Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study
dc.contributor.author | Sprumont, Yves | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-06-20T17:37:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-06-20T17:37:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-06 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/13942 | |
dc.publisher | Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques. | fr |
dc.subject | Social choice under uncertainty | fr |
dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | fr |
dc.subject | Subjective expected utility | fr |
dc.title | Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study | fr |
dc.type | Article | fr |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de sciences économiques | |
dcterms.abstract | We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case. | fr |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:0709-9231 | |
dcterms.language | eng | fr |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Cahier de recherche | |
oaire.citationIssue | 2016-06 |
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