

Université de Montréal

**Governmentality and exclusion in post-disaster spaces:
conducting the conduct of the survivors of Typhoon Sendong in
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines**

par

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Résumé

Lorsque les aléas naturels se déroulent en catastrophes, les réponses des religieux, de l'Etat, et d'autres acteurs puissants dans une société révèlent à la fois les relations complexes entre ces parties et leur pouvoir dans la production des espaces auxquelles les survivants accèdent. La réponse en cas de catastrophe comprend la création d'espaces post-catastrophes, tels que des centres d'évacuation, des logements de transition et des sites de réinstallation permanente, qui ciblent spécifiquement un sous-ensemble particulier de survivants, et visent à les aider à survivre, à faire face, et à se remettre de la catastrophe. Les acteurs puissants dans une société dirigent les processus de secours, de récupération et de reconstruction sont des acteurs puissants qui cherchent à problématiser et à rendre un problème technique dans des termes qu'ils sont idéalement placés pour aborder à travers une variété d'interventions.

Ce projet de recherche vise à répondre à la question: où les survivants d'une catastrophe reconstruisent-ils leurs vies et leurs moyens de subsistance? Il enquête sur un cas spécifique de la migration environnementale dans laquelle des dizaines de milliers d'habitants ont été déplacés de façon permanente et temporaire de leurs résidences habituelles après le typhon Sendong à Cagayan de Oro, Philippines en 2011. La recherche est basée sur des entretiens avec les acteurs puissants et les survivants, des vidéos participatives réalisées par des survivants pauvres urbains, et des activités de cartographie. L'étude se fonde sur la théorie féministe, les études de migration, les études dans la gouvernamentalité, la recherche sur les changements de l'environnement planétaire, et les études régionales afin de situer les diverses expériences de la migration dans un contexte géographique et historique.

Cette thèse propose une topographie critique dans laquelle les processus et les pratiques de production d'espaces post-catastrophe sont exposés. Parce que l'espace est nécessairement malléable, fluide, et relationnelle en raison de l'évolution constante des activités, des conflits, et des expériences qui se déroulent dans le paysage, une analyse de l'espace doit être formulée en termes de relations sociales qui se produisent dans et au-delà de ses frontières poreuses. En conséquence, cette étude explore comment les relations sociales entre les survivants et les acteurs puissants sont liées à l'exclusion, la gouvernamentalité, la mobilité, et la production des espaces, des lieux et des territoires. Il constate que, si les trajectoires de migration de la plupart des survivants ont été confinés à l'intérieur des limites de la ville, les expériences de ces survivants et

leur utilisation des espaces urbains sont très différentes. Ces différences peuvent être expliquées par des structures politiques, économiques, et sociales, et par les différences religieuses, économiques, et de genre. En outre, il fait valoir que les espaces post-catastrophe doivent être considérés comme des «espaces d'exclusion» où les fiduciaires exercent une rationalité gouvernementale. C'est-à-dire, les espaces post-catastrophe prétendument inclusives servent à marginaliser davantage les populations vulnérables. Ces espaces offrent aussi des occasions pour les acteurs puissants dans la société philippine d'effectuer des interventions gouvernementales dans lesquelles certaines personnes et les paysages sont simplifiés, rendus lisibles, et améliorés.

Mots-clés : Migration environnementale, gouvernementalité, exclusion, Philippines, catastrophes, aléas naturels, genre, espace, territoire et lieu

Abstract

When natural hazards unfold into disasters, the responses of religious, state, and other trustees reveal both the complex relationships among these parties and their power in producing the spaces accessed by the survivors. The disaster response includes the creation of post-disaster spaces, such as evacuation centres, transitional housing, and permanent resettlement sites, that specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of survivors, and aim to help them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. The trustees directing the processes of disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding are powerful actors who seek to problematise and render technical an issue in terms that they are ideally placed to address through a variety of interventions.

This research project sets out to answer the question: where do the survivors of a disaster rebuild their lives and livelihoods? It investigates a specific case of environmental migration in which tens of thousands of residents were permanently and temporarily displaced from their usual places of residence after Typhoon Sendong in Cagayan de Oro, Philippines in 2011. The research is based on interviews with trustees and survivors, participatory videos made by urban poor survivors, and mapping activities. The study draws on feminist theory, migration studies, studies in governmentality, global environmental change literature, and regional studies to situate diverse experiences of migration within a geographical and historical context.

This dissertation offers a critical topography in which the processes and practices of producing post-disaster spaces are exposed. Because space is necessarily malleable, fluid, and relational due to the ever-changing activities, conflict, and experiences unfolding in the landscape, any analysis of space must be formulated in terms of the social relations occurring within and beyond its porous boundaries. Accordingly, this study explores how the social relations among survivors and trustees are linked to exclusion, governmentality, mobility, and space- and place-making. It finds that although the migration trajectories of most survivors were confined within the city limits, the experiences of these survivors and their use of urban spaces were vastly different. These differences can be explained by political, economic, and social structures, and by religious, economic, and gender differences. Furthermore, it argues that post-disaster spaces are best understood as “spaces of exclusion” where trustees exercise a governmental rationality. That is, purportedly inclusive post-disaster spaces serve to further marginalise vulnerable populations.

These spaces also open opportunities for trustees to carry out governmental interventions in which certain people and landscapes are simplified, rendered legible, and improved.

Keywords: Environmental migration, governmentality, exclusion, Philippines, disaster, natural hazards, gender, space and place

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List of acronyms

4Ps	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
Air Con	Air conditioning
BMLO	Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization
BPO	Business Process Outsourcing
BSP	Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
CDO	Cagayan de Oro
CENOMAR	Certificate of No Marriage
CMP	Community Mortgage Program
CR	Comfort room (bathroom)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSWD	City Social Welfare and Development office
DENR-MGB	Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Mines and Geology Bureau
DepEd	Department of Education
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government
DMPI	Del Monte Philippines Inc.
DOH	Department of Health
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DREAM	Disaster Risk and Exposure Assessment for Mitigation
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EMD	Estate Management Division
FICCO	First Community Cooperative
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRO	Guest relations officer (sex worker)
H	Hazard
ICT	Information and communication technology
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFI	Interfaith Initiative
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Indigenous Peoples
LIAC	Local Inter-Agency Committee
LGU	Local government unit
LGTBQIA	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual
MDA	Mindanao Development Authority
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

NCMF	National Commission on Muslim Filipinos
NDF	National Democratic Front
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NFP	Natural Family Planning
NHA	National Housing Association
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPA	New People's Army
NSO	National Statistics Office
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OFW	Overseas Filipino Worker
PAGASA	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (Philippine national weather bureau)
PDNA	Post-disaster needs assessment
R	Risk
RA	Republic Act
ReINA	Real, Infanta and General Nakar
RP-ANFP	Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning
SAC	Social Action Center
SAP	Strategic action plan
SHFC	Social Housing Finance Corporation
SEASSI	Southeast Asian Summer Studies Institute
SOS	Survivors of Sendong
TS	Tropical storm
TWSC	Third World Studies Center
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States of America
V	Vulnerability
VP	Vice-president
WASH	Water, sanitation and health

List of Bisayan and Tagalog terms

<i>Ate</i>	Older sister. Respectful term for a woman not too much older than oneself/
<i>Abaca</i>	Type of banana tree (<i>Musa textilis</i>) endemic to the Philippines. Commonly called Manila hemp.
<i>Amakan</i>	Type of locally available bamboo (<i>Bambusa</i> spp.) woven into large sheets and used in construction.
<i>Anabaw</i>	Type of palm (<i>Saribus rotundifolius</i>).
<i>Aswang</i>	Mythical creature in Philippine folklore
<i>Babae</i>	Girl or woman.
<i>Balbal</i>	Ghoul, witch, or monster in Philippine folklore.
<i>Barangay</i>	Village. Officially, it is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines.
<i>Barangay basura</i>	Informal settlement by the dump.
<i>Baryo</i>	Village. Usually used to describe a rural village.
<i>Bayaniban</i>	Cherished Philippine value of helping each other and creating the sense of community.
<i>Carinderia</i>	Eatery.
<i>Carabao</i>	Water buffalo.
<i>Cogon</i>	Type of grass (<i>Imperata cylindrical</i>) that grows readily in areas cultivated with swidden agriculture methods.
<i>Colegio</i>	College or university.
<i>Datu</i>	Traditional chief.
<i>Gillage</i>	Informal settlement around an exclusive village.
<i>Habagat</i>	Monsoon.
<i>Ilaga</i>	Rat.
<i>Jeepney</i>	Converted U.S. military jeep used for public transportation on set routes.
<i>Kamote</i>	Sweet potato.
<i>Lalaki</i>	Boy or man.
<i>Lambago</i>	Tree species endemic to the Philippines that grows on riverbanks.
<i>Lechon</i>	Roasted pig prepared by a <i>lechonero</i> .
<i>Lumad</i>	Collective term for the non-Muslim minority in the Philippines. In CDO, the term is used synonymously with 'Indigenous Peoples' or 'IP.'
<i>Maayong hapon</i>	Good afternoon.
<i>Malling</i>	Shopping and window-shopping. A favourite pastime of many Filipinos in which they enjoy air-conditioned stores, eat at fast food or fancy restaurants, listen to concerts, receive vaccinations, attend church services and occasionally purchase items.
<i>Malong</i>	Traditional woven tube skirt used by Muslim Filipino men and women in southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.
<i>Malunggay</i>	Endemic tree species (<i>Moringa oleifera</i>) widespread in the Philippines. Its leaves are used in many soups and as a traditional medicine.

<i>Merienda</i>	Snack or small meal.
<i>Minanga</i>	Literally a type of freshwater fish, and the colloquial term for a sex worker who is a minor.
<i>Motor</i>	Motorised scooter for hire. Also called <i>habal-habal</i> .
<i>Motorela</i>	Small motorised scooter with an attached cab used for public transportation on set routes.
<i>Multicab</i>	Small light truck generally used for public transportation on set routes. More expensive than <i>jeepneys</i> .
<i>Nipa</i>	Type of palm (<i>Nypa fruticans</i>) found throughout the archipelago. Its fronds are frequently used to make the thatch roofs of the quintessential Philippine <i>nipa</i> hut.
<i>Pakyaw</i>	Pre-arranged deal in which a driver agrees to drive for a certain period of time and/or along a particular route at an agreed-upon price.
<i>Piso-piso</i>	Literally “one cent, one cent.” Refers to a program of the mayor of CDO that aims to reduce poverty and enable the urban poor to purchase a lot upon which they can build their house.
<i>Riles</i>	(Along the) <i>riles</i> . Informal settlement by the train tracks.
<i>Sala</i>	Living or meeting room.
<i>Sari-sari</i>	Small convenience store.
<i>Sikad</i>	Non-motorised cycle rickshaw for private hire. Also called <i>trisikad</i> .
<i>Simbang gabi</i>	Devotional pre-dawn masses for Catholic and Aglipayan Filipinos from 16 to 24 December.
<i>Sitio</i>	Hamlet or sub-village. Smaller than a <i>barangay</i> .
<i>Tabing-dagat</i>	Informal settlement by the sea.
<i>Tabing-ilog</i>	Informal settlement by the river.
<i>Taga-gawa</i>	Literally “from the outside.” Refers to an outsider.
<i>Talipapa</i>	Small specialised kiosk.
<i>Tanod</i>	Security guard.
<i>Tito</i>	Uncle.
<i>Usog</i>	Practice in which a parent or well-meaning adult licks their finger then puts it on a baby’s forehead. Believed to prevent illness.
<i>Yaya</i>	Nanny.

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Chapter 1. A case of environmental migration

Introduction

On the evening of Friday December 16th 2011, many Cagayaños were celebrating the holiday season at Christmas parties all over town. Unaccustomed to severe tropical storms, most Cagayan de Oro (CDO) residents had failed to notice or had dismissed the tropical storm weather warnings issued earlier that day by the Philippine national weather bureau, PAGASA, as fear-mongering hyperbole. They reveled, returned home, and fell asleep. Hours later, they awoke to the sounds of rushing water and the terrified screams of neighbours. Only then did they realise that the great Cagayan River had breached its banks, and was rapidly sweeping people, houses, and debris into its torrential waters and carrying them downstream out to sea.

This was Tropical Storm Washi, locally known as Typhoon Sendong. Never before had the city experienced such devastation: 41 of 80 *barangays*¹ were directly affected; 388 people died; 386 people went missing; 38,071 families were displaced; \$19.5 million worth of road, water, and power utilities infrastructure were destroyed; and economic losses to the agriculture, fisheries, forestry, service, commerce and trade, and industry sectors were \$4.9 million (Local government unit of Cagayan de Oro (LGU of CDO) 2012).² On 20 December 2011 Philippine President Benigno Aquino III declared a State of National Calamity for the cities of CDO and Iligan (Government of the Philippines (GoP) 2011a). The disaster revealed myriad weaknesses – from impotent local political leadership and uneven distribution of disaster relief aid to unsafe and unenforced zoning laws and precarious livelihoods of many CDO residents. The activities that unfolded in the ensuing days, weeks, and months showed the intricate negotiation between the survivors of the disaster and the trustees who controlled the access to resources, especially those linked to disaster relief and recovery. (The concept of trustee is developed in chapter 2.) The disaster and the response to it exposed a city topography in which gender, religious, and class dynamics continually produce spaces and places that are experienced very differently by individual residents.

¹ In the Philippines, a *barangay* is the smallest administrative unit. It loosely translates to “village.”

² Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are converted from Philippine pesos into American dollars using the average exchange rate from 2012, which according to the Philippine Statistics Authority – National Statistical Coordination Board was ₱1 = \$0.024 US (PSA-NSCB 2015).

Of particular significance to this study is the displacement or migration of the survivors. When environmental factors influence the mobility of people away from their habitual residences, either temporarily or permanently, such movement is termed “environmental migration” (U.K. Government Office for Science (GOS) 2011). Typhoon Sendong is one such example: over 38,000 households in Cagayan de Oro were temporarily forced from their houses because of rising flood waters. Only a portion of these people were granted housing in the official permanent off-site relocation sites. Other affected people returned to the sites of their old houses, or left permanently for other locations.

Official aid conduits included government agencies, religious groups, civil society organisations, and international humanitarian agencies. These experts or trustees created official spaces of disaster relief and recovery. They contributed financial, material, and human resources to alleviate the suffering of survivors, to rebuild the local infrastructure and economy, and to support survivors in rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Directly or indirectly, they urged a subset of survivors to follow very particular trajectories, along what I call “institutionalised sleeping pathways.” The typical pattern is: flooded house site to evacuation camp, to transitional housing site, to permanent relocation housing site. Although hundreds of households did follow institutionalised pathways, such trajectories were exceptional. Far more survivors forged much more complex routes; they supplemented official relief aid with personal assets, personal networks, and individual or household initiatives.

The experiences of survivors in the aftermath of Sendong were highly gendered. In some instances, the existing gendered division of labour was amplified, for example when women stretched a very limited household budget in the temporary housing sites. In other cases, prevailing gender roles were temporarily reshaped, for example as mothers assumed the responsibility for securing a resettlement house. The official spaces of disaster relief and recovery were profoundly gendered, too. The responses of state and religious trustees to gender-based violence in evacuation camps and temporary housing sites, and the isolation of relocation sites in CDO’s periphery disproportionately penalised women survivors. Even purportedly inclusive official aid spaces reinforced the exclusion of the city’s Muslim population, in particular by designing official sleeping spaces inaccessible to veiled Muslim women and by allowing religious prejudices to affect relief distribution.

The environmental migration after Typhoon Sendong in CDO is an interesting and instructive case. It is neither representative of, nor unique among, disasters around the world, or even in the Philippine archipelago. Yet, understanding what happened is potentially very useful. The perceived inexperience of the city with natural hazards hints at what climate change might bring to other areas previously unaccustomed to them. The interventions of religious and state trustees in disaster relief and recovery suggest they pursued what James Scott (1998) calls acts of simplification with the goal of increasing the legibility of survivors and of the spaces they inhabit for the purpose of manipulation. Moreover, the CDO case reveals the importance of pre-existing religious prejudices in the failure of official post-disaster spaces. The purported improvement of so-called worthy survivors in relocation sites raises practical and ethical questions for politicians and practitioners, and, for scholars, theoretical questions about vulnerability, space, place, exclusion, and mobility.

Before describing the academic landscape in which this research is situated, a brief terminological note is warranted. In this dissertation, the term “Typhoon Sendong” does not refer strictly to the geophysical phenomena associated with this particular tropical storm and the flooding that ensued. According to the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale categories, Sendong was not a typhoon, it was only as strong as a tropical storm (Manila Observatory 2011). The criteria separating tropical storm from typhoon, while useful to meteorologists, are meaningless to the people affected by Sendong. For example, a shopkeeper whose micro-business and house were swept away in the flood waters wasn’t particularly bothered by technicalities such as the exact wind speed that differentiates a tropical storm from a typhoon.³ What mattered was the outcome. As such, in this dissertation, the geophysical components of Typhoon Sendong are deemed inseparable from its catastrophic impacts on people, and on the social, political, economic, and physical environments in which they live their lives. Such an understanding of Typhoon Sendong is echoed by Filipinos, and especially Cagayaños, for whom the natural phenomenon of the storm and the human devastation are indivisible. When referring exclusively to the geophysical components, the official designation for this tropical storm is used: Tropical Storm Sendong. The discrepancy between the understanding and prescription of so-called experts or trustees, and that

³ According to the Manila Observatory (2011), the one-minute maximum sustained wind speeds for a tropical storm are 63 to 118 kph, and 119 to 153 kph for the lowest intensity typhoon.

of the laypeople (i.e. the intended beneficiaries of the former's knowledge and programs) surfaces many times in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. For the remainder of this chapter I situate this study as an example of environmental migration best studied through a feminist lens, and then provide an outline of the dissertation.

Environmental migration

That people move, in part, for environmentally-driven reasons is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has existed for about as long as humans have inhabited the planet as a means for adapting to environmental and economic “perturbations,” and for reducing vulnerability (Suhrke 1993, Hugo 1996, Barnett and Webber 2010, McLeman and Hunter 2010, McLeman 2013).⁴ What is new, and what is likely to be seen in the coming years, is an increase in population mobility that is influenced by environmental change and perturbations, and especially by climate change, most of which will occur in developing countries (Perch-Nielsen, Bättig and Imboden 2008, McLeman and Hunter 2010, GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). Climate-related exposures, for example, will affect ecosystem goods and services, water supply, food production, and spread of infectious diseases, and may reduce the effectiveness of traditional coping mechanisms or even render them maladaptive (Barnett and Webber 2010). The poorest people and poorest countries will be disproportionately affected (Barnett and Webber 2010, GOS 2011).

Migration is but one of a suite of adaptation measures people may pursue in anticipation of or in response to environmental “triggers” such as typhoons, famine and industrial pollution. The term “adaptation” is conceived differently by migration scholars and by environmental change scholars. Migration scholars use the term to discuss the ability of migrants to integrate into destination communities, whereas environmental change scholars use it to describe the capacity of a system, population or location to adapt to a given exposure (McLeman 2013). Throughout this thesis, “adaptation” refers to the latter sense. Environmental “triggers,” however, may have

⁴ The environmental migration literature typically uses terminology like “perturbations,” “drivers,” “targets,” “pressures,” “triggers,” and “factors.” Feminist scholars contend the uncritical use of these terms serves patriarchal, capitalist and neoliberal agendas. Such use of language abstracts or naturalises the objects being described, thereby suggesting they can be studied outside of the social and that they are not human constructs produced through unequal social relations. The use of these terms is minimised, but when their inclusion is necessary I have written them inside quotation marks so as to draw attention to this limitation in the environmental literature.

little or no direct connection with other factors, such as access to social networks and financial resources, cultural heritage, and the freedom to migrate legally, that influence the duration and destination(s) of migration (McLeman 2013, xii). Migration can be considered an adaptation to environmental change in that it can be used to adapt to negative impacts or to take advantage of resulting opportunities (McLeman and Smit 2006, Tacoli 2009, Barnett and Webber 2010, McLeman and Hunter 2010, Warner 2010, GOS 2011).

One example of a migration-focused adaptation is the planned relocation of groups of people or even entire communities to a predefined location. Since the mid-1990s, planned resettlement has occurred in Papua New Guinea, Montserrat, Ethiopia, China and the Maldives, where households and entire communities were moved away from areas dealing with sea level rise, erosion, volcanic activity, drought, and land degradation (GOS 2011, 175-179, 185). The U.K. Government Office for Science's (2011) report on the future of environment migration argues that these experiences reveal the following factors that undergird successful relocation and those that hasten failure. Well-resourced, carefully planned relocation is better than haphazard, uncoordinated, internal relocation. Relocation funding should be secured before there is an immediate need for it, as in the aftermath of a typhoon. Moving agricultural communities from one rural area into another is very risky and has a low probability of success. Securing adequate and appropriate livelihoods for migrants is very difficult. Relocation organised by the state or by another organisation is very costly. People should always have the option to refuse relocation. The most resilient policies are the ones that favour individual control over mobility; the least resilient ones privilege state control over individual mobility.

A brief history of environmental migration scholarship

In the 1980s there was an enormous surge in the volume and breadth of research on the causes and impacts of anthropogenic climate change, so it is not surprising that the idea of environmental refugees first surfaced in the United Nations Environment Programme in 1985 (Bates 2002). The concept of environmental migration was based on hypothetical projections and worst case scenarios, and not on empirical evidence. Environmental refugee-type research succeeded in connecting migration to changes in exposure to environmental phenomena, but overlooked the significant effects of adaptation processes, especially those occurring at the individual and household levels where most migration decisions are made (McLeman 2013).

Stephen Castles (2002), (2010) and the U.K. Government Office for Science (2011) provide succinct overviews of the evolution of the environmental migration discourse, the wide discrepancies in estimates of the number of affected people, and the debate over how to categorise them. Since the mid-1980s, scholars from a range of disciplines have contributed diverse empirical studies, allowing for a much more nuanced, but still inadequate, characterisation that reflects actual cases. Emerging research came from fields such as natural hazards, global change, biology, ecology, climate science, political science and law (McLeman 2013). Migration scholars were conspicuously absent. Writing specifically about climate change and migration, geographer Robert McLeman (2013, 8) points out that this dearth means “that much of what scholars know about the relationship between climate and migration has been developed in relative isolation from the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological practices of the broader scholarly field of migration research.” A parallel situation exists in the broader environmental migration literature.

In a recent review of empirical work from around the world, Bremner and Hunter (2014) highlight four salient features of environmental migration. One, environmental change can be a dramatic push factor for migration, but more often, there is a continuum of environmental “pressures” (i.e. natural hazards and the disasters they precipitate are the extreme). Two, most environmental migrants move voluntarily over short distances, often returning after the “pressure” subsides. Three, environmental change may constrain some migrants, and so a focus on immobility and trapped populations is urgently needed. Four, environmental change almost always interacts with other drivers of migration. In other words, environmental migration is not a simple case of stimulus-response. Instead, like every other type of migration, environmental migration will be shaped by the interactions of environmental processes with cultural, political and social ones (McLeman 2013). Bremner and Hunter (2014) also emphasise that the early alarmist projections of massive waves of environmental refugees flooding across international borders, threatening the security and sovereignty of states (cf. Homer-Dixon 1994, UNHCR, IOM et al. 2009), have been discredited as hyperbolic fantasy (cf. McLeman 2011, GOS 2011). Today, researchers of environmental migration issues are urged to study the linkages among climate change, migration and food security issues; the trapped and immobile populations in the context of environmental change and; the classed, racialised, and gendered aspects of climate change and migration (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). It is the latter call that this study addresses.

To critically investigate the classed, racialised, and gendered aspects of a case of environmental migration, this research project draws upon feminist approaches to migration.

Migration through a feminist lens

Gender and migration scholars underline the inadequacy of mainstream migration theories, whose ideas inform environmental migration discourses. One of the earliest critiques targeted the persistent invisibility of women. Over decades of engaging in migration debates, feminist scholars shifted academic debates away from the omnipresent male standard. Prior to the 1970s, most migration research assumed women were passive companions (Pessar and Mahler 2003), who “followed merely as appendages to the career aspirations of the male partner” (Raghuram and Kofman 2004, 96), and were thus denied the possibility of agency (Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). At the time most research was focused on economic and labour-based explanations for migration. By assuming men and women equally valued higher wages, and by restrictively defining work as paid productive work in the public sphere, this research effectively silenced women’s migratory experiences, and left uninvestigated the role of household dynamics, reproductive activities and gender relations in migratory processes (Lawson 1998), even though women made up nearly half of all international migrants (Hunter and Davis 2009). In the 1970s and 80s, feminist scholars tried correcting these omissions with an add-and-stir approach of inserting women’s experiences into dominant narratives (Pessar and Mahler 2003). The focus on women became so pronounced that the male migrant almost disappeared from migration studies. The response to this swing was the emergence of a gender and migration approach, which prevailed from the late 1980s until the early 90s. It sought to reveal how gender differentiated men’s and women’s experiences in migration and how gender relations shifted in the process of migration. The current approach of feminist migration scholars is to situate gender as a constitutive element of migration, where gender is understood to operate in a myriad of institutional, political and economic structures, to intersect with other forms of inequality, and to permeate practices, identities, expectations and institutions at a variety of scales (Parreñas 2009, Gaetano and Yeoh 2010, Roulleau-Berger 2010).

To be a useful analytical tool, gender is best conceived as a situated social difference and inequality that is located between and within groups of women and men with material consequences, and that operates as both a contested social process and structure. Gender is manifested materially in everyday practices, ideas and representations, which reflect power

relations between men and women, and within groups of women and of men (Wickramasinghe 2005). Hence, gender encompasses both social difference and social inequality; Parreñas (2009) fiercely defends that the latter should be the principal framing to avoid inadvertently accepting difference or inequality as natural or inevitable. The tangible outcomes of gender are best understood when gender is conceived as both a social process and a structure. Theorising gender as a process implies that social differences are necessarily created, revised and repeated to reproduce or dispute hierarchies of power and privilege (Pessar and Mahler 2003). Treating gender as a process is conducive to a praxis-oriented approach of debunking the myth of the naturalness and inevitability of gender differences by interrogating fluid gender identities, relations and ideologies (Pessar and Mahler 2003). Such a process, however, does not occur within a vacuum. As such, gender should be simultaneously imagined as a structure, or a scaffolding, of social relationships that allocates and organises power beyond the reach of an individual.

Mainstream migration discourses and practices do not incorporate such an understanding of gender. Instead, they tend to indiscriminately equate “gender” with a biologically-based definition of “sex,” which can overlook the voices of marginalised men, limit gender relations to male-female relations, and ignore major underlying structural issues (Cornwall 2003).

Dominant approaches are similarly impoverished by their simplistic definition of migration. Migration is typically conceived as a discrete event in which one or more person(s) move(s) over a certain distance for a certain period of time (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson 1998). Such a portrayal is problematic because it overemphasises economic and geopolitical forces precipitating the migration event, thereby implicitly inscribing masculinist assumptions about the nature and significance of migration (Kofman 2004, Silvey 2005). It neglects the practical role of migration as a pressing social justice issue insofar as migration policies dictate who is controlled, and how (Crosby 2006), and as a livelihood strategy, in particular for livelihood diversification and household security (Caces, Arnold et al. 1985, Hunter and Davis 2009) in the context of global environmental change (GOS 2011, Bremner and Hunter 2014).

Mainstream approaches cannot adequately address the complex stratification and interaction of gender, class and race (Kofman 2004). The example of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. underscores the potential for these inequalities to impart devastating impacts when a natural hazard occurs in

a locale with an uneven distribution of risk and vulnerability. The variation in the social inequality landscape of New Orleans far surpassed that observed in the physical landscape. Entitlements to health care, clean food and water, safe and livable neighbourhoods, social networks, transportation, capital and political representation were highly differentiated (Cutter 2006). The city's topographical gradients mirrored its class, race, ethnic, age and gender gradients: the wealthy had access to cars, credit cards and insurance plans; African-American and other ethnic enclaves were located in some of the most hazard-prone areas; insurance cheques were delayed for female-headed households who did not fit their insurer's narrow definition of family (Smith 2006, Hunter and Davis 2009). The social systems that had produced such unequal exposure to risk increased the likelihood that a disaster would affect certain people more than others, and these disparities reflected the city's power hierarchies (Bankoff 2006). As the relief and reconstruction efforts after Hurricane Katrina tragically demonstrated, disasters do not obliterate social differences but instead further entrench pre-existing social oppression and exploitation (Smith 2006).

Finally, feminist scholars reject the binary theoretical perspectives characteristic of dominant migration research. Mainstream approaches reinforce gendered dichotomies of public/private, male/female, skilled/unskilled, agentive/reactive, permanent/temporary, global/local and production/reproduction in explaining complex migratory flows (Kofman 2004, Gaetano and Yeoh 2010, Roulleau-Berger 2010). Even a heroes/victims discourse is problematic insofar as it eliminates a wider spectrum of migrant identities (Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). The static categories of "men" and "women" used in these approaches obscure the causes of diverse mobility patterns and the consequences of migration on migrants and their networks (Lawson 1998), while strict classification schemes (and immigration rules) that limit migratory moves to a single category (e.g. labour, family reunification, asylum) oversimplify actual migratory decisions combining work, career and marriage aspirations (Kofman 2004). The binaries are damaging; whether a person is categorised as "legal" or "illegal," or as an "immigrant" or a "refugee" has (un)intended, and in some cases, dangerous and marginalising consequences when used as a means of control or restricting access to resources and services (Crosby 2006).

The rejection of mainstream paradigms does not infer a refusal of all insights, methodologies and theorisations associated with them, only that there is a need for alternative approaches to better

account for different experiences. Feminist scholars offer several options. A useful starting point is to reframe migration as a social process embedded in other social processes simultaneously reflecting and reinforcing the existing social order, political processes, cultural norms and power differentials (Silvey 2004, 2005, Piper 2006, Roulleau-Berger 2010). Roulleau-Berger (2010, 10, my translation)⁵ proposes a revision of migration categories to better explain the myriad of migratory situations in which women's life journeys are "multipolar, transnational and oscillating." Unlike mainstream theoretical frameworks in which classification is aimed at simplifying migration into departure-arrival, settlement-return, temporary-permanent or other binaries, her classification scheme insists upon maintaining the complexity inherent in migration.

A troubling of scale is important, too. Scale can refer to either spatial or temporal boundaries and is often defined for "a particular issue and for particular purposes" (Cash and Moser 2000, 110). By extensively exploring scale, its construction and operation, feminist migration scholarship destabilises the gender-neutral approach of conventional migration research and its uncontested assumption of the primacy of certain scales (e.g. region, nation). Scale is socially constructed through sociospatial hierarchies and political, gendered and racial processes, privileging specific identities while excluding others (Silvey 2004, Hays-Mitchell 2008). Migration highlights different temporal, spatial and analytical scales, such as the body, household, region, nation-state, supranational organisation, among others. When people migrate, they bring with them social and cultural norms, they develop new social ties, and they send remittances home in the form of money, knowledge and skills (Bailey 2010). Gender constraints in the sending area are often replaced by a new set in the receiving area; for example, gender constraints operating at the national level in the sending area may be absent at the national level in the receiving area but present at the household level (Parreñas 2009, Roulleau-Berger 2010). Gender is part of each exchange, and so gendered social norms and constructs are circulated in the migration process at various spatial and temporal scales (Pratt 2004, Hunter and Davis 2009, Bailey 2010).

A scalar approach to investigating migration is akin to looking through a kaleidoscope, gently shifting between coarse and fine scales, trying to perceive how each picture is related to another. Investigating multiples scales and the interactions between them can reveal relational linkages

⁵ The original text reads "multipolaires, transnationales, pendulaires aussi à certains moments" (Roulleau-Berger 2010, 10).

hidden from single scale studies; for example, turning the kaleidoscope around the national scale can illustrate connections among bodies, households and the transnational sphere (Silvey 2004, Wright 2014). Interrogating scales reveals how the female migrant is constructed in departure, transit and arrival spaces, all of which produce differentiated inequalities. Roulleau-Berger (2010, 152, my translation⁶) explains,

At each stage of migration, women place themselves or are placed in a social space or order, differentially constructed depending on societal contexts. At each stage, men and women in migration change places in societies uniquely stratified as a result of the political, social and economic histories of countries. But, depending on the economic, cultural or political gaps among the different societal contexts, inequalities can be amplified or reduced along the migratory journey.

Hence, scales do not exist in isolation. With increased mobility of people, goods, ideas and institutions comes increased connectedness of scales from the body to the transnational space, and even the ability to bypass or jump scales (Bailey 2010), for example when global trade policies have material impacts on the households and even the bodies of Mexican *maquiladora* workers (Wright 2014). Investigating multiples scales and the interactions between them can thus reveal relational linkages hidden from single scale analyses (Pratt and Yeoh 2003, Silvey 2004).

Two additional alternatives to the dominant migration discourses merit a brief mention here. Pessar and Mahler's (2003, 818) update of their gendered geographies of power framework is designed to analyse people's social agency "given their own initiative as well as their positioning within multiple hierarchies of power operative within and across many terrains" in transnational spaces. It highlights the organisation of gender in migration as a process that (re)produces social differences. According to the model, a person's ability to act (e.g. the types and degrees of their agency) depends on scales such as the state, body and family and on their social location within fluid hierarchies of race, class, sexuality, ethnicity and gender. Gaetano and Yeoh (2010, 2-3)

⁶ The original text reads:

À chaque étape migratoire, les femmes se placent ou sont placées dans un espace social ou dans un ordre de reconnaissance construit différemment selon les contextes sociétaux. Les hommes et les femmes en migration changent de place à chaque étape dans les sociétés stratifiées différemment en fonction des histoires politiques, sociales et économiques des pays. Mais selon les écarts économiques, culturels ou politiques entre les différents contextes sociétaux, les inégalités multisituées peuvent s'amplifier ou se réduire au cours des étapes migratoires (Roulleau-Berger 2010, 154).

articulate an inclusive theoretical framework that best applies to the analysis of gendered mobilities in the Philippines:

[It] carefully analyses how gender intersects with the global and regional political economy; transnational institutions, legal frameworks, and social movements; state policy and citizenship practices; labour markets, labour processes, and the migration industry; households and family structure and relations; cultural and social norms in sending and receiving societies; and individual women's desires, goals, strategies and activism. [It] considers how gender intersects with other axes of identification such as nationality, ethnicity or race rural or urban, class, kinship, and sexuality to shape migrants' experiences and relations with sending and host societies. Moreover, [it] explores the complex ways that migrant women actively accommodate, reinforce, resist and otherwise engage with these gendered institutions, processes and ideas, as individuals and collectives.

Hence, scholars should embrace complexity in deconstructing gendered binaries and in exposing the institutions that construct them and strip away women's agency.

What is lacking in much of the gender and migration literature is the integration of environmental considerations. Environmental and global change factors are essential in any theoretical analysis of gender and migration because livelihood strategies, including migration, are shaped by environmental factors that interact with gendered labour processes and the household division of labour (Hunter and Davis 2009, Willis 2010). For example, climate change and shifts in the availability and quality of proximate natural resources and agricultural potential may differentially shape both the causes and consequences of migration by gender. A decline in natural resource-based livelihood options can shape patterns of outmigration, especially in developing countries where environmental change has immediate and direct impacts on livelihood options and on the health and well-being of millions of people.

The neglect of environmental factors in the gender and migration literature is problematic, but unsurprising. It is unsurprising because migration scholarship and environmental migration scholarship evolved as distinct non-overlapping fields, and has been developed by researchers in different disciplines (McLeman 2013). It is problematic because environmental factors are also gendered. This is especially true for natural hazards and the disasters they catalyse. Women, for instance, are three times more likely to die in disasters than men, although mortality rates by sex differ according to type of disaster and risk-taking behaviour (Hunter and David 2009, 18).

Deadlier experiences for women are not due to biology (e.g. strength, size, physical capabilities)

but to socially produced gender relations. Gender-based cultural factors also shape immobility, and sometimes are a hurdle separating the intention to evacuate and the capacity to evacuate. In flood situations, for example, women took risks more seriously and evacuated earlier than men but were less able to evacuate than men once the floods were well underway because their caregiver role made it impossible for them to escape with their children (Hunter and David 2009). Such situations create trapped populations, which are disproportionately female. In the immediate aftermath of disaster, women often experience extra economic, domestic, social and personal burdens, and face increased domestic violence and sexual demands (Delica 1998). At the same time, they may also find that new gendered opportunities have opened up for them, which may have long-lasting impacts on gender relations (Delica 1998, Enarson 2000). Integrating environmental factors into a feminist study of environmental migration is thus imperative.

Research questions

The central research question guiding this dissertation is seemingly simple: where do survivors rebuild their lives and livelihoods after a disaster? An exhaustive list of locations accompanied by their geographic coordinates, however, is not what I'm after. The “where” component is much more nuanced. In asking, “where do survivors go?” I seek to analyse post-disaster spaces – their characteristics and meanings, the connections they have with other spaces, the way they are shaped. Post-disaster spaces are spaces that specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of survivors, and aim – in some way – to help them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. This question segues into the equally important question of “where do survivors *not* go?” which begs for an explanation of forced exclusion or voluntary immobility. Embedded in the “rebuilding their lives” part of the research question is the assumption that lives were in some way “broken” or severely disrupted by Typhoon Sendong, and that these lives are indeed “rebuilt.” This component requires an unpacking of both the explicit and implicit objectives of all implicated actors, as well as the actual processes and outcomes (both intended and unintended) of the rebuilding. In this way, a simple “where” research question is also layered with questions of what, why, how, and for whom.

Three research objectives further tease apart the overarching research question. They are: (1) to characterise vulnerable survivors, (2) to map their post-disaster routes in the short and medium term, (3) to evaluate the roles of trustees and vulnerable survivors in shaping post-disaster spaces.

A brief note on terminology is required here. As feminist migration scholars have argued, definitional issues have very real implications on the lives of migrants. This dissertation refers to the people directly affected by Typhoon Sendong as “survivors” and “victims.” Unless otherwise indicated, a survivor is someone who was physically present in a location affected by the tropical storm on 16-17 December 2011, and who was obliged to leave that location temporarily or permanently. A victim is someone who died or went missing during or as a result of the tropical storm. These terms accurately describe the people affected by Sendong, and their situations, while still leaving open the possibility of analysing alternative discourses advanced by trustees.

Other possible terms, including “environmental refugee,” “environmental migrant,” “internally displaced person,” and “*bakwit*,” were rejected for a variety of reasons. Using “environmental” as a descriptor is misleading because no single factor, event or process inevitably produces migration. Indeed, while environmental change may be a proximate catalyst of migration, the impetus to migrate or not is often deeply embedded in underlying and interacting social, economic, political, cultural and personal factors (Lonergan 1998, McLeman and Smit 2006, Boano, Zetter and Morris 2008, McAdam 2009, Barnett and Webber 2010, McAdam 2011a).

Many communities in Mindanao, the large Philippine island in which Cagayan de Oro is located, use the term *bakwit* to describe displaced people; its literal translation is “to evacuate” (Canuday 2009, 1). The *bakwit* are usually portrayed as helpless, evoking an image of “a throng of people burdened by heavy loads, trudging away from some strife-torn countryside” (Canuday 2009, 1). Although *bakwit* has Mindanao roots and offers the possibility of looking beyond pejorative stereotypes to see the power of the displaced (cf. Canuday 2009), it is inappropriate for this research project. *Bakwit* is associated with the war in Mindanao and the people directly impacted by the conflict, and not with the people living outside the war zone affected by natural hazards.

The challenge of labelling is further complicated by political, colloquial and organisational meanings. The term “refugee” has a very specific and narrow definition enshrined in international law; the definition does not include environmental factors as a form of persecution (Kniveton, Schmidt-Verkerk et al. 2008, Wahlström 2011, McAdam 2011b, 2011c). Colloquially, “refugee” connotes an image of limited choices, forced mobility, minimal agency, but conferring of legal protection through the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Prior to the adoption of the Refugee Convention, the term “refugee” was widely used as a generic term for forced

migration, even in government documents (McLeman 2013). The term “migrant” has no internationally agreed upon legal definition. It is usually associated with agency, choice, and voluntary, planned mobility; for instance, people following job opportunities or loved ones are classified as “economic migrants” or “family reunification migrants,” respectively. On the other hand, displacement insinuates forced or unplanned mobility with limited choice; for example, people forced from their homes due to violence, war, famine, natural hazards who do not cross international borders are called “internally displaced persons” (IDPs). Like refugees, IDPs may be afforded certain protections, but only if the IDPs’ home country has agreed to implement the voluntary *United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement* (OCHA 2004). Furthermore, there are currently no internationally agreed upon legal definitions for “environmental migrant,” “environmental refugee” or “environmentally displaced person” (Black 2001, Betts 2011). Given the disparate political, colloquial and organisational meanings of refugee, migrant and IDP labels, and their mismatch with the CDO case, the best descriptors of the Sendong-affected people are thus “survivors” and “victims.”

Outline of the dissertation

The dissertation is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents theoretical concepts that help in critically interrogating migration. Briefly, these concepts construct migration as (1) a process that alters space, place and exclusion, (2) an avenue for exercising governmentality, and (3) mobility which can compress space-time or the distance separating an individual from desired resources. These concepts form the basis of the conceptual framework guiding this thesis. The chapter also introduces the trustees who shape migration.

Chapter 3 delves into political, historical, geographical, social, cultural elements that help explain the settlement and growth of Cagayan de Oro (CDO), and the trustees who play salient roles in post-disaster efforts. It is a selective history of CDO up to, and including, Tropical Storm Sendong. The chapter is based on official reports, newspaper articles, eye witness accounts and scholarly research. Chapter 3 and subsequent analytical chapters find that the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong was neither anomalous nor unpredictable, but was instead an example of the continuity of the power of the Catholic Church and the state in the Philippines.

The methodology chapter articulates the research process – from conception to final analysis – as a process of becoming. Chapter 4 is inspired by the calls of feminist geographers to question how

the researcher's positionality, power and the constructed boundaries of the field all affect the research process. The writing style of this chapter reinforces the chapter content (i.e. the underlying messy, disruptive, rewarding, and emotional aspects of developing and writing up a research project, and of conducting fieldwork with a family). Foregrounding the intersection of research and family life in the research process is not a thinly veiled mommy blog. Rather, it justifies using particular methods over others, and illustrates how methodology-related decisions were rooted in family-related factors. The chapter deals with the specifics of accompanied fieldwork, data construction methods, data interpretation methods, and study limitations.

The following three chapters present the research results. Chapter 5 analyses vulnerability in CDO, in the particular context of the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. It argues that vulnerability is not natural, but is instead a function of constructed economic, political, social and cultural elements that form societal structures, which necessarily interact with environmental factors. It shows that in selecting the beneficiaries for their disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding efforts, trustees typically single out particular demographics or identify people with particular indicators of vulnerability. These approaches do not encapsulate all the different types of people who lie along the vulnerability continuum. The chapter ends with an analysis of the vulnerability discourses that inform and shape post-disaster efforts.

Chapter 6 offers a critical topography of post-Sendong CDO. It maps the trajectories of survivors and the specific places where they rebuild their lives and livelihoods. The chapter draws heavily on Hall, Hirsch and Li's (2011) *Powers of exclusion* to articulate the exclusionary character of post-disaster spaces. The analysis of post-disaster spaces emphasises the extent to which the vulnerability approaches and vulnerability discourses laid out in Chapter 5 rely upon the powers of exclusion. Together, the approaches, narratives and powers of exclusion combine to produce profoundly gendered post-disaster spaces where power hierarchies are reinscribed, gender roles are remade and pre-existing prejudices are perpetuated.

Chapter 7 posits CDO's post-disaster spaces are spaces for reconstruction where time-space is stretched out for the majority of residents. The intended long-term products of the reconstruction processes are permanent resettlement sites and purportedly "improved" people; these spaces and the people who live there reflect what each actor envisions as an improved society. Simplified and legible resettlement sites receptive to governmental interventions are

contrasted with the impenetrable, illegible slum communities to which many survivors belonged pre-Sendong. Put another way, this case of environmental migration is also a case of governmentality; the trustees shaping official post-disaster spaces aimed to conduct the conduct of others. The chapter engages with James Scott's (1998) *Seeing like a state* and Tania Murray Li's (2007a) *The will to improve*.

The final chapter synthesises the preceding chapters, highlights the study's main contributions and limitations, and suggests notable areas for future research. In doing so, it reframes environmental migration as a (re)making of spaces, places and people at the sites of people's old homes, their new homes, and everywhere in-between.

Chapter 2. Theorising post-disaster spaces and places

Introduction

Which spaces do survivors access and avoid, and which spaces are they excluded from in the process of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods after a disaster? Who else is there or not there? What explains their presence or absence? Why is each space uniquely experienced as distinct places by different people or even by the same person over time? This chapter provides a theoretical basis for applying these questions to the post-disaster trajectories of Sendong survivors.

To answer these questions, this chapter reaches beyond the environmental migration literature. A growing body of empirical environmental migration studies informs the research design of this project and especially the methodology; for example in selecting appropriate questions, and in identifying and locating potential interviewees. This literature also usefully characterises environmental migration as typically short distance, voluntary, return-oriented, linked to pre-existing or structural vulnerabilities, a response to a continuum of “environmental pressures,” and almost always interacting with other “drivers of migration” (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013, Bremner and Hunter 2014). This chapter delves into other theoretical concepts that help in critically interrogating migration. Briefly, these concepts construct migration as (1) a process that alters space and place, (2) an avenue for exercising governmentality, and (3) mobility which can compress space-time or the distance separating an individual from desired resources.

Chapter 2 is organised into three parts. Part I contends that space and place are inextricably linked to social relations, which are differentially experienced by individuals and groups at particular moments in time. These social relations are necessarily influenced by political, social, historical, economic, environmental, and other factors that result in an unequal distribution of power and, of particular relevance to this study, control over mobility. Although people with varying access to mobility may temporally or spatially share given locales, each individual’s experience and interpretation of these places will necessarily be unique. Moreover, the inequality in social relations unfolding in these locales yields a simultaneous multiplicity of spaces, which are produced through myriad social processes occurring and structures existing above the scale of the individual within and beyond the boundaries of a given space. In other words, no two people had

identical conceptions of post-disaster spaces in Cagayan de Oro (CDO); each person had their own unique experiences of post-disaster places.

Part II examines government in the Foucauldian sense of “the conduct of conduct.” It includes a discussion of power, informed by critical studies, and especially by feminist studies. The section studies the experts or trustees who “problematise” and “render technical” particular issues (Li 2007a), so that they can “manipulate” (Scott 1998), or exert a “will to improve” (Li 2005, 2007a, 2007b). It also identifies the objects of governance; although diverse people and landscapes are subject to manipulation or improvement, the discussion here focuses on vulnerable people because the relevance to the CDO case.

Finally, because this research project is a case of environmental migration in which trustees attempt to govern vulnerable people, particular attention will be paid to mobility and time-space compression in part III. Individuals and groups who can initiate and control their mobility benefit from a compression of time-space because their hypermobility reduces the temporal and spatial distance between them and desired resources (Massey 1994). In some cases, these hypermobile elites can diminish the mobility of others, and effectively stretch out the latter’s experience of time-space, making it harder for them to access resources.

Space, place and exclusion

The concepts of space and place are intrinsic to a geographical study investigating where survivors go in the aftermath of a disaster. Understanding the constructed, dynamic character of space and place helps to situate the objectives of and actions occurring within official post-disaster spaces such as evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation sites, and to explain the various roles played by different groups of people at these sites.

While space and place are sometimes used interchangeably, geographers distinguish between the two concepts. In conventional geography, place is a unique bounded entity within which a person can undergo a subjective, meaningful and emotional experience; space is usually couched in abstract, geometrical, locational and objective terms such as distance, latitude and longitude (Bondi and Davidson 2005). Space is portrayed as general and impersonal, whereas place is portrayed as particular, authentic, localised and intertwined with everyday relations (Taylor and Flint 2000). Such conceptualisations are built on the erroneous assumption that space and place are static (Massey 1994).

Echoing Massey, many feminist geographers reject the assertion that spaces and places are fixed, neutral, separate from social and spatial processes, and impervious to social categories such as sexuality, race and gender (Staeheli and Martin 2000, Silvey 2004, Bondi and Davidson 2005). They reject any suggestion of disembodied objectivity, and offer alternative characterisations. They emphasise the malleability of space and place over time due to ever-changing activities, conflict and experiences unfolding in the landscape (Staeheli and Martin 2000). Massey (1994) argues that concepts of space and place must be formulated in terms of social relations, which are themselves constantly shifting, and so space and place are necessarily dynamic. Space occurs above the scale of the individual; it encompasses “the broader network of relations and processes that connect places with each other” (Staeheli and Martin 2000, 141). These networks connect “all spatial scales from the most local level to the most global” (Massey 1994, 264). Massey (1994, 264) insists that space and time are inseparable and that “space is not static, nor time spaceless [... because] neither can be conceptualized as the absence of the other.”

Places, contend Staeheli and Martin (2000, 140), are uniquely experienced by each individual, and are “contested, multiple, layered, subject to shifting and porous boundaries, and constructed in relation to systems of power, including economic relations, racialization, ethnicity, and gender.” The unique experiences of each individual, stemming from their different experiences and interpretations of social relations, produce multiple identities of a place and a “simultaneous multiplicity of spaces” (Massey 1994, 3). The particularity of a place derives “not from some long internalized history but [from] the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus” (Massey 1993, 66 in Li 2007a, 28). In other words, the identity of a place is constructed through its openness to “movement, communication and social relations which always stretched beyond it” (Massey 1994, 170). Massey (1994) notes that most places are hubs of social relations and interconnections from within *and* that stretch beyond the boundary of a locality. In other words, place is necessarily extra-local and border-crossing.

In her critique of American urban planning in *The death and life of great American cities*, Jane Jacobs (1961) offers an understanding of borders that will prove salient to the discussion of post-disaster spaces in subsequent chapters. To Jacobs (1961, 257), a border is any “perimeter of a single massive or stretched-out use of territory.” Borders exist at many scales, including within cities or

even within the neighbourhoods that people encounter in their everyday lives. Jacobs dismisses the characterisation of the border as passive object, arguing instead that it actively exerts influence through its mere existence. Borders are inevitably destructive; the blandness and emptiness of a border around a single primary use area kills diversity, discourages people from visiting the area and makes streets unsafe, which, in turn, reduces areas to “fragmented, self-isolated neighborhoods or backwaters” (Jacobs 1961, 259). As we’ll see in Chapters 6 and 7, the single “stretched-out use of territory” for resettlement housing is already turning relocation sites into “fragmented, self-isolated neighborhoods or backwaters.” Yet, at the same time, relocation sites are not fenced in, their borders deliberately left ambiguous.

In the broader context of migration, feminist research positions borders – usually national borders – as the subject of inquiry. Operating between social subjects and places, “the border is a ‘meeting place’ of a tangled network of uneven social and economic relations, environmental circumstances, and ecosystemic limitations, all of which are constructed on a far larger scale than the place itself” (Di Chiro 2005, 511). They are complex, contradictory and transient (Staeheli and Martin 2000), and political, deliberate and imposed (Crosby 2006). They exclude certain people yet are porous to capital (Kofman 2004, Silvey 2004, Pellerin 2004a, 2004b, 2005, Mountz 2011). They are produced through gendered relationships of power (Staeheli and Martin 2000). Hence, borders must be conceptualised as simultaneously form and function (Pellerin 2004b). Managing borders is fundamental to current debates on citizenship, human rights, democracy, economic development and transborder cooperation (Pellerin 2004b). Indeed, Crosby (2006) points out that the term “migration policy” is a euphemism for containment policy or population control policy. Therefore, asking questions about the social and political making and remaking of borders challenges dominant discourse and uncovers underlying assumptions and power relations that sustain their taken-for-grantedness (Silvey 2005). Borders, of course, also connote exclusion.

Powers of Exclusion

In their book *Powers of exclusion: land dilemmas in Southeast Asia*, Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch and Tania Murray Li (2011) examine the processes and actors implicated in land exclusion in rural Southeast Asia, arguing that the interaction of regulation, force, the market and legitimation can largely explain exclusion. The authors define exclusion as “the ways in which people are *prevented* from benefiting from things (more specifically, land)” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 7, *emphasis in original*).

The opposite of exclusion is thus “access” and not “inclusion.” There are three main processes of exclusion: (1) the ways in which already-existing access to land is maintained by the exclusion of other potential users; (2) the ways in which people who have access lose it; and (3) the ways in which people who lack access are prevented from getting it (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 7-8). Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) approach recognises that exclusion is inherent in all land use. Despite its conventional framing as a negative condition or process imposed on the weak, “all political perspectives on land relations – from the most conservative to the most radical – take some types of exclusion to be positive” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 4). For example, a rice farmer may prevent construction workers from building houses on her land, thereby ensuring she has a paddy to cultivate. Exclusion is thus normal, inevitable, and desirable. Yet, exclusion is not a random process, nor does it occur on a level playing field. It is structured by uneven power relations and creates both security and insecurity.

Four so-called “powers of exclusion” – namely, regulation, force, the market and legitimation – interact to facilitate and hinder access to land (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). These societal constructs often remain anonymous and faceless, are not the sole purview of the state, and are not strictly defined as a “who.” The first exclusionary power, regulation, refers to the state and legal instruments that set rules about access to land and the conditions of use. Regulation consists of prohibitions and requirements, as well as positive incentives to promote or reduce certain behaviours, all of which may prove effective. As a result, “‘fuzzy’ zones of compromise, accommodation and bribery are the rule rather than the exception” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 16). Force is at the heart of regulation. Sanctions ultimately come down to force. Even the threat of force by state or non-state actors can be very effective; “[t]he possession of means of violence, then, can create a climate in which force acts quite effectively without ever being used” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 17). The market limits access by price and creation of incentives to lay more individualised claims to land. The market is underpinned by regulation, force and legitimation. Legitimation provides the moral basis for exclusion claims, and entrenching the market, regulation and force as politically and socially acceptable bases for exclusion. It is powerful and *never* opposed. As Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 196) explain,

Legitimation, finally, is vital to exclusion. It has a power in itself, in that at times people will relinquish or allow claims to land on the basis of the compelling power of discourses of right and wrong. But it also provides the indispensable normative underpinnings to

rules, right to buy and sell, and violence that makes them seem legitimate, or in some cases, makes them so much more a natural order of things that they are not up for debate or analysis.

Legitimation emerges from discourses of development, modernity, civilisation and ambient environmentalism. In addition to the four powers of exclusion on which they concentrate their analyses, Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 197) identify four other powers, namely “environmental change, growth in and control over knowledge and technologies that influence both the incentives for new forms of exclusion and capacities for monitoring and enforcement, political relationships and alliances, and inertia.”

While the book largely focuses on conflict over land in rural Southeast Asia, the eight powers of exclusion provide helpful heuristics for analysing post-Sendong spaces. Hall, Hirsch and Li’s (2011) framework helps in dissecting the processes of creating and controlling post-disaster spaces in an urban environment, and in understanding the people and the organisations who employ powers of exclusion to intervene in post-disaster spaces, and facilitate and constrain access to them.

The will to govern

Access to post-disaster spaces is important for many reasons. For instance, post-disaster spaces offer shelter and basic goods needed by people whose houses, their contents, and even loved ones were swept out to sea. Of greater interest to this study, however, are the strategic opportunities to govern in post-disaster spaces. The will to govern is variously motivated by desires to maintain, change or improve upon the status quo, and to manipulate or improve people, landscapes and societal structures. Actually shaping the behaviour of others necessarily entails unequal power relations among those who control post-disaster spaces, those intended to be controlled in them, and those who are excluded from them. The “who” can be individuals, groups, and institutions, or it can be the more intangible forces that Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) call “the powers of exclusion.”

Governmentality

French philosopher Michel Foucault is credited with shaping how we understand government and what it mean to govern. Timothy Mitchell (2006, 179) explains that for Foucault,

the word [government] refers not to the institutions of the state, but to the new tactics of management and methods of security that take population as their object. [...]

Government refers to power in terms of its methods rather than its institutional forms. [...] Conceived in terms of its methods and its object, rather than its institutional forms, government is a broader process than the relatively unified and functionalist entity suggested by the notion of the state.

Foucault's conception of government is succinctly summarised as the "conduct of conduct," in which government is "the attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means" (Li 2007b, 275). It is not limited to "political structures or [...] the management of states" and "the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection" (Foucault 2003a, 138). Instead, government refers to the deliberate structuring of all the possible actions of individuals or groups. Government requires that the people being governed are active, free and willing subjects, and not passive or coerced ones (Burchell 1991, Gordon 1991). The challenge of government is thus spurring individuals "to act and to align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through constraining and facilitating models of possible action" (Burchell 1991, 119), without "attempting to dictate actions or coerce the population" (Li 2005, 387). The lofty aims of government, such as increases in the wealth, longevity, health and education of the citizenry, cannot be achieved through coercion at this scale. So, the "government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs. It sets conditions, 'artificially so arranging things so that people, following only their own self-interest, *will do as they ought*'" (Scott 1995, 202 in Li 2007a, 4, *emphasis in original*). Consent is a non-issue because control is exerted remotely and people are likely unaware of how or why their behaviour is being shaped, and consequently do not raise the issue of consent (Li 2007a).

In his essay on "Governmentality," Foucault (2003b) argues that government is more concerned with improving the welfare of the population than the actual act of governing. The breadth of issues subject to governmental improvement is extraordinary (Li 2007a).

The[se] things [...] [include] men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with all its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation with those other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; and finally, men in their relation to still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, and so on (Foucault 2003b, 235).

Today, government is applied to "public health, welfare, agricultural extension, conservation, good governance and, increasingly, conflict management, elements of the hydra-headed endeavor

we have come to know as development” (Li 2007b, 276). Improving the welfare of the population requires specific governmental interventions. These schemes are usually aimed at a particular part of the population, and on defined issues or purported deficiencies (Li 2007a, 2007b). They are important because they effect change, albeit rarely the change anticipated in the original plan (Li 2007b). The plans themselves are typically assemblages that cobble together the intentions of diverse parties striving to shape human conduct (Li 2007b).

Foucault calls the art of government the “rationality of government” or “governmentality.” He offers a three-part definition of the term,

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflection, the calculation and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led toward the preeminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, and so on) of this type of power – which may be termed ‘government’ – resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of knowledges [*saviors*].
3. The process or, rather, the result of the process through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and gradually becomes ‘governmentalized’ (Foucault 2003b, 244).

Governmentality is about how to govern. As Gordon (1991, 3) explains, “it is a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced.”

A governmentality analytic is especially useful for the present study of post-disaster spaces. It directs researchers to inquire about the design of government interventions, the practices employed to achieve them, and the actual outcomes and unintended effects (Li 2005, 388). It is applicable to cases where non-state actors attempt to set the conditions under which lives are lived; according to Gupta and Sharma (2006, 277), “governmentality offers a way of approaching how rule is consolidated and power is exercised in society through social relations, institutions, and bodies that do not automatically fit under the rubric of ‘the state.’” Furthermore, governmentality “draws our attention to the ways in which subjects are differently formed and differently *positioned* in relation to governmental programs (as experts, as targets), with particular

capacities for action and critique,” instead of being limited by a binary of “power here, resistance there” (Li 2007b, 276, *emphasis in original*). These theoretical insights are applied to various cases in *Seeing like a state* by James Scott (1998), where he examines the objectives, methods and outcomes of state actors implementing an extreme form of governmental rationality.

Seeing like a state

In his highly influential book *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*, James Scott (1998) analyses state mega-projects. He contends that states aiming to remake society and ecology in accordance with a rational, high modern plan will inevitably fail. According to Scott (1998), the three primary objectives of any state are simplification, legibility and manipulation. Achieving these objectives facilitates the expansion of state spaces and the neutralisation of non-state spaces. Although he never uses the term “governmentality” per se, the processes he analyses clearly demonstrate the willful attempts of state actors to apply a governmental rationality in improving the welfare of populations (Li 2005).

Simplification, legibility and manipulation

Legibility and simplification are prerequisites for manipulation. Because most societies predate the very states who profess to administer them, there is often a mismatch between state plans and actual social relations, settlement patterns, production methods, etc. (Scott 1998). The resulting diversity of social forms spanning state territory remains opaque to the central administrators. Therefore, to appropriate wealth and exert control, the state demands a simplification that “reduce[s] the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality” into a highly selective, easily replicable, synoptic view that does not require local knowledge (Scott 1998, 81). High modernism, “a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied - usually through the state - in every field of human activity,” advanced this objective (Scott 1998, 90). High modernist schemes took the simplification of individuals to the extreme. The standardised citizens they envisaged

were uniform in their needs and even interchangeable. [...] [They had] no gender, no tastes, no history, no values, no opinions or original ideas, no traditions, and no distinctive personalities to contribute to the enterprise. They have none of the particular, situated, and contextual attributes that one would expect of any population and that we, as a matter of course, always attribute to elites. [...] [T]he lack of context and particularity is not an oversight; it is the necessary first premise of any large-scale planning exercise (Scott 1998, 346).

Still, simplification is only one of the necessary conditions for state manipulation. For states to successfully enact any major intervention in society – from population-wide vaccination campaigns to collecting income taxes – there must be visible units (e.g. citizens, villages) that can be readily “identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated and monitored” (Scott 1998, 183). In other words, society must be rendered legible. Legibility enables “counting and locating people, gauging wealth, mapping land, resources and settlements” (Scott 1998, 77). To render society legible, states carry out a “civilizing process,” which Scott (1998, 184) describes as “an attempt at domestication, a kind of social gardening devised to make the countryside, its products, and its inhabitants more identifiable and accessible to the center.”

Scott’s use of a gardening metaphor is apt. The gardener designs and plans the spatial and temporal layout of the garden; the gardener selects which flowers, shrubs, trees and edibles are permitted to flourish, and even determines their role in the garden; the gardener categorises and attributes value to plants, such that what is deemed a beautiful addition one season may be weeded out as an invasive in the next. There is a high degree of control exerted by a central authority acting to achieve specific objectives. Yet, there are always subversive and unpredictable elements in the garden; the dormant seeds of undesirable weeds threaten to sprout in inopportune places, while a heavy downpour, late spring frost, or heavy windstorm can wreak havoc on and disrupt the meticulous work of the gardener. It is these elements beyond the direct control of authority that ultimately undo and recreate the garden when there is a lapse in the gardener’s attention. The garden metaphor can also be applied to the processes of expanding state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces; for example, the gardener seeks to extend the area under careful cultivation and also tries to eliminate the threats to the garden posed by wild plants and grazing herbivores outside the garden.

Expanding state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces

Historically, the processes of expanding state spaces and neutralising non-state spaces are intertwined with the expansion of agricultural land. Scott (1998) affirms that state authorities felt threatened by impenetrable (i.e. wild, remote, inhospitable lands) and illegible non-state spaces; authorities sought either to fully transform them into controllable state spaces, or to defuse the presumed subversive elements of non-state spaces. Previously disparate pieces of marginal lands were assembled by the state and colonised by peasants, and both the people and nature in these margins were “ ‘domesticated’ and brought into the national mainstream” (De Koninck and Déry

1997, 2). These processes form the basis of a geopolitical strategy, where geopolitics is not only a “contest over space between nations” but also “within the borders of a given country” that serves the intention of a state “to define itself territorially and [...] to] send a message to its neighbors and to the world at large, about its capacity to manage its domain, including its borderlands” (De Koninck 2006, 33). De Koninck (1996, 231-232) explains:

By ‘planting’ or ‘sowing’ peasants, and then ‘protecting’ them, many States have secured their territory. By establishing its control, whether or not as a result of a planned process, over agriculturalists located on the frontiers of a coveted domain, as well as in the heart of the country, a State consolidates its very base. [...] The peasants were thus providing their past, present, or future rulers, who were generally following closely in their footsteps, with a territory to rule, administer, and defend, often by using the same peasants as soldiers. Following this unequal exchange, the state builders were able to gain territorial legitimacy.

These planted peasants under state control serve as the landmarks that demarcate state spaces; they “reaffirm [a state’s] territoriality” and demonstrate its ability to “establish tighter control over people’s activities as well as movement” (De Koninck 2006, 34).

State concerns include increasing legibility and quelling agrarian unrest through land titling, formalisation, and land reform and land settlement programs. These concerns can be understood as a progression of what Scott (1998) contends are the main objectives of a state: simplification and legibility of land and society, which enable manipulation by outsiders. These concerns also demonstrate systematic attempts to transform non-state spaces into state spaces. Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 34) explain:

Formalization projects are motivated in substantial part by official desires for better information about who is using what land for what purposes and for the revenue that comes from taxing newly ‘visible’ resources, while resettlement programs promise expanded state control over sparsely populated ‘frontier’ areas.

These formalisation projects adopt a discourse of inclusion. They reposition so-called “squatters” as newly legal “landowners” enmeshed in an integrated market economy. Proponents of titling such as the World Bank herald this transformation as the successful inclusion of the poor into the national economy, national politics and national legal system. Titling also accrues benefits to outsiders by delocalising the land market and “transform[ing] land into a commodity easily bought and sold *outside* place-based networks” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 39, *emphasis in original*). Titling, language that repositions people, and settlement programs were all part of the post-

Sendong interventions in Cagayan de Oro. These interventions served to expand state space into the designated official post-disaster spaces and to neutralise the perceived threats of the city's non-state spaces – the informal settlements that were impenetrable and illegible to outsiders.

A critical engagement with Scott's arguments

Tania Murray Li (2005, 383) critically engages with Scott's work, reading it "as a starting point and a provocation." She agrees with Scott's overarching argument, which she articulates in the following way: "states construct simplified models of the world that they would like to control and improve, yet improvement schemes fail in proportion to their effectiveness at preventing people from applying the everyday knowledge essential to human well-being" (Li 2005, 383). But, as she convincingly points out, what is missing from his argument and his examples significantly changes the discussion, resulting in messier, albeit more realistic and nuanced, accounts of governmental interventions.

Her main arguments are summarised below because of their relevance to analysing the schemes enacted in post-disaster spaces, who initiates and who is affected by them, and how. Most current day governmental intervention schemes are not high modern mega-projects, but are instead designed as improvements (rather than manipulations) that incorporate the wants, needs and practices of the intended beneficiaries. Such schemes are not master plans reflecting a singular state vision but are instead "the emergence of a discursive formation [...] formed within relations of power" that is continually contested and reformulated, and that is not always aligned with elites' interests (Li 2005, 386). As such, the state does not have sole jurisdiction over improvement projects; there are many proponents, including a wide range of activists, planners, corporations (and their corporate social responsibility branches), missionaries, local and international NGOs, United Nations agencies, conservation groups, humanitarian organisations, and other trustees or experts (Li 2005, 2007a, 2007b, Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). Their methods rarely include coercion but instead set the parametres so that beneficiaries will freely choose to behave in the way intended for them to behave. Often, the methods even reflect the right way of doing planning, as prescribed by Scott (Li 2005). In spite of their good intentions and supposedly correct planning methods, the proponents of many current-day improvement schemes replicate the problems characteristic of Scott's high modernist planners.

They [the non-high modernist planners] position themselves as experts who know how others should live, they collect and arrange data according to simplified grids, they

diagnose deficiencies, and they devise elaborate interventions to bring about improvement. [...] [It] is still an exercise in power. Not only do experts direct peoples' conduct without a democratic mandate, they define what counts as development and how it can be achieved (Li 2005, 384).

Scott's narrow focus on how certain schemes designed to improve the human condition have failed is too restrictive. More valuable insights can be gleaned from empirical studies investigating Ferguson's (1994, in Li 2005, 384) questions: "What do these schemes do? What are their messy, contradictory, multilayered, and conjunctural effects?" The answers will likely reveal that power and resistance are intertwined, and that "improvement schemes are simultaneously destructive and productive of new forms of local knowledge and practice" (Li 2005, 391). Li's insights help inform the critical engagement with Scott's work in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Power

Governing, attempting to govern, and resisting government are all an exercise of power. Power is variously conceived as "something to be held, exerted, deployed, mobilised, sought after, or refused, or as something structural and inevitable, despotic and concentrated, or dispersed and everywhere" (Moss 2005, 42). It is used as an umbrella term to describe the people, institutions and structures that wield control. Power operates in post-disaster spaces through structures and institutions that facilitate and constrain mobility, that enhance or deny access to resources and opportunities, and that influence vulnerability.

Power acts upon the actions of others, it designates relationships between partners. In his essay "The subject and power," Foucault (2003a, 137) contends the defining characteristic of "a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions." It thus requires that both parties act freely, albeit unequally. According to Foucault (2003a), if one party is not free to respond in several ways when faced with a field of possibilities, then it is a relationship of violence and not a relationship of power. Power can only exist if both parties retain the capacity to act, including refusal or revolt (Foucault 2003a, Li 2007b). Like the act of governing, the exercise of power conducts or leads an individual or a group to behave in a certain way.

It incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is

always a way of acting upon one or more subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action (Foucault 2003a, 138).

Power involves ideas and practices (Li 2007b), and “is omnipresent in human relations, but [...] never a fixed and closed regime” (Gordon 1991, 5). It is typically characterised as an exterior constraint. Mitchell (2006, 177-178) explains that “its source is a sovereign authority above and outside society, and it operates by setting external limits to behavior, establishing negative prohibitions, and laying down channels of proper conduct.” In contrast, discipline works from within, “entering social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and assembling them into more productive and powerful combinations” (Mitchell 2006, 178).

Diverse forms of power and discipline permeated post-disaster efforts and post-disaster spaces in CDO. The two models of power that best characterise the intentions of trustees, their governmental interventions, and social relations in official post-disaster spaces, however, are the empowerment and pastoral power models.

Empowerment

Power is typically constructed negatively as the control over people and things, often of men over women (Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Because existing social structures equate power with domination, if women gain more of this type of mainstream power, they just imitate men and reaffirm dominant oppressive systems (e.g. over poor, working class or minority women) instead of changing them (hooks 1984). Consequently, the redefinition and redistribution of power has been an important feminist project, and one that has also been embraced by a variety of trustees seeking to govern, including some of the ones directing post-disaster efforts in CDO.

One alternative model pursued by scholars and activists is that of “empowerment,” a process whereby people develop a personal sense of power that fits within their own specific context (Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). It was heralded as “the key to challenging gendered and other forms of oppression and thus overcoming the obstacles to meaningful education and development” (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 283). Formerly perceived as a laudable objective to address unjust power imbalances, empowerment has degenerated into a ubiquitous and almost meaningless buzzword that continues to be employed uncritically by scholars, organisations, businesses, government agencies and others. The institutions funding empowerment initiatives

are usually the very same ones who imposed the structural adjustment policies that disempowered marginalised people in the first place (Gupta and Sharma 2006). The emphasis on empowerment derives not from a sense of guilt or a desire to reverse harms, but from the cosy fit of empowerment with a neoliberal governmentality. Gupta and Sharma (2006, 284-285) explain:

[E]mpowerment fits in the neoliberal agenda of small government, participatory governance, and market-based competitiveness. It enables developmentalist states to shift away from directly providing for the basic needs of their marginalized citizens to helping these citizens to govern themselves and take care of their own development needs. [Furthermore] [...] as compared with welfare-based programs [...], which distribute material resources to particular groups, empowerment programs are relatively low-cost because they do not deliver any goods or services.

The failure of the empowerment discourse was inevitable. There is an inherent hypocrisy in the empowerment promise of contemporary development interventions: the people and institutions who direct such interventions forget that their own positioning relies on uneven power relations (Li 2007a). That is, “the will to empower others hinges upon positioning oneself as an expert with the power to diagnose and correct a deficient power in someone else. [...] Empowerment is still, in short, a relationship of power” (Li 2007a, 276).

Pastoral power

Foucault (2003a) develops the concept of pastoral power, which is especially relevant to the type of power employed in CDO’s post-disaster governmental interventions. Pastoral power is a technique that originated in Christian institutions and, since the 18th century, has been adopted by modern states exercising governmentality. Originally, pastoral power was very much rooted in Christian doctrine and institutional practices. Foucault (2003a, 132) explains that

1. It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world;
2. It is not merely a form of power that commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock. Therefore, it is different from royal power, which demands from its subjects to save the throne;
3. It is a form of power that looks after not just the whole community but each individual in particular, during his [*sic*] life; and
4. It cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.

When the wielding of pastoral power spread beyond ecclesiastical institutions, and the intended partners included not only parishioners but the whole social body, the old pastoral power changed in three ways.

1. [There was] a change in its objective. It was a question no longer of leading people to their salvation in the next world but, rather, ensuring it in this world. And in this context, the word “salvation” takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents.
2. Concurrently, the officials of pastoral power increased. Sometimes this form of power was exerted by state apparatuses or, in any case, by a public institution such as the police. [...] Sometimes the power was exercised by private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors, and generally by philanthropists. But ancient institutions, for example the family, were also mobilized at this time to take on pastoral functions.
3. Finally, the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral power focused the development of knowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual (Foucault 2003a, 132-133).

The emphasis on ensuring, sustaining and improving the concrete lives and conduct of individuals, characteristic of pastoral power, is observed in CDO’s official post-disaster spaces. Moreover, the attention paid to saving souls in the old pastoral power is found in the governmental interventions carried out by Christian trustees in these spaces.

Who governs? Who is governed?

Who or what are the powers that govern post-disaster spaces? The state certainly does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the governmental interventions that transpire in them. There is a range of parties seeking to influence the behaviour of others, including “not only diverse state agencies with competing visions, mandates and techniques, but missionaries, scientists, activists and the so-called NGOs, both national and transnational” (Li 2007b, 276, 2005). Moreover, there is a fuzzy line separating state from so-called non-state actors (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). For example, how best to categorise state representatives using official authority for private gain, or the collaboration of NGOs, government offices and local businesses? The following paragraphs consider who shapes populations, including both the parties seeking to govern, and the people intended to be governed.

Tania Li Murray’s (2007a) analysis of trustees offers a useful lens through which to study those who seek to govern in the Foucauldian sense. In *The will to improve*, she examines the rationale of

programs, the practices of experts in drawing boundaries around a knowable, manageable and technical domain, and the limits of government in colonial and post-independence Indonesia. She defines trustees as having a “position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007a, 4). There are a range of trustees; in Indonesia in the last 200 years, trustees included “colonial officials and missionaries, politicians and bureaucrats, international aid donors, specialists in agriculture, hygiene, credit and conservation, and so-called NGOs of various kinds” (Li 2007a, 5). The Philippines, with its extensive colonial history and wide range of ongoing development, disaster relief and conservation projects, offers a comparable list (Chapter 3). Guided by the – often genuine – desire to improve the welfare of populations, these trustees manage processes and relations. However benevolent the objective of trusteeship may appear, the underlying power imbalance between trustee and intended beneficiary is highly problematic. Li (2007a, 4-5) cautions that

[t]he objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others – it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct it. [...] Their [trustees] intentions are benevolent, even utopian. They desire to make the world better than it is. Their methods are subtle. [...] They make certain courses of action easier or more difficult. [...] Whatever the response, the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one that merits careful scrutiny.

As previously stated, the goal of empowering or enhancing the capacities of certain people itself depends on a hierarchical power relationship (Li 2007a). On a practical level, many trustees blindly assume the ruling regime – their critical development partner – will necessarily act on behalf of public interest (Li 2007a). Indeed, Philippine political studies scholar Patricio N. Abinales (2010, 155) laments that “development agencies maintain this myopic vision that is based on the assumption that the Philippine state is ‘good’ and ‘efficient,’ and hence a capable partner in development.” Trusteeship interventions will ultimately fail because the solutions proposed and implemented never fix the structural sources of inequality, and usually rely upon a utopian narrative of “an incarcerated ‘local’ in which properly guided villagers are expected to improve their own condition by their own efforts” (Li 2007a, 275-276).

To translate the will to improve into specific programs, trustees deploy two practices: problematisation and rendering technical. In the first practice, experts “identif[y] deficiencies that need to be rectified” (Li 2007a, 7). In the second, experts frame the problem in technical terms that only they can solve. In fact, “the claim of experts to expertise depends on their capacity to

diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire” (Li 2007a, 7). Through processes of problematisation and rendering technical, trustees “limit opportunities to engage targets of improvement and schemes as political actors, fully capable of contestation and debate [...] by inscribing a boundary [dividing] those who claim to know how others should live from those whose conduct is to be conducted” (Li 2007a, 281-282). Trustees, in other words, are the people and institutions who identify and frame a problem that they are suited to rectify, and then implement what they perceive as appropriate governmental interventions. Two of the most influential types in the Philippine context are those loosely classified as state and Catholic trustees.

State trustees

The state is perhaps the most readily identifiable trustee shaping populations, mobility, and access to land. Indeed, in most of the world the state has been the most powerful institution in society since the 17th century (Scott 1998). But what is, or who is, the state? That is, beyond Scott’s (1998, 7) assertion that it is “the vexed institution that is the ground of both our freedoms and our unfreedoms.”

For most of history, the majority of the population perceived the state as an abstract and distant institution demanding (but not necessarily successfully obtaining) tribute from the people and localities over which it claimed dominion (Taylor and Flint 2000). In Southeast Asia, the separation between the state and the lives of people living outside the capital region eroded during the colonial era as larger, centrally administered bureaucratic states emerged (Scott 1976). These new states unified “fragmented local customs and procedures into a more homogeneous whole” through its central administration who “worked increasingly through formulas, regulations, and laws that would be applied across the board by its agents” (Scott 1976, 94). It also had a disciplined army and modern weapons at its disposal, ensuring that it had the power to effectively extract taxes, often through coercion. The new bureaucratic state is perhaps best represented by paperwork such as cadastral surveys, settlement reports for land revenue, censuses, land titles and licenses, identity cards and tax receipts (Scott 1976, 1998). Together, these tools enable the state, like large corporate firms, to be “examples of power institutions with particular forms of knowledge and power” (Scott 1998, 11).

As part of her critical engagement with Scott's (1998) *Seeing like a state*, Li (2005) posits that Scott's definition is limited and out-of-date. The "'up there,' all-seeing state operating as a preformed repository of power spread progressively and unproblematically across national terrain, colonizing nonstate spaces and their unruly inhabitants" that Scott describes is a myth because there is "no spatial beyond the state, and [...] no subjects outside power" (Li 2005, 384). Scott's assertion that only states possess sufficient resources to move people and build settlements, or want to simplify and render populations and landscapes legible in order to manipulate them is similarly wrong. Many other non-governmental groups such as resource extraction corporations, conservation NGOs, missionaries and family planning groups also share the state objectives of simplification, legibility and improvement (Li 2005). Furthermore, the state that Scott envisions does not reflect the paradoxical, conflictual and composite nature of the modern state.

Today, scholars portray the state as paradoxical in that it "exist[s] simultaneously as material force and as ideological construct [and that] it seems both real and illusory" (Mitchell 2006, 169).

Mitchell (2006, 185) maintains that the state should be addressed

as an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and representation that create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society or state and economy. The essence of modern politics is [...] the producing and reproducing of these lines of difference. [...] These processes create the effect of the state not only as an entity set apart from economy or society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, expertise, information, planning and intentionality. The state appears as an abstraction in relation to the concreteness of the social, a sphere of representation in relation to the reality of the economic, and a subjective ideality in relation to the objectness of the material world.

In addition to paperwork, the modern state is represented by government departments, politicians and bureaucrats who make decisions and implement policies. In its networks and practices, the state is incoherent, but the public imagination of the state is coherent (Mitchell 2006). There are often multiple and contradictory motivations of and actions carried out by government agencies (Li 2007b, Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). That the state routinely pursues discordant and incoherent objectives belies any claims to a singular, unified, integrated state. Rather, the state is "a multilayered and conflictual ensemble" (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 291). The importance of this "composite reality" and "mythicized abstraction," Foucault (2003b, 244)

argues, “is not so much the statization [*étatisation*] of society, as the ‘governmentalization’ of the state.” As such, studying power and the governmentalisation of the state necessarily requires looking beyond the state (Mitchell 2006).

Catholic trustees

Religious trustees also seek to govern, and are thus another potential shaper of post-disaster spaces, especially in the Philippines – “the country [that] rivals the Vatican as the most Catholic place on earth” (Calderisi 2013, 122). In his book *Earthy mission: the Catholic Church and world development* former World Bank economist and longtime Catholic Robert Calderisi (2013) argues that organised religion aspires to shape society through emotional and intellectual appeals to believers. He asserts that in many developing countries Christianity’s historical influence resulted more from educating and spreading particular religion-inspired values, than through direct intervention in economic and social affairs. This claim of non-interference, however, does not apply to the Philippines. For more than three hundred years, Catholic priests and friars directly intervened in all aspects of governance in the Philippine archipelago under Spanish colonial rule (Hedman 2006, Tan 2009, Francia 2010). Later, under American rule and Philippine independence, the Catholic Church maintained its hegemonic position in governing Philippine society, albeit in new ways (Hedman 2006, Tan 2009, Francia 2010).

Still, Calderisi’s (2013) discussion of how the Catholic Church has and continues to serve the world’s poor is useful in contextualising the post-disaster interventions of CDO’s religious trustees. He affirms that by the end of the 19th century, church leaders began looking beyond the interests of the institution and began engaging with larger social issues. The idea of a Christian social mission overseas was sparked by 19th century missionaries encountering hardships and inequalities, which they interpreted as opportunities to intervene with modern technology – such as medicine – that would improve the lives of the poor. The three thrusts of church action were education, basic development services, and advocacy. The overseas social mission was based less on specific scriptures than on Catholic traditions, especially the emphases on collective well-being and on material progress. Calderisi (2013) explains that these emphases meant that Catholic services must serve everyone and not only Christians, and that building hospitals and introducing improved agricultural practices were as important as providing spiritual nourishment. In presenting the advocacy work of Catholic missionaries, Calderisi (2013, 242) goes as far as to assert that church action “has gone further than any other religion in questioning the structures

of capitalism and socialism alike.” Variations of this Christian social mission were resurrected in diverse post-Sendong interventions of Catholic trustees in CDO.

The governed

The final actors to consider as shapers of post-disaster spaces are the people directly affected by the disaster – the survivors themselves. Ignoring the potential for them to play even a small role in their post-disaster trajectory is to deny them agency, defined as “people’s abilities to influence lines of conduct in their lives and call attention to factors that both constrain and enable people to act” (Bolin, Jackson and Crist 1998, 28). The acts of migrating and of staying put are two ways of exercising agency. The role of human agency in migration is paramount (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). More importantly, eliminating the possibility that survivors influence their post-disaster trajectory eliminates the opportunity for government. Recall that government demands that those being governed are free to act, albeit within the constrained conditions set out by trustees.

Mobility and time-space compression

Mobility is not merely the ability to move or the act of moving from one physical or social location to another, but also an embodied experience with distinct everyday, materially and socially differentiated dimensions (Silvey 2005, Willis 2010). Mobility acts reciprocally within existing hierarchies and spatialities of power, thus the way mobility is organised and imbued with meaning must mirror its embeddedness in a fluid economic, political and cultural landscape (Pessar and Mahler 2003, Silvey 2005, Piper 2006, Hunter and Davis 2009). It can be seen positively as an indicator of existing empowerment and transformational opportunities, or negatively as a mechanism for reinforcing social exclusion and poverty through displacement or forced containment (Silvey 2005, Willis 2010). Mobility depends on many factors, including socioeconomic status, childcare responsibilities, geographic location, violence, age, race, gender, sexuality, religion, class, caste, and institutional and state migration practices and policies (Lawson 1998, Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000, Silvey 2004, Crosby 2006). Increasingly, the mobility of people is deliberately constrained, while the mobility of goods and ideas is facilitated by nation-states as regional economic integration issues collide and clash with security and border control issues (Pellerin 2004a, 2004b, Crosby 2006). In today’s globalised world, only the “innovators, transmitters and managers of information, science and technology who propel the global economy” are bestowed the privilege of unrestrained hypermobility (Kofman 2004, 653). Unsurprisingly, workers representing the reproductive sectors whose skills and competences are

people-focused are excluded from this elite group (Kofman 2004). Taken together, these observations underscore the gendered nature of mobility.

Doreen Massey (1994, 149) calls for framing mobility within a power geometry, in which “different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows [of technology, capital, communication, etc.] and interconnections.” Different individuals and social groups have unequal access to and control over mobility and movement, with some initiating flows, others merely following flows, and yet others imprisoned by them. Such differential power over mobility (or lack thereof) is not inevitable, but is instead the product of time-space compression, which Massey defines as “movement and communications across spaces, [...] the geographical stretching-out of social relations, and [...] our experience of all of this” (Massey 1994, 147). One’s place in this time-space compression depends on actions related to capital, race and gender that may not be within one’s control. Time-space compression has real repercussions for people’s lives, especially when those in power actively constrain the mobility of the less powerful. Massey (1994, 150) explains:

mobility, and control over mobility, both reflects and reinforces power. It is not simply a question of unequal distribution, that some people move more than others, and that some have more control than others. It is that the mobility and control of some groups can actively weaken other people. Differential mobility can weaken the leverage of the already weak. The time-space compression of some groups can undermine the power of others.

In this way, Massey underlines critical links among mobility, power, and space.

People with very little or no access to or control over mobility through space are immobile. Immobility is an urgent yet underappreciated component of environmental migration (GOS 2011, Bremner and Hunter 2014). This was one of the main findings of the *Foresight: migration and global environmental change final project report*, a highly regarded analysis on migration and non-migration influenced by environmental change. Commissioned by the U.K. Government Office for Science, the Foresight report was informed by more than 70 papers and other reviews, and involved more than 350 experts and scholars from 30 countries.

Environmental change is expected to shape migration, “specifically through its influence on a range of economic, social and political drivers which themselves affect migration” (GOS 2011, 9). For example, more frequent or intense natural hazards are expected to increase migration and

displacement. Conversely, the deterioration of the environment is expected to reduce the wealth and capital of people with land and natural resource-dependent livelihoods. Diminished livelihood returns may prevent them from amassing sufficient capital to migrate, which will reduce migration. This problem will be especially acute among people who wish to migrate but are unable to do so.

It is important to distinguish between populations who stay because they are unable to leave (i.e. trapped) and those who stay because they chose to stay (i.e. immobile), although, admittedly, the line separating these categories is blurry. Migration can help diversify livelihood options; the remittances from migrants can present households or even entire communities with the choice to remain in a sending area (including in hazard-prone locations). In other cases, populations can be trapped, either through direct force (e.g. from the state, paramilitary or other actors) or through implied constraint (e.g. asset levels are insufficient to enable migration). These reduced options for migration do not necessarily reduce migration in the long-term. Instead, they increase the likelihood of large-scale, illegal, unsafe, unplanned and unmanaged displacement when extreme environmental events occur. When vulnerable people do migrate, they typically go to areas of high environmental risk, such as low-lying areas in mega-deltas or slums in growing, water-insecure cities (GOS 2011).

Trapped populations in the context of environmental change face a double dilemma. People with little wealth or capital do not possess the means to move away from environmentally risky or hazardous areas, yet the same lack of capital diminishes their capacity to cope and adapt to environmental shocks and change, effectively trapping them in areas susceptible to environmental change. Based on an analysis of the 1930s Dust Bowl Migration in the American Midwest, McLeman (2013, 176) offers a useful and intuitive characterisation for distinguishing among mobile, trapped and immobile migrants and non-migrants based on their capital. People with portable capital, including cultural capital (e.g. young healthy families with good farming skills), economic capital (landless or tenant farmers who are not destitute) and social capital (e.g. social networks connecting them to locations outside the Plains), were more likely to migrate. People less likely to migrate were those with place-specific capital, including landowners or people with strong local social networks, and people with little or no capital, including the destitute, elderly, broken families and people without any social connections.

Conclusion

The concepts introduced in this chapter are essential to analysing post-disaster spaces and the migration that directs people to these spaces. Sendong survivors access many spaces, including slums, covered courts, evacuation sites, *barangay* halls, city hall, transitional sites, places of worship, permanent relocation sites, and shopping malls. The character of each space can be read as a state or non-state space, as conducive or not to the compression of time-space, as a site for governance or improvement, or as selectively exclusionary.

Each individual accessing a given space has a unique understanding of it as a particular place. This understanding evolves over time as social relations within the space change and spur new relations in other spaces. Hence each space consists of multiple places. Each individual has the potential to exert agency in the space they inhabit, although their agency is necessarily constrained by multiple hierarchies of power. The social relations unfolding within and stretching beyond each space are fluid and influenced by various forces. The forces can be easily recognised as trustees such as religious officials, bureaucrats, NGO workers, politicians, business tycoons, or can be understood as broader structures or phenomena such as legitimation, force, the market, regulation, political alliances and relationships, inertia, human agency, and environmental change and hazards such as Tropical Storm Sendong. These forces originate and manifest themselves at various scales, from the international down to the household and individual levels. That there are many human forces acting upon post-disaster spaces underscores the *unnaturalness* of disaster outcomes.

Individuals and groups may or may not have access to mobility that enables them to enter other spaces. Sometimes actors have the mobility to exit some spaces and approach others, but they are unable to penetrate them. The boundaries around spaces are selectively porous. Some actors, ideas, capital, goods and services easily pass through, while others are effectively trapped within or prohibited from entering. In other cases, certain actors may be absent from a particular space because they are ignorant of its existence or its relevance to post-disaster processes. Mobility and access to space are spatially and temporally specific.

The next chapter delves into political, historical, geographical, social, cultural elements that help explain the settlement and growth of Cagayan de Oro, and the trustees who play salient roles in

post-disaster efforts. It is a history of the city and the forces acting upon it up to, and including Tropical Storm Sendong.

Chapter 3. Migration, settlement, and Tropical Storm Sendong

Introduction

Sometimes a simple question can spark a whole new set of questions or a new way of looking at a problem. In my case, the question (two, actually) came from Dr. Emma Porio, a lively sociology professor at Ateneo de Manila University. At the recommendation of some friends of friends I had met some years earlier during a Tagalog language training program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, I interviewed her before plunging into my fieldwork in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Drawing on her own research on vulnerability in Manila slums, she suggested I start my research by answering two short questions: ‘who settles where?’ and ‘what do they build?’ Then she answered her own questions, offering that settlement patterns are based on social networks (e.g. family, friends, and recruitment through other social connections), and that housing construction is based on affordability. This chapter expands upon Porio’s succinct answers.

Migration of all sorts has influenced Mindanao and the city of Cagayan de Oro. These migration patterns are linked to the overarching geopolitical strategies of colonial and post-colonial governments, and to diverse projects such as settling the frontier, propelling economic development, assimilating minority populations, quelling political unrest, and consolidating central state control. The geographical and historical processes that have shaped migration and settlement in the Philippines, and especially in Mindanao and in Cagayan de Oro, have made CDO what it is today. These processes help situate the context in which the city’s post-disaster spaces are first needed, and later created, governed and transformed.

The chapter begins with an overview of migration to Mindanao, and its role as a governmental intervention intended to influence behaviour. Next, the chapter characterises the trustees involved in migration and settlement. It presents where different people settle in CDO, and why. This discussion is useful in deciphering which CDO residents are vulnerable to disaster. The chapter ends with a synopsis of the factors leading up and including Typhoon Sendong.

A brief history of the Philippine archipelago

A short synopsis of Philippine pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history helps situate migration and settlement in Mindanao. From 250,000 years before present to the early 16th

century, the islands were sparsely inhabited and organised into small kinship and village-based groups dispersed throughout the islands (Church 2003, Tan 2009, Francia 2010). Unlike other pre-colonial territories in the region, the Philippine archipelago did not have large cities, agrarian kingdoms or indigenous states supported by bureaucracies, aristocrats, or religious organisations (Church 2003, De Koninck 2012). Connecting the islands in the Philippine archipelago to what would later become the nations of Southeast, South and East Asia, was a well-established maritime trade network (Church 2003, Francia 2010). In the 13th century, Malay merchants involved in this network introduced the archipelago to Islam, which subsequently spread throughout Sulu, Maguindanao, Palawan and Manila, and hastened the creation of sultanate-based settlements that were united by and organised around religion (Tan 2009, Francia 2010, Donoso 2013). In fact, had the Spaniards arrived much later and not halted the spread of Islam (Francia 2010), the Philippines may have evolved to reflect Islamic social norms, power relations and spatial forms.

But Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese-born captain working for Spain, arrived in the archipelago in 1521, his successor Lopez de Legaspi established a Spanish settlement in Cebu by 1565, and the Spaniards took Manila by 1570, setting in motion over three centuries of Spanish colonial rule (Church 2003, De Koninck 2012, Francia 2010). The Spanish colonial era (1521-1898) was characterised by the repatriation of Philippine resources to Spain (Church 2003, Batalla 2010), the colonial state-supported efforts to Catholicise the islands (Tan 2009, Francia 2010), and the undermining of traditional economic and political structures, settlement patterns, and social hierarchies (Tan 2009). Yet, the Spanish failed to alter spatial patterns of human settlement in the entire archipelago; Mindanao, and remote, often mountainous, parts of Luzon and the Visayas remained largely beyond direct colonial influence (Tan 2009).

After the Americans replaced the Spaniards as colonial rulers in 1898, the isolation of these territories from the central administration and colonial authorities eroded. As discussed in the following section, variations on a Mindanao-as-frontier narrative and waves of both state-sponsored and spontaneous migration played major roles in a wider geopolitical strategy under American rule (1898-1941, 1945-1946), and later under Philippine independence (1946-present). After the end of the violent Philippine-American War (1899-1902), U.S. colonial rule was characterised by a hearts and minds approach. A strategic realignment of the values and cultural

ideologies of Filipinos with U.S. interests positioned the Americans as both friend and benign ruler, which meant they could behave as they wished without fear of serious rebellion from the nationals (Tan 2009). Like their Spanish predecessors, the Americans were not concerned about developing the archipelago for the benefit of Filipinos, and more concerned about establishing an American presence in Asia. A strategic position in the Philippines facilitated U.S. military and economic penetration in the region (De Koninck 2012).

The strategy to win over the hearts and minds of Filipinos paid off handsomely in World War II. Many Filipinos overtly or covertly resisted Japanese occupation (1941-1945), retaining the hope that the Americans would return to free them (Francia 2010). Filipinos suffered immensely; urban and economic development was put on hold as financial, human, natural, and material resources were redirected to meet the demands of war (Tan 2009, Francia 2010). After the war, the Americans returned to reclaim the colony for a brief period. As a colonial ruler, the U.S. would have been responsible to pay for and carry out reconstruction throughout the archipelago. The U.S., however, successfully shirked any official responsibility by expediting the long-standing promise of granting independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946 (Francia 2010). As an independent nation, the first in Southeast Asia, the Philippines had to sequester resources for reconstruction and development on its own (Tan 2009). The war had depleted much of the country's resources, effectively forcing Philippine government officials to accept inadequate compensation for its losses and to sign exploitative trade and military agreements with the U.S. (Francia 2010). The newly independent state of the Philippines was thus open to neocolonialism, and the U.S. stepped in to reinforce its control over national and local political, economic, military, and sociocultural affairs (Tan 2009). The U.S. government has maintained a hegemonic position in the Philippines and persists today as one third of the “dominant bloc [...] whose identity and interests have been deeply imprinted on [...] institutions and practices” in the country (Hedman 2006, 21). The U.S. government, along with the other members of the dominant bloc – the Catholic Church and the capitalist class – have also played roles in migration to and settlement in Mindanao.

Migration to and settlement in Mindanao

As argued by Rodolphe De Koninck and Steve Déry (1997, 2), the “migrations of people, whether planned or not, whether controlled fully or only partially – at least at their outset – by

the State or by State builders, represent a key feature of the history of Southeast Asia, including its contemporary one.” The state is necessarily involved, to some degree, in all migration. For example, in recent decades, the state in its myriad forms has supported emigration away from the Philippines (Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Pratt 2005, Dungo 2009, Kelly 2009, Francia 2010, Gibson, Cahill et al. 2010, De Koninck 2012). In the 20th century, state-supported internal migration to Mindanao was part of a wider geopolitical strategy. An administrative map of the Philippines is depicted in Figure 3.1. Mindanao, the large region covering the southern third of the archipelago, is less volcanic, less population-dense and has fewer typhoons than its Visayan and Luzon counterparts to the north (De Koninck and Caouette 2012). Consequently, Mindanao-bound migration fit a geopolitical strategy designed to attain diverse goals. It promised to solve agrarian problems, and decongest and redistribute the populations of Luzon and the Visayas (Pelzer 1948, De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 1997). It promised to consolidate central state control over peripheral and border areas, and to politically and culturally integrate the population and assimilate minority populations (De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 1997, Abinales 2000). It promised to develop Mindanao’s vast resources to propel the country’s economic growth and to meet the increasing demand for agricultural exports (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). Yet, there was never a clear and coherent southward-bound internal migration strategy. Instead, state and other trustees alternately supported and stalled migration to Mindanao.

The perception of Mindanao has been carefully crafted by politicians and other state and non-governmental trustees so as to advance their particular agendas and ideas about state-building. Under American rule, for example, all of the Philippine islands were governed by a central civilian American and Filipino government based in Manila except for the highlands of northern Luzon and southern Mindanao (Abinales 2010). The newly established province of Misamis, of which Cagayan de Oro was the capital, was granted civilian jurisdiction and was not subject to military rule (Edgerton 2008). The American Army had been granted the right to govern the Moro province, an autonomous regional structure covering almost two-thirds of Mindanao on the premise that it was an “ungovernable territory” inhabited by a “wild, backward, and unpacified” population (Abinales 2010, 97, 100).



Fig. 3.1. Administrative map of the Philippines. Source: Nations Online (2015), adapted by Marc Girard.

