Université de Montréal

GERMANY, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND *THE ECONOMIST* 1989-1999

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Sommaire

Peu nombreux sont ceux qui auraient envisagé que l'Allemagne retrouverait au XXe siècle une place au sein des grandes puissances. Pourtant, suite à la chute du mur de Berlin et la fin de la Guerre froide, l'Allemagne devint la première puissance économique et politique de la Communauté européenne. C'est ainsi que la « question allemande » ressurgit en Europe, les pays de la Communauté européenne s'inquiétant du nouveau rôle que ce pays puissant allait jouer au sein de la Communauté. L'Allemagne devait donc rassurer ses voisins à l'Ouest, mais ne pouvait, en même temps, ignorer les pays résurgents de l'Europe de l'Est, se trouvant ainsi dans une situation précaire.

Beaucoup allaient étudier cette nouvelle Allemagne, laissant autant les leaders politiques que les intellectuels et les journalistes inquiets, voir même méfiants, par rapport à la place de l'Allemagne réuni en Europe. Partant de ce constat, ce travail visera donc à étudier la perception médiatique de l'évolution de la politique européenne allemande. L'objectif ultime est donc d'analyser comment un périodique percevait les changements qui transformaient l'Allemagne et l'Europe, tout en cherchant à voir si l'Allemagne parvint à surmonter ce défi, convaincant ses voisins qu'elle est redevenue un pays ordinaire et bienveillant. Comme source de base, cette étude s'appuiera sur *The Economist*, périodique

britannique de renommée mondiale. En analysant les articles écrits entre 1989 et 1999 et en les comparant aux écrits érudits de la même époque, nous découvrirons un nouvel angle sur cette période et sur ce pays qui provoqua tant de soucis au début des années 1990. Ce travail jettera donc une nouvelle lumière sur la position de l'Allemagne en Europe et nous montrera comment elle fut perçue par un des journaux les plus influents de la décennie 1990.

Mot clés: Allemagne, politiques européennes, Union européenne, réunification allemande, périodiques, *The Economist*.

Abstract

There were few who would have predicted that Germany would, in the span of the twentieth century, once again find itself a place among the great European powers. After the fall of the Berlin Wall however, and the end of the Cold War, Germany was on the road to becoming the strongest power in the European Community both on the economical and political level. It is thus that the 'German Question' came once again to the fore as the leaders of the European Community worried about the role which this new power would play in their midst. Germany therefore had to appease its Western neighbours by promoting deeper integration of the European Union, but could not, at the same time, ignore the rising and unstable democracies on its Eastern borders. Germany thus found itself in a rather uncertain situation, leaving world leaders, scholars, and journalists to wonder what the new Germany might bring.

Among those studying Germany's new predicament in Europe, the media played an important role, influencing the way in which Germany was perceived by both leaders and individuals alike. The main goal of this thesis is to analyse how a periodical perceived the transformations that both Germany and Europe were undergoing, and at the same time to try and see whether Germany managed to overcome the challenge of proving

to its neighbours that it had become a normal and benign country. This thesis will study the perception of Germany's role within the European Union from the point of view of a prominent British periodical with a broad international readership, *The Economist*. *The Economist*, whose political analyses rank high among its competitors, brings a new twist on Germany and its European policies, quite different than the main scholarly texts of the day. With its sharp and witty style of writing, *The Economist* closely covered Germany's evolution in Europe and allows us to see how its opinion of Germany evolved over time. This study will thus bring forward a never-before studied aspect of Germany's place in Europe, and will shed light on the way in which Germany was viewed by one of the more important journals of the 1990s.

Key words: Germany, European politics, European Union, German unification, periodicals, *The Economist*.

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Dedicated to my parents, whose love and support have largely contributed to this project, and all my endeavors. Thank you.

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

1. An Overview of the Dissertation

I. Germany's Predicament Following Its Unification

The Cold War ended differently than one might have expected. There was little fanfare or explosions as the walls of Communism tumbled like dominoes in front of a Soviet Union that no longer seemed to care. On the contrary, the war ended peacefully, as conferences and speeches replaced the expected flare-ups and hostilities. Despite this external calmness, the European political order of over forty years was growing unstable, leaving politicians and world leaders uncertain of what lay ahead. With the first breach in the Berlin Wall, talks of a reunited Germany began to appear as an almost attainable goal and for the first time since the end of the Second World War, Europe was once again faced with the prospect of German predominance. A united Germany had the possibility of becoming, with the help of its strong economy, a European superpower. Re-emergence of a united Germany in the heart of Europe thus rekindled a "host of half-repressed fears and concerns"[1], leaving more than one political leader apprehensive of what

[1] Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, *Enlarging NATO and the EU*, Manchester/New York, Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 1.

this new Germany might bring. Although Germany remained enclosed within the European Community (EC), no one could be certain of the direction that this rising power might take. The "German Question" returned once again onto the political arena, as Germany became the object of many contradictory worries, both rational and irrational, about its future role in a Europe no longer divided by an iron curtain.[2]

The Federal Republic of Germany has been known to be one of the strongest promoters of the EC since its foundation in 1958. However, with the reunification of Germany there arose a tension between Germany and the other members of the EC. While the unification of a divided people may have seemed a good objective in itself, the reunification of Germany would bring to Europe what Europe feared most: a strong Germany. Few would have imagined that Germany would, once again in this turbulent 20th century, find itself a place among the world's powers. However, by 1991 the "new" Germany's population reached nearly 80 million, thus a third larger than any of the other three largest states of the EC: Great Britain, France and Italy.[3] Moreover, Germany had Europe's largest economy, a strong currency and a gross national product one and a half times higher than that of Great Britain, one third higher than those of France and Italy.[4] It would not take

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[2] *Ibidem*

[3] Spence, David. "The European Community and German Unification", from *Federalism, Unification and European Integration,* Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm, ed. London and Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1993, p. 136.

[4] Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name. Germany and the Divided Continent*, New York, Random House, 1993, p. 382.

much, with these statistics, for Germany to lose the description that Willy Brandt had ascribed to Germany, that of an "economic giant but a political dwarf" and to become a "giant" on both counts.[5]

Thus, a united Germany found itself in an entirely new situation. The European dynamics were altered, and the "German Question" became again central. There were worries about the impact of reunification on several levels. For example, what influence would sixteen million people who had known over sixty years of dictatorship have on a democratic, though perhaps no longer stable, Western Germany?[6] Some predicted a revival of the old German desire for hegemony in Europe, while others feared that the Soviet Union's price for reunification would mean that Germany, or rather, the two Germanys, respectively withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and NATO, thus creating a united Germany that would be both neutral and unpredictable.[7]

Anxieties such as these were not rare, but on the contrary, continued to rise as France and Great Britain became increasingly apprehensive of the renaissance of this enlarged Germany. They feared a new German domination, and regarded reunification worriedly. In this manner, Germany now found itself in a new and complex situation that was

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[5] Spence, David. *op. cit.*, p.136.
[6] *Ibidem*
[7] *Ibidem*

charged with historical connotations- a position which put Germany in a rather shaky equilibrium.

While the events of the early 1990s seemed relatively calm on the surface, considering the widespread changes that were transforming the shape of Europe, the reservations that held back Western leaders ran deep. These fears were not taken lightly, in view of the important measures that the EC would undertake in order to counteract this newly increased German power. Moreover, the political and economic space of Europe was quickly shifting eastwards. The EC could no less ignore this fact than openly acknowledge its fear of a rising German power. With these two factors in mind, the EC had to balance a double-sided political agenda – that of a deeper integration within the Community, with the idea of enclosing Germany more tightly within it, and that of a greater expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe. It could not, however, choose one over the other, as both factors played strongly on European politics, and could hardly be ignored.

Germany, in the meantime, was not oblivious to the concerns mounting all over Europe. Indeed, if many were to study this new "German Question", it was studied no less, if not more, by the Germans themselves. They too, were uncertain of the way an increase in power might affect German politics in the future, and were, for the most part, more than eager

to remain bound within a more integrated Europe. In addition, Germany bordered a number of ex-Communist states, and its interest in keeping stability in the East was more than evident. Enlargement, for Germany, seemed the key solution to maintaining peace and order on its Eastern front. Germany's position toward enlargement and deeper integration was that one could not exist without the other. More than any other European state, Germany wanted to balance these two political agendas. The politicians in Bonn saw these as the only two possibilities of action: a choice had to be made between further integration within the EC and a more open position towards Eastern Europe. These politicians had then to try and do the impossible- manage, within the EC, a simultaneous policy of both integration and enlargement. In their viewpoint, this was the only way to secure Germany a place in a stronger and deeper Europe.

II. A Menacing Germany?

Apprehensions and sensitivities concerning Germany have existed since the late 19th century. Throughout this time, Germany found itself at a point of convergence of European interests, with its geographic location and economic potential playing an essential role, as well as its territory and its population, which were the largest in Europe (with the exception of Russia, which was also the object of some suspicion throughout the 20th century). Without necessarily meaning to, Germany

reflected a disquieting, sometimes menacing, image. Napoleon III had said in 1868, preceding Bismarck's first unification of Germany:

> "It may be very well to say that Germany is not an aggressive Power, but who can say when she may not become so? And that she may not some day seek to unite within her boundaries the Russian-German provinces of the Baltics?"[8]

This concern, expressed at the end of the 19th century, is not bereft of a certain validity. It could even be said that Napoleon III had enounced a somewhat prophetic vision. Germany had, after all, known more than its share of belligerence and expansionist visions during the 20th century. It would be unjust, however, to interpret Germany and its history with only somber visions and depictions.

Since the end of the Second World War, West Germany has wanted but one thing- an ever deepening integration in the West. Nonetheless it was not easy for other European countries to remain neutral before Germany, especially if its remarkable economic growth was to be taken into account. Germany, for its part, did everything to be accepted as an equal among the other European nations. According to the journalist David Marsh, Germany abstained from any national policy for forty years, or rather, its national policy was, almost without interruption (if one is to take into consideration Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*) that of assuring North

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[8] David Marsh, *Germany and Europe. The Crisis of Unity*, London, Mandarin, 1995 [1994], p. 127.

America and the rest of Western Europe that its national interest did not differ from theirs.[9]

Thus, for four decades, West European countries came to appreciate having a divided Germany, economically strong yet politically obedient, within their exclusive club. Talks of German unification, however, woke dormant fears among West European countries, leaving Germany in a delicate position. According to Timothy Garton Ash, director of European Studies at Oxford, "whatever the evolution of German power in the 1990s, the united country would remain an awkward size in an awkward place. Germany now had precisely that 'critical size' to which Chancellor Kiesinger had referred back in 1967: 'too big to play no role in the balance of forces, too small to keep the forces around it in balance by itself'"[10]. The end of the Cold War and German reunification disrupted the status quo that had been more or less achieved following the Second World War. What role would a united Germany now have to play?

III. Presentation of the Thesis

The European states and their leaders were at the core of the EC. As a result, they would also play an important role in mapping out Europe's future. Their fears and ambitions were craftily worded so as to make the

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[9] *Ibidem.*, p. 129.
[10] Garton Ash, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

good of Europe seem their primary concern. However, not only presidents and prime ministers took part in this game of opposing and converging interests. Journals, magazines, and newspapers showed certain political positions and a consistent interest in what was happening to this new Europe as well. These, along with other mass media, may have affected the way that citizens in Europe and abroad viewed the events happening on the Continent. Thus, the importance of periodicals cannot be underestimated, nor their political views and analyses understated.

Indeed, according to several leading analysts in communication and media studies:

> "Newspapers appear regularly and frequently, in uniform format. Also, they have a more or less explicit point of view. The press is mainly an information medium rather than an entertainment medium; and the most significant category on which the press regularly presents news and views is the political, including the ideological.... The press is both accessible and rich in the vocabulary of political ideology current among the elite of any given time..."[11]

This citation explains that periodicals too, engage in political thought, and, it should be pointed out, on a scale much more greater than most scholarly work. In comparison, journals - certainly those highly

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[11] Wayne A. Danielson and Dominic L. Lasorsa, "Perceptions of Social Change: 100 Years of Front-Page Content in the New York Times and The Los Angeles Times," in Carl W. Roberts, *Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Method for Drawing Statistical Inferences from Texts and Transcripts*, Mahwah, NJ, Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, 1997, p. 104.

regarded by the political elites- enjoy a far larger spectrum of influence, having the capacity and the means to transmit their message in an age when mass media plays a preponderant role in everyday life.

Thus, in viewing Germany's new and evolving place in Europe, I found it interesting to compare how leading journals covered this event. However, broadening the scope of a Masters thesis to include analyses of several journals would have resulted in a rather superficial study. Therefore, in trying to present Germany's situation in Europe after its reunification, this dissertation will address the significance of one journal's political viewpoint and compare it to the perception of this question in scholarly literature. From a broad selection of periodicals, this dissertation will focus on one specific magazine, *The Economist* (the reason for this choice will be explained further on in the introduction). With two distinctive aspects, the scholarly accounts of the evolution of Germany's position in Europe, on the one hand, and its media coverage, on the other, this dissertation will present points of convergence and divergence between the two. This study will span the breadth of *The Economist* articles published from 1989 to 1999, trying to determine its editorial policy, or at least find a continuum in its political analysis. In this manner, it will try to understand the way in which *The Economist* covered German unification and Germany's evolving place in Europe.

Of all the institutions and organisations in contemporary Europe, the European Union (EU) is beyond doubt the most important, having fundamentally transformed the dynamics of the European order.[12] My interest in contemporary European history, and more specifically, in German history, led me to a subject so far more explored by political scientists, sociologists and economists than by historians: the contemporary history of the EU. Relations among Western European countries reversed entirely in less than a century, going from two world wars to an ever tightening economic and political union. In studying contemporary European history it is no longer possible to ignore the impact of the EU, whose role is increasingly felt in day-to-day European politics. My interest in this institution overlapped with my interest in Germany, another political entity whose dimensions and political aspirations have changed drastically in the span of a century.

Much has been written on Germany ever since its unification. If Germany has fascinated historians and political scientists throughout the 20th century, it remains no less true in present day. A plethora of books and articles studying Germany, its economy, its role in Europe and in the international sphere, its defence, its role in the wars in Yugoslavia, etc., are published yearly. A careful selection has therefore to be made in order to have a balanced and comprehensive view of Germany's role in Europe in the 1990s.

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[12] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p. 174.

In the research that has been undertaken for this project, several texts written by prominent historians and political scientists have been used. Timothy Garton Ash published a comprehensive survey of Germany's role in Europe since World War II, while Adrian Hyde-Price did a wide-ranging study of the enlargement of the EU.[13] Henning Tewes, Harald Müller, and Barbara Lippert present clear analyses of the integration versus enlargement debate in Germany.[14] David Spence, editor of the *Financial Times*, studied some issues posed for the EC by German unification.[15] These are the principal, though by no means only, sources used in this research project. Another kind of study was done by Ruth Dudley Edwards: a history of *The Economist.*[16]

Despite the passage of time since the Second World War, in studying Germany at the beginning of the 21st century one must still deal with abundant prejudices and presumptions. Indeed, the judgements of more than one historian or political scientist have been clouded by biased sentiment toward Germany, be it in overly positive or overly negative a light. Adrian Hyde-Price, professor of Politics and International Relations at

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[13] Garton Ash, *op. cit.*; Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*
[14] Henning Tewes, "Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany's Enlargement Policy", *Western European Politics*, vol. 21 (April 1998).; Harald Müller, "German Foreign Policy after Unification", from *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Paul B. Stares, ed. Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1992.; Barbara Lippert, et al. *British and German Interest in EU Enlargment: Conflict and Cooperation,* London, Continuum, 2001.
[15] Spence, *op. cit.*
[16] Ruth Dudley Edwards, *The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist, 1843-1993*. London/ New York. Hamish Hamilton, Penguin Books USA, 1993.

the University of Leicester, explains this trend by reducing it to two main dangers involved in studying Germany in Europe. It is easy, on the one hand, to lapse into an exaggeration of German power and its ability to influence and determine events in Europe. On the other hand, Hyde-Price continues, it is important to keep in mind that Germany is not just another state in Europe.[17] Though sometimes perceived as such by contemporary scholars, Germany is not a superpower, nor does it use the EU to serve its own purposes. Its people are not overridden by 'angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality', as they were described by Margaret Thatcher's private secretary Charles Powell in March 1990.[18] They are, to quote Richard von Weiszäcker, president of Germany between 1984 to 1994, a 'pretty normal people, just like everyone else.'[19] This does not mean that German policy is not to be judged nor critiqued. Even if one abstains from overly praising or criticizing Germany, one must keep in mind that Germany is a country with a troubled past, and one that has enough economic strength and political power to substantially shape the turn of events not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but in the rest of Western Europe as well.

