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About Time: Life-cycle and Cohort Effects on Support for Quebec Sovereignty

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Résumé

L'appui à la souveraineté du Québec diminue-t-il avec l'âge, ou est-il le reflet de préférences générationnelles ? Cette recherche se base sur les théories du changement générationnel et de la socialisation politique pour répondre à cette question. À l'aide de données de sondages de 1985 à 2014, nous mesurons l'impact de l'âge et de la génération sur l'appui à cette option constitutionnelle chez les Québécois francophones. Nos deux hypothèses de recherche sont confirmées dans une certaine mesure. Premièrement, les Québécois ont moins tendance à appuyer la souveraineté en vieillissant. La relation négative entre ces variables devient par contre plus faible au début des années 2000. Deuxièmement, les Baby boomers (nés entre 1945 et 1964) ont une probabilité plus élevée d'être souverainistes que les autres générations, et ce peu importe leur âge. Ils sont suivis, dans l'ordre, par les Aînés (nés en 1944 et moins), la Génération X (nés entre 1965 et 1979) et les Milléniaux (nés en 1980 ou plus).

Mots clés : souveraineté du Québec, génération, âge, opinion publique

Abstract

Can life-cycle and cohorts effects help explain support for Quebec sovereignty? This research attempts to answer this question by drawing on theories of generational change and political socialization. It uses longitudinal survey data from 1985 to 2014 to measure the impact of age and generation on support for this constitutional option among francophone Quebeckers. Our results confirm, to a certain extent, these two hypotheses. First, as they age, Quebeckers become less likely to support sovereignty. However, the relationship between age and support for independence weakens at the beginning of the 2000s. Second, Baby boomers (born between 1945 and 1964) are more likely to support sovereignty than any other generation, regardless of their age. They are followed by the Oldest generation (born in 1944 or before), Generation X (born between 1965 and 1979) and the Millennial generation (born in 1980 and later).

Keywords: Quebec sovereignty, generation, age, public opinion

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ADQ	Action Démocratique du Québec
BQ	Bloc Québécois
DV	Dependent variable
IV	Independent variable
PQ	Parti Québécois
QLP	Quebec Liberal Party
RIN	Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale

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"Pour accentuer cette croyance en l'inévitabilité de la souveraineté, on a mis de l'avant des théories basées sur l'évolution des groupes d'âge qui laissaient entendre que l'idéal souverainiste, majoritaire chez les plus jeunes, finirait par gagner l'ensemble de la population. On supposait un peu trop vite que les nouveaux jeunes seraient aussi fascinés par l'indépendance que leurs prédecesseurs, ce qui ne s'est pas vérifié. On avait tort aussi de prendre pour acquis qu'aucun jeune indépendantiste ne changerait d'avis en vieillissant."

—Louis Balthazar, 2013

Introduction

What explains support for Quebec sovereignty? In 1990, support for sovereignty reached its peak with almost 70% of Quebeckers in favour of this option (Yale and Durand 2011, p.252). Today, more than 25 years later, sovereignty is preferred by only 40% of the people in the province (Durand 2014). How can we account for this decline? Over the last several decades, scholars have attempted to identify what factors explain the decision to support Quebec independence. So far, researchers have shown that rational thinking—or the evaluation of costs and benefits—influences public opinion on this issue (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Martin 1994; Blais et al. 1995; Nadeau and Fleury 1995; Johnston et al. 1996; Howe 1998; Nadeau et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2004). We also know that attitudes towards particular politicians or political parties help explain why some Quebeckers support this option at different times (Kornberg and Archer 1982; Blais and Nadeau 1992; Clarke and Kornberg 1994; Johnston et al. 1996; Pammett and LeDuc 1995, 2001; Clarke et al. 2004). In addition, researchers have shown that context and survey questions can explain the fluctuations in support for constitutional options in Quebec (Yale and Durand 2011). Finally, scholars have confirmed that several socio-demographic variables were related to support for Quebec independence (Kornberg and Archer 1982; Blais and Nadeau 1984; Cloutier et al. 1992; Nadeau 1992; Clarke and Kornberg 1994; Pammett and LeDuc 1995; Johnston et al. 1996; Gagné and Langlois 2002; Martin and Nadeau 2002).

Among the many demographic traits that have been shown to influence the support for sovereignty, age is probably the most important factor identified so far (see, for instance, Cloutier et al. 1992; Kornberg and Archer 1982). Scholars of the socio-demographic approach have demonstrated that younger people were more likely to support Quebec independence in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, they have also found that the strength of this relationship weakens over time (Nadeau 1992; Gagné and Langlois 2002). We

therefore find two interpretations of the effect of age. First, there is the understanding that younger Quebeckers tend to support sovereignty more than their older counterparts, regardless of the generation in which they were born. This is in the life-cycle hypothesis. Second, there is the expectation that specific generations, like those who were first eligible to vote in the 1980s, are always more likely to support independence, when compared to members of the older or younger generations. This is the cohort effects hypothesis.

The primary goal of this research is to attempt to validate these two hypotheses. I argue that both life-cycle and cohort effects can help explain public support for Quebec sovereignty. On the one hand, older people should be less likely to support this option because they are more risk averse, and more attached to the past (Gagné and Langlois 2002). On the other hand, I draw on Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990, 2008), Mannheim (1970), Guay (1997) and Martin and Nadeau (2002) to justify the intuition that different generations of Quebeckers should have distinct constitutional preferences. Inglehart has empirically confirmed that younger generations from Western democracies have distinct value priorities when compared to their older counterparts. He shows that these differences are lasting despite the short-term effects of spontaneous economic or political events. Inglehart attributes these cleavages to the timing of socialization of generations. For his part, Mannheim suggests that generations create distinctive personalities when their members engage in a "common destiny" at the end of adolescence. He theorizes that not all generations are unique, because some did not "create [new] principles original to themselves" (Mannheim 1970, p.400). Lastly, Guay, and Martin and Nadeau looked more directly at the opinions of Quebeckers on different constitutional options and at how they perceived themselves. Guay found that the generation born between 1946 and 1959 and the one born between 1960 and 1979 had similar opinions on Quebec nationalism. These Quebeckers were also more likely to believe in the sovereignist project, which was not the case of the oldest Quebeckers, born before the Second World War. Martin and Nadeau found that some generations of Quebeckers were more likely to identify as "Quebecker", as opposed

to "Canadian", and argued that this could be linked to their moment of socialization and to the evolution in support for independence.

In order to explain the relationship between age, generation, and support for Quebec sovereignty, I use longitudinal survey data from 1985 to 2014. This method allows me to explain the decline in support for sovereignty over the long term. My approach is therefore similar to Yale and Durand (2011), who explained fluctuations in support for this issue from 1976 to 2006. However, my research design is different from most scholars of this question, who analyzed support for constitutional options at specific moments in time (see, for instance, Nadeau and Fleury 1995; Pammett and LeDuc 1995; Kornberg and Archer 1982). From these longitudinal data, I present three models to test the life-cycle and cohort effects hypotheses in the case of Quebec independence. The first model looks at the role of age, the second model verifies the effect of generations, while the last model tests the effect of age within each generation of Quebeckers.

This thesis takes an inductive approach. My goal is to *explore* a generational hypothesis in the case of support for Quebec sovereignty. However, I make a contribution to the study of public opinion and constitutional preferences in Quebec by offering an original interpretation of the weakening effect of age on support for independence. I also present an original attempt to empirically verify the conventional wisdom that members of certain generations, like the Baby boomers, are the main drivers of the sovereignist project.

Organization of the thesis

In order to explore the phenomenon of life-cycle and cohort effects in the case of support for Quebec independence, this thesis begins by presenting in Chapter 1 a short historical review of the concept of "sovereignty" in Quebec. In Chapter 2, I review the literature explaining constitutional preferences in this province. In existing studies of public opinion, most proponents of the socio-demographic school have focused on age as a predictor

of support for Quebec sovereignty. However, no-one has so far answered the question of whether cohort effects help explain the evolution of support for this constitutional option. I therefore also review the literature on generational change in order to build a theoretical framework on life-cycle and cohort effects. Chapter 3 presents my methodological approach. I use data from public opinion surveys over a period of 29 years asking Quebeckers which is their favourite constitutional option. These data allow me to track the evolution of the support for three constitutional options, and to verify the effect of age and generation on support for Quebec sovereignty.

In Chapter 4, I present the results of my analyses in three distinct models: the first and second ones consider the influence of age and generation on support for sovereignty; while the third model looks at the influence of age *within* generations to explain the support for this option. The results confirm to a certain extent my two hypotheses about life-cycle and cohort effects. First, age remains negatively correlated with support for Quebec sovereignty from 1985 to the beginning of the 2000s, but the relationship disappears in more recent years. Second, the Baby boomers (born between 1945 and 1964) are always more likely to support this option when compared to all other cohorts, while the other generations turn their backs on the project rather quickly as they age. The oldest generation (born in 1944 and before) is the second strongest supporter of the project when taking age into account, followed by Generation X (born between 1965 and 1979) and the Millennials (born in 1980 and after). Lastly, in Chapter 5, I discuss these results in relationship with the theory on generational change, and end by considering some of the limits of my analysis.

1 Defining Quebec sovereignty

What is Quebec sovereignty? From sovereignty-association to complete independence, the concept of sovereignty has taken different meanings through time in this province. Chapter 1 provides a context to my study of fluctuations in support for Quebec sovereignty by presenting the historical background of this concept since the 1960s. This review allows me to offer a nominal definition of the term "Quebec sovereignty", which is the first step in the operationalization of this concept. Finally, because independence has evolved together with other constitutional choices in Canada—like renewed federalism and the status quo—this chapter ends by providing a definition of these other concepts as well. We notice that all constitutional alternatives have changed over time, which justifies that they be defined at the beginning of this research.

1.1 Quebec sovereignty since 1960

The Quiet Revolution started in the early 1960s in Quebec. It was led in part by Jean Lesage, whose Liberal government began to take over some administrative fields traditionally under the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church, such as education and social services (Balthazar 2013, p.145). The Quebec government also began a process of empowerment of the province through economic reforms, for example by nationalizing Hydro-Québec (Balthazar 2013, p.148). With a broader access to higher education, francophone Quebeckers were also able to reach higher positions in public and private administration (Balthazar 2013, p.147-9). This process of reaffirmation of the Québécois nation was accompanied by an increase in the number of demands from Quebec's National Assembly to the federal government. Quebec wanted to be in charge of more areas of jurisdiction, namely in the fields of culture and international relations. These new demands, along with the development of a greater nationalist sentiment in the province, reasserted the need to reform the constitution. In fact, although the British North America Act protected French

language and Catholicism, it lacked an amending formula (Russell 1993; Munro 1989). As a consequence, it promoted the constitutional status quo.

One of the first attempts at finding an amending formula—the Fulton-Favreau formula—was agreed to by all provincial governments before being rejected by Quebec in 1966. René Lévesque, Jean Lesage's minister of Natural Resources, believed that the proposal "merely recognised the *status quo* and could not, therefore, be seen as either a loss or a gain for Quebec" (Oliver 2007, p.173). With this new amending formula, all provinces would have obtained a veto on future amendments. To some Quebec autonomists, this amounted to a loss of powers for their province[1].

In the 1970s, Quebec's National Assembly "strove to achieve 'profitable federalism' and 'cultural sovereignty' in an attempt to acquire the powers and resources deemed necessary for the "preservation and development of the bicultural character of the Canadian federation'" (Burgess 1996, p.53). Such enterprise was reinforced by the election of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1976 in Quebec, a first sovereigntist government led by René Lévesque. The PQ had emerged from the fusion of the *Mouvement Souveraineté-Association*, an organization founded by René Lévesque in 1967, with the *Ralliement National*, a right-wing political party created by ex-members of the *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale* (RIN). The RIN party had been created by an eponymous movement founded in 1960 (Monière 1977, p.273). In 1968, it was dissolved and some of its remaining members joined the PQ. The same year, Lévesque was elected president of the PQ.

Since its creation, the PQ promoted the idea of sovereignty-association, a "project of association [between Quebec and the rest of Canada] comprising a monetary union and a common market along with their natural complement, a coordinated fiscal policy" (Lévesque 1988, p.143). Lévesque had formulated the idea of sovereignty-association and proposed it to the Liberal caucus in 1967. After the caucus rejected his project, Lévesque left the party before becoming leader of the PQ. Sovereignty-association did not aim at

[1]Quebec rejected Pierre Trudeau's Victoria Charter on similar bases in 1971 (Stein 1984, p.124).

cutting all ties with Canada, but rather to preserve an economic relationship with the country while acquiring political independence (Rocher 2013, p.29).

During the 1970s, sovereignty-association was not the only constitutional position defended by Quebec political elites. The Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) had tabled a document called "A New Canadian Federation". This position "favoured [granting] veto power to each region of Canada, including Quebec. [...] The Paper proposed substantial changes to the division of legislative powers, controls over federal spending power and replacement of the Senate by a Council of the Provinces" (Rocher 2013, p.30). These proposed constitutional changes were however not considered by the PQ, which had made the referendum on sovereignty-association an electoral promise. A plebiscite was therefore organized for May 1980. The referendum question asked Quebeckers if they wanted the province to negotiate sovereignty-association with Ottawa. The evolution of the concept of sovereignty had reached a point where the project had the potential to have concrete consequences, but still didn't amount to a complete separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada.

During the referendum campaign, Prime Minister Trudeau insinuated that a NO vote would result in renewed federalism (Munro 1989). He believed that the constitution had to be modified, otherwise the constitutional deadlock would never be solved. One week before the vote, he said:

> I know I can take the most solemn commitment that in the case of a NO, we will at once put in place the mechanism for renewing the constitution and we will not stop until it is done. [...] [We] are putting our heads on the table, us, Quebec members of Parliament, because we are telling Quebeckers to say NO, while at the same time telling the other provinces that we will not accept that a NO be interpreted as an indication that everything is fine and that everything can stay the same. We want change, and are risking our seats in the name of change. Here's what's going to be our answer to a NO. (Trudeau 1980)

On referendum day, sovereignty-association was rejected by 60% of the population. Trudeau then began work to repatriate the constitution (Stein 1984, p.125). The "patriation package" would include a new amendment procedure, a Charter of Rights and

Freedoms, "linguistic rights, and an equalization formula" (Stein 1984, p.125). Quebec's demand that provinces should be compensated for provincial programs was left aside (Harder and Patten 2015, p.9). The package also included a "mobility clause" and "minority language educational rights" in the Charter of the Rights and Freedoms (Stein 1984, p.127). Quebec did not agree with these two additions. As a consequence, the province did not sign the patriation package.

Two years after the constitution was repatriated, Progressive Conservative leader Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister of Canada. He promised that Quebec would join the Canadian federation "with honour and enthusiasm", and that the province would sign the constitution. When the PQ was replaced in 1985 by Robert Bourassa's QLP, the stage was set for a new round of constitutional debate. Along with provincial and territorial premiers, Mulroney negotiated the Meech Lake Accord—a proposal of renewed federalism—in 1987. All provinces had to uphold the accord in their respective legislatures. But when the ratification deadline came in June, 1990, Manitoba and Newfoundland had not consented to the accord, and so the proposal failed. In reaction to the failure of Meech, Quebec commissioned public consultations in order to know what Quebeckers thought would be the best solution to the constitutional deadlock. The Bélanger-Campeau and Allaire commissions tabled "highly autonomist reports" (Russell 1993, p.35), and in May 1991, the National Assembly declared that it was waiting for an offer of renewed federalism from Ottawa, otherwise it would have a referendum on sovereignty in October 1992.

The early 1990s therefore came as a turning point in the evolution of the idea of sovereignty. The QLP, which was not expected to defend such a strong position, was now "determined to oppose the status quo" (Balthazar 2013, p.235). But one year after his surprising promise to reject the status quo, Bourassa agreed to negotiate once again with all prime ministers about a new constitutional proposal. In 1992, they tabled a new accord in Charlottetown. The accord guaranteed, among other things, 25% of the House of Commons seats to Quebec (Pammett and LeDuc 1995, p.8). The Charlottetown Accord

was however subject to a popular referendum on October 26th, 1992, when it was rejected by 54% of the Canadian population.

Following the defeat of Charlottetown, the political landscape suffered dramatic change. In the 1993 federal election, the Bloc Québécois (BQ)—a separatist party that aimed at representing Quebec's interests—managed to elect 54 representatives in Ottawa. In Quebec, the PQ came back to power in 1994 (Rocher 2013, p.37). With a majority of the Quebec seats in Ottawa occupied by sovereignists, and a sovereignist party governing in the province, Quebec did not negotiate constitutional renewal anymore.

Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and Mario Dumont, respectively leaders of the PQ, the BQ and the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ), became the principal leaders of a movement to make Quebec a sovereign nation. Together, they came up with the referendum question that was agreed to by the National Assembly in September 1995: "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership[...]?" The 1995 referendum question makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of sovereignty at this moment in time. On the one hand, it foreshadows complete independence ("that Quebec should become sovereign"), while on the other hand it presupposes a partnership with Canada ("a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership"). The question was even used differently by the two opposite sides: the NO side emphasized the fact that Quebec could become entirely independent, and the YES side claimed that a relationship would be maintained with Canada in order to persuade softer sovereignists to join their ranks (Monière and Guay 1996, p.29). Nevertheless, the question still suggested something closer to complete independence than the 1980 referendum question, which only proposed sovereignty-association.

