Université de Montréal

The Importance of Language:
The Impact of Linguistic Vitality on Intergroup Tensions

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Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de
Philosophiae Doctor (Ph.D.) en science politique

Août 2014

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures

Cette thèse intitulée:

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Résumé

Cette thèse vise à mieux comprendre les tensions ethniques. Ceci est fait en explorant, dans une étude en quatre parties, l'une de ses caractéristiques les plus importantes mais sévèrement négligées: la langue. S'inspirant des traditions de recherche de la sociolinguistique, de la psychologie sociale et de la science politique, cette thèse fournit une analyse en profondeur de l'influence de la langue sur les relations intergroupes. Elle le fait, spécifiquement, en se concentrant sur l'influence que la vitalité linguistique, la santé sociale d'une langue, a sur les tensions sociales. Cette thèse propose un cadre théorique dans lequel le niveau de vitalité linguistique contribue à générer des griefs culturels qui ont une incidence par la suite sur les relations intergroupes.

Le premier article explore la relation macro entre la vitalité linguistique et l'intensité des conflits intergroupes. Les résultats, dérivés de données de l'Atlas UNESCO des langues en danger dans le monde et du projet *Minorities at Risk* (MAR), démontrent une relation curvilinéaire où les niveaux bas et élevé de vitalité linguistique génèrent une intensité inférieure au niveau modéré de vitalité. Ces résultats confirment que la vitalité linguistique est un déterminant important des tensions ethniques fondées sur la langue d'une manière générale, mais encore davantage pour les pays ayant plusieurs minorités linguistiques.

Le deuxième article explore l'influence de la vitalité linguistique sur la confiance politique. Il utilise des données de l'Atlas UNESCO des langues en danger dans le monde ainsi que des données du *European Social Survey* (ESS). Les résultats soutiennent un modèle de médiation dans lequel la vitalité linguistique influence positivement la confiance politique d'une manière directe ainsi qu'indirectement par le biais de la discrimination perçue.

Le troisième article cherche à isoler la séquence socio-psychologique qui relie la vitalité linguistique aux tensions intergroupes. Des données de sondage originales ont été recueillies auprès de francophones du Québec, de l'Ontario, du Nouveau-Brunswick et du Manitoba. Les résultats d'analyses de régression multiple soutiennent une séquence socio-psychologique dans laquelle la menace endogroupe influence les attitudes envers l'exogroupe par le biais de la menace perçue comme étant causée par l'exogroupe. Ainsi, ces constats soulignent l'importance des perceptions de la vitalité linguistique pour les attitudes intergroupes.

Le quatrième article, produit en collaboration avec Patrick Fournier et Veronica Benet-Martinez, utilise un protocole expérimental pour déterminer le rôle causal de la vitalité linguistique sur les attitudes intergroupes. Les résultats démontrent que le type d'information, positif ou négatif, au sujet de la vitalité linguistique influence les perceptions de menace envers une langue. Cependant, les résultats quant à l'impact de l'information à propos de la vitalité linguistique sur les attitudes envers l'exogroupe, l'appui à la souveraineté et l'identité subjective sont moins évidents.

Cette thèse permet de mieux comprendre les tensions intergroupes en démontrant le rôle important que joue la vitalité linguistique sur des phénomènes macros ainsi que sur les attitudes des individus.

Mots clés : Vitalité linguistique, intergroupe, conflit, confiance, perceptions, attitudes.

Summary

This dissertation seeks to add to the understanding of ethnic tensions. It does so by exploring in a four-part study one of its most important but severely overlooked features: language. Combining research traditions from sociolinguistics, social psychology and political science, this dissertation provides an in depth analysis of language's influence on intergroup relations. It does so, specifically, by concentrating on the influence that linguistic vitality, the social health of a language, has on social tensions. This dissertation puts forward a theoretical framework in which linguistic vitality is presented as fueling cultural grievances, which subsequently impact intergroup relations.

The first article explores the general macro-social relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup conflict intensity. Using data from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger and from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, the results show a curvilinear relationship in which low and high levels of linguistic vitality generate lower conflict intensity than moderate vitality levels. The findings support linguistic vitality as being an important determinant of language-based ethnic tensions in a general manner, but even more so for countries with multiple linguistic minorities.

The second article explores the influence of linguistic vitality on political trust. The results of the analyses, using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and linguistic vitality data from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, show that linguistic vitality positively influences trust in national institutions and that perceptions of linguistic discrimination decrease political trust. The findings further indicate that the status of a language, how 'official' it is, also positively affects trust in national institutions. Therefore, language is clearly underscored as being an important dimension of political trust.

The third article seeks to isolate the socio-psychological sequence which connects linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions. Original survey data was gathered from Francophones in Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba. The findings, using stepwise regression analyses, support a socio-psychological sequence in which in-group threat influences attitudes towards the out-group through the mediation of perceived threat caused by the out-group. Thus, these findings emphasize the importance of linguistic vitality perceptions on intergroup attitudes

The fourth, and final, article, in collaboration with Patrick Fournier and Verònica Benet-Martínez, uses an experimental design to ascertain the causal role of linguistic vitality on intergroup attitudes. The results demonstrate that the type of information, positive or negative, on linguistic vitality influences perceptions of threat towards a language. However, results about linguistic vitality information's impact on out-group attitudes, support for sovereignty and subjective identity were less one-sided.

This dissertation permits to shine new light on group tensions by highlighting the important role that linguistic vitality plays on macro-social phenomena and micro-individual attitudes.

Keywords: Linguistic Vitality, Intergroup, Conflict, Trust, Perceptions, Attitudes.

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CoR	New Brunswick Confederation of Regions party
CoW	Correlates of War
ESS	European Social Survey
ISPP	International Society of Political Psychology
MAR	Minorities at Risk project
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project
OV	Objective Vitality
SEV	Subjective Ethno-linguistic Vitality
SQP	Survey Design Predictor
SVQ	Subjective Vitality Questionnaire

Remerciements

The PhD process is a tough challenge. It is a journey full of learning and discovery, wonderful encounters and stimulating conversations. Yet, it is also laden with obstacles and, all too often, a sense of confusion which engender doubt and desperation in PhD students (we all go down that dark road). This is why the PhD path is not a lonely adventure, it cannot be. It is completed by individuals that inherently guide, teach and listen; making the process not only worthwhile but ultimately enjoyable and successful.

I understood from the very beginning that the quintessential piece of a successful PhD is the supervisor. Supervisors serve as the primary mentor, teaching and guiding the apprentice through a long and difficult process. A supervisor acts as a vital support for the student, taking the lead in administrative battles, listening to the apprentice's worries and finding ways to make sure everything works out in the end. Described is of course an ideal-type of the PhD supervisor. Yet, in my case, Patrick Fournier came as close as possible to this ideal. It is obvious that this dissertation would not be possible without him. Moreover, beyond the PhD, I would not be the scholar that I've become without his guidance. Words cannot express the gratitude I have for all that he has done for me.

I am also grateful to other mentors who have helped guide me to the proverbial PhD finish line. Chief amongst them is Richard Nadeau. Richard has perfected that art of turning wary-eyed students into professional academics. He does not force pragmatism on students, but rather gently and politely guides them away from their errors towards where they need to go. I am also appreciative of Richard for something else. Social research can be perplexing for young researchers often causing them to wonder whether what they are doing is worthwhile and not

simply a waste of time and resources. Questioning the benefits, contributions and scholarly attraction of linguistic vitality on social relations did take hold of me. Richard decided to go out of his way and to let me know that I was doing great and interesting work. Such encouragement and kind words are a treasure for any young scholar.

I also owe a great debt to Alain Noël. Not only did he take me on as a collaborator, he treated me as an equal. Furthermore, his advice on how to properly navigate through the academic waters has been indispensable. Alain did a great deal to give me a solid academic foundation. I would also like to thank Jean-François Godbout. He is an eclectic, brilliant person who knows exactly what PhD candidates are going through. His advice on the PhD process, and the transition thereafter, was truly priceless and greatly appreciated. André-J. Bélanger also deserves my gratitude. Not only did he help prepare me for the PhD endeavour, he regularly followed up on my journey and was always willing to share helpful advice. I am truly grateful for his passion and kindness.

I would also like to acknowledge the important role played by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Citizenship (CSDC) in my academic development. Not only have the members of the CSDC build, over a relatively short period, a world-class research centre, they put in place a structure aimed at developing their student members. Besides the non-negligible resources that I benefited from to develop my skills and knowledge, I also greatly profited from the forum provided by the CDSC to young scholars to learn and produce academic material; an important exchange that played a significant part in my academic development. To Elisabeth Gidengil, Dietling Stolle, Benjamin Forest, Stuart Soroka, Éric Bélanger and Antoine Bilodeau, your dedication to the Centre's students is truly priceless.

I additionally owe special thanks to André Blais. Though I am not one of André's students, he made accessible to me his Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies, giving me a place to work and exchange with fellow colleagues. André also offered me his wealth of knowledge and scholarly guidance. He treated me so much like one of his own students that people would often think he was my supervisor. André has truly built a convivial forum for young and experienced researchers to exchange, learn and grow; a group which I felt privileged to be part of.

Doing research at the intersection of several fields of study can be an overwhelming venture, especially for a young scholar. I therefore owe a great debt to the academics who shared with me their thoughts and expertise of fields outside my comfort zone. Marie-Joëlle Zahar and Magdalena Dembinska were gracious enough to aid me navigate through helpful literature in international relations and conflict studies. Verònica Benet-Martínez deserves similar gratitude for her suggestions dealing with socio-psychological aspects of the theoretical frameworks and of research design used in my dissertation. Even more challenging for me was venturing towards sociolinguistics. An unavoidable passage to make for the topic of this dissertation, sociolinguistics was at the onset completely foreign to me. This is why Rodrigue Landry was so helpful in his recommendations; help for which I am truly grateful. The advice of these scholars played an especially important part in the subsequent articles.

I would also like to thank Ignacio Lago Peñas for welcoming me as a visiting scholar at the *Grup de Recerca en Comportament Polític* at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. This stay allowed me to expand my knowledge of linguistic issues and get a wider first hand

perception of linguistic minorities around Europe. Thus, thoroughly contributing to the quality of this dissertation.

For financial support, I need to thank the *Fonds de recherche du Québec - société et culture* (FRQSC), the CSDC, the Department of Political Science of the Université de Montreal, and my supervisor Patrick Fournier. Their assistance was not only greatly appreciated, it was also indispensable to the realisation of this dissertation.

Two fellow PhD candidates, Chris Chhim and Jean-Philippe Gauvin, merit special gratitude. What started out as a collaboration on an article developed into friendship. We worked together, learned from each other and encouraged, through sometimes difficult times, one another. We truly became 'three dimensions' with a shared goal: submit a dissertation! *Merci les gars*! The PhD process would not have been as simple, fun and 'delicious' without these two colleagues and friends.

The PhD process does not simply stay at the office. It takeover one's life. Ayşegül Erman deserves special appreciation for not only encouraging me through this long and difficult process, but for also listening to me and stimulating my intellectual thoughts. *Her şey için teşekkür ederim*.

Finally, I would like to thank the commentators at various conferences for their suggestions, recommendations that greatly improved the articles which make up this thesis.

The PhD process is a tough journey, but it is not one that is accomplished alone. For all those who have been kind enough to help along the way, I am truly grateful. Thank you!

1

Introduction

Intergroup conflicts evidently represent a source for grave concern. They are not only a cause of social instability, they can also result in the loss of life. Out of all the social cleavages that can divide populations, ethnicity garners great academic, political and media interest. This attention is mainly driven by their destructive potential, their increased incidence and their quasi-universal prospective. In fact, ethnic distinction arguably holds the highest potential for violence and death out of all social cleavages (Ellingsen 2000, Huth and Valentino 2008). There are scores of cases in which ethnic strife has led to terrorist attacks or even to full-scale warfare. Moreover, the tendency of ethnic divisions to develop into intergroup tensions has also increased in recent decades (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997, Hewitt, Wilkenfeld et al. 2008). Added to these worries is the fact that most countries are heterogeneous (Ellingsen 2000, Duffy Toft 2002). Thus, the vast majority of countries can potentially be the stage for such problematic and deadly social phenomena.

Yet, ethnic tensions are not a monolithic social phenomenon. Ethnicity can divide groups on evident social markers such as religion, language or race; but such social discords can also be based on less evident ties of kinship, such as tribe and clan membership. Although ethnic social cleavages are centered on a variety of ethnic markers, sometimes even on multiple ethnic distinctions, when carefully examined, one ethnic division stands out among the rest: language. An overwhelming majority of ethnic conflicts possess a linguistic difference between the conflicting parties (Medeiros 2010). This suggests that linguistic social factors are an important element in intergroup tensions. In fact, there are so many cases of social group tensions possessing a linguistic division that characteristics specific to language may be an essential key for better understanding, and alleviating, ethnic conflicts in general.

Important issues related to ethnic tensions have been the focus of a large body of research. More specifically, the causes which lead to intergroup tensions, the factors which exacerbate these tensions, as well as manners to attenuate or resolve intergroup hostilities have been the subject of a growing literature. Yet, the importance of language in ethnic division seems to have been so far underappreciated.

This is not to suggest that the role of language in group tensions has been completely ignored. Benedict Anderson's seminal work (2006) gives a prominent role to language in the development of modern nationalism and the rise of ethnic tensions, even remarking on the "fatal diversity of human language"(48). However, a brighter light is yet to be shone on the relationship between language and intergroup tensions. Although many states house multiple linguistic groups and many social tensions have populations divided by language, the literature on linguistic group relations is far from exhaustive. This situation leaves many questions unanswered. Notably among these is a very basic one: How does language influence intergroup tensions?

Research examining characteristics of linguistic group relations does exist. Yet, this scholarship seemingly lacks the depth required to properly comprehend the influence of language on intergroup tensions. This situation might be due to the bicephalous nature of the topic. The study of intergroup linguistic tensions has taken place in disjointed fashion between two main academic branches: political science and sociolinguistics / social psychology. The former concentrates on intergroup tensions in terms of intensity but also examines policy and institutional influences on intergroup relations. It is centered on macro-level phenomena, exploring the way in which societal factors impact intergroup tensions. The latter, on the other hand, driven by sociolinguists and social psychologists, focuses on micro-level phenomena

among individuals, notably socio-psychological factors such as attitudes, which greatly impact intergroup relations. Despite a focus on the same subject matter, research in these two camps has remained distant from one another. This scholarly separation weakens the understanding of linguistic group relations. This counterproductive academic situation has led to a call for more collaboration between these different fields of research (Phillipson 1999).

This dissertation takes up this call and aims to address this gap in the scholarship. It seeks to add to the understanding of ethnic tensions by examining one of its most important but severely overlooked features. This dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of language's influence on intergroup relations.

Hence, by exploring the role that language has on intergroup relations, this research aspires to contribute to the scholarship on civil strife. Specifically, four separate articles explore in a comprehensive manner linguistic group tensions. This series of articles begins by examining macro-social phenomena and progressively takes a micro-level turn to focus on individuals. These novel studies shine new light onto linguistic group tensions and allow us to better understand the manner in which language influences social relations.

The first article is a two-part macro-level quantitative analysis. It initially attempts to determine whether a general relationship exists between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. Thereafter, the study delves into an exploration of countries with multiple linguistic conflicts to better isolate linguistic vitality's impact on conflict intensity. The study captures objective linguistic vitality through data from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger; whereas conflict intensity is grasped through data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. The findings show that linguistic vitality levels have an impact on conflict intensity.

Specifically, the results demonstrate a curvilinear relationship in which low and high levels of linguistic vitality generate lower conflict intensity than moderate vitality levels. The findings reveal linguistic vitality's influence on language-based ethnic tensions in a general manner, but even more so for countries with several linguistic minorities.

The second article turns its focus towards the relationship between linguistic vitality and trust in national institutions. Seeing that institutional trust can play a non-negligible role in the relations between majority and minority groups, this study explores the impact that language has on this attitude. The paper elaborates on the linguistic grievances framework and presents a mediation model in which perceived discrimination acts as a mediating factor between linguistic vitality and institutional trust. Though the results, using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and linguistic vitality data derived from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, do not fully support the proposed mediation model, they do show that linguistic vitality positively influences trust in national institutions and that perceptions of linguistic discrimination decrease political trust. The findings further indicate that the more 'official' the status of a language, the more trust the linguistic group members will have in national institutions. Therefore, language is clearly underscored as being an important dimension of political trust.

The third article furthers the micro-level turn as it attempts to determine the socio-psychological sequence which connects linguistic vitality to intergroup attitudes. The study focuses on Canada's Francophones because they form a diverse linguistic minority on a vitality level. Original survey data was gathered from Francophone university students in Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba. The findings support a socio-psychological sequence connecting objective vitality to attitudes towards out-groups and the country. Moreover, the

results of stepwise regression analyses support mediation for a shortened sequence in which threat to French influences attitudes towards out-groups through the mediation of perceived threat caused by the out-group. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate that believing that the out-group threatens a group's language fully mediates the influence of perceived in-group threat on out-group attitudes.

The fourth, and final, article uses an experimental protocol in order to isolate the causal influence of linguistic vitality perceptions on intergroup attitudes. In order to achieve this goal, an experimental design was conceived to manipulate perceptions of linguistic vitality to, consequently, capture its effect on intergroup attitudes. The study once again focuses on Canada; this time centering the scope of the exploration on Quebec only. The perceptions of linguistic vitality, specifically of French in Quebec, were manipulated in order to gage their causal effect on individuals' other attitudes. The results demonstrate that linguistic information impacts levels of perceived in-group threat. The findings of this experiment also demonstrate a heterogeneous effect, based on the identity and the threat levels initially held by subjects, of linguistic perceptions on out-group attitudes, support for sovereignty and subjective identity.

These four studies provide new insight into language's influence on intergroup relations. They allow to better understand the manner in which language can influence social phenomena as well as how linguistic factors' impact individuals' attitudes. This dissertation thus serves as an important contribution to the comprehension of language's influence on intergroup tensions. Though it is not able to fully explore the subject, it does serve as an academic leap for research on linguistic group tensions.

1.1 Setting the – Linguistic - Groundwork

The thorough research of linguistic group relations requires the exploration of relevant past scholarly works and appropriate methodological methods, as well as the conception of a theoretical framework able to explain language's influence on intergroup relations.

The following section exposes, firstly, an overview of the scholarship relating to language and intergroup tensions. It will, initially, present the principal factors believed to generate intergroup tensions, factors which can exacerbate such tensions, and possible solutions to alleviate them. In order to thoroughly appreciate the understanding of such phenomena, ethnic group relations are explored in a general manner and linguistic groups in a more precise fashion. Seeing that a part of the literature is only applicable to linguistic groups, findings from the sociolinguistics / social psychology tradition are, thereafter, portrayed.

This chapter, secondly, expressly exposes the potential contribution of this dissertation. Thereafter, this chapter, thirdly, develops a theory which links language to conflict intensity through a sequence of socio-psychological mechanisms. This theoretical model focuses on a linguistic concept from sociolinguistics: linguistic vitality. The notion of linguistic vitality refers to the ability to use a language in a given social environment. Based on a rationalist perspective in which a language's social health serves as the basis for linguistic grievances, the theoretical model, the socio-psychological linguistic conflicts model, hypothesizes the manner in which linguistic vitality can influence conflict intensity. The model states that objective linguistic vitality influences perceptions of linguistic vitality, which subsequently determines levels of in-group threat, which, consequently, results in positive or negative attitudes towards the out-group and, ultimately, in intergroup peace or conflict.

In order to accurately and thoroughly test the proposed model, this chapter, fourthly, exposes a review of appropriate methodological techniques. Seeing that we seek to comprehensively explore the relationship between language and intergroup tensions, and that the proposed theoretical model examines the relationship between two macro-social variables which are presumed to be linked through a socio-psychological sequence, a macro to micro approach is thus followed. This empirical framework starts by exploring the general social relationship and progressively focuses on the individual. Therefore, indicators of conflict intensity, which generally highlight the relationship between macro-social variables, are initially highlighted. This is followed by a presentation of survey design and experiments, two often used empirical techniques which explore micro-level phenomena.

With the purpose of exploring the principal research question of the dissertation, testing the proposed theoretical model, and arriving at a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup relations, four separate studies that form the core of this dissertation are, sixthly, elaborated.

This introductory chapter is a comprehensive exploration of not only the relationship between language and intergroup tensions, but also of the social issues which underline these subjects and of the empirical tools used to analyse them. It also acts as an overture to the four articles which form the core of this dissertation.

1.2 Group Tensions and Language: The State of the Literature

The influence of linguistic factors on social phenomena as well as individuals' behaviour has been, for the most part, carried out by two branches of social sciences: political

science and sociolinguistics / social psychology. The main objective of this review is to bring both streams of research together in a thorough assessment of their respective contributions to the understanding of linguistic intergroup relations.

1.2.1 Leading to Conflict: The Main Causes of Intergroup Tensions

Although social tensions have been presented as an inescapable part of human nature (Ardry 1966, Lorenz 1966, Cosmides and Tooby 1992), no intergroup conflict arises out of thin air. Intergroup conflicts can be seen as the exception in intergroup relations not the rule (Parsons 1951, Smelser 1962, Johnson 1966). Therefore, there needs to be a spark that drives groups away from amicable interactions towards strife. Even for primordialists, who believe that past tensions are never truly abated and can resurface at any moment, there always needs to be a tangible catalyst which leads groups into conflict.[1]

Academic scholarship has identified a few important social factors that have been shown to impact intergroup relations. What follows is a general overview of potential causes of intergroup tensions.

Resources

As with any social phenomenon, intergroup tensions have multiple causes. Rarely can a single event or reason fully account for issues affecting intergroup members. However, a large

[1] For more detailed examples of primordialist theory, see Geertz (1963), Isaacs (1977), Smith (1981) and Sudetic (1998).

segment of the scholarship dealing with intergroup conflicts highlights one dominant factor accounting for unhealthy relations between groups: resources.

The focus on the causal role which resources play on intergroup tensions goes back several decades. Classic works on intergroup conflicts reserved a special place for the struggle for resources. None may be more seminal in highlighting this influence than Sherif's Robbers Cave experiment (1956). The researcher and his team demonstrated that friends could easily be turned into enemies in striving for limited resources. The same struggle for resources has often been associated with the development of ethnic conflicts. Cohen (1974) underlined that the cause of intergroup ethnic conflicts is quite always linked to economic and/or political resources. Groups who find themselves in a disadvantaged social position develop frustration towards the social hierarchy and the advantaged group, these sentiments simmer and eventually lead to aggression (Dollard, Miller et al. 1939).

Still, resource inequality might also worsen intergroup relations in the opposite direction. Though resource inequality spurs disadvantaged groups to want to redress their situation, it can also push dominant groups to reinforce their prevailing position and thus further the social gap between groups (Bartkus 1999, Sambanis and Milanovic 2011); resulting in a further poisoning of majority-minority relations (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995, Muñoz and Tormos 2014).

The role of resource inequality, and the resentment caused by it, in group tensions has also been specifically highlighted in linguistic intergroup relations (Inglehart and Woodward 1967). Fishman (1990) even states that resources are the key factor to properly understanding linguistic tensions.

Resource inequality is often amplified because it is easily institutionalized. Structural constraints of polities can establish an unjust resource distribution. The tangible impact of institutionalized rules which disadvantage a specific group is to limit social mobility and keep alive the disproportional social relationship between groups (Petersen 2002, Hooghe 2007). Unfair institutional hurdles frustrate disadvantaged groups and, consequently, lead to conflict (Birnir 2007). Though it is human nature to seek to maintain an advantageous position in group relations (Sidanius and Pratto 2001), recent tendencies, especially in liberal democracies, have emphasized attempts to address disadvantaged and discriminatory situations (Kymlicka 2005).

Yet, an important factor worth highlighting is that the scholarship has also emphasized that the key to the eruption of tensions lies not in the actual intergroup resource situation but rather in the perception of injustice (Davies 1962, Gurr 1970). No matter the objective state of the intergroup resource distribution, the determining factor is the manner in which group members assess the situation. The role which the perception of resource distributions plays in intergroup relations is also a main feature of several socio-psychological theories on intergroup dynamics – namely, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Therefore, if group members perceive themselves as not possessing an amount of economic and political resources they believe to be fair, tensions towards the dominant out-group will arise.

Though the importance played by resources in intergroup relations seems to be quite well established, this argument has not been without some criticism. Around the turn of the millennium, a new current of research called into question the significance of resource inequality for intergroup conflicts. These studies looked beyond the sentiments which perceived unfairness might generate among individuals and concentrated on another motivational factor:

greed. Famously associated with Collier and Hoeffler's seminal text (2004), this school of thought put forward that individuals' greed better explains the onset of intergroup conflicts than their perceived grievances. Greed's individualistic nature was seen as a stronger determinant of conflict than grievances' collective stature (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Still, the conclusion that personal avarice was better at explaining conflict dynamics than social grievances was quickly attacked by the academic community. A slew of scholars pointed to the fact that both motivational factors tend to work together, with greed demonstrated to actually be influenced by the presence of intergroup resource differences (Gurr 2002, Kalyvas 2003, Sambanis 2004, Korf 2005, Regan and Norton 2005, Murshed 2008). An argument supported by Collier and colleagues' acknowledgement (2009) that even in cases in which conflicts are not directly caused by grievances, they remain an essential determinant.

Though the importance of resources in conflicts is undeniable, as Ballentine (2003) puts it, very few group tensions can simply be presented as standalone resource conflicts. Rather, the role of political actors cannot be overlooked.

Political Elites

There is a long line of research which demonstrates that intergroup tensions can be used, even created, by political actors in order to serve their own interests (Brass 1985, Rothchild 1986, Davis and Moore 1997, Fox 2000, Saideman and Ayres 2000, Fox 2001, Soeters 2005). The essential role of political elites in conflicts can truly be appreciated by Gurr's statement (1970) that the discontent in intergroup relations has to be politicized before it can be transformed into conflict.

Yet, research shows that the role of political actors in group tensions is in itself linked to resources. It is in the struggle for more political and economic resources that political elites can play on regional and ethnic differences (Offe 1998, Fitjar 2010). Political actors can purposely ignore factual evidence in order to overstate the disadvantage of their group and overplay the opposite side in a negative light (Bourhis and Foucher 2012). Too often, this resource manipulation takes on a strategic electoralist dimension which can contribute to intergroup divisions (McRae 1986, Young and Bélanger 2008, Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, Meguid 2010, Bourhis and Foucher 2012, Sandri 2012). Although elites can generate and intensify group tensions, one must not forget that their role is also essential to alleviate troublesome social situations (Zolberg 1977, Glaeser 2005, Uslaner 2011). This is because the political discourse of elites plays an important part in guiding individuals' attitudes in either a positive or negative manner (Muñoz Mendoza 2008). Therefore, politicization can also work as a mediating factor between resource disparity and intergroup relations. Political elites can thus at once be seen as the creators and the guardians of intergroup tensions.

The influence of resources, the perceptions attached to them and their politicization by political elites on the onset of group tensions cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, the literature also highlights the importance of another macro-social variable.

Social Diversity

Though the mere perception of a difference between groups is enough to generate in-group bias (Tajfel, Billig et al. 1971), there is no evidence that the mere existence of social heterogeneity is enough to generate a conflict. Rather, social diversity seems to act more as a factor which influences the intensity of group tensions rather than the spark that ignites them.

Mill (2010 (1861)) had early on pointed to the possible adverse effects of a heterogeneous population on national peace; he presented diversity as hurting the unity of public opinion and of government. Some recent studies have also lined their conclusions in this direction. The level of diversity of a country, whether it is more ethnically homogenous or heterogeneous, has been presented as negatively impacting intergroup tensions (Sambanis 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003).

However, as Reilly (2000/01) points out, ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily increase conflict intensity. Sambanis and Milanovic (2011) even point to the alleviating role that greater diversity can have on intergroup tensions. The relationship between diversity and conflict has rather been shown to be curvilinear (Fearon and Laitin 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These results showcase the lack of danger in the extremes of the diversity scale because, at one end there is quasi or full homogeneity and at the other the level of ethnic fragmentation is so elevated that it forces groups to work together. The hazard is hence believed to lie in the middle range of social heterogeneity, especially in bipolar divisions such as those found in Canada and Belgium (Reilly 2000/01).