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[17] *Ibidem.*, p. 3.

[18] *Ibidem* (these were national characteristics ascribed to the Germans in the confidential Whitehall memorandum drawn up by prime minister Thatcher's private secretary Charles Powell after an informal seminar at Chequers on Sunday, 24 march 1990).

[19] *Ibidem* (citing Weizsäcker, R. von (1991) Gulf War Not a Sign of Things to Come', *German Comments*, 9:22 (April) p. 7.)

Keeping a balanced view on Germany has not always proved easy, certainly not in the immediate years following its unification. Historians and politicians alike were torn about the future of Germany, not without reason, for Germany was a major cause of the two greatest wars in Europe in less than a century. Since the turn of the 20th century and with new issues on the political agenda, such as the war against terrorism and a war in Iraq, anxieties concerning Germany have diminished as has the perceived threat by Russia to the West. Yet many of the sources that are used for the purposes of this project were written in the early 1990s, when debates about Germany were both more involved and more heated. Thus, an analysis of two kinds of writing on Germany and European integration – scholarly accounts and those published in *The Economist* - should provide a balanced view of the course of Germany's development.

IV. Outline of the Dissertation and the Sources Used

Before explaining the manner in which this study will be conducted and the methods that will be used, it is important to explain why this essay covers the dates between 1989 and 1999. This time frame was chosen with the purpose of underlining the evolution of our problem during a crucial time period which will be presented in the following chapter.

Indeed, it was a decade of uncertainty, when the bipolar world, by then familiar, even comfortable, for much of Europe, collapsed. What emerged was an uncertain balance of powers, the United States taking the lead, with European countries needing to redefine themselves for the first time in over fifty years. This change of the political order, in Europe and in the rest of the world, is a crucial period in history and it is only now, with a little more hindsight, that we are able to understand these events. Yet to study this time period- in our case through the medium of *The Economist*- meant also to study relatively recent articles. Appropriate measures had to be undertaken, for it was important to remain distant from the articles, and to weigh their standpoints appropriately.

Analysing magazine articles is a procedure that requires careful judgement as it is easy to be swayed by the style and character of the articles, especially when the number of articles read is high and spans several consecutive years. With the help from the departments of communication and journalism at the Université de Montréal and with several reputable textbooks on quantitative and qualitative analysis, appropriate methods to be used in analysing political periodicals were established.

In order to understand the inner workings of this periodical, I contacted the European editor of *The Economist*, Xan Smiley, whose

thoughts will be presented in the conclusion. With these combined methods of analysing *The Economist*'s political views, we will be able to compare the approach of *The Economist* regarding Germany's place in Europe to those of historians and political scientists of the day.

As to the body of the dissertation itself, it will be divided into two main sections, each of which will be separated into two parts. One section will present a historical analysis of Germany's position in Europe, based on scholarly work, while the second section will survey articles from *The Economist*. An assessment of these articles will give the events being studied a different twist. Comparisons between *The Economist*, history books and other periodicals will be drawn, so that *The Economist*'s viewpoint may be put into perspective. This study of *The Economist*'s articles will lead the reader to understand the way in which this periodical perceived Germany's position in Europe between 1989 and 1999.

Thus, the first part of this thesis will explore how Germany dealt with its unification, and how it perceived its role within Europe. It will give a detailed account of German unification and its influence on European politics. It will shed light on the events that led to the Treaty on the European Union, more often referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. Among other things, this treaty established the EU, gave the European Parliament new powers, and laid down the procedures for creating Economic Monetary

Union.[20] This part will focus on the importance that a greater European integration held for Germany, as well as on the monetary, economic, and political questions with which Germany was confronted. Its struggle for a new identity is another issue that will be raised, and Germany's positions concerning greater influxes of immigration and American troops on German land will be mentioned.

The second part will span a longer period, ranging from the Maastricht Treaty, past the Amsterdam Treaty, ending in 1999, as preparations for the next Intergovernmental Conference were under way. Yet this part will be shorter than the first, for the first part involves a more difficult period for Germany and for Europe, and requires explaining both Germany's and Europe's role in greater detail. The second part, which includes the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, is a much more stable time period for Germany, its place in Europe less uncertain, and therefore as long an elucidation of Germany's European policies will not be required. Indeed, it is during this time period that Germany established itself once again among the other European nations. The "Germany Question" no longer brought about the same doubts and fears that it did before the Maastricht Treaty. Preparations for the accession of new members in the EU were under way. It is at this juncture that Germany understood that enlargement was becoming a reality and that it would come sooner than

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[20] John Pinder, *The European Union. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 191.

later, and felt that an even deeper integration was necessary. Thus, Germany occupied itself with promoting reforms inside each European institution, without which enlargement would produce nothing more than a diluted community. Consequently, Germany's focus on enlargement became less important, and other concerns took over instead: the Common Agricultural Policy for example, and social issues, such as the European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights.[21]

The above is an overview of the first section of the dissertation. The second section of the dissertation will explain how *The Economist*, a privileged observer, related to what was going on in Germany and in Europe. This section's timeframes correlate closely to those in the first section. The first part will extend from the reunification of Germany until 1994, and the second part will continue from 1994 until 1999. A comparison will thus be drawn between reality as perceived by contemporary political scientists and historians, and that perceived by *The Economist*. Yet before studying what *The Economist* has to add to our historical analysis of this decade, it is important to understand who *The Economist* writes for, the perception that *The Economist* has of itself, and the manner in which *The Economist* is written.

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[21] Pinder, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

2. *The Economist*

I. What is *The Economist*?

The Economist has a circulation of over 900 000 readers per week.[22] Four issues are printed each month, totalling fifty-one journals per year, with a double issue at the end of December. Each issue covers the main economic and political news of the past week, offering in-depth analysis of several of these events. The magazine belongs to a select group of highly regarded journals throughout the world.

This "newspaper" as it likes to call itself, is published in six countries and is available in most of the world's main cities and in over two hundred countries.[23] Founded in 1843 with the specific purpose of campaigning on the important political issues of the day, *The Economist* was, and has remained, a promoter of classical liberal ideas. A believer in free markets and free trade, *The Economist* has, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, been a strong promoter of internationalism and minimum interference by government, especially in market affairs.[24] In a phrase coined by a previous editor, Geoffrey Crowther, *The Economist* represents

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[22] John F. Jungclaussen, "Liberal bis in die letzte Zeile", *Die Zeit*, 26 February 2004, p. 27.
[23] *Ibidem*
[24] Economist.Com, *About the Economist*, [on-line] http://www.economist.com/help/DisplayHelp.cfm?folder=663377 (page consulted on December 12 2002).

the "extreme centre," a role it has aimed to maintain throughout its history.[25] Though *The Economist* has certainly voiced a somewhat conservative opinion, it has not been predictable or constant in its political views. For example, *The Economist* backed the more conservative parties under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan when they were in power, and supported the Americans both in Vietnam and in the most recent war in Iraq, yet also encouraged many of Bill Clinton's polities and endorsed several liberal clauses such as gun control and gay marriage.

An interesting element in *The Economist*'s writings is that it is entirely written in one voice, and discord is rarely, if ever, found in its pages. Moreover, the articles are anonymous, unless it is an article written by an invited specialist to analyze a specific topic. Yet, while the articles are mostly unsigned, some eminent people have contributed to the pages of *The Economist* such as Herbert Henry Asquith and Garret Fitzgerald, future British and Irish prime ministers, Luigi Einaudi, future president of Italy and Kim Philby, a key Soviet spy.[26]

There is a reason for which *The Economist* writers are to remain anonymous: while many hands write *The Economist*, "it speaks with a collective voice".[27] In fact, all the articles in *The Economist* are written in one style, and it is hard indeed to tell one writer from another. The

[25] Jungclaussen, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
[26] *About the Economist*, *op.cit.*
[27] *Ibidem.*, p. 2.

journalists gather weekly to discuss and dispute the issues that they are to cover; and some articles get heavily edited if they fall out of line. Moreover, according to *The Economist*, "what is written is more important than who writes it",[28] and the editor sees himself as "the servant of something far greater than himself."[29]

Although *The Economist* began as a British journal, in order to survive *The Economist's* readership became increasingly international, today largely centred in the United States. At present, forty six percent of its sales are in North America, twenty one percent in Continental Europe, seventeen percent in the United Kingdom, eleven percent in Asia and the Pacific region, three percent in the Middle East and in Africa, and two percent in Latin America.[30]

As early as the 1840s, *The Economist* could find readers in Continental Europe and the United States. *The Economist* began by covering mostly British politics and finance, but slowly broadened its scope to Europe. The American focus became increasingly important as *The Economist* tried to give its British readers a better understanding of the United States. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, *The Economist* began to reserve an entire section for the United States,

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[28] *Ibidem*
[29] *Ibidem.*, p.3.
[30] Economist.Com, *Advertising Info: Circulation*, [on-line], http://ads.economist.com/print/circulation.htm (page consulted on December 12 2002).

called "American Survey". Over time, more sections have been added to *The Economist*, devoting weekly articles to Africa and Asia, and later Latin America and Canada. *The Economist* had to continue catering to its readers, who, increasingly, became interested in, and were more affected by, politics and finance beyond their borders.[31]

The Economist is written for an audience of senior business, political and financial decision-makers who, according to *The Economist*, "value [the magazine for the] accuracy of its incisive writing and lack of partisanship."[32] *The Economist* caters to readers drawn largely from business and political elites, the average income of its readers exceeding 154 000 US dollars.[33] The magazine sees its purpose in supplying these people with a correct and rapid analysis of world events, both of economic and political nature, all the while using simple language and carefully avoiding a more cumbersome style that might be expected from an elite magazine produced in Britain.[34]

This perhaps explains why *The Economist* has a smaller circulation than most international magazines. According to *Vanity Fair*, *The Economist* is "probably read by more presidents, prime ministers, and

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[31] *About the Economist*, *op.cit.*
[32] Economist.Com, *Advertising Info: Introduction* , [on-line], http://ads.economist.com/print/index.htm (page consulted on December 13 2002).
[33] Jungclaussen, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
[34] *About the Economist*, *op.cit.*

chief executives around the world than any other...The positions it takes change the minds that matter."[35]

In a section of its website, called 'Media Testimonials', *The Economist* has excerpts, needless to say all positive, though by no means unjustified, of what other journals have written about it. The *New York Times* writes that *The Economist* is "one of the most respected magazines in the world,"[36] while the *Los Angeles Times* writes that *The Economist* is "one of the world's most influential news magazines...required reading among movers and shakers from 10 Downing Street to the White House."[37] *Newsweek* states that reading *The Economist* is mandatory at the pinnacles of power and that, in all its years, the magazine "has cared less about how many readers it has than who those readers are."[38] And *Time* magazine continues in a similar vein, saying that *The Economist* exerts "an influence far beyond its circulation."[39] *The International Herald Tribune* for its part writes: "This unique journal in which sheer intellect, backed by integrity and a bold welcoming of new ideas, has held say over statesmen and governments."[40] Among its prominent readers were Lord Granville, British foreign secretary in the late 19th century, Woodrow Wilson, president of the

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[35] Economist.Com, *Advertising Info: Media Testimonials*, [on-line] http://ads.economist.com/print/testimonial.htm (page consulted on December 14 2002).
[36] *Ibidem*
[37] *Ibidem*
[38] *Ibidem*
[39] *Ibidem*
[40] *Ibidem*

United States from 1913 to 1921 and, more recently, Helmut Schmidt, chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982.[41]

In spite of its reputation, *The Economist* has deserved few studies focusing on its political analyses.[42] This dissertation will offer one such study, focusing on Germany and its reunification, providing us with a unique perspective and analysis of Germany's evolving position in Europe. Moreover, it will show not only the situation in which Germany found itself, but also the way Germany was seen from a British perspective, though certainly not always representing the perspective espoused by the British governments during this period.

The opinions of *The Economist* also matter in Germany. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, *The Economist* is uniquely qualified to analyze German politics: "*The Economist*'s survey on West Germany [combines] economic and current affairs in a way that no other magazine of international reputation achieves... This endeavour succeeds admirably well, both in the way the vast mass of material is sifted and effortlessly mastered and in its acutely penetrating powers of observation."[43] A higher praise from a prominent German journal can hardly be imagined.

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[41] *Ibid*em

[42] I have searched all the large university libraries for any studies written on *The Economist* and have not found any. It may be possible, however, that similar studies have been done, though perhaps not in recent years.

[43] *Advertising Info: Media Testimonials*, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

Yet, as previously mentioned, the scarcity of sources about *The Economist* means that this chapter is largely based on information retrieved from *The Economist* archives and web pages. While the magazine certainly entertains a measure of self-criticism, it seems likely that, as any other magazine would, it must market itself and may therefore give an image of itself that does not correspond entirely to reality. Nevertheless, no evidence has been found to contradict the information found on *The Economist* web pages and in its archives. What is more, an article about *The Economist* published in *Die Zeit*[44] gives a thorough account of the way *The Economist* operates and its reputation worldwide, in no case contesting or contradicting the information found on *The Economist* website.

Now that a clearer vision of what *The Economist* is has been drawn, we will take a few steps back to look at how scholarly work has studied Germany's role in Europe before tackling the actual purpose of this dissertation: to examine whether *The Economist* holds any slants concerning Germany, whether it focuses on one aspect of Germany's position in Europe more than on other aspects, whether the question of integration and enlargement is important to *The Economist*, and whether it brings any new viewpoints into light. The study will try to discern the differences between how *The Economist* analyses Germany in Europe throughout the 1990s and how current political analysts and historians have viewed this development. In doing so, a new and so far unexplored perspective on the evolution of

[44] See Jungclaussen, *op.cit.*

Germany within the EU will be exposed. There is much to gain from what a magazine with, according to *Der Spiegel*, a "legendary influence,"[45] has had to say.

[45] *Ibidem*

PART TWO:
HOW DANGEROUS IS A REUNITED GERMANY?
A SURVEY OF GERMANY'S ROLE IN EUROPE FROM 1989 TO 1999

1. The First Half of the 1990s

I. The Future of the EC: Enlargement versus Integration

Throughout its history, the EC has remained open to enlargement. The name that the founding fathers gave the EC reflected an aspiration, rather than a fact. Six states of Western Europe, however important their status, were certainly not representative of the Continent, and could hardly be called Europe.[46] The aspiration was, among most European federalists, that this community would grow until its name would become a reality.