Just like Trudeau in 1980, Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chrétien came out in the referendum campaign to reassure Quebeckers that a NO would lead to constitutional change. Such change would include recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness (Rocher 2013,

p.38-9). On October 30th, 1995, 50.6% of Quebeckers rejected sovereignty. But this major event marked a peak in the evolution of the concept of sovereignty. From 1960 to 1995, the notion had evolved from autonomist demands to a movement for sovereignty-association, ending with a project much closer to independence. Since 1995, the idea of sovereignty has not been abandoned. Of course, no other round of constitutional debate like those of Meech or Charlottetown has taken place, and no other referendum on sovereignty has been organized. But sovereignist political parties remain active in the provincial (the PQ, Québec solidaire, Option nationale) and federal (the BQ) stages.

Quebec's actions for more autonomy have not stopped either. In 1996, the federal government of Jean Chrétien passed legislation regarding future constitutional amendments. Bill C-110 guarantees that any constitutional amendments must be approved by at least Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and "two or more of the Atlantic provinces [and two or more of the Prairie provinces] that have [...] combined populations of at least fifty per cent of the population of all the Atlantic [or Prairie] provinces" (Government of Canada 1996). In other words, Quebec acquired a veto on constitutional amendments, but so did Ontario, British Columbia, and to a certain extent, the Prairie and Atlantic provinces. Chrétien also passed legislation on manpower training, leaving this jurisdiction to the provinces. But at the same time, the Chrétien government also started funding programs aimed at increasing Canadian nationalism in Quebec. In 2004, it was revealed that these funds had been illegally allocated to firms close to the Liberal Party of Canada. The "sponsorship scandal" had a disastrous impact on support for the party in Quebec, and reactivated the nationalist fiber of many Quebeckers (Balthazar 2013, p.272). After power passed to the Conservatives in 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced a motion, "That this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada". Even though this motion has no constitutional meaning whatsoever, it consists in a formal affirmation of Quebec's distinctive character.

This short review of the evolution of the Québécois nationalist and sovereignist ideolo-

gies since 1960 illustrates that the concept of "sovereignty" has taken different meanings throughout the history of the province, and it probably still does for many people. In the context of this research, I define Quebec sovereignty as a proposition to make Quebec *politically* sovereign from the rest of Canada, be it by achieving sovereignty-association *or* complete independence.

1.2 Renewed federalism and the status quo

The previous section made several mentions of "renewed federalism" and the "status quo". Indeed, the concept of Quebec sovereignty has often been opposed to these two other constitutional options. Without going into too many details in the definition of these concepts, it is important to remember that since the 1960s, the concept of sovereignty has coexisted with other constitutional proposals. This section offers a quick review of their meaning.

Before the patriation of the constitution in 1982, "constitutional renewal" (or renewed federalism) meant finding a new amending formula for the constitution. Demands to modify the Senate were also made by Western provinces that wished to have more power in the decisions made by the central government (McRae 1985). With the first election of the PQ in 1976, constitutional renewal gained ground on the political agenda (McRoberts 1997, p.166). In 1979, in an attempt to find a solution to the problem of national unity, Prime Minister Trudeau created the Pépin-Robarts Commission. The commission recommended better "redistribution of powers, 'quasi-special status' for Quebec, and a Council of the Federation appointed by and responsive to the provinces, which would replace the Senate" (Stein 1984, p.125). However, the recommendations did not lead to any particular constitutional change.

The patriation of the constitution in 1982 represents the next step in the evolution of the concept of renewed federalism. The patriation could in itself be considered as a form

constitutional renewal. From that moment on, Quebec took a central role in the propositions of renewed federalism. The two proposals that came close to succeeding—Meech and Charlottetown—were aimed at finding solutions to the fact that Quebec had not signed the constitution. These attempts, as well as the many commissions that were conducted by the federal and provincial governments from the 1970s to the early 1990s, led to different understandings of "renewed federalism" for Quebeckers. Among other designations, the terms "distinct society" and "special status" have been used interchangeably to refer to Quebec's demands for change.

No clear definition exists of these terms. But they can both be related to the general concept of renewed federalism. On the one hand, "special status" can be defined as the different *means* for guaranteeing Quebec's "distinct" character. For instance, while the term "distinct society" was included in the Meech Lake Accord, it remained absent from Charlottetown. On the other hand, Charlottetown offered Quebec a guaranteed 25% of the seats in the House of Commons. Such "special status" can be considered as a way to secure Quebec's distinctiveness within the federation. In short, even though they are not identical, the two concepts still work to "renew" Quebec's place within the federation.

After the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, the concept of renewed federalism kept on evolving. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has promised in 2005 to reform the Senate. More recently, the Liberal Party of Canada has made a promise along the same lines during the 2015 electoral campaign. We can therefore define renewed federalism as any proposition to redistribute power between the two levels of government.

Like renewed federalism, the concept of status quo took one definition prior to 1982, and another one after the patriation of the constitution. Of course, "status quo" literally means maintaining the existing constitution. But the federal option has changed with the patriation of the constitution by Pierre Trudeau. Prior to 1982, it meant the 1867 constitution, while post-1982, it means the new constitution.

In short, all constitutional alternatives have evolved through time in Canada. Despite

the many forms taken by these concepts, I define "sovereignty" as a proposition to make Quebec *politically* sovereign from the rest of Canada, and "renewed federalism" as any attempt to redistribute powers between the federal and provincial governments. Finally, I define the "status quo" as the prevailing Canadian constitution and current distribution of powers between the levels of government. While providing a context for my research, these definitions are also the first step in the measure of opinion on support for Quebec sovereignty.

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter reviews the literature explaining constitutional preferences in Canada. I focus primarily on socio-demographic factors to explain support for Quebec independence. Interestingly, scholars who have looked at these factors explored the relationship between *age* and support for sovereignty. However, it is unclear whether their conclusions are the result of life-cycle, or cohort effects. This is why my theoretical framework is also complemented by theories of generational change. The chapter ends by presenting hypotheses to be tested in this research.

2.1 Explaining constitutional preferences

Studies explaining support for constitutional options in Canada can be classified into four different approaches: the rational school, the psycho-sociological school, the "contextual" school, and the socio-demographic school (Yale and Durand 2011).

First, authors of the rational school have considered how the economic and linguistic costs of different constitutional options could influence the preferences of voters in Quebec or Canada (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Martin 1994; Nadeau and Fleury 1995; Blais et al. 1995; Johnston et al. 1996; Howe 1998; Nadeau et al. 1999; Clarke et al. 2004). Second, scholars of the psycho-sociological approach investigated the relationship between the attachment towards Canada or Quebec, or the feelings towards different politicians, and constitutional choice (Kornberg and Archer 1982; Blais and Nadeau 1992; Clarke and Kornberg 1994; Johnston et al. 1996; Pammett and LeDuc 1995, 2001; Clarke et al. 2004). Third, proponents of the "contextual" school found that question wording and spontaneous political events had an influence on support for Quebec sovereignty (Yale and Durand 2011). Lastly, scholars of the socio-demographic approach have explained constitutional preferences by using variables such as age, occupation, education, or language. Their most recurrent findings are that francophone, younger, better educated Quebeckers,

as well as Parti Québécois identifiers, are all more likely to support Quebec sovereignty (see, for instance, Gagné and Langlois 2002; LeDuc 1977; Kornberg and Archer 1982). Authors also noted differences between the various cohorts of sovereignists. They found that age, education and occupation remained the most influential determinants of support for independence over time. However, these predictors became less important between 1980 and 1990 (Cloutier et al. 1992; Nadeau 1992), and between 1995 and 2001 (Gagné and Langlois 2002).

Concerning the particular determinant of *age*, scholars found that younger Quebeckers were more likely to support this option (for example, Nadeau 1992)[2]. Scholars attributed the lower likelihood to support sovereignty of older Quebeckers to the fact that they were more "attached to the past" (Gagné and Langlois 2002, p.23). Older people also tend to reject uncertain projects like sovereignty because their financial future is insured by Canada, through old age pensions. Middle-age people (adults of less than 55 years old) are for their part more likely to support independence because they are better able to make plans for the future. Moreover, older people are usually attached to Canada because they were born before the rise of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, and are therefore more likely to prefer that Quebec remains a province. The opposite is true for people who received their political education in the 1960s (Gagné and Langlois 2002, p.23-4).

More specifically, Cloutier et al. (1992) found that age remained the most important explanatory variable of support for independence from 1980 to 1990. Nadeau (1992) also determined that younger Quebeckers were more likely to support independence over the same period of time. However, he added that the effect of this variable faded over time. In a similar vein, Gagné and Langlois (2002) found that the youngest were more likely to support Quebec independence in 1995 and in 2001, but that the explanatory power

[2]On another constitutional issue, a similar trend was found when looking at the determinant of age. Pammett and LeDuc (1995) and Johnston et al. (1996) found that younger Quebeckers were less likely to support the Charlottetown Accord, while Clarke and Kornberg (1994) found that younger people were *more* likely to support the accord. For their part, Kornberg and Archer (1982) determined that older people were more likely to support renewed federalism or the status quo in 1979-80.

of age has decreased over this period. In other words, the youngest group was still more likely than all other groups to support sovereignty in 2001, but the young represented a smaller proportion of supporters of sovereignty in 2001 than in 1995. Blais and Nadeau (1984) did not find that the youngest Quebeckers were the most likely to vote YES in the 1980 referendum. On the contrary, they found that Quebeckers born after 1960 were less likely to support this option than people born between 1945 and 1959. According to their results, the "middle" generation was therefore more supportive of sovereignty (Blais and Nadeau 1984, p.326).

For their part, Kornberg and Archer (1982) also found that age was negatively correlated with support for this option, but hypothesized that an eventual decline in support for sovereignty could be linked with the aging of francophone Quebeckers born around 1960. As they grow older, this cohort would be more likely to support "system-maintaining options such as renewed federalism" (Kornberg and Archer 1982, p.84). In other words, Kornberg and Archer hypothesized that there existed *life cycle effects* to constitutional preferences. Younger people were meant to change opinion as they aged. As a consequence, society's overall distribution of preferences would not change. However, Blais and Nadeau (1984), Nadeau (1992) and Gagné and Langlois (2002)'s findings on the question seem to contradict Kornberg and Archer's hypothesis. Indeed, Blais and Nadeau (1984)'s results suggest that some generations are more likely to support sovereignty than others. Moreover, Nadeau (1992) and Gagné and Langlois (2002)'s results confirm that the effect of age faded over time—i.e., support for this option is not reserved to the youngest group anymore. Following this reasoning, should we assume that the generations first eligible to vote in the 1980s are always more likely to support sovereignty when compared to any other generations? In this context, support for constitutional options would be the result of *cohort effects*. If this is the case, society's aggregate constitutional preferences would change with time, as older generations are replaced. This could be the reason why the effect of age was weaker in 2001 than in 1980.

In short, two interpretations exist regarding the effect of age on support for sovereignty. The first one is that there is the interpretation that aging decreases Quebeckers' likelihood to support this option. The second one is that support for sovereignty is driven by the generation first eligible to vote in the 1980s. The apparent contradiction between these two interpretations consists in the *main puzzle of this thesis*. But before addressing this puzzle, the next section reviews theories of generational change and political socialization in order to provide an understanding of why some generations could have different attitudes towards sovereignty. More particularly, in the next section I draw on the work of Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990, 2008), Mannheim (1970), Guay (1997) and Martin and Nadeau (2002) to complement the theoretical framework of my thesis.

2.2 Explaining generational change

In the 1970s, Inglehart found large differences between the values of older and younger generations in Western European countries (Inglehart 1971, 1977). He demonstrated that younger people were more likely to possess materialist values, i.e. values that "[relate] to the need for belonging and to aesthetic and intellectual needs" (Inglehart 1971, p.991). In later studies, Inglehart asked whether the value differences identified in the 1970s remained constant over time (see, for instance, Inglehart 1990, 2008; Abramson and Inglehart 1986, 1992). In other words, he wanted to know if they resulted from cohort effects. If they did, it would mean that younger people in the 1970s had kept the same value priorities as they grew up, and that society had changed as a consequence of population replacement. On the other hand, if they came from life-cycle effects, it would mean that people's value priorities had changed as they got older, population replacement having no impact on the values present in societies.

Using longitudinal data from Eurobarometer surveys and World Values Surveys, Inglehart found that citizens of Western states held on to their values as they grew older,

confirming the fact that value differences were the result of cohort effects (Inglehart 1990, 2008). Inglehart's theory focuses on the development of post-bourgeois or "post-materialist" values, which he defines as "nonphysiological needs, such as those for esteem, [and] self-expression" (Inglehart 1990, p.68). He showed that people who experience prosper living conditions were more likely to develop liberal opinions on "gender roles, sexual orientation, work, [and] religion", in contrast to employment, price stability, or other security-related values, which he refers to as materialist values (Inglehart 2008, p.142). His results also confirmed that "one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years and [that] these values change mainly through intergenerational population replacement" (Inglehart 2008, p.131), thus reaffirming his socialization hypothesis. Lastly, he was able to show that specific events have the potential to alter people's value priorities for short periods of time, a phenomenon he refers to as "period effects" (Inglehart 2008, p.135). However, he notes that in the long run, period effects do not deeply transform cohorts' values.

Inglehart's empirical results are consistent with Mannheim's theoretical insight on generations (1970). Mannheim did not merely believe that generations formed a group because their members were born during the same period. He believed that something more was needed, like the "*participation in the common destiny* of this historical and social unit" (Mannheim 1970, p.394). Inglehart's empirical results are consistent with Mannheim's theory, because Mannheim thought that generations were meant to preserve their original identities. To Mannheim, what people learned in their early formative years was determinant of how they would conceive the world in the future:

> Early impressions tend to coalesce into a *natural view* of the world. All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set. [...] [Even] if the rest of one's life consisted in one long process of negation and destruction of the natural world view acquired in youth, the determining influence of these early impressions would still be predominant. (Mannheim 1970, p.389)

However, Mannheim did not think that all generations were necessarily unique. In fact,

he thought that some generations did not "create new collective impulses and formative principles" of their own (Mannheim 1970, p.400). Lastly, Mannheim also gave an age to the particular time when people's ideas were supposed to have "coalesced". He believed that around 17 years old, people's core opinions were almost completely formed. Seventeen years old may seem as an arbitrary age for attitudes to be shaped, but scholars of political socialization actually found that the adolescent to pre-adult period was a very fertile time for the consolidation of opinions (Niemi and Hepburn 1995). In other words, even though restricting the phenomenon to the age of 17 years old is probably too limiting, studies of political socialization confirm Mannheim's intuition that adolescence is a determinant age of attitude formation.

Mannheim's definition of generations is more theoretical than empirical, but it offers foundations to empirical studies that confirm the lasting presence of different generational values. Indeed, while Inglehart's theory is limited to the development of "materialist" and "postmaterialist" values, the intuition on generational change can also be applied to other cases of opinion formation. For example, it has been used by Jennings (1987) in the United States to verify the lasting presence of the different values of the "protest generation". Jennings wondered if the movement against the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States lasted, or if young Americans changed values as they grew up. The author confirmed the presence of differences between this generation and others (Jennings 1987, p.380).

In Canada, most authors who explored the question of generational change in political opinion studies did so in relation with electoral turnout (see, for instance, Blais and Rubenson 2013; Blais et al. 2002, 2004). They tried to determine if decreasing turnout was correlated with population replacement, since younger generations are less likely to vote. Blais and Rubenson (2013) tested the hypothesis that "recent generations have different values and that these value differences explain turnout decline". They found truth to the generational thesis, explaining their results by the fact that younger generations

offer less value to moral duty and are "more skeptical about politicians' responsiveness to their concerns" (Blais and Rubenson 2013, p.112). Blais et al. (2002) also determined that the generation born in 1970 was responsible for most of the turnout decline. They could not attribute the lower levels of voter turnout of this generation to life-cycle effects only. In fact, declining turnout was the result of lower levels of political interest and information, which translated into less political engagement (Blais et al. 2002, p.10). In a later article, Blais et al. (2004) confirmed that "there [were] powerful generation effects, with turnout being about 20 points lower among the most recent generation than among pre-baby-boomers", in addition to life-cycle effects (Blais et al. 2004, p.234).

In Quebec, Guay (1997) brought some insight to the question in his study of the province's generational cleavages. He noticed generational distinctions in political orientations between the oldest generation (born 1900-1945), and two younger generations (born 1946-1959 and 1960-1979). He concluded that when a generation is "endowed with a strong political personality", like is the case of the Baby boomers, there will likely be important differences between this generation and the previous one (Guay 1997, p.149). On the other hand, even when external conditions differ greatly, generations might be similar if "one generation is endowed with a strong political personality and the next is not". This would be the case of the Baby boomers and Generation X, the latter of which has a weaker political personality (Guay 1997, p.149).

Concerning the particular question of Quebec nationalism, Guay concluded that the Baby boomers were more different than their elders and more similar to Generation X. Baby boomers and Generation Xers considered themselves "Québécois" in proportions of 64% and 65%, whereas it was the case of only 42% of the oldest generation. The two youngest generations were also less likely to be proud of being Canadian than their older counterparts (30% versus 49%). Otherwise, Baby boomers and Generation Xers agreed with the same arguments about the sovereignist project (Guay 1997, p.84-92). First, they thought in proportions of 43% and 44% that the sovereignist project was easily achievable.