In multilingual states - such as Canada and Belgium - diversity has been given a prominent role in the scholarship. This emphasis becomes especially important when, as Laponce (1987) claims, there are no unilingual states.[2] McRae (1983) found that linguistic heterogeneity constituted a danger to peace because his empirical evidence showed that linguistic homogeneity leads to less conflict intensity. For his part, Laponce (1987) follows the middle range of the heterogeneity argument and presented that the rejection of out-groups by

[2] Though Laponce's statement is more a reference to dialects than actual linguistic distinctiveness, the fact remains that there are very few countries in which there is not at least two autochthonous linguistically distinctive groups.

linguistic groups shows a curvilinear relationship with territorial homogeneity. Yet, Inglehart and Woodward (1967) had earlier showed that economic perceptions and resource discrimination play key roles in linguistic conflicts, that tensions are not simply linked to the existence of a distinct language. Fishman (1989) re-examined the linguistic diversity phenomenon and found that without it being combined with a number of other societal factors, notably deprivation and authoritarianism, linguistic heterogeneity is not conducive to increased conflict intensity.

Therefore, research overall presents social diversity as not leading by itself to intergroup tensions. Rather diversity is portrayed as an influence on conflict intensity, an influence which, depending of the circumstances, may even alleviate social tensions.

This exploration of the possible causes of intergroup tensions highlighted the importance of economic and/or political resources. Even when other social factors were presented as impacting intergroup relations, a relationship with resources has generally been uncovered.

After exploring the causes which can lead to intergroup tensions and the factors which can intensify them, it is important to examine possible solutions in order to alleviate or resolves improper group relations.

1.2.2 Resolution of Intergroup Tensions: Suggested Paths to Peace

It can be argued that conflict resolution has become its own branch of the social sciences. There are so many scholars, and even journals, devoted to resolving, or at the very least attenuating, tensions between groups. Such scholarly interest towards conflict resolution

has permitted the evocation of a variety of different options available to improve intergroup relations. We expose the most prominent ones.

Homogeneity

The most efficient manner to resolve a conflict between two groups is to eliminate contact between both groups. To achieve this end, and attain social homogeneity, two options are available: elimination and separation.

The first option may be achieved through extermination. This 'solution' refers directly to genocide, defined as the willing destruction of one group by another. Whether the Nazis' 'Final Solution' or the Rwandan Genocide, extermination is seen as an extreme manner of solving the ills caused by social diversity. A somewhat less violent path of eliminating diversity is through complete assimilation. In this option, the out-group is eliminated through cultural genocide. Yet, to arrive at such a result undoubtedly means some form of oppression, and most likely violence. The major issue with this option, from a pragmatic point of view, is that assimilation has to be complete or the resentment by the targeted group will greatly amplify the tensions (Kaufmann 1996). However, the development of international humanitarian law, and its subsequent incorporation into the dynamics of intergroup relations, has made such a solution no longer tolerable (see United Nations 1948, UNESCO 1978, Dunbar 2001). Moreover, as Alfredsson (1990) remarks, forced assimilation ultimately fails. For these reasons, elimination, through extermination or assimilation, cannot be considered as a viable option to resolve intergroup tensions.

The second choice to achieve social homogeneity is through separating the groups. Unlike elimination, group separation has been presented as a feasible resolution (Laponce 1987,

Duffy Toft 2002). Kaufmann (1996) actually pushes this separatist notion a step further by presenting group separation, even by force, as the only genuine manner of resolving interethnic conflicts. Beyond the political and moral issues implicated in such an option, forced displacement of groups have also entered into the realm of actions which can constitute crimes of genocide (Patrick 2005). Furthermore, the separation of groups does not bring any guarantees of success. Horowitz (1985) correctly points out that group partition is not an adequate resolution of conflict because it is almost impossible to obtain true social homogeneity. Consequently, without true group homogeneity, the risk of intergroup conflict remains present. And even if true group separation were to be achieved, this option could still manage to exacerbate the conflict because the groups would most likely still be in contact across state borders, but with added resentment (Jenne 2009).

Therefore, the only realistic solution for interethnic tension is for the groups to find a way of co-existing. Collaborative approaches to living with social diversity, rather than seeking homogeneity, are when all is said and done more successful at resolving group conflicts (Gurr 2002).

Contact

Living together, or next to each other, means contact. In opposition to promoters of separation, many other researchers present intergroup interaction as a necessary first step in improving relations. Sherif (1966) outlines that "contact between groups is necessary for any change in their relationships" (143). Contact can decrease intergroup hostility (Newcomb 1947), reduce prejudice and discrimination (Dembinska 2010, Pettigrew, Wagner et al. 2010) and, ultimately, resolve some intergroup differences (Hadjipavlou 2004).

However, contact can also have negative consequences for intergroup relations. Smith (1964) presents data which shows that though greater contact does lead to less prejudice, an increase in the proportion of the out-group leads to more prejudice. Such reactions can be caused by in-group threat (Laponce 1987), social competition (Quillian 1995, Pettigrew 1998) or negative contact experiences (Corenblum and Stephan 2001); all of which can lead to heightened social anxiety among individuals. Thus, contact between members of different groups is not a solution onto itself and can actually worsen intergroup relations.

The ambiguous nature of contact is why Allport (1954), renowned as the originator of contact theory, presented four conditions for contact to be optimally positive: equal status, common objectives, cooperation and institutional support. Sherif (1966) further highlighted one of these conditions: cooperation. He demonstrated the need for cooperation to effectively reduce intergroup tensions. Superordinate goals, such as mutual rewards or having a common enemy, lead conflicting groups to cooperate with each other (Deutsch 1949, Sherif 1958, Sherif 1961). Yet, Sherif (1966) also exposes the need for such cooperative necessity to be long-lasting. Baaklini (1983) suggests achieving this intergroup goal through the creation of integrative institutions. Cooperation has also been shown to have an added benefit as it can blur the divisions between groups and re-categorize individuals' perception of group boundaries (Anastasio, Bachman et al. 1997).

Though contact can reduce intergroup tensions, it alone does not get to the root of tensions. It seems to serve more of an alleviating factor; which needs appropriate conditions to achieve the desired benefit to intergroup tensions. Allport's conditions for optimal contact refers to some form of collective fairness. As previously exposed, tensions are generally believed to arise out of a perceived unfair situation relating to economic and/or political

resources. Therefore, issues which spark tensions have to be ultimately addressed in order to obtain a resolution to the conflict. This undoubtedly leads down the road to 'fairness'.

Achieving Fairness: How to get to an Acceptable Share

The notion of resources seems quite straightforward. However, some elements of economic and political resources, and the manner to perceive or attain them, are far more abstract in nature. This miscellany in resource related matters has led to proposals allowing minority group members to attain a level of comfort vis-à-vis an opposing group. Such solutions range from more individualistic options to more collective ones, but all pass through some form of institutionalization.

Rights

In the past decades, there has been a move away from attempts to harshly deal with social diversity and towards accommodation (Kymlicka 2005). An important part of these accommodations involves rights. However, this avenue has been somewhat controversial.

Although collective rights respond to concerns of the aggrieved group, the sufficient level of appropriate rights tends to remain contested (Offe 1998). Thus, in what De Zwart (2005) describes as the 'dilemma of recognition', discussions on rights could ultimately lead to a heightening of intergroup tensions. Furthermore, the granting, or recognition, of collective rights to one group might also lead other groups in the country to claim the same rights (Bourhis and Foucher 2012); therefore, possibly creating or exacerbating tensions with other groups. These arguments are the basis behind fears which state that cultural recognition, through rights, might actually be an attack against social harmony. This situation has been referred to by

Roshwald (2008) as the 'the dilemma of ethno-cultural diversity'. Group rights are feared to be a slippery slope to never-ending requests (Offe 1998); and thus would not be an actual solution.

In terms of linguistic diversity, linguistic rights have also become a norm (see United Nations 1992). After calls to have linguistic rights recognized as international human rights (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995, May 2011), it would seem that judicial decisions have begun to be interpreted in this manner (Izsák 2012). Yet, as in the case of other rights regimes, the benefits of linguistic rights have also not been universally accepted. They are seen by some as regressive and illiberal because of the limits on individual choice that might be adopted (see Fishman 1991). Furthermore, the linguistic rights regime needs to be adapted to specific situations; "equal rights given to unequal languages will not produce egalitarian situations" (Laponce 1987, 164). Therefore, a truly effective linguistic rights regime might have to be asymmetric, which might provoke other problems for the central authority.

Yet, with all the potential problems which might be sparked by acquiescing to rights' demands, ultimately, the advantage of conveying or protecting rights would far outweigh any possible issues that might be generated. The bulk of the evidence points to the beneficial outcomes for intergroup relations of granting or preserving rights (Gurr, Marshall et al. 2000, Hooghe 2007). Thus, this fact reinforces Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas' claim (1995) that minority rights being a threat to a country is nothing but a myth.

Although rights do not have to be attached to territory (see Coakley 1994, Smith 2013), rights in intergroup tensions are often associated with some form of territorialisation. This process devolves rights and powers to regions in which there is a strong minority presence.

Decentralization

Bauböck (2000) states that the major issue involving claims for rights is that they are often associated with demands for autonomy. In fact, political decentralisation would be the most prominent response to minority issues (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Such attempts at ethnic accommodation have centered on models to give effective power to minority groups (Kymlicka 2005). These structural reforms seek to encourage the resolution of intergroup conflicts (Young 1998).

Linguistic tensions are a perfect example of the association between rights and decentralization. A linguistic rights regime might not ultimately be enough to satisfy linguistic groups. Seeing that controlling a state is the best way for a language to protect itself, territorial boundaries might be required (Laponce 1987).

Hence, political decentralization, such as federalism, has been advanced as a manner of getting intranational groups to peacefully co-exist. These political arrangements are supposed to reduce conflict intensity by giving ethnic groups control over aspects of their own political, social and economic affairs (Lijphart 1977, Lijphart 1979, Horowitz 1991, Gurr 2000). However, for some scholars, as in the case of rights, decentralization is not a solution but rather a slippery path down accentuated intergroup tensions (see Brubaker 1994, Treisman 1997, Bunce 1999, Cornell 2002). This fear is associated with a possible disconnection with the country that decentralization might bring. Autonomy results in institutions similar to states which therefore engage in the socialisation of nation-building similar to countries, which, in turn, can lead to less identification with the central state (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Furthermore, regional institutions have an easier time to claim political successes and tend to blame the central government for problems (Lawler 1992).

The reduction of national attachment is what Kymlicka (2001) calls the 'paradox of multination federalism'. While decentralization provides minorities with workable alternatives to secession, it manages to make secession more realistic. Though, in reference to the Quebec case, Mendelsohn (2002) presents a bit of a nationalistic paradox in which nationalist sub-state sentiments grow but attachment with the central state prevents secession. This perspective is in line with Linz and Stepan's inference (1992) that the lack of attachment to the central state might have resulted in the explosion of Yugoslavia. Simply because regional attachment becomes more predominant than national attachment does not necessarily mean a disconnect with the latter; rather, dual identities might peacefully co-exist (Pallarés, Lago et al. 2006, Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). Therefore, in terms of the concerns related to national attachment conjured up by decentralization, the worries have somewhat tended to be exaggerated.

This overstated situation also applies in general terms to overall concerns associated with decentralization. Not only has scholarship tended to show an overall benefit for decentralization's ability to mitigate conflicts (Kohli 1997, Stepan 1999, Bermeo 2002), it has also shown a capacity for autonomy to relieve resource disparities which tend to be the underlying cause of social conflicts (Kymlicka 2005, Lublin 2012). One issue highlighted by scholars is that the pessimist school of thought tends to focus on the fact that autonomy does not eliminate secessionist movements rather than on the fact that autonomy renders these movements unsuccessful (Kymlicka 2005, Bakke and Wibbels 2006). Furthermore, Erk and Anderson (2009) have highlighted that scholars who espouse concerns over decentralization are focused on the post-communist context, conclusions which do not seem to be generalizable

to other regions. Overall, decentralization actually seems to aid in the long-term stability of a country (Fishman 1989, Stepan 1999, Bermeo 2002).

Nonetheless, decentralization can engender uncomfortable situations. In order to mitigate the possible negative effects associated to decentralization, it has been recommended to stay away from overwhelming differences in autonomy between groups and regions (Tarlton 1965, Elazar 1993, Bauböck 2002). Horowitz (1985) enforces that the key to decentralization not becoming a stepping stone to secession is for the interests of the minority in the state to be re-enforced; in other words, a superordinate goal needs to be salient.

Yet, the best antidote seems to be that the central state and its institutions need to be perceived as being fair (Wright 1935, Gurr 1970, Sambanis 2001, Gurr 2002, Cameron 2009). In this perspective, the benefits of decentralization in aiding in the fairer distribution of resources, and even in the protection of collective rights, is unquestionable. Baldacchino and Hepburn (2012) remind us that independence is not always the initial preferred option for minorities but can arise out of frustration with the existing unsatisfactory situation. At the end of the day, a country might not have a choice but to acquiesce to decentralization demands if it wants to remain intact (Cameron 2009). Yet, countries forced to 'unwillingly' decentralize can be re-assured by exploring the data which points to decentralization being an effective solution for intergroup tensions in Western and Third World states (Gurr 2000).

Minority rights and decentralization are effective paths towards resolving intrastate tensions. However, conflicting groups have to ultimately be willing to seek a resolution; there needs to be some sort of collective motivation (Wright 1935, Sherif 1966). And the best way to motivate a group to resolve a conflict is to address past and present economic, political and cultural discrimination (Gurr 2000). Any successful resolution will have to address social

discrimination while at the same time limiting nationalist aspirations (Laitin 1998); an often difficult balancing game. Yet, sub-state aspirations should be recognized and addressed rather than ignored or destroyed (Lecours 2007). Decentralization might be the best option to guarantee collective rights and a fair share of national resources for minorities.

Solutions for intergroup conflicts concentrate on strategies to resolve, decrease or prevent intergroup tensions in the hope of achieving peaceful relationships. Though it might seem sometimes difficult, hope always exists. As Birnir (2007) explains, even past violence is not a barrier to resolving intergroup conflicts.

However, the success or effectiveness of potential solutions relies on their acceptance by the members of the different groups; in other words, all have to be satisfied. Still, as previously mentioned, such judgments tend to be less objective assessments than subjective perceptions. Thus, in order to truly achieve an improvement in intergroup relations, options which seek conflict resolution need to address potential, and important, socio-psychological barriers.

1.2.3 The Wild Card: Psychology

The previous section presented institutional strategies to remediate intergroup relations. Such approaches obviously place the focus on tangible factors which can be presented as elements of change. Yet, the importance of psychological factors, more abstract in nature, is not to be under-estimated. Specifically, emotions have been described as a feature of intergroup tensions that tends to be badly undervalued (Connor 1994). This section presents two main emotions as being major psychological barriers to the effectiveness of resolution strategies: hate and fear.

Hate

As previously mentioned, grievances play a quintessential role in intergroup tensions. The danger associated with grievances is linked to them finding root in disadvantaged social situations, which can be perceived as discrimination and prejudice. Underprivileged social positions can lead to intergroup resentment and hatred (Van Dijk 1987, Essed 1991, Akerlof and Kranton 2000); sentiments which have been described as the best predictors of conflict (Petersen 2002). Such antipathy can be heightened by nationalistic rhetoric, used by political actors to deepen the divide between groups (Coller 2006). When one considers that collective victimization can be passed down from one generation to another, the obstacle to positive intergroup relations can truly be difficult to surmount (Aguilar, Balcells et al. 2011, Balcells 2012).

In terms of linguistic group relations, language policies, either positive (supportive or permissive) or negative (restrictive or prohibitive), have been presented as being at the root of intergroup attitudes (Yavuz 2001, Muñoz Mendoza 2008, Fishman 2010). Thus, the role played by the central state is quintessential because the latter can adopt an accommodating, rather than provocative, approach (Lecours 2012). Consequently, the central government has the power to fan the flames of loathing or alleviate a tense social situation.

Negative intergroup feelings are unquestionably a difficult barrier to improving attitudes between groups. Therefore, intergroup attitudes have to be improved if inter-communal relations are to truly be remediated; a process to which central authorities can easily and positively contribute, if the will exists.

However, dislike is not the only emotional obstacle which impedes the improvement of intergroup relations. Often, intergroup relations are embittered by the emotional power which fear can have over individuals.

Fear

It can be argued that the major psychological barrier to resolving intergroup tensions revolves around fear. Much has been written in the international relations scholarship on the role which fear plays in intergroup conflict. Fear is seen as the main psychological factor in a situation that is felt to be unbalanced or unequal, an imbalance of power which can quickly tilt tensions towards violence (Wright 1935, Richardson 1960, Jervis 1978, Wehr 1979, Posen 1993). Hence, when fear of survival sets in, tensions are surely bound to escalate.

In intergroup tensions, existentialist fears have different points of origin depending on whether the group forms a majority or a minority. Social anxieties in majority-group members have been shown to be linked to changes in the status quo, whereas for minorities the status quo is the basis of their perceived threat (Scheepers and Ellemers 2005).

In the case of majorities, the difference posed by the presence of minorities can represent an existential threat to the state, of which they see themselves the guardians, and generate a survivalist reaction (Offe 1998, Yavuz 2001, Bourhis and Foucher 2012). These fears evidently lead to a greater sensitivity towards real or perceived threats to the state. In this perspective, social diversity may not be seen as a positive notion, resulting in a preference for assimilationist policies and negative attitudes towards pluralist policies due to the perceived increase of risk to the state's territorial integrity or its civic identity (McRae 1997, Offe 1998, Yavuz 2001, Hehman, Gaertner et al. 2012). Identification with a minority identity can be seen as

competition to the main national identity. A fear which research has somewhat justified by demonstrating that minorities possess a weaker sense of national identification (Staerklé, Sidanius et al. 2010). One can thus understand why most countries, and the majorities which rule them, leave little national space for minorities (Bauböck 2000).

However, a minority identity might not actually be anything to worry about. Differing identities, even confronting ones, do not necessarily have to be problematic. Mendelsohn (2002) demonstrates, using the case of Quebec, that opposing identities don't have to enter into conflict, they can be complimentary within individuals. Furthermore, individuals who have integrated an internal compatibility with both identities will identify with both groups (Chen, Benet-Martínez et al. 2008). Hettne (1987) highlights that tensions arise not because of the existence of a difference but rather because that difference is not allowed to be expressed. The risk of social diversity is further weakened by Sambanis and Milanovic's demonstration (2014) that the effects of ethnic distinctiveness on intrastate tensions is conditional on resource inequality. Therefore, to reiterate, social group differences in themselves are not causes of intergroup tensions.

In the case of minorities, fears take on an even stronger survivalist impulse. Their political, economic and even physical security are more often threatened because they do not control their state's apparatus (Saideman and Ayres 2000, Sidanius and Pratto 2001). Majorities can thus be seen as being responsible for minorities' social situation (Dustin and Davis 1970, Brewer 1979, Bettencourt, Brewer et al. 1992). Not only are minorities easily disadvantaged by having less resources, these very same state resources can be used to attack and even destroy them (e.g. Nazi Germany, Rwanda, etc.). Such imagery puts into perspective just how anxiety prone a disadvantaged situation can be for minorities.

In terms of linguistic groups, either majorities or minorities, when an existential threat arises, perceived or real, they tend to react with boundary-maintenance strategies (Fishman 1989). Groups in this position seek to raise the proverbial barriers. These fears can arise when other languages intrude into the group's sphere (Fishman 1989). These groups are seen as a 'Trojan Horse', raising the fear of invasion and destruction (Bourhis and Foucher 2012). As in the case of other social groups, existentialist threats are felt more by linguistic minorities who are in a weaker social position (Laponce 1987).

Beyond being in a majority or minority social position, another non-negligible factor which has been demonstrated to be linked to fear in intergroup relations is interpersonal trust (Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 1995). Groups with low levels of intergroup trust are not only more ethnocentric, they also have a greater tendency to want to separate from the out-group (Brewer 1986, Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011). Though the threatening situation might dissipate, the problem of intergroup trust can still remain (Bailey 2011). Consequently, to attempt to resolve intergroup tensions, building trust between the groups is essential (Bazin 2000, Kaufman 2001, Dembinska 2010); a process in which institutions have been shown to be non-negligible actors (Pettit 1995, Cordell 2009, Karakoç 2013).

Therefore, reconciliation is not simply about correcting social inequalities but must also involve a pro-active attempt at changing intergroup attitudes. Thus, the successful overcoming of negative intergroup attitudes must involve institutional as well as attitudinal changes (McRae 1983, 1997, Rouhana 2004, McGarry and O'Leary 2011). Specifically, negative intergroup attitudes need to be improved and fears among individual group members addressed; two strategies which would help institute interpersonal trust. Though sometimes situations seem

bleak, intergroup attitudes can change; especially if majorities adopt accommodating and conciliatory approaches to social diversity (Bickerton 2011).

Many of the group factors so far surveyed are not really distinguished by language; being applicable in general to both linguistic and non-linguistic intergroup relations. Yet, language possesses specific characteristic that need to be explored.

1.2.4 The Impact of Language on Individuals

Although many aspects of intergroup tensions generally relate to linguistic groups, language poses some particularities of its own that warrant a specific interest.

Firstly, and probably most interestingly, one needs not speak a language to be attached to it (Kulyk 2011). Though the language, in such cases, can be seen in a less important light by non-speakers compared to speakers, by identifying to the language they adopt the emotional baggage and the group links associated with it (Loughlin 2007).

But, unlike many other social groups, the major distinction of groups based on language is that they possess a tangible and quantifiable measure of their identifying feature. The health of the language, and therefore of the group, can be evaluated. This variable is referred to as linguistic vitality, more specifically as objective vitality (OV), and it denotes the overall ability to utilize the language in everyday life. As originally put forward by (Giles, Bourhis et al. 1977), and subsequently further explored, OV is determined by three major variables: group status (Landry and Allard 1994, Ben-Rafael, Shohamy et al. 2006), demographic realities (Stevens 1992, Coupland, Bishop et al. 2005), and institutional support and opportunity (Harwood, Giles et al. 1994, Yagmur and Kroon 2003). Though it might be expected that demographics play a dominating role, their influence can be somewhat offset by institutional support (Cenoz 2001).

These factors merge to determine the ease at which ethno-linguistic group members can use their language in social situations. According to Giles and colleagues (1977), the apex of OV refers to a situation in which a group is able to behave as a distinctive and active entity in relation to another. For Laponce (1987), the best manner to achieve this status, and by the same token guarantee the group's survival, is to attain a situation of unilingualism; or, as an alternative, to be in a dominant sociolinguistic position.

However, linguistic vitality can also be understood as relating to the perceptions of the language's social health, referred to as subjective ethno-linguistic vitality (SEV) (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). The actual ability to use a language and the perceived facility of using that language can be completely different. Therefore, a distinction between both types of vitality is evidently warranted. Though one would assume a strong relationship between OV and SEV, there is no academic consensus on the issue. Some researchers have presented OV and SEV as correlating quite well (Landry and Allard 1992, Gao, Schmidt et al. 1994), while a more independent trajectory has also been shown to exist (Bourhis and Sachdev 1984). SEV might actually be influenced by other variables. For example, Coupland and colleagues (2005) show a positive relationship between fluency and SEV.

Much of the research on linguistic vitality has been devoted to the manner in which it influences intrapersonal behaviour. Landry and Allard (1994) point to a positive relationship between OV and language use. Although the realization of a threatened linguistic state might warrant individuals to speak and promote the language (Laporte 1984). Yet, there might be a point of no return in vitality terms, a situation in which the efforts to maintain the existence of their language are not seen as worthwhile by the group members (Denison 1977, Giles and Johnson 1987).

In terms of language vitality's influence on intergroup behaviour, consensus seems to be lacking on whether high vitality groups seek social distinction (Giles, Bourhis et al. 1977, Gudykunst and Gumbs 1989) or lower ones do so (Giles and Johnson 1981). However, concerning observable behaviour, it is likely to be the perceptions of vitality rather than OV that influence individuals' actions (Giles and Johnson 1987). Thus, SEV has also been presented as having an influence on the harmony of intergroup relations and might actually act as a mediating factor between OV and intergroup behaviour (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). Still, the relationship between SEV and intergroup relations might not be direct, rather it might also be itself mediated by other variables. One such variable which has been identified is ethno-linguistic identification; though the relationship between both variables is not clear. Some studies show a positive relationship (Gao, Schmidt et al. 1994, Landry and Allard 1994, Ytsma, Viladot et al. 1994), while the opposite relationship has also been found (Giles and Johnson 1987, Gardner-Chloros 1991).

Yet, the influence of SEV might not be quintessential to determining intergroup attitudes. Rather, the perceived out-group treatment, regardless of vitality perceptions, has been presented as the key to defining intergroup attitudes (Inglehart and Woodward 1967, Harwood, Giles et al. 1994). Specifically, the perception of threat to the group or its identity posed by the out-group can result in in-group bias and negative out-group attitudes (Taylor, Meynard et al. 1977, Giles and Johnson 1987, Ros, Huici et al. 1994).

All in all, there is still a lot left to be understood about the relationship between language and intergroup tensions. Although the scholarship brings forth that linguistic division does not in itself constitute a cause of intergroup conflict and that objective vitality influences the perception of linguistic vitality, there nevertheless needs to be a better comprehension of the

manner in which language specifically influences social tensions. While political science and sociolinguistics / social psychology share common preoccupations and themes, their research remains disjointed.

Therefore, research should, as this dissertation does, heed Phillipson's call (1999) for collaboration between these two research fields in order to fill the voids in our understanding of the relationship between language and intergroup relations.

1.3 Focusing on Linguistic Tensions: The Need for better Understanding

Civil conflicts can be the scene of tremendous social and political instability, and even the stage for deadly warfare. Thus, their further understanding is called for. Yet, group tensions divided by language, one of the most common manifestations of civil strife, remain strongly underexplored.

As the previous review of the literature indicated, language-based factors can have an impact on civil strife. Though this line of research has not been completely ignored, it has basically been limited to examining the influence of the level of linguistic diversity – heterogeneity vs. homogeneity – of countries. While important, many other macro-social linguistic variables might hold explanatory power over group conflicts. Notable amongst them would be linguistic vitality.

The review of the scholarship showed that linguistic vitality can influence the behaviour and attitudes of linguistic group members; both on an intrapersonal and interpersonal dimension. However, no clear conclusions have currently been drawn from this latter tract of research. It would not be too farfetched to believe that the health of a group's language can influence its members' willingness to fight for it.

This query would be in line with the rationalist tradition of conflict studies. More specifically, it would be an addition to the scholarship on group grievances, explicitly applied to linguistic group discords. Thus, looking beyond macro-social relationships and deeper at individuals would naturally provide richer insight into this social phenomenon. Endeavouring to examine the psychological processes of linguistic group members would bring greater awareness to linguistic group tensions.

However, conflict studies research, as with other lines of social research, cannot be simply about better understanding phenomena, it must strive to offer concrete strategies for improving the lives of individuals. Though much literature has been devoted to improving or resolving dysfunctional social relationships, strategies specifically aimed at linguistic tensions remain under-evaluated. Evidently, novel concrete contributions to resolution strategies devoted to linguistic group tensions would be very much welcomed.

Thus, this dissertation focuses on linguistic group tensions in order to develop a much deeper understanding of the phenomenon but also to inspire further resolution strategies. When dealing with the risk of instability, and even death, a thorough exploration, on a macro and micro level, is called for.

The following section begins to take up Phillipson's call and puts forward a theoretical model that unites contributions from diverse fields of social research.

1.4 Language Grievances and their Influence on Intergroup Tensions: A Socio-Psychological Linguistic Conflicts Model

The review of the scholarship dealing with intergroup tensions and the behavioural influence of linguistic factors demonstrated a disjointed academic vision. The result has been

that the relationship between language and group tensions has been underappreciated. Chief among these oversights has been the connection between linguistic vitality and intergroup relations. Though the manner in which linguistic vitality might influence group tensions remains, for the most part, unknown, clues from research in conflict studies, social psychology and sociolinguistics allow us to develop a theoretical framework.

The group conflict literature has placed great emphasis on the concept of grievances. Basically, it has been shown that a group in a disadvantaged social position becomes frustrated and seeks to remediate this situation. This rationalist interpretation of civil tensions portrays grievances as the motivation to act and attempt to redress an unfair social relationship (Sambanis 2002). While presented as quintessential factors in intergroup tensions, grievances have tended to be explored from essentially two dimensions: economic and political resource differences. This situation has somewhat left cultural grievances in the academic dark; though they can just as much create unfair social situations and motivate actions to redress them (Gurr 2000). Specifically, in terms of language, linguistic grievances might be fuelled by barriers to economic and political resources leading to or acerbating group inequalities. If an individual is meant to communicate in another language than their mother tongue (presumably their most comfortable and principal means of linguistic communication), than it is easy to imagine their disadvantage.

Even if objective linguistic vitality was to have an effect on intergroup conflicts, these are two macro-social phenomena. Thus, there would have to be a psychological link within linguistic group members connecting linguistic vitality to conflict.

