conference as not having gone far enough, as basic demands of the coalition of the willing went unmet: “Since I came back people have asked me about the results of the Conference and honestly I have nothing to say... in fact I think I became more

⁵⁷⁴*Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Ministerial Conference, December 2000, Bamako, Mali, available from <http://www.peace.ca/afoau.htm> : Internet.

⁵⁷⁵ Rachel Stohl, “United States Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference,” *Arms Control Today* (September 2001).

⁵⁷⁶Colum Lynch, “Arms Talks at UN Snag,” *Washington Post*, 21 July 2001.

⁵⁷⁷Human Rights Watch, “United Nations: ‘Program of Inaction’ on Small Arms, Conference Ending with Little Result,” Press Release, July 19, 2001.

pessimistic about Humanity and its future,” wrote Andre Porto in his post-conference report for the Brazilian-based Via Rio⁵⁷⁸. “We are all very angry at the conference’s failure, but are determined to step up our campaigning to control small arms and cut the killing”⁵⁷⁹, explains Brian Wood of Amnesty International.

However, both groups did have to make concessions, proving that one can never be sure of an outcome until one considers the bargaining stage (interest variable), regardless of power politics or the contribution of knowledge to information-awareness. The big concession the great powers made to the coalition was that the conference went ahead at all.

Since the conference, prospects for the regime-in-the-making have appeared more positive. “After great pain/A formal feeling comes” --- Emily Dickinson’ line sums up the current situation. The Programme of Action has “locked in gains.” Now most states feel that they understand the gains, and are less afraid of what lies ahead with respect to future bargaining (e.g. at the Biennial Meeting on Small Arms and the Review Conference).

iii) Enforcement: New Ways to Ensure Trust

Change has happened that has improved the chances for a successful compliance policy in the evolving regime. Unfortunately for the issue of small arms, verification is a nearly impossible task given the weapons’ easy concealment and their large number currently floating around the globe. Furthermore, as there is

⁵⁷⁸ Andre Porto, Via Rio, “When Peacemakers and Death Merchants Meet,” Draft, 2001.

⁵⁷⁹ Brian Wood, quoted in Oxfam, “UN Conference on Small Arms on Brink of Failure” 20 July 2001. Oxfam News release. Available from <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/unarms.htm>; Internet; accessed August 1, 2001.

never any thought of an outright “small arms ban,” a regime to control small arms poses still greater challenges to verification. Bans are simpler to enforce, as what is allowed and not allowed is unambiguous in nature. To evaluate the violation of an irresponsible light weapons transfer is much more difficult and requires more information to substantiate⁵⁸⁰.

Undercutting is widely recognized to be a problem that needs to be enforced – (states metaphorically going for the “hare” in the stag hunt) in the form of confusion over the denial notification process (granting license formerly denied). Some countries have been reporting informal denials of exports, while others have not. By not reporting informal denials, the chances that unintentional undercutting will occur have become greater. Some member states have shown a proclivity towards a narrow, technical approach with regards to what constitutes an “essentially identical transaction” (requiring consultation), due to a lack of clear guidelines. The need for countries to agree to a uniform approach in dealing with export denials has been explored in the annual review of the *Code of Conduct EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports* as well as discussions amongst Wassenaar Arrangement members.

In addition, the ambiguity surrounding the information that should be contained in Member State’s annual reports of defence exports has been discussed. Different methodologies of data collection and reporting systems across the EU make it difficult to compare figures on exports – a loss for the *EU Code’s* aim of transparency.

⁵⁸⁰ Kate Joseph and Taina Susiluoto, “A Role for Verification and Monitoring in Small Arms Control?” *Verification Yearbook 2002*, 136.