Indeed, between the creation of the EC and the end of the Cold War, most European nations that applied to join the EC were welcomed as full members, with little or no delay. The notable exception was Great Britain, whose membership had been delayed for political reasons both within Great Britain and on the Continent. Many countries, however, abstained from having any relations with the EC. What kept this rather large

[46] Pinder, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

number of countries from applying was the Cold War. Communist governments had their own form of economic union through COMECON, whereas several non-communist states, such as Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, abstained from membership, preferring not to compromise their neutral status in the Cold War.[47]

Thus, with the fall of communism came a rise in requests for membership in the EU.[48] First to apply were the countries that, throughout the Cold War, had decided upon neutrality. Their applications accepted, Austria, Finland and Sweden became full members in 1995. During this time, former communist regimes in Eastern Europe were slowly turning into newly democratic regimes and market economies. It was not long before they too, expressed their desire to join the EU, and by the mid-1990s, a dozen countries had indicated their interest in adhering to the EU.[49]

The idea of expanding the EU was not, however, appreciated by all Member States. Certain ambivalence existed among many countries unsure if such an enlargement would favour the Union. Many feared that the Eastern economies would prove to be incompatible with those of the West, "in part because of their social legacies but also because they were less

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[47] Frank L. Wilson, *European Politics Today. The Democratic Experience*. 3rd edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1999 [1990], p. 409.
[48] The names European Community (EC) and European Union (EU) will at times be interchanged, depending on the years being covered.
[49] Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 409.

developed, poorer, and more agricultural than the existing members."[50] Moreover, these members claimed that cultural differences, such as those between Orthodox Christianity and the Roman Catholic and Protestant cultures, would come in the way. The list of reasons against expansion went beyond the legacy of communism, particularly after East Germany joining the EU 'through the back door' had made Eastern expansion more real.

The issue of further expansion of the EU had been divisive since the 1980s. With the possibility of opening eastwards, the debate over deepening versus widening intensified. Deepeners reasoned that the EU should develop closer ties within its existing members states before taking on new members, whereas wideners maintained that membership should be open to other states immediately.[51] The question of how large the Union could and should become without losing its character or its potential for political unity was of major importance for the deepeners. Deepeners argued that because the applying countries were, for the most part, small in size, their accession would inevitably shift the political balance in the EU away from the four large countries that had dominated the Union since 1973 (Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) to the smaller countries.[52] Moreover, argued the deepeners, adding countries to the Union would slow down integration as the EU would integrate the new members.

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[50] *Ibidem*
[51] John McCormick, *The European Union. Politics and Policies*, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999, p. 73.
[52] Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

Conversely, for countries uneasy with the intensification of the EU's role, enlargement was seen as the solution. British Prime Minister John Major, for example, favoured widening mainly because he opposed integration.[53] On the other hand, countries in favour of further integration were most reluctant to enlarge, France being a prime example. This picture, however, was not entirely clear-cut. Germany, generally an advocate of further integration, was also a strong supporter of expanding the EU. Reasons for this are numerous, and will be studied in greater detail throughout this essay.

And now, in the context of the enlargement versus integration dichotomy, let us examine Germany's predicament after its reunification. We will follow Germany's transition through the 1990s and the evolution of its position on questions of enlargement and integration of the EU.

II. Germany within the EC

On October 3rd 1990, the German Democratic Republic dissolved into West Germany. This was joined by another extraordinary, though largely unnoticed, event: East German territories, in that same moment, joined the EC. The EC had played a limited role as to the pace and nature of unification, but it had nonetheless provided a framework within which

[53] McCormick, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

unification could take place. While Moscow had held the key to unification, West Germany had to work within a European framework in order to unite the two Germanys. This meant that West Germany had to appease its European partners, uncertain of what a united Germany might bring, and, more importantly, it had to secure East Germany accession to the EC.

At the time of the unification, Germany was at pains to point out the continuity of German attachment to the EC and to its further integration. After all, for forty-five years, West Germany's relationship to Europe had been one of stability and equilibrium. West Germany had been an active promoter of integration starting from Adenauer, who saw this as a means of overcoming Germany's disastrous past. By the 1970s, all German political parties had adopted the line of an 'increasing integration' as had been laid down in the Treaty of Rome.[54]

The Federal Republic had drawn its economic prosperity and political legitimacy from its membership in a larger European project which in turn "gained strength from Germany's constructive engagement on the Continent."[55] Foreign policy, which then meant mostly European policy, had been central in this process. William E. Paterson, director of the Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham, explains that

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[54] Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests", from Arnulf Baring, ed. *Germany's New Position in Europe. Problems and Perspectives*, Oxford and Providence, Berg, 1994, p. 109.

[55] Jeffrey Anderson, *German Unification and the Union of Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 1.

the Federal Republic consisted of a foreign policy in search of a state, instead of a state in search of a foreign policy.[56] According to European editor of the *Financial Times*, David Marsh:

> "During the four decades of partition, West Germany's overwhelming national interest was to prevent its new European and North American allies from thinking that it had one that was different from their own. The best method of keeping West Germany's hopes and ambitions in check was to ensure that they were never out of line with those of the rest of the continent. Channelled into a receptacle called Europe, they could become both dignified and benign: for Germany, an unusual combination."[57]

Marsh explains the way in which Germany was perceived throughout the Cold War era as financially strong yet politically obliging. In other words, Germany, an economic giant, remained a 'political dwarf.' However, as soon as unification became a possibility, old inhibitions about Germany resurfaced. Great Britain and France were not keen on seeing this 'political dwarf' grow into a giant with a population of over eighty million and a powerful economy. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher cautioned against a "rash resolution of the German Question", while French president Francois Mitterrand saw German unification as a "legal and

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[56] William E. Paterson, "The Chancellor and Foreign Policy", from *Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German Chancellorship*, Stephen Padgett, ed. London, Hurst and Company, 1994, p. 127.

[57] David Marsh, *Germany and Europe. The Crisis of Unity*, London, Mandarin, 1994, p. 129.

political impossibility."[58] When Kohl surprised Europe with his Ten-Point Plan "for a confederal structure between the two German states, as a step toward an inevitable unification in a federal state,"[59] Europe's reactions became even more critical of Germany. Member States were sceptical about Germany's new place in Europe. More than one country perceived that the EC was evolving into a Trojan horse for predominantly German national interests.[60] At the same time, many politicians and some rather influential voices in the media seemed set on reminding Europe of Germany's violent past. German leaders saw that they could do little more than seek refuge in European integration.[61]

III. Deeper Integration – the Only Road to Reunification

In the midst of these emotions, the Bonn government saw that it had to draw out its own policy of integration with the EC for at least three reasons. First, deeper integration would calm the fears that a re-united Germany might embark on a dangerous path in foreign policy. By showing its willingness to maintain and even promote its "self-entanglement" within the Community, Germany was determined to prove the other countries wrong. Its second goal was to maintain the close Franco-German relations

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[58] Anderson, *op.cit.*, p. 33.
[59] Joey Cloutier, Benoît Lemay and Paul Letourneau, "German Foreign Policy and International Security", from *Inauspicious Beginnings. Principal Powers and International Security Institutions after the Cold War. 1989-1999*, Onnig Beylerian and Jacques Lévesque, ed., Montreal/Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004, p. 112.
[60] Stephen Wood, *Germany, Europe and the Persistence of Nations. Transformation, Interests and Identity, 1989-1996*, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1998, p. 1.
[61] Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

that had been moulded over the years. The insecurities felt in Paris made Germany even more resolute about pursuing further Franco-German initiatives within the EC. Finally, multilateral integration was seen as the best means of ensuring Germany's stability and avoiding a rise of nationalism in Germany, as was occurring in other parts of Europe.[62]

Germany's integration policies resonated well with leaders like Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission, as well as with countries such as France. Both were eager to secure from Germany an "early and irreversible confirmation of its integration."[63] In March 1990, Kohl announced his unwavering support for the goal of economic and monetary union. France, however, was unappeased, though, like Germany, it was resolute in its support of deeper European integration. Kohl therefore suggested, in April 1990, that he and Mitterrand submit a joint proposal to the council on opening a second track in the European integration process.[64] This second track took bold steps toward a second kind of union, a political union, which would accompany the economic and monetary union that was already in the makings. This union would include an integration of foreign, security, and defence policies that would serve to further entangle Germany. An intergovernmental conference on political union was thus to run parallel to the formal discussions concerning the Economic and Monetary Union. The combination of these two tracks, monetary and political, was in this

[62] Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
[63] Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[64] Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

way opening the course toward a stronger, more democratic Community and a common foreign and security policy.[65]

By agreeing to monetary and political union, Kohl had managed to appease his European partners, although many questions concerning the integration of the German Democratic Republic remained unsolved. These questions will not be treated in this essay, as they do not directly relate to the questions concerning the integration and enlargement of the EC. Suffice it to say that the formal unification process was brought to a close in October of 1990, and Germany, now larger and stronger, had to continue affirming its pledge to greater integration before a worried EC.

IV. Turbulent Eastern Neighbours

While Germany was trying to prove its attachment to the EC, it could not help but notice the rise in nationalisms on its eastern borders, nor the desperate economic situation that plagued its eastern neighbours. Germany remembered how the EC had helped Germany out of a similar predicament at the end of the Second World War, and to Germany, it was obvious that association and eventual membership of the Central and Eastern European countries was necessary.

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[65] Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

Germany understood that a guaranteed security in Europe was something that could not be neglected. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1974 and 1992, explains: "if Eastern Europe fares badly, Western Europe, too... will not prosper."[66] Germany strongly believed that without enlargement, the yet unstable conditions of Central and Eastern Europe could easily degenerate into security problems for the EU. These problems, Germany predicted, would come in the form of refugees and asylum seekers, trans-border environmental pollution, and increased international criminal activity and political terrorism, among other things.[67] Moreover, Germany warned, an unstable situation in the East would require military intervention from the West - a situation that Western Europe had, during the 1990s, obviously not been able to control in ex-Yugoslavia. This, according to Kohl, was a crucial reason to bring in Central and Eastern European countries into the Union, in that way preventing them from breaking down into ethnic rivalries, as had occurred in ex-Yugoslavia.[68]

With time, more arguments for enlargement arose, this time of economic nature. However, during the period covered in this chapter, Germany was still finding its place in Europe, sorting out its policies of

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[66] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe. The Process and Politics of EU Enlargement,* Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000 p. 8.
[67] *Ibidem*
[68] McCormick, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

integration and enlargement and trying to see if either of these policies should lead the way.

V. Contradiction in German Policies?

At first, Germany did not see any contradiction between the deepening and widening of the Community, as did many other Member States. As mentioned earlier, Germany's goal was to preserve stability in Western Europe and to achieve stability in the whole of Europe, and it thus saw deepening and widening as parts of one single process. Widening was seen as indispensable if long-term political and economic stability were to be achieved. While the widening process was to be prepared, Germany argued, the Community would continue to accelerate the present integration process. Germany maintained that if the Community were to remain as it was, with its cumbersome institutions and processes of decision-making, new members would do nothing more than paralyse the entire system. This is why Germany pushed for the acceptance of majority voting in the European Parliament, even if this meant that Germany would have to submit to decisions that it did not approve. This emphasis on both deepening and widening were promoted by Genscher and Kohl, and enjoyed a widespread popularity among the Germans. Thus there was even disappointment, on the

part of some Germans, when the Maastricht Treaty failed to open doors for Central and Eastern European accession.[69]

Although Germany was in favour of enlargement and was its principal proponent, Germany remained far more ambivalent on specific aspects of the enlargement process than were other pro-enlargement countries, notably Great Britain. This ambivalence stemmed from the fact that Germany found it difficult, at times, to reconcile enlargement with its desire to promote deeper European integration.[70] Since the end of the Second World War, Germany's main role had been to endorse and uphold deeper integration within the EC. According to Henning Tewes, deputy director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland, the deepening of West European integration had become "a part of the self-conception of West Germany's foreign policy-making elites."[71] He explains that from 1990, the situation altered greatly, because for the first time in its recent history, Germany could pursue its foreign interests and found enlargement towards the East essential. Thus, "West Germany's traditional self-conception as an 'integration deepener' conflicted with the desire on behalf of the united Germany to press for EU enlargement."[72] This was why, in the first half of the 1990s, Germany's promotion of enlargement was rather hesitant, and Germany took priority on deepening over widening.[73]

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[69] Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
[70] Tewes, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[71] *Ibidem*
[72] *Ibidem*
[73] *Ibidem.*, p. 118.

This contrasted with previous 'traditional' German foreign policies that favoured integration. German policy-makers had then the task of solving this problem; a task which they thought could be solved by one of the following three strategies. First, as we have already mentioned, they ignored, or did not see, that any such conflict between deepening and widening even existed. Secondly, they tried to segregate the roles of integration and enlargement. And the third phase was an attempt to merge the two. At no point in this strategy-planning did a fundamental redefinition of Germany's role take place. Thus, integration remained the main priority in Germany's European diplomacy.[74]

However, with the establishment of reform democracies in the Central and Eastern European countries, new demands were placed on Germany. They conflicted with its traditional role as a promoter of deeper integration. At first, Germany did not react to these demands, and, as we have seen, it eagerly bound itself even more strongly to the Community through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, Germany saw that it was not viable to limit Europe to twelve or even fifteen members. Germany thus found itself in an impasse, for expansion seemed incompatible with the idea of a homogenous economic and currency bloc that was striving to achieve a common foreign and defence policy envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.

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[74] *Ibidem*

Germany then, according to Henning Tewes, found itself in a role conflict between its roles as an integration deepener and an integration widener. On one level, Germany understood that EU membership was a crucial element of stabilisation, and at the same time, Germany was faced, more than any other EU country, with increasing expectations from the Central and Eastern European countries. Although these countries remained, at first, suspicious of German hegemony, they too, understood that both Germany and Central and Eastern European countries had vested interests in EU enlargement. It is not surprising then, that as early as 1991-92, Germany ensured its support for enlargement by signing bilateral treaties with several Central and Eastern European countries.[75] All this was happening against a background of even further integration as Germany pursued both objectives simultaneously.

Though Germany tried to achieve both its objectives of enlargement and integration in a complementary manner, it often found itself in a conflicting position. Moreover, Western European countries were not clear about the roles which they expected Germany to play. They expected Germany to ratify the Maastricht Treaty and to join the European Monetary Union on the one hand, yet some even began supporting Germany's interest in Eastern enlargement. However, Western countries tended to remain wary of Germany's interest in enlargement. Sometimes, the "Germanisation" thesis would take over, where, according to several EU

[75] *Ibidem.*, p. 122.

countries, enlargement was going to increase Germany's weight substantially within the EU by the two rounds of enlargement towards the North and East. This argument maintained that the Northeast bloc would end up bound more tightly together by economic, political and cultural links against a (poorer and weaker) southern bloc dominated by France.[76] This however, remained a marginal view, and did not occupy much place among major EU thinkers. Moreover, by this time, the EU was concerned with its own problems such as the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the collapse of the Economic Monetary System, and an economic recession. It had little time to dwell on worrying about the North-Eastern Germanic bloc.

[76] *Ibidem*

2. Germany Speaks Up: The Second Half of the 1990s

I. After Maastricht

As Europe entered the second half the 1990s, Germany's weight no longer posed a threat for its European counterparts. It began to increase its voice within the EU, and put more emphasis on what its own interests were. It was no longer as prone to its "leadership avoidance reflex",[77] which had dominated its post-World War Two policies and through the first half of the 1990s. There were several reasons for this, most importantly the decreased reliance on the United States, and the external pressure from European countries to work as a "motor" for EU integration. More and more, Central and Eastern Europeans looked west to Germany, seeing Germany as a country in "...prime position to influence greatly the events in Central and Eastern Europe, given its physical proximity to the region, its historical ties and consequent perceived obligations, its experience with the transformation process in the former GDR..."[78] This transition thus happened both inside of Germany and in the countries surrounding it. Germany felt now more comfortable to pursue its own interests, but still held on to the discourse that what Germany wanted was essentially what was best for Europe.