Hence, the theory that is put forward presents the vitality of languages as shaping ethnic tensions through a series of intermediary socio-psychological factors which form the rational

choice decision-making process responsible for intergroup behaviour. Figure 1.1 displays the sequence which is believed to connect linguistic vitality to group conflicts.

Figure 1.1: Socio-Psychological Linguistic Conflicts Model



The first part of the theoretical sequence supposes that objective linguistic vitality determines perceptions of linguistic vitality. As previously mentioned, reality and how it is perceived can be quite different. The subjective evaluation of a language's social health, afterwards, affects perceptions of in-group threat. As the scholarship demonstrates, perceived menace to a group, including the language which defines it, has important ramifications towards out-group relations. This is especially true if the out-group is perceived to be the cause of the menace. The next step in the sequence presents perceptions of in-group threat as influencing perceptions of blame towards the out-group. It is the threat which is perceived to be caused by the out-group that will establish, in turn, positive or negative attitudes towards that out-group. This sequence of socio-psychological mechanisms among individuals, when taken in an

aggregate manner, ultimately determines whether there is peace or conflict between linguistic groups.

Therefore, according to this theory, attitudes towards out-groups, seeing that they are the socio-psychological factor immediately before conflict, might be the major key to comprehending intergroup tensions. Hence, out-group attitudes determine whether one chooses to engage in conflict or not with the out-group and also, if the former option is selected, the intensity of that conflictual engagement.

Yet, the perception of vitality plays an important role in the type of attitudes that are held towards out-groups. In other words, the belief that one's language is healthy or not, and the subsequent feelings of it being threatened or not, determines the way that linguistic group members feel about out-groups. Seeing that, in this case, out-groups are majorities with more political, economic and social power, they can thus be reasonably seen as being accountable for the social situation of a minority language. Therefore, believing that an out-group is responsible for the perceived weakness of and threat to an individual's language would push that individual from a linguistic minority to dislike the majority group and, subsequently, to enter into conflict with it.

The basic relationship between the two social factors, the first and last variables of the sequence, should be linear. This linear relationship follows the trend shown in the scholarship regarding economic and political grievances' impact on conflict intensity. Thus, when a groups' language is stronger conflict intensity should correspondingly be weaker. Figure 1.2 illustrates this theorized relationship.

Figure 1.2: Hypothesized Linear Relationship between Objective Vitality and Conflict Intensity



However, there is room for doubt on the potential linearity of OV's influence on conflict intensity. Giles and Johnson (1987) suggest that very weak vitality eliminates the desire of group members to act in a collective manner. In weak linguistic situations, individuals would not have enough motivation to fight for a socially unimportant language (Sorens 2005). Furthermore, due to the great effort required to improve a disadvantaged linguistic position, dire linguistic situations might not even warrant the formation of serious linguistic grievances. Hence, low levels of OV should render language unimportant to group members and should generate low levels of tension towards out-groups. On the other hand, if the language has a very strong vitality, the members of the group should not feel very threatened and should thus express less negative attitudes towards out-groups. Group members in this position have a language which is safe; therefore, there would be less linguistic grievances and, subsequently,

less to fight for than linguistic groups in a more vulnerable position. However, in the high vitality situation, the tensions should never be fully extinguished; when language becomes important and salient it should push minority group members to always have certain demands, just not at the level of groups in poorer linguistic situations. Therefore, linguistic vitality is expected to lead to more intense conflicts when language has a significant level of vitality but not such that the group members no longer perceive themselves as threatened.

Figure 1.3: Hypothesized Curvilinear Relationship between Objective Vitality and Conflict Intensity



Consequently, it would be in the middle range of vitality that conflict intensity should be at its optimum. This prediction is in line with Giles and Johnson's observation (1987) that it is before a language attains a weak level of vitality that the perception of linguistic endangerment might stimulate efforts to protect the language. It is also in the middle level of

OV that minorities would have the most grievances against the majority, because it is at this vitality level that the language has major weaknesses, but is still socially important. Hence, the middle range of OV should be where linguistic minorities should have realistically the most to fight for and, subsequently, the most motivation to fight. Thus, the relationship between OV and conflict intensity, following this logic, would reveal an inverted U-shape curve. Figure 1.3 illustrates the expected curvilinear relationship between OV and conflict intensity.

We are thus left with two possible manners in which OV can affect conflict intensity. Unfortunately, previous findings do not allow to convincingly emphasize one over the other. This query further adds to the necessity of a comprehensive study of language and intergroup relations. Yet, to be effective, a thorough investigation of the targeted relationship needs a proper empirical framework.

1.5 Methodology

The proposed model examines the relationship between two macro-social variables which are presumed to be linked through a socio-psychological sequence. Therefore, in order to thoroughly explore in an empirical manner linguistic group relations and, specifically, to test the proposed socio-psychological linguistic conflicts model, an in-depth research on the subject necessitates an initial focus on macro-social phenomena and thereafter a progression towards micro-individual factors. This dissertation follows such a macro to micro empirical approach.

The following section exposes in a comprehensive manner the research methods which are used in the dissertation to thoroughly explore the relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions.

1.5.1 Measuring Conflict Intensity

Conflict is not only the ultimate outcome of our proposed model, it is also a wide social phenomenon. Hence, the initial exploration into language's influence on group relations should focus on conflict intensity. The conflict studies scholarship has been focused on highlighting the factors which impact the gravity of group tensions.

A trend in this research has been to focus on violence, which is understandably a worrisome and attractive outcome. Such studies have been greatly influenced by the work of Singer and Small (1982) and their Correlates of War (CoW) dataset.[3] Their typology of the factors which constitute a civil war specifies that one of the primary actors must be the national government, that both sides need to have the ability to inflict death (in order to exclude civilian massacres), that the war must be internal to a country, and that at least 1 000 battle related deaths – civilians and military – per year should to have been recorded. It is the last condition which has been the most impactful and controversial on conflict studies research.

Though sometimes employed as is in research (see, for an example, Licklider 1995), the constraining nature of only examining conflicts which results in at least 1 000 deaths per year leans the data towards the margins of violent conflicts; thus, overlooking many potentially insightful cases and factors. Yet, there has been a tendency to liberalize this restriction in the literature. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) delineate the fatality condition as causing more than 1,000 deaths overall and during at least one year of the conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for their part, define this condition as a total of 1 000 deaths with a yearly average of 100. Sambanis (2004) presents a plethora of conditions on the definition of a civil war, but is nevertheless, arguably, more inclusive than Singer and Small's original fatality conception.

[3] For information on the CoW dataset, please see the project's website: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.

Still, the Uppsala dataset on armed conflict has taken this condition a step further towards the path of greater inconclusiveness (Gleditsch, Wallensteen et al. 2002). This dataset includes conflicts with 25 battle deaths per year. As Gleditsch and colleagues state, the 25-death threshold is inclusive without being overly low as to include sporadic incidences of violence. Yet, another interesting element of the Uppsala dataset is that it offers a range of conflict intensity: no conflict, 25 battle deaths per year and fewer than 1 000 overall, 25 battle deaths per year and more than 1 000 overall, and a conflict with at least 1 000 battle deaths a year. This ordinate measure of conflict intensity renders it richer than a binary one (Smith 2004).

But the CoW data might suffer from more serious methodological issues than strict inclusion conditions. Sambanis (2004) presents an unclear picture of what constitutes the fatality variable; the conclusion is one of confusion. This situation with the CoW data poses a major methodological hurdle (Lacina, Gleditsch et al. 2006).

However, as Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) note, methodological issues, especially related to comparability, are a common feature of fatality compilations. Chief amongst these problems are the concerns over the reliability of the data. Sambanis (2002) and Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) highlight that often data for certain conflicts is simply not available. While Sambanis states that an "effort to improve the quality of our data is much needed and we must focus on identifying and measuring variables over time and for the highest frequency possible" (239); Lacina and colleagues (2006) call upon political scientists to turn to demographers, public health specialists and epidemiologists to help in this quest.

The concerns over comparison, data collection and the focus on an extremity of intergroup tensions related to death tolls is somewhat answered by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. The founder of the project, Ted Robert Gurr, developed coded indexes derived

from historical, anthropological, political, and journalistic sources (Gurr 1993). The MAR data do answer some of the concerns related to fatality compilations. The reliance on precise coding instructions and the use of multiple sources of the MAR data have permitted greater comparability (Hug 2013). However, the MAR dataset is somewhat restrictive on the cases it includes.[4] This issue can lead to selection bias that can, likewise, overlook important intergroup conflict factors (Wimmer, Cederman et al. 2009). In order to deal, in part, with the selection bias issue, the MAR project will be expanding the cases it includes in its data through an All-Minorities at Risk dataset (Birnir, Wilkenfeld et al. 2011).

However, an important advantage of the MAR data is that they do not concentrate exclusively on violent conflicts. Examining the full spectrum of intergroup conflict intensity allows, unquestionably, to attain clearer and more thorough insight into intergroup relations.[5] These types of collective dissent, such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, are generally defined as actions without the intent of causing physical harm (Bond 1988, Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Chenoweth and Cunningham's findings (2013) show the manner in which non-violent resistance can be an important factor in civil conflicts. The importance of non-violent tensions is further highlighted by Stephan and Chenoweth's results (2008) that point to their greater success rate compared to violence. The success of non-violent protest might be due to the greater acceptability of such means compared to violent attacks (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, Shaykhutdinov 2010). When we further consider that tensions

[4] For the criteria of inclusion, see the MAR project's website: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

[5] Schock (2003) speculates that the emphasis on violent conflicts might be due to a connotation of 'non-violent' as being 'weak', 'pacifist', or 'activist'. The 'negative' aspect of non-violence is also highlighted by Day and colleagues' review (2014) of current non-violent conflict data. Thus, researchers would see non-violent tensions as not being conflicts, in line with the literature's emphasis on large death tolls. Yet, I further speculate that there exists an academic attractiveness of violent deadly conflicts which casts an academic shadow over non-violent tensions. Such a situation is quite understandable when one considers that violent conflicts have a greater urgency to them and tend to receive more popular attention.

tend to pass through the non-violent protest phase before reaching violence, non-violent tensions, thus, warrant equivalent academic attention.

There does exist a certain effort to re-balance, or simply thoroughly explore, group tensions by exploring non-violent strife. Beyond the MAR project, there appears to be a recent scholarly interest in non-violent group tensions. Notably, the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project also seeks to examine both violent and non-violent conflicts.[6]

Though non-violent conflict data permit a more comprehensive vision of intergroup tensions, they do suffer from many of the same methodological ills of violent data. The major concern with non-violent data is that the phenomenon is difficult to measure (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Many initial non-violent conflict studies have been based on Sharp's data (1973), which were themselves often based on media coverage.[7] Reliance on media sources for non-violent data obviously limits, and might even bias, the scope of the data. The NAVCO data attempt to overcome this lacuna by using wider gathering, as well as validation, methods (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). However, issues of case inclusion still surround these data. Stephan and Chenoweth's description (2008) of the cases included in the NAVCO data make it clear that they are not fully inclusive of all conflicts; therefore, the subjective element of inclusion remains. Day and colleagues (2014) also argue that non-violent types of data suffer from a systematic violence bias in mainstream news reports and incite individuals to misrepresent them. To overcome these methodological issues, they advise collecting data at

[6]For more information on NAVCO data, please consult the project's website: http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html.

[7] Sharp's data are specifically based on coverage from the New York Times and on The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. The latter source concentrates on official governmental as well as media documentation.

multiple temporal and purposive units, diversifying the source material and coding ambiguity as a meaningful substantive variable.

Seeing that non-violent and violent manifestations of group tensions seem to form a continuum of violent action (Gurr 1993, Regan and Norton 2005), researchers should take a wider perspective to fully understand conflict phenomena.

Macro-social indicators are not the only measure which exist to ascertain conflict intensity. Dalton and colleagues (2010) utilize self-reported non-violent behaviour gathered from survey data to explore group conflicts. Thus, surveys not only provide a potential wealth of data and insight into social phenomena, they also highlight the methodological turn from macro-social factors to micro-individual ones.

1.5.2 The Art of Survey Design

Survey research is the locus of much political science data. Surveys are used to ascertain individual-level data on a plethora of issues and subjects. Yet, several methodological concerns can arise in the survey design process.

One of the important elements that survey designers must contemplate is the order of the questions. Research has demonstrated that questions asked beforehand can have an effect on answers to questions later on in the survey (Tourangeau, Rips et al. 2000, Fournier, Turgeon et al. 2011). Nevertheless, Saris and Gallhofer (2007) recommend that the questions be ordered by topic; and that the main focus of the survey should be asked early on, just not at the very beginning. But researchers need to, particularly, pay special attention to the measures they use in surveys. Saris and Gallhofer (2007) highly recommend that answer choices have a neutral point in order to capture respondents' most accurate attitude positions. Saris and Gallhofer also

point to the fact that batteries have become quite popular in survey design. These measures can be quite helpful in order to save questionnaire space and reading time for respondents. However, the authors warn that they, as with all survey measures, are not without risks. In order to guide survey design, Saris and Gallhofer (2007) developed the Survey Design Predictor (SQP) program which aides survey designers in the selection and creation of appropriate questions, in several languages, and provides a quality prediction.[8] This type of questionnaire evaluation is also used on electronic survey websites, such as Survey Gizmo, to guide survey design.

Computerization has revolutionized survey research. The computerization of surveys has led to a slew of advantages: it reduces the rate of missing data and the data entry time, it shortens the data transmission time, it lowers the cost related to surveys, it provides more design options, it reduces interviewer effects, and it allows for more well thought-out answers (Tourangeau, Rips et al. 2000, Fan and Yan 2010, McPeake, Bateson et al. 2014). However, on the downside, computerization increases rates of non-response (Tourangeau, Rips et al. 2000, Fricker, Galesic et al. 2005, Fan and Yan 2010). Though studies have shown that the response rate is just over 10% lower than more conventional survey modes (Bälter, Bälter et al. 2005, Manfreda, Bosnjak et al. 2008), this downside should not be taken lightly.

One of the main concerns of survey research involves the fundamental aspect of obtaining responses. Tourangeau and colleagues (2000) place great emphasis on simplicity in terms of questions design. The primary manner to not burden respondents and to increase response rates is through length. The literature shows a negative linear relationship between survey length and response rate (Singer 1978, Yammarino, Skinner et al. 1991, Cook, Heath et

[8] For more information on SQP, please visit the program's website: http://sqp.upf.edu/.

al. 2000). Surveys should thus be kept as short as possible; however, without severally affecting the process of data collection (Sahlqvist, Song et al. 2011).

Yet, other strategies can also be used to increase response rates. Pre-notification and reminders improve response rates (Cook, Heath et al. 2000, Trouteaud 2004). Pre-notifications should include an estimated time to complete the survey in order to provide an indication of the sacrifice that will be demanded of the respondent (Ganassali 2008). As for reminders, research has shown them to be more effective when sent out two days after the initial invitation rather than five days afterwards (Crawford, Couper et al. 2001). Another oft-used technique to increase response rates relies on incentives. The scholarship demonstrates that incentives not only motivate people to start a survey but that they also lead to greater completion rates (Göritz 2006, Perez, Nie et al. 2013).

Researchers also use other techniques to increase the number of survey respondents. Snowball sampling, which relies on referrals from initial respondents to add additional ones, can attain a wider range of individuals. This method can especially be useful to contact harder to reach populations (Capelos and Chrona 2012, Perez, Nie et al. 2013). Social media has also opened new possibilities for survey research (see Singh and Roy 2014). Though snowball sampling and internet samples are not representative of a broader population, they do offer broader and more diverse samples than the oft-used convenient student sample.[9]

The methodological concerns over the use of student samples have been well documented (see Sears 1986, Druckman and Kam 2011). Yet, empirical research shows that many of the concerns related to student samples are actually overblown (Dyer, Kagel et al.

[9] This point is made by Singh and Roy (2014) about internet samples, but it can easily be applied to snowball samples.

1989, Depositario, Nayga Jr et al. 2009). However, as Blais and colleagues (2012) and Van der Straeten and colleagues (2013) show, political scientists need to be concerned with the non-representativity of political opinions in convenience samples. Nevertheless, this issue does not debilitate convenience samples as these authors present that it can be overcome by weighting respondents to more representative data.

With all the benefits related to micro-level survey data, namely the flexibility and plethora of subjects it allows to examine, the inferences derived from such data remain, for the most part, correlational. In order to identify a causal relationship between variables, research needs to go deeper into individuals' psychological processes. The way to arrive at such empirical results is through experimental manipulations.

1.5.3 Seeking Causation through Experiments

Experimental studies have taken political science by storm. They are growing rapidly as a component of political research in number, impact and prominence (Druckman, Green et al. 2006, Druckman, Green et al. 2011).

Experiments offer a welcomed flexibility in terms of their applications. Experimental manipulations can be run in laboratories, in the field or in surveys. Non-manipulated changes, natural experiments, can even be studied in an experimental manner. Experiments also offer a diversity of targets. Sniderman and Grob (1996) put forth an analytical scheme in which the formulation of a choice, the context of a choice, or characteristics of the chooser can be manipulated.

However, it is the ability to isolate causal relationships which attracts researchers towards experimental research procedures. As Kinder and Palfrey (1993, 6) state: "Experiments

intrude upon nature, and they do (almost always) to provide answers to causal questions." Experiments reduce biases which exists in observational research, they thus provide unmatched control over the variables of interests (McDermott 2002). Experiments, therefore, allow to target cause-and-effect relationships, by controlling for external factors, and allow to establish causal arguments (Kinder and Palfrey 1993, McDermott 2002).

Experimental treatments consist of two basic designs: pre-test/post-test or post-test only. The former compares measures taken before and after the treatment, whereas the latter only uses measures ascertained after the treatment. In order to have interpretable comparisons, subjects are divided along multiple treatments with or without a control group or along a single treatment and a control group. In the case without a control group, the most important aspect of the design "is not the fact that the researcher has a comparison, but that the researcher can control confounding variables" (Morton and Williams 2008, 342). The key though to experiments' empirical success lies in randomization. "By randomly assigning subjects to treatments, the experiment, in one elegant stroke, can be confident that any observed differences must be due to differences in the treatment themselves" (Kinder and Palfrey 1993, 7).[10]

The analysis of the treatment is supported by two concepts working in a "two-step temporal process" (McDermott 2011, 28). Firstly, internal validity is examined. Essentially, researchers look to see if there was a significant difference in the outcome attributable to the treatment (Druckman, Green et al. 2011). Secondly, the external validity of the findings is also

[10] As Druckman and colleagues (2011) explain, the logic of randomized experiments if often explained in a notational system inspired by the work of Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974), and therefore known as the Neyman-Rubin Causal Model. The treatment effect is defined by: $\tau_i = Yi_1 - Yi_0$. For each individual (i), Y_0 is the outcome if i is not exposed to the treatment and Y_1 is the outcome if i is exposed to the treatment. Therefore, the treatment effect is the difference between two possibilities: one in which the individual receives the treatment and another in which the individual does not. This logic can be extended from a single individual to a group, in which the average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as: $ATE = E(\tau_i) = E(Yi_1) - E(Yi_0)$. For a more in-depth discussion on the algebraic logic of experimentation, see Druckman and colleagues (2011).

explored. Essentially, internal validity centers on whether the treatment had an impact, whereas external validity explores the generalizability of the results beyond the experiment's subjects (Campbell and Stanley 1963). But the true advantage of experiments rests on their high degree of internal validity (McDermott 2002), because measured changes can be tracked to the manipulated variables.

Yet, as with any other technique, experiments are not perfect and carry a fair share of weaknesses. One such weakness is related to internal validity. The expectation that a one-shot treatment will result in the desired effect can often lead to disappointment. Thus, when possible, multiple and longer duration treatment protocols should be privileged (Gaines, Kuklinski et al. 2007, Bruter 2009).

However, the most important concern with experiments might lie with their external validity. The so-called Hawthorne Effect calls for individuals to change their behaviour if they are aware of being observed (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). Therefore, if doubt with regards to being manipulated arises in subjects, their behaviour might not only be unnatural, it would also be unrepresentative. This is the main concern in relation to the representativity of laboratory results to real-world contexts (McDermott 2002). Experimental protocols in which such an unwanted effect could take place should be encouraged to use deception; but, in such occasions, researchers have to debrief subjects at the end of the experiment (Ibidem). Gaines and colleagues (2007) also draw attention to the issues of treatment endurance, mutual cause-and-effect and real-world contamination; phenomena too rarely taken into consideration by social researchers. Also, as in the case of surveys, students have had a starring role in experimental research. Though the concerns over external validity are obvious, research has

shown that student samples do not pose an intrinsic problem (Kinder and Palfrey 1993, Mintz, Redd et al. 2006, Druckman and Kam 2011).

These issues do not render experiments unusable. As with any methodological approach, proper thought is necessary to avoid methodological mishaps. In this optic, experimental protocols should be supported by strong theoretical reasoning (Druckman, Green et al. 2011). However, replication should be used as a tool to not only surmount methodological concerns but also to add to the robustness and generalizability of results (Kinder and Palfrey 1993).

As Kinder and Palfrey (1993) state, "experiments must supplement, not replace, traditional empirical methods" (1). Consequently, to properly capture social phenomena, a wide methodological approach is necessary. The thorough exploration of a social phenomenon should thus initially canvass wide and thereafter be more specific.

This is the reason that this dissertation is based on a macro to micro empirical approach. The research firstly explores macro-social phenomena and progressively turns towards micro-individual processes in order to thoroughly explore linguistic tensions and, specifically, the influence of linguistic vitality on them.

1.6 The Articles

In order to comprehensively explore the principal research question of this dissertation and test the socio-psychological linguistic conflicts model that was put forward, and thereby arrive at a thorough understanding of the relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions, four separate studies were undertaken. This dissertation, which employs the different aforementioned empirical methods, starts by examining the macro-social relationship between

linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. Thereafter, the research progressively turns to micro-level processes by, in succession, examining the influence of linguistic vitality on institutional trust, isolating the socio-psychological sequence linking linguistic vitality and intergroup attitudes, and, finally, attempting to determine a causal effect of linguistic vitality on intergroup attitudes.

1.6.1 Article 1 – The Language of Conflict: The Relationship between Linguistic Vitality and Conflict Intensity

The impact of ethnic diversity on conflicts has, as previously demonstrated, normally been examined through polity characteristics rather than through group-specific features. Seeing that most ethnic conflicts have a linguistic distinction between the protagonists (Medeiros 2010), language related factors might bring new insight on the reasons that push group members to adopt a certain level of conflict intensity. Linguistic vitality, a concept derived from sociolinguistics research and referring to the ability for individuals to use a language in a social environment, is such a language-based social factors that has been ignored in political science research. Linguistic vitality is a quantifiable social factor that may help to explain the discrepancies in the levels of conflict intensity between groups divided by language. Thus, the first article of this dissertation examines the impact of linguistic vitality on intensity levels in language-based ethnic tensions.

The article initially details a rationalist theory in which the social health of a group's language is presented as the basis of collective grievances. As with other such grievances, namely economic and political ones, gripes related to linguistic vitality are expected to influence the intensity of linguistic group conflicts. A two-part quantitative analysis is

thereafter undertaken to examine the relationship between linguistic vitality and ethnic conflict intensity.

The first series of analyses examines the general relationship between these two social features. Objective linguistic vitality is ascertained through UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger. As for conflict intensity, the data are taken from the Minorities at Risk project. This analysis also controls for the influence of economic and political differences between the groups. The second series of analyses takes a more focused approach by concentrating on polities with multiple linguistic conflicts. Different linguistic minorities in conflict with the same national majority are compared in an attempt to isolate the determinants of intranational conflict intensity differences.

The results of these analyses show that linguistic vitality levels have an impact on conflict intensity. Specifically, they support a curvilinear relationship in which low and high levels of linguistic vitality generate lower conflict intensity than moderate vitality levels. Thus, the findings indicate an inverted U-shape curvilinear relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. The results are consistent with the proposed theoretical model for language-based ethnic conflicts in general but even more so for countries with several conflicts involving groups with different linguistic vitality levels.

1.6.2 Article 2 - The Language of Trust: Language Vitality and Trust in National Institutions

After having established the relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions, the dissertation turns its attention to the possible reasons behind this macro-social relationship.

The focus of the second article is the relationship between linguistic vitality and trust in national institutions. The scholarship has demonstrated that the connection with the central state, through its institutions, needs to be perceived as being fair in order to foster healthy intergroup relations (Wright 1935, Gurr 2002, Cameron 2009). Institutional trust can contribute to reducing social tensions by helping to improve majority-minority group relations (Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 1995). While the link between institutional political trust and intergroup relations has been established, the literature has overwhelmingly concentrated on the influence of economic and political factors on trust (Karakoç 2013); thus, not giving appropriate attention to cultural ones. This article attempts to shine new light onto this social phenomenon by exploring the impact of linguistic vitality on institutional trust among linguistic minorities.

Elaborating on the theoretical framework in which linguistic vitality can constitute cultural grievances, the paper presents a mediation model in which perceived discrimination acts as a mediating factor between linguistic grievances and trust. In other words, linguistic vitality would have a direct positive effect on trust in national institutions and would also have an indirect positive effect mediated through perceptions of group discrimination.

Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and linguistic vitality data derived from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, the results of the analyses do not support the entirety of the proposed model. The findings indicate that linguistic vitality unexpectedly leads to greater perceptions of linguistic discrimination. Yet, the results do show that the linguistic vitality of individuals' group language positively influences trust in national institutions in a direct manner but also indirectly through perceived linguistic discrimination. The findings also demonstrate that perceptions of linguistic discrimination negatively affect

political trust. Furthermore, the institutional status of a language also affect trust. The more 'official' a language is in a country, the greater the level of institutional trust there will be among that language's group members. Thus, linguistic factors, accounting for linguistic grievances, are clearly highlighted as important determinants of trust in national institutional.

1.6.3 Article 3 – The Language of Blame: The Influence of Linguistic Vitality on Intergroup Attitudes

The third article of the dissertation furthers the micro-level turn and seeks to isolate the socio-psychological sequence which connects linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions.

The study specifically seeks to test the proposed socio-psychological linguistic conflicts model. As previously exposed, this theory expects that objective linguistic vitality determines perceptions of linguistic vitality that afterwards affect perceptions of in-group threat which, subsequently, impact perceptions of blame towards the out-group, and, in turn, these out-group perceptions lead to positive or negative attitudes towards the out-group.

In order to test this theory, original survey data from diverse linguistic vitality environments had to be collected. Seeing that Francophone communities in Canada possess such vitality diversity, an electronic survey was administered to Francophone university students in Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba.

However, the results of stepwise regression analyses do not support the entirety of the proposed model. Rather, a shortened socio-psychological sequence in which in-group threat influences attitudes towards the out-group through the mediation of perceived threat caused by the out-group. Ultimately, the findings demonstrate that beliefs that the out-group threatens a

group's language fully mediate the influence of perceived in-group threat on out-group attitudes.

Therefore, specific focus is placed on the importance related to linguistic vitality perceptions as a predictor of intergroup attitudes.

1.6.4 Article 4 - The Language of Threat: Linguistic Perceptions and Intergroup Relations

The previous article permitted to identify a socio-psychological sequence linking language vitality to intergroup attitudes. However, the previous results only allow to ascertain that the variables in our sequence are correlated to each other and do not give a proper indication of causality. In order to respond to this concern, and further our understanding of the socio-psychological process involved in linguistic group tensions, the fourth and final paper of this dissertation attempts to establish a causal relationship. Specifically, the article aims to further our understanding of the impact of linguistic vitality perceptions on intergroup attitudes.

In order to achieve this goal, an experimental design was conceived to manipulate perceptions of linguistic vitality in order to capture their effect on intergroup attitudes. The subjects of the experiment were recruited from the student population of the Université de Montréal. The experimental protocol manipulated perceptions of the linguistic vitality of French in Quebec. This was done through the reception of factual information, via an electronic newsletter, about linguistic social health. Subjects were recruited under the guise of participating in a study examining social issues. The newsletters were composed of four brief articles providing information on crime, poverty, women's condition and language in Quebec. Subjects were randomly divided into two groups: one which only received positive information

about the state of French in Quebec, whereas the other one received only negative information about this topic. The information on the other subjects was the same for both groups. The treatment lasted a month as subjects received four weekly newsletters.

Pre- and post-treatment questionnaires were the basis of difference variables for several attitudes. The results demonstrate that the type of information, positive or negative, about the vitality of a language impacts perceptions of threat towards that language. The results repetitively demonstrate that providing Francophones with positive information about the social health of French in Quebec improves their level of perceived threat regarding the language.