Officially, there is no international mechanism for monitoring compliance provided for in the UN Programme of Action. However, the following developments in verification -substitutes have aided the movement towards a regime:

a) Marking and Tracing

Marking and tracing are measures to ensure that licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each SALW as an integrated part of the production process, so that illegal weapons may be traced. Electronic devices like a microchip called RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) to place in guns are now available to aid in marking and tracing.⁵⁸¹

b) Civil Society

The humanitarian dimension of the small arms problem demands that we examine verification with new lenses – in ways that incorporate the efforts of civil society, especially those in the developing world. But small arms can learn from the example of landmines whereby an NGO fact-finding mission is sent out if a country is suspected of not accurately presenting facts on the import, export, manufacture or stockpiling of the weapon in a report that must be submitted. Any transgression that is discovered is presented to a meeting of signatory states. Enforcement actions are then suggested at this point, such as a reference to the Security Council. The Small Arms Survey has established a “Transparency

⁵⁸¹ The RFID still needs some refinement, however, as disabling of the microchip is apparently a problem.

Barometer” along these lines. Moreover, the “Biting the Bullet” team of International Alert, Saferword and the University of Bradford has launched a monitor of practices of 156 countries on small arms control (titled *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003*)⁵⁸².

c) Transparency

Until recently, the dominant accepted way of thinking by states was that all had a right to military privacy. Now, accountability, or “regulation by revelation” is key in today’s climate of openness in democratic societies. Transparency, whether in corporate affairs or arms control, is becoming the name of the game:

Just what is transparency? Put simply, transparency is the opposite of secrecy. Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately revealing them. This element of volition makes the growing acceptance of transparency much more than a resigned surrender to the technologically facilitated intrusiveness of the Information Age. Transparency is a choice, encouraged by changing attitudes about what constitutes appropriate behavior⁵⁸³.

Information is submitted by states on a voluntary basis. The public release of information about arms transfers and greater sharing of information between governments can ensure, or at least improve the likelihood, that proposed transfers are in fact desirable. Within nations, greater transparency can put the spotlight on legislatures, the media and public opinion on arms acquisitions to see if they are reasonable.

⁵⁸² *Small Arms Survey 2004*; Batchelor, “The First Biennial Meeting,” 3.

⁵⁸³ Ann Fiorini, “The End of Secrecy,” *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998).

The UN Arms Register, established by the General Assembly in 1992 is a prime experiment in how transparency has been attempted as a confidence-building measure similar to verification. Governments provide information on their transfers of major weapon systems such as aircraft, tanks, battleships, artillery and missiles (unfortunately not small arms) on a voluntary basis. This information is published as a UN official document each year and is available to the general public including through the UN web site. “Even if the importing country acquiring weapons refuses to cooperate, or cheats in its submission to the Register, the exporting country transferring the arms may have made an accurate report.”⁵⁸⁴ Currently, the Small Arms Survey operates as a non-official transparency tool by publishing national small arms data on exports, imports and production.

d) Shaming

Ann Marie Clark writes that there is “evidence that most states care how they are regarded by others, suggesting that international pressure alone can effect state action under certain conditions.”⁵⁸⁵ States weigh reputational payoffs against the costs of nonconformity. Mere negotiation of a regime may be enough to change the way small arms are perceived, and by implication, the way they are used and exported, even if it is known that there are no direct costs for disobeying the regime.

⁵⁸⁴ Pierre, “Toward an International Regime,” 388.

⁵⁸⁵ Ann Marie Clark, “Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society,” *Journal of International Affairs* 48:2 (Winter 1995), 512.

e) Benchmarking

Benchmarking can be a replacement for strict verification. At the United Nations Special Session on Children, progress was reviewed on many aspects of the rights and well-being of children since the World Summit for Children convened in 1990. A series of targets were made at that time to be met for the year 2000, like the reduction of the maternal mortality rate by half, universal access to basic education and the completion of primary education by at least eighty per cent of primary-school-aged children in all signatory states.⁵⁸⁶ Global benchmarks are measures to be used to judge the practices of states. It has been said that “Multilateral monitoring regimes that do not produce and disseminate global benchmarks are condemned to ‘spin’ information in a circle of distribution without feedback to learning. Such regimes tend to ‘overproduce’ information. They generate a fog of information in which there is monitoring without learning”⁵⁸⁷ As it stands now, there are no clear “benchmarks” for states to follow from the Programme of Action, but the possibility for their future creation is there, as benchmarking grows in popularity as a practice in multilateral negotiation.

f) Positive Reinforcement

It is possible that instead of deterring bad behaviour, rewarding good behavior can take its place – through the use of incentives. Light weapons are easy to use and obtain but hard to give up, as there is the prestige and security factor for

⁵⁸⁶ Department of Public Information, UN, *UN Briefing Papers: The World Conferences – Developing Priorities for the 21st Century* (New York, NY: 1997).

