dc.contributor.author | Zuniga, Didier | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-03-11T22:05:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-03-11T22:05:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.revueithaque.org/fichiers/Ithaque17/Zuniga.pdf | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1866/13277 | |
dc.publisher | Société Philosophique Ithaque | |
dc.rights | Ce texte est publié sous licence Creative Commons : Attribution – Pas d’utilisation commerciale – Partage dans les mêmes conditions 2.5 Canada. | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ca/legalcode.fr | |
dc.title | What’s wrong with Charles Taylor’s moral pluralism | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Université de Montréal. Faculté des arts et des sciences. Département de philosophie | fr |
dcterms.abstract | In political philosophy one often encounters claims on behalf of pluralism, yet there is anything but a consensus over the meaning of this fundamental concept. It is true that there is no single pluralist tradition; rather, there are different pluralist traditions within different domains of practical reason. No one would object, however, to the notion that Isaiah Berlin’s “value pluralism” is a genuine form of meta-ethical pluralism. Charles Taylor is another philosopher who is often called a pluralist, but I shall argue that this is a mistake. One of the central goals of his philosophy is that of reconciling competing aims and ends and this is incompatible with pluralism. | |
dcterms.isPartOf | urn:ISSN:1703-1001 | |
dcterms.language | eng | |
UdeM.VersionRioxx | Version publiée / Version of Record | |
oaire.citationTitle | Ithaque | |
oaire.citationVolume | 17 | |
oaire.citationStartPage | 21 | |
oaire.citationEndPage | 43 | |