L'éthique et sa place dans la nature
dc.contributor.advisor | Tappolet, Christine | |
dc.contributor.author | Dishaw, Samuel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-11-14T16:51:11Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | fr |
dc.date.available | 2016-11-14T16:51:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-09-28 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-09 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/16195 | |
dc.subject | Non-naturalisme moral | fr |
dc.subject | Naturalisme moral | fr |
dc.subject | Propriétés morales | fr |
dc.subject | Métaphysique des raisons | fr |
dc.subject | Argument de la question ouverte | fr |
dc.subject | G.E. Moore | fr |
dc.subject | David Enoch | fr |
dc.subject | Just-too-different intuition | fr |
dc.subject | Derek Parfit | fr |
dc.subject | Intuition normative | fr |
dc.subject | J.L. Mackie | fr |
dc.subject | Motivation morale | fr |
dc.subject | Thomas Scanlon | fr |
dc.subject | Is-ought gap | fr |
dc.subject | Moral naturalism | fr |
dc.subject | Moral non-naturalism | fr |
dc.subject | Moral properties | fr |
dc.subject | Metaphysics of reasons | fr |
dc.subject | Open question argument | fr |
dc.subject | Normative intuition | fr |
dc.subject | Moral motivation | fr |
dc.subject.other | Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422) | fr |
dc.title | L'éthique et sa place dans la nature | fr |
dc.type | Thèse ou mémoire / Thesis or Dissertation | |
etd.degree.discipline | Philosophie | fr |
etd.degree.grantor | Université de Montréal | fr |
etd.degree.level | Maîtrise / Master's | fr |
etd.degree.name | M.A. | fr |
dcterms.abstract | Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel. | fr |
dcterms.abstract | One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains. | fr |
dcterms.language | fra | fr |
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