⁵⁸⁷ Edward Weisband, “Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 4 (December 2000), 645.

actors in a conflict (those trapped in a security dilemma). At least twenty-four states (including Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama) have experimented with voluntary gun exchange programs, in the form of either outright buy-back programmes or with the offer of non-monetary reimbursement. Tools (sewing machines and construction materials) were offered in exchange for guns along with community-oriented “rewards” (services such as road repairs).

However, according to Fred Tanner, “Extensive evaluations of UN peace operations have been unable to provide conclusive answers” on whether incentive-based missions are more successful than coercion-based missions.⁵⁸⁸

Conclusion

It is frightening for countries to give up their unilateral decision-making (sovereignty) in an issue-area. However, with 1) solutions being circulated which appeal as the “appropriate” or “salient” response to states –that is, recognizing that certain problems are best dealt with on a region-by-region basis or from a microdisarmament perspective, it becomes less frightening for states to cooperate. Solution-salience deals a blow to scepticism. 2) A fair distribution of gains is also a contributor to regime success. This distribution is still in the process of being worked out but the degree to which a fair distribution of gains is possible for the sum of states involved appears to be more possible than it was during the Cold War.

⁵⁸⁸ Fred Tanner, “Consensual Versus Coercive Disarmament,” in UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues* (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 1996): 169-204.

3) Finally, creative ways to ensure enforcement, better suited to the issue-area of small arms, were introduced at the same time that the regime began to unfold. Some of these factors helped to lock in and secure the forward-moving tide of policy action on small arms in the 1990's and 2000's during the prenegotiation stage, whereas the tide might have otherwise reversed or disappeared.

CONCLUSION: EVERY WHY HAS A WHEREFORE

Few men realize that their life, the very essence of their character, their capabilities and their audacities, are only the expression of their belief in the safety of their surroundings.⁵⁸⁹

-Joseph Conrad

All human beings have the right to peace including the right to live in a secure, dignified and human environment. In the absence of these conditions, however, the proliferation and misuse of small arms is endangering personal security, undermining good governance, contributing to violations of human rights and frustrating social justice, development, and peace in all parts of the world.

-IANSA *Founding Document*

This dissertation represented an attempt at understanding why so little action was taken by governments to solve the problem of the excessive proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons for so long. We also wanted to know why governments finally *did* begin to act (starting in the 1990's)– creating a large number of regional agreements to curb small arms, a UN Protocol on Firearms, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms.

A significant part of the dissertation was devoted to conceptual analysis.

Thinking carefully about “power”, “knowledge” and “interests” as variables, and about measurement and indicators (operationalization) were priorities. In what kind of form should the variables be placed to permit measurement (so that we could see

⁵⁸⁹Joseph Conrad, from *An Outpost of Progress*, quoted in “Joseph Conrad: International Narrator,” by George Walker, *Journal of Research in International Education* 3, no. 2 (2004): 225-236, 230.

if power, knowledge and interests were indeed the driving forces in the regime-in-the-making – or not)?

In the power chapter, we questioned how much stock we should finally place in the hegemonic stability thesis (realism's principal explanation of regime creation). Hegemonic stability has its advantages. However, some authors doubt its range of applicability. Others point out that the theory lends itself poorly to application as demonstrated by the use of the theory to explain the failure of regimes at both high and low ebbs of superpower strength. Most probably, the hegemonic stability is not even a realist thesis at all, we decided, as the key aspects of the theory are related to ideas – (legitimacy, winning the hearts and minds of others), and not the material distribution of power in the international system. Legitimacy is important but it can conceal real power-based motives (as in a “veil of legitimacy”). (Intangibles like “veils”, we determined, are best covered by a non-realist approach). In the final analysis, the usefulness of the hegemonic stability thesis lies

less in the analytical coherence and empirical accuracy of the theory – both of which are highly suspect in any case – than in the opportunity that the theory presents for discussion of the place of the US in the international system and the consequences that changes in American capabilities and influence would have for the United States and the rest of the world.⁵⁹⁰

Following that observation, we did indeed focus on the consequences of changes in great power capabilities. Borrowing from the orientation of traditional realism, we determined that the best route to take to look at the power in the

⁵⁹⁰ McKeown, “Foreign Policy of Declining Power,” 257.

regime-in-the-making was to study great power small arms policy before and after the end of the Cold War to know if power was behind the emergent regime.

