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dc.contributor.authorBeaulac, Stéphane
dc.contributor.authorCôté, Pierre-André
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-31T14:11:55Z
dc.date.available2007-05-31T14:11:55Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1866/1352
dc.format.extent456914 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherLes Éditions Thémisen
dc.subjectlegislation
dc.subjectstatutory interpretation
dc.subjectElmer Driedger
dc.subjectmodern principle of statutory interpretation
dc.subjectSupreme Court of Canada
dc.subjectfonctions of interpretative arguments
dc.titleDriedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimizationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.affiliationUniversité de Montréal. Faculté de droitfr
dcterms.abstractIn the last 20 years, Elmer Driedger’s “modern principle” has emerged as THE expression of the Supreme Court of Canada’s preferred approach to statutory interpretation. The authors examine this fundamental development in Canadian law, including the variable relations between Driedger’s quote and the Court’s use of it, the different circumstances in which the principle is invoked and its influence on the caselaw of other superior courts in the country. Follows an appraisal of the impact of the “modern principle” on Canadian law. The principle is shown to serve three clearly different functions. It is used in the interpretation of statutes, it provides judges with a justification framework for interpretive decisions, and it is also instrumental in the legitimization of the judicial function in statutory interpretation. No doubt, the “modern principle” has brought about some advances in the law relating to statutory interpretation in Canada. However, the author reckon that it constitutes an over-simplified reflection of the actual practice of Canadian jurists, including judges. As a result, Driedger’s principle provides neither a valid method for interpreting statutes nor a suitable structure for the courts’ justification of interpretive decisions. One should not see in it more than a good starting point for statutory interpretation.en
dcterms.descriptionUn résumé en français est également disponibleen
dcterms.description[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : Fac. Droit - Coll. facultaire - Théories du droit]fr
dcterms.languageengen
UdeM.VersionRioxxVersion acceptée / Accepted Manuscript
oaire.citationTitleRevue juridique Thémis
oaire.citationVolume40
oaire.citationIssue1
oaire.citationStartPage131
oaire.citationEndPage172


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