Yet, linguistic vitality did not manifest such a one-sided effect on other outcomes. The effects of linguistic vitality information on out-group attitudes, support for sovereignty and subjective identity are shown to vary according to the initial identity and threat levels held by subjects; in line with past studies that also demonstrated heterogeneous effects related to subjective identity (Gaertner, Dovidio et al. 1993, Falomir-Pichastor, Muñoz-Rojas et al. 2004) and in-group threat (Jetten, Branscombe et al. 2001, Jetten, Postmes et al. 2002).

1.7 Towards the Core of the Dissertation

The four subsequent chapters of this dissertation are the articles which form its core. Afterwards, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the results presented and their implications for understanding the relationship between language and intergroup relations. The dissertation thereafter closes with a discussion on future research which is still needed to further grasp the influence of language on intergroup tensions.

Chapitre 2

The Language of Conflict: The Relationship between Linguistic Vitality and Conflict Intensity

Interethnic tensions represent a cause for grave concern. These apprehensions can be explained by three simple reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, they hold a potential for violence and death (Kegley and Witkopf 1995, Ellingsen 2000, Huth and Valentino 2008). There are scores of cases in which ethnic tensions have led to terrorist attacks or full-scale warfare. Secondly, their frequency has also increased in recent decades, becoming the premier form of civil strife (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997, Ramsbotham, Miall et al. 2005, Hewitt, Wilkenfeld et al. 2008). Finally, these worries culminate with the fact that most countries are heterogeneous (Ellingsen 2000, Duffy Toft 2002). In others words, the vast majority of the world's states are multi-ethnic and, hence, can potentially be the stage for violent ethnic conflicts. Therefore, due to their destructive potential, their increased occurrence and their quasi-universal prospective, ethnic conflicts represent an undoubted cause for concern.

The traditional reasons to explain the motives which push ethnic group members to enter into conflict or not, as well as the level of intensity they choose to adopt, have centred on economic inequalities and political differences (see, notably, Gurr 1968, Walter 2006). However, the magnification of these two major grievances has led other factors specific to ethnic groups to be somewhat overlooked.

The ethnic lines which divide groups can be based on evident social markers such as religion, language or race; or they can also be defined by less evident social demarcations such as tribe and clan membership. Yet, although ethnic social cleavages are centred on a variety of ethnic markers, sometimes even on multiple ethnic distinctions, one ethnic division stands out. When carefully examined, results reveal that the overwhelming majority of ethnic conflicts possess a linguistic difference between the conflicting parties (Medeiros 2010). This suggests that linguistic factors might be an important element in intergroup tensions.

Furthermore, the widespread occurrence of language-based ethnic tensions has led them to being far from uniform. They involve movements that vary greatly in their demands. They range from the simple desire to protect group language, as with the Frisians in the Netherlands, to the will to form an independent country, as in the case of Catalans in Spain. They also have a high degree of variance in their intensity. Some linguistic groups use peaceful means in order to have their demands acquiesced, such as South Tyroleans in Italy, while others take up arms and resort to violence, a deadly situation exemplified by Karen in Burma. Thus, group tensions based on language vary significantly in the demands that fuel them as well as their intensity.

Yet, despite the fact that most ethnic conflicts have a linguistic distinction amongst the conflicting groups and that such conflicts have an important variance in terms of intensity, the role of linguistic factors in intergroup conflicts has been underexplored by scholarly research. One reason for this neglect is due to the fact that research in political science and sociolinguistics, two sciences which explore such intergroup relations, remains disjointed. This situation impedes the understanding of language-based ethnic tensions; but it has fittingly led to a call for more collaboration between these different fields (Phillipson 1999).

By taking up such a challenge, political science might find a more comprehensive insight into the dynamics of language-based group tensions. One novel link between political science and sociolinguistics may come from the study and utilization of the concept of linguistic vitality. Referring to the ability for individuals to use a language in everyday life, linguistic vitality is a variable commonly employed in sociolinguistic research; but which political scientists have overlooked. Linguistic vitality is a varying linguistic social factor, which may help to explain the discrepancy in the levels of conflict intensity between groups divided by

language. Thus, linguistic vitality might permit researchers to better understand intensity levels in language-based ethnic tensions.

This paper takes up the challenge to address this gap and to incorporate linguistic social factors into the study of ethnic conflicts by examining the relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. This study thus seeks to answer an important question: How does linguistic vitality influence conflict intensity?

In order to answer this question, a rational choice perspective is used to develop a theory which connects the macro-social variables of linguistic vitality and conflict intensity through a sequence of micro-level socio-psychological factors. The reasoning behind this process is that linguistic vitality influences perceptions of linguistic vitality in linguistic minority group members, which, subsequently, impacts their perceptions of in-group threat, resulting, in turn, in the adoption of positive or negative attitudes towards the out-group and, ultimately, through an aggregation of these individual attitudes, in peace or conflict.

This paper explores this theory through the analysis of linguistic vitality data from the UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger as well as conflict intensity data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. The results not only support a theoretical model that explains the relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity in a general manner for language-based ethnic tensions, but also show that this model is more robust in countries affected by multiple linguistic group conflicts in which linguistic groups differ in vitality levels.

2.1 The Rationality of Grievances

An attempt to identify a particular key variable that would entirely explain conflict intensity would prove to be an impossible task. This impracticality stems from the fact that

conflicts cannot normally be associated with one single causal variable (Sorokin 1957, Gilliland 1995). Consequently, in analysing the factors that influence group conflicts, it is important to keep in mind the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon. This perspective allows us to appreciate that the psychological process that determines decision-making is influenced by several motivational factors. Seeing that groups, as Allport (1924) defined it, are fallacies in which only its individual members are real, it is therefore essential to examine the individual members' perceptions that influence intergroup attitudes and behaviour. While traditionally two grievance factors have been at the forefront in the conflict literature, this paper presents another type of grievance that is directly associated with ethnicity.

2.1.1 Two Traditional Group Grievances

There have been many attempts to understand the factors that influence groups, and more specifically the members who compose them, to adapt specific intergroup behaviours. This rational choice perspective – in which individual motivations of group members helps to explain tensions – has often been presented in the literature as either a choice between greed or grievance; and often, it is the *homo economicus* aspect of the former which has been highlighted. Collier (2000) points out that economists are somewhat dismissive of grievances as a factor in conflicts because they are seen as a public good; whereas individual greed is much closer to an economic rational choice motivation in decision-making. Thus, greed would be a much more individualistic element and grievance would be more of a collective factor. Greed would hence motivate individuals to act in self-interest whereas actions inspired by grievances would be for the so-called greater good; rendering the former, in a pure rational choice perspective, a stronger determinant of conflict. This is the conclusion that has been advocated

by seminal articles which have examined the influence of greed and grievance on civil conflicts (see, notably, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

However, Sambanis (2004) points out that the distinction between greed and grievance is "illusory, because greed and grievance are usually shades of the same problem".[11] It is in the presence of economic differences that individuals who are fuelled by greed have the best chances of being successful in their struggle. Following this perspective, several studies have concluded that conflicts are formed and fuelled by both greed and grievance (Berdal and Keen 1997, Kalyvas 2003, Murshed 2008). Even Collier and colleagues (2009) acknowledge the fact that even in cases in which rebellions are not directly caused by grievances, they play a quintessential role in the conflict. Therefore, greed and grievance should not be seen as two entirely distinct motivational factor but, rather, as part of the same phenomenon which incites individual to act or not.

The impact of grievance on group conflicts has been primarily examined through two types of intergroup differences: economic and political. According to Sambanis (2002), rational choice theories of civil strife portray intergroup conflict as being "explained as a way to redress grievance, and grievance may be due to either political or economic factors, or both." In the case of economic inequalities, the difference in available economic resources has been shown as accentuating civil strife (Sigelman and Simpson 1977, Müller and Seligson 1987, Lu and Thies 2011). Complementing to grievances caused by economic inequalities has been those conjured by political discrimination. Differences to the access to political resources have also been presented as positively influencing conflict intensity (Gurr 1968, Regan and Norton 2005,

[11] This 'illusion' might be fuelled by a reliance on a *homo economicus* interpretation of rational choice. Mueller (2003) recommends going beyond the pure economic model of rational choice in order to get a more realistic understanding of the rational decision-making process in individuals.

Walter 2006). In both cases, intergroup disparities lead to more serious tensions. These two group-based grievances are undoubtedly important factors in individual's decision-making process. Yet, grievance factors specifically related to ethnicity might shine new light into the influence of grievance on conflict intensity.

2.1.2 Linguistic Grievances

Economic and political intergroup differences have been taken from the general notion of civil conflicts and applied to the more specific category of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1993, Cetinyan 2002, Caprioli and Trumbore 2003, Kaufman 2006). However, few studies have examined group-based grievances specific to ethnicity. Such novel factors could possibly allow for an improved comprehension of intergroup conflicts and could also lead to a more accurate understanding of current explanatory variables.[12]

Ethnic divisions can be based on the most obvious ethnic markers which are religion, language or race; as well as less noticeable differences such as tribe or clan membership. However, when ethnic conflicts are carefully examined, one ethnic division stands out. A classification of ethnic conflicts reveals that the vast majority of their incidences imply a linguistic difference amongst the protagonists (Medeiros 2010). Therefore, given that linguistic difference is present in the overwhelming majority of ethnic conflicts, language may play a key role in such conflicts. For example, linguistic grievances might be fuelled by language barriers which keep economic and political resources out of the reach of ethno-linguistic group members

[12] Explanatory models of ethnic conflicts which include economic and political discrimination, as well as many other variables, usually only account for a relatively small amount of the variance of the conflict variable (see, for examples, Gurr 1993, Cetinyan 2002).

and / or they might be kindled by the symbolism of linguistic, and hence group, inequality. In any case, an examination of grievance factors specifically related to language is warranted.

Although linguistic difference has previously been presented as an important divisive factor leading to intergroup tensions (Das Gupta 1970, Isaacs 1977, Harrell 1995), the literature that specifically applies to conflicts involving linguistic groups is quite scarce. The impact of linguistic characteristics on conflict intensity has only been examined through linguistic diversity; either using a dichotomous homogeneity / heterogeneity dimension (McRae 1983, Fishman 1989) or a fractionalization scale (Hibbs 1973, Reilly 2000/01, Liu 2011). Nonetheless, it has to be pointed out that these studies utilize linguistic variables which are only applied at the polity level.

The polity is an important factor in ethnic conflicts studies. The vast majority of the ethnic conflict literature has placed its emphasis on the country level. Yet, when examining conflicts that part of the literature presents as being caused by linguistic group incompatibility, it is curious that the phenomenon has lacked an exploration of group-level factors. Furthermore, examining language in a more elaborate manner would represent a major contribution to ethnic conflict studies in general and more precisely to the understanding of linguistic factors' impact on conflict intensity.

Sociolinguistics, and the sub-field of social psychology associated to it, examines language on a more intricate level. The major contribution, as our subject of interest is concerned, of this academic current concerns the concept of linguistic vitality. The notion of ethno-linguistic vitality, first suggested by Giles and colleagues (1977), refers to the general health of a language. It is the overall ability to utilize the language in everyday life, what is also referred to as objective vitality (OV). As originally conceived by Giles and colleagues (Ibidem),

and further developed, three major variables define OV: group status (Landry and Bourhis 1997, Ben-Rafael, Shohamy et al. 2006) demographic realities (Stevens 1992, Coupland, Bishop et al. 2005), and institutional support and opportunity (Harwood, Giles et al. 1994, Yagmur and Kroon 2003). These factors merge to determine the ease at which ethno-linguistic group members can use their group language in social situations. However, linguistic vitality can also be understood as relating to the perceived language vitality of ethno-linguistic group members, referred to as subjective ethno-linguistic vitality (SEV) (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). The actual ability to use a language and the perceived facility of using that language can be completely different.[13] Therefore, a distinction between both types of vitality is, evidently, quite important.

This academic trend has primarily been concerned with linguistic vitality's influence on in-group members. It has shown that the easier a language is to use in society the more positive individuals view it (Landry and Allard 1994). This relationship is due to languages with high OV levels generally having a higher social status; a finding which is in line with the main tenant of Tajfel's (1978) social identity theory: individuals seek to feel better about themselves through positive intergroup comparison. Socio-psychological and sociolinguistic research has also demonstrated OV to have an impact on SEV (Giles and Johnson 1987). Specifically, individuals in high OV situations have more positive perceptions of vitality than counterparts from lower OV cases (Ytsma, Viladot et al. 1994). Thus, greater positive perceptions should correlate with use of the language; consequently, higher OV could actually counteract a strong argument of ethno-linguistic militancy, the endangerment of the language.

[13] A group's language can be considered safe, demonstrate positive trends in all sociolinguistic indicators and still be perceived by its members as being threatened. A good example of such a disconnect between OV and SEV relates to the case of French in Quebec (see, for specific details, Levine 1991, Gidengil, Blais et al. 2004).

The political science literature on language-based ethnic conflicts has tended to examine the manner in which societal factors influence conflict. However, this scholarly focus has generally ignored the role of individuals in the process. All things considered, conflicts are essentially made up of individuals and the way they react to each other. Therefore, it is only natural to explore individuals in the conflict process to get a broader understanding of the phenomena. Yet sociolinguistics and social psychology, which have endeavoured to explore the effects of linguistic social factors on individuals, have not expressly sought to understand the linguistic conflict process.

But could bridging the gap between political science and sociolinguistics actually contribute to our understanding of language-based ethnic tensions? We believe so, and put forward that the key might be in the link between OV and conflict intensity.

2.2 The Influence of Linguistic Vitality on Conflict Intensity

Scholarly research has not focused much attention on the relationship between linguistic vitality and group conflict. Yet, this variable might improve our understanding of language-based ethnic tensions. But how exactly does linguistic vitality effect conflict intensity, what are the mechanisms which constitute this relationship; answers to these questions remain, for the most part, unknown.

Linguistic vitality could help to explain why and how linguistic minorities react against national majorities. The grievances related to language might constitute motivations for linguistic group members to choose to enter into conflict and why, thereafter, they chose to engage in more pronounced forms of tensions. Seeing that linguistic vitality and conflict intensity are both macro-level variables, it is important to explore intermediary socio-

psychological mechanisms which form the rational choice decision-making process. In other words, the macro-level social phenomena of OV and conflict intensity are undoubtedly connected by a sequence of micro-level socio-psychological factors.

The abovementioned empirical findings in sociolinguistics and my deductive reasoning suggest a theoretical sequence in which perceptions and intergroup attitudes link linguistic vitality to conflict. This paper thus theorizes that OV levels influence SEV perceptions in individual group members. The subjective evaluation by individuals of the health of their minority's language afterwards would affect perceptions of in-group threat. It is put forward that the level of threat that an individual feels about their language will establish, in turn, positive or negative attitudes towards out-groups. This socio-psychological sequence among individuals, when taken in an aggregate manner, should ultimately determine the tension levels between linguistic groups.

Therefore, according to this theory, attitudes towards out-groups are the major connection between OV and conflict intensity. This might be seen as a somewhat evident assertion because it would be the socio-psychological variable immediately before conflict. Hence, out-group attitudes determine whether one chooses to engage in conflict or not with the out-group and also, if the former option is selected, the intensity of that conflictual engagement. Yet, the perception of vitality plays an important role in the type of attitudes that are held towards out-groups. In other words, the belief that one's language is threatened or not determines the way that linguistic minority group members feel about out-groups. This is so because, in this case, out-groups are majorities with more political, economic and social power,

and they can thus be seen as being responsible for the situation of the minority language.[14] Therefore, the perceived weakness and threat of an individual's language, and the responsibility for this situation applied to the out-group, could push an individual from a linguistic minority to enter into conflict with the majority group in order to improve their situation.[15]

The basic relationship, however, between the two social factors, the first and last variables of the sequence, should be non-linear. Giles and Johnson (1987) suggest that very weak vitality eliminates the desire of group members to act as a collective. Individuals do not seem to have enough motivation to fight for a language which is perceived to be socially unimportant (Sorens 2005). Furthermore, due to the great effort required to improve a disadvantaged linguistic situation, dire linguistic situations might not even warrant the formation of serious linguistic grievances. Hence, low levels of OV should render language unimportant to group members and should generate low levels of tension towards out-groups. On the other hand, if the language has a very strong vitality, the members of the group should not feel very threatened and should thus express less negative attitudes towards out-groups. Group members in this position have a language which is safe; therefore, there would be less linguistic grievances and, subsequently, less to fight for than linguistic groups in a more vulnerable position. However, in the former situation, the tensions should never fully be extinguished; when language becomes important it should push minority group members to always have certain demands, just not at the level of groups in poorer linguistic situations.

[14] This theoretical statement is heavily based on social psychological studies which have explored intergroup attitudes and found that individual are predisposed to place blame for being in a negative situation on out-groups (Dustin and Davis 1970, Brewer 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Bettencourt, Brewer et al. 1992). It is also inspired by Sidanius & Pratto's (2001) social dominance theory which states that societal groups seek to dominate by imposing inequalities on other groups, a social power systems in which members from the different groups are aware of who holds power and dominates.

[15] Social psychology research has also revealed that individuals do not appreciate being in a disadvantage position and will seek to remediate the situation (see, notably, Tajfel 1978, Sidanius and Pratto 2001).

Therefore, linguistic vitality is expected to lead to more intense conflicts when language has a significant level of vitality but not such that the members of the group no longer perceive themselves as threatened.

Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Relationship between Objective Vitality and Conflict Intensity



Consequently, it would be in the middle range of vitality that conflict intensity would be at its optimum. This prediction is in line with Giles and Johnson's observation (1987) that it is before a language attains a weak level of vitality that the perception of linguistic endangerment might stimulate efforts to protect the language. Yet the reason as to why the middle range of OV should be emphasized has to do with grievances. It is in the middle level of OV that minorities would have the most grievances against the majority, because it is at this level that the language has major weaknesses, but is still socially important. Hence, the middle range of OV should be where linguistic minorities would have realistically the most to fight for and, consequently, the most motivation to fight. Thus, the relationship between OV and conflict

intensity is expected to reveal an inverted U-shape curve. Figure 2.1 illustrates the expected relationship between OV and conflict intensity.

These theoretical considerations about the socio-psychological connection between OV and conflict intensity allow us to suggest a major hypothesis:

> H1: Objective linguistic vitality and conflict intensity have an inverted U-shape relationship in which there always remains a certain, though lower, level of conflict intensity at high OV levels.

2.3 Data

The hypothesis suggested above is composed of two main variables: objective linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. The OV variable was operationalized through UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger. This dataset determines the OV of linguistic groups, through the strength of languages in each country, by means of a measure composed of nine societal factors. The UNESCO data only expressively indicate values for languages judged to be in danger; thus, their classification ranges from extinct to vulnerable. All languages excluded from the classification were classified as safe. The OV of the groups in the cases selected for analysis ranged from severely endangered to safe; no group's language was coded as critically endangered or extinct.

As for conflict intensity, the data was ascertained from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.[16] MAR is a dataset that monitors the conflicts of politically active ethnic groups in all countries with a population of at least 500 000 inhabitants. The project is designed to provide

[16] It is important to note that this study used phase IV of the MAR dataset, released in February 2005, and not the 2009 MAR update. This decision was taken due to major issues, at the time that this study was conducted, with the update's data.

information in a standardized format, through composite indexes, for comparative research. Two different MAR conflict intensity measures were selected: the protest and rebellion variables, respectively, the project's PROT and REB variables. The former assesses more peaceful demonstrations of group tensions, whereas the latter appraises violence. Following Regan & Norton's example (2005), the conflict intensity variable, labelled Intensity, was constructed by joining both of the MAR intensity variables into a 12-point ordinal scale, which is believed to capture a continuum in the level of conflict intensity. The OV of the linguistic minorities was ascertained for the latest year in which data was available for each of the groups in the MAR dataset.[17]

The MAR dataset includes 289 groups in conflicts (Medeiros 2010). In order to isolate the language-based ethnic conflicts in the dataset, the Different Language variable (CULDIFX2) was utilized; conflicts coded as having 'No differential' or with 'No basis for judgment' were excluded from the analyses.[18] Furthermore, two additional conditions were added to retain groups in the analyses. Firstly, seeing that immigrant groups possess different characteristics than those of traditional territorial ethnic groups (Fuchs 1993, Sanders 2002), minorities coded as having immigrated mainly since 1945 in the MAR dataset's Length of Group's Residence in Country variable (TRADITN) were also excluded for the analyses.[19] Secondly, due to the nature of our vitality variable, groups who are linguistically diverse, which

[17] The UNESCO data fluctuate slightly in terms of the year the OV was estimated. Careful research was undertaken to ensure that vitality levels used for each case corresponded accurately to the OV situation for the year matched to the MAR dataset.

[18] Minorities in which qualitative analyses revealed were not actually linguistically different, not a minority or too linguistically ambiguous were also excluded from the analyses.

[19] There were four exceptions to this exclusionary rule. Europeans in Zimbabwe were left in because MAR qualitative data state that they were in that country prior to the 1950s. Also, Russians in Estonia and in Latvia and Slavs in Moldova were not excluded because they, unlike the other groups coded in this manner, are mostly geographically concentrated and thus form a territorial minority.

have more than one language associated to them, were also excluded. This filtering process, and the available data on conflict intensity, led to the retention of 176 cases for the study.

In order to isolate the influence of linguistic grievances on conflict intensity, economic and political differences, both ascertained from the MAR dataset, were also included in the analyses as control variables; respectively, the Economic Differentials Index (ECDIFXX) and the Political Differentials Index (POLDIFXX) were inverted to form the Economic Strength and Political Strength variables. Controlling for these group-based grievances allowed for the relationship between OV and conflict intensity to be seen clearer.

The vitality variable was converted into a three-point ordinal scale (endangered, vulnerable, and safe). All other variables were converted into a 0 to 1 scale. Annexe A provides greater information on the MAR variables that were used in the analyses.

2.4 Results

The abovementioned theory suggests that the relationship between OV and conflict intensity should be curvilinear. The results tend to support the proposed relationship between these two variables.

The mean scores of conflict intensity for the three levels of vitality, presented in Figure 2.2, reflect a curvilinear trend. The conflict intensity mean score of groups whose language is judged to be vulnerable is 15 percentage-points greater than groups whose language is endangered, and 9 percentage-points greater than groups with a language at a safe level. Therefore, the bivariate relationship fits the predicted model quite well; especially seeing that intensity for groups with a safe language have a slightly (6 points) higher mean than groups with an endangered language, as the model predicts. The figure does not, however, show

significant differences between the vulnerable category and the two other OV levels; though, significance is nearly reached at $p < 0.1$ for the difference between the means of the endangered and the vulnerable categories.[20] Nonetheless, with the small numbers of cases, 176 linguistic groups, the lack of significance is not so surprising.

Figure 2.2: Mean Scores of Conflict Intensity (All Language-Based Ethnic Conflicts)



The expected curvilinear relationship between OV and conflict intensity was further confirmed through multivariate OLS regressions. In order to capture the curvilinear relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity in OLS regressions, the vitality variable was converted into dummy variables for each level of vitality. The results, in Table 2.1, show a significant 20 percentage-points increase in intensity for groups with a vulnerable language compared to those with endangered languages ($p < 0.01$). Groups' whose language is judged to

[20] These results are concordant with an analysis of the means using an ANOVA followed by Tukey's test (not reported).

be safe have a significantly greater intensity that the endangered category ($p < 0.1$). But in OLS regressions performed with the vulnerable category as the reference (not reported), safe groups show a weaker intensity than vulnerable linguistic groups, without however reaching any level of significance. As for the control variables, economic strength is shown, as expected, to have a strong negative significant, at $p < 0.01$, influence on conflict intensity. However, political strength only shows a slight negative influence on intensity without reaching any level of significance.[21]

Table 2.1: Determinants of Conflict Intensity (All Linguistic Conflicts)

Endangered (Ref.)	-	-
Vulnerable	0.15*	0.20***
Safe	0.06	0.12*
Economic Strength	-	-0.26***
Political Strength	-	-0.04
Constant	0.12	0.20
R-Square	0.02	0.08
N	176	170

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

[21] While the results on the influence of political discrimination are in line with those found by Fox (2000) , thus contradicting Regan and Norton (2005) and Walter (2006), they also go against Gurr's findings (1993) that political discrimination is associated with less rather than more conflict. The weakness of political discrimination's influence on conflict intensity might be due to the fact that it is so intertwined with economic inequalities and that it is the economic grievance variable which might account for variance in conflict levels.

Thus, the results presented so far give credence to the proposed model which expected a generalized curvilinear relationship between OV and conflict intensity in linguistic ethnic conflicts.

However, if OV really has such an effect on language-based ethnic tensions, the relationship between both variables should be more evident in polities experiencing several of these conflicts. Examining countries with multiple linguistic conflicts would allow to better understand the reasons behind why some minorities are more radicalized than others.

Out of the 47 countries in the dataset with multiple language-based ethnic tensions, 20 countries possess conflicts with different levels of vitality. The dataset was filtered to isolate these countries, resulting in 61 cases being retained for analysis.[22]

As in the case of all the linguistic conflicts (Figure 2.2), the mean scores for the three levels of vitality, presented in Figure 2.3, display a curvilinear pattern between vitality and intensity. The intensity mean score of groups with a vulnerable language is 19 percentage-points greater than groups with an endangered language and 12 percentage-points greater than groups with a safe language. The intensity of groups with a safe language is 7 points greater than groups with an endangered language. As in the previous analysis, the means do not demonstrate significant differences between the vulnerable groups and the other two categories; although, significance was very nearly reached for the difference between endangered and the

[22] An examination of the relationship between Vitality and Intensity in these countries revealed that in three countries there was no difference in conflict intensity between the linguistic groups, and in another four countries the relationship was positive. Yet, in the majority of countries, 11, groups with a stronger linguistic vitality demonstrated weaker conflict intensity than compatriots with a weaker OV. For the remaining two countries, Russia and Spain, the only ones which possess cases in the three levels of vitality, the relationship was, as expected, curvilinear. Although these results are quite striking, it is important to note that countries without a vitality difference between their groups still often possessed differing conflict intensities. Yet, when there exist differences in vitality levels among groups in a country, more often than not, greater linguistic vitality concords with weaker conflict intensity.

vulnerable linguistic groups.[23] Again, this bivariate relationship shows a quite good concordance with our predicted model.

Figure 2.3: Mean Scores of Conflict Intensity for Intranational Conflicts



Once more, OLS regressions with control variables reveal the expected curvilinear relationship between vitality and intensity. The results, in Table 2.2, show a significant increase of 23 percentage-points in intensity for linguistically vulnerable groups compared to groups with endangered languages ($p < 0.01$). However, an important difference from the previous results is that the greater intensity of groups with a safe language compared to those with an endangered language is not significant. Furthermore, OLS regressions performed with vulnerable groups as the reference category (not reported) demonstrate a 15 percentage-point significant, $p < 0.1$, weaker intensity for groups in the safe category compared to linguistically

[23] These results are a match to an analysis of the means using an ANOVA followed by Tukey's test (not reported).

vulnerable ones. As for the control variables, both are shown to have a negative influence on conflict intensity, however without reaching any level of significance. It is worth noting that the level that intensity weakens from vulnerable language groups to safe language groups is actually the same as would result from an improvement in economic inequality (15 percentage-points). While very similar to the results for all the language-based ethnic tensions, it can be argued that these results specifically for countries with multiple language-based ethnic conflicts possessing different linguistic vitality levels are even more in line with the proposed model because the weakening of the intensity from the vulnerable category to the safe one is significant and there is no significant difference for conflict intensity between endangered and safe groups.

Table 2.2: Determinants of Conflict Intensity for Intranational Conflicts

Endangered (Ref.)	-	-
Vulnerable	0.19**	0.23**
Safe	0.07	0.08
Economic Strength	-	-0.15
Political Strength	-	-0.04
Constant	0.13	0.19
R-Square	0.07	0.10
N	61	56

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * p< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Linguistic vitality thus seems to influence conflict intensity in a curvilinear manner. This is consistent with the hypothesis (H1).

Consequently, the results not only support the hypothesis which was put forward, they give credence to a model which seems to explain in an accurate manner the conflict intensity of language-based ethnic conflicts in a general context and, more precisely, within countries.[24]

2.5 Conclusion

Political instability and violence associated with ethnic conflicts make such intergroup discords an important subject. Accordingly, the ultimate goal of these investigations into ethnic conflicts is to prevent or attenuate their negative social and political effects; as well as to contribute to the development of strategies to resolve, decrease or prevent contemporary intergroup tensions. Conflict resolution strategies attempt to get to the root of the problem and address the causes which generated the conflict or, at the very least, establish an environment that minimizes the chances of escalation (Burton 1990). The present study was conducted in the hope of contributing to the understanding of these conflicts and to the elaboration of strategies to alleviate them.