Secondly, the rising popularity of a group of avant-garde, knowledge-focused scholars in International Relations – constructivists – demanded that we review what they have to say concerning knowledge. After evaluating their approach, we decided not to use it. Of course, we did not throw their approach out *entirely* –the attention to knowledge and inter-subjective meanings by constructivists is well-placed – but there are simply too many problems with constructivism for us to accept the basic premises (the difficulty in contextualizing “thick” data, lack of a theory of agency, the departure from rationalism, etc.). Instead, we chose to tie the study of knowledge to the older and more hospitable theoretical mooring of liberalism. This return to liberalism offered a relatively clear-cut way to operationalize the variable of knowledge so its influence may be compared in two periods, one during which there was no governmental movement on controlling small arms, and the other during which there was. We discussed using an alternative form of measuring results (for we decided we could not measure “ideas” and “knowledge” as themselves). Rather, we looked for the presence of what we termed a “knowledge collective” (consisting of experts and NGOs) in hopes that this operational version fit the meaning of the original variable – as closely as possible. Of interest to us was the process through which “knowledge collectives” attempt to shape the views of political leaders.

Thirdly, how to measure the influence of interests, we wondered? While it might seem simple and true to say that a main reason why the world began to see

the emergence of a global regime in the issue-area of small arms and light weapons is because it has been in the self-interest of states, this line of thinking is not “simple and true” to measure. (To paraphrase Robert Gilpin on the matter, if expected benefits exceed perceived costs, states will attempt to move towards a regime. Should states fail to believe it profitable to create a regime, they will not.⁵⁹¹)

Actually, most interest-based scholars (neoliberals) understand that a main pitfall of using a simple tally of interests to assess the likelihood of regime formation (from interests) is that it is extremely difficult to arrive at a net assessment of all manner of interests confronted by and held by all statespersons contemplating a regime – let alone one statesperson. As an illustration of the difficulty, we reviewed the myriad interests at stake in the small arms issue from the point of view of first, second and third-tier arms-producing states --for and against cooperation in a regime. We added individual and group motives to the mix, too, as they are relevant to this issue-area. What a complicated mix! Thankfully, for operationalization’s sake, a clearer, and possibly more accurate way of understanding interests and cooperation exists, derived from game theory. To avoid the complicated (and often inconclusive) tallying of mixed interests, we adopted neoliberal bargaining theory as an approach that considers that states, as in a game, are dependent on what others do. This is an interesting approach because it answers a question that has long plagued interest-based scholars. Why does cooperation

⁵⁹¹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 10-11.

occur even when it appears that interests are not on the side of cooperation, or vice versa?

As we saw in the parable of the stag hunt, the answer is that, even when states' interests *are* aligned to cooperate in a regime, they will *still* worry about certain things that are common to *all* collective action scenarios. There are certain universal reassurances that states need to cooperate. This meant, to us, that if we could find a way to zero in on the presence or absence of such reassurances, we could see if the presence or absence of a regime was due to a presence or absence of the reassuring factors. This is what we did. We determined, based on the neoliberal literature, that if states are rational they will care about a) solution-salience, b) a fair distribution of gains (so as not to be exploited) and c) verification (in Hobbes' words, there must be some mechanism to compel [states] equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror [or shame] of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant"⁵⁹²) With these reassuring factors in place, fears (we hypothesized) would be quelled and cooperation can proceed.

The Results and How the Variables are Inter-Linked

The current regime-in-the-making is a reflection of the above variables in incomplete form struggling to appear.