Second, about 60% of them thought that Quebec had the resources to become a country. And third, more than 70% of them though that the province had the right to separate from Canada. On the contrary, only 25% of members of the generation born before the Second World War thought the project was achievable, 45% believed Quebec had the resources to become independent, and 53% thought the province had a right to self-determination.

In the same vein, Martin and Nadeau (2002) addressed the question of Quebeckers' self-identification. They linked this perception of self to the moment of socialization and to the evolution in support for independence. They noted that between 1970 and 1997, "identification with Quebec" went from 21% to 63% among Quebeckers. Before 1970, Quebeckers were more likely to identify as "Canadian" or "French Canadian". They attributed this change in part to the replacement of generation, because younger cohorts, which experienced the Quiet Revolution, were more likely to perceive themselves as "Quebeckers" (Martin and Nadeau 2002, p.146-7).

Guay and Martin and Nadeau's findings indicate that cohort effects could be an explanation to the evolution of support for Quebec independence. Inglehart and Mannheim, who are also proponents of the cohort explanation, would justify generational differences on this issue by the fact that groups of Quebeckers were socialized during different times. Their political personalities are therefore distinct, and they are enduring. Thus, the work of these authors help support the cohort effects interpretation of this issue. On the other hand, other authors cited previously would rather explain fluctuations in support for sovereignty by the simple fact that aging reduces the voters' likelihood to support this option (Cloutier et al. 1992; Gagné and Langlois 2002). They would argue that people change opinion as they grow older because they become less secure, or more attached to the past. Their theories help support the life-cycle interpretation. I believe that both mechanisms can help explain the evolution of support for Quebec sovereignty. The next section presents the hypotheses laying foundations for this thesis.

2.3 Hypotheses

In this study, I argue that both life-cycle and cohort effects should be at play in explaining the evolution of support for Quebec sovereignty:

> *Hypothesis 1: Younger Quebeckers should always be more likely to support sovereignty, regardless of their generation.* (Life-cycle hypothesis)

> *Hypothesis 2: Quebeckers born in different generations should have different constitutional preferences, regardless of their age.* (Cohort effects hypothesis)

The first hypothesis is the life-cycle hypothesis. It implies that support for Quebec sovereignty is influenced by the cycle of life. It is supported by the empirical findings of Cloutier et al. (1992); Nadeau (1992); Gagné and Langlois (2002) and Kornberg and Archer (1982), who found that younger Quebeckers were more likely to support this option, regardless of the timing of their analyses. Younger people should be more likely to support Quebec sovereignty because they are less insecure about the future, and are thus more likely to be able to project themselves in a different reality. As expressed by Gagné and Langlois (2002), their financial security is less endangered by the idea of sovereignty: they are not dependent of the federal pension system and may even not be responsible of any financial liabilities yet. They are also less likely to be attached to the past, which might explain why they are less likely to be change averse (Gagné and Langlois 2002, p.23).

The second hypothesis is the cohort effects hypothesis. My four generations are: the Oldest generation, born before 1945; the Baby boomers generation, born between 1945 and 1964; Generation X, born between 1965 and 1979; and the Millennial generation, born in 1980 or later. I also have some more precise expectations about the behaviour of particular generations. First, *members of the Greatest generation should always be less likely to support sovereignty than Boomers and Generation Xers, regardless of their age.* Members of the Greatest generation were the oldest in 1980, a time when older people were less likely to support sovereignty (Cloutier et al. 1992; Nadeau 1992; Gagné

and Langlois 2002; Kornberg and Archer 1982). They also have different attitudes about Quebec nationalism than younger generations (Guay 1997), and are more likely to identify as Canadian, as opposed to Quebecker (Martin and Nadeau 2002). This behaviour could be explained by the period in which they were socialized (Inglehart 1990, 2008). In fact, members of the Greatest generation lived their pre-adult years prior to the Quiet Revolution. This implies that they must have been less influenced by the rise in Québécois nationalism that occurred in the 1960s because their political attitudes were formed before that period. If we follow Mannheim (1970), these attitudes should endure.

Second, *Baby boomers should always be more likely to support sovereignty than their older counterparts, regardless of their age.* The rationale behind this hypothesis is very similar to the previous one. Baby boomers were among the youngest at the beginning of the 1980s, and were thus the "young" ones who supported the sovereignist project during the 1980 referendum (Cloutier et al. 1992; Nadeau 1992). Because they were socialized in a different time than their older counterparts, it would be consistent with Inglehart's and Mannheim's theories if Baby boomers had different constitutional preferences than the oldest generation. However, they should be *more* likely to support sovereignty because the youngest Baby boomers were 15 years old in 1960. Their political attitudes were being formed when the reaffirmation of the Québécois identity started at the time of the Quiet Revolution. Following the same intuition, Baby boomers should also preserve these preferences as they age (Mannheim 1970).

Third, *Generation Xers should also be more likely to support sovereignty when compared to the Oldest generation, regardless of their age.* Generation Xers were not socialized at the time of the Quiet Revolution—like Baby boomers—but they lived their pre-adult years during the first 1980 referendum. Many of them were still teenagers at the time of the constitutional debates of 1987 and 1992. Growing up when Quebec sovereignty was well on the political agenda should make them more likely to support this option than the Oldest generation. I do not make any distinction between Generation Xers and Baby boomers

because these two generations should not be very different. Actually, Guay (1997) found that these two generations had very similar opinions on Quebec nationalism. Having not lived in "revolutionary" times like the Baby boomers, Generation Xers should not have a personality as strong as their predecessors (Mannheim 1970; Guay 1997).

Fourth, *Millennials should be less likely to support sovereignty than Baby boomers and Generation Xers.* Since they were not socialized in times of great constitutional turmoil, like their predecessors, the opinions of this generation should be less clearly in favour of Quebec sovereignty than Baby boomers and Generation Xers. Moreover, Cloutier et al. (1992), Nadeau (1992) and Gagné and Langlois (2002) found that age was not as strongly correlated with support for independence in 1990 as it was in 1980, and even less in 2001. Being young was a weaker predictor of this constitutional preference in 2001 than in 1980. If the trend persists, the effect of age should be even weaker when the Millennials join the analysis. Age should thus be a very weak determinant of support support for sovereignty for members of the new youngest generation.

3 Methods

In order to measure the effect of age and generation on support for Quebec sovereignty, I use survey data analysis. This research aims at building a longitudinal portrait of the constitutional preferences of Quebeckers. It thus uses a different approach than most proponents of the socio-demographic school reviewed in the previous chapter, who mostly produced cross-sectional studies (see, for instance, Cloutier et al. 1992; Nadeau 1992; Kornberg and Archer 1982). This chapter discusses the decision to use longitudinal survey data analysis, as well as the choice of data and the operationalization of concepts. Limits brought about by this methodological decision can be found in the conclusion.

3.1 Data choice

I selected my data based on the consistency of the dependent variable (DV). My DV is support for sovereignty, or, in more general terms, constitutional preference. Because a consistent measure of the dependent variable reduces the potential for measurement errors, I selected surveys that ask Quebeckers their favourite constitutional option using always the same question.

Moreover, I chose surveys in which the question about constitutional preference does not limit respondents to a choice between Quebec sovereignty and the status quo, but also includes other options (see Appendix 2). On that note, I argue that research on support for Quebec sovereignty is incomplete as long as it does not measure preference for sovereignty *along with other constitutional alternatives.* In fact, the measure of support for independence used in several papers is based on survey questions such as "If a referendum were held today, would you be in favour of Quebec sovereignty?" This question limits respondents to a dichotomous choice, and has the potential to overestimate (or underestimate) support for this option. Considering the constitutional history of Canada (see Chapter 1), it is perfectly reasonable to assume that Quebeckers developed a partic-

ular order of constitutional preferences that also includes a third option, such as renewed federalism. Depending on the political context, some "softer" sovereignists might actually forsake Quebec independence if the option of renewed federalism is more attractive to them. The only way to know is to use more complete survey questions that consider all alternatives. Building on that account, some studies put emphasis precisely on the fact that sometimes, the federalist-sovereignist dimension loses importance in Quebec, revealing unanticipated behaviour on the part of "less ardent sovereignists" (Gauvin et al. 2016). In these moments, the social or economic dimensions may have more influence on electoral behaviour (Medeiros et al. 2015). It could be argued that in such cases, both hard and soft sovereignists really reveal themselves. Thus, including other constitutional options in survey questions allows for a more precise understanding of public opinion on this issue.

Bearing this in mind, I chose to work with Environics Focus Canada (EFC) surveys[3]. I also combine data from a post-electoral survey produced by Léger in 2014. The Environics surveys include the following question: "Here are some constitutional options that have been proposed for Quebec. Which one do you think would be best?". The four options proposed are: Present status in Canada, Special status, Sovereignty-association, and Independence. This question is present in the Environics public opinion surveys from 1983 to 2012, at a rate of one to four times a year. In the end, sixty-three EFC surveys from 1985 to 2012[4] were included in the analysis. I put emphasis on the fact that the question is *always* the same, which strengthens reliability and internal validity. From the 2014 Léger survey, I use the question "If a referendum were held that asked you to choose from the three following options, would you vote for: signing the 1982 Constitution, more powers for Quebec, or independence?". The question is not identical, but offers choices comparable to those of the Environics surveys.

[3]Accessed through the Canadian Opinion Research Archive of Queen's University.

[4]One survey in each of the following years: 1985-86, 1989, 2008, 2010 and 2012; two surveys in 1990, 2003 and 2007; three surveys in 1996; and four surveys in 1991-2001, 2005 and 2006. Years 1987-88, 2002, 2009 and 2011 did not include the question on the dependent variable.

Environics surveys are pan-Canadian, but the sample used in this research is limited to francophone Quebeckers (average N=436). The Léger survey includes a total of 1,176 francophone Quebeckers, for a total of 28,699 respondents in our 64 surveys. I limit my analysis to French Quebeckers because there is usually little variation in support for different constitutional options among anglophone Quebeckers (see, among others, Johnston et al. 1996). This is why it is more interesting to limit the analysis to French respondents. Allophone Quebeckers are for their part almost absent from the surveys. It is true that they grow in numbers as time goes by, but their numbers are very small at the beginning of the analysis. In addition, the goal of this research is to determine whether sovereignty is a generational project. In the 1960s and 1970s, sovereignty emerged mostly among French Quebeckers, who wanted to assert their cultural distinctiveness from the rest of Canada by acquiring more autonomy. Including immigrant respondents, present in greater numbers at the end of the period, could distort the phenomenon under study. Indeed, it could be argued that more and more young allophones would be included in more recent years as a result of increasing levels of immigration. This could affect the comparison of current and former younger generations of sovereignists. Of course, a different analysis that integrates these voters could be done. The results would lead to a different interpretation of the evolution of support for sovereignty. It is not to say that such research would be fruitless; simply that it is not the goal of the present thesis.

Environics/Focus Canada surveys are produced by the Environics Research Group. The sampling procedure is stratified probability sample. Information about language of respondents is obtained from the question "Which language do you, yourself, usually speak at home?"[5]. The sampling method of the Léger survey is non-probability stratified sampling. It was conducted online, and the respondent's language was determined using the question: "Which language do you speak most often at home?".

[5]In EFC 1994-4 and 2005-3, data for this question is missing. For these years, the respondent's language is thus assumed to be French if the interview was conducted in French.

3.2 From concepts to indicators

The stage of operationalization allows the researcher to transfer her general concepts into terms that can be measured (indicators). First, my dependent variable is binary: support for Quebec sovereignty (1) versus support for any other option (0). In the Environics surveys, "Sovereignty-association" and "Independence" are merged to create a single indicator of "Quebec sovereignty". Even though sovereignty-association and complete independence do not have the exact same meaning, they correspond to my nominal definition of "Quebec sovereignty" (see Chapter 1), and have both been used in previous research as measures of sovereignty (Yale and Durand 2011). In the Léger survey, "Independence" is the indicator for my DV.

Second, my independent variables (IV) are age and generation. "Age" is measured using the exact age or the year of birth. It is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to a maximum 106 years old, depending on the survey. "Generation" has four categories: the Oldest generation, born in 1944 and before; the Baby boomers, born between 1945 and 1964; Generation X, born between 1965 and 1979; and the Millennials, born in 1980 and after.

The choice of cutoff periods for generations may seem arbitrary. Different studies have operationalized this concept by using different years of birth. For example, Guay (1997) used the following divisions: 1900-1945, 1946-1959, and 1960-1979. Blais and Nadeau (1984) also refer to the same three cohorts, adding to them the people born before 1915. Inglehart's generations correspond to cohorts of 10 years, which might also seem arbitrary. According to Grand'Maison and Lefebvre (1993), one way of defining cohorts is to classify people according to the generation which they believe they belong to (Grand'Maison and Lefebvre 1993, p.15). For example, if someone identifies to the Baby boomer generation, they should be classified as such. The authors also believe that cohorts should share particular "personal, collective, social and cultural experiences"

(Grand'Maison and Lefebvre 1993, p.92). Self-identification of respondents, as well as important political events, can therefore guide the researcher in determining generational divisions. In the context of this study, I could not ask respondents what they believed was "their" generation, since this information was not included in the original surveys. I therefore operationalized generations based on influential historical events.

First, the Oldest generation ends in 1944: it is the wartime generation. The 1944-1945 cleavage, which corresponds to the end of the Second World War, has been used by many scholars to divide this generation with the Baby boomers (see, for instance, Guay (1997), Blais and Nadeau (1984)). The end of World War II also corresponds to the rapid demographic surge that defines the "baby boom". Second, the Baby boomer generation ends in 1964. As previously mentioned, many studies locate the members of this generation during the period ranging from 1945 to 1960, which stops at the beginning of the Quiet Revolution (Guay 1997, p.15). The end date of the baby boom is indeed debatable. However, in the context of this study, the end date of the Baby boomer generation is justified in demographic terms: 1964 corresponds to the greatest population decrease since World War II, and therefore technically "marks the end of the baby boom" (Statistics Canada 2015). Third, Generation X ranges from 1965 to 1979. The years 1979-80 are an appropriate cutoff point to divide Generation X with the Millenials because the Millenial generation is greatly defined by the use of technology, which has been on the rise since the late 1990s and early 2000s (when they reached adolescence and early adulthood). That being said, I reiterate the arbitrariness of these generational divisions: different years of birth of generation could as easily be justified.

The Oldest generation represents 29% of total respondents, Baby boomers represent 40% of the sample, Generation Xers represent 25% of the sample, while Millennials represent 5% of respondents. The fact that the distribution varies quite a lot from one generation to the next consists in one limit of our study, which will be discussed in the conclusion. When running my analyses, generation is sometimes considered as a binary

variable. In these cases, the Oldest generation is used as the reference category.

In addition to my main dependent (constitutional choice) and independent variables (age and generation), I operationalize several control variables[6]. These are gender, the level of education, income, and union affiliation. I select these control variables because they are consistently present in my 64 surveys, and because authors have found relationships between respondents' constitutional choice and their level of education (Nadeau 1992; Cloutier et al. 1992; Kornberg and Archer 1982; Johnston et al. 1996), income level (Gagné and Langlois 2002; Kornberg and Archer 1982; Pammett and LeDuc 1995; Clarke and Kornberg 1994), and union affiliation (Nadeau 1992). Including these variables into the models therefore allows for better control of the relationship between age, generation, and support towards Quebec sovereignty.

3.3 Data analysis

As presented in the previous section, the goal of this research is to identify the impact of age and generation on constitutional preferences. Since the dependent variable "constitutional choice" is binary, my analysis is done using probit regressions. A probit regression model allows me to make inferences about the larger population. The statistical software program Stata is used to run the models. Because the dependant variable (DV), constitutional choice, is binary, the probit regression estimates the effect of a particular change in the independent variables (IV) on the probability of supporting this option.

A test of statistical significance on the coefficients is used to determine which IV has a significant impact on the predicted probability of supporting Quebec independence. This test allows for a verification of the association between the IV and DV. It verifies if the relationship is only the result of chance, or if we can be relatively confident that it also exists within the larger population. Using the likelihood-ratio test, I obtain a p-value for each IV. This allows me to verify the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship

[6]See Appendix 3: Codebook for more details.

between each IV and the DV). The decision to reject a null hypothesis is made when the p-value is equal to or lower than 0.05, which means that there is a 95% chance that the null hypothesis is false. In other words, the probability that there is a relationship between our variables in the larger population is high enough (Halperin and Heath 2012, p.377). Otherwise, predicted probabilities are used to determine to what extent some specific types of individuals (for example, younger people) are likely to support Quebec sovereignty. Predicted probabilities, $\hat{p}$, "indicate the likelihood of y=1" of particular types of observations (Katchova 2013). For example, in the case under study, predicted probabilities could indicate the likelihood for 20-year old Quebeckers of supporting sovereignty (y=1), in opposition to any other constitutional option (y=0).

4 Results

Having operationalized the variables and justified my choice of method, I now turn to the presentation of the results of my analyses. This chapter starts by describing the evolution of support for different constitutional options in Quebec between 1985 and 2014. It then presents three models to measure the influence of age and generation on support for Quebec sovereignty. The first model tests the effect of age on our dependent variable, the second model looks at the effect of generation, whereas the third model verifies the interaction between age and generation on support towards Quebec sovereignty.