In governing southern Mindanao in the early 20th century, the U.S. Army favoured military rule with de facto autonomy from Manila. The U.S. military deliberately avoided any interference with Islam, a propitious decision that won the Muslim population onto their side (Abinales 2010). Because it was so invested in the idea that Southern Mindanao was different from the rest of the archipelago and because of the pervasive American mistrust of Filipinos, the Army fabricated fantastical images of the inhabitants, advocated for the separation of Mindanao, and embellished the narrative of a “Moro problem.”⁷ Abinales (2000, 21) explains, “[w]hen Manila did poke its nose into provincial affairs, the army conjured up the image of Mindanao as a vast frontier, peopled by savages who were once the scourge of the northern communities, to limit Manila’s interference.” U.S. Army administrators heralded the “successful pacification of non-Christians” but always tempered their achievements with a warning about the potential instability resulting from “the Moro problem” (Abinales 2000, 21). Historically, non-Muslim Filipinos were suspicious of Muslims because they had been the targets of Moro slave raids (Abinales 2010),

⁷There are several terms used to refer to people living in the Philippines who practice Islam; each connotes a particular meaning. At the 1935 Philippine Constitutional Convention, Aluya Alonto, a newly elected official from Lanao, spoke to the prejudice embedded in the term “Moro” and implored his colleagues to use an alternative term. Abinales (2000) cites an excerpt from that speech,

We do not like to be called “Moros” because when we are called “Moros” we feel we are not considered as part of the Filipino people. [...] So I would like to request the members of this Convention that we prefer to be called “Mohammedan Filipinos” and not “Moros,” because if we are called Moros we will be considered as enemies, for the name “Moro” was given to us by the Spaniards because they failed to penetrate into the Island of Mindanao (Philippine Constitutional Convention 1935 in Abinales 2000, 61).

Alonto conveyed the willingness of “Mohammedan Filipinos” (later “Muslim Filipinos”) to participate in the Filipinisation process as long as both “Muslim” and “Filipino” identities were permitted to coexist. The term “Muslim-Filipino” was “articulated consciously by those *datus* who had come to accept as their political arena the agencies, institutions, and offices opened to them by the *Filipino* authorities” (Abinales 2000, 68, *my emphasis*). Alonto and his Muslim colleagues were the sons of *datus* and were the first generation to attend school in Manila (Abinales 2010). They wanted to distinguish themselves from their elders who purportedly did not share their youthful cosmopolitanism. Today, by using the term “Muslim Filipinos,” the national government’s National Commission on Muslim Filipinos declares its preference for a particular type of Muslim who is sympathetic to national unity and the broader goals of the state.

In contrast, the term “Moro” emphasises opposition, distinctiveness and sovereignty. It is the term chosen by secessionist political organisations, notably the MNLF and the MILF. It is also the term used in the ongoing Bangsamoro peace talks between the national government and militants. (*Bangsa* means ‘nation,’ thus Bangsamoro is the ‘nation of the Moro people’ (Abinales 2010, 119). The emergence of the term coincided with the escalation of violence in Mindanao under Marcos and the subsequent proliferation of writings asserting a “Moro” national identity (Canuday 2009).

suggesting a fear of the identity represented by the Moro, and not of Islamic religious beliefs per se, is at the root of anti-Muslim prejudices. This fear of Muslim Filipinos persists into the 21st century.

The U.S. Army's propaganda campaign ultimately failed with the Philippine Commission's passing of Act 2408 on 20 December 1913, which integrated Southern Mindanao into the larger body politic of the country (Abinales 2000, 29). The U.S. military ceded power to civilians and Filipinos in 1914 (Abinales 2010). The Act created the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, aimed at bringing non-Christians under democratically organised government as fast as possible. Migration was a critical policy tool in the bureaucrats and politicians' governmentality toolbox. It was expected to expedite the integration of non-Christian groups (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012), and to transform Filipinos into "quintessential owner-cultivators who would combine the desire for self-improvement with service to the general welfare of the community" (Abinales 2000, 97). The design of seven agricultural colonies established in Mindanao between 1913 and 1917 reflect this government objective of assimilation; the government deliberately mixed Christian and Muslim settlers "in an attempt to show that the two could work together and live peaceably [...] even when there was no need for them [Muslims] to seek land" (Pelzer 1948, 129-132).

Under the auspices of American colonial rule, state-led migration programs yielded mixed results. The social aim of creating peaceful, mixed communities of Christians and Muslims was met, but the economic goal of establishing many productive, economically independent homesteads was not (Abinales 2000). In late 1928 settlers owed the government ₱372,000 (equivalent to \$2.6 million US dollars in 2015), and were unlikely to ever repay the sum (Pelzer 1948, 132).⁸ This failure was attributed to: a lack of funds, ill-chosen sites, unwisely chosen settlers (most migrants had no farming experience and hailed from waterfront sites of Cebu City and Manila), the absence of a system of uniform administration and supervision in the colonies, minimal assistance in resolving transportation and marketing problems, and chronic irrigation and

⁸ Under American colonial rule, a Philippine peso was valued at half a U.S. dollar (Kemmerer 2005, 375); this valuation lasted until the *Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas* was established in 1949 (Justiniano pers. comm., 23 September 2015). According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator, ₱372,000 or \$187,000 in 1928 is equivalent to \$2,606,145.73 in 2015 (BLS 2015).

drainage problems resulting in frequent crop failure (Pelzer 1948). Instead of becoming the “quintessential owner-cultivators” that Manila desired, many of the government-sponsored migrants “became homesteaders, squatters, tenants, or agricultural laborers” (Pelzer 1948, 134). Despite their limited agricultural achievements, these land pioneers necessarily played a critical role in the formation of the Philippine state and in securing its legitimacy (De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 1997).

The dual task of fabricating national unity and attaining social integration was later led by the first Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon (1935-1944), a Filipino who favoured civilian rule with Muslim *datu*⁹-cum-politicians apprenticing to Manila-based Filipino politicians (Abinales 2000). By preserving communal differences within the nation-building process, employing “ethnic juggling” to thwart separatist sentiments nurtured by American army administrators, copying the American approach of *not* touching Islam, and giving “‘friendly’ Muslim leaders access to the state,” Quezon successfully convinced Muslim leaders that their local interests were best preserved under Filipinisation (Abinales 2010, 31). According to then vice-governor of the Philippines Joseph Ralston Hayden (1942 in Abinales 2010, 76), Filipinisation worked towards “the establishment of the Moros in the Philippine Commonwealth under conditions that will make them willing, patriotic, and useful members of the body politic.” In other words, the *datu*-cum-Moro representative was supposed to align his interests with those of the nation-state, and subsequently convince his constituency to do likewise.¹⁰ Despite these efforts, the Filipinisation of Mindanao’s population remained an unfinished project.

The dismal failure of the perennial state project of developing Mindanao and subsuming it within state interests is similarly illustrated by the history of the now defunct Mindanao Development Authority (MDA). Formally created in 1951, the MDA was a government agency with the flexibility of a corporation to oversee the economic, infrastructure, education, health, and social development of Mindanao within the framework of a national plan (Abinales 2000). It never achieved its objectives; it was not activated until the 1960s, its allocated budget was never fully disbursed, and it had a very weak structure and personnel (Abinales 2000, 118). As a result, the

⁹ A *datu* is a traditional chief.

¹⁰ In all of the material I have read, Muslim politicians were all men at this time.

development of Mindanao and the MDA itself fell into the hands of local politicians. The preeminence of local politicians in shaping cities, towns and villages in Mindanao persists today, including in CDO. These politicians, together with their national counterparts and colonial officials, have drawn up various framings of Mindanao as frontier, which, in turn, have affected migration and settlement to and within Mindanao.

Mindanao as frontier

De Koninck (2006, 35) aptly points out that “a fundamental planning tool of any state [or other trustee] lies in its discourse about the people over which it rules as well as the land under its control.” The discourses about Mindanao as a frontier illustrate this point well. The state imagination of Mindanao as frontier has been evoked repeatedly to advance diverse policy objectives that have shaped spaces in Mindanao. Mindanao was frequently used by leaders of the nation-state as a laboratory for implementing reformist agendas, for bringing the *lumads*¹¹ and Muslims into modernity through “education, the law, the market and the political process” (Abinales 2010, 155), and promoting the political integration of the archipelago via the cultural dilution of Mindanao’s Muslim population (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). But it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to transform Southeast Asian frontiers.

[A]s has been the case of many frontier zones, development means only the further entrenchment of national interest in these peripheries, and if a petit bourgeois does grow out of the latter, its tendency is to depart the frontier in favor of the national metropolitan centers, leaving Mindanao, Aceh, Sulawesi, Sabah, and Kalimantan backward or underdeveloped. This condition preserves the idea of frontiers as a zone of darkness, savagery, and instability, which, in turn, continues to nurture the fantasies of nation-states subduing and binding these dark places to them. The cycle continues, and the only way to stop it and fundamentally recast relationships and flows to favor the frontier is to break up or fragment the nation-state (Abinales 2010, 185).

Since the Spanish colonial era, Mindanao has been characterised by “its dense ecology and the presence of small communities of fiercely independent Muslims and semi-isolated ‘wild’ *lumad* living off each other, mak[ing] many parts of it impenetrable. For the leaders and planners of the nation-state, a frontier like Mindanao stands for mystery, volatility and darkness” (Abinales 2010, 154). The meaning of “darkness” evolved alongside major changes to the landscape and the

¹¹ *Lumad* is a collective term for the non-Muslim minority in the Philippines (Abinales 2010, 128). In CDO, the term is used synonymously with ‘Indigenous Peoples’ or ‘IP.’

island's population. Up to World War II, 95% of Mindanao was covered in rainforest, and most of the population lived in lowlands along the sea or river shorelines (Abinales 2010, 194), leaving much of the island inaccessible except on foot or by boat. Darkness was thus equated with impenetrability. From the mid-1950s, extensive road-building, logging, and settlement of Filipinos from the Visayas and Luzon rendered lands accessible; Mindanao's darkness had become synonymous with "savagery in referring to the Muslims and even the *lumad*" (Abinales 2010, 170).

The perception of Mindanao as frontier persists well into the 21st century in spite of the fact that the once vast forests are gone, the gulf between the area's population density and the national average has shrunk significantly (e.g. in 2007, population densities in Mindanao's regions ranged from 107 to 204 persons/km² versus 260 persons/km² nationally (PSA-NCSB 2008)), and Mindanao's political landscape is the same as in Luzon and the Visayas in terms of the control of local politics by political clans, the ubiquitous class and social differentiation, and the "insidious presence" of the military and the communist insurgency (Abinales 2010, 184). The Muslim areas with an active presence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, however, remain noticeably different from Luzon and the Visayas.

Drawing on the frontier narrative, the government and other state actors have long played roles in alternately hindering and promoting migration to and settlement in Mindanao. The Americans alternated between a frontier-as-danger narrative to justify military rule and autonomy from Manila, and a frontier-as-empty-space-and-enormous-wealth narrative to attract American homesteaders to settle in the Moro province (Pelzer 1948, Abinales 2000, 2010). The Philippine Commonwealth pursued a frontier-as-"land of promise and unlimited opportunity" narrative to encourage resettlement of Filipino peasants from congested Visayan islands to Mindanao (Pelzer 1948, 127). Subsequent governments promoted this same image to solve agrarian problems linked to insufficient or unfair land distribution in Luzon and the Visayas (De Koninck 1996, De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). The Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1946) used resettlement as a nation-building exercise:

In the Philippines colonization was a national adventure. It was one of the first large-scale enterprises undertaken by the Philippine Commonwealth. [...] All the participants had a national as well as a personal, stake in the success of the National Land Settlement

Administration. Everyone shared in the glory as well as the responsibility. [...] All participants shared also in the discomforts and risks (Pelzer 1948, 232).

After World War II, the Philippine Republic repeated the Commonwealth's evocation of unbridled possibility, hoping that the lure of so-called empty space would attract enough disgruntled farmers from overcrowded areas to dissipate political instability (Abinales 2010). In response, and to dissuade Filipino immigrants from settling in their territory, local leadership in Muslim Mindanao encouraged a counter-narrative of frontier-of-dangerous-savages (Abinales 2010). Variations on these narratives endure in the 21st century, are selectively employed to attract or deter investment, tourists and settlers, and are used to justify violence in the territory.

Postwar migration and conflict in Mindanao

In his book *Making Mindanao* Patricio Abinales (2000) contends that the movement of 1.2 million people from Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao and within Mindanao between 1946 and 1960 was the most important social change in the Philippines during the postwar era. Postwar difficulties and diminishing availability of land in northern provinces convinced enough peasants to reconsider resettlement and overcome their fear of Mindanao, propelling the most massive movement of Filipinos in history (Abinales 2000).

Migration was the ultimate panacea for state leaders. It offered the perception of state capabilities, reduced resource demands in overcrowded areas, and enabled political leaders to address the ever-present land problem without undertaking radical reforms such as breaking up and redistributing landed estates (Abinales 2000, 99). In short, it was an excellent geopolitical strategy to solve agrarian problems (De Koninck and Déry 1997, De Koninck and Caouette 2012). Moreover, the demographic shift aimed to undermine the communist movement by providing irate peasants with an alternative to rebellion, namely the possibility of becoming owner-cultivators (De Koninck 1996, Abinales 2000). Mindanao was the ultimate receiving area for both people and economic development because it was relatively unscathed by the devastation wrought by American liberation,¹² 90% of its land was public, and its population was

¹² CDO was one of the few sites in Mindanao directly hit by World War II. Before 1942 there were many Japanese shops in CDO, and many of the Japanese merchants became military men during the war. The city, however, was accepting of American colonial rule. On 2 September 1944, U.S. planes bombed the city, purportedly to destroy Japanese installations (Edgerton 2008). All the buildings in the old part of the city were destroyed. Xavier University, which had been temporarily repurposed as a garrison, was also hit.

sparse (Pelzer 1948, Abinales 2000). State leaders set impossibly high expectations – “migration to Mindanao was at once expected to accomplish peasant aspirations, dissipate the predilection to rebel, and ease population pressure in other parts of the Philippines” (Abinales 2000, 96, De Koninck and Déry 1997). Between 1946 and 1972, there were five major government colonisation programs targeting Mindanao as a receiving area (Abinales 2000, 119). All tried to provide land to small settlers; all had no or negligible success owing to “administrative ineptitude, pervasive corruption, and lackluster support from central state authorities” (Abinales 2000, 120). Despite the failure of government migration programs, there was massive spontaneous and unorganised migration to Mindanao as people joined their relatives and settled by newly or soon-to-be-constructed roads (Abinales 2000).

An important non-outcome of such migration was conflict. Contrary to what some scholars have suggested, Mindanao was not on a rapid downward spiral; in fact, there was minimal social conflict from 1946 to the mid-1970s (Abinales 2000). Due to the rush for land and the changes in the demographic environment, tensions rose between Muslims and Christians, but they never escalated to the point of undermining the pre-existing political and social conditions. The relative peacefulness of the period is notable given the proliferation of American and Japanese firearms that fell into the hands of bandit groups and local strong men after the war, and the ill-equipped and understaffed character of the Philippine Constabulary and Philippine National Army (Abinales 2000, 124). The addition of Christian settlers, overlaid with a popular belief among Muslims in Southern Mindanao that “a Catholic Filipino state was determined to destroy Muslim culture and religion,” created a sense of identity, not a symbol of defiance against the state (Abinales 2000, 109). In fact, the Philippine state, despite its weak structure and capacity, “was an important source of *legitimate political symbols and practices*” for aspiring Mindanao leaders, and that the goal of a stable frontier was advanced by extending the right to vote to Mindanao residents (Abinales 2000, 129, *emphasis in original*).

The violence that has become synonymous with Mindanao over the past four and half decades originated during the Marcos dictatorship, which lasted from 1972 to 1981. The former president

The old water tower next to the archbishopric was the only building that survived the air assault; it has since been converted into the City Museum (Roa 2012).

chose Mindanao to grandstand his economic, land, and political reforms, and to solidify his influence. Mindanao was rich with vast timber and agricultural lands, minerals, and fishing grounds, all of which were undeveloped, and it had an increasing and diverse population (Abinales 2000). Marcos activated the MDA, staffed it with his cronies, and then used it to selectively distribute economic and industrial support to sympathetic communities. According to Abinales (2010), it was Marcos who broke the delicate balance between state and strongmen in Mindanao. He undermined the power of local Muslim politicians who opposed his regime by destabilising their political networks (Abinales 2010). Not surprisingly, Muslim-Christian tensions escalated in the 1960s. Marcos's government exacerbated the violence by supporting Christian settlers, including the extremist militia anti-Moro group *Ilaga* (Bisayan for "rat") in the 1970s, and dispatching the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) into Muslim areas (Abinales 2000, 2010). Several Moro separation movements and militia groups formed, including the Muslim Independent Movement in 1968, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1969, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (later renamed the Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization or BMLO) in 1970, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984 (Abinales 2000, Canuday 2009). These groups thus emerged as a response to a threat under exceptional and violent conditions during a period of intense and extremely disruptive interference by the national government. This history supports Abinales' (2010, 119) thesis that the MNLF and the MILF "are better understood as modern mobilizations against the intrusive reach of the nation-state than as the latest edition of an epic Moro struggle against various colonialisms." As such, the violence, unrest and mistrust that mar Mindanao are less the product of religious tensions (which many scholars argue were rather exceptional, historically) and more the deliberate fabrication of actors affiliated with the state, carefully designed to achieve specific goals.

Migration to and settlement in Cagayan de Oro

Geographical considerations

The siting of Philippine secondary cities (the primate city being Metro Manila) was determined by proximity to resources, water access and strategic location, as defined by habitable relief and protection from natural hazards (Francia 2010, Huff and Angeles 2011, De Koninck 2012). The city of Cagayan de Oro reflects this tendency, with water and topography featuring prominently in its geography and settlement patterns. The city's location on the coast of Northern Mindanao,

at the mouth of the great Cagayan River, is indicative of the importance of water in CDO's story and its connections with other parts of Mindanao and other Philippine islands, and beyond to other parts of Southeast Asia.

CDO is located in Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippine archipelago (Fig. 3.1). The city is nestled between the central coastline of Macajalar Bay to the north and the lush plateaus and mountains of Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon that bound the city from east to west to the south (Fig. 3.2). These upland areas are part of the vast river basins of seven rivers and six big creeks that traverse the city and empty into Macajalar Bay (LGU of CDO 2012). The Cagayan River basin is one of the largest in Northern Mindanao, covering an aggregate area of 136,046 hectares (Scientific research and risk assessment committee for TS Sendong 2012). It is bowl-shaped, fed by eight major tributaries, and prone to flooding (Scientific research and risk assessment committee for TS Sendong 2012). Previously, the watershed supported a rich and abundant biodiversity and offered a generally stable climate; these two factors are credited with attracting and retaining settlers (Montalvan 2002). Today, its lands have been logged, mined or used for short-term crop production (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, LGU of CDO 2012, NEDA 2012). In the Bukidnon headwater regions, for example, destructive and widespread logging operations and lax enforcement of forest protection laws have resulted in the siltation of the Cagayan, Iponan and Tagoloan Rivers and the flooding of surrounding areas (Edgerton 2008).

The city's topography constrains development. Within the city limits, steep inclined escarpments separate the lowlands along the bay and CDO's rivers from the highlands. In 2010, 35.8% of city land was classified as agricultural, with the remaining 64.2% of non-agricultural lands classified as residential, commercial, industrial, special class, other properties, exempt properties, and open spaces (LGU of CDO 2012, 7). Only 28% of CDO's total land area (13,587 ha out of a total 56,967 ha) has a slope of eight percent or less (LGU of CDO 2012), meaning that most of the city's landmass is ill-suited for infrastructure, residential, agricultural, commercial and industrial development. The only level or gently sloping areas are concentrated on the narrow coastal plain, the flood plain areas of the Cagayan and Iponan Rivers and in the upland terraces (LGU of CDO 2012).




Fig. 3.2. Topographical map of Northern Mindanao. © Marc Girard, 2015.

Such topographical challenges influenced the spatial pattern of urban development, concentrating people and infrastructure into the limited relatively flat areas. The city's first buildings – the cathedral, convent, jail and courthouse – were erected at a high point near both the Cagayan River and Macajalar Bay under the watchful eyes of the Portuguese-born Recollect Fray Agustin de San Pedro who was charged with the Christianisation and pacification of Cagayan during the Spanish colonial period (Demetrio 1995, Roa 2012). When these buildings were first constructed circa 1624 (Demetrio 1995), the site was estimated to be less than 100 m from the bay. Now, this

same site is five kilometres away due to extensive siltation of the Cagayan River, and the land between the bay and the old city centre is densely built-up.

An exhibit at Xavier University's Museo de Oro in CDO shows that residential, commercial and industrial development first spread northward and eastward along what is now Burgos Street, which parallels the river, and out toward the port (Burton 2013). Once the land parallel to the river was built up, development radiated outward from around this centre. Although permanent structures were concentrated in flat lowland areas 10 m or less above sea level, the areas first developed were rarely flooded. In contrast, the lands adjacent to the river in *barangays* Macasandig and Carmen were used as rice farms in the 1920s, which benefitted from the periodic flooding that replenishes soil nutrients. The rice fields in these *barangays* are now a mixture of commercial buildings, informal and formal settlements, and flattened settlements devastated by Typhoon Sendong.

The rapid and mostly unplanned construction of formal middle class housing developments and informal housing settlements in the flood plains began in the 1990s when there was no other land near the city's economic and cultural centre available to the influx of migrants. For example, the large sandbar in the Cagayan River known as Isla de Oro mushroomed into a bustling informal settlement. Isla de Oro was one of the many locations covered under a settlement ban that was issued, but not implemented, by the local government. Tragically, it was also one of the areas devastated by Typhoon Sendong.

Natural hazards in Cagayan de Oro

As a whole, the Philippine archipelago is subject to frequent and intense natural hazards, including typhoons, landslides and flash floods (Francia 2010, De Koninck 2012), which often unfold into disasters and affect people, infrastructure and development. The proximity of CDO to mountain ranges and to coastal areas, for example, increases its exposure to landslide, flooding and storm surge hazards (Fig. 3.3; LGU of CDO 2012).

LANDSLIDE AND FLOOD SUSCEPTIBILITY MAP OF CAGAYAN DE ORO QUADRANGLE MISAMIS ORIENTAL AND BUKIDNON PROVINCES, PHILIPPINES




Fig. 3.3. The susceptibility of Cagayan de Oro to floods and landslides. The map indicates areas with high susceptibility to flooding (purple) and low to moderate susceptibility to flooding (pale pink); and areas with high (red), moderate (green) or low (yellow) susceptibility to landslides. Main roads are depicted with a continuous black line, rivers with a blue line, municipal boundaries with a thick dashed line and trails with a thin dashed line. Source: Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (DENR-MGB)(2011), adapted by Marc Girard.

Yet, CDO has been largely considered safe from natural hazards, albeit erroneously. In seven months of fieldwork, nearly every single person with whom I spoke – both within and outside of the city – made a point of informing me that typhoons and floods “don’t visit CDO” or “are not in people’s consciousness,” and that “Sendong was just a freak incident.” The myth that “typhoons don’t come to CDO” (or to Mindanao more generally) recurs in local historical accounts (cf. Demetrio 1995), and persists among local residents, although the occurrence of severe tropical storms in 2011 and 2012 seems to have shaken this belief.

How did the narrative of a disaster-free CDO originate and persist? Like most myths, it contains a kernel of truth. CDO lies south of the nation’s typhoon belt (Pelzer 1948), but within the Intertropical Convergence Zone (De Koninck 2012). As depicted in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Regional Office for Asia Pacific’s hazard map, CDO does not fall within any of the tropical storm intensity zones, meaning that it has less than a ten percent probability of being hit by a category 1 to 5 tropical storm in the next decade (Fig. 3.4). CDO does not experience natural hazards at the intensity or frequency of many other parts of the country, but the city still is subject to the occasional violent storm (LGU of CDO 2012). According to the Manila Observatory, typhoons strike CDO once every 80 to 100 years (PPDO no date). Thus, CDO and Mindanao more generally are rightfully perceived as being relatively safe as compared to the Eastern Visayas and the eastern coast of Luzon (Fig. 3.4).

Under the American colonial government, the myth was perpetuated through official propaganda and mass media designed to attract homesteaders to Mindanao agricultural settlements. Pelzer (1948) recounts an exchange he observed in the early 1940s between the chief of the National Land Settlement Administration and two representatives of a tenant organization in Tarlac province, Luzon. The farmers expressed their preference for settlement in a Mindanao agricultural colony instead of a Northern Luzon alternative “because they had read in the press that Koronadal [in Mindanao] was free from typhoons” (Pelzer 1948, 234). Despite the pervasiveness of the myth, geographical features and historical events that transpired before Tropical Storm Sendong (2011) and Super-typhoon Pablo (2012) belie it (Montalvan 2002, 2014).




Fig. 3.4. Natural hazard risks in the Philippines. Source: OCHA (2011), adapted by Marc Girard.

The city and its environs have previous experiences with flooding. The CDO *Disaster Risk Assessment Report* cites nine separate typhoon-rain induced flooding incidents between 1916 and 2011 (LGU of CDO 2012, 12). Anecdotal evidence indicates additional incidents of minor and major flooding of the Cagayan River during this period (cf. Demetrio 1981, Montalvan 2002, 2011). Two of these floods deserve some explanation here because of their link to Typhoon Sendong. A 1916 storm followed a trajectory similar to Sendong and inflicted similar damage. Heavy rains fell from 21-24 January 1916 causing major flooding and killing people and animals, but it was the post-flood cholera and smallpox that actually exacted the greatest toll (Montalvan 2002, Roa 2012). As a result of the 1916 flood, an entire *barangay* was abandoned. Yet, few current residents are aware of the flood (Montalvan 2002, 2011). A single panel in the City Museum of Cagayan de Oro commemorates the event: a photograph of houses piled up against each other taken by the Hon. Antonio Tadeo Cosin and a short explanatory paragraph (Roa 2012). In more recent memory is the January 2009 floods, in which the Cagayan River breached its banks on 3, 11 and 13 January, flooding homes, streets and businesses near the river (Fig. 3.5), and affecting approximately 15,000 families. The lack of human casualties is attributed to the fact that the 2009 flooding occurred relatively slowly and during daylight hours. After the flood, Catholic churches and other non-governmental groups distributed construction materials enabling families whose homes had been destroyed to rebuild *in-situ*. As recounted by several key informants, these same organisations were accused three years later of enabling the devastation in locations affected by both the 2009 and 2011 floods because they had implicitly encouraged residents to rebuild in hazardous locations.

Knowing a particular part of the city was hazard-prone is unlikely to have deterred prospective residents intent on living there. Hazard risks are rarely the most significant consideration in deciding where to live. In fact, the economic opportunities that attract migrants can be, in some cases, so compelling that people stay knowing full well that their homes and businesses are located in natural hazard-prone locations (Gaillard 2008). There is little evidence (apart from the aforementioned exchange overhead by Pelzer (1948)) that the presence or presumed absence of natural hazards were significant push or pull factors for in-migration to CDO during the American and early postwar years. Rather, political, economic and social considerations were more salient in propelling out-migration from other parts of the Philippines, and in influencing where they settled in the city.

Digital Reconstruction of the January 2009 Flood along the Cagayan de Oro River Critical Areas against Flooding

Legend

Critical Area	
43	88
44	89
45	90
46	91
47	92
48	93
49	94
50	95
51	96
52	97
53	98
54	99
55	100
56	101
57	102
58	103
59	104
60	105
61	106
62	107
63	108
64	109
65	110
66	111
67	112
68	113
69	114
70	115
71	116
72	117
73	118
74	119
75	120
76	121
77	122
78	123
79	124
80	125
81	126
82	127
83	128
84	129
85	130
86	131
87	132



Sources:
 Basemap from Google Earth
 Contour from Cagayan de Oro City Planning
 and Development Office

Map developed by:
 Xavier University
 Engineering Resource Center



Fig. 3.5. The areas along the Cagayan River flooded in January 2009. Source: Xavier University Engineering Resource Center (2009).

Economic, social and political considerations for migration

Historically, the Cagayan territory had been connected to other parts of the archipelago and Southeast Asia through maritime trade and migration. For example, the Cagayaños and Spaniards had known about each other for more than six decades before the Spanish Recollects first arrived at the Himologan settlement,¹³ which lay along the Cagayan River, several kilometres inland from Macajalar Bay (Demetrio 1995). When the Spanish navigator Miguel López de Legaspi captured a Muslim junk off Camiguin Island in March 1565, “he was surprised to find its pilot to be a skilled navigator familiar with not only Philippine but with Chinese, Indonesian, and Indian waters, and plying a four-cornered trade between Manila, Mindanao, China, Borneo” (Demetrio 1995, 4). Artifacts displayed in Capitol University’s Museum of Three Cultures and in Xavier University’s Museo de Oro provide additional evidence of Cagayan’s role in the Southeast Asian maritime trade (De La Peña 2012, Burton 2013). Cagayan was thus directly involved in a well-established maritime trade network connecting what would later become the nations of Southeast, South and East Asia (Church 2003, Francia 2010).

Not all visitors to Cagayan left. Demetrio (1995, 2) points out that “in legend and probably in fact too” the indigenous Bukidnon people were driven out of the coastal and lowland areas into the mountains by Visayan migrants prior to the Spanish colonial era. Although the Spaniards largely failed to penetrate and pacify most parts of Mindanao, there was continued migration from crowded parts of the Visayas to coastal areas in Northern Mindanao during the Spanish era (Pelzer 1948). The colonial government did not provide official support to said migration.

This migration continued under the auspices of American and independent Philippine rule as migrants flowed into traditional areas of in-migration. As a destination, Misamis Oriental was a perennial favourite for migrants from the Central Visayas, especially from Cebu and Bohol (Edgerton 2008). Once established, the migrants encouraged their relatives and friends to join them. Between 1939 and 1948, Misamis Oriental has the greatest population growth rate of any Philippine province (Edgerton 2008). The growth cannot be attributed solely to a particular

¹³ Before the coming of the Spaniards, the site that was to become Cagayan was originally called *Kalambagohan*, on account of the many *lambago* trees that grew along the riverbanks (Demetrio 1995). In several languages spoken in the Philippines the suffix *-han* indicates a place. Hence *Kalambagohan* is the place of the *lambago* trees.

government intervention because CDO was not a site of any official state-sponsored migration program or policy (Pelzer 1948).

Instead, the unplanned and spontaneous inter-regional migration reflects the ramping up of historical movement and the intensification of demographic and agrarian problems in the Visayas. During the American era, overcrowding,¹⁴ continued cultivation of annual crops of the steep slopes of Cebu Island, and the precipitous drop in agricultural productivity resulting from such practices forced Cebuanos to migrate to neighbouring islands, especially to Mindanao (Pelzer 1948). Thus agrarian problems related to inequitable land distribution, overcrowding and difficulty in meeting subsistence needs in Cebu, Bohol, and other parts of the Visayas were important push factors spurring out-migration. Strong social networks connecting Visayans to CDO and Misamis Oriental were an important pull factor directing the destination of this movement to the closest large and thriving city to the south.

In recent decades, urbanisation and the promise of better economic opportunities in CDO has lured migrants from adjacent provinces and towns (LGU of CDO 2012). Indeed, labour-motivated migration among regions continues to be a major source of internal migration in the Philippines (Kelly 2009, Francia 2010), including rural to rural flows, and flows into, out of and between cities (Fuwa 2011). Faced with overpopulation in rural areas (De Koninck 2012), migration appeared to be the only way of securing an adequate livelihood in the face of decentralisation policies that devolved development and welfare responsibilities from the national to the provincial or even municipal governments (Gibson, Cahill et al. 2010). The industrial sector and cities, however, cannot absorb the excess labour (De Koninck 2012), leading to a seemingly paradoxical relationship of accelerated rural-urban migration in the context of rising un- and underemployment in cities (Calero Cuervo and Kim Hin 1998). Despite boasting the highest 10-year average growth in Gross Regional Domestic Product in Mindanao (Rubillo 2014), the unemployment and underemployment rates in Region-X in April 2014 were 5.3% and 20.7%,

¹⁴ The population density statistics provided by Pelzer (1948, 84) underscore the huge variation among Philippine islands, and point to the attractiveness of Mindanao. Circa 1939, the population density was 53.8 persons/km² nationally, with vast discrepancies between sparsely and densely populated areas. Cebu, for example, has a density of 214.8 persons/km² whereas Mindanao had a density of only 19.3 persons/km². Crowding was even worse in the small peasant farms on crowded plains and valleys; the population density in Cebu's agricultural areas was 767.5 persons/km².

respectively (PSA 2014). In comparison, the national unemployment and underemployment rates were 7.0% and 18.2% (PSA 2014).

Evidence from interviews and local media sources indicates that unemployment and underemployment in sending areas were, and continue to be, salient issues for CDO residents who came to the city since the 1970s. A lack of viable economic opportunities drove them out of their old communities and into a city they presumed had them. The lack of economic options in many parts of the Philippines outside large cities is linked to larger problems such as the takeover of large swathes of agricultural land by large corporations or landowners, deforestation, resource extraction, land conversion, and the government policies and programs that explicitly or tacitly support them; they all displace people and impede their access to viable livelihoods (cf. Bello, Docena et al. 2004).

The war in Mindanao

Despite the limited geography of the war in Mindanao (Abinales 2010), the whole island carries a tarnished reputation of violence, unrest and mistrust, which, in turn, has deterred potential migrants from outside the region. Yet, CDO maintains a reputation as a peaceful city largely exempt from violence. Informants described the city as “the rest and recreation centre for the military forces and the revolutionary forces” and “the playground of opposing factions where Philippine Armed Forces, Moro and Communist rebel fighters lay down their arms and go *mall*ing” alongside each other at the city’s four major shopping malls.¹⁵ A CDO-based businessman and philanthropist I interviewed went as far as distinguishing between the petty crimes committed in CDO and the major crimes committed in other Mindanao cities such as Davao, Zamboanga and Cotabatu. He explained that the major criminals come to CDO to pickpocket, and then return to Davao and Zamboanga where they assassinate people and bomb

¹⁵ A legacy of the American colonial era, “*mall*ing” is a favourite pastime of many Filipinos in which they enjoy air-conditioned stores, eat at fast food or fancy restaurants, listen to concerts, receive vaccinations, attend church services and occasionally purchase items. Philippine malls are indicators of the relative stability, safety and economic potential of a city. For example, Guisano malls are found everywhere in Mindanao; they sell inexpensive goods, house crowded chaotic stores, attract customers from all economic classes, and have very lax mall security. In contrast Ayala malls are known to exist only in cities considered to be very safe; they house luxury brand stores, are very clean and calm, attract upper and upper middle-class shoppers, and have very tight mall security. There are only two of Ayala malls in all of Mindanao, including the new Centrio Mall that opened in CDO in 2012.

buildings. As a result of its peaceful reputation, CDO has drawn Mindanao-bound migrants from the Visayas and Luzon, as well as migrants from other parts of Mindanao seeking to escape violence and unrest, among other reasons. The conflict in Mindanao, however, still affects economic activities, social dynamics and politics in the city. For example, commercial banks in CDO receive money earned from illicit activities in the underground economy of Muslim Mindanao (Abinales 2010), and the business community is continually faced with investment, supply and distribution problems linked to the conflict.

The only time the CDO-as-a-peaceful-space narrative is seriously challenged occurs during the electoral period. Two anecdotes illustrate this dynamic. The first occurred during an interview at a research institute in CDO. My informant advised me against going to Iligan City to conduct interviews because she feared that my family and I would be kidnapped. She explained that it was approaching the electoral campaign period and that the ransom from a presumed affluent white foreign family would to bolster campaign funds. The second incident occurred several months later when a prominent lawyer from one of the affluent established families in CDO offered me a ride back into town after a meeting we had both attended. He was concerned I would fall victim to a “drive-by snatching” from a “thief on a motor bike.” He explained that during the election gun ban “thieves” are especially brazen because they are not afraid of retaliation. For 90 days before and 60 days after elections, everyone except uniformed officers is banned from carrying firearms.¹⁶ Consequently street crime in CDO rises during the election gun ban, and home robberies decrease because the “thieves” know people keep their guns at home. The election gun ban was instituted because of the risk of electoral violence, especially between political family

¹⁶ Guns are everywhere in the Philippines. Armed guards patrol the entrance of many restaurants (including McDonald’s!), banks, schools and shopping malls. Young attractive saleswomen sell guns, bullets and related accessories in shopping malls. My husband, quite knowledgeable about firearms from over two decades of playing violent video games, was amazed and horrified by the plethora of guns, including military grade weapons, he saw on the streets, in markets, and in private businesses. On one occasion we left Cogon market abruptly when he noticed a very young child carelessly waving a gun around like a toy – only it was not a toy. Despite the abundance of firearms, there were no reports of gun violence in CDO during my fieldwork.

dynasties.¹⁷ These two examples also illustrate the race- and class-based assumptions of my informants.

The peaceful space narrative at the city level does not scale down to the *barangay*, *sitio*¹⁸ or street level. According to the police, the incidence of criminal activity is roughly even across *barangays*. Yet, research participants frequently reported that the *barangay* they personally inhabited was safer and more peaceful than other *barangays*. This disjuncture between city and *barangay* scale peace and safety discourses had real repercussions in the aftermath of Sendong, particularly in the evacuation and relocation sites. The incongruence, like the two anecdotes described above, also underlines the salience of profoundly racialised, gendered, and classed dynamics in shaping narratives. The lawyer, for example, performed what he perceived as his duty in protecting a foreign woman from the purportedly violent streets in the city's working class *sitios*. Similar to the lawyer, the comments made by many research participants revealed racialised, gendered, and classed discourses about who settled where in the city.

Who settles where?

Today, the city of Cagayan de Oro is the provincial capital of Misamis Oriental, the regional capital of Northern Mindanao (Region X), and the primary gateway to the rest of Mindanao. It houses the provincial Capitol, provincial government agencies, and regional offices for many of the national government agencies. In addition to being the administrative centre of Region X, CDO is the education and business centre and a major transport and transshipment hub in Mindanao (LGU of CDO 2012). CDO is a chartered city, meaning that it has an administration separate from that of Misamis Oriental.

CDO is the third most populous city in Mindanao, after Davao and Zamboanga Cities.

According to the latest published census data from 2010, the city counted 602,088 residents (PSA

¹⁷ A recent example of horrific electoral violence was the Maguindanao massacre on 23 November 2009. Buluan vice-mayor Esmael Mangudadatu had arranged for members of his family, journalists and lawyers to accompany him when he filed a certificate of candidacy to challenge Andal Ampatuan, Jr. for the mayorship of *datu* Unsay. The Ampatuans are a leading Muslim politician clan, and had threatened Mangudadatu if he filed his candidacy. The Ampatuans followed through with their threat: 100 armed men stopped Mangudadatu's convoy on its way to the Commission of Elections office, then brutally murdered and raped 57 members of the convey and bystanders (Abinales 2010).

¹⁸ A *sito* is hamlet or sub-village. It is smaller than a *barangay*.

2013), making it the tenth most populous city in the Philippines and the most densely populated city in Northern Mindanao, with an average of 11 persons per hectare (LGU of CDO 2012, 44). The city is divided into 80 *barangays* (23 rural and 57 urbanised) (LGU of CDO 2014). The most densely populated *barangays* are situated around the city centre and along the coast of the Macajalar Bay (Fig. 3.6), with the highest density (450 persons per hectare) in Macabalan, a *barangay* situated on reclaimed land and bounded by Macajalar Bay to the north and the Cagayan River to the west (LGU of CDO 2012, 44). The most populous *barangays* are Carmen (67,583), Lapasan (41,903), Kauswagan (34,541), Balulang (32,531) and Bulua (31,345) (PSA 2013).

Where people settle within the city depends upon several factors, especially economic considerations and social connections. The cost of land and housing affects where people live, the type of housing they inhabit, and whether they are renters, sharers or homeowners. Social networks also strongly influence settlement decisions. Like the Visayan migrants who persuaded their kin to settle in CDO (cf. Edgerton 2008), late 20th and early 21st century CDO residents convinced their family, friends and acquaintances to settle in their neighbourhoods. As a result, for example, there are *sitios* such as Villa Angeles in *barangay* Balulang where many of the Muslim residents came from Marawi City in Lanao del Sur in the 1990s based on positive word-of-mouth accounts. Residents inhabiting the city's informal settlements also display a shared geographical origin or ethnicity.

As previously mentioned, natural hazard risks were not a significant factor in recent settlement decisions for migrants of any economic class. In CDO, both formal middle-class subdivisions such as Emily Homes in *barangay* Macanhan and informal settlements such as Isla de Oro and Isla Bugnaw in *barangay* Consolacion are located in hazard-prone areas, and were all heavily affected by Typhoon Sendong. These middle-class residences were recently built; developers had advertised stunning riverside views. (After Sendong, developers began advertising “flood-free” homes.) For low income households whose transportation budgets are very limited, the attraction of riverside living was less about gorgeous views than proximity to jobs, services, markets and people in their social networks. Typically these low income settlements are a mere \$0.16 *motorela* ride lasting five to ten minutes to the city centre.




Fig. 3.6. Population density of Cagayan de Oro by *barangay*. © Marc Girard, 2015.

Few city spaces are the sole purview of a single group, although different groups of people have very different levels of access to and control over these spaces and the way life unfolds there. For example, all city *barangays* include households of varying income levels, although certain neighbourhoods may be exclusively inhabited by rich or by poor people. Like in many parts of the Philippines, makeshift houses built from locally-sourced materials sit adjacent to the tidy high exterior walls enclosing affluent gated communities (cf. Alcazaren, Ferrer and Icamina 2011). Yet, many poor, informal residents freely pass through the gates to work in the most intimate spaces of private homes, raising children, touching personal belongings, and hearing private conversations of the rich. Such divergent access to and control over city space had real impacts in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong.

What do people build?

There are different ways to answer the question, ‘what do they build?’ People build houses. They also build communities. This section focuses on the physical characteristics of formal and informal housing settlements. The social, economic, cultural, ecological and political aspects of community is beyond the scope of this section, but is explored extensively in Chapters 6 and 7.

The type and quality of housing is frequently a question of availability and affordability. CDO has a housing shortage. According to the local government unit of CDO and the Region X offices of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the National Economic and Development Authority, the ideal household to housing ratio is 1:1, but in 2010 the ratio was 116,224: 113,321 (1.03:1), indicating there was a doubling up of housing and a shortage of 2903 housing units (LGU of CDO 2012, 49). The devastation of Typhoon Sendong, however, drastically changed the scenario, with 4362 houses totally washed out, 6283 partially damaged, and countless others now sited in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Mines and Geology Bureau (DENR-MGB)-designated danger zones (LGU of CDO 2012, 49).¹⁹ The local government has suggested that the backlog can be met temporarily with “unacceptable housing units – those made of light materials like *cogon*, *nipa*, *anahaw*, etc. which will not last for five years and makeshift houses” (LGU of CDO 2012, 49). This statement reflects the preference of most

¹⁹ After Typhoon Sendong, the President declared several heavily flooded areas in the city as “no build zones” where the construction of permanent residential and commercial structures is prohibited. Previously, many of these areas were densely populated with informal housing settlements.

Filipinos for concrete houses, which are perceived as more durable and comfortable than houses built with other materials.

In the Philippines, urban housing settlements are characterised as either planned or formal settlements, or as unplanned or informal settlements. The former description is typically applied to middle or upper class developments, and the latter to working class ones. Informal settlements are usually called “squatter cities” or “slums,” except by the residents themselves who call them by the neighbourhood’s proper name (e.g. Isla de Oro, Isla Bugnaw). A stunning coffee table book, *Lungsod iskwater: the evolution of informality as a dominant pattern in Philippine cities*, identifies five types of informal settlements in Philippine cities: *tabing-ilog* (by the river), *tabing-dagat* (by the sea), *barangay basura* (by the dump), along the *riles* (by the train tracks), and *gillage* (around exclusive village) (Alcazaren, Ferrer and Icamina 2011, 12). CDO has four of the five types – despite promises from the national government and a completed feasibility study, there is no railway system (and hence no train tracks) running through the city (cf. Diaz 2013). CDO also has its share of so-called planned settlements.

In distinguishing between the two types of settlements, regional government agencies reveal their interest in governmentality and their frustration with non-state spaces. According to the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) (2012, 13), informal settlements are “unplanned, usually overcrowded, have poor sanitation and other basic facilities, and are not in compliance with current planning regulation and building standards” and “have been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to.” In contrast, formal housing “is constructed following the building codes and planning standards enforced by local government and national housing agencies and has security of tenure as it follows formal procedures of legal ownership” (OCD 2012, 14). Informal settlements are unreadable by outside observers, and thus hinder state interventions aimed at improving “sanitation and other basic facilities” and enforcing “planning regulation and building standards” (OCD 2012, 13). The definition of formal settlements is equally telling, problematic and ironic. It values adherence to building codes, planning standards and formal legal procedures – all forms of regulation and legitimation that states can employ to exclude (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011), or to increase legibility and to facilitate manipulation (Scott 1998). The phrase “enforced by local government and national housing agencies” in the definition is ironic, and blurs the lines between formal and informal housing in CDO (OCD 2012, 14). The municipality had ordinances

prohibiting the construction of residences on hazard-prone land. It just did not enforce them (Corrales 2011). If building codes and planning standards were not enforced, or the siting not compliant with the no-build danger zones of DENR-MGB hazard maps, then shouldn't these affluent middle-class developments be labelled *informal* settlements, too?

Moreover, the definition of informal settlements is decidedly pejorative, reflecting a broadly-held misunderstanding about the reality of actual residents. For residents, the siting of the settlement was planned insofar as it is located on free or inexpensive land close to social networks, livelihoods, and critical amenities and services. The houses themselves may be planned but built with affordable, locally-sourced light materials, or built and then iteratively renovated as resources became available. Instead of describing their neighbourhood as “crowded,” residents focus on the benefits of being surrounded by a large customer base that supports their livelihood activities. As will be unpacked in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the sometimes unsubstantiated assumptions about people's needs and wants has material consequences. Many of the trustees who directed post-disaster efforts in CDO were the same ones who have previously shaped migration to and settlement within the city.

Trustees shaping migration and settlement

Recall that trustees assert a “position defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need” (Li 2007a, 4). Since the beginning of the Spanish colonial era in the 16th century and into the present day, a range of trustees have governed the Philippine archipelago, and have shaped migration and settlement patterns. The positioning of each of the trustees as “state” or “civil,” or as “religious” or “secular” actors has shifted under Spanish and American, Japanese occupation, and Philippine independence (cf. Tan 2009, Francia 2010). Most trustees, in fact, have simultaneously spanned multiple categories. For example, it is impossible to identify a purely religious actor or institution who has never been involved in state or civil matters, or a politician who was not taught at a religious (usually Catholic) school, volunteers in their church and has no ties to influential members of the business community or voluntary sector. Much like how the state is simultaneously a “composite reality” and “mythicized abstraction” (Foucault 2003b, 244) in pursuit of discordant and incoherent objectives, the trustees occupying each category also form “a multilayered and conflictual ensemble” (Gupta and Sharma 2006, 291). Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity and

brevity, it is helpful to discuss the trustees who have influenced CDO-bound migration and settlement patterns as state, Christian, Muslim, or elite family trustees.

State trustees

Earlier parts of the chapter discussed migration to and settlement in both Mindanao and CDO. The movement of people into Mindanao was alternately helped and hindered by which variation of the Mindanao-as-frontier narrative was promulgated. Different governments, government departments, politicians, and other representatives of the colonial, and later independent, state employed diverse, and often conflicting, discourses, policies and programs that changed over time. In CDO, government incentives to develop different parts of the local economy helped convince job-seekers to settle nearby; for example, investment in the maritime transportation and shipping industry attracted people to *barangays* near the port. The situation in which various levels of government, and even different government agencies within a single level of government, pursue discordant objectives and vie to govern particular spaces continues today. The following paragraphs elaborate on one particular municipal program to illustrate how state trustees currently influence where Cagayaños live in the city, and to underscore the incoherence of state trustees.

Cagayaños associate their mayor²⁰ with many things: a very deep voice, incessant smoking, the colour purple,²¹ an aversion to attending Mass,²² peace-brokering,²³ membership in political parties in opposition to the President, controversy, land-banking, pro-poor sympathies,²⁴ and the *pisso-pisso* program. The last four elements are components of a municipal program that has influenced where many poor residents have settled in the city. Under the previous administration, the city's Office of the Marginal Settler had helped to organise informal settlers into associations or cooperatives so that they could purchase land. The city government contributed ten percent. Still, many families had difficulty in consistently paying the monthly mortgage payments

²⁰ Mayor Vicente Emano was ousted from office in the May 2013 elections, so technically he is the “former mayor.” However, because this research project focuses on the pre-Sendong period up to April 2013 during his mayoral reign, I refer to him as the “mayor” and not the “former mayor” throughout this dissertation.

²¹ The most obvious and widespread (and garish) mark of the mayor on the urban landscape is the use of the colour purple. It's a colour he has liked since childhood. He chose it as the official colour of his political party, and uses it in abundance. In nearly all city *barangays*, the infrastructure, including flyovers (overpasses), *barangay* covered courts, bridges, and the main city market, is painted purple. The mayor's office has two Ikea-style purple couches, light violet walls, curtains patterned with giant purple flowers, and purple paneling around each ceiling light. Moreover, as he explained to me, purple provokes the ire of his political opponents.

²² His refusal to attend church services – in spite of his claim to believe in God – distinguishes him from his predecessors. Moreover, religious icons or symbols of any sort are conspicuously absent at city hall. Instead of the usual crucifix or *Santo Niño* statue that adorn other government offices in the city, the lobby display at city hall consists of four six feet high rectangular columns presenting his peace-brokering achievements.

²³ The mayor stands apart as one of few Philippine leaders who is trusted by all sides of the Mindanao conflict (except by the Muslim separatist group Abu Sayyaf, which he states are “only terrorists with no ideology”). During his career, he successfully negotiated the release of 13 of 14 kidnapped persons, and personally exchanged the ransom money for the hostages. He boasts that he can even bring his beautiful secretaries and other women with him when he travels into hostile territory, announce that there are women there if the men want to have sex with them, knowing that the women will not be touched. He explains that his reputation among the leaders of diverse groups in Mindanao as a respected peace-broker derives from his decades-long campaign for the autonomy of Mindanao and his insistence that in Mindanao there are no Muslims, Christians, Indigenous Peoples, communists, etc., - only “Mindanaoan.”

²⁴ The mayor's voter base, selective enforcement of municipal bylaws, preferred means of communication and political priorities and initiatives all reinforce his “pro-poor” reputation.

demanded by the landowner for 15 to 25 years. In his first year in office, the mayor replaced the Office of the Marginal Settler with the Estate Management Division (EMD), a municipal office responsible for relocation, and he introduced the *pisso-pisso* program. Through *pisso-pisso*, for a one-time fee of one peso (\$0.02) poor families could purchase a 70 m² lot on which they could build a house. Beneficiaries own the land and any building they erect on the lot, thereby gaining security of tenure. The head of EMD describes the program as a way to resolve “the situation [in which] there are a lot of people residing within areas where [it is] not really a dignified place or a suitable place for these families who came in the city.”

As of February 2013, the city had sold more than 2000 lots to *pisso-pisso* beneficiaries. The lots come from the mayor’s “land-banking” initiative in which the city used a “proactive approach” to purchase “vacant” lands that could be used for future relocation. Before selling one peso lots to beneficiaries, the city scouted potential properties, negotiated a purchase agreement with the landowner, acquired the land, arranged the zoning, and prepared the land for roads and services. As of January 2013, the city had 36 sites for *pisso-pisso* relocation, including 30 *in-situ* sites. This availability of land was a critical factor in expediting the construction of relocation housing for Sendong survivors.

The mayor matter-a-factly admits that his *pisso-pisso* program has gotten him into trouble. He was accused of plunder, and was critiqued that some resettlement lots were located in geohazard-designated areas, including areas devastated by Typhoon Sendong. In early January 2013, for example, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) accused the mayor of gross negligence and dereliction of duty in relation to Typhoon Sendong, and attempted to deliver suspension papers. The DILG charged that the mayor’s *pisso-pisso* program had encouraged city residents to inhabit unsafe areas. The national government representatives failed because they could not reach the door to city hall. Hundreds of supporters from informal settlements and relocation sites had responded to a request to surround city hall in a week-long sit-in to protect the mayor. Despite the controversy, the mayor insists that the *pisso-pisso* program has benefited the city’s urban poor. He noted that the national government’s Ombudsman’s Office publically defended him against the DILG charges with its statement: “if only all local government units in the country would follow the programs of the city mayor of Cagayan de Oro then there would be lesser poor in this country.”

Catholic and other Christian trustees

The Philippines is the “bastion of Christianity in Asia” (de Guzman 2011). From the 16th century until very recently, Christianity had made little headway in Asia (Moreno 2006), unlike in Africa and Latin America. This difference is attributed to (1) the perceived youth and lack of sophistication of Christianity as compared to the older religions already present in the region, (2) “Asian institutions and intellectual traditions [that] were sturdier than their African and Latin American counterparts,” and (3) the incompatibility of “Western individualism and the stress on religious truth” with “Eastern life, which emphasized the rules and requirements of community” (Calderisi 2013, 119). In contrast to many of its Asian neighbours, the Philippines has embraced Christianity, in large part due to the wide-reaching governmental interventions of Catholic Church officials during more than three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. The 2000 census national survey found that almost 93% of the population is Christian (USCIRF 2013). According to the census, the religious affiliations of Filipinos are: Catholic (82.81%, including Roman Catholic (81.04%) and Aglipayan²⁵ (1.77%)), Muslim (5.06%), mainline Protestant (3.10%), Evangelical (2.82%), *Iglesia ni Cristo* (2.31%), and other (3.90%) (NSO 2003, 200 in Moreno 2006, 33).

Clearly, Catholicism is not the only Christian religion practiced in the Philippines, nor are its officials the only Christian trustees wielding financial, political and social clout (Hedman 2006, Moreno 2006). Still, the Philippines remains the third largest national Catholic Church, surpassed only by Brazil and Mexico (Moreno 2006), and now “rivals the Vatican as the most Catholic place on Earth” (Calderisi 2013, 122). Over its long and storied history in the Philippine islands, the Catholic Church hierarchy has established itself as one of three components of the dominant bloc of forces in civil society in the Philippines (alongside the U.S. government and the capitalist class) (Hedman 2006). It has repeatedly used its hegemonic position to organise and govern the physical and social landscape, working alongside and sometimes in opposition to other trustees. The following discussion thus focuses on Catholic trustees.

During the Spanish colonial era, the Catholic Church hierarchy occupied a privileged position as a de facto state actor. Spanish rule was officially devoted to the evangelisation of the archipelago,

²⁵ Aglipayan is also called *Iglesia Filipina Independente* or the Philippine Independent Church.

with the church formally awarded considerable autonomy and power within the colonial state (Hedman 2006). Colonial administrators and their allies instituted political, social and economic structures to achieve the objectives of the motherland, namely “God, glory and gold” (Tan 2009, 50). The administrators quickly learned that by cooperating with the Catholic priests and friars, and by supporting efforts to Catholicise the islands, they could attain their objectives (Tan 2009, Francia 2010). For example, in 1622, eight Augustinian Recollect priests arrived and launched a religious movement that eventually resulted in the Christianisation of the entire northeastern coast of Mindanao; they are credited with pacifying a part of the archipelago deemed impenetrable by colonial officials (Demetrio 1995).

It was extremely difficult for administrators and clerics to rule, extract taxes from, and convert a highly dispersed and transient population. The solution they devised was to compel people to settle permanently in compact villages; this forced relocation was done under the auspices of *reduccion* (resettlement) policies (Hedman 2006). Spaniards encouraged the pre-existing tendency to settle in groups instead of isolated farmsteads (Pelzer 1948), which facilitated Christianisation and state supervision. New settlements were patterned according to an *abajo de las campanas* (under the bells) logic, whereby each resident was within earshot of the church and could quickly come to Mass or respond to a call for arms (Francia 2010, 69). Ecclesiastical, administrative, and business establishments were clustered into a “municipal plaza complex, [...] signal[ing] the fusion of religious, state, and economic power” (Hedman 2006, 26). Such reorganisation of the Philippine territory mostly took place in lowland parts of Luzon, the Visayas and Northern Mindanao.

Through its wide-ranging activities operating at a variety of scales, the influence of the Catholic Church hierarchy spanned both private and public spheres. In the Spanish colonial era, each village had its own church, run by a Spanish friar who was granted the liberty to rule (and enrich himself) as he desired so long as he assisted with tax collection and colonial administrative duties (Tan 2009). He administered the private lives of villagers by sanctifying births, deaths and marriages in Catholic rituals (Hedman 2006). Throughout the archipelago, the Church monopolised education, and censored literature, media and other forms of cultural production (Hedman 2006). The local friar was the conduit of state power through his official duties of overseeing “the ratification of elections among the *principalia* (local notables) to positions of

municipal and village-level authority (*gobernadorcillos* and *cabezas de barangay*)” (Hedman 2006, 26, *emphasis in original*).

In the countryside, commercial and export-oriented agriculture slowly replaced traditional subsistence agriculture, providing the colonial government with a source of sorely needed revenues, and a newly emerging elite (e.g. native *principalia*, Chinese mestizos, Church orders, Spanish citizens and government officials) with political and economic structures conducive to establishing monopolies and accumulating private landholdings (Tan 2009, Batalla 2010). These monopolies disrupted and destroyed the open and dynamic nature of Philippine external trade and commerce that existed pre-1521, and later provided the basis for rent-seeking activities of elite families (Tan 2009).

The church and friars were among the great landowners at the beginning of the 20th century in the Philippines; for more than 300 years, the Roman Catholic Church and Orders had amassed large areas of the best agricultural land, especially around Manila (Pelzer 1948). These vast estates or “friar lands” were a source of conflict and repeated revolts. Some of the land titles date back to the 17th and 18th centuries, but most of the friar land titles were issued in 1880 and 1894 under a weakening Spanish colonial government (Pelzer 1948). Hedman (2006, 26, *emphasis added*) summarises the reach of this de facto state actor: “In short, the Catholic Church did not simply ‘inflect’ the nature of colonial rule in the Philippines with religious coloration, as has been argued for the (Protestant) British Raj in India; it was located *at the very core of Spanish state power* in the archipelago.” Put another way, the Catholic hierarchy practiced an extremely wide-reaching governmentality.

Why were the Catholic Church and its emissaries so successful in governing many parts of Luzon, the Visayas and Northern Mindanao? Calderisi (2013) suggests that Catholic missionaries began implementing methods that enhanced the receptiveness of locals – especially the ruling class – to foreigners and their ideas. Moreover, they prioritised local concerns unrelated to evangelisation over their religious duties. The activities of Catholic priests during the Spanish colonial era in what is now CDO illustrates the successful application of these tactics. The following account is based on a compilation of oral and written histories of Northern Mindanao written by the Jesuit priest Francisco R. Demetrio, S.J. (1995), and on articles by and conversations with CDO historian Antonio J. Montalvan II (cf. 2002, 2009).

In the 16th century, the *lumad* tribes living in the Cagayan area were at the northern periphery of the great Maguindanao sultanate. They were concentrated in the hilltop Himologan settlement several kilometres upstream from present-day CDO. *Datu* Salangsang, the then-chief of the Cagayan people, initially rebuffed the request of two Spanish friars to enter Himologan because he feared reprisal from the Maguindanao sultanate. Later, he relented and even granted them permission to say Mass. When the legendary Sultan of Maguindanao Muhammad Kudarat learned that Himologan was harbouring Catholic priests, he ordered Salangsang to kill them. Betting on eventual Spanish conquest, and being positively inclined towards Christianity, Salangsang appealed for Spanish support. Instead of receiving a battalion of Spanish soldiers, Himologan got a single new priest: 23 year old Fray Agustin de San Pedro, trained in architecture, gunnery and military tactics. Immediately, Fray Agustin suggested two major changes to Himologan's defence: (1) dispatch spies to track Maguindanao movements, and (2) relocate the fortified settlement. Salangsang consented. The new citadel was built circa 1624 at the present-day site of San Agustin Cathedral and city hall. Four years later, once Salangsang was convinced of Cagayan's victory over the Maguindano, he and his wife pledged allegiance to Spain and were baptised. By 1634, most of Salangsang's people had also converted. In this way, a young Portuguese priest inspired by strategic military considerations – and not Catholic doctrine – had accomplished three major feats. He won the trust of Cagayaños by leading successful defensive and offensive military operations against the Maguindanao and Maranao fighters. He also initiated the first recorded large-scale relocation in the Cagayan territory and the founding of Cagayan de Oro as a predominantly Catholic settlement.

The replacement of Spanish colonial rule by American colonial rule loosened the entanglement of church and state in state governance. The Catholic Church shifted into the “emerging public sphere of civil society” as its privileges were whittled away by the new American colonial government (Hedman 2006, 26). In 1905, the Bureau of Lands bought 23 friar estates totaling 165,000 hectares of land, then transferred them to the tenants (Pelzer 1948, 91). (The Church was generously compensated for its losses, and later, repossessed confiscated property (Hedman 2006).) The Church's authority in politics, education, mass media and cultural expression was similarly eroded. Control over local elections and municipal politics was no longer the purview of parish priests (Hedman 2006). Instead of backing the Catholic Church, the new colonial government endorsed “secular education, civil liberties, and freedom of religion” (Hedman 2006,

26). Hedman (2006, 26) surmises this disentanglement yielded a “Catholicism [that] now serv[es] as a ‘civil’ rather than a state religion.”

The identity of the Church changed under the auspices of American rule. The Church was demoted from a position of equality with colonial authorities to a subordinate position. In 1902, the Church splintered when archbishop Gregorio Aglipay and other dissident priests formed the *Iglesia Filipina Independiente* (Philippine Independent Church), taking one quarter of Philippine Catholics with them (Moreno 2006, 33). American bishops replaced Spanish bishops (Hedman 2006). The Church adapted to its reconfiguration as a civil and fractured institution, and quickly regained its influence on power through new means. Today, the Catholic Church continues to sway political decision-making and remains a fundamental collective cultural symbol in much of Filipino society (Quimpo 2011), especially through its governmental interventions in education, voluntary associational activities, and reproductive health.

The Church’s educational institutions proved a formidable obstacle to the American colonial administration’s efforts to diminish the Church’s power. Catholic schools were preeminent in the formation and socialisation of the Filipino elites who assumed leadership roles in government and in civil society (Hedman 2006). Religious orders had established *colegios* catering to the sons of the elites in the Spanish colonial era (Calderisi 2013). These Catholic colleges aimed “to give the sons of the native ruling families an education which would not only make Christians of them, but fit them for the local magistracy; for as town governors and village headmen, they could exercise a profound and salutary influence on their own people” (de la Costa 1961 in Hedman 2006, 28). Many prominent and influential politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders were educated in these institutions, even if they were not Catholic themselves. According to Calderisi (2013), it was not so much the number of schools, but the quality, reputation and prestige of a Catholic education that gave Catholic schools an advantage over their secular counterparts. The prestige of Catholic colleges, including Ateneo de Manila, University of Santo Tomas, and De La Salle University in the national capital region and their counterparts in major provincial cities, persists into the 21st century.

By sponsoring voluntary associational activity, the Catholic Church further entrenched its hegemonic position. Lay Catholic organisations such as the Catholic Action of the Philippines,

the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic Women's League were formed under American rule. Participation in Christian lay associations was a stepping stone for professional success and career advancement even if associational duties were entirely unrelated because of the invaluable "cultural, social, and symbolic capital" accrued through membership (Hedman 2006, 31). The Philippines also hosts many Catholic labour and peasant federations, radio and television stations and magazines, which are preoccupied with "imparting a Christian outlook on all aspects of modern life, from intellectual to economic life, from family life to civic life" (Poggi 1967 in Hedman 2006, 31). Many Christian churches and their lay organisations have allied themselves with other segments of civil society, including business associations, to promote free and fair elections through various campaigns in the 1950s, 60s, 80s and early 20th century (Hedman 2006). In sponsoring diverse voluntary associational activity, the Church has influenced the social, political and economic landscape in the Philippines.

The nation's bedrooms are yet another space shaped by a civil Catholic faith. For decades, national governments have timidly proposed then backed away from reproductive health laws despite clear calls for them within and outside the country. Many non-Catholic Christian organisations, including those represented by the National Council of Churches in the Philippines, are strong advocates of reproductive health laws (Calderisi 2013), and have lobbied extensively to provide all Filipinos with safe and affordable access to family planning and safer sex services. In contrast, since the 1970s Catholic Church officials in the Philippines have stymied numerous attempts to reform reproductive health laws. For example, the Church blocked government legislation that would increase access to condoms; the money that was destined for contraception was instead given to the Catholic organisation Couples for Christ to teach natural family planning (Calderisi 2013, 190). In CDO, the interest of Catholic officials in natural family planning surfaces as an important component of the archdiocese's post-Sendong relief efforts, and the educational programs of Couples for Christ are used extensively to shape the behaviour of Sendong survivors living in relocation sites.

Even if one manages, somehow, to evade the influence of the Catholic Church on education, public policy, career advancement, voluntary organisations, and sex in the Philippines, it is impossible to miss the plethora of Catholic symbols etched upon urban and rural landscapes. The in-your-faceness of the Catholic faith in Manila is unmistakable.

Every school bus in Manila seems to belong to a Catholic school. To attract credulous customers, private clinics carry religious monikers (St Stephen, Sacred Heart, The Lord's Grace), advertisers play tricks with Holy Writ (Almighty Aluminum, Immaculate Complexion), and bus companies name themselves after saints, like St Martin of Tours. [...] Reacting to a fall-off in attendance and the inroads of Protestant Evangelical sects, pastors now schedule Sunday masses at shopping malls (Calderisi 2013, 122-123).

The names of most Philippine cities, towns and villages outside Muslim Mindanao can easily replace "Manila" in Calderisi's description. The visual and social imprint of Christianity is also striking in CDO.

Catholicism in Cagayan de Oro

The Catholic Church hierarchy, its lay organisations, and Catholic educational institutions in CDO have acted as both de facto state actors under Spanish rule and as entities whose power to shape public and private spaces has rivalled (and sometimes exceeded) that of the state under American and later Philippine rule. But, as in other parts of the archipelago, the Catholic Church in CDO has another side that deserves elaboration – its social mission.

The city of Cagayan de Oro lies within the archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro – 3,799 km² of predominantly Catholic territory comprising of two provinces (Misamis Oriental and Camiguin), a town in Bukidnon and CDO (Catholic Hierarchy 2014). A beautiful hand-drawn map of all the *barangays* in the archdiocese is displayed in the archbishop's *sala*. The map, prepared by Lino G. Gelsano, was probably the most complete map of the area that I saw during my fieldwork.²⁶ From 1958 to 2013, the percentage of people who self-identified as Catholic in the archdiocese fluctuated from 80 to 90% (Catholic Hierarchy 2014).

The Catholic Church is a recognised and trusted authority in the city. Its data are widely regarded as valid, reliable, and sometimes superior to government data. The archbishop is frequently consulted on matters, religious or otherwise. He is a highly educated, charismatic and outspoken individual known for his progressive political views and for his commitment to peace and

²⁶ Unfortunately, a replica of the map was not for sale. The salesclerk at the bookstore where I purchased my city map (produced by government agencies) apologetically warned me not to heed the map too closely because it was incomplete and erroneous. There is only one university geography department in the entire Philippine archipelago, which may explain the dismal enthusiasm for producing official maps. The department is housed at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, located in Quezon City.

community outreach initiatives. Journalists, academics, visiting researchers and local community leaders actively seek out and respect his opinion. Under his leadership, the Catholic Church in CDO became notable for its social mission. According to Calderisi (2013), the three pillars of a Christian social mission are education, provision of basic services such as health services, clean water, primary education and credit schemes, and advocacy on behalf of the poor and disenfranchised. The first two elements are very much reflective of the objective of the new pastoral power characteristic of welfare-type governmental schemes (Foucault 2003a). The current activities of the archdiocese in CDO indicate its focus on implementing a Christian social mission and its retreat from state governance and administration.

The promotion of a Christian social mission in CDO is perhaps best exemplified by the Social Action Center (SAC), one of the two ministries established by the archbishop when he arrived in the city in May 2006.²⁷ The SAC is an “ad-extra-ministry,” which its director describes as

programs to take care of the body because we [are] both body and soul. So this is the ministry that takes care of the body. It’s outward-looking, and the programs [and the] apostolate services of the ad-extra-ministries [are] not limited only to Catholics but [are open] to all people regardless of religion, belief, culture.

The SAC is illustrative of the conscious effort of churches in developing countries to immerse themselves in local economic and social issues. At a global scale, such efforts were spurred by Pope Paul VI’s 1967 papal encyclical (*Populorum Progressio*), which extended the Church’s social teachings to the problems of the world at large (Calderisi 2013). The SAC operates 25 different programs in all 63 parishes in the archdiocese. The programs cover a wide range of concerns, and include ministries for sustainable agriculture, women, prisons, migrants, children, mentally challenged persons, Indigenous Peoples, natural family planning, good governance, enterprise and ecology. The SAC’s commitment to changing the unfair conditions that cause the need for charity seems to embody the words of Pope Pius XIII, when he addressed his fellow bishops in a 1951 letter: “Charity can remedy many unjust social conditions. But that is not enough. For in the

²⁷ The other ministries established by the archbishop are “ad-intra-ministries,” which focus on faith and evangelisation (e.g. liturgy, clergy, catechism, etc.), and on caring for the souls of Catholics. The ad-intra-ministries’ emphasis on preparing the individual for salvation in the next world indicates these ministries exercise the old pastoral power (Foucault 2003a).

first place there must be justice” (*Evangelii Praecones* 1951 in Calderisi 2013, 6). The basic services and advocacy aims of the SAC are reinforced by ecclesiastic teachings directed at Catholics.

Sunday homilies announce the advocacy component of the Church’s modern-day social mission. Unlike many of the homilies I have heard in Catholic Churches in North America, which tend to be general and global, the homilies I heard in CDO churches focused predominantly on locally relevant priorities. In a tiny rural *barangay* church, for example, the local priest and a visiting nun jointly delivered a homily about the impacts of climate change on local watersheds and the concrete actions the parishioners should take. The accompanying PowerPoint presentation included local topography, water catchment basin and hazard maps obtained at a recent disaster risk reduction and climate change workshop for religious women and men in Northern Mindanao. For several Sundays around the one-year anniversary of Sendong, the homilies focused on natural hazards, disasters, and human activities that destroy the environment such as logging and mining. The archbishop explained the rationale for addressing such concerns from the pulpit:

Here, it’s because of the immediate effects of calamities like Typhoon Sendong and also news from other parts of the country about disasters. I think the consciousness on protecting the environment has been – you might say – raised by that. The term climate change may be something that’s still vague for many, but the idea of protecting the environment is certainly there. And connected with that here are local issues like concern about mining and logging activities. There is a concern here about mining activities in upland areas of Iponan River and also here in the city – Lumbia area and beyond. [There is] flash mining [in the] Iponan River. Hydraulic flash mining has certainly affected the topsoil and caused the severe siltation of the riverbed. And in a way, has caused the flooding during typhoons like Typhoon Sendong. [The church is addressing the situation through] advocacy [by] making people aware of the dangers of environmental destruction. Saying ‘no’ to irresponsible mining and illegal logging. Actually now the president has declared a moratorium on logging, commercialised logging. So there should be no more logging except maybe just for on a small scale for local needs.

The archbishop and local priests demonstrate a clear willingness to immerse themselves in advocacy efforts, including adopting stances that strongly oppose the positions and activities of powerful state and business actors. In a sense, they use Catholic social teachings as “a convenient entrée into debates that might otherwise have seemed outside the scope of church

responsibility,” much like their fellow “priests, nuns, brothers, and even laypeople, previously shy about expressing ‘political’ opinions” in other parts of the world (Calderisi 2013, 67).

The archbishop, priests and other religious figures who are the faces of Christian institutions are not the only Christian trustees in CDO. Many lay organisations, such as Couples for Christ and Gawad Kalinga, and civil society organisations with Catholic roots, such as Habitat for Humanity, are active in the city. There are many Catholic educational facilities, such as Capitol University and the prestigious Xavier elementary, secondary and university campuses. The leaders of these Catholic lay associations and schools act as Catholic trustees governing city spaces; their objectives and methods are often but not always in line with those of their religious counterparts.

The visual imprint of Catholicism and Christianity on the cityscape is unmistakable. In November 2012, the first billboard greeting visitors entering the city from the Lumbia airport proclaims “God is great.” Churches, cathedrals, basilicas, seminaries, and parish and archdiocese offices are scattered throughout the city, including in prime city centre locations. Even the grounds of secular public schools have murals with the words to popular prayers and small shrines devoted to the Virgin Mary or the patron saint of the *barangay* (Fig. 3.7). Many of the city’s public transportation vehicles sport Christian names and are decorated with Christian posters, crucifixes, and religious statues (Fig. 3.7). The dominance of Christianity, and especially Catholicism, on the city landscape is not just indicative of the wealth of the Church, but, as Calderisi (2013, 35) would argue, also “a mark of its reach, experience, potential, and commitment to serving others.” Similar to other parts of the archipelago, it also demonstrates the extent to which Christianity has permeated local popular culture (Hedman 2006, Moreno 2006).

Christianity imbues cultural life in CDO, as illustrated by the following two examples. First, as in other parts of the Philippines, the city and each of its *barangays* host an annual fiesta or local feast honouring the *barangay’s* patron saint. San Agustin was declared the patron saint of Cagayan by the Recollects on 28 August 1780 (Montalvan 2009). For one week each August, city residents and tourists – Christians and non-Christians alike – participate in parades, feasts, dance competitions, water processions, and religious services celebrating him.



Fig. 3.7. Christian symbols abound in CDO. Clockwise from top left: the secular Macasandig National High School has a shrine devoted to Mary and the *Santo Niño* in the schoolyard (4 April 2013); a *jeepney* announces that “God is good all the time” (18 December 2012); crucifixes and religious statues greet visitors at the DSWD-X office (15 March 2013) and the municipal tax collection office (19 February 2013).

Second, business-as-usual grinds to a halt in government offices and formal businesses on the days or weeks around Christian holidays, especially Holy Week and Christmas, as people travel

and prepare for celebrations with family and friends.²⁸ The processions for the Stations of the Cross, for instance, are very popular in CDO during Holy Week. Thousands of people partake – to reaffirm their faith and commitments, to petition for favours, or just for the adventure. The city boasts several options to contemplate Christ’s journey: a three kilometre walk up the steep Malasag Hill in *barangay* Cugman; a 14 church pilgrimage; a multi-kilometre walk past small farms, a posh gated partially-built residential development and wooded areas in *barangay* Agusan. I opted to join my friend A. on the popular four kilometre river trek from *barangay* Tablon to the shrine of Our Lady of Guadalupe at Igbalalay Hills in *barangay* Balubal (Fig. 3.8). The following excerpt from my field notes illustrates the solemnity, excitement and perseverance that characterised the event.

We – A., her 7 year old son E., Frank, Ada and I – were in the van by 5 am. It’s best to hike before the sun gets too strong. The trek starts at the end of a concreted road in Tablon. Cars pile into a field converted into a parking lot. It’s filling up and a young man is directing drivers into specific parking spots (for a tip, of course). By 5:20 am vendors are already selling bottled water, snacks, Stations of the Cross prayer books and the colourful pencil-thin candles typically found in Catholic Churches. We brought water and buy only candles.

The trek entails crossing the Umalag River nine times. At low water levels crossing is easy; there’s negligible current. But it rained this year. The current is strong(ish) in places, requiring a human chain. I take Ada out of the carrier and hold her above my head to keep her dry for some of the crossings where the water rises above my hips. Yet, despite the conditions, I count dozens of elderly men and women and young children among the ‘pilgrims’ (or thrill-seekers). None appear as worried as I feel. The Army arrives by the time we head back down; they wear bright orange life vests and secure ropes across the river to help people cross.

The stations are unevenly spaced, located in sheltered areas along the riverbank or in wooded areas. Each is marked with a numbered six or seven-foot tall bamboo cross and a pile of blackened rocks. Small groups of people stop and pray silently or in hushed tones, reading specific prayers at each station. They wedge lit candles in the rock pile. The calm

²⁸ Some entrepreneurial people plying their trade in the informal sector augment business activities around religious holidays, capitalising on short-term demand for certain goods and services. For example, outside churches on Palm Sunday, women were selling the most intricate and beautifully-designed palms I have ever seen. *Lechon*-makers, typically men, see a spike in business around Christmas as people spend their 13th month salary (an expected bonus in the Philippines) on special holiday food such as roasted pig.

and solemnity at each station contrasts sharply with the light banter adults exchange and the pitter-patter of children's footfalls as they scamper between stations.

There's a lineup at the small mountaintop shrine. Only a few people can enter at one time. They touch the Our Lady of Guadalupe figure, and pray silently on the kneelers flanking the altar. Some pose for a selfie or group shot before leaving, probably to post on Facebook.

It's a party-like atmosphere in the clearing just below the shrine between stations 13 and 14. Loud music is playing (more pop than church hymns), vendors are selling hot food prepared on-site (presumably brought up via an alternative route), families are picnicking, and kiosks are bursting with religious paraphernalia and toys. A similarly boisterous and bustling party unfolds around the parking lot entrance. By the time we arrive at the bottom, a local radio station has set up a mobile unit, and dozens of vendors and specialty food makers are busy making sales. It's more like a noisy market than the entrance of a solemn religious journey.

The return trip from the shrine to the parking lot is what attracts the adventure-seeking crowd. For several years now, some entrepreneurial river raft guides offer to take people down the river in inflatable tubes. ₱200 gets you a tube, a guide and an exhilarating ride down the river (but no safety briefing, helmet or life vest).

Two groups of people who are usually present at major public events in CDO were noticeably absent. I did not see or hear of any local politicians doing the trek – although they may have arrived after we left. There were no women or men whose dress identified them as Muslim. I expect that Muslims would refrain from partaking in Catholic religious traditions. Perhaps any Muslim vendors present might have tried to 'blend in.'

The river trek Stations of the Cross shows the comingling of Christianity, informal commerce, pleasure-seeking, loud mass media, social media, and the presence of force (i.e. army) present in everyday life in CDO. To many Cagayaños, Catholicism is not a religion demanding quiet, piety or separation from the joys of life and the necessity of making money. Rather, like in many other parts of the country, it is omnipresent and infused in diverse elements of popular culture, business and social relations (Hedman 2006, Moreno 2006).



Fig. 3.8. The Stations of the Cross river trek in CDO (28 March 2013). The barangay council of Talon welcomes pilgrims at the entrance – note the absence of the mayor’s name even though the Tablon barangay councilors and the mayor are part of the same political party (top). Crossing the Umalag River (bottom).

Muslim trustees

Islam arrived in the archipelago in the 13th century, and subsequently spread throughout much of what is now known as Mindanao (e.g. Sulu, Maguindanao) and to Palawan and Manila, hastening the creation of sultanate-based settlements that were united by and organised around religion (Tan 2009, Francia 2010, Donoso 2013). Inhabitants of the Cagayan territory once paid tribute to the powerful Sultanate of Maguindanao, although historians have found no convincing evidence that Cagayaños actually practiced an Islamic faith during this period (cf. Montalvan 2009). Today, about ten percent of city residents are Muslim, but the political, religious, cultural, social, economic and visual imprint of Islam on the city is much less visible than that of Christianity. More salient, perhaps, is the dearth of Muslim trustees powerful enough to exercise governmentality, to shape city space, and to influence mobility to the same extent as state, Catholic, or other so-called “non-state,” “non-religious” trustees. The subordinate position of CDO’s Muslim trustees means that the treatment of the city’s Muslim population is heavily influenced by historical relations and contemporary prejudices and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Politically, CDO’s Muslim population wields little clout. Even in *barangay* Balulang, which has the largest Muslim population in the city, there is no Muslim *barangay* councilor. Similarly, there are few or no Muslims elected to City Council, or working in city, provincial and regional government offices (except for the regional office of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos). Muslim residents can voice their concerns, but they are not guaranteed of an empathetic or receptive audience. For example, an official from a *barangay* with a large Muslim population told me that there were no Muslims there. We were a five minute walk away from a mosque.

The regional office of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) is similarly marginalised. Created by Republic Act No. 9997, the NCMF is the sole government office with an explicit claim of defying the principle of separation of church (mosque) and state (GoP 2010a). A poster in the NCMF-X office sets out the aspirations of the commission. Its mandate is “to preserve and develop the culture, traditions, institutions and well-being of Muslim-Filipinos, in conformity with the country’s laws and in consonance with national unity and development;” its vision is “progressive, caring and peaceful Muslim Filipino communities living

harmoniously with all stakeholders;” its mission is “to promote the well-being of Muslim Filipinos and strengthen Islamic institutions towards national unity;” and its organisational vision is to be “the premier Muslim national government agency committed and competent to provide quality and efficient services to Muslim Filipino communities.” Despite the inclusive aspirational language, the regional NCMF office in CDO is marginalised by and isolated from other regional government offices. The office is situated, somewhat ironically, in *barangay* Nazareth, near the Nazareth mosque. Its isolation is due less to the physical distance separating it from other government offices, which are dispersed throughout the city, than to the minimal communication and coordination it has with other government offices except with other NCMF offices. This divide was unmasked in the relief and reconstruction efforts after Sendong. The appearance of the NCMF-X office also contrasted sharply with all the other municipal, provincial and regional government offices I visited. It was very plain, and had minimal furniture, few computers and no air conditioning units.

The spatial distribution of the city’s Muslim population and Islamic institutions is much more confined than their non-Muslim counterparts. Muslims are concentrated in *barangay* Balulang, with some families living in Bulua, Consolacion, Iponan, Macanhan, Macasandig and Vamenta (near Igpit) (Fig. 3.6). Fewer than ten mosques serve the Muslim population. Unlike many of the Christian churches, none of the mosques is situated in the city centre; instead they are tucked away in a maze of buildings or in peripheral *barangays*. Named after the first Muslim missionary to arrive in North Mindanao from Malaysia in 1475, the Sharief Alawi Islamic Centre boasts the largest mosque in Northern Mindanao and CDO’s only *madrasah* (Arabic school) (Sharief Alawi Islamic Sharief Alawi Islamic Centre no date). Yet, it is not served by regular *jeepney*, *multicab* or *motorela* routes. One needs to hire a *sikad* or walk from the nearest *motorela* stop to the mosque. The mosque and *madrasah* lie on the west bank of the Cagayan River in Lower Balulang, opposite *barangay* Macasandig. Even though both buildings were flooded during Sendong, the mosque served as a refuge for Sendong survivors and a distribution point for relief goods.

Officially, CDO welcomes everyone, and even calls itself the inclusive “City of Golden Friendship” (Department of Tourism (DOT) no date). Public spaces, such as markets, shopping malls, schools, restaurants, and businesses are open to, and operated and frequented by people of all faiths. Yet, signs of Islam in public spaces are much less conspicuous than signs of

Christianity. Few businesses in CDO advertise clever wordplays and symbols inspired by Islam. A handful of *jeepneys* and *motorelas* are notable exceptions (Fig. 3.9). Several small shops at the main public market, Cogon market,²⁹ and at the Limketkai shopping mall cater specifically to a Muslim clientele, for example by selling Muslim women's clothing. Other shops are owned and operated by Muslim families selling goods with broad appeal, such as mobile phones and prepaid credit, jewelry, pirated CDs and DVDs, fake brand name apparel and accessories, and beautiful *malongs*³⁰ imported from Thailand, Malaysia or southern Mindanao. Many of these shops are located in a strip of stalls running along the outer northeastern wall of Cogon market. Apart from the *malongs*, the only clues to the religious affiliation of the shopkeepers are banter in the Maranao language and the hijabs and chadors worn by some of the women owners and clerks.

The official discourse of religious inclusivity is not by matched by private opinions. In private conversations some non-Muslim residents express their personal ignorance and misgivings about Muslims – always a generic Muslim. Consequently, while not officially barred from any city space, Muslim residents typically do not match their non-Muslim counterparts in the depth and breadth of their use of and control over urban space. These personal prejudices and the underlying Christian hegemony embedded in many government offices, policies and programs limit the access of Muslim residents to certain spaces. These religious prejudices and biases restricted mobility and access to resources in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong.

²⁹ The market was named Cogon on account of the area being previously covered with cogon grass. Cogon grass (*Imperata cylindrical*) grows readily in areas cultivated with swidden agriculture methods (Pelzer 1948).

³⁰ A *malong* is a traditional woven tube skirt used by Muslim Filipino men and women in southern Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. Today, it is widely used by Filipinos of all faiths throughout the archipelago as a skirt, a blanket in frigid Air Con buses, a hammock strung up in houses and *jeepneys* for sleeping children, a bed sheet, a prayer mat, and for many other uses. The *malongs* sold at Cogon market are batik-style, which means they are constructed from machine-made printed cotton and much cheaper than traditional handwoven ones.



Fig. 3.9. One of the few *motorelas* in CDO with an Islamic name (19 February 2013).

Elite families or “non-state,” “non-religious” trustees

In many parts of the Philippines elite family dynasties are a dominant social force. Through their actions and relationships, patrons, bosses, and caciques have significantly influenced the economy, politics and development at the national, regional, and especially the local scale (cf. McCoy 1994, Sidel 1999, Hedman 2006). These Filipino elites have repeatedly used the resources at their disposal for achieving and preserving personal and family power. McCoy’s (1994) *An anarchy of families*, for example, is dedicated to investigating the role of elite families in entrenching the seeming paradox of a resource-rich nation in a perpetual condition of state dysfunction and underdevelopment. The economic base of elite families has been largely independent of state apparatuses, even though the state has played a central role in the process of accumulating riches (Caouette 2010). This is made possible through a convergence of private and public interests favouring the elite (Caouette 2010), the imposition of landholding elite families’ views on the bureaucratic apparatus and even elections (Sidel 1994, 1997, 1999, Bello, Docena et al. 2004,

Caouette 2010), and the absence of efficient institutions (Batalla 2010). As such, the power in the Philippines lies outside the centre of the bureaucracy and is loyal to different factions of the landholding oligarchy, who paralyse the efforts of politicians and government agencies to implement real reforms. Elite families, in other words, wield power characteristic of a state and exercise government rationality even if they do not hold public office.

Unlike many parts of the archipelago, CDO does not have elite family dynasties acting as a dominant social force. This point was insisted upon in several key informant interviews, including with local historians. According to one such historian, there are families with multiple generations of politicians and affluent families whose control over businesses and land is significant, but no dynasties, per se, who wield enough power to significantly shape city space singlehandedly. Some of these families are major landowners, but the area and importance of land under their control is much smaller than the elite dynasties in other parts of the archipelago. Not surprisingly then, the city's elite families and prominent businesspeople did not operate as influential trustees directing the post-Sendong efforts. For example, they could not convince the municipal administration to endorse their funded plan of repurposing riverside areas devastated by the flood and designated as a no-build zone.

There are, of course, other non-state, non-religious, non-elite family trustees relevant to CDO's post-disaster spaces. Those interested in influencing behaviour include scientists, activists, humanitarian agencies, NGOs, corporations, among others (Li 2005, 2007a, Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). In CDO, for example, these other trustees include engineers and other technical experts from foreign development agencies, United Nations agencies, and foreign humanitarian organisations. These particular trustees, however, were not especially influential in shaping migration to and settlement within the city prior to December 2011. Their interest in and ability to control the city's physical landscape and to govern the social relations therein mostly began after Tropical Storm Sendong hit CDO.

Tropical Storm Sendong

Tropical Storm Sendong was the most lethal storm of 2011 (Guha-Sapir, Vos et al. 2012). It swept across Northern Mindanao, Philippines, with the eye of the storm passing through CDO around midnight on 16 December 2011 (Fig. 3.10; PPDO no date). Never before had the city experienced such devastation: 41 of 80 *barangays* were directly affected by extreme flooding; 388

people died; 386 people went missing; 38,071 families were displaced; \$19.5 million worth of road, water and power utilities infrastructure were destroyed; and economic losses to the agriculture, fisheries, forestry, service, commerce and trade, and industry sectors were \$4.9 million (Fig. 3.11; LGU of CDO 2012). On 20 December 2011 Philippine President Benigno Aquino III declared the cities of CDO and Iligan under a State of National Calamity (GoP 2011a).

Meteorologically, Tropical Storm Sendong (TS Sendong) was not particularly notable. With a maximum sustained wind speed of 75 kph and gustiness of 90 kph (OCD 2012), TS Sendong only qualified as a weak storm according to Saffir-Simpson Tropical Cyclone categories. The amount of rainfall in the city and its catchment basin, however, was extreme – more than 1.5 times the December monthly average of 117 mm (PPDO no date). The city's weather station in *barangay* Lumbia measured a record 180.9 mm of rain over a 24 hour period, most of which fell between 5 pm and midnight (PPDO no date). The Manila Observatory has suggested that the amount of rainfall was enhanced by an orographic mountain effect (PPDO no date). It was the excessive rainfall, and not the wind, that precipitated the disastrous flooding.

All the waterways feeding into the city's major rivers – the Cagayan River and the Iponan River – worked in overdrive, carrying water down from the mountains and plateaus out to sea. The waters swelled and spilled over the banks, flooding riverside and low-lying areas. The Cagayan River rose to 9.86 m with an estimated water discharge of 2,500,000 L/s during Sendong, more than 62 times its usual discharge rate of 40,000 L/s at 2 m (LGU of CDO 2012). It inundated nearby (mainly urban poor) settlements, drowning hundreds of people (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011). Many residents were caught by surprise because the flooding occurred late Friday night and early Saturday morning, a time when most people were asleep after an evening of Christmas partying. They had dismissed weather warnings from the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA).




Fig. 3.10. Trajectory of Tropical Storm Sendong 15 to 17 December 2011. Source: NASA (2011), adapted by Marc Girard.

Flood Footprint and Percentage of Persons per Barangay Affected by Sendong in Cagayan de Oro




Fig. 3.11. Flood footprint of Tropical Storm Sendong in Cagayan de Oro. Source: Manila Observatory (2012).

Survivor accounts and a scientific study carried out by engineers at Xavier University indicate that the particularities of the flooding were different along different parts of the rivers. The “snake-like form” of the Cagayan River was especially treacherous for communities located inside the “S” curve with water on three sides and for those established on semi-permanent sandbars. For example, in the informal community of Isla de Oro, a sandbar in the river, an estimated 10,000 people were affected (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011). In the *barangays* upstream of the cathedral where the river is wide and the riverbanks not especially high (e.g. Macasandig, Balulang), the flooding occurred relatively slowly. The narrowing of the Cagayan at the Ysalina bridge that connects Carmen to downtown CDO near the cathedral became a bottleneck. As a result of the high pressure and volume of water and accumulated debris forced through the small area, the flooding was very fast and powerful in *barangays* downstream of the cathedral (e.g. Puntod and Consolacion). One child survivor explained that “the water is angry” (De La Peña and De Torres 2012). An adult survivor living in a formal middle class development in a downstream *barangay* recalled the speed of the flood: “When the flash flood happened, it was so fast. At 1 am it was knee-deep. In five minutes or less, the water level had doubled. We have a second floor, which was lucky because you couldn’t open the door to get outside because the water pressure was so high.”

What caused the disaster?

The causes of the devastation wrought by Sendong have been variously attributed. At the top of the list is Tropical Storm Sendong itself as an extreme weather event (PPDO no date). Scientific and speculative explanations for the underlying factors that enabled the storm to catalyse a disaster range from government incompetence and general unpreparedness to irresponsible resource exploitation and deep-rooted development failures.

The natural capacity of the landscape to cope with environmental stress was eroded by irresponsible resource exploitation. In the Bukidnon headwater regions, for example, destructive and widespread logging operations and lax enforcement of forest protection laws have resulted in the siltation of the Cagayan, Iponan and Tagoloan Rivers and the flooding of surrounding areas (Edgerton 2008). As mentioned earlier, the headwater areas in CDO’s watershed include mountains and plateaus that have been logged, mined and cultivated with short-term crops (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, LGU of CDO 2012, NEDA 2012). Deforestation from both

commercial and illegal logging has permanently changed the watershed; according to a woman from San Fernando, Bukidnon “the rivers [have] change[d] shape, [and] turn[ed] muddier, less deep, yet more violent during big rains” since the arrival of the big logging trucks (Edgerton 2008, 276). Hydraulic mining of gold along one of the Cagayan River’s tributaries has also caused major changes in the landscape. Before Sendong, researchers noted that such mining has caused severe soil erosion, and warned it could result in massive mudflows and landslides (Gorra 2011). The debris from these activities that is carried down the rivers interferes with normal river flow and hampers drainage (LGU of CDO 2012). While some resource extraction and agricultural activities are carried out on a small scale by so-called illegal loggers and miners and smallholder farmers, the massive damage inflicted upon the land has been mainly carried out by corporations, especially foreign companies working with Filipino subsidiaries. As a result of the major changes to the landscape, the infiltration capacity of relatively barren soil in the mountainous areas of Bukidnon was overrun during Sendong, sending excess water down tributaries feeding the rivers that wind through the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan as surface run-off (NEDA 2012).

Almost all key informants, excluding those employed by the city government, identified local government failure as a critical factor. There was an overall lack of disaster preparedness at the city level, in particular in implementing the elements required by each municipality as per the Philippine Disaster Act of 2010 (Montalvan 2012). Flood warning systems were absent even in frequently flooded communities (LGU of CDO 2012). There were no flood mitigating structures to combat rising water levels on the Cagayan River, however, according to key informants at several regional government agencies, there are plans and funds committed for a river control project.

In addition to neglecting disaster preparedness, the city was faulted with permitting, even promoting, construction and settlement in hazard-prone areas. The city issues building permits and is not supposed to allow construction in areas with known hazard risks. Yet, since the 1990s there has been rapid expansion of permanent structures built along the riverbanks and growth of an increasingly dense population in flood-prone areas such as floodplains, former mangrove areas, old waterways (e.g. dry riverbeds) and geologically unstable areas (e.g. sandbars) (LGU of CDO 2012, PPDO no date). Geohazard maps were produced by the Region-X DENR-MGB office after the January 2009 flooding, so the local government was aware of which parts of the

city were at risk of flooding and other natural hazards (Corrales 2011, Montalvan 2012), and even advised people against moving to these areas prior to December 2011. While people do not necessarily obtain permission before building, particularly in informal settlements, the city is still at fault. It did not implement its own ordinance banning settlement in hazardous areas, and, under the *piso-piso* program, even distributed land in areas that were known hazard-risks (Corrales 2011). Such inadequate urban planning is widespread in the Philippines (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, La Viña, Dactor-Bercilla et al. 2012).

It is not only CDO officials who shirk making responsible decisions about land planning and settlement. The lead researcher of the Disaster Risk and Exposure Assessment for Mitigation (DREAM) project noted that he routinely receives requests from politicians and city planners about the siting of relocation and housing projects. Supported by the Department of Science and Technology, the DREAM project is producing a comprehensive and integrated early flood warning system for the entire country based on 3D hazard maps. When I interviewed him in October 2012 much of the country had already been mapped, at least coarsely, and these maps made available for free online. That morning he had received an email listing dozens of proposed relocation sites and a request for him to ascertain whether or not the sites were safe. The list included areas clearly marked as flood-prone on the DREAM maps, and even included *barangays* that were flooded only two months prior in the *Habagat* rains that affected Metro Manila and Regions III and IV-A. He attributed this request (and the others he receives from all over the Philippines) to

a culture of passing on [responsibility by people who] don't want to decide for themselves. [It's as if the government] already knows the answer but doesn't want to do it themselves. They want academics and scientists to give the official approval so that the government can say, 'the experts advise that ...' or 'the experts approve or not of ...' These people don't like being responsible, especially because they didn't make the maps themselves.

The Manila Observatory pointed to a lack of information and knowledge as a contributing factor of the disaster (PPDO no date). Yet, it is less about the absence of information and more about the refusal of CDO residents and their leaders to seek out and heed available information. PAGASA had accurately predicted the actual movement of Sendong, and issued an advisory on 14 December 2011. It followed up with 15 severe weather bulletins disseminated through text

messages, Twitter, Facebook, reports from the Office of Civil Defense-National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, press conferences, and radio and TV notices (PPDO no date). Despite repeated warnings, most locals took no precautions. One informant explained that in CDO “we don’t take serious what the weather bureau is telling us.” The blasé attitude of residents towards disaster preparedness, and widespread complacency is due to a false sense of security that major flooding will not occur in the region (LGU of CDO 2012). The myth of CDO as a natural hazard-free safe haven reinforces this attitude.

The other causal factors are development and environmental failures. The poverty that plagues many growing Philippine cities is a critical factor (Corrales, Mascarinas et al. 2011, La Viña, Dactor-Bercilla et al. 2012). Several NGOs, and even the chairman of the National Disaster Council, claimed the disaster was influenced by climate change (Kalikasan 2012); however, several key informants trained as scientists and engineers cautioned against asserting such a conclusion without further study. Like many other disasters, the causes of Sendong were complex and multiple. And, like in many disasters, the impacts, and not the causes, were of primary concern for the majority of people affected by Sendong.

What are the impacts of the disaster?

For city residents, it was the impacts of the disaster that mattered most. This section presents an overview of the impacts, as articulated in official government reports. Other perspectives on the impacts are analysed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.

The CDO disaster reduction assessment report focuses on the toll exacted by Sendong on the city’s economy and infrastructure (LGU of CDO 2012); unless otherwise indicated, all figures cited below come from this report. Total losses to agriculture, fisheries and forestry were \$861,000 (17.48% of total reported damages to the economic sector). A total of 2,417 farmers were affected, 1,203 ha under cultivation were flooded, 666 head of swine, cattle, goat, horse, *carabao* and poultry were lost. Fishing boats (both motorised and non-motorised), nets and fishponds were also reported as lost or damaged. Losses to the service sector, including hotels, restaurants, schools and real estate, were \$492,000 (10% of total reported damages). White water rafting tours and cancelled Christmas parties in city restaurants and hotels were singled out as notable examples of lost revenue (NEDA 2012). Commerce and trade estimated \$1.07 million in damages (21.71% of total reported damages). Industry, and manufacturing in particular, had \$2.5

million worth of damages (50.81% of total reported damages). Road, water and power infrastructure were also affected. In CDO, 35% of roads (totaling 218 km) were damaged, requiring \$14.5 million to repair. Damage to the water system was estimated at \$3.3 million. More importantly, water supply to 80% of the coverage area was disrupted for at least 48 hours; it was one month before service was fully restored. The damage to power utilities was estimated at \$1.968 million. Despite these damages and losses, Sendong did not significantly affect the prices of commodities, government revenues, or the regional economy overall (OCD 2012).

