

Université de Montréal

**Principle and Prejudice: Attitudes Toward Ethnic
Minorities in Quebec**

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Principle and Prejudice: Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in
Quebec

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SOMMAIRE

L'intégration des nouveaux immigrants pose un défi, et ce, particulièrement dans les nations infra-étatiques. En effet, les citoyens vivant dans ces contextes ont davantage tendance à percevoir les immigrants comme de potentielles menaces politiques et culturelles. Cependant, les différents groupes ethniques et religieux minoritaires ne représentent pas tous le même degré de menace. Cette étude cherche à déterminer si les citoyens francophones québécois perçoivent différemment les différents groupes ethniques et religieux minoritaires, et s'ils entretiennent des attitudes plus négatives envers ces groupes, comparativement aux autres Canadiens. Dans la mesure où ces attitudes négatives existent, l'étude cherche à comprendre si ces dernières sont basées principalement sur des préjugés raciaux ou sur des inquiétudes culturelles. Se fondant sur des données nationales et provinciales, les résultats démontrent que les francophones Québécois sont plus négatifs envers les minorités religieuses que les autres canadiens mais pas envers les minorités raciales, et que ces attitudes négatives sont fondées principalement sur une inquiétude liée à la laïcité et à la sécurité culturelle. L'antipathie envers certaines minorités observée au sein de la majorité francophone au Québec semble donc être dirigée envers des groupes spécifiques, et se fonde sur des principes de nature davantage culturelle que raciale.

Mots clés: *immigration, opinion publique, minorités ethniques, multiculturalisme, politique canadienne*

ABSTRACT

Immigrant integration poses a particular challenge to sub-state minority nations where citizens are more prone to perceive immigrants as cultural and political threats. However, different ethnic groups might be seen as differentially threatening. This study investigates whether francophone citizens in Quebec perceive different ethnic minority groups differently and whether they are more negative towards these groups than other Canadians. To the extent that negativity exists, the study seeks to understand whether it is grounded principally in racial prejudice or in concerns about culture. Results from national and provincial data show that Quebec francophones are specifically negative toward religious minorities, not racial minorities, and that their negativity is largely couched in concerns over secularism and cultural security. Ethnic antipathy among Quebec's majority francophone population thus appears to be more group-specific and culturally principled than generalized and racially based.

Keywords: *immigration, public opinion, ethnic minorities, multiculturalism, Canadian politics*

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ABBREVIATIONS

ROC: Rest of Canada

CES: Canadian Election Study

VC: Vote Compass

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Large-scale immigration to western democracies has generated debates about how to integrate newcomers. Integration poses a particular challenge in sub-state minority nations, where feelings of political and cultural insecurity can lead to a greater propensity to perceive incoming ethnic groups as threatening (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). Minority nations typically make particular efforts to protect their unique languages and cultures, so the concurrent attempt of incoming ethnic groups to preserve their own languages and cultures can give rise to inter-group tension. This tension can be exacerbated if the nation already feels culturally threatened by the central state and if it has strong nationalistic currents (Montreuil, Bourhis and Vanbesalaere, 2004; Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009). The dependent-but-separate status of sub-state nations ultimately creates a structural incentive for ethnic minority exclusion. At the same time, contextual and historical factors unique to a nation can cultivate unique attitudes within nations (Jeram, 2012). This study examines the attitudinal dynamics between the majority population and different ethnic minority groups in the Canadian province of Quebec. Ethnic minority groups are considered to be those whose religion, race, culture, or language is distinct from that of the majority population (Smihula, 2009). Its purpose is twofold: it endeavours to understand both how Quebecers feel toward different ethnic minority groups and why they feel that way. While much has been said about attitudes toward immigrants in Canada and Quebec and some research has examined attitudes toward individual ethnic minority groups, little work compares attitudes toward different

ethnic minority groups. A comparative study like the one undertaken here can parse out whether citizens are responding to the structural fact of immigration or to the particularities of specific ethnic minority groups.

Quebec represents an interesting case for several reasons. First, it is both the home and political representative of the majority of the country's French speaking population. While francophones form 82.5% of the population in Quebec, they represent a small proportion of total Canadians (23%), and a tiny proportion of North Americans (2%) (Canada, 2012, 20). They thus form a minority nation within Canada, but a majority people within Quebec. The province also has one of the strongest nationalist movements of all minority nations (Jeram, 2012). Nationalism is associated with more negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities in general, but this effect is thought to be particularly salient in minority nations (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010). In recent years, Quebec has also been the locus of several high-profile debates about ethnic minority accommodation, with many mainstream citizens favouring a more restrictive approach. Are Quebeckers less accommodating because they feel more negatively toward ethnic minority groups than Canadians in other provinces? And are francophones within the province more negative than anglophones? The first part of the study is focussed on answering these questions. Following the literature on social identity theory and threat perception in minority nations, we hypothesize that Quebeckers are more negative toward ethnic minorities than other Canadians and that francophones are more negative than anglophones.

If Quebeckers, and francophones in particular, are indeed more negative toward ethnic minorities, what motivates such negativity? The second part of the study endeavours to understand the precise nature of any extant antipathy in the province. To this end, we posit two competing hypotheses. Racial prejudice has historically been among the strongest drivers of animus toward ethnic minorities, especially in contexts with strong nationalist tendencies (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). The first hypothesis thus expects that ethnic minority antipathy among Quebec francophones

is driven by racism. However, a more recent literature suggests that symbolic cultural concerns have an impact on ethnic minority antipathy beyond and apart from what is accounted for by racism (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010; Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Majority citizens might dislike an ethnic minority group not because it is a racial “other”, but because they perceive the self-avowed practices and beliefs of that group as challenging valued national principles (Parekh, 2000). If Quebeckers feel their national principles are already on uncertain ground, they may be less tolerant toward cultural out-groups whose values are perceived as conflicting with common national values. A third and competing hypothesis is thus that ethnic minority antipathy among Quebeckers and francophones, to the extent that it exists, is driven not by racial prejudice but by concerns about cultural principles. Using cross-sectional data from the 2011 Canadian Election Study and the 2014 Quebec Vote Compass project, we evaluate these hypotheses by examining Quebeckers’ attitudes toward different religious and racial minority groups.

The study proceeds in five parts. We first review the literature on the economic and psychosocial determinants of attitudes toward immigrants and racial minorities—the ethnic out-groups about which the most research has been conducted. We then evaluate whether differential feelings toward ethnic minorities can be observed between Quebec and the rest of Canada and, within Quebec, among francophones and anglophones. The term ethnic minority is used as an umbrella category mainly encompassing two specific and measurable groups: racial (e.g. Black, Aboriginal) and religious (e.g., Muslim, Jewish) minorities.¹ We subsequently assess how psychoso-

¹ While many citizens fall into both racial and religious minority categories, the unit of analysis here is the group by which they are technically defined. For instance, while many Muslims—a religious minority—also belong to a racial minority, the group is fundamentally religiously defined, and it is not necessary to belong to a racial minority to be a Muslim. Religious minorities are at their base defined by faith, while racial minorities are defined by biological phenotypes.

cial influences on attitudes toward ethnic minorities can be moderated by minority nation status and how such status impacts inter-group attitudinal dynamics in Quebec. Three hypotheses are derived and tested using Canadian and Quebec data. The results show that while Quebecers indeed have more negative attitudes toward religious minorities than Canadians in other provinces, they are not particularly more negative about racial minorities. Within Quebec, francophones are more negative toward religious minorities than anglophones, but again differ little from anglophones when it comes to racial minorities. Francophones are found to make distinctions between religious and racial minorities where anglophones generally do not. Moreover, francophone antipathy is almost entirely accounted for by higher levels of support for secularism and feelings of cultural insecurity. Taken together, these findings suggest that ethnic antipathy in Quebec is more culturally based than racially based. The study closes with a discussion of the implications of these findings as well as an assessment of the limitations of the research and suggestions for potential future directions.

Chapter 2

THEORY

2.1 Immigration Attitudes: Economic and Sociopsychological

In rapidly diversifying contexts, the well functioning of democracy is contingent on native-born populations accepting newcomers. As such, much scholarly work has examined how native-born populations perceive immigrants and what factors mitigate or aggravate attitudes toward immigrants. These studies have been guided by two principal approaches, an economic approach grounded in realistic competition theory and a sociopsychological approach grounded in social identity and group conflict theories. The economic perspective posits that in difficult economic times, members of the mainstream population will have a greater propensity to perceive immigrants as competitors for limited resources (ie. jobs and wages) and will therefore develop more hostile attitudes towards them (Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Semyonov, Rajzman and Gorodzeisky, 2006). Such hostility is expected to be especially prominent in contexts where there are higher than average concentrations of immigrants or ethnic minorities (Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012). However, across both observational and experimental studies, this perspective has fared poorly in explaining individual attitudes. So poorly, in fact, that Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) consider such models “zombie theories”—ones that look alive but are in fact dead. Egocentric evaluations account for the least variation in attitudes toward immigrants; despite the notoriety of the “immigrants stealing our jobs” cry, it seems native citizens do not think much about their own jobs when forming attitudes about immigrants or ethnic minorities. Sociotropic concerns about the economy or job market in general have more weight, but still only account for a

relatively small proportion of citizens' attitudes (Citrin et al., 1997; Citrin and Sides, 2008).