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[77] Stephen D. Collins, *German Policy-Making and EU Enlargement during the Kohl Era. Managing the Agenda?* Manchester/New York, Manchester University Press, 2002, p. 4.
[78] *Ibidem*

Thus, despite of, or as a result of, this change in its position in Europe, Germany continued to promote enlargement. This did not change the fact that Germany was intent on preserving the *acquis communautaire*, though quite aware that enlargement would have a paralysing effect on the decision- and policy-making process in the EU. Germany specified, however, that it would be far more affected by enlargement than any other Member State, stating that firstly enlargement was due to happen on Germany's borders and secondly, that this would probably happen at Germany's expense. Germany insisted therefore that it did not want enlargement to be a "German project", and thus wanted other Member States to share the burden, both politically and financially.[79] With Germany strongly maintaining this position, it became obvious that it was increasingly taking a firmer stance, particularly after the election of a new government in September of 1998. This transformation came as something of a novelty to Europe.[80]

Germany was thus finding itself in an increasingly uncomfortable situation. On the one hand, it was demanding support from other Member States on European matters that it found important: gradual reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, restrictions on the free movement of labour

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[79] Lippert, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[80] Paul Letourneau, "La politique étrangère allemande. Style nouveau et fidélité au multilatéralisme," from *Revue d'Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande*, April-June 1999, vol. 31, number 2, p. 333.

and reduced net contribution to the EU.[81] At the same time, it never ceased to press for a swifter enlargement for which it had a "vital interest".[82]

Indeed, despite the sensitive issues mentioned above, all of Germany's major social, economical and social forces – which include all political parties, every government and opposition party in the sixteen German *Länder*, unions of entrepreneurs, trade unions, church and social groups, academic experts and other opinion leaders[83] - supported enlargement as a "political necessity and a historical chance" for Germany and Europe.[84] As Germany neared the end of the 20th century, its reasons for enlargement could be narrowed to two: to achieve stability in the region and to intensify business with the new market economies. Yet despite considerable economic gains, Germany's interest in expanding the EU was largely based on political considerations and on continuity with its *Ostpolitik* and European policies since the end of the 1960s.[85]

Germany continued, during this time, to pursue its dual strategy of deepening and widening in the EU. However, in the course of the 1990s, Germany's integration policies became more cautious and deliberate than those preceding the Maastricht Treaty, when Germany had felt the need to

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[81] Lippert, *op.cit.*, p.14.
[82] Mathias Jopp, "Germany and EU Enlargement", from *East-Central Europe and the EU. Problems of Integration*, Karl Kaiser and Martin Brüning, ed. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1996, p. 107.
[83] Lippert, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
[84] *Ibidem*
[85] *Ibidem.*, p. 15.

anchor itself ever more firmly to the EC. This attenuation in its integration policy and the new displayed caution toward EU reforms could be seen at the Amsterdam Summit which modified the ambitious programme laid out in the multi-party coalition agreement of November 11th, 1994. Indeed, apart from the European Monetary Union, there was no identifiable movement towards political union.[86]

Eastward enlargement, on the other hand, did not lose its momentum, certainly not under Kohl's last government. He believed that Germany had historically been open to enlargement of the EC (with the notable exception of Turkey, which was being treated as a special case), and saw enlargement as a European solution to peace, stability and prosperity. He looked toward the southern countries as proof that the EU's Mediterranean Policy had paid off, and saw no reason that the same would not occur in Central and Eastern Europe.

Moreover, Germany was "by far the biggest trading partner of the Central and Eastern European countries."[87] Thus, not only geographical proximity, but trade, developing since the late 1980s, played a significant role in Germany's policy to enlarge the Union.[88]

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[86] *Ibidem.*
[87] Dieter Schumacher, "Impact on German Trade of Increased Division of Labor with Eastern Europe", from *Europe's Economy Looks East. Implications for Germany and the European Union*, Stanley B. Black, ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 101.
[88] *Ibidem*

Enlargement of the EU definitely had its advantages for Germany. It gave Germany a larger and safer medium through which it could exercise its own power in areas of both domestic and foreign policy. The domestic advantage was that in enlarging the EU, Germany would not be tempted to act alone with regard to the Central and Eastern European countries. On the contrary, as a result of its attachment to the EU, all of Germany's bilateral treaties with these countries had been "fully complementary of the EU's Europe Agreements and supportive of the pre-accession strategy and the membership perspective offered by the Union."[89] This channelling of Germany's Eastern policies through the EU reassured Germany that it remained anchored in the West, all the while pursuing its interests in Eastern Europe. The question did not disappear altogether, and continued to be asked: would enlargement to the East affect the EU's importance within Germany, despite the fact that Germany would continue pursuing its goals mostly within a multilateral framework and enlarged institutions?[90] This question remained on many European minds as the process to eventual accession of the Central and Eastern European countries became closer to reality.

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[89] Lippert, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[90] *Ibidem*

II. Germans Express Themselves

It would be impossible to conclude an essay on German attitudes toward enlargement without referring to German public opinion. Leaders in Berlin feared the public's reluctance with regard to enlargement. Between 1989 and 1999 many changes had been imposed on the public – from reunification to a common European currency. Germans increasingly felt that, in financing the unification and fifty percent of the Community's budget, too much was being demanded of them. It is no wonder that many regarded enlargement of the EU with a sceptical eye, wondering how much this would cost them this time. However, there was no political party, such as Jorg Haider's Liberty Party (FPÖ) in Austria, which openly opposed the enlargement of the EU.[91]

Surveys confirm that pro-European attitudes in the German public experienced a decline.[92] The rise of Euro-scepticism was often related to the feeling that Europe was out of control, that it was not democratic enough, and, as usual, that Germany paid too much for the other Member States. The disappointment following the Nice Treaty could be seen by the decrease of satisfaction with the European system that declined from 44 percent in 1999 to 35 percent in 2000.[93] The German public was not alone

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[91] Jean-François Drevet, *L'Élargissement de l'Union européenne, jusqu'où?* Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 153.
[92] Henri de Bresson, *La nouvelle Allemagne*, Paris, Editions Stock, 2001, p. 198.
[93] *Ibidem*

in this disenchantment with the EU. Many Europeans deplored its democratic illegitimacy and a large number of them were simply indifferent to the whole process.

III. Conclusion

As has been shown, Germany overcame the uncomfortable predicament that plagued its European policy-making after unification. Germany was once again, as it had often been during recent history, faced with a tug-of-war between the East and the West. Only this time, while Germany had real links to the West, it felt that its security and well-being could only be assured with stability in the East. At the beginning, Germany was hesitant to place too much emphasis on enlargement, be it to the North or East. It was too preoccupied with reaffirming its place within the EC and proving to Europe that it remained firmly anchored in the West. After the Maastricht Treaty, Germany began to feel more confident with regard to its place in Europe, and saw key interests in a European enlargement to the East. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty had left more than one German disappointed, and integration policies, while still crucial to Germany, were no longer as stridently pursued.

Thus, Germany took more interest in its economic involvement with the Central and Eastern European countries. While integration was still

Germany's main goal, many conflicts had to be resolved, such as agricultural reforms, which let the integration process fall behind the enlargement negotiations. Between 1997 and 1999, Germany focused strongly on the integration and deepening of the EU which continued holding a central place on its political agenda. It managed, however, to balance deepening with its politics of enlargement. Germany wanted the momentum of the original members to continue on, and remain, at least on the political level, if not in public opinion, very much attached to keeping this "Old Europe", in other words, the original EC, alive.

Meanwhile, historians and politicians of this era followed Germany carefully, at first unsure of where it would tread, eventually dropping their guard and focusing more on Germany's specific policies with regard to various aspects of integration and enlargement. In the following chapter, we will see how *The Economist* perceived these events.

PART THREE:

THROUGH THE EYES OF

THE ECONOMIST

1. The First Stage: 1989 to 1994

I. Introduction

Both the unification of Germany and the deeper integration of Europe constantly interested *The Economist*, which covered them in almost every issue. The editorials, written mostly with optimism and a touch of humour, offer the reader a more personal viewpoint of the events transforming Europe.

A survey of the articles written between 1989 and 1992 leave the reader with a two-sided image of Germany. On the one hand, admiration is shown as to the economic prowess of Germany. On the other hand, a certain reservation and misgiving is demonstrated. A sample of titles is quite telling[94]. They capture the imagination, particularly when accompanied by cartoons illustrating either malevolent aspects (always with historical

[94] "Worried about West Germany", *The Economist,* February 18 1989, p. 14.; "Weimar it isn't, but Watch Out", *The Economist,* March 18 1989, p. 43. ; "The German Question", *The Economist,* October 12 1991, p. 18.; "Kohl's Anschluss", *The Economist,* February 17 1990, p. 16. ; "Looming Germany", *The Economist,* March 10 1990, p. 13; "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles", *The Economist,* January 13 1990, p. 43.; "Germany Benign?", *The Economist,* January 27 1990, p. 13.

connotations) of Germany or of the growing (and therefore menacing) economic and political power of this newly reunited country. This is a tendency that reached its peak at the end of 1990, before slowly dying away. In 1991, cartoons of Germany become rarer, and from 1992, few are to be found altogether.

As for the content of the articles itself, it too, became progressively less critical with regard to Germany, albeit at a slower pace. Indeed it is impossible not to notice the ironic tone initially employed by *The Economist.* Although it is far from expressing ultranationalist worries, certain ambivalence was conveyed with regard to Germany that cannot be ignored. It is by examining several articles that we will grasp the essence of *The Economist*'s vision of Germany, its opinion with regard to the EC, as well as its way of interpreting the "German Question" in the early 1990s.

This type of analysis, covering over a hundred articles and exploring continuity versus discontinuity in the coverage, is familiar to analysts and specialists in media and communication. This method of analysis is best described by Lasswell:

> "When it is desired to survey politically significant communication for any historical period on a global scale, the most practicable method is that of counting the occurrence of key symbols and clichés. Only in this way can the overwhelming mass of material be reliably and briefly

> summarized. By charting the distributions in space and time, it is possible to show the principal contours of... political history."[95]

It is important to keep in mind that most of the information used for the purpose of this thesis is derived from editorial articles and special surveys covering either Germany or the EU. Indeed, according to leading quantitative analysis specialists, "politically significant symbols are usually concentrated in the front page or editorial page."[96] Regular political and financial coverage is most often brief, less personal and opinionated, and most hints of any particular attitude or judgment can be found in the title only. Thus, this essay will entirely disregard financial and business articles, which deal little, if not at all, with the political implications of Germany within the EU, and will use only several articles that are part of the weekly political coverage of Europe. Moreover, certain periods will have more articles concerning Germany than others. This will be discussed in the conclusion but will in no way affect the analysis, which will be ordered both thematically and chronologically.

The articles which will be studied will often be quoted, at least in part, in the original. This is because the rewording of articles is not always effective in transmitting the desired message. According to most specialists on qualitative analysis of texts, it is crucial to remain close to the original text, for any reformulation or change hinders the message that the text is

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[95] Danielson and Larosa, *op. lit.*, p. 103.
[96] *Ibidem.*, p. 104.

trying to follow through.[97] At times articles will be combined and compared with one another, while at others one particular aspect of the article will be concentrated on. We will seek to understand where *The Economist* stood with regard to Germany, and how this opinion is combined with the place *The Economist* believed the EU should have during the last decade of the 20th century.

II. Early views on Germany

"Are you Afraid of Germany?" Thus began an article dated October 12, 1991. According to *The Economist*, this question was at the base of any discussion concerning the future of a federal EC. No attempt to answer it was made in this article. *The Economist* claimed that it was a question that continuously hovered in the back of the Community Member States' minds. It was the only way, continued the article, to explain why preparations for the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht, which were initially supposed to treat only economic and monetary aspects of the Community, had acquired an increasingly political aspect. Moreover, and more interestingly, *The Economist* claimed that those who were most afraid of Germany were the Germans themselves. The consensus among historians confirms this opinion. Indeed, as was seen in great detail in the previous

[97] See Danielson and Larosa, *op. lit.*, and Kimberly Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 2002.

chapter, the Germans were no less worried, if not more, about the future of a reunited Germany, than was the rest of the EC.

As *The Economist* was quick to point out, a united Germany was suddenly much larger and potentially more audacious and inclined to the East. The article supported this opinion by quoting several German leaders doing everything to avoid their violent past, their goal being "to bind their country securely into the Community."[98] One specific quotation is especially interesting: "Better do the tethering soon, they [the German leaders] say darkly; in a few years the beast will be stronger, wilder, possibly untameable."[99] The word "beast", no matter in which way interpreted, was in no way flattering to Germany. The article, whose provocative title "Are you Afraid of Germany?" was remained unanswered, leaves the reader with a rather foreboding image of Germany.

The Economist did not provide an entirely one-dimensional image of Germany. However, the alternative arguments were portrayed with less conviction. *The Economist* highlighted the argument that "all this worrying about Germany [was] out of date" and that therefore it was unnecessary to emphasise the importance of a federal Europe. This opinion claimed that while Germany was Europe's "economic powerhouse", it was not its "superpower", and so while its exports were twice those of France,

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[98] "Are you Afraid of Germany?" *The Economist*, October 12 1991, p. 18.
[99] *Ibidem*

they were less than a third of the EC total.[100] Though *The Economist* did not discount this argument, it did point out that this opinion, which sought to appease Europeans, was one that was mostly heard from a "safe distance across a stretch of water from continental Europe"- the allusion to the United States and Great Britain could not be clearer. Moreover, in view of its hesitance with regard to a more federal Europe, it was no surprise that Great Britain would be quick to adopt such a line of thought. Thus, *The Economist* presented us with continental Europeans on the one side, more affected and thus more concerned about the future of both Germany and the EC, and, on the other side, with more optimistic Great Britain and United States, their lands and economies much less threatened by a stronger Germany, indeed a 'safe distance away' from the events on the Continent.

In the same article, this British and American opinion was shunned aside, and considered unrealistic. *The Economist* claimed that though few Germans would admit to supporting a European federation in order to pursue old national interests, they may be doing so, albeit in a twisted manner. *The Economist* brought a suggestive quotation by Bismarck in 1876: "I have always found the word Europe in the mouths of those politicians who were demanding from other powers something that they did not dare demand in their own name."[101] *The Economist* concluded this paragraph in a similar train of thought, saying: "A federal Europe, with

[100] *Ibidem*
[101] *Ibidem*

Germany at its heart, offers Germans the chance to extend their influence in all directions. The common German argument - embrace us now or regret it later - can almost sound like blackmail."[102]

This image of Germany was indeed threatening, almost alarming, considering the late date - October 1991. However negatively Germany was portrayed in this article, and however 'beneficial' the EC was made to be for Germany, *The Economist* drew on one last argument, this time of a more positive nature, before concluding the article. The journal suggested that Europeans need not get carried away by their fright of a more powerful Germany, indeed, that they should see things more clearly. *The Economist* argued that if Germany was ready to cede some of its sovereignty, as it clearly was, it should be seen as an opportune moment for the rest of Europe to take advantage of this. *The Economist* reasoned that Europeans would certainly prefer a Europe strongly influenced by Germany (and vice versa) to a neutral Germany, free to do whatever it pleased. Thus, *The Economist* agreed that Germany must be bound within the Community, and therefore it advocated a more integrated Europe. This opinion, that Germany was best bound within Europe in order to avoid any resurgence of German supremacy in Europe, evolved throughout the 1990s, as *The Economist* started to view both Germany and the EC in a different light. In the following chapters, the beginning of this transformation will become obvious.

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[102] *Ibidem.*, p. 19.