Power has allowed a general mould of feasibility for a regime to form – but a far from perfect one. It is clear that the major power of the USA is selective about allowing a regime to move ahead. What we must add, however, is that while a

⁵⁹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 113.

regime is forming, it is not exactly the one that many middle and small-sized countries ordered up. Conforming to realist thought, the regime that we are seeing is being created in the image of the dominant power – with that actor's standards prevailing.

Secondly, there appears to be a link between the sudden birth of a knowledge collective on small arms (from silence on the problem of small arms and light weapons in arms control, human rights, development, and security circles) and the heightened explosion of government interest in controlling these weapons. It can be forwarded with a fair degree of certainty that governments *learned* that small arms and light weapons posed serious problems, propelling them into action.

In our review of interests, we witnessed both highly contentious and also cooperative-oriented concerns on the part of states— a mixed atmosphere. However, over time, a situation evolved in which states became more reassured that the solutions being advanced (UN Programme of Action, regional arrangements) were salient (e.g. through copycat arrangements that reinforced plausibility), that gains were being distributed relatively fairly, and that enforcement was being taken care of (through shaming, transparency, NGO monitoring).

It is hard to imagine the story of small arms cooperation being told without one of the chapters on power, knowledge and interests. The belief at the outset of this dissertation was that not one of these theories can claim to explain the puzzle of cooperation on its own—no one theory is pre-eminent --all are needed in complementary form.

This dissertation showed that cooperation is not random. The puzzle pieces now fit. Every why has a wherefore. A full picture emerges only after all three variables are considered together.

How do the variables work together? At a certain point, the regime becomes overdetermined when the variables are present in strong form.

In general, power sets the general mould, though knowledge or a coalition of middle and small sized states can trump power if a tide of awareness causes a new norm to be created (at which point even superpowers cannot normally resist change). The interests of all the players in the “game of international relations”(not just great power interest) have their place in explanation in the same way that ships have their own sails and motors. True, wind and waves (the force of power) shape the direction of a ship’s movement at sea (evidenced when one “turn[s] off the motor and pull down the sails --- the ship will drift through the sea in response to these environmental forces”⁵⁹³) but left alone, and despite the wind and waves, the ship has its individual direction that it finds.

Certain variables do *not* explain the failure and rise of a regime-in-the-making. We do not think technology, ideology, and administrative obstacles/advantages explain these outcomes uniquely.

We furthermore do not feel that the fact that small arms were taken up by policy-makers after the Cold War is solely because the threat of nuclear doom decreased, as is sometimes advanced (as the nuclear threat is now greater than ever). It is true that during the Cold War, American and Russian policy-makers devoted exhaustive energy to the prevention of nuclear war. Since the end of the

⁵⁹³Tyler, “Leadership,” 769.

Cold War, the nuclear threat became subsumed with others, and in part, seemed to fade away from the thoughts of policy-makers. “This is both ironic and potentially tragic,” write Graham Allison and Andrew Kokoshin, “since the threat of a nuclear attack on the US or Russia [and other states] is certainly greater today than it was in 1989.”⁵⁹⁴ The latter point emphasizes that “issue characteristics”⁵⁹⁵ have only limited input into understanding (one would not think it would be likely that “landmines” would be taken up as an object for cooperation – a security issue in the field of humanitarian action-- but it was).

Just as the causes behind the small arms toll (internal and inter-state wars, gang fights, police brutality, government-sponsored violence, homicide, terror⁵⁹⁶) are multi-faceted, so, too is the explanation of the story behind how governments began to put a stop to such tragedies.

⁵⁹⁴Graham Allison & Andrei Kokoshin, “The New Containment: An Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism,” *National Interest* (Fall 2002): 35-43.

⁵⁹⁵See John A. Vasquez and Richard W. Mansbach, “The Role of Issues in Global Cooperation and Conflict,” *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (1984): 411-433.

⁵⁹⁶*Small Arms Survey 2001*, 1.