Sociopsychological theories, and in particular the psychological perspective on group conflict theory, have fared comparatively better. The psychological perspective on group conflict theory is grounded in the notion that group identity is integral to defining individual identity (Brown, 1995; Capozza and Brown, 2000; Huddy, 2001). Insofar as people strive for positive self-evaluation, they are concurrently motivated to evaluate the groups to which they belong positively (Tajfel, 1981; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004). Yet evaluating one's own group positively often entails evaluating other groups negatively (Brewer, 2001). The tendency to negative out-group evaluation is thought to explain a substantial proportion of hostility toward immigrant and ethnic minorities (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Such hostility is exacerbated when members of the majority population believe minority group members pose a symbolic threat. That is to say, hostility is aggravated when the majority perceives minority groups' identity, values, and beliefs as challenging their own (van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010). Majority citizens may come to fear that minority worldviews will eventually override their national way of life (Esses, Hodson and Dovidio, 2003; McLaren, 2003). In their recent review of the literature on attitudes toward immigrants, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) remark that symbolic concerns have, of all factors, consistently the strongest effect on how majority citizens view immigrants. Similarly, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) show that feelings of symbolic or cultural *threat* invoke strong exclusionary reactions toward minorities even among individuals who do not demonstrate any level of prejudice. The magnitude of negativity between majority and minority groups depends in part on the size of perceived symbolic differences between the groups, how important these differences are to the majority, and how "pure" minority ethnic groups are perceived to be (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004).

The most commonly perceived symbolic threats among majority citizens are threats to national identity and culture (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010; Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013; Schneider, 2008). Like in economic theories, it is not threats to the *individual* that matter most, but rather threats to the society or collectivity. Valuing collective identity and culture has been associated with negative immigrant attitudes in several studies (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012; Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010), and appeals to national and cultural threats are common among far-right anti-immigrant parties (Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten (2010) and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) find that individuals who strongly identify with their national identity are more likely to be sensitive to symbolic harms and thus are more likely to *perceive* threats to national identity. Consequently, they are also more likely to dislike immigrants. In other words, the strength of negativity arising from feelings of cultural threat is moderated by how much an individual personally values the collective beliefs and identity of his or her group (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Ultimately, in-group valorization at the cost of out-group denigration is augmented in contexts of symbolic threats to cultural values and national identity. There are reasons to believe that perceptions of threat would be higher in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, and that attitudes toward ethnic minorities would thus be more negative. The following section explores these reasons.

2.2 *The Particularity of Minority Nations*

Understanding why attitudes toward minorities in Quebec may differ from those in the rest of Canada requires understanding the implications of Quebec's position as a sub-state minority nation. Grounded in social identity theory, a substantial literature documents the unique potential of minority nation status to generate conflictual attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Because minority nations consider themselves

culturally distinct but lack the full political control necessary to safeguard this distinctiveness, a baseline feeling of political and cultural threat typically exists among minority nation citizens (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010). This feeling of threat leads to a greater scepticism of the capacity of the nation to absorb ethnic minority difference without itself being subsumed. Specifically, minority nation citizens tend to fear that greater diversity will dilute a culture already in peril, dampen the potential for nationalistic mobilisation, and disturb fragile balance between the central state and sub-state nation (Banting and Soroka, 2012). Strong nationalism in sub-state minority nations can also lead to greater hostility toward ethnic minorities. Nationalism is both generally associated with exclusionary attitudes (de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Koch, 1991; Sides and Citrin, 2007; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010) and specifically associated with exclusionary attitudes in minority nations, where feelings of threat exacerbate its effect (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2010). In Spain, for instance, Escandell and Ceobanu (2010) find that strong regional identity leads to greater antipathy toward immigrants in Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country but not in the rest of the country. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) notes that “some conceptions of the national community and its boundaries can easily accommodate newcomers whereas others cannot” (p.235). Those persistently undergirded by political and cultural threat especially cannot. Though some authors question the notion that minority nations are particular in their attitudes toward out-groups (Jeram, 2012), there are context-specific reasons to expect Quebecers to be more negative toward ethnic minorities than other Canadians.

2.3 The Case of Quebec

French-speaking Quebecers are a majority within Quebec but a distinct minority in Canada and North America. Though about 82% of people living within the province have French as their first language, only 23% of the Canadian population and a mere

2% of the North American population are francophone (Canada, 2012, 20). Over the last several decades, both of these numbers have declined. The decline is partly a result of low birth rates among French speakers, but also a result of increasing numbers of non-French speaking immigrants settling in the rest of Canada. Overall, since 1951, the proportion of Canadians who have French as their native language has declined from 29% to slightly over 21% (Canada, 2012, 12). Linguistic insecurity has long been a feature of public debate in the province, no less because until relatively recently immigrants to Quebec tended to adopt English instead of French as their main official language. Of those who arrived prior to 1961, for instance, nearly 79% ended up adopting English as their lingua franca, despite French being the language of the provincial majority (Canada, 2007, 22). Two major policy changes were eventually brought about in an attempt to curtail the declining usage of French. Perhaps most notably, in 1977, a sovereigntist Parti Québécois government implemented Bill 101. The law restricted access to English public schools to children whose parents had attended English schools, effectively limiting children of immigrants to French schools if they wanted to remain in the public system. As such, first generation immigrants over the years increasingly came to adopt French instead of English as their second language. Moreover, also beginning in the 1970s, the province began to increasingly take over matters of immigration from the federal government. In selecting immigrants, Quebec has tended to distinctly favour francophones. As a consequence, by 2006, the majority of immigrants who had arrived in the 1990s and early 2000s had French as the language most frequently spoken at home (Canada, 2007, 22).

While these policies have to an extent mitigated linguistic insecurity in the province, it seems a broader cultural insecurity might have taken its place. In part precisely because of policies favouring French-speaking immigrants, the ethnic backgrounds of newcomers are increasingly distant from the European background of the majority population. Prior to the 1970s, the vast majority of immigrants to the province were of European backgrounds. Today, immigration has grown substantially on the

whole, and most immigrants hail from Algeria (9%), Morocco (9%), China (6%), and Colombia (5%) (Quebec, 2012). In Montreal, the proportion of immigrants has grown over the last several years to 22.6% of the population. While the rest of Canada has addressed the integration of newcomers with multiculturalism, Quebec has opted to manage integration through interculturalism. Though interculturalism, like multiculturalism, encourages pluralism, it also endeavours to preserve Quebec's historical cultural lineage by requiring that newcomers contribute to the common social fabric of the province (Banting and Soroka, 2012; Quebec, 2008). The principle of interculturalism was officially articulated in a 1981 document entitled "Autant de façons d'être Québécois," published by a newly re-elected Parti Québécois government. Since then, its preservation in light of increasing cultural fractionalization has been a frequent point of discussion for sovereigntist parties. One of the strongest among minority nations, Quebec's sovereigntist movement managed to hold two referenda on separation in the province in the last three decades. The outcome of the most recent one in 1995 was a win for the "No" side by a mere 1.2 percentage points. Today, for a substantial proportion of Quebecers and several political parties, sovereignty is still the only way to linguistic, cultural, and political survival of the nation (Dickinson and Young, 2003; Montreuil, Bourhis and Vanbesalaere, 2004).

Immigrants tend to support sovereignty at much lower rates than native-born citizens (Banting and Soroka, 2012) and their political allegiances tend to lay more with the central Canadian government than the Quebec government (Bilodeau, 2010). Questions of newcomers' political and cultural loyalties recently came to a head in a series of debates about religious accommodation. These debates began in 2003 when the Action démocratique du Québec—a party that gained only four seats in the previous election—managed to become the official provincial opposition. Its campaign focused heavily on limiting religious accommodation and developing assurances that immigrants will adopt the common values of the province. Evidently, this message resonated with the population (Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). A series of other events

involving immigrant minorities put fuel on the fire. A small town instituted a civil code for new immigrants that emphasized the illegality of practices such as the stoning of women, which many citizens, especially those from the Muslim community, found insulting. A Sikh boy was prohibited from wearing his kirpan to school. A YMCA refused to frost its windows to prevent Hasidic Jewish boys from seeing women exercising. Controversies regarding girls wearing the hijab arose in public schools.

These events cumulated in a 2008 public inquiry examining religious accommodation and eventually an expert report recommending the continuation of Quebec's intercultural model (see: Quebec, 2008). Though it appeared that the "crisis" was then over, opinion polls over the following year revealed persisting tensions (Leduc, 2009). Between 2010 and 2011, the governing Part Québécois (PQ) proposed a policy (Bill 94) to prohibit the wearing of niqabs while giving or receiving public services and ultimately passed legislation that prohibited Sikhs from wearing kirpans in provincial parliament (Quebec, 2010). The government argued these measures were instituted to safeguard the principles of gender equality and public secularism, considered fundamental values of Quebec society, as well as to limit security risks to the National Assembly. In 2013, the PQ proposed a comprehensive Quebec Charter of Values, which prohibited the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols by people giving or receiving public services (Quebec, 2013). Some media outlets, especially English language ones, argued these were inappropriate infringements on the rights of religious minorities, and in some instances, argued the policies were simple racism. An Angus Reid poll found that 95% of Quebecers compared to 80% of the rest of Canada (ROC) agreed with the prohibition on face veils for administrators of public services (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2010).

The government, for its part, framed the policy in terms of preserving secularism. For most of its history, Quebec's public functions, services and sociopolitical life in general were dominated by the Catholic Church. In 1881, Mark Twain famously said of Montreal: "This is the first time I was ever in a city where you couldn't

throw a brick without breaking a church window” (Twain, 1881). A rapidly growing francophone nationalist movement throughout the 1960s succeeded in unseating the Church (perceived as ineffectual in defending the province in the federation), in what came to be known as the Quiet Revolution. During this period, the Quebec state simultaneously took over the public sphere and became an assertive defendant of francophones’ interests both within the province and in the federation more broadly.

Individually-speaking, Quebeckers went from being among the world’s most religious citizens to the least (Lefebvre, 2012). In effect, a new civic nationalism was born from the fall of the Catholic Church and a modern Quebec identity thus came to be strongly linked to secularism. Many decades later, in 2007, a federalist Liberal government proclaimed that the separation of church and state represented one of three fundamental and unalterable values of the province, along with gender equality and the primacy of the French language (Quebec, 2007). Quebec’s unique historical dynamics have meant that religious accommodation debates have carried a specific meaning and weight in the province. The rest of Canada never underwent a Quiet Revolution and the modern Canadian identity is marked much more by an allegiance to multiculturalism than to secularism (Dufresne, Jeram and Pelletier, 2014). Ultimately, persisting linguistic, cultural, and political insecurity in the province, coupled with strong nationalism and a peculiar religious history have created a context where incentives to feel negatively toward ethnic minority out-groups may be particularly strong. If insecurity, nationalism, and the valuing of collective beliefs all lead to antipathy toward ethnic minorities as the social identity theory and minority nations literatures suggest, then Quebeckers should exhibit greater negativity toward ethnic minority groups than other Canadians.