Sendong was equally superfluous to formal employment numbers in Region-X because no major employers were severely affected (OCD 2012). In fact, the employment rate fell by less than one percentage point after Sendong (95.7% in Q1 of 2012 versus 96.1% in Q4 of 2011; OCD 2012, 56). Breadwinners reported returning to work even before their houses were repaired and cleaned because their income was the primary means of recovery (OCD 2012). These optimistic findings obscure the impacts on the livelihoods of poorer families in the informal sector, especially those with home-based small businesses. A survey published by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Region X office in February 2012 found that people working in the informal sector were disproportionately affected. In *barangays* Balulang, Consolation, Carmen, Iponan and Macasandig, of the 7,100 people whose livelihoods were affected by Sendong, 6,862 worked in the informal sector (NEDA 2012, 29). Responding to the needs it identified, DOLE's initial release of \$52,000 was targeted at 366 "greatly affected workers in the informal sector" (in all of Region X, not only CDO) (NEDA 2012, 30). DOLE distributed starter kits for carpenters, electricians, beauticians and dressmakers, and capital assistance for projects such as food processing, fruit and vegetable vending, backyard hog raising and electronics shops.

According to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council's final report published on 10 February 2012, there were a total of 38,071 affected families and 228,576 affected individuals in CDO (OCD 2012, 8). Most survivors remained outside the 42 evacuation centres in the city; inside the evacuation centres there was a cumulative total of 13,321 families (65,046 individuals) whereas outside the evacuation centres there were 24,750 families (163,530 individuals) (OCD 2012, 8). The city's *Disaster risk assessment report* suggests that 17,527 students were affected when their schools were either damaged or transformed into evacuation centres, resulting in the suspension of classes (LGU of CDO 2012, 48).

The *Post-disaster needs assessment* (PDNA), published by the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) Region-X, highlights housing as a critical issue. In CDO, 5,801 houses were totally damaged, and 12,635 houses were partially damaged (OCD 2012, 11). The assessment and categorisation of damage to housing structures quickly emerged as a critical issue in post-disaster compensation and advocacy. A totally damaged house is a structure that was completely destroyed and became uninhabitable after the disaster. A partially damaged house had one or more components that had been damaged but could be repaired. The PDNA insists that these definitions do not imply that houses should be repaired or rebuilt *in-situ* because many are located in no-build zones.³¹ Damaged houses were sorted into four categories based on the type of construction materials: wood or locally sourced light materials (57%), mixed wood-concrete (29%), concrete (13%), and individual house with shop (1%) (OCD 2012, 12). Using the National Housing Authority's (NHA) standards of the value for typical household contents, the estimated damages per house type were: wood or locally sourced light materials (\$428), mixed wood-concrete (\$1,500), concrete (\$2,140), individual house with shop (\$2,140) (OCD 2012, 13). The large number of affected households, especially among ones with very limited capacities to immediately cope and to later rebuild without assistance – 85% of totally and partially damaged houses were informal houses (OCD 2012, 14), had a major impact of disaster efforts. It spurred trustees to create official post-disaster sleeping spaces: evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation sites.

Various policy recommendations are included in the government reports. Both the PDNA and the *Strategic action plan for the rehabilitation and recovery of the areas affected by Tropical Storm Sendong (Washi)* (SAP) prepared by the regional office of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) recommend a build-back-better principle (NEDA 2012, OCD 2012). The SAP includes policy recommendations that span reforming land use, improving infrastructure, providing adequate housing, monitoring prices of basic commodities and services, delivering financial assistance to and ensuring safety nets for micro, small and medium enterprises and severely affected individuals, and supporting good governance (NEDA 2012, 77-79). It calls for enforcement of environmental laws, particularly on prohibiting settlements in identified “danger

³¹ In a no-build zone, houses are prohibited within 40 m of the shoreline. No-build zones are declared by the national government, and are expected to be enforced by the municipality. In CDO, approximately 2,700 households were located within the no-build zone (Reach 2012, 4).

zones,” or what the DENR-MGB have listed as no-build zones. The PDNA concentrates its recommendations on implementing coordinated, systematic long-term planning and zoning, and on providing “permanent housing for the internally displaced population that is safe, accessible, and sustainable and one that will provide security of tenure for the inhabitants” (OCD 2012, 15). The objectives and their relevance to CDO’s relocation sites is discussed extensively in Chapter 7.

Conclusion

Typhoon Sendong was much more than an extreme weather event, one that precipitated previously unprecedented levels of death and destruction in Cagayan de Oro City. Floodwaters swept away physical entities – houses, roads, people, houses, television sets, *motorelas*, *sari-sari* stores, trees, livestock – and deposited a thick layer of mud and debris on what they didn’t take. For many survivors, returning to their “normal” pre-Sendong life was impossible because of the trauma, the family and friends they lost, the siting of their old houses and workplaces in newly declared and enforced no-build zones, and the losses of personal belongings and livelihood capital. The displacement and loss of survivors, coupled with the outpouring of local, national and foreign resources for rebuilding, created a situation where it was both possible and in the interests of CDO trustees to relocate a targeted segment of the city’s population. The legacy of Typhoon Sendong is thus the reconstruction or improvement of society through the creation, expansion and contraction of post-disaster spaces.

Chapter 4. Methodology

THE FOURTH “M”

This blog chronicles the journey (and tangents) of my PhD. It begins in Montreal, where I am a student in the Université de Montréal’s geography department. Almost immediately it jumps to a tiny street in Quezon City called Mayumi. Mayumi was my home base for a three month exploratory field season in the Philippines in 2010. Then, it returns to Montreal for coursework and comprehensive assessments. The third “M” refers to an intensive two-month Tagalog language course in Madison, Wisconsin.

Thus we arrive at the fourth “M” – motherhood.

On many occasions, I have been told that there is never a “good time” to have kids. This is particularly true for academics – not as an undergraduate or graduate student (time and financial constraints), not as a post-doc (similar constraints as students), not as a young prof trying to balance a research programme, teaching requirements and administrative duties. The gap in publications that often accompanies parental leave isn’t always looked upon favourably in tenure applications.

And so, for someone (hopefully) headed on a professorial track, the question is not when to have a family but rather how to make it work.

* * * *

Four months ago my husband and I became parents. Thus far, it has been an exhilarating experience.

Motherhood is also changing various dimensions of my PhD, in particular the dynamics of my field research. In this field season, for example, I’m joined by my husband and daughter. While they won’t accompany me to every meeting, interview and event, they will be integral parts of the research process. I anticipate that I will be treated differently, and perhaps privy to different kinds of insights, when people see me as a mother, in addition to being a western woman researcher. Caring for an infant also means that the pace of research is slowed. Plus, it’s more challenging to act spontaneously and chase down leads at a moment’s notice.

On a personal level, I’m thrilled to share the highs and lows of new experiences with loved ones in person, and not just via Skype, email and blogs.

* * * *

And so I enter my main field season with fresh eyes and ears, attuned not only to things relevant to my research project, but also to things relevant to family life (Gibb 2012, 12 October).

Introduction

The overarching research strategy can be neatly summarised: pre-fieldwork visit to the Philippines, language learning at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, testing of ideas at various conferences and academic events, ethics approval, main field season and data analysis. On paper the process is clear and linear, but in reality it was an iterative process – replete with frustration, with new knowledge and circumstances continually requiring modifications to the research

process. As the above excerpt from my PhD blog suggests, explaining this research project necessitates delving into diverse topics. These topics include: fieldwork and data construction, positionality, accompanied research, pre-fieldwork stages critical to research design, blurring of the professional and the private in the field, writing, reflexive research, expectations and constraints, and the importance of various modern technologies. Like any methodology chapter, this one justifies the research design, and clearly explains how I went about finding answers to, and analysing, the overarching research question and specific research objectives. To these basic requirements, I layer in selected aspects of my personal life. My rationale for writing my family into this chapter, is not to turn the chapter into a mommy blog³² or a confessional tale. As several critical scholars point out “autobiography is a useful mode for analyzing structures of power and generating theory” (Frohlick 2002, 50, Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998). Instead, the chapter probes the professional and the personal for the following three reasons.

First, to heed to the feminist call to do and write reflexive, embodied research that both illustrates how research is actually constructed (cf. Moss 1993, Parreñas 2009), and disputes the dominant image of the lone (usually male) researcher conducting objective ethnographic fieldwork (Frohlick 2002, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). Writing such a methodology chapter exposes the research process as full of questioning, wrong turns and revisions, and interspersed with serendipitous events, relationships, frustrations and “aha” moments. Presenting a linear anaesthetised chapter would betray the actual process and hide the personal aspects of carrying out this research, which, I believe, had an enormous impact on the research project. For the reader, a glimpse into the joys and frustrations of the research process, and especially the fieldwork component, will help to explain why certain results are privileged, and to clarify the necessary limitations and scope of the project.

Second, the epistemological stance of this dissertation posits that reality is constructed. Applied to the research context, a constructivist stance means that data are not simply out there awaiting discovery by a researcher but are necessarily shaped by the research process itself. How the

³² Urban Dictionary defines mommy blogging as “A new mother’s unfortunate need to talk endlessly about their new children despite the fact that no one actually cares. Updates and pictures and stories are plastered all over social media. Can continue indefinitely and is not limited to only new mothers and their babies, but that is what is most common.” The word most frequently associated with mommy blogging is “annoying” (Urban Dictionary 2013).

researcher interacts with others and is perceived to interact with them affect research outcomes. Put another way, and “the nature of our personal and professional relationships and the multiple blurrings between them will affect the knowledge produced” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 212). Accordingly, a reflexively written methodology chapter acknowledges my complicity in constructing knowledge.

Third, and related to the second point, the inclusion of the personal reinforces the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 2 on the constructed nature of space and the relational nature of power. That is, space should be conceived as social relations that individuals and groups experience differently at particular moments in time (Massey 1994), and power is necessarily relational insofar as the actions of one affect the possible and actual, present and future actions of another (Foucault 2003a). In other words, by making explicit social relations and power – necessarily influenced by the positionality of people involved in the research – inherent to the research process, I show the creation and modification of research space. By intertwining the research process and the world it seeks to understand, I avoid what Alvin Gouldner (1970 in Burawoy 1998, 10) called “methodological dualism” in which “social scientists are exempt from the theories they develop about others.”

Theoretical positioning

Thus far, this thesis has emphasised the relational character of space, mobility, and power, and how each of these concepts is differentially experienced by individuals or groups at a given point in time. In other words, there is no singular true reality. Rather, the real world is not absolute; it is instead constructed and shaped by social, economic, cultural and environmental factors.

Moreover, these constructions are manifested in material differences among individuals and stratified by gender, class, and race (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). This position has implications for the research design.

This study’s ontology is constructivist, its epistemology interpretivist. Such a theoretical stance is conducive to understanding the nature of post-disaster spaces and places. An alternative, a positivist approach in which the researcher ascribes to an objectivist ontology and empiricist epistemology, is inadequate for this study. A model could have been built based on existing literature, and then tested. The results, however, would likely have only yielded a simple list of the

various places survivors go after a disaster. They could not adequately explain the creation, interventions and experiences of post-disaster spaces.

Michael Burawoy's (1998) distinction between positive science and reflexive science is useful for further explaining this study's epistemological starting point and research principles. He argues there are two co-existing models of science. Positive science presumes scientists are separate from the subjects they study, requires an objective and detached observer, and strives to accurately map or mirror the world. Positive science suffers from context effects, that is the effects that stem from the subjectivity of the researcher and the research subject, the field as inseparable from political, social and economic contexts, and the impossibility of "sampling from a population of social situations" (Burawoy 1998, 12). Reactivity is taboo, while reliability, replicability and representativeness are imperative (Burawoy 1998). In contrast, reflexive science begins with context and situatedness. It "elevates *dialogue* as its defining principle and *intersubjectivity* between participant and observer as its premise. It enjoins what positive science separates: participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its field of location, folk theory and academic theory" (Burawoy 1998, 14, *emphasis in original*). In other words, reflexive science does not hold the positivist premise that "there is an external world that can be construed as separate from and incommensurable with those who study it" (Burawoy 1998, 10). Unlike its positive counterpart, reflexive science values intervention, process, structuration and theory reconstruction (Burawoy 1998, 4).³³ Consequently, positive science is limited by "power effects," notably domination, silencing, objectification and normalisation, all of which researchers should seek to reduce (Burawoy 1998, 30). Burawoy's conception of reflexive science is at the core of the feminist methodologies that inspired the research design of this study.

Doing feminist geography

As Linda McDowell (1997, 382) reminds us,

³³ Burawoy (1998, 4) elucidates the following terms. The simple act of conducting an interview is an *intervention* in the research process. *Process* refers to the aggregation of situational knowledge into social processes. *Structuration* is the simultaneous shaping and being shaped by an external field of forces. *Theory reconstruction* locates social processes in the context of their external determination; it is an alternative to representativeness.

[d]oing feminist geography means looking at the actions and meanings of gendered people, at their histories, personalities and biographies, at the meanings of places to them, at the different ways in which spaces are gendered and how this affects people's understandings of themselves as women or men.

Yet, for feminist scholars, the content of the research topic is insufficient to characterise the research as feminist (cf. Moss 1993, Parreñas 2009). Indeed, many of the key concepts in feminist geography have been studied in conventional, positivist, non-feminist research. To actually do feminist geographical research, the research must actively engage with issues such as positionality, representation, legitimacy, research relationships, reflexivity, and gender. Researchers must assess the nature of knowledge, its production, and its connection to truth, belief and justification. In other words, how research is conceived, how data are constructed and how researchers act are crucial components (Sharp 2005). Instead of pursuing a specific feminist method, feminist scholars should explore processes of producing and legitimising knowledge (Moss 1993). The following paragraphs summarise key methodological considerations for feminist geographers. The authors cited in this section are not all feminist geographers; instead, all authors have critically engaged with the issues in their own disciplines.

Positionality

Positionality usually refers to “who a researcher is in the eyes of the community, and who community members are in the eyes of the researcher” (Caplan 1993, 178 in Flinn 1998, 9). A researcher's positionality is based on his or her class, gender, race, age, ethnicity, social status, education, values, sexual orientation, language ability and social network. Positionality affects fieldwork because positions shape which data sources and informants are accessible to the researcher (Flinn 1998, Cornet 2010). Certain personal traits are conducive to obtaining particular insights, which enable some researchers to understand specific phenomena better than their peers (England 1994). In understanding a fieldworker as a positioned subject and social actor, particular aspects of one's positionality are magnified or minimised; for example, in some contexts gender and family status play a greater role in accessing informants whereas in other contexts the ethnicity and social class of the same researcher may be more important (cf. Cupples and Kindon 2003, Cornet 2010). Acknowledging and reflecting upon positionality and its impact on fieldwork “both elucidates the organisation of the society one is examining and reveals the limits of one's fieldwork according to varying degrees of integration in the field” (Cornet 2010, 135).

Unfortunately, as Rose (1997a in Cloke, Cook et al. 2004) aptly points out, researchers can never be fully aware of or represent their own positionality.

It is not only the positionality of the researcher that counts. Positionality-based power hierarchies emerge not only between the researcher and the research subjects, but also among the research subjects, particularly if group-based methods are employed. In a study in Turkey on gender-based constraints faced by women micro- and small entrepreneurs, Simel Esim (1997) observed that the different positionalities of the individual women confirmed critical class, generational and regional differences among them. She concluded that these positionality-based dynamics influenced her research results. The positionality of the people who accompany researchers also matters. Accompanying research assistants or interpreters (cf. Turner 2010), family members (cf. Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998), and colleagues (cf. Cupples and Kindon 2003) all affect how research subjects see the primary researcher and how they engage in the research process.

Representation

Closely linked to the challenges posed by positionality are those associated with representation. How can an academic researcher, whose training, education, and often class, race and citizenship affords them the privilege of conducting research, possibly represent or speak for oppressed people? At many stages throughout the research process the researcher has the power to control what is and is not included: in defining the research question, in selecting and implementing research methods, in designing data analysis, in choosing which results to foreground and share, and in deciding where, how and in what language to present the research findings. But to assume research necessarily exploits research subjects wrongly implies that they have no power (Scheyvens and Leslie 2000). Research subjects do have power, mainly through whether or not they participate and how much or how truthful is the information they reveal (De Sardan 1995, Scheyvens and Leslie 2000). De Sardan (1995, 8) describes the power play between researcher and interviewee as an “invisible negotiation” in which each person “manipulates” the other to attain their individual objectives. Such negotiation puts the researcher in a double bind because she must both maintain control of the interview so that her research progresses while simultaneously leaving the interviewee to express themselves in their own way (De Sardan 1995). Robinson (1994) argues that it is impossible for a researcher to represent the people she is studying, even if the researcher is an insider of the community, defined in terms of ethnicity,

sexuality, gender, (dis)ability or other shared markers of social location. Despite noble emancipatory intentions, attempts at representation can elicit accusations of othering, objectifying and silencing research subjects (cf. Robinson 1994). Unresolved positionality and representation dilemmas can thus lead researchers to find themselves in a crisis of legitimacy.

Legitimacy

In a seminal article reflecting upon the feminist research process, Kim England (1994) describes the crisis of legitimacy researchers experience when conducting work in developing countries. It occurs when they first realise that dominant discourses (e.g. development discourse) legitimise voices of Western “experts” while undermining those of the local people, in effect colonising and reinforcing patterns of domination, and second, that through “academic voyeurism” they are advancing their own careers without necessarily helping their research subjects. The main responses of researchers are: (1) to abandon development research, (2) to adopt a relativist perspective which privileges the knowledge and understanding of those in developing countries, and (3) to continue research while trying to redress inequalities in post-fieldwork stage. The issue of legitimacy in research raises questions about accuracy, precision and the implications of methods, particularly when research results can impact the well-being of the research subjects (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000). Ignoring the issue risks co-opting knowledges and marginalising research subjects to legitimise the academic project (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000). Such problems can be lessened or avoided by developing a collaborative research agenda, sharing resources and clearly establishing project management roles (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000).

Research relationships

The implication of Hyndman and Walton-Roberts’ (2000) proposition is that feminist geographers must attend to the relationships they develop or do not develop with their research subjects. Wilson (1992 in England 1994, 129) underscores the importance of research relationships, “[l]ocals remember researchers and learn from them through their personal relationships – not their monographs.” The researcher’s intimidating, approachable, self-promoting, pleading or ingratiating stance determines whether the research relationship is reciprocal, lop-sided or manipulative (England 1994). Feminist scholars typically adopt the role of supplicant (England 1994), although they may take on various roles throughout the research

process, such as technology expert, academic expert, egalitarian feminist, and care and connection (Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003).

Knowing your research has the potential to exploit your research subjects is a harrowing thought. In fact, the potential for exploitative relationships is greater with feminist geography methods (e.g. betraying and abandoning subjects, raising expectations, inducing dependency) than with surveys and conventional methods (McDowell 1997, Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Yet, feminist researchers can use their positionality and power to directly advance social justice by re-positioning marginalised social locations as compelling intellectual and political vehicles (Harding and Norberg 2005). Similarly, Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) insist that research can yield valid, valuable and sensitive findings, can empower local participants, and work towards reducing the power gradient between researcher and research subject. Addressing the power differential requires acknowledging it (Stacheli and Martin 2000), and shifting the power to the research subject, and acknowledging that his or her knowledge is greater than that of the researcher on a particular topic; this process is called *supplication* (England 1994).

Speaking alongside

To mitigate the potential dangers of positionality, representation, illegitimacy and exploitative research relationships, feminist researchers can strive to speak “alongside,” “with,” or “nearby” their research subjects, often marginalised groups, instead of aiming to “speak for” or “give voice to” them. Claiming to give voice to research subjects is problematic because the researcher has editorial control over the final research products (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Kindon (2003) argues that certain research tools, such as participatory video, lend themselves to speaking nearby research subjects and can even reduce hierarchical researcher-research subject relationships. Robinson (1994) notes that by using a model of speaking with research subjects, the researcher necessarily reflects on their own positionality and its impact on the research. Similarly, a speaking with model of engagement in which the researcher is consciously open to exploring negotiated and partial meaning can disturb the effects of positionality without eliminating them altogether (Robinson 1994). It is critical to avoid framing the process of speaking alongside, with or nearby marginalised groups as merely giving power. In their analysis of ethical dilemmas on cross-gendered and cross-cultural research, Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) point out that such framing is

problematic in that it reinforces the colonial discourse of the powerless Third World woman, and ignores the social and political contexts in which power relations are situated.

Reflexivity

Another option for dealing with epistemological challenges is to integrate reflexivity into the research process. Reflexivity is the “self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of the self as researcher” (England 1994, 244). It recognises that research is extremely permeable to the researcher’s own identity and experiences and inseparable from the social context and power hierarchies within which it occurs (Hall 2002). Although it can improve fieldwork, inspire new insights and hypotheses, and make us more aware of asymmetrical or exploitative relationships, it cannot remove them (England 1994). Certain research methods, such as field-noting and journaling, can facilitate reflexive research (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). Simply thinking reflexively is insufficient to yield material improvements in the research process; subsequent action is required.

Engaging with the methodological considerations discussed here yields better results than could be obtained otherwise. But perhaps the most insightful note is that research is often “a mixture of hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance” (McDowell 1997, 393). While researchers should critically examine their research, such examination should not prevent them from capitalising on serendipitous coincidences and pure chance. In the rest of the chapter, I present how these elements, plus the aforementioned methodological considerations, apply to the research design, its implementation, and subsequent data analysis.

Case study research

The case study suffers from a much maligned reputation, and yet persists as a popular research approach in the social sciences. It is the one used for this study. The political scientist John Gerring (2004, 341, *emphasis in original*) articulates the paradoxical character of the case study: “although much of what we know about the empirical world is drawn from case studies and case studies continue to constitute a large proportion of work generated by the discipline, the case study *method* is held in low regard or simply dismissed.” An equally disparaging view is held by sociologists who “see the case study as barely better than journalism” (Stoecker 1991, 88). In this

section I elaborate a definition, unpack the critiques and counter-critiques of the case study, and defend its appropriateness for this research project.

What is a case study?

The term “case study” is a “definitional morass” (Gerring 2004, 341); the plethora and diversity of definitions being used by researchers contribute to the confusion surrounding and critiques of the case study. In the literature, case study research variously refers to ethnographic, qualitative research, to a study with a small-*N*, to an investigation of a single site, event or phenomenon, and to a process-tracing investigation (Gerring 2004). To be useful, however, the case study should not be conceived as a particular method for data collection and analysis (Stoecker 1991, Gerring 2004). Instead, it is best understood as a “particular way of defining cases” (Gerring 2004, 342), or a “*frame* determining the boundaries of information gathering” (Stoecker 1991, 98, *emphasis in original*). Rethinking the case study as a design feature allows for greater flexibility and responsiveness throughout the research process while still producing rigorous research results.

The research frame must consider the researcher’s role, multiple methods, the role of theory, and the historical perspective (Stoecker 1991, 101). The researcher delineates the frame by “specif[ying] the event, arrang[ing] the facts, and analyz[ing] them” (Stoecker 1991, 105). Such enjoining of researcher and researched and the emphasis on reflexivity in the research process echo feminist methodological considerations. Moreover, these points situate the case study within the reflexive science model of science. The case study is a particularly effective way of combining multiple methods to investigate a particular temporally and spatially bounded social phenomenon (De Sardan 1995). Grounding a case in theory and in its historical and structural contexts allows a researcher to extend out from the field (Stoecker 1991). Burawoy (1998), for example, uses what he calls the extended case method to extend out from his investigation of the microworlds of Zambianisation in the copper mining industry in newly postcolonial Zambia to analyse the sources of underdevelopment. The extended case method “applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on preexisting theory” (Burawoy 1998, 5). Because (1) an ethnography entails multiple methods (cf. Cloke, Cook et al. 2004), (2) reflexive science requires attention to the researcher’s role (cf. Burawoy 1998), (3) connecting the past to the present demands an historical perspective, and (4)

building on preexisting theory presupposes a consideration of theory, the extended case method fulfils Stoecker's (1991) four criteria for rethinking the case study as a research frame.

The case study can thus be defined as:

a research frame with structural and historical boundaries, an integral theory component, an involved rather than distanced researcher, and multiple methods which include collaborative methods, [that] provides different standards from which to judge the adequacy of our work (Stoecker 1991, 108-109).

The case study in this research project is an investigation of the short and medium term environmental migration in Cagayan de Oro following Typhoon Sendong, which can be extended out to understand the production of post-disaster spaces. Stoecker's (1991) four considerations are discussed in Chapter 2 (theory), Chapter 3 (structural and historical boundaries) and Chapter 4 (researcher role and multiple methods).

Critiques and counter-critiques

Many critiques of case study research centre on issues related to theory, reliability and validity. With the rise of quantitative research in the social sciences came a growing number of case study critics. They charged that because $N=1$, "objectivity is more difficult to maintain, falsification criteria are more difficult to meet, and generalization is impossible" (Stoecker 1991, 91). In other words, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the case study to uphold the standards of reliability, replicability and representativeness, and to avoid reactivity as required by the positive model of science (Burawoy 1998). Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) expands on Stoecker's (1991) list of case study critiques. He summarises five "common misunderstandings:" (1) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (2) a single case cannot be generalised, therefore a single case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (3) case studies are good for developing hypotheses whereas other methods are preferred for testing hypotheses and building theory; (4) case studies tend to confirm a researcher's preconceived ideas; and (5) it is difficult to summarise specific case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006, 219).

In response to the critics, case study researchers have attempted either to infuse greater rigour to their methods or to critique the critiques (Stoecker 1991). The first option has largely failed (Stoecker 1991); just as positivist research is necessarily limited by context effects, a research frame designed for a reflexive model of science cannot attain positivist research standards. The critique of critiques have been much more successful, and even highlighted the strengths of the

case study. In his counter-attack, Flyvbjerg (2006, 223) argues the first misunderstanding is irrelevant because “[s]ocial science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and has [...] nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge.” Moreover, statistically significant results do not guarantee accurate explanation (Stoecker 1991). The strategic choice of a case study, for instance those elaborated by Marx, Freud and Darwin, does permit generalisability (Flyvbjerg 2006). There is, however, a tendency to overvalue generalisability and to undervalue examples in scientific development (Flyvbjerg 2006). To the third critique, Flyvbjerg (2006) simply posits that a case study is useful for both creating and testing hypotheses, but is not limited to these research endeavours. The methods preferred by positivist quantitative researchers, such as surveys, are not especially insightful for applied research questions (Stoecker 1991). Case study research is no more likely than other methods of inquiry to demonstrate a bias towards verification (Stoecker 1991, Flyvbjerg 2006); moreover, researchers conducting intensive in-depth case studies often report their initial pre-fieldwork notions were wrong (Flyvbjerg 2006). Finally, Flyvbjerg (2006) concurs with the fifth misunderstanding, adding that the difficulty in summarising is reflective of the properties of the reality studied rather than reflective of the case study as a research approach. Moreover, he contends that the narratives of good case studies near “the complexities and contradictions of real life,” and that it is undesirable to reduce the narrative to a concise, generalisable account (Flyvbjerg 2006, 237).

Suitability for this study

Various characteristics inherent to case study research make it the most appropriate option for this study. The so-called “fuzziness of case studies” is particularly conducive to exploratory work or the generative moment of scientific progress (Gerring 2004, 350). In designing a research project, researchers must choose between knowing more about less or knowing less about more. Case studies offer the former option; they are good for depth and bad for breadth (Flyvbjerg 2006). Gerring (2004, 348, *emphasis in original*) expands: “one of the primary virtues of the case study method is the *depth* of analysis that it offers, [where depth is] [...] the detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance that is accounted for by an explanation.” This depth of analysis is attractive to researchers who study topics poorly or erroneously covered in the literature, or not covered at all (Gerring 2004). As outlined in Chapter 1, existing literature on environmental migration is framed in dominant, masculinist terms, and it focuses primarily on

politically and humanitarian salient features. So far, there has not been intensive study of the topic through a feminist geography lens, nor has an alternative framing been proposed. Moreover, although many migration studies have been conducted in the Philippines, few social science studies have investigated the role of the environment in migration (Mahmud 1994 is one notable exception). A Philippine case study challenging conventional framings is thus highly appropriate. Case studies also produce context-dependent knowledge, a nuanced view of reality (Flyvbjerg 2006), and an “historical and idiosyncratic” understanding of processes (Stoecker 1991, 94). The creation of and subsequent intervention in post-disaster spaces, and the mobility within and between them, are highly context-dependent. Finally, case studies can stimulate a researcher’s own learning process through the continued proximity to the study’s reality and feedback from research participants (Flyvbjerg 2006), a point especially relevant to doctoral students as fledgling researchers. In addition to the academic considerations to study a single case, there were personal considerations that made the case study a desirable option.

“Fieldwork” in the “field”

The rich narrative characteristic of good case study research often draws upon “fieldwork” in which data are constructed in the “field.” Delineating the parameters of the field or fieldwork is difficult and requires unpacking.

Geography’s legacy of “exploring, mapping and colonizing the globe” and its emphasis on “bringing the field home” in the teaching of geography obliges critical geographers to closely scrutinise the way they locate the field, set spatial and temporal borders around the field, situate themselves in or apart from the field, and construe findings from the field (Staheli and Martin 2000, 145). In mainstream geography, there is a clear delineation of the field: it is a naturalised place or people or an unambiguously defined physical location. But articulating the field as “somewhere else” is to understand the world-as-exhibition (Hyndman 2001). Without troubling a narrow conceptualisation of the field, it is impossible to meaningfully engage with epistemological issues such as legitimacy, positionality and representation and to develop accountable analysis and theory (Hyndman 2001). Feminist geographers recast the field as a site of embodied experiences (Frohlick 2002, Sharp 2009), disrupted power (Harding and Norberg 2005), and purposeful interference in other people’s lives (England 1994). The field is constructed and unbounded; it is a “leaky space” where personal and professional roles and

relationships overlap (Burns McGrath 1998, Hyndman 2001, Cupples and Kinson 2003, 212). Instead of defining the field as a place or a person, feminist geography locates and identifies it in terms of specific political objectives or social networks of people, capital and ideas that span political borders (Hyndman 2001). Candice Cornet (2010), an anthropologist, contends that the field is more process than locality because the field is where the researcher assumes various roles through her engagement with informants, interpreters, friends and colleagues, which, in turn, enable her to gradually develop insights.

Fieldwork, or the construction of data, in this complex, situated and leaky field, is similarly complex, situated and leaky. Fieldwork is part data collection, part relationship-building, and part personal and professional development (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). It is a “compromise between one’s research plan and what is actually feasible, and between one’s own cultural ways of being and trying on local customs” (Shea *in press*, 17). It is simultaneously a political, personal and professional endeavour (Hyndman 2001), and a very particular, even peculiar, scientific activity in which a researcher goes somewhere, observes something, returns home, and analyses that something. Iterative fieldwork, proceeding by “intuition, improvisation and *bricolage*” is the *sine qua non* of good qualitative fieldwork (De Sardan 1995, 3). It necessarily entails “detours, delays and blunders” (Cornet 2010, 146), and “getting lost in the field” for extended periods of time (De Sardan 1995, 3), which allow the researcher to better – but never perfectly – grasp the local context (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The periods in which the researcher feels like she is wasting her time on tangents or has unwittingly committed social *faux-pas* are essential for learning local codes, observing unspoken messages and meanings, probing beyond a pre-designed question guide (De Sardan 1995), and identifying who should speak on certain issues – even if the link between the person and the research topic is not obvious at first (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). For example, at the beginning of my fieldwork, which initially focused exclusively on post-disaster mobility and livelihoods, so many people insisted I speak to the archbishop that it would have been ludicrous to not interview him and ignore the potential significance of religion in post-disaster mobility. Just as the field is fuzzy in terms of time, space, relationships and interactions, Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 4) contend that fieldwork comprises “the whole range of human encounters occurring within the uneven social terrain of the field, in which case it is marked as much by social ‘work’ as by the practicalities of getting there, setting up and travelling around.”

Consistent with such portrayals of the field and fieldwork, I acknowledge my fieldwork transpired in a large field encompassing many different places. These places included all the field sites and offices I visited during the preliminary and main field seasons. Although some experiences did not contribute directly to the CDO case, they did provide additional contextual insights into relevant socioeconomic, political, cultural and ecological conditions. The field also intruded into my personal life, particularly during the main field season. Finally, the field crossed over into the preparation, dissemination and analysis spaces in which I tested ideas with other researchers and conducted research-related activities. One of the first steps in delineating the field was selecting an appropriate case.

Case selection

The best cases focus on explanation rather than prediction or representativeness (Stoecker 1991). If the goal is to obtain the greatest amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, then a representative or random sample may not be the most appropriate strategy, and therefore the typical or average case will not yield the richest information (Flyvbjerg 2006). Atypical or extreme cases have greater explanatory power than their typical representative counterparts because they provoke “more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied,” and they reveal “deeper causes behind a problem and its consequences” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229). I sought an atypical case of environmental migration in Southeast Asia that would allow me to investigate post-disaster space at a site without a lot of previous experience with natural hazards and disasters. My first attempt to select a case study transpired during a pre-fieldwork visit to the Philippines.

Pre-fieldwork visit

A pre-fieldwork visit is a valuable component of the research process because it enables a researcher to build and maintain social networks and chains of contact (Cornet 2010). From September to December 2010 I conducted an exploratory field season in the Philippines. It was especially helpful as I had never before conducted research or even set foot in Southeast Asia, and was thus unfamiliar with the particularities of conducting research in the Philippines. The most useful outcomes of the pre-fieldwork visit were connecting with key contacts, developing a greater understanding of migration in the Philippine context, and whittling down the list of potential sites. Sites were evaluated based on three main criteria: (1) quality of access to local respondents, information and support; (2) lack of research overload in study site and among

potential participants; (3) suitability to address research objectives. The two finalists selected for the study were Real, Infanta and General Nakar (ReINa) in Quezon province and Ormoc, Leyte. Both sites had experienced severe flash flooding. In the end, neither option became my study site because of pragmatic research considerations and altered personal circumstances.

A study site in Cagayan de Oro

One year after I left the Philippines, Tropical Storm Sendong hit Northern Mindanao. In the aftermath of the disaster thousands of residents were displaced temporarily or permanently from their homes. The environmental migration provoked by this storm in this part of the country – which I had not considered during my pre-fieldwork visit – became my case. From the research perspective this case offered several advantages over both Ormoc and ReINa. The flooding was much more recent, making it easier to locate survivors and to reduce the effects of confounding factors such as the modification of individual and collective memories over time (cf. Kansteiner 2002) and the differences in migratory experiences attributable to life histories (cf. McLeman 2013). Furthermore, Northern Mindanao better exemplifies the atypical case described by Flyvbjerg (2006) because of low incidence of natural hazards in the region relative to other parts of the Philippines (LGU of CDO 2012).

The other motivation for choosing a Sendong-affected site was personal; I would be doing “accompanied” fieldwork. My gendered roles as a wife and a new mother, in addition to my role as a primary researcher, forced me to seriously reflect upon Susan Frohlick’s (2002, 50, *emphasis in original*) question: “how *do* our positions as gendered subjects and as feminists shape our choices of research sites?” I sought a city that promised to be a pleasant and safe place to live for a young family, and that had quality health care facilities. Of the affected areas in Northern Mindanao, the city of Cagayan de Oro was the best match for reconciling research and family considerations. CDO thus became the primary site for data construction.

Construction, or data collection

In their book *Practicing human geography*, Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) present a helpful frame for thinking about geographical data. They contend that geographers must situate data within processes of construction.

How we come by them [data], and all the many procedures which we then operate upon them from the most basic of sorting to the most complex of *representation*, are all in one

way or another constructions found, created and enacted by ‘us’ (human geography researchers) as people living and working within specific economic, political, social and cultural contexts. There is nothing natural here; nothing straightforwardly pregiven, preordained or untouched by human emotions, identities, relations and struggles (Cloe, Cook et al. 2004, xiii, *emphasis in original*).

It is within these processes of data construction that I situate the research methods used.

Several critical steps were accomplished prior to the main field season. Among the most important research activities were the acquisition of ethics approval and the design of oral and written consent protocols (Annex 1), the development of a flexible research protocol for data collection, and the finalisation of a partner agreement between my host organisation in the Philippines (the Third World Studies Center at the University of the Philippines-Diliman) and the International Development Research Centre in Canada. I took introductory Tagalog language classes through the Southeast Asian Summer Studies Institute (SEASSI) based out of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Eight weeks of intensive language training in 2011 gave me rudimentary speaking and writing skills, which proved helpful in navigating daily life when I was based in the Tagalog-speaking regions of Luzon. Because few Cagayaños can or choose to speak Tagalog, the main benefits of participating in SEASSI were the opportunities to exchange ideas with other scholars working on the Philippines and to establish relationships with them. In this way, the blurring of the professional and the personal launched data construction in the main field season.

The main field season

The main field season ran from October 2012 to May 2013. It began with the collection and preliminary review of library and grey literature, or what Cloe, Cook et al. (2004) call “pre-constructed data.” These data are created by other agencies (e.g. governments, companies, journalists, poets, etc.) that geographers extract and use for their purposes. After, the methods concentrated on creating what Cloe, Cook et al. (2004) call “self-constructed data,” which are produced through the active field-based research of the geographers themselves. This part of the research was conducted in three distinct steps; each employed a combination of ethnographic, qualitative and participatory research methods. The first step consisted of site visits, non-participant observation, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and key informant interviews; each method contributed to answering all three research objectives. The second step

involved the creation of participatory videos and collecting GPS data to make counter-maps. Following the production of the participatory videos, the final stage of the data construction period centred on two group workshops in which participants and Filipino researchers discussed the research results, and evaluated my interpretation of preliminary research results. A summary of the main data construction activities is given in Table 4.1. Because this study derived mostly from self-constructed data, the allocation of space is weighted heavily toward explaining the issues related to them, and less on issues around pre-constructed data.

Table 4.1. A summary of the main data construction activities.

Method
Counter-map-making
Focus group discussion (3)
Interactive presentation to share and evaluate preliminary results with researchers (2)
Key informant interview (47 men, 60 women)
Non-participant observation
Participatory video (2 men, 5 women)
Semi-structured survivor interview (23 men, 56 women)

I used ethnographic methods and adopted an ethnographic methodological framing for data construction, but I did not do an ethnography, per se. Ethnographic research requires prolonged immersion at the research site thereby enabling the researcher to acquire *in-situ*, contextualised, situated and ordinary knowledge gleaned from everyday life interactions with the local population (De Sardan 1995, Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). In ethnographic research, fieldworkers are neither insiders nor outsiders but somewhere in-between and dependent on the social actors and situation at hand; put another way, guests but more than guests, a kind of family or a “long-term guest-hybrid family” (Shea *in press*, 11). My relatively short field season, inability to fluently speak Bisayan, and the separation of my living quarters from the relocation sites where many of my research subjects lived precluded such prolonged immersion. Despite these limitations, the research design reflects an ethnographic methodology. That is:

[Ethnography] treats people as knowledgeable, situated agents from whom researchers can learn a great deal about how the world is seen, lived and works in and through ‘real’ places, communities and people. [...] [I]t is an extended, detailed, ‘immersive,’ inductive methodology intended to allow grounded social orders, worldviews and ways of life gradually to become apparent (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169).

The research design also uses ethnographic methods, some of which are also called qualitative methods. The anthropologist Jean-Pierre Olivier De Sardan (1995, 25) divides field data from ethnographic studies (*l'enquête du terrain*) into four large types, namely participant observation, interviews, the devices of census, and written sources. The first three, being constructed by the researcher, yield self-constructed data, while the fourth yields pre-constructed data. I used variations of all four types plus participatory video and counter-map-making. The mixing of methods – also described as the “eclecticism of data” (De Sardan 1995, 10) or the “methodologically opportunist combination of research methods” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169) – is characteristic of ethnographic research. It helps to ensure the complexity of the studied social reality is reflected in the study and improves the rigour of qualitative research (De Sardan 1995, Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Multiple methods enable a researcher to triangulate data, thereby improving their reliability and validity. Triangulation, like the epistemological underpinnings of this study, recognises the incoherence and heterogeneity of culture (De Sardan 1995). Thus, just as triangulation from various sources can yield reinforcing and complementary narratives and findings, triangulation can also yield conflictual ones. Both situations occurred; seemingly conflicting results are discussed in subsequent chapters.

In the following paragraphs each method is described separately. In actuality, however, methods were frequently used simultaneously and bled into one another in the field. As Gerring (2004, 346) aptly points out “[t]here are few “pure” methods. And this is probably a good thing. Chastity is not necessarily an attribute to be cherished in research design.”

Pre-constructed data

Pre-constructed data are the primary inputs from the field into a research project that have not yet been interpreted by the researcher (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). They are frequently, but not necessarily, written works. Written works can assist in exploring and supporting hypotheses and research questions; they can complement or refute other data sources; or they can even become their own corpus of data (De Sardan 1995). When examining pre-constructed data, the focus must be on how these sources are constructed, on contexts, influences and forces that affect the data, and on their categorisation as fact or fiction (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004).

The first type of pre-constructed data used in this study is official sources, the textual, graphical, numerical, statistical, aural and financial data produced by the state (e.g. government agencies or

public authorities) (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Often, these data are assumed to be reliable and accurate because they are “official.” Although governments may have the resources, legal power and breadth of involvement to acquire or produce good data, official sources should be treated skeptically; state trustees are motivated to obtain, process and present certain information that they can use to produce the nation or other social realities (Scott 1998, Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Official government statistics influence the society they represent by defining and categorising society in particular ways and not others. Put another way,

official data do not provide complete or transparent pictures of social reality. Rather they are influenced and conditioned by the interests at stake in their production. The demands of government policy or the moral concerns of the middle classes are reflected in the statistics that are constructed. [...] Not only are statistics sometimes an inaccurate picture of ‘reality’ but, by being collected at all, they also change the nature of that ‘reality’ (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 48).

The official pre-constructed data sources used in this study are: government reports, census data and statistics, land titles and contracts, government-issued identification, and natural hazard maps. Their political and constructed character is especially evident in the focus of the post-Sendong reports, and in the discrepancies between official and non-official data, and even among official data sources.

The second type of pre-constructed data used in this study is what Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) call non-official sources, which are produced by non-state entities. Non-official data sources used in this research project include: newspaper articles, unpublished master’s theses, flood maps, museum displays and archives, Facebook pages, books on folklore and local history, event pamphlets and other promotional material, relocation site engineering and architectural plans, relocation site posters, short documentaries, press releases, project documents, memos and reports. Although these materials mostly claim to be “factual” (as opposed to “imaginative”), they, like official sources, are social products. As such, these data should be considered for their authenticity, credibility, representativeness, meaning and biases (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 68).

The third and final type of pre-constructed data used in this study is imaginative data. Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) outline a range of possible imaginative sources, but the most pertinent ones for this study are buildings and built environments. This is because “buildings are expressive of human imagination but they are also functional objects that are used for all kinds of purposes by

people who may rarely if ever think about the imaginative meanings bound up in their construction” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 113). Even the seemingly smallest of architectural details can reveal a deliberate intent to exclude, to exercise power, or to help or hinder mobility (Weizman 2007). In this study, imaginative data are found in the built environment of the city, and especially in the official post-disaster sleeping spaces specifically designed for Sendong survivors. Evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation sites are important data sources that demonstrate attempts at governmentality. As observable entities, these imaginative sources helped confirm, refute, nuance or otherwise triangulate claims made by official and non-official data sources, and by informants during self-constructed data activities.

Self-constructed data

In contrast to pre-constructed data, self-constructed data are produced by the researcher. Presenting and evaluating self-constructed data should consider the roles played by researchers in the field, which methods are used, the relations between researcher and research subjects, and textualisation (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). The following pages address these issues for each of the self-constructed data methods I used.

“Non-participant” observation

The research method that best characterises ethnography-inspired research is participant observation. In participant observation, the researcher “stud[ies] both what people *say* they do and why, and what they are *seen* to do and say to others about this” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 169, *emphasis in original*). The method targets everyday behaviour and ritual activities that can be seen, heard and actively participated in by the researcher, as well as the local discourses in which the researcher does not directly participate but can learn about by listening (De Sardan 1995). Observation must be done “openly” so that the researcher observes the unanticipated, and is willing to change her hypotheses (De Sardan 1995). Typically, the observations and interactions that form participant observation are focused on events, people and places perceived as relevant to the research topic.

De Sardan (1995, 6) extends the concept of participant observation to things that may not seem to be directly related to the research topic but that are acquired almost unconsciously through practice; he groups these elements and activities under the concept of “impregnation.” Impregnation, acquired through lived experience, differentiates between studies based on self-

constructed data and studies based on the pre-constructed data of others. The researcher's brain is the equivalent of a black box – everything the researcher observes, sees, hears, experiences during her fieldwork passes through this black box, informing subsequent analyses, conceptualisations, interpretations during the fieldwork, and later during the writing period. For me, this black box metaphor is particularly useful in explaining how my off-duty time in the Philippines (e.g. experiencing environmental migration firsthand, running through rural *barangays*, buying food at the market, exploring different sites and cultures in the archipelago on mini vacations with my family) has filtered the entire field experience, helping to structure and interpret my data. Many of the research activities carried out during the 2010 pre-fieldwork visit can be classified as an impregnation form of participant observation because they assisted in a broad contextualisation of the CDO case.

Researchers using a participant observation method often fully immerse themselves in their research context, for example by living among and working alongside research subjects for an extended period of time (Burawoy 1998, Luker 2008). These researchers are more like participants and less like observers. During my fieldwork, I was more an observer, and less a participant; I mostly observed other people participate, and only occasionally participated in the activities and events I studied. Accordingly, my use of the participant observation method is more aptly described as “non-participant” observation. In this research project, non-participant observation included site visits to former evacuation camps, current and former temporary housing sites, completed and under-construction relocation sites, and attendance at a mass wedding and baptism, a values training session and graduation ceremony, a livelihoods training for Sendong survivors, a public demonstration, a local chamber of commerce meeting and various Sendong memorial events. I frequently brought my daughter with me for these activities, except when I judged the sites unhealthy (e.g. city landfill) or unsafe (e.g. relocation sites only accessible by motorcycle) for her.

Interviews

The “talking with people” component of my research was more reflective of “interviewing,” defined as “a qualitative exercise aimed at teasing out the deeper well-springs of meaning with which attributes, attitudes and behavior are endowed,” than of “questionnairing,” defined as “a wider quantitatively driven strategy of a social survey where representative samples of people can be questioned in order to produce numeric measures of behavior, attitudes, attributes and so on”

(Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 127). As “conversations with a purpose” (Webb and Webb 1932 in Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 149), interviews are the most economical and therefore the most privileged research method to acquire *emic*, local discursive data (De Sardan 1995). Interviews can shorten and focus data gathering on a particular issue that would be impossible to glean from participant observation alone. Interviews are good for probing experiences, feelings and meanings (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004), and for understanding some component of social life (Luker 2008).

De Sardan (1995) divides interviews into two main, and sometimes overlapping, types: consultation and narrative. Consultation interviews are done with a “consultant” who has a known expertise or competency on a particular subject, usually unrelated to their own personal experience. In contrast, narrative interviews are done with a “storyteller” who has had a particular personal experience pertinent to the particular research subject. Both types of interviews are necessarily co-constructed because the interviewer and the interviewee are complicit in producing the narrative. Together, they

work their way through questions which begin as the ‘property’ of the researcher but which become co-owned and co-shaped in the unfolding interactivity of questioning, answering, listening and conversing. Here, the original scheme of intended data construction can be diverted or even subverted by both the researcher and the researched: the former as he or she follows up with what appears to be interesting conversation angles; and the latter as he or she demarcates consciously or subconsciously the boundaries of what he or she will reveal in the interview (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 149).

As such, interviews are less “extracting truth from the vessel-of-answer” and more creating “an interpersonal drama with a developing plot” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 156, 150). The researcher must therefore consider both the content and the process of the interview, and remain alert to the ways participants support and subvert access to their knowledge, opinions and personal thoughts (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011).

I did both consultation and narrative interviews. Interviewees were identified predominantly through the snowball method in which informants directly or indirectly identified other potential informants. It is a non-random method reflective of real social networks (De Sardan 1995). These social networks informed subsequent analyses of how social networks shape post-disaster spaces. I stopped interviewing people when little or no new information was gleaned from additional

interviews. This is called the saturation point, where “saturation means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist [or geographer] can develop the properties of the category. As he [or she] sees familiar instance over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated” (Glaser and Strauss 1973, 61, in De Sardan 1995, 14). Because the research project aims to explore the production of post-disaster spaces, and mobility within and between these spaces, and not to examine the representativeness of such spaces, stopping interviews based on the saturation principle was appropriate.

In my study, consultation interviews were done with “key informants.” Key informant interviews were done with health workers and government, humanitarian and United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organisations based in CDO, Manila and other parts of the Philippines (Table 4.2). These interviews were aimed at identifying vulnerable groups, migratory routes and contextual factors underlying susceptibilities to disasters. In CDO, these interviews were additionally focused on elucidating the specific roles of organisations in relief, recovery and relocation efforts, and on understanding their interactions with and perspectives of other actors. In a few instances key informants were also Sendong survivors. Key informant interviews ranged from 25 minutes to a full day, with the majority lasting between 30 to 90 minutes. Most key informant interviews were conducted in English; one was done in Bisayan with a smattering of English. Because of the limited availability of my interpreter Kuki and the excellent English language skills of my key informants, all but two key informant interviews were conducted without the assistance of an interpreter. I was accompanied by Ada and Frank for five interviews, and by Ada only for three. I opted to conduct most of my interviews with government officials without Ada, a decision partly motivated by a desire to present myself as a researcher instead of as a mother.

Almost one third of key informant interviews from the 2012-2013 field season were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The other key informant interviews were not recorded for a variety of reasons: (1) the informant did not want to be recorded, (2) the informant started talking before I had a chance to ask for their permission to record the interview (and interrupting them would have been rude under the circumstances), (3) my audio recorder got a virus that went undetected for several days, and (4) the interview site was very noisy (e.g. construction site). During the interview, I acquired relevant research reports from the organisation represented by

the key informant (i.e. pre-constructed data sources). I met with many key informants on multiple occasions in diverse settings (e.g. interview at their office and then at subsequent public events at a relocation site; interview in their home, and later at focus group discussion at an NGO office and International Women’s Day demonstrations at the main public square). De Sardan (1995) contends that opportunities that allow for follow-up conversations throughout fieldwork enhance a researcher’s understanding. I also found that by observing and interacting with the same person under different circumstances I could better grasp the content they divulged in the interview, and the context in which they conduct their work and they engage with other actors.

Table 4.2. Summary of key informant interviews.

Type of key informants	Number of interviewees
City and <i>barangay</i> politicians and government agency officials	5 men, 5 women
Regional government agency officials	2 men, 9 women
National government agency officials (based in Manila)	1 woman
Other state institution employees (e.g. police)	1 man, 3 women
Research institute staff employees	4 men, 7 women
University employees (in CDO)	5 men, 2 women
University employees (based elsewhere in the Philippines)	2 men, 3 women
Local NGO employees and volunteers; local chapters of national and international NGO employees	6 men, 5 women
National NGO employees (based in Manila)	6 men, 7 women
Staff members at evacuation camps, transitional housing sites, and resettlement sites	2 men, 6 women
Private sector employees and business owners	6 men, 7 women
Religious officials and organisation staff members and volunteers	4 men, 3 women
Other (e.g. lawyers, journalist, historians)	4 men, 2 women

Narrative interviews were done as semi-structured interviews with Sendong survivors (hereafter survivor interviews); these interviews were equivalent to De Sardan’s (1995) narrative interviews. Because environmentally-displaced people typically return home and do not migrate very far (GOS 2011), the majority of the survivors were expected to reside in or in close proximity to CDO. For practical reasons, all of the survivors I interviewed were living in CDO during my fieldwork. Seventy-nine survivor interviews were conducted with 56 adult women and 23 adult men. The discrepancy reflects the availability of interviewees during daytime hours. Interviews were conducted inside and in front of people’s homes and work sites, and at temporary and permanent relocation sites throughout the city. Interviews lasted between 30 to 60 minutes, and

focused on the individual's migratory experiences during and after the December 2011 disaster. Survivor interviews were not recorded because the majority were conducted in Bisayan, and frequently in situations where people were talking simultaneously. It was more effective for me to write notes while my interpreter translated, and later elaborate upon these notes in a private debriefing with her.

My main interpreter, Kuki, conducted almost all of the survivor interviews. Before we began the survivor interviews, she had translated interview questions and instructions for the participatory video activity into language that made sense to research participants. As De Sardan (1995) points out, researchers craft questions to answer their specific research question using academic language; these questions benefit immensely from translation. Moreover, ensuring interpreters both know what type of data is required by the primary researcher and have the flexibility ask questions in a culturally appropriate manner (i.e. not necessarily translating the researcher's question verbatim) improves the research process and outcomes (Turner 2010). Ada, but not Frank, accompanied me on many of the survivor interviews in part because I knew people would be more inclined to come and speak with a foreigner with a blond-haired blue-eyed baby than to a lone woman foreigner.

Compensating interviewees was another research consideration. Heller, Christensen et al. (2011) suggest that immediate, culturally-appropriate compensation can be helpful, and the question of how to meaningfully give back to research participants is an important methodological consideration. In my fieldwork, I sought the advice of experienced researchers at my host organisation the Third World Studies Center on appropriate compensation, and then checked with Kuki and university professors in CDO to ensure I would not violate any CDO-specific norms. I did not pay any participant. Instead, during the survivor interviews I provided snacks, drinks or small meals. Whenever possible, foodstuffs were purchased from the participant or from an establishment they recommended. I also patronised the businesses of my interviewees; for example, I returned to the home of a seamstress I had interviewed several weeks prior to have some zippers replaced, and I hired the husband of another interviewee to drive us around on his *motorela* for a participatory video-making activity. During key informant interviews I was usually offered something to eat and drink, and it would have been rude to refuse or for me to offer them something else instead.

Annex 2 contains the key informant and survivor interview guides. Before moving on to the next research method a brief mention of how I concluded the interviews is warranted. It is perhaps best explained by a blog post I wrote after a particularly spirited exchange with women residents at a temporary housing site for Sendong survivors. Ada, but not Frank, was with Kuki and me.

DO YOU EAT RICE?

At the end of each interview and focus group discussion, I ask respondents what (if any) questions they have for me. About half of the respondents don't have any questions and prefer to move on with the rest of their day. Of the respondents who elect to pose questions, most inquire about the research itself or how I am enjoying life in the Philippines. If Ada is with me, then I am often asked "lalaki or babae?" (boy or girl), "how many months?" and "is the father Pinoy?" This 'second interview' typically lasts only several minutes.

Today, the second interview was much longer. There was a back and forth of questions, a comedic performance, a round of pass-the-baby, and peals of laughter. I tried to answer the questions as fully and truthfully as I could but I didn't have all the answers. Here's a smattering of their queries.

They inquired about the Canadian climate and weather:

- *What kind of precipitation is there in Canada?*
- *How cold is it?*
- *Do you like snow and cold?*
- *What are the seasons in Canada?*
- *Do people freeze in the wintertime?*

Other questions delved into family and personal matters:

- *Do you have more children?*
- *How old are you?*
- *Where do you stay here in the Philippines?*
- *When did you arrive in the Philippines?*
- *Where is your husband? What does he do here?*
- *What is your husband's job? Does he have a salary here in the Philippines?*

Then, there were the food questions:

- *Do you eat rice?*
- *Why don't you eat rice three times a day?*
- *What do you eat?*
- *Is it true that there are people in the USA who only eat fruits and vegetables and bread?*
- *What is your favourite Filipino food?*

There were questions about social issues in Canada:

- *Are there poor people in Canada?*
- *Is there a social safety net for poor people and unemployed people in Canada? Does the government provide them with free housing?*

- *How does the welfare system work?*

And, some questions about transportation:

- *How long does it take to get to the United States? By car? By plane?*
- *Are there buses in Canada?*
- *How do people travel long distances in Canada?*

Other inquiries focused on their observations of foreigners (i.e. white) in the Philippines:

- *Why do foreign men like Filipina women?*
- *Why do foreigners always walk [instead of taking a motorela, jeepney, motor] even when it is so hot and only 7 to 10 pesos?*
- *Why do American men walk so fast - like this [imitation of a man taking enormous strides]? His Filipina wife has to walk so fast just to keep up [imitation of a woman hurrying around taking four or five tiny steps just to keep up with the husband], and she's usually pregnant [arm gestures to indicate a pregnant belly].*

The questions you ask can reveal a lot about you, perhaps even more than the response. It's an issue I've considered in the process of designing and carrying out my research. In asking respondents to take a turn as the interviewer, I can learn about values, stereotypes, cultural biases, among other things. And, in answering questions, I can satisfy their curiosity and hopefully help to nurture cross-cultural understanding (Gibb 2013, 6 March).

Group activities

Initially I had planned to lead a group workshop after all the participatory videos were completed. In the workshop, participants would watch and discuss the videos, and evaluate the research team's interpretation of preliminary research results. Such a workshop never materialised for two main reasons. One, I was unable to edit the videos in the field so that the participants' faces could not be recognised, and thus the videos could not be shared without compromising participants' anonymity. Two, I was cognisant of the fact that research has the potential to be extractive because research outputs are inevitably less than what the participants contribute in terms of their time and knowledge (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). Participants had already given significant amounts of their time to the research project through individual or group interviews and a day-long video making activity, and they had other interests and responsibilities.

Instead, the group activities included three focus group discussions and three interactive presentations. I did two presentations for the researchers and staff at the Third World Studies Center (TWSC), one before my fieldwork and the other after. The pre-fieldwork presentation was done as a round-table with an extensive question and answer period. It was aimed at fulfilling one of my requirements as a TWSC foreign research fellow, troubleshooting potential problems with

the research design, identifying contacts in CDO (including potential research assistants), revising research questions, and obtaining further confirmation that CDO would be a safe place to bring my young family. The second TWSC presentation gave me the opportunity to obtain critical feedback on my preliminary results. In the third presentation, I presented my preliminary research results to research participants, friends and other people interested in my research in Cagayan de Oro. It was a nerve-wracking experience because they were the ones who had had intimate experiences with Typhoon Sendong and could invalidate my results. (Luckily, they confirmed them). It was also the most enjoyable and rewarding presentation I have given, especially the ensuing discussion. Ada and Frank attended each presentation.

Focus group discussions were an efficient research tool for triangulating data from key informant and survivor interviews, and for probing specific questions. Their purpose was to acquire the opinions and an overview of the experiences of three different groups of people (Table 4.3). One was conducted with women Sendong survivors-turned-activists who began volunteering on behalf of a Filipino women’s rights organisation after their Sendong experiences. A second was tacked on to a natural family planning session co-hosted by the archdiocese’s Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning ministry and the local Imam. Most attendees were women, and all attendees were Muslim Sendong survivors. It was held in both the Maranao and Bisayan languages, with the Imam translating from Maranao into Bisayan for Kuki, who then translated into English for me. A third focus group discussion was carried out with a small group of men and women Sendong survivors living in the temporary bunkhouses at the Xavier Ecoville relocation site. This group was handpicked by site staff. Ada accompanied me in all focus group discussions; Frank was present for the first one only. Kuki directed all three; we had gone over the design together, and she understood the information I sought. I acted as recorder, filling in flipcharts with the participants’ responses and making my own notes, only interrupting Kuki if there was a point requiring additional probing. A summary of the focus group discussion itinerary is given in Annex 3.

Table 4.3. Summary of focus group discussions in CDO.

Focus group discussion	Number of participants
With urban poor women survivors and activists	7 women
With survivors living at Ecoville	4 men, 3 women
With Muslim survivors	2 men, 7 women

Participatory video

Participatory videography is a variation of the photo voice method. Photo voice is a process in which participants are asked to capture their personal perspective on a particular topic using photography, with the goal of identifying, representing and improving their community (Hurworth 2003). The photographs are later used as the basis for a critical discussion, either as part of a group workshop or a dialogue with decision-makers. Similarly, by enabling the research subjects to control the camera and storyline, participatory video can be a democratising and empowering method (Kindon 2003). It ultimately remains an unequal power relationship because the researcher decides which elements to accentuate and which elements to obscure in their analyses and research reports. Still, participatory video is perceived as an effective means of reaching and including the most powerless and increasing equitable outcomes, a useful tool for participatory research that works in both developing and developed countries, and a helpful means to enable communities to critically analyse their own realities and to explore the construction of meaning (Kindon 2003). It also has its drawbacks; for example, it requires a lot of time and commitment from everyone involved, there may be concerns about confidentiality, the relationship between the researcher and the participants can be negatively affected, and there is a high degree of selectivity in choosing a focus and deciding what is allowed to be filmed (Kindon 2003).

In my study, participatory video can be thought of as an intensive, long-duration, traveling (*in-situ*) interview coupled with a transect drive through the city. Seven participants created videos about the places significant to them during their post-Sendong migratory experiences.

Participants were given the choice of remaining anonymous or not in their video (via post-production film editing software to blur faces). They were also given the option of limiting which audiences could view their video: the research team, research participants, Philippine-based organisations, internationally-based organisations, etc.

My initial naïve plan to have research participants go out on their own to create videos – a method I had successfully used with participant photography for my master's research (Gibb 2007) – failed. Despite assurances that I would not hold participants responsible if the smartphones (i.e. cameras) I provided were damaged or stolen, nobody would take a phone. Moreover, the shooting locations were far apart from each other and would incur a significant

burden in terms of time and money. Finally, participants suggested that it would be better if Kuki and I were present to actually hold the camera and to remind them which issues to cover in their videos. Acquiescing to this third consideration meant forgoing the goal of a participant-controlled gaze. In hindsight, I am glad my initial plan failed because accompanying the participants throughout the video-making process provided excellent opportunities for non-participant observation, for probing certain issues, and for developing rapport with the participants. The informal conversations travelling between sites often yielded insightful comments that were not made explicit in the official interview or videos. The revised method also helped the participants to process and confront their experiences, and in the case of the group video-making, to selectively share their past with their new neighbours.

Several steps were involved in preparing for and carrying out the participatory video-making activity. One or more days before shooting each participant was interviewed. Kuki explained the objectives, process and very limited in-kind compensation of the video-making activity, and then asked the participant to prepare a list of locations where they wanted to shoot videos. I arranged transportation and refreshments, and made sure the video and GPS recording equipment were ready. Filming took place on two separate days. On the first day, the activity was done with one survivor who was then living at the Xavier Farm temporary relocation site. I hired her husband, a *motorela* driver, to take us to all the sites she wanted to include in her videos. That day, we used a smartphone as a video camera. The research team on this first day consisted of the woman survivor, her husband, their five year old son, Kuki, Ada and me. The second day of shooting was a very different experience because it was done with a cohort of survivors living together at the Xavier Ecoville temporary housing site. Kuki had borrowed a high quality camcorder from a film studies friend (see discussion on gatekeepers in the *Social networks* section of the chapter). I had hired a *jeepney* driver to drive us, and had purchased snacks through the Ecoville catering cooperative. The research team was larger this time: four adult women participants and two of their young children, two adult men participants, Kuki, the *jeepney* driver, Frank, Ada and me. Perhaps the best way to explain the dynamics, logistics and surprises of the group participatory video-making day is to reproduce an abridged version of my blog post based on the experience.

A FILM SHOOT

9:15 am – Arrival at Ecoville. There are no staff on-site, and no group of participants waiting (as per our arrangements). Uh oh. We head to the carinderia of one of the participants who has agreed to come out on today's activity. He helps gather the other participants, while I go collect and pay for the snacks I'd ordered from the Ecoville cooperative.

10:00 am – There's an air of excitement. Transport from Ecoville into the city is relatively expensive so it's a rare splurge for many of the Ecoville residents, particularly for those with no or sporadic employment. When Kuki explained the activity at a workshop last week, there was an enthusiastic response. It would be like a school trip - back to the sites of their old homes and the other places that had a significant impact on them in the months after Typhoon Sendong. It would also be an opportunity for them to learn more about their new neighbours and their pre-Sendong lives.

10:30 am – First stop is the Xavier Heights covered court. It's a few side streets off the national highway in barangay Balulang. A goat grazes at the edge of the property. A half-dozen boys play basketball in the covered court. We all dismount and tour the site. Kuki interviews one woman who lived here from December 2011 until February 2012. The army brought her here. We film on the spot where she and her family slept. On the walk out, a group of men stop Frank, and inquire about our activities. Upon hearing our interest in Typhoon Sendong, they offer an explanation on the root causes of the devastation: illegal logging, mining, unchecked development. Everyone, it seems, has an opinion on the calamity.

11:20 am – It's a harrowing ride through the backroads of Balulang down to Isla Puntod, the former home of two of the women. The road is used mostly by big trucks carrying crushed gravel from the river quarries. Much of the soil was carried away with the floodwaters, leaving only large boulders and giant potholes. The driver's grimace tells me he was not anticipating this kind of off-road driving when he quoted me his pakyaw price.

There used to be two bridges connecting Isla Puntod to the mainland, a hanging bridge for pedestrians and a cemented bridge for motors (motorbikes), quarry trucks and the multicabs that served as the main mode of public transportation here. The former bridge was completely washed out and has not been rebuilt. The latter is cracked and doesn't look like it could withstand another flood, but is still used. Looking at the river and the main Taguanao bridge upstream, it's easy to see that Isla Puntod would inevitably be flooded if the river level ever rose. There is no other place for the water to go. During Sendong, the water rose to within one metre of the bridge.

Yet, the lots on Isla Puntod were titled. There used to be plenty of houses. One woman moved here in 2003, paying a monthly mortgage of \$2.48 to eventually own the land. Her place was connected (legally) with electricity in 2008. She will not receive any reimbursement for the money she has paid for the lot. We film in front of her old house. She points to the site where a coconut tree once stood. When the water began rising (up to 25 feet), she and her husband climbed the tree to escape. The tree was knocked over by a barrage of uprooted trees. It was very dark so they kept shouting "where are you?" They crossed from one treetop to another, eventually making it to the safety of a neighbour's place several hundred metres away. Her family has rebuilt a house with locally-sourced materials. They return occasionally to harvest mangoes, papaya, kamote and other vegetables and root crops. It's very peaceful; the river air and breeze is welcome respite from the summer heat.

The only new structure on the Isla is on a quarry site. The building serves as an office. Quarrying activities continue unabated.

12:40 pm – The next stop is Isla Delta in barangay Consolacion. The young mother who used to live here talks rapidly. She calls cheerfully to former neighbours who seem happy to see her. She points out the spot where her amakan house once stood. It's just past a junk shop and adjacent to a small creek whose waters are more stagnant than flowing. The water is barely visible under a thick mass of bright green aquatic plants. The house was given to her from the Celebration Church. She lived at the house for 15 years.

A two minute walk away is her brother's house. She returns here on a regular basis to visit family; she sleeps here whenever she comes into the city. The house has a concrete foundation and amakan walls on the upper floor. He continues to stay here with his family, even though they have a bunkhouse (temporary shelter) in Ecoville. They will move permanently to Ecoville once the construction of the permanent houses is complete.

We continue walking and stop under the Marcos bridge. She came here on a daily basis to collect relief goods given by the Catholic Church and some non-governmental organisations. Across the dirt road is a giant billboard. On the night of 16-17 December 2011, her mother and cousin were carried by the flood waters and stranded in the struts of the billboard. Luckily, they survived.

We leave on a somber note. She points to a stretch of road where the bodies were laid out, brought there by members of the police and armed forces. In the days after the calamity, families gathered on the bridge and looked down, trying to identify loved ones.

1:15 pm – We drive past the pier and into barangay Macabalan. Most of the houses are constructed with light materials. It is densely populated, and lacking in trees and greenspace. It's an estuary barangay, located at the meeting of the Cagayan River and Macajalar Bay. Salty air wafts into the jeepney. It's a refreshing change from the diesel, charcoal and refuse stench in the downtown core. The roads are very narrow with deep gutters on either side. It is barely wide enough for the jeepney to pass. Our driver demonstrates his expert driving skills when he is forced to creep around a wake extending onto the street. Kuki explains that when someone dies, there is usually a wake in which family, friends and neighbours come to pay their respects and maybe share a shot of Tanduay rum. In poorer neighbourhoods, where most people have tiny houses with very limited space for accommodating visitors, these wakes extend onto the street. It is socially acceptable to appropriate public space for the duration of the wake.

We shoot a video looking out onto the river. The former resident explains that his house was built on a seawall and extended over the river. It was entirely washed out. All along the river side of the road are empty concrete house ruins and newly planted vegetable gardens. Children play in the abandoned houses. On the other side of the road is a thriving community - sari-sari shops, carinderias, residential homes, etc. No building is vacant.

Many of his former neighbours are waiting to be relocated to the Calaanan and Indabag relocation sites. Initially, no Macabalan residents were supposed to be given relocation housing, even though many of houses were washed out. The city's rationale was that nobody in the barangay died in Sendong. It took a very tragic incident for this position to change. One woman died by suicide in an evacuation centre; she had been denied relocation housing because she was a renter and not a homeowner, was too traumatised to return to her old place, and felt she had no alternative. The Catholic parish priest in Macabalan was afraid that his parishioners may follow suite, so he

lobbied the city on their behalf, advocating for relocation. He is credited with helping a lot of former and soon-to-be former Macabalan residents.

3:45 pm – We finally arrive back at Ecoville, exhausted. We do a final video in one of the bunkhouses, where the Macabalan man and his family now stay. It's small but cheery. A motorcycle helmet hangs on one wall. Bags of donated clothes and linens line one wall. He narrates his video in a mixture of English and Bisayan.

* * * *

The day is long, emotionally taxing and physically exhausting. And rich, revealing and rewarding. I will go back to Ecoville again next week to deliver copies of the video to each participant. Before the videos can be shared with others outside the research team, they need to be translated, edited, and, in some cases, altered to conceal the identity of the participant (Gibb 2013, 25 March).

At the end of each day of filming, Kuki and I debriefed the day's activities. I wrote copious notes, especially on the discussions in the *motorela* and *jeepney* travelling between locations. Later, Kuki translated and transcribed the content of each video; these transcriptions and the videos were included in the corpus of textual data that was analysed. Each of the seven participants received a DVD with all the videos from either the first or second day of filming.

Critical topographies and counter-maps

Understanding CDO's post-disaster landscape is a critical component of this research project; the research question posits an exploration of the "where" of post-disaster spaces, and the second research objective aims to map where survivors go in the short and medium term following a disaster. Because this research project also ascribes to feminist geography principles, the way in which I understand, produce, and use topographies and maps requires elaboration.

Feminist geographer Cindi Katz (2001, 1232) is well-known for employing topography as a critical research method that yields a "spatialized understanding of the problems." She explains:

To do a topography is to carry out a detailed examination of some part of the material world, defined at any scale from the body to the global, in order to understand its salient features and their mutual and broader relationships. Because they routinely incorporate both 'natural' and social features of a landscape, topographies embed a notion of process, of places made and nature produced. [...] [A] critical topography makes it possible to excavate the layers of process that produce particular places and to see their intersections with material social practices at other scales of analysis. Revealing the embeddedness of these practices in place and space in turn invites the vivid revelation of social and political difference and inequality. [...] [Critical t]opographies provide the ground – literally and figuratively – for developing a critique of the social relations sedimented into space and

for scrutinizing the material social practices at all geographic scales through which place is produced (Katz 2001, 1228-1229).

Inspired by the similarities she observed in the effects of globalisation on the social reproduction of the Howa in central eastern Sudan and the working class in New York City, Katz (2001) went a step beyond creating critical topographies to create counter-topographies. A counter-topography connects multiple critical topographies of vastly different places that are similarly affected by global processes (Katz 2001). A counter-topography approach “suggests tracing lines across places to show how they are connected by the same processes, and simultaneously embedding these processes within the specifics of fully contextualised, three-dimensional places” (Pratt and Yeoh 2003, 163). Because they are rooted in historical moments that at once eliminate possibility through social exclusion and mobilise opportunities through social movements and political struggles lived, counter-topographies can be used to connect people and ideas, to navigate political space, and to bridge theoretical and empirical work on marginalised populations (Mountz 2011). Counter-topographies can expose the intricate weaving of gendered state policies, cultural ideologies, familial obligations, transnational householding, and conflicting mobilities, among other aspects of the migration experience – a task that, as Piper (2006) contends, is urgently needed.

I aimed to create a critical topography of CDO’s post-disaster spaces, but not a counter-topography, which would entail comparative research with another vastly different site undergoing analogous processes. Like other scholars developing critical or counter topographies, my objective in using a critical topography approach was to destabilise dominant, naturalised knowledges, and social structures, and to expose the people and institutions who draw the lines and the ways in which they do it (Pratt 2004). In CDO, such an endeavour revealed the “spatialized understanding of the problems” in official post-disaster spaces (Katz 2001, 1232). In addition to producing a critical topography as a written analysis, I co-produced maps that illustrate salient features of this topography. The maps fall into De Sardan’s (1995, 25) data type of “devices of census” or the “systematic and intense process of observation and measurement.” These devices of census include the list of all the post-Sendong places deemed important to people (*emic* data), and the maps produced based on the interpretation of these data (*etic* data).

The maps produced in this research project are better characterised as counter-maps than conventional maps.

Maps are anything but banal or apolitical because mapping is an entry point for studying power, agency, identity, categorisation, lines of inclusion and exclusion, diversity and resistance (Rocheleau 1995, Mitchell 2002, Radcliffe 2010). Conventional maps are typically two-dimensional, produced by governments, privilege land use (Rocheleau 1995); they reflect the projects, identities and culture of dominant groups (Radcliffe 2010); and they are designed to abstract and summarise (Scott 1998). Maps simplify a complex world, transcribing only the aspects “that are of immediate interest to the mapmaker and ignore the rest” (Scott 1998, 87). As such, map-making is not a neutral process, but is instead a highly selective and political process in which the map-maker has the power to emphasise and exclude. In other words, “[e]very act of measurement [i]s an act marked by the play of power relations” (Scott 1998, 27). Maps are a useful tool for increasing the legibility of a place to outsiders.

As a substitute, feminist geographers produce alternative maps, ones that challenge conventional representations and attempt to engender more equitable power relations. These counter-maps depict interpretations of the world that subvert prevailing representations, distinguish among diverse understandings of resources, places and spaces, and acknowledge oppression and conflict (Rocheleau 1995, Kwan 2002). They are used throughout the research process as a starting point for discussion with research subjects, a basis for understanding the context, a venue for negotiating, a vocabulary, and a means for coding and quantifying data (Rocheleau 1995). The significance of a counter-map does not lie in its artistic appeal or accuracy, but rather in the rich commentary on the uses, values, access to and control over components of the landscape that is elicited in counter-map-making.

A valuable contribution of this research tool were the insights gleaned from the process of creating counter-maps. During both the survivor and key informant interviews respondents were asked about the places that were important to them after Sendong, and the reasons why. I compiled a list of all locations (including locations beyond the city limits), then collected GPS points for the CDO and city outskirts sites. Data points were collected using an application on a smartphone. I also photographed each location. For logistical, security and financial reasons, I

did not collect data for locations in other parts of Mindanao or in Luzon and the Visayas. Getting to each of sites underscored the difficulty, time and expense incurred in survivors' commutes, thereby providing insight into mobility, and the inclusive and exclusive nature of particular post-disaster spaces (Chapters 7 and 6, respectively). Some GPS data were collected during the participatory video-making activity. The process of actually visiting these sites opened opportunities for frank, personal, thoughtful conversations.

Although I set out alone for most of the GPS work, I did not always work unaccompanied. Because GPS work did not require translation assistance, I did it on days when Kuki had other engagements. Unlike the other more sedentary research activities, I felt GPS work would be unsafe for Ada because of all the different modes of transportation I used (e.g. *jeepney*, *motor*, *motorela*, *multicab*, transport truck, private car, taxi, *sikad*, construction vehicle, and running), and, furthermore, that her presence would slow me down. But I was rarely alone. When I arrived in an unfamiliar *barangay* with multiple sites to visit I would arrange a *pakyaw* deal with a *sikad* driver in which he³⁴ would take me everywhere on my list for an agreed-upon price. *Sikad* drivers were my preferred drivers because they frequently had an intimate knowledge of the area through living and working there for several to many years. Their geographic knowledge of the *barangay* enabled them to plan an efficient route. The small size of the *sikad* permitted us to travel down narrow paths that were inaccessible to larger vehicles, and the window height and low speed of the *sikad* allowed me to see more than I could sitting inside another type of vehicle. Most important, the *sikad* drivers often had personal experiences with Sendong and its aftermath. They were generous in recounting personal stories of their families and clients. On several occasions, they added stops, explained the significance of these places, and introduced me to Sendong survivors along the way. In retrospect I should have done *sikad* tours of Sendong-affected *barangays* at the beginning and not the end of my fieldwork because of the richness of these informal interviews.

Field notes

Studiously recording all field observations is critical for good case study research. Field-noting is important for recording and organising descriptions and accounts of the data, which will be analysed later (De Sardan 1995). Writing field notes is a creative, "sense-making process" that

³⁴ All the *sikad* drivers in CDO were male.

enables the researcher to recognise, manage and interpret positionalities (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 197). Heller, Christensen et al. (2011, 67) argue that it is important to write beyond field notes and to keep a field journal, which they describe as a “reflexive tool” that promotes fieldwork rigour and “better research.” The journals assist in data collection as an additional source of data, as a log recording changes in the research design and the rationale for these changes, as well as a decisional trail, and in reflexive engagement with issues including ethics, gatekeepers, positionality, power, reflexivity, rigour and subjectivity (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 80, 68).

During both the pre-fieldwork and main fieldwork seasons, I made shorthand jottings during all research activities throughout the day. For activities where it was not appropriate to take notes, I wrote my jottings and notes *a posteriori*. On the days when I worked with Kuki, we would review the day’s activities on the *jeepney* or *motorela* ride back into town or over lunch. I would make additional notes based on Kuki’s observations and insights. These debriefing sessions were important to openly discuss interview dynamics, and to clarify any erroneous assumptions. All of these jottings and reflections were then fleshed out into much longer and reflexive field notes that I typed up in the evening or during a day when no field visits were planned. As such, my completed field notes were a combination of De Sardan (1995) and Cloke, Cook et al. (2004) type field notes and Heller, Christensen et al.’s (2011) field journal. I purposefully thought and wrote reflexively about diverse facets of fieldwork and the blurring of the professional and the personal. These writings, together with the other forms of self-constructed data and pre-constructed data described in the previous pages, form the corpus of data used for interpretation.

Interpretation, or data analysis

In the *Theoretical positioning* section of the chapter I cited McDowell’s (1997, 393) description of research as “a mixture of hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance.” This description applies to data analysis, too. After defining data analysis as a process of interpretation, this section presents the hard slog, serendipitous coincidences and pure chance elements.

In the course of a research project data undergo two major processes: construction and interpretation. Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 4, *emphasis in original*) distinguish between the two processes: “a process of *construction* necessarily occurs as these data are extracted from the field through active research, ready for a further process of *interpretation* designed to ‘make sense’ of these data (to substitute their ‘rawness’ with a more finished quality).” Interpreting data entails re-

presenting or constructing geographical texts. It begins with “sifting and sorting” or the “filed work” that proceeds fieldwork and that is generally omitted from research reports because it feels like “an unglamorous almost clerical process” (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004, 217). Yet, this step is imperative for organising large amounts of data and identifying relationships among derived categories. This step, frequently called content analysis, is “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the context of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278).

The sifting and sorting began with transcribing 32.5 of hours of recorded interviews. I made notes during the transcription process, which informed my initial codes. From there, I did a careful reading of all self-constructed data (e.g. interview transcriptions, participatory video transcriptions and field notes) and pre-constructed data. The text data that were coded included: field notes, transcriptions of recorded interviews, interview notes, workshop notes, government documents, newspaper articles (print and online), NGO documents, government identification cards, relocation housing agreements contracts and organisational promotional material. I did a second reading to develop the “*in vivo*” or “*emic*” codes derived from terms in the text. To the text-generated codes I added my researcher-generated or “*etic*” code to ensure my coding would fit within the conceptual framework and answer the research question and objectives. In the third reading, the texts were coded according to both *emic* and *etic* codes. Based on this coding, codes were then further subdivided into sub-codes as well as grouped into broader categories. Links between codes and categories were identified, and the type of linking relationship examined. Finally, I did selective coding to refine the codes, sub-codes and categories, and to clarify how they were systematically related. Such a close reading of texts reflects an artisanal mode of understanding (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). Based on textual coding, I then set about explaining and understanding processes and mechanisms behind the environment migration provoked by Typhoon Sendong, in particular the creation of and governmental interventions carried out in post disaster spaces (Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

This type of coding is called open coding (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004) or conventional data analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). In conventional content analysis a study begins with observation (fieldwork), codes are defined during data analysis (not before), and codes are derived from the data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Conventional, as opposed to directed or summative, content

analysis is appropriate when a study aims to describe a phenomenon or when existing theory or literature on a phenomenon is lacking (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Its main advantage is that codes and categories emerge from the data themselves (i.e. the research participants) instead of from preconceived categories and theories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Its two main disadvantages are the risk of the researcher not fully understanding the context and thus failing to identify key categories and misrepresenting findings, and a limited ability to advance theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The former problem of internal validity or trustworthiness can be mitigated through data triangulation, peer debriefing and presenting preliminary results back to the research participants themselves (cf. Hsieh and Shannon 2005). As explained in earlier sections, all of these methods were used.

Counter-maps were produced by Marc Girard based on GPS data collected in the Philippines. The specific locations frequented by survivors were overlaid on political and topographical maps of the city. Data were used selectively on each map to conduct specific analyses. For example, to illustrate the relative remoteness of relocation sites Figure 6.2d in Chapter 6 depicts only data points of the relocation sites. As such, the counter-maps are suited for diverse analytical purposes. They show the propensity of vulnerable people to live in hazard prone areas (especially to flooding) that are near hubs of economic opportunities. They underscore how relations in space are affected by axes of difference such as gender, religion, class and ethnicity. They illustrate the mismatch between the official spaces where disaster relief is dispatched, and the spaces actually frequented by vulnerable survivors. They highlight the increasing distance of the living spaces of survivors from the social and economic hubs of CDO. The counter-maps, however, are imperfect reflections of the lived experiences of Sendong survivors. For example, the increased distance between pre-Sendong and post-Sendong housing and the city centre is apparent on the map, but the greater difficulty and time required to commute into the city for work, shopping, services, etc. is not. Counter-maps do not show the paucity of public transportation or the poor condition of roads.

Interpreting reflexively

Interpreting data necessarily entails writing. Indeed, the act of writing itself is a reflexive activity (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). Cloke, Cook et al. (2004, 336) explain that “writing is a form of representation (or indeed re-presentation) which helps to create, rather than simply reflect, our

geographical experience.” Representation is about producing knowledge and ways of seeing or conceiving the world. Representation is typically done using three distinct types of writing: expository, which seeks to analyse, understand, explain or argue; expressive, which seeks to express feelings; and narrative, which seeks to tell stories (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). In producing this research project, I used all three types of writing to achieve different objectives. For example, most of the chapters in this thesis are of the expository writing type – as per the requirements and objectives of a geography PhD. The results chapters are filled with narrative writing, key to explaining and understanding the how and why of post-disaster spaces. To better enact a feminist way of research and writing, which I strive for, I have included expressive writing in this dissertation. I have also explored expressive and narrative writing in my field notes and in a research blog. Because there is currently little published literature on the use of blogging as a research or self-reflexive tool, I indulge in a brief tangent on the subject.

Blogging about the research experience, and mixing it with observations about life in the Philippines, was my foray in translating the fieldworker experience into something my friends and family back in Canada could understand. Perhaps more than any other form of communication, blogs blur the lines between public and private, individual and group, and fact and fiction (Saka 2008). I deliberately wrote for a non-academic audience, striving to clearly interpret elements of the world of the field to others. Similar to my field notes, my blog was akin to the group journaling of Heller, Christensen et al. (2011); blogging was a form of public journaling, it was reflexive but carefully curated and timed. The blog forced me to conduct mini analyses of the research and quotidian life experiences and to explain them somewhat coherently. Indeed, research blogs motivate the author to narrate what would normally remain as fragmented in field notes (Saka 2008). Unlike other forms of scholarly writing, research blogs are typically written in short, emotive language with details limited only by “self-control” (Saka 2008, 7). In my case, this meant judicious editing of topics and details to avoid compromising the identity and safety of research participants and eliciting worry among family members. The blog also proved successful in obtaining timely feedback, usually via a personal email. Immediacy is characteristic of blogs: they are written in the present tense, by people actively engaged with the issue, and responded to by people almost immediately, thereby adding elements of participation and researcher accountability (Saka 2008, 1). Regularly publishing blog posts was easier in 2010 when I was unaccompanied than in 2012-2013 when Frank and Ada were with me. This discrepancy is largely

attributable to the amount of free time and how I filled it. Even though more than half of the posts were left unfinished and unpublished, the exercise of reflexively thinking through an issue has been helpful to data interpretation during and after fieldwork.

The “hard slog” part of data interpretation was mostly done indoors tapping away on my laptop – reading, coding, categorising, re-reading, re-coding, analysing, etc. The “serendipity and chance” parts, or what I consider the creative and insightful elements of interpretation, were done on the run. Literally. I would read, write, think, write, get frustrated, and then head out for a run. The run would focus my attention on my immediate surroundings – Filipino nannies pushing expensive strollers in Outremont, the Rocket’s boxy black tombstone in the Cote-des-Neiges cemetery, the colourful ice fishing huts on Lac des Deux Montagnes, the rhythmic drilling of pileated woodpeckers on insect-infested trees, the bitter winter wind mercilessly freezing exposed skin. Without exception, my mind would wander back to the Philippines and my writing. Without the visual cue of the laptop and self-imposed pressure to produce when sitting in front of a computer, I found it much easier to see connections and generate ideas. In writing *Girl Runner* novelist Carrie Snyder had a similar experience:

[R]unning had become, for me, kind of a meditation. It helps me formulate ideas but in a strange way, I would say. I don’t go out and start thinking about plot or character. Or I may go out thinking that I will think about it, and then discover that my mind completely empties out, which is kind of a meditative quality. My mind goes still, and then when I’m finished my run I’ll have an amazing idea (Snyder 2014).

Like Snyder, I have used running as a way to remain grounded throughout the processes of data construction and interpretation. Indeed, engaging in a favourite activity is highly recommended by early career human geographers as a way to reduce researcher fatigue (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). I would add that it can offer opportunities to think reflexively about the research process. One particular issue that preoccupied me during my runs in the Philippines were the dynamics of accompanied research.

An accompanied research project

This part of the chapter forms part of a general reflection on academia, and specifically on how to make academic life and family life work. Together. The issue is addressed in casual conversations among graduate students and their advisors, in side events hosted by career development offices at major conferences, and in a growing number of scholarly books like *Do*

babies matter? Gender and the ivory tower by Mary Ann Mason, Nicholar H. Wolfinger and Marc Goulden (2013). My own questions and ideas on academia-family balance began to crystallise during fieldwork, in that “leaky space” where personal and professional roles and relationships inevitably overlap (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 212). Perhaps this is because “successful fieldwork is [...] a peak life experience, a time of sensual bombardment with new stimuli, of incredible intellectual excitement, of self-discovery” (Oboler 1986, 50 in Cupples and Kindon 2003, 221). I include the following discussion on accompanied research for several reasons. It more truthfully reflects the actual processes of constructing research. It illustrates the manner in which relationships affect research dynamics and research spaces. It disputes the myth of the solitary unattached geographer immersing *himself* in a remote and difficult field site for extended periods of time. It helps to explain some of the epistemological and practical research decisions, and the limitations of this study.

Being accompanied in the field has epistemological and practical implications. It affects the choice of research topic, field site, research methods, and the timing of research activities (Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Frohlick 2002, Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). The gendered, classed, and ethnic positions attributed to a researcher are different depending on whether or not he or she is accompanied (Seiler Gilmore 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003, Cornet 2010, 2013). The identities and positions of the accompanying family members or members of the research team also matter in determining access to resources in the field and in shaping research outcomes (Flinn 1998, Turner 2010). Being accompanied permits “a form of mutual exploitation” in which researchers “retain the power to interpret other cultures in our writing but [...] we might simultaneously find that the identities constructed for us by our hosts are different from those we had imagined or planned for ourselves” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 223). Indeed, Cornet (2013, 96) suggests that the challenges of being an accompanied researcher “push reflexivity one step further,” and Flinn (1998, 18) writes that “fieldwork with family forces more honesty.”

The myth of the solitary unattached geographer

Despite a plethora of critiques, there is a persistent myth that legitimate research is produced by a solitary researcher who leaves his or her family and home community for months or even years to conduct ethnographic fieldwork under difficult conditions. Matthew Sparke (1996, 212 in

Frohlick 2002, 50 *emphasis in original*) describes the portrayal of geographical fieldwork as a “character-building rite of passage” in which the field is

cast as a seductive but wild place that must be observed, penetrated and mastered by the geographer who, having battled with it, reveled in it, and, in the end, triumphantly risen above it, returns to the academy his education complete, his stature assured and his geographical self proven, definitely, *his*.

Flinn (1998) criticises the persistent model of the lone male ethnographer, pointing to the colonial roots of the image popularised by Bronislaw Malinowski who argued that “proper conditions for ethnographic fieldwork [...] consist mainly in cutting oneself off from the company of other white men” (1961, in Flinn 1998, 6).

The dominant paradigm is profoundly gendered, erroneous and misleading. It is gendered in that presupposes the fieldworker is either unaccompanied or has a nonworking spouse to attend to personal matters (Linnekin 1998). It is erroneous in that most fieldworkers *are* accompanied, even if the presence of these family members, friends or colleagues is relegated to a brief acknowledgement (Flinn 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003). Writing people out of the research report is misleading because “the work that we do when with others is different from the work we do when alone” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 222). Being accompanied shapes and destabilises the positionality of the researcher, which, in turn, has implications for power relations and research outcomes (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009).

The dominant model perpetuates the myth that fieldwork is, or should be, a disembodied practice. Portraying research as disembodied erodes the gains that feminist geographers have made in contesting the masculinist depiction of the field (Frohlick 2002). Moreover, as the narratives of many accompanied researchers demonstrate, fieldwork is “an example of embodied entanglements that play out between our selves or subjectivities and our research sites, both before and while we are in the field” (Frohlick 2002, 50). Put another way, “since when are our children and spouses and friends not a part of our field sites in some manner, if only to complicate how we negotiate our research time and place?” (Frohlick 2002, 52). Presenting research as an embodied practice means crossing boundaries between the private and the public during fieldwork and writing stages, making visible the private aspects of fieldwork (Cornet 2013), not compartmentalising “our research selves and our selves” (Cupples and Kindon 2003,

223), and unmasking “the unevenness and serendipity” inherent to all field research (Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, 55).

Although all researchers do embodied research, few acknowledge it in their research reports. Frohlick (2002) affirms that publically admitting to having done accompanied research is still taboo, even when these personal relationships enhance our understanding of our research topic. Ethnographers have been reluctant to describe the blurring of the personal and the professional in fieldwork because “such revelations risk being constructed as nonscientific, subjective, and unprofessional” (Flinn 1998, 6). Linnekin (1998, 74) remarks that “in practice, details about family and other close relationships are still inadmissible in ‘straight’ scholarly writing; discussions about personal dramas and entanglements are acceptable, if they are compartmentalized in volumes specifically dedicated to the theme.” When young scholars do disclose personal field experiences, these accounts are usually published *after* establishing a reputation as a serious scholar (based on one’s discipline-based research) (cf. Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Friedl 1998, Sutton 1998, Frohlick 2002). Even when researchers want to integrate the theoretical and methodological implications of accompanied research into their entire writing, it can be difficult or even impossible; the resulting omission perpetuates the myth of unaccompanied research (Burns McGrath 1998).

In challenging the myth of the solitary, unattached geographer, which people should be written into research reports? Or, as Frohlick (2002, 53) more eloquently asks, “when opening up our methodological framework to include others, whose bodies count and what might they have to do with the spatiality of our sites?” The accompanying “bodies” who had the greatest impact on the scope, content and spatiality of this particular research were a host organisation, a host family, an interpreter, a husband, and a daughter. These accompanying bodies affected, albeit in different ways, what Cupples and Kindon (2003) contend are the two critical issues of accompanied fieldwork: dependence and access.

Social networks

Unlike in other countries where it can be extremely difficult and time-consuming to gain access to information or to obtain in-country research permits (cf. Cornet 2010, Heller, Christensen et al. 2011), conducting research in the Philippines is relatively easy. That is, if you can demonstrate your place in a locally-relevant social network. When a researcher can be ascribed a place within

locally-relevant social networks, she or he becomes less anomalous (Counts and Ayers Counts 1998, Thurston 1998). In my case, these networks connected me to a host family in Cagayan de Oro and to several Philippine host organisations.

Many of the interviews, both key informant and survivor interviews, began with me situating myself within a locally-relevant social network. I would explain who put me in touch with them, and the reasons why. This explanation would segue into a brief description of my research project, which would then be followed by the interview. The referral was almost always perceived as more important than demonstrating my affiliation with the Quezon City-based University of the Philippines-Diliman or producing the ethics approval certificate from the Université de Montréal. Even in government offices, I was never asked to produce official documentation, only to describe my social network. At the end of the interview, there were frequently additional questions about my place in a locally-relevant social network, usually about with whom I was living and where. Interviewees often recommended potential informants and insisted that I mention their name as the referral. Often, the interviewee would inform the other person(s) so that when I did follow up, the recommended person would say that they had been expecting me. Interviewing people who have learned about your research interests from others can be challenging and can shape the content and tone of the interview (cf. Cornet 2010). But, it can also facilitate access to certain people and information.

In many cases informants doubled as gatekeepers. Typically characterised as “authority figures with whom access has to be negotiated, or as obstacles to be overcome” (Mandel 2003 in Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 73), gatekeepers structure a researcher’s access to others, actively steering her toward people and organisations the gatekeepers judge as helpful or safe (Cloke, Cook et al. 2004). This description is rather pejorative. An alternative framing put forth by Heller, Christensen et al. (2011) better reflects my field experience of gatekeepers as facilitators. The authors describe gatekeepers as “persons who control and facilitate access to respondents, resources and knowledge, such as interpreters, social contacts and research participants themselves, who hold the ultimate power to allow or deny our [i.e. the researcher’s] work” (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 73). Here, resources can be logistical, human, institutional or informational. The term gatekeeper is usually reserved for persons within a community that enable a researcher to conduct research, where the term “within” refers to a specific geographic

location; they are *in-situ*. Illustrative of the porous field, some of the gatekeepers involved in my research project were *ex-situ*. At the beginning of each of the preliminary and main field seasons, for example, I relied upon “absentee gatekeepers” – people I had met in Montreal or Madison who facilitated my entry with contacts in the Philippines.

The most influential gatekeepers in my locally-relevant social network were my host family and host organisations. Somewhat serendipitously, my family and I ended up living in the compound of a generous middle-class Filipino family directly involved in my research topic. The family owned a construction and manpower company, which happened to be building permanent houses at various relocation sites. My status as an honorary family member meant I could use the air conditioned office, hitch rides into town or to construction sites on the flatbed truck or the company vehicle, and inquire about the structural (in the engineering sense) elements of relocation houses. The family invited me to observe business-related relocation housing meetings, arranged interview key personnel in the organisations with which they did business (e.g. Habitat for Humanity Philippines), and shared the practical challenges of building relocation houses. Additionally, the fact that our host family had five young boys, including a baby only two months older than Ada, made research in an unfamiliar environment relaxed and enjoyable. The boys’ pediatrician accepted Ada as a patient, assuaging parental health worries. Living with a Filipino family also gave Frank, Ada and me a routine in which we partook in many of their activities, such as attending Sunday Mass, celebrating birthdays and holidays, and weekend swimming parties at the Marcos Hotel pool. By associating ourselves with a middle-class Catholic family, commuting in their vehicles, and participating in typical middle-class activities in city spaces that exclude the majority of the city’s urban poor, we were positioned as affluent and connected to local power networks. The fact that we are also white foreigners further entrenched this positioning.

Officially, I was a Visiting Research Fellow with the Third World Studies Center based out of the University of the Philippines’ Diliman campus in Quezon City. This affiliation demonstrated the legitimacy of my research project because it provided me with a connection to a recognised Philippine educational institution. It was useful in introducing my research to Manila-based organisations and universities. In CDO, however, demonstrating a link to a local educational institution proved to be a more fruitful approach, particularly for the survivor interviews. I was

also able to draw on the connections I had established at national organisations based in Quezon City back in 2010; these contacts introduced me to local chapters and local partners of the national organisation during the 2012-2013 field season in CDO.

Interpreters

Researchers are dependent on others because they cannot speak a language or because they cannot directly access certain people. Although I hired a field assistant primarily because I am not fluent in Bisayan and needed help conducting survivor interviews, Kuki's role in the research project was much more significant than mere translation. Kuki was recommended to me by her sister, who was recommended to by researchers at the Third World Studies Center but was too busy studying for the bar exam to work as a full-time research assistant. The following paragraphs briefly reflect upon Kuki's positionality as a research assistant, and how her own concerns and constraints affected our fieldwork. This type of reflection is an underappreciated task that Sarah Turner (2010) contends can increase the rigour of fieldwork. This section also demonstrates Turner's (2010) assertion that research is conducted with, and not through, interpreters.

Just as research participants edit their revelations based on their reading of the primary researcher's positionality, they also respond to the positionality of other members of the research team (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Turner 2010, Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The way Kuki was seen by research participants, as revealed by her language skills, professional and educational experience, social network, and gendered and social positions, shaped the content of interviews and other components of the research process. She is well educated, middle-class, of Visayan descent in her late twenties. She is fluent in Bisayan and English, speaks excellent Tagalog (but preferred to speak in English with non-Bisayan speaking Filipinos, a trait common among Filipinos of Visayan descent), a bit of French and almost no Maranao. She has extensive experience working with foreign researchers, including a former master's student of one of my advisors. Her experience with Western researchers, our pre-interview preparation, and regular debriefing sessions were helpful in ensuring she understood the specific types of information I sought in each fieldwork activity and my expectations of her.

Kuki's religious affiliation, family situation, advanced educational attainment, and middle-class standing set her apart from almost all of the people we interviewed. Unlike most Filipinos she is atheist, but does not bring it up unless asked directly. Many informants assumed that, as a Filipina

not wearing any overtly religious attire such as a hijab, she was Catholic. In contrast, interviewees frequently inquired about my religious beliefs. Unlike most Filipinos, her parents – both successful lawyers – are divorced. Her entire family is politically active, albeit outside of official politics; they focus on advocacy, including promoting the rights of survivors, especially the urban poor, in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong.