III. Reunification

"Is German unification cause for Europeans to tremble?" *The Economist* asked. In an article praising Helmut Kohl and the ability with which he managed to convince leaders that German unification was necessary, *The Economist* wrote that this was not the restless and unhappy Germany of the past, certainly not after forty years of democracy, wealth, and social justice. *The Economist* added that the new Germany would not be a replica of the old Federal Republic, "mainly western-minded since birth" but it would be a new state, very much conceptually in Central Europe, more inclined to "involve itself in Russia's plight than stand aloof."[103] Nor was *The Economist* completely trusting of this new Germany: "...even encased in European structures, like a float at a carnival, the German bulldozer may well veer off in new directions."[104] *The Economist* suspected that Germans may even cool in their enthusiasm for a closer European integration, for a European defence force, and for a monetary union that would replace their "cherished D-Mark".[105] They might promote the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) instead, in order to give themselves more room to manoeuvre, as opposed to a common EC foreign policy. The idea alone would be enough, *The Economist* claimed, to make Germany into quite a "daunting neighbour for the weaker states around it."[106]

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[103] "Wunderkohl", *The Economist*, June 30 1990, p. 16.
[104] *Ibidem*
[105] *Ibidem*
[106] *Ibidem*

Moreover, *The Economist* insisted that European leaders should not take "Kohl at his word" when he spoke of Germany and European unity as one, but should make sure that Germany was, indeed, committed to be more strongly integrated into the EC. This would ensure a less fearful and more manageable Germany than would any alternative. *The Economist* opined that Germany was already too "brawny to twist". All that could now be done was to have European leaders encourage Germany to take the path of a tighter European unity. *The Economist* criticised Thatcher for not doing so, and claimed that it was "high time Thatcher came round to reality." *The Economist* openly stated that it was afraid that if Germany decided that a tighter EU was not in its interests, unity would loosen, and there would be no stopping German hegemony, even if it were benign. *The Economist* thus saw the EC as the ideal system within which European countries could mutually influence each other.[107]

As of June 1990, the magazine offered a detailed survey of German unification. *The Economist* brought a quote by Napoleon III, cited in part in the first chapter of this essay. Both historians and *The Economist* must have found this citation useful, *The Economist* using it to admonish Thatcher for her European policies[108]:

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[107] *Ibidem*

[108] "The Road to EMU", *The Economist*, June 30 1990, p. 17.

> "It may be very well to say that Germany is not an aggressive Power, but who can say when she may not become so? And that she may not some day... seek to unite within her boundaries the Russo-German provinces of the Baltic?
>
> You English have chosen to withdraw yourselves from the political area of Europe, and this abstention of England from active participation in European politics is a great misfortune for Europe, and will later prove to be a great misfortune for herself."
>
> *Napoleon III to Lord*
>
> *Augustus Loftus, British Ambassador to Berlin, 1868*[109]

This quotation was displayed at the top of an article about Germany's reunification. Though *The Economist* did not appear to view Germany as a real threat, it did not exclude the possibility that Germany may be a power that could yet rise, and should therefore be contained, within the EC, in a steadfast and thorough manner.

The Economist did not, however, simply focus on economic factors or the size of the German population to shed doubt on Germany. It identified symbolic factors as issues that had to be dealt with in their own right. One particular issue, which received coverage in more than one article in *The Economist*, was the possible location of Germany's capital. Germany, on its road to reunification, now asked to have its new *Hauptstadt* in Berlin. In a particularly telling article entitled "Ich bin ein Bonner" from July 1990, *The Economist* did not leave any doubts as to its opinion.

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[109] "Quote Unquote", *The Economist*, June 30 1990, p. 47.

While *The Economist* did say that Germany was past the stage where other nations should tell it what to do, it believed that Germans should consider several important factors before deciding upon their new capital. According to *The Economist*, Berlin had too many sombre memories, practically only associated with visions of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hitler and communist Germany. Bonn, on the other hand, represented democracy and federalism, and stood for the Germany that Europeans "know and love"[110]. Moreover, Berlin, already a big city, would, by becoming a capital city, attract lobbyists, corporate headquarters, banks and courts. It would become bigger and more centralized. The clinch, for *The Economist*, was that Berlin as a capital city would result in an eastern shift that would be bound to disturb Germany's Western neighbours, especially since that could induce a shift of Germany's politics. *The Economist* made its position clear- Berlin as capital was not a good idea. Bonn worked perfectly well under the Federal Republic and there was therefore no reason to disturb the status quo.[111]

We see then that *The Economist* professed that Germany's policies were as yet unstable, that the country needed to be continuously anchored in the West, that it had, in short, no business moving its centre of gravity eastwards. Yet, as German reunification loomed closer, *The*

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[110] "Ich bin ein Bonner", *The Economist*, July 28 1990, p. 14.
[111] *Ibidem*

Economist progressively showed a more pragmatic view of the situation. It explained that Germany's predicament was, all things considered, not all that simple. It was a country caught between different interests, each one expecting something else of Germany. The Soviet Union, for example, was hoping for financial aid, while the United States was looking for a 'partner in leadership', in other words, for a more active foreign policy role on the part of Germany. East Germany, meanwhile, was expecting an economic miracle. At the same time, the EC was pushing for a more committed Germany and for monetary union as Germany began to hesitate in its rush for monetary union for the first time since the conception of this idea. The Eastern European countries, for their part, were also asking for considerable financial help. *The Economist* explained that Germany could not possibly be expected to satisfy all these demands, though Germany had made promises in this sense.[112]

While *The Economist* did bring to the fore the different preoccupations Germany was facing, it saw these as a representation of Germany's new and "enhanced status in the world"[113], and maintained its ambivalence towards this representation of Germany. It pointed accusingly to the Franco-German relationship, previously an exalted pillar of the EC, and now rapidly deteriorating – a direct result, claimed *The Economist*, of Germany's new and expanded size. *The Economist* likened a reunited

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[112] "Prosit Deutschland!" *The Economist*, September 29 1990, p. 13.
[113] *Ibidem*

Germany in Europe to a giant Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It continued by explaining that Germany's indecision, and the skill and sensitivity required of Germany to successfully appease all neighbours and allies, would end up weighing heavily on Germany's future. This, maintained *The Economist*, made the future seem "rather daunting."[114] For *The Economist* did not predict that things would run as smoothly as Germany promised. It threw several questions into the open: "[Would] Europhilia really make Germany ready to give up sovereignty just when it got it back?" and would Germans "give up the D-mark just when East Germans [were] experiencing its security for the first time?"[115] *The Economist* answered with no ambivalence: "Where interests conflict, the Germans will put their own interest first."[116] *The Economist* added that Mr. Kohl had been remarkable in putting German interests ahead during the past year and obtaining reunification for Germany. *The Economist* remained less certain about Kohl's instinct when it came to the good of Europe as a whole.[117]

We thus see that in the early 1990s, *The Economist* saw the European idea as a safeguard against a rapid rise of Germany. It promoted the idea of integration, and suggested that European leaders make sure that Germany did not leave the path of furthering the EU. And yet, the idea of further integration had many implications, political and economic, not all of

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[114] *Ibidem.*, p. 14.
[115] *Ibidem*
[116] *Ibidem*
[117] "As Germany Votes", *The Economist*, November 24 1990, p. 15.

which concurred with *The Economist*'s vision of a united Europe. Indeed, as the Maastricht Treaty neared, *The Economist* made its ideas clear to the public, and proposed its vision of an integrated union.

IV. Is Monetary Union Worthwhile?

The main goal of the Maastricht Treaty was to initiate the currency unification among the countries of the EC. According to *The Economist*, the notion of an economic and monetary union was positive and was therefore to be strongly encouraged. It was the idea of a political union, one that gained momentum with the reunification of Germany, which *The Economist* found absurd. "We would like a single European currency, but we dislike the idea of a federal superstate."[118] In this article *The Economist* confronted Germany, who alongside France, both defended and promoted the idea of political union and of a stronger integration of the EC. For *The Economist*, it was understandable that France should like to have its age-old rival tied to the EC as much as possible. Germany's position, on the other hand, aroused suspicion, for, more than any other country in the EC, Germany stood the most to gain.[119]

We thus see that while *The Economist* continued to be apprehensive towards Germany, this apprehension had changed its form. No

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[118] "The Community's Two Unions", *The Economist*, September 14, 1991, p. 16.
[119] *Ibidem*.

longer as pessimistic with regard to Germany's place in Europe, it nonetheless did not approve of Germany's overly integrationist view of the EC, and tried to understand where it came from. According to *The Economist,* the idea of a political union became attractive to Germany as a result of the upheaval in Eastern Europe, for Germany's position in Europe was now seen as shaky by many Western leaders. "The perceived threat was the need to get Germany committed, and the EC more integrated, before Germany became wayward, and too many new members diluted the original European vision. The answer was the aberrant dash towards a treaty on political union."[120]

The distinction between political and monetary union was stressed because *The Economist* was much more conciliatory towards Germany with regard to monetary union. Germany, *The Economist* admitted, was the one willing to lose one of its few symbols of national pride, its *Deutschmark. The Economist* indeed remarked that the country which would be risking the most from a monetary union was not Great Britain, despite its loud claims to the contrary, but Germany. "[The] D-Mark has a proud record. Sterling is a rake; the sooner it is dumped, the better."[121] We can therefore note a strong support for a monetary union, a position that was confirmed time and again in articles such as "Rethinking EMU"[122] and

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[120] "What a Community", *The Economist*, November 2 1991, p. 13.
[121] "The Road to Maastricht", *The Economist*, November 23 1991, p. 15.
[122] "Rethinking EMU", *The Economist*, September 15 1990, p. 14.

"The Flaw in Thatcher's Europe"[123]. It was quite another story, as we have just seen, with regard to an eventual political union.

IV. What Type of Union?

The Economist made it clear that it found Germany to be the biggest advocate of the European project. In an article concerning the European Parliament[124], *The Economist* brought forward Germany's role in pressing for more power for the European Parliament. The reason, *The Economist* affirmed, that Germany was so forthcoming with regard to a stronger European Parliament, was that it viewed Europe as an entity that should resemble something along the lines of a "United States of Europe"[125]. Such a leap, argued *The Economist*, would be a mistake. The reason for this was that, other than Germans, not enough Europeans shared in Germany's idea of a federal EC. Moreover, the European Parliament should prove itself before allowing it much more power, and according to *The Economist*, it would be better to let the Parliament advance in "small steps", and this, not only in order to appease the Germans, but because with time the project might seem sensible in itself.[126]

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[123] "The Flaw in Thatcher's Europe," *The Economist*, August 11 1990, p. 14.
[124] "The Road from Strasbourg", *The Economist*, April 13, 1991, p. 15.
[125] *Ibidem*
[126] *Ibidem*

This does not mean that *The Economist* did not believe that a European federation could work. Federations, claimed *The Economist*, when they work, are an "excellent way of accommodating differences within a single system."[127] However, *The Economist* did not perceive the EC to be ready for this, no matter how much Germany or any other country would insist that it was. A "United States of Europe" would mean having a common foreign policy and a central government that would have ultimate sovereignty, and where states would only be able to legislate in certain areas.[128] This was not something Europeans were ready to commit themselves to, wrote *The Economist*. Moreover, while the EC was formed as a result of fear of a war between Germany and France, the EC of the 1990s did not draw on the same fear, and therefore people were more apt to be interested in a common market and even a common currency, but not much more.[129] The idea of a federation was one that produced many debates in Europe at the time, especially among Germans. This project was notably dismissed by the British in the run-up to the following Intergovernmental Conference, and, as we have seen, *The Economist* held no differently from the British viewpoint, bringing strong arguments against the idea of a federation.

What then did *The Economist* think was best for Europe? As we have seen, it believed that Germany needed to be integrated firmly within

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[127] "Playing as One", *The Economist*, June 29 1991, p. 9.
[128] *Ibidem.*, p. 10.
[129] *Ibidem*

the EC, and especially to allow for a monetary union to take place. In this context, it believed that the only way that the EC could succeed in its mission was if Germany's place in Europe was stable and secure. Because of Germany's preponderant weight in Europe, any unrest within the country could shake the entire Community. Thus, the economic instability in Germany that followed the high costs of reunification put the whole question of monetary integration, let alone political integration, to test. This new situation, concluded *The Economist*, brought back the 'German question', only this time, in quite a different form.

The Economist explained itself: During the reunification of Germany the uppermost fear in Europe was "that a resurgent Germany might dominate its neighbours too much".[130] Now *The Economist*, along with the rest of Europe, feared that Germany might not be strong enough. Too much, it seemed, depended on Germany. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics looked toward Germany for financial aid and West Europeans relied on Germany as the anchor of the European exchange-rate mechanism. According to *The Economist*, the upcoming Maastricht Treaty on economic and monetary union was "unlikely to succeed" if Germany's commitment to the EC weakened. "Much is at stake not just for Germany but for the European Community and beyond."[131]

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[130] "The New German Question", *The Economist*, May 2 1992, p. 15.
[131] *Ibidem*

It is interesting to see how much had changed in the two years since German unification. Now *The Economist* found it important that Germany regain its economic strength and devoted an entire page to the matter in the article "A New German Question" explaining the implications of Germany's weakening economy and gave several suggestions to rectify the situation. For *The Economist*, Germany's economic stability was indispensable for the EU to succeed, and thus it was imperative that measures be taken to overcome Germany's economic slump. *The Economist*'s enthusiasm for a European monetary union was in no way disguised.

Yet, as the Maastricht Treaty approached, the idea of monetary union became as important as that of political unity in Europe. *The Economist* did not mince its words in showing its standpoint. It clearly expressed its distaste for a closer political union, saying that Europe was neither apt, nor ready, to follow through with this vision. Moreover, because both unions were to be addressed equally in the referendums on the Maastricht Treaty, closer economic union would be at stake. What is more, wrote *The Economist*, the very idea of closer political union would jeopardise the rightwing vote. The cost would be the loss of a common European market, a loss which would be unfortunate, according to *The Economist*.[132]

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[132] "Europe in his Hands", *The Economist*, September 5 1992, p.11.

As Maastricht neared, *The Economist* found that it was not the only one sceptical of a closer political union. It explained that Germany, previously one of the biggest proponents of European integration, was starting to be less certain of its strive for an ever closer union. *The Economist* of March of 1992 wrote that Germans were "wailing about the Maastricht Conference in December"[133]. *The Economist* had an interesting perspective on Germany's changing role in Europe. It wrote that while there was no need to worry that Europe's "weightiest nation believes it can do better on its own", it did think that it was a "warning sign" for the EU.[134] *The Economist* explained that Germany had, for all the years previous to its reunification, used the European idea as a "semi-substitute" for its own defeated and occupied fatherland. This is why, according to *The Economist*, neither England nor, to a lesser extent France, had ever quite had the same enthusiasm and neither strives for a deeper European integration. Thus Germany, which saw in the EU an indelibly important function, never questioned the means to reach further integration, not the process nor the costs each country would incur. The existence of the EU was, in itself, a good thing, and had to be promoted without any doubts.