4.1 Constitutional preferences, 1985-2014

Figure 1 shows the evolution in support for Quebec sovereignty, renewed federalism, and the constitutional status quo for francophone Quebeckers between 1985 and 2014[7]. I look at this evolution by dividing it into four periods: 1985-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2012, and 2014.

To begin in the first period, the status quo received higher support when compared to the two other constitutional alternatives between 1985 and 1989. Indeed, according to an Environics Focus Canada survey, in 1986 more than one francophone Quebecker over two (53%) thought the status quo would be the best constitutional option for Quebec. Twenty-nine percent (29%) thought complete independence or sovereignty-association would be the best alternatives (option Sovereignty), and 18% believed that Quebec should be given a special status within the Canadian federation.

Starting in the 1990s, the trend was reversed. From 1990 to 1996, an average of 61% of French Quebeckers thought sovereignty was the best option for their province. Between 1996 and 1999, support for this option decreased a little, but remained close to 50%. Support for the status quo accounted for 20% to 30% until 1993, and then remained

[7]See Appendix 1 for an amended version of this figure (08-30-2016).

Figure 1: Support for constitutional options, 1985-2014



between 30% and 39% from 1994 to 1999. Finally, support for renewed federalism remained quite low from 1990 to 1999, at around 10%.

In the 2000s, support for renewed federalism jumped to about 18% and remained so until 2012. On average, 16.8% of francophone Quebeckers believed this option to be the best for their province between 2000 and 2012. From 2000 to 2012, support for the option of sovereignty remained close to 50%, increasing to 55-65% between 2005 and 2006. Support for the status quo remained between 30% and 40% for most of the 2000s.

Lastly, in 2014 support for renewed federalism spiked to 50%, while support for sovereignty and the status quo decreased to 32% and 17%, respectively. This striking result might be the consequence of measurement error. Recall that the 2014 survey is the only one from Léger, and uses a different question as measure of the dependent variable. On the one hand, it does not offer the option "sovereignty-association", which was merged with "complete independence" in the Environics surveys. This might explain the drop in support for Quebec sovereignty in this last year. Also, the indicator for "renewed federalism" is "more powers for Quebec", while in the Environics surveys, the phrasing

is "a special status for Quebec". The spike in support for this option in 2014 might be the result of Quebeckers being more sympathetic to an answer choice that specifies "more powers" for their province. Nevertheless, taking into consideration 2014 or not, the evolution of constitutional preferences in Quebec still reveals an increase of about 10 percentage points in support for renewed federalism since 2000, and a slow decrease in support for Quebec sovereignty since the early 1990s.

4.2 Model 1: The effect of age

My first model looks at the relationship between age and support for sovereignty, excluding generations. We begin by showing in Table 1 the coefficient signs of the probit regression in each of the surveys. The regressions include all control variables[8]. The asterisks show when the relationship between age and support for sovereignty reaches statistical significance at the 0.05 level[9]. Age is, for most of the studied period, negatively correlated with support for sovereignty. As a respondent gets older, he or she is less likely to support Quebec sovereignty.

In the 1980s, the relationship between age and support for sovereignty reaches statistical significance only in 1989, when it is negative. In the 1990s, the relationship between the two variables is almost always negative and statistically significant. Older people are less likely to support sovereignty than their younger counterparts.

Between 2000 and 2014, the relationship becomes less often negative and statistically significant than in the 1990s. It reaches statistical significance at the 0.05 level (and is negative) in only 9 of the 24 surveys of the 2000-2014 period. By contrast, we observe a significant relationship in 31 out of 37 surveys of the previous decade. In 2005 and later, the relationship is significant on only three occasions (2005 2nd quarter, 2006 3rd and 4th quarters). In the other surveys of the 2000-2014 period, the relationship is often negative

[8]The controls are gender, education, income and union affiliation. In 2010 and 2012, union affiliation is missing.

[9]See Appendix 4 for the complete regression tables (Tables 2-65).

Table 1: The effect of age on support for sovereignty

Year	Coeff. sign	Year	Coeff. sign	Year	Coeff. sign	Year	Coeff. sign
1985q3	-	1993q4	-*	1998q1	-*	2003q1	-
1986q2	-	1994q1	-*	1998q2	-	2003q2	-*
1989q4	-*	1994q2	-*	1998q3	-*	2005q1	+
1990q3	-*	1994q3	-*	1998q4	-*	2005q2	-*
1990q4	-	1994q4	-	1999q1	-*	2005q3	-
1991q1	-	1995q1	-*	1999q2	-*	2005q4	-
1991q2	-*	1995q2	-*	1999q3	-*	2006q1	-
1991q3	-*	1995q3	-*	1999q4	-*	2006q2	-
1991q4	-*	1995q4	-*	2000q1	-	2006q3	-*
1992q1	-	1996q1	-*	2000q2	-*	2006q4	-*
1992q2	-	1996q2	-*	2000q3	-	2007q1	+
1992q3	-*	1996q3	-*	2000q4	-*	2007q2	+
1992q4	-*	1997q1	-*	2001q1	-*	2008q2	-
1993q1	-*	1997q2	-*	2001q2	-*	2010	-
1993q2	-*	1997q3	-*	2001q3	-*	2012	+
1993q3	-*	1997q4	-*	2001q4	-	2014	-

Source: Environics Focus Canada.
Probit analysis. The regression includes all other variables as control. * = p > 0.05

and insignificant (11 times), or even positive and insignificant (4 times). In other words, the relationship between age and support for sovereignty weakens with the turn of the millenium, and more especially around 2005-2006.

Another way to illustrate the effect of age on support for Quebec independence over time is by turning the regression coefficients of model 1 into predicted probabilities, i.e. the likelihood to support the option of sovereignty for particular types of observations. Figure 8 (see Appendix 1) illustrates the predicted probability of supporting independence for a simulated value of age ranging from 20 to 90 years old, for each of our 64 surveys. The dashed lines plot the 95% confidence intervals.

The intercept and the slope of our figures both deserve attention. At the onset, in 1985 and 1986, the predicted probability of supporting sovereignty is about 40% for the youngest Quebeckers (intercept). In a hypothetical scenario where everyone were 20 years old, the likelihood of supporting sovereignty would have been 40%, *ceteris paribus*. Moreover, the slope of the relationship between age and support for sovereignty indicates that this relationship is negative. The oldest Quebeckers are 20% likely to support this option.

In 1989, the intercept rises to 60%. The likelihood of supporting independence increases for the youngest Quebeckers, but stays about the same for the oldest respondents, thus making the slope steeper. This 20 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of supporting independence for 20-year old Quebeckers might seem surprising, but political events of the times could help explain this result. In 1987, the Meech Lake Accord, a proposition of renewed federalism, had been negotiated by Brian Mulroney and his provincial and territorial counterparts. The provinces had until June 23rd, 1990, to ratify the proposal. On June 12th, 1990, Elijah Harper, an aboriginal member of the Manitoban Parliament, filibustered the motion that would have led to the vote on the Meech Accord. The procedural deadlock prevented the Manitoban Parliament to meet the deadline. Harper thought the accord should be repudiated because aboriginal and First Nations peoples were not part of Meech's negotiation process. Because of Harper's opposition, the

Manitoban legislature was never able to ratify the proposal before the deadline of June 23rd, 1990 (Russell 1993, p.215). In Newfoundland, the legislature adjourned on June 22nd without holding a vote on the accord (Russell 1993, p.217). As a consequence, the Meech Lake Accord was repudiated.

In Quebec, the reaction was immediate. Support for Quebec sovereignty increased to more than 60% (McRoberts 1997, p.204). Premier Bourassa even declared in the National Assembly "whatever we say, whatever we do, Quebec is and will always be, a distinct society that is free and able to undertake its own destiny and development". This position, coming from a politician of federalist allegiance, was surprising. Quebeckers seemed more united than ever on the question of the constitutional future of their province (Balthazar 2013, p.235). The defeat of Meech is thus probably at the origin of the surge in support for independence among younger Quebeckers in the third quarter of 1989.

After the failure of Meech in June 1990, we observe that Quebeckers aged 20 have a predicted probability of 80% to support Quebec independence. The predicted probability of eldest Quebeckers is about 50% at the same time. Gradually, the slope of predicted probabilities gets steeper between 1992 and 1998. The likelihood of supporting sovereignty remains at about 70-80% for the youngest Quebeckers, but decreases to about 20-30% for older people. The young are always more likely to support sovereignty than older people, which is consistent with the regression coefficient signs of Table 1.

We then observe that between 1999 and 2005, the likelihood of supporting Quebec independence decreases to about 60% for Quebeckers aged 20, and gradually *increases* for eldest people, reaching 40% in the 4th quarter of 2005. As a consequence, the slopes of our figures gradually become flatter. After 2006, when the relationship between age and support for sovereignty becomes even weaker (see Table 1), the slope remains relatively flat.

In 1989, the striking increase in the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty of younger respondents—and, to some extent, of all Quebeckers—could be explained by the

failure of Meech. But the slow decrease in the predicted probabilities of younger Quebeckers that happened afterwards is harder to explain. The same is true about the gradual increase in the predicted probabilities of supporting this option for older Quebeckers. An analysis of generational effects might help answering this question.

4.3 Model 2: The effect of generation

Since the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty have decreased among younger Quebeckers and increased among older Quebeckers with the turn of the new millennium, would it be safe to assume that sovereignty is more popular among the oldest generations? In order to answer this question, my second model analyses the behaviour of four specific generations within the Quebec society: the Oldest generation, born in 1944 or before; the Baby boomers, born between 1945 and 1964; Generation X, born between 1965 and 1979; and the Millennials, born in 1980 or later. Model 2 includes one dummy variables for each generation, and uses the Oldest generation as reference category. Age is excluded from the model but all other control variables are included[10]. Using model 2, I then simulate the predicted probabilities of supporting independence for each generation. Figures 2 to 5 show the evolution in these predicted probabilities, through time. Each dotted marker represents a survey.

The Oldest generation has an average predicted probability of supporting sovereignty of about 60% at the beginning of the 1990s. It decreases to about 40% in the mid-1990s, staying the same for the rest of the period. Compared to all other generations, the eldest generation of Quebeckers is always the least likely support this option between 1985 and 2014.

The trend in the likelihood of supporting independence is quite different for Baby boomers. At the beginning of the 1990s—when they were 26 to 45 years old—the predicted probability of supporting sovereignty was as high as 80% for members of this generation.

[10]See Appendix 4 for the complete regression tables (Tables 2-65).

Figure 2: Predicted probability of supporting sovereignty, Oldest generation, 1985-2014



Figure 3: Predicted probability of supporting sovereignty, Baby boomers, 1985-2014



Figure 4: Predicted probability of supporting sovereignty, Generation X, 1985-2014



Figure 5: Predicted probability of supporting sovereignty, Millennials, 1985-2014



It decreased to about 60% in the mid-1990s and went down to about 50% in the mid-2000s. Like their older counterparts, Baby boomers become less likely to support independence as they age.

The trend is very similar for Generation Xers, born between 1965 and 1979. This generation was the youngest at the time of Meech, Charlottetown, and the 1995 Quebec referendum. And like the Baby boomers, they are about 80% likely to support independence at the beginning of the 1990s. Their likelihood to support this option decreases to about 60% in 2000, and to about 50% at the end of the 2000s.

The Millennials, born in 1980 and after, could only be included in the surveys after 1997, when they reached majority. They thus arrived at a time when the relationship between age and support for this option almost never reached statistical significance. Looking at their predicted probability of supporting sovereignty (see Figure 5), we notice that it is very diffuse and does not follow a distinctive trend. In about half of our surveys, their predicted probability of supporting this option is higher than 60%. In the other half, it is lower than 60%. It is difficult to draw any convincing conclusion about this generation's behaviour since their numbers in the samples are relatively small, but the trend still appears to be negative.

In order to examine the difference between the effect of the various generations on support for sovereignty, I report in Table 66 a slightly altered version of model 2. The probit regressions presented in Table 66 include all 26,327 respondents, and use survey number as a control variable (1985 3rd quarter=reference category). However, each regression uses a different generation as the reference category, which allows for a comparison of the effects between generations.

First, we find that the three youngest generations are significantly more likely to support sovereignty than the Oldest Quebeckers (column 1). Second, when the Baby boomers are used as reference category, we find that Oldest Quebeckers are significantly less likely to support sovereignty than them, while the Millenials are more likely to do so. There is

no significant difference between Baby boomers and Generation Xers (column 2). Third, members of the Oldest generation are the only ones to be significantly less likely to support sovereignty than Generation Xers (column 3). Finally, when taking the Millenials as reference category, we find that Oldest Quebeckers and Baby boomers are significantly less likely to be sovereignist than them, but not Generation Xers (column 4).

These results tell us a little more about the behaviour of our generations. They suggest that there is a significant difference between the opinions on sovereignty of the members of the different generations. More specifically, the Oldest generation is the most different generation. On the other hand, Baby boomers are significantly different from the Oldest generation and from Millenials, but not from Generation Xers. For their part, Xers are the least distinctive: they are only significantly different from the Oldest generation. However, these results do not tell the whole story. Indeed, the signs obtained in these regressions should be analyzed with caution. In fact, the regressions take all respondents into account. Since my surveys range over a period of almost 30 years, Table 66 includes members of each generation at different ages. For example, when looking at column 4, the results tell us that Baby boomers are less likely to support sovereignty than Millenials. However, the Baby boomer respondents are older than the Millenial respondents. In other words, age might be affecting the results reported in Table 66. I address this issue in the next section.

4.4 Model 3: The effect of age within generations

So far, we know that for most of the time between 1985 and 2014, age is negatively correlated with support for Quebec sovereignty (model 1). We also know that generations behave differently in their support for this constitutional option (model 2). But we do not know how aging affects the support for sovereignty within each generation—i.e. what is the *interaction* between age and generation. In other words, should we assume that aging decreases the likelihood of supporting sovereignty for all generations of Quebeckers

equally? In order to answer this question, my third model includes age, generation[11], and an interaction term between age and generation[12].

Like the two previous models, I compute the predicted probabilities in order to interpret the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. In model 3, predicted probabilities are the likelihood of supporting sovereignty for each generation, at each value of age between 20 and 90 years old. The results are presented in Figure 6, where each plot corresponds to a generation. It is important to note that we do not have, in the surveys, members of the Oldest generation who are younger than 41 years old. Likewise, we do not have Baby boomers who are younger than 21 or older than 69 years old. There are no Generation Xers who are older than 49 years old, and no Millennials who are older than 35 years old. These simulations thus represent *hypothetical scenarios* where, for example, all members of the Oldest generation would be 25 years old. However, to get a more accurate picture of the actual situation, the bold lines drawn over each plot of Figure 6 show the generations' ages for which we have real respondents. For example, the Generation Xers' plot is bolder between 20 and 49 years old.

First, the likelihood of supporting independence of Baby boomers at age 20 is about 65%. Their predicted probability to support Quebec independence decreases to about 60% at 55 years old. It is projected to decrease even more at age 90, to about 50%. Second, the slope of the Oldest generation is steeper than that of the Baby boomers and is more similar to Generation X. Members of the oldest generation have a predicted likelihood of 70% to support independence at 20 years old. They are about 30% likely to be sovereignist at 90 years old.

Third, the slope of Generation Xers is more abrupt than for the Oldest generation. The likelihood of supporting sovereignty for members of this generation is 65% at age

[11]As a dummy variable—the Oldest generation is the reference category

[12]Because it takes all surveys into consideration, a binary control variable for surveys has been added to the regression (1985 3rd quarter=reference category). No other control variable has been added to the regression. See Appendix 4 for the complete regression table (Table 67).

20, and is projected to decrease to about 20% at age 90. Fourth, Millennials are about 60% likely to support independence at age 20. Their predicted probability of supporting Quebec sovereignty should decrease sharply with age, more than any other generation. Their likelihood to support this project is set to decrease to about 25% when they will be 55 years old, and to less than 10% when they will be 90 years old.

Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty for each generation, according to respondents' age



Looking at Figure 6, it is impossible to know what is the *difference* between the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty for each generation. For instance, is this probability significantly different for Baby boomers at age 55 when compared to Gen-

eration Xers at the same age? Figure 7 illustrates these differences, first between the Oldest generation and Baby boomers, second between Baby boomers and Generation X, third between Generation X and Millennials, and fourth between the Oldest generation and Generation X. The lighter gray lines show the 95% confidence intervals. When these intervals touch the horizontal axis at zero, it means that the differences are statistically insignificant.

Between the Oldest generation and Baby boomers, the predicted probabilities are only significant when they reach 40 years old. Members of the Oldest generation are 4.4% less likely to support independence than Baby boomers at age 40. Or course, we do not have members of the Oldest generation that are younger than 41 years old. This result is therefore hypothetical. However, as they grow older, the difference between these two generations becomes larger. At age 55—an age for which we have actual members of both generations—eldest Quebeckers are 9.7% less likely to support this option when compared to Baby boomers. At 90 years, the difference is expected to increase to 20.2%.

The difference between Baby boomers and Generation Xers also gets greater as they grow older. The difference is first significant at age 26, when Baby boomers are 2.7% more likely to support independence than Xers. The difference is expected to increase to 29.7% at 90 years old. In this comparison, it is important to recall that we only have "actual" respondents of the two generations between 21 and 49 years old in the survey samples.