Kuki's familiarity with the city, excellent sense of humour and ability to quickly put people at ease enabled her to quickly build rapport with interviewees and encourage them to open up. She had grown up in CDO, was proud of her Visayan roots, and had extensive ties with people in the city, including highly visible and vocal advocates. As a result of her social networks, she facilitated access to key informants and drew upon her family's connections to arrange interviews within a few days with people I had been trying to interview for months. In this way, Kuki, like others in my social networks (and also in the experience of Heller, Christensen et al. 2011), acted as a facilitating gatekeeper. Her personal history in CDO and the fact that some of her relatives died during Typhoon Sendong motivated her to better understand the disaster.

When a researcher begins fieldwork in a new place, he or she frequently assumes “the role of naïve idiot” (Robson 1997, 47 in Turner 2010, 211). A researcher's ignorance can lead to social *faux-pas* and misleading research results. To overcome such problems, interpreters and field assistants are frequently called upon to be cultural consultants, cultural brokers, analysts and translators (Turner 2010), or “gatekeepers of meaning” (Heller, Christensen et al. 2011, 7). Kuki was no exception. In addition to linguistic translation, she translated between the systems of meanings of the academic research world and the systems of meanings in CDO *barangays*, or what De Sardan (1995, 14) describes as “semiotics translation.” She acted as a cultural broker, a role that ensured the research proceeded smoothly, through careful negotiations and social positioning not immediately apparent to Western researchers (Turner 2010). For example, I dictated the research topic, the overarching questions and follow-up questions inspired by informant revelations, but it was Kuki who guided the survivor interviews and focus group discussions. She steered the conversation as she saw fit, and chose when and how much to translate. While often a frustrating experience for me, this system kept the interviews to a manageable length, yielded the data I required, and left us with the opportunity to discuss the interview at length later. The translation also enabled Kuki to translate potentially sensitive

questions into clearer and softer language. Inevitably, her personal values, beliefs and preconceptions influenced the way she saw and translated field experiences, which, in turn, shape my interpretation of the data (cf. Cornet 2010, Turner 2010).

The language barrier prevented me from conducting survivor interviews alone. Thus, my survivor interview schedule was almost entirely dependent on Kuki's availability, which became increasingly constrained near the end of the fieldwork. She had begun chef school, and so the interview schedule was arranged to accommodate her classes. This situation illustrates Turner's (2010) finding that research assistants consider assisting foreign researchers as a short-term job and one they would gladly exchange for something else. Most of the time when Kuki was unavailable, I visited field sites alone to do non-participant observation, or I conducted key informant interviews. Occasionally I worked with another translator, an older man recommended to me by a local organisation.

The Frank and Ada effect

Being a parent affects all stages of the research process from conceptualising the project, to entering the field and gaining access to participants, to writing up the results (Flinn 1998, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, Johnston 2015). Personal, methodological and theoretical issues are all at stake in accompanied research because a researcher's family situation in the field shapes behaviour, influences research relationships, affects access to information, informs interpretations and attitudes, constrains mobility, imposes practical and logistical constraints, and thwarts attempts at impression management (Flinn 1998, Linnekin 1998, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, Cornet 2013). Just like life at home, life with children is different from life without them; you go different places, you talk to different people and you proceed at a slower pace (Johnston 2015). This section depicts fieldwork as an embodied process influenced by the involvement of my husband Frank and our daughter Ada.

The decision to bring children into the field or not reflects a researcher's own cultural interpretations and expectations of "family" and "parenthood" (Flinn 1998, Sutton 1998, Shea *in press*). Bringing children along assuages a socialised gendered mother's guilt about leaving her children for extended periods of time while she indulges her own "ambitious research sights/sites" (Frohlick 2002, 50, Cupples and Kindon 2003). It remedies the problem of a lack of childcare options (Cupples and Kindon 2003, Cornet 2013). It is based on the researcher's belief

that his or her children and partner will benefit from the experience (Burns McGrath 1998, Seiler Gilmore 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003). For me, the decision to bring a three-and-a-half month old baby into the field was easy. I wanted to pursue PhD research in the Philippines, and was confident that none of us would be in any serious harm. Going as family was professionally and financially feasible because the Quebec government's parental insurance program enabled Frank to take seven months of paid parental leave and resume his job upon return.³⁵ We expected Ada to continue nursing and have limited mobility for the duration of the fieldwork, so it would be relatively easy to feed and entertain her, to travel with her and to control her exposure to harmful substances. Finally, Frank and I believed that the experience would enrich our lives. It was not a question of if my family would accompany me, but a question of how to make it work.

Pre-departure

Ada's presence modified the study site selection criteria. This change to the research plan was only one of many pre-departure adjustments and preparatory activities. Like Ingrid Johnston (2015) who brought her children and husband with her to Fiji while she carried out doctoral research, I treated accompanied fieldwork with a baby as requiring greater preparation than solo fieldwork. In addition to health and safety measures, pre-departure preparation involved planning for regular communication with family back in Canada; for instance, installing Skype and Dropbox on Frank and my parents' computers and teaching them how to use the programs. With the immediacy of the internet, and the possibility of live video chats, we did not face what previous generations of overseas researchers faced in terms of the difficulty in maintaining regular and meaningful conversations with loved ones at home (cf. Gallagher Goodenough 1998).

Another critical preparatory activity was negotiating parental leave with Frank's employer. Although both parents are eligible for paid parental leave (RQAP 2015), and most eligible Quebec fathers take some paternity and/or parental leave (e.g. 78% took 7 weeks of leave in 2011, Tremblay 2012), it is still unusual for the father to take extended leave because he fears it will be perceived negatively by supervisors, colleagues and clients (Rehel 2014). Moreover, Frank

³⁵ There are two variants of the Quebec parental insurance plan: the basic plan (longer leave with lower benefits) and the special plan (shorter leave with higher benefits) (RQAP 2015). We opted for the basic parental plan. Without parental leave, it is unlikely that Frank could have joined me in the Philippines.

works in a male-dominated industry in which new fathers do not take extended leave and for an employer based in a Canadian province with five days of paternity leave. The timing of Frank's parental leave and Ada's pre-departure vaccinations dictated clear start and end dates for fieldwork.

Breaking the ice

Like other graduate student-parents, I intended to, and did, bring Ada with me on a variety of fieldwork activities (cf. Young Leslie 1998, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). In her research proposal Heather Young Leslie (1998, 48) described "using my [18-month old] daughter as a passport to the women in the village." Other parent-researchers have similarly recognised the potential for their children to break the ice with their host community, and actively "used" their children for this purpose (Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Johnston 2015). I had hoped that having a baby would help Filipinos see me not only as a privileged, white, Canadian woman researcher, but also as a mother. And it worked. Men, women and children frequently announced that the "Americano baby" looked like a "doll" or "Barbie" with her blond hair and blue eyes – just like in the movies of the former American colonial rulers. Ada piqued people's curiosity, and helped to create a relaxed, informal conversational environment. Cornet (2010, 145) recounts a very similar experience in China where "many women were curious to meet my daughter with her blond hair and blue eyes. These encounters generated numerous informal conversations and chances to interact." Through interacting as a mother with local mothers, Cornet (2010), (2013) revealed her value system and a willingness to understand theirs, and slowly built rapport. The conversations "provided peripheral, serendipitous knowledge that contributed to explanations of issues more directly related to my research question" (Cornet 2013, 93). In this way, the children of parent-fieldworkers can accelerate the process of building rapport with community members who are also informants, and of gaining access to information and people (Counts and Ayers Counts 1998, Johnston 2015). Mose Brown and de Casanova (2009) further clarify how motherhood affects access: it can provide a different type of access to participants, or it can provide access to a different set of participants.

Shattering attempts at impression management

Parent-fieldworkers have commented about the ability of children to facilitate more egalitarian relationships with research participants because children humanise the researcher (Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003, Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, Cornet

2010, 2013, Johnston 2015). When accompanied, hosts have the opportunity to study researchers interacting with members of their own culture and to ask that researchers account for these interactions. Put another way, accompanied researchers are “observers observed” (Cupples and Kindon 2003, 211) who “are simultaneously looking both ways through the looking glass” (Seiler Gilmore 1998, 35). Bringing children into an unfamiliar environment humbles the parent-researcher, unravelling the myth of a powerful, unattached fieldworker who “is more rational and objective than the people under study” (Linnekin 1998, 73, Cornet 2013). The host community observes the researcher’s professional and personal performances, including the scenes the researcher would prefer to hide. As such, family members, especially children, render impression management almost impossible (Linnekin 1998).

It is not uncommon for parent-fieldworkers to publically display behaviour or critical judgments that are normally kept private, especially when they feel the well-being of their child is threatened (Flinn, Marshall and Armstrong 1998). For me, one particular incident stands out. It happened during a values formation graduation ceremony at the Xavier Ecoville relocation site. Normally I had no problem letting people hold and play with Ada. Like Cornet (2010, 2013) and Johnston (2015), I felt that sharing my daughter revealed my vulnerability and demonstrated my trust in my informants. But, when my nine month old was returned to me sucking on a yellow lollipop – which I saw as a choking hazard and an unhealthy sugary treat she was not supposed to have until she was at least a year old – I was upset. I removed the candy from her mouth, tried to discretely step on it, and then said I would give Ada some milk. My research assistant Kuki was not around to politely explain my overreaction and smooth things over. The woman who had given her the candy would have had to spend some of her very limited money to successfully appease my crying baby, and I had just stomped on her efforts – literally. In this incident I was clearly not an objective, distant observer but very much an emotional and embodied researcher-parent, showing her guilt, fear, anger and fatigue. Embarrassing cases like this, when researchers lose control and thus violate cultural norms about appropriate behaviour, can shatter attempts at impression management, alter field relationships, and positively or negatively affect the research process (Burns McGrath 1998, Linnekin 1998, Cornet 2013).

Cultural relativism

The lollipop incident illustrates two other issues that accompanied researchers frequently wrestle with: the construction of culture and the limits of cultural relativism. Jeanne Shea (*in press*, 11-12)

explains how culturally-based ideas became apparent to her when she brought her daughter along -for her fieldwork in China:

[N]o one person or family can be representative of all people or families in one culture [...] but what all persons or families within a culture do is to reflect and to cobble together some aspects of the contested *mélange* which is their culture. [...] Rather we are both active cultural agents influenced by our surrounding cultures in particular ways based on our social positioning and the idiosyncrasies of our personal and family histories.

David Sutton (1998) arrived at a similar conclusion after reflexively engaging with his experiences as a parent-anthropologist and contrasting them with available academic literature on the fieldwork experiences of other North American and European parent-researchers – people with whom he shared a similar social and cultural position (e.g. middle class, professional, left-leaning intellectuals) but who also held very different ideas about parenting. This realisation provided him with an embodied understanding of culture as something that is not shared by all members and is instead “refracted through unequal relations of class, race, gender, age, etc.” (Sutton 1998, 135). It also offered a cautionary note in interpreting research data: differing responses to our personal ways of doing things is frequently dismissed as “narrow-mindedness” when done by people in our culture, whereas the exact same response is considered a “cultural difference” in another culture (Sutton 1998, 135).

Cultural relativism is not the opposite of ethnocentrism, but rather “the respect for and valuation of other forms of practice, including other systems of organization and prioritization” (Young Leslie 1998, 45). Aspiring ethnographers are taught to employ cultural relativism as a research tool in which they temporarily suspend their own cultural views and practices during their fieldwork to better grasp local explanations for everyday practices of the community under study (Sutton 1998, Shea *in press*). Relativism is a comfortable position because it permits researchers to observe and record other people’s actions without addressing pesky and potentially distracting ideas of right and wrong until some later point in the future (Burns McGrath 1998). The practice of cultural relativism, also called “methodological relativism” or “pragmatic relativism,” is much easier if a researcher’s own ideologies, practices and symbolisations are not threatened (Young Leslie 1998), and if the associated risks apply to the researcher and not to his or her children (Sutton 1998, Cornet 2013). Children make it hard to compromise between short-term professional methodological practice and diplomacy with hosts on the one side, and personal

beliefs about what is best for one's children and long-term personal family expectations on the other (Sutton 1998, Young Leslie 1998, Cornet 2013, Shea *in press*). While parent-fieldworkers are often rationally aware of "native" child-rearing practices (and would accept them anthropologically), they are unwilling to apply them to their own children (Friedl 1998, Sutton 1998, Cornet 2010, 2013). Our public child-rearing practices demonstrate to our research participants the boundaries of our cultural relativism, which, in turn, reduce our capacity for impression management, require us to be more honest, and make us aware of how our own culture shapes our behaviour.

Recognising fieldwork as an embodied practice

To illustrate how Ada highlighted that fieldwork is necessarily an embodied practice, I recount how nursing shaped data construction. Recall that my research topic does not cover breastfeeding (nor parenting nor children, except indirectly), yet this very intimate practice became an integral part of my interactions in CDO and indirectly helped with research insights.

From the perspective of my informants and the broader host community, two highly visible parts of my positionality were seemingly at odds with each other. I was a white foreign mother and I was a nursing mother. I was told repeatedly that Filipinos did not think white mothers breastfed their babies; in Hollywood movies and American TV shows women bottle feed. By nursing my daughter, I was reflecting and cobbling together child-rearing practices that did not fit with my hosts' understanding of my culture. Like Sheila Seiler Gilmore (1998, 42) who found herself explaining that, unlike the American television series broadcast on local channels at her field site in French Polynesia, "not all Americans devote their time to extramarital intrigue, cocktail parties, and crime," I found myself explaining media distortions about parenting practices "back home." The topic of nursing and related childcare topics provided an opening for people to freely

dispense parenting advice and opinions on traditional practices such as *usog*³⁶ and the consumption of *malunggay* to improve milk production.³⁷

When Ada accompanied me for data construction activities, she was a focal point for starting the conversation. People inquired about her sex and age, and if and where she was baptised. Once they learned that I was breastfeeding, the conversation would frequently turn to nursing: who nurses, who doesn't, and why? Shortly thereafter, we would segue into a broader discussion of class, government programs (or lack thereof, or lack of implementation), parental, maternity and paternity leave, or the reasons why people have children. From there, the interview would transition into more research topic-focused questions. Such opening exchanges were more common with women informants, but also transpired with men informants.

While several mothers have mentioned nursing as a practical consideration during their accompanied research (cf. Linnekin 1998, Young Leslie 1998), it is Frohlick (2002) who best articulated its potential for generating research insights. She explained that nursing emphasised the “embodied presence of her children and all their bodily needs,” especially her breastfeeding baby, whose “body unwittingly became the locus of much of the dialogue and many of the social relations through which my understanding of the spatiality of the mountaineering encampment unfolded” (Frohlick 2002, 54). As a nursing mom in the Philippines, I was very much attuned to young babies and breastfeeding mothers during my fieldwork. This attention coincided with my research topic after Super-typhoon Pablo hit Mindanao on 3 December 2012 and a young mother in CDO decided to help the orphaned babies by organising a “milk letting” drive at the city’s trendiest, most exclusive mall. The event, together with the conversations about nursing, shaped my broader understanding about class-specific practices and where they occur. The following blog post comments on how class is intertwined with the very bodily practice of

³⁶ *Usog* is a Tagalog word, but the practice is widespread throughout the Philippines. It involves a parent or well-meaning adult licking their finger then putting it on a baby’s forehead. *Usog* is thought to prevent illness. If you ask people to refrain – *pero usog* – and the baby gets sick afterwards, the adult who wanted to do it will feel badly.

³⁷ The *malunggay* tree (*Moringa oleifera*) is indigenous species widespread in the Philippines. Its leaves are used in many soups and as a traditional medicine. In recent years, it has been refined into gels, tablets other health food products.

breastfeeding and the separation of spaces accessed and used by the urban poor and the middle class.

LIQUID GOLD

After Typhoon Pablo, there's an outpouring of support to the affected areas. Donations range from noodles, water and canned sardines to blankets, clothes, cash and medicines. And chain saws - to cut all the felled trees so that the lumber can be sold or used for rebuilding.

A young twenty-something mother and a few of her friends opt to collect another sort of relief good. These first-time mothers created an awareness and advocacy group in November to educate themselves and others about baby-wearing, cloth diapers (the enthusiasm of middle class mothers for porte-bébés and couches lavables in la belle province has not yet spread throughout the Philippines), breastfeeding and related baby matters. A natural extension of their education project is a milk letting drive.

At a milk letting drive, nursing mothers pump and donate breast milk. The set-up is similar to a blood drive: preliminary medical screening, semi-private areas for mothers to pump milk, medical professionals who seal the collected milk in sterile milk bags, post-donation water or juice for donors. The intended recipients for this particular milk letting drive are the orphans of Typhoon Pablo in the eastern parts of Mindanao.

The group's founder is Nadine. She's a confident, poised and educated woman. When she talks about breastfeeding, her face lights up and her voice becomes animated, drawing in the listener. She wants to pursue her passion as a professional lactation consultant. Unfortunately, there are no such certification options available locally in CDO.

Three days after Pablo struck the Philippines, Nadine contacted the management at the Ayala Centrio Mall, the newest and trendiest of CDO's malls. They were receptive to the idea of allocating some space for the collection of this 'liquid gold for Typhoon Pablo orphans' and agreed to waive the usual exhibitor rental fee. The group is still responsible for paying for security and janitorial services.

Convincing middle class mothers at the mall to pump and donate a few ounces of breast milk is an arduous task. Nadine explains that breastfeeding is not strongly encouraged at the hospitals. Moreover, the prevalent attitude is that, for those families who can afford it, commercial formula is a desirable and maybe even preferable baby food choice. Of the nursing mothers she encounters at the mall, many decline to donate for fear they won't have enough milk for their babies.

It's a different story among women whom Nadine refers to as "marginalised." These women breastfeed. They don't need to be convinced of the benefits of nursing for mother and child. They nurse out of necessity. They nurse at home, at work, on jeepneys and non-Air Con buses, in churches, in carinderias (small cafeteria style eateries), in covered courts, in barangay halls, in wet and dry markets, outside roadside shops. But these women aren't at the mall.

At the end of the three day milk letting drive, Pay it forward CDO has netted just over three litres of milk and has raised an immeasurable amount of awareness. Given the limited number of eligible donors, the mall crowd's reticence to nurse and donate milk, and the minimal amount of event promotion, this is a remarkable achievement.

A laudable goal and effort by a caring group of young middle class mothers. Still, I can't help but wonder what results would a milk letting drive located outside of the mall, in a locale frequented by marginalised women, in a sitio devastated by last year's Typhoon Sendong, have yielded (Gibb 2012, 30 December)?

Children are not in a position to make informed consent (Burns McGrath 1998). As a baby, Ada clearly had no choice in doing accompanied fieldwork. She did not consent to being “instrumentalised” for the purposes of breaking the ice with community members, gaining rapport, improving access to research resources, and developing more egalitarian relationships with research participants. Nonetheless, her selective presence during various fieldwork activities was beneficial. And her selective absences, similarly critical to fieldwork activities, were made possible by another member of the accompanied research team.

Frank's roles

Frank assumed the full-time role of househusband, a role not uncommon in the Philippines, which focused on childcare, cooking, cleaning, communicating regularly with family in Canada and planning short family vacations. Most of these tasks took much longer than comparable tasks in Canada; for example, Ada's bath water had to be boiled to kill pathogens an infant might inadvertently swallow, her cloth diapers had to hand-washed, and a lengthy commute using multiple modes of transportation was required to buy groceries and drinking water at various wet and dry markets and supermarkets. And then there was the thankless, ongoing challenge of ridding the house and kitchen of fire ants, giant cockroaches and mice. Like other new North American fathers who naïvely thought paternity leave would grant them ample time to pursue personal hobbies (Rehel 2014), Frank's goal of eliminating his “pile of shame” (video games purchased but unplayed) in the Philippines remained unachieved. He did not want to be a full-time research assistant, but he did consent to a part-time fieldworker role which included “tech guru,” GPS data collection research assistant, and on-site “*yaya*” (nanny) for some research activities. His professional background in engineering and his personal interest in technology proved helpful in understanding context issues indirectly related to the research (e.g. how power plants work), ensuring multiple and regular data back-ups, and fixing broken technical equipment. In the course of his everyday interactions with people, he identified research leads and introduced me to key informants. As househusband, *yaya* and part-time fieldworker, Frank played a pivotal

part in ensuring our accompanied field season together went smoothly. Frank's hybrid role is perhaps best illustrated in the blog post below.

THE PRESENTATION

One of my key informants at Ateneo de Manila University kindly invited me to present a paper as part of their social sciences guest lecture series. I jumped at the opportunity. But it didn't unfold exactly as planned.

The lecture was set for Friday January 25 at 4:30 pm. As luck would have it, Frank received a text message from the MSI service center earlier that week, informing him that the long-awaited hard drive for our beleaguered laptop was finally ready for pick-up. We were in Manila for only a few days; Friday was the only available day for pick-up. Because the trek to the MSI office entails a short stint on the body-crushing MRT (Metro Rail Transit), bringing Ada was not an option. So Ada spent the day with me.

Shortly before the scheduled start time I asked a fellow student if he'd hold the baby during the presentation. He replied that it would be his pleasure. As the lecture hall filled up, Ada started to fuss. She was getting into one of those moods, the one in which she refuses to be held by anyone except mom and papa. I sent a frantic text to Frank.

When I was introduced, the remarks included the usual info - name, degrees, country of origin, research interests, etc. The remarks also included some commentary about changing gender relations (in which the father takes time off work to care for the children), work-life balance, parental leave in Quebec, and conducting research with a baby.

I walked up to the podium, notes in one hand, baby in the other. I don't remember much about the words alternately flowing and stumbling from my lips. I do remember bouncing my daughter up and down on my hip, listening to her babble into the microphone, watching her make eyes at the audience. I remember feeling mortified and guilty; the guilt comes from wondering whether or not I am exerting white privilege by bringing my baby to work and expecting others to ignore the inconvenience. I remember stealing frequent glances at the door, willing Frank to enter the room.

A half hour later he does. Waltzes down the stairs to the podium, picks up the baby and exits the room.

Despite (or perhaps because of) the distraction of my co-presenter, the lecture was well-received. I am very grateful that everyone I have met here in the Philippines, without exception, has been extremely understanding and receptive to accommodating a baby. Even when it entails listening to a lecture delivered (in part) by a seven-and-a-half month old (Gibb 2013, 12 February).

Not all it's cracked up to be

While I've painted a mostly rosy image of my field experiences with Frank and Ada, this section ends with a cautionary note about overemphasising the purported impacts of accompanied research with family members. Researchers unaccompanied by their family members also experience ethical dilemmas, researcher fatigue and power relations, and they also develop rapport and relationships with their research subjects (cf. Heller, Christensen et al. 2011). The

benefits of shared experiences and hardships with a loved one from home are counter-balanced, for example, by the extra burdens of finding personal space and caring for other people, and the potential to minimise the time spent learning local languages and cultural practices (Cupples and Kindon 2003). Moreover, research subjects respond positively to solo researchers; Cupples, for example, recalls an informant who thanked her for being prepared to spend time away from her children to find out about women's lives (Cupples and Kindon 2003). In a country with high levels of internal and international migration, where it is relatively common for spouses to reside in different provinces, many of participants would likely have responded in a similar way to an unaccompanied researcher.

Overstating motherhood as a shared identity with research subjects is similarly misleading. Bringing Ada to interviews and other research activities made my motherhood "concrete," as opposed to a "symbolic or abstract motherhood" in which the researcher's child is not in the field (Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009, 49). But my recognisable position as a mother did not eliminate my identity as a cultural "other." While the presence of her daughter repositioned her from "a scholar linked with the authorities" to "a mother far from home, caring for her child," Cornet (2010, 145) acknowledges she never became (and will never become) an "insider." Graduate student parent-fieldworkers are often seen as having a privileged position relative to the people they study. They are foreigners who have more education and money than the research participants (Cornet 2013), and parents who have the luxury of being full-time students (Mose Brown and de Casanova 2009). The disparate living conditions of researchers and participants belie a claim of a shared experience of motherhood. Accompanied research with a family has its constraints, upon which other research limitations can be added.

Limitations

Given the time, spatial, human and financial constraints of doctoral research and the specific conditions in the field, this research project is necessarily limited. There were language and cultural barriers, especially at the *barangay* level. Important nuances were likely lost in translation. Despite studying Tagalog for one semester, my language skills were insufficient to carry out in-depth interviews. Moreover, Bisayan, and not Tagalog, was the primary language spoken by many CDO residents. Most Muslim participants spoke Maranao as a first language, and had to express themselves in their second language (Bisayan) or with the help of two translators. Working with

an interpreter helped reduce the language and cultural barrier, as did the use of triangulated data, in particular the participatory video-making. While participatory methods are often portrayed by supporters as empowering, inclusive and effective for conducting research in a second language, they have generated an equally large body of critics who dismiss participatory research as overly time-consuming, potentially exploitative and non-analytical (Cornwall 2003, Kindon 2003, Lennie, Hatcher and Morgan 2003). Moreover, focus group discussion and other group-based methods can re-inscribe positionality-based power hierarchies among the research participants (Esim 1997). By working with Filipino researchers and personally engaging in reflexivity throughout the research process I tried to minimise the limitations of participatory methods. Another constraint pertains to mobility and the fact that I could not track survivors who could not be traced through government, humanitarian aid agency and other public records, and those who had severed all of their ties with the study site. Thus, their experiences are omitted from the study.

Another set of limitations was precipitated by the family element of accompanied research. An anthropologist couple who collectively conducted over 30 years of accompanied research with their children cheekily described the drawbacks of bringing children into the field: “[t]hey get sick, they insist upon eating regularly, and – being children – they consume parental time and energy” (Counts and Ayers Counts 1998, 143). Indeed, satisfying Ada’s needs and keeping her healthy, and attending to family responsibilities more generally, made me less efficient in the field. Field activities with Ada were carefully scheduled; for example, I avoided *jeepney* rides during the hottest and most polluted times of the day, and I timed interviews between nursing sessions and diaper changes. As compared to previous fieldwork I had done without my family, I had less flexibility to just hang out after the official research activities, to add last-minute overnight site visits, or to participate in somewhat risky participant observation activities such as white water rafting on the Cagayan River. During Super-typhoon Pablo, we went to a hotel; had I been alone I would have gone to an evacuation camp to observe firsthand the experience of living temporarily in an official post-disaster sleeping space. Put another way, Frank and I felt that to protect Ada we needed to constrain our mobility.

I also tried instituting a no-work-on-weekends rule and a regular after-dinner routine which consisted of reading bedtime stories, then pumping milk, typing up field notes and perhaps

sending a quick email. I was generally too tired to go out again to collect data in the evenings, which is why I did not pursue some potentially interesting research angles on the impacts of Sendong on vulnerable groups such as sex workers who were most accessible at night. Similar to the experiences of other parent-fieldworkers (cf. Linnekin 1998, Cupples and Kindon 2003) and, unlike my previous field seasons without a husband and baby, I found that I was too tired to regularly engage reflexively on field experiences beyond writing field notes and blog posts. In spite of the limitations brought about by the constant navigation between fieldwork and family life, the constraints of doctoral research, and the specific conditions in the field, the methodology enabled the construction of a richly textured data set.

Conclusion

This methodological chapter has justified the research design, and clearly explained how I went about finding answers to, and analysing, the overarching research question and specific research objectives. I deliberately wrote my family into the chapter to depict the research project as an embodied process intertwining the professional and the personal. The results of these data construction and interpretation processes are presented in the next three chapters.

Chapter 5. Who are the vulnerable survivors?

Introduction

Vulnerability is not natural. Instead, it is a function of economic, political, social and cultural elements that form societal structures, which necessarily interact with biological, geological, hydrological, geographical – or more broadly “environmental” – factors (cf. Walker 2005, 2006, 2007). This chapter delves into vulnerability in Cagayan de Oro, in the context of the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. The goal of this discussion is to elucidate who exactly are the vulnerable survivors of the disaster. Understanding vulnerability is important because a natural hazard only progresses into a disaster if normal conditions are disrupted, people are affected, and the capacity of the local community to cope exceeded. In other words, if there were no vulnerable people in CDO, then Typhoon Sendong would not have been a disaster. It would have merely been a tropical storm.

The findings in this chapter are based on a conventional content analysis. The *Defining vulnerability* part of the chapter draws primarily on key informant interviews conducted in 2010, 2012 and 2013, disaster-themed conferences in the Philippines that I attended in 2010, and a review of disaster-themed Philippine government and NGO documents. These data sources reflect the positions of trustees who are in a position to create and implement targeted post-disaster interventions. The *A continuum of vulnerability* section is heavily informed by survivor interviews, focus group discussions, CDO-based key informant interviews, and my field notes. These data sources point to the missing or misleading elements of prevailing definitions of vulnerability. The final section, *Vulnerability discourses*, draws on all the aforementioned sources, as well as on the participatory video-making and reports on the post-Sendong rescue, relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts of government agencies, international humanitarian aid organisations, and religious trustees. When analysing these data, I paid particular attention to the use of language and the discrepancies between the claims made by trustees and the perceived impacts of their interventions by survivors and by other trustees.

Before analysing the CDO case, the chapter presents the relationship between vulnerability and disaster as set out in the political ecology literature. Next, the chapter lays out how diverse disaster response and rebuilding actors conceive of vulnerability, and how these discourses inform their actions or lack thereof. There was no common, coherent understanding of

vulnerability among local, national, and international trustees delivering humanitarian aid and assisting in the rebuilding processes. Furthermore, these actors repeatedly confused a structural understanding of vulnerability in the political ecology sense with a structural understanding of vulnerability in the engineering sense. The disparate narratives had practical implications for short-term post-disaster assistance. They also have broader societal impacts in which structural problems and prejudices are reinscribed, left unresolved, and even replicated in other parts of the archipelago when natural hazards strike.

Political ecology and the disaster-vulnerability relationship

Political ecology is an approach to analysing how society and nature interact. A political ecology perspective on disasters insists upon the *unnaturalness* of *natural* disasters (Sen 1981, Hewitt 1983). Mark Pelling (2001, 183) contends that so-called “natural disasters” are more aptly described as “humanitarian disasters with a natural trigger” (hereafter simply “disasters”). Political ecologists reject an apolitical characterisation of environmental crises and their impacts (Forsyth 2003), and posit they are not “unfortunate accidents under advanced capitalism” but rather “consistent symptoms of various logics and trajectories of accumulation” (Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011, 26). Political ecology can thus help to reveal not only the ecological aspects, but also the underlying historical, political, economic and social dynamics of a disaster and the pre-existing social and economic inequalities in a society (Walker 2005, 2006, 2007).

Some basic definitions are a useful starting point for teasing apart the disaster-vulnerability relationship. According to Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (2002, 4), a disaster is

a process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the natural, modified or built environment and a population in a socially and economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived disruption of the customary relative satisfactions of individual and social needs for physical survival, social order, and meaning.

A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that carries a potential for social, infrastructural or environmental damage is called a hazard (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004).

Hazards are categorised as natural (e.g. atmospheric, hydrological, geological and biological), technological (e.g. dangerous materials, destructive processes, mechanical and productive) and social (e.g. war, terrorism, civil conflict, and the use of hazardous materials, processes and technologies) (Oliver-Smith 2002). Natural hazards can result in catastrophic disasters (e.g.

hurricane, flood) and in more common but less visible chronic disasters (e.g. everyday risks to human health and wealth brought about by poor sanitation or no drinking water) (Pelling 2001). The likelihood that hazards precipitate disasters is based on risk, which is the probability of harmful consequences or expected loss. It is a function of exposure, capacity to mitigate hazard impacts, and vulnerability (Enarson 2000). Wisner, Blaikie et al. (2004) define the relationship according to the risk equation, $R = H \times V$, in which risk (R) is a function of a hazard (H) that interacts with vulnerability (V). The unequal distribution of risk is based on access to and control over resources (e.g. via class, age, physical ability, citizenship status, racial/ethnic and cultural group, and gender).

A structural understanding of vulnerability

Structural vulnerability, pared down to its most basic elements, involves an individual or group's exposure to, capacity to cope with, and potential to recover and minimise damage from crises, stresses and shocks (Watts and Bohle 1993, 45). The structures in structural vulnerability refer to the institutions, power, and historical factors in society that create inequalities and make some individuals and groups more vulnerable than others (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004, O'Brien, Eriksen et al. 2007). Structural vulnerability is variously called "contextual," "starting-point," "social," or "type II" vulnerability (hereafter "vulnerability") (Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger 2000, Adger 2006). Each term serves either to emphasise a particular aspect of this understanding or to distinguish it from a physicalist view of vulnerability. Wisner, Blaikie et al.'s (2004, 11) definition of vulnerability as "the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard" has become the general standard in hazards and disasters research. Put another way, vulnerability is defined by prior damage and not by a future stress; the vulnerability of an individual or social group to a particular stress is primarily determined by their extant state, or their capacity to respond to a stress. So, characterising the vulnerability of survivors requires an understanding of their capacity before the occurrence of a natural hazard.

In contrast, the dominant "geophysicalist and technocratic reductionism" (Hewitt 1983, 7), or simply "physicalist" (Pelling 2001), paradigm attributes disaster to an unavoidable extreme geophysical event occurring in a nature independent of society. It assumes that scientific expertise and technological solutions are always the best options for predicting and preventing threats,

thereby reducing risk and vulnerability. It emphasises the preeminence of bureaucratically organised institutions that hire and pay specialised professionals (Hewitt 1983, O'Brien, Eriksen et al. 2007). The physicalist paradigm treats vulnerability as a function of mainly biophysical and sometimes technological risk (Cutter 1996). It privileges “end-point” or “type I” vulnerability, in which vulnerability is a characteristic or a state after recovery and rehabilitation efforts have been implemented (Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger 2000, Adger 2006). The physicalist framing reflected new ideas and discourses emerging in academia and spreading throughout society in the post-war era: an elevated status for mainly Western experts, technology and knowledge (Mitchell 2002), a pervasive capitalistic worldview producing uneven development and cementing the separation of nature from society (Smith 1984), an end of nature and emergence of risk societies (Beck 1992), a gross mismatch between the welfare state’s ability to address external collective risks and the prevalence of new manufactured risks in contemporary societies (Giddens and Held 1982), and widespread uncritical acceptance and adoption of orthodox science (Forsyth 2003). The physicalist approach endures as the dominant paradigm in most governments and their agencies, United Nations bodies and multilateral funding institutions, and continues to heavily influence national and international decision-making (Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001).

A thorough understanding of vulnerability, however, demands that researchers situate a case within spatialised social processes that begin before the disaster. In *Interpretations of calamity*, geomorphologist Kenneth Hewitt (1983) suggests a starting point. He stresses that it is the everyday social interactions and structures embedded in broader historical circumstances, and not the particularities of a natural hazard, that ultimately determine the nature, causes and consequences of a disaster. The corollary of such a framing of disaster is that vulnerability is necessarily driven by economic, social and political influences. Vulnerability is not exclusively based on socioeconomic and political conditions, but also on environmental forces (Oliver-Smith 2002). In other words, vulnerability is a function of both biophysical and socially constructed risks, or what Giddens (1999) would call traditional and manufactured risks.

Pelling (2001, 179) argues that the root cause of a disaster is always marginalisation, defined as “the exclusion of certain individuals and groups from economic, social or political resources.” The result of the inequalities in a given society (Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001, 2006, Cutter 2006), marginality influences people’s control over basic needs and rights (Watts and Bohle 1993),

which, in turn, determines who is vulnerable and whether a hazard unfolds into a disaster (Pelling 2001). Marginalisation and vulnerability are thus constructed in social systems that apportion risks unevenly among citizens who exert different demands on the physical environment (Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004, Bankoff 2006).

A structural understanding of vulnerability thus rejects the physicalist one-dimensional portrayal of disasters (e.g. caused by natural forces) in favour of a multidimensional portrayal. Wisner, Blaikie et al. (2004, 367) contend that disasters

are rooted in everyday life, are manifestations of development failures, have distant and remote precursors, are linked to livelihood resilience and household capabilities, and result in the need to release pressures through changes in institutions, structures of domination and improved access to resources.

Hence, disasters reflect the “totality of relationships” of a particular social context that prefigures a disaster precipitated by environmental forces (Oliver-Smith 2002, 28). Feminist scholars applaud this multidimensional depiction of disasters and vulnerability because it focuses on current and future vulnerabilities arising from power differentials, gender ideologies, historical changes, and the inseparability of society and nature (Bolin, Jackson and Crist 1998, Enarson 2000). It also closely examines individuals’ relative access to or control over key resources within societies, which are necessarily influenced by gender (Enarson 2000).

The practical benefit of recognising the multidimensionality of disasters is that it aids in explaining the production, reproduction and consequences of natural hazards and disasters, and in prescribing solutions. For example, Pelling (1999) uses a political ecology approach to study vulnerability to floods, climate change and sea-level rise in Guyana, which he estimates affect 90% of the population. He examines how the country’s colonial history, decades of poor political leadership and perverse power structures established under the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment reforms all coevolved with an increasing risk to flood hazards to create a particular political and environmental space shaping present-day vulnerability. Drawing on two case studies, Pelling (1999) argues that remedies should deal with the political, social, and economic processes that render individuals and groups vulnerable, rather than the actual vulnerabilities themselves. Hence, the multidimensional character of disasters highlights opportunities to alter unfair political, social and economic structures.

The corollary of this observation is that disasters create opportunities for exploitation, including by those who deny the multidimensionality of disasters. The dominant physicalist paradigm legitimises the discourse and actions, or lack thereof, of Western governments whereby disaster, poverty, disease and the environment are treated as isolated issues to be addressed in accordance with the preferred timelines and strategies of Western governments (Bankoff 2001). The paradigm's assertion that destruction is caused by natural hazards validates the idea that nature is responsible for poverty and for the uneven distribution of material goods, conveniently absolving a global capitalist system and neocolonialism of any wrongdoing. It allows engineers, scientists and bureaucrats to appropriate the hazards and disasters discourse, quarantine it away from non-experts, thereby stymying efforts to understand, prevent and mitigate disasters (Hewitt 1983). While not written as a critique of disaster discourse and management, insights from Timothy Mitchell's (2002) *Rule of experts* are useful in illustrating this point. Mitchell (2002, 41-42) reveals three significant but overlooked features of the politics based on technological expertise that guided the development and modernisation in 20th century Egypt. First, so-called expertise was merely a concentration and restructuring of pre-existing knowledge. Second, each technical project failed, forcing experts to learn from nature and to continually adjust their science and technology. Third, the extra-scientific origins of technical expertise were actively covered up, as was the fact that each new technology was itself a reaction to difficulties stemming from earlier failed techno-science projects. Mitchell (2002, 52) concludes that deliberately misapprehending complexity in favour of generating "neatly separate realms of reason and the real world, ideas and their objects, the human and nonhuman" was necessary for the production and reproduction of techno-power in Egypt, and in the 20th century in general. Parallel lessons exist in the history of disaster management (cf. Bankoff 2001, Pelling 2001).

Parallel lessons can also be found in post-Sendong Cagayan de Oro. This short discussion of the disaster-vulnerability relationship has outlined the salient points for analysing the vulnerability of survivors and the discourses that informed disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding processes.

Who is vulnerable?

Defining vulnerability

In Cagayan de Oro, government agencies, humanitarian organisations, religious groups and NGOs alike claim that their disaster risk reduction, relief and recovery activities target "the

people who need help the most.” Yet, these same actors share neither a coherent definition of vulnerability nor a consensus on delimiting one or more target populations. Instead, different actors invoke diverse interpretations of “vulnerability” in guiding their post-disaster efforts. They use three main approaches: (1) they ascribe to the physicalist paradigm; (2) they single out certain demographic groups; and (3) they specify particular risk factors. Each of these approaches is developed over the following pages. This discussion is based on key informant interviews with individuals who can be broadly categorised as “experts” or what Tania Murray Li (2007a) calls “trustees” whose aim is to problematise and render technical anything and everything pertaining to the disaster response and recovery efforts. Key informants included *barangay*, city and regional government employees, elected officials, academics, local and national NGO workers and activists, Catholic and Islamic clerics and lay organisation members, evacuation camp managers, private sector employees, police and technical consultants. Several informants also provided organisational reports that help reveal their employer’s approach to vulnerability.

The physicalist paradigm

Engineers are among the most respected and most frequently consulted experts on disaster risk reduction and management in the Philippines. According to the lead researcher of the Disaster Risk and Exposure Assessment for Mitigation (DREAM) Program, a government-funded initiative to produce and disseminate hazard maps and models, engineers define vulnerability as the probability of something bad happening multiplied by the base value of the affected sector. They ascribe to the physicalist paradigm (cf. Hewitt 1983, Pelling 2001). He explained that assessing vulnerability is a thorny issue for engineers, who prefer working with hard facts and numbers over terms that are “too relative for us.” For his engineering colleagues, there’s a difficulty in defining vulnerability; is it the risk of fatality or is it the risk of property damage? Moreover, how should the vulnerability of people and property be measured? Calculating the vulnerability of property is relatively easy; historical data can be used to evaluate a property’s value, which can then be used to generate a risk assessment and to plot an assessment curve. To assess vulnerability, government engineers and members of the DREAM team calculate the number of buildings (or other physical variable) predicted to be affected by a particular hazard event. The type of industry present in an area also informs the vulnerability calculations, insofar as if industry *X* is here, then there are *Y* vulnerable sectors that must be taken into account. In contrast, measuring the vulnerability of people is much harder, so the DREAM team opted

instead to single out certain demographic groups without considering how and why they are affected. The fuzzy social, political and micro economic components of vulnerability are relegated to a simple list, leaving engineers to concentrate exclusively on the technological and physical elements of vulnerability that they are trained to address. In other words, they behave like the trustees that Li (2007a) describes who problematise and render technical an issue (e.g. vulnerability) in terms that only they can adequately address.

The engineering conception of vulnerability matters. The dominance of the physicalist paradigm has significant material, financial and political implications. It results in Philippine hazard maps and forecasting models that depict geophysical risks only. It is the main discourse used to inform government spending and policies on everything from city planning to funding and building infrastructure. Because it privileges infrastructure, industry and property over people's lives and livelihoods, it typically results in spending and policies that reflect technocratic solutions. After Sendong, for example, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency conducted a year-long feasibility study investigating potential technical interventions on the Cagayan River, and committed \$107 million for construction in October 2012 (cf. ReliefWeb 2012, Sun Star 2012). Based out of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Japanese engineers and experts on water, dams, and institutional capacity developed a plan for a 12-kilometre megadike (Jerusalem 2014). If the plans are approved, construction should begin in 2016.

Like the technocratic fix proposed by Japanese experts, solutions are frequently recommended and carried out by the multibillion dollar disaster industry, which is composed primarily of engineering firms based in the global North (Pelling 2001). This situation repeats a pattern of economic exploitation instituted in the European colonial era (Forsyth 2003, Davis 2004), in which business opportunities are sought out in the Third World-cum-hazardous nations whose resources are drained through the purchase of expensive disaster risk reduction and rehabilitation technologies (Pelling 2001). Furthermore, these firms have a bias for technology-based solutions, which may not be available, accessible, affordable, socially acceptable, or advisable on environmental grounds (Moser 2009), thereby fulfilling Bertrand Russell's (1925 in Hewitt 1983, 3) fear that "science will be used to promote the power of dominant groups rather than to make men [and women] happy." As Pelling (2001) points out, when used in isolation, the technology-based solutions endorsed by the physicalist paradigm may actually prolong or increase losses

associated with a disaster because they fail to engage with root causes, they create a false sense of security thereby encouraging increased risk-taking, and they are open to meddling by powerful economic, political or social actors. In fact, politics and ideology can and have trumped real disaster risk reduction efforts (Smith 2006).

Singling out particular demographic groups

A second approach to defining vulnerability is to target a particular segment of the population. Many actors extend the same categories of vulnerable groups they use for their regular (non-disaster related) programs to their disaster relief and recovery interventions. Table 5.1 lists all groups identified as vulnerable in the context of disasters. These groups are typically defined in demographic terms. Each group is presumed to exhibit particular characteristics that render them vulnerable. If an individual falls into two or more categories, his or her vulnerability is presumed to be exacerbated. For example, an urban poor child with a disability or an unemployed single mother has less capacity to cope with and recover from a disaster than their single category counterparts.

Key informants expressed various rationales to explain each group's vulnerability. Some explanations were bodily and biologically-based. For example, pregnant women, the elderly, very young children, and persons with disabilities were described as weak and having limited mobility. These characteristics reduce their chances of survival in the case of a sudden-onset hazard event, and increase their susceptibility to illness in the immediate aftermath. Other explanations were geographically-based, and are discussed later on. Many of the explanations, however, can be framed in terms of exclusion or a lack of access. For instance, some groups of vulnerable people cannot access adequate economic resources; they have difficulty in covering daily expenses (e.g. urban poor, women, single mothers), or they cannot acquire sufficient resources to rebuild their lives and to restart a livelihood post-disaster (e.g. Indigenous Peoples, women, farmers). The inadequacy or absence of technology and infrastructure accessible to certain groups is another attribute that renders certain groups vulnerable. For instance, Indigenous Peoples lack modern technology to deal with disasters, while the urban poor reside in poorly constructed houses made of flimsy temporary materials. Particular groups, especially the elderly and persons with disabilities, were described as vulnerable because they are "invisible victims;" they rarely go to evacuation centres and they cannot easily access mainstream services. While their invisibility is not unique to the disaster period, it is amplified during this time. In a few cases, vulnerability was

linked to precarity and exclusion from formal economic and legal structures. For example, informal settlers are deemed vulnerable because they have no land or no title. In these latter cases, the vulnerability of demographic groups stems from their exclusion from critical resources, which, in turn, is rooted in the exclusionary powers of regulation, force, the market and legitimation (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011; Chapter 6).

Table 5.1. Vulnerable groups, as articulated by Philippine organisations implicated in disaster risk reduction and management.

Vulnerable group	Expert who identified this group
Children, especially children under 5 years old and babies	Local, Provincial and Regional government agencies, Local and National NGOs, Engineers, Academia, Police, Disaster research centre
Elderly (over 60)	Local, Provincial and Regional government agencies, Local NGO, Engineers, Camp manager, Disaster research centre
Farmers	Local NGO
First responders	Disaster research centre
Indigenous Peoples (IP)	Local, National and International NGOs, Engineers
Informal settlers	Academia
Injured people	Disaster research centre
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual (LGTBQIA)	Disaster research centre
Orphans and children living with grandparents	<i>Barangay</i> -level politician, Camp manager
Out-of-school youth	Regional government agency
People living in very disaster-prone or flood-prone areas	National NGO, Local government agency
Persons with disabilities, especially children with disabilities (e.g. deaf, blind, autistic, wheelchair-bound, paralysis) and persons with severe health conditions	Local, Provincial, Regional government agencies, Local and National NGOs, Engineers, Camp manager, Power company, Disaster research centre
Poor, urban poor	Provincial government agency, Local NGO, Engineers, Academia
Pregnant women	Local and Regional government agencies, Camp manager
Sex workers	Camp manager, Local NGO
Single mothers	Camp manager, Local NGO
Unemployed	Regional government agency, Academia
Women (mothers)	Local NGOs, Disaster research centre, Local, Provincial and Regional government agencies, Academia, Police

A purported moral failure characteristic of particular demographic groups was another explanatory factor for their vulnerability. One local state actor in a position of authority, for example, pronounced that children were vulnerable because they had irresponsible parents who permitted them to roam around everywhere, and sometimes even allowed their daughters to become “*minanga*” (literally a type of freshwater fish, and the colloquial term for a sex worker who is a minor). The same informant claimed that women’s vulnerability could be attributed to a lack of guidance and education, and to being forced to work as a sex worker. Left unsaid, but implied, is that these children and women are urban poor. Many other key informants inferred that the urban poor are lacking in morally upright behaviour and that their values and behaviour are “so different” from the middle class. For example, in explaining the vulnerability of persons with disabilities, one informant who works with this population relayed that, unlike their counterparts born into middle or upper class families, autistic children born into poor families do not receive special care and are likely to be neglected by their family. Household-level economic constraints of urban poor families underlie the tacit approval of *minanga* and the denial of expensive services for autistic children. Yet, the economic aspect was denied as an explanation of vulnerability. By framing vulnerability as a moral failure, trustees individualise a problem; by ignoring the salience of poverty in producing vulnerability, trustees ignore the failure of the state to ensure an adequate standard of living for all of its citizens. These moral judgements, articulated by mostly middle to upper class informants, had real implications; as argued in Chapters 6 and 7, assumptions about the moral character and the values of the urban poor informed the eligibility criteria to access certain resettlement sites, and the rules imposed on residents. As such, moral standards and values acted as powers of exclusion and justified class hierarchies.

Key informants frequently singled out women – mothers, pregnant women, sex workers and urban poor – as a vulnerable demographic. This identification of the gendered causes and consequences of disasters has significant empirical support in the academic literature (cf. Delica 1998, Enarson 2000, Hunter and Davis 2009). In CDO, the vulnerability of women was attributed to their gender roles. After the disaster, women retained their private responsibilities such as cooking, cleaning, laundry and childcare, and had additional responsibilities such as waiting in line to obtain relief goods. The statement of one informant heading the regional chapter of a national feminist activist organisation summarised the scope of urban poor women’s and men’s responsibilities according to the extant gender division of labour: “It is the right and

responsibility [of the woman] to care for the children, house, and community – while the husband goes to work.”³⁸ Another common explanation for women’s vulnerability was a biologically-attributed maternal instinct, which prevents a mother from leaving her children to save herself and compels her to always prioritise the well-being of her husband (or male partner) and children over her own well-being. The fact that this instinct was biologically and not socially attributed illustrates the extent to which a specific gender ideology privileging the “care” aspects of a woman’s identity is embedded in people’s psyches. Such gender ideologies had practical implications on the design and delivery of resources after the disaster. Interestingly, a paternal instinct compelling a man to save his family was never mentioned, despite ample evidence of men saving (or trying to save) their children, and later becoming the primary caregiver either temporarily or permanently after Sendong.

Trustees presumed “women” were “mothers” and that it was the maternal component of their identity that rendered them vulnerable. Not surprisingly then, there were no targeted programs for survivors who did not fit into a rigid gender binary or who fell outside the woman-mother, man-provider narrative. The specific needs and concerns of Sendong survivors from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual (LGTBQIA) community, for example, were left unaddressed. Moreover, the tendency to lump women together into a few vulnerable categories repeats a problem in the gender and disaster literature: it universalises or essentialises the category of woman, and neglects to systematically consider axes of social difference and inequality concurrently with gender. Just as moralistic claims about the urban poor parents of *minanga* and autistic children conceal underlying economic problems and state failures, an uncritical discourse reducing “women” to “mothers” masks the ways in which gender interacts with class, race, religion, disability, kinship, sexuality and rural or urban affiliation to produce and exacerbate vulnerability in Philippine society (cf. Gaetano and Yeoh 2010).

For the most part, vulnerable groups were recognised as having pre-existing characteristics that render them susceptible to a shock from which they cannot recover without external assistance. This articulation reflects the structural conception of vulnerability described earlier. Responders are the exception; they exhibit end-point or type I vulnerability (cf. Cutter 1996, Kelly and Adger

³⁸ The direct quotations of interviewees are close but not exact transcriptions of what was said. For example, I edited out most Bisayan and Tagalog interjections, words like “um,” and word repetitions. I also modified some citations slightly so that there is subject-verb agreement.

2000, Adger 2006). Their vulnerability is attributed to the trauma they witnessed during rescue operations, and not to a pre-existing condition. While not an insignificant group, responders are not examined in this thesis.

Singling out specific demographic groups presumed to exhibit certain characteristics was a popular approach to defining vulnerability. It simplified post-disaster interventions because it did not require the trustee to consider within-group differences necessitating different types of and degrees of intervention. It was especially helpful in enabling rapid disaster rescue, relief, and rebuilding operations. Frequently, it correctly identified vulnerable individuals and groups. But it did not resolve the underlying problems that make vulnerable groups vulnerable. Nor did it recognise that vulnerability is relationally-produced. The approach did not tackle the structures and processes in society that render certain people vulnerable. Instead, this approach reveals that the trustees' understanding of vulnerability mirrors societal beliefs, assumptions, values and ideologies.

Indicators of vulnerability

The same trustees who conceived and operationalised vulnerability by singling out particular demographic groups simultaneously used another closely related approach. They articulated specific factors that increase or demonstrate vulnerability, and then assisted individuals with these factors. In contrast to the singling out approach, which starts with an informed assumption on which *groups* are vulnerable, the indicators of vulnerability approach starts with an informed assumption on which *factors or indicators* increase vulnerability. Alone, or together, certain characteristics were recognised as rendering a person, household, or community “vulnerable” to disasters. An archetypal vulnerable person in CDO is a poor migrant with one or more health conditions, is part of a large family (seven or more), has no, one or two household members working a precarious job in the informal sector, lives in a poorly constructed house made of non-durable materials on a lot to which they have no title, and which is located in an informal settlement along the riverbank. A complete list of the indicators of vulnerability identified by state, religious, NGO and academic trustees is presented in Table 5.2. The remainder of this section explores each indicator. The discussion of the indicators approach, similar to the people it identifies as vulnerable, has considerable overlap with the singling out approach.

Table 5.2. Indicators of vulnerability, as articulated by Philippine organisations implicated in disaster risk reduction and management.

Indicator
Cannot swim
Food insecurity
Gender roles and responsibilities that penalise women
Geophysical susceptibility (living or working in natural hazard-prone areas, especially close to the river)
Informal sector job, insecure livelihood, livelihood with irregular pay
Illiteracy or lack of education
Lack of preparedness
Large family
Likely to get sick
Migrant from the provinces, limited or no family network in CDO
No land and no title (no stable housing)
No or limited awareness of available services and how to access them
Poorly constructed house built with non-durable materials
Poverty
Reliance upon government and NGO assistance because they cannot access resources to rebuild house and livelihood post-calamity
Unemployment

Underlying the seemingly tidy checklist of vulnerability indicators are complex and intertwined economic, political, technological, biological, geographic, cultural, legal, and social issues. Nearly all of the indicators have both an economic and political basis, even if the connections are not apparent at first. Take, for example, geophysical susceptibility, in which people are susceptible to harm because they live in natural hazard-prone areas. In CDO, portions of several *barangays* are located on reclaimed land. Public schools, churches, registered tax-paying businesses, local government-approved housing developments and informal settlements are all located on reclaimed land, illustrating the complicity of municipal governments in allowing construction in areas that, at some point in the future, will be reclaimed by the rivers and the sea. While building on reclaimed land can be justified by the technological ingenuity and historical geological and hydrological processes that went into making the land safe, the same claims cannot be made by people who reside in clearly unsafe locations. Why do they settle there? In the Philippines, riverbanks are usually not allocated for state-endorsed planned developments. Thus, a sliver of

flood-prone land is available. As one engineer who creates hazard maps for the entire archipelago described to me, the riverbanks and the coastal areas offer land that is “essentially free” where “no one will accost them.” His statement is telling. There is an economic component to geophysically-based susceptibility insofar as land can be difficult to obtain; land is expensive, especially near the city centre where many urban poor work, and the people trying to live there do not have money to buy land. In fact, one of the reasons why the CDO mayor initiated his famous *piiso-piiso* program in which small lots were sold to poor households for a symbolic ₱1 (\$0.02) is because the poor were falling behind on their very modest monthly mortgage payments. The second part of the engineer’s statement is indicative of further economic and political factors at play in the Philippines. No one accosts the residents because the land is unattractive for private sector investment, in part because there is inadequate or no technological infrastructure in place to mitigate hazard risks. There is no or only limited economic or political pressure on politicians to impose mass evictions and to demolish informal settlements in hazard-prone areas.

The inability to swim is a particularly interesting indicator of vulnerability. It seems straightforward: if there is a flood and you are swept into turbulent waters, your ability to swim can mean the difference between life and death. But it is not so simple. Learning to and being able to swim is part biological, part geographic, part economic, part cultural. Obviously babies, very young children and the infirm do not have the physical strength or learned skills of swimming. Swimming skills are also geographically linked because working class Cagayaños who live near the city’s rivers or Macajalar Bay typically learn how to swim as children because it is a popular pastime. The adult men who live in riverside barangays where quarrying river sand is the main livelihood (by diving into the water and pulling up river sand) are also, by necessity, good swimmers. The ability to swim is also a class issue. Urban poor families do not send their children for swimming lessons. The local pools offering swimming lessons are located at expensive hotels, spaces typically inaccessible to the urban poor. The children who learn to swim through official lessons belong to the middle class. Finally, there are cultural factors that hinder certain groups from learning how to swim. Muslims in CDO, for example, rarely know how to swim, and especially Muslim women who do not have places where they can swim in culturally appropriately modest garb. The ability to swim, similar to geophysical susceptibility, is indicative of larger societal structures and processes.

The assertion that vulnerable people are recent arrivals and have no or limited social or family networks in CDO is misleading. Migrants may not have the deeply entrenched networks of Cagayaños whose ancestors resided in the city. But, the specific sites where migrants settle are frequently based on social networks; they settle near relatives or acquaintances from their old homes, and they rely upon these contacts to jumpstart a livelihood in their adopted city. Roughly half of the survivors I interviewed was born and raised in CDO. Yet, the type of social networks and contacts of certain segments of vulnerable people, migrants included, do occlude them from accessing valuable resources. For instance, Sendong survivors who were not aware of the specific requirements necessary for obtaining assistance, or who were uninformed about the date, time, and location of relief distribution were usually excluded from the benefits to which they were entitled. Being connected to church or civic groups, or to a charismatic champion, had major benefits. People lacking such connections were severely disadvantaged because they did not know what they did not know, and as a result, they missed out.

The wide-reaching effects of poverty

Most of the indicators of vulnerability are rooted in or linked to poverty. Poverty manifests itself in different ways that increase vulnerability. Take, for example, the three indicators linking education, health and family size to vulnerability. Poverty can be linked to lower levels of educational achievement and literacy because the costs of so-called “free” primary education are prohibitive (e.g. uniforms, transportation, meals, books, school supplies, etc.), or because having children attend classes instead of participating in the family business or earning other income represents a significant opportunity cost. Poverty is also connected to the “likely to get sick” vulnerability indicator. While biology is an important determinant of health, poverty is a greater predictor of health and longevity than individual choices such as healthy eating and regular exercise (CSDH 2008). In CDO, poor people living in informal settlements are not served by proper waste management, may not have access to clean water, likely do not have screens on their windows, bed nets, or air-conditioning to keep dengue-carrying mosquitoes out of the home. And, when they do get sick, the cost of “getting better” can be prohibitive. Finally, poor Filipino families are typified as large families. The official poverty threshold calculated by the National Economic and Development Authority is for a hypothetical family of five (NEDA 2009). Yet, in CDO – an urban centre where families are generally smaller as compared to rural

areas – the average urban poor family has seven (or more) members.³⁹ The issue of large families and the discrepancy between a state-sanctioned ideal household size and the actual household size in the design of relocation houses and the rules about the number of inhabitants per house is addressed in the next two chapters.

Poorly constructed houses made of non-durable materials are also symptomatic of insufficient means. Impoverished residents in CDO often possess neither the knowledge nor the financial resources to implement disaster-resistant building methods. With limited means, the city's urban poor ingeniously use available and affordable materials to build their own living quarters, with the intention of upgrading their abode as additional means become available. A local developer explained to me that the typical Filipino mode of building is to purchase or somehow acquire land and an unfinished house, and then renovate it as money becomes available. This observation is true in both the affluent government-approved residences and in the informal settlements that pepper the cityscape. Building with flimsy corrugated cardboard or iron sheets, plastic sheets, or *amakan* or non-durable lumber (e.g. cocolumber) that only lasts a few years is not the preferred option of most Filipinos, including the urban poor I interviewed. When possible, the urban poor build concrete houses. Indeed, many of CDO's urban poor living in informal settlements have concrete or partly concreted houses (Fig. 5.1), so the widely-held stereotype that inhabiting or owning a concrete house is indicative of middle class status is erroneous. According to an informant from a national NGO that builds houses all over the Philippines, concrete houses are the preferred housing of most Filipinos outside of Muslim Mindanao. Another informant leading the infrastructure and housing team at the Ecoville relocation site explained this preference in terms of durability:

³⁹ In 2010, I attended a Senate meeting debating the proposed reproductive health bill that would require the government make family planning services available. It is difficult to obtain birth control or safe access to abortion in the predominantly Catholic country because they are illegal. The Chair and sponsor of the bill wanted to make a point about why poor Philippine families tend to be large families. She began by sharing a story about a poor family in Manila. There were eight children that the husband was trying to support on just \$2.40 per day. The wife did not want more mouths to feed but could not access birth control and found herself pregnant *again*. This is a common story among the urban poor. The Chair then asked the room full of middle and upper class individuals putting forth arguments in favour of or against the bill to raise their hand if they had at least one child, two children, three children, four children, etc. Apart from the Catholic priests, most hands shot up at one child and stayed up for three children. No hands remained once she reached five children. She'd made her point: Filipinos with the financial means can largely control their family size and access birth control, whereas the urban poor cannot.

In the Philippines concrete is the most, I mean, people perceive concrete structures as the highest level of a shelter. So if you give them a choice between a wooden house, an *amakan* house and a concrete house, they definitely choose a concrete house – because people are more concerned with strength of the material and how long it will last. Because they don't want to be renovating every so often.



Fig. 5.1. Many of CDO's urban poor living in informal settlements have concrete houses (top, 22 March 2013) or partly concreted houses (bottom, 7 March 2013).

Another reason why the urban poor erect poorly constructed houses is due to insecure land tenure. As many of these houses are built on untitled land, there is little incentive for residents to invest in sturdy, disaster-resistant houses because of the perpetual risk of eviction. Why spend money on something that could be taken away at any time? Given this risk, it is a rational decision to allocate scarce household resources to the contents of the house and not its physical structure. To use McLeman's (2013, 176) terms, the urban poor invest in "portable capital" that enables them greater mobility, as opposed to non-portable "place-based capital" that ties them to a particular location. This point is not recognised in the municipal and national compensation packages for survivors; government guidelines aim to compensate damaged physical structures instead of the contents of the house. This and other examples of how the most vulnerable are further marginalised through disaster are explored in Chapters 6 and 7.

Poverty is also correlated with the livelihoods of vulnerable people. The urban poor typically have insecure, irregularly paying jobs in the informal sector. In CDO, the household incomes of the urban poor range from \$1.11 to 6.68 per day, indicating families are at or below the provincial 2009 poverty threshold in Misamis Oriental of \$5.50 per day for a family of five (NEDA 2009). The majority are informal sector workers occupying livelihoods such as *jeepney*, *sikad* or *motorela* drivers,⁴⁰ port worker, construction worker, *sari-sari* store owner, buy-and-sell vendor, or junk shop collector (also called a gleaner or canvasser). Those employed in the formal sector typically hold low-paying, precarious jobs as office, restaurant, hotel and mall workers. The conditions associated with a job, and not the livelihood itself, increase vulnerability. For example, a freelance carpenter who does short-term contracts and spends long periods of time unemployed is in a very different position from a carpenter who is employed full-time with an established construction company and receives employee benefits. Informal sector jobs, and even the majority of formal sector jobs, do not provide employee benefits. Unskilled or low-skilled positions in the formal sector are usually offered as contract positions with a fixed term just shy of the minimum period mandated under the Philippine Labor Code requiring an employer to register and pay benefits to the employee. Even though workers often stay in the same position

⁴⁰ There are many forms of quasi-public and private transportation in Cagayan de Oro. A *motorela* is a small motorised scooter with an attached cab used for public transportation on set routes. A *jeepney* is a converted U.S. military jeep used for public transportation on set routes. A *sikad* is a non-motorised cycle rickshaw for private hire.

over several contract periods, they live without the job security and employee benefits that enable long-term planning. Similarly, in the informal sector, it is unlikely a worker has access to credit from their employer (e.g. emergency workplace loan), is eligible for mandatory employee benefits, has colleagues advocating on their behalf to people in positions of authority, receives legal protection, has job security, and has insurance protecting their livelihood capital. The livelihoods of many of CDO's urban poor are thus characterised by precarity and uncertainty.

Living so close to the financial edge, many vulnerable people require daily income to survive. In fact, most require a daily infusion of cash to pay their creditors. For example, many urban poor regularly rely upon high interest "5-6 loans"⁴¹ from moneylenders to meet their subsistence needs; the 5-6 lenders collect payment on a daily basis. Similarly, the urban poor men who drive rented *sikads*, *motorelas* and *jeepneys* as a livelihood must pay the vehicle owner the rental fee every day. Most of the urban poor purchase their foodstuffs in small quantities because they do not have enough money at any one time to purchase a larger quantity and store it, even though they could save money with the latter option. The urgent need for a daily income also affects the livelihood options available to and preferred by the urban poor. As a city official put it, the urban poor "belong to the sector wherein it's really to work to be able to eat tomorrow."

Poverty is most visible at the individual or household level. Trustees recognised that poverty at the micro scale is revealed through multiple indicators of vulnerability. What was left unsaid, and thus unresolved, was that poverty in the Philippines reflects the perpetual state of impoverishment of the national economy. In turn, this is a product of, for example, a colonial past (Church 2003, Tan 2009, Batalla 2010), urbanisation without accompanying economic growth (Gibb 2012), political nepotism (McCoy 1994), the imposition of landholding elite families views on the bureaucratic apparatus and even elections (Sidel 1994, 1999, Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Caouette 2010), rent-seeking and kleptocratic tendencies of some political dynasties (Kelly 2009, Batalla 2010), an unwavering commitment of the central administrations to a globalisation discourse of deregulating, liberalising and decentralising the national economy and development (Kelly 1997, 1999, Francia 2010), and the unfulfilled commitment of every

⁴¹ A 5-6 loan carries a 20% interest rate. For every five pesos borrowed, six must be repaid over the agreed upon period. Typically, 5-6 moneylenders are not affiliated with accredited financial institutions, and they do not require collateral or documents from their borrowers. The latter characteristic makes their loans appealing to the urban poor.

Philippine administration to agrarian reform and breaking up huge, landed estates (Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Takigawa 2004, Francia 2010).

Food insecurity is another example illustrative of the complex processes and structures producing poverty. Food insecurity stems from more than a mere financial difficulty in providing sufficient healthful meals. For some of CDO's recent urban poor migrants, it is reflective of dispossession of land, whereby large multinational corporations acquire leases for large swathes of fertile agricultural land on which to expand their plantations. These leases are negotiated with the upper echelons of the national government, and the decisions taken in Manila are imposed on the people inhabiting and using the land. It is, according to activist NGOs and people's organisations, nothing more than land-grabbing, albeit legitimised and euphemised as "land conversion" by national government approval. Small-scale farmers are dispossessed of their land, their means of livelihood, their means of subsistence, and are faced with the choice to move into ever more marginal lands (e.g. higher up, in small parcels of land, along steep slopes, etc.) or to take their chances as migrants in cities crowded with other rural escapees just like them. The livelihood skills they possess are not needed or wanted or are in oversupply, so many find themselves competing for scarce low-skilled, low paid informal employment. As described above, the livelihood situation of the urban poor makes it difficult to feed a large family, especially with food prices higher than in their former rural homes.

The unsaid indicators of vulnerability

In addition to the vulnerability indicators identified by trustees, there were other indicators of vulnerability that emerged throughout the research process. Interviews with survivors, participatory video-making and participant observation made these additional factors very apparent. They include inexperience with floods, little or no savings, dependency on public transport, exclusion from supra-household decision-making processes and being Muslim or indigenous. Clearly identifiable indigenous and Muslim survivors were less able to access mainstream official conduits of aid than their Christian and non-clearly identifiable indigenous and Muslim counterparts. Deeply rooted prejudices and omissions entrenched in state organisations, policies and structures imbued with Catholic worldviews have real impacts and, as such, belonging to a stigmatised group increased vulnerability. That all of these factors were not recognised by the trustees creating and implementing disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding had

major impacts on the experiences of survivors in post-disaster spaces and in their post-disaster mobility.

A continuum of vulnerabilities

The trustees' approaches to vulnerability are clearly limited. A more useful way of framing vulnerability and understanding vulnerable people is to visualise the CDO survivors of Typhoon Sendong along a continuum. Variation exists within communities, households, and even individuals depending on their situation in relation to other people at a given time. This section develops these ideas showing which groups of Cagayaños are less or more vulnerable. It also delves into “invisible vulnerability” and the difficulties faced by Sendong survivors who are not officially “vulnerable” and are therefore excluded from official conduits of disaster relief. Their exclusion can render them even more vulnerable than the officially vulnerable people.

The less vulnerable

Vulnerability can be grossly simplified to mean the inability to respond to and recover from an external shock without external assistance. Accordingly, any person receiving external aid is vulnerable. Thus, the vast majority of people are vulnerable, at least to an extent. There are, however, many conditions, circumstances, abilities, and structures that reduce the vulnerability of an individual, household, community, or other defined group.

In the case of Typhoon Sendong, the less vulnerable survivors can be grouped according to their economic circumstance: they are middle class. The concept of class is developed in an extensive body of academic literature, and can only be selectively summarised here. In a traditional Marxist approach, class is articulated according to “common structural positions with the organizations of production,” and class stratification according to “the concept of exploitation and property relations” (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014, 25). The Weberian concept of class groups individuals according to shared “economic life chances” that delimit their income opportunities, and defines the middle class as individuals possessing education and marketable skills (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014, 25). Pierre Bourdieu's concept of class aligns with the way many Cagayaños understand class. Bourdieu (1987 in Kroeker 2014, 4) insists that “members of a particular class have a certain way of behaviour, a specific *habitus* and a particular taste, which distinguishes them from other social groups,” which, in turn, is a product of “economic, political, educational and cultural entanglements and thus a large variety of factors that strengthens or

weakens someone's position in society." The Cagayaño articulation of the middle class refers to what Kroecker (2014, 6) describes as a "social group in the middle of society with a middle income and middle societal position," and possessive of "a minimal standard of formal education, economic stability and an orientation towards social security and savings."

In CDO, this concept of middle class is operationalised by key informants as "those who work," "those who can afford to build a second or third floor onto their house," and "those who live in middle class [planned and government-approved] developments." The middle class usually hire someone else to build or renovate their titled concrete houses. They typically hold relatively secure mid-level or higher professional jobs in the public or private sector, or own a registered business. They pay income taxes and often receive workplace benefits.

Certain middle class houses were flooded and partially or totally damaged. Middle class Cagayaños died. Middle class residents were forced to evacuate from their homes and relocate – just not to the official evacuation camps or relocation sites. Instead, they went to hotels or to their relatives' and friends' homes. They paid for secure and comfortable temporary housing. They had the financial capacity and social networks required to construct their own safe space after the disaster. They did not rely upon external assistance from humanitarian organisations, NGOs, religious groups, government agencies, and individual donors, although many middle class survivors accessed available resources, especially to claim compensation for damaged property and indemnities for dead or missing relatives.

Several key informants were also middle class survivors; they were candid with me about their personal experiences and those of their neighbours, relatives, colleagues, and friends. They noted that Sendong was the first time they had received money from friends and relatives living outside of CDO. One woman described being "so ashamed on our part to receive money." Many middle class recipients used the donations from their kin networks to hire acquaintances to clean and repair their houses, or to wash each article of clothing multiple times. Other middle class survivors used the donations to build a second or third story on their concrete house, or an easy access route onto the roof. These high-rise additions are called "panic rooms." They are a logical solution for homeowners who are heavily invested in non-portable place-based capital, such as a house on titled land. In still other cases, some middle class survivors received such a large influx of donations that they invested the money in developing or expanding their personal businesses.

For example, some families opened water filling stations or expanded a family-owned grocery store. Although most of the small-scale enterprises, such as small pharmacies and grocery stores, run by middle class residents were not insured, the cost of replacing lost and damaged supplies was not necessarily borne by individual shop owners. Instead, it was often the suppliers who replaced the stock as part of a corporate social responsibility initiative. In contrast, urban poor entrepreneurs typically bore the costs of replacing washed out or damaged capital and of repaying the items bought on credit.

A brief note on remittances and assistance from overseas relatives is warranted here. The Philippines has a vast overseas diaspora (cf. De Koninck and Caouette 2012); the latest numbers from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2015) estimated that over 10 million Filipinos were living outside of the archipelago as of December 2013. These numbers are reflective of a weak domestic economy that cannot provide enough quality jobs with a living wage and government policies instituted since the Marcos era of encouraging emigration (Bello, Docena et al. 2004). Many of these Filipinos maintain links with family back in the Philippines, returning every couple of months or years, and sending remittances back to family members. Many of the survivors with whom I spoke, both urban poor and middle class, received financial or other material assistance from members of their social network within or outside the country. The amounts received by the two economic classes were very different. The discrepancy helps to explain the differential capacity to rebuild lives and the speed at which it is done. For example the amounts received by the urban poor typically ranged from \$24-240, whereas the amounts were tens or hundreds of times greater for the middle class. One regional government employee described the assistance received by her neighbours living in a heavily affected middle class development.

I have a friend. Before the flood they have this small house but after the flood they were able to purchase a house at Camellia homes [an affluent gated community in CDO] because of the rich amount of money that he received from relatives and friends. It was enough to buy a house. I have another friend [who was] able to reconstruct [her] house. Now it's two-story because they received half a million [pesos] from her sister's friends in the U.S. Her sister is working in the U.S. so her officemates and friends gave money and then sent it to the Philippines. So, they were able to build a two-story house.

This quote reveals the magnitude of difference between the resources available to urban poor survivors versus those available to some middle class survivors. \$12,000 goes a lot further than \$240, especially if the family already possesses the means to cover its daily expenses. The huge

differential also helps to explain the different rebuilding strategies of middle class and working class survivors living in flood-prone parts of the city. Those with financial means mitigate risks with expensive techno-fixes. The middle class build stronger and taller houses. They can even “move” the Cagayan River, as is the case with the private Paseo del Rio skyscraper which required redirecting the river’s flow.⁴²

A personal tangent

In situating middle class survivors along the less vulnerable side of the vulnerability continuum, I do not mean to diminish their very real and traumatic experiences, and the difficulties they underwent in rebuilding their lives post-disaster. I listened attentively to many harrowing and often very tragic stories of middle class victims and survivors during my fieldwork. To a limited degree I can relate to, but never fully understand, the fear that middle class households might have experienced during Sendong. To explain this point I share another excerpt from my blog, one that I wrote during my own family’s evacuation for Super-typhoon Pablo, and posted after we had returned home safely to our compound.

SUPER-TYPHOON PABLO/BOPHA

12:35 pm – I am lying on a dorm bed in the Marigold Hotel – ironically the very same hotel I visited last week asking to speak with management about their Typhoon Sendong experiences.

Ada is finally napping. J., after a very long bout of crying, is also asleep. A. is calling her husband to check if he’s left their home for the safety of the Nestlé compound located on the other side of the national highway on higher ground away from the seashore. The Ates (literally ‘older sisters’ but used here as a term of respect for the hired help who care for A. and E.’s boys) and baby E. are sleeping on two single beds pushed together in the corner of the room. The three older boys are tearing up and down the halls, into and out of the room. Tito Frank is out on the balcony watching the storm.

Frank and I talked a lot about what to do yesterday. Looked up every weather website we could find. Diligently read up on typhoons. Calculated contact time with Mindanao and with CDO. Discussed the hazards most likely to affect us: typhoon, storm surge, flooding. Debated which details to divulge to our families and when to share them.

⁴² The Paseo del Rio has earned a notorious reputation in its short history. The mixed-use riverside development is the pet project of a prominent CDO family. It required significant political arm wrestling in order to acquire the necessary permits, in particular for permission to redirect the river’s flow. This redirection is accused as being the reason why several previously flood-free *barangays* outside of the flood-risk zones were flooded during Sendong.

The main event should hit around 2 pm. It's raining harder now. There are big gusts of wind. The girls I saw playing baseball on a first floor porch earlier this morning have left. The occasional cab, motorela and motorcycle drive by. Otherwise, the streets are eerily deserted. Corrugated sheet iron roofs threaten to cave in or fly off. Papaya trees bend in the wind.

There's nothing we can do at this point. Except pray. And write. And wait. The knot in my stomach is gone. It was there yesterday afternoon and evening and night. Maybe it's time, or maybe it's the fact that we're on the fifth floor or a solidly constructed building. Or because there's nothing we can do at this point.

Last night was long. We drove from hotel to hotel to hotel. First, we tried the hotels on high ground near the airport: Prycegas, Korseca and Condotel. Booked solid. Then, we tried the clubhouse at Xavier Estates. It's not exactly a hotel, but it has a roof and it's located on high ground. The next option was to go downtown - lower ground but multistory buildings. Hotels were full, full, full. Finally, one with an empty dorm room.

In the room are eight single beds. Each is covered with starched white linens, not the mismatched assortment of bargain sheets that cover typical dorm beds at budget hostels. Air Con. Cable T.V. Two enormous wooden wardrobes. It's the swankiest dorm room I've ever entered.

It was after midnight when we finally checked in. Ada was wired. I was exhausted. Frank paced the halls with her. Brought her outside to the fire escape, but the city lights only rewired her up more.

Not much sleep was had by anyone that night. The babies took turns crying. Babies sense trouble. A. was constantly on her mobile, checking in with her husband, father and hired help who stayed at the compound.

I had wild dreams. The rat. Ada wakes up crying. I reach my hand over to comfort her. A large dark rat scuttles along the bed frame in the space between Frank's mattress and mine. It dives down as I pull Ada in close. She screams. Loud. I shift again and the rat resurfaces a little farther down the bed. I silently curse dirty, grungy hotels. I pat Ada down, like in a first aid secondary survey, trying to identify where the rat has bitten her. I don't find any blood or tender spots. She feeds then snuggles into the crook of my neck. Frank pushes our beds even closer together.

Several hours later I shift positions. Shadows dance. My hands are a puppeteer. The rat was me; my hand motions its scurrying. Daylight, even with an imminent storm, brings calm.

3:00 pm – It's still raining - a constant, steady downpour. The eye of the storm has passed us, along with the strong winds. It's not the super-typhoon that has A. on edge; it's the rain in the mountains of neighbouring Bukidnon province. The mountains are the water catchment area for the rivers and creeks of Tablon, where we live, as well as the tributaries feeding into the Cagayan River.

An ambulance topped with a rubber boat (the white water raft kind) drives by. Sirens blare. Though huge puddles cover the roads they are still passable. Cars, vans, motorelas and taxis drive by. The visibility of the distant mountains waxes and wanes.

I am crouched in the doorway looking out onto the road, enjoying a rare cool breeze, listening to the rain. Two children dash across the street. Two people drive by on a red motorbike. The passenger holds up a purple umbrella

to shelter them from the rain. Off in the distance at the unfinished Paseo Del Rio hotel is a white crane. The rain begins to let up. People begin milling around near the wall of the Capitol.

6:20 pm – Normalcy returns with surprising speed. The brown out ends. Street lights switch on. Street vendors bring out their stalls. Stores and eateries re-open. Karaoke microphones crackle (Gibb 2012, 29 December).

The more vulnerable

The survivors located at the “more vulnerable” end of the vulnerability spectrum share two traits. First, they have one or more pre-existing conditions that render them susceptible to a shock from which they cannot recover without external assistance; they exhibit structural vulnerability. Second, these survivors are identified by trustees as being “officially” vulnerable, and are thus eligible for, and often receive, disaster assistance from government agencies, religious and non-governmental organisations.

The invisible vulnerable

Lying along the vulnerability continuum, but hidden from official eyes, are the “invisible vulnerable.” Invisible survivors experienced the classic Type I error – the rejection of a true null hypothesis (i.e. a false positive). Put another way, legitimate survivors, including many at the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum, were denied benefits for which they should have been eligible.

The omission of many people who exhibit characteristics of vulnerability was linked to their non-recognition by official conduits of aid. For example, the elderly, persons with disabilities and persons injured during the natural hazard event were described by several regional government actors and a disaster research centre as “invisible” because they typically avoid evacuation centres and cannot access mainstream services. Their invisibility is not unique to the post-disaster period, but it is exacerbated during this time. One CDO-based activist for an urban poor organisation succinctly summarised the problem and its consequences. “Even in normal circumstances people with disabilities in the Philippines do not have legislation or any special attention given to them. So in times of crisis, it’s the basics that they attend to, so sometimes they’re just left out. And a lot of them already died.” As such, disasters can reinforce or deepen pre-existing injustices.

This section briefly introduces five overlapping groups of people who exhibit many indicators of vulnerability, and who land on the “more vulnerable” side of the spectrum, but for various reasons were largely beyond the purview of official disaster assistance. These invisible groups partially overlap with the official vulnerable people identified by the trustees’ three vulnerability

approaches. Yet, for reasons discussed here, they are invisible and hence excluded from disaster relief, compensation, or other benefits.

One caveat for this section is that, by their very nature, invisible vulnerable groups can be difficult to identify and analyse because they are obscured from the public (and the researcher's) gaze. Despite efforts to seek out diverse informants who have worked with vulnerable people, the following discussion is undoubtedly limited by my access to informants and information. Furthermore, there are likely additional invisible groups that remain unknown to me.

The Muslim community

Cagayan de Oro has a significant minority Muslim population. Muslims share many city spaces with non-Muslim city residents, especially commercial spaces where Muslims own, operate and patronise small shops, market stalls and malls. The regional office of the national government agency dedicated to Muslim Filipinos, the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF), is headquartered near the city centre. Muslim households inhabit(ed) many of the *barangays* heavily affected by Typhoon Sendong, including in Carmen, Balulang, Consolacion, Nazareth, Macasandig and Iponan. According to NCMF-X records, in Balulang alone there were 407 Muslim households affected by Sendong. Yet, the Muslim community was conspicuously absent from the official post-disaster spaces. Actors in charge of post-disaster housing, including representatives from regional and city government agencies, local universities and NGOs, noted that in the vast majority of cases “Muslims just don’t go to evacuation camps or temporary and permanent housing.” Instead, Muslim survivors typically sought refuge in the houses of local relatives and friends or in their mosque, and availed of the financial and material assistance from their Muslim compatriots. There were a few exceptions in which a very small number of Muslim individuals (and not families) went to evacuation camps and received relocation housing. However, these individuals did not remain at either the camps or the relocation sites. There were plans to open a joint Muslim and Christian relocation site in Opol, and a request of the NCMF-X to fund a Muslim-only relocation site. Neither site has been built as of July 2015.

The NCMF-X is framed as a Muslim and not a state trustee for two reasons. One, it is isolated from other government agencies. Two, it operates almost exclusively in association with and on behalf of the Muslim community. The official government agency acting for Muslim residents is largely invisible to and excluded by all other government agencies at the municipal, provincial and

regional levels in CDO. Indeed, no other government agency reported on the issues of Muslim survivors, or on any activities or funds allocated to or accessed by them. Instead of lamenting their isolation from other regional government offices, NCMF-X officials emphasised the assistance from various Muslim donors. The national governments of Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, the Red Crescent International Society, and other Muslim donors sent money, halal food, Muslim clothing and other material support specifically intended for Sendong-affected Muslim communities in Region X. Not all the money, however, was actually received by the NCMF-X office, and was speculated to be lost somewhere in the coffers of the national government.

In CDO, the coexistence of communities separated along religious lines persisted in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. The usual habit of the Christian majority – including state actors – to not interfere with the city’s Muslim population went uninterrupted. The result of such non-interference, with a few notable exceptions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, was that the plight of Muslim survivors of Sendong went largely undetected by the official conduits of aid.

Just-above-the-poverty-threshold

Formal sector workers whose income teeters just barely above the poverty line were invisible vulnerable survivors, too. They typically work as administrative and support staff (such as drivers and cleaners) in government offices and businesses. A manager at a regional government office described these survivors as “taxpayers [working in] the government sector” who “are also vulnerable, receive very meager salaries and were also hard hit by the calamity.” Their salaries place them above the poverty line and their employment in the formal sector provides them with some employee benefits, so they are ineligible for many of the formal government assistance programs aimed at vulnerable populations. Yet, this population shares much in common with the urban poor working in the informal sector. They frequently live in hazard-prone areas in houses constructed with temporary materials and just eke by pay cheque to pay cheque.

The poverty threshold itself plays an important role in creating and maintaining the invisibility and vulnerability of this group. The latest numbers published by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) estimated the 2009 poverty threshold for a family living in Misamis Oriental at \$2,168.76 per annum (NEDA 2009).⁴³ This amount is the average for the

⁴³ No data on the poverty threshold for the city of Cagayan de Oro were available.

entire contiguous territory of the province, and is significantly below the minimum required to meet basic needs in CDO. The leader of a women's rights organisation in CDO contended that Philippine politicians misconstrue numbers to wrongly suggest that poverty is dropping:

The government says, 'the level of the poverty is lowered,' but the truth is that the level of the poverty is rising. The government today said, [president] Noynoy Aquino said, 'if you have 30 pesos in your pocket, you are not considered poor.' But when you take a look with the 30 pesos, what these 30 pesos can buy? 1 kilo of rice is already 42 pesos. So, is it true that if you have 30 pesos in your pocket you not considered poor? We eat only once.

In other words, she suggested that the poverty threshold is set artificially low, which, in turn, can partially explain why formal sector employees who earn more than the poverty threshold are vulnerable. They do not have the reserves to rebound after a disaster; they do not have the capacity to withstand and recover from an external shock such as Typhoon Sendong.

Unlike the plight of Muslim survivors, the difficulties of the just-above-the-poverty-threshold Sendong survivors were made visible. According to the Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121), national and subnational government agencies have a mandate to assist vulnerable people when there is a calamity (GoP 2010b). But, as CDO-based Sendong-affected government employees found out, they receive nothing. At a meeting of regional government agencies convened six months after Sendong, affected employees endorsed a resolution that the government should help government workers. They proposed a compensation scheme based on the degree of damage. The Office of the President approved the resolution in August 2012 and disbursed funds in November 2012. Eligible regional government employees with fully damaged houses received \$2,400, and those with partially damaged houses received \$720. The funding was available to all eligible regional government employees, regardless of position or income. There was no specific targeting of the most economically precarious employees. No equivalent funds were made available to other formal sector employees working in *barangay* and city government offices, private companies, and educational institutions. As such, this example demonstrates an exception in which some just-above-the-poverty-threshold Sendong survivors obtained access to official disaster aid. The example also underscores that many more just-above-the-poverty-threshold Sendong survivors working outside of regional government agencies remained invisible to official conduits of disaster aid.

Renters and sharers

The “renters and sharers” who do not own a house or have title to land were invisible Sendong survivors. Their damages and losses were ineligible for financial compensation from municipal and regional government agencies. They could, however, obtain relief goods such as food and blankets, and they could participate in livelihood assistance programs. The rationale for their exclusion, according to a regional government actor, was that “if you are a renter you can just rent anywhere. You can just leave that house and move somewhere.”

The housing compensation package for survivors reveals the economic and political priorities of the national government, as represented by regional government offices. Sendong-affected home owners are eligible for up to \$120 from each of the City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWD) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for a partially damaged house, and up to \$240 from each of CSWD and DSWD for a totally damaged house. Municipal and regional government agency workers presumed, frequently erroneously, a beneficial trickle-down effect whereby sharers would receive a portion of the financial compensation given to the owner of the house. The amount of compensation is independent of the total value of the house. In distinguishing between totally damaged and partially damaged houses and the corresponding compensation, a regional government officer explained the official state stance that structure trumped contents – regardless of the value placed on those contents by the residents themselves:

We are talking of the structure. Even if all the posts are there but it is not livable then we consider it [the house] totally damaged. [We consider it] partially [damaged] if it is just a portion of that house that is damaged. [Survivors] try to argue with us that their things, their appliances were all broken or all damaged. But we’re trying to tell them [what] we’re talking [about] here is the structure of the house, not the belongings.

The unified position of municipal and regional governments that the physical structure of a deeded house is more important than its contents disproportionately punishes renters and sharers. From a state standpoint, however, a position that rewards home ownership is desirable: owning a house with a deed immerses an individual or a household into the market economy and renders them legible to the state, which, in turn, permits the state to collect taxes or otherwise intervene (Scott 1998). But the position fails to address the reality of vulnerable renters and sharers. Even more so than the urban poor homeowners introduced earlier, who scrimp on building materials and spend on personal belonging and livelihood capital build, renters and

sharers (often urban poor themselves) opt to allocate their scarce resources to portable capital. Yet, these carpentry tools, *sari-sari* store merchandise, sewing machines, or rented *sikads* or *motorelas* – the very things that permit a livelihood – are not recognised as valuable by state trustees. In other words, the very government agencies mandated to support the recovery of the survivors of a disaster clearly discriminate against people whose net worth is tied up in the very things that allow them to eke by, instead of a physical, deeded house. The government rewards investing in the physical structure of a legible house and lot (i.e. non-portable, place-based capital) over investing in an individual or a household’s livelihood capital (i.e. portable capital).

Renters and sharers were initially ineligible to receive relocation housing. A regional government actor explained how the change to include renters and sharers at resettlement sites came about:

Under the guidelines of DSWD renters are not considered [for relocation housing]. It is very clear: you are the renter [and] you may have lost your belongings but who lost [the most]? It is the owner of the house. But I think our secretary [gave] consideration to them – for the renters and the sharers – because [of what happened] during the first summit vice president Pinay and our secretary attended [here in the city]. One of the IDPs came to that and asked, ‘Ma’am, what about us? We are just renters and we are [victims too].’ [The] secretary is pro-poor so she said, ‘Ok, we’ll give consideration to that.’ That is why in the last turnover there were renters and sharers. [The secretary] was also moved by the valid concern of a renter [insofar as] they’re survivors and should be [eligible for some compensation]. But as far as the guidelines of DSWD [are concerned,] renters are not.

The statement exposes some of the barriers faced by renters and sharers in accessing disaster assistance. Many of the important disaster management and planning meetings occurred in spaces where vulnerable people normally cannot access. The summit, for example, took place at a swanky CDO restaurant, a place rarely frequented by the urban poor. It was only after a renter snuck into the summit and implored their case to the top government officials in attendance, including the vice president and the national secretary of DSWD, that renters and sharers were reclassified as legitimate victims.

The explanation for the change in government guidelines – “the secretary is pro-poor” – reveals the informant’s attitude toward her superior and her understanding of the role of her agency. That is, the state is not officially responsible for certain people (e.g. renters and sharers), but thanks to the generosity and benevolent character of the secretary these people can obtain benefits and resources. The beneficiaries, however, still remain in a precarious situation. Anything given to

these people from the state is akin to a generous gift, and not something to which they are entitled as members of Philippine society. The original decision to exclude renters and sharers from obtaining disaster compensation and relocation housing in the design of the compensation guidelines reflects a neoliberal position that privileges ownership, and legible participants of the market economy. The modifications to the criteria indicate a willingness to extend some of the benefits to those currently outside it.

Upland communities

Communities inhabiting the rural uplands encircling three sides of CDO were also affected by Typhoon Sendong. The communities are relatively isolated because of the distance and the poor condition of the roads and the availability of transit connecting the communities to the main highways and cities. The population is a mix of *lumads* and non-*lumads*. The Higaunon, the only Indigenous Peoples currently inhabiting Misamis Oriental, lived along the Cagayan River and closer to the mouth of Macajalar Bay in pre-colonial times (Demetrio 1995, Montalvan 2002, 2009). Beginning in Spanish colonial times, they were driven inland and upland into the plateaus and mountains with the expansion of coastal cities and large-scale agricultural plantations. The post-Sendong invisibility of the Higaunon and their non-*lumad* neighbours is not surprising given the physical, economic, political, and social isolation of upland communities surrounding CDO, and the economic and political exclusion and social ghettoisation of Indigenous Peoples prevalent across the Philippines.

Sendong's catastrophic impacts were clearly visible in the lowlands (i.e. urban *barangays* in CDO): hundreds of dead and missing persons, thousands of families crammed into evacuation camps, damaged infrastructure, piles of rubble. In contrast, Sendong's impacts in the uplands were harder to see. There were no recorded deaths, and all routes connecting the upland communities to the outside world were impassible except for a precarious footpath. The main impacts of Sendong on upland communities were on people's livelihoods and their access to outside services and resources.

The hilly terrain, thin soil and thick forests that characterise the uplands are ill-suited for agriculture. The preferred, and often the only feasible, livelihood option of the Higaunon is

small-scale, manual gold panning in upper portions of the Cagayan River and its tributaries.⁴⁴ To minimise commuting time and maximise livelihood efforts, many families live in two sites: one official residence in the village centre where limited services are provided, and one temporary camp on the riverbank near the gold panning activities. Although the village residences are where people's official residency are registered, and their land titled, many households live almost exclusively in their so-called "temporary" riverbank houses located on public land. Sendong floodwaters destroyed many temporary riverbank houses, and the ensuing turbidity of the Cagayan River forced a temporary halt of gold panning. Compounding these difficulties was the destruction of routes to the outside. Not only were upland communities prevented from receiving aid, but they were also isolated from the middlemen who regularly travel to the uplands, purchase gold, and bring it to gold buyers based in CDO.

The only trustee who identified Indigenous Peoples (and upland communities more generally) as vulnerable Sendong survivors was a CDO-based international research institute. The invisibility of the Higaunon in the relief efforts is partly attributed to government bureaucracy. In the current system, any issue pertaining to Indigenous Peoples is automatically forwarded to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), even when it would be better addressed by another government agency. After Sendong, for example, the government agencies specialised in disaster risk reduction and management have more appropriate resources to deliver timely post-disaster interventions than the NCIP. The government agencies responsible for collecting data on Sendong-affected areas did not actually visit Higaunon communities. Instead, they requested information from an organisation working in affected Higaunon communities. It is unclear whether these data actually informed official relief and recovery activities. The inattention from government agencies appears to have been anticipated, as demonstrated by the disaster recovery and rebuilding initiatives taken by the Higaunon. For example, a member of the local tribal council donated land for on-site relocation. As such, the invisibility of upland communities (and especially *lumads*), like that of CDO's Muslim population, illustrates that disasters can exaggerate or amplify existing exclusionary and punitive structures and processes embedded in society.

⁴⁴ According to Philippine mining laws, the manual gold panning activities of the Higaunon are classified as illegal mining. The mining equipment and gold stock of the Higaunon are regularly confiscated by government officials.

Hors-système survivors

The final example of invisible survivors are the people who, either deliberately or inadvertently, avoided official post-disaster spaces. Consequently, they remained largely unbeknownst to the state and non-state trustees directing and distributing disaster relief and recovery assistance. I call these invisible people “*hors-système* survivors” or outside-the-system survivors. Two groups of *hors-système* survivors have already been introduced. Lying near the less vulnerable end of the continuum, the middle class survivors who used various means at their disposal to avoid evacuation camps and relocation sites are the first group. The second group comprises the invisible Muslim survivors. Muslim survivors typically self-selected themselves out of official post-disaster spaces for reasons discussed in the following chapter.

A third group of *hors-système* survivors consists of survivors who demonstrate characteristics of vulnerability and who employed self-initiated strategies for rebuilding their lives and livelihoods with minimal or no official assistance. That this group of vulnerable non-middle class, non-Muslim *hors-système* people exists was made clear in December 2012 when Super-typhoon Pablo hit Mindanao. Religious, state and NGO trustees all noted that many of the city’s evacuation centres were full, including from pre-emptive evacuations in anticipation of the storm. The people at the centres were predominantly urban poor who (1) continued to reside in flood-prone areas, (2) had not received a house at a relocation site, and (3) were aware that to be eligible for a free concrete house, you must stay at an evacuation site. The post-disaster trajectories of this third group, and the city spaces most critical to them will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6.

Summing up the vulnerability continuum

Laying out vulnerability along a continuum is helpful in unpacking the range of Sendong survivors and their experiences. The continuum is informed by the three major approaches to vulnerability, and takes into account the variation that exists within communities, households and even individuals. It acknowledges that less vulnerable survivors were affected by Typhoon Sendong. At the same time, it shows which people (e.g. those clustered at the more vulnerable end of the spectrum) lack the resources and capabilities to quickly recover from a disaster. It also gives a place to invisible survivors who span the continuum, so called because of their neglect by the official conduits of disaster relief. Before delving into the post-disaster spaces accessed by and off limits to all of the Sendong survivors lying along the vulnerability spectrum, a discussion on one more aspect of vulnerability is required. In the next section, I present the major discourses

characterising the survivors located at the more vulnerable end of the continuum. These narratives are created, advanced, modified and endorsed by trustees; they are accepted, rejected and perpetuated by the subjects themselves. These narratives also play an influential role in the targeting of beneficiaries, the design and delivery of disaster assistance and resettlement programs, the mobility of more vulnerable and invisible survivors, and the exclusionary nature of post-disaster spaces.

Vulnerability discourses

In Cagayan de Oro, five major discourses were used to designate and characterise vulnerable people affected by Typhoon Sendong. These discourses are apparent in the language used by and the attitudes of trustees, the types of disaster assistance, and the formal and informal rules over access to assistance. The five narratives overlap, and occasionally contradict each other. Each one advances or hinders a specific agenda. Not surprisingly, intervening actors adopted one or more discourses to support their particular agenda. The discourses had real repercussions on the lives of Sendong survivors, in determining their access to resources, and in shaping where they went to rebuild their lives. The ensuing discussion is based on things said explicitly in interviews and official reports, as well on other things unsaid, but understood and often reinforced by the decisions and actions of trustees.

Data from key informant interviews are especially relevant to uncovering the vulnerability discourses because interviews can reveal the “mental maps that people carry around inside their heads, and that it is this, rather than some videotape of reality, which is of interest to us” (Luker 2008, 167). The interviews do not portray “a realistic account of some aspect of social life;” instead, they expose “ ‘narratives’, stories about what the person being interviewed *thinks* happened, or thinks *should have* happened, or even *wanted* to have happen” (Luker 2008, 167, *emphasis in original*). Because the same narratives or mental maps were repeated by different sources, the following discourses are socially-, and not just individually-, held. In labeling and characterising each of the discourses, I have tried to use the specific terms used by the trustees and the survivors.