This had begun to change since reunification, wrote *The Economist*. The Germans had just then regained full sovereignty, and so could only then understand what they would have to sacrifice for the

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[133] "On Second Thoughts", *The Economist*, March 14, 1992, p. 56.
[134] *Ibidem*

European cause. Moreover, because the costs of reunification proved to be far heavier than they had anticipated, European integration was perceived by the Germans as an extra cost on an already heavily burdened economy. *The Economist* maintained that Germany, for the first time since reunification, was beginning to doubt the speed at which the integration process was taking place. It was no longer the same country that it used to be, and *The Economist*, in a rather sombre tone, warned its readers that while Germany was unlikely to stray from the European model, it was becoming a tougher partner to work with. The reason: Germany was "slowly waking up to the fact that it has more options than it used to."[135]

As *The Economist* surveyed Germany's place in Europe, it continued to explain why Germany had changed, and why the EU, in the way envisaged by Cold War federalists, could no longer ring true in this period where Europe spanned an area from Ireland to the Urals. *The Economist* maintained that it was France and not Germany that had gained the most from the EC during the Cold War period. However now that the Cold War was over, the Franco-German alliance, though still important, had shifted gears. Germany was no longer squeezed between an Atlantic alliance dominated by the United States and a powerful Soviet Union, explained *The Economist*. Germany acquired 17 million new citizens, with the countries on its Eastern border looking to it for trade and investment. Germany had, in

[135] *Ibidem.*, p. 59.

short, become a country preoccupied with many new challenges, such as immigration, aid to the East and nuclear safety.[136]

Moreover, *The Economist* explained, it was no longer a matter of binding Germany more deeply into the EU for fear that it would be lured toward the East, as it had been at the time of unification. At this stage, no matter which way the EU evolved, whether by integrating more deeply or expanding towards the East, Germany would have to "look in both directions"[137], as well as sort out its own affairs. It was no longer a country that had to fulfill its national interests in an international forum, pointed out *The Economist*, warning that the EU would have more and more trouble convincing Germany to continue doing so. Because the face of Europe had changed, claimed *The Economist*, Germany had no choice but to open its doors to its eastern borders, and far more than any other country in the EU.[138]

The best option for Europe then, continued *The Economist*, was to widen the EU but in a way different than the guidelines set by the Maastricht Treaty. The community should become, it explained, "a Europe *à la carte*", in which different members could choose to join some policies and not others. This would make the EU a more viable enterprise, more than a free-trade zone, but with less ambitious federal policies in areas such as

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[136] "Europe Falls to Earth", *The Economist* August 7 1993, p. 16.
[137] *Ibidem*
[138] *Ibidem.*, p. 15-16.

agriculture or regional spending. According to *The Economist*, "in the place of the old federal illusions must be put the realities of the new, post-Cold-War Europe."[139]

It is obvious that by 1993 *The Economist* viewed this post-Cold War era with more certainty than between 1989 and 1991, and even in 1992. It now saw the EU as a reasonable endeavour, perhaps even worth integrating politically, though at different speeds and never aiming for anything resembling a federation. At the same time, it saw Germany as a more stable and certainly more secure country, and was no longer as quick to criticise. For example, while the Maastricht Treaty was being ratified and discussed, Germany was undergoing some severe strains, mostly of an economic nature. This led Edmund Stoiber, premier of Bavaria and regional chief of the right-centre Christian Social Union, to speak out rather strongly against Germany's commitment to European integration, creating turmoil throughout the EU.[140] Yet *The Economist* was quick to show the backlash from other German politicians and indeed, took a balanced approach to this comment. Instead, it analysed this phenomenon from a different angle and put Germany's place in Europe in a new light.

The Economist explained that while most of the EU members had discussed the pros and cons of further European integration, this had never

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[139] *Ibidem.*, p. 15.
[140] Germany under Strain", *The Economist*, November 20, 1993, p. 17.

been the case in Germany. Before German unification, European unity was "universally accepted as the best way of overcoming Germany's past and securing a prosperous and peaceful future."[141] Since its unification, German politicians had been at pains to reassure themselves and their allies that Germany would stay secured in the West, and that this new and enlarged version of West Germany would be no Fourth Reich. Germany, itself, pleaded to be more tightly bound, maintained *The Economist*, sometimes too insistently, showing that Germans themselves were worried of their new position in Europe. Thus, no debate existed at home as to the future of the *Deutschmark*, nor about the European economic and monetary union to which Germany was uncritically committed.[142]

That, *The Economist* argued, was a mistake. Germans should have a right to worry about their "beloved" currency as much as anyone else. Otherwise, as things stood, little internal debate existed concerning the Maastricht Treaty or Germany's position in Europe, but Germans were nonetheless faced with recession, with uneasy relations between Eastern and Western Germany, and with burdensome costs of unification that had led to the rise of the far right. At the same time, Germany was also providing aid to Russia and other Eastern European countries that had asked for financial aid, first to buy off doubts about unification, then in hopes of financing stability in the new democracies to the East. It would only be a matter of

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[141] *Ibidem*
[142] *Ibidem*

time, *The Economist* explained, before the Germans began to ask questions about funding in the East, the rush to European unity, and their commitments to the Union. While this thought may be unsettling for some, wrote *The Economist*, it should not be taken in a negative light. Germany was "not about to reinvent itself in disturbing new guise nor [was] it likely to stray too far from familiar landmarks."[143] On the contrary, continued *The Economist*, for all its problems, Germany was now more at peace with itself than at any other time during the 20th Century. Despite the collapse of the countries to the East, Germany had no outstanding claims on them, nor did they hold anything back on Germany. Russia did not tempt Germany, but worried it, and Germany preferred not to deal with this worry alone, but together with its allies.[144]

Most important, continued *The Economist*, was the fact that Germany had remained remarkably stable throughout this process of unification, recession, and the upsurge of racism on the political fringes. And while the challenges were not yet over, wrote *The Economist*, the question for Germany was not "whether it will emerge from its coming year of trial-by-election still a democracy, but how a democratic Germany should use its power and influence in the world." [145] This would be an appropriate subject for debate, not only in Germany, but throughout the EU, *The Economist* concluded.

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[143] *Ibidem.*, p. 18.
[144] *Ibidem*
[145] *Ibidem*

The Economist maintained that any questions that Germans may have about European integration and the speed at which it progresses did not necessarily put integration itself in doubt. Germans were entitled to their worries, but they were strongly aware of the importance of the EU to them, if not always politically, then certainly economically, for one third of Germany's GDP was provided by the trade and free markets within the EU.[146]

Yet while *The Economist* asserted that Germany was no longer a threat, that it was completely entitled to its own opinion with regard to integration, and that it was one of the most important players in the EU, it did hold several doubts as to Germany's ability to push forward a deeper European integration. In examining Germany's European policy, *The Economist* found that there existed too many inconsistencies with regard to Europe. Firstly, Germany's three strands of European policy- opening the union to the new democracies in the East, pushing toward deeper economic and monetary co-operation, and making the European decision-making process more open and democratic- would, according to *The Economist*, pose increasingly hard choices.[147]

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[146] *Ibidem*
[147] "Chancellor of Unity", *The Economist*, October 22 1994, p. 18.

The Economist continued to maintain that Europe could only function if it worked at different speeds, a term coined as "variable geometry" in the Maastricht Treaty. But how, asked *The Economist*, could the European Parliament be democratic if its policies were not implemented by all the countries from which its members had been elected? How could a wider Europe function if there was no radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy? *The Economist* accused the German government of avoiding these difficult decisions and of being particularly slow to address these problems. Until Germany understood where it stood on these issues, continued *The Economist*, it would not be able to play a leading role in Europe. Thus, Germany had to understand itself and its position before it imposed its opinion on the rest of Europe. *The Economist* concluded: "for some time to come, Germany will be looking inward, not leading Europe."[148]

VI. Enlarging the Union

While *The Economist* urged that Germany focus on its own issues with regard to the EU before pushing any specific policy, *The Economist* periodically wrote articles concerning the EU explaining that enlargement had to take place. Already in 1993 it wrote that the widening of the EU could not wait, and should include not just Austria, Finland and Norway, but also East Europeans such as Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, as soon as they

[148] *Ibidem*

qualified. "The benefits, to new and existing members alike, of a broader Community far outweigh the costs."[149] Enlargement was viewed, by *The Economist*, as a crucial factor if the European project was to remain a valid enterprise.

In the eyes of *The Economist*, the EU existed with the main purpose of sustaining a combination of prosperity and security in Europe that "[was] arguably without rival on such a scale anywhere in the world."[150] *The Economist* firmly believed that the EU should ignore the notion of first deepening the EU. "Widening cannot wait", it kept repeating[151]. For *The Economist*, the reason was simple: security. *The Economist* believed that if the Central and Eastern European countries failed to prosper, their new founded democracies would be imperilled. And if the current Union was not ready to accept more members, it should either reform radically, or scrap the policies that could not in any way accommodate more members, such as the Common Agricultural Policy.

It is interesting to note that it was during Germany's EU presidency in 1994 that *The Economist* urged most the widening of the EU. It argued that no members were "as enthusiastic about admitting easterners to the club as the Germans."[152] Central and Eastern European countries

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[149] "The Maastricht Recipe", *The Economist*, October 23 1993, p. 15.
[150] "Europe for All", *The Economist*, June 18 1994, p. 15.
[151] *Ibidem.*, p. 16.
[152] "Welcome Eastern Europe", *The Economist*, December 10 1994, p. 16.

would surely survive their current slumps, regardless of whether they would be accepted by the EU, wrote *The Economist*. Yet, if they do go through a turbulent interim, Western Europe too, would suffer. Moreover, Western Europe needed its 170 million eastern neighbours as trading partners, claimed *The Economist* as it continued to enumerate the reasons for which is saw the enlargement of the EU as desirable.

The Economist also pointed out that at that time the Central and Eastern European countries shared most of the same values and principles as the West, and they should therefore be treated as equals.[153] It was quite plain that *The Economist* was a strong promoter of an expanded EU, and it reiterated in several articles that Germany's presidency was a blessing for the EU, as expanding the Union should happen sooner than later. Germany was the only country which, according to *The Economist*, could ensure that enlargement take place, and soon.

Thus, on this scale too, *The Economist*'s view of Germany was palpably different than in the period immediately following the unification of Germany. It saw Germany as a stable country, as the ensuing sentence well shows: "Post-war German governments have tended, like German bread, to show the same dependable characteristics: a firm build, a resilient texture, and a tremendously long life."[154] Germany was now seen as a

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[153] *Ibidem*
[154] "A Long Year in German Politics", *The Economist*, January 8 1994, p. 47.

country which should promote what the *Economist* valued as important for the EU, and it was the country with the most potential to assure stability and peace in Europe. Quite a difference, one must admit, to what *The Economist* was writing only four years earlier. It is impossible, however, to discuss *The Economist*'s vision of Germany's role in Europe without entering the domain of European security, certainly not as the 1990s progressed and the question of German's military role within Europe came to the fore. Thus, in the following chapter, not only will the perception of Germany in Europe be studied, but also the military role which *The Economist* expected Germany to play.

2. The Second Stage: 1995 to 1999

I. Germany Benign

For *The Economist*, the EU was a large, extremely diverse entity, divided among many geographical, political, economical and social lines. An area so divided that those promoting the creation of any sort of federal union were under the false impression that the European territory could be united as a single national entity. *The Economist* explained that most European countries, such as France and Britain, often acted as proud nation-states within the EU. Germany, on the other hand, was "eager to sit under a supranational umbrella."[155] *The Economist* accused Germany of being too federalist. It quoted the German Christian Democrats, who, according *The Economist*, ridiculously "want the [European] commission to be a quasi-government."[156]

The Economist said that at least for the time being, regardless of what the Germans thought, the EU should avoid jumping ahead to topics such as foreign policy, justice and home affairs. Instead, the EU should focus on delivering a single market, a single currency, and an economically sound social policy as it had promised, and had not yet fulfilled. It pointed out that dreams of a federal union were unreal, with the EU barely able to

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[155] "1996 and all that", *The Economist*, January 21 1995, p. 17.
[156] *Ibidem*

maintain unity among its current fifteen members. Given its eventual enlargement, the EU should centre on important reforms instead of furthering talks on integration, asserted *The Economist*.[157]

Yet why did *The Economist* keep mentioning Germany when it spoke of the EU? After examining over twenty articles covering the EU, the answer became quite obvious. Germany was seen as a continuously moving actor in the EU. In one article from April 1995, for example, *The Economist* wrote that "the European Parliament [was] the Germans' main instrument for democratizing the EU."[158] Germany here was seen as a positive and democratic force within the EU. In this article, there were no inhibitions concerning Germany's European role, and in no way alluded to was the idea that the EU might be Germany's 'Trojan horse', as was the case in the early 1990s.

In another article, however, *The Economist* focused less on Germany's "democratizing" role in Europe, and more on its use of the EU to fulfill its own interests.[159] As *The Economist* surveyed Germany's foreign policy, it noted Germany's 'zealous' dedication to Russia, bringing as an example Kohl's numerous visits- far more than any other world leader - to Yeltsin during his re-election campaign. This was understood as part of Germany's attempts to keep stability in Central Europe. What was striking

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[157] *Ibidem*
[158] See "Capitol Hill comes to Europe", *The Economist*, April 15 1995, p. 45.
[159] "Germany Resolves to Pursue its Interests", *The Economist*, July 13 1996, p. 45.

to *The Economist* was that Germany pushed an active Russian policy without "crouching behind the EU"[160]. In other words, Germany was not hesitant of pushing its interests and was not worried about offending any EU member. *The Economist* argued that this was a new phenomenon. Although it had been predicted that after unification Germany would shift its attention eastward, *The Economist* added that:

> "[This] puts a fresh slant on Germany's familiar habit of expressing its own national interests as European interests. That habit is consistent with its ambition to give Europe a common foreign policy, and to cloak the Germanness of interests that Germany wants to pursue."[161]

Thus, the moderation that *The Economist* espoused with regard to Germany in the mid-90s did not mean that *The Economist* ceased to keep note of Germany's influence in Europe. In January 1996 an article concerning Germany's place in Europe spoke of Germany's new political weight in Europe and its entry on both the political and military scene as never before since the end of the Second World War. [162] Interestingly, the first sentence in the article was a quote from none other than Helmut Schmidt, ex-chancellor of Germany, who proclaimed that "Germany [was] making itself unloved around Europe again."[163] The reason, according to

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[160] *Ibidem*
[161] *Ibidem*
[162] "Germany Resurgent. The Urge to Shove," *The Economist*, January 6 1996, p. 39.
[163] *Ibidem*

The Economist, was that "Germany [was] at last growing comfortable with the idea of matching economic might with political muscle."[164]

The Economist noted that for all its muscle, German interests still had limits. Unlike the other dominant EU countries, notably France and Britain, Germany had "no Commonwealth and no Africa to fend for". Thus, the difference between Germany and its European partners was that Germany "really does believe its interests are identical with Europe's. Britain and France for their part can still pursue their national interests- and call them by their name."[165] *The Economist* concluded by quoting Mr. Lamers, active in designing Kohl's foreign policy: "If Germany tried doing that [pursuing obviously national interests] we would have hell to pay"[166]. *The Economist* ended by saying that Germany was still wary of its muscle, but less so than previously.[167]

The Economist tried, throughout 1996, to define what was meant by German dominance. In one particular survey called "Too Big for its Boots?" *The Economist* compared Germany with the rest of EU countries. It explained that while Germany occupied "centre stage" in Europe, it was not the EU's largest country, taking up 11% of land mass in comparison to

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[164] *Ibidem*
[165] "Germany Resolves to Pursue its Interests", *op.cit.*, p. 46.
[166] *Ibidem*
[167] *Ibidem*

France's 17%.[168] Then again, wrote *The Economist*, its population compensated for this lack, comprising 22% of the EU total population, in comparison to France and Britain with 16% each. *The Economist* continued by comparing Germany's share in the EU's GDP in the previous year (28%) to France's (18%), Britain's and Italy's (both at 13%). It pointed out that Germany's comprised over 10% of world exports, more than twice that of any other EU country. And Germany's *Deutschmark*, at least before euro became active, was the world's second most important reserve currency after the dollar.[169]

Having outlined these facts that clearly showed Germany's dominance in Europe, *The Economist* tried to see what Germany now represented for Europe. It argued that reunification had not made Germany a wealthier country, at least not per capita. Moreover, the economic burden of reunification meant that even Germany might not fit the Maastricht criteria for membership of the European monetary union. Militarily, Germany's army was smaller than that of France's, and only slightly larger than Italy's. Moreover, Germany had committed itself to permanently maintain its ban on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Another source of anxiety to many notable European leaders and thinkers- Germany's borders- had finally been put to rest, and Germany, for the first time in history, accepted the finality of Poland's borders. And since Germany did not have any

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[168] "Too Big for its Boots?" in "Survey Germany", *The Economist*, November 9 1996, p. 20.