The differences between the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty of Generation Xers and Millennials are only significant from 26 to 28 years old. At 26, Generation Xers are 4.1% more likely to support sovereignty. At 28, they are 4.5% more likely to do so. The difference in predicted probabilities then stops being statistically significant, but we must bear in mind that we have no Millennials older than 35 years old.

Lastly, members of the Oldest generation are 5.5% more likely to support sovereignty than Generation Xers at 40 years old. The difference is expected to increase to 8.6% at 63 years old, but we do not have Xers who reach this age in the sample. At other values

Figure 7: Differences in the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty between generations, according to respondents' age





of age, the differences are expected to be insignificant.

Main results

To summarize, I obtain four main results from the three previous analyses. First, I found that age is negatively correlated with support for sovereignty until the beginning of the new millennium, after which point the relationship between these two variables becomes weaker (model 1). Second, Baby boomers and Generation Xers have higher predicted probabilities of supporting independence during the period under study, when compared to members of the Oldest generation. The predicted probabilities of supporting independence of Millennials are quite eclectic from 1998 to 2014, but appear to be decreasing over time. Also, most of the generations significantly differ from one another: the Oldest generation is different from all others, the Baby boomers are different from their elders and from Millenials, while the Xers are only significantly different from the Oldest generation (model 2). Third, when taking age into account, Baby boomers are always more likely to support independence than any other generation, followed by members of the Oldest generation, Generation Xers, and Millennials. All generations should also become less likely to support sovereignty as they grow older. Fourth, this decrease should be quicker for members of the Oldest generation, Generation Xers and the Millennials, and more slow for Baby boomers (model 3).

5 Discussion

In the previous empirical analysis, we found that the probability of supporting sovereignty declines with age for most of the studied period. In the early 2000s, the relationship between these two variables is less often statistically significant. We also found that during the period under study (1985-2014), members of the Oldest generation and Millennials were less likely to support sovereignty when compared to the Baby boomers and Generation Xers. We also confirmed that Baby boomers were more likely to support sovereignty than any other generation throughout their life, and that this remains true regardless of their age. What do these results tell us? Can they help us validate our hypotheses? Can they help us answer the question of whether sovereignty is a generational project? This chapter addresses these questions. On the one hand, I discuss the presence of life-cycle and cohort effects in the case of Quebec sovereignty. On the other hand, I consider the broader implications of these results by connecting them to the literature on generational change and political socialization. Finally, I end by raising some limits to the analysis.

5.1 Life-cycle and cohort effects

My two hypotheses are supported by the results presented previously: life-cycle *and* cohort effects help explain the evolution of support for Quebec sovereignty. First, age is negatively correlated with support for this option until the 2000s (Table 1 and Figure 8). It also decreases for all generations as they get older (Figures 2 to 5). The life-cycle hypothesis is thus confirmed from 1990 to the early 2000s: during these years, younger Quebeckers were more likely to support sovereignty than older people, but the correlation between age and support for independence weakens at the beginning of the 2000s. These results are consistent with those of Nadeau (1992) and Gagné and Langlois (2002), who found that the role of age in explaining constitutional preferences decreased between 1980 and 1990, and between 1995 and 2001. We do not have the evidence to support the thesis that age is

now positively related to support for sovereignty. However, our latest results indicate that at some point, the relationship between age and support for independence might become positive and significant: older people would be more likely to support this constitutional option than their younger counterparts.

Second, generations have different constitutional preferences. The cohort effects hypothesis is thus confirmed. Model 2 shows three distinct patterns of support for independence between 1985 and 2014 (Figures 2 to 5): the Oldest generation (born in 1944 or before) is always less likely to support this option; the Baby boomers and Generation Xers (born between 1945 and 1979) are more likely to support this option; and the Millennials (born in 1980 or later) are somewhat less likely to support sovereignty when compared to those born between 1945 and 1979. Table 66 confirms the difference between the Oldest generation and the Baby boomers. It also shows that the two middle generations—Baby boomers and Generation X—are not statistically different from one another. Plus, it tells us that Millenials are actually different from the Oldest generation and the Baby boomers, but not from Xers. The cleavage between the opinions of the Oldest generation and the next two generations observed from 1985 to 2014 is consistent with Guay (1997)'s empirical results. He found that there was a large difference between the opinions on nationalism of the oldest generation of Quebeckers and the generation born between 1946 and 1959. The generation born between 1946 and 1959 had opinions on the issue more similar to Quebeckers born between 1960 and 1979[13]. This could be explained by the fact that Baby boomers have a very strong political personality. They are therefore very distinct from their predecessors, but relatively similar to their successors. Generation Xers would simply follow in the path of Baby boomers because the latter have a unique character (Guay 1997, p.149).

However, if we look at my third model that presents the interaction between age and generation, not all of the expectations about the effects of this interaction are confirmed.

[13]Guay uses different years of birth to define his generations.

My four expectations were as follows: first, I expected that members of the Oldest generation would be less likely to support sovereignty than Boomers and Xers, regardless of their age; second, I supposed that Baby boomers would be more likely to support independence than their older counterparts, regardless of their age; third, I presumed that Generation Xers would be more likely to support sovereignty than the Oldest generation, regardless of their age; and fourth, I expected that Millennials would be less likely to support sovereignty than Boomers and Xers, regardless of their age. Two of these expectations are not supported by model 3. For one thing, members of the Oldest generation are *not* less likely to support independence than Xers regardless of age. For another, Generation Xers are not more likely to support sovereignty than members of the Oldest generation when we take age into account (see Figure 6).

This result seems to contradict the findings of model 2, where Generation Xers had higher probabilities of supporting independence than members of the Oldest generation. To understand this contradiction, it is important to remember that model 2 focuses on generation only. It shows the behaviour of generations at their *actual age* between 1985 and 2014, while model 3 predicts how generations behave *at the same values of age*. In model 2, Xers are more likely to support independence than members of the Oldest generation, but Xers are at least 20 years younger than the oldest generation in the period under study. Between 1985 and 2014, Xers therefore have a higher likelihood to support this option because they are younger. But when we *take age into account*, we notice that Generation Xers are actually less likely to support sovereignty than members of the Oldest generation throughout their lives. For example, a 30-year old Xer should be less likely than a 30-year old member of the Oldest generation to support independence. Once again, these conclusions need to be interpreted with care because they are simulations. In reality, members of the Oldest generation were never 40 years or less in the period under study, and Generation Xers were never more than 49 years old. Nevertheless, the interaction between age and generation still shows that members of the Oldest generation

are significantly more likely to support sovereignty than Xers between 41 and 49 years old, ages for which we have real observations (see Figure 7).

In short, our two hypotheses are confirmed to some extent. First, there is a life-cycle component to support for sovereignty (hypothesis 1), but the negative relationship gradually disappears at the beginning of the 2000s. Second, generations of Quebeckers have different attitudes towards sovereignty, but not all of my expectations about generational cleavages were confirmed (hypothesis 2). Yet, confirming or invalidating hypotheses does not help us answer the larger question of this research: Is sovereignty a generational project? The next section draws on theories of generational change and political socialization to bring some insight into the constitutional preferences of Quebeckers.

5.2 Is sovereignty a generational project?

The sovereignist project is not *exclusively* limited to a generation in particular. It is true that Baby boomers stand out (see Figure 6), but they are not the only ones who favour this option for Quebec. Born between 1945 and 1964, they lived their late adolescent to pre-adult years—a moment considered crucial to the definition of political attitudes (Mannheim 1970; Niemi and Hepburn 1995)—in the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, they reached 17 years old between 1962 and 1981. The 1960s and 1970s were pivotal decades for the development of the sovereignist ideology in the province. It was a time when Quebec's administration and civil society began a process of reaffirmation of the province's distinctive cultural character, liberated themselves from the influence of the Catholic Church, and reached out to Ottawa for more powers (Balthazar 2013, pp.137-165)[14]. This process began under the Liberal government of Jean Lesage, but accentuated with the creation of the Parti Québécois. In fact, the PQ received its largest support from younger Quebeckers at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s (Kornberg and Archer 1982). The opinions of Baby boomers must have been greatly influenced by these years of effervescence of

[14]For more historical information, see Chapter 1.

Québécois nationalism. To use Inglehart's words, I argue that Baby boomers' attitudes towards sovereignty "reflect the conditions that prevailed during [their] pre-adult years" (Inglehart 2008, p.131). Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, Baby boomers participated in the "common destiny" of their "historical unit" (Mannheim 1970, p.394) by taking part in the reaffirmation of the cultural and political distinctiveness of their nation.

The likelihood of supporting sovereignty for this cohort remained above 50% until the end of the 1990s (Figure 3). This implies that up until the 1995 referendum at least, Baby boomers were more likely to support this option than not. Having been developed during the 1960s and 1970s, their opinions on sovereignty thus remained relatively positive throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. But like all generations, their opinions about sovereignty became more negative with age (Figure 6), perhaps because members of this generation became more risk averse (in 2010, they were 46 to 65 years old) (Gagné and Langlois 2002). In short, it is safe to assume that the sovereignist project has been cultivated by Baby boomers in their younger to middle-life years, probably because of the times when they were socialized into adulthood.

According to my third model, they are even expected to remain the strongest supporters of this option when they reach an older age. However, they should still become less likely to support this option as they grow older. In other words, *contrary to conventional wisdom, Baby boomers do not necessarily remain sovereignist as they get older.* And they are not the only cohort to make up for the supporters of this option.

In fact, between 1985 and 2014, Generation Xers also had opinions about sovereignty that were quite similar to the ones of Baby boomers (see Figures 3 and 4). Generation Xers were born between 1965 and 1979, a time when Boomers were living their adolescent to young adult years. Generation Xers are not usually thought of as a "revolutionary" generation, like it is normally the case with Baby boomers. However, Generation Xers lived their late adolescence and young adult years in the 1980s and early 1990s, the oldest members of this generation being 17 years old when Prime Minister Trudeau patriated the

constitution in 1982. They might have been influenced by the political discord that happened between Quebec and Ottawa following this event. The 1982 constitutional package did not satisfy Quebec's demands, which justified the province's pleas for constitutional renewal in the years after (Stein 1984, pp.125-7). Moreover, Generation Xers lived their teenage years during the two rounds of constitutional debate led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney between 1987 and 1992. Finally, they lived the years of rejection of the constitutional status quo by Quebec political elites after the failure of Meech in the early 1990s. In these years, Xers were about 70% likely to support independence (Figure 4). They were also quite young (16 to 30 years old) at the time of the 1995 referendum. In short, their entire political education has been influenced by the patriation of the constitution, by the two rounds of constitutional debates and by the second referendum on sovereignty. They were therefore confronted to many constitutional disputes when they were adolescent and young adults. But unlike the Baby boomers, Generation Xers did not grow up during the emergence of modern Québécois nationalism that went on in the 1960s and 1970s.

As time went by, Generation Xers began to reject the idea of sovereignty more quickly than Baby boomers (Figure 6). In the 2000s, they were 40% to 50% likely to support this option, which is similar to Baby boomers during the same period (Figure 3 and 4). But in 2000, they were 21 to 35 years old only, while Baby boomers were aged between 36 to 55 years old. The opinions of Xers have changed much more quickly than those of Baby boomers. Drawing on Inglehart's socialization hypothesis (Inglehart 2008, p.131), I argue that some of the Generation Xers were still too young at the time of Meech, Charlottetown and the 1995 referendum (the youngest were 8, 13 and 16 years old at the time of these events), which might explain why some members of this generation have weaker preferences on these issues. This would explain why the likelihood of supporting sovereignty for this generation decreases more quickly than the Baby boomers.

In short, Generation Xers *were* strong advocates of sovereignty when the project held an important place on Quebec and Canada's political agenda, but turned their backs

on it rather quickly. It just happens that their highest likelihood of supporting this option coincides with the period studied in this research (1985 to 2014). The impression of resemblance between Xers and Boomers in the late 1980s and early 1990s might be explained by the simple fact that Xers were younger at the time, and were thus obviously more likely to support independence. This intuition is supported by model 1. I argue that they turned their backs on the project more quickly than Boomers because there is no "new collective impulse and formative principle original to" their generation (Mannheim 1970, p.400). Because the Generation Xers did not participate in a moment as formative to the Quebec identity as the Quiet Revolution, they might have been drawn into the sovereignist momentum of the early 1990s by Baby boomers, or by the youngest members of the Oldest generation. This is consistent with the intuition that Xers are "followers" of the Baby boomers (Guay 1997) because they do not possess a distinct personality (Mannheim 1970).

Millennials were born after Generation Xers. The eldest Millennials reached late adolescence around 1997. The youngest members of this cohort were still children (or were not born) at the time of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. Unlike their older counterparts, modern Québécois nationalism was not emerging when Millennials formed their main political opinions. This generation grew up in a Quebec ruled mostly by the Liberal party (in 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2014), which did not take position in favour of sovereignty. Even though the sovereignist political parties in Quebec were—and still are—present while Millennials' attitudes were being formed, these parties have been relegated to the opposition during this period. When the PQ won an election after 1994, it did so with minorities or weak majorities: in 1998, it won a majority of seats but with less votes than the Liberal party (43% versus 44% for the Liberals); and in 2012, it formed a minority government with 32% of the popular vote. The third largest party in Quebec when the Millennials were living their pre-adult years was the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ), which formed the official opposition in 2007-2008. The party however defined itself as neither federalist

nor sovereignist, but rather autonomist. It wished Quebec to acquire greater autonomy in the provincial areas of jurisdiction as defined in the 1867 Constitution (Lévesque 2004). The ADQ then changed to become the Coalition Avenir Québec, which also took a neutral stance on the constitutional question. On the federal scene, Millennials lived the sponsorship scandal in 2004, which led to the Gomery commission from 2004 to 2006. However, in terms of constitutional impact, this event cannot be compared to the rounds of constitutional debates and referendums that their older counterparts experienced. They also grew up in drastically different times than the Baby boomers. Millennials were not socialized in a moment when francophone Quebeckers were fighting for better recognition of their cultural distinctiveness, or to break away from the overpowering grip of the English minority, as was the case during the Quiet Revolution.

Even though they are almost as likely to support independence as other generations at the age of 20, Millennials are predicted to turn their backs on independence rather quickly, like Generation Xers. In 2014, when they were 34 years old or younger, they were about 40% or more likely to support this option (Figure 6). It is less than any generation at this age. When they will reach middle-age (55 years old), model 3 predicts that their likelihood to support sovereignty should decrease to about 20%. At the same age, Baby boomers were still more than 50% likely to support this option. According to the model, their behaviour should not be significantly different from Xers, who *are* less likely to support sovereignty than Boomers at each value of age (Figure 7). The Millennials' expected probability to support independence at each value of age is even lower than members of the Oldest generation.

In fact, members of the Oldest generation were the least likely to support sovereignty between 1985 and 2014 (Figure 2). But we must recall that age is negatively correlated with support for sovereignty for most of the period under study (model 1), and, needless to say, this generation is the oldest to be included in the analysis. In 1990, when they were 46 years old or younger, their likelihood of supporting independence was of almost

60% (Figure 2). It is difficult to interpret their constitutional preferences by looking at the period between 1985 to 2914 only. However, we can better understand the behaviour of this cohort by looking at their moment of socialization. Members of this generation reached late adolescence around 1960 or before. Many of them were already adults at the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, but still participated in the genesis of the movement. In fact, between 1945 and 1960, they saw—and participated in—the emergence of a "neonationalism" in the province. Even though this ideology was not generalized at the time, many Quebeckers still began to "defend the linguistic and cultural rights of French Canadians, provincial autonomy as well as the labour cause, pluralism, and openness to the world" (Balthazar 2013, p.130-2).

Members of the Oldest generation are about 6% more likely to support independence than Xers at age 49 (see Figure 7). This finding goes against my expectation that members of the Oldest generation should be less likely to support sovereignty when compared to Generation Xers, regardless of age. However, this result might be explained by the fact that members of the Oldest generation lived in pre-Quiet Revolution times. Contrary to Generation Xers, they were present when the Québécois nation began its process of reaffirmation (Balthazar 2013, p.130-2). The youngest members of the Oldest generation were 17 years old in 1961, while older ones participated in the rise of a common sense of "Quebec belonging" through modernization of the society in the 1950s (Balthazar 2013, p.134). I suspect that this is the reason why members of the Oldest generation are more likely than Xers to support sovereignty when we take age into account.

The future of sovereignty

In short, between 1985 and 2014, Baby boomers were the main supporters of Quebec sovereignty, along with Generation Xers. However, neither one of these cohorts is likely to support this option in the same proportions today. The effect of life-cycle is observable: every generation becomes less likely to support independence as it grows older, the process

being quicker for Generation Xers, members of the Oldest generation, and Millennials. This finding raises concerns about the future of the sovereignist option. In fact, the youngest members of the Oldest generation are now 72 years old. Aging has already turned most of the members of this generation against independence. Baby boomers are now between 52 and 71 years old. Their likelihood of supporting this option should only keep decreasing, as well as their numbers within Quebec society as population replacement works its way. Generation Xers are today almost as likely to support independence as Baby boomers, but their likelihood to do so should decrease even more rapidly as they age. They are now between 37 and 51 years old, but already less than half of them are likely to support independence. The last cohort, Millennials, do not offer promising signs for the sovereignist movement. As a group, their likelihood to support this option is already at about 50% and they are only 36 years old or younger. It is true that their behaviour has been very eclectic since the beginning of the 2000s, and we should therefore be more careful when interpreting the results of my analysis. But considering that age is negatively correlated with support for sovereignty, it is safe to assume that their likelihood to support this option should continue to decline over time.