The Internally Displaced Person (IDP) discourse

To discuss their work, “IDP” was the default descriptor used by most representatives of regional and municipal government agencies directly implicated in Sendong relief, recovery and rebuilding

efforts. This choice may reflect a recent proposal for the Philippine government to enshrine the *United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement* into law. It is the term used by many humanitarian organisations and Catholic institutions, as well as by many of the survivors themselves. In CDO, the use of the term “IDP” is generally restricted to people who lived at evacuation centres, and temporary and permanent housing sites. As such, the IDP discourse in CDO became associated with the official more vulnerable category of survivors who lack the capacity to recover from the disaster without external assistance. Yet, the official international definition of an internally displaced person could apply equally to all persons displaced temporarily or permanently by Sendong, irrespective of where they lie along the vulnerability spectrum. According to Article 2 of the *United Nations guiding principles on internal displacement*, IDPs are

people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (OCHA 2004).

The pervasiveness of the IDP discourse in CDO proclaims the idea that disaster relief is and should be devoid of partisan politics. Yet, the narrative’s local focus on a subset of IDPs reveals a decision to concentrate efforts on certain people and not on others – a decision that could not be entirely divorced from political influence.

The widespread adoption of the IDP language reflects the implementation of the cluster approach and its targeting of “IDP” beneficiaries in the overall coordination of disaster relief in CDO. As part of the United Nations Humanitarian Reform process, the cluster approach was established in 2006 and has since been used in more than 30 developing countries (WHO 2015, Humanitarian Response no date). By grouping agencies into 11 needs-based thematic clusters (Fig. 5.2), the cluster approach aims to improve coordination among UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations and to clearly delineate responsibilities, thereby ensuring predictable, rapid and effective disaster response, and eliminating the duplication of efforts (WHO 2015). In CDO, it was the regional government agencies, and not the United Nations, that coordinated disaster relief and recovery. These agencies, however, used a slightly modified version of the UN cluster approach, and received significant on-the-ground support from UN staff and international

humanitarian organisations accustomed to working under the approach.




Fig. 5.2. The cluster approach groups agencies into needs-based thematic clusters. The cluster approach helps improve coordination among UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations and clearly delineate responsibilities, thereby ensuring predictable, rapid and effective disaster response, and eliminating the duplication of efforts. Acronyms are: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO). Source: Humanitarian Response (no date).

Which survivors self-identified as “IDPs” demonstrates the penetration of the IDP discourse in official post-disaster spaces. The Sendong survivors most likely to describe themselves and their former neighbours (including the people who avoided official post-disaster spaces) as IDPs were those who were living in temporary and permanent relocation housing and who had lived in

evacuation sites for many weeks or months. Their community-based counterparts who had spent minimal time in official post-disaster spaces and were not living in one when I interviewed them in 2012 and 2013 were less likely to self-identify as IDPs. As such, the former group has internalised the official IDP discourse presented by trustees operating in post-disaster spaces, and encouraging the participation of IDPs in trainings and other interventions.

The prevalence of the IDP discourse in official government reports, politicians' speeches, and conversations among staff working in evacuation camps, and temporary and permanent resettlement sites derived from its perceived neutrality and technicality. The UN, international humanitarian organisations, and more importantly, the international standards they endorse were carefully crafted to be seen as politically neutral. Employing the IDP discourse to describe the target beneficiaries or programs at relocation sites reflects an attempt to depoliticise and to render universal the activities of trustees. The discourse also helped depict a trustee as fair and impartial; this attribute was especially important for the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) in charge of coordinating and distributing relocation housing. According to a senior staff at a municipal government office, it was imperative that LIAC was perceived as non-partisan and adhering strictly to the official housing eligibility guidelines, especially given the committee was headed by the mayor.

The way Catholic trustees used the IDP discourse illustrates how the international IDP definition was reworked into a locally-relevant IDP discourse. Representatives, including the archbishop, the camp managers recommended by local Church officials, and the staff members working at a resettlement site run by a Catholic university, emphasised that IDPs had pre-existing indicators of vulnerability in terms of their political standing, housing situation and economic opportunities. In the passage below, a member of the clergy describes the conditions that explain the structural vulnerability of internally displaced persons. To underline the difficulties they face he articulated which opportunities should be given to them post-Sendong:

[T]hese internally displaced persons were maybe already marginalised – on the fringes, literally, of society and the riverbanks. But now, with Typhoon Sendong, they're given a chance to be relocated and given even permanent housing. So the challenge is really to also provide livelihood activities and to make them more stable, to give them more regular employment or self-employment. And to create, in that sense, communities of hope, [so that] they're not only always living in, maybe, conditions that are like the slum.

Catholic trustees adopted IDP language to indicate their work targeted structurally vulnerable Sendong-affected people. For example, available church spaces were opened up to temporarily house “IDPs” and the grounds of the archdiocese’s two seminaries were converted into transitional housing sites for “IDPs.” Clerical and lay religious groups were also encouraged to “minister to the IDPs” in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong as part of the twelfth cluster – a CDO archdiocese-initiated religious or spiritual needs cluster. The religious cluster attended to the “assure individual salvation in the next world” component of the old pastoral power exercised by religious institutions (Foucault 2003a, 132). The IDP discourse was used to insinuate non-discriminatory selection of beneficiaries, and to legitimise the governmental interventions of Catholic trustees.

The IDP discourse was not the only vulnerability discourse invoked by humanitarian, state and Catholic institutions in describing their various post-disaster activities. Many of these same organisations, along with CDO-based NGOs and activist groups, also used variations of a survivor and victim discourse in justifying other aspects of their post-disaster efforts.

Survivor and victim discourses

Different interviewees and documents bandied about the terms “survivor” and “victim.” In some instances, the word was carefully chosen to advance a specific agenda or to adhere to a strict definition. In other cases, the terms were used interchangeably. As explained in Chapter 1, I use the term “survivor” to describe persons directly affected by Typhoon Sendong who did not die in the hazard event, and the term “victim” for people who died or went missing during Sendong. This distinction was also used in the archdiocese’s survivor and victim database. In this section, I interrogate the meanings of survivor and victim, who uses which term and why, and the ramifications of such usage.

Creating legitimacy and rendering legible

The default term to describe the people affected by Sendong, including people who lived, went missing and died, was “victim.” The term “Sendong victim” referred to individuals who were deemed legitimate persons affected by Sendong. “Sendong victims” were the intended recipients of the generous relief packages donated by prominent Filipino politicians and celebrities who toured CDO in late December 2011. “Sendong victims” benefited from sympathetic provincial

politicians who permitted them to camp on Capitol grounds for almost a year. “Sendong victims” even obtained “too much assistance from the Church,” according to one archdiocese worker.

Because victims were entitled to various forms of disaster assistance, Sendong-affected people were motivated to self-identify as “victims.” Victims classified as legitimate were identified by special identification cards, which rendered them legible to state and non-state actors. Official proof of residence was required to obtain a card. Sometimes, it was sufficient just to provide an address because the *barangay* officials who issued cards knew which streets were flooded. The cards enabled state actors to record information about household members, former address, length of stay in CDO, etc., and to track each time a victim received relief goods or participated in disaster assistance activities. According to a senior official at a regional government agency issuing the cards, the official government records are incomplete because the individuals who distributed the cards left many blanks. She attributes this error to a lack of training and to the high demand for cards immediately after the disaster. Victims had to show their card every time they obtained relief goods at evacuation centres or other sites where official aid was distributed. The amount of aid for which a victim was eligible was related to their address. On known middle class streets, victims received the card and little else, whereas victims with a known working class address were allocated greater benefits. The card was also required for participation in short-term income-generating opportunities such as cash-for-work or food-for-work programs in which victims were paid a nominal honorarium.

Not only were the identification cards critical for obtaining disaster relief goods, but they were also essential for government benefits such as compensation for totally and partially damaged houses, and indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing persons. The private sector also gave special treatment to the people with these cards. For example, airlines allowed middle class “victims” to postpone their flights over the Christmas holidays without paying a penalty so that they could clean and repair their houses. Thus, there was a monetary incentive to claim the “victim” label. Unlike the IDPs who were presumed to be poor, Sendong victims included people from all economic classes and who spanned the entire vulnerability continuum.

Promoting healing

The survivor and victim narrative was also used to promote healing. For example, distinguishing between survivors and victims was especially important in the design and implementation of psychosocial counseling of Sendong-affected persons. From 17 to 25 December 2011, a team from Ateneo de Manila University trained CDO-based faculty members, graduate students, and other interested individuals to help debrief the adults affected by Sendong, while recruiting artists to help the children. From Christmas into January 2012, volunteer counselors met with survivors in evacuation centres and churches, and referred serious cases to professional health workers. The Manila-based team drew on their experience assisting people after Typhoon Ondoy back in 2009. They emphasised talking not to “victims” but to “survivors.” One volunteer counselor, a sociology professor, explained that this “first aid counseling” really helped survivors in “process[ing] the experience.” Telling their stories to an attentive listener “allows people to ventilate their feelings, their emotions during the flood.” As such, the counselors promoted psychological healing by reinforcing the positive image of a survivor who works through difficult experiences by expressing themselves and moving on with the help of others.

Shifting from a victim to a survivor narrative was also important in promoting other forms of healing. According to several trustees, the shift must be internalised by the survivors themselves so that they stop relying on aid from government agencies and NGOs. One senior staff at a regional government agency explained the challenge of changing an established narrative partway through the post-disaster period.

During the first few months in the transitory [phase] we’re trying to explain to the people that we are no longer in the emergency phase. As far as [our agency] is concerned, we have already provided livelihood at the camp for them, so I think that is also the time when they have to start standing on their own feet. And, although there are some who feel [cheated and use] an excuse [of] being a vict- a survivor of that calamity.

Ironically, the “victim or survivor excuse” that she lamented as problematic draws upon the “legitimate victim” and “IDP” narratives developed and perpetuated by the very same agency.

A final example of using – or in this case eliminating – a victim narrative to promote healing was emphasised in a speech delivered by an NGO worker who oversaw the building of nearly half of all resettlement houses in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan. In December 2012, he was a guest of

honour at a symbolic housing turnover event at Ecoville,⁴⁵ the Jesuit University-run relocation site. He stressed the need to stop thinking of Ecoville residents as “victims” and to start thinking of them as “homeowners.” “Victim” connotes dependence, whereas “homeowner” connotes self-sufficiency and agency. His remarks were aimed as much at Ecoville residents as they were at the other attendees – people in positions of power to craft and disseminate discourses. The speaker’s comments also reinforced the community-oriented philosophy guiding Ecoville’s development. His deliberate attempt to change the conversation also served to depoliticise the potentially empowering language and behaviour of a victim and survivor discourse.

Inspiring advocacy

Several NGOs invoked another iteration of a survivor and victim discourse to advance their advocacy agenda. These NGOs strategically employed the terms “survivor” and “victim” to rally support for their causes and to call out state failures. The discursive power of language was harnessed as a form of resistance against the improvement schemes woven into post-disaster efforts. Resistance, according to Li (2005, 391) “involves not simply rejection but the creation of something new, as people articulate their critiques, find allies, and reposition themselves in relation to the various powers they must confront.” Local NGOs and activists encouraged Sendong-affected persons to use the term “survivor” to represent proactive methods and ideas, an unwillingness to just sit around and wait to be given your just due, and a rallying cry to unmask injustice and demand remedies. These trustees emphasised the passivity of the term “victim” and its connotation with something done to you over which you have limited capacity to do anything about.

A federation of urban poor people organised groups of Sendong-affected persons into “survivor collectives” or “SOS collectives” (Survivors of Sendong). It was through these collectives that the federation and other local NGOs delivered services and distributed relief goods. Survivor collectives met regularly to discuss their problems and needs, to develop strategies to lobby the government to meet their demands, and to organise picket rallies. Survivor collectives were

⁴⁵ No houses were actually turned over to beneficiaries during the ceremony. Ecoville residents had agreed to move from their temporary bunkhouses into their new concrete resettlement houses *en masse* once all houses were ready. The move happened in July 2013.

conceived as a long-term tool for building capacity and meeting community needs long after the foreign humanitarian agencies left CDO. As one organiser put it:

We try to empower these communities that have survivors. We form mass organisations. We train them as health workers, train them as psychosocial workers. We also conduct discussions on [environmental] awareness and [how] to prepare for disasters. We try to maintain these services because most of the foreign funding, for example, just went there to give relief for a few months. After that, they just took off. So it's our collectives that have been working [since] that time helping out in providing different services.

Survivor collectives were also used as spaces for replacing a charity-based notion of development with an advocacy and benefits-come-after-struggle one. The destruction precipitated by Sendong was a propitious opportunity for achieving the agendas of local activist organisations. The same informant recounted that,

We've been trying to educate people. When the typhoon came and aid was happening [i.e. pouring in] all these people were just expecting aid to come in. So this is a very charity-based notion of development. They were just receiving [aid] without having to do anything [for] it afterwards. So, we've been trying to upgrade their consciousness [so] that they can demand better services [from] the government. It's a good opportunity for us to organise communities [around] other issues as well. We have urban poor organisers but sometimes we can only organise them when there's threat to their house, like demolitions. [When] there's an urgent threat, they [see] that the only way for them to surmount this [obstacle] is to organise. For example on Earth Day, we have been able to mobilise these collectives to be in the streets and to demand the local government do something about disaster prevention and stuff. So they were talking about mining and plantations and stuff. There's no other people who can demand it better than the people who have been victimised themselves.

Indeed, survivors wielded power. The power of survivor collectives derived from the coordinated pressure of large numbers of people. Without constant pressure from a significant voter base, there was a tendency for government agencies to ignore the plight of those in need. In her dual roles as the leader of a women's advocacy group in Region X and the head of a survivor collective, one informant observed that protesting collectively was the most effective way of ensuring demands were acknowledged and acted upon by government officials. She noted that survivors must first learn their rights and then ways to assert them.

Once you educate the people they know how to assert their rights, assert their 'I want to avail this one. I want to because I am qualified. I am Sendong survivor.' Because the government will just wait, [and justify their inaction by saying] 'no one came here to ask.'

That the survivor collectives were effective was demonstrated by skyrocketing membership numbers in urban poor advocacy groups post-Sendong. Membership in an urban poor federation doubled from 3,000 to 6,000 after Sendong, with “survivors” constituting the greatest number of new members. The local leader attributes the jump to the fact that

most people, after Sendong, [were] looking for an organisation to deal with the problems of victims. If they have a problem, the government doesn’t hear them. So, people need an organisation to hear grievances, problems. That’s the reason why most victims become a member voluntarily.

A similar rise in membership in a women’s advocacy group was also observed after Sendong, with women “victims” joining the group and later redefining themselves as “survivors.” At an all-female focus group discussion, women survivors explained that they, along with their female neighbours and friends, joined the group and began doing advocacy work on behalf of survivors and urban poor women more generally after Sendong. For them, the typhoon was a catalyst to get involved, educate themselves, and advocate for their rights. In other words, the narrative held by the urban poor about themselves was reframed from “victim” to “survivor advocate.” The NGOs they joined post-Sendong were instrumental in directing and supporting this discursive shift.

Another critical incentive for joining an NGO advocating on behalf of survivors was gaining access to resources, especially information. As explained by the leader of a women’s advocacy group in Region X, actively participating in church or civic groups increased access:

Only those who were very active on the *barangay*, active on the church, active on the civic organisation know about it [e.g. times and locations of relief distribution, requirements for obtaining disaster assistance, rights and entitlements of survivors, etc.]. How about those who are not active on that field? They [women survivors] were just at home [in the community]. They were just busy, busy thinking on how to survive. So there was a problem. And that factor is information dissemination. And, including, maybe, education.

In addition to membership in organised groups or associations, regular exchanges with a charismatic leaders were also essential in accessing important and timely information. For example, the above-cited informant was singled out in several survivor interviews with survivors living in her *barangay* and in the neighbouring *barangays* as someone who had successfully demanded benefits for survivors in her community. Urban poor survivors frequently referred to these leaders as “*barangay* champions.” The relevance of social networks was particularly

important for people who remained in the community, outside of the official evacuation sites. People lacking connections were severely disadvantaged because they did not know what they did not know, and consequently, they missed out.

The same organisations that coordinated “survivor collectives” simultaneously referred to “Sendong victims.” Here, the NGOs deliberately play upon the helpless victim discourse to emphasise state failure and obligation. By pointing out the inadequate response to meet the needs of Sendong “victims,” NGOs reminded people of the responsibility of the government to fulfil its legal and moral obligations. An insistence upon helping Sendong “survivors,” presumed to be back on their own two feet, would not have had the same discursive power. The following statement of an NGO advocate is illustrative; it shows that (1) the NGO thought of people as “survivors,” (2) the government disbursed limited support to “victims” and (3) support was obtained by proactive “survivors.”

The Sendong survivor, as of now, has a lot of struggle. The government, actually, gives minimal, minimal support to the victims, actually. This support is not merely or simply given to the survivors, but this support is obtained by the survivors through struggles.

People’s organisations also cited a Sendong victim discourse to achieve broad, long-term organisational goals such as promoting fair agrarian reform and stopping the land-grabbing activities of multinational corporations. For example, on 19 February 2013 the New People’s Army (NPA) launched simultaneous attacks on the Dole Philippines and Del Monte Philippines Inc. (DMPI) pineapple plantations in Bukidnon and the canning plant in Bugo, just east of CDO. Local spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) Mindanao Jorge Madlos justified the attacks, contending that pineapple plantations in Bukidnon had worsened the impact of Typhoon Sendong in CDO. The two newspaper excerpts below remind readers that the state and its allies failed Sendong victims.

‘The punitive attacks against the multinational plantations have long been demanded by the indigenous people and peasant masses in Bukidnon and other parts of Mindanao whose ancestral lands have been seized, plundered, despoiled and poisoned by big foreign multinational corporations,’ said NDF-Mindanao spokesperson Jorge ‘Ka Oris’ Madlos. Madlos said the raids were ‘measures against the multinational corporations whose operations in the province are among the root causes of the massive flooding in Cagayan de Oro in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong in December 2011. [...] This is one way of delivering justice to the 2,000 people who died in the floods.[...] We have been calling on the owners and operators of these plantations to reorient their businesses and stop the

expansion of their plantations in Mindanao. These plantations have caused grave damage to the environment' (Fernandez 2013).

And,

Madlos said 'pineapple plantations in Bukidnon' worsened the impact of the storm. He said DMPI and Dole Philippines are the same multinational corporations that allegedly abused laborers, amassed large plantation areas that could have been subjected to land reform, and damaged the environment. 'This is our way to search for justice for the Sendong victims,' he said (Balane 2013).

The NDF clearly relied upon the strategic use of a Sendong victim narrative to garner public sympathy. The careful deployment of survivor and victim narratives was similarly demonstrated by other trustees, advocates, and even the subjects of the discourses themselves. The strategic use of language was also evident in other discourses, notably the illegal squatter and informal settler discourse.

Illegal squatter and informal settler discourses

The illegal squatter and informal settler narratives underline the precarious housing situation of vulnerable Cagayaños, which, in turn, is linked to larger economic, political and legal processes. These discourses were primarily narrated, advanced and used by trustees, and not by the people to whom the labels were applied. These discourses strongly influenced the post-Sendong efforts of many trustees, notably the mass relocation of thousands of urban poor households into newly constructed resettlement sites. This is because most of the city residents who were heavily affected by Typhoon Sendong and did not have the capacity to recover on their own were and in some cases remain illegal squatters and informal settlers. A city official explained these people had been identified for resettlement prior to Typhoon Sendong:

There are a lot of people residing within areas where [it is] not really a dignified place or a suitable place for these families who came in the city. The city is growing. There are opportunities for livelihood. So the situation cannot be avoided. The areas badly hit by Sendong were already occupied by these people. [With the help of a municipal office,] they are being organised [into a] landless association [whose] main purpose is [to help] them to avail of security of land [tenure] where their houses were rebuilt. So when Sendong strikes in the city, these areas were badly hit by that flood so there are thousands of people being victimised. Now, during that time [a municipal office] has already listed all the names of those residing on those areas. You might say those are danger areas.

As revealed in the statement, the beneficiaries were vulnerable for several reasons: they lived in substandard housing, they needed work, they fled a worse economic situation, they were

newcomers to the city and likely have a limited social network, they did not belong to associations and were thus denied the indirect social and informational benefits of membership, they were landless, they were likely poor. Yet, the overriding factor driving their vulnerability was presumed to be an insecure and unsafe housing situation.

As my research assistant succinctly summarised, illegal squatters and informal settlers are people who “don’t have lot numbers” and thus don’t pay property taxes. So-called informal settlements (i.e. slums) are “unplanned, usually overcrowded, have poor sanitation and other basic facilities, and are not in compliance with current planning regulation and building standards” and “have been constructed on land that the occupants have no legal claim to” (OCD 2012, 13). In the city, the landowners may be absentee landlords, speculative developers, or the municipal or national government. Frequently, these sites are located near the city centre on prime real estate where the government could be collecting taxes and generating significant revenue. As one academic informant explained, “when people squat on prime real estate, it’s more expensive to keep people in informal areas than to resettle them in the city somewhere else.” This issue is especially relevant in Manila with several mostly failed relocation attempts, but also exists to a lesser extent in other urban hubs in the archipelago where land is deemed more valuable than certain people.

Cagayan de Oro has a history of transferring people from land when it is economically and politically desirable. For example, prior to the 1960s and 1970s CDO and its environs were densely forested; the areas and the people living there have since been cleared out to make way for logging and mining activities. More recently, the mayor’s *pisso-pisso* program let poor city residents purchase a small lot for one peso upon which he or she could build a house. Residents living on a designated *pisso-pisso* property lived with uncertainty, never knowing if and when the city might evict them. An urban poor federation worker described his wariness of the program:

You only borrow [the land for] as long as the government doesn’t use the land. But when the government needs land for other purposes you can be demolished. That’s why we critique that kind of program – no security to live there. In our experience here, when the government or private interests want the land, they’ll demolish the people.

The regional leader of a national women’s organisation recalled her personal experience with demotion (albeit not on a *pisso-pisso* lot). In 2000, she was living in *barangay* Puntod and the alleged landowner asserted that he wanted the so-called illegal squatters off his land. The city government supported his claim. It planned to relocate them to *barangay* Canitoan, which at that

time was poorly serviced by roads and was considered very remote. For two months, she and her neighbours staged protests in the city's main square, demanding to be relocated to a part of the city near their livelihoods. The protestors won and were relocated to flood-prone Consolacion. The Puntod lot is still vacant. The experience had a lasting impact both on the woman's personal trajectory as an activist and a community leader, and on her household's livelihood and living situation. She elaborated:

We are afraid of maybe, someday, we will be demolished again, and we'll be displaced again. Actually the program of the government on housing, especially *pisso-pisso*, has no guarantee and security of tenure. That's the reason my husband works much [in the Middle East as an overseas Filipino worker]. Because he doesn't want that our kids would experience the same terror with demolition.

In her story, the informant connects different scales of intertwining economic and political processes. Private interests at the local scale are prioritised by elected officials who impose evictions and, only after much protesting, acquiesce by allocating inexpensive untitled lots to the evictees near their livelihoods. Yet these sites were hazard-prone and severely affected by Sendong. Land tenure there is uncertain. The traumatic experience of forced eviction and demolition spurred a desire to purchase a titled house and lot. Yet, there are limited job options in CDO that pay enough to turn this desire into a reality. It thus became a rational choice to split the household and send one member to work overseas for most of the year. This temporary situation has been going on for eight years with no foreseeable end date. As illustrated by these examples, political and economic quandaries underlie illegal squatter and informal settler discourses.

In written and oral communications, academics, municipal and regional government workers, businesspeople, and Catholic Church officials defaulted to a euphemistic "informal settlers" language. These trustees only applied the "illegal squatters" label to people living in places where they were expressly unwanted (as opposed to being in places where they were tolerated as "informal settlers") or to people presumed to be illegitimate claimants. According to a city official, some beneficiaries of the city's ongoing relocation program were "squatters living in sites that were to be demolished by private companies and public groups like the city," thus illustrating the squatter-as-an-unwanted-person-living-where-he-or-she-is-not-wanted narrative. The illegitimate claimant narrative was demonstrated by a government bureaucrat recalling a case of

fraudulent Sendong claimants who “squatted” on the provincial Capitol grounds long after the last legitimate “Sendong victims” had been transferred to transitional or permanent relocation sites:

The city government and the DSWD issued a statement [demanding the evacuees demonstrate that] they are really the persons affected during the typhoon and that their residences or their houses are located in this [Sendong-affected] areas. They cannot comply with the requirements, so they remain there. So these [evacuees] are part of the squatters. They cannot comply with the requirements so they cannot be placed in the resettlement areas.

These two examples clearly show the negative association of a squatter discourse.

During two field seasons interviewing people in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, not a single person actually called him- or herself an “illegal squatter” or an “informal settler.” Nobody described their neighbourhood as a “slum” or an “informal settlement.” Rather, the so-called squatters and informal settlers talked about themselves and their neighbours as “residents of *barangay* or *sitio* X” or “survivors or victims of Typhoon Y” or “IDPs.” By distancing themselves from the terms, the residents rejected the imposition of external labels and their negative connotations. This observation elucidates two key elements of the informal settlers and illegal squatter discourses.

First, being called a squatter in a slum is denigrating; the social perception of such living conditions is pejorative and dehumanising. This sentiment has been largely internalised by the people who live in such places, and by the people and agencies who aim to “build capacity” or otherwise assist the people living there. While trustees purport to intervene in slums, they refuse to have the final results of their work associated with these same slums. This fear drives the shelter-related disaster rebuilding programs of some trustees. For example, a project coordinator based out of the national headquarters of a major international humanitarian organisation explained that her organisation’s solutions to post-disaster shelter needs are only temporary. Although the organisation could distribute building materials to survivors, they opted against it because of potential legal and financial repercussions for the organisation. As she put it, “what if [the organisation’s] logo goes up in an illegal squatter area?”

CDO-based trustees were also afraid that Sendong relocation sites might deteriorate into slums. Some of the major donors to Ecoville were explicit in their instructions that “Ecoville should not

be a slum like some of the other relocation sites.” Consequently, Xavier University took concrete measures to avoid such an outcome; for example, it insisted upon building housing units that exceeded the minimum standard, and its on-site team is set on creating a community and not just houses. The aversion to slums is also shared by the members of a local foundation whose aim is to promote investment and tourism in CDO. The foundation’s president even expressed his members’ concern to the city that each of the relocation sites may not be receiving enough support to “prevent it [from] becoming a slum area.”

Second, the illegal squatter and informal settler discourses are imposed by politically, economically and socially powerful actors onto less politically, economically and socially powerful actors. The terms are employed by those in positions of authority. The discourses reinforce the difference between “us” and “them,” creating or accentuating sometimes artificial differences, and reinscribing power differentials. The narratives thus perpetuate difference and hierarchy. Even the politically correct “informal settler” euphemism stresses the outsider character of the person; he or she is *informal*, and therefore outside of the system – be it the economic, political or legal system. The term emphasises the difference between those within the system (e.g. formal settlers living in formal settlements) and those living outside of it, and the precarity and exclusion this location imposes. This outsider aspect of the informal settler and illegal squatter narrative is especially pertinent to the design of permanent post-disaster spaces. Resettlement sites are designed to bring informal settlers and illegal squatters into the fold of formal societal structures by relocating these people into formal settlements in which the residents have signed a legal agreement ensuring their entitlement to a house and lot.

The deficiency discourse

The deficiency discourse was another narrative that heavily influenced the post-disaster programs of trustees. To a lesser extent, Sendong survivors clustered at the more vulnerable end of the spectrum accepted the discourse – as evidenced by their participation in these programs and by the retelling of their Sendong stories. The deficiency discourse is about what is missing or inadequate in the lives of vulnerable survivors. It focuses on everything from material objects to morals and values to awareness of social norms to inclusion in social and cultural institutions.

A lack of material goods and financial resources is one component of the deficiency discourse. It is perhaps the most visible and visceral aspect of the discourse. It compelled trustees, Cagayaños

(including some urban poor survivors themselves), and people from around the world to donate generously to the disaster relief efforts. Vulnerable people lack sufficient quality food, they don't have spare cash to buy their children toys, they do not have sturdy houses built on lots to which they hold a legal deed, etc. If someone in the household falls ill, they do not have enough savings to cover medical bills, prescription drugs, and sometimes even the transportation fare to the clinic or hospital. These deficiencies were attributed to a lack of stable, secure, well-paying livelihoods. Consequently, the subjects of this discourse lack money and are thus compelled to avail of free or cheap options. The founder of an NGO providing free health services explained that

the low income class – D, E, F community – [consists of] the low income families are usually dumped in a relocation area. They don't have any choice where to live. They don't have money, they don't have relatives to accept them. They are just waiting for the government, and some other non-government organisations to accommodate them [in evacuation centres and transitional and permanent relocation housing sites].

Trustees quickly addressed the specific needs evidenced by this aspect of the deficiency discourse. For their immediate disaster relief activities, trustees provided food, water, blankets, mosquito bed nets, shelter, clothes, medical missions, medicine and small amounts of cash. For their short to medium term activities, they continued providing this type of aid and also added building materials, construction labourers, school supplies and school fees and livelihood assistance. For their medium to long term activities, they reduced their distribution of relief items and concentrated instead on allocating concrete relocation houses to eligible survivors.

Included in the deficiency discourse is the idea that vulnerable Sendong survivors lack appropriate morals, values, and spiritual guidance. Informants expressed the idea in various ways. The police, for example, noted that theft increased in Sendong-affected *barangays* in December 2011 and was rising in the relocation sites. It is not this observation but the officers' explanation that insinuates a moral deficiency: "the Sendong survivors came from everywhere in the city," and some of them were "already thieves." Only after much discussion did one officer suggest an underlying economic rationale for the theft: "maybe because Sendong survivors were already thieves because of poverty." One camp manager attributed some of the difficulties faced by the "IDPs" to a lack of moral support and spiritual guidance. She recalled her interventions in a domestic disputes, musing "it's, maybe, they need some advice. The family lacks moral support

or spiritual advisers.” A perceived absence of religious piety among Sendong-affected persons was not restricted to trustees. In key informant and survivor interviews alike, interviewees proposed that the devastation wrought by Typhoon Sendong was retribution from a higher power (usually God) judging immoral people. For example, at several points during the interview one camp manager suggested that God sent Typhoon Sendong to spur people living in “squatter areas” to change their sinful ways.

Before when they are staying in I., they are prostitutes, dancers. Prostitutes are rampant in O. Gamblers. Maybe God wants them to be changed. [I told my IDPs,] ‘Please change. God is giving us time to change because Sendong [was] really sent by God to help a change in lives.’ Men and women, the old, the young, they are crying maybe because they are living in the squatter area here in O. Changing wives, changing husbands is rampant in O. But now maybe they are changed. Some [now] have *motors* for livelihood. [I tell them,] ‘You go to church, whatever is your religion, go to the church. In the morning you just say ‘Lord, thank you for the new life. Thank you Lord we are still alive.’ God is happy because God is waiting for us, for a change.’

As such, the deficiency discourse emphasises the purported deviant, uninformed and non-Christian individual behaviour of vulnerable people.

The narrative also suggests that vulnerable people operate outside of the social and cultural norms of Philippine society, where the norms are set primarily by the middle and upper classes. For instance, a staff member who worked closely with Sendong survivors noted that they did not possess cultural knowledge about “the Pinoy way of getting along” and trusting other people. Another informant working at a municipal government office pointed to cases in which children were abused by their parents in the evacuation centres, insinuating that evacuees lacked a respect for the family institution in general and for their children and partners in particular. The perceived lack of adherence to major social and cultural institutions is perhaps best illustrated by the efforts of various Catholic trustees, led by the archdiocese, to join unwed IDP couples in holy matrimony and to baptise their children. To remedy this purported deficiency in certain Sendong survivors, trustees implemented diverse initiatives to bring into mainstream social and cultural institutions those previously outside of them.

A final component of the deficiency narrative is a claim that vulnerable survivors lacked the personal drive or motivation to improve their situation. Some government workers and humanitarian aid workers expressed disgust at the oft-repeated “survivor excuse” and a desire for

survivors to be independent, and rely on their own livelihood income instead of “dole-outs from the government.” This position was the national government’s rationale for spending millions of pesos on livelihood assistance for survivors.

So in fact there was an order from Manila [headquarters] to saturate all [the livelihood assistance program] because there is really money for that. Because, you know, we wanted people to be independent, we don’t want people to just make an excuse that they are survivors. So that is why the direction also of the office is really to capacitate them and have their own livelihood.

Not all government workers agreed, however, that it was the government’s responsibility to provide economically deficient people with livelihoods.

What these explanations all have in common is that the purported deficiencies of vulnerable survivors point to individual or household level failures and not to larger processes and structures in society that bar these same people from accessing resources.

The different-from-us discourse

Vulnerable people, mainly those living in slums, informal settlements, or particular *sitios* with a large portion of urban poor were frequently portrayed as “different from us.” This statement is true in some ways. The urban poor are different from the middle class because they cannot access the same resources and privileges available to many of the middle class. Yet, when the different-from-us narrative was evoked, it rarely referred specifically to economic differences. Instead, it usually referred to presumed social, cultural, moral, or religious differences. Like the four other vulnerability narratives, the different-from-us discourse profoundly shaped the post-disaster efforts of trustees.

In one version of the different-from-us narrative, there are two categories of people separated along economic lines who exhibit distinct behaviours, practices and aspirations. One municipal government worker distinguished between the urban poor working in the informal sector and the middle class working in the formal sector:

The culture of the formal and the informal is really different. Even if they [Sendong survivors from the informal sector] were already transferred to houses, still, they claim not to have recovered even if they were given this package of house and lot that cost 300,000 [pesos for a quadruplex relocation house]. And [they] are liability of the government.

The informant's statement indicates that the urban poor expect government assistance and remain unsatisfied with what they have been given, whereas the middle class do not exert such expectations. In addition to the obvious economic differences, many of the middle class who work in the very agencies that design and implement official aid spaces assume the urban poor have particular pejorative social and cultural attributes. This is evident in part by the workers' reluctance to stay at evacuation centres and to move into relocation sites. Several regional government employees expressed the social differences between "us" and "them" quite clearly; one informant's middle class neighbours just did not like the relocation sites because they did not like the community there and the houses are too small. Another regional government agency director explained why affected employees in her agency – one of the main agencies responsible for collecting and analysing post-disaster needs data – avoided evacuation centres, opting instead to stay with relatives, at a hotel, or in the upper floors of their flooded home.

Life in the evacuation centres [is] very difficult because there are limited facilities. [It was] very terrible because [at] first [there was no] water. I think electricity was restored after a week. It's very congested. Then [there is the issue of] different practices among families. [That is] different habits. Now the problem is more on cleanliness and sanitation.

In this quote, the director suggests that not only do the urban poor staying at the evacuation sites tolerate lower living standards, but also that their practices and habits are distinct from hers and those of her middle class colleagues.

The different-from-us narrative was not limited to distinguishing between economic classes. Many residents at the official aid spaces used it to distinguish among residents coming from different geographic locations. The story of a stall helper in the meat section of Cogon market is illustrative. Pre-Sendong, he lived in Isla de Oro, and he currently lives in one of the Calaan relocation sites. His former neighbours from Isla de Oro are his current neighbours in Calaan because they petitioned to be kept together. Outsiders can cause trouble, and so he and his neighbours actively avoid them. As an example of outsider-caused-trouble, he cited high levels of theft in the relocation site, attributing it to the mix of people coming from different *barangays* and that people do not necessarily know their neighbours. Chapter 6 expands upon the repercussions for survivors who were not accepted into the cliques at evacuation sites and temporary housing areas. It is particularly difficult for recent migrants to city whose "normal" social practices were learned outside of urban centres.

That the more vulnerable survivors distrust each other was recognised by state and religious trustees. Like the assertion of the stall helper introduced above, a regional government officer who oversaw all the camp managers in Region-X confirmed *barangay*-based stereotypes lead to rifts.

You cannot just avoid conflict within the camp because they all came from different *barangays* and you know sometimes when you are coming from this *barangay*, they are known to be like this. And when they stay together as one family in the camp you can't help but there is some rifts. So, sometimes you cannot help but have one quarrel or misunderstanding [from] one IDP to another but I think we [camp managers] were all able to manage it.

To ensure minor rifts did not escalate into major problems, camp managers at evacuation and transitional housing sites were trained to diffuse conflicts and mediate disagreements. Trustees working in post-disaster spaces implemented additional measures to mitigate problems stemming from difference. At several relocation sites, for example, the Catholic NGO Gawad Kalinga ran a values formation program aimed at bringing about a change in the values, attitudes and behaviour of residents. One of the NGO's staff explained that the curriculum was based on a standard national curriculum, and then adapted to the particular perceived needs (i.e. deficiencies) of Sendong survivors. The implementation of such training was justified by observation that residents were coming from different *barangays* and different backgrounds and do not trust each other, and so need to be taught.

People who actively avoid evacuation camps, temporary and permanent relocation housing sites, and other official spaces of aid, also subscribed to a different-from-us discourse. For example, the desire to remain in the community instead of moving to a relocation site was expressed by a Carmen-based *sari-sari* shopkeeper. He preferred to stay because "I know this place and the people around here" and because he did not want to go to a place with new people who he did not know. He conceded, however, that he would consider resettlement at a site where many of his former customers currently reside.

The importance of perceived and real difference in shaping post-disaster routes is perhaps best illustrated by Muslim survivors. Nearly all of the Muslims I interviewed, including key informants at a regional government office serving Muslims, recounted that Muslim households typically avoided the evacuation centres to avoid Christians and situations in which they would be socially

ostracised. At a focus group discussion with low income Muslim Cagayaños, participants agreed that most Muslim Sendong victims do not like living with Christians, even though the participants themselves “didn’t really mind being with Christians.” The participants and their acquaintances detected animosity directed at them, and consequently sought to “avoid chaos.” Differences in religious beliefs and practices also made it difficult for Muslims to share an open, yet confined space with Christians. The group also perceived that their local *barangay* officials actively disliked Muslims even though he publically boasted that Muslims and Christians get along in the *barangay*. One Muslim government employee explained that what happened during the aftermath of Sendong was an extension of everyday life in CDO: “The Muslim doesn’t mingle with Christians because of cultural barriers. We mingle with our relatives and other Muslims. So we don’t mingle in recovery.” He then situated the attitudes of individuals within the broader Mindanao conflict introduced in Chapter 3: “Several Muslims were not helped by relief aid. This is because of a characteristic of Muslims – they would rather go to relatives and friends for help than to Christians. That’s why we have a Mindanao problem.” In this way, presumed religious difference compounds other presumed social, cultural and moral differences evident in different-from-us narratives.

Conclusion

The chapter discussed vulnerability in Cagayan de Oro, in the particular context of the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. It demonstrated that vulnerability is not natural, and is instead a function of constructed economic, political, social and cultural elements that form societal structures, which necessarily interact with environmental factors. It situated vulnerability as structural vulnerability, wherein people are unable to cope with a stress due to pre-existing difficulties. It showed that in selecting beneficiaries for their disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding efforts, trustees typically single out particular demographics or identify people demonstrating particular indicators of vulnerability. These approaches indicate trustees did not share a common understanding of vulnerability. Furthermore, these approaches do not encapsulate all the different types of people who lie along the vulnerability continuum. While those lying at the less vulnerable end of the spectrum had the capacity to recover from a disaster without official assistance, there were many “invisible survivors” who were excluded. When invisible survivors are clustered at the more vulnerable end of the continuum, disaster reinforces their marginalisation. Ideas about vulnerability were worked in five main discourses, which, in turn,

informed and shaped post-disaster efforts. These vulnerability discourses had real repercussions in the lives of Sendong survivors, particularly in determining their access to resources and in shaping where they went to rebuild their lives. The discourses enabled trustees to problematise and render technical the purportedly underlying causes of vulnerability, thereby ensuring they were experts best able to implement solutions. The discourses also had broader societal impacts in which structural problems and stereotypes were reinforced and reinvented in other spaces.

Chapter 6. Where do survivors rebuild their lives post-disaster?

Introduction

Where do survivors go after a disaster? Recall that in a disaster (as opposed to a mere natural hazard event) affected individuals, households and communities do not possess the capacity to cope and recover without external assistance. Do survivors remain in the usual spaces in which they lived their pre-Sendong lives, waiting for assistance to find them and accessing assistance from their usual networks? Do they seek out places where they have occasionally received assistance in the past or have heard that their peers received assistance? Or, do they venture into new spaces altogether? Are such movements voluntary or choices of last resort? This chapter answers these questions, mapping the trajectories of survivors and the specific places where they rebuild their lives and livelihoods post-Sendong. To draw out the exclusionary character of post-disaster spaces, the discussion is framed within a *spaces of exclusion* framework inspired by Hall, Hirsch and Li's (2011) book *Powers of Exclusion*.

The chapter draws heavily on what Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) call the “powers of exclusion” that deny certain people access to land. It investigates how these powers apply to the CDO case in excluding certain people from accessing a broader suite of resources after Typhoon Sendong, and not just land. It presents the results of a conventional content analysis of the survivors and key informant interview data. These results are supplemented and triangulated with a conventional content analysis of my field notes on the GPS, participatory video, and non-participant observation activities – especially site visits to former evacuation camps, and to transitional and permanent relocation housing sites. Government documents and Sendong-related reports round out the data sources used to inform the discussion.

The chapter analyses the three generalised post-Sendong trajectories followed by all survivors lying along the vulnerability continuum. It concentrates, however, on the experiences of those clustered at the more vulnerable end, looking at the different strategies they employ and the rationale for their choices. The chapter presents the various urban spaces accessed for critical rebuilding activities, namely sleeping in a safe space, obtaining money and relief goods, accessing medical, educational and safety services, enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and engaging in advocacy or political activities. I call these spaces “post-disaster spaces;” they are

spaces that specifically target or appeal to a particular subset of survivors, and aim – in some way – to help them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. The analysis of post-disaster spaces, and especially the official post-disaster spaces created and run by trustees, emphasises the extent to which the vulnerability approaches and vulnerability discourses laid out in Chapter 5 rely upon the powers of exclusion. Together, the approaches, narratives and powers combine to produce profoundly gendered post-disaster spaces where power hierarchies are reinscribed, gender roles are remade and pre-existing prejudices are perpetuated.

The operation of the powers of exclusion post-Sendong

The powers of exclusion shape access to myriad resources, not just land, in a post-disaster context. Tropical Storm Sendong, itself a natural hazard fitting within a broad “environmental change and environmental phenomena” category of power, was a catalyst in spurring changes in access to land in Cagayan de Oro. Variations on the other seven powers of exclusion were similarly influential in shaping the type and quantity of disaster assistance for which Sendong survivors were eligible. Legitimation, for example, was critical in justifying the post-disaster interventions of trustees. Exclusion was also essential in determining beneficiaries of their post-disaster assistance. With limited resources, trustees necessarily restricted assistance to people whom they deemed legitimate and needy survivors; their choices were strongly influenced by vulnerability discourses. The exclusionary power of regulation played a key role in determining where survivors went and what they built (and rebuilt). As Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 15, *emphasis in original*) explain, regulation serves four main roles:

it determines *boundaries* between pieces of land; it prescribes the kinds of *land use* acceptable or not within the boundaries; it seeks to determine the kinds of *ownership* and *usufruct* claims to certain kinds of land; and it makes claims about which individuals, households, groups, state agencies have rule-backed claims to any particular piece of land.

Together, the first three roles are the basis of zoning. Zoning changes made by the local government, and the threat to forcefully implement them, have effectively forced residents living in newly created no-build zones out of their neighbourhoods. In contrast, survivors living outside the no-build zones retain the option to rebuild and renovate their flood-affected houses.

Regulation also played a central role in resettlement sites; for example, there were a plethora of rules about acceptable land and house use, and the conditions of owning, transferring and selling

a relocation house. The other powers of exclusion similarly affected access to resources after Typhoon Sendong.

The rest of this chapter traces the post-disaster trajectories of Sendong survivors and explores how the powers of exclusion shaped these trajectories. The powers of exclusion alternately enhanced and hindered Cagayaños from accessing a broader suite of resources as they sought spaces to sleep, obtain relief and income, and fulfil their recreational, spiritual and advocacy needs.

Sleeping pathways

A sleeping pathway describes the specific places where a survivor is based over a given period of time; it is a list of where he or she sleeps. All survivors who were forced to leave their usual homes temporarily or permanently after Typhoon Sendong followed a similar pattern, or what I call “a generic pathway.” This generic pathway can be subdivided into three broad categories of sleeping pathways: institutionalised, *bors-système* and hybrid pathways. In the institutionalised pathway, survivors sleep exclusively at the official post-disaster spaces created by state, religious and humanitarian trustees. In the *bors-système* pathway, survivors do not sleep at these same official spaces. In the hybrid pathway, survivors sleep in a mix official and non-official spaces.

A sleeping pathway does not reveal the other post-disaster spaces used by survivors, such as sites for receiving food or medical assistance, or important worksites, although they may be correlated. Instead, sleeping pathways present the various options available to survivors lying along the vulnerability continuum, and their preferences. These options and preferences are necessarily linked to the different constraints and resources of individuals and households, which, in turn, are underpinned by larger processes, structures, and institutions in CDO and in Philippine society that have the power to exclude. Together, these elements explain why some survivors went to one place and not to another.

The generic pathway

The generic pathway for persons directly affected by Typhoon Sendong – those people who can be considered environmental migrants because they had to leave their usual place of residence either temporarily or permanently – is straightforward. On 16 December 2011, the survivor began at his or her house, then went to what is frequently called “higher ground” for several hours or a few days. This stopover was then typically followed by a temporary stay at one or

more intermediate “safe space(s)” for one night to several weeks, days, months, or even more than one year. In some instances where there was little more than a bit of water flooding the first floor of a multi-story house, the person may have skipped the interim safe space, opting to return home immediately and possibly living in the upper floor(s) until the flooded areas were cleaned and repaired. In most cases, however, the person would have had a temporary stay elsewhere before moving into a “home” where they intend to stay.

Higher ground

Taking refuge on higher ground literally means moving up a higher elevation. Higher ground includes second or third stories, rooftops, and even the upper tresses of metal billboard scaffolding. It includes flyovers (i.e. overpasses) and highways, which are typically raised above the mean height of residential areas. It includes parts of each affected *barangay* with elevations slightly above the water level. Survivors recounted spending hours clinging onto treetops as turbulent floodwaters raged by; for example, a mango tree in Isla de Oro reportedly saved more than 50 of people during Sendong who clung onto its branches (Fig. 6.1). Reaching higher ground was a sequential process; as the water rose, survivors sought higher and higher structures that would place them above the floodwaters and, ideally, on a structure firmly rooted to the ground. While these places and physical structures were not used for a long period of time, survivors emphasised their significance in recounting their personal experiences on Sendong night and their personal healing processes. Some survivors, for example, return to these sites almost like a pilgrimage; the visits remind them of their survival and help them remember the family and friends they lost during the disaster. There is thus symbolic meaning attributed to these places binding survivors to their past. Some of these physical structures, like the mango tree in Isla de Oro, are even formally recognised. Unlike the subsequent destinations in the generic pathway of survivors, higher ground spaces included both public and private spaces, and were used by working and middle income classes alike. At this initial stage and in a restricted area, social and economic stratification did not significantly shape where survivors went. Within a bounded geographical area, the powers of exclusion did not determine access to the most sought-after resource: higher ground above raging floodwaters.



Fig. 6.1. On the banks of the Cagayan River in Isla de Oro, a plaque commemorates Sendong victims and marks the tree credited with saving lives (7 March 2013). It reads, “ ‘The tree of life’ This mango tree saved more than 50 people, residents of Isla de Oro, at the height of the unprecedented flooding caused by Tropical Storm Sendong last December 16, 2011.”

Safe spaces

In contrast, there was a wide range of interim safe spaces frequented by survivors. In CDO, and as is frequently observed in other Philippine post-disaster situations, the divide of which people went to which safe spaces mirrored socioeconomic lines and market forces. The most recognisable interim spaces are evacuation camps and temporary housing sites (e.g. tent cities and bunkhouses); these official post-disaster spaces are perhaps the most compelling visual of the disaster’s human impact. Middle class survivors usually avoided the public post-disaster spaces run by state, religious, and non-governmental trustees – the very spaces targeting and accessed by urban poor survivors. Instead, middle class survivors gravitated toward private temporary safe spaces. They rented apartments for a few weeks or months. Occasionally, small offices at the survivor’s worksite were repurposed into temporary living spaces for the survivor’s family for up to three months. The latter option was available more to middle class than to urban poor survivors because they were more likely to work in a building separate from their personal house outside flooded neighbourhoods. Those with financial means also booked hotel rooms. The city’s

largest, poshest, most expensive, most secure, and most central hotels were filled with staff from United Nations agencies, big international NGOs and national government agencies. CDO-based middle class survivors did not stay at these swanky hotels. Instead, they went wherever was cheap and available, and stayed for several days. The only private safe spaces that were accessed by survivors with a range of means were the homes of family and friends whose houses were not directly affected by Sendong.

Home

In this study, the generic pathway ends when the survivor finally moves into a home. Similar to the differential access to and use of safe space(s) by urban poor survivors and middle class survivors, socioeconomic status shaped the choice of homes. Based on qualitative interview data, a close reading of the implementation of political decisions about instituting no-build zones post-Sendong, and anecdotal evidence, the following generalisations can be made. First, most middle class survivors returned to their previous house, and, if required, built additional stories. Second, of the middle class survivors who moved, most relocated to another middle class development within the city. Third, very few middle class or urban poor survivors actually left CDO permanently. Fourth, the home options for the urban poor were mostly restricted to returning to a previous house (and frequently just the site itself) or moving into a relocation house at a resettlement site. Fifth, few urban poor had sufficient resources to invest in major renovations or to move into more affluent private neighbourhoods. In one exceptional instance, an urban poor family did move post-Sendong from a makeshift house in an informal settlement into a concrete house located outside of a relocation site and very close to the old residence. The house was loaned to the family by the husband's employer, an affluent lawyer belonging to one of the city's historically prominent, and still affluent, families. Most trajectories of urban poor survivors, however, did not lead them to a better quality house in a desirable central location, irrespective of whether they resorted to an institutionalised, *hors-système*, or hybrid pathway.

Institutionalised pathways

Survivors slept at official post-disaster spaces when they followed an institutionalised pathway. It was a migration through a series of official spaces conceived and run by the state, religious, and humanitarian trustees who managed post-disaster efforts. The assistance of these trustees is required by “trapped populations” – populations who want to move away from environmentally risky or hazardous areas but are unable to do so because their asset levels are insufficient to

enable migration (GOS 2011, McLeman 2013). These trustees designed a linear progression: survivors first went to an evacuation centre, next they went to a temporary or a transitional housing site until a space opened up for them in a permanent relocation site. In exceptional cases, survivors were transferred directly from an evacuation centre into a permanent relocation house. In most cases, however, after leaving higher ground, survivors slept in multiple evacuation centres and temporary housing sites (i.e. safe spaces) before moving into a permanent resettlement site (i.e. home).

The official post-disaster spaces were scattered throughout the city limits and into the neighbouring municipality of Opol (Fig. 6.2a). Figures 6.2b-d show that survivors moved farther and farther away from their pre-Sendong homes with each move through official post-disaster spaces. Evacuation centres were clustered along the flooded portions of the Cagayan River and minor rivers east of the city centre, near people's old homes (Fig. 6.2b). Transitional housing sites were further away, with some sites overlapping with evacuation camps and relocation sites (Fig. 6.2c). Finally, permanent resettlement sites were all far away from the major residential and commercial areas in CDO; they were located in the city outskirts and even beyond the city boundaries (Fig. 6.2d).

The ensuing discussion of institutionalised pathways analyses the three main types of official post-disaster sleeping spaces. These spaces are distinguished by where they are located, when people stay there, what type of housing they reside in, and the types of assistance given there. The discussion characterises each space. It shows how the vulnerability discourses and powers of exclusion informed the objectives, day-to-day operations, and lived experiences at each space. It explores the strategies of resident survivors, delving into how they employed limited resources and capacities to survive and rebuild their lives and livelihoods.




Fig. 6.2. Institutionalised post-disaster spaces in and near Cagayan de Oro city that were accessed by study participants. (a) Evacuation centres (red), transitional housing sites (yellow) and permanent relocation housing sites (green). (b) Evacuation centres. (c) Transitional housing sites. (d) Permanent relocation housing sites. © Marc Girard, 2015.

Official post-disaster spaces

Evacuation centres

The first in a trio of official post-disaster spaces designed and run by trustees, and accessed primarily by urban poor survivors, evacuation centres are spaces of exclusion. That is, evacuation centres are spaces where people are prevented from benefiting from things. They were typically public spaces repurposed as temporary housing for dozens to hundreds of families whose pre-Sendong houses either no longer existed or were unfit for habitation. These spaces began opening on 17 December 2011, the day after the flooding began, and started shutting down when survivors were transferred to temporary housing sites or returned to their old houses. Most evacuation camps were open for three to four months, until March 2013. At its peak, there were between 45 and 80 evacuation centres in the city. Humanitarian organisations and municipal and regional government offices used different numbers; the discrepancies reflect whether or not the agency had a physical presence at a camp or considered the site official.

Evacuation sites served as shelter, as distribution hubs for relief goods, and as on-site emergency medical clinics. They were sites of education, religious instruction, economic pursuits, and violence. They were spaces where social norms, cultural quirks and privately-held prejudices normally hidden from public view were prominently displayed. The constantly changing portrayals and perceptions of evacuation sites, strategically deployed by various interests in pursuit of particular objectives, demonstrated the fluidity and porosity of space. Evacuees and trustees sharing a given locale each had a unique lived experience there. This observation underscores the salience of social relations, which are necessarily felt and interpreted differently by different individuals, in producing place. Over the next few pages, I explore these ideas.

Repurposed spaces

Because they must be immediately available, evacuation centres consisted of extant public buildings and public grounds converted into emergency shelters. They were located within walking distance of flooded portions of the Cagayan River and minor rivers east of the city centre (Fig. 6.2b). They were near homes, work sites, markets, and services. According to a municipal official, the number of people affected by Sendong far exceeded the capacity of designated evacuation centres, especially because some were themselves flooded. In addition to the designated covered courts or *barangay* centres, the city was forced to use non-designated sites such as primary and secondary schools, the grounds at the Provincial Capitol, and a former

regional government office as evacuation camps. Christian and Islamic officials also sheltered survivors in churches and mosques. In contrast, a year later for Super-typhoon Pablo, no schools or government properties were used as evacuation centres, only covered courts and churches.

Public buildings and grounds, or portions thereof, were temporarily repurposed to meet the basic needs of Sendong survivors. The usual activities that occur in these spaces – like playing basketball, attending classes, hosting church activities – were temporarily suspended. Changes in the use of space were accompanied by changes in the people accessing the space. For example, people who regularly participated in the usual activities either chose or were forced to avoid the space. Or, these same people began using the space in a different capacity – either as a survivor or as a volunteer or paid employee assisting with relief efforts. In many cases, people who did not normally access these spaces did access them – as survivors. Repurposing public spaces as evacuation centres frequently entailed making physical changes to a space; for example, setting up additional toilet, washing and laundry facilities, and subdividing an open area into tiny spaces designed to give a family some privacy with blankets or other fabric strung up as partitions (Fig. 6.3).



Fig. 6.3. Evacuation camps are usually repurposed public spaces, such as this covered basketball court, that require some physical changes to turn them into temporary living spaces. Source: Dennis M. Sabangan (in Bernal 2013).

Survivors generally preferred schools because they usually had electricity, water and sanitation facilities, and they had closed areas. Schools offered a slightly greater degree of security because of the clear physical boundaries of the school grounds, surrounded by a fence and usually protected by security guards. According to one camp manager, it was difficult to ascertain “who is really an IDP” and to keep so-called “illegitimate survivors” out unless there was a fence or other control system to limit entry. Yet, physical barriers are not the only way to exclude people from accessing post-disaster spaces and resources. Regulatory, political, economic, social, and cultural means of exclusion can be as, or even more, effective tools. Schools were also some of the first evacuation centres to be shut down. There was concern about exceeding the capacity of the school’s facilities; comfort rooms (CRs or washrooms) engineered to meet the needs of 200 children and a few dozen adult staff for several hours a day could not handle the full range of water, sanitation and health (WASH) needs of one hundred or more families 24 hours a day for weeks. As one WASH specialist at a major international humanitarian organisation explained, even if the flood (or other disaster) did not destroy the evacuation site, the pressure from hundreds of families beyond the facility’s capacity could. School officials also invoked a sanitised version of the illegal squatter discourse in which undesirable residents should be cleared out of a location where they are not wanted. Citing the need to restart classes as a step toward resuming normalcy, school officials actively campaigned to close school-based evacuation camps and to transfer survivors into other evacuation centres or to temporary housing sites. By appealing to the high regard Filipinos place on education, school officials used legitimisation as an uncontested moral basis for their exclusion claim.

Why go to an evacuation centre?

The obvious answer to this question is “because my house is gone or is currently uninhabitable and I have nowhere else to go.” But it is not the only answer. All sorts of people and organisations had a presence in CDO’s evacuation camps, each motivated by a variety of objectives and informed by discourses on vulnerability.

For survivors following an institutionalised sleeping pathway, the primary reason for going to evacuation centres was to obtain shelter and disaster relief goods and services. Evacuation centres were perceived as bountiful sites. They were where most relief goods, cash donations, and vouchers exchangeable at grocery stores were distributed, and where government agencies, NGOs, and many religious groups concentrated their efforts. Several survivors recounted they or

people they knew stopped working during the time they lived at evacuation camps because they did not require money to buy food; food was simply given to them by myriad donors. These survivors attributed the lack of theft at evacuation sites to the abundance, even overabundance, of relief goods. In contrast to the prevalence of theft in relocation sites (where residents lack jobs, food and money), there was no need to steal in the evacuation camps.

Accessing abundant resources frequently required a physical on-site presence. Disaster assistance disbursed at evacuation camps was often exclusively given to the people staying there. Once an evacuee resumed living in their cleaned and repaired former house, or in a new house, he or she was denied access to the relief goods distributed at the evacuation centre. The leader of a Sendong survivor collective explained that “when you [leave] the evacuation centre and decide to go home in your community, you will not [be] given any support or any relief from any of these [government] agencies.” For survivors who remained in the community, this concentration of resources in official post-disaster spaces was perceived as neglectful and unfair. The same leader recalled the response of several SOS collective members to this injustice:

So, what they did, they went to DSWD and told them, ‘how come the communities do not receive relief operations [and] relief goods at all?’ And then they [DSWD] said, ‘it should not be part of our job, it should be the CSWD.’ So there was no clear definition of who should do this job and who should focus on specific areas. That [is] one of the conflicts: they [CSWD and DSWD] did not know which areas they are assigned. Second, both only focused in evacuation areas. So the evacuees, which are lesser in numbers, received more relief goods than those who just stayed in the community because, first of all, the evacuation centre is already very full.

For government agencies, especially the regional Department of Social Welfare and Development office (DSWD), this concentration of efforts was justified because their organisational mandate restricted their intervention to evacuation sites. In contrast, the City Social Welfare and Development office (CSWD) was officially responsible for providing aid to the entire community. The mismatch between organisational mandates and survivor needs, and miscommunications over organisational restrictions exacerbated the frustration of survivors. Although Sendong survivors remaining in the community were eligible for disaster assistance, and did obtain some, they clearly did not have the same access as their counterparts residing in official post-disaster spaces.

The trustees disbursing aid and other services were present in the evacuation camps. Some trustees, such as government agencies, were legally obliged to be there. Other trustees, such as humanitarian agencies, were motivated by organisational missions (and poignant photo-ops, according to some cynical observers). Yet other trustees, such as religious actors, came to evacuation camps out of a sense of moral obligation. Trustees, including a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors, saw opportunities to disseminate their messages to large captive audiences.

Images of exhausted and unkempt-looking people crammed into evacuation camps were a powerful visual. Trustees and survivors recalled scenes in which politicians, reporters, celebrities, or national and international NGOs handed out food, water, and blankets at evacuation camps. Some interviewees described the unfurling of an organisational banner, a short photo-shoot, and nothing else. Such incidents illustrate the instrumentalisation of evacuation camps and evacuees as tools for story-telling, gleaning votes, garnering sympathy, gaining reader- or viewership, and attracting donations on a local, national, and even international scale. The camps represented the urgent need to rally help and monies. They were constant evocations of the disaster. For local Cagayaños, the camps were visual reminders of what had been done to help the more vulnerable survivors, and what still remained to be done. They were impossible to ignore because of their siting throughout the city, including near prominent city landmarks.

The power of evacuation camps in creating a fluid public narrative was perhaps best illustrated by the Provincial Capitol grounds site. Early on, this camp symbolised overcoming adversity, sustaining hope and government charity. Provincial government employees, for instance, would regularly cook and serve hot meals to the evacuees. A former camp manager describes the very public generosity of the provincial governor of Misamis Oriental in opening up the space and helping to make camp life more comfortable.

The governor of Misamis Oriental let the IDPs get inside the Provincial Capitol. Maybe the governor pitied them, so they were temporarily sheltered at the Provincial Capitol. Governor Moreno helped us much. They [provincial government employees] did not leave us, they gave us free light and water in Provincial Capitol. They provided us free use of toilets. And free 10 units of washing machine. Every morning they [the IDPs] said, the children, 'Ma'am B. is there.' In Capitol, I used to bathe the children. Twenty children more or less, marching, going to the bathroom. The Provincial Capitol [staff] is laughing at me 'Oh! Mrs. B., your children, plenty of children.'

The camp was located in front of one of the major political buildings in downtown CDO. The site is frequently used for staging public events showcasing regional products, industries, and achievements. As such, the benevolence of politicians and political staff did not go unnoticed by CDO voters. In late 2012, there was significant political pressure to close the Capitol evacuation camp before the one year anniversary of Sendong. The mayor and other local politicians were seeking re-election and needed to demonstrate their capacity to rebuild the city and the lives of the Sendong survivors. The presence of urban poor “squatters” at a major government building in the city centre detracted from the message of “we delivered on our promise to assist the city’s poor in quickly recovering from disaster.” The symbolic meaning of the Capitolio camp had thus been transformed into a space of delay, protracted misery, something undesirable to be cleared away or at least hidden from public view. Consequently, Capitolio evacuees were given relocation houses in November 2012 – even though many of the remaining residents did not meet the eligibility criteria. Just before the first anniversary of Typhoon Sendong, the last evacuation camp at the Provincial Capitol was closed through a combination of force, pressure exerted through political relationships and alliances, and strategic neglect of particular relocation eligibility rules.

A strong sense of moral obligation to assist those in need attracted Catholic trustees to evacuation camps. On 17 December 2011, religious and lay archdiocese staff began helping Sendong survivors. The head of one ministry explained how the Catholic actors first got involved in the evacuation centres, and then responded to perceived needs.

December 17 was supposed to be our Christmas party of the Social Action [Center]. But when I wake up – because I stay here in the bishop’s house – 6 o’clock I saw people around. Then, when I went to the bridge at the back, there’s already [a] line-up of dead bodies [on the banks of the Cagayan River]. But Father N. our director still advised us to come to our venue for the party, yeah, to plan what will be our, ah, activities. We just have Mass, Eucharistic celebration, then after we volunteered to go to DSWD to pack up [relief goods]. Every one of us went to DSWD. Because in the archdiocese we have nothing to pack up. And we do not know what to do.

Every ministry, we are asked [by the archbishop] to adopt an evacuation camp and stay there. And just observe what we can do, what we can offer. I chose Macasandig gym. I will be there. There are 15 youth who [are] also assigned to me. Then we went there in Macasandig. The *barangay* captain in Macasandig is very active, also the wife. They’re very active. They really, they manned the camp. When we asked ‘how many families?’ they [*barangay* captain and *barangay* officials] do not know. For the first three days, every day, everyone who came [was] registered. And every day they have separate lists. That’s why I

volunteered to make a system of their data. That's the beginning. So we bring all the computers there, we encode all their data. But every day they will give us a number of families. Every day different. I really find hard, we really find it very hard. Emotionally, you are very down there because everything [every problem] will come to you, everyone will come to you, and you will listen. So we decide to come here [and work out of the archbishopric]. Then, that's the time after one week the archdiocese decided that we will have the survey. A man from Manila helped us to make that database system. And we assigned [volunteers at] every camp to [conduct the] survey.

As pointed out at the end of the quote, it is noteworthy that it was the archdiocese, and not a government agency, who initiated a system for collecting and tracking data. It was Catholic actors who initially responded to a lack of organised data, and tried to correct delays and errors with proper records. Catholic actors conducted other activities in the evacuation camps, too. Nuns delivered psychosocial debriefing sessions, priests came to say mass, youth volunteers came to lead theatre, arts, and other recreational activities, and the Catholic Church sponsored medical missions. Such interventions continued and grew in the temporary housing and permanent relocation sites. According to the archbishop, the archdiocese had simply identified two major gaps in the disaster response that it was qualified to fill (i.e. they problematised and rendered technical), and then acted accordingly. The first gap was disaster coordination.

When the typhoon happened, there was a lot of immediate need for help because people were flocking to the evacuation centres that were public – that was like the public school, the *barangay* covered court, but the city itself, the – what do you call it? – City Social Welfare, CSWD group, were undermanned and not trained for emergencies like this. They did try to help but then there was sort of a lot of confusion. Many people also wanted to help but there was no coordination. So for our part, we called for a meeting of all the involved government agencies and also NGOs here in the *sala* [meeting room]. And I think that was where there was some kind of coordination that started. And then, the DSWD from Manila also came in, maybe after a week or two. After a week or two, they took over - the national DSWD. We helped set up what we call a Sendong Executive Committee where periodically, maybe once a month, or in the first phase it was about every two weeks, we would meet normally here or Xavier University. So all the groups that were willing to help, we brought them together. And then we followed the DSWD template that we formed clusters.

The second gap pertained to the spiritual needs of survivors, and the response of the archdiocese of inserting an overtly religious cluster into the official disaster management scheme in CDO. By tending to the spiritual needs and salvation of survivors, this cluster exercised what Foucault

(2003a) described as old pastoral power. Prior to this insertion, United Nations, humanitarian, and state trustees were implementing a secular cluster approach, akin to the new welfare-type pastoral power (cf. Foucault 2003a), to Sendong disaster management.

The other cluster we helped set up is the pastoral care or spiritual activities because that is the maybe surprising thing: that the international cluster approach or even the one of DSWD does not include the spiritual care. And for us, [we observed that] the affected families themselves find that [pastoral care is] one of the more significant way[s] to help them. Just like the presence of religious sisters in the evacuation centres was a reassuring presence for many of them. And also saying Mass every day and having Christmas mass even in the evacuation centres was one way, I think, of unifying the community.

The other international approach and also here [the] DSWD [approach], they follow a secular approach. But we brought that up, that it's not only really Catholics but [also] Protestants or even Muslims [who] should be brought in to minister to the IDPs. [The members of the pastoral care cluster, however,] were mostly our own church workers. Although we know that there were also Protestant groups that approached the residents in the camps to give their own services or activities.

For their part, regional government agencies actively encouraged religious groups to do activities in the camps. A regional government official who oversaw the management of all evacuation camps in Region X justified her agency's rationale for such inclusion.

We acknowledge the spiritual act is very important so we encourage religious groups to come in and conduct activities within the camps. And so far, there were so many that also, I think, accepted that call and had sessions or activities in the camps.

Not all faiths practiced in the city responded to the invitation. The same official cited above could not recall any Muslim groups conducting activities in the CDO evacuation sites. Instead, it was Christian organisations and churches, and especially the Catholic Church, that actually had a physical and spiritual presence. Rather than feeling threatened by Catholic actors arrogating state roles for themselves, all my informants at municipal and regional government agencies were grateful for, and highly praised the swift actions of the archdiocese and Xavier University. The intervention of Catholic actors was especially welcome during the immediate aftermath of the storm when municipal and regional government agencies were overwhelmed, under-staffed, and uncertain of official procedures. One informant recounted that

We are just also thankful that our bishop was just taking the lead when the DSWD was not there, he took the lead in, I think, bringing the civil society and the volunteers in church to manage the camps. So we are having that multi-sectoral [disaster management]

meeting because he wanted to get updates on what's happening in the evacuation centres. And we're having that, I think every two weeks or weekly during the early phase. And because there were thousands in the evacuation camps, we encourage the religious groups [to assist] our social workers and psychologists [with] the psychosocial processing [that was] supposed to be done. We ran out [of] psychologists and volunteers to do that.

As such, evacuation sites had a strong Christian, and especially Catholic, presence. They were public spaces with a large audience receptive to the interventions of religious actors.

Evacuation centres were also spaces of economic opportunity for Cagayaños. Small businesses sprung up within camp borders. Some survivors restarted their former livelihood activities such as giving manicures or pedicures, selling *sari-sari* shop items, or engaging in micro-scale buy-and-sell businesses. Survivors also partook in numerous limited time cash-for-work and food-for-work programs offered by the city, various *barangays*, and NGOs. Tasks included cleaning debris from city streets and digging graves for the dead. Both men and women did the former activity, while it was mostly the men who did the latter. These programs were not exclusively for survivors living in evacuation camps, but it was easier for them to remain informed about opportunities than for their community-based counterparts. Because evacuation camps were located throughout the city at sites close to the affected *barangays*, it was possible for evacuees whose livelihoods were not home-based to simply resume their pre-Sendong work. They would leave the evacuation camp in the morning or at night and return after work to sleep. Some non-evacuees had the opposite work pattern; they left their homes in the morning, worked all day at an evacuation camp as a paid employee for a state, religious or humanitarian organisation, and then returned home to sleep. The potential for economic gain in evacuation centres was an incentive that attracted some survivors to camps. On balance, however, the potential economic, material, and informational benefits did not compensate for the drawbacks of staying at an evacuation centre. These limitations explain why so many people avoided them or at least limited their time there.

Why not go to an evacuation centre?

Although thousands of Cagayaño households did access evacuation centres, many more avoided them. Evacuation camps garnered an unsavoury reputation as spaces to avoid. Despite their portrayal as inclusive spaces open to all, the experiences of people living and working in and

actively avoiding them suggest that evacuation camps were spaces designed, perhaps inadvertently, to exclude.

Evacuation camps were typically described in pejorative terms. Many urban poor survivors called them “dirty,” “congested,” “unsanitary,” “unbearably hot and dusty,” and “not livable or even humane.” The camps had a reputation as spaces where disease and infection were rampant. The quality of relief goods distributed at the evacuation sites was sometimes deemed substandard. For example, the water being delivered to evacuation camps was rumoured to have been collected from the rivers with dead bodies. The water was reportedly cleaned, but many people still did not trust it as drinking water. Survivors described their former living conditions at one school evacuation camp: evacuees slept directly on cement floors with no mosquito nets, blankets or mattresses; there were no lights; bathing and washing were done in the Cagayan River. Evacuation centres were overwhelmingly perceived as spaces to be endured until it was possible to return to the site of a previous house or to move into a more comfortable temporary bunkhouse or even a concrete resettlement house.

For the most part, sleeping at an evacuation camp was a last resort option. As discussed in Chapter 5, middle class survivors largely avoided them, even the people who designed and ran them. The director of a regional government agency in charge of the post-disaster interventions stated simply that “people who can afford to stay outside evacuation camps would stay elsewhere.” The number of Sendong-affected government staff who stayed at evacuation camps reinforces this statement. In a relatively small regional government agency of 50 staff members, five were affected by Sendong and temporarily left their homes. All opted to stay either with relatives, in a hotel or in an unused room at the office. In another regional government office, all 200-300 full-time staff and roughly 600 contractual staff took turns going to the evacuation centres in a work capacity. Yet, only two of an estimated 270 affected employees at this agency actually slept in a camp. One of the two employees had the choice to stay with relatives in CDO but she wanted to better understand and assist the more vulnerable survivors. This tendency to self-exclude from evacuation camps in anything but a formal work or volunteer capacity recurred in all my conversations with middle class Cagayaños throughout my fieldwork. In addition to justifying their decision with negative characterisations of evacuation camps, informants would

invoke the different-from-us discourse claiming that they did not want to live alongside people whose values and ways of life were significantly different from their own.

Previously private affairs were on public display at evacuation camps. Couple quarreling, domestic and gender-based violence, adulterous relationships, drug-dealing, prostitution, and other disreputable activities were no longer hidden in the secret enclaves of private houses in illegible informal settlements.⁴⁶ They moved into the quasi-personal spaces (e.g. makeshift fabric tents) and spilled into the open spaces within the evacuation camps. Family disputes and domestic violence are not part of the public conversation in the Philippines. These issues are typically confined to the family, and it is rare for other people to intervene even if they are aware of the problem. My research assistant Kuki explained the phenomenon:

There is a tendency for people not to intervene in marital affairs. There is this culture of Filipinos which isn't really very helpful. Some people will not intervene if it's a marital affair. Sometimes even if you call for help [from] some government, I mean like *tanod* [a security guard] or *barangay* officials, they will [say], 'ah, because it's you're fighting as a couple', so they will not intervene and it's a family trouble. That's just this underlying – it's a Filipino thing. Even if you hear your neighbour, it's not often people will just look at you when you and your husband are fighting. If they call the *tanod* they just let you separate, they will not help with your problems. It's a marital affair.

Despite the unspoken privacy rules, it became impossible to pretend nothing was going on. For example, two police officers and one camp manager employed by DSWD were assigned to each evacuation camp. Although the police and DSWD staff may have, on occasion and on an ad-hoc as-necessary basis, ventured into informal settlements where many of the urban poor survivors had previously lived, they were not there *every* day, and in the case of the police, 24 hours a day. But they were present in the evacuation camps.

The officers, camp managers and other state, religious, and non-governmental trustees could not ignore what they saw and heard; they were tasked with being on-site, diffusing conflict, promoting health and safety, managing relief distribution, disseminating information, and ensuring a smooth day-to-day living. Put another way, their role was to intervene in people's lives, or to encourage them to behave as they ought. Consequently, evacuation sites became sites of

⁴⁶ As several state and non-governmental key informants aptly pointed out, these activities also occurred in the formal developments among middle and upper class residents.

instruction. The selected topics corresponded to problems identified by trustees. Experts came to the evacuation camps to teach about the protection of children, gender-based violence, conjugal law, women's rights, and natural family planning.

The evacuation centres, and more specifically the activities that transpired in these spaces, shocked some camp managers recruited through the Catholic Church. They described themselves as “previously naïve”; it was the first time they had observed firsthand and interacted with people engaged in violent or illicit activities, and so-called unchristian, immoral economic exchanges. The experiences of mainly middle class trustees working in evacuation camps reinforced their understanding of vulnerability discourses, especially the different-from-us and deficiency narratives. The public exhibition of these narratives also confirmed the biases of some survivors who had avoided staying at an evacuation camp based on their assumptions about the people living there. Over time, however, the close bonds nurtured through months of working alongside each other changed the way some trustees understood evacuees. As one camp manager recounted, she began seeing the survivors as “my IDPs” who “are like family to me.” They entered into her personal social network and she felt obliged to treat them as she would members of her own family: “I wash, feed, and care for them like they were my own children.” The sum of such trustees' experiences thereby added another dimension to vulnerability discourses: a “*but*” suffix intended to reduce the stigma and outsider character associated with being vulnerable. The discourse thus became different-from-us, but... and deficient-in-some-way, but...

These discourses were also deployed by another demographic of Sendong survivors conspicuously absent at evacuation centres. Many non-governmental organisations and government agencies working on disaster relief efforts noted a lack of Muslims in official post-disaster spaces. Several Muslims, however, did stay at two of the city's mosques in *barangays* Balulang and Nazareth, treating them like evacuation centres. Muslim survivors cited religious beliefs, norms, and prejudices as the major reasons why they deliberately avoided evacuation centres. They contended they would be misunderstood by Christians, with whom they would necessarily share private spaces at evacuation camps. This was especially problematic if, as sometimes happened, two families were forced to inhabit a single tent. As one informant put it, “if your tentmates are Christian they will misunderstand you.” Despite the good intentions of trustees to create inclusive evacuation camps, the fear of being socially ostracised in these spaces

was justified. Subtle and usually unspoken prejudices against CDO's minority Muslim population persist, even though they do not escalate into overt or violent acts as happens in other parts of Mindanao.

Muslim women interviewees contended that it is not easy for Muslim women to mix with men, but in the evacuation centre, you have no choice but to mix with men. The lack of true privacy in an evacuation camp makes it a public space with no truly private spaces. Consequently, for faith-based reasons, a Muslim woman would have to be covered all of the time because she cannot reveal her hair to men other than her husband or close relatives. This assertion recalls two critical points made by scholars who study veiling. One, veiling is a socio-spatial practice that affects women's mobility through urban spaces.

We can best understand the socio-spatial experience of veiling or not-veiling if we consider the city to be comprised of different *regimes of veiling*, that is, different, spatially realized sets of hegemonic rules and norms regarding women's veiling, which are themselves produced by specific constellations of power. Veiling regimes should be understood to differ in terms of formality, enforcement, stability, and contestation. For example, while some veiling regimes could be called formal and enforced, such as those of university examination rooms in Turkey where veiling is prohibited, others may be purely informal, such as the veiling regimes of some squatter areas, where it may be the social norm that women cover their heads (Secor 2002, 8, *emphasis in original*).

Two, Muslim women wear the veil for a variety of reasons (Secor 2002, Marchand 2009, Mohanty 2010). In her book *Politics of Piety*, Saba Mahmood argues the veil should be understood as (1) an expression of the identity of Muslim women (similar to a Sikh turban or Jewish kippa) or (2) both a means to achieve piety, modesty, and other virtues and an end indicating the achievement of these attributes (Landry 2010). For Muslim women survivors in CDO, the veil primarily represented the latter option, and veiling was a socio-spatial practice. The social-spatial practice of veiling became evident over the course of a three hour group discussion and interview with Muslim survivors. The discussion took place at the *madrasah*, in the presence of several men, including an Imam. There, all the women wore veils. After leaving *madrasah*, we walked along the residential streets of Balulang, passing by the *barangay* hall, a *motorela* station and several *sari-sari* shops. One of the women removed her veil during the tour. When we entered into the private homes of some of the women, almost all of them removed their veils.

These gender-based restrictions make it more difficult for Muslim women than for Muslim men to adapt to coed post-disaster spaces. Adherence to these rules was likely one of the reasons why the few Muslim survivors who did venture into CDO's evacuation and temporary housing sites were single men and not Muslim women or Muslim families. Here, religious norms affected gender-based access to and exclusion from private spaces.

The geographical location of evacuation camps also dissuaded Muslim survivors from staying at official evacuation camps. The fact that many of the evacuation sites were far from mosques was problematic. Muslims pray five times a day. Women can pray anywhere,⁴⁷ but men are expected to go to the mosque to pray. As such, geographical proximity to a mosque was a priority for Muslim men. In contrast to the religious norms about veiling and the need for truly private *private spaces* that dissuaded Muslim women from accessing evacuation camps, here it was the religious norms about men having to pray in a mosque and the need to go to a particular *public space* that dissuaded Muslim men from accessing evacuation camps. Although observance of gender-based religious obligations produced the same outcome for men and women, the impetus for each one was different.

Given the considerations of Muslim survivors and the character of the official evacuation centres, it is not surprising that CDO's Muslim survivors overwhelmingly chose to stay temporarily with relatives or Muslim acquaintances who understood their religious needs. The trustees who designed and ran evacuation sites did not set out to exclude Muslim survivors. In fact, some trustees tried to assist Muslim survivors. The archdiocese, for example, reached out to its Muslim contacts in Balulang to conduct a needs assessment of affected Muslim households, and subsequently provided them with material and financial assistance. It also helped in rebuilding the flooded *madrasah* and mosque buildings.

Overall, however, the trustees' intent to create inclusive evacuation camps failed because there was no systematic consideration of gender and religion-specific needs. The thinking behind the creation of official post-disaster spaces simply reflected the existing processes, attitudes,

⁴⁷ For example, many Muslim women vendors who work at Cogon market close their stalls for short periods of time throughout the day to pray.

knowledge, and values embedded in the organisational culture of state and non-state institutions. Inertia thus operated as a power of exclusion.

Evacuation centre as place

Recall from Chapter 2 that places are “contested, multiple, layered, subject to shifting and porous boundaries, and constructed in relation to systems of power, including economic relations, racialization, ethnicity, and gender” (Staheli and Martin 2000, 140). Places are uniquely experienced by each individual because each person has different experiences and interpretations of their social relations within and beyond a particular locale (Massey 1994). The variation in the lived experiences of individuals at different evacuation centres across the city thus indicates that these post-disaster spaces should be simultaneously read as unique places produced through ongoing and hierarchical social relations extending beyond the sites’ physical boundaries.

To analyse the place-like character of CDO’s evacuation camps, this section delves into the story of one Sendong survivor, whom I call “Bonnie.” In the following paragraphs, I cite extensively from seven participatory videos that she made for this research project. The videos were recorded in Bisayan, then translated and transcribed by my research assistant Kuki. The other details of Bonnie’s story come from a focus group discussion in which she participated, a day of informal conversations (interspersed by participatory video-making), a series of text messages, a short informal meeting one month after the video-making, a key informant interview with one of her camp managers, and a review of pre-constructed material about the *balbal*.

From December 2011 until April 2013, Bonnie lived in three different evacuation camps, one government safe house, one transitional housing site and one permanent relocation site. Although she followed an institutionalised pathway, she also identified spaces beyond the official post-disaster spaces as critical to rebuilding her life and livelihood post-Sendong. Her account demonstrates clearly that the particularity of a place is produced and given meaning through the human relationships and exchanges. Hence, no two evacuation centres are exactly the same, and no two people perceive a single evacuation centre as exactly the same place. Her story illustrates the earlier discussion: evacuation sites are crowded, hot, uncomfortable spaces to be endured; they are discriminatory spaces in which the distribution of relief goods is uneven; they are sites where formal and informal rules and norms are created and enforced; they are spaces where

domestic violence is put on public display, which precipitates intervention by state and religious trustees; they are spaces where gender, religion, stereotypes, and cultural norms matter.

Bonnie's first evacuation centre was at City Central School, several hundred metres away from her pre-Sendong home in Isla de Oro. She stayed there with her partner (whom she calls her husband even though they are not legally married) and her six year old son from a previous relationship. The proximity of this evacuation site to her husband's work site made it relatively easy for him to continue his work in the informal sector as a *motorela* driver.

This is the City Central, our evacuation after Sendong. We were brought here in the afternoon after the flooding. It was still okay. It recently caught fire. Inside, 3,000 plus families stayed here. Too bad it was burned. We stayed here for two to three months. [... The living conditions were] okay. We were well taken care of. Food was abundant, we had a lot. Water and electricity were for free. Then the foreign and private groups who helped us were usually Americans, coming from the U.S. This is also very important for me because this is where we fled and received help. That is why this place is also important for me. I will not forget our [first] evacuation centre.

She noted the abundance of external aid in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, which allowed her family to access almost all of the resources they required. Yet, she characterised City Central as a crowded and uncomfortable evacuation centre. Classes resumed after Christmas holidays, during the time when Sendong survivors were staying at the school. Evacuees were made to feel like squatters residing in a space where they were unwanted. Within a few months, the City Central School evacuation camp was closed.

Bonnie's family was next transferred to the old DSWD building in *barangay* Macanhan, approximately three kilometres southwest and across the river from City Central.

This is DSWD evacuation centre. I came from City Central Evacuation Centre. I was moved here during the months of March and April. When I lived here it was okay. It was peaceful – no confusion, not disturbing. I had a task here, I was vice president or leader of the camp. I check on how my members are doing, I also check on what they need. I also monitor who is smoking and drinking. If the camp manager is away, I am the second camp manager. I take care of the members.

She emphasised that her second evacuation camp was important to her because she had a positive overall experience living there for two months, especially because she was elected by her fellow evacuees into a leadership role as the camp's VP (i.e. assistant camp manager). In this role, she segregated relief, settled disputes and quarrels, monitored so-called vices (e.g. smoking and

drinking), did peacekeeping, and reminded people to clean. As a perk of being the camp VP, her family was allocated some private space within the camp; her family slept in an enclosed room with concrete (and not fabric) walls. She got along well with her fellow evacuees who trusted and respected her, and with the DSWD-appointed camp manager. In fact, after we made the video, the former camp manager walked by and had a long friendly chat with Bonnie. While the physical conditions for Bonnie's family were better at the old DSWD building than at the other two evacuation camps, it was the positive relationships she developed with people that mattered most in Bonnie's evaluation of each place.

Bonnie's stay at the old DSWD building was cut short because something that had previously transpired in private spaces was suddenly in full view of state authorities.

The reason why I left here is because my husband beat me up. I did not know his reason [for] beating me up. But when I asked my husband after that time, it was because of the talk going around among my neighbours that a lot of people were attracted to [me] and so he was jealous. That was the reason why he beat [me] up suddenly. When he beat me up, I moved out of the camp and went to DSWD Region 10 office [in Lumbia]. I stayed there in the haven. Even though I was told not to see him, I went to see my husband to know how he is doing. Then I moved out of [the] DSWD [Lumbia office] and was transferred to Camaman-an evacuation centre where I experienced a lot of bad experiences.

This citation raises several issues that help explain how gender ideologies, domestic violence and individual interpretations of events construct evacuation centres as uniquely experienced places. Other points raised in the citation, such as the role of regional state authorities in shaping mobility and in using post-disaster spaces as an entry point for intervening in people's lives, are explored in Chapter 7. Bonnie's husband claims his jealousy over the attention directed at her incited his violent behaviour. It follows then, that Bonnie's appearance might somehow shape her experiences living in evacuation centres differently than his experiences and those of other evacuees. While it is highly problematic and sexist to reduce the complex social causes of domestic violence to a woman's appearance and the attention given to her, it is useful to reflect upon Bonnie's experiences. Her experiences demonstrate the persistence of sexism and victim-blaming in Philippine society. They also provoke questions about the experiences of other categories of women, such as disabled women or lesbian women, in post-disaster spaces, and they point to the importance of the body as a scale of analysis.

That the 25 year old is stunning and knows how to dress modestly to enhance her natural beauty did not go unnoticed by others in post-disaster spaces. For example, at City Central School, one evacuee thought Bonnie was a “guest relations officer” or “GRO,” the local term for a prostitute. He insinuated that he wanted to rent her. She and her husband reported the incident to on-site police officer, who detained the man. One of her former camp managers recalled the first time she laid eyes on her. She thought Bonnie “was a government employee or a United Nations or other humanitarian aid worker.” She did not think Bonnie “was an IDP because she was so beautiful.” In my field jottings, I too remarked on Bonnie’s stylish appearance,⁴⁸ in part because she does not look the part of an urban poor Sendong survivor. These anecdotes illustrate some of the pre-conceived ideas about how a beautiful woman should behave, what she does as a livelihood, what social and economic class she belongs to, what her intentions might be, and her ability to cope with difficulties. Pre-conceived ideas about gender, class, and beauty play out in evacuation sites; for example, by informing how people interact with a beautiful woman, and who trustees select for removal in cases of domestic violence. Bonnie’s experience as a beautiful woman living in a series of evacuation sites, and her experiences as a victim of gender-based violence at the old DSWD building clearly shaped her unique understanding of each place.

Bonnie herself suspects that erroneous preconceptions about her, her past, her character, and her intentions strongly influenced her negative associations with her third evacuation camp. Her feelings were so strong that she had not wanted to make a video at the Camaman-an covered court when we initially planned the day’s itinerary. But, by the time we finish the fifth video, Bonnie and Kuki had been talking almost non-stop for several hours. In my field notes, I wrote that “I think it is this trust, and Kuki’s explanation that ‘important places’ aren’t necessarily associated with positive experiences that convinced [Bonnie] to go to Camaman-an.” In the video, Bonnie narrates the following:

⁴⁸ On 7 March 2013, I wrote about Bonnie’s attire:

She was wearing beige slacks, a black long-sleeve V-neck t-shirt, dress black sandals with criss-crossed straps and heels. She wear no necklace, but a stylish pair of sunglasses hangs in the crook of the V. Her toe nails were painted burgundy with sparkles. Her fingernails look like she recently removed red or orange polish. She has two rings on her left hand. Her long black hair is pulled back with a square plastic barrette. Throughout the day she alternates between having it pulled up (in various styles of twists and ponytails) and straight down. When it’s down, her hair reaches just below her belt. It’s long, straight and shiny, just like in one of the Pantene hair commercials they play on TV here.

This is my third evacuation centre. I lived here temporarily in this evacuation centre in Camaman-an. I could not forget this place because I experienced a lot of pain and difficulty in this place. Very painful. People think lowly of me. The camp manager here did not accept me, but there was also somebody from here who accepted me. I put a small tent made of blankets. When my neighbours sweep the floor, they deliberately hit my sleeping quarters. When there is relief, they do not give me even as I watch them. They don't even give me water. But there was one camp manager here, Ma'am V. She would give me water and other support. She is usually the one who helps me but I don't know where she is now. I know that she is from here (Camaman-an), she is the wife of a counselor. She always told me to let them be and ignore them, they are just jealous.

There was one time when they destroyed my tent. When I got back, I asked around why it was destroyed. They told me kids played around my tent. I was very hurt but I ignored it. At this time of day, it was very hot, but I don't go out of my tent because I don't want to cause any trouble here. But they check inside my tent, and gossip and insult me, calling me names like '*balbal*' [witch or ghou] and suspect me of being a monster.

Despite of the pain, at least someone [Ma'am V.] is on my side who advised me to leave them alone. There was also a time when UNICEF came. They just passed by my tent, ignored me. They did not give me relief because people from the DSWD considered me '*taga-gawa*' [outsider] already. They were thinking that I was already expelled from my previous evacuation centre, that's why I was transferred here.

I had a lot of experiences though. There was this one time when they took my urinal and placed it in the middle of the camp for everyone to see, somebody told everyone that "hey, this is the urinal of [Bonnie], that is very yellow and very dirty. Look, she did not even clean it." I did not know what was the reaction of the other camp managers here. I just endured everything they did to me, despite the pain I felt. I did not fight nor bother anybody. I just leave everything to God, what they are doing to me, how they belittle me. These are the bad memories I have of this evacuation centre.

Bonnie's account illustrates how applications of certain vulnerability discourses can have material, emotional, and social consequences, notably bullying and denial of resources. Unlike her first two camps, she came there alone and was one of the last evacuees to arrive. The reason for the move was not disclosed to the other residents, who incorrectly assumed that she was the cause of problems (hence her expulsion and relocation to another evacuation camp), and not that she has been moved for her own protection. Bonnie was thus labeled as 'morally and socially deficient' and 'different from the other evacuees' right from her arrival. This reputation influenced subsequent interactions with her fellow evacuees and camp manager. She recalled many painful experiences, from the public humiliation of the urinal incident to the times when she would pack

up her tent and belongings leaving everything “closed and locked” only to find her tent open and belongings strewn all over upon her return. The evacuees claimed it was just children playing around, but she maintains it was either the adults or the children with tacit approval from their parents. Bonnie recounts that she was always passed over for the higher quality relief goods. For example, the bed she was given only had three legs. All the other evacuees received good beds and mattresses. She initially thought it was because she arrived late, but when the camp manager was distributing beds and mattresses they told her she could not have a good one and gave her the broken one instead. (Bonnie had the broken leg fixed and continued to use it in her transitional and permanent relocation houses.) Off-camera, Bonnie stated repeatedly that the camp manager did nothing to diffuse the tension and was just as prejudiced as the other evacuees.

The timing of her arrival at Camaman-an covered court had spatial and social repercussions. Within any evacuation site, some sleeping spaces are better than others; there are more and less desirable micro-spaces within the larger space. Because Bonnie arrived last, all of the good ones were taken. She was left with a spot near the edge of the covered court near a loud, hot, busy road. The evacuees often sprayed water on the road so that the dust would not enter the covered court. They would spray her tent and belongings, too, claiming it was an accident. Bonnie’s late arrival also affected her acquisition of social norms. In all evacuation sites, new rules were instituted to govern the space – some formal, others informal, some created by trustees, others by the evacuees themselves, some applicable to all evacuation camps, others unique to one particular camp. There are rules about curfew, allocation of relief goods per family, cleanliness, and social cliques. Bonnie did not observe all the Camaman-an-specific rules because she moved into an established camp and was not present when the rules were being formed, and nobody – not even the state-appointed camp manager – helped her learn.

She supposed that she was considered a *taga-gawa* (literally “from the outside” in Bisayan) because she did not mingle with people, and arrived after the others had formed cliques. Moreover, although she never stated that she is a *lumad*, she referred repeatedly to her family home in the mountains of Misamis Oriental, where she continues to farm and where many of the province’s Indigenous Peoples reside. As a suspected *lumad*, Bonnie would have been subjected to the same (usually) subtle but widespread prejudices against Indigenous Peoples living throughout the

archipelago. At the Camaman-an camp, the children and adults called her a *balbal*, one category of *aswang*, or mythical creature, in Philippine folklore. In many communities, *aswang* tales perform a social control function; invoking an *aswang* belief, for example, might be used to discipline an unruly child or to scare unwanted visitors from particular sites, or to coerce so-called deviant individuals into conforming to socially acceptable behaviour (Ramos 1971). The Spaniards first introduced *aswang* stories to the Philippines during colonial rule, and the stories later spread to Northern Mindanao as Visayan migrants moved south (Demetrio 1991, Burton 2013). Calling someone an *aswang* is a powerful insult; it is not done lightly. The *balbal* (literally a ghoul) is a witch or monster with long flowing black hair that helps her to fly at night (Demetrio 1991, Demetrio, Cordero-Fernando et al. 1991). Filipino parents warn their children about a possible visit from the *balbal* when they want to scare them into behaving. In labelling Bonnie a *balbal*, her fellow evacuees ostracised her; they invoked Philippine folkloric traditions to exclude her socially.

Bonnie's interpretation of her experiences at the City Central School, old DSWD building, and Camanan-an covered court evacuation centres demonstrate that these three post-disaster spaces are vastly different places. The types of exchanges she had at the old DSWD building, where she was assistant camp manager – a position in which she was respected, given responsibility, and treated well – and where she made friends and got along well with the other evacuees contrast sharply with the exchanges she had at the two other sites, especially in Camaman-an. Although the physical spaces of the three evacuation sites were different in terms of their comfort (e.g. level of crowdedness, dustiness, and quality and quantity of relief goods) and geographic proximity to the city centre, it was the people and Bonnie's relationships with people in these spaces that really defined the character of each evacuation site. This finding reinforces the arguments of feminist geographers who emphasise the salience of power hierarchies, gender, race, and economic relations (Staeheli and Martin 2000), and the necessarily unique interpretation of social exchanges (Massey 1994), in the construction of ever-changing places.

The above discussion has depicted evacuation centres as highly exclusionary spaces. In spite of their inclusive mandate to assist vulnerable survivors of a disaster, the design and character of evacuation camps deterred many survivors from accessing these spaces. Even the survivors who opted to stay in evacuation sites frequently found themselves excluded – from one-time evacuation camps returned to their original purpose, from quality relief goods, and from fellow

evacuees. The powers of exclusion operating in the evacuation camps were similarly present in other official post-disaster spaces, notably the temporary housing and permanent relocation housing sites.

Temporary housing

The second type of safe space in the institutionalised sleeping pathway was the temporary or transitional housing site. As its name suggests, this post-disaster space was conceived as a short-term bridge where vulnerable survivors wait out the period between the closure of the evacuation camps and the availability of relocation houses or the return to their former houses. Transitional housing sites served similar functions to the evacuation sites: they offered shelter, relief goods, (limited) economic opportunities, medical care, and spiritual guidance. They similarly revealed private and sometimes violent activities, which provoked the intervention of state, religious, and non-governmental trustees. Like evacuation camps, transitional sites were spaces of exclusion informed by vulnerability discourses.

In several ways temporary housing sites were distinct from evacuation camps. Instead of converting existing public buildings designed for non-residential purposes into emergency shelters, transitional sites were specifically designed for housing people. They were located away from the densely populated and built areas of the city (Fig. 6.2c). The availability of land at transitional sites meant that housing was typically more spacious, comfortable, and private than in the evacuation camps, with only one family assigned to each bunkhouse or tent. The quantity, quality, and type of disaster assistance available to residents was different in transitional site residents as compared to in the evacuation camps. The ensuing discussion analyses these differences, and how the vulnerability discourses and powers of exclusion operated in temporary housing sites.

Types of transitional housing

There were three main types of housing in CDO's temporary housing sites: tents, bunkhouses with cement foundations, and transitory houses made from light, local materials. At each of the transitional sites, temporary residences were laid out in a carefully planned arrangement, usually a grid or other layout easily legible to outsiders.

The tents were the first of the transitional housing sites to be erected; they were known locally as "tent cities" (Fig. 6.4). The largest ones were located in Calaanan and Lumbia, west and

southwest of the city, respectively, and at their peak housed tens of thousands of Sendong survivor families. Although the tents provided a quick fix for rapidly moving evacuees out of school-based evacuation camps (thereby enabling classes to resume after the Christmas holidays), they were less than ideal as a form of shelter. Several different types of tents were donated by international humanitarian organisations. The first tents provided by one organisation were rejected by the survivors because they were reportedly too short. The tents did not effectively protect people from the elements. According to former tent city residents, it was too hot to remain inside the tents during the day, it was uncomfortable at night because the tents were open, and when it rained, the tent's contents got soaked. The tents even floated when it rained. The heat was especially difficult for survivors whose compromised health conditions push them toward the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum; for example, one elderly gentleman recounted having a stroke in his tent, which was later linked to the extreme heat. Even a regional government officer in charge of camp managers underlined how hot and uncomfortable the tents were:

Most of them [evacuees] cannot make it in the tents because it's so hot, so most of them suffered when they were in the tents. It's very uncomfortable, really. I have tried, and you know, I cannot really stay there even 15 minutes. [If] it's [a] sunny day, then it's really very hot. The tent is.



Fig. 6.4. One of Cagayan de Oro's tent cities. Source: GMA News Online (2012).

The geographical location of the tent cities exacerbated the problem. In their pre-Sendong homes and in the evacuation camps, survivors had options to escape unbearable heat and rainy weather. They could walk or take inexpensive public transportation to markets, restaurants, places of worship, air-conditioned malls, or other residences with electric fans, or they could simply jump into the Cagayan River or Macajalar Bay to cool off. No such facilities existed near the tent cities, and the cost of public transit away from the tent cities was prohibitive. With such conditions the tent cities were not really “safe spaces.”