2.4 Attitudes Toward Minorities In Quebec

Previous scholarship focusing on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Canada has found some support for the notion that Quebecers are indeed more negative toward newcomers than other Canadians. In an early study following the inauguration of official multiculturalism in Canada, Berry, Kalin and Taylor (1977) argue that francophones, the majority of whom reside in Quebec, feel less warmly toward immigrants and cultural and ethnic diversity in general than anglophones in the rest of Canada. They conclude that francophones' attitudes may be characterized as ethnocentric, but also point out that in the context of cultural insecurity in which Quebec finds itself, such a reaction does not seem entirely unwarranted. In a similar vein, Johnston and Blais (1988) find that while Quebec francophones support anti-discrimination policy for homosexuals at rates higher than their English-speaking compatriots, they are more ambivalent about such policies for immigrants. Bolduc and Fortin (1990) also find that Quebec francophones have more tepid attitudes toward both immigration and multiculturalism than their anglophone counterparts. However, they argue that this characterization only applies outside of highly diverse city centres such as Montreal and that all differences in immigrant attitudes among francophones and anglophones can be explained by francophones' linguistic insecurity. Several other early studies confirmed these general tendencies, with some finding that Quebecers are also more negative toward racial minorities regardless of whether individuals are immigrants or native-born (see: Lambert and Curtis, 1983). Interestingly, in a more recent study, Bilodeau and Turgeon (2014) demonstrate that while tolerance toward immigrants is indeed highest in Montreal, it is not, contrary to common perception, lowest in rural areas of Quebec. Montrealers are quite tolerant of immigrants because immigrant diversity is a fact of every day life to which they have become accustomed. Rural citizens are relatively tolerant as well because immigration is more of an abstract concept than a real day-to-day consideration. Suburban

Quebeckers are actually the most intolerant, as they do not have adequate contact with immigrants to become sensitized nor do they have sufficient distance to consider immigration abstract.

Studies following Quebec's seizure of control over a greater proportion of immigration have yielded more ambiguous findings, however. Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc (2012), Gidengil et al. (2002), Safdar et al. (2008) all contest the idea that Quebeckers are unique in their immigration and racial attitudes. Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) show that although Quebeckers are slightly more negative than other Canadians when it comes to racial minorities, they are among the least opposed to increasing immigration and among the most supportive of accepting more immigrants, particularly compared to Ontarians. To the extent that it exists, the authors find that negativity toward immigration in Quebec is higher among those who perceive the French language to be threatened, but only in the sense that these people are more likely to ask for fewer immigrants, not that they are less likely to ask for more immigrants. Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) also find that sovereignists are slightly more likely to ask for fewer immigrants, but are not any different than federalists in the extent to which they support accepting more immigrants. Finally, their study shows that anti-immigration attitudes are actually less present among Quebec nationalists than among those who dislike Quebec. Harrell et al. (2012) agree that francophones are not necessarily less supportive of immigrants overall, but argue that they are less likely to support immigrants of low economic status than are anglophones. Moreover, francophones seem to make distinctions between Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants, preferring the latter, while anglophones do not make distinctions at all.

Taking a more group-specific approach, Sniderman et al. (1993) find that Quebeckers have relatively more negative attitudes toward Jews than other Canadians. This negativity, they argue, is the product of Quebeckers' simultaneously placing a higher value on social conformity and perceiving Jewish residents as rejecting the province's

common values. In a similar vein, Montreuil, Bourhis and Vanbesalaere (2004) suggest Quebeckers support exclusion, assimilation, and segregation more highly when it comes to immigrants of Arab or Muslim background than immigrants of French background. However, care should be taken in generalizing these results as they are based on a small, non-representative student sample. The authors suggest that negativity toward Arab and Muslim communities is particularly high among Quebeckers who say they feel culturally insecure. Similarly, Helly (2004) argue that while attitudes toward Muslims have become relatively negative in all of Canada following the September 11th terrorist attacks, discrimination of Muslims is higher in Quebec than other provinces. Interestingly, in a series of photograph-based framing experiments, El-Geledi and Bourhis (2012) find that Quebeckers' attitudes toward Muslims are not different from their attitudes toward other religious groups. In fact, the authors find that francophone university students react more negatively to images of Catholic nuns than they do to images of Muslim women wearing hijabs.

Though much has been said about Quebeckers' attitudes toward immigrants, and a few studies shed light on attitudes toward specific ethnic minority groups, little research compares Quebeckers' attitudes toward several *different* ethnic minority groups. Immigrants today hail from increasingly diverse backgrounds. Treating them as a homogeneous entity does not allow us to adequately parse out whether native-born citizens are reacting to the structural fact of immigration or to the ethnic groups to which immigrants belong. The present study endeavours to remedy this lacuna in the literature by examining attitudes toward ethnic minority groups directly, regardless of migrant or native-born status. Moreover, instead of focussing on one specific group, we compare the attitudes of the mainstream population toward several different groups. To this end, two hypotheses derived from the literature on social identity theory and minority nations are derived:

Hypothesis 1a: Quebeckers have more negative attitudes toward ethnic

minorities than other Canadians.

Hypothesis 1b: Within Quebec, francophones have more negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities than anglophones.

The goal of the study is explicative as well as descriptive. As Turgeon and Bilodeau (2014) point out, relatively little has been said about *why* attitudes toward minorities in Quebec are the way they are. If Quebecers' attitudes toward ethnic minorities are indeed unique in the country, and if francophones' attitudes are unique in Quebec, what drives this difference? On the one hand, it is possible that those claiming religious accommodation debates in the province were grounded in racism are right. A substantial international literature has documented the impact of racial prejudice on attitudes toward incoming ethnic minorities. For instance, Sniderman, de Figueiredo and Piazza (2000) show using a survey experiment in Italy that majority population citizens exhibit generalized antipathy toward all racial out-groups. Similarly, Kinder and Kam (2010) show that in the United States, citizens anti-immigration attitudes are ethnocentrically driven and that "what whites think about one out-group is quite consistent with what they think about another, just as ethnocentrism requires" (p.54). Indeed, Tichenor and Harris (2002) argues that white Americans' attitudes toward minorities have always been racially driven, as they have consistently opposed the most recently arrived racial out-group regardless of their linguistic or cultural similarities. Ford (2011) demonstrates similar results in Britain between 1983 and 1996. Ethnocentrism is also considered to be stronger in contexts characterized, like Quebec, by strong nationalist currents, often because the nationalism is ethnic in nature (see: Fennema, 2005; Kunovich, 2009; Wright, 2011).

On the other hand, a more recent literature suggests that racism might not always tell the whole story. Perceived threats to social identities and symbolic politics have been shown to be among the strongest drivers of ethnic minority antipathy, especially in minority nations, and are considered both empirically and conceptually distinct

from racial prejudice (for a detailed empirical discussion, see Gibson and Gouws, 2003). It is possible to have positive attitudes toward a racial or ethnic minority group overall but take issue with specific practices and beliefs of that group (Parekh, 2000). van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten (2010) and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) demonstrate both observationally and experimentally, respectively, that racial prejudice toward Muslims and support for or opposition to certain rights for that group are distinct: citizens who feel generally negatively toward Muslims do not necessarily oppose accommodation for that group and citizens who feel generally positively toward Muslims do not necessarily support accommodation.

Although inter-ethnic negativity is often based, as Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) point out, on a misunderstanding or misperception between groups, this is not always the case. Majority citizens in the Netherlands, for instance, understand Muslim cultural practices just as Muslims understand the majority's practices, yet neither group agrees with the practices of the other. Interestingly, in both South Africa and Russia, Gibson and Gouws (2003) and Gibson and Howard (2007) find that correlations between racial prejudice and political tolerance of ethnic minority groups are lower than 0.08. These results suggest, the authors argue, that intolerance in these contexts cannot merely be reduced to a prejudiced dislike of out-groups and actually reflects more complex considerations. In earlier studies, Sniderman et al. (1993) and Sniderman and Piazza (1993) demonstrate that both principled liberalism and principled conservatism can lead to the rejection of certain ethnic minority groups in a way that is distinct from how an individual feels about racial minorities. And in an earlier Canadian study, threat-based negativity toward immigrants was shown to be “ [...] not simply racism in disguise, but a complex attitude resulting from an interplay between various concerns and moderating beliefs about immigration's consequences” (Palmer, 1996, p.180). Drawing from evidence about racial prejudice and symbolic threat, two competing hypotheses can thus be posited:

Hypothesis 2: Francophones' negative attitudes are grounded principally in racism.

Hypothesis 3: Francophones' negative attitudes are grounded principally in cultural concerns.

Chapter 3

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

These hypotheses are evaluated using cross-sectional public opinion data emerging from both the 2011 Canadian Election Study (CES) and the 2014 Quebec Vote Compass. The 2011 CES data are informative as they reflect the recent attitudes of a representative sample of the Canadian population. To compare attitudes toward ethnic minorities in Quebec to attitudes in the rest of Canada, we rely on data emerging from the campaign ($N = 4\,308$) and post-election ($N = 3\,362$) waves of the survey. The surveys were conducted by telephone using random-digit-dialling and the post-election wave includes as many respondents from the campaign wave as possible. The 2011 data are useful to the study as they represent the first instance in which Canadians were asked about their feelings toward both racial and religious groups. Specifically, the post-election survey asks respondents to rate on a scale from 0 (feel very negatively) to 100 (feel very positively) their feelings toward Muslims living in Canada, Catholics, Protestants, and racial minorities.¹ The data also provide an indicator of religiosity, measured by how important religion is to a person. Respondents are at 0 if they do not consider themselves religious at all and at 1 if they consider themselves very religious. Finally, the CES data include a standard set of sociodemographic indicators, including indicators for residency in each province. All variables are re-scaled to range from 0 to 1.