Three elements could however be encouraging for the future of the sovereignist project. First, since Millennials are quite recent to the analysis and are present in fewer numbers in the sample of our surveys, it might be possible that their likelihood to support sovereignty does not decrease as quickly as expected. Yet, this would be surprising considering my analysis of their moment of socialization—i.e. the fact that they did not participate in a moment of common destiny of the Québécois nation, and were less influenced by the sovereignist ideology than their older counterparts. Second, the generation born after the Millennials is still forming its opinions on this issue. Political, constitutional or social events could happen that would influence their opinions on sovereignty. For example, they could become more aware of the distinctiveness of their province if the constitutional question was reopened. Of course, we cannot predict that any of these events will happen.

And if they do, it will take time before we can verify if new Quebeckers really are more likely to support sovereignty than Millennials. Third, considering that Generation Xers are still relatively young, it might be possible that their "sovereignist" fibre, as weak as it is, be reactivated. Even though they are not assumed to have a political personality as strong as Baby boomers, they were still educated in ardent constitutional times. If mobilization happens in favour of sovereignty, they might be carried along by the momentum.

5.3 Limits

The analysis I presented entails a certain number of limits, which I discuss in this last section. First, the period under study (1985-2014) is relatively short considering that the goal is to study generational change. Consequently, a large part of my analysis relies on predictions. On the one hand, Millennials are only present from 1998 to 2014, and are never older than 34 years old. Generation Xers are also never older than 49 years old. On the other hand, we have no idea how the Oldest generation behaved before they were 41 years old (1985), or how Baby boomers will actually behave after they reach 69 years old (2014). We cannot be entirely certain of the constitutional preferences of the generations at these "missing ages", especially given that the political context may also change.

In fact, it would be interesting to see the trend in support for sovereignty since the 1970s, when the option gained ground on the political agenda. Of course, if we extend the period under study, we would need to add surveys that do not necessarily have the same measure for the dependent variable. In the present research, the survey question measuring constitutional preference was very consistent. Adding different surveys would potentially include measurement errors to the analysis. However, a longer period coud give us a better idea of how, for instance, Baby boomers behaved when they were the youngest generation, and when members of the Oldest generation were younger. This would also allow us to look at the effect of some interesting political events on opinion,

like the first election of the PQ, the first referendum on sovereignty, or the patriation of the constitution.

Even more importantly, looking at a longer period of time could give us a better idea of the distinctions between the generations. Perhaps generations behave more differently—or more similarly—when we include more years to the analysis. One strength of Inglehart's research came from the fact that it included data from 1970 to the mid-2000s. Inglehart's generations were also shorter (10 years each), which allowed for comparison of more cohorts. Of course, for the sake of making the generations more populous, I decided to use "conventional" generations of about 15 to 20 years. Using shorter groups could bring more nuances to the analysis, but it could also potentially make my sample more fragmented. Otherwise, we could re-do the analysis in the future. This would allow for a better analysis of the behaviour of our youngest generation, and see if the trends in the behaviour of our older generations are lasting.

Besides, the Millennials are not only present in fewer surveys when compared to other generations, but this cohort also contains less respondents, particularly in 1998 when it is first included in the analysis. In 1998, we only have a total of 2% of respondents belonging to this cohort. This figure increases to 4% in 1999, and to 6% in 2000. In 2014, at the end of my longitudinal study, 26% of respondents are Millennials. However, the fact that there are few members of this cohort when it is first included in the sample makes it difficult to draw conclusions from their behaviour. In fact, having fewer Millennial respondents increases the potential for sampling error. In other words, inferences about the larger Millennial population are more likely to be erroneous when there are fewer Millennials in the sample.

In addition, some potentially relevant variables are absent from the analysis. It would be interesting to measure how some attitudinal variables interact with generations. For example, we could verify if confidence in the Quebec and/or Canadian state is stronger among some generations than others. If this is the case, we could look at the relationship

between faith in government and support for Quebec sovereignty. In the present research, it was impossible to test this hypothesis because attitudinal determinants were not systematically present in the surveys. Moreover, while our analysis is very consistent on the measure of the dependent variable, other variables were less consistent. On the one hand, two surveys (1983-4) had to be dropped from the analysis because they did not include a measure of year of birth, which prevented from measuring the effect of both age and generation. Otherwise, some variables would have made interesting controls, but were not consistently present in the surveys. For example, some authors found that occupation was related to support for sovereignty (Cloutier et al. 1992; Gagné and Langlois 2002; Nadeau 1992). However, many surveys lacked a measure of this variable, so it had to be abandoned.

That being said, missing variables represent a minor weaknesses relative to the fact that we do not have survey respondents over their entire lifespan, and that fewer Millennials are part of the sample when compared to other cohorts. These two sampling issues raise a problem because they might have altered my interpretations of the results.

Conclusion

The Quiet Revolution marked the emergence of the Québécois nation. Starting in the 1960s, this revolution also paved the way for the creation of the first nationalist government in the province, led by the Parti Québécois. Fostered by autonomist grievances, linguistic claims and constitutional disputes, the Quebec nationalist movement later became a fight for sovereignty. Historically, Quebec sovereignty has been supported mainly by youth, but researchers also found that the relationship between age and support for this constitutional option has been fading over time (Nadeau 1992; Gagné and Langlois 2002). What explains this trend? Is sovereignty still driven by the Baby boomers, which consisted in the main supporters of the project in the late 1970s and early 1980s? Or is this project driven strictly by young voters? In other words, is sovereignty a generational project, or is it naturally inspired by younger Quebeckers?

In this research, I argued that both life-cycle and generational effects can explain support for Quebec sovereignty over time. More specifically, I tested the hypotheses that younger Quebeckers were more likely to support this option, regardless of generation; and that different generations of Quebeckers had distinct attitudes towards sovereignty, regardless of their age. I tested these hypotheses using public opinion survey data from 1985 to 2014.

On the one hand, I found that age was negatively correlated with support for sovereignty from 1990 to the early 2000s. This is in conformity with the intuition that older Quebeckers are more risk averse than younger people (Gagné and Langlois 2002). However, the relationship between these variables weakened at the beginning of the 2000s. After 2006, younger Quebeckers were no more likely to support sovereignty than their older counterparts. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Nadeau (1992) and Gagné and Langlois (2002), who found that this relationship faded over time.

On the other hand, when taking age into account, I found that generations of Quebeck-

ers had different attitudes towards sovereignty. First, Baby boomers (born between 1945 and 1964) were more likely to support sovereignty, regardless of their age. But like any other generation, aging decreases the Baby boomers' likelihood of supporting this option. Second, I found that members of the Oldest generation (born in 1944 or before) were the second most likely group to support sovereignty, regardless of their age. They are followed by Generation X (born between 1965 and 1979) and Millennials (born in 1980 or later). Third, my results confirmed that aging has—or is expected to have—a more rapid effect on the likelihood of supporting independence for the oldest and two youngest generations, but not for the Baby boomers, whose likelihood to support this option declined more slowly with age.

I explain these generational cleavages by drawing on theories of generational change, and more particularly on Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990, 2008)'s study of Western European generational values, and on Mannheim (1970)'s definition of the concept of generation. I attribute the Baby boomers' higher likelihood to support sovereignty to the fact that they were socialized during the Quiet Revolution, which is a determining moment for the formation of the Québécois nation. Members of the Oldest generation also lived the genesis and onset of these "revolutionary" times, which might explain why they are the second most likely group to support this option. Generation X, on the other hand, grew up during the constitutional debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s, but did not participate in the emergence of the Québécois nation, like their older counterparts. Lastly, Millennials grew up after the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. They did not experience the Quiet Revolution, and were very young during the constitutional debates that led to the 1995 referendum.

In short, life-cycle and cohort effects can help explain the evolution in support for Quebec sovereignty, but both of these effects need to be interpreted with care. First, sovereignty is not wholly supported by young Quebeckers anymore. Second, the project is not entirely exclusive to the Baby boomers generation: as they grow older, this generation

is less likely to support this project, just like the members of the other three generations.

Methodological and theoretical critique

This research contains several methodological and theoretical limitations. On the methodological side, the statistical decisions that I made when coding certain variables or selecting cases could have impacted my results. First, concerning the time scope of my research, I limited my analysis to Environics surveys from 1985 to 2012. I made this decision because I valued a consistent measure of the dependent variable—i.e., constitutional preference. But in order to extend the period under study and to have more information on the last generation, I used the Léger survey. This last survey might have introduced measurement error to the analysis because it contains a different measure of the dependent variable. The question of whether I should have used this survey or not is open for debate. However, I believe that these data must not have greatly affected my general conclusions since the Léger survey only represents one survey out of sixty-four.

Another related problem is that my analysis only covers a period of 29 years. The comparison between cohorts is therefore limited. Many of my results are drawn from predictions: members of the Oldest generation are never younger than 41 years old in the data, Baby boomers are never older than 69 years old, Generation Xers are never older than 49 years old, and Millennials are never older than 34 years old. I cannot be absolutely certain of the behaviour of these generations when age is missing. The fact that my results come from predictions does not mean than they are incorrect. This means that they must be presented with greater caution. It also implies that if the analysis were extended beyond 2014, these trends in the predicted probabilities of supporting sovereignty for each generation might be different.

Otherwise, the choice of the generations' years of birth could also be extensively debated. Changing the years of birth of generations would certainly affect the relationship

between this variable and support for sovereignty, because it would redistribute Quebeckers to different cohorts. I opted for the traditional generational divisions (the pre-Baby boomers generation, the Baby boomers, Generation X, and the youngest generation) in order to echo the conventional wisdom that Baby boomers are the drivers of the sovereignist project. The goal was for my research to resonate with this popular belief. Of course, any research taking another approach could potentially reach a different conclusion. In a future research, I would explore the effect of different generational cutoff periods—for example, by ending the Baby boomer generation in 1960, and not in 1964—in order to verify how they influence my results.

On the theoretical side, this thesis relies on an interpretation of studies on generational effects, more specifically on Inglehart's and Mannheim's conception of socialization and its impact on attitude formation. I assume that the moment of socialization of Quebeckers has a life-long influence on their constitutional preferences. This assumption is drawn from Inglehart's studies (1971, 1977, 1990, 2008), where he demonstrates that generations of Western Europeans have distinct value priorities, and that these attitudes are stable over time. In other words, Inglehart believes that generations keep most of their attitudes on political questions because those values are the result of their moment of socialization. Drawing on Mannheim's theory on generations, I also assume that late adolescence and early adulthood consist in the most defining moments of political socialization. There is however no consensus in the study of political socialization about the exact moment when people formulate the core of their civic attitudes. Some argue that socialization continues throughout life, and that the focus on adolescence is wrong. In addition, scholars have not always focused on adolescence to explain attitude formation. In the 1950s, scholars of political socialization focused more on childhood as the determining moment of the creation of political attitudes (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, p.6). In my research, I decided to concentrate on the late adolescent to pre-adult period as the most important moment of socialization, because empirical studies have shown that people's attitudes suffer most

variation during this period (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, p.10). However, it is important to bear in mind that socialization is not limited to this stage of life. It would be fallacious to pretend that the constitutional preferences of Quebeckers are *entirely* determined by what happens in their late adolescent years.

Contribution and future research

Of course, variation in the support for Quebec sovereignty has many explanations: it is related to several socio-demographic determinants, as well as rational considerations, attitudes and context. As such, the present research offers only one interpretation to this complicated question. It is also an inductive attempt at testing the presence of generational cleavages in the context of constitutional preferences in Quebec. But despite its exploratory character, this research offers interesting results that would be worth analyzing again in a few years.

This research also makes a contribution to the literature on constitutional choice in Quebec. On the one hand, it brings an explanation to the decreasing effect of age on support for Quebec sovereignty. On the other hand, this research is an original attempt at verifying the conventional wisdom that Baby boomers are those keeping the sovereignist project alive. This intuition is not entirely false: Baby boomers *are* more likely to support this option than any other generation. But they *do* become less likely to do so as they grow older. Otherwise, this thesis includes an original discussion of the theories on generational change and political socialization in the context of constitutional preferences in Quebec.

If we take a more comparative perspective, the models and theoretical framework that I use in this study could be applied to other cases as well. For example, my approach could be used to explain the evolution in support for Scottish or Catalan independence, since both these movements have existed for a number of years. In Scotland, the modern movement for autonomy was marked by the election of eleven Nationalist Members of Parliament in 1974, and by the first devolution referendum in 1979 (Broughton 2016). The

country finally obtained its own parliament after a referendum in 1999 (Carrell 2013). In Catalonia's modern history, the death of Franco in 1975 marked the beginning of increased autonomy for this Spanish region (BBC News 2015). Also, in the Scottish and Catalonian cases, polls revealed that independence received greater support from younger people (The Guardian 2014; Davies 2012). It would be worth looking into the effect of generational cleavages on the evolution of support for independence in these two cases as well, especially since this option is the result of a long historical evolution in both of these regions.

In the context of Quebec, a new research of the same type could look at generational cleavages in support for sovereignty by including allophone Quebeckers, whose numbers are greater within the immigrated public. Including these voters could modify the observations about generational cleavages, especially since it has been noted that younger allophone Quebeckers are increasingly likely to support sovereignty (Bélanger and Perrella 2007, p.22).

Will the relationship between age and Quebec sovereignty continue to fade away, as we observed since the beginning of the 2000s? As it is expected by our results, will the Millennials continue to have lower levels of support for sovereignty as they age, when compared to all other generations? Could particular political events still convince this generation to support independence? Some authors believe that the sovereignist fiber of Quebeckers has the ability to be reactivated, particularly if the Quebec state reclaims a more interventionist role in the definition of the nation (Balthazar 2013; Gagné and Langlois 2002). If Quebec takes on this role, would the youngest Quebeckers be convinced of the soundness of this project? Will future generations of Quebeckers be socialized in a context that draws them towards independence?

These questions are still open for discussion. But so far, our results are not very hopeful: if nothing happens to reactivate the sovereignist sentiment of Quebeckers, supporters of independence should keep decreasing in numbers as the population ages, and as the new younger generation fails to take over the project.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Additional figures

Figure 8: Predicted probability of supporting sovereignty according to respondents' age, 1985-2014




1997 3rd quarter
1997 4th quarter
1998 1st quarter
1998 2nd quarter
1998 3rd quarter
1998 4th quarter
1999 1st quarter
1999 2nd quarter
1999 3rd quarter
1999 4th quarter
2000 1st quarter
2000 2nd quarter
2000 3rd quarter
2000 4th quarter
2001 1st quarter
2001 2nd quarter
2001 3rd quarter
2001 4th quarter
2003 1st quarter
2003 2nd quarter
2005 1st quarter
2005 2nd quarter
2005 3rd quarter
2005 4th quarter
2006 1st quarter
2006 2nd quarter
2006 3rd quarter
2006 4th quarter
2007 1st quarter
2007 2nd quarter
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
20 55 90
Age


2008 2nd quarter
2010
2012
2014
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
20
55
90
Age

Figure 9: Support for constitutional options, 1985-2014 (amended 08.30.2016)



Appendix 2: From concepts to indicators

Appendix 2 enumerates the survey questions that were used to measure our dependent, independent and control variables, and to define our population.

Environics Focus Canada, 63 surveys between 1985 and 2012:

1. Dependent variable: Here are some constitutional options that have been proposed for Quebec. Which one do you think would be best for Quebec?
   (a) Present status in Canada
   (b) Special status
   (c) Sovereignty-association
   (d) Independence
   (e) DK/NA
2. Which language do you, yourself, usually speak at home?
   (a) English
   (b) French
   (c) Other (specify)
   (d) Refusal
3. Age: What is your exact age? and In what year were you born?
4. Level of education: How many years of schooling have you completed?[15]
5. Level of education: What is the highest level of education you have reached?
   (a) Some elementary
   (b) Completed elementary
   (c) Some high school
   (d) Completed high school
   (e) Community college/vocational/trade/commercial/CEGEP
   (f) Some university
   (g) Completed university
   (h) Post-graduate university/professional school
   (i) DK/NA

[15]The question is only used in 1985.

6. Income level: Which number on this card best corresponds to the total annual income, before taxes, of all members of your household? [Different categories depending on years.]

7. Union affiliation: Do you, or does anyone in your household belong to a labour union?

   (a) Respondent belongs to union

   (b) Other household member belongs to union

   (c) No one belongs to union

   (d) DK/NA/Refusal

Post-electoral Léger survey, 2014:

1. Dependent variable: And if a referendum were held that asked you to choose among the three following options, would you vote for...

   (a) Signing the 1982 Constitution

   (b) More powers for Quebec

   (c) Independence

   (d) I don't know

   (e) I prefer not to answer

2. Which language do you speak most often at home?

   (a) English

   (b) French

   (c) (14 other choices)

   (d) Other

   (e) Don't know

   (f) I prefer not to answer

3. Age: In what year were you born?

4. Income level: Among the following categories, which one best reflects the total income, before taxes, of all the members of your household in 2013?