Other trustees were similarly disenchanted with the living conditions in the tent cities. Two of the professional staff members who helped to design the temporary and permanent housing at Ecoville went as far as describing life in the tents as “so dehumanising,” and the tent cities as another “sort of disaster.” The physical conditions in the tent cities served as a powerful deterrent in keeping survivors out. In fact, once the tent cities opened up and survivors had to choose between moving into a tent city and returning to their former houses (or house sites), they frequently chose the latter option if their houses were not located within one of the newly created no-build zones.

The two other types of transitory houses were much better received than the tents. The majority of survivors who resided in a transitional housing site lived in *amakan* villages. *Amakan* is a type of locally available bamboo that is woven into large sheets. As a lightweight and inexpensive building material, it is frequently used as walls or partitions by the urban poor in informal settlements and by middle class Cagayaños in their rural retreat houses. Several NGOs, notably the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), partnered with regional government agencies in issuing *amakan* sheets to the IDPs, which were used as walls in their temporary houses. CRS selected the *amakan* house as their preferred transitional shelter design because it fit the following design parameters: culturally appropriate, moveable, quick to construct, economical, flexible, and upgradeable (Hirano 2012, 24). When the survivor was transferred into a relocation house, he or she could keep or sell the *amakan* sheets. Many opted to sell them; in 2013, the going price was \$108. Most of the *amakan* houses had corrugated metal roofs, although some had *nipa* roofs.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ *Nipa* is a type of palm tree (*Nyssa fruticans*) found throughout the archipelago. Its fronds are frequently used to make the thatch roofs of the quintessential Philippine *nipa* hut. It is ideally suited for a tropical climate. If damaged by typhoons, floods or earthquakes, it can be easily repaired or rebuilt.

Amakan houses were positively princely compared to the evacuation camps or tent cities. The houses were relatively cool, spacious, and private. The sites had access to electricity, and at some sites, connections were available inside each house. The sites had proper comfort rooms and (mostly) decent access to water. In my field notes, I described Bonnie's *amakan* house at the Xavier Farm transitional housing site.

The house is up on stilts. You walk up three wooden steps to get into the house. The bottom step is broken. Inside, the place is cool. It can get hot, because of the corrugated metal roof, but there is a 1.5' gap between the top of the walls and the roof so when there is a breeze it's quite comfortable. There is a woven mat on the floor at the back. The TV is on, and [Bonnie's son] is watching a cartoon, the volume turned up quite loud. The blue and white ceiling fan is not turned on. There are fabric flowers (roses) in a vase. Bottles of nail polish, some blush and other make-up are on a small table. There are at least a dozen pairs of fancy women's dress shoes, including some with 3+ inch heels. Kuki and I comment that she doesn't need the extra height; she's already quite tall for a Filipina.

Amakan villages were opened later than the tent cities, beginning in February 2012. Most were situated in the city outskirts, for example in Calaanan and at Xavier Farm in Canitoan, although one was located near the city centre (Fig. 6.2c). All but two of the *amakan* villages were under the purview of state authorities; in a peaceful wooded plateau in Camaman-an, each of the city's two Catholic seminaries had established *amakan* villages on their grounds.

The third type of transitional house was built exclusively at Ecoville, the resettlement site of Xavier University in *barangay* Lumbia. Successful Ecoville applicants moved into bunkhouses on the Ecoville property between January and April 2012 and remained there until July 2013. A bunkhouse is a quick construction housing unit; it is easy to construct and easy to dismantle. Its main advantage is the speed of construction. It is light construction and can be built easily with minimal engineering. The bunkhouses were built with 2' x 2' wood. They had cement foundations, so the structures were very rigid as compared to the *amakan* houses and tents. After moving in, however, the wood foundations started to settle, so the residents cemented them to make them sturdier. Bunkhouses offered families privacy, space, and comfortable interior temperatures. The bunkhouses at Ecoville were funded by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the DSWD, and built by the engineering brigade of the Philippine Army. Unlike the *amakan* sheet walls, Ecoville bunkhouses are not the property of individual survivors

and cannot be easily sold or transported to another location. As of April 2013, the University had no definitive plans for the bunkhouses after people moved into the permanent housing.

Changes to disaster assistance

The quantity, type, and conditions of disaster assistance offered to Sendong survivors differed among the three main types of post-disaster sleeping spaces, and also within each type. There was a gradual reduction in the volume of aid distributed at the transitional housing sites, especially once the disaster was no longer front page news. There was also a shift in the type of assistance so that survivors would be more independent; trustees, for example, implemented livelihood trainings designed to help residents support themselves financially. Transitional housing sites were thus spaces where disaster assistance transitioned from “a hand-out to victims” to “a conditional tool for building independent survivors.”

At evacuation centres and many temporary housing sites, survivors received assistance from government agencies, religious groups, or non-governmental organisations. Often, basic goods were distributed, such as food (especially rice, canned sardines, and noodles), water, clothing, medicine, sleeping mats, and blankets. A small subset of households also received basic utensils or cooking implements. As noted above, evacuees received *amakan* sheets to build the walls of their temporary houses when they moved into *amakan* villages. Many of them sold the *amakan* when they moved into their permanent relocation homes, pocketing \$108. Evacuees were also provided with amenities such as access to electricity, water, and basic washing and toilet facilities. Trustees covered these expenses at all of the evacuation sites and at most of the transitional sites until December 2012. As one regional government officer explained, various regional government agencies were obliged to provide light, electricity, and WASH facilities for one year after Sendong. National government offices provided additional funding to cover these expenses until Super-typhoon Pablo hit in December 2012; the response diverted resources to disaster relief efforts in Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley. The burden of paying for amenities was shifted to other trustees in 2013. It was the archdiocese that bore these costs.

The transitional site at Ecoville had a different approach to cost sharing and disaster assistance, carefully designed to instill a particular attitude in the future homeowners. Some costs, such as electricity and water, were paid by the residents; each of the 518 households contributed for the privilege of charging cell phones, watching the site’s only television, having some electrical lights

at night, and accessing clean water. The monthly bills were posted on the exterior wall of the Ecoville office, a committee collected money from each household, which was turned over to Ecoville staff who paid the water and utilities companies. Most households could afford their portion of the monthly bills, which were, for example, \$1.68 for electricity and \$2.45 for water in January 2013. Asking residents to start paying was a calculated decision taken by Xavier University and the Jesuit priests. It was intended to build independence among survivors, eliminate a so-called “dole-out mentality,” ease residents into covering their own expenses, and enable the university to eventually withdraw from its role of running the transitional and permanent relocation sites.

Evidence from several relocation sites support the soundness of the Ecoville cost-sharing strategy at transitional sites. Survivors resettled at sites other than Ecoville were shocked that they were suddenly expected to cover all their own expenses and no longer received any relief goods. They had come to expect free services and goods from the government and NGOs. There were protests when the government agencies providing electricity and water tried asking the recipients of livelihood assistance loans to start paying their own bills in the transitional sites. The agencies rescinded their requests, and agreed to continue paying these bills. According to some survivors and trustees, it got to the point where some people living at the temporary shelters did not want to leave and settle in the permanent relocation housing.

The quality of disaster relief at temporary housing sites was often inferior to that at the evacuation centres. During a focus group discussion at an *amakan* village, the participants complained about the deterioration of sanitary conditions at temporary housing sites over time. The discussion took place in March 2013, and many of the participants had spent more than a year living in transitional housing – first at the tent city in Lumbia, and later in the Xavier Farm *amakan* village. Broken toilets and taps remained unfixed for days or weeks. Evacuees suffered from “loose bowel movement” (diarrhea) at both sites, which they attributed to contaminated drinking water. The on-site water tanks, provided by the water district, “are so dirty” and the water “is so muddy.” They “really tried to drink mineral water, but it is so expensive” leaving them no option but to drink tap water. One entrepreneurial woman turned the water problem and demand for alternatives into a micro-scale business opportunity selling mineral water to her fellow survivors (Fig. 6.5), but she could not generate enough sales to support her household.

Given that transitional sites are (1) typically sited in unbuilt areas with no or limited pre-existing facilities, and (2) expected to close within several months to one year, it is not surprising that the trustees designing and running these sites did not invest in high quality, durable infrastructure. This lack of investment, however, affected residents; occasionally, it sparked economic opportunities, but more often, it negatively affected the health of residents, particularly the majority of evacuees who could not afford alternatives.



Fig. 6.5. A *motorela*-based bottled mineral water enterprise at one of CDO's transitional *amakan* housing sites (6 March 2013). The woman uses the revenue to supplement her income.

Just as it distinguished itself from other transitional sites in terms of its cost-sharing strategy, the Jesuit University-run relocation site Xavier Ecoville also distinguished itself in planning and implementing sound water and sanitation systems. For example, based on the recommendations of the “sustainable sanitation” committee, a closed system for waste management was implemented. Urine is collected from the male urinals, and combined with other compostable materials at the on-site composting facility. The compost is used as fertiliser in the communal

vegetable and flower gardens interspersed among the bunkhouses. A committee of Ecoville residents monitors the water and sanitation systems; any problems they cannot solve themselves are reported to and dealt with by Ecoville staff.

The motivations for investing significant financial and human capital into a temporary living space were manifold. The transitional site borders the permanent site and Xavier University owns other parcels of land bordering the transitional and permanent sites. Ecoville also had a high local, national and even international profile, and carries the Xavier name. So, any lasting negative impacts from the transitional site would ultimately spill over into the permanent site, the university property, and even the university's reputation. Encouraging residents to maintain facilities on their own water and sanitation systems advanced the Ecoville aim of creating independent homeowners. Most importantly, perhaps, was a genuine desire expressed by *all* of the more than two dozen people who worked in Ecoville in various capacities with whom I spoke. They wanted to turn Ecoville into a self-sustaining, well-functioning, and desirable place to live. But it was more than just lofty ideals and reputational threats that enabled the Ecoville transitional site to have good water and sanitation facilities. Ecoville had advantages the other sites did not. Not only could its trustees focus their efforts on a single site, but they could also tap into a highly-trained professional staff to imagine and plan the site, significant financial resources to fund the site, and a large pool of enthusiastic, able-bodied volunteers to carry out the work.

Another change to the assistance offered to survivors in transitional housing was the emphasis on livelihoods and trainings. A variety of trustees sponsored and ran livelihood training sessions. For example, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority in CDO offered free rug-making, slipper-making training, massage, culinary arts, parlour and hairstyle, and cosmetology classes to residents at the Lumbia and Calaanan tent cities. When trainings were held off-site, evacuees were provided with free transportation and snacks. Municipal and regional government agencies, NGOs, and church groups also hosted livelihood trainings, which were frequently funded by the DSWD and major international NGOs like Save the Children. Survivors who completed certain livelihood training programs were eligible to receive zero-interest livelihood loans of up to \$120 from either the DSWD or the archdiocese's Social Action Center (SAC). Other trustees donated livelihood kits with basic hairdressing, carpentry, sewing, cooking, or other tools. Ecoville adopted a more comprehensive and long-term approach to its livelihood

assistance efforts. It hired a livelihoods coordinator who surveyed the pre-Sendong livelihoods and skills of residents, arranged for livelihood trainings, set up a cooperative to support the businesses of Ecoville residents, negotiated business contracts in which several private companies agreed to purchase products from Ecoville residents, oversaw the creation of on-site livelihood opportunities (e.g. tree nursery and small-scale vending), and supported the construction of a permanent livelihoods building. The focus on livelihood assistance underscores the concerted efforts of trustees to shift from the discourse from sustaining passive Sendong victims to supporting self-reliant Sendong survivors. Trustees presumed such a change could be spurred by eliminating presumed deficiencies (e.g. lack of skill, knowledge, money, tools and certification). Promoting livelihood assistance in post-disaster spaces also presented trustees with a means to draw people previously beyond the purview of the formal economy into it.

The trainings that took place in the temporary housing sites were not all about livelihoods. Religious actors, occasionally supported by state actors, initiated, created and implemented activities aimed at improving the religious and moral character of survivors. The two following examples are illustrative. The adult residents at Ecoville must complete an eight-day values formation training before they are permitted to move into their relocation house. Ecoville trustees commissioned the Philippine-based NGO Gawad Kalinga to design and deliver the training because of its extensive experience in building relocation housing and providing social assistance to survivors throughout the archipelago. Gawad Kalinga is a self-described anti-poverty and nation-building movement that carries out social engineering projects (Gawad Kalinga 2013). Its values formation program aims to bring about a change in values, attitudes, and behaviours among participants, which, in turn, fosters a cohesive, peaceful community. Local Gawad Kalinga staff adapted a national Couples for Christ training program to suit the needs of Sendong survivors. The values training has seven modules. The first part, called 'Building community to end poverty,' has three modules: (1) Called to care and share, (2) Building the community of our dreams, and (3) Together we can end poverty. The second part, called 'Living a life of caring and sharing,' has four modules: (4) Loving the least, the last, the lost, (5) Loving without fear, (6) Loving is believing, and (7) Loving is life. As pointed out in Chapter 5, the values formation training reflects the deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses held by some trustees. The values formation was expected to contribute to the long-term success of Ecoville; trustees assumed that once the residents were trained and assimilated the appropriate

values (which they purportedly did not have pre-Sendong), they would naturally ensure the proper social functioning of Xavier Ecoville.

A special project of the archdiocese's Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning (RP-ANFP) ministry illustrates another example of fixing moral wrongs. In response to the demand for "legitimising" otherwise sinful relationships, this ministry carried out all the ecclesiastical, legal, and logistic preparations needed to marry over 250 couples and baptise their children. The archdiocese paid for wedding expenses from a special Typhoon Sendong fund, except for the wine and wedding rings, and the bride and groom's outfits, which were covered by local Congressmen and the couple, respectively. According to the head of the RP-ANFP, the archdiocese's position was both pragmatically and theologically motivated; marriage helps children when they grow up and need official papers for a job, and marriage is a sacred sacrament between a man and woman who want to share a loving life together. When the program began, preparatory classes took place at or near the transitional sites; as survivors were relocated into resettlement sites, the classes (and subsequent workshops on parenting, all-natural family planning, etc.) have followed them.

In each of the aforementioned types of assistance available at transitional sites, Ecoville demonstrates a unique approach. The approach reflects a careful distinction between "temporary" and "transitional." Unlike the vast majority of other interim housing sites, the Ecoville bunkhouses were not constructed as "temporary" spaces where people merely wait out the time before moving into a concrete relocation house and moving on with their lives. Instead, Ecoville trustees deliberately constructed a "transitional" space where survivors were trained to adopt particular attitudes, values, and lifestyles, which they were expected to carry over into Ecoville's permanent resettlement site. At the transitional site, disaster assistance, as expressed through the physical space, infrastructure, rules, and programs reinforced the Ecoville motto of "We are not just building houses. We are building a community."

How long is "temporary?"

The irony of so-called "temporary" housing is that it is not so temporary. One informant on Ecoville's infrastructure team questioned the temporary characterisation of houses, "I don't know at what point it becomes transitory and [when it becomes] permanent. Houses *are* permanent." While tents and *amakan* houses can be easily dismantled and moved to another site, the

transitional houses at Ecoville have cement foundations, a building material usually associated with permanence. It is not the physical structures, however, that challenge the temporary nature of transitional sites, but rather the long-term social and economic consequences of living in them.

The temporary character of life in the transitional housing sites can yield permanent and unintended negative social consequences, too. For example, mothers living in evacuation camps and transitional housing sites for extended periods of time withdrew their school-age children from classes. In some instances, children had been out of school for over one year. The mothers explained that the school officials insisted their pupils have a permanent address and did not want students to attend classes for several weeks or months, only to leave for another school when the family was transferred to another evacuation camp, transitional housing site, or a permanent relocation housing site. Thus the threat of frequent moves indirectly contributed to absenteeism among Sendong survivor children residing in official post-disaster spaces. Because repeated and prolonged withdrawals from school are precursors to dropping out (Sabates, Akyeampong et al. 2010), it is likely that at least some of the school-age survivors who are kept temporarily out of school while they wait for a relocation house will be permanently denied a formal education.

This repercussion underscores the hardships faced by survivors in temporary safe spaces. Keeping children out of school, especially at the primary level, is unusual in Philippine cities because parents of all economic classes typically highly value their children's education and will take measures, such as scrimping on other expenses or living in an undesirable location because it is near the school, to ensure their children have at least a basic education. Moreover, among the urban poor survivors, many are recipients of the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (4Ps), an anti-poverty initiative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development aiming to provide social assistance and to promote social development (DSWD no date).⁵⁰ To receive the small – but not

⁵⁰ DSWD describes the 4Ps as “a human development program of the national government that invests in the health and education of poor households, particularly of children aged 0-18 years old” that is “patterned after the conditional cash transfer scheme implemented in other developing countries.” To receive the cash grants, beneficiaries must comply with program conditions such as accessing pre- and post-natal care, attending Family Development Sessions, ensuring children receive preventative health care, and enrolling and attending school classes (DSWD no date).

insignificant – 4Ps stipend, a parent (usually the mother) must show proof that her children regularly attend school. Forgoing this money is not a desirable option.

The risk of dropping out is further exacerbated by two additional factors characteristic to the transitional housing sites and the people living there: school inaccessibility and poverty. In her study on why Filipino children leave school, Fe Nava (2009) found that financial constraints meant families could not afford school-related costs such as school project fees, school contributions, uniforms, transportation money, lunches, etc. She found that a long distance between home and school also induced dropping out; if children lack transportation fare, or have to walk for hours, or must cross a busy road, they are unlikely to attend school regularly. This distance deterrent was noted by a municipal government agency in CDO in charge of relocation:

Most of the families used to send their children [to] the nearby school and now that they are being relocated [to] the relocation site, most of their complaints are the distance for their children. In fact there were other children who were being stopped from their studies because of the distance.

Interestingly, the regional government agency responsible for both the 4Ps and the design and operation of official post-disaster spaces was unaware that evacuees were pulling their children out of school for prolonged periods of time. This knowledge gap demonstrates, among other things, that information is not necessarily shared among levels of government and that there is no all-knowing, comprehensively-acting state.

Together, the poverty of urban poor survivors, the enforcement of school rules about attendance, the ongoing threat of another government-induced move, and the distance of transitional, and later permanent relocation, sites from schools operate to exclude children from school. In other words, the temporary application of certain powers of exclusion (notably the market, regulation and force) effectively prevent a more vulnerable component of Cagayaños from accessing a critical resource in the long term.

The potential problems associated with prolonged stays in temporary housing, including the uncomfortable and difficult living conditions for survivors and the financial and opportunity costs to government agencies, are compelling arguments for shortening the time survivors spend in temporary post-disaster spaces. In other Philippine disasters, the interim housing measures typically drag on for at least two years. After the eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991 and the

resulting displacement of the Aeta population living on the volcano's slopes, the temporary tents were slowly replaced with concrete houses. In 2006, Typhoon Reming hit the Bicol region of Luzon, displacing more than 4000 families. The resulting tent city remained open until 2008. In 2011, some Metro Manila-based Ondoy survivors were still living in temporary housing – two years after the 2009 Typhoon Ondoy.

Yet, in CDO this waiting period was significantly shortened; survivor families began moving into resettlement sites less than one year after the storm. As one regional government officer pointed out, “the first turnover of the permanent site was in April 27 [2012] when the President came. Since then, I think every two weeks or every week, there is movement of IDPs to the permanent site. They say that we are the fastest so far.” In fact, the speed at which the transfer occurred was an aspect of rebuilding that was repeatedly remarked upon by organisations involved in many disaster rebuilding efforts throughout the archipelago, such as Habitat for Humanity Philippines and Gawad Kalinga, as well as by politicians from other municipalities and from the national government. Rapid recovery from Typhoon Sendong was a priority for state, religious, humanitarian, and academic trustees.

Philippine and foreign researchers inquired into the reasons why CDO was able to develop and build resettlement sites, then transfer people into them so quickly, especially compared to Iligan City in the neighbouring province of Lanao del Norte, which was devastated by the same Tropical Storm Sendong. One NGO informant overseeing the construction of almost half of the resettlement houses in both CDO and Iligan identified the three “key ingredients” to CDO’s unusually rapid response as (1) the immediate availability of land and of money to build houses, (2) the willingness of political leaders to quickly take decisions, and (3) the modification of the usual building strategy. To this trio of key ingredients, regional and municipal government authorities added the outpouring of donations and technical assistance from NGOs, and the rapid disbursement of government funding to start construction. The mayor’s land-banking strategy in which the city purchased land that was subsequently prepared for *piso-piso* lots meant that CDO had land that could immediately be converted into resettlement sites. In contrast, Iligan had no comparable land reserves and had the additional steps of identifying and purchasing land before it could begin construction. Indeed, the lack of land is a typical bottleneck in the reconstruction process. The high profile of the disaster, the volume of donations, and the

pressure on politicians and bureaucrats to successfully implement the Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121) meant that monies for rebuilding were quickly disbursed. In fact, even before the official paperwork had been approved, DSWD paid the organisations selected to build the resettlement sites because it wanted to expedite construction. The CDO mayor and other city officials also moved very fast; normally a builder must acquire all sorts of certificates and permits before beginning construction, but these restrictions were loosened for relocation house builders. Lastly, the usual building order was modified. Ideally, site development, including the building all water, road, electrical and drainage infrastructure, precedes house construction. In CDO, however, site development was done concurrently with, and even after, resettlement house construction. The Department of Public Works and Highways just shared the site development plans with the builders so that they would build the houses in the right locations. Many of the “key ingredients” for speeding up post-Sendong resettlement required that powers of *exclusion* act as powers of *inclusion*. For example, regulations that normally slow or even halt formal planned housing developments were relaxed, and political relationships and alliances were strategically employed to cut through bureaucratic red tape.

The expedited building process was not without its problems. Certain trustees reported that the quality of the new and repaired projects was questionable. Furthermore, in trying to speed up the construction of resettlement sites and reduce the transitional period, trustees inadvertently introduced temporary problems for the people building the houses and the people living in them. Incomplete site development slowed down construction; for example, the lack of roads meant that when it rained, the trucks carrying building supplies got stuck in the mud; the lack of water on-site required trucking in copious amounts of water for mixing cement; and the lack of electricity meant bringing in generators to power the equipment. Site development was not always completed before survivors were transferred into the relocation sites. The lack of good roads and access to water and electricity was a major deterrent for full-time residency at the resettlement site, spurring circular migration strategies. As such, the temporary character of transitional sites was merely carried through to the permanent relocation sites.

This section has illustrated one application of the powers of exclusion, namely to accelerate the building process. The powers of exclusion were also invoked by trustees for other purposes, including to address domestic violence and sexual abuse.

Invoking the powers of exclusion

Similar to the evacuation camps, there were cases of domestic violence and sexual abuse at the temporary housing sites. Most acts of violence were committed by men against women, but there were exceptional cases in which women were the perpetrators or silent accomplices. As such, temporary housing sites were spaces of public and gendered violence. Although living quarters were much more spacious than at evacuation camps, it is impossible for on-site trustees and neighbouring evacuees to ignore what was happening inside a tent or bunkhouse.

One camp manager recounted many incidents in which she observed gender-based violence and subsequently intervened. The following discussion is based on her account of two such cases. In her response, the camp manager demonstrates how transitional sites, like evacuation camps, are spaces of instruction and intervention. It shows how regulation, force, and legitimation were invoked as powers with the potential to exclude (e.g. to deny access to a relocation house). It also reveals the salience of the moral authority of the Catholic Church in shaping interventions, and consequently, in developing the religious character of transitional housing sites.

In the first case, a 16 year old girl was raped on four separate occasions by her step-father. Her birth mother was aware of the violence, but kept silent. The camp manager intervened, and the daughter was taken away and kept in a safe house run by Catholic nuns.

I have an IDP, her daughter was raped by her own husband. I was the one who called the church. The daughter now is at the hands of the nuns here in cathedral. The father is at large because he has already a warrant of arrest. The mother, before the Sendong, they're staying in [*barangay* O.]. The accident happened three times [there]. So it came to my mind that the mother is just keeping silent because [she] is not the real daughter of [her current] husband.

The fourth time she was raped by the father. It was 10 o'clock in the morning, when the daughter was washing clothes. We were having the second batch of [mass] wedding[s] at Xavier University. That is why not all of [the IDPs] were at the camp, [nor] the camp manager. The mother was in Xavier [University] for [the] wedding because [she was] one of the godmothers.

The following day somebody told me, 'Ma'am, the daughter of our neighbour is raped by the step-father'. So I acted then, I asked the mother 'Where is your daughter? Where is your husband? If you will not go with us, I will file a case against you for connivance with your husband. So where is your daughter?' So she cried.

I talked to the daughter. The daughter told me ‘Ma’am, this is my fourth time. My step-father raped me. We are still in [*barangay* O.], I was raped.’ ‘What did [your] mother [do]?’ ‘My mother was just silent.’

So after talking to the daughter, I talked to the [mother again]. ‘This is already fourth time, why did you just keep on? Your daughter, she might be pregnant with your own husband.’ She asked forgiveness from us. Maybe this is the will of the Lord. This will be stopped. [Then I told her], ‘If you do not agree with us, if you will not work with us, I will also file a case against you if you allow your daughter to be raped by your own husband. I will file a case against you as a DSWD [representative].’ So the mother was afraid. ‘Why [did] you not talk [about] or report this to the police or DSWD or to the *barangay* [*tanod*] to arrest him?’ She kept on crying and crying so I brought her here [to the] cathedral. She talked to Sister A.

I brought the girl to here [the archbishopric] and talked to [the man in charge of child protection]. God’s will, the daughter is now in good condition. Before she could not talk, just roaming around the eyes because of trauma. She was now in safekeeping with the nuns here. For safety, she was not sent to the school because the father might be still there. Because we have a connection with the DepEd (Department of Education) a special arrangement [was made with] the DepEd, the principal of that school and the mother [to teach the daughter] here in the church. She will be graduating [from high school] this March. The nuns, the priests will be the ones to take charge of her schooling for college.

So the father now is at large, wanted because the church is now filing a case against him. Warrant of arrest is waiting anytime, because we have pictures. The mother gave us the picture. ‘You give me the picture [of your husband]. If you want to be settle in a permanent house, just cooperate with us.’ She was able to give me the picture.

Before the mother was transferred we talked to her. ‘OK ma’am, you will be transferred to [relocation site I].’ She told me ‘Ma’am, I’m very happy because my daughter is really in good condition. She is more beautiful.’ I also told her ‘OK, just cooperate with the sisters, this is for your own good and for the good of your daughter. That is why we are here, the camp manager – to protect you, not just keep on silent.’ So that is nine-two-six-two. Violence against women and children. That is R.A. 9-2-6-2.

The second incident was another case of gender-based violence. The camp manager intervened, but the family remained together.

There is also a couple – the wife was choked. There was an evidence because of the bruises. So the wife went to the police station in B. The following day I talked to the husband because the wife did not [come] home [to the temporary housing site.] I took him to the multipurpose [court], our office. I told the husband ‘Why did you do that to

your wife? You are not allowed to do that against 9262.’ ‘Because of jealousy.’ ‘So how many times did you do this to your wife?’ [He] cannot answer me. He cried in front of me. ‘Ma’am I’m sorry. I’m ashamed,’ he told me. [I replied,] ‘Yes, because your children are growing up, they’re already ladies. Beautiful, they are beautiful.’ They have eight children.

I [also] talked to the wife many times [and I talked to them together.] ‘If you will not change your attitude I will not give you [a] permanent house,’ this is what I told them, ‘because the government, the church, the private organisations are here to protect and help you to change your way of life, to change your attitudes because God is warning us. We are here to help you to change your lifestyle.’ So the husband promised me, ‘OK ma’am.’ I talked to [him], ‘You sign here [agreeing] that this incident will not happen again.’ [He] promised me not to do it again. Why [did I give him a second chance]? Because there was already a report to the police.

[The family] was transferred February 18 to [relocation site I.]. [After they moved] I openly asked the wife when I saw her, ‘How is your husband now doing?’ ‘Ma’am after you talked to my husband he was really sorry for that.’ [Now,] every time I see him from the wharf – because he’s working as [a] construction worker [and] passes by our offices – he [greet]s me, ‘Ma’am, *maayong bapon*, good afternoon.’ ‘OK, *maayong bapon*.’ So, it’s, maybe they need some advice. The family lacks moral support or spiritual advisers.

Setting aside whether or not the camp manager acted appropriately, these excerpts reveal transitional sites as socially-produced spaces. Attempts to fix one problem can inadvertently create other problems. For instance, the successful recruitment of many transitional site residents and employees to attend a mass wedding meant that there were too few people remaining on-site to deter a rape at an open-air washing station. As Jane Jacobs (1961) has shown, the mere presence of people, or having “eyes on the street” (or around the temporary housing site), enhances the safety of public spaces. The two accounts paint transitional sites as spaces produced through uneven social relations and experiences that transpire within and beyond the physical and temporal boundaries of a specific locale. In both cases, the violence that occurred within the sites was part of a pattern begun before Tropical Storm Sendong. The camp manager had also developed a strong rapport with her charges, to the point where the evacuees trusted her, disclosed their troubles to her, responded apologetically to her reprimands, and made amends (albeit under the threat of not getting a relocation house). They accepted her duties as camp manager to protect “IDPs” and to speak up for “victims.” They allowed her to influence their behaviour.

The excerpts reveal transitional sites as spaces where the powers of exclusion are selectively invoked to produce certain behaviours and outcomes. The camp manager drew upon two irrefutable authorities – national laws and God – in explaining her position to and in requiring behavioural changes of the people involved in each case. For example, she referred to the 2004 *Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) Act* (R.A. 9262) to defend why violence against women is wrong, and to “the will of the Lord” to support why the violence was brought to her attention and later dealt with. Force, or more accurately the threat of force, was employed to elicit a particular response. In the first case, the mother was threatened with a case being filed against *her* if she did not cooperate. That it came from the camp manager as a representative of a government agency, instead of from the camp manager as a friend and protector of IDPs, made the threat intimidating and authoritative. There was a stiff penalty for not cooperating; if the camp manager did not endorse a survivor, then he or she could not receive a house. The promise of a free concrete relocation house was a powerful incentive for enduring adverse conditions in the evacuation camps and the temporary housing sites, so it is not surprising that survivors cooperated.

It is noteworthy that the camp manager called attention to the role of state authorities in dealing with gender-based violence within the family. She asks the mother outright, “Why [did] you not talk [about] or report this to the police or DSWD or to the *barangay* [*tanod*] to arrest him?” as if such reporting would have fixed the problem. As explained earlier in the chapter, in the Philippines, it is rare for non-family members to intervene in family disputes and domestic violence. The women involved would know this, which made the woman in the second case all the more unusual because she actually filed a report with the police.

The excerpts underscore the importance of the Catholic Church as an (and perhaps even *the*) irrefutable and well-connected authority, and the pervasiveness of Christian values in post-disaster spaces. The camp manager frequently cited religious and spiritual beliefs as justification for her interventions, and as elements missing in the survivors that she was qualified to ameliorate. In doing so, she ascribes to both the deficiency and the different-from-us vulnerability discourses. To remedy the situation she threatened to contact state authorities (e.g. the police and the DSWD) but she actually divulged her concerns to officials at the archdiocese, who subsequently dealt with the situation through Church institutions. Consequently, the

archdiocese placed a young woman in a safe house with nuns instead of at a government-run safe house, and used its strong connections with the secular Department of Education to enable her to complete her high school diploma by taking classes in a church instead of at a school.

The discussion on transitional housing sites echoes the preceding discussion of evacuation centres. Both types of post-disaster sleeping spaces served similar functions, were highly exclusionary spaces, and were informed by vulnerability discourses. Temporary housing sites, however, were not mere replicas of evacuation camps where vulnerable survivors waited out the time between the closure of the evacuation camps and the availability of relocation houses or the return to their former houses. The geographical locations, the kinds of housing, and the quality, quantity, and type of disaster assistance at temporary housing sites were distinct. In some instance, such as at Ecoville, the sites were conceived as training grounds where residents transitioned from their old Pre-Sendong ways of life into ways of living better matched with the trustees' visions of an ideal permanent resettlement site. The ideal and actual characters of CDO's relocation sites are developed in the next section.

Permanent relocation housing

The third and final post-disaster sleeping space along the institutionalised pathway is the relocation site. It is "home." A permanent relocation, or resettlement, site is a planned housing development. Its stated objective is to provide safe housing for vulnerable Sendong survivors, where safety is defined primarily in terms of a low risk of natural hazards. Similar to the other official post-disaster sleeping spaces, relocation sites were primarily conceived and run by trustees, highly exclusionary, and limited by financial and other constraints. In other ways, relocation sites are unique and underscore what trustees deem as the key tenets of the vulnerability discourses. These elements derive from the theoretically permanent character of resettlement sites. This section analyses the types, geographical location, look and feel, and functioning of CDO's relocation sites.

Three main types

In CDO, there are relocation sites developed by the regional and municipal governments, others by the Catholic Church, and one by academe (Xavier University). Each of the three sponsors subcontracted the actual building of relocation houses to other organisations, namely Habitat for Humanity Philippines, Gawad Kalinga, and the Chinese donors. At each site, there are houses

built by one, two or even all three organisations. Table 6.1 lists the resettlement sites by type, and Figure 6.2d shows these sites on a map.

Table 6.1. Resettlement sites for CDO’s Sendong survivors categorised by type. All but two sites are located within Cagayan de Oro city limits.

Government relocation site	Catholic Church relocation site	University relocation site
Berjaya Village	Caritas Village	Xavier Ecoville
Calaanan (multiple sites)	Divine Mercy Village (Opol)	
Canitoan (multiple sites)	Opol (Opol)	
Indahag Phase I	Tabang Cagayan Village	
Indahag Phase II		
Pagatpat		

Although Cagayaños distinguish among these three different types of sites, the on-site differences among them are relatively minor, with Xavier Ecoville as one notable exception. As the Sendong coordinator of the archdiocese’s Social Action Center ministry noted, the distinction among government, church and academe sites lies in who funds it, and not in what is there. Even this distinction is murky because all three types received funding from a variety of public and private sources.

Basically it’s the same [for all relocation sites insofar as] the funds for the construction of the house and for the purchase of the land are donations from different sources. Even the permanent relocation program of the government, the funds for the construction of the house came both from the government and the private sector. Like, for example, for the relocation centres of the government [agency] Department of Social Welfare and Development, it came from San Miguel Corporation, it came from SM Foundation. The same is true of the one handled by Xavier University. It came from donations from private sectors. The only difference is for the academe and for the Church [relocation sites], all donations for the purchase of the property, for the building of the houses, it came from private sector because government cannot come in, they cannot use public funds in private property. These are donations from different sources, both here in the Philippines and abroad.

All the stakeholders involved in building permanent housing were invited to join the “Local Inter-Agency Committee,” or LIAC, a task force headed by the mayor. LIAC was charged with creating and implementing guidelines for everything pertaining to resettlement sites, from eligibility rules to square footage. The committee agreed that all the houses – whether built by

Habitat for Humanity Philippines, Gawad Kalinga, or the Chinese donors – should be basically the same. The uniformity was a deliberate strategy to avoid jealousy among beneficiaries living in houses sponsored by various private sector, government, religious and other funders. As one LIAC member recounted, the rationale was that “survivors will not say ‘why is it that houses built by the private sector [are] better than [those] of the government?’ ”

A peripheral location

CDO is a sprawling city with very little unoccupied land near the city centre, so, not surprisingly, resettlement sites are located in the periphery and even in the neighbouring municipality of Opol (Fig. 6.2d), where undeveloped land could be purchased at affordable prices. Potential sites were selected based on their availability, and a successful inspection ascertaining whether the land was livable and safe. To a lesser degree, politics affected site selection. The availability and suitability of the lands identified as resettlement areas does not mean they are attractive to either future residents or trustees; in the *TS Sendong strategic action plan*, the National Economic and Development Authority points out that these sites “still have a long way to go for barren lands to be transformed into a promise land” (NEDA 2012, 42). Not only are they undeveloped, but all of the lands offered and used for resettlement sites in CDO are between three and 20 km from the city centre, or a 40 to 120 minute ride on public transit costing between \$0.22 and 0.66 each way – several times longer, farther, and more expensive than commuting from their old settlements. As a consequence of their geographic isolation, resettled survivors have difficulty accessing livelihood opportunities, services, and amenities.

All the relocation sites are situated on city land. Some sites, such as the Calaan sites, are on land previously purchased by the city and prepared through the mayor’s land-banking strategy. Other sites are on land owned or purchased by other trustees, then subsequently donated to the city. As the vice president of a major power and utilities company explained, the city must hold the land deed before the Department of Public Works and Highways will issue a plan for road and drainage infrastructure, and the city must approve the overall development plan before permanent electrification can commence.

Our problem [of the power and utilities company] is we cannot just drive in the lines inside the property. We need to have a development plan so we know where to locate our lines. We cannot remove and reinstall the lines whenever somebody says, ‘You trespassed on our property, remove the line.’ So we will want something permanent. So we are

requiring any relocation site to agree [to] a formal and formally-approved development plan so that we know where our lines should pass and we can get the easement or right of way. You cannot disrupt the service once it's there just because we just crossed over the line of the people's [property].

Thus, setting up temporary or unapproved connections is not an option. It is the permanent quality of the resettlement sites that makes it all the more important that the critical steps of turning the land over to the city and obtaining approval of the development plan are fulfilled. The fact that relocation sites are located on city land cuts both ways: it facilitates the intervention of some trustees (e.g. for electrification), but it also imposes restrictions on what residents can do with their houses.

In addition to their availability, relocation sites were selected according to a broadly defined safety criterion. Sites were considered safe if they had a low risk of natural hazards, especially flooding. To a lesser degree, safety also encompassed a lack of physical violence and crime, and the ability to carry out one's livelihood. The characteristics of actual relocation sites, however, belie the safety claim.

Many of the sites were identified as safe sites because "they are in higher grounds." For example, *barangays* Lumbia and Indahag are plateaus in the southern part of the city and each contain several relocation sites, which are unlikely to experience flooding. Other relocation sites – in particular sites located on land previously purchased through land-banking and prepared for the *piso-piso* program – do not exhibit the same low hazard risk. Consequently, some houses were built next to what are locally called "live creeks" known to rise and flood nearby areas during the rainy season. There are houses located in landslide-prone areas at the bottom of steep, clear-cut valley walls (Fig. 6.6). According to an engineer involved in a national hazard-mapping project, building in hazard-prone areas reflects the tendency of Philippine politicians to routinely ignore hazard maps and local knowledge of flooding patterns when approving development plans.



Fig. 6.6. Relocation houses built between a steep landslide-prone hill (on the right) and a live creek (on the left) that floods nearby areas during the rainy season.

The achievement of the social and economic components of safety is similarly unresolved at relocation sites. The security issue was addressed on-site, with mixed success, by maintaining a police presence and offering religious activities and values formation trainings. Dealing with the livelihoods issue was much more difficult. Accessibility to the city was a consideration, for at least some of the trustees who identified livelihood opportunities as a critical element of recovery. Yet these same trustees acknowledged that some sites, such as those in *barangays* Lumbia and Indahag, are not exactly easy to access. The choice to locate resettlement sites there was partially based on their growth potential, in terms of both residential and commercial growth. As one Sendong relocation site coordinator explained,

The choice of Lumbia and Indahag [as relocation sites] is also because the city has identified these *barangays* as the growth areas in terms to be a residential place. [They are also growth areas for business.] As a matter of fact, the old Lumbia airport will be redeveloped into a commercial area. According to the politicians, it will be developed like another global city like in Taguig.

But, the envisioned growth is targeted at the middle class, and would exclude many of the urban poor who reside in the resettlement sites. As a group, the urban poor largely self-exclude from the middle to high end malls in CDO (e.g. SM Mall and Centrio Mall), opting instead to go *mallong*

(i.e. shopping or window-shopping) at the lower end Guisano and Limketkai malls. When I pointed out that a CDO adaptation of the Bonifacio Global City⁵¹ in Taguig City would be very exclusive and would most likely leave out most of the city's poor (including the residents of the relocation sites), the Sendong coordinator wholeheartedly agreed.

Another example illustrates the mismatch between the economic opportunities envisioned by trustees and the ability of the presumed beneficiaries at relocation sites to access them. An executive from the corporate social responsibility office of a major Philippine corporation noted that his firm was initially interested in building a business process outsourcing operation (BPO or call centre) in CDO as part of its post-Sendong disaster assistance package. If the city could provide the firm with land near the workers' residences (e.g. near the Calaanan relocation sites), the company would hire thousands of English-speaking workers, train them, and pay them well. In the Philippines, BPOs do indeed offer good, well-paying jobs; as one informant lamented, these call centres are staffed by college graduates trained as chemists, nurses, architects, engineers, and biologists because they earn more by answering phone calls than by working in their chosen profession. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Sendong survivors living in relocation sites would be hired as BPO staff because they are not fluent in English. If a BPO was built in CDO, the urban poor would be excluded from these jobs.

These two examples underscore the lacuna between the thinking underlying the plans of trustees (i.e. they identify future growth potential and economic opportunities for skilled and specialised workers) and the realities of many of the urban poor resettlement site residents (i.e. they need immediate work in a livelihood that does not require advanced formal education). Furthermore, the objective of ensuring safety through sustainable livelihoods is undermined by the geographical isolation of the relocation sites. Put another way, trustees have invested significant resources in bringing Sendong survivors into the market economy through a variety of livelihood trainings, starter kit donations, and no-interest livelihood loans, but will not see a return on

⁵¹ Bonifacio Global City, also called "The Fort," is home to Manila's financial district, many foreign embassies, hotels and conference centres, and numerous high-end retail, commercial and residential skyscrapers. Unlike most other parts of Manila, Bonifacio Global City is organised on a grid, is pedestrian-friendly, and has large swathes of greenspace and designated parks. It is not a space typically accessed by the urban poor.

investment because the beneficiaries are essentially trapped at relocation sites and thereby excluded from market opportunities.

Geographical isolation thus exacerbates economic constraints. The lack of jobs near relocation sites, the commute into the city, and the failure of skills trainings and livelihood assistance to produce livelihoods generating sufficient and reliable income left families with unattractive options: spend a significant portion of their time and money on commuting, cut back on expenditures, send some household members to live and work in the city, or steal food from neighbours or construction materials from nearby unfinished resettlement houses. Although state actors clearly recognise that failing to bundle livelihood opportunities with ongoing and proposed housing projects will cause “the quality of life of relocated families [to] further suffer, make the underprivileged poorer, and increase social ills and crimes,” no trustee – from any segment of society – had successfully addressed this challenge (OCD 2012, 11).

Sights, sounds and smells

Being located away from the noisy and polluted downtown core, resettlement sites boast a quieter and cleaner atmosphere than the informal settlements near the city centre where most residents used to live. One Ecoville resident described the site as “comfortable because it’s windy, cool, looks like a *baryo*,” then contrasted it with the city, which is “overcrowded, hot, abundant, busy [but] it has fish, meat and vegetables.” Her statement points to the sights, sounds and smells typical of CDO’s resettlement sites, which necessarily reflect what types of infrastructure and activities are present or absent.

CDO’s resettlement sites are first and foremost housing developments. The basic minimum components of a relocation site are: houses, roads, and water and electricity hook-ups. Hook-ups for water are either communal on the street or in individual houses, those for electricity are installed in each housing unit. At the government-sponsored resettlements sites, the beneficiaries typically moved into their new houses and lived there for several months before the water and electricity were fully connected, and the roads paved. For example, in January 2013, the city’s fire trucks were still required to occasionally deliver water to relocation sites. By March 2013, the Indahag Phase I, Berjaya and most Calaan relocation sites had been fully energised, and electrical hook-ups for Indahag Phase II were almost complete. In April 2013, the roads at Indahag Phase II were not yet fully paved. Residents considered the incomplete roads a mere

nuisance, but were much more frustrated by the poor or lack of access to water and electricity. In fact, the latter problem compelled many households to delay moving into their allocated relocation house or to adopt a circular migration or split household strategy.

The focus on housing and the emphasis on economical building – in terms of both financial cost and space (e.g. maximum number of units per unit of land) – resulted in relocation sites lacking on-site spaces for commerce, leisure, public, and ecosystem services. To expedite and facilitate the building process, all the trees were felled and the landscape rebuilt with dense concrete housing, concrete roads and concrete gutters at all but two sites (both funded by religious donors), resulting in relocation sites that are frequently very hot during the day. According to LIAC guidelines, there is no requirement for other infrastructure, such as green space and parks, play areas for children, schools, medical clinics, markets or stores, restaurants, multipurpose courts, public transit stations, financial services, etc. All of these items, except for private businesses, are the responsibility of the local government. Some donors allocated funds for these extras; for example, religious donors typically built chapels and multipurpose courts at sites that were too far from neighbouring communities to avail of their infrastructure. The importance of this presumed non-essential infrastructure to the residents' quality of life is illustrated by an incident at Xavier Ecoville. Shortly after new playground equipment was unveiled at the site, it was destroyed, perhaps partially attributable to the quality, but mostly because of the number of children using it. The head of the Ecoville infrastructure team elaborated on the team's reaction:

After it was being installed, about in two days, there was a mix of emotion. At one point we were dismayed because the facilities installed – the swing – were destroyed already. At one point we were saying, if you could just imagine children, not being able to play for a year and then you give them something. So you know, it's even [expected with] so many children playing in the playground. They were really deprived of these facilities for a year, and then suddenly it appears in front of them. So, what would you expect? Imagine children, not being able to play for a year and then now – all of a sudden – you give them something. So, it's something that you would expect would happen. So, well, we just have to repair it and repair it and repair it. It's a pretty small equipment for 500 families. We were telling the [funder] we need more. This small space could not accommodate all the children in this community.

The informant points out that the children “were really deprived.” They were not denied food, water, medical care, shelter, or other essentials; instead, they were denied opportunities for play, and a physical space specifically designed for play. If a lack of playground equipment deprives

children, imagine how the lack of other types of non-housing infrastructures affects the quality of life of residents accustomed to living in the city centre with all the infrastructure and services it offers.

A municipal official recounted that the city is developing plans to erect markets, schools, churches, and multipurpose buildings at the relocation sites, but that houses were always the primary focus, with everything else a distant second. In most cases, space was allocated in the site development plan for an open area that can later be transformed into a covered court, community centre, or other community building. Most donors gave money for houses, and the three main building organisations were tasked with building houses. When non-housing infrastructure was built, it was paid for with funds specially solicited by the main sponsor of the particular resettlement site. According to regional government informants, it was difficult for non-government trustees to build most forms of non-housing infrastructure because of the official delineation of responsibilities.

The housing units at all sites are densely packed and nearly identical. The houses are made of concrete and have a floor area of $21 \text{ m}^2 (\pm 1 \text{ m}^2)$, which can be expanded by 10 m^2 if a loft is added. The loft is not standard, but some donors (mostly religious donors) paid for the addition. All Xavier Ecoville houses have a loft. Depending on the relief and hydrological features of each individual site and the preferences of the funder and the builder, the houses are built as single detached houses, duplexes, quadruplexes, or row houses. There are minor cosmetic differences in the external appearance of Habitat, Gawad Kalinga and Chinese donors-built houses, and in the design of the floor plan (Fig. 6.7). All the houses and other infrastructure at all relocation sites are arranged on a grid, which, as Scott (1998) points out, facilitates the work of trustees in everything from laying down power and water lines, to registering voters, to responding to emergencies.





Fig. 6.7. Relocation housing built by Habitat for Humanity Philippines (6 April 2013, previous page top), Gawad Kalinga (6 April 2013, previous page bottom), and the Chinese donors (19 March 2013, above) in CDO resettlement sites.

Most resettlement sites rapidly took on the look and feel of an informal settlement once Sendong survivors began moving in. Before the houses were turned over to survivors, the builders provided the city with guidelines for ensuring the long-term integrity of the houses, including a stern recommendation to not modify the house. The city shared this information with the new residents, but, as soon as families moved in they started building extensions, planting gardens, and subdividing their houses into separate commercial and living spaces. Within weeks, the sameness of the houses and the sterility of the development disappeared (Fig. 6.8). For example, small *sari-sari* shops and vulcanising enterprises appeared in the small front yards of people's homes. The non-concreted spaces at the end of dead-end streets, or the neighbouring hills were converted into home gardens with vegetables and papaya and banana trees. Children and skinny dogs run up and down the hot concrete roads; women wash clothes at communal water pumps; people buy and sell prepared food, pre-paid mobile phone load, and household items from home-based *carinderias* and *sari-sari* stores; and chickens and pigs poke around in the gardens in search of food.



Fig. 6.8. Habitat for Humanity Philippines-built relocation housing just before residents move in (27 November 2012, top) and several weeks after residents have moved in (19 March 2013, bottom).

The attitudes of trustees towards this customisation vary: a university dean lamented that a particular city-sponsored site already looked like a “shantytown,” archdiocese staff expressed indifference, and the city mayor welcomed the initiatives of residents in taking ownership of their new houses. An executive at a power and utilities company tasked with energising relocation sites added that the spiraling of relocation sites into slums was not merely cosmetic.

I think the message is [that the] government and the private sector should assume the responsibility to make sure that these relocation sites do not become slum areas. It’s so sad. Very pitiful. When there is a relocation site, the crime rate goes up [in the site and in the neighbouring communities]. We were also scared that the relocatees might have a stigma. [They] are from the areas of the banks of the river. A lot of these areas have been inhabited by, you know, criminals, pickpockets, because it is easy to escape from this areas. And so, there is this stigma if you’re [from this] community.

The purported “slumming” of relocation sites thus has repercussions within and beyond the designated resettlement spaces. If government and private sector (and non-governmental) trustees shirk their responsibility, there will be negative security and social consequences. Claims that crime and social stigma increase near “shantytown”-like resettlement sites were partially supported by statements from survivors and the police.

The trustees involved at some sites, most notably at Xavier Ecoville, took measures to ensure the sites would not degrade into a “slum.” The University Board of Trustees and the Jesuits hired a well-known developer of high-end housing in Manila to design Ecoville. At the request of the developer, the university increased the area of land it donated from 5 to 5.3 ha to comfortably accommodate all its intended beneficiaries. The university limited the number of families to avoid future overcrowding and overtaking the carrying capacity of the land, and to leave space for non-residential facilities. One third of the property has temporary housing, a community garden, composting facilities, a row of *talipapas* (small specialised kiosks), a covered court and a small tree nursery (Fig. 6.9). Unlike other resettlement sites where gardens sprang up organically, gardens were incorporated into the design of Ecoville. Growing food was seen as a way for residents to feed themselves and to recapture the skills they were presumed to have as former farmers forced off their land with the expansion of plantations. The rest of the property has 518 concrete row houses, a small daycare and schoolhouse, a chapel, a playground, an indoor meeting room, a livelihoods centre, and offices. The relocation houses exceed the minimum standards used at the other sites, without straying outside the standard LIAC criteria. In some ways, Xavier Ecoville

was better planned than other parts of the *barangay*. Lumbia, for instance, has neither a site development plan nor a *barangay*-wide drainage system. According to the head of the Ecoville infrastructure team, in Lumbia, “they just let the water flow wherever it may go. Each resident would have to take care of his [or her] own property, so people dig their own canals.” In contrast, Xavier Ecoville has a well-researched and approved site development plan made by professionals in collaboration with Lumbia *barangay* officials.

We had this [site development plan] prepared with all the technical descriptions, like the drainage system. The drainage system, water works, electrical, everything. So we had them prepared by our engineers here in the university. But actually the teaching engineers, the faculty members, they helped in developing the site and the actual designing of the houses. And we also worked with the *barangay* to establish the roads, which roads should be opened, which roads should be kept closed.

The carefully designed elements of Ecoville reflect the optimistic view of the site’s trustees who desire a wholesome, self-sufficient community and not a transplanted slum.

The different attitudes of academic, religious, city, and private sector trustees toward the customisation (or slumming) at resettlement sites are indicative of their respective adherences to vulnerability discourses and their respective understandings of the overarching objectives of resettling urban poor survivors in a relocation site. Chapter 7 analyses the ways in which trustees developed resettlement sites akin to what Jane Jacobs (1961) describes as the perpetual state project of “unslumming.”

In this discussion of the physical space of relocation sites, two additional absences must be underlined. The first point is that on-site opportunities for acquiring money are rare. There are few livelihood opportunities apart from low-return, self-initiated self-employment within or near the resettlement sites. As indicated in the quotation opening this section, relocations sites do not have lots of “fish, meat and vegetables” because the economic activities, money and customers that make the city “abundant [and] busy” simply do not exist in the periphery. Relocated residents no longer have access to the high interest informal 5-6 loans they previously depended upon for making ends meet. Lenders assumed their former clients cannot find work in the resettlement sites and are thus no longer credit-worthy. These problems suggest that although trustees claim they want survivors to have secure and viable livelihoods, this objective is subordinate to transferring people into the newly built houses.



Fig. 6.9. The Xavier Ecoville transitional and permanent resettlement sites on 21 January 2013 (top) and 14 March 2013 (bottom).

Fences are the second conspicuous absence at relocation sites. None of the resettlement sites I visited in CDO or Opol was enclosed by a fence. Informal settlements and the residences of the urban poor typically do not have fences or gates. They are open. In contrast, when a new middle

or upper class development is built in CDO, the first physical structure to be built is a fence enclosing the area. Only after the community is gated can construction begin on the roads, houses and other facilities contained within the gate. Although the individual houses might not be fenced in, or might just have a fence serving nothing more than a cosmetic purpose, the neighbourhood itself is fenced in.

The lack of fences at relocation sites can be partially explained by economic constraints and design objectives. With a limited budget, trustees may have prioritised building a few additional housing units over a superfluous fence. Or, trustees may have perceived fences as tools potentially undermining their attempts to integrate the physical space of relocation site into the host *barangay*. Or, trustees may have prioritised building other types of infrastructure that would facilitate their work. At Ecoville, for example, one of the first structures to be built was a large covered community centre where people could gather to disseminate information, distribute relief goods, and socialise. As such, it was more important to create a space in which people come together – both insiders (i.e. residents) and outsiders (i.e. donors) – than to fence off the area.

The lack of fences also situates relocation sites as spaces for the urban poor, a group characterised as deficient and different from the upper and middle classes. In the Philippines, like in many other places around the world, fences are erected as barriers to keep some people out and other people in. The wall in the West Bank, for example, serves a dual purpose: (1) to prevent Palestinians from “leaking out” into Israel or Occupied Territories, and (2) to protect Jews from Arab Palestinians (Weizman 2007, 172). Fences are both literally and metaphorically “structural;” they are physical structures (in the engineering sense), and they are visual cues of the institutions and structures in society that delimit power and class. Fences should not be overused, however, because their presence suggests those within fear the outside; hence, building a fence gives power to the adversary (Weizman 2007). Weizman (2007, 133) points out that *not* building fences is also a deliberate strategy because it allows for expansion into new territories. As such, a fence is an indicator of wealth, of the power to exclude people from entering, or alternatively, of protecting the inhabitants from being exposed to certain undesirable people. It is a constant and glaring reminder of difference and exclusion. The absence of a fence in formal developments planned by predominantly middle class trustees is equally telling.

Rules

Rules operate both as an external power that sets limits to behaviour and prohibits certain actions, and as an internal discipline imbuing and remaking social processes (Mitchell 2006). At the majority of relocation sites, the rules are designed primarily for determining eligibility and for stipulating what can and cannot be done with the relocation house. Rules about appropriate behaviour are largely absent and left to national laws and municipal bylaws, or to rules spontaneously generated and enforced by the residents themselves, for example through a homeowners' association. The exception to the hands-off approach is Ecoville. From the outset, the importance of rules was unmistakable. During the resident selection interview, candidates were informed of Ecoville rules. To proceed to the next step, candidates had to agree to abide by a code of conduct. In addition to these initial rules, new rules were added once the residents moved into the temporary housing. The ensuing discussion summarises the generic rules applicable to all resettled survivors, and delves into the particularities of rules at Xavier Ecoville.

There were stringent rules delineating who is and who is not eligible for relocation housing. For example, relocation house recipients must provide certification from a *barangay* official that their house was washed away or irreparably damaged. They must possess a government-issued family access card indicating they are Sendong survivors. Their names must be on one or more of the official lists of Sendong survivors made by the city, the DSWD, and the archdiocese. They must prove they had a prolonged stay at an evacuation camp, or that they formerly resided in a designated no-build zone. They cannot own property in another part of CDO. They must demonstrate that they do not have the capacity to rebuild a house, or cannot access other means to build or buy another house within one year's time. This last criterion excluded most middle class survivors and just-above-the-poverty-threshold survivors working in the formal sector because both groups could apply for a *Pag-Ibig* or other employer-sponsored loan to repair or purchase a house. These rules, developed and enforced by LIAC, were occasionally relaxed. For instance, some relocated survivors did own land in other parts of the city, and others had resided outside of the Sendong flood affected areas. In general, however, only applicants who met the eligibility criteria were placed on a list of survivor households that would eventually receive a free, concrete relocation house. For many, the house was the last form of assistance to which they were entitled; once survivors moved in, they are typically cut off from disaster relief goods and services other than livelihood assistance.

There were rules restricting the number of and type of familial relationships among residents who can inhabit a single dwelling. A maximum of seven people are permitted to live in each housing unit. While this cap is based on the small size of relocation houses, the average size of Filipino families, and the aim of avoiding overcrowding, it also indicates a willingness on the part of trustees to actively shape the concept of “family” and “household.” Government agencies assume an average Filipino family size of five: a mother, a father, and three children. Yet, it is not uncommon for urban poor families to have more than five people living under the same roof. There were five to seven cases at Ecoville where Sendong survivor households had eight or more members, and the families had to be split into two units. The “core family” consisting of a couple and their children was kept together; other members such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and other close or distant relations were grouped together into another house. Large families were occasionally penalised in other ways; one NGO’s eligibility criteria for its educational grant to survivor households included a stipulation that recipient families have four or fewer children. Thus, the policies dictating who is part of the family unit, who can live together under a single roof, and what size families deserve assistance are based on what certain trustees qualify as family, and not what the beneficiaries themselves experience.

In addition to the eligibility rules, there was a second set of on-site rules. These latter rules specified which types of physical changes to the relocation house and lot were permissible, to whom the house and lot could be sold or transferred, and which behaviours, activities, and goods are allowable, and which are banned.

Rules about renovating and selling relocation houses are another device used by trustees to problematise and render technical (Li 2007a), thereby maintaining their control over people and landscape. Recipients of relocation houses sign a contract, written in English, agreeing to a suite of conditions. A municipal official in charge of relocation housing elaborated on the content of the contract.

The contract is all about their [the beneficiary’s] responsibility. This is a contract between the city and the beneficiary because, according to the policy guidelines under the Local Inter-Agency Committee, there [is a] set of policies that governs the awardee because we wanted to prevent them from stealing or from having some business [using] the awarded house and lot. We do not allow any IDP or any beneficiary awardee to transfer without complying this one [the contract]. So, it is being signed by the awardee and also the city mayor. So here in this contract it elaborates about the rights and duties, the perpetual

rights and duties, the limitations that we [beneficiaries] cannot just own the house and then let other people live [in it]. [The contract] also elaborates on who will own this awarded house and lot after they [the beneficiaries] grow old or they will die. It is stipulated here who will be the next beneficiary. [It delimits] the responsibility [of] the community [regarding] climate change – in terms of providing, helping establish a community of dignity, a community free from the disaster.

As stipulated in another part of the contract, homeowners are forbidden from making modifications to their house because any changes might affect the structural integrity of the building. This particular rule is not enforced and was broken almost from the instant survivors began moving in. Such customisation is a way for residents to assert their control over space, to defy state rules. From the perspective of trustees, such allowances can be read as a form of compromise in which there is a “tacit agreement to look the other way when rules are broken” (Li 2007b, 280). Homeowners cannot sell either the land or the house because the land upon which the house sits is owned by the local government. Beneficiaries can, however, pass the house on to their children. This not-quite full ownership underscores the paternalistic attitude of trustees, and their reluctance to relinquish control and truly allow survivors to exercise control over their own lives. This situation breeds uncertainty in housing tenure because residents never know if or when their lot will be reclaimed by the titled owner. This situation is especially troubling for residents who had previous experience with demolition and eviction. Resettlement can thus be framed as a land problem, not just in the natural hazard sense, but also in the (in)security of land tenure and ownership sense. These conditions, and the other characteristics of resettlement sites discussed in this section, point to the gap between the stated objective of providing safe housing and its actual achievement at resettlement sites. The gap among stated, attained and attainable objectives is even wider when the broad visions of resettlement sites are studied.

Unlike other relocation housing sites established after other disasters in the Philippines, the CDO resettlement sites do not have minimum residency requirements for retaining ownership of the house. At two resettlement sites in General Nakar and Infanta, Quezon, for example, residents are required to spend a minimum of two nights per week in their resettlement house if their farm is located in the same municipality, or two nights per month if their farm is further away in another municipality. Without such residency restrictions, relocation house recipients frequently sleep at various sites in the city that better facilitate their ability to meet their livelihood, health

and personal needs and preferences. These recipients demonstrate a hybrid post-Sendong sleeping trajectory.

To help ensure the proper functioning and the long-term success of relocation sites, trustees strongly urged residents to form committees or associations, especially homeowners' associations. Most relocation sites, like most planned neighbourhoods in CDO and in other parts of the Philippines, have homeowners' associations. A homeowners' association plays several roles: it brings order and stability, it promotes architectural integrity, it ensures basic maintenance, it may support collectively-owned recreational or other facilities available to residents, and it tacitly enforces individual conformity to group values. Members must maintain their houses, pay certain fees, and comply with use regulations and other association rules. The legal rights and responsibilities of a homeowners' association are laid out in *The Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations* (R.A. 9904), enacted into law in 2010 (GoP 2010c). Although trustees generally concurred on the necessity of homeowners' associations, there was intense negotiation and debate over when such associations should be created. For example, should the associations be formed once survivors start moving into the resettlement sites, to ensure the smooth running of the site right from the outset? Or, should the associations be formed only after all the residents have moved in, thereby ensuring the rules and policies created by the association would have been produced by *all* residents, and not potentially favour the first-comers at the expense of the later-comers? Another timing consideration was a fact that no key informant actually verbalised, even though they were undoubtedly aware of it. Officially, external trustees cease to exert significant influence over the internal governance of each relocation site once the site's homeowners' association is officially registered with the national government's Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Put another way, the same regulation endorsed by trustees effectively shuts them out of the day-to-day running of the relocation site. In CDO, there was no single resolution to the timing debate. In the end, homeowners' associations were established at different times during the move-in period at different resettlement sites.

In addition to a homeowners' association, Xavier Ecoville has committees. Each adult resident is required to join at least one committee. There is a committee for peace and order, for health, for education, for agriculture, for family relationships, for infrastructure, for finance, and for livelihoods. Committees are responsible for everything from managing the chapel and playground

equipment, to helping to organise and fund livelihood trainings, to polling residents on what sort of additional infrastructure should be built. Committee work was presumed to help build the social elements of a community, to encourage collective problem-solving, to promote self-governance, and to foster trust among strangers. These attributes were all part of the rationale of Ecoville trustees for instituting mandatory participation in one or more committees.

At most of the relocation sites, the formal, relocation site-specific rules imposed by external trustees ended with the rules about eligibility, homeowner contracts and homeowner associations. What external trustees did bring to relocation sites were less official rules and more highly recommended guidelines. For example, the success of the values training at Ecoville inspired the implementation of special seminars, educational classes and orientation events at government and church-run relocation sites. To combat youth delinquency, domestic violence, and other problems, residents were strongly encouraged to undertake the Gawad Kalinga values formation training. Successful completion of the training could not be enforced as a condition for housing because residents had already moved into their relocation houses. Still, municipal and regional government agencies perceived it as a means to address the peace and order problems prevalent at some relocation sites. Consequently, they supported religious and non-governmental organisations willing to implement corrective actions that would help ensure the peaceful and proper functioning of relocation sites. Frequently, these actions took the form of socially-enforced informal rules.

The major exception to the hands-off approach to official rule-setting was, not surprisingly, Xavier Ecoville. On-site staff explained that its rules help to build a sustainable community based on trust, self-motivated initiatives, and self-reliance. Ecoville residents were introduced to a variety of rules when they first moved into the temporary housing portion of the site. For instance, households had to pay a portion of the electricity and water bills and tend to a small garden, and adults had to join one or more committees, complete a values training formation, and fulfill a minimum of six hours of volunteer work on-site. To an extent, the practical outcomes of the rules are embraced by the residents. An elderly woman explained that gardening is a therapeutic and peaceful experience that allows her to forget the trauma of Sendong. Some men explained that their volunteer hours surveying the construction of their new concrete houses were important because it ensured quality control, and they could inform Ecoville staff if any of

the builders were cutting corners to accelerate the construction process. Ecoville rules are well-intentioned and anything but nefarious, but they do border on zealous. Moreover, they reflect a clear intentionality, a deliberate design in modifying the behaviour of residents.

The attempt of Ecoville trustees to shape the behaviour is perhaps best illustrated by on-site bans. No pets, animals, videoke machines, smoking and drinking are permitted. Residents can and still do possess these things and partake in these activities, just not within the Ecoville boundaries. The rationale for and the repercussions of each banned activity or item are diverse. Smoking and drinking are considered vices. Anyone succumbing to these vices was clearly identified in the initial screen process. Their vice did not prevent their family from receiving a relocation house, but it did exclude them from receiving additional family or educational support grants from one of Ecoville's NGO partners.

The prohibition against keeping pets or any animal on-site had both emotional and economic consequences for the residents. Some residents had to give up their pets (mostly dogs), and leave them in the care of old neighbours or relatives living elsewhere. Residents rarely, if ever, see their old pets. One woman sadly recounted that her dog had had puppies, but that her neighbour, to whom she had given her dog, ate them. Other residents, especially those who lived in the Isla Puntod area of *barangay* Balulang, had raised farm animals, many of which were swept away in the flood. Some livestock and poultry had been replaced through the livelihood initiatives of the DSWD and NGOs, but these animals had to be given away to neighbours and relatives who would care for them off-site. When Ecoville residents can afford the time and expense to visit their animals, they do. Moving to Ecoville forced upon them a difficult choice to forego some of their wealth (e.g. animal capital) and future income in exchange for a free house outside of a flood-prone area.

The rationale for the on-site ban on videoke was never explained to me. It is not a particular aversion to musical performances, pop music or suggestive dancing; in fact, Ecoville trustees proudly support the public appearances of "Xavier Ecoville Got Talent," an Ecoville youth group that enthusiastically partakes in all three. Instead, I suspect the ban is partly based on a desire to create a calm and peaceful space, unpolluted by scratchy, loud and rambunctious singing. Partly, it is because of the affiliation with activities that frequently occur alongside a night of videoke, namely drinking, smoking, *mahjong*-playing, and raucous partying. Partly, it is because

of the association of videoke bars and prostitution; in CDO, many of the videoke bars double as brothels, with the matron of the videoke bar, often a former sex worker herself, acting as a brothel keeper. Despite the on-site ban, residents continue to belt out a constant stream of machine-amplified tunes at one of several videoke bars located just outside the Ecoville perimeter, and operated by entrepreneurial Lumbia residents.

The ban on pets, animals, videoke machines, smoking, and drinking demonstrate a particular vision of what is right and wrong, and what should and should not be done or kept in a community. The values of cleanliness, discipline and calm that religious trustees envisioned for Ecoville are enacted imperfectly within the site's physical boundaries (e.g. when videoke music trespasses into the Ecoville airspace) and are partially (or even entirely) rejected by the residents when they engage in prohibited activities off-site. Although residents may consent to the conduct of their conduct inside Ecoville, they do not necessarily assimilate the underlying intention or values. The spatial compliance with rules can be, in fact, a subversive strategy for obtaining otherwise mutually exclusive benefits.

There is yet another layer of rules at Ecoville. These rules are more fluid, and they are framed and understood differently by different residents, on-site staff, and university-based trustees. They cover what residents can and cannot do, when tasks must be completed, and other minor things. The site's director explained that these rules were created by the residents themselves. Several residents, however, dispute this claim, insisting that it was the university who imposed more and onerous rules on them. Irrespective of who creates the rules, at Ecoville, there is a strict policing of rules, mostly self-policing among the residents. It is somewhat akin to the Big Brother feeling of constantly being under the scrutiny of your neighbours in an Orwellian dystopia (Orwell 1949), or the design of Jewish settlements in the West Bank that allows for the inward-facing gaze (Weizman 2007). A list tracking the rule violations of each resident is posted in a public part of the site. As one elderly woman resident explained, "if you have two black marks next to your name then you will be kicked out." As of April 2013, only one survivor was expelled for failing to abide by the rules. For minor rule-abiding lapses, residents must do extra chores such as cleaning the CRs and tending to the compost. These on-site rules and the way in which they are policed by the staff and residents demonstrate the exercise of discipline (cf. Mitchell 2006).

In a powers of exclusion framework, the rules at relocation sites operationalise the regulation, force, and legitimation powers. The rules shape the physical character and the social dynamics of resettlement sites. The rules encourage, even compel, residents to behave in certain ways, without ever coercively forcing them to comply. The rules shape relocation sites into spaces of exclusion, at times excluding the very trustees who aim to control the space and the people within it. The peripheral location of the resettlement sites further cements the exclusionary character of the third major type of official post-disaster sleeping space.

Balik Provincia

The vast majority of Sendong survivors who followed an institutionalised pathway slept at one or more safe spaces run by state and non-state trustees, and eventually moved into a resettlement site. There was, however, a very small minority of survivor households who followed an alternative institutionally-endorsed pathway.

The *Balik Provincia* program encourages survivors to literally “go back to your province.” It is a national program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) implemented by regional DSWD offices. The intended beneficiaries of *Balik Provincia* are “those who are not amenable to settling here after what they’ve been through” and “families [who] don’t plan on staying in the city.” While participation is entirely voluntary, regional government officials actively encouraged evacuees to partake. After their documents are processed, *Balik Provincia* participants receive a one-way fare “to anywhere in the Philippines, wherever you are from” plus an additional amount for food allowance and porter service. It was a potentially lucrative option for large families because funds were allocated per individual, and not per family or per household.

Of the tens of thousands of affected families, the number of CDO-based families who took the deal was “more or less, maybe a hundred.” Whether or not the program attained its stated goal of returning beneficiaries to their former provincial homes is unknown. As of March 2013, the regional government agency responsible for follow-up had not contacted municipal officials to ascertain whether program participants had actually arrived at their destinations. This lack of follow-up and the low participation rate reflect the minor importance of the program, and more importantly, the harsh reality of life in the home provinces of CDO migrants. Philippine provinces have been gutted of livelihood opportunities and land for people with limited means. They do not offer many of the benefits of cities in terms of quality of life, and educational, social,

and economic opportunities. Decades of government investment in the development of urban areas, largely at the expense of rural areas in the provinces, are paying dividends in attracting and retaining the rural-turned-urban poor. Despite the hardships of city life, the vast majority of potential *Balik Provincia* beneficiaries residing in CDO do not want to return to their provinces. Government agencies recognised this situation, and allocated their resources accordingly.

Balik Provincia reflects another discourse reactivated by Southeast Asian governments during the 2007-08 food crisis and the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011, 201) describe it as the “discourse of the ability of the Southeast Asian countryside to serve as a ‘safety net’ for redundant workers [from urban and industrial sectors], who can return to ‘their’ villages to wait out the crisis.” The discourse exaggerates the capacity of rural areas to absorb redundant workers and ignores the reasons why they migrated to the city in the first place. During the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, for example,

[i]n Java, many of the people who had left villages for the cities were precisely those who had lost their land, decades or sometimes generations previously, and they also had been squeezed out of opportunities to work as sharecroppers or labourers in the fiercely competitive agrarian scene. [...] That the concept of the village as a safety net providing ‘farm-financed social welfare’ re-emerged and was again promoted by the World Bank after another decade of deagrarianization, and at a time when agriculture in the region was facing a profound crisis, seems perverse (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 201).

Helping survivors return home is only one objective of *Balik Provincia*. A more significant and urgent aim of the program was to immediately alleviate pressure on overtaxed official post-disaster spaces (and perhaps in the medium to long-term, to alleviate pressure on an overcrowded city, too). As one regional government official explained, motivating this program was the desire to “decongest the evacuation camps.” Recall that the evacuation camps were very undesirable places to stay and were consuming copious amounts of state resources. *Balik Provincia* can thus be read as a state attempt to exclude certain people from official post-disaster spaces in CDO. By paying survivors to leave the city permanently, the DSWD program used positive incentives to promote certain behaviours; in other words, the state regulated people out.

***Hors-système* pathways**

Institutionalised pathways monopolised media, public, and trustee attention, shaping what people assumed were the spaces frequented by Sendong survivors. Yet, many Sendong-affected people simply avoided most or all official disaster aid spaces. Some households never ventured into an

evacuation camp, transitional housing site, or permanent relocation site. These people followed what I call an “*hors-système*” sleeping pathway because they remained outside the official disaster sleeping spaces run by state, religious and humanitarian trustees. A significantly larger group of people, even surpassing the number of people who followed an institutionalised sleeping pathway, pursued a “hybrid pathway” in which households slept in both official and non-official spaces. This section characterises the sleeping spaces of *hors-système* devotees, while the next section analyses those used by hybrid followers.

Where do urban poor survivors sleep?

Urban poor survivors put themselves on an irreversible *hors-système* trajectory when they decided to stay away from the evacuation camps. Sendong survivors were expected to follow a sequential path along institutionalised post-disaster spaces – from evacuation camp to transitional site to resettlement site. It was extremely rare for survivors to skip a step (or, using a powers of exclusion language, to break the inertia of an immovable institutionalised pathway). With the benefit of hindsight, the choice of whether or not to go to an evacuation camp was potentially life-altering.

The *hors-système* urban poor survivors offered diverse reasons for why they did not go to official post-disaster spaces. Some people had other options. If they could, they preferred to stay with relatives whose homes were still habitable. Other people did not perceive any benefit of going to an evacuation camp, and just stayed put. Had they known a long stay at an evacuation camp would increase their chances of getting a free relocation house, then they would have gone. Evidence from the archdiocese’s database charting which survivors went to evacuation camps for Tropical Storm Sendong and Super-typhoon Pablo supports the free housing incentive hypothesis. An urban poor federation similarly recounted that many of its members and their neighbours who had avoided evacuation camps post-Sendong had willingly and pre-emptively evacuated one year later with the hope of getting a free house and lot. Many people deliberately avoided evacuation camps because they considered them unpleasant, overcrowded, and even dangerous. After observing that people at the camps were falling ill with leptospirosis, dengue, and festering open wounds, they opted to stay away, especially if they had a pre-existing health condition. Still other people were influenced by their employers who told them that the camps were unsafe and unsanitary.

The explanation of a Carmen-based *sikad* driver stands out because it explicitly draws upon his place-based sense of belonging. He simply stated, “I don’t go to evacuation because this is my place.” After his house and all its contents were completely washed away, he spent several months staying with friends and relatives in other parts of the city, which required a 30 minute, \$0.20 commute to work each way. One year after the storm he remained without a permanent home. He slept in his *sikad* and bathed either in the Cagayan River or at the public bath at Carmen market at a cost of \$0.22. Unlike most other interviewees, he never sought assistance from any trustee or member of his social network (apart from the people who gave him shelter during the initial months). For him, it was more important to stay in a familiar place “where I belong” than to risk being sent away by a trustee with whom he came in contact. As a single man with no dependents, he could prioritise his own well-being and not worry about the needs and desires of immediate family members.

For a young vegetable seller and her family, it was both financially feasible and socially preferable to remain outside official post-disaster spaces. The 25 year old lives with her parents and seven siblings in *barangay* Kauswagan, just across the Maharlika Bridge from where she works in Consolacion selling vegetables at the market under the bridge. On Sendong night, her family took her father’s *motorela* to the bridge, to higher ground. When the water subsided, they returned to their house and lived on the second floor while they cleaned the flooded first floor. Because their house was only partially damaged and they had an intact second floor, they did not need to go to an evacuation centre. More importantly, they owned the house. Selling it was not an option because it is located within the no-build zone; the resale value of the house and lot plummeted to zero with Sendong, and it became legally impossible to transfer the deed. Yet, as homeowners of a partially damaged house, they were still eligible for government compensation; DSWD gave them \$21.85. Even though they are eligible for relocation as residents of a no-build zone, the vegetable seller’s family does not want to be relocated. Their reasoning echoes the concerns of many resettled residents: the relocation sites are too far from the city, especially considering some of her siblings are still students and the sites are far from their school.

Furthermore, it is economically possible for the family to remain in Kauswagan. The contents of her house, including all of her livelihood-related products were washed out with the flood waters. Like many other urban poor, she had no insurance. She stopped selling for one month while the

market was shut down and was cleaned and repaired by the market sellers. A relative living in CDO lent her \$87.41 to restart her shop, and she has repaid the loan in full. Access to credit was critical in enabling her to rebuild her livelihood. Such access reveals that contrary to the assumption embedded in the illegal squatter, deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses, urban poor families do have local social networks that can provide them with material assistance. Moreover, the resources obtained through the personal network of an urban poor survivor can exceed the resources obtained from trustees. For example, the amount of the relative's loan was four times greater than the official compensation from DSWD. The long-term future of the vegetable seller's business is uncertain. Pre-Sendong, she earned \$17.48 per day, but many of her former clients, especially those from nearby Isla de Oro have been relocated. Consequently, in 2013 her daily earnings has dropped by nearly 40% to \$10.93 per day. It is unlikely she can ever make up for these lost clients because the no-build zone prevents people from reclaiming and living in these spaces.

Where do Muslim survivors sleep?

For a variety of social, cultural, and religious reasons, Muslim survivors avoided post-disaster spaces. Post-disaster spaces were supposed to be open to all people regardless of religious affiliation. Yet, in practice, very few, if any, Muslims felt welcome in these spaces. If they could not stay in their own houses, they stayed with relatives, and occasionally with other Muslims in their homes or in one of the city's mosques.

Muslim families frequently adopted a temporary split householding strategy in which the husband would remain at the family house in CDO and the wife would bring the children to stay with relatives in Marawi City, 100km southwest of CDO. The man was expected to continue his work, which often involved small-scale entrepreneurial activities at or near the city's main market. It was considered important to maintain a business presence in the aftermath of the disaster and not lose existing business connections. It was considered safer, more comfortable and more appropriate for the women and children to leave the city and live with extended family members while their CDO home was cleaned and repaired. Most Muslim split householding families eventually reunited and returned to their CDO homes. Only a few houses of Muslim Sendong survivors were permanently deserted by their former inhabitants. The *bors-système* pathways of Muslim Sendong survivors demonstrate a highly gendered migration pattern based on a gendered division of labour and entrenched constructs of gender.

Where do middle class survivors sleep?

The interim safe spaces accessed by survivors with financial means were predominantly private spaces, including the homes of relatives and friends, hotels, rental apartments, and offices temporarily converted to apartments. The middle class avoided sleeping in evacuation camps and transitional sites for many of the reasons presented in this chapter. Because they had the capacity to repair or rebuild their houses, or to move into an entirely new house, they did not meet the eligibility criteria for a free, concrete resettlement house. To my knowledge, there was only one case of a middle class survivor (an individual, not a family) who moved into a relocation house.

In CDO, middle class survivors typically returned to their old houses. They are an immobile population in that they chose to stay in hazard-prone locations (cf. GOS 2011). They had the financial means to return, clean, and rebuild, either through their personal savings or through the generous donations of their social network within and outside of the Philippines. The decision to return was a rational one. The neighbourhoods in which the middle class reside usually do not experience the regular flooding characteristic of the informal settlement neighbourhoods heavily hit by Sendong. These middle class developments are mostly located outside of the government-declared no-build zone, so they retain the legal right to inhabit these spaces (Reach 2012).

Regulation worked in their favour, ensuring their inclusion, whereas the same regulation prevented many of the urban poor who formerly resided in the no-build zone from returning home. Moreover, middle class survivors typically possess a formal deed and title to their house and lot, and are thus financially invested in a very specific non-portable, place-based capital. In the Philippines, house insurance is included in all mortgages. Thus, households with a mortgage had access to some financial compensation through their mortgage provider. Households that had paid their mortgage may not have had house insurance, and would have had to find alternate resources for repairing or rebuilding their houses. But, because they had finished paying for their house and lot, they too had a significant economic incentive to stay. A final factor compelling the middle class to return to their old houses is that the quality of the house structure, usually made of concrete and other long-lasting, structurally sound materials, would have been more likely to withstand raging floodwaters and be able to be repaired (as compared to the makeshift houses of the urban poor).

When middle class survivors returned to their old houses, they frequently built one or more additional floors (called “panic rooms”) and/or stairs providing easy access to the roof. Many

Cagayaños describe this response as the “build-back-taller” strategy. This strategy was also adopted by urban poor survivors who returned to their former homes, and was financed through savings, loans, and donations from the survivor’s social network and/or from trustees (Fig. 6.10).



Fig. 6.10. Renovations made to houses affected by Sendong floodwaters. A build-back-taller strategy was adopted by both middle class and urban poor survivors who built an upper floor with a so-called “panic room” (10 March 2013).

Some middle class survivors did move. In a few exceptional cases in which they experienced extreme trauma (e.g. watching one’s child drown or swimming alongside snakes in the floodwaters), entire households did leave CDO and even Mindanao. More often, however, the middle class households who moved typically moved into middle class houses of equivalent or greater value as compared to their previous houses. Some families received enough money from friends and relatives to purchase a larger house in a highly desirable middle class neighbourhood. The most popular destinations were geophysically safer parts of the city – mostly in the plateau *barangays* near the Lumbia airport on the western side of the city. In fact, some developers were

actively advertising these developments as “flood-proof” or “flood-free.” The peripheral location of these new neighbourhoods added time and distance to commutes into the city for work, school, leisure, and other activities. But, because the middle class mostly have access to a private vehicle or take taxis, the added distance was not an obstacle. Instead, the difficulty in reaching these flood-proof neighbourhoods without private transportation (i.e. their exclusivity) was occasionally portrayed as a benefit in that the neighbourhoods will not attract illegal squatters or deficient or different vulnerable people. Put another way, some middle class survivors could use their economic clout as a power of exclusion.

What distinguishes all *bors-système* survivors is that they chose to avoid official post-disaster sleeping spaces. Their exclusion from these spaces was a self-imposed and not a trustee-imposed exclusion. In theory, all survivors, including all urban poor, Muslim and middle class survivors, were permitted to stay at evacuation camps and transitional housing sites. Yet by design, these spaces were targeted at particular segments of CDO’s vulnerable population. The resulting character of these spaces and the people inhabiting them, which were carefully crafted by trustees, was frequently the rationale of *bors-système* survivors for avoiding official post-disaster sleeping spaces. In contrast, the hybrid pathway followers, by choice or by force, were not excluded from official post-disaster sleeping spaces.

Hybrid pathways

As the name suggests, a hybrid sleeping pathway is one in which members of a Sendong-affected household sleep in spaces both within and beyond the purview of trustees. Hybrid pathways were extremely common amongst the urban poor, with many survivors spending one or several nights in an evacuation camp before returning home. The urban poor also adopted a variety of strategies that guaranteed their access to the plentiful disaster relief available at post-disaster spaces, while simultaneously allowed for continued livelihood opportunities or comfortable living conditions for at least some family members. The strategies dispute the characterisation of vulnerable survivors as needy, helpless, socially-*un*networked, unambitious freeloaders, as portrayed in the IDP, victim, illegal squatter, deficiency, and different-from-us vulnerability discourses. Yet the strategies also reinforce elements of these same discourses; they underscore that the precarious economic and housing situation typical of CDO’s urban poor has an enormous impact on their capacity to cope and recover from a disaster, and consequently affects

the decisions they take. The following paragraphs study three of the most common strategies used by urban poor survivors to acquire what they perceived, at the time, to be the greatest value.

A split householding strategy

Split householding occurs when members of an economically-defined household reside in different places but all contribute to the economic and social betterment or welfare of the household. It is commonly recognised in the migration literature as a strategy for coping with difficult economic situations (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson 1998, Ball 2004, Parreñas 2006, Hunter and Davis 2009, Parreñas 2010). In the Philippines, many families can count at least one relative working overseas who contributes to their economic well-being. According to the *Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas* (BSP), personal remittances from 1.6 million overseas Filipino workers continue to be a major contributor to the national economy, accounting for \$27 billion or almost 8.5% of the Philippine gross domestic product in 2014 (BSP 2015, iMoney 2015). Many of those who go overseas do so because of the lack of well-paying jobs in the archipelago, rather than a desire to travel and work abroad.

For the present discussion, however, the phenomenon of split householding is confined to the scale of the city, and the contributing factor to Typhoon Sendong. Split householding occurred when a survivor family deliberately sent members of the household to stay at different locations, even though pre-Sendong, the family lived together as a single unit. The rationale for doing this was to obtain the perceived maximum benefits while incurring the minimum costs to the family. As previously indicated, evacuation camps and temporary housing sites were undesirable places to live. They were crowded, unsanitary, noisy, and hot. Families with different practices were crammed into tight spaces. But, in order to receive a free cement house in a relocation site, survivors had to stay in an evacuation camp for a minimum, albeit unspecified, period of time. The account of one Ecoville family helps unpack the rationale for and the mechanics of a post-disaster split householding strategy.

At 4:30 am, after spending five hours stuck in an acacia tree in lower Balulang on the banks of the Cagayan River, Rizalyn, along with her two children, husband and two helpers were rescued by the Philippine National Army. The family, but not the hired help, went to her sister-in-law's house in a higher elevation part of *barangay* Balulang and stayed for three days. Then, she and her husband went to stay at the Xavier Heights covered court for two months and nine days while

the children remained with their aunt. Rizalyn and her husband visited the children on weekends. It was only when the family was transferred to a bunkhouse at Ecoville that the parents and children began living together again. Rizalyn explained that the army had told them that the people who stayed at evacuation centres would be given a free concrete house and lot. There was no guarantee of relocation housing for those who did not stay at an evacuation camp. Because she and her husband wanted a free concrete house on their own lot outside of the flood-prone areas, they opted to live temporarily in an evacuation site, even though they had the option of staying in a more comfortable temporary safe space.

Rizalyn's story reinforces the earlier discussion on evacuation camps, and provides additional insight into the situation of more vulnerable survivors and the haphazard dissemination of critical information. First, her decision points out that evacuation camps are undesirable places, which should only be tolerated if there is a prize (e.g. free house and lot) at the end. Because they are undesirable places, individuals located at the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum (such as their children) should be protected or excluded from them. Details of difficult periods in one's life tend to be remembered; Rizalyn, like many other survivors I interviewed, knew exactly how much time she spent at each post-disaster space. Second, the idea that the urban poor have limited social networks in the city upon which they can rely, perpetuated by the illegal squatter and deficiency vulnerability discourses, is not entirely founded. The first place Rizalyn's family turned for help was to her extended family, and not to trustees at the official disaster relief spaces. Having her children stay with her extended family was deemed a better option than moving them into an evacuation site. This was one way that Rizalyn's family could create their own safe space – in the short-term by keeping the children with a trusted family member outside of an undesirable evacuation camp, and in the long-term by obtaining greater housing security and quality by obtaining a relocation house. Third, it was serendipitous that Rizalyn learned about the eligibility criteria for relocation housing through the exchange with her army rescuers. The criteria were not widely advertised. As several urban poor informants who continue to reside in their old *barangays* told me, had they known about the “live in an evacuation camp, get a free house and lot” deal, they would have gone to an evacuation camp, or stayed there for a longer period of time. Fourth, Rizalyn's family was only one among several families who adopted a split householding strategy in which the children stayed with CDO-based relatives, while the adults lived in the evacuation camps.

A circular migration strategy

Circular migration refers to the temporary movement of people, usually for livelihood purposes (Caces, Arnold et al. 1985, Parreñas 2010). It includes short- to medium-term migration strategies for coping with seasonal variability and employment opportunities, and, if the movement of people is significant, the daily commute into a city or a particular neighbourhood (Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson 1998). In many cases, it was livelihood-related issues that compelled urban poor survivors to deviate from a strict institutionalised pathway onto a hybrid pathway.

Livelihood-driven migration

Certain livelihoods are predisposed to circular migration, particularly if the hours are odd, the pay unpredictable, and the work site specific. The following two profiles are illustrative.

Lechonero

Roasted pig, or *lechon*, is a favourite dish of Cagayaños. CDO *lechon* is famous throughout the country; it is not uncommon to receive orders from Manila or other Philippine cities. It is prepared by men called *lechoneros* (Fig. 6.11). They sell *lechon* by the kilo; piglets for \$33.75-45.00, and full-sized pigs for \$90.00-112.50. The butchering, cleaning, seasoning, and cooking is an additional \$15.75, which is split between two to four *lechoneros*. *Lechoneros* can do up to five *lechon* per day, or even up to ten per day during peak season (Christmas). *Lechon*-making is lucrative enough to support an urban poor family.

Typhoon Sendong strongly affected the city's *lechoneros*. As one *lechonero* explained, "you have to know something about Filipino culture to understand why there was no *lechon* during this evacuation period." Not only were there no pigs (they were washed out with the flood), and people left with no money, but Cagayaños had no desire to celebrate. *Lechon* is expensive and usually only consumed during special occasions such as holidays, graduations, birthdays, and fiestas. It is associated with festivities and joy, and not with devastation and mourning.

Even after the post-disaster recovery had begun, pursuing their livelihood was difficult for the *lechoneros*. Because the pig is roasted over an open fire, *lechon*-making can theoretically be done at many different sites throughout the city. However, it is typically done near established pig delivery sites in informal settlements where dead carcasses and large open fires are permitted. It is not a particularly portable livelihood. Consequently, when the *lechoneros* were transferred to transitional and permanent relocation sites in the city outskirts, they continued to return to their

former worksites, which are frequently located in the no-build zones along the Cagayan River near their former homes in Isla de Oro and lower Balulang. A group of *lechoneros* I interviewed in Isla de Oro explained that they used to live and work there, but have been relocated to the Calaanan relocation site. To fill orders from Manila that are shipped out on the afternoon flight from the Lumbia airport, the *lechoneros* must start preparations at 3 am. There are no *jeepneys* running from Calaanan into the city at a quarter past two in the morning, so the men have no choice but to spend the night in Isla de Oro, in the flood-prone no-build zone. Employing a circular migration strategy is the only option available to the resettled *lechoneros* if they want to continue their profession.



Fig. 6.11. *Lechoneros* at work in Isla de Oro (22 March 2013).

Quarry workers

Circular migration is imposed on quarry workers, too, albeit by economic forces. River quarrying is one of the main income sources for the urban poor living in *barangays* adjacent to the Cagayan River. Men dive into river, collect river sand and gravel, and put in into the base of a boat (Fig. 6.12). Once the boat is full, it is brought to shore. The sand and gravel are loaded onto the trucks

of buyers, who pay the quarry men by the truckload. The account below derives from group-based survivor interviews with Consolacion-based quarry men and their wives. Similar accounts were told by quarry men based in *barangays* Kauswagan, Macasandig, and Balulang. In the latter two *barangays* quarrying is also done mechanically, where it is directed by private companies instead of self-employed individuals.



Fig. 6.12. Quarry workers dig for sand in the Cagayan River in *barangay* Consolacion (21 March 2013, top and 18 March 2013, bottom).

All the interviewees used to live in Isla de Oro, where it was walking distance to the quarry. The men receive \$3.28 per small truckload, which is divided among the workers and usually amounts to \$1.09 each after deductions. In one day, the men can earn up to \$2.18-4.36 if they are “lucky with buyers.” Some days there are no buyers, and thus no income. On average, there are three out of seven days each week when there are no buyers. No income, no food. Some days all they eat is coconut meat from the coconut trees that grace the riverbanks.

The no-buyer, no-income days are especially hard now that the quarry workers and their families are officially living in resettlement sites. Some were relocated to Camaman-an, a 10-minute *motorela* ride from the quarry. Others were relocated to Calaanan, which requires a considerably longer and more expensive commute (e.g. a one-way trip lasts two hours in traffic). The workers, their wives and children all stay in Consolacion when they have no money for the fare to return to their relocation houses. Seven families, totaling 25 people, cram into a small house about the same size as the relocation houses designed for a maximum of seven people. On average, they stay at the Consolacion house 12 days per month. As of March 2013, the longest uninterrupted stay was one week. *Barangay* officials have informed them that the concrete house will be demolished because it is located in a designated no-build zone, but they did not specify when demolition would occur. The interviewees stated matter-a-factly that they will continue to stay there even after the house is demolished, they just will not have a house to stay in. Like the *lechoneros*, the quarry workers must accept a circular migration lifestyle or find a new livelihood.

The post-Sendong livelihood experiences of the *lechoneros* and the quarry workers indicate various ways in which relocation sites, by design, can exclude people from livelihood opportunities. The peripheral location of the sites, and the accompanying physical distance between home and work imposes challenges. The schedule of public transit is not conducive to a city centre-based livelihood with an irregular schedule. The cost of this transportation can be prohibitive, especially on days with little or no income. The transportation hurdles therefore increase the likelihood that workers will stay overnight, and sometimes multiple nights, at the sites of their old houses near their work sites in the no-build zones. Put another way, the men deliberately avoid the official “safe” spaces (i.e. relocation housing) in favour of the official “unsafe” spaces (i.e. no-build zones). The men and their families are safer in officially unsafe spaces because the possibility of income enhances their economic and food security.

This type of circular migration in which survivors continue to work and often stay overnight in their old unsafe house sites instead of at a safe relocation site is not unique to CDO. It is observed in other parts of the Philippines, and was a common theme at relocation sites in Southern Leyte and Quezon provinces, and in interviews with Filipino geologists and NGO researchers working for a disaster centre. One survivor of the 2004 typhoons that devastated parts of Real, Infanta and General Nakar in Quezon province recounted that many residents officially living at the relocation site consider these residences their “vacation homes.” They slept in the resettlement site only as often as required by the mandatory residency rules. Relocated residents spent the majority of their time at the sites of their old homes because of the proximity to their source of livelihood and income.

The *lechonero* and quarry worker accounts also underscore that different livelihoods have different degrees of portability. River quarrying, for example, cannot be moved to relocation sites as a livelihood option. Thus, the quarry men either have to commute or find another livelihood. *Lechon*-making could potentially be established at relocation sites. But, it must be considered in the initial design phase so that appropriate spaces are set aside in the site development plan, and the rules dictating allowable activities on-site permit such livelihoods. Then, there are the additional hurdles of recreating supply and delivery chains and networks. The exclusion of residents from the planning process and planning spaces obliterated any such possibility.

The portability of livelihoods is also gendered. Most livelihoods done by men living in relocation sites require commuting to a job site outside the relocation sites, although the hours and pay may not require an overnight stay at or near the job site. While some of the livelihoods done by women are place-specific and do require commuting (e.g. laundry woman for a family or salesclerk at the Guisano Mall), many of the women’s livelihoods, such as *sari-sari* shop owner or dress-maker, are more portable and can more easily be recreated at different locations, including relocation sites. Indeed, women survivors continued to work in the evacuation camps and transitional housing sites, giving manicures and pedicures, selling mobile phone load, and doing laundry. Some were the sole income earners in their household at this time. Because women’s livelihoods are typically less lucrative than men’s livelihoods, there were significant economic impacts at the household level, when the secondary income became the primary one.

There were social impacts, too. The portability of women's livelihoods meant that post-disaster spaces were sites for temporarily remaking or reshaping gender roles. Although many Filipina women contribute to their household's income (e.g. in 2012, employment rates for women and men were 46.7% and 72.9%, respectively; ADB 2013, 13), it continues to be the social expectation that male household members cover daily expenses and provide the house. For example, the city's ongoing livelihood training programs for the urban poor teaches women how they can supplement husbands' income (without upsetting mainstream gender norms). As the mayor explained,

We are concentrating more specially on the women, because the husbands, even those without jobs, know how to find ways to make money here and there. The wives are left at home. So they're the ones we concentrate on. While at home, they can do the trade that they have learned from this skills training actually. Augmentation, so a little augmentation of the incomes of their husbands.

The post-Sendong livelihood programs of trustees that targeted women similarly concentrated on small-scale livelihoods that women can do in or near their houses, thereby reinforcing gendered social norms about work.

The responsibility for obtaining a home, however, shifted from the male to the female domain. The head of a municipal office that allocated relocation housing, for example, recalled that it was always women – often pregnant and with children in tow – who waited in line to ask her for relocation housing. She asked them outright if their husbands put them up to this, preying upon her pity in order to “jump the cue” and get relocation housing faster than the others. There was thus a mismatch between a revised economic and social reality and norms faced by survivors and the services offered to them by trustees.

Other motivations for circular migration

Reasons other than strictly economic ones spurred circular migration between relocation sites and former homes, too. The peripheral location of relocation sites and the lack of on-site services and facilities were frequently cited as the reasons why survivors moved between two houses. For example, the transfer of survivors into relocation sites began before water and electricity were connected. Survivors did not want to live without water and power, so they simply returned to their old houses and waited until resettlement site facilities were hooked up, returning periodically to maintain their claim on the relocation house.

Other survivors justified their circular migration with health-related claims. For example, even for women with uncomplicated pregnancies, living at Ecoville can be a challenge. There are no nearby clinics offering pre-natal appointments. The bumpy and long roads connecting Ecoville to the city are poorly served by public transit. Other women support pregnant residents, for example, by contributing gas money or taxi fare, or by lending a vehicle when the women go into labour and need to get to a hospital in the city. As such, it is an informal social safety net that provides security to these women, and not the official design of the relocation site. For women with high risk pregnancies, staying at a remote resettlement site is not an option. In one instance, a pregnant woman, her husband and father-in-law lived in a small rental apartment near their old house in *barangay* Macabalan close to the city centre. They were Sendong survivors, had been allocated a relocation house at Ecoville, and, according to the site's guidelines, were supposed to be staying in their bunkhouse. But they were not. Instead, they adopted an extended circular migration strategy in which they lived in town for the duration of her pregnancy. The woman had been instructed by her doctor, employed by and thus a representative of the State, to remain in the city centre. She was having a difficult pregnancy and required quick and easy access to emergency health facilities. The jarring movements that inevitably occur along the roads to and from Ecoville were considered dangerous for her and her baby. Put another way, a state trustee had clearly identified that the safe relocation site is unsafe for some pregnant women. As such, the inability of a relocation site to meet the specific health needs of survivors can compel circular migration.