Analyses of attitudes toward ethnic minorities within Quebec are conducted using data from the 2014 Quebec iteration of the Vote Compass project. The Vote Compass (VC) is an interactive online electoral literacy application that estimates

¹ See Appendix for all question wordings.

users' ideological positioning relative to political parties participating in the election. It derives this alignment by asking users a series of 30 questions that reflect salient public issues. Question items are neutrally phrased and responses are Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The tool is developed by Vox Pop Labs and was accessible during the 2014 campaign from the home webpages of both the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Radio-Canada (respectively, the national English and French language public broadcasters). Before and after answering issue questions, respondents entered in sociodemographic information about themselves. Those who offered their e-mail address in the campaign-wave online tool were re-contacted by email to complete the post-election survey. Overall, 325 563 people used the online tool and 12 777 responded to the post-election questionnaire.

The unprecedented magnitude of these data allows for research into subtle attitudinal differences between the province's French-speaking majority and English-speaking minority. Nevertheless, they also bear certain methodological limits. Vote Compass is a tool intended principally to increase civic participation and as such is open to anyone wishing to participate. The data do not emerge from a random sample of the population and thus care must be taken in generalizing results to the population. Given the nature of the tool, the data are expected to be biased toward younger, more educated citizens, with a greater interest in politics than the general population. Yet it is worth noting that the declining use of landlines and low survey response rates have resulted in comparable biases in random telephone samples (Chang and Krosnick, 2009). In their highly cited study, Chang and Krosnick (2009) also show that nonprobability Internet samples exhibit less random measurement error, less survey satisficing, and more accurate responses than probabilistic telephone samples.

The VC post-election survey presents a unique opportunity to examine Quebecers' attitudes toward ethnic minorities as it includes questions evaluating how citizens feel toward a diversity of specific ethnic groups, including Arabs, Blacks, Asians, Abo-

iginals, Whites, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, Catholics, and Protestants. These questions are feeling thermometers that, like all other measures in the study, have been re-scaled to range from 0 to 1, where 0 represents a strong disliking and 1 a strong liking. The VC data also include several questions that allow us to parse out the extent to which attitudes toward these groups are racially versus culturally based. To evaluate whether the value shift following the Quiet Revolution impacts attitudes, the study examines the impacts of both religiosity and support for secularism on attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Two questions in the campaign survey capture religiosity by probing the frequency of attending religious services and the frequency of religious practice. These questions are summed and averaged to create an index of religiosity. Similarly, eight questions across the campaign and post-election surveys capture support for the religious neutrality of the state; these too are summed and averaged to create an index of support for public secularism.² Though the VC data include many more questions pertaining to secularism, we selected the ones that were the most general and least evoked the religious accommodation debate. In a factor analysis, all eight items load highly onto one principle factor and the index has a Cronbach's alpha score of over 0.9. To assess whether cultural insecurity might affect attitudes toward ethnic minorities, our analyses include a question that asks respondents to indicate from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" the extent to which they feel Quebec culture is threatened. Initial descriptive analyses also include a binary variable capturing attitudes toward Quebec separation, where zero represents opposition to separation and one represents support.

The study begins by examining the distributions of attitudes toward ethnic minorities in Canada and within Quebec. Second, confirmatory factor analyses are used to assess the dimensionality of attitudes toward ethnic minorities. In order to determine whether observed descriptive relationships are robust to the inclusion of

² Full index information is detailed in the Appendix.

intervening factors, the study's main analyses rely on ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) estimates. OLS models are appropriate given that all of the dependent variables under study are interval-level and continuous. Moreover, all analyses of the structure of attitudes toward minorities exclude the views of members of the minority group under study, as it is the attitudes of the mainstream majority population that are of theoretical interest. Doing so is in line with previous studies of attitudes toward immigration and specific racial groups (see, for instance: Bilodeau, Turgeon and Karakoc, 2012). Finally, missing data are managed using list-wise deletion. The next section presents the results of both the descriptive and inferential analyses.


Chapter 4

RESULTS

4.1 Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Canada and Quebec

Taken together, the scholarship on attitudes toward immigrants in Canada, the particularity of minority nations, and the geography of recent religious accommodation debates suggest that attitudes toward ethnic minorities should be more negative among Quebeckers than Canadians living in other provinces. To evaluate this first hypothesis, we begin by examining whether attitudes in Quebec and the rest of Canada substantively differ when it comes to racial minorities. Using the CES feeling thermometer evaluating attitudes toward racial minorities, mean responses are calculated and presented in Figure 1. The most positive evaluation possible is 1 while the most negative is 0. While average feelings toward racial minorities in Quebec are around 0.67, feelings in the rest of Canada are somewhat more positive, at an average of 0.77. The distribution of these attitudes is presented in the Appendix.

When it comes to attitudes toward Muslims, a religious group, a different image appears. On the same 0 to 1 scale, Quebeckers evaluate Muslims at about 0.55 on average, substantially lower than they evaluate racial minorities (Figure 1). By contrast, Canadians in the ROC evaluate Muslims at about 0.71 on average—still lower than they evaluate racial minorities, but less than the difference in Quebec attitudes on the same items. While mean attitudes in Quebec and the ROC on racial minorities differ by about 0.10 points, they differ by 0.16 points when it comes to Muslims. The distribution of these attitudes is plotted in the Appendix. Though the expectation that Quebeckers are more negative toward ethnic minorities than other Canadians is borne out, they are not negative uniformly: they seem to some extent


Figure 1. Mean Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Canada

Source: 2011 Canadian Election Study.

to distinguish between racial minorities and Muslims—a religious minority. While Quebecers appear to differ from other Canadians in general, it remains unclear whether French-speaking Quebecers—those who we expect to be most negative—differ systematically from English-speaking Quebecers. To examine this possibility, we turn to the Quebec Vote Compass data.


In Quebec, the mean feeling toward racial minorities—a composite of attitudes toward all specific racial minority groups probed by the Vote Compass—among francophones is 0.68, while among anglophones it is 0.71, representing a slight gap of 0.03 points. Breaking down attitudes by specific racial groups in Figure 2, the differences between francophones and anglophones remain slight, never exceeding 0.05 points when it comes to blacks, Asians, and aboriginals. There is a larger difference in attitudes toward Arabs, but it is not clear whether individuals make a distinction between Muslims and Arabs, given the substantial overlap between the two groups. Though francophone and anglophone attitudes differ little when it comes

Figure 2. Mean Attitudes Toward Racial Minorities in Quebec



Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

Figure 3. Mean Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec



Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

to racial minorities, greater divides emerge when it comes to religious minorities. Francophones' average evaluations of Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews are 0.55, 0.58, and 0.65, respectively—substantially lower than their evaluations of racial minority groups (Figure 3). Meanwhile, anglophones' mean evaluations are 0.69, 0.72, and 0.76. On the whole, francophones and anglophones differ by at least 0.11 points when it comes to religious minorities, and these differences are most pronounced in evaluations of Sikhs (a 0.14 point difference) and Muslims (a 0.19 point difference). It is worth noting that Quebeckers in the CES data and francophones in the VC data evaluate majority religious groups, such as Catholics and Protestants, more negatively than do anglophones, suggesting they have a more negative feeling toward religion in general.¹ Overall, observations emerging from the VC data reflect patterns similar to those in the CES data: francophones are more negative toward ethnic minorities than anglophones, but this difference is only substantial when it comes to religious minorities and slight when it comes to racial minorities. While Muslims draw the most animus from the majority population, Sikhs come second, followed by Jews.


4.2 The Nature and Roots of Minority Antipathy

The fact that minority antipathy among francophones seems to be directed mainly at religious, not racial, minorities raises the possibility that factors other than generalized racial prejudice might be influencing intergroup attitudes. Nevertheless, racism has historically been and continues to be across contexts a strong force influencing negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Its potential impact thus warrants further investigation. In minority nations, racism has in several instances been found to be higher among the nation's strongest patriots, who also tend to have more ethnically-based conceptions of the nation (Mayda, 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Sida-

¹ That said, given that they evaluate white people more negatively too, this outcome might be the product of phrasing differences in the French and English versions of the surveys.

nius et al., 1997). If racism is indeed the driving force behind francophones' attitudes

Figure 4. Mean Attitudes Toward Racial Minorities by Francophone Support for Independence




Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

in Quebec, then we might expect sovereignists to exhibit the strongest antipathy toward ethnic minorities and to be uniformly unsympathetic toward racial and religious minorities. The fact that Charter of Quebec Values, often characterized as a racially prejudiced policy, was a project of the sovereignist Parti Québécois government seems to anecdotally bolster the point. Yet it appears that sovereignist francophones are *not* more negative toward ethnic minorities than federalist francophones. In fact, there appears to be little difference in sovereignist and federalists' average feelings toward both racial (Figure 4) and religious (Figure 5) minorities. It is thus not the case that antipathy toward minorities in Quebec is driven by French sovereignists bearing a racially exclusive conception of the nation. Sovereignists do not feel more negatively toward neither racial nor religious minorities than other Quebecers. It

seems, then, that even those most expected to be racially prejudiced are not really so. Yet to disentangle the roots of ethnic minority antipathy in Quebec, the influence of factors exterior to racial prejudice and cultural concerns must be taken into account. Differences in attitudes toward minorities might simply be the product of disparities in age or educational attainment, for instance (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The following section thus explores Quebecers' attitudes in greater depth using multiple regression analyses that control for potentially intervening sociodemographic factors.

