Abstract(s)
Sweatshop labour is sometimes defended from critics by arguments that stress the
voluntariness of the worker’s choice, and the fact that sweatshops provide a source of
income where no other similar source exists. The idea is if it is exploitation—as their
opponents charge—it is mutually beneficial and consensual exploitation. This defence
appeals to the non-worseness claim (NWC), which says that if exploitation is better for the
exploited party than neglect, it cannot be seriously wrong. The NWC renders otherwise
exploitative—and therefore morally wrong—transactions permissible, making the exploitation of the global poor a justifiable path to development. In this paper, I argue that
the use of NWC for the case of sweatshops is misleading. After reviewing and strengthening
the exploitation claims made concerning sweatshops, most importantly by refuting certain
allegations that a micro-unfairness account of exploitation cannot evaluate sweatshop labour as exploitative, I then argue that even if this practice may seem permissible due to benefits otherwise unavailable to the global poor, there remains a duty to address the background conditions that make this form of wrong-doing possible, which the NWC cannot accommodate. I argue that the NWC denies this by unreasonably limiting its scope and is
therefore incomplete, and ultimately unconvincing.