A Community Mortgage Program strategy

Survivors who were not allocated a relocation house under LIAC rules can participate in a special express lane of the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). Its intended beneficiaries are survivor households who require relocation but did not meet the official eligibility criteria, for example, because they did not go to the official post-disaster sleeping spaces, they live outside the no-build zone, or their houses were partially, and not completely, damaged. The CMP helps trapped households who want to move away from environmentally risky or hazardous areas but lack the capital to move or to cope *in-situ* (cf. GOS 2011). The post-Sendong trajectory of survivors on a hybrid CMP pathway spend several months to years living in their partially repaired pre-Sendong houses or in other private spaces while they wait for a house and lot acquired through the intervention of trustees. After escaping to higher ground, these survivors stayed at interim safe

spaces beyond the purview of trustees, and occasionally at the official evacuation sites and transitional housing sites, and then eventually moved into a home in a trustee-endorsed relocation site.

Since 1988, the CMP has provided group mortgages to low-income communities in the Philippines (Sawyer 2014). It is a microfinance approach to housing in which the national government, through the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC), aims to give informal settlers access to affordable financing so that they can secure tenure on the land they occupy, and improve their houses and neighbourhoods (Cacnio 2001, SHFC no date). The mortgages have a 6% interest rate, and a maximum amortisation period of 25 years (Sawyer 2014).

In response to Sendong, the SFHC created an express lane so that survivors could buy land for off-site relocation (Sawyer 2014). The express lane differs from the regular program in that up to 500 families can join a community association (versus a maximum of 200), a portion of the loan is disbursed before all of the obligatory documentation is done (thereby shortening the process by up to several years), and community mobilisers⁵² guarantee that the deferred documents will be completed within one year (Sawyer 2014, 4). There are three accredited community mobilisers in CDO; the archdiocese's Social Action Center is taking care of 5,000 families in 25 community organisations, and the Growth, Organizational Upliftment of People, Inc. (GROUP) and the Technology Outreach and Community Help (TOUCH) Foundation are taking care of the rest. The community mobilisers organised 8,000 beneficiary families into 36 community organisations, and are helping them navigate the program, negotiate purchase agreements with landowners, liaise with other government agencies, and build organisational capacity (Sawyer 2014).

Demand for relocation housing on safer and higher ground outstrips supply in CDO. The CMP helps resolve this problem. By March 2013, approximately 3,000 relocation houses had been built for survivors, with another 3,000 in the pipeline. But as the Sendong coordinator at the archdiocese explained, "based on our data, the total number of families that need to be relocated

⁵² A community mobiliser organises informal settlers into a community association that purchases and owns the land. A community mobiliser can be "any government entity, non-government organizations (NGO) and People's Organizations (PO) and must possess the needed skills to organize communities, document CMP project applications and provide access to other government agencies involved in the program" (SHFC no date).

to safer ground is about 20,000.” The 14,000 house shortfall is reduced through the CMP; it targets 8,000 families. If additional funds can be raised, the remaining 6,000 families may be added to the program.

Like the other official post-disaster spaces, the CMP-facilitated relocation sites are exclusionary spaces. CMP sites are situated in the same peripheral areas as the fully-funded relocation sites, including in the *barangays* of Indahag and Lumbia, and the municipality of Opol. Consequently, the same transportation, accessibility, livelihood, and services problems associated with a remote location also apply. Access to the CMP also presents financial hurdles because the beneficiary must pay for the house and lot. The SHFC imposes a ceiling of \$1,350 for the house portion of the loan, but the actual cost of building fully functional houses exceeded this amount (Sawyer 2014).

The hybrid pathways underscore that some Sendong survivors were very savvy in crafting their post-disaster trajectory. The three strategies indicate that survivors went out of their way to ensure that they would not be excluded from disaster assistance. The importance of trustees differs among the strategies; in the split householding and circular migration strategies, trustees play a secondary role in directing movement, whereas trustees play essential roles as community mobilisers and funders of the CMP-sponsored relocation sites. The existence of these hybrid pathways underscores that “improvement schemes [– implemented in official post-disaster spaces –] are simultaneously destructive and productive of new forms of local knowledge and practice” (Li 2005, 391). The split householding and circular migration strategies, in particular, show that survivors are creating new practices that enable them to weave their needs and desires into the schemes designed to improve them.

This concludes a lengthy discussion of the post-disaster sleeping pathways of CDO’s Sendong survivors. Whether survivors follow an institutionalised, *hors-système* or hybrid pathway is strongly influenced by individual and household scale factors, such as where a survivor is located along the vulnerability continuum, as well as by macro scale factors and institutions linked to the powers of exclusion. Sendong survivors, of course, did much more than just sleep in the days, weeks, and months after the disaster. The final section of this chapter looks at the other places Sendong survivors went in the course of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods.

Where else do survivors go post-disaster?

In addition to sleeping places, CDO's Sendong survivors accessed a variety of other urban spaces. They sought out spaces for obtaining money and relief goods, for accessing medical, educational and safety services, for enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and for engaging in advocacy or political activities. These spaces, just like sleeping spaces, should be read as spaces of exclusion informed by vulnerability discourses. The following pages briefly introduce the major relief spaces, income and livelihood spaces, and recreational, spiritual, and advocacy spaces that were deemed significant by the more vulnerable survivors.

Disaster relief spaces

For many survivors, obtaining some sort of immediate disaster relief was a priority. Disaster relief refers to money, goods, and services made available to the individuals and communities affected by Sendong. It does not include the money some survivors obtained by selling their personal possessions or seeking loans from private companies to cover post-disaster expenses. Disaster relief is usually collected and distributed by government agencies, religious groups, NGOs, humanitarian organisations, and private companies. In CDO, academic institutions, notably Xavier University, and local residents (including many survivors) were major conduits of disaster relief. Filipino politicians, actors, and other celebrities were also highly visible distributors of disaster relief.

Disaster relief was distributed at what I call "disaster relief spaces." Trustees typically maintained a strong presence in them. For example, emergency relief was distributed primarily in state spaces such as *barangay* halls and health centres, covered courts, and schools, or in religious spaces such as churches and mosques; compensation for partially and totally damaged houses, and indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing persons were disbursed exclusively at government offices; and livelihood assistance cheques and trainings were delivered at a variety of government, Christian and private sector offices, academic institutions, and even at some transitional and permanent relocation housing sites (Fig. 6.13). To a lesser extent, relief was distributed directly to survivors in their affected communities.

Disaster relief distribution sites




Fig. 6.13. The sites in CDO accessed by survivors to obtain aid and non-livelihood income sources. Sites include the official distribution disaster emergency relief and other forms of disaster assistance sites, and they include commercial enterprises such as pawn shops and financial institutions. © Marc Girard, 2015.

In order to access relief at a state site, survivors first had to obtain a “family access card.” Initially, the cards were issued only at the municipal and regional social welfare and development offices (CSWD and DSWD, respectively). The DSWD office is located in *barangay* Lumbia, far away from affected areas and difficult to access. Yet, it was important to obtain cards from both CSWD and DSWD because neither agency would accept the other agency’s card. It quickly became apparent that two distribution points were insufficient; the inaccessibility excluded survivors from obtaining much needed resources. Consequently, family access cards began being issued at evacuation centres and at *barangay* halls, including ones that were not evacuation camps – the same locations at which the emergency relief items, services, and small cash grants were distributed by state, religious, and non-governmental trustees.

Other disaster relief distribution sites in the city did not impose restrictions on who could access relief. Both Christians and Muslims reported non-discriminatory distribution of relief goods at their places of worship. Churches and mosques reportedly gave to anyone who came, regardless of religious affiliation, economic status, and even Sendong survivor status. In addition to distribution sites for food, water, clothing, and other physical goods, they were also sites where medical missions took place. Anyone was welcome to receive a check-up, medical care, drugs, and referrals from trained health care professionals.

Some relief spaces were roving public spaces or informal private spaces in the community. For example, NGOs and religious groups walked along the streets in affected communities distributing aid to anyone who asked. Celebrity Filipinos and politicians went into selected affected communities and handed out bills to people. In listing the various forms of disaster relief they obtained, many urban poor survivors recalled getting “₱500 from Erap” (\$12), the former actor-turned one-time-President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Survivors hailing from *barangay* Consolacion described a surprise, almost cinematic, visit from the heartthrob Filipino actor Robin Padilla. Around 10 pm on 24 December 2011, Padilla woke up survivors sleeping in tents pitched on the streets and sidewalks in Consolacion. He handed them an envelope containing \$12. Excited recipients began texting their family and friends. Many people arrived by 11 pm, but the so-called James Dean of Philippine cinema had already left. These three examples point to the temporal and spatial fluidity or the transience of disaster relief sites. The latter two examples highlight the prevalence of celebrity culture in the Philippines, and more importantly, that

individual, recognisable faces and names are perceived as larger than the institutions they represent.

This latter point helps to explain why some current politicians were closely associated with disaster relief and were often seen at evacuation camps and other disaster relief spaces in CDO. The names of these politicians came up repeatedly in survivor and key informant interviews. For politicians with future political ambitions, it is clearly in their interest to advocate on behalf of their constituents, and especially to be seen working on their behalf. For a politically-savvy politician seeking re-election, time is better spent personally visiting disaster relief spaces and personally handing out small envelopes of cash to prospective voters than negotiating in the backrooms with colleagues and superiors. Although survivors would likely gain more from the latter lobbying efforts, the credit would go to a government agency and not to a particular politician. Because the amount of relief money given to any one individual is relatively small, it is the physical presence of a politician in a camp that has the most impact. According to a regional government officer, this physical presence, favourable name retention link explains the involvement of several prominent CDO politicians in a variety of disaster relief and recovery events and spaces: “Sometimes people will not appreciate the amount given. Their presence going there into the camp to meet them matters to the people. So it is their presence in the area that will matter to the people. That is why they are popular.”

Survivors from all along the vulnerability continuum were selective in choosing which disaster relief spaces they accessed. Not surprisingly, many survivors selected disaster relief spaces that were in close proximity to their Sendong-affected homes. They also preferred to go to the places where they felt welcome; for example, they would seek assistance at their usual places of worship where they were already part of a community before they would go to a relief site set up by state or humanitarian actors. Many middle class survivors considered the opportunity cost of waiting for hours in a hot line-up to receive some noodles, canned sardines, bottled water, and rice unfavourable; instead, they typically sought out or received unsolicited assistance through their personal social networks. If they even bothered to obtain a Sendong victim card, they used it almost exclusively to obtain high value disaster relief such as compensation for partially and totally damaged houses, indemnities paid to the surviving family members of dead and missing persons, and allowances from air carrier companies to change holiday travel plans without paying

a penalty. Moreover, because the family access card included the family's former and sometimes current address, which is indicative of the family's wealth, middle class survivors were given smaller or no aid packages at the distribution sites requiring a family access card. Consequently, most of the survivors who regularly frequented disaster relief spaces were the urban poor.

Survivor household were similarly selective in which family members went to the disaster relief spaces. If survivors knew that relief items would be given on a per person basis, then all adult family members, and sometimes even the children, would wait in line. If survivors knew that relief items would be allocated on a per household basis, then it was primarily the adult women, sometimes accompanied by their young children, who went. The women would also be the ones who exchanged the "gift cheques" (e.g. gift certificates) for groceries and household items at participating stores, and who waited in line to plead for relocation housing. Not surprising, women survivors of all ages typically had a greater knowledge of the sources, amounts, and types of disaster relief and the sites where it was distributed than did their male counterparts. As such, the disaster relief sites were gendered spaces.

It was rare for survivors to actually venture inside some designated disaster relief distribution sites. In Figure 6.13, the dotted circles indicate disaster relief distribution sites that were not accessed by any of the survivors I interviewed or by any of their acquaintances. For example, the indemnities paid to survivors who lost a family member during Sendong were disbursed at the Region-X headquarters of the Office of Civil Defense, but no participant in my study actually collected money from the OCD office. This is but one example of the gap between the disaster relief sites run by trustees and the use of these same sites by survivors.

There were reasons other than acquiring goods, services and money for seeking out disaster relief spaces. They were information hubs. Survivors could inquire about the next shipment of food and blankets, or find out when the next medical mission was taking place. In the first few days after the storm, disaster relief spaces were also spaces where survivors could inquire about missing family members and friends; some families were indeed reunited in this way. Disaster relief spaces, especially those that doubled as evacuation sites, were also spaces where Sendong survivors could begin a healing process with the assistance of trustees conducting psychosocial counseling and debriefing activities.

Although disaster relief spaces and official post-disaster sleeping spaces were intended to meet the immediate survival needs of Sendong survivors, they could not meet all of their needs. Consequently, many survivors sought out other spaces to fulfil their financial, recreational, and spiritual needs.

Income and livelihood spaces

To supplement what they received at the disaster relief sites, urban poor survivors frequently sought out opportunities to earn income through livelihood activities or through the one-time sale of personal items. In exceptional cases, they could access loans from a formal financial institution. These livelihood and income spaces were located throughout the city.

Livelihood earnings were an important source of money for survivors, urban poor and middle class alike. Middle class survivors often continued with their usual jobs. Those working for the government agencies, private sector companies, and NGOs tasked with disaster relief and recovery efforts frequently experienced a temporary increase in their workload without an accompanying increase in salary or benefits. The urban poor experienced greater short-term interruptions to their livelihoods. Whenever possible, they resumed their usual livelihoods, often after a brief delay of several days to several weeks during which the work sites were cleaned up, and the capital repaired or replaced. In other cases, survivors restarted their old livelihoods in new locations such as the evacuation camps. Certain livelihoods were more penalised by the disaster than others. For example, the river quarry workers had to wait for the river to “calm down,” and then adjust to its slightly altered currents, channels, and shorelines. Many Cagayaños stopped consuming fish for several weeks, even months, after Sendong; they were suspicious of freshwater fish that may have come into contact with dead human bodies. The stigma against fish was especially hard on the city’s fishermen and fish mongers who experienced a major drop in business that lasted for several months.

Other urban poor capitalised on short-term opportunities opened in the aftermath of the disaster. For example, the drivers of small vehicles such as *sikads* and *motorelas* that could easily navigate narrow city streets strewn with debris were in high demand. For one week after the flood, drivers were earning \$15.19-17.36 per day – instead of the usual \$4.34-6.50 income – shuttling debris from middle class and urban poor homes to the city dump in Zayas. Many *barangays* and humanitarian organisations offered a ten day cash-for-work program in which survivors were

paid a total of \$54.25 to clean up the streets. This program was very popular among the urban poor.

The volume of garbage post-Sendong provoked a mini bonanza for the city’s recycling, scrap and junk shop businesses. The benefits accrued not only to survivors but also to non-Sendong survivor Cagayaños involved in the business. The canvassers, able-bodied men who collect bits of metal and plastics that can be exchanged for cash at junk shops, benefitted greatly. The case of a junk shop in Macanhan is illustrative. The way the business normally works is that each canvasser is given a \$32.55 capital loan each morning, which he uses to buy scrap and recyclables around the city. Canvassers typically earn \$2.17-10.85 a day once they have repaid the morning’s loan. In low season, the junk shop takes in 900 kg of scrap on a daily basis (300 kg each of plastics, metals, and cans). The scrap is sorted and processed by the junk shop’s regular employees. The scrap is purchased on-site by buyers based in the city. After being flooded and closed for two days, there was what the junk shop owner called a “boost in business” from December 2011 until February 2012 (Table 6.2). There was a big increase in the collection of plastics and metals post-Sendong, and a lesser increase in almost everything else. The price the shop paid canvassers for items increased temporarily. The price paid by the buyers for scrap items around Sendong was also \$0.01-0.02/kg higher than usual. Overall, the junk shop did more than three times its usual business.

Table 6.2. Comparison of a Macanhan junk shop’s usual business and its post-Sendong boost.

		Usual level (e.g. March 2013)	Post-Sendong boost (December 2011-February 2012)
Total daily capital loaned to canvassers		\$434.04-542.55	\$1,953.16
Price paid to canvassers for collected scrap	Cans	\$0.11/kg	\$0.15/kg
	Metals	\$0.26/kg	\$0.28/kg
	Plastics	\$0.30/kg	\$0.33/kg

A similar boost in business was observed at the vast city landfill site in Zayas, Carmen from December 2011 to March 2012. An on-site city official recalled that there was a lot of electronic garbage and furniture entering the landfill site. In the boost months, there were more than 600 “scavengers” (or who the junk shop owner and employees called canvassers) seeking recyclables like plastics and metals to sell to junk shops. The landfill scavengers are mainly from Zayas, and do scavenging as part-time work. There are also scavengers who come down from Lumbia but

only twice a week because the fare to reach the landfill site is quite expensive. During the boost, scavengers could earn \$21.70-32.55 or more per day, and even more if they found a television or fridge, or if they worked the full day. Unlike the junk shop canvassers who are almost exclusively male, scavengers at the city landfill are both men and women, mostly between the ages of 40 to 60 years old.

Sendong survivors also sought out non-livelihood means for obtaining money. They initiated financial transactions with private sector companies (Fig. 6.13). For example, women sold the jewelry they were wearing, or other valuables they had managed to save. Bonnie, the woman profiled in the institutionalised pathway, pawned her engagement ring for \$130.21 at a Carmen pawnshop. It was this money that sustained her family after their house and its contents were washed out, and before her husband was able to resume his livelihood as a *motorela* driver and she was able to resume her livelihood as a farmer in a neighbouring province.

In rare cases, urban poor survivors could access new loans or change the conditions of existing loans from a formal financial institution. Only four out of the 23 men and 56 women urban poor survivors I interviewed had a personal account with a formal banking institution. In contrast, many of the urban poor maintained a line of credit with 5-6 lenders. All four were with a CDO-based financial cooperative called FICCO. One woman vendor had been pre-approved for a loan and received the first installment before 16 December 2011. The second half of the loan was disbursed after Sendong, and she was able to delay repayment without penalty. Similarly, a middle-aged couple running a *carinderia* in the Consolacion market did not require an additional loan post-Sendong. They used the dividends paid from their FICCO account to cover for the college fees of their children, and money from other sources to restart their successful *carinderia* business. A woman vegetable seller at the Consolacion market rounds out the FICCO members; she joined after Sendong and had a very modest savings account by February 2013. To help her manage her household and restart her business post-Sendong, she obtained a loan from a neighbour and not from FICCO. That so few urban poor survivors seek out assistance from formal banking institutions underlines their exclusion from a critical component of the formal market system.

Recreation, spirituality and advocacy spaces

The third suite of non-sleeping post-disaster spaces were those used for recreational, spiritual, and advocacy purposes. According to survivors, these spaces were vital for helping them recover from Typhoon Sendong. These spaces helped survivors to cope emotionally and psychologically with their experiences, and to regain a sense of normalcy in their lives. The existence of this category of post-disaster spaces indicates that successful disaster relief and rebuilding efforts should not only enable survivors to meet their basic physical needs, but should also promote overall well-being.

Recreational spaces

Visits to recreational spaces plummeted in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. Urban poor survivors described their favorite leisure activities in the city: picnicking along the riverbanks, spending the day at the Bonbon, Agas, Macasandig, or Bayabas beaches, and *mall*ing at CDO's Guisano and Limketkai malls. They stopped going to these spaces in the days and weeks after Sendong. For many, it was because they had more urgent matters to attend to – like reuniting with missing relatives, surviving, and finding income. For others, it was because they “didn't feel like it.” Other survivors avoided recreational spaces out of necessity and even shame. For example, survivors who had previously enjoyed *mall*ing avoided the city's shopping centres because they had no money, and moreover, they considered themselves unpresentable. They had not had a chance to properly bathe, and they had no appropriate clothing to wear because they had lost everything but the clothes on their backs. One woman recalled going to a grocery store on the morning of 17 December 2011. The security guards blocked her entry because she was so dirty and muddy. There were many other like her trying to get in. All she wanted was to buy some clean underwear. This initial post-Sendong exclusion from recreational spaces was thus a product of force, the market, formal rules, and especially informal norms about appropriate entry, and self-imposed, personal priorities. As the weeks and months passed, survivors began returning to their preferred recreational spaces, but less frequently than when they lived in the city. For resettled survivors, the added travel time and expense cut into a household budget already constrained by the dearth of livelihood opportunities and the increased cost of living in the relocation sites.

Spiritual spaces

Spiritual spaces were also important in helping Sendong survivors heal. Rather than offering material or physical things, these spaces nurtured the souls of survivors. While in the evacuation camps, many people continued attending religious services at their regular places of worship. For Christians, it was just before Christmas time, which for many Catholic and Aglipayan Filipinos involves a frequently unsuccessful attempt to attend all the *Simbang gabi* or devotional pre-dawn masses from 16 to 24 December. While no interviewee specifically mentioned trying to go to 3am masses, they did describe regular attendance at church services. Once survivors began moving into the transitional and permanent relocation sites, they sought out nearby churches.

Occasionally, they return for church services in their former *barangays*, but only on special occasions when they can justify the extra travel time and expense. Attending or even participating in one of the mass weddings and mass baptisms at the Xavier University chapel is one example.

Included in the spiritual spaces category are the spaces used for the events commemorating the one year anniversary of Sendong. The events blended cultural and religious traditions with the objectives of local government, academic, religious, and other non-government actors. Among Filipino Catholics, mourners celebrate multiple times after the death of a loved one, including 9-day prayers, 45-day prayers and mass offerings, and one-year anniversary celebrations. Non-Catholic Filipinos partake in similar commemoration activities. To commemorate the death and disappearance of hundreds of Cagayaños during Typhoon Sendong, trustees organised one-year anniversary events in November and December 2013. Table 6.3 summarises all of the events I attended or was aware of. As one regional government official explained, these types of events are like “a ritual, a closure,” which are “an essential part of moving on.”

Commemorative events were located at different sites around the city, and were targeted at different segments of the population. For politicians, commemoration events were opportunities to showcase the achievements of the city and the regional governments in enabling a speedy recovery and rebuilding process. Not surprisingly, there was a push to close all of the evacuation camps before the one-year anniversary. As previously explained, the “squatters posing as survivors” were swept out of the highly visible Capitolio evacuation camp in late November 2012 and given relocation housing even though they did not meet the LIAC relocation eligibility criteria. For urban poor survivors, the commemoration events were perceived as opportunities to remember and mourn the loss of their loved ones, to celebrate their recovery, and to reunite with

old neighbours (at the expense of politicians who paid for transportation and food), and to demand that government agencies address the injustices and difficulties they continue to face. For religious actors, commemorative events were used as a way to re-engage and remember alongside Cagayaños in fun, high-energy, and solemn activities alike. Commemorative masses at Catholic churches were a platform for priests and nuns to remind parishioners about climate change, disaster risk reduction, watershed management, and in some cases, the ineptitude of the city administration in protecting its citizens from a disaster.

Table 6.3. A summary of the events commemorating the one-year anniversary of Sendong. Acronyms are: Ateneo de Manila University (AMU), Capitol University (CU), Habitat for Humanity Philippines (H4H), Junior Chamber International (JCI), Mindanao University of Science and Technology (MUST), Office of Civil Defense (OCD), Xavier University (XU).

Organisers	Event description	Venue	Attendees	Notable absentees
City government	Lively commemoration event for resettled survivors with free food, music and dancing	Rotunda (by the Cagayan River)	Over 6,000 urban poor survivors (bussed in from relocation sites); street vendors; musicians; children and youth dance teams from the relocation sites	Politicians
City government	Unveiling of “Tree of Life” that reportedly saved more than 50 Isla de Oro residents during Sendong	Isla de Oro mango tree	Politicians; media	
City government; JCI	Unveiling of Sendong memorial wall, followed by a solemn mass, speeches and a concert	Gaston Park	Politicians (e.g. mayor, vice mayor); JCI; Catholic priests; media	
CU	Book launch of <i>Sa kagabhion sa Sendong – Narratives of children-survivors</i> by Lilian C. de la Peña and Amor Q. de Torres (eds.)	CU campus	CU staff and students; OCD; XU; Children’s book club; children-survivor authors and their families; media	Politicians
CU	Typhoon Sendong installation	CU’s Museum of Three Cultures		
Kadamay (urban poor federation)	Protests at government offices, followed by prayers	DSWD office, city hall, Rotunda	Urban poor; urban poor federations	Politicians; government agency officials

	to remember the victims	(by the Cagayan River)		
OCD	Launch of OCD's official report <i>Bul-og – Streams of learning from Sendong</i>	SM Mall (venue changed from Centrio Mall a few days prior)	OCD; organisations contributing to the report; mall-goers; media	Urban poor survivors
OCD, XU	<i>Dagan Kagay-an</i> Sendong commemoration fun run	Rotunda; route along Cagayan River in flooded <i>barangays</i>	OCD; XU; police; Philippine National Army; university students (mostly middle class); vice mayor; children and youth from Xavier Ecoville Got Talent club; media	Mayor; urban poor survivors
OCD, XU	Photo exhibit and creative writing workshop	XU campus	OCD; XU students; media	Urban poor survivors (i.e. the subjects of the photo exhibit)
OCD, XU, CU	“Mobile Read” – Readings of <i>Sa kagabbion sa Sendong – Narratives of children-survivors</i> by Lilian C. de la Peña and Amor Q. de Torres (eds.)	Ecoville, Indahag and Calaanan relocation sites	OCD; XU; CU; urban poor survivors at relocation sites	
Various Christian churches	Special church services and commemorative masses	Various churches in CDO	Parishioners	
XU	Symbolic housing turnover and house blessing event	Ecoville relocation site	City politicians (e.g. vice mayor, councilors) and administrators; <i>barangay</i> captains; private sector donors (e.g. San Miguel foundation, Union Bank, TP Wood); religious donors (e.g. Chinese ladies of Sacred Heart Parish, Cebu); H4H; XU (including the Board of trustee, the university president, staff and students); AMU; Children and youth from Xavier Ecoville Got Talent club; Catholic priests; media	Residents from Ecoville's transitional sites (i.e. the future home owners); mayor

XU	Mass wedding and mass baptism	Ecoville relocation site	Ecoville couples, their children and families and friends; Ecoville staff; photographers; XU staff; Catholic priests	Politicians; media
XU, H4H	Interfaith event (building relocation houses and ceremony)	Ecoville relocation site	XU and MUST engineering students (including some Muslim women); H4H private sector partners from the construction industry; various Christian churches; various Christian student associations; XU officials; H4H officials; media	Residents from Ecoville's transitional sites (i.e. the future home owners); local and regional politicians

Advocacy spaces

The final type of post-disaster space that CDO's urban poor survivors frequented were spaces used for advocacy and protesting purposes. These spaces included centrally-located sites like Divisoria, city hall and Capitolio, and out-of-the-way sites like the DSWD regional office in Lumbia. At these sites, the urban poor, particularly those organised into the survivor collectives of an urban poor federation and the newly minted activists in a women's organisation, did numerous "dialogues" and "picket rallies." According to the organisers and participants, the events aimed to protest a haphazard and unjust selection of the beneficiaries of government aid and narrow definitions that excluded many flood-affected people from accessing aid, and to demand that more, better quality, and fairly distributed services and cash assistance be given to all needy Sendong survivors. The number of protesters was limited by availability of free transportation, especially for events outside the city centre.

A year of protests began in January 2012. The foci of the ensuing protests closely mirrored the changes in the disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts of state trustees, and called attention to unfulfilled promises. Many of the participants were survivors who had returned to their old communities. The first picket rally on the highway outside the DSWD Lumbia office called out the unfair interview process for assessing Sendong damage to houses. Protesters claimed that their houses had been wrongly classified, or that the damage was grossly underestimated by officials who did not actually survey the affected areas but instead relied upon accounts from their personal contacts. In February and March 2012, they returned to the DSWD Lumbia office, these times protesting the unfair, random, and insufficient distribution of kitchen

utensil kits, and the unfulfilled promises of educational assistance to survivors, respectively. In July 2012, 300 members of the S.O.S. collectives staged a dialogue outside the DSWD office calling for a review of the data and the implementation of projects. The DSWD had promised kitchen utensils, cash assistance for partially damaged houses, and livelihood assistance. At the time, however, only the utensils had been distributed. The collectives reiterated these complaints to DSWD in November 2012; many people were dissatisfied with the execution of the program. More than 500 protestors claimed that without a close friend in the bureaucracy or very vocal protests to the appropriate authority, it was impossible to receive any aid. As one survivor explained, not only did DSWD “randomly select the people who get benefits,” it also grossly underestimated the actual need. For example, DSWD allocated benefits to only 200 families per affected *barangay*, whereas thousands of families required assistance. In September 2012, Sendong survivors went to the city hall to ask for reclassification from the City Social Welfare and Development office. They claimed that because their houses were not properly surveyed, they were incorrectly classified as “flooded” instead of “partially damaged” or “fully damaged.” The erroneous classification meant they were denied financial compensation. In January 2013, there was another protest, this time in front of Capitolio. DSWD had promised to accommodate all the “Sendong victims” by January 2013 but many victims had not yet been assigned a relocation house. Protestors were objecting to the delay and the resulting prolonging of precarious and uncertain living conditions in no-build zones and transitional housing sites.

From the perspective of the government agencies targeted by the picket rallies and dialogues, many of the complaints were unjustified and demonstrated a lack of knowledge about procedural and jurisdiction constraints. Government workers pointed to the immense pressure they were under to perform assessments in very short periods of time; these data formed the basis of all subsequent official state-sponsored disaster relief and recovery activities. Government workers admitted that their data were not always sound, especially because their assessment of whether or not a person is a victim relied upon a belief that people would tell the truth and inform authorities about unjustified claims. As one official explained,

We conducted a validation, and we encouraged the people to tell us the truth. And we assured them that the information [is] confidential. We even told them that ‘you can text us [about unjustified claims] and then you don’t have to tell us [what] your name is. That information will be strictly confidential.’ That will be our basis to conduct validation.

Later, government agencies did revisit these initial assessment and tried to correct erroneous information. They also bent the rules to accommodate people who would have otherwise been excluded from benefits. A regional government officer explains the limitations imposed on her agency's work, and how it tried to be more inclusive and fair.

If you are categorised as totally damaged in our list, then you will receive [P]10,000 based on assessment of the worker. But we don't really have to give the [P]10,000 – it depends on the assessment of the social worker. If partially damaged, you can receive the [P]5,000. But again, it depends on the assessment. For those families who are categorised as flooded under our guidelines, we are not supposed to give them. But they cannot understand that. Because they say 'we are also victims.' [Our workers reply,] 'But you are categorised as flooded so we cannot just bend the law [that] has been there for as early as 1970s.' So, they were complaining that some of them were not given [compensation].

We will only accommodate those on our master list. But we do understand that [there might be some mistakes on the list] because, you know, [the] United Nations came and we have to make that report in 72 hours. We have to make that assessment fast. If you are not included in our list, there is no money for you. But you cannot just tell the people like that, so what we did was try to bend that guideline. We tell the people that 'even if you are not in our list, but you are a holder of [a] family access card [we will consider giving you benefits].' Then last year, we did the revalidation. Second, there are those who are categorised as flooded but [are really] partially or totally [damaged], or the other way around. So we have conducted that revalidation to ensure that what we give to this family [what] is really due to them.

I end this section with an excerpt from my blog. It describes the International Women's Day rally in Divisoria, another popular location for protests. It is a public square outside the gates of the city's premier university and part of the main commercial district near the city centre. Most banks have their regional headquarters, or at least a branch, here. It is the site of the famous Night Café, where street vendors, shoppers and foodies take over in Friday and Saturday nights, turning the area into a bustling night bazaar. Municipal, provincial and regional government offices are all within walking distance. The following excerpt provides a feel of what actually transpires during a dialogue or picket rally in an advocacy space. Unlike the aforementioned events, the focus of this particular one did not centre around justice for Sendong victims or survivors. The focus was instead on the rights of Filipina women and the difficulties they continue to face. Here is what I wrote.

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

The Northern Mindanao chapter of Gabriela hosted a rally in Divisoria, the city centre. According to its website, Gabriela Philippines is “a nationwide alliance of more than 200 women’s organizations that cut across sectors and regions.” Since 1984, Gabriela has led the struggle of Filipinas for freedom and democracy. The Gabriela organisers I have met over the past few months have helped me better understand the political and domestic situation of women in this country.

Today’s event builds on the 1 Billion Rising campaign that was launched on Valentine’s Day. The campaign calls attention to violence against women and girls, and refuses to accept this violence as a given, demanding a change. On February 14th, the campaign aimed to have one billion men and women from all around the world rise up and dance. And they did.

Gabriela’s unity statement for the 2013 International Women’s Day calls attention to the “oppressive conditions that have been plaguing the Filipina women – poverty, hunger, structural violence, discrimination and the general lack of opportunities for women.” On page two there are a few lines about the situation of women and children survivors of Typhoon Sendong: “in our region, ‘Sendong’ survivors especially mothers and children suffer still in relocation sites and danger zone communities. Access to livelihood, water, electricity, school and other social services remains a persistent problem.” From what I’ve been told in interviews, and observed in site visits, this statement rings true.

When Ada and I arrived at in Divisoria, there were one hundred plus women, men and children sitting in the park, listening attentively to the speeches. Many participants wore pink or black t-shirts stamped with the campaign logo. Throughout the afternoon, Gabriela leaders and sympathetic partylist political candidates read unity statements. Their calls for action were received with enthusiastic cheering. A spirited version of the 1 Billion Rising choreography interspersed the speeches. Most of the crowd had mastered the choreography, suggesting they had participated in last month’s campaign launch.

Not surprisingly, the crowd was filled with individuals apparently very sympathetic to the women’s cause. It was, however, not who was present that is especially telling, but rather who was absent. There were no politicians - municipal, regional or national. There were no boards of university students (easily identifiable by their school uniforms), even though the main gates of Xavier University stand less than 200 metres from the microphone. There were no individuals wearing religious garb. There were no Muslim women (although Muslim Filipinas do participate actively in other Gabriela campaigns in the Philippines). There were no army, police or fire units. There was one photographer, and no film crew.

Tomorrow morning, the Region-X Police is hosting a fun run to raise money and awareness for abused women. If I can wake up early enough to run, I expect to see a very different crowd and experience a very different vibe at the state-sponsored event (Gibb 2013, 8 March).

Conclusion

After Typhoon Sendong, many sites within the city were used in disaster rescue, relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts, but these sites were used very differently by survivors variously positioned along the vulnerability continuum and by trustees tasked with assisting them. Such a

differential suggests each group has a limited spatial sphere where they exercise power and agency over rebuilding processes. For example, to acquire cash to meet their immediate needs, survivors brought salvageable goods to pawn shops and junk shops, or returned to work at their old job sites. Religious, state, and humanitarian trustees were largely absent from these places, opting instead to design interventions in their offices, and then implement programs in evacuation centres, transitional sites, and resettlement housing sites. Their post-disaster management plans necessarily interacted with the powers of exclusion to deny certain people access to a broader suite of resources after Typhoon Sendong.

This chapter has drawn attention to issues about mobility and the compression of time-space in post-disaster spaces. It posited that post-disaster spaces are not merely exclusionary, but exclusionary by design. The next chapter contends that the careful crafting of resettlement sites demonstrates the attempt of certain trustees, notably state and Catholic actors, to reconstruct specific elements of CDO society. The impacts of such governmental interventions are unevenly distributed among Cagayaños and disproportionately penalise relocated survivors in terms of their mobility and their experiences of time-space compression.

Chapter 7. Resettling Sendong survivors: an unslumming project of trustees

Introduction

The two preceding chapters laid out what happened to whom and in which spaces in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong. Chapter 5 introduced the five main vulnerability discourses that place Sendong survivors along a vulnerability continuum, inform and influence the post-disaster efforts of trustees, and limit the access of survivors to resources required for rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Chapter 6 contended the official post-disaster spaces, such as evacuation camps and resettlement sites, were deliberately designed as spaces of exclusion. Chapters 5 and 6 were very CDO-focused. Here in Chapter 7, the discussion broadens. It argues that the environmental migration of certain people affected by a disaster was co-opted by trustees aiming to govern or conduct the conduct of others.

This chapter posits post-disaster spaces are spaces for reconstruction. By definition, *reconstructing* assumes that something is broken and requires fixing. This assumption is reflected in the groups of people targeted as the beneficiaries of reconstruction (Chapter 5), in the post-disaster reconstruction activities carried out by diverse trustees (Chapter 6), and in the spaces they designed and created (Chapter 6). The intended long-term products of the reconstruction processes are the permanent resettlement sites and the people; these spaces and the people who live there reflect what each actor envisions as an improved society.

The discussion in Chapter 7 is informed by a conventional content analysis of key informant interviews with trustees and the Sendong-related reports they produced. The official claims made by these sources were then contrasted with the experiences of survivors accessing post-disaster spaces, as expressed in survivor interviews, focus group discussions, participatory videos, and non-participant observation. Discrepancies between the various accounts are noted throughout the chapter. The discussion on time-space compression, especially the parts about fast and slow mobility and the speed of recovery, is based on survivor and trustee interviews, GPS activities, and my personal experiences traversing the city using all the different modes of transportation available to trustees and survivors.

Chapter 7 is organised into two parts. Part I briefly recaps literature on state aims and how trustees and experts attempt to achieve them. It then applies James Scott's (1998) thesis of "seeing like a state" – tempered by Tania Murray Li's (2005) critical engagement with his arguments – to the three main official post-disaster sleeping spaces – evacuation sites, temporary housing sites, and permanent resettlement housing. It extends Scott's thesis to investigate how official post-disaster spaces also demonstrate "seeing like a church."⁵³ This discussion establishes post-disaster resettlement as what Jane Jacobs (1961) has termed an "unslumming project" and what Tania Murray Li (2007a) describes as a demonstration of "the will to improve." At relocation sites, there are attempts to change and control people and landscapes. This is done through various means, in particular through direct intervention in the culture of the intended beneficiaries, where culture is understood as "a general process of intellectual, spiritual development [and] [...] as a 'way of life' characteristic of particular groups" (Williams 1981, 90 in Gregory, Johnston et al. 2009, 135). The discussion in part I underscores that post-disaster interventions were an exercise in governmentality. The discussion focuses on the intentions of trustees – "what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques" – the starting point of any study of government according to Rose (1999, 20 in Li 2007b, 278). To a lesser extent, the discussion here also addresses the " 'witches' brew' of processes and practices" resulting from governmental interventions, a critical yet underappreciated corollary of empirical analyses of governmental intentions (Li 2007b, 279). (The "witches' brew" of outcomes was developed at length in Chapters 5 and 6.)

Part II analyses the uneven repercussions of relocating certain segments of the city's population into resettlement sites. It focuses on the reduction in the mobility of resettled residents. The discussion is framed in terms of Doreen Massey's (1994) ideas about time-space compression, and how one person's or one institution's power can actively enhance or constrain the mobility of another. It underlines that the differential experience of time-space compression necessarily impacts the possibilities for truly rebuilding lives and livelihoods post-disaster.

⁵³ I am indebted to Dr. Patricia Ehrkamp who first suggested that I had a case of "seeing like a church." She was the discussant for the *Religion and biopolitics* panel where I presented preliminary research results at the annual meeting of the American Association of Geographers in 2014.

Seeing like a state / Seeing like a church in Cagayan de Oro

James Scott (1998) contends that states ascribing to high modernism aim to remake society and ecology to conform to a rational plan. This plan enables the state and its representatives to intervene or to “manipulate” in order to achieve certain objectives, be it implementing mass vaccination campaigns, collecting taxes, setting up proper sanitation facilities, enforcing conscription for military service, etc. To see like a state, Scott (1998) argues your three primary aims are to simplify, to render legible and to manipulate. You carry out your rational plan in a blank space that exists outside of locality and history. High modernists see the world as a blank canvas devoid of ecological, historical, geographical, social, political, and cultural particularities. This blank canvas can be moulded into a specific vision. Such a plan requires copious amounts of data be collected, standardised and held by a central authority. You rely upon experts who decide what is best for your beneficiaries. The implementation of your plan requires a state powerful enough to force its scheme on the beneficiaries.

Both state and religious trustees, to a degree, attempted a high modernist revamping in CDO’s relocation sites. This section explores how post-disaster spaces reflect “seeing like a state” and “seeing like a church.” CDO’s state actors closely followed Scott’s (1998) articulation of seeing like a state. CDO’s religious trustees, especially Catholic actors, followed a similar pattern; they collected, organised, and standardised data that not only made people and the places they inhabit more accessible to outsiders, but also made it easier for them to further intervene in people’s lives and impart on them specific values. Seeing like a church thus entails exercising both old and new types of pastoral power (cf. Foucault 2003a), or ministering to the *entire* person because, according to one archdiocese staff member “a person is both body and soul.”

Since the Spanish colonial period, religion and state governance have been closely intertwined in the Philippines (Tan 2009, Francia 2010). The response to Sendong was no exception. There was a close interplay, a tacit complicity perhaps, between state and religious trustees in the relocation sites, and indeed in all of the post-disaster spaces. From the outset, the Catholic Church had a leadership role in directing post-disaster management and bringing together civil society, religious groups, and state agencies, with whom the archdiocese has strategic partnerships and receives funding. To help with disaster relief and recovery, Catholic actors intervened at evacuation camps, temporary housing sites and in Sendong-affected communities. Catholic NGOs provided

physical materials to build and repair houses, archdiocese staff created a database of Sendong victims and survivors, nuns helped with psycho-social debriefing of traumatised survivors, archdiocese-recommended camp managers intervened where there were incidences of domestic violence at the evacuation camps, and so on. In other words, Catholic actors did all of the things that state actors should have been doing. Gupta and Sharma (2006, 277) critique this type of “government-at-a-distance” element of neoliberalism in which “social institutions such as nongovernmental organizations, schools, communities, and even individuals that are not part of any centralized state apparatus [...] are made responsible for activities formerly carried out by state agencies.”

This situation elicits the question of whether the Catholic Church is a competitor of the state (e.g. by delivering parallel services) or an instrument of the state (e.g. by delivering services that the government chooses to fund)? It is not an either/or situation. It is both. The post-disaster situation unfolding in post-disaster spaces reinscribes the power play between a weak Philippine state (and other levels of the state), and a strong, secular church (Hedman 2006). Yet, even though CDO’s religious institutions were in a position to usurp the primary position of the state in reconstructing society post-Sendong, they frequently allied themselves with state trustees instead of opposing them.

The rational plans of trustees revealed a motivation to reconstruct broken elements of some of the CDO citizenry. The rational plans did have laudable objectives. They aimed to fix the poorly constructed housing of the urban poor (by giving beneficiaries concrete houses) and to relocate them to safe parts of the city that would not be prone to flooding. The plans were designed to remedy the dire economic situation of the urban poor by offering livelihood training and loans, too. These were the explicitly stated objectives. But there were other equally important objectives motivating the disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding interventions in post-disaster spaces.

The role of experts

The role of experts is essential to high modernist plans to control people and landscapes (Scott 1998). Experts are akin to the trustees who strive to problematise and render technical an issue or an element of social life so that they are uniquely positioned to address it (Li 2007a). There was no lack of experts or trustees involved in CDO’s post-disaster efforts. Official post-disaster spaces are conceived, supported, and run by myriad actors, including: local government offices,

regional or provincial government agencies, humanitarian organisations, the United Nations, the private sector, local NGOs or people's organisations, schools and universities, churches and other religious organisations, and private affluent individuals. Conspicuously absent from this list of so-called experts are the very beneficiaries of disaster assistance and the people who actually reside in official post-disaster spaces.

The purported expertise of the experts is questionable. As Li (2007a, 7, *emphasis added*) points out, “the claim of experts to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall *within their repertoire*.” The people in charge of creating and running post-disaster programs were indeed in positions of power and authority, but they were not always highly knowledgeable about the disaster-related issues for which they were responsible. Sendong was “seen by many as a test of leadership and good governance” at the regional and national state levels (NEDA 2012, 78). It was the first calamity after the passing of the Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121) (GoP 2010b). The Act mandated that Philippine agencies lead disaster rescue, recovery and rehabilitation processes, whereas these processes were previously under the purview of external international agencies such as the United Nations. Because the law had come into force, regional offices were under immense pressure from the national government to quickly “learn on the fly” so they could carry out the duties for which they had “not yet [been] capacitated.” According to R.A. 10121, the disbursement of disaster relief funds from the national government is contingent upon the publication of an action plan. Regional government staff, however, had not yet been trained on the preparation of key documents such as the *Strategic action plan* (SAP) and the *Post-disaster needs assessment* (PDNA). The SAP reports on the four major sectors (infrastructure, economic, social and governance) affected by Sendong for which post-disaster programs and policies are required, and it delineates the obligations of all relevant government agencies. The PDNA identifies priority needs for post-disaster reconstruction and initiates short and long term recovery processes. The lack of training in preparing these critical documents limited the scope and quality of the data collection, analysis, and validation. It contributed to inconsistencies between the SAP, which was released in February 2012, and the PDNA, which was published nine months later. It may have even provided misleading information to post-disaster programs and policies.

Non-expert non-state trustees were similarly called upon to manage post-disaster efforts because they were widely perceived as possessing the capacity to do so. The people representing powerful institutions were treated as experts because of their authoritative and respected positions in Philippine society, and specifically in CDO, and not because they possessed any particular proven expertise in disaster management. For example, the archdiocese and Xavier University assumed leadership roles in collecting and distributing emergency relief, chairing coordination meetings among local, national, and international actors, and even designing and running temporary and permanent sites. Underpinning these efforts were very well-intentioned individuals, many of whom spent countless hours volunteering in post-disaster sleeping spaces or coordinating relief activities. Still, much of their expertise was unrelated to disasters and resettlement. Many, including members of the Xavier Board of Trustees and Xavier professors involved in Ecoville, admitted to knowing very little about setting up and running a resettlement site; their expertise lay in their specific academic subjects in agriculture, engineering, social work, etc., and not in housing developments and planning. As one professor explained, the university was committed to supporting Ecoville to the best of its abilities, but it acknowledged its limitations and had no intention of long-term engagement. “We are not a resettlement agency, we are a university. When we want to donate the land, we don’t want to engage the people there [forever], we also don’t want to stay there forever. So they have to have their own community.” Similarly, the archdiocese, while in the business of tending to the spiritual needs of its congregation, and supporting diverse community development initiatives through its Social Action Center, had no formal experience relocating and rebuilding communities.

Both Catholic trustees, recognising their limitations, sought out external expertise. Xavier University, for instance, welcomed students and staff from its sister school Ateneo de Manila University who had worked on psychosocial debriefing in other disasters to help train locals on delivering appropriate programs to Sendong survivors. It also hired a professional developer to prepare the site development plan for its Ecoville resettlement site. As such, it gained expertise during, and not before, the design and implementation of its post-disaster activities.

There were, of course, many trustees assisting in CDO’s post-Sendong relief, recovery and rebuilding who could rightfully be considered experts in disaster relief, recovery and rebuilding in the Philippines. But these trustees did not direct the efforts, they merely supported them.

The lack of experience of state and religious trustees thrust into leadership positions meant there was a very steep learning curve. As key informants from several regional government agencies, NGOs, activist groups, universities, and religious groups stressed, the initial absence of a centralised incident command system was problematic. Organisations each performed their own needs assessments and rarely shared their results and action plans with others. Not surprisingly, this lack of communication contributed to the somewhat chaotic delivery of emergency relief, the duplication of efforts, the oversupply of some items and the undersupply of other items, and an overall inefficient and ineffective distribution of aid immediately after the disaster.

The inexperience of state and especially religious experts likely also influenced what they constructed as a rational plan to help Sendong survivors rebuild their houses, lives and livelihoods after the disaster. They, like the state planners Jane Jacobs (1961) critiqued a half century before, succumbed to the fallacy of salvation by bricks. That is, the resettlement plans carried out by state and Catholic trustees unmask resettlement sites as an unslumming project underpinned by the assumption that good housing begets good neighbourhoods and good conduct.

A rational plan to reconstruct society

The rational plans devised for CDO's relocation sites echo a broader historical pattern in which states attempt to expand state spaces and neutralise non-state spaces (De Koninck 1996, Scott 1998). In CDO, the relocation sites demonstrate an attempt to reduce the perceived threat posed by the impenetrable and illegible neighbourhoods of the urban poor and to transfer the residents into productive and settled state spaces. The newly visible residents are ushered into the national economy, national politics and national legal system; for example, they become titled homeowners, and are eligible for government loans. The rational plans also attempt to enact a doctrine of salvation by concrete. The resettlement plans of CDO's state and religious trustees stipulate not only the type of physical space that beneficiaries should inhabit, but the social, economic, and political spaces, too. Put another way, the rational plans of CDO trustees aimed to reconstruct a certain segment of the city's residents through what can be described as an "unslumming project."

By definition, *reconstructing* assumes that something is broken and requires fixing. In the case of Typhoon Sendong reconstruction, two things were stated explicitly as broken: (1) poorly

constructed housing, and (2) the location of the housing settlements on hazard-prone land. What was usually left unsaid was that there are other broken elements requiring fixing, namely (3) the dire economic situation of the urban poor survivors, and (4) their purported questionable moral character and values. To enact their rational reconstruction plans, trustees first had to identify and select beneficiaries. A second prerequisite was to simplify and render legible the beneficiaries. Once they were sufficiently knowable to external actors, trustees could begin their governmental interventions. Processes of simplification, rendering legible and manipulation (i.e. intervention) mostly occurred in official post-disaster spaces.

The design and implementation of the rational plans in official post-disaster spaces is telling. The selection of beneficiaries shows which groups are perceived as somehow deficient. The identification of four explicit and implicit problems, and the ways each is addressed hints at what each trustee values in reconstructing society. The reconstruction principles guide trustees in transforming former outsiders into insiders while enabling state and Catholic institutions to retain their power and hegemonic positions in Philippine society. The fact that diverse state, religious, academic, and non-governmental actors are even engaged in reconstruction activities reveals an intention to govern. They sought to govern not in a strictly governmental sense, but instead in a Foucauldian sense, where governance is “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault 2003a, 2003b). State, academic, and church actors alike actively sought to shape the behaviour of beneficiaries, which, in turn, reinforces the existing positions enjoyed by these trustees. As such, building Cagayaños’ trust in and respect for government authority was an imperative part of their rational plans.

Enacting unslumming plans post-Sendong also allowed trustees to advance their particular agendas. Throughout the reconstruction process, trustees capitalised on opportunities only tangentially related to Typhoon Sendong. For example, many trustees privately, and occasionally publically, critiqued the ineptitude of the city administration in its management of the disaster. Trustees also reframed certain societal problems as Sendong-related issues, thereby deliberately creating alternative discourses that mask unresolved problems prevalent in Philippine society. The rational plans of experts thus had broad political, economic, and social effects reaching far beyond the physical boundaries of resettlement sites.

Targeting beneficiaries

Seeing like a state or a church entails selecting beneficiaries of a rational plan. The vulnerability discourses discussed in Chapter 5 featured prominently in the selection of beneficiaries for post-disaster interventions, and especially for relocation housing. As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, trustees targeted people they categorised as “victims,” “illegal squatters,” or “informal settlers,” and people they declared as somehow “deficient” or “different-from-us.”

In CDO, the selection process was iterative; trustees first attempted to identify all flood-affected persons, and then chose a subset of these people as the primary recipients of their reconstruction programs. During the initial stage of identifying potential beneficiaries, however, political meddling, unreasonable expectations, inexperience, and institutionalised prejudices against Muslims created a situation in which there was systematic exclusion of affected people and inclusion of non-affected people. Thus, from the outset, both Type I and Type II errors plagued the identification of persons legitimately affected by Typhoon Sendong.⁵⁴

Of all the Sendong survivors, only the urban poor survivors were specifically targeted for reconstruction. “Vulnerable people” were the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian, state, and religious post-disaster assistance. The city’s urban poor living in precarious housing in informal settlements fit the trustees’ definitions of “vulnerable people.” The archbishop, for example, recounted which factors were most important in choosing beneficiaries of CDO’s official resettlement program.

Some of the priorities would be those whose houses were totally washed out, also those who have rented houses that were also washed out. In other words, they are not the owners but they are renters. In general those were the informal settlers, or we call them squatter families, that did not have any land at all so they were living dangerously by the margins of the river. So in that sense, Typhoon Sendong, the overflowing, also affected the most marginalised groups that were already without, you might say, stable housing or no lands to own. [Other factors are that they typically exhibit are] no employment, and also, a number of them would come from the provinces.

The archbishop’s comments, echoed by many other key informant trustees, indicate that beneficiaries are chosen based on a singling out of particular vulnerable demographic groups approach and on an indicators of vulnerability approach. The quotation singles out informal

⁵⁴ A Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis (i.e. a false positive). A Type II error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis (i.e. a false negative).

settlers, the unemployed, and people living in disaster- or flood-prone areas (Table 5.1 on vulnerable groups). It points to geophysical susceptibility, migrant status, no land, title or stable housing, and unemployment as key criteria or indicators (Table 5.2 on indicators of vulnerability). Both approaches classified the urban poor as vulnerable.

Selective targeting is evident through the plethora of programs and resettlement sites aimed at the urban poor, and the dearth of programs and housing aimed at the middle class, Muslim, and rural poor survivors. The urban poor were the ones targeted at the evacuation sites. They were ones allocated space at the temporary and permanent housing sites – spaces that permit people and landscapes to be controlled. For example, only one out of more than 15 built and planned housing resettlement sites was allocated specifically to Sendong survivors working in the formal sector and earning more than the poverty threshold (NEDA 2012). The targeting was justified by the disproportionate number of urban poor affected by the disaster. For example, although Sendong survivors included city residents from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, roughly 85% were urban poor living in informal housing (OCD 2012, 14). In five of the hardest hit *barangays*, affected informal sector workers outnumbered affected formal sector workers nearly 29 to one (NEDA 2012, 39).

The clearest example of the selective targeting of beneficiaries comes, not surprisingly, from Xavier University's relocation site. As explained in Chapter 6, Ecoville trustees were highly selective in choosing who was permitted to live at the site. In addition to meeting the minimum criteria for all relocation site applicants, Ecoville residents had to pass other screening processes. For example, residents must be listed on two, and preferably all three, Sendong survivor lists; residents were interviewed, and then informed about and consented to the community guidelines at Ecoville; and Ecoville staff conducted background investigations to verify the veracity of claims. After meeting these prerequisites and moving into the temporary housing at Ecoville, residents were required to fulfil additional criteria before moving into the permanent housing. Failure to comply with these rules was grounds for getting kicked out of the Ecoville transitional housing and booted off the list for a free concrete house in the permanent resettlement site. The additional conditions for living in Ecoville permanent housing reflect who the site's trustees consider worthy of joining their community. Furthermore, the application of stringent eligibility rules display concerted attempts to govern in the Foucauldian sense.

Reconstruction principles

In designing their rational plan to unslum a portion of CDO residents and their homes, state and religious experts adopted guiding principles, which were mostly implied and left unsaid. These principles are both process- and outcome-oriented. That is, some guide the ways in which trustees set about creating resettlement sites, while others focus more on what trustees set out to achieve. Some principles, such as the simplify-and-render-legible principle and the build-back-better-and-safer principle, fit into both categories. The reconstruction principles highlight the extent to which post-disaster spaces were instruments of governmentality.

Simplify-and-render-legible

James Scott (1998) contends that simplification and legibility are prerequisites for manipulation. Simplification entails stripping away all particularities of people, land, social and economic relations, market production, farming systems, religions, languages and other institutions within state boundaries. Legibility yields visible units (e.g. citizens and villages) that are easily “identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated and monitored” by external agents (Scott 1998, 183). At the scale of state mega-projects, previously inaccessible populations are rendered legible through sedentarisation, concentration, and radical simplification of both settlement and cultivation. The state and its agents can manipulate or intervene in simplified, legible spaces.

On a smaller scale, simplification and legibility were salient features of the disaster relief, recovery, and reconstruction processes in Cagayan de Oro. In any disaster management situation, legibility is key to grasping the magnitude of the problem and designing an appropriate response. For instance, knowing which people in which particular geographical areas were hardest hit by Sendong was a prerequisite for targeted distribution of emergency goods. As one informant from an NGO working with Indigenous Peoples underlined, Sendong-affected groups who remained illegible to authorities (such as the upland communities surrounding CDO) did not receive aid. Measures to simplify and render people legible to outsiders were thus introduced in the initial stages of the disaster response, and became the basis for subsequent interventions.

Some trustees had already established initiatives to promote legibility prior to Sendong. The Philippine Red Cross, for example, had introduced a nation-wide “Red Cross 143” volunteer program in 2006 as part of its disaster preparedness and capacity building programs. Each participating *barangay* has one leader and 43 trained first responders; of the 43, 25 are designated

as emergency blood donors, nine are specialised in disaster response and another nine in health. The capacity building component of Red Cross 143 ensures that *barangay* residents know how to help each other during emergencies or disasters, and not rely exclusively upon the assistance of the municipality, *barangay* council, or Red Cross (or other organisation). According to the officer-in-charge of the CDO branch disaster preparedness is an urgent and salient concern for all Filipinos because they live “in the ring of fire, where all of the disasters are [happening], especially with the climate change and with all the changes.” The legibility component of the program is equally valuable to the NGO. The officer succinctly articulated the importance of having “this Red Cross 143 [as] our eyes [and] ears [on] the ground.” She explained that “if there is nobody who is reporting [an emergency, fire, flood, etc.], of course, there is nobody [from the outside] who can help.” As such, the interventions of trustees from outside the *barangay* is sped up by ensuring people and places are legible prior to a disaster.

CDO’s legibility-oriented coping mechanisms, however, were overwhelmed by the enormous demands brought on by Typhoon Sendong. On 17 December 2011, it was clear the disaster response required new ways to rapidly simplify survivors and their immediate needs, and to quantify, organise, and map the distribution of relief aid. The selected methods were the cluster approach, family access cards, and victim and survivor lists.

The cluster approach

In the context of the IDP vulnerability discourse, Chapter 5 introduced the cluster approach to coordinating disaster relief. Once set in place, the cluster approach helped improve coordination among myriad organisations and clearly delineated responsibilities. Gathering, managing, and sharing data on food, shelter, water, medical, sanitation, and other needs were made easier, and the distribution of aid streamlined. Many different trustees participated, including municipal and regional government agencies, United Nations organisations, local, national and international NGOs, universities, religious groups, and private companies. They profiled affected households and *barangays*, organised their data into needs assessments which they shared, and used each other’s data in their subsequent disaster relief and recovery interventions.

Family access cards

The regional DSWD and the municipal CSWD government offices each issued “survivor cards” or “family access cards.” The cards were the agencies’ main tool for identifying Sendong

survivors, and for collecting, organising, and tracking data on survivors’ post-Sendong movements, needs, and activities. The family access cards simplified survivors into a list of names, ages, monthly income, occupation and region(s) of origin of all family members, an address and the name of the head of the family at the time of Sendong. The workers assigned by DSWD or CSWD to issue cards were “as much as possible encouraged not to leave [any portion of the card] blank,” however, due to the immense demand, many workers did not complete the interview, leaving blanks on the cards and holes in government records.

The family access cards were a sort of passbook, recording all the disaster relief-related transactions of the cardholder (Fig. 7.1). Survivors were required to produce their family access card every time they sought relief goods, cash, or other items at evacuation camps or other aid distribution sites. Survivors had their cards stamped each time they participated in a cash-for-work or food-for-work program. Because only households whose incomes fell below a certain threshold were eligible for most of disaster relief packages, there was little incentive for middle class survivors to obtain and repeatedly use a family access card. Consequently, the cards were disproportionately used by the urban poor, thereby disproportionately increasing the legibility of the urban poor – a previously illegible segment of the city’s population – to authorities.




Fig. 7.1. A family access card, or “yellow card” of a totally damaged urban poor Sendong survivor household (18 March 2013). One side records personal information, and the other records the types of assistance received (e.g. a kitchen set from DSWD and a food package). All legible names have been removed.

The family access cards were fraught with problems: obtaining a survivor card required standing in a hot line for long hours, claims were not properly validated with community visits, cards issued by the city were not accepted by the regional offices and vice versa, and the card data were incomplete. Put another way, the state efforts to render legible did not allow for smooth, effective intervention in the lives of the survivors, especially for those remaining in the community, outside of the evacuation camps.

The family access cards permitted the CSWD and DSWD to minimise resource expenditure. For example, the DSWD began issuing family access cards on 19 December 2011 on small sheets of paper. The agency quickly switched to official family access cards that came in various hues; most were yellow, but there were green, blue and pink cards, too. The cards came from various DSWD regional offices; they all recorded the same information, just the colour was different. The different colours provided a serendipitous solution to the problem (from the DSWD perspective) of “double-dipping.” One officer explained.

[Colour coding is] our innovation to ensure that people are not getting more than what is intended for them. Because there are so many people in the evacuation camps. One camp is near to another camp. One thing that people do not know is about our colour coding. If you are in the Citizen’s Route [evacuation camp] you are pink. And Citizen’s Route to Macasandig [evacuation camp] is just a bridge away. So, since there are 3,000 families in the Citizen’s Route if I am number 20 [in the relief good line], right after I got my share in Citizen’s Route, I will go to Macasandig. So little do the people know that we have that colour coding. So they went there again and fall in line, but we know that they are lying. [Even though] we sign it at the back [as] our way of knowing whether they’re done getting their family food pack, sometimes they ask their wife to get another card. Or their son, another card. [Colour coding] is our way of ensuring that when we give our quality foodstuff, they’re not going to have it the second way around.

The benefits of legibility are thus accrued to the outsider trustees (e.g. DSWD). Legibility enables them to restrict the quantity of relief goods and cash disbursement. It is easier to control and deny resource access to legible survivors than illegible ones.

Victim and survivor lists

Immediately after the flood, religious and state actors alike prioritised the identification of affected persons. The city, the region and the archdiocese each compiled their own list of dead, missing, and affected persons. A fourth list, made by the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, comprised the names of Muslim families whose homes were partially or fully damaged.

(No Muslims died or went missing in CDO.) As of April 2013, the NCMF-X list had not been used to disburse aid or prioritise housing beneficiaries. Lists were made at evacuation camps and *barangay* halls. The archdiocese list was also based on reports from parish priests. Being on one or more of these lists was imperative for receiving aid and other benefits.

The archdiocese's list was widely lauded as the most thorough and valid. It included data on Muslim survivors, people who remained in the communities, as well as those who went to the evacuation centres. The city even used the archdiocese's list of dead and missing persons – instead of its own list – when it commissioned a memorial plaque for the city park across from city hall (Fig. 7.2). There were substantiated rumours that some lists were politically motivated with the inclusion of many non-affected households, especially the city list.

The simplification and legibility efforts of the Catholic Church and other Catholic actors went beyond compiling a simple list of names. In the immediate disaster relief and recovery efforts, the archdiocese enlisted the staff in its various ministries and volunteers at the parishes in CDO to conduct interviews with survivors, and then track and validate the data. They recorded demographic information, including specific details on people's origins, and disaster-related info such as the extent of the damage to people's houses. The archdiocese commissioned a computer software expert to design a database system so that the data could be easily catalogued and used. Thanks to the intervention of certain congressmen and their wives (who answered the archdiocese's calls even at midnight!), the archdiocese's team was granted permission to encode these initial data at the computer labs at four of CDO's post-secondary institutions. The archdiocese is staunchly committed to record-keeping; when I visited in February 2013 (more than one year after data gathering began), there was a team of five youth volunteers adding to the database and conducting analyses in a small computer lab in the archbishopric.



Fig. 7.2. A memorial plaque in Gaston Park across from both the City Hall and the Archdiocese commemorates the dead and missing victims of Tropical Storm Sendong (21 February 2013, top). The plaque was unveiled by local politicians, civic organisations and Catholic priests at a special anniversary celebration (17 December 2012, bottom).

The archdiocese's Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning ministry (RP-ANFP) went even further in their sleuthing on a group of survivors. The ministry acquired their baptismal records from other dioceses all across the Philippines; these records were needed for the mass weddings they arranged for survivors. The head of the RP-ANFP recalled that procuring baptismal certificates was a near-Herculean task.

They are from different provinces. [The] IDPs or the victims in the evacuation camps, I realised [by] asking them [that] they're from Luzon, all over Luzon, anywhere in Visayas. During that time I really tried to send [for copies of the original baptismal certificate]. Some can say that 'I was baptised in Talibon, Bohol,' [or] 'I was baptised in Hagna [in Southern Leyte]'. We really sent letter of request for the baptismal certificate all over Visayas and all over Mindanao.

When the documents could not be found she sought ecclesiastically acceptable substitutes.

If you ask 'where were you baptised?' [they respond,] 'in Manila.' [Then you ask,] 'where in Manila?' [and they answer,] 'I do not know, I only know that it's in Manila'. [Similarly, you would ask,] 'Ma'am are you baptised?' [and she would answer,] 'Yes, in Cebu'. [You would follow up with,] 'Where in Cebu?' [and she would respond,] 'No, I do not know'. So, it's hard to get ..., we cannot get the baptismal certificate. So, I asked our Chancellor, because he is also a canon lawyer, what to do. And you just ask the bishop to give them conditional baptism. To fast-track also the activity [of the mass weddings] because if we will wait for them to look for somebody to remember where they were baptised [we would never finish].

The detective work of the RP-ANFP provided further evidence that many of the urban poor survivors were born and baptised in other parts of the country and later moved to CDO.

The Ecoville trustees similarly added to the basic baseline data on the survivors who would be living at the Xavier Ecoville relocation site. The staff conducted a preliminary survey on the various skills and livelihoods of adult residents, and their vices. The data were added to the site's records, which also include information about whether or not households pay their portion of the electricity and water bills. These data were then used for targeted interventions.

Applications for the legibility data

Once survivors were rendered legible to trustees, the latter could reconstruct them according to their rational plan to fix one or more of the four purportedly broken elements of their lives. At Ecoville, for instance, the staff used the residents' data in subsequent disaster assistance programs such as livelihood trainings and special family support grants. The grants program is an

illustrative example of how legible people facilitated the very specific targeting of beneficiaries according to the very specific missions of trustees. One of Ecoville's NGO partners offered special health, educational, and livelihood benefits to families that met certain criteria. To be eligible for the grants, the household head had to be younger than 45 years old, family members had to have no vices (e.g. drinking or smoking), and families could have no more than four children. Only five of 518 Ecoville households met all the criteria.

The archdiocese used its data to focus on remedying the supposed moral failings of the urban poor. The survey data collected by the archdiocese complemented the observations of religious and lay workers volunteering in the evacuation camps and transitional housing sites, allowing the workers to design and carry out a sequence of appropriate interventions. For example, after observing "the problem of the conjugal act" the RP-NFP ministry inspired a series of "couples sessions," which subsequently inspired natural-family planning and marital counseling workshops, mass weddings and baptisms, and all the associated prerequisite activities. The head of the RP-NFP explained the iterative learning and intervention processes spurred by the presence of the archdiocese workers and volunteers at CDO evacuation camps.

[In the] middle of the night, everyone will wake up because somebody might shout. Then when interviewed, it was found out that the cause of the problem is the conjugal act. [The RP-ANFP], we make a two-hour couples session. It's about 'what is conjugal act?' to enhance the relationship, that's our goal. So since they're working during daytime, we give that orientation [at] 7 to 9, or 7 to 10 o'clock in the evening. We give that almost two times or three times every night [at the evacuation camps]. One of the things that we found out, they are not married, or even civilly- or church-married. They are not. They are just live-in partners. And they expressed the need to legalise their bonds. So, after that, we offer NFP counseling or marital counseling. Then, they want to marry each other with the legal documents. So that's why we [organised] the first batch [of weddings].

Organising and financing three mass weddings for more than 300 couples, and conducting all the ecclesiastical preparations was a massive undertaking. The head of the RP-ANFP described the some of the steps and costs involved.

It's very expensive. For each couple, each individual we need to pay [P]125 for the CENOMAR [Certificate of No Marriage], and [P]240 for the application for the marriage license here in the city hall. So what I did is, I talked to the director of the NSO [National Statistics Office] if they can give us [the CENOMAR] for free. I asked bishop Tony to write the director with his signature. Then I just [ask] if they can give us a paper because we are only helping the people in the evacuation camps. I also did that with our mayor.

Bishop Tony also wrote a letter if they can give the [marriage] application for free. And so far, they agreed. So that's the legal documents needed, the [CENOMAR from the] NSO and the marriage application.

But in the church we need their baptismal certificate, we need their confirmation certificate. And they need to undergo that preparation for marriage – the seminars. And only [then do we] find out they claim they are Catholics but they are not baptised here. Yeah. They have 3, 4, 5, 6 kids. They are not baptised, they are not confirmed. So again, another pre-baptism seminar, then baptism. [Pre-reconciliation seminar, then the Sacrament of Reconciliation. Pre-Eucharist seminar, then the Sacrament of the Eucharist.] Confirmation seminar, then confirmation. After they comply, then we ask them to undergo the seminar for the preparation for the marriage. Before they say the Sacrament of Matrimony, we ask them to have Confession. That's a requirement. The wedding celebration, that's the day also [of] the Confirmation. And for the first batch [of 53 couples married in the first mass wedding] one of their first problems is their kids, their children are not also baptised. So during the wedding celebration, after that big celebration, there's a mass baptism for their children.

We solicit help for their wedding ring, for their bouquet. We are very ambitious to have cake [at] each table, and wine [at] each table. For that, we ask [the] politicians, but for the catering, each couple they have 10 visitors that's paid by bishop Tony from the Sendong funds. For that first two batches [of couples married at two mass weddings] we are working with the camp managers, camp managers of DSWD. For now [for the third batch], we are working [with] a congregation of priests, the Barnaby fathers, who stayed in Calaanan camps. In the field the Barnaby fathers manage all the [ecclesiastical] activities, but for the legal papers, I'm the director.

That out-of-CDO parents were happy to see their children finally legalise their relationships in the eyes of God is another example of how Sendong was seen as an opportunity arising out of catastrophe.

They [the young people in question] came in Cagayan de Oro for work. And they meet someone. Without the blessing of their parents, they are together. I met some parents [who came from the provinces for the wedding]. They're very happy. They thanked us [the RP-ANFP team] because they are really against the decision of their son or daughter to live together without the blessing. [The parents' excuse was,] 'we have no money, we have no time'. But after Sendong, we have time [and money from many donors]. Many of them who visit the Sacrament of Matrimony [were] cross because of Sendong but for now they told us, 'now we are happy because of Sendong'. There is blessings after Sendong. Many of them.

A legible landscape

Official post-disaster landscapes were similarly intended to be simplified and rendered legible.

According to Scott (1998), a legible landscape can be easily navigated by outsiders aided only by a map or other official document; it does not require an intimate knowledge of the particularities of a place. In practice, legible landscapes are transformed through the removal or the overlooking of geographical particularities. Hills are razed, meandering creeks straightened, locally unique microcosms of biodiversity homogenised. Atop this blank canvas, high modernist experts can recreate the built landscape so that it follows a purportedly universal or intuitive logic. For example, city streets that follow north-south east-west axes. Not only is the design immediately understood by outsiders, but it is also conducive to below-ground drainage and sewage systems, quicker response times by the police, and more organised mail delivery – interventions or manipulations intended to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants.

Creating legible landscapes was a priority for the trustees contributing to Sendong relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts. Such landscapes and the built structures on them would fix the two main problem requiring reconstruction, namely the substandard housing and the siting of these homes on natural hazard-prone sites.

At the transitional housing sites, tents and *amakan* houses were arranged in neat rows, facilitating the task of relief workers to monitor evacuees. The grid design made it easier to locate and track people. Like many building projects, preparing the land for resettlement houses frequently involved removing or significantly altering existing components of the landscape. Small mountains and hills were bulldozed into level planes, many trees were felled, ditches and small creeks were filled in. Onto this tidy blank workspace orderly permanent relocation sites were built, mapped out in a grid. Every house was designed not only to match its neighbour, but to replicate its appearance exactly. Each house was assigned to one family only, who can have a maximum of seven members. As such, the permanent relocation sites are much more legible to outsiders than the maze-like informal settlements where the urban poor survivors formerly resided, often in homes filled with seven or more household members.

The architectural design of CDO's relocation sites necessarily reflects practical planning constraints such as a limited budget, a short time-frame, and a large number of families to be accommodated. But it also tells another story. As Israeli architect Eyal Weizman forcefully

argues, architecture is a way of exercising separation and maintaining control (de Sousa 2014). Drawing from his research on the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Weizman describes architecture as a kind of low violence in which the crime is committed on the drawing board. The built landscape is a battlefield where weapons are simple elements like trees, terraces, houses, and cladding. These tactical tools need to be decoded; they tell the story the government wants them to tell. The architect's job is to translate that story into something the people can easily decipher. Weizman (2007) purports that the physical exclusion of Israeli settlements mirrors the increased political exclusion of and control over Palestinians in the West Bank. Israeli settlements are located on hilltops, the ideal sites for self-protection, dominating the surroundings, and surveying the Palestinians in the valleys. In their design, architects created two kinds of constructed gazes, both of which serve Israeli state interests. The outward-facing gaze looks out and down towards the landscape, and the inward-facing gaze overlooks the common public spaces and other people's homes in the settlement.

Each of the constructed gazes, inwards and outwards, embodies complexities and contradictions of different kinds. The inward-looking gaze aims to reinforce a sense of community, facilitating the intimate management of the inhabitants' lives, and with it, regulating 'acceptable' public behavior. The disciplinary power of this urban layout conforms the subject under a common gaze which is diffused amongst all other community members. The fact that the circular layout is closely oriented inwards towards the common public areas promotes an 'unconscious policing' with controls on acceptable public behavior. With the social and physical cohesion of its cul-de-sac environment, the 'community settlement' promotes a communal coherence in a shared formal identity. [...]

The outward-facing arrangement of homes orients the view of the inhabitants towards the surrounding landscape. [...] [This design] attests to the perceived role of visual control in the state project of pacification: 'terrorist elements operate more easily in territory occupied exclusively by a population that is indifferent or sympathetic to the enemy than in territory in which there are also persons liable to *monitor* them and *inform* the authorities of an suspicious movement'. [...] Implicit in this statement is the Israeli government's enlisting of its civilian population to act as its agents alongside the agencies of state power, and the fact that the settlers' presence is being used to serve the state's security aims (Weizman 2007, 132, *emphasis in original*).

Clearly, the political and security situation in CDO is drastically different from that in the West Bank. The trustees involved in designing the city's resettlement sites did not intend for relocated survivors to spy on their new neighbours or keep authorities informed on happenings in their new *barangays*. Still, the built landscape of the resettlement sites do lend themselves to

“unconscious policing” and the formation of “a communal coherence in a shared formal identity.” Specific discourses pursued by trustees are communicated through the architecture of resettlement sites, which are themselves an expansion of state spaces. This expansion of state space followed other principles, notably a faster-is-better rule.

Faster-is-better

Rapid recovery from Typhoon Sendong was a priority for state, religious, humanitarian and academic trustees, especially the mayor. These trustees applied a “faster-is-better” principle to diverse aspects of disaster management and reconstruction. Chapter 6 examined how CDO’s resettlement sites were built so quickly, and what problems ensued from the accelerated building process. Here, I explain why a faster-is-better strategy was considered so crucial.

The faster-is-better principle first applied to the distribution of emergency relief. The collection, packaging, and distribution of aid began immediately. On 17 December 2011, for example, the Xavier University campus was converted into a conduit of relief goods, and the university’s website was updated to accept donations. The local chapters of humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross began coordinating their staff and volunteers in response to reports emerging from affected *barangays*. The archdiocese’s Social Action Center staff packaged emergency relief kits at the regional DSWD office.

Applied to housing, the faster-is-better principle meant that it was important to rapidly move people out of evacuation camps into more private, more comfortable temporary housing. Quickly moving them into permanent relocation housing was perceived as a superior option. One trustee described how fast the focus on shelter shifted from meeting emergency housing needs to proposing long-term housing solutions.

It was very fast. First two days: relief. The next five days was already [focused on] rehabilitation. And then, the next two days after the rehabilitation [there was] already the call for resettlement. And then we were meeting with Habitat, IOM, Red Cross and they were thinking of putting up temporary shelters because they are saying that the situation could escalate, and tents could only be an emergency form of shelter, and it may take a while for other organisations to come in and really build permanent houses.

The trustees feared that “the situation could escalate” such that there would be greater numbers of displaced people who “do not have the capacity to resettle themselves on their own.” Hence, expediency was a strategy for containing the disaster.

Another motivation for a faster-is-better approach to disaster management was political. As the mayor pointed out, projects that are completed quickly tend to be marred with less corruption – not an insignificant consideration in the Philippines (cf. Transparency International 2014). A more pressing consideration for politicians was the political repercussions of swift versus tardy action. Resettlement sites took longer to build in Iligan City than in CDO, even though both cities were similarly affected by Sendong. The mayor of Iligan was not seeking re-election, and he could afford to focus on projects other than disaster recovery and rebuilding. In contrast, local politicians in CDO demanded expediency in rebuilding, in part, because of the then-upcoming 2013 elections in which the congressmen, mayor, and *barangay* officials were seeking re-election. Demonstrating an ability to lead a speedy recovery was considered an excellent strategy to winning political allies and votes. In an interview, for example, CDO's mayor was not shy about boasting about the city's post-disaster achievements under his leadership.

We are [much-admired] in Geneva because of what we have done [in terms of building resettlement sites and moving people into them]. It's a recognised fact, and they said that, 'what has happened here [in CDO] is a miracle because very normally it takes at least two years before anything can be started.' [But] we [already] have rehabilitations and relocations. We were able to do it four months after the flood, after the typhoon.

Economic pressures also influenced the speed of recovery. When survivors stayed at evacuation camps and transitional housing sites, various levels of government incurred costs. The city, for example, was responsible for providing water, electricity, and light. The regional DSWD office paid the salaries and expenses of full-time camp managers for one year after Sendong. Once survivors were transferred into the resettlement sites, these government expenditures disappeared.

Instituting capitalist values

The rational plan of experts prioritised remedying the precarious economic situation of urban poor survivors, which was correctly identified as a critical element of vulnerability. The integration of capitalist values into post-disaster assistance and the concerted attempts to bring vulnerable survivors into the formal economy thus became critical reconstruction principles. Such efforts began in the evacuation camps, and continued through to the transitional and permanent relocation housing sites. The tendrils of capitalism were apparent in the gentle reminders of DSWD camp managers to their charges to repay their credit and livelihood loans,

the corporatisation of post-disaster spaces, the terms of the livelihood loans programs of church and state trustees, and the emphasis on private property in the design of relocation sites.

Corporate money influenced post-disaster spaces. Many Philippine companies donated millions of pesos worth of branded products and cash to Sendong survivors, which were distributed in evacuation camps. A large portion of the funding for relocation housing was provided by the private sector. For instance, San Miguel Corporation, one of the largest conglomerations in the Philippines with ventures in everything from logging concessions to bottled beverages, gave more than \$10.8 million. Following San Miguel's lead, other large Philippine companies, including major banks, telecommunications companies, and water, power and utilities companies donated cash or in-kind products and services. Corporate representatives attended public ceremonies such as the housing raffles at the city hall and the symbolic housing turnover event at Xavier Ecoville, where their philanthropic generosity was applauded by state and religious trustees, and in subsequent media coverage. This public recognition was beneficial to the individual businesses. Indirectly, the positive recognition also commended the policy directives of Philippine national governments since the 1980s that brought in structural reforms and the ideologies of globalisation and liberalisation (Bello, Docena et al. 2004, Francia 2010). Politicians could justify their push for privatisation and measures for strengthening the private sector (without equivalent efforts on improving the public sector) because Philippine companies were good corporate citizens and would help Filipinos in a time of need.

Livelihood loan programs

The livelihood assistance programs of various state and Catholic actors provide another example of weaving capitalist values into rational reconstruction plans. The DSWD and the archdiocese's Social Action Center (SAC) were the main disbursers of livelihood assistance loans in CDO; for example, as of March 2013, the SAC had loaned out more than \$49,000. The official procedures, loan conditions, and recipient selection all demonstrate attempts to bring people previously outside of the formal capitalist economic system into it, and to render them legible to trustees. Yet, the types of livelihoods supported and the loan provisions are heavily informed by the deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses, which reinforce the status quo.

The process of obtaining a livelihood loan from either the DSWD or the SAC renders Sendong survivors legible to trustees, and offers a starting point for a capitalist education. The livelihood

loans programs of both the DSWD and the SAC are akin to a Grameen Bank kind of scheme. Trustees conducted a skills inventory of potential beneficiaries and helped organise them into groups. Group members submitted proposals, received loans, tracked business transactions and loan repayment in special passbooks, and applied peer pressure to ensure loan repayment. The repaid money was reinvested as new loans to new recipients and larger loans to existing recipients. Loan beneficiaries were required to attend business classes. While these classes may be useful to some recipients, for many of the urban poor, the skills to run a small business at the scale enabled by the size of the livelihood loan are often ones recipients already possessed through their previous livelihood activities.

The procedure for obtaining a livelihood loan is similar to that for obtaining a business loan from a private financial institution. For the SAC loan, prospective recipients first attended an orientation program. Interested individuals then underwent a livelihood skills, experience, and preferences assessment. They were placed into loan groups of five to ten recipients; members were expected “to take care of each and monitor their membership [so] that everybody is contributing to the venture.” Individual members each prepared a project proposal. They received seed capital of up to \$107.82. Repayment was amortised over a period of ten months; the weekly payment were “very, very affordable for them,” usually only \$2.16. Although there was no interest on the loan, there was a one percent service fee. Once the loan was repaid, recipients could apply for a second (or third) loan; as of February 2013, about 30% had taken out multiple loans. SAC staff also provided instruction on simple bookkeeping and record-keeping, assisted in market studies, and monitored livelihood activities in the communities. In addition to the equity requirement of many business loans, SAC loan recipients were required to provide savings equivalent to 10% of the loan amount. As an SAC officer explained,

We require them to put up an equity equivalent to 10% because we want them to own their livelihood project. In other words, we emphasise to them that ‘this is not a dole out, you have to pay this back, and you have to have your counterpart.’ So we require them a 10% equity and also we require them to put up savings, it’s also equivalent to 10% savings. The idea here is once the loan is fully paid, we will return to them the amount of equity and savings they have accumulated so that they can start on their own. In other words, they will not be dependent on anybody else. The idea is once they have fully repaid their loan, and their livelihood program is doing fine, and then they can continue with their own money, and [they are] not dependent anymore with us.

The SAC livelihood loan program very much mirrors a capitalist system of acquiring capital, repaying it, and getting entrenched in the market economy. Thus, the Catholic Church is not competing with the state through its post-disaster activities. Rather, it is complicit in implementing the state's neoliberal agenda. The assistance program is designed using capitalist language and ideas: loans, equity, savings, seed capital, etc. The narrative invites people previously outside of the formal system into its folds. It reduces them to a series of skills and financial transactions, and renders them legible to anyone reading the detailed profile assessments and passbooks. Typhoon Sendong was thus a catalyst for bringing people to the market economy. And because it was facilitated by a trusted purportedly non-state actor, it is perceived as less state-interventionist.

In its livelihood program, the DWSD sought to minimise risks to the agency. For example, by providing loans to a group of 15 to 30 families, it downloaded risks to loan recipients. DSWD feared that recipients thought they were getting a “dole-out from the government” and would default on their loans. The government's fear is largely unfounded; according to one government officer, “the repayment rate is good. [It is] more than 90%.” Still, DSWD officers reminded potential loan recipients of the importance of carefully selecting group members, discussing business matters with other group members on a monthly basis, and remaining aware of their whereabouts, especially as group members moved through a variety of post-disaster spaces.

During that time when they were in the evacuation centre, we warned them that if they will go away and will not pay, it's the members who stayed behind who will pay on behalf of that one rogue. So it is very important that the selection of members is really [done by] them and they have to know each other, that they check each other so that they will know who are the members because they will shoulder the payments if ever one will go away.

To further ensure loan recipients ran profitable businesses, a DSWD project evaluation officer was assigned to support each group. The officer helped the group to research the market potential of various livelihoods, and to prepare their project proposal, and even wrote or improved it. The officer evaluated proposals, trying to minimise competition within and among groups, and later monitored loan repayment. Finally, the DSWD livelihood loans program aimed to minimise risk by capping the amount of each loan at \$107.82 for a first-time recipient, so that the agency could “establish their track record” before it lent out larger sums.

The disbursement of livelihoods loans was used as a way to educate the urban poor about the value of saving money and opening bank accounts at financial institutions. As one DSWD officer explained, not only did loan recipients obtain seed capital, they also learned money management and marketing skills, and were “encouraged to have life savings” at one of the city’s banks. None of the bank employees with whom I spoke was aware of urban poor Sendong survivors opening up bank accounts after the disaster; only one urban poor survivor with whom I spoke had opened a savings account during this period. In contrast, saving was a mandatory component of the SAC livelihood loan. Recipients were obliged to save 10% as part of their loan conditions, but were encouraged to set aside even more if they could afford it. Although the SAC livelihood loan program promoted saving, it did not promote opening up a savings account with a financial institution. Instead, the SAC acted as a financial institution by collecting, holding, and later returning money to program participants. Like the DSWD, the SAC encouraged the value of saving to promote capitalist accumulation. Unlike the DSWD, the SAC did not overtly support the financial institutions that epitomise capitalism.

Reproducing class differences

Certain characteristics of the livelihood assistance programs of trustees belie the claim that livelihood loans and training will render beneficiaries independent and lift them out of poverty. The design of the programs, for example, reproduces existing class differences. First, both the DSWD and SAC loan programs work with groups and not individuals. This decision makes logistical sense from the trustee perspective; it is easier to manage a program for hundreds, even thousands, of micro-loan recipients organised into self-policing groups with a single representative. Second, both the DSWD and SAC loan programs impose a weekly loan repayment schedule. This decision is similarly sound from the trustee perspective; loan recipients can better manage small, frequent payments than large, less frequent payments, which, in turn, augments repayment rates. In contrast, the loans made by private banks to middle class entrepreneurs are typically made to individuals who are given greater flexibility in the repayment frequency. Even the loans disbursed by financial cooperatives to the urban poor, in amounts similar to those given by the DSWD and the SAC, are made to individuals and may have more flexible terms. The restrictions placed on the urban poor receiving livelihood loans are thus designed to overcome their presumed deficiencies (i.e. a presumed inability to manage money),

which the middle class are presumed not to have. The discourse and (mis)assumptions about vulnerability thus informs the programs designed to assist urban poor survivors.

Third, the SAC perceives a livelihood disbursed to an individual as a loan “given to the entire family.” Children, for example, are presumed to partake in their family’s economic enterprises.

In the slipper-making or candy-making [livelihood], it’s the entire family. The kids help in the cutting of the cloth. In the candy-making, the kids help in the wrapping of the candy. It’s a household activity. Except for vending, that is the job of the husband and the wife.

Yet, in middle and upper class Filipino families, children would not be expected to be involved in the family business. Instead, they are expected to attend school, do their homework, and play.

Thus, the expectations of how the livelihood loans will be used reproduces class distinctions.

Fourth, the livelihoods supported by trustee initiatives are mostly the precarious, small-scale, self-employed, high competition ones characteristic of the urban poor. For example, the SAC’s livelihood program supports 42 different options “from rug-making to vending, fish-vending, to candy-making, junk, scrap buying and selling, bag-making, slipper-making, small eatery, rice vending.” A similar targeting of low-yield livelihoods is evident in the livelihood trainings offered by Xavier Ecoville: carpentry, masonry, food processing, beauty care service, massage, housekeeping, food and beverages, nursery and sewing. Most of these livelihood options do not promote upward economic and class mobility, especially at the scale practiced by urban poor Sendong survivors. Instead, they make daily survival just a bit easier. The few livelihood options that have the potential for lucrative employment, such as carpenter, mason and food and beverage worker, require entry into the formal economy and working as a wage labourer.

Bringing in the women

More than 70% of DSWD’s livelihood loans were disbursed to women. In a statement that echoed comments made by the city mayor on the rationale for women-focused livelihoods training programs, a regional government officer justified her agency’s targeting of women recipients.

[We focus] mostly [on] women because their husbands are having a job after all. So we encourage women not just to stay at home, but if ever it is a home-based then at least you have to augment the minimal income of your husband. That is why mostly it is women. Usually men have their existing work so they can no longer engage in another livelihood so we encourage women, too, as part of women’s development.

This statement echoes a neoliberal development rhetoric that sees women as economic actors that should be brought into the market economy. Joining the formal economy is expected to advance their well-being. Teaching women the value of saving, accumulating capital, managing a business, tracking financial transactions, and following a budget is expected to promote their welfare and that of their household. As such, the livelihood loans made to women survivors further the neoliberal agenda of the Philippine state, and bring a previously excluded group into the fold of capitalism. And, by supporting these activities, the Catholic Church is complicit.

Curiously, the trustees who develop and implement the livelihood loan programs wrongly presume that their intended beneficiaries lack entrepreneurial and management skills. As one women's rights activist aptly pointed out, CDO's urban poor women face difficult financial decisions every day.

The role of the wife in the house is how to create their economic situation easier – that's the biggest challenge to the women. Your husband just give you [P]2,000 and said, 'you will fit this one. You will see to it that this 2,000 will be enough for 15 days.' And then you have- you have 6 kids. Like that. Is this 2,000 enough for two weeks? There are some times a housewife from the urban poor, her husband only give 200 pesos and said, 'see to it that this 200 pesos would be enough for one week.' So that's the challenge on the women's side. How could she fit their budget – the 200 pesos budget – for one week? Since they have three or four kids. And they were six all alone with her husband.

Not only can these women manage a budget, but many also have extensive experience with credit through their regular use of the services of the high-interest, daily repayment terms of the 5-6 lenders, or through their tab at the informal economy businesses, such as *sari-sari* stores, that are part of their daily lives. Many of these women also ran buy-and-sell operations, they gave manicures and pedicures, or they did laundry in their homes. Yet, the business skills they acquire from operating these micro-businesses do not count; recognising these skills as legitimate threatens the validity of the deficiency and different-from-us vulnerability discourses. It suggests the need for alternative explanations for vulnerability, which, in turn, demand a questioning of powerful structures and institutions in Philippine society.

Three final points close this discussion of the implementation of capitalist values in post-disaster spaces. One, resettlement sites celebrate private property. Beneficiaries are called "homeowners" and are recorded as the legal holders of a deeded house. Two, another aspect of capitalism has ironically invaded post-disaster spaces. Capitalism yields unequal benefits and costs among

members of society, creating enormous wealth or access to resources for some people, while impoverishing others and limiting their access to resources. In spite of the genuine efforts of various state and religious trustees to integrate survivors into the formal market economy, most relocated survivors do not have viable livelihoods. Three, there is room for alternative economic systems in relocation sites. At Xavier Ecoville, for example, the livelihoods program is actively facilitating the formation of a cooperative, which owns and runs many of the on-site businesses. Endorsing a system in which the means of production are collectively owned by survivor members, and are specifically employed to yield useful (as opposed to profitable) goods and services, was a calculated decision taken by Ecoville trustees. The cooperative model, as explained later, is a good match with the vision of Ecoville trustees of ensuring fairness and creating an ideal community.

Fairness and objectivity

Throughout the reconstruction process, great pains were taken to ensure fair and equal access of legitimate Sendong victims to resettlement housing. Or, at least, to maintain the appearance of objectivity. The processes of creating eligibility rules, designing of relocation houses, and allocating housing units, and the outcomes of these processes, were all intended to ensure fairness. Diverse trustees contributed to the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) in setting up a series of minimum eligibility criteria against which potential housing beneficiaries at all CDO's resettlement sites were evaluated. The square footage and basic design of all relocation housing at all sites is roughly the same; it was done this way so that there would be no basis of comparison. As illustrated in Figure 6.7, even the façades of adjacent relocation houses are nearly identical (at least before the residents begin personalising their homes). Even the assigning of relocation houses was done through a lottery system at a "housing raffle." The randomness of the lottery assignment reinforced the message that no household receives preferential treatment.

The spectacle of the relocation housing raffle

Relocation housing is turned over to beneficiaries at a "housing raffle" or a "lottery;" municipal and regional government offices describe the "raffling of resettlement houses." The process unfolds in the following way. All eligible households are placed on a list at the Estate Management Division (EMD), the municipal office responsible for housing. Once a certain number of resettlement houses are ready, a corresponding number of eligible households are randomly picked to attend a housing raffle at the city hall. Occasionally, raffles are held at

transitional housing sites. Lists of selected households are posted at evacuation and transitional housing sites; one household member is required to attend the event. Households generally know which relocation site they had been assigned, but not which house. Free transportation is provided on the day of the raffle. At the event, each household is informed which house they “won.” There is much fanfare at the event, with speeches from politicians, bureaucrats, NGO workers, and funders. The event is covered by local, and sometimes national, media outlets.

The choice to call the housing turnover event a “raffle” or “lottery” is curious. The Cambridge Dictionaries Online define raffle in two ways: as a noun, a raffle is “an activity in which people buy tickets with different numbers, some of which are later chosen to win prizes, that is organised in order to make money for a good social purpose,” and as a verb it means “to offer something as a prize in a raffle” (Cambridge Dictionaries Online 2015). In the CDO context, these definitions can be further elucidated as “an activity in which legitimate Sendong survivors may be selected to obtain a free concrete relocation house, that is organised in order to assist in the disaster recovery process,” and “to offer a relocation house as a prize in a raffle.” Raffle suggests an element of chance, that every eligible person has an equal chance of winning. Lottery is associated with gambling, in which the state determines the rules and ultimately ends up as the winner. While both raffles and lotteries pay out a certain amount in prizes, they are designed such that most of the benefits are accrued to the state (or other organiser).

The raffle event and the publicity it generates offer more than the “good social purpose” of providing houses to the urban poor survivors. The optics of the spectacle are as important as the actual transfer of the housing. It is a political and public relations bonanza. It provides an excellent platform for selling oneself, one’s party and one’s organisation (i.e. securing future votes and political or financial support). The mayor, for example, articulated the importance of personally raffling off the houses in the presence of the beneficiaries (i.e. *his* people.)

It would not be fair if the mayor would just choose who would be relocated. Definitely, if it would be me [and my decision alone], then priorities as to who [would receive houses first would be] people who are my political allies, definitely. [I.e.,] they [are] my political allies so they get the priorities. But if you raffle it, in their presence, then everybody gets a fair chance to own a house. And that has been the rule. That has been the policy since I started constructing houses for my people.

The fact that the mayor personally draws the names, congratulates all housing recipients at all housing raffles at the city hall (yet is absent at many other Sendong-related events), and stands next to a representative of the builder, the major funder, and the DSWD is indicative of their political salience.

The word raffle is also suggestive insofar as it implies that providing secure housing is a charitable act, instead of an act in which a responsible state accepts its duty to protect the well-being of its citizens. By positioning the giving of houses as a charitable act, state actors and partner trustees advance a narrative of the benevolent-state-that-looks-out-for-its-citizens-in-their-time-of-need. The narrative tries to mask the fact that these same actors neglected citizens by allowing, and sometimes even encouraging, them to build in high risk locations. Using language that connotes chance and charity slyly shifts the discourse away from a state that deserves blame and condemnation to a state that deserves congratulations and further support.

Unfair and subjective evidence

Refuting claims of fairness and objectivity is contradictory evidence. Government compensation packages for Sendong victims are underlain with highly subjective value judgements. Chapter 6 discussed the issues at the centre of Sendong-provoked picket rallies. Protesters pointed to the unfair way municipal and regional government representatives assessed the damages to totally and partially damaged houses, and subsequently allocated compensation. Protesters alleged that there was political favouritism in the process; for example, politically-connected households would receive compensation even if they were not genuinely affected by the flood. Protestors objected to the value-laden criteria, too. Recall the embedded assumptions about the worth of the physical structure of the house (which is eligible for government compensation) versus the value of the contents in sustaining other aspects of people's livelihoods that may have been washed out or destroyed (which is ineligible). This value judgment is anything but neutral, and demonstrates a classist bias that privileges households that can afford to separate their living spaces from their productive assets.

Furthermore, anecdotal evidence contesting claims of fairness and objectivity abounds. There were rumours about inconsistencies on the official lists of survivors and victims of Sendong. The last evacuees at the Capitolio evacuation camp were given free relocation housing even if they did not fulfil the official eligibility criteria. Neighbours living together in a *barangay* pre-Sendong had

“successfully advocated and lobbied” to remain together in the relocation sites. Clearly, the allocation of relocation housing was not entirely random. Consequently, the authenticity of trustees’ attempts to embed fairness and objectivity in the reconstruction processes is unresolved.

Build-back-better-and-safer

Safety and access to safe spaces were priorities in all post-disaster processes. Trustees clearly stated that improving safety was an overarching objective for post-Sendong reconstruction. Yet, what exactly was meant by “safety” was ambiguous. The confusion around the term, and especially its temporal and spatial fluidity, contributed to the creation of safe-yet-still-unsafe resettlement sites in spite of strong commitments of trustees to a build-back-better-and-safer reconstruction principle. (The “-er” suffix on safer connoted a comparison of resettlement sites and informal settlements.)

Regional state actors unanimously described their approach to reconstruction as ‘build-back-better-and-safer,’ but different agencies understood the principle differently. Take, for example, the approaches of the two lead agencies that each prepared one of the two main government documents directing the disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction policies and programs. In the *Strategic action plan*, the Region-X director of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) explains that

[t]he rehabilitation and recovery focus is more of rebuilding the affected communities, restoring livelihoods effectively, preventing the recurrence of disasters and harnessing conditions for future development. Thus, managing recovery efforts will require building local capacities, restoring coping mechanisms, empowering communities and determining root causes and vulnerabilities which make the communities disaster-prone. [...] The aftermath of TS Sendong is not a mess, it is an opportunity for all of us to become resilient and rebuild safer and productive communities (NEDA 2012, i).

This definition reflects a structuralist approach to disasters (cf. Wisner, Blaikie et al. 2004 and Chapter 5). It is consistent with the international approach of building national and community-level resilience to disasters articulated in the Hyogo Framework of Action, to which the Philippines is a signatory (PreventionWeb no date, UNISDR no date). In contrast, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) adopts a narrower definition reflecting a “geophysicalist and technocratic reductionism” (Hewitt 1983, 7). In the *Post-disaster needs assessment*, it defines building-back-better as the

construction, rehabilitation and community building that is safer and smarter. This involves identifying hazard-free areas for resettlement projects, using disaster-resilient housing design and construction (e.g. concrete foundation), and community-based disaster risk reduction (e.g. early warning system) (OCD 2012, 15).