Figure 5. Mean Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities by Francophone Support for Independence



Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

4.2.1 Disentangling the Effects of Racism and Cultural Concern

When sociodemographic dissimilarities across Quebec and the ROC are taken into consideration, do attitudes toward ethnic minorities still differ? Table 1 presents the results of a multiple linear regression estimation of attitudes toward racial minorities

in Canada. Because the interest is in the attitudes of the mainstream population, controls for the ethnic minority group under study are included in all regression analyses.² Compared to other Canadians, being a Quebecker leads to a 0.06-point decrease in positivity toward racial minorities. This result is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Given the comparative negativity of Quebeckers' attitudes toward Muslims, we should expect Quebec residency to have an even greater impact on attitudes toward Muslims. As the second column of Table 1 shows, Quebec residency is indeed a significant predictor of negativity toward Muslims. And its effect is nearly twice as great in magnitude: *ceteris paribus*, being a Quebecker leads to a 0.10-point decrease in the positivity of feeling toward this religious minority group. Evidently, then, Quebeckers are indeed more negative toward ethnic minorities than other Canadians.

Yet it is worth noting that Quebeckers' attitudes toward Muslims and racial minorities might not be entirely unrelated. Given the centrality of Muslims to the high-profile religious accommodation debate, it is possible that when evaluating racial minorities, Quebeckers' have to an extent been *primed* to think about Muslims (Giasson, Brin and Sauvageau, 2010; Potvin, 2010). Priming effects occur when individuals use a certain object, made salient in their minds by the environment, to evaluate other objects (Dragojlovic, 2011; Entman, 2004). If Quebeckers' ethnic antipathies were more religiously than racially grounded, as descriptive statistics seem to suggest, and such priming indeed occurred, then we would expect Quebeckers' negativity toward racial minorities to be at least partly grounded in their attitudes toward religious minorities, and specifically, toward Muslims. Prior research suggests that attitudes toward specific ethnic minority groups can affect, especially through media prim-

² All regression models presented in the study have also been tested with the inclusion of variables controlling for income. Though the results remain substantively the same, these controls have here been omitted due to high non-response rates on the income question in both surveys (over 25% of each sample).

Table 1. Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in Canada

	Racial Minorities	Muslims	Racial Minorities
Quebec	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.096*** (0.017)	-0.010 (0.011)
Francophone	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.095*** (0.017)	-0.006 (0.012)
Allophone	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.060*** (0.016)	-0.005 (0.011)
Below high school	-0.077*** (0.013)	-0.085*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.010)
University degree	0.068*** (0.009)	0.084*** (0.010)	0.023*** (0.007)
Age	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.0003)	-0.0005** (0.0002)
Woman	0.030*** (0.008)	0.027** (0.009)	0.016** (0.006)
Atheist	0.033*** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.033*** (0.008)
Non-Christian	0.027* (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.010 (0.012)
Visible minority	-0.005 (0.016)		-0.009 (0.013)
Feeling toward Muslims			0.524*** (0.012)
(constant)	0.863*** (0.016)	0.865*** (0.019)	0.415*** (0.017)
Observations	3,042	3,022	2,929
R ²	0.126	0.163	0.461
Adjusted R ²	0.123	0.161	0.459


Source: 2011 Canadian Election Study

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01


ing, attitudes toward other larger minority groups (Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013). For instance, Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008) show that when citizens are exposed to negative news about Latinos, they become more apprehensive about immigrants in general. To examine the possibility that evaluations of racial minorities among Quebecers are to an extent grounded in evaluations of Muslims, the first regression model is re-estimated with the inclusion of a control for attitudes toward Muslims. The results are reported in the final column of Table 1. When feelings toward Muslims are taken into consideration, Quebec residency ceases to have any impact on feelings toward racial minorities. That is to say, detected racial antipathy among Quebecers seems to be wholly captured by an antipathy toward the salient religious minority: Muslims. It seems thus that Quebecers' have to an extent indeed been primed to consider Muslims when evaluating racial minorities. When that consideration is parsed out, their attitudes toward racial minorities do not seem to be significantly different from the attitudes of other Canadians.

These results appear to offer further indication that, to the extent that ethnic antipathy exists in Quebec, it is not necessarily grounded in racism but rather in specific concerns relating to religious groups. Are similar patterns reflected in Quebec among francophones and anglophones? The Vote Compass data are well positioned to offer some insight as they include separate evaluations of specific ethnic groups. If there is indeed something unique about francophones' relationships to religious minorities, and if their attitudes toward these groups are systematically different from their attitudes toward racial minorities, then two different latent variables should underlie their attitudes.

In other words, francophones' feelings toward ethnic minorities should be underpinned by two distinct conceptual dimensions, demarcated by religion and race. To assess whether this is indeed the case, a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted on all variables capturing respondents' attitudes toward specific minority groups. We expect two factors to emerge, one representing race and the other, religion. The re-

Figure 6. Racial Dimension of Francophone Attitudes

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

Figure 7. Religious Dimension of Francophone Attitudes

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass.


sults of the analysis confirm the expectation and the loadings of the variables each of the two factors are presented in Figures 6 and 7. The first factor, illustrated in Figure 6, seems clearly racial, while the second seems clearly religious, with the exception of

Arabs, who are likely to be conflated with Muslims.


If francophone attitudes toward ethnic minorities are grounded in cultural concerns unique to francophones, then this same bi-dimensionality should not as clearly underpin anglophones' attitudes. A second factor analysis presented in Figure 8 examines anglophone attitudes and generally bears out this expectation. Anglophone opinion toward ethnic minorities does not plot as clearly onto two factors as does francophone opinion. Though anglophones seem to make some distinction between racial and religious minorities, the dimensionality of their attitudes seems better captured by one single factor than by two. Indeed, in a two-factor solution, the factor loadings of anglophone attitudes toward all groups surpass the 0.3 threshold on the first factor. Unlike francophones, then, anglophones make weaker conceptual distinctions between racial and religious minorities. Their attitudes toward ethnic minorities in general are better captured by one unified underlying concept. By contrast, francophones' attitudes appear to reflect two separate conceptual considerations.

Does this distinctiveness in francophone attitudes persist once sociodemographic differences are accounted for? A series of OLS regression analyses, presented in Table 2, first assess whether all else being equal, francophones' attitudes toward racial minorities are indeed different from the attitudes of anglophones. In all cases, being francophone is a significant negative predictor of attitudes toward racial minority groups. However, such effects are small in magnitude and, except for in the case of Arabs, never exceed 0.04 points. When feelings toward all racial minorities are taken together, as is shown in the last column of the table, being francophone leads only to a 0.02 decrease in positivity. When potential wording effects across the two languages are considered (recalling French speakers are also 0.01-points less positive toward white people and Catholics) we might even say that there is no effect. A very different image emerges when assessing attitudes toward religious minorities. Table 3 presents a series of OLS regression estimations evaluating the effect of being francophone on feelings toward different *religious* minorities. *Ceteris paribus*, francophones are more

Figure 8. Two Factor Solution: Anglophone Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities



Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass



Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

Table 2. Attitudes Toward Racial Minorities in Quebec

	Arabs	Blacks	Asians	Aboriginals	Racial Minorities
Francophone	-0.064*** (0.012)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.009)	-0.023*** (0.008)
Allophone	-0.121*** (0.024)	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.043** (0.017)	-0.064*** (0.020)	-0.069*** (0.017)
Below high school	-0.031* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.012)	0.022 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.012)
University degree	0.061*** (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Age	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0001)
Woman	0.012** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.025*** (0.004)
Atheist	0.042*** (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.012*** (0.004)
Non-Christian	0.064*** (0.019)	0.011 (0.014)	0.007 (0.013)	0.030* (0.016)	0.025* (0.013)
Visible minority	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.049*** (0.011)	0.020** (0.009)
(constant)	0.730*** (0.015)	0.824*** (0.011)	0.830*** (0.010)	0.759*** (0.012)	0.746*** (0.010)
Observations	10,013	11,337	11,279	11,351	9,853
R ²	0.073	0.021	0.017	0.022	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.072	0.020	0.016	0.022	0.029

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3. Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec

	Muslims	Sikhs	Jews	Religious Minorities
Francophone	-0.121*** (0.011)	-0.122*** (0.011)	-0.108*** (0.010)	-0.117*** (0.010)
Allophone	-0.147*** (0.023)	-0.144*** (0.022)	-0.109*** (0.021)	-0.132*** (0.020)
Below high school	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.014)
University degree	0.072*** (0.005)	0.064*** (0.005)	0.045*** (0.005)	0.060*** (0.004)
Age	-0.004*** (0.0002)	-0.003*** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.003*** (0.0001)
Woman	0.035*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.005)
Atheist	0.014*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Non-Christian	0.107*** (0.018)	0.080*** (0.017)	0.029* (0.016)	0.073*** (0.015)
(constant)	0.791*** (0.014)	0.802*** (0.013)	0.797*** (0.012)	0.797*** (0.012)
Observations	12,205	12,137	12,202	12,060
R ²	0.083	0.075	0.035	0.074
Adjusted R ²	0.082	0.074	0.034	0.073

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

negatively disposed toward all religious minorities. And unlike in the case of racial minorities, the magnitudes of these effects are substantial, especially when it comes to Muslims and Sikhs. Toward both of these groups, francophones are 0.12-points less positive than anglophones. Ultimately, the collective evidence in Quebec suggests the following: francophones view ethnic minorities less favourably than anglophones, but the difference is only remarkable when it comes to religious minorities, who also occupy a distinct conceptual position in the minds of francophones.

4.2.2 *Religion and Religiosity*

In and of itself, the fact that francophones' racial views are not so particular suggests that extant ethnic antipathy among francophones is not grounded in racial prejudice *per se*. Negativity aimed at religious minorities suggests that the roots of ethnic antipathy in the province might be instead more culturally based. The notion that two conceptions of society could influence negativity toward ethnic minorities resurfaces: one ethno-racial, and the other cultural, with the latter receiving greater empirical support thus far. But what cultural factors might be behind antipathy toward religious groups? The most obvious answer is perhaps religion itself. As previously discussed, the Quiet Revolution marked a turning point in Quebec history and was remarkable especially for the rise of secularism, both personal (Bibby and Archambault, 2008) and public. Today, rates of adherence to a religion in Quebec are substantially lower than in the ROC (Clark, 2003; Eagle, 2011). In the 2011 CES data, only about 14% of Quebeckers consider themselves highly religious, compared to 34% of citizens in the ROC.³ Central to the recent religious accommodation debates has been the question of balancing the secularism of the state with the right to religious expression. If religious minorities are perceived as challenging the secularism

³ Measuring religiosity by frequency of religious practice instead of by religious affiliation is instrumental to avoiding the overreporting of religiousness as a cultural artefact of francophones' Catholic heritage.