   (a) Less than $8,000

   (b) $8000 - $15,999

   (c) $16,000 - $23,999

(d) $24,000 - $39,999

(e) $40,000 - $55,999

(f) $56,000 - $71,999

(g) $72,000 - $87,999

(h) $88,000 - $103,999

(i) $104,000 or more

(j) I prefer not to answer

5. Level of education: What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

(a) No schooling

(b) Some elementary schooling

(c) Completed elementary school

(d) Some secondary school

(e) Completed secondary school

(f) Some CEGEP

(g) Completed CEGEP

(h) Post-secondary/further education, not higher education

(i) Some higher education

(j) Undergraduate degree

(k) Postgraduate degree

(l) I prefer not to answer

6. Union affiliation: Do you or anyone in your household belong to a union?

(a) Yes

(b) No

(c) I prefer not to answer

Appendix 3: Codebook

sv: 1=prefers sovereignty, else=0

rf: 1=prefers renewed federalism, else=0

sq: 1=prefers the status quo, else=0

male: 1=man, 0=woman

exage: exact age, continuous

gene: 1=born in 1944 and before, 2=born between 1945-1964, 3=born between 1965-1979, 4=born in 1980 and after

educ: 1=elementary, 2=high school, 3=high school diploma, 4=cegep or equivalent, 5=university or more

unaff: 1=person or family member belongs to a union, 0=no-one belongs to a union

inc4: income level, 4 quartiles

surveyID: survey number (xth survey=10x)

year: survey year

Appendix 4: Regression tables

Models 1 and 2

Table 2: 1985 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00729	
	(0.00436)	
Education	0.0546	0.0448
	(0.0685)	(0.0681)
Income	-0.159*	-0.153*
	(0.0684)	(0.0686)
Un. affil.	0.255	0.263
	(0.144)	(0.143)
Gender	-0.0347	-0.0397
	(0.128)	(0.128)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.310*
		(0.147)
Gen. X		0.190
		(0.273)
_cons	-0.0495	-0.506*
	(0.326)	(0.187)
N	436	436

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 3: 1986 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00724	
	(0.00452)	
Education	0.00580	0.0194
	(0.0553)	(0.0555)
Income	-0.0778	-0.0673
	(0.0750)	(0.0755)
Un. affil.	-0.00652	0.0129
	(0.142)	(0.142)
Gender	0.307*	0.302*
	(0.131)	(0.131)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.108
		(0.150)
Gen. X		0.230
		(0.227)
_cons	-0.260	-0.700*
	(0.322)	(0.190)
N	436	436

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 4: 1989 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0159*	
	(0.00414)	
Education	-0.0224	-0.0125
	(0.0526)	(0.0522)
Income	-0.0626	-0.0560
	(0.0663)	(0.0666)
Un. affil.	0.148	0.185
	(0.143)	(0.142)
Gender	0.275*	0.274*
	(0.131)	(0.131)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.638*
		(0.149)
Gen. X		0.312
		(0.192)
_cons	0.540	-0.515*
	(0.297)	(0.192)
N	389	389

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 5: 1990 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00920*	
	(0.00416)	
Education	0.0825	0.0853
	(0.0551)	(0.0553)
Income	-0.0782	-0.0824
	(0.0709)	(0.0715)
Un. affil.	0.563*	0.562*
	(0.146)	(0.147)
Gender	0.164	0.177
	(0.133)	(0.134)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.479*
		(0.155)
Gen. X		0.302
		(0.193)
_cons	0.473	-0.174
	(0.318)	(0.189)
N	405	405

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 6: 1990 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00611	
	(0.00426)	
Education	0.0623	0.0618
	(0.0557)	(0.0559)
Income	-0.0240	-0.0215
	(0.0743)	(0.0742)
Un. affil.	0.247	0.247
	(0.157)	(0.158)
Gender	0.185	0.189
	(0.135)	(0.134)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.195
		(0.164)
Gen. X		0.249
		(0.198)
_cons	0.334	-0.0625
	(0.336)	(0.197)
N	383	383

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 7: 1991 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00729	
	(0.00488)	
Education	0.134*	0.146*
	(0.0596)	(0.0603)
Income	0.00580	-0.00653
	(0.0762)	(0.0766)
Un. affil.	0.268	0.261
	(0.163)	(0.163)
Gender	0.295*	0.314*
	(0.146)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.435*
		(0.176)
Gen. X		0.130
		(0.212)
_cons	0.180	-0.338
	(0.367)	(0.219)
N	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 8: 1991 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0180*	
	(0.00465)	
Education	-0.0144	0.0175
	(0.0589)	(0.0575)
Income	-0.00945	-0.0132
	(0.0685)	(0.0684)
Un. affil.	0.162	0.196
	(0.154)	(0.154)
Gender	0.291*	0.276*
	(0.137)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.416*
		(0.164)
Gen. X		0.507*
		(0.195)
_cons	1.092*	-0.0366
	(0.329)	(0.207)
N	387	387

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 9: 1991 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0160*	
	(0.00451)	
Education	0.0946	0.0962
	(0.0602)	(0.0603)
Income	-0.127	-0.130
	(0.0681)	(0.0686)
Un. affil.	0.0714	0.0584
	(0.148)	(0.149)
Gender	0.203	0.222
	(0.135)	(0.138)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.687*
		(0.163)
Gen. X		0.489*
		(0.198)
_cons	0.878*	-0.182
	(0.335)	(0.202)
N	379	379

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 10: 1991 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0157*	
	(0.00438)	
Education	0.0799	0.0791
	(0.0562)	(0.0566)
Income	-0.105	-0.0974
	(0.0720)	(0.0732)
Un. affil.	0.198	0.213
	(0.149)	(0.149)
Gender	-0.0894	-0.0823
	(0.137)	(0.137)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.519*
		(0.164)
Gen. X		0.594*
		(0.192)
_cons	1.001*	-0.0238
	(0.328)	(0.212)
N	376	376

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 11: 1992 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00927	
	(0.00506)	
Education	0.136*	0.140*
	(0.0671)	(0.0676)
Income	-0.133	-0.136
	(0.0721)	(0.0733)
Un. affil.	0.402*	0.404*
	(0.165)	(0.165)
Gender	0.545*	0.564*
	(0.151)	(0.152)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.342*
		(0.174)
Gen. X		0.300
		(0.221)
_cons	0.374	-0.246
	(0.370)	(0.233)
N	340	340

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 12: 1992 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00377	
	(0.00470)	
Education	0.0508	0.0441
	(0.0632)	(0.0631)
Income	0.0420	0.0368
	(0.0701)	(0.0707)
Un. affil.	0.342*	0.348*
	(0.152)	(0.151)
Gender	0.113	0.116
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.216
		(0.167)
Gen. X		0.191
		(0.203)
_cons	0.0986	-0.168
	(0.345)	(0.210)
N	358	358

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 13: 1992 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0149*	
	(0.00450)	
Education	0.0916	0.103
	(0.0624)	(0.0632)
Income	-0.105	-0.135
	(0.0685)	(0.0698)
Un. affil.	0.335*	0.393*
	(0.168)	(0.167)
Gender	0.224	0.220
	(0.143)	(0.143)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.594*
		(0.174)
Gen. X		0.304
		(0.193)
_cons	0.846*	-0.0762
	(0.340)	(0.222)
N	361	361

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 14: 1992 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0154*	
	(0.00447)	
Education	0.0204	0.0335
	(0.0555)	(0.0549)
Income	-0.0369	-0.0439
	(0.0638)	(0.0639)
Un. affil.	-0.0396	-0.0410
	(0.152)	(0.153)
Gender	0.0433	0.0515
	(0.134)	(0.134)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.507*
		(0.160)
Gen. X		0.430*
		(0.183)
_cons	0.988*	0.00696
	(0.323)	(0.218)
N	378	378

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 15: 1993 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0100*	
	(0.00445)	
Education	0.0630	0.0686
	(0.0594)	(0.0593)
Income	-0.0149	-0.0120
	(0.0696)	(0.0698)
Un. affil.	0.226	0.249
	(0.156)	(0.156)
Gender	0.0200	0.0148
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.207
		(0.167)
Gen. X		0.371
		(0.191)
_cons	0.524	-0.107
	(0.336)	(0.227)
N	353	353

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 16: 1993 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0153*	
	(0.00457)	
Education	-0.0534	-0.0582
	(0.0601)	(0.0605)
Income	-0.0754	-0.0817
	(0.0712)	(0.0713)
Un. affil.	0.152	0.136
	(0.161)	(0.163)
Gender	0.112	0.106
	(0.139)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.532*
		(0.175)
Gen. X		0.616*
		(0.200)
_cons	1.253*	0.262
	(0.343)	(0.221)
N	355	355

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 17: 1993 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0154*	
	(0.00450)	
Education	0.0261	0.0357
	(0.0591)	(0.0585)
Income	0.0128	0.0168
	(0.0703)	(0.0708)
Un. affil.	0.156	0.149
	(0.151)	(0.153)
Gender	0.246	0.239
	(0.131)	(0.131)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.435*
		(0.164)
Gen. X		0.597*
		(0.193)
_cons	0.574	-0.446*
	(0.324)	(0.204)
N	389	389

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 18: 1993 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0176*	
	(0.00466)	
Education	0.0500	0.0428
	(0.0591)	(0.0590)
Income	-0.0945	-0.0952
	(0.0663)	(0.0668)
Un. affil.	0.147	0.131
	(0.158)	(0.159)
Gender	0.121	0.0915
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.715*
		(0.168)
Gen. X		0.689*
		(0.200)
_cons	0.899*	-0.268
	(0.338)	(0.208)
N	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 19: 1994 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0167*	
	(0.00474)	
Education	0.0864	0.0885
	(0.0596)	(0.0598)
Income	-0.162*	-0.161*
	(0.0739)	(0.0749)
Un. affil.	0.313	0.253
	(0.163)	(0.167)
Gender	0.185	0.214
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.643*
		(0.173)
Gen. X		0.579*
		(0.195)
_cons	0.849*	-0.276
	(0.337)	(0.219)
N	356	356

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 20: 1994 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0167*	
	(0.00411)	
Education	0.0515	0.0545
	(0.0546)	(0.0545)
Income	-0.0412	-0.0392
	(0.0662)	(0.0667)
Un. affil.	0.0341	0.0431
	(0.148)	(0.148)
Gender	0.217	0.218
	(0.130)	(0.130)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.678*
		(0.150)
Gen. X		0.671*
		(0.181)
_cons	0.588	-0.596*
	(0.307)	(0.197)
N	398	398

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 21: 1994 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0197*	
	(0.00444)	
Education	-0.0906	-0.0605
	(0.0545)	(0.0531)
Income	0.0393	0.0307
	(0.0713)	(0.0710)
Un. affil.	0.0783	0.138
	(0.163)	(0.161)
Gender	0.317*	0.303*
	(0.137)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.434*
		(0.161)
Gen. X		0.540*
		(0.190)
_cons	0.983*	-0.285
	(0.332)	(0.210)
N	356	356

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 22: 1994 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00451	
	(0.00416)	
Education	0.119*	0.120*
	(0.0534)	(0.0537)
Income	-0.0165	-0.0339
	(0.0640)	(0.0654)
Un. affil.	0.238	0.230
	(0.156)	(0.156)
Gender	0.554*	0.576*
	(0.135)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.310
		(0.163)
Gen. X		0.130
		(0.175)
_cons	-0.348	-0.665*
	(0.310)	(0.213)
N	377	377

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 23: 1995 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0172*	
	(0.00444)	
Education	0.00355	0.0138
	(0.0602)	(0.0603)
Income	-0.0396	-0.0453
	(0.0673)	(0.0677)
Un. affil.	0.446*	0.453*
	(0.164)	(0.164)
Gender	0.168	0.177
	(0.138)	(0.138)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.646*
		(0.165)
Gen. X		0.544*
		(0.189)
_cons	0.842*	-0.338
	(0.338)	(0.219)
N	359	359

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 24: 1995 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0147*	
	(0.00474)	
Education	0.0598	0.0680
	(0.0597)	(0.0595)
Income	-0.0240	-0.0193
	(0.0717)	(0.0724)
Un. affil.	0.216	0.226
	(0.167)	(0.167)
Gender	-0.174	-0.164
	(0.140)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.382*
		(0.170)
Gen. X		0.485*
		(0.202)
_cons	0.716*	-0.259
	(0.342)	(0.219)
N	338	338

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 25: 1995 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0178*	
	(0.00475)	
Education	0.184*	0.183*
	(0.0592)	(0.0592)
Income	-0.0588	-0.0534
	(0.0697)	(0.0706)
Un. affil.	-0.0830	-0.120
	(0.172)	(0.174)
Gender	0.200	0.194
	(0.149)	(0.150)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.748*
		(0.178)
Gen. X		0.737*
		(0.207)
_cons	0.478	-0.783*
	(0.354)	(0.228)
N	318	318

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 26: 1995 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0183*	
	(0.00455)	
Education	-0.0157	-0.0235
	(0.0605)	(0.0611)
Income	0.0447	0.0575
	(0.0738)	(0.0742)
Un. affil.	0.174	0.158
	(0.166)	(0.167)
Gender	-0.00123	0.0180
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.677*
		(0.168)
Gen. X		0.630*
		(0.189)
_cons	0.983*	-0.248
	(0.326)	(0.202)
N	355	355

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 27: 1996 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0220*	
	(0.00491)	
Education	0.0334	0.0378
	(0.0618)	(0.0620)
Income	0.0244	0.00287
	(0.0721)	(0.0736)
Un. affil.	0.260	0.251
	(0.164)	(0.164)
Gender	0.00457	0.0236
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.748*
		(0.174)
Gen. X		0.817*
		(0.200)
_cons	0.847*	-0.600*
	(0.356)	(0.217)
N	355	355

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 28: 1996 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0174*	
	(0.00471)	
Education	0.0680	0.0550
	(0.0612)	(0.0619)
Income	-0.0888	-0.0866
	(0.0710)	(0.0714)
Un. affil.	0.324	0.303
	(0.169)	(0.171)
Gender	0.0983	0.0866
	(0.145)	(0.146)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.729*
		(0.178)
Gen. X		0.688*
		(0.202)
_cons	1.031*	-0.156
	(0.364)	(0.216)
N	346	346

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 29: 1996 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0198*	
	(0.00490)	
Education	0.0609	0.0653
	(0.0626)	(0.0626)
Income	-0.0379	-0.0576
	(0.0729)	(0.0756)
Un. affil.	0.0436	0.0521
	(0.156)	(0.157)
Gender	0.295*	0.316*
	(0.142)	(0.143)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.648*
		(0.179)
Gen. X		0.754*
		(0.202)
_cons	0.621	-0.694*
	(0.369)	(0.230)
N	335	335

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 30: 1997 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0184*	
	(0.00504)	
Education	0.0203	0.0267
	(0.0648)	(0.0643)
Income	-0.0197	-0.0571
	(0.0713)	(0.0719)
Un. affil.	0.388*	0.429*
	(0.162)	(0.163)
Gender	0.264	0.313*
	(0.145)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.741*
		(0.186)
Gen. X		0.637*
		(0.205)
_cons	0.543	-0.722*
	(0.364)	(0.236)
N	319	319

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 31: 1997 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0164*	
	(0.00476)	
Education	0.134*	0.146*
	(0.0639)	(0.0638)
Income	-0.0602	-0.0787
	(0.0791)	(0.0803)
Un. affil.	0.0491	0.00721
	(0.168)	(0.173)
Gender	0.200	0.204
	(0.145)	(0.145)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.581*
		(0.191)
Gen. X		0.598*
		(0.205)
_cons	0.345	-0.781*
	(0.368)	(0.239)
N	320	320

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 32: 1997 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0150*	
	(0.00436)	
Education	0.152*	0.158*
	(0.0633)	(0.0630)
Income	-0.00610	-0.0231
	(0.0718)	(0.0728)
Un. affil.	0.0400	-0.00315
	(0.160)	(0.162)
Gender	0.0596	0.0455
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.628*
		(0.173)
Gen. X		0.571*
		(0.186)
_cons	0.277	-0.751*
	(0.330)	(0.235)
N	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 33: 1997 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0173*	
	(0.00446)	
Education	-0.0327	-0.0184
	(0.0583)	(0.0577)
Income	0.00687	-0.00877
	(0.0643)	(0.0638)
Un. affil.	0.0623	0.0665
	(0.158)	(0.159)
Gender	0.143	0.155
	(0.130)	(0.130)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.422*
		(0.169)
Gen. X		0.623*
		(0.182)
_cons	0.928*	-0.202
	(0.320)	(0.208)
N	394	394

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 34: 1998 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0137*	
	(0.00430)	
Education	0.0856	0.0957
	(0.0587)	(0.0588)
Income	-0.113	-0.128
	(0.0686)	(0.0698)
Un. affil.	0.0738	0.0506
	(0.174)	(0.175)
Gender	0.295*	0.290*
	(0.136)	(0.137)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.469*
		(0.174)
Gen. X		0.594*
		(0.193)
Millennials		0
		(.)
_cons	0.477	-0.507*
	(0.329)	(0.212)
N	356	352

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 35: 1998 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00808	
	(0.00437)	
Education	0.128*	0.140*
	(0.0585)	(0.0576)
Income	0.00718	-0.00842
	(0.0687)	(0.0699)
Un. affil.	-0.0315	-0.0508
	(0.156)	(0.160)
Gender	0.176	0.195
	(0.134)	(0.135)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.290
		(0.180)
Gen. X		0.219
		(0.193)
Millennials		0.536
		(0.453)
_cons	-0.131	-0.690*
	(0.345)	(0.221)
N	359	359