The OCD's definition thus concentrates on technical fixes to mitigate the impacts of natural hazards instead of addressing the root causes of vulnerability. In contrast, the NEDA definition acknowledges the need to address them. This discrepancy is reflective of other reconstruction-related discrepancies between organisations that purport to ascribe to a common principle or objective, but, upon closer inspection, are actually at odds with each other.

Different trustees had diverging, even conflicting definitions of safety, as did different survivors. Their definitions and methods to achieve safety changed over time and space. For example, on 17 December 2011, trustees began opening safe spaces, where safety was initially defined in terms of spaces free from contaminated water, damaged buildings, and dead bodies. Many survivors, however, did not perceive these official evacuation sites as safe and instead opted to create their own safe spaces and used them exclusively. Safety was redefined in the resettlement phase, where it referred primarily to the absence of geophysical hazards and the presence of sturdy concrete houses. Even this safety consideration was not achieved at several sites, notably the relocation houses built between a steep landslide-prone hill denuded of vegetation and a live creek that floods nearby areas during the rainy season (Fig. 6.6). Safety secondarily meant the absence of physical violence and crime, and the presence of livelihood opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 6, trustees introduced a values formation training at transitional and permanent housing sites, which was expected to increase trust among strangers and thereby reduce crime rates. They also encouraged the intervention of camp managers at the evacuation and transition housing stages in addressing domestic violence, even going as far as threatening to withdraw relocation houses from repeat offenders. To address the safety concerns stemming from a lack of economic and livelihood opportunities, city and regional government agencies coordinated with technical and trade schools, local universities, NGOs, and religious groups to design and deliver skills training. They distributed livelihood starter kits to ensure beneficiaries had the basic tools required for their specific livelihood; for example, beauty care workers received scissors, combs and manicure sets. Trustees also disbursed zero-interest livelihood loans. The success of these various efforts was mixed.

Other aspects of safety, particularly those prioritised by the survivors living at the resettlement sites, were less considered by trustees. As argued in Chapter 6, the distance and inaccessibility to the city centre from the resettlement sites had repercussions on the economic and food security of resettlement site residents. For example, people who used to count on easy access to credit through 5-6 loans to feed their family in their old *barangays* no longer have access to this credit. The lenders assume that the resettlement site residents live too far from the city to earn enough money to repay their loans. Relocated residents similarly noted an erosion of their personal and community security. They explained that the mix of residents coming from many different *barangays* across the city exacerbated distrust and stereotype-based prejudices that manifest in material ways, especially as disputes among young men. Both residents and police confirmed an increase in theft and violence at most relocation sites as compared to their old *barangays*. Although the values formation training aimed to remedy this problem, it was not enough to counter the underlying economic precarity and geographic isolation.

In theory, the principle of build-back-better-and-safer is a laudable one for guiding reconstruction efforts. Not understanding what safety means to different trustees, and especially to different survivors, renders it an unattainable objective. That the concept is characterised by spatial and temporal fluidity and requires addressing the root causes of vulnerability further complicates matters. The failure to enact relocation sites as safe spaces – from the perspectives of the actual inhabitants – results in the adoption of hybrid migration pathways. The divergence on the definition of safety is similarly found in the concept of an “ideal” relocation community.

An ideal community

Each relocation site was designed according to its major sponsor’s vision of an ideal community. Not surprisingly, the visions of state trustees diverged from those of Catholic trustees, and especially those of Ecoville’s trustees.

According to state trustees

According to the mayor, CDO’s resettlement sites are flourishing. When asked what characterises a successful resettlement site he responded,

I would not answer that. If you would have a chance, it would be good that you go there and look at them and watch them and have a look-see of the area. Because I would be praising myself and telling you ‘it’s the good one, it’s the best that anyone can find.’ Oh certainly. We’ll leave that to your judgment even when you have a chance to go to these

areas and look how people have been relocated and accommodated, actually. If you would ask me, [the relocation sites are working well now] – tremendously yes. The foreign donors whose money was donated here are now in Compostela and Davao Oriental [in response to Super-typhoon Pablo] and [in] the speeches there they will always tell them, all the time, ‘follow the example of the city of Cagayan de Oro, do not lose hope.’ They keep on telling them that.

The mayor’s ideal community evolves organically through the initiatives of residents or interested external groups after the site’s minimum infrastructure is built and the people move in. Put another way, for him, reconstructing society is restricted to fixing the broken elements of housing locations and poorly-built structures.

The rational plan of other state actors is similarly focused on physical geography and engineering fixes. The *Strategic action plan* clearly writes the primary goal of state actors in building resettlement sites is to establish disaster-resilient communities (NEDA 2012, 42). All other aims are secondary. The ideal relocation sites of state actors are “safe and sustainable communities” in which survivors enjoy “a sense of normalcy” and can “rebuild their lives and progress” (NEDA 2012, 41). Relocation housing should be “safe, accessible, and sustainable [long-lasting] and [...] provide security of tenure for the inhabitants” (OCD 2012, iii). Some state actors conceded that the ideal reconstructed community must be more than merely disaster-resilient. For example, the head of one municipal government office involved in the relocation sites argued that they should be peaceful, orderly, and address health, educational, livelihoods, religious, and moral needs.

How do these ideals match up with the actual state-funded resettlement sites? Not well. The siting of certain relocation houses in hazard-prone areas belies the primary aim to secure a minimal risk of natural hazards. The state-sponsored programs offered to survivors reflect a half-hearted attempt to meet the perceived needs of residents, and fail to reach all residents, much less to meet all of their needs. The rush to transfer residents into permanent housing before services, livelihood options, and even water and electricity were available suggests that state actors prioritise deadlines over truly livable communities. Lastly, while state trustees recognise the salience of long term tenure security, they, along with religious actors, fail to achieve this objective or even call for Sendong survivors to become both homeowners and landowners.

According to religious trustees

In contrast to state actors' priority on safety from hazards and their *laissez-faire* approach to post-transfer interventions, religious actors envision a resettlement site as a community-oriented space where they maintain a highly visible, long-term, on-site influence. Recall, for instance, the livelihood trainings and loans programs of the archdiocese's Social Action Center, and the pre-marital and all-natural family planning courses led by the archdiocese's Responsible Parenthood and All Natural Family Planning (RP-ANFP) ministry. The archbishop penned articles for the local press in which he describes the ideal relocation site as "a community of hope" characterised by "orderliness" and "community awareness" (Ledesma 2012). Community awareness is demonstrated through the formation of associations such as homeowners' associations, and the active participation of residents in those associations. He distinguishes communities of hope from the "slums [where] these internally displaced persons were already marginalised – [living] on the fringes, literally, of society and the riverbanks, [and had no] regular employment or self-employment." This ideal community, in the eyes of the Catholic Church, demonstrates a concern for morality, ethics and fairness, and of course, Catholic values. This position presupposes the former communities of the beneficiaries were not worth keeping.

According to Xavier Ecoville trustees

Like the archdiocese and other Catholic trustees, the Xavier Ecoville relocation site is conceived as a community-oriented space. In fact, its motto, proudly displayed at the site's entrance (Fig. 7.3), is "We are not just building houses. We are building a community." The ideal community Ecoville trustees envision is self-reliant, self-governing, resilient,⁵⁵ inclusive, and egalitarian. The ideal Ecoville residents are interdependent, actively engaged in neighbourhood and *barangay* life and demonstrate the treasured Filipino trait of *bayanihan*. Ecoville trustees went further than any other trustee involved in Sendong reconstruction efforts in designing an "ideal community" and then taking concrete steps to implement it. Their vision and subsequent actions echo the tradition of religious institutions and Catholic missionaries who sought to develop the whole

⁵⁵ At the housing turnover event at Xavier Ecoville, one of the guest speakers defined resilience as "growing stronger under pressure." It is one of the most cherished of Filipino traits and frequently came up in interviews with key informants and survivors.

person providing not only spiritual guidance but also by supporting self-sufficiency, livelihood, educational, and governance initiatives (Foucault 2003a, 2003b, Calderisi 2013).



Fig. 7.3. A sign welcomes residents and visitors at the entrance of the Xavier Ecoville relocation site, reminding them of the site's overall mission (17 March 2013).

Not surprisingly, the Jesuit university-run relocation site strives to enact the ideals of a Jesuit education. What, precisely, are the skills, attitudes and knowledge that distinguish Jesuit-trained graduates? Calderisi (2013, 88) writes that

the phrase 'trained by the Jesuits' [means not so much] to be consumed by a passionate faith, so much as to be able to stand on one's own feet, be critical of inherited truth, discern and exploit important distinctions in meaning, debate confidently, and admire

knowledge and culture. Jesuits were also indulgent confessors. From the very start, they were urged to be ‘sweet, approachable, and sensitive,’ to show ‘compassion and kindness,’ and avoid self-righteousness. Their moral judgments could also appear rather convenient, which is why the word ‘Jesuitical’ has never been a compliment in the English language. Inspired by the humanist ideals of the Renaissance, they wanted to produce good citizens, not just good souls.

Although the first Jesuits arrived in the archipelago in 1581 (Demetrio 1981), they did not begin concentrating their efforts on education in the mid-19th century (Hedman 2006). Since then, however, they have established prestigious educational institutions – including Xavier University – throughout the archipelago that count among their alma mater Filipino national heroes, presidents, Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, politicians, media moguls, scientists, businesspeople, engineers, academics, cardinals, diplomats, artists, musicians and writers.

Ecoville’s trustees are affiliated with Xavier University – as members of the Board of Directors, as professors and professional staff, as student members of clubs or other special initiatives, or as staff hired specifically to work for the relocation site. The decisions and programs implemented at Ecoville reflect the ideals of these university trustees. According to a dean who is also Ecoville’s director, the site mirrors “student idealism” and the desire of students for “an ideal community where they’re able to love each other.” High school and university students and recent graduates are encouraged to volunteer at Ecoville; they help build houses, they tutor and read stories to children, they host story-writing contests, they organise singing sessions and artistic glee clubs like Xavier Ecoville Got Talent. Their active participation in community life models the active participation trustees desire of Ecoville residents.

The work of a Catholic university would naturally be influenced by religious teachings and traditions. As the site’s director explained, Xavier Ecoville was no exception. “It’s part of our being a Jesuit University in that generosity of saving stray ships. We’re kind of infected by all of this.” These “stray ships” are saved by getting to know, trust and have empathy for each other and by becoming integrated into “a community that can be self-reliant, can govern themselves, and be part of the bigger local community [i.e. the *barangay* of Lumbia].” The mandatory participation of adult Ecoville residents in a values formation program facilitated this process. The program aims to instill values deemed essential to a properly-functioning community.

Despite their clear identification as Christian values, Ecoville trustees and their Gawad Kalinga partners contend the values are shared by people from all faiths.

We start with [becoming aware of your] feelings [and] valuing your neighbours, your community. And then values like service. [Then] you would have to address the needs of the poor, the excluded, and the lonely. Things like those. Those are very Christian values but of course, Muslim families are very much welcome. But these are [the] general kind of values that we think are important in building a community.

The importance of the values was reinforced in diverse aspects of life in Ecoville. Chapter 6, for example, described a long list of rules such as obligatory volunteer hours on committees and participation in community gardens. Collaborative creative projects such as the ongoing youth music and dance clubs or the seasonal decorating initiatives are designed to “let all [of] these artistic abilities surface and be valued by themselves.”

Ecoville trustees were equally concerned with assuring the long-term financial and livelihood security of residents. The site’s director was adamant that livelihoods are a critical component of community-building. A livelihoods focus is particularly salient at Ecoville because

many of these families have their businesses or sources of income somewhere here in the city proper. So when they went there [to the Ecoville site in Lumbia], some of them, actually, have to give up some of these employment opportunities. So, we put importance in providing livelihood opportunities.

Ecoville trustees were highly supportive of the site’s livelihoods program. Ecoville had a full-time paid livelihoods coordinator, it offered training courses, it subsidised professional licensing fees (e.g. for carpenters and masons), it built a permanent livelihoods centre, it established partnerships with private firms who agreed to purchase goods from Ecoville businesses, etc. Trustees also encouraged the formation of a cooperative for Ecoville residents. The cooperative handled the on-site tree nursery, catering services, *talipapa* kiosks, and a manpower agency. It did bulk purchase orders for on-site businesses, passing the savings on to cooperative member entrepreneurs. As of January 2013, the livelihoods coordinator had begun the official registration process with the Cooperative Development Authority and scheduled the required 14 training courses.

Not only was the cooperative expected to support viable livelihoods for Ecoville residents, but the business model itself embodied the broader Ecoville vision of an ideal community. The livelihoods coordinator explained why the cooperative model was selected:

We want the IDPs to be united through cooperatives. We already see the values of co-operatism. It's not all about business, it's not all about livelihood. It is more about *bayaniban* – helping each other. So we want them also to inculcate the deepest, the deepest value of the sense of *bayaniban*. The sense of helping each other, the sense of the neighbourhood. Because values is the most important rather than their livelihoods. Because if you change the person's [values], you change the IDP. That's the main reason why we want to put up a cooperative.

The initial capital outlay required to join a cooperative was much more affordable for the urban poor, as compared to the steep registration fees and associated costs of setting up a corporation. Ecoville co-op members began receiving the benefits of membership even before they had fully paid their dues. Ecoville trustees deemed the cooperative model more egalitarian than alternatives. Egalitarianism ensures that benefits are shared, and not accrued exclusively to those already in control of substantial resources. This was particularly important for Sendong survivors “because of the little resource that they have, the benefits should be shared.” The governance structure of the cooperative also facilitates the exit of the external livelihoods staff by putting cooperative members in charge of Ecoville businesses. Finally, the Ecoville cooperative was also intended to generate a small profit, which would help reduce the financial burden on Xavier University and other private funders, and enable the livelihood program to cover its costs.

Individuals from several different organisations who were involved in the Ecoville relocation site expressed a shared long-term goal of self-governance in which Ecoville residents ensure an appropriate conduct of conduct on-site. Attaining this objective requires that residents assimilate certain values (i.e. those promoted through the values formation training) and engage in self-policing to maintain what has been achieved through the efforts of Ecoville trustees and their partners. The goal is more of a “self-governance, but...” ideal. That is, Ecoville residents should organise and represent themselves, yet remain under the oversight of one expert group or another. In January 2013, a member of Ecoville's project management team explained why self-governance was a priority for trustees.

In the next six months our objective really is to strengthen the community as an organisation so that they may be able to govern themselves. And of course, turn over the entire Xavier Ecoville to their management, and get them to partner with the local government unit, the *barangay*, and the city. [In] June we will have to pull out because they will have the resilience in themselves, they will have to be effective in taking the lead and so we must be able to strengthen the programs, like livelihood.

The informant immediately followed up with the “but,” or how there will be continued trustee oversight of the way Ecoville is managed by the residents.

But Xavier will not end its engagement there. There is a plan. Child Fund Japan [is] an NGO sponsoring children in their education and not only sponsoring them [in terms of] books and school supplies, tuition, allowance, et cetera, but they take into account the whole family. What they do is they sponsor one child in your household and then they get everyone involved in the education of that single child. They train the mothers. They have programs for the fathers. They offer livelihood programs. [The NGO] already has sponsored children in Lumbia and they will be extending to Xavier Ecoville once this team, the project management team, pulls out by June. There will be a transition, so they will now be the ones who will take care of the community. And then, of course, there will also be medical missions by the German Doctors [an NGO providing medical care to the poor] and the School of Medicine [at Xavier University]. There will be interventions. It’s just that we will pull out from being full-time community workers, but there will be engagements with the community. We will just have to pull out so that they may be strong in themselves so that they will not develop this dependency.

As such, in the ideal community of Ecoville planners there is limited self-governance with a continued and flexible role for trustee oversight.

Ecoville, and to a lesser extent other resettlement sites where religious groups have intervened, have narrowed the gap between the ideal resettlement site and the reality. Ecoville has targeted (and achieved with varying levels of success) all four perceived problems – damaged housing units, hazard-prone settlements, poverty, and questionable moral character – in reconstructing its own society of urban poor survivors. Its long-term success or failure, however, remains uncertain.

The other intended consequences of carrying out a rational plan

Efforts to simplify, render legible, and intervene for the purposes of reconstructing a certain segment of CDO’s population were not the sole objectives of post-Sendong activities. The rational plans of trustees were carefully crafted to attain additional goals. These aims were less focused on actual disaster-related issues, and more focused on larger narratives relevant at the scale of the city, and even the country.

Public and private critiques of the city administration

According to Philippine Disaster Act (R.A. 10121), the local government should have immediately taken the lead in disaster relief (GoP 2010b). In CDO, however, the city

administration was conspicuous for its absence, especially in the first month following the disaster. Many trustees framed their dissatisfaction with the city's response within a broader critique of it; for them, the city's inaction confirmed what they already believed about the merits of the administration. Most trustees, however, hid their criticism from the public. Instead, they publically praised the local government's involvement in the post-Sendong efforts. These white lies were designed to achieve a larger objective of instilling confidence in the authorities. As such, reconstruction activities revealed a mostly private critique of the city administration's inadequate response alongside a mostly public recognition of its efforts.

In the hours and days after the flooding began, it was the archdiocese and Xavier University who immediately filled the leadership void; it was to these Catholic institutions and the charismatic archbishop that the majority of the city residents turned for help. On the state side, when it became clear the city had neither the capacity, nor the experience to deal with the situation, it was national and regional government agencies who assumed the responsibilities normally under the purview of the city. For example, the DSWD oversaw the management of the disaster and the National Housing Association (NHA) oversaw resettlement housing for several months before the city took over its mandated responsibilities. The absence of the city and the takeover first by Catholic actors, and then by national and regional agencies, disrupted the normal governance hierarchy in the city. In the context of relocation housing, for instance, instead of going through the *barangay* captain to solicit potential residents for the resettlement sites as would normally be done, the trustees sponsoring relocations sites bypassed municipal and *barangay* officials to work directly with the DSWD.

Trustees frequently remarked upon the ineptitude of the city administration, and occasionally regional government agencies, in managing the disaster. Even the mayor himself acknowledged such critiques of his administration's handling of Sendong. When asked about the different outcomes of Tropical Storm Sendong in December 2011 and Super-typhoon Pablo in December 2012 in CDO, he stated,

Let's put it this way. We were prepared for typhoon Sendong. Unfortunately we never expected it was going to be that huge. And no amount of preparation would have been able to stop it from destroying houses and the lives that were lost because it came so suddenly. We were there. They say I was not around. My political opponents spread the news that I was playing *mahjong* – that I was there, I was here, that I was all over. I was

here [at the city hall] together with my secretaries until five o'clock in the morning but there was nothing we could do against the flood that hit us, who struck so suddenly. And therefore we lost a lot of lives, a lot of houses were swept away. When Pablo wanted to come, we were at the time very, very prepared. We were ready for that based on the last one we got from Sendong, and very precisely we were able to get people away from harm's way and no deaths did happen at that time. But while the international community lauded, even talked about it, our own [national] government could not talk about it because, again, it would be good for my politics, very precisely. But that's ok. I'm not here for the honour of all these because I would not want you to praise me to the higher heavens, no. I'm just here, Miss Gibb, because this is a crusade, this is a cause. And, I just would like to serve my people.

In the majority of key informant interviews, however, trustees – apart from those representing the city administration or a municipal government office – offered substantially less sympathetic opinions. The following citations are a small sample of their comments. From a local research institute worker,

In terms of the responding agencies, even the city LGU [local government unit] was not prepared for it, the Office of Civil Defense was not prepared for it.

From an academic researcher,

[The] government just couldn't function. The local government didn't function so the church just essentially took over.

From an activist in an urban poor federation,

Our current mayor has been the mayor for, like, decades and decades already. And he has great political influence, but it's kind of wavering now because of what happened during the typhoon just to show at how inefficient he is. A lot of, even the local groups there, there's political strife. There will be anti-mayor movements already because of this inefficiency that has happened before, during and after the disaster.

From the archdiocese,

Sometimes the local government's own data was with political overtones. They would want to include the people that they favoured politically. Or sometimes the people that were not actually affected but since the *barangay* captains wanted their names inserted, they were included. There are reports about that [i.e. people were commonly added or removed from survivor and victim lists based on politics] but it's hard to verify. But, that's why eventually the city government had its own listing, the DSWD Region X had its own listing, and we had our own listing. And to verify people who would apply for the permanent housing, they had to sort of match those three lists or to find out [through house validation visits].

From a trustee in the academe,

Probably it's confidence in the city's ability to manage the situation. When Sendong hit the city, everyone was like 'where is the city?' I mean, 'where is the city government in all of this mess?' For like a month or so we could not get assistance from the city government, so that is why national agencies took over. That is why DSWD took over. That is why NHA took over during the rehabilitation to resettlement period. And during the relief period, it was DSWD who was leading. It took that long before they had confidence in the government, in the local government, to actually lead in the response for Sendong.

From a regional government officer,

In the early days, it was like they [the city] are an island. We understand that feeling because it's supposed to be their responsibility but although we have that order from the president, the term was 'take over.' Supposedly it [is] the local government unit who will man the evacuation centres but they also acknowledge that they don't have the [capacity]. This is sad to say but they don't have the capacity to run as far as manpower and experience. So we, by order of the president, the regional office take[s] over the management of all the camps.

These sorts of comments were frequently followed by fault-finding opinions on the reasons for the city administration's inadequate response. Some trustees pointed to the private economic interests of municipal politicians in two of the resource extraction activities singled out as causal, or at least aggravating, factors of the disaster: logging and mining. One local activist recounted that in "the local government a lot of the local officials were engaged in logging and mining. That's scandal, really. Some of them were investing in the equipment." Such investments are deemed "scandalous" because of a national moratorium on logging was declared in February 2011, just months before Sendong, and the general restrictions placed on all mining activities except for small-scale exploration (GoP 2011b).⁵⁶ A researcher at a CDO-based research institute noted the complications added to disaster relief efforts due to the intertwining of local mining interests and patronage politics.

The small-scale mining activities in Cagayan de Oro have really multiplied. Because of the natural landscape of Cagayan de Oro City, and [the] mining [that] is taking place up there [in the highlands and the plateaus that comprise the city's watershed] where they are using

⁵⁶ On 1 February 2011, President Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 23, which declares a nationwide moratorium on the cutting and harvesting of timber in natural and residual forests, and created the Anti-Illegal Logging Task Force (GoP 2011b).

hydraulic mining, they're literally melting the hills and the mountains to expose the soil with the gold, and excavating for whatever. Then Cagayan de Oro City downtown is really bound to the disaster track. Given the political situation now... Because it's small-scale mining, the LGU [and not the Department of Environment and Natural Resources] is able to provide the [mining operations] permit. But they [the miners] are actually operating with big equipment. This is already illegal mining operation because they're bringing big barges that continually dredge the river and overturn the whole riverbed, changing the whole landscape.

Environmentally and politically, mining in Cagayan de Oro is a very, very big issue. Because of our present mayor, it's really difficult. And then when you go to the hinterland *barangay* local government units, they are also very much entrenched in the patronage politics. So if you are a political member of the mayor's [party], you have to heed his whims, you have to protect his business interests. So, actually when we were facilitating the whole relief, we were facilitating the shelter assistance, we really had difficulty in coordinating with the LGU because in these *barangays*, political rivalry is very strong.

With the assurance of confidentiality, key informants did not conceal their disappointment with the city's disaster response. Yet, despite this private lack of confidence, at all public Sendong relief and reconstruction-related events, churches, non-governmental organisations, academic groups, and regional government agencies always gave credit to the city. Such public praise was part of a deliberate strategy to reinstate in Sendong survivors a trust in their local government, which was deemed necessary to avoid chaos. One trustee involved in the planning of CDO's resettlement sites justified these little white lies.

The thing is, we in the private sector and the civil society organisations, inasmuch as we could hate the government, the local government, but we could not take away the little trust, the hope that the communities have in the government. Or else it would be chaos. So we always say 'this is in partnership with the city.' Because if not, then the people will lose trust and hope in the government, and we would foresee chaos in the end. So we did not want that to happen. So yes, as much as possible, I, for one, am not very comfortable with the local government, [but] we always make it a point to say that 'this is in partnership with the city' and we always make it a point to invite them [the city administration] in all of our activities.

Yes, it has to be [that politicians are thanked at public events even if they are not physically present] to maintain order. Because if you say '*abbb*, the government' [in a condescending or cynical tone] then, you'd really foresee like what happened in Comp Val [Compostela Valley] when Pablo hit them. The government [there] really is helpless and now [the people there] have not yet given back the trust the local government. I'm saying this because we see the local government as an institution, not as a personality.

The public must trust the local government – whoever would be in [a] position of power. Now in Comp Val, the local government is very helpless, and now there was a case of lawlessness. And at the time of Sendong we did not want to happen here. Well at least they [the city] were providing police assistance. They helped in some way.

In any place in the Philippines, that's our ideology: we must make the local government work. That is why the national agencies took over so they could strategise on how to put back the trust of the people to its local government because it will not be the national government governing the local communities, no. So, that was actually a strategy – to put back the trust.

Regional government offices backed up their public praise with private overtures to the municipal administration, and later built successful partnerships upon which productive planning and construction of resettlement site transpired. A regional government officer explained the process.

What I did is to introduce myself, 'I'm from the Regional Office' and I told them that I am here to help. Later on, they understood that there is a need for us to work together but the early stage is really difficult. [Eventually, we were able to work effectively with the city] because our Secretary, almost every day, she was here in the city and talked with the mayor trying to [work out a compromise]. Because you know the political situation: the mayor is not in the same boat with the president politically. Our secretary is here almost every day to talk with the mayor, and explain our role, and give support regardless of the political affiliation. I think that's the reason why now mayor Emano is really telling how good the relationship is [between] the city [and] our office.

The archdiocese remained one of the few public critics of the city, with the archbishop strongly condemning the city's unpreparedness and its ineffectual response, and calling for the resignation of elected officials (Tubeza 2011, Ledesma 2012). The stance of the archdiocese is especially interesting given the general complicity of the Catholic Church in advancing other state interests in their disaster response. The archdiocese, like most of the other trustees critical of the city's response to Sendong, criticised many facets of city administration. Typhoon Sendong just provided an additional opportunity to publically and privately pass judgement on the administration. As such, the rational plans of these trustees incorporated elements of their wider interests and discourses.

Creating alternative discourses

With their rational plans, the post-Sendong experts also sought to advance or redirect particular narratives. The example that best illustrates this phenomenon is the treatment of gender-based

violence in official post-disaster spaces. According to the national leader of a prominent women's rights advocacy group, violence against women is a pervasive and unresolved societal problem in spite of myriad laws, "we have many, many laws for violence against women, laws in the Philippines but it doesn't mean the implementation is good." Furthermore, gender-based violence is linked to other highly politicised and polarising issues in the Philippines, notably human rights violations and the culture of impunity in which representatives of the state have a *carte blanche* to act howsoever they please. These two latter problems draw national and international attention and can have significant political (and occasionally economic) repercussions for politicians and other state actors. Consequently, it is in their interest to deploy the discursive potential of disaster to reframe social problems as "Sendong issues."

Even before Typhoon Sendong, many representatives of the state, including the police and municipal and regional social welfare and development offices, were tasked with addressing gender-based violence. These actors and others, such as the Catholic trustees, continued dealing with this violence in the evacuation camps, transitional housing sites and permanent relocation sites. They joined forces with other local and international organisations and government agencies working in the protection cluster, creating a special Gender-Based Violence team. The team delivered lectures on violence and the conjugal law, on the rights of women and children, and on the *Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children (VAWC) Act* (R.A. 9262) (GoP 2004). The team also "answered all those problems relating to family matters, like the abuses, [and] answered all the situations right away there in the evacuation centre," and maintained a presence in the camps to deter violent outbursts. According to one team member, such interventions were necessary because the typhoon and the ensuing losses provoked the violent and aggressive behaviour of men directed against their partners. She recalled that, the violence "happens anytime because of their depression, because they cannot control these emotions, frustrations because they have no houses." Other trustees similarly attributed the violent behaviour of some Sendong survivors to their traumatic Sendong experiences, even though they acknowledged the violence had occurred before 17 December 2011, too.

The regional leader of a women's advocacy organisation deplored this approach of reclassifying gender-based violence as "Sendong trauma" because it marginalises a pressing, unresolved and harmful issue in Philippine society. As an example, she recounted how the death of one woman

at one of the city's evacuation centres was attributed to depression by state authorities, even though the woman's fellow evacuees maintained she was the victim of domestic violence. Note also that the different explanations indicate that the evacuation centre was perceived as a very different place by some of the evacuees who lived there, and by the state officials who provided the official explanation for the woman's death.

So there was a case wherein there was a couple – they weren't married. The woman was killed in the evacuation centre. But the findings were that [it] was due to domestic violence. They didn't impose it as like a murder or something. They just say that it was Sendong-related, like she was depressed or something. But we, the people in the evacuation centres, firmly believe that she was [a] victim of domestic violence.

As explained in Chapter 6, Filipinos generally do not interfere in marital affairs. It is thus unsurprising that domestic violence continues to be neglected in post-disaster spaces. Trustees could have used the violence they observed to raise awareness about gender-based violence and to tackle the institutions and structures in society that permit its persistence. Instead, they chose to scale down the problem from a societal to an individual or household level, and to deploy the discursive suggestion of Sendong trauma to conceal gender-based violence.

Reclassifying gender-based violence as an unfortunate by-product of a *natural* hazard event is highly problematic. It masks the failure of the state to live up to its duties to protect its citizens against violence. As David Petrasek (2015) points out, in the 1980s feminists in Canada (and elsewhere) argued that domestic violence was not a private matter (as previously understood and acted upon by state representatives such as law enforcement), but rather a failure of the duty of the state to protect its citizens and to ensure their physical, psychological, and emotional safety. This ground-breaking perspective has been integral in international treaties and agreements protecting the rights of women, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Woman (OHCHR 2015). In the Philippines, this perspective is embedded in the aforementioned R.A. 9262. The Sendong trauma narrative is yet another instance of the state's shirking of its duty to implement the "many, many laws for violence against women." The trauma discourse mutates gender-based violence from a socially-constructed unnatural problem in which the state is complicit through its failure to act into a problem with natural origins largely beyond the purview of the state.

The chapter has thus far contended that disasters create opportunities. Through their rational plans, trustees can attempt to expand state spaces and neutralise non-state spaces, to reinscribe power, hierarchy and the status quo, to advocate for change, and to shape a segment of society that is deemed deficient, or in need of reconstruction or rebuilding. Trustees may also endeavour to advance interests and discourses only indirectly linked to the disaster. But do these efforts succeed?

Why do the rational plans of high modernist inevitably fail?

In his book, James Scott (1998) shows that centrally managed social plans to control people and landscapes inevitably go awry. Several reasons explain this failure. Rational plans are devised by trustees whose privileged positions in society depend upon uneven power relations, and thus will never eradicate the structural sources of inequality that render their intended beneficiaries vulnerable (Li 2007a). These trustees “claimed an omniscience they did not have” (Li 2005, 387); not surprisingly, the improvement schemes they designed reflected their ignorance. These experts disregard *métis*, or what Scott (1998, 313) defines as “a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural human environment” that is analogous to contextualised, place-based knowledge and practice. Experts expect interventions aimed at solving one problem will solve other unrelated problems. They confuse aesthetics with efficiency. Their rational plans disrupt complex social and ecological interdependencies. The following pages explore some of the literature explaining the inevitable failure of centrally managed social plans. It is still too soon to observe all of these processes unfolding at CDO’s relocation sites. Nonetheless, there are already both literal and figurative fissures in the concrete, foreshadowing, perhaps, the future of these official post-disaster spaces.

History lessons

State planned settlement to effect massive social engineering has a long history. For instance, compulsory villagisation in Tanzania in the mid-1970s aimed to “reorganize human communities in order to make them better objects of political control and to facilitate the new forms of communal farming by state policy” (Scott 1998, 224). State appointed experts envisaged standardised citizens inhabiting legible, controlled state spaces called “*ujamaa* villages.” A program that first encouraged and later coerced five million dispersed rural-dwelling Tanzanians to move into larger villages planned by the central administration, *Operation Planned Villages* was supposed to result in better bureaucratic management, improved development services such as education

and health, and visual order and efficiency. Initially, Catholic leaders in Tanzania were supportive, even complying with President Julius Nyerere's request to send Catholic sisters to the *ujamaa* villages (Calderisi 2013). Catholic leaders later withdrew their support; this was significant because the Catholic Church was the only national institution that could rival the influence of the national party after the abolition of traditional chieftaincies. Villagisation, however, was a dismal failure. The designers dismissed *métis*, denied the intended beneficiaries the possibility of agency, and forgot

the most important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response and cooperation of real human subjects. If people find the new arrangements, however efficient in principle, to be hostile to their dignity, their plans, and their tastes, they can *make* it an inefficient arrangement (Scott 1998, 225, *emphasis in original*).

While Tanzanians resisted moving to planned villages there continued to be voluntary pioneer settlement that was “disorderly, illegible, but more productive” and more importantly *outside* government purview, although it “was castigated as squatting and severely reprovved, although without much practical effect” (Scott 1998, 228). The hubris of state officials is not, however, exclusive to East Africa.

In a similar critique, Jane Jacobs (1961) bemoans the perennial state objective of “unslumming” especially through state-led “salvaging projects.” Under the euphemism of “urban renewal,” paternalistic planners and politicians aim to replace slums and their populations with projects and people that yield higher tax revenues and draw upon fewer public resources. Such policies are doomed to fail. They destroy vibrant neighbourhoods already in the slow process of unslumming, and they often just create new slums, with uprooted residents shouldering the hardship of moving and starting again in a new location. Conventional planning ignores the real requirements for unslumming, namely the retention of slum residents through choice, the advancement of this population, the presence of safe streets and animated and continuously used public spaces, the diversification of commercial and cultural establishments, and the continual inflow of constructive gradual money that helps to build complex diversification and brings about gentle changes over the long term. Instead, “orthodox planners” employ “impossibly superficial means” to “make impossibly profound changes” (Jacobs 1961, 271). For example, in designing a housing project, these planners may also attempt to shape the private, business, and recreational lives of

the intended project beneficiaries. But, as Jacobs (1961) points out, good housing does not beget good neighbourhoods or good conduct. She explains:

Other things may be more important than housing, however, and it means also that there is no direct simple relationship between good housing and good behavior, a fact which the whole of the Western world's history, the whole collection of our literature, and the whole fund of observation open to any of us should long since have made evident. Good shelter is a useful good in itself as shelter. When we try to justify good shelter instead on the pretentious grounds that it will work social or family miracles we fool ourselves. Reinhold Niebuhr has called this particular deception, 'The doctrine of salvation by bricks' (Jacobs 1961, 113).

When such a moralistic lens is focused on city design, the results are detrimental.

Orthodox planning is much imbued with puritanical and Utopian conceptions of how people should spend their free time, and in planning, these moralisms on people's private lives are deeply confused with concepts about the workings of cities. [...] The preference of Utopians, and other compulsive managers of other people's leisure, for one kind of legal enterprise over others is worse than irrelevant for cities. It is harmful. The greater and more plentiful the range of all legitimate interests (in the strictly legal sense) that city streets and their enterprises can satisfy, the better for the streets and for the safety and civilization of the city (Jacobs 1961, 41).

In this way, Jacobs underlines the fact that not only does the doctrine of salvation by bricks fail to produce obedient, morally righteous citizens, it is also ruinous to the development of a city.

In the above examples, Jacobs and Scott illustrate the inevitable social failure of top-down imposition of planned settlements. The mere idea of a salvaging project is absurd; conceiving of projects as *projects* "abstracts [them] out of the normal city and sets [them] apart" (Jacobs 1961, 392). Planners wrongly presumed they were smarter and more farseeing than they actually were, and that the intended project beneficiaries were more stupid and incompetent than they actually were (Scott 1998). In the process of dumbing down and denying agency to beneficiaries, planners would actually create the unthinking, indistinguishable robot citizens they had assumed in their plans. Scott points out another source of failure. Massive state-led social engineering attempts will inevitably be thin as compared to their thick city and village counterparts that grew out of a long history built by many people from all walks of life. The thinness derives from the complexity of social processes and relations that can never be re-created through planned order. The planned model of social organisation and production is insufficient to create a thriving, functional social

order. The model forgets, perhaps deliberately, that formal order “is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes” (Scott 1998, 310). It is the disorderly, improvised, illegal structures, social relations and spaces paralleling the planned ones that permit the official city to function.

Confusing aesthetics with efficiency

Yet, as Jacobs (1961) emphasises repeatedly, modern state-led planning has consistently favoured visual order over functional or experienced order. There is not a necessary correspondence between the tidy look of geometric order and systems that effectively meet daily needs. States prefer grid designs because they are simple, legible, and easy to manipulate. Without local knowledge, outsiders can easily move goods, deliver services, and treat land as a standardised commodity (Scott 1998, 58). A neat structure, however, does not answer Jacob’s perennial question, “what function does this structure serve and how well does it serve it?” Planners have limited knowledge and cannot possibly re-create the diversity, cross-use and complexity that increase social order, and the rich, informal public life that undergird successfully functioning formal public institutions of order (Jacobs 1961, Scott 1998). Jacobs strongly rebukes the primacy of the visual order approach because it wrongly confuses life with art. A city is “life at its most complex and intense” and cannot be reconstructed and refined into an immutable piece of art (Jacobs 1961, 372). The artist necessarily makes selections and organises these selections into works under their control, hence art entails selectivity, organisation and control. Cities planned as art instead of as life result in “neither life nor art. They are taxidermy. [...] However, it goes too far when the specimens put on display are exhibitions of dead, stuffed cities” (Jacobs 1961, 373). Scott further points out that a focus on the visual aesthetic of social engineering and settlement projects results in a stasis, disconnected from the realities or human life. He explains that the planned villages in Tanzania have a

curiously static quality to [them]. It is rather like a completed picture that cannot be improved upon. Its design is the result of scientific and technical laws, and the implicit assumption is that, once built, the task then becomes one of maintaining its form. The planners aim to have each new village look like the last. [...] Every field and every house would also, in principle, be nearly identical and located according to an overall scheme. To the degree that this vision had been realized in practice, it would have made absolutely no connections to the particularities of place and time. It would be a view from nowhere. Instead of the unrepeatability of settlements closely adjusted to local ecology and subsistence routines and instead of the constantly changing local response in shifts in

demography, climate, and markets, the state would have created thin, generic villages that were uniform in everything from political structure and social stratification to cropping techniques. The number of variables at play would be minimized. In their perfect legibility and sameness, these villages would be ideal, substitutable bricks in an edifice of state planning. Whether they would *function* was another matter (Scott 1998, 255, *emphasis in original*).

Scott's observation about the absence of the particularities of place and time in planned settlements recall the analyses of post-disaster spaces and places in Chapter 6. Massey's (1994) emphasis on conceiving of place, space and time as processes of social relations experienced differently by different individuals and groups is especially relevant. If we accept the dynamic, relational character of space and time, then settlements lacking the capacity to change will ultimately fail.

Instead of focusing on *visual order* and *isolation*, Jacobs (1961) advocates a focus on *functional order* and *integration*. There is no single linchpin that supports a city's complex systems of functional order. Instead, it is the mixture of elements and the interactions among these elements. Thus "a city's very *structure* consists of mixtures of uses, and we get closest to its structural secrets when we deal with the conditions that generate diversity" (Jacobs 1961, 377, *emphasis in original*). Jacobs calls for the erasure of the soulless single-use borders that creep up around projects and for the stitching together of edges into a strong, cohesive seam. She clarifies that "the aim should be to get that project, that patch upon the city, rewoven back into the fabric – and in the process of doing so, strengthening the surrounding fabric too" so that the project "take[s] on the qualities of healthy city fabric" (Jacobs 1961, 392, 394). These results can be achieved by recognising people's agency and their capacity for perceiving and behaving in accordance with their own self-interests. Achieving functional order and integration of planned settlements into the wider city (or region), however, are rarely state objectives.

Finally, attaining the desired aesthetic without encroaching upon the elite or other powerful interests often requires displacing the urban poor toward the periphery. State planners typically prefer

a freshly cleared site and a 'shocked' population moved abruptly to the new setting in which the planners' influence is maximized. The alternative is to reform *in-situ* an existing, functioning community that has more social resources for resisting and refashioning the transformation planned for it (Scott 1998, 256).

As such, settlement sites are located away from the city centre, on land that is not owned by powerful landowners. This so-called frontier “terrain [is] where land can be found without taking on powerful actors, and thus as a ‘safety valve’ for people living in crowded core areas who are mobilizing, or might be able to mobilize, against the government” (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 34). A shocked population in an isolated frontier does not guarantee that collective protest will abate. For example, in Sulawesi, Indonesia, the highlanders resettled under state schemes did not become “quiescent and abject” (Li 2005, 391). Rather, the unmet promises about improved lives and livelihoods spurred the highlanders “to challenge experts and officials, and organize themselves to claim their due;” resettlement had “radicalized them in ways no one would have predicted” (Li 2005, 391).

The fallacy of salvation by concrete relocation houses

Typhoon Sendong precipitated the preferred prerequisites for enacting a centrally managed social plan to control people and landscapes: a “shocked population” willing to move into “a freshly cleared site” where “the planners’ influence is maximized” (Scott 1998, 256). In its design and its implementation, the rational plan to reconstruct a particular segment of CDO’s population shares many of the aforementioned characteristics of state-led settlements.

The experts involved in Sendong reconstruction activities were akin to the state planners described by Jacobs and Scott. Trustees carried out activities to simplify, render legible, and manipulate people and landscapes. They ascribed to the doctrine of “salvation by concrete relocation houses outside flood-prone areas.” That is, providing good shelter will miraculously cure the other social and economic problems faced by the urban poor, especially their poverty and purported questionable moral character and values. The experts did not recognise or understand the complex social and ecological organisation that underpinned the functional order and integration of the city’s informal settlements. Given this disregard, it is not surprising that the members of the Local Inter-Agency Committee who planned the resettlement sites failed to solicit input based on the *métis* of the future residents.

The exclusion of the specific needs, desires, and *métis* of intended beneficiaries in the planning phase has material consequences on the city’s resettlement sites both as spaces and as uniquely experienced places. Many sites demonstrate a confounding of aesthetics with efficiency. There is a spatial separation of activities and infrastructure types, with identical housing units neatly laid

out in grids. Sites are located in the city outskirts on land censured of its geographical particularities. Newly-built sites are necessarily thin compared to the thick decades-old riverside slums. Relocated survivors, for example, noted that the sites lack the relatively easy access to services, credit, livelihoods, and recreation, and the general sense of community and security they enjoyed in their old neighbourhoods. The sites do not replicate the complexity and diversity characteristic of a thriving neighbourhood that develops organically over time.

There are other indications that Sendong trustees overestimated their ability to control relocation sites, and more importantly, to govern the desires and behaviour of residents. There were flagrant violations of the rules prohibiting renovations to relocation houses. Attempts to improve the moral character of residents were similarly dismissed. Residents continued to smoke and drink and sing videoke – off-site. Prostitution continued – on-site. To a degree, it was the housing beneficiaries who control their residency movements. They delayed moving until they were satisfied with the on-site infrastructure. Many residents rejected full-time residency at the resettlement sites. Instead, they adopted a circular migration strategy or a split householding strategy to compensate for the shortage of nearby livelihood opportunities or healthcare facilities.

These acts of defiance, or demonstrations of human agency, will undoubtedly hamper or at least slow down the achievement of rational plans. There is, however, a greater obstacle preventing Sendong trustees from reconstructing a certain segment of CDO's population. The uneven impacts of mobility and time-space compression were not considered in the design and the implementation of the resettlement sites. Mobility and time-space compression, themselves shaped by societal structures, affect how, when and why different people use different spaces. Understanding how these concepts shapes the lives of Sendong survivors helps to explain where and how they choose to live.

The uneven repercussions of “unslumming” on mobility

Mobility is typically conceived as the ability to move or the act of moving between physical or social locations. Physically moving from one location to another is important for accessing services (e.g. going to school, going to a doctor's appointment), for conducting livelihood activities (e.g. going to work, selling goods in a market, visiting clients), as well as for exerting influence on decision-makers and the decisions they enact (e.g. going to vote, attending public meetings). Mobility is important for deriving social, cultural, and psychological benefits through

visiting friends and relatives, and nurturing social networks that help people, especially in times of need (e.g. in the aftermath of a disaster). As such, mobility is important for many aspects of people's lives because it enables a person to actively shape and derive benefits from social relations with other people in a particular space.

Mobility, as argued by feminist scholars, is also an embodied experience situated within societal structures and spatialities of power (Pessar and Mahler 2003, Silvey 2005, Piper 2006, Hunter and Davis 2009). It is a function of socioeconomic status, childcare responsibilities, geographic location, violence, age, race, gender, sexuality, religion, class, caste, and institutional and state migration practices and policies (Lawson 1998, Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000, Silvey 2004, Crosby 2006). Consequently, both access to mobility and speed of movement are unevenly distributed in any society.

Typhoon Sendong accentuated the variance in mobility and speed of movement that different groups of Cagayaños enjoy. The disaster laid bare that some citizens benefit from a compression of time-space, others struggle with its elongation, and all employ strategies to benefit from time-space compression. The response of trustees to the disaster, notably the attempt to unslum parts of the city by creating resettlement sites, catalysed changes in the urban poor survivors' access to mobility and their speed of movement. Resettlement sites effectively reduced the mobility and the speed of movement for resettled survivors, thereby intensifying the existing gap between them and their more privileged counterparts. The slowness and reduced mobility characteristic of resettlement sites made them governable spaces. For, as Eyal Weizman explains in the documentary film, *The architecture of violence* (de Sousa 2014), "to control a space you need to create differentiation in speed of movement."

Time-space compression

Time-space compression is defined as "movement and communications across spaces, [...] the geographical stretching-out of social relations, and [...] our experience of all of this" (Massey 1994, 147). Due to actions related to capital, race, and gender, people have unequal access to and control over mobility and movement. Some people initiate and control flows. These hypermobile elites can compress time-space such that they diminish the temporal and spatial distance between them and desired resources. They also wield the power to reduce the mobility of significantly less powerful people, thereby stretching out the latter's experience of time-space, and increasing the

temporal and spatial distance between them and desired resources. Thus, the least powerful people can be imprisoned by flows. In the middle are people who merely follow flows, neither directing nor being trapped by them. The salience of time-space compression to people's lives is evident in the speed of recovery of various groups post-Sendong, as well as in CDO's relocation sites where those in power (e.g. trustees) actively constrain the mobility of the less powerful (e.g. relocated survivors).

Differentiation in the speed of post-Sendong recovery

Sendong survivors located at various positions along the vulnerability spectrum took different amounts of time to recover after the disaster. The less vulnerable middle class survivors typically remained outside the institutionalised post-disaster spaces. They stayed with friends and relatives, or perhaps at their office instead of at evacuation sites. They amassed sufficient resources through their personal savings and donations or loans from people in their social networks to either return to their previous homes or to move into another concrete house in a planned development. The duration for which they stayed outside of their home was relatively short, a matter of days or weeks, up to three months. The time they took off work was usually limited to a few days, which they used to clean and repair their homes. As such, the period of displacement and the time to rebuild lives and livelihoods was relatively short; it was compressed time-space.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ While not a Sendong- or CDO-specific example, the following account illustrates how the middle class benefit from time-space compression in the aftermath of a disaster because of their social networks and their rapid access to livelihood assistance.

In December 2012, Super-typhoon Pablo flattened parts of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental on the eastern side of Mindanao. My middle class host family in CDO has relatives in Davao Oriental, coconut farmers whose ancestral home and livelihood were uprooted and destroyed. Other CDO-based relatives housed and provided affected relatives in the weeks after Pablo, in addition to sending money, water, blankets, clothes and food to the relatives who opted to stay *in-situ*. As such, social networks were critical in the immediate relief period and in accelerating recovery. Social networks determine access to, and especially the *speed* of access to, resources including people, spaces, events, and material goods and money.

To help their family members, my host family focused on rebuilding their livelihoods. They sent a chainsaw, which was used to cut the felled coconut trees, which was then sold as timber. The family researched fast maturing coconut varieties that would yield fruit earlier than the usual variety that only reaches maturity at 10 years. They invested in other agricultural products to diversify revenue sources and to generate livelihoods and income in the short and medium terms. Finally, they sent several family members to physically assist with rebuilding. Clearly, rebuilding livelihoods is a priority, particularly on titled land. The middle class – in part thanks to its extensive and well-resourced social network – can expedite their livelihood recovery and rebuilding processes.

In contrast, the recovery period was much longer for survivors clustered at the more vulnerable end of the vulnerability continuum. As a group, the urban poor typically experienced a stretching out of time-space. Many had protracted stays at official post-disaster sleeping spaces. The precarious situation was exacerbated for survivors who were transferred through multiple evacuation camps or multiple transitional sites, and who waited more than 15 months to finally settle into a relocation house. While living in temporary housing, it was incredibly difficult to rebuild lives, especially ones with a semblance of normalcy. At these sites, the focus was on surviving, on obtaining financial and material resources to support short-term needs, and not on long-term planning. The uncertainty made it difficult for the urban poor to restart certain of their livelihood activities on a large scale. It was difficult and potentially expensive to move business assets (e.g. portable capital such as *sari-sari* store goods), and it was unwise to invest in hard-to-move assets (e.g. non-portable, place-based capital such as the physical structure of *sari-sari* stores). Furthermore, residential uncertainty also discouraged mothers from sending their children to schools until they could provide school officials with a permanent address and guarantee that the children would not have to be transferred to another school in a few weeks or months.

The survivors who did not qualify for relocation housing demonstrate an extreme example of stretched out time-space. For these survivors, it is a waiting game that they will almost certainly lose. Many of them lived in what are now designated as no-build zones. At any time with little or no notice they may be forcefully evicted, and their houses destroyed. Although these survivors have recovered insofar as they have repaired or rebuilt their Sendong-affected houses and restarted their old livelihoods, they cannot be considered to have fully recovered. They continue to live precariously in a state of uncertainty about their future.

Differentiation in the speed of movement at relocation sites

Time-space compression is also experienced differently by the well-intentioned experts designing, building, and servicing relocation sites and by the people actually living there. Pre-Sendong, each group had its own, mostly non-overlapping, ways of understanding and coping with time-space compression. These differences were not effectively incorporated into the design of the resettlement sites. The neglect of urban poor *métis* in the planning process resulted in very different experiences of the post-disaster livelihood assistance, the geographical siting of the

relocation sites in the periphery of the city, and the material impacts such locations have on the lives of trustees and housing beneficiaries.

Site selection was partially based on the future growth potential of *barangays* Lumbia and Indahag. These locations are well-suited to middle class or affluent Cagayaños; their wealth affords them the privilege of waiting until these *barangays* transform into residential and commercial hubs. They can cope with the possibility of losing money. They can afford to wait months or even years for a return on their investment. Consequently, they have greater choices, including the option to do work with greater profit margins but that requires a certain waiting period. Put another way, their access to resources allows the affluent to cope with the difficulties associated with the prolonging of time-space.

In contrast, the urban poor cannot afford to wait for economic opportunities to materialise. Most urban poor households require a *daily* income to survive. The daily requirement for cash affects many aspects of their lives – from the choice of livelihood, to the preferred housing location, to the decision to take on a high-interest 5-6 loan. For the urban poor, the prolonging of time-space exacerbates their precarious economic situation.

This mismatch thwarted the success of livelihood assistance programs aimed at the urban poor but designed according to a middle class understanding of the world. A frustrated business graduate volunteering at Ecoville explained to me that the residents had a “myopic perspective” on livelihood activities. They repeatedly forewent opportunities for seasonal work that offered large profit margins and greater overall income opportunities in favour of highly competitive ones with miniscule profit margins. For example, residents rejected lucrative bag- and pillow-making opportunities, which offered a monthly or quarterly paycheque, and instead requested help in running a *sari-sari* or *taliapa* shop on site. But, as the Ecoville director pointed out, there were 40 *taliapas* that “compete with each other because they’re selling the same things.” It is not that residents do not want to partake in relatively high value enterprises, but that they do not want to forgo a daily income, no matter how tiny the profit. Predictability trumped opportunity cost. Waiting – as required in investing – is the luxury of those possessing a certain reserve of resources. Obtaining a daily income is one of the few options available to the urban poor in which they exert some control over time-space compression, and ensure a predictable, albeit financially costly, temporal and spatial distance between them and required resources.

A second major problem is linked to the different means of transportation used by the relocated survivors and the trustees. The former group commutes using what American geographer Joseph Nevins (2015) describes as modes of “slow mobility,” while the latter group uses modes of “fast mobility.” Nevins argues that the slowness of Third World travelers is indicative of their vulnerability, where the speed at which people move is proportional to their power. The fastest mode of transportation (e.g. airplane) is the safest; it is also the most expensive, most regulated, most energetically costly, and most ecologically destructive. In air travel, the benefits are individualised, and the costs are dispersed throughout society. In contrast, the slowest forms of transportation, walking and cycling for example, are the least safe options because people share the road with motorised vehicles (and not because slow transportation is dangerous, per se). Even slow motorised vehicles, such as freight trains, are more dangerous than fast ones because it is easier to jump on and off of them. Fast travel or fast mobility thus enables the enrichment of “speed capitalists” and their control over less powerful people forced to use modes of slow mobility.

Nevins’ arguments can be scaled down to the municipal level in CDO. Faster modes of transportation include private vehicles and taxis, and slower modes of transportation include walking and public transit (e.g. *motorela*, *sikad*, *jeepney*, *multicab*). The trustees mostly took private vehicles to reach the relocation sites situated in the city outskirts. For them, the distance from the city centre is “not so far” and the commuting time is “not so long.” Plus, the comfort of commuting in a private air-conditioned vehicle along dry, dusty, hot roads is “not so bad.” Theirs is a fast mobility; they have the capacity to compress time-space. The commute between the same sites is drastically different on public transit. During my fieldwork, I never met a trustee who commuted to resettlement sites aboard public transit. When the Xavier University *jeepney* went in for repairs for a few days, the staff cancelled all on-site activities and worked instead out of the Ecoville office on the university campus in the city. The alternative – walking to the *jeepney* station, taking two *jeepneys* to the Ecoville resettlement site, and organising the day’s schedule around the only *jeepney* returning to the city in late afternoon – was not considered a viable option. Public transit still offers mobility, but it is a slow mobility. The routes are circuitous, often weaving in and out of tiny, potholed roads to pick up or drop off commuters in out-of-the-way locations, doubling or tripling the distance covered. The added distance and the additional stops to pick up and drop off passengers add significantly to the commuting time. The infrequent trips

mean that many people (and their large packages) are crammed into vehicles, which is not especially comfortable. Additionally, the fare is relatively expensive, for example ranging from \$0.54-1.08 for a one-way trip into the city centre from the Lumbia, Indahag and Calaan sites. The public transport that is available at the resettlement sites is perceived as costly in terms of time and money by the people who use it.

The difficulty in leaving resettlement sites has material repercussions on the lives of residents. The few urban poor survivors who have access to motorised vehicles prefer not to use them solely for commuting purposes. The added gasoline costs and mileage are considered unnecessary and unwanted costs. To compensate for the increased commuting expense (in terms of both time and money), many residents reduced the number of trips into the city as compared to when they lived in their pre-Sendong homes. The total cost is prohibitive, and effectively deters or reduces physical mobility, thereby isolating resettlement site residents in the periphery. For them, time-space is elongated. So, like the *lechoneros* and quarry men, many urban poor survivors devise strategies to enhance their physical mobility, and potentially their social mobility through increased economic wealth. Put another way, they use circular migration to compress time-space to ensure they can access their livelihoods. Because they rely upon slow mobility modes of transportation, other urban poor survivors adopt strategies to minimise their travel. Some, like the Ecoville woman with a high risk pregnancy, adopt a split householding strategy in which household members who require access to critical resources actually move closer to these resources. Living in the city reduces their dependency on slow transportation by decreasing the temporal and spatial separation between them and key resources.

Living in relocation sites also accentuates gender differences in access to mobility and speed of movement. The limited vehicles available to the urban poor survivors in resettlement sites are controlled by men. The male drivers of *jeepneys*, *motorelas*, *sikads* and *multicabs* are responsible for their vehicles, and thus act as gatekeepers connecting people seeking transportation with the means of transportation. Without easy access to public transportation or direct access to private vehicles, women are disproportionately affected by a reduced mobility. Not all women are trapped in relocation sites (e.g. through implied constraint because they cannot afford transportation). Indeed, the women at Ecoville pool their limited financial resources to ensure that pregnant women can travel into the city for medical appointments. Yet, because men control

the means of transportation, women face an additional hurdle in accessing mobility as compared to their male counterparts.

The design of and the conditions at CDO's relocation sites set up a situation in which hypermobile trustees actively reduced the mobility of the already weak. By increasing the differentiation in the speed of movement, trustees could control space (de Sousa 2014). Trustees facilitated the resettlement of people with limited access to fast transportation into peripheral locations. By moving the beneficiaries out of city homes and increasing their dependence on slow transportation, trustees exacerbated the pre-existing differential in the speed of movement, and guaranteed that people with greater mobility will control relocation sites.

Conclusion

This chapter has situated post-disaster spaces as spaces for reconstruction where purportedly “broken” urban poor survivors could be “fixed.” For the state-funded sites, reconstructing society concentrated on physical improvements in house structure. It reflected a mostly *laissez-faire* attitude. It was suited to the organic development of a resettlement site into a lived space with renovated houses and neighborhoods sculpted by residents. It allowed diverse non-governmental, religious, and government groups to enter and run activities, livelihood trainings, political, and social events, in which participation was mostly optional. State actors were not preoccupied with improving the moral character of residents.

In contrast, the governmental interventions at religious group funded sites focused on improving morality, ethics, fairness and sustainability. Religious groups made a point of holding trainings and maintaining a strong religious presence. At the religious sites, reconstruction entailed ensuring what religious actors perceived as opportunities to better one's life and that of the family, which necessarily involved improving the economic situation (e.g. via livelihood trainings and loans) and the moral character (e.g. via values formation training) of residents.

Before closing I want to clarify that I have no evidence that neither Catholic nor state trustees had a nefarious master plan to remake society and landscapes according to a particular ideology, or to elongate time-space for beneficiaries. I do not believe such a plan ever existed. Indeed, as Li (2007b, 276) points out, the grandiose, visionary, high modern plans that Scott describes are very rare; instead, it is more common that “programs of intervention are pulled together from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion and *bricolage*.” What transpired in CDO was a

situation in which there was a highly visible and urgent need for assistance after a disaster, state actors were conspicuously absent, and the Catholic Church already possessed the means, the capacity and the public's trust for directing disaster relief and recovery. As Catholics and as Filipinos, Catholic trustees saw it as their civic, religious, and moral imperative to help, which they did. But, the work they carried out, and the vision they applied to the post-disaster spaces where they intervened, demonstrate that Catholic actors assumed state-like roles. In other words, the disaster created an unforeseen opportunity for the Catholic Church to target a particular segment of CDO residents, and to remake and govern them according to Catholic values. And Catholic actors seized this opportunity to enact their own vision of development. This vision of development was largely *un*informed by the previous experiences, values, interests – the *métis* – of the beneficiaries.

Taken a step further, in post-disaster situations where you have a weak or absent government, there are opportunities for so-called non-state actors, such as churches, corporations, rebel groups, or NGOs, to re-imagine, re-create, and govern portions of society and landscapes according to their visions.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

This research project set out to answer the question: where do the survivors of a disaster rebuild their lives and livelihoods? Rather than generate a list of locations, this dissertation analysed post-disaster spaces, defined as the spaces designed for a particular subset of survivors with the aim of helping them to survive, to cope with, and to recover from the disaster. Many survivors accessed and benefitted from official post-disaster spaces designed and run by trustees. The uses of and experiences inside these spaces, however, were very different for individuals differentiated by gender, class, race, and religion. Many survivors also sought to rebuild their lives and livelihoods outside of the official post-disaster spaces; they turned to their personal social networks, their usual work spaces or places of worship, as well as to newly created spaces for advocacy and healing. This latter category of survivors was largely excluded from official aid conduits because these survivors were either invisible to, or not officially deemed vulnerable by, trustees.

This dissertation offered a critical topography in which the processes and practices of producing post-disaster spaces were exposed, which, in turn, “invite[d] the vivid revelation of social and political difference and inequality” (Katz 2001, 1228). Because space is necessarily malleable, fluid, and relational due to the ever-changing activities, conflict, and experiences unfolding in the landscape (Staehele and Martin 2000), any analysis of space must be formulated in terms of the social relations occurring within and beyond its porous boundaries (Massey 1994). Accordingly, this study explored how the social relations among survivors and trustees were linked to exclusion, governmentality, mobility, and space- and place-making. Specifically, it examined these processes and practices in the environmental migration precipitated by Typhoon Sendong in Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.

The first research objective aimed to characterise vulnerable survivors. Understanding vulnerability is important because a natural hazard only progresses into a disaster if normal conditions are disrupted, people are affected, and the capacity of the local community to cope is exceeded. Put another way, without vulnerable people there are no disasters. In CDO, government agencies, humanitarian organisations, religious groups, and NGOs alike claimed that their disaster risk reduction, relief, and recovery activities targeted “the people who need help the most.” Yet, these same trustees shared neither a coherent definition of vulnerability nor a

consensus on delimiting one or more target populations. Instead, different trustees invoke diverse interpretations of vulnerability in guiding their post-disaster efforts.

The trustees designing and implementing disaster relief and recovery programs claimed their initiatives helped vulnerable Sendong survivors. Despite the absence of a clear shared understanding of vulnerability, the trustees primarily ascribed to a singling out of vulnerable demographic groups approach or to an indicators of vulnerability approach, and to a lesser extent, a physicalist approach. What these approaches have in common is that they attribute vulnerability to biologically-based attributes, technological failures or inadequacies, unfortunate geography, individual or household level poverty, and poor decisions made by individuals and households. They do not associate vulnerability with the deeply rooted unjust processes, structures, and inequalities in society.

As a result, the solutions enacted by trustees fail to resolve the very elements that enable the perpetuation of vulnerability in CDO and the ongoing disasters that result from natural hazard events all over the archipelago. Philippine disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts rarely tackle, let alone remedy underlying complex and intertwined economic, political, technological, biological, geographic, cultural, legal, and social issues. Understandably, immediate search and rescue and disaster relief cannot and should not address these issues when urgent responses are required to save people from imminent death. Yet, without acknowledging and then addressing the underlying issues, trustees effectively absolve the state, the Catholic Church, and other powerful entities in Philippine society from addressing root problems. In variously framing vulnerability in terms of property, of individuals exhibiting particular biological characteristics, and of terrain-based geophysical risks, vulnerability is framed as an individual problem instead of a collectively-produced one. Framed in the latter sense, the onus to resolve underlying issues is the responsibility of powerful trustees. Whereas, framed in the former sense, anything a trustee does to help vulnerable people is a charitable act but not its ultimate responsibility.

Given the inability of the trustees' approaches to vulnerability to account for the range of Sendong survivors and their experiences, I proposed that a more useful way of framing vulnerability and understanding vulnerable people is to visualise survivors along a vulnerability continuum. A continuum unmask the variation that exists within communities, households, and even individuals depending on their situation in relation to other people at a given time. It

acknowledges that “less vulnerable” survivors were legitimately affected by Typhoon Sendong. It highlights the “more vulnerable” people who lack the resources and capabilities to quickly recover from a disaster. It also gives a place to “invisible” survivors who span the continuum, so-called invisible because of their neglect by the official conduits of disaster relief. Their exclusion, in some cases, rendered them even more vulnerable than those officially deemed vulnerable.

The final, and most significant, element of charactering vulnerability in CDO is what I call the five major vulnerability discourses. By shaping how people conceptualise vulnerability and vulnerable people, these discourses informed the official post-disaster programs. These narratives played an influential role in the targeting of beneficiaries, the design and delivery of disaster assistance and resettlement programs, the mobility of more vulnerable and invisible survivors, and the exclusionary nature of post-disaster spaces. These discourses were apparent in the language used to describe these people, the attitudes of trustees towards these people, the types of disaster assistance, and the formal and informal rules about accessing assistance.

The five narratives overlap, and occasionally contradict each other. Each one advances or hinders a specific agenda; not surprisingly, different intervening trustees adopted one or more discourses that reinforce their particular attitudes and priorities. For example, an internally displaced persons (IDP) narrative emphasises the unbiased work of trustees; a victim narrative focuses on legitimate, helpless people; and a survivor narrative is used for advocacy and healing purposes. Illegal squatter and informal settler narratives lend themselves to strategies aimed at solving the precarious housing situation of vulnerable Cagayaños. A deficiency narrative identifies beneficiaries as people with actual and presumed shortages. A different-from-us narrative accentuates differences between trustees and beneficiaries, and among survivors. To varying degrees, each discourse was also adopted and reworked by vulnerable people affected by Typhoon Sendong. Unlike the trustees who typically framed discourses in terms of individual, household, and even class-based failures, the more vulnerable survivors and their advocates also point out that the challenges they face are embedded in larger economic, political, and legal historical processes. Put another way, the former interpretation suggests micro and meso level issues produce vulnerability, which can be addressed with micro and meso level interventions, while the latter contends macro scale issues produce vulnerability, which is then manifested at the micro and meso scales.

The second research objective sought to map the post-disaster trajectories of survivors, and especially those situated at the “more vulnerable” end of the continuum, in the short and medium terms. Chapter 6 presented a critical topography of the various post-disaster spaces along these routes. Sendong survivors accessed various urban spaces for critical rebuilding activities, namely sleeping in a safe space, obtaining money and relief goods, accessing medical, educational and safety services, enjoying recreational and spiritual activities, and engaging in advocacy or political activities.

The analyses focused on “sleeping pathways,” the specific places where a survivor is based over a given period of time. Sleeping pathways reveal the options available to survivors lying along the vulnerability continuum, and their preferences. These options and preferences are necessarily linked to the different constraints and resources of different individuals and households, which, in turn, are underpinned by larger processes, structures and institutions in CDO and in Philippine society. There were three broad categories of sleeping pathways: institutionalised, *hors-système*, and hybrid pathways. In the institutionalised pathway, survivors sleep exclusively at the official post-disaster spaces created by state, religious and humanitarian trustees; for example, they typically went from their flooded house to “higher ground” to an evacuation camp to a transitional housing site to a permanent relocation site. Institutionalised pathways monopolised media, public, and trustee attention, shaping what people assumed were the spaces frequented by Sendong survivors. Yet, many Sendong-affected people avoided most or all official post-disaster aid spaces. Some households never ventured inside an evacuation camp, transitional housing site, or permanent relocation site. They followed what I call an “*hors-système*” sleeping pathway because they remained outside official disaster sleeping spaces run by state, religious, and humanitarian trustees. A significantly larger group of people, even surpassing the number of people who followed an institutionalised sleeping pathway, pursued a “hybrid pathway” in which households slept in both official and non-official spaces.

Access to all types of post-disaster spaces was uneven, and the experiences of different individuals and groups within these spaces were similarly disparate. Such unevenness is a product of exclusion. The analyses engage extensively with what Hall, Hirsch and Li (2011) call the “powers of exclusion” that deny certain people access to land. The authors identify eight powers of exclusion; they contend that the most important ones in rural Southeast Asia are regulation,

force, the market, and legitimation, but that “environmental change, growth in and control over knowledge and technologies that influence both the incentives for new forms of exclusion and capacities for monitoring and enforcement, political relationships and alliances, and inertia” can also exclude (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011, 197). To varying degrees, all eight powers operated in an urban post-disaster context in Southeast Asia. Not only did they shape access to land (e.g. where survivors slept), but they also shaped access to other critical resources such as relief goods and compensation for damaged houses.

The official post disaster sleeping spaces – evacuation camps, temporary housing sites and permanent resettlement sites – are distinguished by where they are located, when people stay there, what type of housing they reside in, and the types of assistance given there. They all share inclusive mandate to assist the vulnerable survivors of the disaster. Yet, the design and character of these spaces deterred many survivors from accessing them. The official post-disaster sleeping spaces are highly exclusionary spaces, in part because they are more informed more by the vulnerability discourses to which trustees adhere than by the needs, desires, and *métis* of the intended residents.

The survivors themselves were mostly excluded from spaces of power, in which decisions about them and their fate were taken. When they did enter such spaces, such as the city hall, the archbishopric or Xavier University campus, it was primarily for positive publicity for the city administration (e.g. relocation house raffles) and for social activities (e.g. psychosocial debriefing activities and mass weddings), in which survivors did not assume a decision-making role. This non-overlapping use of a shared space recalls Doreen Massey’s (1994) articulation of a fluid time-space that is necessarily differentially experienced by different people through their varied social relations with others. For the purposes of expediency, decisions can and probably should be taken by a relatively small group of people during the disaster rescue and relief period. However, in designing relocation sites, and temporary housing where people live for more than one year, it only seems fair to include purported beneficiaries in the discussion.

The third and final research objective endeavoured to evaluate the roles of trustees and vulnerable survivors in shaping post-disaster spaces. These roles were articulated throughout the thesis, in Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7, and were critically analysed in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 went beyond evaluating roles. It used Michael Burawoy’s (1998, 5) strategy of using preexisting theory to

“extend out” from the microworld of a very specific, bounded case study to “extract the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future.” I extended out from the very particular case of environmental migration in CDO catalysed by Tropical Storm Sendong to analyse processes of exclusion and governmentality in trustee-led disaster relief and resettlement.

Such an analysis underscores an obvious and unacknowledged point: reconstructing is much more than building houses. It is about rebuilding lives and livelihoods. It also poses many questions about fairness and power. It entails choosing which people should and can be reconstructed, and creating or reinforcing barriers that exclude certain groups of people. It allows the erasure of people and their presumed immoral or undesirable acts from previously occupied territory, cleansing the space and freeing it for other purposes. It cements or unravels relationships and strengthens faith in religious and state institutions, and in the individuals fronting them. It offers opportunities to shape people and impart on them the values deemed important, sometimes quite explicitly. It has uneven repercussions on different individuals and groups, especially with regards to their mobility and experience of time-space compression.

The process of resettling survivors and the relocation sites themselves can thus be read as an “unslumming” or an “improvement” project that abstracts the residents and the locale out of the normal city. It is a process that takes unreadable, underground, informal people from an illegible, non-state space and transforms them into standardised citizens living in a legible state space conducive to governmental intervention. It is not only a conflictual and incoherent, concrete yet abstract state who endeavours to carry out this social engineering project, but also other trustees acting like quasi state actors (e.g. the Catholic Church), however benevolent their intentions.

Main contributions of this dissertation

Among the contributions of this research project, I underline four here. First, this inquiry intersects studies of environmental migration, feminist research, governmentality, and political ecology. The integration of these diverse research arenas in this study offers salient insights to each one. In particular, I have demonstrated the importance of extending beyond the practical and policy-oriented focus of much of the environmental migration literature. Using empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions from feminist geography and feminist approaches to migration situates environmental migration as a process of space- and place-making with vastly

uneven consequences for different individuals and groups. Analysing environmental migration through a governmentality framework indicates that this type of mobility yields yet another opportunity for trustees to control people and landscapes.

Second, this dissertation, and Chapter 6 in particular, provides a strong case in support of Hall, Hirsch and Li's (2011) thesis on the importance of regulation, force, the market and legitimation as powers of exclusion that shape access to land in Southeast Asia. It demonstrates that these powers can determine access to a broader suite of resources, in addition to land. It develops examples of how the four other powers of exclusion operate in the context of disaster relief, recovery, and rebuilding efforts. It proposes that social norms and prejudices also have the power to exclude.

Third, on a practical level, the main findings of the research can usefully inform disaster management efforts in the Philippines and elsewhere. Like many aspiring international development scholars, a part of me had hoped that my research would somehow benefit people on-the-ground. (This was countered by another, more cynical side of me attuned to the disconnect between academic research and actual policy and programs.) At the end of my field season in CDO, however, my aspirational side received a reason to be hopeful. When I presented preliminary research results to a variety of people who had participated in the project in some capacity, I was told by top officials at two regional government agencies that they wanted a copy of my dissertation (or at least a succinct summary of the main findings). They were surprised by the salience of religion in post-disaster spaces, and the many ways in which what they perceived as inclusive spaces were actually highly exclusive. Furthermore, because the critique would come from a foreign researcher – another so-called “expert” – it would carry more weight when presented to their superiors at the national offices. They also pointed out that I had more freedom to be critical; the same critiques postulated by government employees could hinder their career opportunities. As such, I am hopeful that there are committed government trustees who have the authority, the desire, and the resources to actually create better post-disaster spaces.

Fourth, this dissertation demonstrates the potential for accompanied research projects. The writing, and especially the fieldwork, components of this study required that I explore ways to make academic life and family life work together. The richness of the data and the analyses in this dissertation indicate that accompanied research projects can and do work, and moreover, that

there is value in writing reflexively about the accompanied and embodied aspects. For graduate studies brave enough to read this tome (or at least parts of Chapter 4), I hope that my reflections can help them to navigate their own experiences with accompanied fieldwork and academic life more generally.

Limitations of this research project

As presented in Chapter 4, this research project has methodological limitations. Here, I want to briefly discuss two other limitations related to its theoretical component. The first is the limited analysis of class and race in producing and contesting CDO's post-disaster spaces. As Kofman (2004) insists, migration is a process in which gender, class, and race are intertwined. The interaction of these and other constructs of inequality yield a complex stratification that contributes to very different migration experiences of people occupying a common space. For the most part, my analyses grouped survivors into broad economic classes – the middle class and the urban poor – without rigorously troubling these categories, situating them historically, and investigating the within-group variation, and what such variation means. My analyses did not critically examine class for trustees who, while mostly situated as middle class, were not uniform. My analyses similarly sidelined the salience of race in post-disaster trajectories and individual experiences of post-disaster spaces. In exploring the exclusionary nature of official post-disaster spaces, Chapter 6 did delve into several race-related issues. For example, survivors who were visibly identifiable as Indigenous Peoples or as Muslim Filipinos were ostracised in post-disaster spaces and were either denied relief goods or given goods of substandard quality. Further unpacking of class and race, and their relationship to gender would likely yield a more nuanced and complex understanding of environmental migration and post-disaster spaces.

A second point concerns scale. As explained in Chapter 4, the decision to undertake fieldwork with my husband and then-infant daughter had important practical implications. The focus on a single case in a single city was one such implication. Yet migration is inevitably connected to different temporal, spatial, and analytical scales, such as the body, household, region, nation-state, supranational organisation, among others. In contemporary feminist theory, the body is not a mere corporeal biological entity that exists at a single location of scale; instead it is an analytical concept that evades dichotomies, welcomes many material and symbolic sites, and exists as lived sites of power (Moss 1993, Silvey 2005). This concept lends itself to studying how migrant bodies

(re)produce space and place, who wins by claiming certain bodies are illegal or undocumented, how and where power dynamics operate between states and migrants, and what are the corporeal migration experiences of specific social groups (Silvey 2005, Parreñas 2010, Mountz 2011). I did analyse temporal, spatial, and analytical scales at the body, household and municipal levels, albeit within a restricted time-frame. I did not, however, investigate other more meso or macro level analytical scales such as the region, nation-state, and transnational sphere. A scalar approach to studying the production and governmentality of post-disaster spaces that includes these larger scales would likely reveal relational linkages I could not detect with my limited scale study. There is a vast global Filipino diaspora that maintains significant material ties to the Philippines, for example by sending remittances (cf. De Koninck and Caouette 2012). As evidenced in the outpouring of international support after Typhoon Sendong, this diaspora also cares about Cagayaños. It is thus probable that the CDO case would illustrate the ability of scales to interact dynamically and even jump scales through the increasing transnationalisation of people, goods, ideas, and institutions (Bailey 2010, Wright 2014).

Starting points for future research

An intriguing direction for future research would be to produce a counter-topography that connects the case of Typhoon Sendong in CDO to “vastly different places made artifactually discrete by virtue of history and geography but which also reproduce themselves differently amidst the common political-economic and socio-cultural processes they experience” (Katz 2001, 1229). The accelerated pace of global environmental change, and especially climate change, is amplifying the impacts of larger economic, political, and social processes that increase the vulnerability of millions of people around the world. These processes increase the possibility that natural hazards precipitate disasters that can provoke environmental migration and the real and perceived need to create safe post-disaster spaces for the survivors. In the past decade alone, examples can be found in diverse locations including New Orleans, U.S.A. (Hurricane Katrina in 2005), Haiti (earthquake in 2010), Eastern Visayas, Philippines (Super-typhoon Haiyan in 2013) and Nepal (earthquakes in 2015). A counter-topography would investigate specific issues – for example the character of post-disaster spaces and the roles of diverse trustees involved, and their attempts at governmentality – in and across sites, generating contour lines that illustrate particular relations to a process of governmental intervention. Such a counter-topography would draw attention to “precise analytical relationships” without homogenising different sites (Katz 2001,

1229), and could be used to connect people and ideas, to navigate political space, and to bridge theoretical and empirical work on marginalised populations (Mountz 2011).

A second research project could analyse CDO's relocation sites as spaces of everyday resistance. According to Benedict Kerkvliet (2002, 114),

Resistance refers to what people do that shows disgust, anger, indignation, or opposition to what they regard as unjust or unfair claims on them by people of superordinate class and status or institutions. Stated positively, people struggle through resistance to affirm their claims to what they believe they are justly entitled to based on values and rights recognized by a significant proportion of others in similar class and status positions.

Everyday resistance usually occurs on a small scale, for example an individual or a small group with no formal leadership. It requires some sort of justification or implicit values. It brings immediate benefits to the resister, but if too many people resist, then there may be serious repercussions. Finally, the target is often unaware of the opposition and the identity of the resisters.

As a starting point, a research project could investigate the architecture of resettlement sites.

Architecture, as Weizman (2007, 26) explains, has a communicative function.

Architecture – the organization, form and style by which these neighborhoods were built, the way they were mediated, communicated and understood – formed a visual language that was used to blur the facts of occupation and sustain territorial claims of expansion. This project was thus an attempt to sustain national narratives of belonging while short-circuiting and even blocking other narratives.

Yet, Weizman argues that architecture itself can resist the violence of architecture. In CDO, does this mean that the modifications made by resettled Sendong survivors to their identical cookie-cutter houses are forms of resistance contesting the narratives put forth by trustees? Were these customisation efforts akin to the “subdued, subtle, and surreptitious type” of everyday resistance deployed by the subordinate residents of a village in Central Luzon studied by Kerkvliet (2002, 16)? Apart from architectural expressions of everyday resistance, other political, cultural, and social forms of resistance practiced by CDO's resettled survivors are worthy of further study.

A third fascinating research project would be to reimagine or reconfigure mobility so that the benefits of time-space compression are more equitably dispersed and available to people living in the periphery. The project should aim to resolve, or at least advance, the following puzzle.

There were clearly very real practical constraints in resettling tens of thousands of Sendong survivors, especially because of the pressure to build relocation sites in the city's periphery. Given this limitation, how can the differential in the speed of movement between resettled residents and their city-centre counterparts (both trustees and urban poor) be diminished? Can a person actively shape and derive benefits from social relations with other people in a particular space through a virtual, and not a physical, presence? Instead of defining mobility as the ability to move or the act of moving between physical or social locations, what if mobility was recast as the potential to engage with others in another space and to influence that space? Would it then be possible for an individual with restricted physical mobility to obtain the benefits accrued from physical mobility? If so, then it might be possible for the urban poor survivors resettled in the periphery of the city to counter the repercussions of limited physical mobility and the resulting elongation of time-space.

The advent of modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) promises such an outcome. Of all the technological tools and resources currently available to create, disseminate, store and bring value to information, mobile phones and especially smartphones are most relevant to enhancing mobility to CDO relocation site residents. Indeed, like many women in the developing world who “are not ‘waiting’ for access to ICTs, but rather using ICTs when they are available to get around the constraints they face in politics, society and economy” (Hambly Odame 2005, 20), many urban poor Cagayaños, both women and men, are already using mobile phones. Sharing information through text messages and phone calls can provide the urban poor with greater “influence” mobility, despite their restricted “physical” mobility.

Yet, there are limits to influence mobility. At some point, obtaining the full benefits of mobility requires physical mobility; receiving a text message about the time and location of the distribution of relief goods, or other resource, alleviates the need of being physically present for the announcement. Picking up the goods requires physical travel to the distribution site at the appropriate time, which can be difficult from some of the resettlement sites. Moreover, influence mobility implies dependence – or at least a degree of reliance – upon new technologies, and the infrastructure, capital and powers underpinning them. While mobile technologies have reduced gender inequalities and democratised communications for many previously disconnected or isolated populations around the world (Hambly Odame 2005), the technologies are not a

panacea. They remain largely controlled by corporate and state interests, and require significant investment in, for example, setting up cellular towers. In a hilly region such as Cagayan de Oro, setting up enough infrastructure to ensure people living in the periphery are well connected would be difficult, especially if the potential clients are construed as too poor to pay as per the deficiency vulnerability discourse. Furthermore, despite the relatively inexpensive costs to purchase a cell phone and to send and receive calls and text messages, the cost is a significant addition to a household with a limited budget. It is not uncommon for the urban poor to own a cell phone, but never have the load required to make calls or send text messages. As such, this alternative influence mobility is still within the purview of the powerful, the affluent, the experts.

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The built environment of relocation sites and the programs offered there reflect an amalgamation of the objectives of trustees. The changes imagined and created by trustees to the resettlement landscape and the lives of the people whose lives were targeted for reconstruction are thus the legacy of Typhoon Sendong. Thus, it was a reconstruction primarily designed and implemented *by* state and religious trustees *for* urban poor, with almost no overlap between the former reconstructors and the latter reconstructees. In re-making society, there was no intent to change religious or state institutions, the inner workings of local politics and religious practices, or the people in positions of power. There is no attempt to heed Pelling's (1999, 2001) call to reduce vulnerability by addressing the underlying political, social and economic processes that render people vulnerable. In CDO for example, a patriarchal relationship is maintained through the house ownership – land tenure arrangement at resettlement sites, indicating that reconstructing society does not mean a restructuring of hierarchical patron-client relationships that have characterised the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia (cf. Scott 1972, 1976, McCoy 1994). Neither church nor state was willing to relinquish the power that comes with land ownership in the Philippines. Such a focus replicates the problem of “correcting the deficiencies of villagers while leaving the deficiencies of [trustees] [...] unexamined and unimproved” identified by Li (2005, 384). Perhaps this re-making is the real reconstruction challenge post-Sendong.

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Annex 1. Oral and written consent forms

CONSENTEMENT VERBAL

Bonjour,

Mon nom est Christine Gibb, je suis étudiante à l'Université de Montréal, au Canada. J'effectue une thèse de doctorat dans laquelle je m'intéresse aux expériences locales de la migration environnementale suite aux catastrophes naturelles aux Philippines. Les renseignements collectés auprès de vous seront repris dans le cadre de mon travail de recherche doctoral. La recherche comporte trois différentes étapes; chacune implique un traitement différent de confidentialité.

1. La première étape comprend principalement des entrevues. Les informations collectées seront anonymes. Votre identité ne sera pas divulguée dans les communications écrites ou orales. Je vais peut-être utiliser une citation de notre conversation, mais votre identité sera protégée.

2. La deuxième étape implique la création d'une vidéo. Vous avez le choix de rester anonyme ou pas dans votre vidéo. Vous avez le choix de permettre la diffusion de votre vidéo à: l'équipe de recherche, et/ou aux participants de l'atelier (voir ci-dessous), et/ou aux organisations aux Philippines, et/ou aux organisations ailleurs. Il y aura des outils de postproduction pour modifier votre vidéo pour s'assurer de votre anonymat. Votre identité ne sera pas divulguée dans les communications écrites ou orales. Je vais peut-être utiliser une citation de votre vidéo, mais votre identité sera protégée.

3. La troisième étape implique un atelier de groupe pour visionner et discuter les vidéos, et pour discuter les résultats de recherche. Pendant l'atelier, je ne peux pas vous offrir la confidentialité ou l'anonymat parce que c'est une activité de groupe avec des autres membres de votre communauté. Cependant, je vais demander aux participants de l'atelier de respecter la confidentialité des participants après l'atelier. Suite à l'atelier, votre identité ne sera pas diffusée dans les communications écrites ou orales. Je vais peut-être utiliser des citations de l'atelier, mais les identités des participants seront protégées.

Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Je vous invite de participer dans l'étape (les étapes) X (1, et/or 2, et/ou 3). Vous êtes libre de refuser sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre décision, la participation à cette recherche à tout moment.

SVP, confirmez oralement si vous acceptez de participer, oui ou non :

- Oui, j'accepte de participer ;
- Non, je n'accepte pas de participer.

CONSENTEMENT ÉCRIT

Titre de la recherche : Reconstruire la dignité : Une exploration des vies post-catastrophes des migrants environnementaux aux Philippines

Chercheuse : Christine Gibb, étudiante, Doctorat en géographie, Université de Montréal

Co-directeurs de recherche : Patricia Martin, professeure agrégée, Département de géographie, Université de Montréal ; Rodolphe De Koninck, professeur titulaire, Département de géographie, Université de Montréal

A) RENSEIGNEMENTS AUX PARTICIPANTS

1. Objectifs de la recherche.

Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre où des groupes vulnérables de « migrants environnementaux » aux Philippines reconstruisent leurs vies et gagne-pains après une catastrophe. Les objectifs spécifiques du projet sont : (1) de caractériser les groupes vulnérables aux Philippines, (2) de cartographier où les migrants environnementaux se retrouvent dans les court et moyen termes, et (3) d'évaluer les rôles des acteurs religieux et de l'état lors des trajets migratoires.

2. Participation à la recherche

Votre participation à cette recherche consiste à

- partager vos expériences migratoires lors d'une et après une catastrophe dans une entrevue d'environ une heure; et/ou
- partager vos expériences migratoires d'une et après une catastrophe dans la création d'un vidéo; et/ou
- évaluer les conclusions préliminaires dans un atelier final.

3. Confidentialité

Les renseignements que vous nous donnerez demeureront confidentiels. Chaque participant à la recherche se verra attribuer un numéro et seuls la chercheuse principale et/ou la personne mandatée à cet effet auront la liste des participants et des numéros qui leur auront été attribués. De plus, les renseignements seront conservés dans un classeur sous clé situé dans un bureau fermé. Aucune information permettant de vous identifier d'une façon ou d'une autre ne sera publiée. Ces renseignements personnels seront détruits 7 ans après la fin du projet. Seules les données ne permettant pas de vous identifier seront conservées après cette date.

4. Avantages et inconvénients

En participant à cette recherche, vous pourrez contribuer à l'avancement des connaissances sur expériences locales de la migration environnementale suite aux catastrophes aux Philippines.

Votre participation à la recherche pourra également vous donner l'occasion de mieux vous connaître. Par contre, il est possible que le fait de raconter votre expérience suscite des réflexions ou des souvenirs émouvants ou désagréables. Si cela se produit, n'hésitez pas à en parler avec l'agent de recherche. S'il y a lieu, l'agent de recherche pourra vous référer à une personne-ressource.

5. Droit de retrait

Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous êtes libre de vous retirer en tout temps par avis verbal, sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre décision. Si vous décidez de vous retirer de la recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec la chercheuse, au numéro de téléphone indiqué à la dernière page de ce document. Si vous vous retirez de la recherche, les renseignements qui auront été recueillis au moment de votre retrait seront détruits.

B) CONSENTEMENT

Je déclare avoir pris connaissance des informations ci-dessus, avoir obtenu les réponses à mes questions sur ma participation à la recherche et comprendre le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients de cette recherche.

Après réflexion, je consens librement à prendre part à cette recherche. Je sais que je peux me retirer en tout temps sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier ma décision.

Signature : _____ Date : _____
Nom : _____ Prénom : _____

Je déclare avoir expliqué le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients de l'étude et avoir répondu au meilleur de ma connaissance aux questions posées.

Signature de la chercheuse _____ Date : _____
Nom : _____ Prénom : _____

Pour toute question relative à la recherche, ou pour vous retirer de la recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec Christine Gibb, chercheuse principale, à l'adresse courriel suivante :

Toute plainte relative à votre participation à cette recherche peut être adressée à l'ombudsman de l'Université de Montréal, au numéro de téléphone (514) 343-2100 ou à l'adresse courriel ombudsman@umontreal.ca. (L'ombudsman accepte les appels à frais virés).

Un exemplaire du formulaire de consentement signé doit être remis au participant.

Annex 2. Interview guides

Example of a key informant interview question guide

History of organisation and the role of the informant

- Will you tell me about your organisation (mandate, main activities, issues, intended beneficiaries, funders)?
- What is your position? What does it entail? How long have you been involved?

Typhoon Sendong: organisational involvement

- What did your organisation do in the hours, days, weeks and months after Sendong? Why?
- Did you offer any livelihoods-related activities or programs? Explain.
- Where did you work (list *barangays*)? Why?
- Who were the beneficiaries of your work?
- How long have they lived at their pre-Sendong houses?
- Pre-Sendong, where did these people typically live? Work? Go? Post-Sendong? Describe their trajectories.
- Which other organisations or groups did your organisation work with?
- When did your Sendong work start and end?
- Were any of your staff personally affected by Sendong?
- How did you fund your Sendong work?

Typhoon Sendong: personal experience and knowledge

- Apart from the people your organisation targeted, who else was affected by Sendong?
- Which other areas (locations) were affected by Typhoon Sendong?
- Who lives / works / goes to these areas? What do people do there?
- Who doesn't go to these places? Why (not)? (prompt with gender and religion question, if necessary)
- Where else did people go post-Sendong?
- Were any links made between climate change and Sendong?
- Are you aware of any new livelihood opportunities that were created post-Sendong? If so, who participated? (prompt with gender and religion question, if necessary)
- What else should I know about Sendong and people's experiences? (prompt with gender and religion question, if necessary)

- Where can I obtain data/statistics, reports and maps on: evacuation centres, population movements, relief and aid programs, donors, etc.?

Contextual information about CDO, migration and settlement

- When did the migration pressures arise in CDO? Why? Where were the migrants coming from?
- Who settles where? What do they build?
- Where did the poor used to settle? Where do they settle now?
- How have stakeholders X, Y and Z affected where people live and work?

Vulnerability

- Who are the most vulnerable groups of people? What makes them vulnerable? (prompts, if necessary)
- Are these vulnerable people also the ones most affected by Sendong? If not, who are the most vulnerable groups of people affected by Sendong?
- How can I reach these people?

Example of a survivor interview question guide

I'm a PhD researcher from the University of Montreal in Canada. I'm interested in the migration experiences of people affected by Typhoon Sendong in and around Cagayan De Oro. In particular, I am interested in the changes in people's livelihoods since December 2011.

I'd like to ask you some general information questions and also about your experiences post-Sendong. If you want to end the interview at any time, just say so. All information you share will be kept confidential.

Demographic information for interviewee and other members of their household

- Name, pseudonym, age, sex, gender, ethnicity, family status, faith, education
- Address on 16 December 2011

Pre-Sending migration experiences

- Original home(s), other destination(s), reasons for migration, timing

Livelihood history of interviewee and household members (including OFW)

- Livelihood, job history, +/- of livelihood, why start/stop this livelihood
- Employment status, work hours, days per week
- Income, type of remuneration, pay income taxes, receive employee benefits
- Training (where, when, sponsored)
- Livelihood location, distance and time between job-home, commute mode and cost

Vulnerabilities and assets at household level – Pre-Sendong, post-Sendong (evacuation period, transitional housing and current)

- Monthly/annual income and expenses
- Debts and liabilities
- Access to credit (e.g. 5/6 loans)
- Physical household assets (e.g. house, electricity, running water, furniture, car, phone, electronics, jewellery, etc.)
- Physical livelihood assets (equipment, land, etc.) – access and/or control over
- Support to or from OFW
- Support to or from other family members, friends, others
- Savings or investments
- Insurance (health, house, etc.)
- Pre-arranged, pre-paid funeral arrangements
- Security of living situation (human risks and natural hazards)
- # meals per day
- Experience with violence (verbal, sexual, physical, etc. – domestic, work, state, etc.)
- Health status

Please tell me about the places you'd go on a daily, weekly, monthly and annual basis pre-Sendong – for living/sleeping, for work/livelihoods, for religious, recreational and activism activities. Why these places?

Please tell me about the places you went when Sendong occurred.

Please tell me about the places you went in the first few days after Sendong.

Please tell me about the places you went in the first few weeks after Sendong occurred a daily, weekly and monthly basis.

Please tell me about the places you went in the first few months after Sendong occurred a daily, weekly and monthly basis. Why these places?

Please tell me about the places you go now on a daily, weekly and monthly basis.

Please elaborate on your experiences during and after Sendong – for living/sleeping, for work/livelihoods, for religious, recreational and activism activities, and for Sendong relief and recovery. (E.g. who went to these places with you? Who didn't go with you? Why (not)? Why did you go to these particular places? What were the other options? How long did you stay at these places? Who cared for the other members of your household during this time? What happened to your belongings?)

You listedas (one of) your livelihood(s) post Sendong. Please elaborate. (E.g. how did you support yourself/ your household? What happened to your livelihood? How did you obtain food, shelter, money, etc.? Aware of livelihood trainings or cash for work programs available? Participate? Why (not)? Other post-Sending livelihood options?

Are you interested in participating in the focus group discussion and/or the video component of the research project?

Who would you recommend I speak with? How can I reach them?

Do you have any questions for the research team?

Annex 3. Focus group discussion guidelines

Introductory Workshop

This workshop with Sendong survivors aims to (1) introduce the research and research team, (2) identify livelihoods and generally characterise changes pre and post Sendong, (3) identify and characterise the places people went post Sendong, (4) find out how workshop participants define vulnerability.

Workshop schedule and activities:

1. Opening activities (30 min)
 - a. Opening prayer (most of the meetings I've attended here open and close with a prayer) and thank participants for coming – (2 min)
 - b. Logistics (timetable, CR location, etc.) - (5 min)
 - c. Introduce research, research team, today's activities. (5 min)

Christine Gibb a PhD researcher from the University of Montreal in Canada. I'm interested in the migration experiences of people affected by Typhoon Sendong in and around Cagayan De Oro. In particular, I am interested in the changes in people's livelihoods since December 2011. Kuki Musngni is part of the research team; she's helping with translation during today's workshop and interviews later on.

Today, we'll be asking you about (1) your livelihoods, and the changes in your livelihoods since Sendong, (2) the places you went after Sendong – for living, for work/ livelihoods, for disaster relief, for recreational/ religious activities, and for activism purposes, and (3) which groups are the most vulnerable after Sendong. The results of the workshop and the other research activities (e.g. interviews and participatory video) will be used for Chris' PhD dissertation. Copies of the research reports will be given to groups in CDO and Manila. There is no project or funding that is associated with this research project.

- d. Note on confidentiality, participation and withdrawal from research (2 min)

Your participation in this research consists of sharing your migratory experiences during and after Sendong. The information you share will be kept confidential. The information will be coded so that only the primary researcher can identify individual participants. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the research at any point and to ask that any information you share not be included in the research.

- e. Go around the room and everyone introduce themselves and say (1) one thing they do for their livelihood, and (2) the *barangay* in which they lived pre-Sendong. (15-20 min)
2. Livelihoods theme (60 min)
 - a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the types of livelihoods of people living in the community. Write the list on flipchart paper. (5 min)
 - b. Break into livelihood-based groups. Each group discusses the following questions: (20 min)
 - i. Describe the typical persons doing this livelihood (age, male/female, marital status, level of education, religion, economic status)?

- ii. What is the daily/weekly/monthly/annual wage of someone with this livelihood?
 - iii. Is this livelihood secure? Why or why not?
 - iv. Where is the location of this livelihood? How much time does it take to get from home to work? How much does it cost? What mode of transportation is used to get there?
 - v. Describe what happened to this livelihood during and after Sendong. For example, did the livelihood offer more or less employment to people? Did people have to take time off? Were new jobs created? Did the pay increase, decrease or stay the same?
- c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min)
 - d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min)
3. *Merienda* (snack) break
4. Places theme (90 min)
- a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the places people went during and after Sendong. Write each place on flipchart paper. (10 min)
 - b. Break into 4 small groups. Each group discusses 1 of the following questions: (30 min)
 - i. Where did people go for “living” and “sleeping” immediately after Sendong and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong?
 - 1. Draw it out like a timeline
 - 2. Why did you go to each of these places?
 - 3. Describe the profile of the people who went to these places (age, sex, marital status, level of education, religion, economic status).
 - 4. Who did not go to these places?
 - ii. Where did people go for “relief” and “recovery” needs immediately after Sendong and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? (same 4 points as “living” and “sleeping” question)
 - iii. Where did people go for “work” and “livelihoods” immediately after Sendong and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? (same 4 points as “living” and “sleeping” question)
 - iv. Where did people go for “recreational” and “religious” and “activism” activities immediately after Sendong and in the days, weeks and months after Sendong? (same 4 points as “living” and “sleeping” question)
 - c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min)
 - d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min)
5. Lunch (reimburse participants for travel costs)
6. Vulnerability theme (60 min)

- a. As a large group, do a brainstorm (list) of all the types of people who are most affected by disasters. Write the list on flipchart paper. (5 min)
 - b. Break into 3 small groups. Each group discusses 1 of the following questions: (20 min)
 - i. For each group (type of person), describe the reasons why they are “vulnerable”?
 - ii. For each group (type of person), describe their assets (e.g. skills, abilities, knowledge, physical possessions, social networks, land, etc.)?
 - iii. You’ve listed vulnerable groups that you – the survivors of Sendong – know to be vulnerable. Compare your list to the groups of people the government, religious groups, relief agencies and NGOs define as vulnerable. If there are any differences between lists, why are there differences?
 - c. Each group reports back to the larger group (20 min)
 - d. Individuals comment on other groups (10 min)
7. Closing (5 min)
- a. Invite participants to volunteer for a longer individual or household semi-structured interview about their personal experiences, and indicate if they want to participate in the video-making component (take down names afterwards) (3 min)
 - b. Thank participants for their participation and closing prayer (2 min)