This study used a rational choice perspective in which ethnic group grievances constitute motivational factors for group members. Grievances were presented as being the anchor in the decisional process that leads group members to choose which type of intergroup relation to adopt. It was shown that traditionally the literature on civil conflicts, both in general

[24] Regan and Norton (2005) conclude that different types of civil conflicts, protest or violent, are differently influenced by factors. All of the analyses were also undertaken with the protest and rebellion variables separately. The results for both variables were basically the same as for those conducted with our Intensity variable; except that in the former, the dummy variables in the OLS regressions did not attain any level of significance.

and specifically on ethnic conflicts, usually treats group grievances in two dimensions: economic inequalities and political discrimination. In the process, grievances specific to ethnicity have been underexplored.

Seeing that the overwhelming majority of ethnic tensions involve a linguistic difference between the groups in conflict and, moreover, there is a range in the demands and the intensity of language-based group tensions, a factor specific to linguistic groups was presented as being able to add an important explanatory dimension to these conflicts. Linguistic vitality, a variable often utilized in sociolinguistics and which is specific to linguistic groups, was retained for this purpose. This paper, hence, presented the level of linguistic vitality as another form of group grievance capable of impacting conflict intensity. Therefore, this study sought to examine the relationship between linguistic vitality and the intensity of group conflicts.

The results of these analyses lend support to a hypothesized model in which low and high levels of linguistic vitality generate lower conflict intensity than moderate vitality levels. Thus, the findings indicate an inverted U-shape curvilinear relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity.[25] The results support the proposed theoretical model for language-based ethnic conflicts in general but even more so for countries with several conflicts involving groups with different linguistic vitality levels.

This study not only brings together two academic traditions that share common interests but which have been disjointed, political science and sociolinguistics, it also permits to

[25] It is important to note that the results are based on data for groups already considered to be in conflict. Due to limitation of the data, a comparison of linguistic minorities in conflicts with those considered not to be in conflict was not possible. Furthermore, seeing that cross-national linguistic vitality data are somewhat in its infancy, a large scale temporal analysis in order to examine changes in conflict intensity is at this time not a viable analytical option.

contribute to the development of sound governmental policies towards linguistic minorities. All in all, the results indicate that aiming to strengthen minority groups' language towards safe levels reduces considerably levels of conflicts intensity when compared to vulnerable groups.

Yet critics might point to the fact that the lowest levels of conflict intensity are found with groups in an endangered situation. Though endangered groups seem to be the least threatening to national majorities, a purposely implemented national policy to endanger a group's language not only violates important international legal conventions regarding minority group rights as well as the current international trend in the treatment of national minorities, but it also may engender a new series of grievances which may negatively affect intergroup relations.

Theoretically it is much more rewarding to strengthen minority languages in an attempt to alleviate their perceived threat and, hence, positively influence majority / minority relations. Therefore, policies which would make it possible to strengthen the linguistic vitality of minority groups would more likely than not improve, if not avoid, conflict situations between linguistic minorities and national linguistic majorities.

One final element from this study needs to be highlighted. Although the results of this research lend support to the explanatory theoretical model which was proposed, they only do so for the general relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. At present, it is only the macro-social connection between both variables which can be supported. These results are quite enlightening and may help to explain, for example, Linz and Stepan's challenging findings (1992) which show Catalans as being much more attached to Spain than Basques, a discovery that the authors were unable to truly explain. Seeing that the data used in this study indicate that Basques have stronger conflict intensity than their Catalan counterparts; this

conflictual discrepancy is theorized in this paper, and inferred from the results, to be linked to the fact that the former group is in a vulnerable linguistic situation whereas the later one is in a safe position. Thus, Linz & Stepan's mystery might be in fact linked to different levels of linguistic vitality.

However, to thoroughly and accurately explain the relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity, further research needs to be undertaken on the individual level. The model presented above is based on a socio-psychological sequence, which theoretically serves as the connections between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity. Therefore, an exploration at the micro-level is an essential next step in order to test the explanatory ability of the theory as well as forming a more compelling understanding of the relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup relations.

Chapitre 3

The Language of Trust: Language Vitality and Trust in National Institutions

Trust in political institutions is of great concern for states. Not only does popular trust contribute to the effectiveness of governance, it is also a stabilizing force for countries and regimes (Putnam 1993, Hetherington 2005, Rothstein 2005, Marien and Hooghe 2011). Though institutional trust can be a non-negligible factor for the performance of state agencies, it also contributes to reducing social tensions by helping to improve majority-minority group relations (Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 1995).

While the ability of political trust to contribute to serene intergroup relations seems important, the large literature on political trust has somewhat underscored the importance of this factor. Rather, the focus has particularly been on the economic and political dimensions of trust (Mishler and Rose 2001, Hetherington 2005), overlooking the relationship between social diversity and confidence. Seeing that most countries are ethnically heterogeneous (Ellingsen 2000, Duffy Toft 2002), delving deeper into ethnically-related factors might shine a new light on political trust.

Though ethnic social cleavages can be based on a range of different markers, one ethnic division stands out. The overwhelming majority of ethnic conflicts possess a linguistic difference between the conflicting parties (Medeiros 2010). Furthermore, unlike other ethnic markers, language possesses a tangible and quantifiable measure of its social well-being: linguistic vitality. Considering that linguistic vitality has been shown to impact intergroup relations (Inglehart and Woodward 1967, Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981, Harwood, Giles et al. 1994, Medeiros 2013), the research into the influence of linguistic vitality on political behaviour warrants further exploration. Thus, this paper seeks to examine the impact of linguistic vitality on political trust.

This study explores this question by, firstly, developing a theoretical model of the psychological process linking a macro-social variable to individuals' attitudes. More precisely, it is theorized that linguistic vitality directly influences trust in national institutions but that it also indirectly does so through a mediator: perceptions of linguistic discrimination. This mediation model is thereafter empirically tested with survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and linguistic vitality data derived from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger. The results support the assertion that the vitality of individuals' group language positively influences trust in national institutions and that perceptions of discrimination decrease political trust. However, the findings unpredictably indicate a positive relationship between linguistic vitality and perceptions of linguistic discrimination.

This study is nevertheless able to demonstrate the important influence that language can have on institutional trust. The overall findings show the determining role of three different linguistic factors on political trust: linguistic vitality, perceptions of linguistic discrimination and the institutional status of a language.

3.1 Language and Behaviour

Social divisions have a range of origins. Yet, often, those based on an ethnic marker stand out. This is a tendency which has been highlighted in recent decades (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997, Hewitt, Wilkenfeld et al. 2008). Social divisions' potential for violence and the fact that most countries are ethnically heterogeneous account for an interest, in academia and in the media, for ethnic tensions (Ellingsen 2000, Duffy Toft 2002).

Ethnicity can be based on religion, language or race; as well as ties of kinship, such as tribe and clan membership. However, out of all these social group markers, language-based

divisions stand out in their prominence (Medeiros 2010). Besides being an oft present factor in social tensions, language, can easily be evaluated through its social health. This measure, originally put forward by Giles and his colleagues (1977), is referred to as linguistic vitality, more specifically as objective vitality (OV), and denotes the overall ability to utilize a language in everyday life.[26] The original conceivers of OV presented its apex, where it is healthiest, as a situation in which a linguistic group is able to behave as a distinctive and active linguistic entity. OV is determined, according to Giles and his colleagues, by three macro-social variables: group status, demographic realities, and institutional support and opportunity. These factors merge to reflect the ease with which linguistic group members can use their language in social situations.

Though it might be expected that demographics play a determining role on the vitality of a language, institutional support can offset weak demographic realities and contribute to a more valued group status (Cenoz 2001). Still, institutional support does have its limits (Ó'Riagáin 1997). Nevertheless, for specialists of linguistic vitality, the importance of institutions for linguistic vitality is undeniable.

Yet, linguistic vitality is not just a dependent variable. Researchers, mostly from the field of sociolinguistics, have demonstrated that it influences intrapersonal behaviour, notably the desire of individuals to use a language (Laporte 1984, Landry and Allard 1994). OV has also been shown to impact intergroup relations (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). In this latter line of research, the key to understanding the influence of linguistic vitality on intergroup attitudes might be the perceived treatment from the out-group (Inglehart and Woodward 1967, Harwood, Giles et al. 1994). Specifically, the perception of threat to the group can result in in-group bias

[26] Linguistic vitality can also be understood as relating to the perception of a language's social health. This variable is referred to as subjective ethno-linguistic vitality (SEV) (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). The actual ability to use a language and the perceived facility of using that language can be completely different.

and negative attitudes towards the out-group (Taylor, Meynard et al. 1977, Giles and Johnson 1987, Ros, Huici et al. 1994). In other words, linguistic intergroup relations might be heavily influenced by perceptions of discrimination.

3.2 The Discrimination Motivation

Discrimination entails a purposely established situation of deprivation. Groups who find themselves in such a disadvantaged social position tend to develop frustration towards the social hierarchy and the advantaged group in that society (Dollard, Miller et al. 1939). The danger associated with disadvantaged social situations is the risk of creating intergroup resentment and hatred (Van Dijk 1987, Essed 1991, Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Resentment among members of discriminated groups can manifest itself in an rejection of the dominant group (Vermeulen and Amesz 1984, Branscombe, Schmitt et al. 1999). Yet, more worryingly, group discrimination can directly lead to violence (Crenshaw 1981).

A disadvantaged social situation that foments collective frustrations is based on grievances. A rationalist interpretation of civil strife portrays intergroup conflict as a way to redress grievances (Sambanis 2002). In other words, intergroup tensions arise because one group believes itself to be in an unfair social situation. The impact of grievances on group tensions has been primarily examined through intergroup resource differences. Economic and political intergroup disparities have been widely studied due to their propensity to increase civil tensions (Gurr 1993, Cetinyan 2002, Caprioli and Trumbore 2003, Kaufman 2006). Specifically, the literature demonstrates that economic inequalities, the difference in available economic resources, and political discrimination, disparities in the access to political resources,

accentuates civil strife (Gurr 1968, Müller and Seligson 1987, Walter 2006, Lu and Thies 2011). In both cases, intergroup disparities lead to more serious social tensions.

Still, resource inequality might also deteriorate intergroup relations from the side of the dominant group. Though resource disparities spur disadvantaged groups to want to redress their situation, it can also push dominant groups to reinforce their dominant position and, thus, further the intergroup resource gap (Bartkus 1999, Sambanis and Milanovic 2011). Such a reinforcement would evidently result in a further poisoning of majority-minority relations (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995, Muñoz and Tormos 2014). Economic and political group-based grievances are undoubtedly important factors in the decision-making process of an individual to fight or not against a dominant social group.

Resource inequality is amplified because it is often institutionalized. Structural constraints of polities can establish an unjust resource distribution. The tangible impact of institutionalized rules which disadvantage a specific group is to limit social mobility and keep in place the disproportional relationship between dominant and dominated groups (Petersen 2002, Hooghe 2007). Unfair institutional hurdles frustrate disadvantaged groups and, consequently, poison social relations (Birnir 2007). Though it is human nature to seek to maintain an advantageous position in group relations (Sidanius and Pratto 2001), recent tendencies, especially in liberal democracies, have emphasized attempts to address disadvantage and discrimination (Kymlicka 2005).

Policies which seek resolution of intergroup tensions have been focusing on collective grievances. Gurr (2000) states that the best way to resolve a conflict is to rectify past and present discrimination. In recent decades, there has been a trend to move away from attempts to harshly

deal with ethnic diversity and go towards the path of accommodation (Kymlicka 2005). Such accommodating policies seeks to instil trust and mutual understanding between different social groups (Malloy 2012).

3.3 The Trust Issue

In dealing with intergroup tensions, the perceived unfairness of a social relationship needs to be addressed in order to evacuate the intergroup resentment that it causes. Yet, such policies should not only tackle past and present woes, but should also attempt to build the foundations for a healthy intergroup future through trust. This is because conflict and trust have been shown to be inextricably linked. Low levels of intergroup trust render social relationships tumultuous (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011, Rohner, Thoenig et al. 2013). This is why fostering trust between communities is necessary in order to overcome the scars of resentment and discrimination that might plague societies (Dembinska 2010).

A lack of intergroup trust affects social relations in specific manners. Firstly, low levels of intercommunal trust tends to lead to more ethnocentric attitudes (Brewer 1986, Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011). Additionally, a lack of interpersonal trust can heighten the sense of fear among individuals (Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 1995). Though perceived threat might dissipate, the problem of intergroup trust can still remain (Bailey 2011). Therefore, to attempt to resolve intergroup tensions, building trust between groups is an essential part of any truly effective resolution policy (Bazin 2000, Kaufman 2001, Dembinska 2010). This is a process in which institutions play a non-negligible role (Pettit 1995, Cordell 2009, Karakoç 2013).

The scholarship highlights that attitudes toward others and institutions are intertwined (Rothstein and Stolle 2003, Rothstein 2005, Lühiste 2006, Crepaz 2008). In terms of intergroup relations, majority and minority trust issues are quite dependent on national institutions. Many scholars have put forward that the central state and its institutions need to be perceived as being fair in order for healthy intergroup relations to take hold (Wright 1935, Gurr 1970, Sambanis 2001, Cameron 2009). Baldacchino and Hepburn (2012) argue that frustration with the existing unsatisfactory institutional framework push minorities towards radical options.

Institutional changes can hence have an important impact on remediating corrosive intergroup relations. Hooghe (2007) presents that changes to institutions, through recognition and minority rights, can help alleviate intergroup resentment. This assertion is in line with Mishler and Rose's finding (2001) that institutions play an important role in developing political trust. Although there is an evident connection between institutional political trust and intergroup relations, the literature has basically concentrated on examining the influence of economic and political performance (Karakoç 2013). While social diversity and trust share a link, research exploring this relationship has been scarce.

In terms of race, studies examining racial minorities in the United States uncover less political trust among these groups (Miller 1974, Hetherington 1998, Michelson 2003). As for religion, there seems to be very little research which has examined political trust in national religious minorities. Haddad (2002) finds that Christians in Lebanon have lower political trust. Yet, Soroka and colleagues (2007) show that Catholics in Canada exhibit more political trust. Looking specifically at linguistic minorities, the picture does not get clearer. Dowley and Silver (2002) document lesser political trust among Russophone minorities in the former Soviet

Union; though this phenomenon was not present among the other minorities they examined. Ehin's results (2007) somewhat contradict this finding. In Lithuania and Latvia, Russian minorities seemed to be as or more trusting of certain institutions; notably the courts, the police and parliament. Though this healthy intergroup relation did not seem to have made its way to Estonia. A linguistic minority, Francophones, with greater political trust is also found in Canada (Soroka, Johnston et al. 2007). Karakoç (2013), for his part, examined political trust in Turkey amongst its Kurdish minority. His findings demonstrate weaker trust, compared to other Turks, in national institutions but greater trust in international ones.[27] Overall, past research does not point to a clear relationship between belonging to a national minority and political trust.

Yet, a link between minorities and institutional trust, or distrust, can easily be understood through discrimination. Perceived discrimination weakens the bonds of trust to the country's political institutions (Michelson 2003). In Petersen's opinion (2002), perceived resource injustices that lead to resentment are often linked to institutions. Thus, discrimination and institutions would be bound together. Consequently, discrimination could play a role in providing a clearer picture of the relationship between minorities and political trust.

Yet, to truly clarify this relationship, research should seek to isolate the exact psychological mechanisms behind minority groups' attitudes towards national institutions. What experience or consequence of discrimination could connect minority status to political trust? So far, this process remains underexplored and unexplained.

[27] This internationalist trust phenomenon was also found by Dowley and Silver (2011) in ethnic minorities across Europe.

Seeing that most ethnically heterogeneous societies are divided by language, can language play a part in the relationships between minorities, discrimination and institutions? We believe so. The following section presents a theoretical framework which puts forward the interconnection between language, perceived discrimination and institutional trust.

3.4 The Influence of Linguistic Vitality on Political Trust

Existing research which examines the relationship between ethnic minorities and political trust has lacked an empirical explanation of the manner in which these variables are connected. The answer might start with collective grievances. As discussed above, a plethora of research examining civil strife, and notably ethnic tensions, has for decades highlighted the importance of collective grievances for intergroup tensions. These grievances have basically been presented as the result of economic and political intergroup inequalities and the sense of discrimination tied to such a disadvantaged social position. Though these two dimensions are important sources of collective grievances, Gurr (2000) also underlines the importance of cultural grievances to better grasp the impact of discrimination on conflicts.

Given that linguistic differences are present in the overwhelming majority of ethnic conflicts (Medeiros 2010), linguistic factors might be one such cultural grievance. One study presents a theoretical model, which is empirically supported, that links linguistic vitality and conflict intensity (Medeiros 2013). The rationale behind this theory is that language barriers which keep economic and political resources out of the reach of linguistic group members lead to group inequality, thus creating and fueling linguistic grievances and the resentment attached to them.

Further research on linguistic grievances has specifically linked them to institutional constraints (Petersen 2002). Linguistic institutional factors are generally presented as linguistic rights. Language-based rights have reached the level of recognized international human rights (United Nations 1992, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995, May 2011, Izsák 2012). The bulk of scholarly evidence points to the benefits, in terms of improving relations with minorities, of granting, or preserving rights (Gurr, Marshall et al. 2000, Hooghe 2007). However, empirically examining the impact of linguistic grievances on intergroup relations can be difficult. Yet, as we have seen, the social health of a language can be quantified through linguistic vitality.

Theoretically, groups with weak levels of vitality should have greater linguistic grievances and should subsequently be less trusting of the national institutions. Hence, if language grievances can be addressed, then political trust could theoretically be improved.

Yet, on a psychological level, the jump from linguistic grievances to trust seems quite large. Abovementioned research pointed to discrimination being linked to both grievances and trust. Therefore, it is proposed that discrimination might act as a mediating factor between linguistic grievances and trust. We put forward a theoretical mediation model in which linguistic vitality would have a direct positive effect on trust in national institutions and would also have an indirect positive effect mediated through perceptions of group discrimination. Figure 3.1 illustrates the expected relationships between these three variables.

Figure 3.1: Theorized Psychological Mechanism between Linguistic Vitality and Trust in National Institutions



These theoretical considerations about the socio-psychological connection between linguistic vitality and trust in national institutions allow us to suggest four hypotheses:

H1: The linguistic vitality of a group has a direct positive influence on trust in national institutions.

H2: The linguistic vitality of a group has a direct negative effect on perceptions of linguistic discrimination.

H3: Perceptions of linguistic discrimination have a direct negative influence on trust in national institutions.

H4: The linguistic vitality of a group has an indirect positive impact on trust in national institutions through perceptions of linguistic discrimination.

3.5 Data

The model suggested above is composed of three main variables: objective linguistic vitality, perceived group discrimination based on language and trust in national institutions. To operationalize these variables, data from the European Social Survey (ESS) were utilized.

The "Language most often spoken at home: first mentioned" variable was used to identify members of minority languages. The respondents' language selection was matched with UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger in order to obtain the linguistic vitality variable.[28] The OV of the languages ranged from critically endangered to safe. Due to the low numbers of respondents which selected either a critically endangered or a severally endangered language, both levels of vitality were merged into one category. Thus, languages were coded into three levels of linguistic vitality (endangered, vulnerable and safe) ranging from 0 to 1. Moreover, there were few respondents in the latest round of the ESS which selected minority languages that were not safe. To alleviate this situation and obtain a sufficient number of respondents from vulnerable and endangered linguistic groups, data from the three most recent ESS rounds, 4 to 6, were pooled together and employed for the analyses.[29]

Considering that immigrant groups possess different characteristics than those of traditional territorial ethnic groups (Fuchs 1993, Sanders 2002), only linguistic groups that are considered national minorities were retained.[30] Furthermore, since the theory put forward seeks

[28] This dataset determines the OV of linguistic groups, through the strength of languages in each country, by means of a measure composed of nine societal factors. Its mission is to ascertain the viability of all the different languages in the world. The UNESCO data only expressively indicate values for languages judged to be in danger; thus, their classification ranges from extinct to vulnerable. All languages excluded from the classification were classified as safe.

[29] The decision was taken not to apply the ESS sample weights due to the focus of this study being on groups; the ESS weights are recommended to allow for a better comparison between countries. Nevertheless, the OLS regression presented in Table 3.1 was also run with the recommended ESS combined weight. The results, not reported, do not show noteworthy differences between the weighted and unweighted analyses.

[30] Regime rights for national minorities are often different from those applied to immigrant groups. The European Convention on Human Rights indicates that rights conferred to national minorities are applied to groups that "maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state" (Council of Europe 1993).

to examine the dynamics between majorities and minorities, only proper linguistic minorities were kept for the analysis.[31] This selection process allowed to retain data from 11 countries.[32]

As for our second main variable, perceived discrimination was operationalized through a dichotomous question asking respondents if they were part of a group discriminated in the country on linguistic grounds.[33] In the case of trust in national institutions, the ESS asks several questions about respondents' level of trust towards different national institutions. Taking inspiration from Karakoç's study (2013), the questions measuring trust in the country's parliament, its legal system and its police were merged into a single 11-point continuous scale (from 0 to 1).[34]

In order to better isolate the influence of the predictor and mediator variables, a series of control variables were also utilized. One set of control variables comes from the ESS data: age, level of education and ideological self-placement of respondents was ascertained through the ESS data. The level of education variable was transformed into an 11-point continuous scale (from 0 to 1), whereas ideological self-placement was already in this 11-point format (it was converted into a 0 to1 scale). As for age, it was left as the age of the respondents. Annexe B provides greater information on the ESS variables used in this study.

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[31] This criteria excluded Belgium and Ukraine. Though Flemings are the demographic, political and economic majority in Belgium, Flemish nationalism demonstrates characteristics of minority nationalism (De Winter and Baudewyns 2009). As for Ukraine, with the Russophone dominant Party of Regions winning recent presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively held in 2010 and 2012, they do not fit into the regular linguistic minority mold. As George and his colleagues (2010) state, it is not uncommon for political parties in Ukraine, including governing ones, to be more attuned to the Russophone parts of Ukraine.

[32] The countries retained for the analyses were Bulgaria, Switzerland, Estonia, Spain, France, Finland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Turkey.

[33] The question "On what grounds is your group discriminated against?" is a follow-up question in the ESS surveys to the dichotomous (yes or no) question: "Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?". Respondents who marked language as a source of their group's national discrimination were coded as 1; all others, those who did not belong to a discriminated group or who did not believe that their group's discrimination was based on language, were coded as 0.

[34] The scale was validated using factor analysis as well as a reliability test that showed a Cronbach's α score of 0.85.

Added to these standard individual-level control variables were two macro-social ones. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the political status of a language can have an independent effect on vitality; even though political status is not very beneficial if its policies are non-committal (Gorter, Riemersma et al. 2001). In order to control for such an influence, the political status inside the country of the groups' language variable was constructed through careful research to determine whether the language had no rights, was a non-officially recognized minority language receiving some governmental support (de facto), an officially recognized minority language (de jure), an official regional language, or an official national language.[35] This variable was transformed into a 0 to 1 scale.

Secondly, a widely accepted, and empirically demonstrated, view in the literature is that decentralization alleviates intrastate conflicts (Lijphart 1977, Horowitz 1991, Stepan 1999, Bermeo 2002, Lublin 2012); including in linguistic groups situations (Laponce 1987). In order to verify that trust was being influenced by the social health of the groups' language and not by sub-state autonomy, a decentralization dichotomous variable was constructed, through careful research, to indicate whether the linguistic group lived in a decentralized region. Autonomous regions and federated states were coded as being decentralized states.

3.6 Results

The theoretical model to explain political trust in national institutions among linguistic minorities presents a mediator, perceived linguistic discrimination, linking a predictor variable, linguistic vitality, and an outcome variable, trust in national institutions. Therefore, stepwise

[35]This process was mostly conducted using qualitative data from the World Directory of the Minority Rights Group (Minority Rights 2012).

regression analyses, inspired by Baron and Kenny (1986), were conducted to assess each component of the proposed mediation model.[36]

Figure 3.2: Mediation Sequence between Linguistic Vitality and Trust



Statistical significance: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

The results displayed in Figure 3.2 show, firstly, that linguistic vitality has a significant positive effect on trust in national institutions ($\beta = 0.09$, $t(5020) = 6.94$, $p < 0.01$). The results indicate as well that linguistic vitality was significantly and positively related to the mediator,

[36] This process uses several regression analyses. In our three-variable model, a four step process is called for. Step 1 tests the influence of the predictor on the outcome variable, step 2 examines the impact of the predictor on the mediator and step 3 explores the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable. Steps 1 through 3 serve to establish that zero-order relationships exist among the variables. If all the relationships in the first three steps are significant, another step is conducted. In Step 4, the predictor and the mediator are put together into the same model examining the former's effect on the outcome variable. If the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable remains significant after controlling for the predictor, mediation is supported. To be more specific, partial mediation is supported if the predictor remains significant whereas full mediation is retained if the predictor is no longer significant.

perceived linguistic discrimination ($\beta = 0.07$, $t\ (5020) = 5.29$, $p < 0.01$). This finding is contrary to our expectation as it indicates that discrimination is perceived to be more widespread when language vitality is high. It was also found that perceived linguistic discrimination was significantly and negatively related to trust in national institutions ($\beta = -0.15$, $t\ (5020) = -10.64$, $p < 0.01$). Because both the a-path, predictor to mediator, and the b-path, mediator to outcome, were significant, mediation analyses were tested using the bootstrapping method using bias-corrected confidence estimates (MacKinnon, Lockwood et al. 2004, Preacher and Hayes 2004). In the present study, the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effects was obtained with 5,000 bootstrap resamples (as recommended by Preacher and Hayes 2008). Results of the mediation analyses confirmed the mediating role of perceived linguistic discrimination in the relationship between linguistic vitality and trust in national institutions ($\beta = -0.01$, CI = -0.014 to -0.008). In addition, the results indicate that the direct effect of linguistic vitality on trust in national institutions remained significant ($\beta = 0.10$, $t\ (5020) = 7.79$, $p < 0.01$) when controlling for perceived discrimination, thus suggesting partial mediation.

Though these results do not support our proposed mediation model, they nevertheless demonstrate the important role that linguistic vitality and perceptions of linguistic discrimination have on political trust.

While the mediation analysis permits to examine the specific influence of predictors and mediators on an outcome, it neglects other variables which might have an impact on the explored relationships. Thus, in order to get a clearer picture of the specific influence of linguistic vitality and perceived linguistic discrimination on trust in national institutions, OLS regressions with control variables were also performed.

Table 3.1: Determinants of Trust in National Institutions

Linguistic Vitality	0.12***
Perceived Discrimination	-0.10*
Gender	0.00
Age	0.00
Education	-0.04***
Ideology	0.16***
Political Status of Language	0.35***
Decentralized State	-0.06***
Constant	0.14
R-squared	0.17
N	4072

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The results presented in Table 3.1 further support the influence of linguistic vitality and linguistic discrimination on trust in national institutions. The findings show that linguistic vitality significantly increases trust in national institutions and perceptions of linguistic discrimination significantly decrease political trust. As for the control variables, four show a significant influence on the outcome variable. Higher levels of education slightly decrease political trust. Right-wing ideology is shown to positively increase trust in national

institutions.[37] Decentralization is also shown to slightly decrease the level of trust in national political institutions.[38] Finally, the findings demonstrate that the more 'official' a minority language is, the more its speakers trust national institutions.

Overall, the results of the analyses support three of the four hypotheses derived from our theoretical mediation model. Linguistic vitality is shown to have a direct positive influence on trust in national institutions as well as an indirect effect. Perceptions of linguistic discrimination are also demonstrated to reduce political trust. Thus, these results are consistent with our first (H1), third (H3) and fourth (H4) hypotheses. However, seeing that linguistic vitality is shown to positively contribute to perceptions of linguistic discrimination, our second hypothesis (H2) is rejected.

3.7 Conclusion

A citizenry's level of trust in their national political institutions is related to several important political phenomena, social and political stability being notable amongst them. Thus, it is no wonder that political trust has received much academic attention. Yet, research tends to focus on the manner in which economic and political matters relate to individuals' trust in their

[37] The model was also tested with the inclusion of a squared version of the ideology variable to test for a curvilinear relationship caused by ideological polarization. The results, not reported, indicate no curvilinear relationship between ideological self-placement and political trust.

[38] Considering that this result showing decentralization negatively affecting trust is contrary to expectations, further analyses were undertaken. The inclusion of data from the Russian Federation in the analyses was seen as a possible reason leading to this counter-intuitive result because of issues related to institutional trust in that country, especially among its minorities (Gorenburg 2006, Shlapentokh 2006, Moser 2008, Sevortian 2009). In order to test for a 'Russia effect', a dichotomous variable for the Russian Federation was created and the analysis re-run with the inclusion of this new variable. Although the results, not reported, show that linguistic minorities in the Russian Federation show a significantly lower trust level in national institutions than those in the other countries examined, the effect of decentralization on trust remained practically unchanged.

political institutions. Somewhat ignored are cultural issues that can also determine how trustworthy a citizen finds the institutions of his or her country.