[169] *Ibidem*

"destabilising minorities abroad" and was making "no territorial claims", there really was less reason to worry about Germany.[170]

Moreover, *The Economist* continued, Germany was also tightly bound to a plethora of organisations, ranging from the EU and NATO, to the World Trade Organisation and the Group of Seven. *The Economist* reiterated that even if Germany was Europe's biggest and richest country, it could not function without the EU, so strong were its investments intertwined with other EU countries, most obviously with France.[171]

Certainly Germany was no longer the dutiful and compliant country that it had been before its reunification, reasoned *The Economist*. It was now reassessing its contributions to the EU budget and its people was less than enthusiastic about dropping its Deutschmark, but Germany's political class remained wholly devoted to the European enterprise, leaving no doubt that it wished to press forward with European integration and enlargement. Moreover, Germany was sure to want to have a successful and smooth expansion to the East, for if anything went wrong, the Germans would be "first in line to clear up the mess."[172]

As for foreign policy, *The Economist* wrote that Germany had been too over-enthusiastic, and markedly less successful, certainly with

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[170] *Ibidem.*, p. 21.
[171] *Ibidem*
[172] *Ibidem*

regard to ex-Yugoslavia. By pushing the EU into recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, Germany de facto propelled the ex-Yugoslavian conflict, something which many Europeans saw as reason to worry that Germany might be less dependable than it claimed. Then again, wrote *The Economist*, Germany had barely to do anything to arouse suspicion. For no matter how stable Germany might be, suspicion remained in the air. *The Economist* concluded: "However normal Germany may have become, its abnormal past still follows it around."[173]

The Economist admitted that Germany was not yet completely trusted in Europe, despite all the reasons detailed above. *The Economist* felt that regardless of Germany's past, its economic and increasingly political might simply take up too large a place in Europe for anyone to be completely comfortable with it.

II. The European Question

According to *The Economist*, Germany's predominant role in Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) may have been a "mere coincidence" but it nonetheless made several members of the EU uncomfortable. One important reason for this was the Solidarity Pact (which penalized any country which did not meet the EMU requirements), strongly promoted by Germany, that had angered many EU members. But more than

[173] *Ibidem*

just being a financial threat, Germany was gaining political momentum. This particularly worried France, which had, to date, been dominating the political sphere while Germany dominated the economic sphere.[174] But France couldn't expect things to remain static, wrote *The Economist*, for Germany had changed. It pointed out that Germany voted to deploy soldiers to Croatia, something it did not choose to do in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Gulf War, and this, without protest among Germans and peace-minded political parties such as the Greens. What was more, this increasingly active German involvement in Europe had boosted German confidence. Germany now figured that it could push for a federalist Europe while simultaneously wishing to expand to the East, opined *The Economist*, and reiterated several times that Eastern enlargement was mostly in German favour. This new Euro-area would act as a buffer zone between Russia and Germany and would allow Germany ample resurgent markets to conquer and eventually dominate.[175]

The Economist saw Germany's excuse for simultaneous integration and enlargement as largely exaggerated, Germany's reason being that this would be the best way to prevent another inter-European war. *The Economist* saw this as a pretext for Germany to push its own interests within the EU, and one that Germany was especially able to use. Paranoia about Germany's up and coming role in Europe was outdated, claimed *The*

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[174] "Germany Resurgent. The Urge to Shove", *op. lit.*, p. 39.
[175] *Ibidem*

Economist, as it pointed to *Le Monde*'s article, published that week that said: "Germans will soon be talking of Hitler as the French talk of Napoleon."[176] This argument had no validity, claimed *The Economist*. Although Germany was certainly gaining strength in Europe, there was nothing to indicate a resurgence of previous behaviour.

Though it wrote that "Germany has gone from economic prominence to European dominance"[177], *The Economist* no longer appeared to view Germany's predominant role in Europe negatively. It wrote that Kohl's European policy needed to be better understood. Kohl's decisions for deeper European integration at the beginning of the decade were unfounded, though understandable, considering Kohl had to appease the Western powers in the years following reunification. But he should have taken economic considerations into account when he both accelerated the reunification of Germany and opted for a single currency under Maastricht, argued *The Economist*, instead of leading his country with an unbalanced and often incoherent European policy. Moreover, *The Economist* continued, if Germany insisted on pushing forward its European policy, it should also participate actively in European foreign policy. It criticized Kohl's decision not to participate militarily in the early 1990s in ex-Yugoslavia, and insisted

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[176] *Ibidem*
[177] "Europe's Heavyweight", *The Economist*, October 26 1996, p. 17.

that it was time Germany accepted the idea of a legitimate and democratic use of military interventions.[178]

This point of German participating in military operations was raised in the early 1990s, but with quite a bit of reticence, and quite rarely at that. Quite differently, in an article from January 1996 *The Economist* wrote a rather surprising sentence: "United Germany is starting to feel its muscle. That is mostly to be welcomed."[179] Five years earlier certainly no one could have predicted such a sentiment. This sentence alone shows a radical change in *The Economist*'s vision of Germany during the course of the 1990s. *The Economist* continued to push for the need for Germans to fight side by side with NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of just handing over "calming words and cash". *The Economist* argued that the post-1945 pacifism should no longer preclude military interventions, as it had for over forty years, but should instead be refashioned into a model of using military force for democratic ends[180].

At the same time, *The Economist* believed that Germany's position within the EU should be seen in a positive light. A weightier Germany in the EU, wrote *The Economist*, was "further assurance that it will remain an open, free-trading place, rather than the closed, protectionist

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[178] *Ibidem*
[179] "Europe's Iron Chancellor", *The Economist*, January 13 1996, p. 16.
[180] *Ibidem*

club that some members might prefer."[181] Clearly, *The Economist* no longer held the same inhibitions with regard to Germany. It did not see German power as a breaking force in Europe, but on the contrary, it felt that Germany was more likely to ensure peace, democracy and economic stability on the continent.

The Economist was nonetheless critical of Kohl's European policies. *The Economist* said that Kohl saw the EU in too simplistic a manner: either a "full union in Europe or bust-up."[182] *The Economist* explained its opinion: the EU had certainly proved to be a successful institution- who could compare the last fifty years in Europe with the first "abysmal" fifty?- but that did not mean that endowing this union with federal institutions would make it any more a success. Moreover, Germany's argument- that a federal Europe would "necessarily solve the problem of coping with a powerful Germany"- was unfounded. Germany would be as strong inside a European federation as without it, wrote *The Economist*. Moreover, monetary union was seen positively even by England and Denmark, who had opted out of monetary union but who were fully committed to the single market. This proved to *The Economist* that the economic aspect of the union was certainly worthwhile and durable, and that

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[181] *Ibidem*
[182] *Ibidem*

Germany need not worry about meeting deadlines and rushing toward a quicker union for fear that the project would fall apart.[183]

The *Economist* believed that Germany did not quite grasp the intricacies involved in rushing toward any kind of union. It explained:

> "By insisting on a toughened EMU and a future federal union, Germany risks a more fundamental fracturing- this time with France, whose partnership with Germany has been the rock on which European solidarity has been built. What is more, by driving harder and faster towards a much tighter union, Germany also risks making the going for those East Europeans who seek full EU membership tougher and slower. Yet enlargement to the east, to take in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, is a surer way of protecting Europe's peace than either a single currency or Mr Kohl's federation. Europe still has a lot of unifying to do. Mr Kohl claims he wants both a tighter union and a bigger one. But by pushing too hard for the first he may end up with neither. Then, he would suffer the fate of Bismarck, who saw the efforts of a lifetime turned to ashes."[184]

The Economist thus concluded that Kohl's European drive was hurting the EU, not making it stronger. *The Economist* stood by its opinion that enlargement was the best solution and that a federal union would only hinder the process of achieving real stability in Europe.

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[183] *Ibidem*
[184] *Ibidem*

By mid-1997, the difficulties of enlargement seemed overwhelming to most members of the EU. *The Economist*, however, quite in agreement with Britain's official foreign policy of the time, remained firm in its belief that enlarging the EU should remain the EU's top priority.[185] It did not, moreover, mention any advantages that Germany, or any other country, might yield from such an enlargement, but rather viewed it as something that would be beneficial to all of Europe.

In early 1998, *The Economist* tried to understand why it was that France and Germany were so pro-EU, whereas Britain was a reluctant participant. *The Economist* reasoned that the EU clearly catered to the national advantage of both France and Germany, and brought the German case to point. "The Germans, for example, press hard for enlargement of the EU to include the countries of Eastern Europe, a natural hinterland for German industry...."[186] Thus, *The Economist*, in this particular article, continued to see European enlargement to Germany's advantage. *The Economist* quoted Nicolas Ridley, a close ally of Margaret Thatcher, though it did not say that it agreed with his opinion, that the EU is "all a German racket", designed to ensure German dominance of Europe."[187] It is hard to gauge that this article is representative of *The Economist*'s view of Germany in the late 1990s, yet *The Economist* did not negate this opinion. On another

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[185] "Welcome to Europe", *The Economist*, July 19 1997, p. 16.
[186] " A Question of Balance", *The Economist*, January 3, 1998, p. 57.
[187] *Ibidem*

note, it is certainly interesting to see that as late as 1997 suspicious voices with regard to Germany's ambitions in Europe could still be heard.

Yet, most articles from 1998 onward that mentioned Germany's role in Europe normally did so in the context of discussing the future of the EU. That was clearly what concerned *The Economist*, who did not mince its words when criticizing EU policies. For example, *The Economist* continued to support European enlargement, and found that the EU had done too little to open its doors to its Eastern neighbours. It had, argued *The Economist*, taken an "inexcusably long time to send out the invitations".[188]

In an article from November 1998, *The Economist* wrote that despite the many losses that the EU would incur in enlarging the Union, it would definitely stand more to gain. If EU members did not admit to this fact, they "[risked] undermining both their broader interests and the reforming efforts of the would-be members themselves."[189] If strong countries, such as France and Germany, became stuck on their own petty reforms, continued *The Economist*, and were not willing to give these up for the greater cause, then the whole European project would be at stake. *The Economist* believed that many of these stalling policies of European integration should be removed. For example, if the cost of enlargement included dismantling the Common Agricultural Policy, a policy which had

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[188] *Ibidem*
[189] "A Wider European Union", *The Economist*, November 7 1998, p. 17.

being widely discussed during the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference, and one that had kept both France and Germany preoccupied and less focused on enlargement, all the better. For *The Economist*, the $48 billion enterprise promoted by the Common Agricultural Policy was simply an unnecessary "cushion for West European farmers."[190]

Thus, in 1998 *The Economist* continued to opine that European enlargement would be beneficial to Europe, but it specified that it was an enlargement of an economic nature that interested it most. Indeed, *The Economist* explained, it was economic union, not political or military ones, which had brought success and security to the European enlargement process since the EC's inception. It brought as an example the once-marginal Mediterranean countries, which, by being included into the EU, were brought "securely into the West European fold." This is exactly what *The Economist* believed should be done with Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, in 1998, the year that yet another European treaty was put to the vote across Europe, the Amsterdam Treaty, *The Economist* wrote rather openly about where it stood on European issues:

> "...*The Economist* [is among those who] welcome the economic benefits of a well-designed monetary union, who deplore the EU's dash for Western integration when it should be dashing for Eastern widening, and who fear that the Union may yet come a cropper by getting too far ahead of public opinion -witness the worrying rise of the

[190] *Ibidem.*, p. 18.

> right in France and Germany... any further political integration should be limited to increasing democratic legitimacy and accountability...."[191]

As far as a common foreign policy was concerned, *The Economist* believed that it was an idea that could one day gain momentum, most certainly with regard to the East, where the EU would be bordering what it considered to be 'unstable' and 'shaky' countries such as Belarus and the Ukraine. But *The Economist* believed that any foreign policy of the EU should remain simple, as it had been to date, despite its Balkan failings.[192]

In 1999, *The Economist* focused often on the issue of a common European foreign policy, but was more sceptical than before that it would succeed. One reason for this scepticism was Germany, affirmed *The Economist*. It pointed out that Germany, which was now more involved in foreign affairs than ever before since the Second World War, was still reluctant to fight a ground war, such as the United States had in Kosovo. This was the first reason which *The Economist* gave in explaining that a stronger foreign European policy was as of yet unlikely. Secondly, *The Economist* found that such a policy would not be representative of

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[191] "Europe takes Flight", *The Economist*, May 2 1998, p. 13.
[192] "Europe's Elusive Foreign Minister", *The Economist*, July 18 1998, p. 48.

Europeans in general who did not think, let alone act, as one entity, argued *The Economist*.[193]

It is interesting that still in 1999 Germany continued to take a central place in *The Economist*'s coverage of the EU. Indeed, *The Economist* viewed Germany as an integral part of the EU, even as late as 1999. It did not cover any other EU country as often or in such length, though France came in a close second. A good example was the June 1999 issue, when the cover page of *The Economist* had, in big letters, the title "Germany Stalls, the Euro Falls", with a picture of an eagle falling rapidly from the sky. This is significant, for it indicates that *The Economist* saw Germany and Europe as being extremely intertwined, so much so, that the fall of Germany as Europe's leading economy would bring chaos to the rest of the Euro area.

This shows the complete integration of Germany, and certainly of Germany's economy, into Europe. The economic downslide of the Euro-area, as a result of Germany's weakening economy, would, according to *The Economist*, certainly give Euro-sceptics a chance to gloat, who would declare that Europe "got what had been coming to it".[194] *The Economist* maintained that the strength or weakness of the euro should not be used to criticise either Germany or the idea of monetary union. At the same time, revived economic growth and job creation would be the only way of

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[193] "Superpower Europe", *The Economist*, July 17, 1999, p. 14.
[194] "Germany Stalls", *The Economist*, June 5, 1999, p. 15.

ensuring both German and European long-term economic success. *The Economist* urged Germany toward structural reform of its economy as the only way it saw that Germany would be able to achieve the goals described above. For *The Economist*, it was vital that Germany rehabilitate itself in order to save both Germany and the euro.[195]

Thus, by the end of 1999, *The Economist*'s reading of both Germany and its role in the European project had certainly changed. No longer perceived as a threat, German economic success was, on the contrary, much desired, in order to maintain stability in the EU. Yet *The Economist* was not so enthusiastic in domains other than economic, something which was obvious when Berlin became capital of Germany and Germany celebrated its ten years since reunification. Throughout, it seemed that *The Economist* was trying to come to terms with the country that Germany had become.

III. Germany in a New Era

Berlin was to become once again capital of Germany. For many years this was the object of discussions and disagreements among European leaders, *The Economist* being among those who had opposed the prospect of Berlin as capital (see page 54: "Ich bin ein Bonner"). Thus, as the following

[195] *Ibidem.*, p. 16.

quote shows, there was quite a difference between what *The Economist* said in 1990 and in 1999:

> "...most of the fears about making Berlin Germany's capital were misplaced. People who dipped into the past for a scary image- the Kaiser's image, chaotic Weimar or Nazi Berlin- were fishing in the wrong pond. History rarely repeats itself so simply. Berlin is not the threat it briefly seemed, as a bottomless tax drain or as a magnet that would pull Germany's allegiances away from the West and towards Russia."[196]

This was the complete opposite of what *The Economist* had been writing just a few years earlier. Certainly its vision of Germany had changed. More articles were published about Germany that showed a clear difference between what was being written about Germany in the early 1990s. For example, when Germany's commemoration of the defeat of Nazi Germany fifty years earlier was covered, *The Economist* portrayed what it called Germany's "return to normalcy".[197]

In this article, called "Almost Normal", *The Economist* wrote that in most external ways, Germany was now a normal country, a cornerstone of Europe, no longer divided, even claiming a permanent seat on the United Nation's Security Council. It was now an exemplary democracy, and was finally beginning to give its opinion, "even yell, on

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[196] "Capitalising on Unity", *The Economist*, April 1 1995, p. 46.
[197] "Nearly Normal", *The Economist*, April 15 1995, p. 48-51.

occasion" at other countries[198]. *The Economist* pointed out that about two-thirds of the German population was born after the war, and explained that the younger generation of Germans saw themselves as "modern Europeans, not old-fashioned Germans". [199] It described what it saw as Germany's uncomfortable predicament in the following article:

> "Germany has done more than any other ex-fascist country to face up to its history. Given the enormity of the Nazis' crimes, it would be astonishing if it could put its past entirely behind it. Yet a country that wrestles with the meaning of the word 'normal', as Germany does, might be said not to feel so normal inside. A false step, a wrong note, and commentators and historians swoop. The weekly *Die Zeit* puts the dilemma thus: German soldiers must not fight in the Balkans, because of Auschwitz; yet because of Auschwitz, they must fight to help the oppressed. The dilemma, it concludes, is unresolvable.... Thoughtful Germans believe it is not in their country's grasp to decide if it is normal. That lies with the collective understanding of other nations; it is for them to decide."[200]

We see that *The Economist* was not critical of Germany, but rather tried to explain the difficult situation in which Germany now found itself. There is no blame here, certainly none of its previously common foreboding tone. *The Economist* did not, however, absolve Germany of its history, and added that it found the inauguration of the Reichstag on Hitler's birthday distasteful. It strongly suggested that Germans avoid symbols that

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[198] *Ibidem*
[199] *Ibidem*
[200] *Ibidem*

evoke the past[201], but insisted that present-day Germany was not dangerous to Europe and acknowledged it as an upholder of peace and democracy.