Table 4. Religiosity and Attitudes Toward Muslims in Canada

	Attitudes toward Muslims	
	(1)	(2)
Religiosity		0.007 (0.019)
Quebec	-0.096*** (0.017)	-0.093*** (0.017)
Francophone	-0.095*** (0.017)	-0.094*** (0.018)
Allophone	-0.060*** (0.016)	-0.062*** (0.016)
Below high school	-0.085*** (0.015)	-0.084*** (0.015)
University degree	0.084*** (0.010)	0.086*** (0.010)
Age	-0.003*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.0003)
Woman	0.027*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.010)
Atheist	-0.002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.018)
Non-Christian	0.028 (0.017)	0.027 (0.019)
Constant	0.865*** (0.019)	0.861*** (0.023)
Observations	3,032	2,962
R ²	0.163	0.162
Adjusted R ²	0.161	0.159

Source: 2011 Canadian Election Study *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

upon which the modern Quebec nation is perceived to have been founded, then it follows that francophone attitudes toward these minorities might be less favourable. If people who are less religious personally are also more attached to public secularism, then differential levels of religiosity should account for differences in attitudes toward religious minorities among Quebeckers and Canadians of other provinces and among francophones and anglophones within Quebec. At the Canadian level, the Pearson correlation coefficient between religiosity and being a Quebecker at the Canadian level is -0.16 , while at the Quebec level, the correlation between religiosity and being francophone is -0.10 . There is thus a slight negative linear relationship between religiosity and the relevant national and provincial variables of interest. It is nevertheless worth assessing whether a clearer relationship emerges when other potentially confounding variables are taken into consideration.

In a linear regression analysis, the impact of being a Quebecker and of being francophone on attitudes toward religious minorities should be substantially reduced when religiosity is taken into consideration. Table 4 first re-estimates the original model examining the impact of being a Quebecker on attitudes toward Muslims in Canada, then, in the second column, presents the results of the same estimation when a measure of religiosity is included. As this second column shows, religiosity does not absorb the effect of being a Quebecker at the national level. Similarly, Table 5 re-estimates the baseline model of attitudes toward religious minorities in Quebec, then again in the second column with the addition of a measure of religiosity. Like with Quebeckers at the national level, religiosity does not substantially absorb the effect of being francophone at the provincial level. In Canada, religiosity is not significantly related to attitudes toward Muslims (the only religious minority group investigated by the CES), and the coefficient for Quebec residency is thus consistent in magnitude when religiosity is added to the model. Within Quebec, religiosity has a *positive* effect on attitudes toward religious minorities, meaning that the more religious a citizen is, the more positively he or she will evaluate religious minorities. Specifically,

Table 5. Religiosity and Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec

	Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities	
	(1)	(2)
Religiosity		0.050*** (0.009)
Francophone	-0.117*** (0.010)	-0.112*** (0.010)
Allophone	-0.132*** (0.020)	-0.127*** (0.021)
Below high school	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.026* (0.015)
University degree	0.060*** (0.004)	0.058*** (0.005)
Age	-0.003*** (0.0001)	-0.003*** (0.0001)
Woman	0.037*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)
Atheist	0.001 (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)
Non-Christian	0.073*** (0.015)	0.064*** (0.016)
Constant	0.797*** (0.012)	0.785*** (0.013)
Observations	12,060	10,962
R ²	0.074	0.077
Adjusted R ²	0.073	0.077

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

a shift from being never practicing religion in any way to regularly practicing religion leads to a 0.05 increase in the positivity of an individual's evaluation of religious minorities. The effect is greatest in the case of Jews, followed by Muslims, and then Sikhs (Table 8 in Appendix). This outcome runs counter to the longstanding conventional relationship wherein greater religiosity in majority population citizens leads to greater intolerance toward religious minorities (Golebiowska, 2004; Saroglou et al., 2009; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010). Yet it makes sense in the Quebec context, where lower religiosity among the majority population is ostensibly related to a greater attachment to the secularism emerging from the Quiet Revolution and thus to more negative attitudes toward religious minorities among those citizens. Indeed, the correlation between being francophone in Quebec and supporting secularism is about 0.27, meaning there is some relationship between the two items. Nevertheless, within Quebec, religiosity overall does not seem to explain the difference in attitudes toward religious minorities between francophones and anglophones.⁴

4.2.3 Secularism and National Values

But if religiosity is merely a proxy for valuing secularism, it is perhaps more relevant to go directly to the source and evaluate how secular attitudes affect feelings toward religious minorities. If valuing secularism leads francophones to oppose those who they believe are challenging it, then support for secularism should absorb a substantial proportion of the effect of being francophone on attitudes toward religious minorities. This expectation is tested in Table 6 and is borne out by the data: when a measure for supporting secularism is added to the baseline model examining attitudes toward religious minorities, the coefficient capturing the effect of being francophone decreases in magnitude by half, from -0.12 to -0.06 (column 4). As such, antipathy toward

⁴ Francophone Quebecers' attitudes toward religious minorities are also not conditional on religiosity: no statistically significant effect was found for the interaction between religiosity and being francophone.

religious minorities among francophones seems to be in substantial part grounded in concerns about secularism. Specifically, the effect of support for secularism absorbs the most substantial portion of attitudes toward Muslims (column 1), followed by Jews (column 3), and then Sikhs (column 2).⁵

Yet the question of endogeneity is inevitably raised. It could well be the case that one's attitudes toward religious minorities influence their attitudes toward secularism. However, across both observational and experimental studies, there does not seem to be more evidence for the notion that religious minority attitudes influence secularism attitudes than the other way around. Generally speaking, extant research treats common or national values or norms as prior to attitudes about minority groups. Indeed, one of the main determinants of ethnic tolerance is a commitment to national democratic values, including equality, individual rights, and the protection of minority rights (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Sniderman et al., 1993). Even national integration values are considered to be "more stable and more strongly and deeply embedded cognitively and emotionally than intergroup attitudes" (Bourhis et al., 2009, p.58). And experimental evidence also demonstrates certain liberal national values, such as gender equality, are prior to attitudes toward specific religious groups (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). If secularism constitutes a fundamental value in Quebec, such a value should arguably be treated like other similar national values. Given the province's long religious history, it is reasonable to suspect the valuation of secularism emerged long before religious minorities came to be important sources of immigration to the province. Moreover, given the legacy and salience of the Quiet Revolution, it is reasonable to suspect citizens also hold relatively concrete and stable attitudes on the subject. To minimize possible endogeneity issues in this analysis, the variables

⁵ Although the effect of being francophone on attitudes toward religious minorities is in part explained by support for secularism, it is not conditional on different levels of secularism. The effect of an interaction term between the two variables is not statistically significant.

Table 6. Secularism and Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec

	Muslims	Sikhs	Jews	Religious Minorities
Support for secularism	-0.321*** (0.014)	-0.251*** (0.013)	-0.252*** (0.012)	-0.274*** (0.012)
Francophone	-0.049*** (0.012)	-0.066*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.056*** (0.010)
Allophone	-0.105*** (0.024)	-0.111*** (0.023)	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.094*** (0.021)
Below high school	-0.029* (0.017)	-0.043*** (0.016)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.031** (0.014)
University degree	0.068*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.005)	0.057*** (0.005)
Age	0.032*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.035*** (0.005)
Woman	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0001)	-0.002*** (0.0001)
Non-Christian religion	0.046*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.005)	0.0002 (0.005)	0.028*** (0.005)
Atheist	0.073*** (0.019)	0.055*** (0.018)	0.013 (0.017)	0.047*** (0.016)
(constant)	0.914*** (0.015)	0.899*** (0.015)	0.890*** (0.014)	0.902*** (0.013)
Observations	11,019	10,968	11,019	10,897
R ²	0.124	0.105	0.071	0.118
Adjusted R ²	0.123	0.105	0.070	0.117

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

used to construct the measure of support for secularism include factors that capture secular attitudes in a general way and do not specifically refer to the religious accommodation debate.⁶ Nevertheless, determining the validity of the suggested causal ordering ultimately requires experimental testing.

While support for secularism captures about half of the effect of being francophone on religious minorities, the effect does not disappear completely, nor does it cease to be statistically significant. But expecting concerns about religious minorities challenging secularism to account entirely for negativity in the Quebec context would seem to be a conceptual stretch. Antipathy toward recently arrived or culturally distinct minority groups in minority nations emerges from a more generalized feeling of cultural insecurity (Bouchard, 2012). While concern about the future of secularism certainly forms part of what can be considered cultural insecurity, it is still a specific indicator of a more diffuse sentiment. More light can be shed on generalized cultural anxiety by the question in the VC data that asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel Quebec culture is threatened. The utility of this measure emerges from its vagueness: insofar as an individual feels a any element of Quebec culture is threatened, he or she can express that feeling without having to go through the more cognitively demanding process of identifying specific elements they believe are threatened. About 60% of francophones believe that Quebec culture is indeed threatened, compared to only 6% of anglophones. The correlation between being francophone and believing Quebec's culture is threatened is about 0.24, indicating there is some relationship between the two factors.⁷

Why should cultural insecurity affect francophones' antipathy toward religious minorities specifically? Religious minorities can also largely be considered *behavioural* minorities (for a discussion, see: Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009), in the sense that

⁶ Index construction information is found in the Appendix.