This paper aimed to tackle this research imbalance and focus on cultural grievances. Specifically, it examined the level of institutional trust among linguistic minorities. The rationalist grievance model, which concentrates on economic and political resources, was extrapolated to linguistic grievances. Basically, the study aimed to see if grievances about the ability to use one's language impact political trust.

The social health of a language, a measure known as linguistic vitality, was used to verify the relationship between linguistic grievances and trust. Specifically, it was theorized that lower levels of linguistic vitality would generate greater cultural grievances and lead to lower levels of trust. Yet, the literature highlights the importance of being perceived as being discriminated against in the development of grievances and the instillation of trust. Thus, a simple mediation model was put forward presenting a presumed socio-psychological process which connects linguistic vitality to political trust. It was theorized that linguistic vitality directly impacts trust in national institutions, but also influences it indirectly through the mediation of believing one is linguistically discriminated against.

Though the exactitude of our proposed mediation model is not supported, the findings nonetheless highlight the important impact of linguistic factors. The result, from Table 3.1, show that an increase from the endangered level of vitality to the safe level accounts for a 12 percentage-point surge of trust in national institutions. As for perceptions of linguistic discrimination, they are shown to decrease political trust by 10 percentage-points. The analyses also explored the impact of the political status of the language. This factor has a positive and significant effect on trust; the more 'official' a language is, the more trusting is the relationship

with central state institutions. Moving from one extreme case to the other of language officialdom leads to a 35 percentage-point increase of trust in national institutions. Therefore, we can conclude that linguistic factors play an important role in the trust levels of linguistic minorities towards their national institutions.

Hence, two major contributions derive from our findings. They, firstly, lend support to a rationalist perspective about the influence of language on intergroup relations. Situations which place an individual's group language in a weak social situation, either through low vitality levels and/or a lack of official recognition for the language, as well as lead to perceptions of linguistic discrimination, contexts that can all fuel linguistic grievances, will negatively impact linguistic minorities' trust in national institutions. Secondly, these findings allow us to bridge a gap in the scholarship and deliver a clearer relationship between belonging to a linguistic minority and political trust.

Nevertheless, further research on the manner that language influences political trust is needed. Our study was not able to isolate the socio-psychological mechanism connecting linguistic vitality to trust. Linguistic vitality and perceptions of linguistic discrimination are shown to impact political trust, yet the exact manner in which these linguistic factors influence trust in national institutions remains unknown. Furthermore, seeing that only European cases are used in this study, a further exploration of the relationship between trust and linguistic grievances, as well as other cultural ones, beyond the lands of the Council of Europe is called for. In a more general perspective, the relationship between cultural grievances and a range of other socio-political factors warrants exploration. Keys to understanding political dynamics or developing appropriate policies might be lying in over-looked important social factors.

Chapitre 4

The Language of Blame: The Influence of Linguistic Vitality on Intergroup Attitudes

Linguistic diversity is rife with challenges. Yet, seeing that the great majority of countries are linguistically heterogeneous, these are challenges that most states cannot ignore. The social relationships between linguistic majorities and minorities vary greatly. Linguistic group relations can be a peaceful and cooperative coexistence. However, they can be much less harmonious. Linguistic factors, such as the social health of a language, may explain these variations because they help to unify and to mobilize groups (Fishman 1989). Therefore, it would be of interest to better understand the mechanisms which explain variations in linguistic group relations.

Whereas research in sociolinguistics and social psychology has for decades attempted to explain the influence of linguistic factors on social phenomena, Phillipson (1999) remarked that political science has seriously underappreciated these factors. The state of the scholarship led him to call for a better cooperation between the social sciences exploring linguistic social phenomena. Thus, the factors allowing to better understand the diversity of social relationships amongst linguistic groups might potentially be found in more linguistics-based scholarship.

One of the most important contributions of this literature is the concept of linguistic vitality. Giles and colleagues (1977) originally conceived the notion of objective vitality (OV) to refer to the objective social health of a language. Intergroup tensions tend to fall in line with OV levels. For instance, groups in better OV situations among Francophones in Canada, Catalanophones in Spain and Swedophones in Finland – respectively those in Quebec, Catalonia and the Åland Islands – display greater confrontational political behaviour, whereas linguistic brethren in weaker OV environments in those countries are seemingly more cooperative and complaisant. Yet, in the case of Francophones in Switzerland, the situations seems reversed. It is those in a weaker OV situation, in the Jura region, which have traditionally

displayed a greater displeasure with their institutional framework. What could account for such differences?

It is important to note that the actual ability to use a language and the perceived facility of using that language can be completely different. This is why Bourhis and colleagues (1981) presented a different conception of linguistic vitality, referred to as subjective ethno-linguistic vitality (SEV). In this concept, the vitality of a language is derived from the perceptions of its members. Thus, the social reality of a language would not necessarily be the driving force in linguistic tensions. But could SEV help explain intergroup attitudes among linguistic minorities? And would there be other, possibly mediating, factors which impact this relationship?

This paper attempts to clarify the influence of language on intergroup behaviour. It seeks to do so by attempting to identify the socio-psychological mechanism linking language vitality to intergroup attitudes in minorities. Guided by past sociolinguistic and social psychological research, this paper presents a theoretical model connecting language to attitudes. The language to attitudes model posits that OV ultimately influences attitudes towards the out-group and the country through the mediation of SEV, perceived in-group threat, and perceptions of threat caused by the out-group.

In order to test this theory, original survey data was collected from Francophones in four Canadian provinces: Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba. Though the results show that the variables in the proposed model tend to impact each other in sequence, mediation can only be supported for a shortened version of the model in which in-group threat influences attitudes towards the out-group directly as well as indirectly through the mediation of perceived threat caused by the out-group.

Two other main findings are derived from the results. Different OV levels are shown to have specific impacts on SEV. Additionally, though living in Quebec is shown to have an important effect on attitudes toward Canada, this result is somewhat tempered by the fact that several other variables also influence these attitudes among Franco-Canadians.

The following section explores the scholarship related to language's influence on behaviour and presents the novel socio-psychological language to attitudes model. Then, the traits of different Francophone groups in Canada are explored. After the presentation of the results, we conclude with a discussion of their possible significance.

4.1 Language and Attitudes

A language is like a living entity that grows or withers. In other words, depending on its social context, a language can be in a strong or weak social position; reflecting the ability to use it in everyday life. The original developers of the concept, and subsequent researchers, presented OV as being determined by three major variables: group status (Landry and Allard 1994, Ben-Rafael, Shohamy et al. 2006), demographic realities (Stevens 1992, Coupland, Bishop et al. 2005), and institutional support and opportunity (Harwood, Giles et al. 1994, Yagmur and Kroon 2003). It is important to note that though demographic realities might be expected to be a dominating force, institutional support can offset a weak demographic condition and positively contribute to OV levels (Cenoz 2001). As can be expected, OV has been shown to have an influence on individuals' attitudes and behaviours. Landry and Allard (1994) demonstrate that language maintenance or loss can be determined by OV. They also demonstrate that OV influences individuals' degree of language use, social networks, level of linguistic competence and identity.

However, linguistic vitality can also relate to the perceptions of a language's social health. Initially presented by Bourhis and colleagues (1981), the concept of SEV is quite different from the actual ability to use a language. Though one would assume a strong relationship between OV and SEV, it is somewhat surprizing to discover that there is actually no academic consensus on the issue. Though some research has shown that OV and SEV are a strongly and positively correlated (Gao, Schmidt et al. 1994, Landry and Allard 1994), a level of independence of both variables has also been discovered (Bourhis and Sachdev 1984). SEV might actually be influenced by distinct predictors, such as linguistic social contacts (Landry and Allard 1991) and language fluency (Coupland, Bishop et al. 2005).

In terms of attitudes, research has pointed to the possibility of SEV being a mediating factor between OV and intergroup relations (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). Yet, SEV is likely to have greater influence on individuals' attitudes than OV (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981, Giles and Johnson 1987). Nonetheless, the influence of SEV might not be the key determinant in explaining linguistic intergroup attitudes. Rather, perceived out-group behaviour, independent of vitality perceptions, has been presented as the determining factor in understanding intergroup attitudes (Inglehart and Woodward 1967, Harwood, Giles et al. 1994). Specifically, the threat to the in-group perceived to be posed by the out-group can result in negative attitudes towards the out-group (Taylor, Meynard et al. 1977, Giles and Johnson 1987).

Threats to the in-group caused by the out-group are unequivocally linked to existentialist fears. Research has demonstrated that fears tend to impact in a negative manner intergroup attitudes (Duckitt 2001, Scheepers, Gijsberts et al. 2002, Riek, Mania et al. 2006); even hindering attempts to improve intergroup relations (Vivian, Hewstone et al. 1997, Brown and Hewstone 2005). It is important to note that fears have different origins based on whether

the group is a majority or a minority. Though majorities are subject to survivalist fears (Yavuz 2001, Bourhis and Foucher 2012), this characteristic is heightened in minorities. Seeing that minorities can be almost dependent in political, economic and even security terms, fears have a greater existentialist impulse among them (Saideman and Ayres 2000, Sidanius and Pratto 2001).

Linguistic groups, whether majorities or minorities, tend to react to existential threats with boundary maintenance strategies (Fishman 1989). It is the raising of the proverbial barriers. These fears can arise when other languages intrude into the sphere of the group (Fishman 1989, Bourhis and Foucher 2012). Yet, as with other minorities, the weaker the social position of linguistic minorities, the more sensitive towards existentialist threats they will be (Laponce 1987).

The review of the scholarship on language and attitudes has permitted to identify several variables which seem inter-related. Thus, the possibility is raised that there might exist a socio-psychological mechanism in linguistic minorities connecting OV to attitudes towards out-groups and even to the national state. Using the literature exploring language and attitudes as a guide, we put forward a theoretical model, presented in Figure 4.1, which explains the socio-psychological relationship between OV and attitudes towards out-groups and the country.

Figure 4.1: Language to Attitudes Model



The model presents a socio-psychological sequence in which OV is ultimately connected to attitudes towards the country through a series of mediating variables. OV would influence SEV, which in turn would impact the perceptions of in-group threat, specifically threat to the language. Thereafter, perceptions of in-group threat would influence perceptions of blame towards the out-group. The level of threat judged to arise from the out-group would therefore lead to positive or negative attitudes towards that out-group. Seeing that countries are, generally, dominated by majority groups, the attitudes towards the out-group should, ultimately, impact attitudes towards the country.

In order to test this model, a country in which a linguistic minority is composed of communities living in different linguistic vitality environments would be a suitable case. Canada, and its Francophone minority, represents such a case.

4.2 Francophones in Canada

Francophones in Canada offer a tremendous opportunity to explore the influence of OV on a specific national minority. Linguistic groups in Canada are not territorially confined. Though a majority of Canada's Francophones call Quebec home, they are spread-out, in varying degrees, throughout the country. However, the demographic realities and institutional status of French are quite different for Francophones in Quebec, Franco-Ontarians, Acadians in the Maritimes and Francophones in the West and the North. Thus, these different Francophone communities provide differing OV levels.

Quebec accounts for 85% of the Francophone population in Canada; a concentration that has led to it being portrayed as the homeland of Francophones (Martel 1997, McRoberts

2003). Prior to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, Francophone nationalism in Quebec was of a French-Canadian Catholic nature. Afterwards, the territory in which Francophones were a majority, and could in fact control, became the focus of their nationalism (Martel 1997, Bernard 1998). Thus, Franco-Quebeckers not only distanced themselves from English-Canada, they also did so with regards to their Francophone brethren beyond their provincial borders (Karmis and Gagnon 2001). Being a Quebecker became the principal identity for many Francophones in Quebec, a situation which created tensions with Canada's nation-building policies (McRoberts 1997, Seymour 2001).

The changes underwent by Francophones in Quebec led to major social transformations for other Francophone groups. Starting in the late-1960s and up to the mid-1980s, a wide series of provincial rights – in terms of education, administrative services and the legislature – were granted to Francophones in Ontario (Gill 1983). During the same period, French was also reinforced at the federal level; especially important was the constitutionalizing of bilingualism and educational rights for linguistic minorities. Thus, as Savard (2008) states, Franco-Ontarians became much more receptive of the federal government.

These socio-cultural transformations placed greater emphasis on Ontario itself. The Franco-Ontarian identity took on a connotation of bilingualism that made it distinct from Franco-Quebeckers (Mougeon and Beniak 1994, Bernard 1998). At the same time, this new bilingual world exposed Franco-Ontarians to a risky future, seeing as bilingualism in Ontario has been described as a one-way phenomenon (Bernard 1988, Mougeon and Beniak 1994). However, though the percentage of Francophones in Ontario has decreased, a trajectory which has recently stabilized, the number of its citizens has kept growing (Statistics Canada 2012).

The situation for Acadians is at the same time quite similar to that of Franco-Ontarians and yet quite different. Acadians are spread-out throughout the Maritime provinces, with a strong concentration in northern New Brunswick. The population size of Acadians in New Brunswick has been able to assure a great number of provincial rights and services for Francophones (Arsenault 2004). Yet, these rights were not always in place. It was only with the Official Languages Act of 1969 and the subsequent Bill 88 in 1981 that French was able to attain institutional equality in the province. Ultimately, provincial bilingualism in New Brunswick was enshrined in the Canadian constitution

Yet, these socio-political changes were not accepted by all New Brunswickers. The changes to the linguistic situation created a backlash from the Anglophone community because it was seen as disadvantaging them (Ullman 1986). The highlight of this Anglophone 'rebellion' was the creation of the populist New Brunswick Confederation of Regions (CoR) party. The party was able to channel Anglophone frustration into electoral success and form the official opposition in the provincial legislature. But, internal discord and the simmering down of linguistic tensions in the mid-1990s across Canada did away with the CoR in New Brunswick (Belkhodja 1999).

The socio-linguistic reality is quite different for Western and Northern Francophones. Their smaller numbers and the fact of being spread-out over vast lands has led to weaker vitality. The heart of the Western Francophone culture lies arguably in Manitoba, which holds the largest share of Francophones west of Ontario. Though Manitoba was founded in 1870 as a bilingual province, this status did not last very long. The often difficult situation for Francophones started to change in the 1970s as Manitoba had also become enthralled in the mist of the minority rights and bilingualism debates. In a landmark decision in 1985, the

Supreme Court of Canada ruled that removing French's status in the late 1800s had been unconstitutional and effectively, and retroactively, re-instated it. Though French is currently an official language for the purposes of the legislature, legislation and the courts, it is not for the executive. Yet, the ever more rights accorded to French at the federal and provincial levels sparked a populist backlash from a segment of the Anglophone community; a group which had always been quite antagonistic towards French (Hébert 2004).

The four provinces we have examined provide a range of different demographic and institutional realities for Francophones. In Quebec, a strong majority of its population, 80%, holds French as its mother tongue. Furthermore, Quebec has a de jure official French state apparatus and strong linguistic laws favouring French. Thus, placing French in Quebec at a strong OV level. The situation is different for the other Francophone groups. Ontario's 550 000 Francophones represent 4.4% of the population. As Bernard (1988) states, living in French in Ontario is a whole other reality than living in French in Quebec. Yet, a wide range of administrative and education services are offered in French. It can easily be argued that French is at an intermediate OV level in comparison to Quebec. As for Francophones in New Brunswick, though they represent nearly 33% of the province's population, 237 575 inhabitants, they still face many linguistic challenges. Landry and Allard (1994) describe French in New Brunswick as being at an intermediate level of OV. Seeing that many of the indicators used to determine this level are currently quite similar, we can conclude that French is still at an intermediate OV level in New Brunswick. In the case of Franco-Manitobans, although 4% of the provincial population, the group is composed of just 47 670 persons. Just as the initial abrogation of Francophone rights was not material to the linguistic survival of the group (Wiseman 1992), the recent Francophone favourable policies have not eliminated the

existential risks posed to them (Marchand 2004). Assimilationist pressures on Franco-Manitobans are described as being beyond the grasp of simple government intervention (McRoberts 1989, Aunger 2002). In comparison with the other examined provinces, French is arguably at a weaker OV level in Manitoba.[39]

These different linguistic realities should lead to different political and intergroup perspectives. However, there has been a lack of empirical research attempting to compare attitudes amongst Francophones in Canada.

Most of the scholarship, which is of interest to the current research, deals with attitudes towards Canada from its different Francophone groups. Canada's nation building and federal bilingualism policies have been described as being a negation of the Quebec nation (Burgess 2001, Seymour 2001). Whereas the bilingual rebranding of the federal institutions gave a new energy to Francophone minorities (Chaput-Rolland 1990, Martel 1997). Hence, Francophones outside Quebec turned towards the federal government, as it became the de facto protector of francophone minorities (Frenette 1998).

Other studies examining Franco-Canadians have gone beyond simply examining attitudes towards the country. Blais (1991) reveals remarkable similarities between Francophones from Quebec and those from outside in terms of their perceptions towards French and attitudes towards Anglo-Canadians. Yet, Fournier and Medeiros (2014) find important divergences on linguistic issues between both Francophones from Quebec and Ontario; whereas, Boissonneault (1996) discovers that the collective bilingualism of Franco-Ontarians had provoked a reduction in their perception of French's importance. Robineau and Traisnel

[39] Demographic data in this paragraph come from Statistics Canada (2012).

(2010), for their part, show that Francophones from Quebec exhibit less linguistic insecurity compared to minority Francophones.

Therefore, the somewhat limited and inconclusive nature of the literature regarding attitudinal differences amongst Francophones in Canada forces certain reservations as to the expectation that the different OV levels of Francophones will lead to a specific socio-psychological sequence. Yet, we endeavour to explore the influence of OV on attitudes towards Anglophones and Canada.

4.3 Data

The available survey data do not provide the necessary socio-linguistic questions needed in order to test the theoretical model. Therefore, original survey data from Francophone communities with differing levels of OV needed to be collected. The data collection process was conducted through the distribution of an electronic (web) survey to students from Francophone universities in Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba.[40] All together, 182 respondents answered the survey. However, the study is interested in exploring the attitudes of Francophones from the specific provinces. Hence, analyses were performed on respondents who had listed French as their mother tongue and who had either grown up (where they had spent most of their youth) in that province or had lived there for at least five years. This process

[40] Departmental administrators were contacted and asked to send out an email to their students requesting them to respond to the survey. The respondents were recruited from Francophone universities in the target provinces: Université de Montréal (Department of political science), Laurentian University (Department of psychology), University of Ottawa (departments of economy, and political science), Université de Moncton (departments of biology, chemistry and biochemistry, history and geography, and political science) and the Université de Saint-Boniface (Faculty of Arts and Sciences). The data for Quebec and Manitoba were collected in late Fall 2013, whereas those for Ontario and New Brunswick were gathered in late Winter 2014.

narrowed down the respondents to 110: 42 in Quebec, 29 in New Brunswick, 17 in Ontario and 22 in Manitoba.

As previously mentioned, Francophones in these four provinces live in different linguistic environments. Thus, OV was determined by the respondents' province. Quebec was labeled as high OV, Manitoba as weak OV, while New Brunswick and Ontario were coded with an intermediated OV level (coded 1 to 3, from weak to strong).

All other variables used for the analyses come from the survey data. SEV was captured by a question asking respondents to rate on a four-point scale, from very easy to very difficult, how easy it was to use French on a daily basis in their province (coded 1 to 4).[41] In-group threat and the threat posed by the out-group were operationalized by a five-point scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree (coded 1 to 5), of respondents' agreement with assertions about French being threatened in their province and Anglophones hindering the will of Francophones to protect French in their province, respectively. Attitudes towards the out-group were measured by a question asking respondents to rate on a five-point scale, from very negative to very positive, their feelings towards Anglophones (coded 1 to 5). Two separate questions about attitudes towards the out-group were asked: one with Anglophones in Canada as the target and

[41] Though sociolinguistic studies have tended to measure SEV with a scale constructed through a multi-item Subjective Vitality Questionnaire (SVQ) (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981), we opted for another avenue. Besides being the target of critics concerning its efficacy (Abrams, Barker et al. 2009), the SVQ is a lengthy questionnaire; the original version consists of 22 questions. Thus, it becomes a burden for respondents in multidimensional questionnaires. In order to circumvent this time and space issue, our SEV question is inspired by Hogg and Rigoli's (1996) "communicative competence and language use" measure. While, the "How easy is it to use" measure is only a segment of their SEV evaluation, and it is asked for several situations, we believe that our question gages the overall appreciation of the contextual language use capacity. Though not a perfect replication of a typical sociolinguistic SEV measure, our measure does capture perceived language vitality without substantially increasing the length of the questionnaire; which contributes to augmenting the response rate of surveys (Yammarino, Skinner et al. 1991, Cook, Heath et al. 2000).

the other one about Anglophones specifically in their province. The same type of question was used to gage respondents' attitudes towards Canada.

A series of other questions were also employed as controls in order to ascertain the specific influence of the variables in our theoretical model. Firstly, research has shown that identity can have an important impact on attitudes. Identity has been linked to out-group attitudes (Ellemers, Wilke et al. 1993), intergroup anxiety (Ellemers, Wilke et al. 1993, Gaertner, Dovidio et al. 1996), attitudes towards the state (Staerklé, Sidanius et al. 2010) and support for independence (Paterson 2001, Pallarés, Lago et al. 2006). However, this last relationship seems to have weakened in the Quebec case (Mendelsohn 2002, Maclure 2014). Though, identity unquestionably is an important factor for many of the variables examined, its causal influence on sociolinguistic mechanisms has not been supported. Empirical research does not show identity being correlated with linguistic vitality (Landry, Deveau et al. 2006, Landry, Allard et al. 2007).

Nonetheless, seeing that research has demonstrated identity's impact on multiple variables of the theoretical model, it was utilized as a control variable. Two different identity questions were asked. Firstly, a classic identity preference question, known as subjective national identity or more familiarly as 'the Moreno question', asked respondents to select the option on a five-point scale that best described them, with categories spanning from only the Francophone group of the province to only Canadian (coded 1 to 5). Secondly, the perceptions of Canadian inclusiveness were measured by asking respondents to judge Canadian identity's

inclusiveness on a five-point scale (coded 1 to 5), from very inclusive (all national groups in Canada are represented by it) to very exclusive (only refers to the Anglophone majority).[42]

Two more control variables were utilized. The importance of the French language for the respondents was gaged through a five-point scale with options ranging from very important to unimportant (coded 1 to 5). The final control variable covers the respondents' perceptions of the role that the federal government has played in helping to protect and promote the French language (five-point scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree, coded 1 to 5). Annexe C provides greater information on the survey questions.

In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, SEV (ease of using French), threat to French, threat to French by Anglophones, inclusive Canadian identity, subjective identity, importance of French and perceptions of the government of Canada towards French were inverted. This procedure places all the variables in the analyses on a negative to positive range.

4.4 Results

The theoretical model explaining attitudes towards Canada among Francophones presents a series of mediating variables linking a predictor variable, objective linguistic vitality, and an outcome variable. Therefore, inspired by Baron and Kenny (1986), stepwise regression analyses were used to examine the proposed model.[43]

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[42] These two variables were kept distinct in accordance with results from reliability tests and factor analyses (not reported).

[43] This process uses several regression analyses in a four step process. Step 1 tests the influence of the predictor on the outcome variable, step 2 examines the impact of the predictor on the mediator(s) and step 3 explores the effect of the mediator(s) on the outcome variable. Steps 1 through 3 serve to establish that zero-order relationships exist among the variables. If all the relationships in the first three steps are significant, another step is conducted. In Step 4, the predictor and the mediator(s) are put together into the same model examining the former's effect on the outcome variable. If the effect of the mediator(s) on the outcome variable remains significant after controlling for the predictor, mediation is supported. To be more specific, partial mediation is supported if the predictor remains significant whereas full mediation is retained if the predictor is no longer significant.

Table 4.1: Influence of Objective Vitality

	SEV (Ease of using French)	Threat to French	Threat to French by Anglos	Attitudes towards Anglos in Canada	Attitudes towards Anglos in Province	Attitudes towards Canada
High OV (Quebec)	1.25***	-0.50*	-0.74**	0.24	0.29	-0.72***
Low OV (Manitoba)	0.31*	-0.08	-0.40	0.15	0.55**	-0.04
Inclusive Canadian Identity	0.03	0.05	-0.22	0.12	0.20	0.23*
Subjective Identity	0.08	-0.02	-0.03	0.20*	0.15	0.37***
Impor-tance of French	0.07	0.26	0.15	-0.17	-0.32**	0.05
Constant	1.97	2.62	3.28	3.39	3.82	2.23
R-Squared	0.45	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.38
N	105	105	105	103	104	104

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The results of stepwise regression analyses (not reported) do not support the entirety of the proposed mediation model. Regressions were nonetheless performed in order to gage the influence of OV on each variable in the model.[44] These results, in Table 4.1, show that both levels of vitality only have a significant influence on SEV. These findings point to a curvilinear relationship between OV and SEV in which Francophones in Ontario and New Brunswick have a significantly lower perception of ethno-linguistic vitality in their province than their brethren

[44] In order to capture a curvilinear relationship between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity in the OLS regressions, the vitality variables was converted into dichotomous variables for each level of vitality. The intermediate vitality level is omitted from the regressions to serve as the reference category. Tests were also conducted using an ordinal vitality variable. This variable only reached a level of significance in the model which has Attitudes towards Canada as the dependent variable (results not reported).

in Quebec and Manitoba. Furthermore, neither of the OV levels in the models show a significant effect on attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada. In the other regressions, at most one of the two OV levels reached a level of significance.[45]

Though the initial proposed mediation model was not supported, stepwise regressions analyses did nevertheless support a shortened mediation sequence. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, this sequence places threat to French as the predictor, threat posed by Anglophones to French as a mediator, and both variables of attitudes towards Anglophones as distinct outcomes. Thus, two separate mediation sequences are in fact supported.

First, the results show a significant negative effect of threat to French on attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada ($\beta = -0.15$, $t(106) = -1.83$, $p < 0.1$) and towards Anglophones in the province ($\beta = -0.19$, $t(107) = -2.22$, $p < 0.05$). The findings also indicate that threat to French was significantly and positively related to threat posed by Anglophones to French; in the first sequence ($\beta = 0.36$, $t(106) = 3.51$, $p < 0.01$) and in the second one ($\beta = 0.38$, $t(107) = 3.85$, $p < 0.01$). It was also found that the mediator, threat posed by Anglophones, was significantly and negatively related to out-group attitudes; towards Anglophones in Canada ($\beta = -0.19$, $t(106) = -2.49$, $p < 0.05$) and specifically towards those in their province ($\beta = -0.36$, $t(107) = -4.65$, $p < 0.01$).

[45] The same series of regressions were performed with only Quebec (High OV) in the models. The results are quite similar to the models which include both levels of OV.

Figure 4.2: Mediation Sequence between Threat and Out-Group Attitudes



Statistical significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Because both the a-path (predictor to mediator) and the b-path (mediator to outcome) were significant, mediation analyses were tested using the bootstrapping method and bias-corrected confidence estimates (MacKinnon, Lockwood et al. 2004, Preacher and Hayes 2004). In the present study, the 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects were obtained with

5,000 bootstrap resamples (as recommended by Preacher and Hayes 2008). Results of the mediation analyses support an indirect effect by confirming the mediating role of threat posed by Anglophones in the relation between threat to French and attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada (β = -0.07, CI = -0.16 to -0.02) and specifically towards those in the province of the respondents (β = -0.14, CI = -0.24 to -0.06). In addition, the results indicate that the direct effect of threat to French became non-significant in both sequences when controlling for perceived, thus suggesting full mediation.

In order to get a better idea of the factors which can lead individuals to perceive their language as being threatened, the predictor in the retained socio-psychological sequence, further analyses were performed. The results of an OLS regression which includes the precursors of threat in our theoretical model and a series control variables are displayed in Table 4.2. They show that it is only SEV which has a significant, and negative, impact on perceived linguistic threat. People who find it easy to use French are less likely to consider that language threatened. OV does not demonstrate a significant influence on perceived linguistic threat. As for the control variables, the importance of French is the only one to reach a level of significance.

The results of the stepwise regression analyses demonstrate that there was no mediation sequence leading to attitudes towards Canada. Yet, as the review of the scholarship demonstrated, the differing feelings towards Canada held by Francophones inside and outside Quebec represents a prominent part in the literature exploring Canadian Francophones. Therefore, attitudes towards Canada were further explored in order to get a better insight into the feelings towards Canada held by Francophones.