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APPENDIX 1

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN Document A/CONF.192/15)

I. Preamble

1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, having met in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001,
2. *Gravely concerned* about the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels,
3. *Concerned also* by the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,
4. *Determined* to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to enhance the respect for life and the dignity of the human person through the promotion of a culture of peace,
5. *Recognizing* that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,
6. *Gravely concerned* about its devastating consequences on children, many of whom are victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the negative impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on children,
7. *Concerned also* about the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective,

8. *Reaffirming* our respect for and commitment to international law and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States,
9. *Reaffirming* the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
10. *Reaffirming also* the right of each State to manufacture, import and retain small arms and light weapons for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
11. *Reaffirming* the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognizing the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
12. *Recalling* the obligations of States to fully comply with arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
13. *Believing* that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems associated with such trade and find ways of resolving them,
14. *Stressing* the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, including financial and technical assistance, as appropriate, to support and facilitate efforts at the local, national, regional and global levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,
15. *Recognizing* that the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, and acknowledging that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is multi-faceted and involves, inter alia, security, conflict prevention and resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions,

16. *Recognizing also* the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

17. *Recognizing further* that these efforts are without prejudice to the priorities accorded to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament,

18. *Welcoming* the efforts being undertaken at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and desiring to build upon them, taking into account the characteristics, scope and magnitude of the problem in each State or region,

19. *Recalling* the Millennium Declaration and also welcoming ongoing initiatives in the context of the United Nations to address the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

20. *Recognizing* that the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, establishes standards and procedures that complement and reinforce efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

21. *Convinced* of the need for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security,

22. *Resolve* therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects by:

(a) Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional and national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;

(b) Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons;

(c) Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently;

(d) Mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to prevent and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all their aspects, to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character and seriousness of the interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these weapons;

(e) Promoting responsible action by States with a view to preventing the illicit export, import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons.

II. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

1. We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind the different situations, capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects:

At the national level

2. To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.

3. To adopt and implement, in the States that have not already done so, the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such activities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.

4. To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.

5. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of contact to act as liaison between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.
6. To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in the illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit small arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against such groups and individuals.
7. To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each weapon.
8. To adopt where they do not exist and enforce, all the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.
9. To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their jurisdiction. These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities.
10. To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.
11. To assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
12. To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons, including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures.
13. To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices, without prejudice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they

have previously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.

14. To develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legislation or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities performed within the State's jurisdiction and control.

15. To take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

16. To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons are destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.

17. To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss.

18. To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.

19. To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated for destruction, taking into account, inter alia, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000.

20. To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

including, where appropriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

21. To develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, unless another form of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons have been marked and the alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to include, where applicable, specific provisions for these programmes in peace agreements.

22. To address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular the reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropriate rehabilitation.

23. To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that impact on the prevention, combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international organizations and in accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia, (a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition that can contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the regional level

24. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact within subregional and regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.

25. To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them.

26. To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed by the States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or subregions on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or action programmes and cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures.

27. To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.

28. To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional action on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.

29. To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard.

30. To support, where appropriate, national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.

31. To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the global level

32. To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the effective implementation of arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

33. To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within existing resources, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action.

34. To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, including providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this section, of collected small arms and light weapons.

35. To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.

36. To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.
37. To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as well as other relevant organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to proceed against them in accordance with their national laws.
38. To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime.
39. To develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.
40. To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to facilitate the appropriate cooperation of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in this area.
41. To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society.

III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance

1. We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that the primary responsibility for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.
2. States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, subregional and national levels and to encourage the establishment and strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions.
3. States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small

arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.

4. States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the affected States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes.

5. States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, cooperate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

6. With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and international and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested States, upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appropriate legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection and exchange of information.

7. States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

8. Regional and international programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate international or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this area.

9. States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate, including by providing relevant information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol's International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database that may be developed for this purpose.

10. States are encouraged to consider international cooperation and assistance to examine technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technologies.

11. States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other

agreements and arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.

12. States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national marking systems on small arms and light weapons.

13. States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to enhance, according to their respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

14. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.

15. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.

16. Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional and international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

17. With regard to those situations, States should make, as appropriate, greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account existing and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the rights of the States concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.

18. States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

IV. Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly the following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Conference:

(a) To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly;

(b) To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action;

(c) To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons;

(d) To consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.

2. Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:

(a) Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action;

(b) Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in their implementation of the Programme of Action;

(c) Further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action.