Oligarchies in Spatial Environments
dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | |
dc.contributor.author | Storcken, Ton | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-01T18:58:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-02-01T18:58:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2141 | |
dc.format.extent | 323356 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.title | Oligarchies in Spatial Environments | en |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | In spatial environments we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Individual preferences measure distances between alternatives according to the Lp-norm (for a fixed p => 1). When the policy space is multi-dimensional and the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex, any quasi-transitive welfare function must be oligarchic. As a corollary we obtain that for transitive welfare functions weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex. | en |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
dcterms.language | eng | en |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 2007-08 |
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