Table 4.2: Determinants of Threat to French

High OV (Quebec)	0.18
Low OV (Manitoba)	0.15
SEV (Ease of using French)	-0.43**
Inclusiveness of Canadian Identity	0.02
Subjective Identity	0.04
Importance of French	0.39**
Constant	2.94
R-Squared	0.14
N	105

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The results of an OLS regression, in the first column of Table 4.3, show that Franco-Quebeckers, as would be expected, hold significantly more negative attitudes towards Canada than Francophones in Ontario and New Brunswick. However, the findings do not show a significant difference between Franco-Manitobans and Francophones from the intermediate OV provinces.[46] However, being from Quebec is not the only factor in our theoretical model which significantly impacts Francophones' attitudes towards Canada. Perceived threat to French also significantly affects these attitudes in a negative manner. Similarly, attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada exhibit a significant positive influence on attitudes towards

[46] The regressions presented in Table 4.3 were also performed with only Quebec (High OV) in the models. Once again, the results are quite similar to the models which include both levels of OV.

Canada. Thus, the more positive are a Franco-Canadian's attitudes towards Anglophones the more positive their attitudes towards Canada will be. Finally, the two identity control variables also significantly influence attitudes towards Canada. The more the Canadian identity is perceived to be inclusive and the more Canadian one feels, the higher the likelihood of having positive attitudes towards Canada.

Table 4.3: Determinants of Attitudes towards Canada

High OV (Quebec)	-0.74**	-0.81**
Low OV (Manitoba)	-0.05	-0.07
SEV (Ease of using French)	-0.21	-0.19
Threat to French	-0.24**	-0.25**
Threat to French caused by Anglophones	0.09	0.11
Attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada	0.29**	0.22*
Perceptions of gov. Canada towards French	-	0.17*
Inclusiveness of Canadian Identity	0.26**	0.25*
Subjective Identity	0.30**	0.23*
Importance of French	0.18	0.14
Constant	1.93	2.01
R-Squared	0.53	0.56
N	93	91

Numbers reported are unstandardized OLS coefficients. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

However, the literature also shows that state institutions related to political attitudes of minority group members. To evaluate in which manner attitudes towards institutions can impact feelings towards Canada, another model was run including the perceptions of how the Canadian government helps to promote and protect French. These results, in the second column of Table 4.3, are very similar to those of the preceding model. Yet, believing that the government of Canada helps to promote and protect French significantly improves attitudes towards Canada.

Overall, the results validate the idea that the variables in the proposed model tend to be sequentially influenced by the ones in preceding them. Yet, mediation can only be identified for a shortened version of the model.

4.5 Conclusion

On the whole, the results of our analyses put forward four main findings. Firstly, though mediation for the entire theoretical model could not be supported, the findings support a shortened version of the model. The results underscore a model in which perceived linguistic threat serves as the predictor of attitudes towards Anglophones and the effect is mediated by the perceived threat to French caused by Anglophones. In actuality, two separate mediation models are backed: one for attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada and another for feelings towards those in the respondents' province. The results are consistent with a full mediation of the influence of threat to French by threat caused by Anglophones in both models.

Secondly, the different levels of objective vitality have a significant impact on vitality perceptions. Thus, the findings indicate that Francophones in Ontario and New Brunswick have

a significantly lower perception of vitality for French than Francophones in Quebec and Manitoba. This curvilinear relationship, in which Francophones in intermediate OV provinces display weaker SEV than Francophones in a weaker OV province, is intriguing.

Furthermore, thirdly, the variables in the proposed model are shown to be sequentially influenced by their precursor. OV impacts SEV, which in turn influences threat to French, the predictor variable of the retained mediation model, and the outcome of that model – attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada – influences attitudes towards Canada. Thus, there is an empirically supported socio-psychological sequence.

Fourthly, Quebec is shown to play an important role in attitudes toward Canada. Whether this is caused by a higher OV level than other Francophones in the study or by other sociological factors, the findings do not permit us to be certain. However, Quebec is not the only variable to influence attitudes towards Canada. Several other factors are shown to impact attitudes towards the country. Therefore, combined with the fact that Quebec's explanatory power is quite limited,[47] one should not place as much importance on simply being from Quebec to explain Francophones attitudes towards Canada.

However, one has to be careful in the interpretation of this study's results. Not only are the findings derived through a small number of individuals, they are also from a social group, students, that is likely to be non-representative. Therefore, the model and the relationships tested in this study should be further explored with larger and more representative samples.[48]

[47] Results from analyses undertaken without Quebec in the second model of Table 4.3 (not reported) indicate little change to the coefficient of determination (R-squared). Thus, Quebec would actually contribute fairly little to the explanatory power of the model.

[48] Though research has demonstrated that student samples do not diverge importantly from more representative samples (Dyer, Kagel et al. 1989, Depositario, Nayga Jr et al. 2009), it is always better to verify the validity of the results with replication; especially, when the number of respondents are quite small, as in this case.

Furthermore, Francophones in Canada represent a specific case. In order to truly understand the causal mechanisms between linguistic factors and intergroup attitudes, other cases should be explored. The OV diversity offered by Catalanophones in Spain, Swedophones in Finland and Francophones in Switzerland presents a tremendous comparative potential. Moreover, the theoretical model highlighted in this study should also be tested in an international comparison, with linguistic minorities from different countries composing the different OV levels.

Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper are a contribution to not only better understand Franco-Canadians' relationships with Anglophones, but also, in more general terms, to the comprehension of the impact of linguistic factors on intergroup attitudes.

Chapitre 5

The Language of Threat: Linguistic Perceptions and Intergroup Relations

With Patrick Fournier and Verònica Benet-Martínez*

* Medeiros conceived and designed the experiment. He also performed the review of the literature. Fournier and Medeiros analyzed the data. Benet-Martínez advised on theoretical and methodological aspects. The paper was written by Medeiros and Fournier.

Many countries are divided by language, often finding themselves in tense social situations. Belgium has been plagued for decades by what seem to be never-ending linguistic tensions. Catalonia has recently ratcheted up its pressure on Spain and threatens to secede. The Basque Country and Corsica were for years the stage of violence. Canada has been the scene of important social and political tensions underscored by language that almost broke the country apart. These are only a few examples of the many linguistic group tensions that challenge state stability and social peace. Seeing that these conflicts are along linguistic lines, and that language often plays a quintessential role in group grievances, can language-related factors help explain linguistic intergroup tensions?

This paper seeks to explore this question. Inspired by sociolinguistic scholarship, this study examines the influence of linguistic vitality, the social health of a language, on perceived in-group threat and out-group attitudes. Using an experimental protocol, we test the effects of differing information about the linguistic vitality of French in Quebec on Francophone Quebeckers' perceived threat of their language, subjective identity, attitudes towards Anglophones, as well as support for Quebec sovereignty.

This paper first presents the scholarship on intergroup attitudes and how they can be improved. Afterwards, a literature review on the manner in which language factors influence intra- and inter-personal behaviour is conducted. Subsequently, a brief history of the relations between Quebec and Canada, as well as Francophones and Anglophones, is exposed. The protocol for our experiment is then described, followed by the presentation of the results from our analyses. The paper concludes with a discussion on the possible implications of the findings, as well as recommendations for further research.

5.1 Understanding Intergroup Attitudes

Negative attitudes towards out-groups are equivalent to having prejudice or bias against members of those groups, and are thus attributed to a range of adverse intergroup behaviours (Gallois, Callan et al. 1982). Notably, negative out-group attitudes have been linked to negative out-group stereotypes (Stephan and Stephan 1996), as well as easy and/or false attribution of blame to out-group members (Wang and McKillip 1978, Pettigrew 1979).

Much of the scholarship on intergroup attitudes highlights a relationship between negative out-group attitudes and threat. Besides leading to greater intolerance (Doty, Peterson et al. 1991, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Huddy, Feldman et al. 2005), perceived in-group threat tends to generate protective behaviour (Grant 1992, Stephan, Ybarra et al. 1998, Zarate, Garcia et al. 2004), even leading to the acceptance of self-sacrificing measures to ensure in-group protection (Huddy, Feldman et al. 2005). When the threat is specifically attributable to the out-group, intergroup discrimination will tend to increase (Tajfel and Turner 1986, Branscombe, Schmitt et al. 1999), occasionally in punitive manners (Marcus, Sullivan et al. 1995).

Since negative intergroup attitudes pose important collective ills, many studies have been dedicated to attempting to alleviate these tensions. By using experimental designs, they also seek to clarify the causal dimension behind the correlations. Some of these experimental interventions have focused on individuals by enhancing their self-image (Fein and Spencer 1997, Rudman, Dohn et al. 2007), promoting egalitarian values (Katz and Hass 1988, Pereira, Vala et al. 2009), and supressing negative stereotypes they might hold (Macrae, Bodenhausen et al. 1997, Kawakami, Dovidio et al. 2000). Other studies have attempted to modify the intergroup relationship by changing the standards of intergroup comparisons (Monteith, Devine et al. 1993), transforming perceptions of intergroup boundaries (Gaertner, Dovidio et al. 1993,

Banfield and Dovidio 2013), and receiving positive feedback from out-group members (Sinclair and Kunda 1999, Stone, Whitehead et al. 2011).

Yet, all of these efforts to improve intergroup attitudes have led to somewhat unconvincing results. Reviews of prejudice reduction studies reveal a somewhat pessimistic picture, with the rate of success being rather disappointing (Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001). Experimental treatments might have difficulty achieving significant results or can even lead to counterintuitive changes in attitudes (Paluck 2009). The relative lack of success of prejudice reduction might be linked to cognitive factors. It is difficult to bypass or suppress anchored beliefs which provoke automatic reactions (Bargh 1999), and motivate individuals to change their personal beliefs (Sherif and Hovland 1961, Devine, Monteith et al. 1991). Moreover, individuals might simply not have the necessary cognitive abilities to adjust these attitudes (Blair and Banaji 1996, Kawakami, Dovidio et al. 2000). Added to this list of cognitive hindrances are long-term affective factors. Negative intergroup attitudes can be passed down through generations and thus be quite stubborn (Aguilar, Balcells et al. 2011, Balcells 2012).

Another reason which can account for difficulties related to improving intergroup attitudes is that this field of research is not so advanced. Paluck and Green's (2009) recent and in-depth review of the prejudice reduction scholarship concludes that much remains unknown. One of the gaps which stands out is the lack of research attempting to reduce perceived threat. Yet, the few studies which have ventured down this road clearly show that manipulating perceptions of threat impacts intergroup attitudes (Maass, Ceccarelli et al. 1996, Rothgerber 1997, Kenworthy and Miller 2002).[49] Thus, further research into in-group threat perceptions

[49] Other studies have also sought to improved intergroup relations by reducing threat felt towards the out-group on a personal rather than in-group dimension (see, for example, Stone, Whitehead et al. 2011).

may offer a better understanding of the psychological processes involved in intergroup attitudes and, hence, provide ways to improve them.

Seeing that language often serves as one of the most important means of identification and distinction (Das Gupta 1970), exploring linguistic threat and its relationship to intergroup attitudes might hold important insight into prejudice reduction.

5.2 The Effects of Language on Group Members

Since most ethnic conflicts have a linguistic distinction dividing the protagonists (Medeiros 2010), linguistic factors might play an important role in intergroup relations. Though some political research has examined the influence of language on intergroup tensions (Inglehart and Woodward 1967, McRae 1983, Laponce 1987, Yavuz 2001, Medeiros 2013), most scholarship examining the relationship between language and behaviour derives from the fields of sociolinguistics and social psychology.

This line of research underlines the importance of language policies, whether they are positive (supportive) or negative (restrictive), in the formation of attitudes between linguistic majorities and minorities (Fishman 2010). Yet, arguably, its most important contribution in understanding linguistic group behaviour revolves around the concept of linguistic vitality. Originally conceived by Giles and colleagues (1977), objective linguistic vitality refers to the social health of a language in a society; in other words, the ability to use the language in everyday life. Though studies have explored the manner in which objective linguistic vitality influences behaviour among individuals (Gudykunst and Gumbs 1989, Landry and Allard 1994), the crux of this line of research deals with another dimension of linguistic vitality.

Linguistic vitality is also presented through its perceived reality. Subjective ethno-

linguistic vitality (SEV) refers to the perceptions of the social health of the language (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). Given that the actual ability to use a language and its perceived facility can be completely different, it is an important distinction. The scholarship has presented SEV as having an influence on the harmony of intergroup relations (Bourhis, Giles et al. 1981). Specific onus has been shown to lie in the perceptions of threat to the language, and subsequently to the group, which leads to negative out-group attitudes (Taylor, Meynard et al. 1977, Giles and Johnson 1987, Ros, Huici et al. 1994).

Yet, the relationship between language vitality, threat and intergroup attitudes is still fairly underexplored. Most crucially, and to the best of our knowledge, the causal nature of the relationship has not been assessed using an experimental design. We directly take on this challenge. We rely on a case with longstanding traditions of linguistic and political tensions: Quebec.

5.3 Franco-Quebec and the ROC

Quebec is the only majority francophone territory in Canada, arguably making it the natural 'homeland' of Francophones (McRoberts 1997). Its history, through the emphasis placed on the Conquest of 1759 and the Rebellions of 1838-39, has stressed the importance of a linguistic duality between Francophones and Anglophones in Canada. This situation led Quebec to play a primary role in all Francophone issues (Martel 1997). The focus for Franco-Quebeckers changed in the 1960s after the social emancipation movement locally known as the Quiet Revolution. French Canada was replaced by Quebec as the nexus of their identity (McRoberts 1997). During this period, while Quebeckers were coming together around a new sense of nationhood, the federal government was implementing a new vision of Canada based

on bilingualism and multiculturalism. Canada's nation-building exercise placed it at odds with Franco-Quebeckers 'national' development (Laforest 1992, Burgess 2001, Seymour 2001, LaSelva 2009). The result has been more negative feelings towards and a weaker attachment to Canada among Quebec Francophones.

In Canadian political science scholarship, this dualist vision of French Quebec and the English Rest-of-Canada is quite present. Many scholars have commented on the divergent policy preferences of both entities (see, for examples, McRoberts 1997, Béland and Lecours 2005, Gagnon 2006). In empirical terms, studies have shown that this division follows a left-right political split (Baer, Grabb et al. 1993, Mendelsohn, Parkin et al. 2005). Yet, differences of opinion not related to policy between Francophones and Anglophones have had limited study (Blais 1991, Fournier and Medeiros 2014). In terms of intergroup attitudes between the two linguistic groups, to the best of our knowledge, only Blais (1991) has examined this issue. Francophones and Anglophones are shown to have similarly positive sentiments for one another, but the research does not explain these intergroup attitudes.

The division between Quebec and Canada has been highlighted by the longstanding issue of Quebec sovereignty. The scholarship dealing with secession points to an inter-relation between threat, prejudice, and support for secession which is mediated through trust (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011, Rohner, Thoenig et al. 2013).[50] Seeing as language plays such a prominent role in the division between Quebec and Canada, and that it can serve as a grievance factor motivating conflict intensity (Medeiros 2013), we would presume it influences support for secession. In fact, believing that French is under threat and that it would be in better social

[50] Studies which have examined the relationship between trust and secession have done so through a generalized variable of the former and not specific intergroup attitudinal evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, there seems to exist a somewhat surprizing void regarding the relationship between intergroup attitudes and secession.

health within an independent Quebec has been shown to be linked to support for sovereignty (Blais, Martin et al. 1995, Nadeau and Fleury 1995, Nadeau, Martin et al. 1999).

Additionally, studies examining support for sovereignty have often demonstrated a relationship with identity. A strong regional identity can negatively impact national identification and lead to greater support for secession (McCrone and Paterson 2002, Wodz 2007, Muñoz 2009). This statement also holds true for Quebec (Blais and Nadeau 1992, Nadeau and Fleury 1995, Bélanger and Perrella 2008). Yet, the effects of regional identity can be mitigated if attachment to the country remains (Gaertner, Dovidio et al. 1996). Research has shown that identity is also connected to other intergroup variables. González and Brown (2006) demonstrate that increasing the strength of dual identities among minorities limits intergroup bias. For their part, Falomir-Pichastor and colleagues (2009) show that identity, threat and prejudice are inter-related. However, Brewer (1999) indicates more of an independent path between identification and intergroup attitudes.

5.4 Hypotheses

Drawing these different literatures together, we propose a hypothesis regarding the expected relationship between linguistic vitality and threat:

> H1: Positive linguistic vitality information about the French language in Quebec decreases the levels of perceived language threat among Franco-Quebeckers.

However, due to the many gaps in the research on intergroup attitudes, and the sometimes contradictory findings, it is difficult to present straightforward hypotheses about the link between linguistic vitality and intergroup attitudes. We nevertheless tentatively suggest

three other hypotheses:

> H2: Positive linguistic vitality information improves out-group attitudes among Franco-Quebeckers towards Canadian Anglophones.
>
> H3: Positive linguistic vitality information decreases support for Quebec sovereignty among Franco-Quebeckers.
>
> H4: Positive linguistic vitality information strengthens the attachment to Canada among Franco-Quebeckers.

5.5 Data

In order to test these hypotheses, an experimental protocol was conceived to manipulate the perceptions of linguistic vitality of French in Quebec through the reception of factual information about linguistic social health.

Subjects were students from the Université de Montréal. An email was sent out to approximately half the undergraduate population of the university's Faculty of Arts and Sciences (about 10 000 students).[51] Participants in the study would have to answer two surveys and read four weekly newsletters.[52] The recruitment email included a link to a pre-treatment electronic questionnaire. The subjects who agreed to participate in the study and who answered the pre-treatment questionnaire were randomly divided into two groups: one which only received positive information about the state of French in Quebec, whereas the other one received only negative information about this topic (all language stories are presented in the

[51] Subjects were recruited under the guise of a study examining social issues. The research disguise was deemed important because subjects are prone to resist experimental treatments if they perceive any form of manipulation (Gaines, Kuklinski et al. 2007, Bruter 2009).

[52] The invitation advised potential participants that if all the steps were fulfilled, they would enter a drawing with a chance to win one of five 50$ gift certificates.

Annexe E).[53] Due to a fear of not being able to recruit a large number of subjects – a fear that ultimately materialized – there was no control group.[54] The articles dealing with non-linguistic topics were identical for both groups. The newsletters were composed of four brief articles providing information on crime, poverty, women's condition and language in Quebec.[55] The subjects received an email asking them to read a new newsletter every 5 days, starting a week after the initial recruitment, and a request to answer the post-treatment survey a week after receiving the final newsletter. 265 subjects whose mother tongue is French and who grew up in Quebec were ultimately retained for the analyses.[56]

The two surveys asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the assertion that "French is threatened in Quebec". This scale was reversed to capture perceptions of the state of the language (running from negative to positive). Attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada were operationalized through a question about subjects' feelings with regards to this group (from very negative to very positive). Identity was measured using a subjective identity question, commonly known as the Moreno question, which ascertains whether respondents feel more Quebecker or Canadian. The preceding three questions offered answer choices on a 5-point scale. The subjects' support for Quebec sovereignty was measured through a 101-point thermometer scale of constitutional preferences: 0 (independence) to 100 (federalism) [the scale

[53] Results (not reported) for post hoc analyses performed on 50 respondents, recruited through snowball sampling and asked to evaluate each text on language on a 0 (negative) to 10 (positive) scale, demonstrate significant differences between the positive and negative versions of the linguistic information for each of the four newsletters.
[54] The lack of a control group means that we cannot assess the relative impact of negative and positive information. We can only compare exposure to one stimulus versus exposure to the other.
[55] The newsletters were created from pre-existing journalistic articles or governmental reports. No false information was communicated to participants.
[56] The vast majority (about 90%) of individuals who did not grow up in Quebec have resided in the province less than a few years. Though 317 subjects were initially recruited (by responding to the first questionnaire), some of these did not complete the second survey after the four newsletters, so attrition affected the number of subjects. Furthermore, a trap question was asked in both surveys: "In order to verify if your browser is working properly, please click on 4". In order to avoid the negative influence of shirkers (Oppenheimer, Meyvis et al. 2009), the respondents who had not followed these instructions were dropped from the analyses.

was reversed for analyses]. The wording for the previous four questions is reported in Annexe D. Subjects were also asked to identify their age, their gender, the level of education of their parents, their mother tongue, and whether they had grown up in Quebec.[57]

Student samples can be rife with problems of representativity (see Sears 1986, Druckman and Kam 2011). Blais and colleagues (2012) and Van der Straeten and colleagues (2013) show that such convenience samples can severely over-represent some political options while severely under-representing others. Though it is difficult to completely overcome issues of convenience sample representativity, these authors correct political non-representativity by weighting respondents to corresponding electoral results. Our student sample did exhibit a lack of political representativity. Since our study is not an election survey, correction based on distant election results is far from optimal. Rather, we used the political poll closest to our experiment which published a breakdown by age groups and we weighted respondents by corresponding vote intentions in the polling data of respondents aged 18-24 (Léger Marketing 2014).[58]

5.6 Results

Before examining the impact of the experiment on the attitudes of interest, we need to ascertain whether the randomization of subjects to positive and negative information was performed effectively. Table 5.1 reports the bivariate correlations between the dichotomous treatment variable, socio-demographic characteristics, and the relevant attitudinal variables

[57] Seeing that the subjects are from a student population, questions on their personal income or their education level cannot be used to accurately ascertain any possible effects of social class. Therefore, the level of education of their parents was employed.

[58] An undergraduate student sample is obviously more educated than a random group of people aged 18 to 24. But this was the best option at our disposal.

measured in the baseline survey. Gender exhibits the only statistically significant relationship: men were slightly less likely to be assigned to the positive treatment. To make sure the observed effect of the treatment is not confounded by this unequal allocation, subsequent analyses control for the influence of gender.

Table 5.1: Correlations between Treatment and Variables at Time 1

	Pearson Coefficient	p-value
Gender (male)	-.15	.01**
Age	.09	.14
Parents' Education	.02	.75
State of the French Language	-.02	.72
Feelings Towards Anglophones	.09	.14
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	-.08	.22
Subjective Quebecker Identity	-.08	.17

Statistical significance: *<.10; **<.05

Table 5.2 presents the dependent variables of subsequent analyses. They capture the differences between each respondent's answers in the two surveys, separated by a month and four newsletters. If subjects provided the same response in both instances, they are classified as unchanged in the difference variables (score = 0). This is the modal category for three

attitudes, most people's views regarding language, Anglophones and identity remained intact. Unsurprisingly given the greater sensitivity of the thermometer scale, opinions about sovereignty were more volatile, with only about a quarter unchanged.

Table 5.2: Amount and Direction of Attitude Change (%)

	More Negative	Unchanged	More Positive
State of the French Language	18.7	54.2	27.1
Feelings Towards Anglophones	18.0	68.1	13.9
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	35.9	27.8	36.3
Subjective Quebecker Identity	10.4	82.1	7.6

The other two categories of the difference variables contain cases with attitude change. The direction of the change is linked to the nature of the variable (as reflected in the label). In other words, a shift in a more positive direction (+1) means that respondents developed a more favourable outlook toward the state of the French language, Anglophones, Quebec sovereignty, and the importance of their subjective Quebecker identity. Conversely, a negative shift (-1) signifies that individuals became less favourable. Attitude change occurred in both directions, but more frequently in a positive direction for language and in a negative direction for

Anglophones and subjective Quebecker identity. The key question, though, is to determine whether these changes were driven by the type of information to which respondents were experimentally exposed.

Table 5.3: Impact of Treatment on Attitude Change

	Unstand. Coefficient	p-value	R-squared	N
State of the French Language	.46	.00**	.11	263
Feelings Towards Anglophones	-.01	.86	.00	265
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	-.03	.76	.00	245
Subjective Quebecker Identity	.00	.99	.01	260

All dependent variables range from -1 to +1, while the independent variable spans from 0 to 1. Gender is included as control, but this variable's impacts are omitted. Statistical significance: *<.10; **<.05.

Table 5.3 displays the results of multivariate OLS models where each of the four dependent variables is regressed on the treatment variable (0/1, negative/positive newsletter information) and the control variable (gender, whose results are omitted to simplify the presentation). The newsletters only had a significant impact on perceptions about the French

language. Subjects who received stories emphasizing the healthy state of the language were more likely to shift their views in a positive direction. The effect's size is considerable, approximately a fourth of the dependent variable's scale. The treatment's influence was therefore limited to the attitude that relates most directly to the manipulation. More distant attitudes were not affected by the experiment.

However, one should not necessarily expect the effects to be apparent among the entire group. It is possible that certain subgroups were swayed differently by the experiment. In fact, inter-individual heterogeneity has become a staple in the study of political behaviour (Sniderman, Brody et al. 1991, Zaller 1992, Bartels 1996, Miller and Krosnick 2000, Fournier 2006). Here we focus on two predispositions that could moderate the impact of newsletter information: respondents' initial beliefs about the threat to the French language and their initial subjective identity.

Table 5.4 shows the results of split-sample regressions analogous to those of Table 5.3 conducted among three subgroups: 1) individuals who identified mainly or solely as Quebecker at Time 1 and agreed somewhat or completely at Time 1 with the statement that the French language is threatened in Quebec, 2) those who identified equally/mainly/solely as Canadian and believed French is threatened, and 3) those who considered that the language is not threatened.

Table 5.4: Impact of Treatment on Attitude Change (Among Subgroups)

	Unstand. Coefficient	p-value	R-squared	N
Predominantly Quebeckers Concerned about the State of the French Language				
State of the French Language	.50	.00**	.20	123
Feelings Towards Anglophones	.15	.19	.02	123
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	-.12	.48	.01	105
Subjective Quebecker Identity	.08	.38	.01	123
Non-Predominantly Quebeckers Concerned about the State of the French Language				
State of the French Language	.28	.07*	.11	45
Feelings Towards Anglophones	.14	.42	.02	45
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	-.76	.00**	.20	45
Subjective Quebecker Identity	-.21	.08*	.09	45
Those Not Concerned about the State of the French Language				
State of the French Language	.45	.00**	.14	91
Feelings Towards Anglophones	-.33	.00**	.15	93
Support for Quebec Sovereignty	.37	.04**	.07	90
Subjective Quebecker Identity	-.00	.96	.04	90

All dependent variables range from -1 to +1, while the independent variable spans from 0 to 1. Gender is included as a control, but this variable's impacts are omitted. Statistical significance: *<.10; **<.05.

The subgroup composed of concerned predominantly Quebeckers, in the top portion of the table, exhibits the same pattern as the one uncovered in Table 5.3. Newsletter information about the French language influenced no other attitude apart from perceptions of language vitality. Since this group holds the most negative attitudes toward Anglophones and expresses the most support for sovereignty, the failure to find a significant effect of the treatment on such attitudes highlights the difficulty of improving intergroup relations. Nonetheless, these findings are not surprising. High in-group identifiers are known to exhibit the strongest belief resistance (Hewstone and Brown 1986, Schmitt and Branscombe 2001, Jetten, Postmes et al. 2002).

In the middle portion of the table, we see that concerned non-predominantly Quebeckers (equally or predominantly Canadians), when exposed to positive information about the state of the language, not only became more optimistic about the health of French, they also became significantly less supportive of Quebec sovereignty and allocated more importance to their Canadian identity.[59] The impact on constitutional preferences was particularly strong. Hypotheses H1 through H3 are all supported among this group.

The reactions of people not preoccupied by the fate of the French language were completely different (the bottom portion of the table). The positive newsletters improved their linguistic assessments. However, the treatment also led to less favourable sentiments towards Anglophones and greater support for Quebec sovereignty, results which obviously do not follow our expectations (H2 and H3).[60] Quite honestly, we are baffled by these findings. We

[59] To confirm that the results of the split-sample regressions were robust, analyses using interactive terms were also performed. The effects of the experimental treatment on support for sovereignty and subjective identity among concerned non-predominantly Quebeckers differed significantly from the impacts among concerned predominantly Quebeckers.

[60] Regressions with interactive terms reveal that the effects of the treatment on feelings towards Anglophones and support for sovereignty among concerned non-predominantly Quebeckers differed significantly from the effects among concerned predominantly Quebeckers.

cannot explain why individuals who do not feel threatened linguistically would develop more negative intergroup attitudes as a result of positive information concerning the state of their language.

In sum, views about linguistic vitality are clearly causally related to opinions concerning out-groups, subjective identity, nationalism, and secession. Nevertheless, the relationships between these variables are not simple and straightforward. They vary substantially across respondents of different profiles.

The results only allow us to confirm our first hypothesis (H1). Positive language vitality information does reduce the perception of language threat. As for the three other hypotheses, the results are decidedly mixed, varying according to the initial levels of identity and threat perceptions. Though the findings show a change in the expected direction for support for sovereignty and subjective identity among Franco-Quebeckers without a prominent Quebecker identity and who are concerned about French, the results are contradictory for attitudes toward Anglophones and support for sovereignty among Franco-Quebeckers not concerned about the state of French in Quebec.