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 36: 1998 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0260*	
	(0.00452)	
Education	0.0369	0.0539
	(0.0591)	(0.0588)
Income	0.114	0.105
	(0.0763)	(0.0766)
Un. affil.	-0.0761	-0.0550
	(0.167)	(0.168)
Gender	-0.0669	-0.0659
	(0.139)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.776*
		(0.180)
Gen. X		1.043*
		(0.193)
Millennials		0.322
		(0.586)
_cons	0.865*	-0.949*
	(0.329)	(0.242)
N	357	357

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 37: 1998 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0215*	
	(0.00455)	
Education	0.0835	0.102
	(0.0638)	(0.0633)
Income	-0.0571	-0.0742
	(0.0749)	(0.0750)
Un. affil.	0.0444	0.0755
	(0.157)	(0.159)
Gender	0.190	0.206
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.485*
		(0.175)
Gen. X		0.794*
		(0.190)
Millennials		0.608
		(0.496)
_cons	0.683*	-0.729*
	(0.334)	(0.237)
N	358	358

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 38: 1999 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0161*	
	(0.00460)	
Education	0.0960	0.112*
	(0.0561)	(0.0562)
Income	-0.0184	-0.0130
	(0.0680)	(0.0679)
Un. affil.	-0.127	-0.119
	(0.160)	(0.162)
Gender	0.200	0.209
	(0.135)	(0.134)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.367*
		(0.178)
Gen. X		0.477*
		(0.192)
Millennials		0.584
		(0.402)
_cons	0.563	-0.529*
	(0.343)	(0.209)
N	366	366

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 39: 1999 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0175*	
	(0.00460)	
Education	0.00986	0.0346
	(0.0625)	(0.0617)
Income	0.115	0.109
	(0.0828)	(0.0829)
Un. affil.	-0.0774	-0.0915
	(0.169)	(0.171)
Gender	0.116	0.137
	(0.145)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.500*
		(0.189)
Gen. X		0.595*
		(0.208)
Millennials		1.272*
		(0.341)
_cons	0.255	-1.026*
	(0.328)	(0.225)
N	331	331

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 40: 1999 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0132*	
	(0.00452)	
Education	-0.0628	-0.0871
	(0.0593)	(0.0606)
Income	-0.00138	-0.00403
	(0.0686)	(0.0692)
Un. affil.	0.316*	0.221
	(0.160)	(0.165)
Gender	0.170	0.174
	(0.135)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.815*
		(0.187)
Gen. X		0.591*
		(0.195)
Millennials		0.584
		(0.432)
_cons	0.481	-0.501*
	(0.330)	(0.221)
N	364	364

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 41: 1999 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0212*	
	(0.00885)	
Education	-0.124	-0.124
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Income	-0.108	-0.103
	(0.122)	(0.122)
Un. affil.	1.148*	1.096*
	(0.466)	(0.469)
Gender	0.694*	0.680*
	(0.218)	(0.217)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.347
		(0.331)
Gen. X		0.707
		(0.370)
Millennials		0.776
		(0.838)
_cons	0.309	-0.920
	(0.736)	(0.647)
N	155	155

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 42: 2000 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00691	
	(0.00443)	
Education	-0.0502	-0.0547
	(0.0640)	(0.0647)
Income	-0.0396	-0.0596
	(0.0733)	(0.0742)
Un. affil.	0.0340	-0.0121
	(0.149)	(0.151)
Gender	0.274*	0.268
	(0.135)	(0.138)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.552*
		(0.193)
Gen. X		0.414*
		(0.207)
Millennials		0.386
		(0.309)
_cons	0.389	-0.217
	(0.352)	(0.261)
N	359	359

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 43: 2000 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00855*	
	(0.00406)	
Education	-0.0759	-0.0579
	(0.0649)	(0.0656)
Income	-0.169*	-0.170*
	(0.0728)	(0.0740)
Un. affil.	0.292	0.321*
	(0.154)	(0.155)
Gender	0.155	0.155
	(0.135)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.0892
		(0.176)
Gen. X		0.270
		(0.194)
Millennials		0.790*
		(0.292)
_cons	0.879*	0.269
	(0.344)	(0.254)
N	366	366

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 44: 2000 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00447	
	(0.00435)	
Education	0.0234	0.0280
	(0.0650)	(0.0660)
Income	-0.0224	-0.0301
	(0.0649)	(0.0656)
Un. affil.	0.241	0.207
	(0.145)	(0.147)
Gender	0.0502	0.0357
	(0.135)	(0.136)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.319
		(0.181)
Gen. X		0.229
		(0.197)
Millennials		0.633
		(0.401)
_cons	0.0534	-0.350
	(0.332)	(0.230)
N	363	363

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 45: 2000 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0198*	
	(0.00493)	
Education	0.0178	0.0520
	(0.0702)	(0.0702)
Income	-0.0458	-0.0623
	(0.0718)	(0.0733)
Un. affil.	0.0241	0.0403
	(0.149)	(0.148)
Gender	0.0862	0.0818
	(0.142)	(0.142)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.382
		(0.206)
Gen. X		0.506*
		(0.214)
Millennials		0.973*
		(0.327)
_cons	0.742	-0.562*
	(0.379)	(0.272)
N	333	333

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 46: 2001 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0117*	
	(0.00455)	
Education	0.0625	0.0636
	(0.0641)	(0.0648)
Income	-0.184*	-0.205*
	(0.0652)	(0.0659)
Un. affil.	0.415*	0.383*
	(0.150)	(0.152)
Gender	-0.0390	-0.0357
	(0.137)	(0.138)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.626*
		(0.200)
Gen. X		0.649*
		(0.212)
Millennials		0.777*
		(0.278)
_cons	0.612	-0.360
	(0.329)	(0.271)
N	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 47: 2001 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0124*	
	(0.00446)	
Education	0.000695	0.00145
	(0.0697)	(0.0708)
Income	-0.105	-0.106
	(0.0683)	(0.0690)
Un. affil.	0.186	0.197
	(0.148)	(0.148)
Gender	0.229	0.235
	(0.140)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.321
		(0.195)
Gen. X		0.474*
		(0.205)
Millennials		0.258
		(0.310)
_cons	0.388	-0.451
	(0.361)	(0.251)
N	356	356

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 48: 2001 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00361	
	(0.00458)	
Education	-0.0676	-0.0646
	(0.0630)	(0.0626)
Income	-0.0153	-0.00766
	(0.0653)	(0.0663)
Un. affil.	0.295*	0.310*
	(0.149)	(0.151)
Gender	0.0653	0.0623
	(0.137)	(0.137)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		-0.0135
		(0.193)
Gen. X		0.0988
		(0.204)
Millennials		0.325
		(0.290)
_cons	0.150	-0.0831
	(0.336)	(0.249)
N	349	349

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 49: 2001 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00500	
	(0.00477)	
Education	-0.0268	-0.00862
	(0.0650)	(0.0675)
Income	0.0628	0.0389
	(0.0625)	(0.0643)
Un. affil.	0.172	0.177
	(0.146)	(0.149)
Gender	0.0175	0.0474
	(0.140)	(0.141)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.140
		(0.209)
Gen. X		0.142
		(0.225)
Millennials		0.846*
		(0.340)
_cons	-0.00816	-0.410
	(0.365)	(0.264)
N	339	339

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 50: 2003 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00589	
	(0.00425)	
Education	0.0727	0.0765
	(0.0620)	(0.0632)
Income	-0.0444	-0.0493
	(0.0720)	(0.0724)
Un. affil.	0.236	0.219
	(0.149)	(0.150)
Gender	0.123	0.114
	(0.139)	(0.140)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.298
		(0.185)
Gen. X		0.184
		(0.211)
Millennials		0.302
		(0.237)
_cons	-0.0170	-0.474*
	(0.341)	(0.236)
N	338	338

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 51: 2003 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0101*	
	(0.00442)	
Education	0.134*	0.148*
	(0.0682)	(0.0699)
Income	-0.179*	-0.195*
	(0.0703)	(0.0708)
Un. affil.	0.310*	0.297*
	(0.146)	(0.146)
Gender	0.0114	-0.00191
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.354
		(0.189)
Gen. X		0.255
		(0.212)
Millennials		0.644*
		(0.281)
_cons	0.192	-0.553*
	(0.371)	(0.261)
N	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 52: 2005 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	0.00314	
	(0.00685)	
Education	0.0339	0.0602
	(0.0847)	(0.0859)
Income	-0.143	-0.195*
	(0.0753)	(0.0786)
Un. affil.	-0.0756	-0.0275
	(0.172)	(0.177)
Gender	0.235	0.208
	(0.172)	(0.175)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		-0.148
		(0.524)
Gen. X		-0.671
		(0.528)
Millennials		0.132
		(0.554)
_cons	0.227	0.661
	(0.449)	(0.630)
N	239	239

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 53: 2005 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.0166*	
	(0.00469)	
Education	-0.131	-0.139*
	(0.0672)	(0.0685)
Income	0.0834	0.0722
	(0.0690)	(0.0705)
Un. affil.	0.173	0.183
	(0.158)	(0.160)
Gender	-0.0439	-0.0346
	(0.142)	(0.143)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.586*
		(0.189)
Gen. X		0.667*
		(0.223)
Millennials		1.246*
		(0.297)
_cons	1.446*	0.167
	(0.403)	(0.257)
N	344	344

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 54: 2005 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00440	
	(0.00606)	
Education	-0.0412	-0.0410
	(0.0783)	(0.0787)
Income	-0.0144	-0.0160
	(0.0697)	(0.0699)
Un. affil.	0.0862	0.0667
	(0.165)	(0.167)
Gender	0.181	0.172
	(0.161)	(0.162)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.228
		(0.374)
Gen. X		0.188
		(0.378)
Millennials		0.345
		(0.390)
_cons	0.377	-0.00887
	(0.390)	(0.456)
N	256	256

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 55: 2005 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00598	
	(0.00410)	
Education	-0.0213	-0.0161
	(0.0602)	(0.0600)
Income	0.109	0.107
	(0.0635)	(0.0637)
Un. affil.	0.0868	0.0882
	(0.147)	(0.150)
Gender	-0.0417	-0.0283
	(0.134)	(0.135)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.155
		(0.181)
Gen. X		0.248
		(0.199)
Millennials		0.135
		(0.237)
_cons	0.352	-0.0936
	(0.335)	(0.240)
N	369	369

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 56: 2006 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00790	
	(0.00470)	
Education	0.0691	0.0874
	(0.0683)	(0.0689)
Income	-0.0690	-0.0586
	(0.0699)	(0.0705)
Un. affil.	0.375*	0.334*
	(0.162)	(0.167)
Gender	-0.149	-0.138
	(0.147)	(0.148)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.181
		(0.195)
Gen. X		0.0665
		(0.206)
Millennials		0.981*
		(0.325)
_cons	0.212	-0.409
	(0.379)	(0.264)
N	325	325

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 57: 2006 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00838	
	(0.00474)	
Education	0.0532	0.0417
	(0.0711)	(0.0721)
Income	-0.0212	-0.0230
	(0.0688)	(0.0690)
Un. affil.	0.245	0.212
	(0.155)	(0.157)
Gender	0.0664	0.0754
	(0.142)	(0.143)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.533*
		(0.218)
Gen. X		0.520*
		(0.243)
Millennials		0.523
		(0.276)
_cons	0.139	-0.638*
	(0.376)	(0.306)
N	322	322

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 58: 2006 3rd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00926*	
	(0.00445)	
Education	0.147*	0.165*
	(0.0684)	(0.0695)
Income	-0.0961	-0.0815
	(0.0757)	(0.0782)
Un. affil.	0.182	0.191
	(0.156)	(0.159)
Gender	0.0870	0.0581
	(0.138)	(0.139)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.387*
		(0.196)
Gen. X		0.133
		(0.223)
Millennials		0.784*
		(0.262)
_cons	0.0305	-0.794*
	(0.373)	(0.295)
N	343	343

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 59: 2006 4th quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00923*	
	(0.00460)	
Education	-0.0352	-0.0502
	(0.0647)	(0.0665)
Income	-0.0228	-0.0289
	(0.0733)	(0.0737)
Un. affil.	-0.130	-0.226
	(0.157)	(0.161)
Gender	-0.0471	0.00469
	(0.144)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.697*
		(0.202)
Gen. X		0.709*
		(0.228)
Millennials		0.433
		(0.276)
_cons	0.674	-0.222
	(0.381)	(0.283)
N	310	310

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 60: 2007 1st quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	0.00138	
	(0.00450)	
Education	-0.0401	-0.0435
	(0.0632)	(0.0635)
Income	-0.0723	-0.0796
	(0.0764)	(0.0764)
Un. affil.	0.0986	0.0639
	(0.157)	(0.159)
Gender	0.463*	0.466*
	(0.147)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.168
		(0.195)
Gen. X		0.0965
		(0.218)
Millennials		0.0792
		(0.259)
_cons	-0.118	-0.116
	(0.371)	(0.272)
N	322	322

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 61: 2007 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	0.00299	
	(0.00453)	
Education	0.0384	0.0479
	(0.0668)	(0.0677)
Income	-0.107	-0.134
	(0.0737)	(0.0753)
Un. affil.	0.0848	0.0493
	(0.156)	(0.157)
Gender	-0.0844	-0.0921
	(0.141)	(0.142)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.297
		(0.204)
Gen. X		0.0863
		(0.214)
Millennials		-0.0789
		(0.253)
_cons	-0.0684	-0.0114
	(0.366)	(0.275)
N	329	329

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 62: 2008 2nd quarter

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00332	
	(0.00486)	
Education	0.0542	0.0615
	(0.0712)	(0.0712)
Income	-0.110	-0.102
	(0.0648)	(0.0653)
Un. affil.	0.119	0.148
	(0.155)	(0.161)
Gender	0.161	0.160
	(0.147)	(0.147)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.0188
		(0.208)
Gen. X		-0.0883
		(0.229)
Millennials		0.147
		(0.267)
_cons	-0.105	-0.323
	(0.403)	(0.303)
N	306	306

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 63: 2010

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00362	
	(0.00424)	
Education	0.142*	0.142*
	(0.0694)	(0.0700)
Income	-0.0423	-0.0234
	(0.0563)	(0.0576)
Gender	-0.0237	-0.0449
	(0.131)	(0.132)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.316
		(0.223)
Gen. X		0.119
		(0.233)
Millennials		0.464
		(0.245)
_cons	-0.334	-0.768*
	(0.385)	(0.315)
N	378	378

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 64: 2012

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	0.00107	
	(0.00553)	
Education	-0.0674	-0.0641
	(0.0787)	(0.0792)
Income	-0.105	-0.113
	(0.0760)	(0.0765)
Gender	0.0376	0.0443
	(0.143)	(0.144)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.390
		(0.406)
Gen. X		0.238
		(0.403)
Millennials		0.342
		(0.407)
_cons	0.331	0.0700
	(0.418)	(0.474)
N	318	318

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 65: 2014

	Model 1	Model 2
sv		
Age	-0.00215	
	(0.00290)	
Education	0.0841	0.0927
	(0.0497)	(0.0502)
Income	-0.119*	-0.131*
	(0.0448)	(0.0455)
Un. affil.	0.298*	0.282*
	(0.0986)	(0.0984)
Gender	0.382*	0.367*
	(0.0924)	(0.0927)
Old. gen.		-
		(-)
Baby boomers		0.501*
		(0.180)
Gen. X		0.442*
		(0.191)
Millennials		0.408*
		(0.193)
_cons	-0.790*	-1.308*
	(0.263)	(0.266)
N	899	899

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table 66: The effect of generation on support for sovereignty

	1	2	3	4
sv				
Old. gen.	-	-0.496*	-0.510*	-0.604*
	(-)	(0.0260)	(0.0274)	(0.0511)
Baby boomers	0.496*	-	-0.0139	-0.108*
	(0.0260)	(-)	(0.0177)	(0.0500)
Gen. X	0.510*	0.0139	-	-0.0942
	(0.0274)	(0.0177)	(-)	(0.0482)
Millenials	0.604*	0.108*	0.0942	-
	(0.0511)	(0.0500)	(0.0482)	(-)
_cons	-0.754*	-0.257*	-0.243*	-0.149*
	(0.0141)	(0.0120)	(0.0174)	(0.0486)
N	26327	26327	26327	26327

Standard errors in parentheses

SurveyID is used as a control variable (1985 3rd quarter=REF)

* $p < 0.05$

Model 3

Table 67: The effect of age and generation on support for sovereignty

	Model 3
sv	
Age	-0.0158*
	(0.00203)
Great gen.	-
	(-)
Baby boomers	-0.245
	(0.134)
Gen. X	0.0227
	(0.137)
Millennials	0.0610
	(0.255)
Great gen.*Age	-
	(-)
Baby boomers*Age	0.00900*
	(0.00240)
Gen. X*Age	-0.00410
	(0.00356)
Millennials*Age	-0.00968
	(0.00919)
_cons	0.168
	(0.119)
N	26327

Standard errors in parentheses

SurveyID is used as a control variable (1985 3rd quarter=REF)

* $p < 0.05$

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