This viewpoint was confirmed in an article recapitulating the ten years after the fall of Communism and how this change had affected Europe. *The Economist* looked at Germany first, before any other country, too see how this country had changed, and portrayed Germany as a sovereign, united country, "pre-eminent among its neighbours."[202] Once again, negative or foreboding tones were completely absent from this article. As far as *The Economist*'s style of writing went, Germany as a threat was officially a thing of the past.

Indeed, *The Economist* assessed Germany as opening up to a new phase. For the first time since the Second World War, Germany had a chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, who was of the post-war generation (he was born in 1944) and who ruled out of "once-imperial Berlin, not from dozy little Bonn."[203] *The Economist* remarked however, that even though this could be seen as a time for Germany to "forget history [and thus] become more difficult as a partner",[204] it was doubtful that it would do so. Schröder grew up in the poverty that dominated Germany after the war. That alone, wrote *The Economist*, would be a reminder to Schröder of what happens

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[201] "What's in a Name?" *The Economist*, April 17 1999, p. 55.
[202] "Ten Years On", *The Economist*, November 6 1999, p. 15.
[203] "Gerhard Schröder, Serious in Anticipation", *The Economist*, June 20 1998, p. 62.
[204] *Ibidem*

when "Germany tries to dominate or go it alone."[205] Moreover, the readers were reminded of the reticence of many Social Democrats toward serving in peacekeeping forces such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing that Germany was nowhere near becoming belligerent.

If Schröder was not as European-minded as his predecessor (whose Europhilia *The Economist* had deemed almost excessive at times), *The Economist* was not concerned about his European policies. Even if he was less verbose about Germany's historic mission in Europe, *The Economist* found that he was keen on open discourse with the Eastern European countries and, moreover, he had not spoken of contributing less to the EU (as Kohl had intended, and Thatcher succeeded, in doing). *The Economist* therefore concluded on a positive note, denoting that the new Chancellor could indeed, be good both for Germany and for Europe. [206]

For *The Economist*, Schröder had to be firm in his political stance on all European issues. Any ambivalence on his part would be frightening, wrote *The Economist*. Germany must be sure of where it's going: "government mayhem at the heart of Europe's most powerful economy would be a worry at any time."[207] Germany's dominant political role, with an upcoming presidency of the EU and chairmanship of the G8 meant that Germany had to be clear, consistent, and reform its economy if needed, to

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[205] *Ibidem*
[206] *Ibidem*
[207] "Germany.Where is it Going?", *The Economist*, December 5 1998, p. 21.

ensure stability in Europe.[208] *The Economist* commended Schröder for successfully pushing for the Agenda 2000, a project of reforms for the EU, and the skilful way in which he had put pressure on his government to react quickly to the war in Kosovo.[209]

The Economist explained that Germans no longer perceived themselves as before. It argued that one important reason for Schröder's capacity to convince Germans to go to war in Kosovo was because he, defence minister Rudolf Scharping and foreign minister Joshka Fischer were of the "1968 generation". *The Economist* considered these three to be "converts" for they were now persuading their countrymen to fight for the first time since the Second World War. *The Economist* kept underlining the difference in this new line of leaders as their being younger, energetic, and in no way associated with the fighting of the Second World War.[210]

The war in Kosovo, combined with the rise of the Social-Democrat and Green parties, were two important factors which allowed Germany a "long-denied role in the world," wrote *The Economist*.[211] *The Economist* was very supportive of Germany's decision to send soldiers to fight abroad, and, what is more, found itself congratulating Germany on its

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[208] *Ibidem*
[209] "The Climb-Back of Schröder", *The Economist*, April 10 1999, p. 47.
[210] *Ibidem*
[211] "Germany Comes Out of its Post-War Shell", from the *Economist*, July 10 1999, p. 43.

new foreign policy, since only several years earlier, Germany had refused to deploy soldiers in international non-combat peacekeeping missions.[212]

The Economist's optimism was curtailed however, several months later in mid-1999, when Germany insisted that the Kosovo crisis was proof that the EU needed to have a common foreign and security policy. It wrote that Germany had been too demanding in its insistence to play a chief role in formulating such a policy. *The Economist* remarked that Germany had been pushing far too much, within the European structure, for Germans to play leading roles in the Balkans and within Europe in general. It brought as examples Germany's choice of two commissioners to preside in Brussels and its recent boycott of several EU meetings because the new Finish presidency refused to include German as a working language.[213]

All this did not bode well for Germany, wrote *The Economist*. While *The Economist* did not openly criticize Germany's foreign policy, it pointed out the many ways in which Germany had become an increasingly resolute force in Europe. In its concluding paragraph, *The Economist* asked: "Is there a danger that Germans may now be forgetting the grimmest aspects of their past?" This loaded question was somewhat curbed by a following sentence, which recalled that the German government had recently agreed to build an impressive memorial to Jewish victims of the Holocaust in the

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[212] *Ibidem.*
[213] *Ibidem.*, p. 44.

centre of Berlin. But this was not enough for *The Economist*, which did not immediately dismiss this new German behaviour. It wrote that while Germany was not turning its back on the past, "it [was] less disposed to be constrained by it."[214] Despite *The Economist*'s approval of seeing German participation in peacekeeping missions and in holding the EU to certain reforms, it was not yet completely comfortable with the new role that Germany was playing. It quoted Schröder, who said, upon taking office, that Germany was a country neither "better nor worse" than other countries. *The Economist*'s retort: "Quite so. Just a bit bigger than its neighbours, and bang in the centre of Europe."[215]

[214] *Ibidem*
[215] *Ibidem*

3. Conclusion

Germany's place in Europe was strongly shaken following its reunification and the end of the Cold War. No longer a country turned almost entirely toward the West, it once again became a large - and central - country in Europe. Germany was now faced with countless challenges, one of its most important ones being to appease its Western European neighbours while at the same time establishing its relations with the East. Assuaging Western European worries, especially those of Great Britain and France, was thus a high priority for Germany. Indeed, Western Europe saw in Germany a new giant, both economically and geographically, and with a population largely exceeding those of other Western European countries. These facts did not combine well with Germany's sombre past, and meant that Germany had to prove to Western Europe that it would remain the peace-promoting European integrationist that it had been since the creation of the European Community.

Thus Germany, torn between calming Western countries and aiding post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries, tried to balance two policies, pushing for deeper European integration while opening its doors toward the East. Many wondered whether Germany would succeed in reconciling these two policies, in this way reassuring both its Eastern and Western neighbours of its benign intentions. Germany's success at reunification would largely determine the future of the European Union

with respect to integration and enlargement. Both politicians and media regarded German reunification and the future of the EU with an apprehensive eye.

The importance of the printed media in shaping Western European and North American perceptions of the events occurring on the Continent can not be underestimated. To see whether or not Germany's attempts at placating these worries were successful would only become obvious if Western media portrayed Germany no longer as a potentially dangerous force, but as a country like any other. Germany's path toward becoming a normal country, and the struggles and impediments that it had to overcome, has been analysed in this study.

This dissertation has shed light on Germany's evolution in Europe and within the European Union on the basis of Germany's portrayal by *The Economist*. This has allowed us to gauge perceptions of this evolution in a most influential international weekly.

It has been found that *The Economist* changed its interest in Germany quite markedly during the 1990s. It went from writing about Germany in virtually every issue from 1989 to 1991, to slowly decreasing its coverage of Germany and, from 1995, it wrote on this subject no more than two or three editorials per year. These changing emphases have been

presented here in the context of scholarly perceptions of Germany and of its place in the EU.[216] Thus, this essay offers journalistic and scholarly visions of Germany's place in Europe.

The Economist was not alone in having fears with regard to Germany. Indeed, anxiety about Germany and of a "Europe created in the image of the German political system"[217] was ubiquitous in European Member States and among intellectuals interested in the German question. This apprehension was to be expected, according to director of the *Institut für Europäische Politik*, Mathias Jopp, especially after the initial surprise of the "re-emergence of a large and united Germany."[218] Arthur Hoffmann, from the Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham, explained this phenomenon in *Germany and European Integration in the 1990s: Continuity or Change?*:

> "Some analysts have argued that united Germany was unlikely to depart significantly from the traditional foreign policy style, while others have claimed that she was likely to turn her economic strength into an explicit leadership role based on the pursuit of her national interests. This, by implication, would mean two things. First, a shift from her commitment to the further

[216] In order to avoid confusion, only the title EU will be used in this conclusion, regardless of whether the era mentioned precedes or follows the Maastricht Treaty.
[217] Mathias Jopp, "Perceptions of Germany's European Policy- an Introduction", from *Germany's European Policy. Perceptions in Key Partner Countries*, Mathias Jopp, Heinrich Schneider, Uwe Schmalz, dir. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 2002, p. 10.
[218] *Ibidem*

> deepening of the EC with the goal of a federal structure; and secondly, a Germany which would be less sensitive to the interests of her neighbours. Thus some analysts even asked: 'Should Europe fear the Germans?'"[219]

It has transpired that *The Economist* echoed several mainstream opinions of political scientists and historians. What then is special about *The Economist*'s viewpoint?

First, the dramatic way in which Germany was portrayed in the early 1990s, with negative innuendos and foreboding titles must have impacted the way Germany was perceived by *The Economist*'s readers. This image was, moreover, representative of a certain political and business class viewpoint in Britain and North America, an audience which, according to *The Economist* itself, is composed of "intelligent, lively, cosmopolitan, thinking people across the board … [with] the highest incidence in the world of movers and shakers among our readership."[220] Thus, the image *The Economist* offered of Germany carried a certain weight.

The internationally minded journal *The Economist*, unlike several British leaders, did not over-dramatize the situation, never openly criticizing Germany. It often confronted these British leaders, especially Thatcher, saying that Germany was certainly not as threatening as Thatcher had

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[219] Arthur Hoffmann, *Germany and European Integration in the 1990s: Continuity or Change?* p. 6.
[220] Email correspondence between Miriam Rabkin and Xan Smiley on April 14, 2003.

implied. Moreover it suggested that such criticism were doing little else than isolating Britain, thus allowing for French and German leaders to pursue their own integrationist views for Europe. Indeed, as time passed and united Germany's actual activities within the EU did not show radical changes from its earlier modus operandi, *The Economist* toned down its anxiety and offered a vision of how the EU should progress.

This transition for Germany - one which historians saw as a transition from a 'subject' to an 'actor' in European politics - did not necessarily reflect a fundamental change in German behaviour.[221] Moreover, partly because of Germany's newly acquired strength as a European "superpower", partly because of its decreased dependence on the United States, it became expected of it to play a much more significant role in both the integration and enlargement of the EU.[222] This same transition can be seen in *The Economist*'s writings, as it too, began to expect Germany to open up to enlargement, while criticizing further steps toward deeper integration.

The Economist's view of the EU also altered over the years. Though in general viewing the EU as "broadly speaking, a good thing,"[223] as this essay has shown, *The Economist* generally abstained from pushing for a closer political union. According to its editor, *The Economist* is "wary

[221] Cloutier, *op.cit.*, p. 108.
[222] Collins, *op.cit.*, p. 4.
[223] Email correspondence between Miriam Rabkin and Xan Smiley on April 14, 2003.

of too tight a political union before the peoples of Europe are ready for it or have a truly common identity," preferring instead a "looser arrangement than the keener federalists want."[224] He explains that for *The Economist*, it is important that national identities be respected and "national governments be the main drivers of political life."[225] He confirms our conclusion that *The Economist* views economic union favorably - "we are very keen on the common market" – and adds rather frankly that *The Economist* is "less keen on 'ever closer' political union."[226] *The Economist* views enlargement as "part of a widening but loose grouping of countries and believes strongly that the former Communist countries should be welcomed back into the heart of Europe."[227]

Germany's post-reunification role in Europe demonstrated its commitment to the West. In addition, Germany had hoped that its active participation in "important European events such as Maastricht, Amsterdam, Monetary Union, the enlargement process and the country's concrete behaviour and policy in these or other cases of European affairs"[228] would counter-act its cumbersome past. Jopp brings Poland as an example of a country which changed its previously negative image of Germany when it

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[224] *Ibidem*
[225] *Ibidem*
[226] *Ibidem*
[227] *Ibidem*
[228] Jopp, "Perceptions of Germany's European Policy…" *op. lit.*, p. 11.

saw that Germany would be a key player in propelling Poland's accession into the EU.[229]

At first we saw *The Economist* suspicious of Germany, not quite ready to admit that it was a country to be treated as any other. This vision evolved and *The Economist* began to relate to Germany's uncertain predicament without invoking its grim past. While no longer portraying it as a threat to Europe, *The Economist* assessed Germany's place in Europe, rarely missing an opportunity to mention Germany's economic, if not political, predominance in Europe. This trend is less pronounced among the historians and political scientists, reviewed in the first part of this work, who, while trying to understand Germany's role in Europe, ceased to address the possibility of a future threat in the early 1990s. Instead we saw these scholars focus on policy options for Germany intent on convincing its neighbours of its commitment to the European project.

A fundamental change happened around 1995, when *The Economist* began to present Germany as a "normal" country, though on occasion suspicions did appear in its pages. In scholarly work however, this era of Germany's 'return to normalcy' began almost immediately following the unification of Germany.[230] Thus, it is only in 1999 that *The Economist* presents Germany as an equal with its EU members, and expects Germany

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[229] *Ibidem*
[230] Letourneau, *op.cit.*, p. 333.

to participate in all peacekeeping missions. Once again, this is concurrent with what was being written in the year 2000:

> "...there has been the expectation that Germany should now assume greater responsibilities concomitant with its new position. Germany has become the central focus of integration in Western Europe and is expected to be one of the principal architects of a new security order."[231]

Yet *The Economist* never fails to acknowledge that Germany is unique within Europe. It admires Germany's economic might and repeatedly suggests that Germany's geographic location places Germany at the centre of all things European. Its frequent assertions that the EU is just a tool for Germany to promote its own interests gradually disappear. A Germany that acts solely for its own interests, or strives to become the strongest of all European nations, was no longer viewed as a possibility. Germany had proved itself, to both *The Economist* and to the scholars, providing "more institutional actors involved in its European policy-making than most other states."[232] Indeed, Germany had succeeded in its goal, for the image of Germany no longer carried negative overtones. Far from being a cause for concern, Germany - as seen by *The Economist* – had become a faithful and vital European partner.

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[231] Bluth, p. 1.
[232] Hyde-Price, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

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