5.7 Conclusion

Language is undoubtedly an important factor in Canadian politics and social relations. Our experimental design attempted to further the understanding of language's influence in the Canadian context as well as intergroup linguistic relations more generally.

One main finding is that the type of information, positive or negative, about the vitality of a language affects perceptions of threat towards that language. The results systematically demonstrate that providing Francophones with positive information about the social health of

French in Quebec decreases their level of perceived linguistic threat. This finding is an important contribution to further our comprehension of intrapersonal linguistic dynamics.

However, the remainder of the results are much less one-sided. The causal effects of linguistic vitality information on out-group attitudes, support for sovereignty and subjective identity are shown to rest on the initial identity and threat levels held by subjects. Some individuals are unaffected by the vitality information, some respond with more positive intergroup attitudes, and some develop more negative intergroup attitudes. The first two reactions are comprehensible, but the last one stumps us.[61]

Nevertheless, our study helps fill the void in the literature regarding important issues. Our results highlight the influence of linguistic vitality on individuals' perceptions as well as political and intergroup attitudes. Thus, linguistic beliefs can be important factors in intergroup relations, and their complexity certainly warrants further study.

[61] It is important to note that past studies have also uncovered heterogeneous effects related to identity preference (Gaertner, Dovidio et al. 1993, Falomir-Pichastor, Muñoz-Rojas et al. 2004). Muñoz and Tormos (2014) ventured that this is due to the fact that individuals with strong identities are less affected by other considerations; whereas other scholars point to a radicalization caused by strong identification (Ros, Huici et al. 1994, Beck 2005). This heterogeneous identity pattern has also been shown to be present among Quebeckers with regards to support for Quebec sovereignty (Nadeau, Martin et al. 1999, Mendelsohn 2002). As for the interaction between identification and in-group threat, past studies have also pointed to its existence (Jetten, Branscombe et al. 2001, Jetten, Postmes et al. 2002); though it is still not fully understood (Riek, Mania et al. 2006).

6

Conclusion

This dissertation sought to better understand linguistic group relations by taking up Phillipson's call (1999) to combine research traditions from sociolinguistics and political science. It did so by concentrating on the manner in which linguistic vitality affects social tensions.

Overall, the results of this dissertation indicate that linguistic factors, and specifically linguistic vitality, represent an important determinant of linguistic group relations. The objective state of a group's linguistic health (OV) is found to directly impact the intensity of group conflicts. This factor also influences the level of trust in a country's national institutions. Moreover, the results point to the perceptions of linguistic vitality (SEV) having an impact on political attitudes and, more importantly, on intergroup attitudes. Therefore, linguistic vitality, and more generally language-related factors, constitute a quintessential aspect in intergroup relations; undoubtedly warranting greater academic attention.

Following a summary of the different chapters of this dissertation, the academic and policy implications of the dissertation's results are presented. Future lines of research are thereafter suggested. The dissertation concludes with an attempt to answer our main research question.

6.1 Summary

The introductory chapter presents a theoretical model in which linguistic vitality fuels collective grievances. These linguistic grievances are suggested as being motivations for attitudes and behaviours undertaken by linguistic minority group members against out-groups. The four empirical chapters flesh out and test the validity of this theoretical framework.

Chapter 2 investigates the macro-social relationship between linguistic vitality and intergroup conflict intensity. Using data from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger and from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, the study first explores the relationship in a general manner and then specifically probes countries with multiple linguistic conflicts. The findings demonstrate that linguistic vitality has an impact on conflict intensity. Particularly, the results show a curvilinear relationship in which low and high levels of linguistic vitality generate lower conflict intensity than moderate vitality levels. The findings support the idea that linguistic vitality as being an important determinant of language-based ethnic tensions in a general manner, but even more so for countries with multiple linguistic minorities.

Chapter 3 attempts to isolate the reasons that might explain why linguistic vitality can push minorities to react against their state. Basing itself on scholarship that highlights a link between the institutions of the central state and social relations (Wright 1935, Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 1995, Gurr 2002, Cameron 2009), this study examines the relationship through a novel angle by exploring the role of linguistic factors.

Following the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, linguistic vitality is presented as fueling cultural grievances. Specifically, the theory in Chapter 3 asserts that linguistic grievances impact institutional trust directly but also indirectly through the mediation of perceptions of being linguistically discriminated against. Survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and linguistic vitality data from UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger are used to test the mediation model. Though the results of the analyses do not fully support the proposed mediation model, they do nonetheless show the positive influence of linguistic vitality and the negative impact of perceptions of linguistic discrimination on trust in national institutions. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that the

level of 'officialdom' of a language also positively affects institutional trust. This study thus highlights the important role that linguistic factors can have on political trust.

Chapter 4 takes the dissertation further into a micro-level turn. It seeks to isolate the socio-psychological sequence which connects linguistic vitality and intergroup tensions. The study specifically tests the socio-psychological language to attitudes model (Figure 4.1). The theory proposes that objective linguistic vitality determines perceptions of linguistic vitality, which affect perceptions of in-group threat, which lead to perceptions of blame towards the out-group; ultimately, this sequence structures attitudes towards the out-group and the country.

Original survey data gathered from diverse Francophone communities in Canada are used to test the model. The findings support the socio-psychological sequence in the proposed model. However, the results of stepwise regression analyses do not support mediation for the entirety of the proposed model, they confirm mediation in a shortened sequence in which in-group threat influences attitudes towards the out-group through the mediation of perceived threat caused by the out-group. Furthermore, believing that the out-group is responsible for the threat posed to a group's language fully mediates the influence of perceived in-group threat on out-group attitudes. These results highlight the importance of linguistic vitality perceptions in determining intergroup attitudes

Chapter 5 attempts to establish the causality of linguistic vitality's influence on intergroup attitudes. Whereas Chapter 4 identified a socio-psychological sequence linking language vitality to intergroup attitudes, Chapter 5 furthers the understanding through an experimental protocol.

An experimental design was conceived, in collaboration with Patrick Fournier and Verònica Benet-Martínez, to manipulate the perceptions of linguistic vitality of French in

Quebec subjects recruited from the student population of the Université de Montréal. Subjects were randomly divided into two groups: one that only received positive information about the state of French in Quebec and the other that received only negative information about this topic. The treatment lasted a month as subjects received four weekly newsletters. Pre- and post-treatment questionnaires were the basis of difference variables for several outcome variables. The findings show that information, positive or negative, about linguistic vitality influences perceptions of threat towards a language. However, less one-sided results were derived about the impact of linguistic vitality information on out-group attitudes, support for sovereignty and subjective identity.

Seeing that most ethnic tensions are divided along language (Medeiros 2010), this dissertation sought to answer a specific questions: How does language influence intergroup tensions? It had the goal to better understand the manner in which linguistic factors could impact social relations. The different studies at the heart of this dissertation point to an effect of language on intergroup conflict intensity, the relationship with the central state, along with political and intergroup attitudes. Thus, linguistic vitality is shown to directly influence macro-social phenomena as well as the way individuals think. Several significant implications arise from this dissertation.

6.2 Implications

The results of this dissertation bring forth two types of implications. The findings highlight factors which shine new light on academic research, but they also may have important repercussions for policy-makers.

6.2.1 Academic Implications

In the review of the scholarship on intergroup tensions (chapter 1), the lack of scholarly interest towards factors specifically related to language jumps out. Thus, the major contribution of this dissertation might be to have addressed this gap in the literature. Not only does the fact that most ethnic tensions have language dividing the protagonists warrant greater academic attention be given to linguistic factors, but the results of this dissertation further reinforce this academic necessity. The objective vitality of a group's language is clearly shown, in Chapter 2, to impact the level of intergroup conflict intensity and, in Chapter 3, to be a determining factor in individual's political trust. In the first case, the impact of linguistic vitality on conflict intensity rivals, and even overshadows, the traditional factors related to economic and political difference. Clearly, linguistic factors' potential in explaining intergroup tensions is supported by the results of this research. Therefore, a signal is sent to the academic community concerned with intergroup tensions, encouraging it to explore language-related factors.

Yet, this dissertation does not simply make the case for greater scholarly attention to linguistic factors. Though the theoretical framework and the results lend support to the notion that linguistic social situations can serve as the basis for collective motivations of social actions, they also reinforce the necessity for greater attention to cultural grievances in general. As Karakoç (2013) highlights, cultural grievances have been under-appreciated in research exploring intergroup relations due to the dominance of economic and political factors. I do not wish to downgrade the importance of economic and political variables in social research, they unquestionable are important in the understanding of intergroup relations. This dissertation nevertheless stressed the significance for researchers to look towards cultural factors in the

study of intergroup relations. Factors specific to religion, race and other social identities may hold important keys to understanding social interactions. However, the overwhelming emphasis on economic and political factors to explain social group relations has been at the expense of other potentially important influences. Thus, moving forward and paying greater attention to other categories of social and psychological influence is likely to further our knowledge of the phenomena.

This dissertation also serves as an example of a holistic approach to social research. The macro to micro approach permitted to ascertain a general social relationship and thereafter to progressively delve into the micro-individual foundations which might explain it. Examining social phenomena and turning to individuals' psychological processes allows for a thorough and comprehensive exploration of research subjects. Due to this approach, this dissertation was able to identify a link between linguistic vitality and conflict intensity and to determine that it is connected to perceived discrimination, trust, threat, and intergroup attitudes.

Finally, the dissertation underscores the significance of interdisciplinary research. Phillipson (1999) correctly pointed out that research on linguistic group relations was being hampered by disjointed fields. His call for an interdisciplinary approach was just in realizing the complementarity of the potential contributions from different disciplines. This dissertation demonstrates the benefits, though not always easily attained, of using multiple fields. Key concepts, measures and methods from sociolinguistics, political science political psychology all came together and produced a better understanding of linguistic group tensions.[62]

[62] I would like to extend a special mention to the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) for its work in promoting interdisciplinary knowledge and collaboration between different scientific fields. ISPP is an inspiration for interdisciplinary researchers.

Research should have as its ethos the desire for social improvement. The knowledge obtained from research should be used to ameliorate individuals' lives. It is my belief that this dissertation allows for improved policy development in intergroup matters.

6.2.2 Policy Implications

This dissertation identified a linkage between linguistic group tensions, discrimination, trust, threat, and intergroup attitudes. These findings could be an important source of inspiration for the development of policies towards linguistic minorities.

The first major implication deals with conflict avoidance, mitigation or resolution strategies. Chapters 2 and 3 clearly show the importance of addressing cultural grievances related to language. Decades of research unmistakably highlight the role of economic and political resource discrepancies as well as the necessity of alleviating them to improve intergroup relations. However, cultural grievances have been somewhat overlooked. Our results unambiguously demonstrate that governmental policies aimed at better intergroup relations need to tackle cultural grievances in addition to economic and political ones.

This dissertation also points to the significance of perceptions. Thus, beyond concrete collective discrepancies, social-psychological issues also need to be addressed. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the importance of perceived threat to the group's cultural marker, which is associated with the majority out-group, in intergroup relations. Therefore, cultural fears also have to be dealt with regardless of concrete efforts to aid intergroup discrepancies. This dissertation re-asserts the importance of minority group members feeling culturally safe. Results from Chapter 4 demonstrate that the central government has a role to play in efforts for the cultural protection of minorities. Furthermore, though the results were not unilateral,

Chapter 5 does show the importance of communicating positive information regarding cultural markers. While this might be conceived as a propagandist assertion, actual facts matching communicated information will undoubtedly have more effective results.

Though the results emanating from this research permit not only to better understand linguistic group tensions and to contribute to research and policies aimed at them, much still remains to be explored about this social phenomenon.

6.3 Future Research

This dissertation had the goal of exploring intergroup relations through the possible influence of linguistic vitality. Yet, we must keep in mind that an extensive understanding of these phenomena is still not reached. Thus, future research should be inspired by our results and seek to deepen our comprehension of intergroup linguistic relations.

This research highlights the importance of cultural grievances for intergroup relations. Scholarly research must continue down this exploratory path and not overly concentrate on economic and political factors. Issues directly related to a group's collective marker can, as this dissertation shows, hold tremendous explanatory power for intergroup relations. Yet, research must not only focus on linguistic grievances, but should also seek to investigate those related to race, religion and other social markers.

Specifically relating to linguistic intergroup relations, this dissertation tentatively establishes the connection between intergroup attitudes and conflict. Our attempt to improve attitudes towards out-groups by providing individuals with information on their language's social health – in Chapter 5 – left much unexplained. Therefore, future research should try to

isolate manners in which intergroup linguistic attitudes can be improved. The results of this dissertation only permit to add a piece to this puzzle.

This research distinguished a few factors which connect linguistic vitality to intergroup attitudes and conflict intensity. There are undoubtedly other factors which have been ignored that also help to explain the manner in which linguistic vitality is associated to intergroup tensions. Their identification and their exploration would also contribute to the refinement of the proposed socio-psychological linguistic conflicts model (Figure 1.1). This theoretical model was an initial step at linking linguistic group phenomena, undoubtedly further research on linguistic group relations will render it more accurate.

Another element warranting greater study put forward in this research regards the type of relationship between linguistic vitality and outcome variables. The dissertation initially, in Chapter 1, presents two types of potential relationships: linear and curvilinear (respectively, Figures 1.2 and 1.3). The results do not unfortunately contribute to clarifying the most appropriate option between these two alternatives. While the findings in Chapter 2 support a curvilinear relationship, those from Chapter 3 do so for linearity.[63] Furthermore, though the results in Chapter 4 point to a curvilinear relationship between OV and SEV, these results are tentative at best. Thus, we are left with a conundrum. Although it might simply be that OV affects different outcomes differently, additional research is evidently needed to isolate the type of influence that OV has on different outcomes.

Among other linguistic factors that deserve further research is the impact of social diversity. While the scholarship highlights the impact of social diversity on intergroup relations,

[63] It is important to note that tests, using dichotomous variables for each level of OV (as in Chapter 2), were performed with the data from Chapter 3 to explore for possible curvilinearity between OV and political trust. The results, not reported, do not support a curvilinear relationship.

the factor is nevertheless underexplored in linguistic group relations. Does linguistic diversity comfort or amplify fears associated to language? This dissertation essentially concentrated on a dichotomous linguistic split focusing on minorities. Yet, often linguistic environments are more diverse than simply a minority group and a majority one. Further research should explore the effects of linguistic diversity on linguistic group relations.

Seeing that this dissertation essentially focused on linguistic minorities, linguistic majorities were somewhat left in the dark. As the scholarship shows, and as our theoretical framework implies, majorities have a quintessential impact on linguistic minorities. Therefore, a better understanding of the socio-psychological mechanism which explains majority group members' attitudes towards minorities is indubitably warranted.

Another important line of future research would be to understand the influence of political elites. As the literature shows, politicization by elites seems to play a crucial role, in both positive and negative manners, on social tensions. Yet, we ignore the fashion in which linguistic social factors influence elites' political strategies. Furthermore, seeing that elites can shape political perceptions, can they also influence individuals' linguistic perceptions? Thus, can elites act as mediators between the actual level of a language's health and individuals' perceptions and even intergroup attitudes? Such research questions would surely further contribute to the understanding of the relationship between language and politics.

Clearly our efforts in this dissertation were but an early step towards reaching a comprehensive understanding of linguistic group relations.

6.4 And the answer is…

This dissertation began with the question: "How does language influence intergroup tensions?" The answer is it does by influencing conflict intensity, political trust, as well as intergroup and political attitudes.

The influence of linguistic vitality is particularly highlighted. Whether it be the actual social health of a language (OV) or the perceptions which individuals hold of their language (SEV), linguistic vitality is presented as a non-negligible factor in intergroup linguistic relations.

Though this dissertation is able to advance a response to our question, a full and complete answer lies in future research.

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Annexe A: MAR Variables

Intensity: Protest 0 to 5 and Rebellion 1 to 7 (recoded 6 to 12 in the Intensity variable)
Protest

- 0 None reported
- 1 Verbal Opposition: (Public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.) Code requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence here.
- 2 Symbolic Resistance: Scattered acts of symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property) or political organizing activity on a substantial scale. Code mobilization for autonomy/secession by a minority-controlled regional government here.
- 3 Small Demonstrations: A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation of less than 10 000.
- 4 Medium Demonstrations: Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation of less than 100 000.
- 5 Large Demonstrations: Mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation greater than 100 000.
- 99 No basis for judgment

Rebellion

- 0 None reported
- 1 Political banditry
- 2 Campaigns of terrorism
- 3 Local rebellion
- 4 Small-scale guerrilla activity
- 5 Intermediate guerrilla activity
- 6 Large-scale guerrilla activity
- 7 Protracted civil war
- 99 No basis for judgment

Economic Strength
Economic Differentials Index: The Economic Differentials Index is a seven-category scale (values from -2 to +4) of intergroup differentials in economic status and positions derived from codings of six dimensions (MAR variables ECDIFX1 to ECDIFX6).

- -2 Advantaged: 3 or more checked advantages
- -1 Some advantages: Only 1 or two checked advantages
- 0 No socially significant differences: A "socially significant" difference is one that is widely seen, within the minority, and/or the dominant group, as an important distinguishing trait of the group.
- 1 Slight differentials: There are socially significant differences between the minority and the dominant group on one or two of the specified qualities. (one or two components checked).

2 Substantial differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to three specified qualities.
3 Major differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to four specified qualities.
4 Extreme differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to five or six specified qualities.

Political Strength

Political Differentials Index: The Political Differentials Index is a seven-category scale (values from -2 to +4) of intergroup differentials in political status and positions derived from codings of six dimensions (MAR variables POLDIFX1 to POLDIFX6).

-2 Advantaged: 3 or more checked advantages
-1 Some advantages: Only one or two checked advantages
0 No socially significant differences: A "Socially significant" difference is one that is widely seen, within the minority, and/or the dominant group, as an important distinguishing trait of the group.
1 Slight differentials: There are socially significant differences between the minority and the dominant group on one or two of the specified qualities. (one or two POLDIFXs checked)
2 Substantial differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to three specified qualities.
3 Major differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to four specified qualities.
4 Extreme differentials: There are socially significant differences with respect to five or six specified qualities.
99 No basis for judging

Different Language

0 No differential
1 Some indeterminate differential
2 Significant differential
99 No basis for judgment

Length of Group's Residence in Country

1 Pre-1800; prior to formation of state
2 Pre-1800; post state formation
3 Immigrated; mainly 19th century
4 Immigrated; mainly early 20th century
5 Immigrated; mainly since 1945
8 Other

Annexe B: Question Wordings for ESS Variables

Perceived Linguistic Discrimination
Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

[If yes to previous question] On what grounds is your group discriminated against?
Language? [One of the options]

Trust in National Institutions
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.
… [country]'s parliament?
… the legal system?
… the police?

Ideology
In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Annexe C: Question Wordings for Survey

Ease of using French (SEV)
Est-il facile d'utiliser le français quotidiennement en [province]?

Très facile
Assez facile
Assez difficile
Très difficile
Ne sais pas

Threat to French
Veuillez indiquer ce que vous pensez des énoncés suivants : Le français est menacé en [province].

Complètement en accord
Assez en accord
Ni en accord, ni en désaccord
Assez en désaccord
Complètement en désaccord
Ne sais pas

Threat to French by Anglophones
Veuillez indiquer ce que vous pensez des énoncés suivants : Les anglophones nuisent à la volonté des francophones de protéger le français en [province].

Complètement en accord
Assez en accord
Ni en accord, ni en désaccord
Assez en désaccord
Complètement en désaccord
Ne sais pas

Attitudes towards Anglophones in Canada
En général, quels sont vos sentiments envers les anglophones au Canada?

Très négatifs
Assez négatifs
Neutres
Assez positifs
Très positifs
Ne sais pas

Attitudes towards Anglophones in Province
En général, quels sont vos sentiments envers les anglophones en [province]?
Très négatifs
Assez négatifs
Neutres
Assez positifs
Très positifs
Ne sais pas

Attitudes towards Canada
Quels sont vos sentiments, en général, envers le Canada?
Très négatifs
Assez négatifs
Neutres
Assez positifs
Très positifs
Ne sais pas

Inclusive Canadian Identity
Croyez-vous que l'identité canadienne est inclusive…
Très inclusive, tous les groupes nationaux au Canada y sont représentés par elle.
Assez inclusive
Ni inclusive, ni exclusive
Assez exclusive
Assez exclusive

Subjective Identity
Lequel de ces énoncés vous décrit le mieux : je suis…?[64]
Un Franco-[province] et pas un Canadien
Plus Franco-[province] que Canadien
Autant Franco-[province] que Canadien
Plus Canadien que Franco-[province]
Un Canadien et pas un Franco-[province]
Ni Canadien ni Franco-[province]

Importance of French
Pour vous, le français est …?
Très important
Important
Assez important
Pas très important
Pas important du tout
Ne sais pas

[64] The exact demonyms used for the Francophone provincial identities were Québécois for Quebec, Franco-Ontarien for Ontario, Acadien for New Brunswick and Franco-Manitobain for Manitoba.

Perceptions of government Canada towards French

Veuillez indiquer ce que vous pensez des énoncés suivants : Le gouvernement du Canada aide à protéger et à promouvoir le français.

Complètement en accord
Assez en accord
Ni en accord, ni en désaccord
Assez en désaccord
Complètement en désaccord
Ne sais pas

Annexe D: Question Wordings for Experiment

State of the French Language:
Veuillez indiquer ce que vous pensez des énoncés suivants: Le français est menacé au Québec.

Complètement en accord
Assez en accord
Ni en accord, ni en désaccord
Assez en désaccord
Complètement en désaccord

Feelings Towards Anglophones:
Quels sont, en général, vos sentiments envers... les anglophones au Canada (et non la minorité anglophone au Québec)?

Très négatifs
Assez négatifs
Neutres
Assez positifs
Très positifs

Support for Quebec Sovereignty:
Maintenant votre opinion sur l'avenir politique du Québec. Où vous placeriez-vous sur une échelle de 0 (indépendance du Québec) à 100 (fédéralisme canadien)? [Scale reversed]

Subjective Quebecker Identity:

Lesquels de ces énoncés vous décrit le mieux : je suis…?
Un Canadien et pas un Québécois
Plus Canadien que Québécois
Autant Québécois que Canadien
Plus Québécois que Canadien
Un Québécois et pas un Canadien

Annexe E: Language Stories

Negative Language Stories

#1 Recul du français au travail depuis 20 ans

De 1989 à 2010, on note au Québec un recul du français au travail, ce qui tend à démontrer, selon l'OQLF, que le bilinguisme au travail a lui aussi progressé au cours de la période visée par cette étude. «L'étude de 2010 révèle que c'est une minorité de Québécois qui travaillaient exclusivement en français : 63% des travailleurs avaient recours à l'anglais à un degré ou à un autre dans leurs communications professionnelles. Cette situation était encore plus répandue dans l'île de Montréal (82%) qu'ailleurs au Québec (53%)», précise l'Office dans un communiqué de presse.

#2 Un immigrant sur cinq au Québec ne parle pas français

Les données de l'Enquête nationale auprès des ménages (ENM), effectuée en 2011, dressent notamment un portrait décevant de la maîtrise linguistique des immigrants au Québec. Il ressort de cette étude que, parmi les immigrants vivant au Québec, 160 000 ont déclaré ne parler que l'anglais, et 43 000 ne maîtrisent aucune des deux langues officielles du Canada. Bref, un immigrant sur cinq au Québec ne peut tenir une discussion en français. Et cela, même si des dizaines de milliers d'entre eux sont arrivés au pays dans les années 1980, et même avant.

#3 Le déclin du français se poursuit, constate Statistique Canada

Sur presque tous les plans, le français poursuit son déclin au Québec - comme ailleurs au Canada - et la langue parlée le plus souvent à la maison ne fait pas exception. Car les francophones augmentent peut-être en nombre, mais pas au même rythme que les anglophones et les allophones regroupés. Le poids démographique du français se retrouve en baisse, conclut Statistique Canada.

Ce constat est des plus évidents à Montréal où le nombre de personnes s'exprimant en français à la maison pourrait passer sous la barre des 50 % d'ici une vingtaine d'années.

#4 Français à Montréal : recul dans l'accueil des clients

L'accueil des clients en français seulement connaît un recul, selon l'Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF). L'organisme a fait ces constatations à partir de ses cinq études sur la langue d'accueil, de service et d'affichage menées en 2010 et en 2012 à Montréal.

Les commerçants du centre-ville de Montréal ont accueilli les observateurs de l'OQLF en français dans une proportion de 74%. Cette proportion était de 89% en 2010. L'accueil bilingue a considérablement gagné en popularité, passant de 1% à 13% en deux ans.

De plus, un commerce sur cinq enfreint la loi 101 en affichant en anglais seulement leur nom d'entreprise. Au centre-ville de Montréal, deux études menées en 2010 et en 2012 par l'OQLF auprès des mêmes 400 établissements montrent que 18% des commerces présentent un affichage de leur nom d'entreprise non conforme à la Charte de la langue française.

Positive Language Stories

#1 Le français au travail progresse au Québec

L'utilisation du français au travail a progressé au Québec au cours des 40 dernières années, selon une étude de l'Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF). L'Office, qui a étudié des données sur la langue d'usage au travail compilées depuis 1971 au Québec, estime que la proportion de travailleurs qui utilisent majoritairement le français est passée de 83% à 89% entre 1971 et 2010. Dans la région de Montréal, l'utilisation du français est passée de 69% à 85% au cours de la même période. Le français est le plus répandu dans les entreprises de moins de 50 employés, note l'Office, alors que ce sont les plus grandes entreprises qui sont l'objet des plus grandes contraintes de francisation en vertu de la loi 101.

Le français au travail a aussi progressé de façon constante chez les allophones au cours des 40 dernières années. En 1971, 42% d'entre eux utilisaient majoritairement le français au travail contre 68% en 2010.

#2 Le français gagne du terrain chez les immigrants de Montréal

La politique sur l'immigration visant à favoriser le français porte ses fruits. La langue de Molière gagne du terrain chez les immigrés de Montréal, selon les données de l'Enquête nationale auprès des ménages, réalisée en 2011 par Statistique Canada.

Statistique Canada a constaté que 18,5% de ceux qui sont arrivés à Montréal entre 2001 et 2006 ne connaissaient que l'anglais. Cette proportion a reculé de trois points parmi ceux qui sont arrivés entre 2006 et 2011. L'apprentissage du français a quant à lui gagné quatre points durant cette période. Entre 2001 et 2006, 33% des nouveaux arrivants avaient choisi d'apprendre seulement le français. Cinq ans plus tard, ils sont près de 37%.

De plus, on remarque que parmi la population allophone du Québec, 24% utilisent le français comme langue principale à la maison. Cette proportion est en hausse depuis 1996 alors qu'elle se situait à 17%. Lorsque des transferts linguistiques s'effectuent, la majorité (51%) opte pour le français, ce qui n'était pas le cas en 1996 alors que seulement 39% des transferts s'effectuaient vers le français. Par ailleurs, chez ceux qui ont l'anglais pour langue maternelle, le taux de bilinguisme du français est passé de 61.7% à 68.9% entre 1996 et 2006.

#3 Le français progresse chez les anglophones du Québec

Selon les données du recensement de 2006, réalisé par Statistique Canada, la connaissance du français chez les anglophones du Québec a presque doublé. En 1971, il n'y avait que 36.7% des anglophones au Québec qui parlaient français; alors que 35 ans plus tard ce taux s'est établie à 68.9%.

Ce taux plus élevé de francisation est par contre accompagné par des données démographiques assez négatives pour cette communauté. En 1971, les anglophones représentaient 13.1% de la population québécoise; en 2006, ils n'étaient plus que 8.2%. De plus, le taux de transmission générationnel est assez faible dans plusieurs régions du Québec. Le résultat est que le taux de transfert linguistique - la propension d'une personne à parler le plus souvent une langue qui diffère de sa langue maternelle - des anglophones vers le français est de 10.6%; un taux nettement plus élevé que chez les francophones, vers l'anglais, qui est de 1.3%.

#4 Français à Montréal : un gain dans l'affichage

Le français gagne un peu de terrain dans l'affichage commercial à Montréal, selon l'Office québécois de la langue française (OQLF). L'organisme a fait ces constatations à partir de ses cinq études sur la langue d'accueil, de service et d'affichage menées en 2010 et en 2012 à Montréal. En ce qui concerne l'affichage du nom d'entreprise, il était conforme en 2012 à la Charte de la langue française dans 82% des commerces. Il s'agit d'un progrès comparativement aux 77% observés en 2010.