⁷ It must be noted, though, that the peril of vagueness is that respondents might not understand what is being asked of them.

it is their values and practices that afford them membership in their groups, not biological characteristics. The fact that belonging to religious groups is intentional and behaviourally-defined instead of simply incidental and phenotypal might make such groups more likely to be perceived as posing a real challenge to the values of minority nations. Those who already feel insecure about Quebec's cultural future—most of whom are francophone—might feel negatively toward those perceived as posing the most realistic challenge to that future. If generalized cultural insecurity indeed underpins francophones' attitudes toward religious minorities, then it should also absorb a substantial proportion of the effect of being francophone on such attitudes. After first re-estimating the baseline OLS model of attitudes toward religious minorities, we evaluate this possibility in the second column of Table 7. Like support for secularism, the belief that Quebec culture is threatened indeed accounts for a sizeable proportion of francophones' attitudes toward religious minorities; specifically, it accounts for about 58% of the effect of being francophone on such attitudes. If both cultural insecurity and support for secularism are considered as concrete elements comprising part of a broader concept of sociocultural anxiety in the province, to what extent can they account for francophone attitudes when taken together?

When both cultural insecurity and support for secularism are taken into consideration in the regression analysis, the effect of being francophone on attitudes toward religious minorities decreases to a mere 0.04 points (Table 7). Taken together, then, the two factors capturing sociocultural concern or anxiety account for about 75% of the negativity of francophones' attitudes toward these minorities. One major caveat to this analysis of the impact of cultural insecurity is that it is very possible that questionnaire respondents were not evaluating their cultural security, but rather their linguistic security. Unfortunately, the lack of a question evaluating linguistic security prevents us from evaluating this possibility. Nevertheless, though cultural insecurity broadly conceived affects francophone attitudes, its specific articulation in the form of anxiety about secular values is ultimately more important. Overall, if levels of

Table 7. Cultural Insecurity and Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec

	Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Support for Secularism			-0.200*** (0.013)
Cultural insecurity		-0.158*** (0.007)	-0.113*** (0.008)
Francophone	-0.117*** (0.010)	-0.067*** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.010)
Allophone	-0.132*** (0.020)	-0.111*** (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.021)
Below high school	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.025* (0.014)
University degree	0.060*** (0.004)	0.053*** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.005)
Age	-0.003*** (0.0001)	-0.002*** (0.0001)	-0.002*** (0.0001)
Woman	0.037*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.005)
Atheist	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)
Non-Christian	0.073*** (0.015)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.039** (0.016)
(constant)	0.797*** (0.012)	0.826*** (0.012)	0.893*** (0.013)
Observations	12,060	11,618	10,733
R ²	0.074	0.114	0.135
Adjusted R ²	0.073	0.113	0.134

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

generalized cultural anxiety and concern about secular values were as high among anglophones as they are among francophones, we could expect these two groups to have more or less equivalent attitudes toward religious minorities. Ultimately, the findings regarding the role of secularism and cultural insecurity in explaining attitudes toward religious minorities among francophones offers further support to the notion that francophone opinion is grounded more in cultural concerns than it is in racial prejudice. The next section summarizes and theoretically interprets the collective findings of the study, while also discussing its limits and potential future directions.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary and Discussion

This aim of this study has been twofold. It has endeavoured both to describe and explain attitudes toward ethnic minorities in Canada and Quebec. Yet description and explanation are herein closely intertwined. They both serve to define both whether and *how* attitudes in Quebec, a predominantly francophone minority nation in the Canadian federation, differ from the attitudes of anglophones. Three hypotheses regarding this difference are posited and two are confirmed. The first hypothesis is descriptive and expects that attitudes toward ethnic minorities are more negative in Quebec than in the rest of Canada and more negative among francophones than anglophones within Quebec. The second hypothesis posits that extant antipathy toward ethnic minorities is the product of racism amongst Quebeckers and francophones. A competing third hypothesis posits that extant antipathy is the product not of racism, but of cultural concerns pertaining to Quebec's status as a minority nation and its unique religious history. Evidence from the 2011 Canadian Election Study shows that attitudes toward ethnic minorities, evaluated in terms of feelings toward racial minorities and Muslims, are indeed more negative in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. Similarly, evidence from the 2014 Quebec Vote Compass shows that attitudes toward ethnic minorities are more negative among francophones than anglophones within Quebec. But this is only true in a very general sense, when "ethnic minorities" are considered a homogeneous category. A different story emerges when we examine attitudes toward specific minority groups. Quebeckers are more negative than other Canadians when it comes to Muslims, but differ little when it comes to racial minori-

ties. Within Quebec, francophones do not differ markedly from anglophones in their attitudes toward racial minorities, specifically Aboriginals, Blacks, and Asians. But they do differ, and substantially so, when it comes to religious minorities, specifically Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews.

Existing research has mainly focused on attitudes toward immigrants or ethnic minorities as a homogeneous unit. But Quebeckers' and francophones' attitudes seem to be more differentiated across groups than prior work would suggest. While francophone attitudes toward ethnic minority groups are indeed more negative *overall* than anglophone attitudes, to stop there is to miss a crucial point. Negativity is not equally distributed across groups, and more importantly, it is overwhelmingly driven by negativity toward religious, not racial, minorities. This finding is descriptive in the obvious sense that it illustrates the distribution of attitudes in Quebec. However, it also contributes to *explaining* what drives ethnic minority antipathy in the province. The fact that Quebec francophones' ethnic antipathies seem to be directed almost exclusively at religious minorities suggests that negativity is not exactly *racially* motivated. Quebec francophones feel relatively positively toward racial minorities—or at the very least, not less positively than anglophones. If the concept of racism is to have definitional utility, it is difficult to maintain that antipathy toward religious minorities, but positivity toward racial minorities, is racism. It thus appears that minority antipathy in the province might be influenced by factors other than racism, and specific to religious minorities.

Religious groups are behavioural groups in the sense that it is their beliefs and practices, not their biological phenotypes, that afford them membership in their group (Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009). While religious minority members may also happen to belong to racial or immigrant minorities, such memberships are neither definitionally sufficient nor necessary. If the specific practices or values that characterize a specific group are at odds with the practices or values that characterize the mainstream population, then such groups might draw culturally grounded animosity. The

present study suggests that ethnic minority antipathy in Quebec is indeed principally culturally based, in part because it is directed at behavioural cultural out-groups, and in part because it appears to be related to Quebec's minority nation status and particular religious history. At the national level, when possible confounding factors are taken into consideration, all observable racial animosity among Quebecers is accounted for by group-specific antipathy toward Muslims. At the provincial level, the negative effect of being francophone is substantial when it comes to attitudes toward religious minorities, but negligible when it comes to attitudes toward racial minorities. Moreover, among francophones, attitudes toward racial minorities are underpinned by a different latent structure than attitudes toward religious minorities. Among anglophones, attitudes toward both groups are underpinned by a common structure. Taken together, the collective evidence suggests that negativity among Quebec francophones is indeed religiously specific, not racially generalized. To better understand the cultural concerns that might drive antipathy toward religious, and thus behavioural, out-groups, the study examines how secularism and cultural insecurity in Quebec might affect francophone opinion.

In holding and occasionally defending values that differ from those of the mainstream population, behavioural minorities are especially susceptible to being perceived as posing a cultural challenge to the mainstream population. The removal of the Catholic Church from public institutions in Quebec in the 1960s, along with a sharp decline in individual religiosity, made secularism a particularly salient cultural symbol in the province. It is possible Quebec francophones are particularly unsympathetic toward religious minorities because these groups are considered to pose a challenge to values of secularism. Today, levels of religiosity in Quebec are substantially lower than in the rest of Canada, and lower among francophones than anglophones. On the national level, we find that religiosity does not influence attitudes toward Muslims—the only religious group measurable with the data—and thus differences in levels of religiosity do not account for differences in the attitudes of

Quebeckers and Canadians of other provinces. Within Quebec, however, religiosity positively influences attitudes toward religious minorities: the more religious a person is, the more positively she or he feels about religious minorities. This outcome is surprising given that the collective international literature generally finds that religious people are the most *intolerant* of religious minorities (Stouffer, 1955; Golebiowska, 2004; Saroglou et al., 2009; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2010). But if the low religiosity emerging from Quebec's Quiet Revolution is indeed related to valuing secularism, then it makes sense that those who are least religious are also least favourable toward those perceived as challenging secularism. Yet personal religiosity is only a proxy for valuing public secularism. In examining the impact of support for secularism on attitudes toward religious minorities directly, we find that secular attitudes account for an overwhelming proportion of francophones' negativity toward religious minorities.

It is unlikely this relationship exists in a vacuum. Minority nations like Quebec tend to be characterized by cultural and political insecurity as a result of being attached to their distinctiveness but lacking full control of its protection (Gidengil et al., 2002; Montreuil, Bourhis and Vanbesalaere, 2004; Turgeon and Bilodeau, 2014). This study shows that cultural insecurity also accounts for a substantial proportion of francophones' attitudes toward religious minorities. A baseline level of cultural insecurity is likely to be more doubtful of the integrative capacity of their cultural fabric. This doubt is magnified when it comes to religious minorities in Quebec, as Sikh, Muslim, and Jewish groups have all made religious accommodation requests that can be perceived as conflicting with national values. Taken together, attachment to secularism and cultural security explain most of the negativity Quebec francophones express toward religious minorities. Cultural insecurity can be understood as a more general articulation of attachment to secularism. While secularism is a specific value citizens might believe is threatened, cultural insecurity refers to a general sense of threat minority nation citizens might feel. Ultimately, though, specific anxiety about secularism bears more weight in francophones' attitudes than generalized cultural

anxiety.

In Quebec, the advent of secularism is likely to have contributed to the exacerbation of cultural insecurity. In a mere 10 years, Quebec shifted from being one of the most religious societies in the world to one of the least. On an individual level, religiosity went from being a fundamental pillar of the Quebec identity to “an obstacle to the modernization” of the province (Lefebvre, 2012, 71). It is unlikely that such a dramatic rupture had no impact on citizens’ sense of security in their collective values. More probably, the shift compounded existing concerns about the nature and substance of national principles in the face of a larger Canada. Lefebvre (2012) writes that Quebeckers were “troubled by this abrupt transition which, on the one hand they favoured, but on the other hand they paid the price for” (p. 71). The price paid is security in values, just as when countercultural ideas challenged traditional family principles in 1960s America. Attachment to secularism today might reflect a desire to solidify national principles in light of this crisis of values. Challenges to public secularism in the province can thus bear a specific weight and be met with particular opposition.

More broadly speaking, cultural insecurity could magnify animus toward religious minorities but not others because religious groups have practices and values that are objectively more distant from those of the mainstream population. An individual already uncertain about the nation’s cultural future may be more doubtful of its capacity to accommodate great difference without sacrificing distinctiveness. Moreover, religious values are commonly perceived as more immutable than secular, cultural values (Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner, 2009). As such, culturally anxious francophones might be more sceptical of the capacity of religious groups to integrate into the common social fabric than they are of the capacity of cultural or racial groups to do so. It should be noted that in the case of the Jewish community in Quebec, cultural concern is likely closely related to linguistic concern, as the province’s Jews have historically adopted English rather than French as their main language (McRoberts,

1997). Moreover, in highly multicultural and liberal contexts in Western Europe, it has been shown that opposition to religious minorities is grounded in the perception that such groups do not share the majority's values in terms of gender equality, the treatment of children, and gay rights (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010). That perception is not wrong: it is a matter of fact that Western European women, for instance, enjoy generally the same liberties as Western European men whereas Muslim women generally have a different status in their communities than do Muslim men. Quebec has historically been Canada's most liberally-minded province and its citizens have typically exhibited the strongest support for gender equality and gay rights (Ornstein, Stevenson and Williams, 1980; Brooks, 2004; Wiseman, 2007). It could be the case that Quebeckers also exhibit specific antipathy toward religious minorities because they, like some Western Europeans, perceive these groups as posing a challenge to progressive gender norms. If high support for progressive values is part of what makes Quebec unique in the federation, then Quebeckers, as a minority nation, have an extra incentive to defend them.

Group-specific theories of antipathy require substantially more social, political, and historical information about particular contexts than theories positing categorical racist or ethnocentric antipathy. Though this can be a boon to their elegance, such theories also risk becoming ad-hoc *ex post facto* explanations of any finding. Their lack of generalizability is compounded by the fact that the fault lines of group-specific antipathy can easily shift over time with new political and social events (Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2013). Approaches based on racism or ethnocentrism are more easily transposable across contexts, as they merely require the majority to negatively differentiate their own group from all others (Kinder and Kam, 2010). By contrast, social identity explanations based on symbols and values require cohesive accounts of elements that are deeply context-dependent. The development of a general theory of how context interacts with individual attitudes would be a first step in systematizing

group- and context- specific analyses.

Taking stock of the dynamics of symbolic politics in a specific context can provide an account of antipathy that takes heterogeneity into consideration in a way that theories based on generalized ethnocentrism or racism do not. We find heterogeneity indeed exists in Canada and that understanding it requires reference to context-specific symbolic politics. There is certainly a sizeable community both in Canada and in Quebec whose attitudes toward ethnic minorities are driven purely by racial prejudice. But ethnic minority antipathy and racism are not always or necessarily one and the same. Quebecers in general seem to not take exception with ethnic out-groups themselves, but with certain out-groups' practices and beliefs. Such an outcome has been experimentally observed in the European context and has been suggested with regard to Muslims in Quebec (El-Geledi and Bourhis, 2012; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010). It might be argued that the opposition of minority practices and beliefs by a majority group is inherently racist or ethnocentric. But as Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) posit: "What could it mean to argue that in a liberal culture, it is ethnocentric to invoke liberal values as a normative standard?" (p.36). If Quebecers are only unsympathetic to minority groups perceived as confronting certain liberal national values, then it is not generalized intolerance that underpins their attitudes, but a specific opposition to the challenging out-group practices. It is possible to not take exception to a group itself but to still oppose forgoing certain valued national principles in order to accommodate that group (Parekh, 2000; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten, 2010).

Group-specific antipathy toward religious minorities has social implications that racial animus does not. In most contexts, racial animus weakens when racial majority group members come into contact with racial minority group members, provided that the contact is positive (Allport, 1954; Stouffer, 1955; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). Yet as Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009) point out, contact, and especially positive

contact, is less likely to occur when it comes to behavioural groups like religious minorities. Majority group citizens might be less likely to seek out contact with religious minorities because they perceive such minorities as intentionally and actively rejecting the beliefs and practices of the majority. In other words, accepting difference might be easier when the difference is seen as incidental, or out of the control of the minority individual. And religious minorities may actually be more likely to reject the beliefs and practices of the majority society than groups whose identity is not inextricably tied to a certain set of values. A value-based push and pull could put into question the flexibility of multiculturalism in liberal democracies. Such tension would be especially salient in minority nations where the “majority” is also a minority, and which thus must thus manage both external cultural pressures and internal pressure from newcomers.

5.2 Limitations and Future Directions

This study bears certain empirical and theoretical limitations. First, survey questions asking citizens to evaluate ethnic minorities are notoriously fraught with social desirability bias (Corstange, 2009; Holbrook, Green and Krosnick, 2003). And social desirability bias might vary by culture, so observed differences in the evaluations of francophones and anglophones might to an extent reflect this variability (Bernardi, 2006). Social desirability bias is mitigated in Internet samples, however, because of greater respondent anonymity (Chang and Krosnick, 2009). Second, francophones and anglophones also differ in their feeling thermometer evaluations of majority groups, such as whites and Catholics, in both the national and provincial samples, suggesting that there are wording effects in the two languages. Such effects could be determined in future surveys by employing alternate phrasing and examining whether differences persist when respondents are asked to evaluate less emotionally charged objects, such as economic policies. As previously mentioned, the study also suffers from murki-


ness over the direction of causality between secularism and attitudes toward religious minorities. Though little prior evidence suggests the relationship should be in the reverse direction, it is still a possibility that needs to be assessed experimentally. It is also possible that group-specific animus toward religious minorities in Quebec is simply a reflection of the fact that such groups represent the newest dominant immigrant waves. Yet such a theory would not explain antipathy toward Jews, who are generally not recent arrivals. Finally, cultural insecurity, like many concepts in symbolic politics, is highly amorphous, and thus difficult to capture holistically or precisely. A better understanding of the effects of cultural insecurity on public attitudes might be gleaned through the use of different items tapping specific aspects of insecurity, or a comprehensive scale comprised of such items. Ultimately, future research on immigration and attitudes toward ethnic minorities should take into consideration that antipathy toward minority groups, while often being grounded in racism, is not always so. A greater integration of specific contextual details into research on attitudes toward minorities in a given context can contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of the heterogeneous dynamics that govern intergroup attitudes.

Chapter 6

APPENDIX


6.1 Additional Figures

Figure 9. Distribution of Attitudes Toward Racial Minorities in Canada




Source: 2011 Canadian Election Study.

Figure 10. Distribution of Attitudes Toward Muslims in Canada



Source: 2011 Canadian Election Study.

Figure 11. One Factor Solution: Anglophone Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass.

6.2 Additional Tables

Table 8. Religiosity and Attitudes Toward Religious Minorities in Quebec

	Muslims	Sikhs	Jews
Religiosity	0.049*** (0.010)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.076*** (0.009)
Francophone	-0.116*** (0.012)	-0.118*** (0.011)	-0.102*** (0.010)
Allophone	-0.137*** (0.025)	-0.139*** (0.023)	-0.109*** (0.021)
Below high school	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.036** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.015)
University degree	0.070*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.005)
Age	-0.004*** (0.0002)	-0.003*** (0.0002)	-0.002*** (0.0001)
Woman	0.032*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.005)
Atheist	0.026*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)
Non-Christian religion	0.094*** (0.019)	0.076*** (0.018)	0.026 (0.017)
(constant)	0.780*** (0.015)	0.797*** (0.014)	0.775*** (0.013)
Observations	11,084	11,032	11,084
R ²	0.086	0.076	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.085	0.076	0.040

Source: 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.3 Question Wording

6.3.1 2011 Canadian Election Study

Feelings Toward Minorities

- And now some questions about countries and groups. How do you feel about [Muslims living here (in Canada) / racial minorities] Use any number from zero to one hundred. Zero means you really dislike [Muslims living here (in Canada) / racial minorities] and one hundred means you really like [Muslims living here (in Canada) / racial minorities].
- Et maintenant, quelques questions sur des pays et des groupes. Que pensez-vous des [musulmanes qui vivent ici (au Canada) / minorités raciales]? Utilisez n'importe quel nombre entre zero et cent. Zéro veut dire que vous n'aimez vraiment pas du tout les [musulmanes qui vivent ici (au Canada)/minorités raciales], et cent veut dire que vous aimez vraiment beaucoup les [musulmanes qui vivent ici (au Canada) / minorités raciales].

Religiosity

- In your life, would you say religion is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all?

6.3.2 2014 Quebec Vote Compass

Sovereignty

- Quebec should become an independent state

Secularism

- Government employees should not be permitted to wear religious symbols or clothing while at work
- Elected officials should be allowed to cover their faces for religious reasons
- The government should put gender equality ahead of religious freedom
- People should have the right to cover their faces for religious reasons when voting
- All religious symbols should be banned from government buildings
- Police officers and judges should not be allowed to wear religious symbols while on duty
- Teachers should not be permitted to wear overt religious symbols in the classroom
- Religious activity should be confined to private life in all circumstances
- The separation of Church and state is of utmost importance

Religiosity

- Aside from events such as weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
- How often do you engage in religious or spiritual activities on your own, such as prayer, meditation, or other forms of worship?

Cultural Insecurity

- These days I feel that Quebec's culture is threatened

Feelings Toward Ethnic Minorities

- We would like to know whether Quebecers have warm or cold feelings toward a number of well-known groups. How do you feel about these groups below? Use a scale from 0 to 10. Zero means you really dislike them and ten means you really like them.

Ethnic Background

- People in Canada come from many racial or cultural groups. What category do you think best describes you?

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